Strategic Inflection Point

The Most Historically Significant and Fundamental

Change in the Character of War Is Happening Now—
While the Future Is Clouded in Mist and Uncertainty
By General Mark A. Milley

Geostrategic competition and rapidly advancing technology are driving fundamental changes to the character of war. Our opportunity
to ensure that we maintain an enduring competitive advantage is fleeting. We must modernize the Joint Force to deter our adversaries,
defend the United States, ensure future military advantage, and, if necessary, prevail in conflict. The Joint Force has taken the first step
by developing and publishing the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) and updating Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces
of the United States. The JWC is a joint, combined vision for how the U.S. military will operate across all domains. The next step is to
create a leadership structure that turns concepts into capabilities. The Joint Force must make fundamental changes now to win the next
war and, by doing so, we will deter the war from happening in the first place.

General Mark A. Milley is the 20th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

6 Forum / Strategic Inflection Point JFQ 110, 3rd Quarter 2023

 U.S. Coast Guard–manned LCVP from USS Samuel Chase disembarks troops of Company
A, 16th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, wading onto Fox Green section of Omaha Beach, early
on June 6, 1944 (U.S. Coast Guard/Robert F. Sargent); Der Wanderer über dem Nebelmeer,
by Caspar David Friedrich, oil on canvas, ca. 1817 (Hamburger Kunsthalle); Drone swarm
(Shutterstock/Chesky); Army Futures Command IVAS Concept Art, circa 2019 (U.S. Army)

paratroopers and glider infantry drifted Simultaneously, we are witnessing an

down to the coast of France. The contin- unprecedented fundamental change in
uous roar from the 88mm guns pierced the character of war, and our window of
the serenity of the night. The stream of opportunity to ensure that we maintain
lead from the German MG-42s raked an enduring competitive advantage is
the beaches of Normandy. For many closing. What we do in the next few years
American Soldiers, the taste of saltwater will set conditions for future victory or
and the sharp smell of gunpowder were defeat. The U.S. military is the most
their first experiences of combat. These effective fighting force the world has ever
brave troops answered our nation’s known, but maintaining this advantage is
call to defend freedom and democracy. not a given. There are two critical areas
The cost was tremendous. Twenty-six where the Joint Force must adapt now:
thousand Americans were killed in action
from the storming of Normandy to the
• a conceptual roadmap—a unifying
joint operational vision—that delib-
liberation of Paris. Between 1914 and
erately drives future force develop-
1945, 150 million people were slaugh-
ment and design
tered in the Great Power wars of World
War I and World War II.
• a leadership structure to turn that
vision into reality.
Since 1945, there have been several
limited and regional wars, but there has
Changing Character of War
not been another Great Power war. There
The rapid change in the character of
are many reasons for this outcome. Two
war demands a corresponding fun-
of the most important reasons are the
damental shift in our Joint Force. As
rules-based international order enforced
Carl von Clausewitz stated, the nature
by a network of allies and partners and
of war—a violent contest of wills to
the dominant capability of the U.S. mili-

W
achieve political aims—is immutable.
hen we look to the future, we tary. This order has held for almost eight
Humans will continue to impose
can see broad outlines, but the consecutive decades. Unfortunately, we
their political will on opponents with
details are clouded in fog and now see tears in the fabric of the rules-
violence. Clausewitz also tells us the
mist. Our path is rarely clear and never based international order as adversarial
nature of war involves fear, friction,
certain. Nevertheless, we must make global powers continuously challenge the
uncertainty, and chance inherent in the
choices for the future of the Joint Force. system. The time to act is now.
dynamic interaction among the govern-
We know we will not get it right, but we The U.S. military’s purpose is simple
ment, the people, and the military.
must strive to get it less wrong than the and contained in our oath to support and
However, the character of war—how,
enemy, paraphrasing the late historian defend the Constitution against all ene-
where, with what weapons, and tech-
Michael Howard.1 The new Joint War­ mies, both foreign and domestic, and to
nologies wars are fought—is changing
fighting Concept (JWC) is our guide to protect the American people and our in-
rapidly.3 For example, the last funda-
that future. It will drive our doctrine, terests. Since World War II, the strength
mental change in the character of war
organizational design, training, and of our nation and military, alongside
occurred between World War I and
ultimately warfighting itself. that of our allies and partners, has de-
World War II. Technological advance-
This is not the first time we have terred Great Power war. Freedom is not
ments fundamentally transformed the
adapted to address an uncertain future. guaranteed. As Ronald Reagan warned,
character of warfare: mechanization and
Seventy-nine years ago, on June 6, 1944, “Freedom is a fragile thing and it’s never
the use of wheeled and tracked vehicles;
ordinary Americans came from all walks more than one generation away from
widespread employment of the aircraft,
of life to enter the crucible of combat. extinction. It is not ours by way of inheri-
including development of bombers and
Over 154,000 troops from eight Allied tance; it must be fought for and defended
fighters; and proliferation of radio to
nations boarded 6,000 vessels to cross the constantly by each generation.”2
coordinate and synchronize dispersed
choppy English Channel. As the moon In 2023, the rules-based interna-
units. The way militaries conducted war-
illuminated the night sky, 24,000 Allied tional order is under intense stress.
fare—the character—shifted drastically

JFQ 110, 3rd Quarter 2023 Milley 7

and drove a change in organizational capable of constant motion, and able may be in competition and confronta-
structure, training, and leadership devel- to periodically mass effects for decisive tion, but we are not yet in conflict.
opment. The nations that capitalized on action. This operational environment will The 2022 National Security Strategy
these changes created the greatest advan- place a premium on decentralized mission (NSS) identifies the People’s Republic of
tages in battle. command. Centralized micromanaged China (PRC) as “America’s most conse-
Almost all developed nations had leadership from the top will be ineffec- quential geopolitical challenge” and its
access to these technologies—Great tive. The American homeland has almost “pacing challenge.”6 More specifically,
Britain, France, Germany, the Soviet always been a sanctuary during conflict, the National Defense Strategy (NDS)
Union, Japan, and the United States— but this will not be the case in a future states that the PRC is a revisionist power
but it was only the German Wehrmacht war. Robust space and cyber capabilities that employs state-controlled forces,
that initially optimized all three techno- allow adversaries to target critical national cyber and space operations, and eco-
logical advancements, combining them infrastructure. We cannot be sure that nomic coercion against the United States
into a way of war called Blitzkrieg that adversaries will ethically constrain emerg- and its allies and partners.7 In 2018,
allowed them to overrun Europe in just ing technologies or restrain their use of it was reported that China’s President
18 months.4 Germany eventually lost to weapons of mass destruction.5 Xi Jinping stated to the 13th National
the overwhelming industrial might of The Joint Force is actively harnessing People’s Congress in Beijing, “We are
the United States, in conjunction with these technologies, but as the Russian resolved to fight the bloody battle against
the Soviet Union and other Allies, but invasion of Ukraine has shown, technol- our enemies . . . with a strong determi-
we may not get 18 months to react to a ogy alone does not guarantee success nation to take our place in the world.”8
future enemy onslaught. in the next war. The Joint Force must China seeks to fundamentally revise the
Today, we are witnessing another adopt innovative technology; modernize system while still operating within it.
seismic change in the character of war, or divest older systems; train, organize, The world is also facing the greatest
largely driven again by technology. The and equip the warfighter in new ways; shift in economic power in well over
next conflict will be characterized by update our doctrine to be effective in 100 years. The PRC has leveraged
ubiquitous sensors with mass data collec- the operating environment; develop economic growth to invest heavily in
tion and processing ability that minimize resilient leaders who can successfully its military with the stated intention
the opportunity for military forces to conduct operations with little guidance of exceeding the capability of the U.S.
hide. Low-cost autonomous platforms, and execute the true meaning of mission military in the Western Pacific in the
coupled with commercial imagery and command; and work as a truly joint and next decade and globally by 2049.9
behavior tracking data augmented by combined team. But we are not adapting Through economic coercion, the PRC
artificial intelligence (AI) and analysis fast enough to optimize the force and is expanding its global footprint and
tools, will accelerate the ability to sense keep pace with the changing character of increasing its ability to project military
and make sense of the environment. war. We must adapt much faster than we power at range and scale. In addition, it
Inexpensive drones, loitering munitions, are doing now. is aggressively modernizing its military
and precision-guided munitions with to develop nuclear, space, cyber, land,
increasing speed, range, and accuracy will Changing Global Order sea, and air capabilities to erode the
further reduce the time it takes to close The global geopolitical situation has competitive advantages that the United
the kill web. Robotics and additive man- also changed fundamentally. During States and its allies have enjoyed for
ufacturing will change the way militaries the Cold War, there were two compet- decades. The PRC’s goal is to revise
supply and sustain their forces. Pervasive ing superpowers. After the fall of the the global international order by mid-
sensors, AI-driven weapon systems, and Berlin Wall, there was a brief so-called century and become the regional Asian
long-range precision fires will make the unipolar moment. Now, it is clear we hegemon in the next 10 years. The
fastest platforms seem slow and leave the are in a multipolar world with at least PRC is taking increasingly aggressive
most hidden formations exposed. three Great Powers—the United States, action toward those ends with a pub-
Finally, the increasing development China, and Russia—with other coun- licly unambiguous national aspiration
of space and cyber platforms and capabil- tries rapidly emerging as regional and and roadmap. This represents a real and
ities, both kinetic and nonkinetic, ensure potential global Great Powers. We can growing national security challenge for
the next war’s decisive terrain will not be say with reasonable certainty the future the United States and its allies. While
limited to the earth’s surface. In short, will be increasingly complex. Addition- the PRC is an increasingly capable
the battlefield fundamentals of see, shoot, ally, the rules-based international order strategic competitor, history is not de-
move, communicate, protect, and sus- established 80 years ago is currently terministic, and war is neither inevitable
tain are changing in fundamental ways. under tremendous strain. The United nor imminent. It is important that we
The attributes of organizations will—by States now faces two nuclear armed keep our relationship with the PRC at
necessity—be small, widely dispersed, powers. Therefore, we must do every- the level of competition and not allow
nearly autonomous and self-sustaining, thing in our power to deter conflict. We it to escalate into conflict.

8 Forum / Strategic Inflection Point JFQ 110, 3rd Quarter 2023

British “Experimental Company” participates in Project Convergence 22, Fort Irwin, California, November 4, 2022 (Courtesy British Army/
Donald C. Todd)

While the PRC is the Joint Force’s pac- materiel and training to ensure that the future operating environment. When ra-
ing challenge, Russia poses an acute threat. international order is upheld. tional adversaries view the United States
The NSS warns that Russia “poses an im- Both China and Russia threaten Asian as dominant, they realize they cannot and
mediate and ongoing threat to the regional and European geopolitical stability and should not engage in conflict with the
security order in Europe.”10 Russia is a the international order.13 The challenge is United States. Implementing a joint war-
revanchist actor seeking to return to an era likely to increase in the years ahead. fighting concept is the best preparatory
when it dominated the “Near Abroad” in action to deter adversarial actors from
a 19th- and 20th-century imperial system.11 A Unifying Joint Vision: The military aggression and preserve peace.
Furthermore, Russia employs disinforma- Joint Warfighting Concept The JWC is our roadmap to the fu-
tion, cyber, and space operations against The changing character of war and geo- ture. It is a threat-informed, operational
the United States and irregular proxy political landscape requires an interop- concept that provides an overarching
forces in multiple countries.12 erable, multidomain capable, joint and approach to how the Joint Force should
Russia’s unprovoked and illegal in- coalition force to demonstrate credible fight in a future conflict. After 4 years
vasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has integrated deterrence. To remain the of focused development, wargaming,
caused untold human suffering. Vladimir most lethal military in the world, the and experimentation, the latest version
Putin’s war of choice not only threatens Joint Force needs a unifying concept of the JWC provides a unifying vision
peace and stability on the European and a faster process to field required for the Department of Defense (DOD)
continent but is also a frontal assault on capabilities. This means we also need to guide Joint Force Development
the basic rules of the post–World War authorities and a leadership model that and Joint Force Design, drive DOD
II United Nations Charter. Ukraine has drive deliberate Joint Force Develop- investment, and inform how we work
been an independent country since 1991. ment and Joint Force Design. in concert with allies and partners. The
Russia’s war of aggression to redraw The most important thing we can JWC is nested directly under the NSS,
country borders is an existential threat to do is to deter Great Power war from NDS, and National Military Strategy
Ukraine and a direct threat to the North happening in the first place. We achieve (NMS), so it also describes how the Joint
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) deterrence by maintaining a highly ready, Force will address the top four DOD
and the rules-based international order. combat capable force in the present and priorities: defend the homeland, deter
The United States and many of its allies modernizing the U.S. military to sustain strategic attacks against the United
and partners are supporting Ukraine with dominant warfighting advantage in a States and its allies and partners, deter

JFQ 110, 3rd Quarter 2023 Milley 9

aggression while being prepared to a conventional war in Europe against The Army introduced ALB in the 1982
prevail in conflict, and ensure our future a numerically superior Soviet Union edition of Army Field Manual 100-5,
military advantage. Most importantly, and its alliances through the Warsaw Operations, and it dominated Army
it challenges the warfighter to make a Pact. After witnessing the modern design, development, and education for
fundamental shift in the way we think high-intensity conflict of the October the next decade.
about maneuvering through space and 1973 Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War, ALB served as an example of success-
time in a fast-paced, high-tech, rapidly Army planners recognized that NATO ful bottom-up efforts; however, while
changing, and exceptionally challenging and U.S. forces in Europe required ALB achieved collaborative force design
and lethal environment. new ideas of force employment.14 The and development between the Army
The JWC’s lineage traces back to subsequent ALB concept reintroduced and Air Force, it did not create neces-
the AirLand Battle (ALB) concept and the operational level of war in its theory sary jointness to overcome conflicting
doctrine developed in the 1970s and of winning decisive first battles on the visions of airpower and responsibility for
1980s. In the 1970s, the U.S. Army ground and then conducting precision long-range fires, nor did it incorporate
and NATO Allies faced the threat of air interdiction of Soviet echelons.15 significant roles for maritime forces.16

10 Forum / Strategic Inflection Point JFQ 110, 3rd Quarter 2023

Air Force Technical Sergeant patrols with Ghost Robotics Vision 60 prototype at simulated
austere base during Advanced Battle Management System exercise on Nellis Air Force Base,
Nevada, September 3, 2020 (U.S. Air Force/Cory D. Payne)

The JWC describes how the Joint Force character of war: “By 2010, we should called for the Joint Force to think differ-
will operate across not only the air and change how we conduct the most ently and act from multiple directions in
land domains but also multiple domains intense operations. Instead of relying on multiple domains concurrently, conduct
(land, sea, air, space, and cyber) and massed forces and sequential operations, integrated and independent actions,
systems. The JWC also provides Joint we will achieve massed effects in other project and sustain the force, act directly
Force Design with enough flexibility ways.”17 Key terms included dominant on perceived key elements and processes
to drive experimentation, exercise, and maneuver, precision engagement, full- in the target system, control tempo, tran-
training of the Joint Force, while lever- dimensional protection, and focused logis- sition quickly and smoothly among the
aging Service iteration and innovation. tics.18 The main idea that emerged— various actions, manage perceptions and
This JWC is truly joint. effects-based operations—changed the expectations, and act discriminately.19 To
way we think about warfare. accomplish this, the concept demanded
Evolution of Concepts By 2005, the Capstone Concept for certain traits of the future warfighter,
In 1996, Joint Vision 2010 claimed Joint Operations (CCJO) 2.0 recognized including networked, interoperable, re-
technology trends would change the “dominance” may not be assured, so it silient, agile, and lethal.20

JFQ 110, 3rd Quarter 2023 Milley 11

 In 2012, the Capstone Concept tary Services across all warfighting teamwork, and extreme resiliency in
for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 domains, enabling them to function the face of intense hardship and con-
recognized “the conventions by which as a unified force. This type of inte- tinuous isolation. Future warfighting
wars are fought are no longer as settled gration involves synchronized plan- attributes must include speed, constant
as they once were. Notions of who is a ning, shared situational awareness, motion, relatively small size, lethality,
combatant and what constitutes a battle- and effective communication across and self-sustaining autonomous or
field in the digital age are rapidly shifting different Service components, fully nearly autonomous abilities. Warfight-
beyond previous norms.”21 In response, aligned and interoperable with key ers must be masters of technological
the concept proposed a new approach: allies and partners. and physical camouflage, concealment,
globally integrated operations22 with • Expanded Maneuver: The expand- and deception.
eight elements: mission command; ing operating environment means
seize, retain and exploit the initiative; the Joint Force must also practice Capability Development
global agility; partnering; flexibility in expanded maneuver. The JWC chal- While the Joint Force has naturally
establishing joint forces; cross-domain lenges the warfighter to think cre- evolved over the years to identify and
synergy; use of flexible, low-signature atively about moving through space procure capabilities through processes
capabilities; and increasingly discriminate and time, including—but not limited and forums like the Joint Requirements
to minimize unintended consequences.23 to—maneuver through land, sea, air, Oversight Council (JROC), the Joint
Similarly, the 2012 Joint Operational space, cyber, the electromagnetic Force still lacks an organizational struc-
Access Concept called for cross-domain spectrum, information space, and the ture—or a coach with the right authori-
synergy with a “more flexible integration cognitive realm.25 ties—to hold the team accountable. The
of space and cyberspace operations into • Pulsed Operations: A type of joint JWC, in and of itself, will not produce
the traditional air-sea-land battlespace all-domain operation characterized the objective Joint Force we need in the
than ever before.”24 We knew over 10 by the deliberate application of Joint future. As aspects of the JWC are vali-
years ago that a fully functioning Joint Force strength to generate or exploit dated through rigorous experimentation
Force would need to outmaneuver, our advantages over an adversary. and analysis, those pieces of the concept
outthink, and outpace malign actors by • Integrated Command, Agile must be translated into military require-
remaining agile and working as a truly Control: Seamless command and ments, both materiel and nonmateriel.
joint team. control across all domains. Effec- Moreover, they must be fully integrated
Over the past 25 years, we have tive command and control aims to across DOTMLPF-P before we achieve a
learned significant lessons. Whereas the integrate sensors, platforms, and true operational capability.26 The JROC
1996 Joint Vision 2010 called for “full decisionmaking processes to achieve is where this happens. It validates these
spectrum dominance,” we know now real-time battlespace awareness and requirements and ensures we have the
that we cannot assume dominance in any enable rapid decisionmaking. right people, equipment, training, leader
domain. Where the 2005 CCJO assumed • Global Fires: Integration of lethal development, and doctrine to deter and,
the Joint Force could move in multiple and nonlethal fires to deliver precise, if necessary, win in a future conflict.
directions in multiple domains, we now synchronized global effects across Since its establishment in 1986, the
know the Joint Force should not expect all domains and multiple areas of JROC has primarily operated through
freedom of movement. In 2012, the responsibility. a bottom-up process where combatant
CCJO: Joint Force 2020 called for mission • Information Advantage: Leveraging commands identified critical gaps in
command but lacked mention of joint advanced technologies, such as AI, their operational employment concepts
all-domain command and control. big data analytics, and cyber capabil- and the military Services sponsored re-
The JWC builds on these lessons ities, to collect, analyze, and dissem- quirements to fill those warfighter gaps.
learned. We now have a truly joint inate information rapidly, enabling Over the last 4 years, the Vice Chairman
all-domain concept. Next month, we decision superiority and action. of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in collabo-
will release Joint Publication (JP) 1, • Resilient Logistics: A system that ration with the Service vice chiefs, has
Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the allows for rapid movement of per- focused the JROC on balancing nearer
United States. This updated doctrine will sonnel, equipment, and supplies to term combatant command needs with
guide the Joint Force in how to fight in places and times of our choosing. the pressing requirement to modernize
the years ahead. the Joint Force. The JWC has been the
In addition to the tenets, the JWC
North Star to this process, providing a
also highlights individual and organi-
Key Tenets of JWC and JP 1 list of Concept Required Capabilities—
zational attributes. We need our war-
critical elements that enable concept
• Integrated, Combined Joint Force: riors, through selection and training,
execution. Moreover, in 2022, the
The concept emphasizes the need to possess the traits of agility, rapid
JROC drove alignment of capability
for seamless integration of all mili- decisionmaking, creativity, dispersed
portfolio management with Office of

12 Forum / Strategic Inflection Point JFQ 110, 3rd Quarter 2023

X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System demonstrator flies near aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush, May 14, 2013 (U.S. Navy/Erik Hildebrandt)

the Secretary of Defense integrated ac- ties, and investments to continuously and requirements generation with clear
quisition portfolios to further streamline calibrate Joint Force weight of effort priorities and direction. Unlike decades
procurement processes across DOD. between campaigning now and rapidly of failed programs like Comanche,
building warfighting advantage for the Crusader, and Future Combat Systems,
A Future-Focused future.28 It could seem like a struggle the Army is now putting the newest and
Organization for Force to balance “fight tonight” against most innovative technology in the hands
Development and Design “prepare to win tomorrow,” but it is a of Soldiers. Like AFC, a Joint Futures
The JWC and JP 1 have established false choice between current readiness organization would have the potential
a path to modernization. But these and future modernization—we must to align critical force design and devel-
alone will not achieve the fundamen- do both with the assistance of a Joint opment functions, integrate concepts
tal changes required to ensure the Futures organization. with experimentation, and synchronize
Joint Force outpaces any adversary Army Futures Command (AFC) is users to accelerate modernization and
and continues to deter aggression. In proof that a future-focused organization close capability gaps.
addition to these reforms, we need a can spark the changes required. The AFC A Joint Futures organization would
future-focused organization that can model can be replicated at the joint level. drive future Joint Force Design. It would
drive change. In the 2022 NMS, we It achieved undeniable momentum in be responsible for characterizing the
highlighted the need to balance both delivering advanced capabilities to the future joint operating environment,
modernizing the Joint Force for future warfighter faster. The Army established looking beyond the current Future Years
warfare and campaigning today in an a four-star operational commander as Defense Program. Building on the success
era of Great Power competition.27 The an authoritative senior advocate for the of the JWC and JP 1, this organization
Joint Force can strike this balance by future—combining the characterization would develop and iterate on future joint
using strategic discipline—the ruthless of the future operating environment, warfighting concepts. It would ensure
prioritization of operations, activi- concept development, experimentation, capability development is threat informed

JFQ 110, 3rd Quarter 2023 Milley 13

B-21 Raider is unveiled at public ceremony, December 2, 2022, in Palmdale, California (U.S. Air Force); Saildrone Explorer unmanned surface
vessel and guided-missile destroyer USS Delbert D. Black operate in Arabian Gulf, January 8, 2023 (U.S. Navy/Jeremy Boan)

and concept driven. This organization synchronization and integration of Conclusion

would not monopolize joint concept de- coalition design and development. Nearly 2,500 years ago, Thucydides
velopment but rather serve as a lead agency Allies and partners give the United warned, “It would be a mistake for
that is responsible for collaborating with States an asymmetric advantage over you to think that because of your city’s
the Services and combatant commands competitors. Thus, including them in present military might, or because of
to identify and help prioritize future op- force design and development allows the gains you have made, luck will
erational problems while synchronizing us to integrate and inform capability always go your way. Prudent men
development of warfighting solutions. development across nations in a way preserve their gains with a view to
This future-focused organization that reduces redundancies, leverages the uncertainty of the future and this
would prioritize joint experimentation strategic competitive advantages, makes them able to deal with disaster
to ensure joint concepts are validated and strengthens the coalition force, more intelligently when it comes.”29
through rigorous wargaming, modeling, enhancing our alliances and security We do not want disaster; we want to
simulations, and other experimentation. partnerships and, ultimately, strength- deter war, but if it comes, this Joint
This would strengthen Joint Force ening integrated deterrence. Force must be prepared to prevail.
Design through competition of ideas, le- Finally, and most importantly, we The Joint Force faces an uncertain
veraging Service, industry, and academic would designate the leader of this or- future, and the challenges are multi-
innovation efforts. It would create ganization as the senior advocate solely faceted, complex, rapidly approaching,
experimentation venues to evaluate dedicated to focus on the future joint and unrelenting—demanding compre-
innovative tactical and operational solu- operating environment, concepts, force hensive modernization of our forces,
tions to inherently joint problems. design, requirements, and doctrine. He or concepts of employment, supporting
This organization would integrate she would represent the future joint war­ technology, infrastructure, and training.
with allies and partners from the very fighter in decision forums. This leader and We are undertaking several initiatives to
beginning of force design, looking organization would maintain a persistent transform, such as the JWC, JP 1, and
to enhance not only the Joint Force focus on the fundamental evolution re- JROC revitalization, and developing a
but also the coalition force, through quired for our future Joint Force. joint organization focused solely on the

14 Forum / Strategic Inflection Point JFQ 110, 3rd Quarter 2023

 krieg Against the USSR, 1941 (Cambridge, October 2021), [Link]
MA: Belfer Center for Science and Interna- lications/reports/improving-joint-operation-
tional Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, June al-concept.
2016), [Link] 17
Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, DC: The
default/files/files/publication/Blitzkrieg%20 Joint Staff, 1996), 17, [Link]
[Link]. sti/pdfs/[Link].
5
Defense Panel Interim Panel Report: The 18
Ibid.
Future of Conflict and the New Requirements 19
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
of Defense (Arlington, VA: Special Competitive Version 2.0 (Washington, DC: Department of
Studies Project, October 2022), [Link] Defense, August 2005), 16–20, [Link]
[Link]/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/De- [Link]/sti/pdfs/[Link].
[Link]. 20
Ibid., 20.
6
National Security Strategy (Washing- 21
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations:
ton, DC: The White House, 2022), 11, Joint Force 2020 (Washington, DC: The Joint
[Link] Staff, September 10, 2012), 3, [Link]
uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administra- [Link]/Portals/59/Documents/Incoming/
[Link]. ccjo_2012.pdf.
7
2022 National Defense Strategy of the 22
Ibid., 4.
United States of America (Washington, DC: 23
Ibid.
The Joint Staff, 2022), [Link] 24
Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC)
gov/National-Defense-Strategy/. Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: Department of
8
James Griffiths, “China Ready to Fight Defense, January 17, 2012), 16, [Link]
‘Bloody Battle’ Against Enemies, Xi Says in [Link]/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/
Speech,” CNN, March 20, 2018, https:// JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf.
[Link]/2018/03/19/asia/china-xi- 25
Todd Schmidt, “The Missing Domain
jinping-speech-npc-intl/[Link]. of War: Achieving Cognitive Overmatch on
9
Edmund J. Burke et al., People’s Libera- Tomorrow’s Battlefield,” Modern War Insti-
tion Army Operational Concepts, RR-A394-1 tute, April 7, 2020, [Link]
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020), https:// missing-domain-war-achieving-cognitive-over-
[Link]/content/dam/rand/pubs/ match-tomorrows-battlefield/.
research_reports/RRA300/RRA394-1/ 26
While the official definition of DOTM-
RAND_RRA394-[Link]. See also Xi Jinping, LPF-P comes from the Joint Capabilities Inte-
“Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a gration and Development System Manual, the
future, unencumbered by current crises Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects Defense Acquisition University defines DOTM-
and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism LPF-P as Doctrine: the way we fight (for exam-
and near-term constraints. with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” ple, emphasizing maneuver warfare, combined
I leave my post as the Chairman of speech delivered at 19th National Congress of air-ground campaigns); Organization: how we
the Joint Chiefs of Staff this fall, and the Communist Party of China on October 18, organize to fight (divisions, air wings, Marine
after nearly 44 years of military service, 2017, Xinhua, November 3, 2017, http:// Air-Ground Task Forces); Training: how we
I am confident that we will remain the [Link]/english/download/ prepare to fight tactically (basic training to
Xi_Jinping’s_report_at_19th_CPC_Nation- advanced individual training, unit training,
most lethal, resilient, and capable force
al_Congress.pdf. joint exercises); Materiel: all the “stuff” neces-
the world has ever seen, but we need to 10
Ibid. sary to equip our forces that does not require a
fundamentally change the way we do 11
Gerard Toal, Near Abroad: Putin, the new development effort (weapons, spares, test
business, and we need to do it now. JFQ West, and the Contest Over Ukraine and the sets that are off the shelf both commercially
Caucasus (New York: Oxford University Press, and within the government); Leadership and
2017). education: how we prepare our leaders to lead
12
Defense Panel Interim Panel Report. the fight (squad leader to four-star officer, pro-
Notes 13
National Military Strategy 2022: fessional development); Personnel: availability
Strategic Discipline (Washington, DC: The of qualified people for peacetime, wartime, and
1
Michael Howard and A.J. Wilson, Joint Staff, 2022), [Link] various contingency operations; Facilities: real
“Military Science in the Age of Peace,” RUSI tals/36/NMS%202022%20_%[Link]. property, installations, and industrial facilities
Journal 119, no. 1 (March 1974), 4. 14
Boyd L. Dastrup, Modernizing the (government-owned ammunition produc-
2
Ronald Reagan, “January 5, 1967: King of Battle: 1973–1991 (Fort Sill, OK: tion facilities); Policy: DOD, interagency, or
Inaugural Address (Public Ceremony),” U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School, international policy that impacts the other
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and 2003), [Link] seven nonmateriel elements,” [Link]
Museum, [Link] books/069/69-5-1/cmhPub_69-[Link]. [Link]/acquipedia/pages/ArticleContent.
archives/speech/january-5-1967-inaugural-ad- 15
Leon H. Rios, The Linkage of the aspx?itemid=457.
dress-public-ceremony. Strategic and Operational Levels of War (Fort 27
National Military Strategy 2022.
3
Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers, eds., Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military 28
Ibid.
The Changing Character of War (Oxford: Ox- Studies, 1986), [Link] 29
Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War,
ford University Press, 2011); Carl von Clause- pdfs/[Link]. trans. Walter Blanco, ed. Walter Blanco and
witz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard 16
Paul Benfield and Greg Grant, Improving Jennifer Tolbert Roberts (New York: W.W.
and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton Universi- Joint Operational Concept Development Within Norton & Company, 1998), book 4, 151.
ty Press, 1976), book 1, chapter 1, 88–89. the U.S. Department of Defense (Washington,
4
Andrei A. Kokoshin, The German Blitz- DC: Center for a New American Security,

JFQ 110, 3rd Quarter 2023 Milley 15