4R

33RD CHRISTOF HEYNS AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS MOOT COURT COMPETITION

UNIVERSITY OF RWANDA

22 – 27 JULY 2024

KIGALI, RWANDA

THE AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS

IN THE MATTER BETWEEN

HUMAN RIGHT FIRST

AND

THE STATE OF RANTANIA

MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT

 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACHPR African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights

ACRWC African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child

ILO International Labour Organization

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

ICESCR The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural

Rights

ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

UN ECOSOC The United Nations Economic and Social Council

AFRICAN CHARTER African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights

UNCRC United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child

[2]
 INTERPRETATION

1. The Charter means the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

2. The Commission means the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

3. The Court means the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

4. The Protocol means the Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the

African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

[3]
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

A. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES

1. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Adopted 27 June 1981 at Nairobi,

Kenya, entered into force 21 October 1986).

2. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (Adopted 11 July 1990 at

Monrovia, Liberia, entered into force 29 November 1999).

3. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (Adopted on July 1, 1990, in

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, entered into force on November 29, 1999).

4. African Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection (Adopted on June

27, 2014, in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, entered into force on November 5, 2021).

5. AU Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance (Adopted on January 30, 2007,

in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, entered into force on February 15, 2012).

6. ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No. 169) (Adopted on June 27, 1989,

in Geneva, Switzerland, entered into force on September 5, 1991).

7. ILO Minimum Age Convention (No. 138) (Adopted on June 26, 1973, in Geneva,

Switzerland, entered into force on June 19, 1976).

8. ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (No. 182) 9Adopted on June 17, 1999, in

Geneva, Switzerland, entered into force on November 19, 2000).

9. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Adopted on December 16, 1966, in

New York, USA, entered into force on March 23, 1976).

10. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Adopted on

December 16, 1966, in New York, USA, entered into force on January 3, 1976).

11. Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human

and Peoples’ Rights (Adopted in 1998 at Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, entered into

force 2004).
[4]
12. Revised African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources

(Adopted on March 3, 2015, in Windhoek, Namibia, entered into force on July 1, 2016).

13. United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment (Adopted on December 10, 1984, in New York, USA. entered

into force on June 26, 1987).

14. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Adopted on November 20, 1989,

in New York, USA, entered into force on September 2, 1990).

B. INTERNATIONAL DECLARATIONS AND RULES

1. Rules of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Adopted 1 September 2020

at Arusha, Tanzania)

C. CASES

1. African Commission v Libya [2016] 1 AfCLR 153.

2. Beneficiaries of the late Norbert - Zongo Abdoulaye Nikiema alias Ablasse, Ernest

Zongo and Blaise IIboudo v Burkina Faso (Application No. 013/2011) [2015] AfCHPR

39 (5 June 2015).

3. Echaria v Kenya Communication 375/09 [2011] ACHPR 89 (5 November 2011).

4. Ingabire Victoiro Umuhoza v. Republic of Rwanda (2016) 1 ACLR 552.

5. Jawara v Gambia (Communication 147 of 1995; Communication 149 of 1996) [2000]

ACHPR 17 (11 May 2000).

6. Konate v Burkina Faso (Application No. 004/2013) [2013] AfCHPR 39 (4 October

2013).

[5]
7. Lohé Issa Konaté v. The Republic of Burkina Faso [2014] 1 AfCLR 314.

8. Mariam Kouma v Mali [2018] 2 AfCLR 237.

9. Norbert Zongo v Burkina Faso [2014] 1 AfCLR 219.

F. BOOKS AND OTHERS

1. Crawford J, The ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility (Cambridge 2002)

The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: The Development of Its Non-

State Communication Procedures’ (1998) 20(2) Human Rights Quarterly.

[6]
 QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The Court is respectfully invited to adjudge:

1. Whether the Court has jurisdiction and whether the case is admissible.

2. Whether the withdrawal by Rantania of its Article 34(6) declaration is invalid, in that it

violates the African Charter and other relevant human rights instruments by

undermining the vested rights of Rantanians.

3. Whether Rantania violated the African Charter and other relevant human rights

instruments by failing to ensure that the Omia people and child workers are protected

from violations committed by the MD Ltd.

4. Whether Rantania violated the African Charter and other relevant human rights

instruments by overthrowing and subsequently detaining President O’Kello.

5. Whether Rantania violated the African Charter and other relevant human rights

instruments by accessing Mr. Ditan’s data on the social media platform, The Truth, by

arresting him, and by convicting him of and sentencing him for disseminating

information likely to disturb public order.

[7]
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Reports of human rights violations surfaced under the Rantania Republican Party

(RRP), including the displacement of the Omia people by Mining for Development Ltd

(MD Ltd), though compensation was provided. Media reports about child labor at MD

Ltd were disproven by the Rantania Mining Board. In January 2023, Mr. OKello was

elected President, implemented tax reforms that led to public backlash and economic

difficulties, and was ousted in a peaceful coup by General Magui in January 2024.

General Magui administration arrested individuals inciting violence, including Mr. Ditan

of the Democratic Party. Former President OKello was placed under house arrest with

access to legal and medical services. Human Rights First (HRF), an NGO with

observer status at the Commission, filed an application with the African Court, on 22

May 2024, alleging that Rantania violated several provisions of the Charter and other

human rights instruments. Rantania ratified the Charter in 1986 and accepted the Court

jurisdiction in 2017 but announced its withdrawal from this acceptance in May 2024.

HRF sought reparations for Rantania alleged human rights violations.

[8]
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY

[1] The Respondent concedes that the Court has jurisdiction on all four merits to hear the

application. However, with regards to admissibility, all four matters are no admissible as

the HRF did not exhaust all local remedies.

MERIT A

[2] The Respondent notes that neither the Protocol nor the Charter provides for the

withdrawal of the declaration under Article 34(6) of the Protocol. The Respondent

argues it is still entitled to withdraw as a sovereign State with self-determination

MERIT B

[3] The Respondent notes its duty to protect child workers and Omia people, The

Respondent submits that Rantania has not failed to protect the Omia people and child

workers from violations committed by the MD Ltd because (i) effective investigations

were conducted and sufficient compensation was provided where appropriate and (ii)

the best interests of the child workers were duly considered.

MERIT C

[4] The Respondent submits that the overthrowing and detaining of O’Kello was

necessary and proportional.

MERIT D

[5] The Respondent submits that accessing Ditan’s data was necessary and proportional

to preserve the right to life.

[9]
 A. JURISDICTION AND ADDMISIBILITY
[1] In every jurisdiction application, Rule 49(1) gives powers to the Court to conduct a

preliminary examination of its jurisdiction in accordance with the Chater, the Protocol and

the Rules.1 whether questioned or not.2 The Court has jurisdiction to deal with all disputes

submitted to it regarding African Charter. 3 In Mariam Kouma v Mali,4 the Court noted that

its material, personal, temporal, and territorial jurisdiction is not in contention between the

Parties, therefore after taking into considerations all instances the Court had jurisdiction to

hear the matter. Rantania accord to the jurisdiction of the Court on all four bases.

(a) Material Jurisdiction

[2] Priscilla Njeri Echaria v Kenya the court held that, material jurisdiction is fulfilled once a

prima facie case has been established, i.e. the facts in the complaint indicate a violation

that has most likely occurred.5 The Courts material jurisdiction is satisfied as the applicants

are raising that the allegations relate to the violation of human rights in the African Charter,

the Protocol and other ratified by the Respondent state. 6 The Human Rights Resource

Centre revealed a number of human rights abuses, including violations of the land rights,

child labour and inadequate security measures in mining operations. The Court has

material jurisdiction because the matters submitted by HRF, call for the use and

interpretation of African Charter, and other international treaties ratified by Rantania. 7

(b) Personal Jurisdiction

1
African Court Rules 2020, rule 49(1).
2
Wanjara v Tanzania [2020] 4 AfCLR 673 [31].
3
African Court Protocol, art 3(1).
4
[2018] 2 AfCLR 237 [25].
5
Echaria v Kenya Communication 375/09 [2011] ACHPR 89 [35].
6
Mariam Kouma v Mali par [ 27(i)].
7
Facts, [3].
[10]
[3]. The Court will have personal jurisdiction in an action instituted by NGO that has

observer status before the commission and the state against whom the action is brought

has made and deposited the optional declaration as required under Article 34(6) of the

Courts Protocol.8 The HRF, according to the given facts is NGO defending human rights in

Rantania and the region. Rantania has observer status. 9 It is evident from this reading that

the objective of the Rule 34 (6) is to prescribe the conditions under which court could hear

such cases.10 The original jurisdiction of the High Courts in Rantania includes all Human

rights matters.11 The court has personal jurisdiction.

(c) Temporal Jurisdiction

[4]. Concerning time, the jurisdiction extends to only those matters that occur after the

dates the Charter, the Protocol and the Operation Declaration under Article 34(6) of the

Protocol, came into force for the Respondent on the 2 nd day of August 2017.12 During 2022

the Mining for Development (MD) expanded its mining activities in North Region. 13 The

Human Rights Centre revealed a number of human right abuses, including violation of land

rights, child labour and inadequate security measures in mining operations, 14 after

Rantania has ratified the ACHPR.15 Therefore the Court has temporal jurisdiction.

[5]. In Kijiji Isiaga v Tanzania16 The court held that, where the alleged violation is

continuous, it will have temporal jurisdiction. An alleged violation is continuous if having

8
African Court Protocol, art 5(3).
9
Facts, [5].
10
Yogogombaye v Senegal [2009] AHRLR 315 [39].
11
Facts, [2].
12
African Commission v Kenya (Ogiek Case) [2017] 2AfCLR 9 [64].
13
Facts, [6].
14
Facts, [7].
15
Facts, [2].
16
[2018] 2 AfCLR 218 [37].
[11]
occurred earlier or it persists after the date of the African Charter, there is a clear indication

that the violation persisted after the 2017 ratification.

(d) Territorial Jurisdiction

[6]. In Konate v Burkina Faso,17 the court held that territorial jurisdiction requires that the

alleged violations occurred in the territory of the accused State. The Court would assume

territorial jurisdiction if the alleged violations occurred within the territory of the Respondent

state.18 The Rantania since all the alleged violations occurred within the North Region

where the company named MD Ltd that signed concession agreements with the Rantanian

government.19 Accordingly, the Respondent submits that the African Court has jurisdiction

to hear the application.

B. ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION

17
[2014] 1 AfCLR 314 [41].
18
Konate v Burkina Faso [2014] 1 AfCLR 314 [41].
19
Facts, [6].
[12]
[7]. Article 6(2) of the Protocol mandates the Court to rule on the admissibility of cases,

considering the provisions of Article 56 of the Charter and Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. 20

In the case of Norbert Zongo v Burkina Faso,21 the court held that an application is

inadmissible if it does not meet all the requirements in Article 56 of the African Charter.

Respondent will address them in order.

[8]. First requirement is that the authors might request anonymity, 22 according to the given

facts the case, the application is not brought by the victims themselves but by the

Applicant. Second requirements, requires that the application must be incompatible with

the Charter, the application is incompatible as it follows the requirements of Article 56. The

third requirement requires that the application must not be written in insulting or abusive

language. Requirement in 56(4) states that evidence must be more than simply on mass

media news. The three first requirements are in line with the African Charter. However, the

other requirements discussed underneath are not in contention with the requirements of

Article 56.

56(5) The Exhaustion of Local Remedies

[9]. An application is admissible if the Applicant exhaust all local remedies even ordinary

judicial remedies.23 In the case of Traore v Mali the court noted that the applications must

be filed after the exhaustion of local remedies, unless it is clear that the proceedings in

respect of such remedies are unduly prolonged.24 In the case of African Commission v

Libya the court emphasised that for this reason the application is mandatory required to

exhaust all local remedies where they are available, effective and sufficient. 25 Respondents

20
Rules of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, rule 40.
21
[2013] 1 AfCLR 197 [84].
22
African Chater, art 56(1).
23
Traore v Mali [2022] 4 AfCLR 665 [40].
24
[2022] par 38.
25
[2016] 1 AfCLR 153 [67]; Ogiek Case (n 12) [94].
[13]
submits that the Rantanian effective local remedies are available to individuals and

organisations.

Local remedies were not exhausted in the case of violation of land rights, and

inadequate security measures in mining operations.

[10]. The Applicant took the case to High Court and the Court of Appeal on behalf of the

aggrieved community, seeking compensation for the aggrieved community on 1 May

2023.26

[11]. The Respondent submits that remedies are regulated by various procedural codes

depending on the subject matter and the Applicant must have proof of the remedies.

[12]. Local remedies were exhausted in the case of the Human rights violations regarding

the employment of 15- and 18-years children in the mining activities, who are poorly

housed, fed and cared for. However, Rantania Mining Board, the government agency, are

unable to remedy these human rights violations.27

[13]. Accordingly, local remedies were exhausted, as the High Court was approached and

its decision upheld by the Court of Appeal; even other government bodies, trade unions

were approached for remedy before referring the matter to the African Court. However, the

Respondent submits that HRF did not exhaust all local remedy, since Rantania has a five-

tier court system to address all court matters.

Local Remedies are available, effective and sufficient in Rantania

26
Facts, [8].
27
Facts, [7].
[14]
[14]. In the Jawara v Gambia28 the court stated that an applicant must exhaust all local

remedies where they are available, effective and sufficient. Local remedies are available

without impediments; they are effective if they offer a prospect of success; and sufficient if

they can redress the violation.

[15]. Respondents submits that HRF did not approach the Supreme Court, Rantania’s

highest court that has supervisory jurisdiction.

[16]. The Supreme Court can hear any matter that has been decided by the Court of

Appeal, HRF had approached the High subsequently Court of Appeal which is an

extraordinary legal remedy in Rantania. It is unreasonable and unjustifiable that they did

not exhaust this remedy as it was available and effective.29

HRF failed to exhaust local remedies in the violation of Child Labour

[17]. About child labourers, the HRF even approached a national trade union, Workers’

Rights Advocates (WRA); went to ILO International labour office and Governing Body

Committee.30 Therefore, the application is inadmissible to the African Court since not all

local remedies were exhausted in terms of Article 56.

Submission with reasonable time

[18]. An Applicant is required to submit the application within reasonable time from the

date of exhausting local remedies.31 Reasonable time is assessed on a case-by-case

basis,32 and the Applicant must show cause why the application was not submitted

28
[2000] AHRLR 107 [32].
29
Facts, [2].
30
Facts, [8].
31
African Charter, art 56(6).
32
Gombert v Cote D’ivoire [2018] 2 AfCLR 270 [36].
[15]
immediately after the exhaustion of local remedies.33 HFR took the case to High Court on

behalf of Omia people, and the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the High Court on 1

May 2023 and the HRF case application was submitted to the ACHPR regarding the

violation of land rights, child labour and inadequate security measures in mining

operations a year later.34

[19]. Accordingly, the application is inadmissible in respect of submitting within reasonable

time.

33
Anthony and Kisite v Tanzania [2019] 3 AfCLR 470 [49].
34
Facts, [8] & [19].
[16]
Submissions on the merits.
A. THE WITHDRAWAL BY RANTANIA OF ITS ARTICLE 34(6) DECLARATION IS

INVALID, AS IT VIOLATES THE AFRICAN CHARTER AND OTHER RELEVANT

HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS BY UNDERMINING THE VESTED RIGHTS OF

RANTANIA.

[20]. We submit that the withdrawal by Rantania of its article 34(6) declaration is valid and

does not violate the African Charter or any other human rights instruments.

[21]. Article 34(6) of the Protocol provides that at the time of the ratification of the Protocol

or anytime thereafter, the State Party shall make a declaration accepting the competence

of the Court and the Court is not competent to receive any petition involving a State Party

which has not made such a declaration, under Article 5(3).35

[22]. The Protocol does not contain any provisions for Article 34(6) withdrawal of the

declaration. Similarly, the Charter does not contain any provisions for denunciation.

Umuhoza v Rwanda the court held that, similarly to the Respondent, Rwanda’s withdrawal

or its declaration under Article 34(6) was valid under the Protocol. 36 Accordingly, the

Respondent submits that the State is at liberty to commit themselves, in the absence of

express provisions for withdrawal in the Protocol and the Charter, according to the case

below.

[23]. State Parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to guarantee the

independence of the Courts and shall allow the establishment and improvement of

appropriate national institutions entrusted with the promotion and protection of the rights

and freedoms guaranteed by the present Charter. 37 Therefore, Rantanian withdrawal of it

declaration is not invalid as it aims to allow national institutions to manage their affairs.

35
African Charter, art 34(6).
36
[2016] 1 ACLR 552 [58].
37
African Charter, art 26.
[17]
[24]. In terms of Umuhoza v Rwanda 2014, declaration is a unilateral act, and State

sovereignty commands that states are free to commit themselves while they retain

discretion to withdraw their commitments.38 In Rwanda case the Court held that the state is

entitled to withdraw its declaration pursuant to Article 34(6) and that such withdrawal is

valid under the Protocol.

[25]. Author Dr. Mutangi argues that to understanding the rationale behind the withdrawals,

we have to focus first on the reasons for the withdrawals, as the African Courts’s decisions

are mostly regarded as inconvenient to national political interest. 39 The Respondent

accordingly submits that the withdrawal is valid as it allows it to enjoy its States

Sovereignty rights and political.40 HRF did not even consider local remedies.

[26]. The Court relied on principles of Customary International Law regarding treaty
withdrawals, particularly the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 41 A treaty which
contains no provision regarding its termination and does not provide for withdrawal, the
right of withdrawal may be implied by nature of the treaty. A declaration may be withdrawn
at any time by notification to the Secretary-General, no further communication by any state
Party shall be received after the notification of withdrawal of the declaration. 42 Rantania is
a state party in the ICCPR, therefore we submit that the withdrawal by Rantania of its
article 34(6) declaration is valid and no rights have been violated nor undermined by the
Rantanians.

B. THE FAILURE BY RANTANIA TO ENSURE THAT THE OMIA PEOPLE AND

CHILD WORKERS ARE PROTECTED FROM VIOLATIONS BY THE MD LTD

38
[2014] 1 AfCLR 003 [58].
39
Dr. Tarisai Mutangi, ‘African Court Coalition Discussion: states withdrawals from Article
34(4) of the African Court Protocol’ (2020) 1.
40
Ghaby Kodeih v Benin, AfCHPR (Order for provisional measure) 2020.
41
Hossou and Adelakoun v Republic of Berlin (2020) AfCLR 016.
42
ICCPR, art 41(2).
[18]
 VIOLATED THE AFRICAN CHARTER AND OTHER RELEVANT HUMAN RIGHTS

INSTRUMENTS

[27]. Rantania did not fail to ensure that the rights of the Omia people [I] and child

workers [II] were protected from violations by the MD Ltd. Consequently, Rantania has not

violated the Charter nor any other relevant human rights instruments.

I. RANTANIA ENSURED THAT THE OMIA PEOPLE ARE PROTECTED FROM

VIOLATIONS BY THE MD LTD

[28]. Article 1 of the African Charter obligates Members of States of the African Union

(AU) to recognise the rights, duties and freedom enshrined in the Charter. However, the

government has the responsibility for developing with the participation of indigenous

people, coordinated and systematic action to protect the rights of indigenous people and to

guarantee respect for their integrity.43 Accordingly, Rantania submits that the country's

development is necessary [1] whilst ensuring that the Omia people are properly

compensated [2]. Therefore, Rantania it did not violate the rights of the Omia people.

(1) The development of the country is necessary

[29]. Admittedly, a state individually and collectively has the duty to ensure the enjoyment

of the right to development.44 Furthermore, Rantania recognizes the right of everyone to

education.45 Rantania submits that as the Northern Region is the least developed in

Rantania,46 there was a responsibility on Rantania to increase revenue mobilisation by

allowing MD Ltd to expand its mining activities in the Omi district.47

43
ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, art 2.
44
Revised African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, art III
(2).
45
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art 12.
46
Facts, [1].
47
Facts, [6].
[19]
(2). Rantania ensured that the Omia people were compensated.

[30]. Rantania has complied with its legal duty to compensate the Omia people, 48 the High

Court ruled that the Omia people had received compensation. 49 Rantania submits further,

that relocating the Omia people from their ancestral land has improved their overall life as

they were moved from the most remote parts of Rantania to modern state-funded housing

units close to government schools.50 Hence, Rantania did not fail to protect the Omia

people from violations committed by the MD Ltd.

II. RANTANIA ENSURED THAT CHILD WORKERS ARE PROTECTED FROM

VIOLATIONS BY THE MD LTD

[31]. Rantania recognises its duty under Article 15 of the African Charter on the Rights

and Welfare of the Child and Articles 7(4) and 14(2) of the International Labour

Organisation Indigenous and Tribe Peoples Convention to protect child workers from

violations committed by MD Ltd. Rantania submits that it ensured that child workers are

protected, and the best interests of the child workers were considered [1].

(1) Rantania ensured that the best interests of the child workers were considered

[32]. It is vital to note that in terms of the ACRWC, a child is defined as a human being

below the age of 18 years. However, in terms of Article 2(3) of the ILO Minimum Age

Convention (ILOMAC), the minimum age prescribed for admission to employment shall not

be less than 15 years. Rantania submits that only children aged between 15 and 18 years

old have been employed and no child less than 15 years was employed.51

48
The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, Principles 25.
49
Facts [8].
50
Facts, [6].
51
Facts, [7].
[20]
[33]. Article 2(4) of the ILOMAC enables members whose economy and educational

facilities are insufficiently developed to go as far as admission to employment to a

minimum age of 14 years.52 Rantania submits that despite its economy and educational

faculties and educational faculties being insufficiently developed it has ensured that no

child younger than 15 years is employed. 53 Rantania has therefore noted that the best

interests of the child shall be paramount. 54 Rantania submits that it complied with Article

3.1 of ILOMAC as the children were exposed to small-scale artisanal mining and this did

not jeopardise the health, safety or morals of the children.

[34]. Therefore, Rantania did not violate the African Charter, ILOMAC or ACRWC, and

ensured that the rights of the child workers are protected

C. THE OVERTHROWING AND DETAINING OF PRESIDENT O’KELLO

[35]. Rantania did not violate the African Charter and other human rights treaties by

overthrowing President O’Kello [I] and detaining President O’Kello [II].

[Link] OVERTHROWING OF PRESIDENT O’KELLO

52
ILO Minimum Age Convention, art 2, [4].
53
ibid.
54
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, art 4.
[21]
[36]. The overthrowing of President O’Kello was necessary [1] and overthrowing President

O’Kello was justified [2].

(1) The overthrowing of President O’Kello was necessary

[37]. During President O’Kello’s tenure, corporate tax policies were introduced, leading to

rising insecurity and a stagnant economy as multinationals fled the country and citizens

lost their jobs.55 Big mining companies had lost faith in President O’Kello. Thus, Rantania

further submits that the intervention was necessary to avoid the collapse of the country’s

economy especially in the mining sector, which accounts for 20% of the national budget. 56

President O’Kello’s popularity among the population had deteriorated to such an extent

that citizens protested in the capital of the country against his policies. 57 Consequently,

Rantania acted in the best interests of the citizens of Rantania by overthrowing President

O’Kello as his removal was necessary to restore law & order, conducive environment for

investment and jobs creation.

(2) The overthrowing of President O’Kello was Justified

[38]. Rantania submits that the presidential elections lacked credibility and a challenge to

the election results was accordingly made via a petition with the highest court of the land,

however, this was unsuccessful.58 Therefore overthrowing President O’Kello was not the

first route taken by Rantania.

[39]. Therefore, considering all in [1] and [2] above, the overthrowing of President O’Kello

was justified.

II. THE DETENTION OF PRESIDENT O’KELLO

55
Facts, [11].
56
Facts, [1].
57
Facts, [13].
58
Facts, [9].
[22]
[40]. The detention of President O’Kello was justified [1].

[23]
(1) The Detention of President O’Kello at an Unknown Location was Justified

[41]. Rantania acknowledges President’s O’Kello’s right to liberty and the security of

person,59 and this right forbids the arbitrary arrest and detention of persons. However, in

Penessis v Tanzania,60 the court held that an arrest and detention of a person for a wrong

in accordance with the law is not arbitrary. President O’Kello blatantly defied his duty in

terms of Article 13 of the AU Charter 61, when he dismissed the country’s Chief of Defence

Staff and the Head of Intelligence without any reasons or consultations with the other

political leaders.62 Therefore, since President O’Kello defied the provisions, his arrest and

detention were lawful.

D. Rantania’s justified infringement on the African Charter and other human rights

instruments by accessing Mr Ditan’s data on social media platform, The Truth, by

59
African Charter, art 6.
60
[2019] 3 AfCLR 593 [108].
61
AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance [2017].
62
Facts, [13].
[24]
arresting, convicting him of and sentencing him for disseminating information likely

to disturb public order.

[42]. Rantania’s violation of the African Charter and other human rights instruments by

accessing Mr Ditan’s data on social media platform, The Truth can be justified [I] Arrest,

conviction & sentencing for disseminating information likely to disturb public order [II] are

justified.

I. Accessing Mr Ditan’s data on Social Media platform, The Truth was necessary.
[43]. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, 63 but the exercise of these rights

may be subject to restrictions provided by law or necessary. 64 No restrictions may be

placed on the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly other than the one necessary

in the interest of public order or public safety. 65 Although Mr Ditan’s posts called for

peaceful demonstrations, just two days after the posts were made the same people

who were reposting peaceful demonstrations, went as far as obstructing traffic and

destroying some property that led to public disorder.66

[44]. After all the violence that was incited by Mr Ditan’s posts, that is, when the Head

of the Criminal Investigation Department ordered the owner of The Truth to delete and

reveal the identity of The Great. 67 Rantania submits that accessing Mr Ditan’s data was

justifiable, as there was a need to enforce the law.

[45]. After all the violence that was incited by Mr Ditan’s posts that is when the Head of

Criminal Investigation Department ordered the owner of the truth to delete and reveal

63
ICCPR, art 19(1).
64
Ibid, art 19(3).
65
Ibid, art 21.
66
Facts, [14 &15].
67
Facts, [15].
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 the identity of The Great.68 The Respondent submits that accessing Mr Ditan’s data

was justifiable, as there was a need to enforce the law and end the violent protests.

[II]. The alleged violation of African Charter and other instruments by arresting,
convicting and sentencing Mr Ditan, can be justified.
[46]. Mr Ditan was arrested and charged with disseminating information likely to disturb

the public.69 Any person who disseminates information that is likely to disturb public

order commits an offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of no less than three

years and not more than five years. 70 Arresting Mr Ditan was the legitimate

enforcement of the national law.

[47]. The High Court convicted Mr Ditan for the offence mentioned above and was

subsequently sentenced to 3 years imprisonment which is prescribed by Article 30 of

Rantania’s Criminal Act.71 The sentence of Mr Ditan was fair as he is the one that

disturbed public peace. Accordingly, the arrest, conviction and sentencing of Ditan by

Rantania were lawful and did not violate the African Charter and other international

human rights instruments.

[48]. The Respondent notes that alleged videos and reports indicating that Ditan may

have been physically assaulted remain unverified.72 However, should such allegations

of police brutality or abuse of power be proven true, the Respondent will investigate

within the Rantanian’s legal system.

[49]. Accordingly, the Respondent has not violated the Charter nor any other human

rights instruments by arresting, convicting & sentencing Ditan for disseminating

information likely to disturb public order and accessing Ditans data.

68
Facts, [15].
69
Ibid.
70
Ibid.
71
Article 30 of Rantania’s Criminal Act 2010.
72
Ibid.
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III. SUBMISSIONS ON REPARATIONS

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[50]. Under International law, ‘any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to

make reparation’.73 In Article 27(1) of the Protocol, where a violation of human or people’s

right is established. The court shall grant reparations, including the payment of fair

compensation, restitution or guarantees of non-repetition.74 The Respondents submits that

no violation of the African Charter and other human rights instruments has occurred,

Rantania requests that (a) the court dismiss application on all four issues, and

subsequently Rantania is has not violated the African Charter or any other human rights

instruments; (b) the Applicant prayers for reparations be declined, (c) The Applicant is to

bear all costs incurred by the Respondent in this matter; and/or (d) Any alternative relief

the Court may deem appropriate in the circumstances.

73
Chorz’ow Factory [1928] PCIJ Series A, No. 17, p. 29; James Crawford, The ILC’s
Articles on State Responsibility (Cambridge 2002) 147.
74
Mtikila v Tanzania [2014] 1 AfCLR 72 [27].
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CONCLUSION AND PRAYERS.

[51]. Considering the foregoing submissions, HRF respectfully prays this Honourable

Court to find, adjudge and declare that:

A. The Court has jurisdiction and admissibility hear the matter.

B. The Withdrawal by Rantania of its Article 34(6) declaration Valid as it does not

violate the African Charter and other human rights instrument.

C. Rantania did not fail to protect Rantanians from violation of Rights

D. The overthrowing and detaining of President Okello was necessary.

E. Accessing Mr Ditan’s data and arresting, convicting and sentencing was lawful and

justified.

Respectfully Submitted,

Agent for Respondent, Rantania

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