Some Principles of Social Organization

Author(s): Raymond Firth

Source: The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol.
85, No. 1/2 (1955), pp. 1-18
Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland
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 Some Principles of Social Organization
Presidential
Address

RAYMOND FIRTH, F.B.A.

LAST YEAR, when I had the honour to address you for the firsttime, I took as my subject
'Social Organization and Social Change' (Firth I954). Since then it has been suggestedto me
that it will be useful to explore furthersome of the ideas involved in the notion of social
organization, and to show how they may be applied.
The air of enchantmentwhich for the last two decades has surroundedthe 'structuralist'
point of view has now begun to be dispelled. Now that this is so, the basic value of the con-
cept of social structureas an heuristictool rather than a substantial social entityhas come
to be more clearly recognized. All British social anthropologistsare structuralistsin their
use of the analytical principles developed by this method. But the rigidityand limitationsof
a simple structuralismalone have come to be more widely perceived. This has been stimu-
lated by closer examination of the concept of social [Link] has also been neces-
sitated by the complexities of the ethnographic material to which structural analysis has
been applied. A case in point here is the increasing understandingof the nature and forma-
tion of descent groups. The earlier emphasis upon the identificationof lineages of simple
formhas given way to recognitionof the wide varietyof unilineal and non-unilineal descent
arrangements allowing choice in the membership of perpetuating corporate kin groups.
Variation in residence and in land-using are seen to be closely related to descent group
affiliation,with no rigid structuralprinciple of transmissionas the sole determinant.(Percep-
tion of this trend recently induced G. P. Murdock to address an American gathering of
anthropologistson the subject of the more 'dynamic' concept of social structurewhich he
sees emerging.) It is in such more flexible connexions that I have suggested that a specific
is appropriate. The term itselfis not important,but I think
use of the term social organization
that we gain in clarityby making a distinctionfromsocial structure- which must of course
still remain as a basic concept.

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

As a general term in use by economists, sociologists and administrators,organizationhas
long had dynamic implications.' In a narrow context, organization implies a systematic
ordering of positions and duties which definesa chain of command and makes possible the
administrativeintegrationof specialized functionstowards a recognized limited goal. In a
broader context it implies diversityof the ends and activities of individuals in society, a
pattern for their co-ordination in some particular sphere, and specific integrationof them
there by processes of choice and decision into a coherent system,to yield some envisaged
result. It can be phrased again as that continuous set of operations in a field of social action

1I gave some examples of this usage in my earlieraddress (Firth 1954, pp. 8-9). See also e.g. Marshall (1922, pp. 240-
I), Cooley (1909, [Link],54); Homans (I950,
21-2, pp. Io6, 238-9); analysisby Selznick (5948) and
the veryinteresting
the usefullittlemonographby Greer (1955).

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2 RAYMOND FIRTH
whichconducesto thecontroland combinationof elementsof actionintoa systemby choice
and limitationof theirrelationsto any givenends.
There is structureat all levels; so also with [Link] the level of individual
personality thereis an organizationof the person'sbodilymovements, the co-ordination of
his muscularactivityin walkingand [Link] can affectthisby drugsor by alcohol,or
by emotionalexcitementas when in love, or in welcomingor biddingfarewellto a dear
[Link] organizationis not partofour inquiry- unlesssuch effectis partof a regular
socializedprocedure,such as respondingto an obligationto get drunkat a weddingparty,
or a [Link] anotherlevel the individualis responsiblefor his mental co-ordination.
He mustplan hisdailywork,therelationbetweenhomecaresand job requirements; he must
keephis head about his expenditure and bank balance; he shouldnothave a 'nervousbreak-
down' or a psychosomatic illnessas a relieffromhis troublesof [Link] also is
not our [Link] are concernedwiththesethingsonlywhenthe activityof organization
concernsgroup as well as individualand is consequentialforothersin a system,or when
regularity ofdecisionis perceptibleamongmanyindividuals,allowingobservation ofsequence
and [Link] speakingofsocialorganizationour aim is to extracttheregularities fromthe
social implications of the processofdecision-making and allied [Link],generaliza-
tionsshouldbe producedindicatingwhatsolutionstendto be arrivedat in specificsituations
in conformity [Link] are a long way fromachievingthisaim. But this
is the generalpositionof social anthropology in whichas yet classification and analysisare
farahead of explanationand prediction.
It is perhapshardlynecessaryto point out that in speakingof social organizationwe
are not dealingwithany isolable,concretesocial [Link] analysisrefersto a fieldofsocial
actionwhichis identified in termsofpattern-sequence. But in applyingsuchnotionsas social
organizationwe are not identifying separable thingsin the systemso much as isolating
separateelementsas [Link] otherwordswe are selectingforemphasiscertain
aspectsof social behaviour,attachingsignificance to certainqualitiesrecognizablein social
relations.
In the conceptof social structure, the qualitiesrecognizedare primarilythoseofpersis-
tence, continuity, form,and pervasivenessthroughthe social [Link] the continuityis
essentially one of [Link] is an expectationof samenessor an obligationto same-
ness,dependinguponhow theconceptis phrased.A structural principleis one whichprovides
a fixed line of social behaviour and represents the order which it manifests. The conceptof
social organizationhas a complementary It
emphasis. recognizesadaptationof behaviour
in respectofgivenends,controlofmeansin varyingcircumstances, whichare set by changes
in the externalenvironment or by the necessityto resolveconflictbetweenstructuralprin-
ciples. If structureimpliesorder,organizationimpliesa workingtowardsorder- though
not necessarily the same [Link] is an arrangement of activityin reference to the pos-
siblereciprocalmovements ofthefactorsinvolvedin [Link] organizationprinciple
also providesa standardof reference forbehaviour,but of its natureis moreflexible,to be
operatedin relationto otherprinciples.
Organizationis to be regardedas a primaryaspectof co-operation, a co-ordinationof
individualbehaviourforeconomicand social [Link] any social group,organization
involvesthe assignment of functions to differentpeople, a processknownas allocation;and
therelationofthesefunctions one to anotherand to groupends,a processknownas integra-
tion.
From different angles,then,social organizationis to be regardedas (a) adjustmentof
behaviour of individuals consequenton the selectionthey make fromamong alternative
coursesof action in referenceto theirsocial goals; (b) selectionof rolesand consequent

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 SOME PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 3
adjustmentsin termsof responsibilityand co-ordination; (c) arrangementof elementsof action
into a systemby limitationof theirsocial relationsin referenceto given ends as conceived by
the actors. These are all modes of perception of phenomena for analytical treatment,and
isolation of problems for working.
Social structureand social organization are both heuristicconcepts. Both are essential
to the handling of social material by the [Link] terms of abstract approach to
social phenomena, the conceptualization of the social framework (structure) must come
[Link] to forma knowledge of the social systemthere is still a whole sphere of activityof
which the qualityis not perceived by structuralanalysis alone. Take the efficiencyof a pro-
ductive undertaking. This is not responsive simply to the structural relations between
members of the enterprise. In the conditions of operation alternatives are open. Choices
must be made. Decisions have to be taken among these [Link] termsof a structural
key,it is apt to be thoughtthat one line of action only is the most probable or even possible in
the circumstances- that the alternativesare not real but only apparent. The effectiveness of
the undertaking 'reflects'the structureof personnel. In theory the chain of command and
the other major types of social relation between the workersare such that their behaviour
must conformto standard. Even where this does not happen the notion of informal structure
is invoked - that is, further'structural' (i.e. persistent,expected) relations are identified
between the participants, but they are understood, not overt in formal rules. It is one of
the discoveries of modern industrial analysis that such informal structuresare often the
most effectivein regulatingworkingbehaviour.' In the 'primitive'fieldthe informalstructure
and the formalstructuremay merge easily, if only because of the lack of any means such as
charts or other writtenrecords by referenceto which the formalstructurecan be maintained
and established.
But beyond this,fieldsof choice which are still less rigid are open. Our task is to expose
these, to delimit the range of alternatives; to observe the relative frequency of choice for
one rather than for another; to explain as far as possible the social factors accounting for
such choices; to examine the implications of choice on social behaviour. It is sometimes
thoughtthat this means tryingto explain social action in termsof individual action - to put
the hands of the clock back in social theoryto a pre-Durkheimianstage. This is not so. But
it does emphasise that social action is expressedthrough individual action, and that this
expression allows of alternative procedures.

EXAMPLE FROM THE ROLE OF MEDIATOR

An example which illustrateshow such individual action formsa part of social organization
is the process of use of a mediator. The use of an intermediarywhen one wishes to make a
request for an arrangement or to transmitan order is a well-known process whereby one
attempts to achieve one's ends while not assuming the full burden of responsibilityand loss
of status if one is [Link] have worked in oriental societies will
recognize how widespread is the custom of the use of such an intermediaryand how import-
ant his social functionsmay be. In some societies these functionsmay even be structuralized
- be given a specificname or be regarded as a primejob of a person fulfillinga specificrole.
He may operate at the interpersonallevel. In Samoa and to some extent in Tikopia, prac-
tically every young man has a soa, a bond friendwith whom he co-operates in many social
affairsand whom he uses in particular as his ambassador in love or in proposing marriage.
But he may operate at the inter-grouplevel. The mangi-ugud of the Kalinga, and analogous
functionariesof the Ifugao and other Philippine mountain tribes act as go-betweens in
'As Selznick (I948, p. 25) has observed,the formaladministrativedesign can never adequately or fullyreflectthe
concrete organizationtcdwhich it refers.

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4 RAYMOND FIRTH

arranging settlementsbetween kinship groups involved in dispute, as through cases of homi-

cide or wounding. In both cases the mediator is a kind of complement to the more formal
structural group frameworkof the society. His operations may even help to maintain it.
In Samoa and Tikopia he may be a kinsman but this is not relevant; he serves as an ally
outside the immediate descent group, someone whose functionscut across those of the kin-
ship structureand provide additional integrativeties. Among the Kalinga and Ifugao, who
have no clearly demarcated descent groups, the mediator may well be a kinsman too. But
here it is relevant. He should preferablybe related to both sides of the dispute, or else to
[Link] again it is his functionas an external element to the immediate units concerned
that is very important. In fields of social action of this kind there are problems of conduct
to be solved, and the solutions have ultimately to be found at the organizational, not the
structurallevel. Bond friend or mediator must initially be chosen from a range of possible
candidates; he must consent to the role required. In performinghis functionshe must con-
tinually examine issues, persuade, suggest,compromise- in other words he must makechoices
and endeavour to clarifyissues and suggestchoices. The upshot, a resolutionof the problem,
is the result of a process of organization.
In many social situations,an intermediarymay be not actual but putative - he may
be provided not by an external person but by an extrapolation, or extrajection of a part
of the actor's personality. This putative agent is assigned the responsibilityof decision and
frequentlyhas an authorityunlikelyto be exercisedby the person [Link] obvious example
of this is the use made by many primitive and other peoples of the organizing functionof
pronouncementsmade by spirit mediums in a dissociated state. I would indeed suggest that
externalizationof responsibilityis an importantfunctionof spirit possession.

SIBLING UNITY AS STRUCTURAL ABSTRACTION AND AS ORGANIZATIONAL REALITY

I have been talking so far in somewhat abstract terms- abstraction,as we have been told,
is a necessary process in anthropological thinking. But I suspect that all anthropologists
have a touch ofJames Boswell. Boswell in his own way was a superb field [Link] in his
discoursegiven beforethe LiterarySociety at Utrecht a couple of hundred years ago, he said,
'I never find myselfprouder of my existence than when I walk with my head swathed in
the solemn cloud of abstraction.' The relevant question is, of course, how far can such
abstraction take us in understandingthe workingsof a social system.
From this point of view let us take a principle commonly used to explain phenomena
in kinshipbehaviour - the principle of the solidarityand unityof the sibling group. This has
been termed a sociological principle of a pure order, of a high degree of structuralquality
(Fortes I955, p. 20).
The principle is usually stated as if it were quite clear, needing no furtherinquiry. Yet
when it is said, e.g. that the structuralprinciple of the unity of the sibling group explainsthe
levirate and sororate, what is implied?
There are at least four possibilitiesin this notion of sibling unity. The first,recognized
by Radcliffe-Brownunder the term 'solidarity',is that the internalrelationsof siblingsamong
themselves are those of co-operation, amity, and easy substitutionin relationships. The
levirate and sororate could then result fromthe wish of one sibling to take the place of the
other vis-a-visspouse and children, and fulfilthe appropriate social [Link] this is
not what is meant, as a rule, by explanation in sibling unity terms.
The second possibilityis that siblings themselvesare united in their external relations
- that whatever be their obvious personal quarrels and rifts,they stand side by side against
the social world outside. Levirate and sororate then are processes of gap-filling,not because
the new spouses wish to make a personal replacement from a feeling of emotional

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 SOME PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 5
identificationwith the dead, but because their interestsor theirfamilypride demand it. By
the external world they may not be regarded as united, but they may wish to appear so. But
this explanation also is not the one apparently implied.
The third possibility is the reverse of this. In the society at large, siblings may be
regarded as united forsocial purposes, and treated as such. Their unity may be treated as a
'given' factor, as a primary feature of familyand kinship in that particular type of society.
On this view, which is the one generally put forward as explanation, levirate and sororate
are an outcome, expression or 'reflection' of sibling unity because the jural position is
empirically assumed; the marital behaviour automatically follows. To the extent that the
unity of siblingsis a jural assumption,I would preferto speak of unification of the group.
For there is also a [Link] unity of the sibling group may be recognized
not as a jural fact but as a moral ideal. It may be openly admitted that brothersought to be
but are not solidary among themselves,and that they are not 'united' in treatmentby others.
Even if there is not a basic instability of sibling relations - which would accord with much
that we have learnt in both anthropologyand psychology- theremay well be such differences
of age that the general social position of the siblings cannot be at all easily equated. So the
jural assumption of sibling unity may not be a fact, but a fiction.A custom such as levirate
or sororate may indeed be one means of keeping up or tryingto keep up the fictionthat
siblings are united, or should be united, and ought to be treated as such. In other words,
the relation of the levirate and sororateto the principle of the unityof the sibling group could
be reversed; it could be not the outcome or evidence of this unity,but part of the process of
attemptingto maintain it.
It may be argued that all that is involved here is demonstrationof the consistencybetween
the two sets of facts, of their reciprocal interaction; that no causal relation is implied. But
then what becomes of the 'explanation'? We must be careful that we do not offera double-
headed penny - presentingthe levirate (or sororate) as both evidence for and outcome of
sibling unity. It is preferableto look on the occurrence of levirate and sororate as resultants
of a variety of social forces,of which sibling unity is only one - and that one needing to be
viewed in a sophisticated way, with alternative meanings.
For the principle of unity of the sibling group to have full use as interpretationthe
structuralprinciple must be supported by organizational analysis - concerned with allocation
of responsibility,with definitionof aims, with competing as well as with congruentinterests,
and with the effectsof multiple structuralprinciples in action together.
I have noted that the principle of the unityof the sibling group, as distinct from its
solidarity,is said to referonly to the attitude towards siblingsexhibited by the world at large.
Yet it cannot be overlookedthat lack of internalunityby siblingswithintheirown group may
lead to changes in external recognitionand action. Sibling quarrels may necessitateremedial
measures by other members of the society at large. They may involve processes of law or
quasi-law. Again, they may involve [Link] may be preciselya breach in the unity
of the sibling group internally which has a sociological effectby giving basis for the external
changes which result in the formationof new groups by segmentation.
It is convenient to speak of identification,equivalence, solidarity,unity of the sibling
group, when referringto those aspects of kinshipwhich have been called jural - a useful but
vague term to cover a mixture of law and morality in many types of obligation. But the
notions of jural relation,jural status,jural aspect, have tended at times to be regarded as
equivalent to that of obligation in general, and even apparently, to be equated with the
sphereof the strictly sociological(FortesI955, pp. 20-I). It mightbe said thatwhereverthe
notion of obligation is perceived in a kinshiprelation this of itselfmakes the relation a socio-
logical one - because the notion of obligation contains some elementof appeal to an authority

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6 RAYMOND FIRTH

outsidethe will of the [Link] the sphereof the sociologicalcon-

tainsmuch more than obligations,and jural relations;in any case manyinternalrelations
of a siblinggroupare characterizedby [Link],thereis stillthe questionhow
far the principleof siblingunityexplainsnormsof [Link] it is more than a
restatement ofthebasic factofa classificatorykinshipterminology, thenwhatdoesit explain?
The factthatsiblingsare treatedas a singleunit,or as equivalentin some social situations.
But whatdoes it not explain?It does not explainwhytheyare not so treatedin othersitua-
[Link] does not explain differential allocationof functionsand resourceson the basis of
sex difference. It does not explainthe factsof kinshipgrading - of the distinctionsmade in
behaviourtowardsdifferent kindsof people called siblings,on the basis of theirnearnessor
remotenessof [Link] does not explain a range of variant relations
towardssiblingsin thefieldofmaritalbehaviour- e.g. fraternal polyandry or sororalpolygny.
It does not normallyexplain also why the phenomenaof successiondo not occur in all
[Link] a rule do not all succeedto the officeof their
parents; normallyonly one sibling succeeds. At the time of successionthe principleof
siblingunityis not complete- siblingsare not regardedor statedas identicalby the external
[Link] this'structuralprincipleof greatimportance'mustbe givena veryhesitating
validitywhenit is actuallyapplied. A relationship to a particularpersonbecomesa relation
to his siblinggroupas a social unitin somesimilarity of behaviour;behaviourto a father's
brotheris in somerespectssimilarto thattowardsthefather;in certain circumstances a relative
may take the place of another,as in someAfricansocietiesthe place of a fatheretc. maybe
taken by his brother(Radcliffe-Brown I950, p. 26). In all this the factsof variationand
choice are basic, and consideration of its implicationson inter-personal relationshipsis part
of a sociologicalanalysis.
SUCCESSION AS AN ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEM
I want now to considerthisgeneralquestionof social organizationfurther, in the political
field,in regardto a problemof [Link] upon organizational
decisionsand actions,and to understandstructure it is necessaryalso to understandorgan-
ization.
By 'political'I mean those elementsof the social systemof primaryconcernforsocial
[Link] is sometimesdescribedas a concernwithLaw and War. This mightseem like a
[Link] the politicalis concernedalso withthe positionand
operationof the community the externalsocial [Link] the
as an entityvis-a-vis
senseofan overallcontrolofthecommunity thereis also impliedan administrative organiza-
tion withconcernforthe organizationof resources,includingpersonnel,as a whole.
From such a standpointa seriesof questionscan follow:how are the elementsof this
systemarranged- in the formof an assemblyor council,a chiefand officers, etc.? How far
do the elementsof a politicalsystemas concernedwith social order correspondto other
featuresof the social system,for instancefeaturesof kinshipand ritual? What kind of
authority is involvedin thissystemand how doesit operate?Whatis itsdefinition in termsof
powerpotentialsand actual exercise?What is the public conceptof thisauthority?(There
can be forexamplea conceptof its exerciseas a rightas by a Divine King; or as a privilege
delegatedfroma kin groupor a community of the people; or as a seizureof power.) How
faris thisauthority unified- theremaybe no singlehead, but by whatarrangement thenare
the elementsof authoritybroughttogether?Or are theynot so broughttogether?If the
authorityis delegatedexplicitlyor tacitlywhat is employedin the notionof delegation or
representation?For instanceifthereis a notionofeffective by a singleindividualor body
decision
of individuals,how far is the opinionintendedto be subsumedby the representative, or

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 SOME PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 7
exercisedindependently in the lightof circumstances? Followingfromthis,what kindsof
notionsof social responsibility are held and operated? Considerationof all this means
organizationalas well as structuralanalysis.
The assumptionof responsibility is one of the crucial elementsin organization.'By
social responsibilityis meant obligationto envisagea situationin termsof the interestof
others,of the widestgroupconcerned,and to take decisionswhichshall be conformable to
[Link] also involvesa readinessto be held accountableforthe implicationsof
thosedecisions,at leastin so faras theyare foreseen(FirthI95I, p. 3). Conversely, the indi-
vidualis representative ofothers,ofa [Link] meansdelegation. But theexerciseofa sense
is not [Link] is a matterof degree;it tendsto varyin relationto
of responsibility
the distributionof authority in a givensituation,and the natureofthe groupor relationship
[Link] anthropologist to considerare: What are the fields
i.e. in what typesof social actionis it exercisedand expected?What is its
of responsibility,
jurisdictionor rangein termsofpersonneland groups?What conflicts ofresponsibility occur
througha personoccupyingdifferent rolesin a society?(As we know,even in a lineage-
guided society,thejurisdictionof responsibility may be widerthan the lineage.)
I wantnow to examinetheoperationoftheconceptofresponsibility as an organizational
principleby reference to a body of materialdealingwithsuccessionto chieftainship.
Successionto officeis a basic social processnecessitated in the last resortby the waxing
and waningof humanphysicaland [Link] successionis a social requirement
dependentultimatelyon the situationand natureof the human [Link] society,
even the mostprimitive, has some measuresforsuccession,and some more or less clearly
formulated principlesas a guide to thosemeasuresin individualcases. In ordinaryanthro-
pologicaltermsthe mostgeneraltypeofprincipleofsuccessionis thatofthestructural order
described,forexample,by suchtermsas 'patrilineal'or 'matrilineal'.It is withinsuchgeneral
framesof referencethat successionis decided. But a patrilinealor matrilinealprincipleof
successionis not [Link] givesgenealogicalpersistence, but it does not accountforthe
actual successionof individualto individualin [Link],say, that
in a particularsocietyis invariable,selectionis requiredfromamongpatrilineal
patrilineality
kin and secondaryprinciplesare needed as guide. Some societiesadopt electionfroma
generalbody of male kin. Othersallow emergenceby [Link] the principleof
fraternalsuccessionin birthorder,othersthe principleof male primogeniture, or ultimo-
[Link] of theseprinciplesare strongand rarelyset aside, yet usuallytheyare not
invariablein the way in whichthe patrilinealprincipleis. Exerciseof authority requires,for
example,somerecognition ofresponsibility,
hencethereis a tendencyin mostsocietiesfora
witless,irresponsible, or lunaticpersonnot to be chosenas chief,althoughhis genealogical
claims qualifyhim. Moreover,in some societies,physicalfitnessin itselfis a desideratum
and in othersit is regardedas an indicationof spiritualfavour,hence the physicallyunfit
personmay be passed overin the [Link],recognition thatthe exerciseof office
may demand qualitiesofjudgementand administrative capacityas well as thoseof fitness
and responsibility, may mean that a predisposition in favourof, say primogeniture, may
be ignoredin favourof a personbetterendowedin [Link] otherwords
successionitselfis an organizationalmatterinvolvingchoice and [Link] the results
of thatdecisionin social termsmay radicallyaffectthe integration and harmoniousactivity
of the [Link] Hilda Kuper (I947, pp. 88, I04) has shownforthe Swazi, the resultsmay
have greatstructural importance;rulesforchoiceof an heirto a chiefare designedas much
to counteracttendenciesto fissionowingto personalrivalriesas to meetthespecificadminis-
trativerequirements of the community.
'See e.g. the classical analysis by P. Fauconnet (I928).

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8 RAYMOND FIRTH

But despitemuchexcellentworkon successionto chieftainshipin Africaand elsewhere,

thereare still manyquestionsto be [Link] Polynesianethnographicarea let me
take Tikopia.
A CRISIS IN TIKOPIA
In Tikopiain I929 therewerefourchiefs, one foreach oftheclans- Kafika,Tafua,Taumako,
and Fangarerein thatorderof [Link] but the ArikiTafua werepagan and
practisedelaboratereligiousrites,bothindividuallyand in concertin the 'WorkoftheGods'.
The Ariki Tafua, who had been convertedto Christianity some ten years before,had
abandoned the 'Work of the Gods' and his privatekava rites,thoughhe still threwfood
offerings and performed otherritualsto his traditionalgods and ancestors(Firth I936, pp.
5, 8; I939, pp. 77-8, I82; I940, pp. I67-8, 327).
In I952, when I revisitedTikopia, conditionswere 'normal'in the threeseniorclans.
In Kafika the formerchiefstillruled,althoughnow a veryold man. In Tafua therehad
been two changes,the eldestson havingsucceeded,and thenonly about two yearsbefore,
his son in turn(his onlymale child). In Taumako the eldestson had succeededhis father.
In bothTafua and Taumako succcessionhad been by [Link] regardsreligion,
the chiefsof Kafika and Taumako werepagan, whilethe chiefof Tafua, like his fatherand
grandfather, was a [Link] thefourthclan, Fangarere,therewas a surprising difference.
The old chiefI knewhad died,havingbeen convertedto Christianity, and in his place were
twochiefs,one Christianand one pagan.
Each case of successioninvolveda rangeof organizationalacts, and thatin Fangarere
in particularnecessitatedcomplex social [Link] I must examine the situation
briefly here,and willdiscussonlythechieftainship ofKafika,as a case ofpotentialsuccession
illustrating organizationalprinciples.
A Tikopia chiefis regardedby his clanspeoplein general,and by the membersof his
own lineagein particular,as havinga greatresponsibility [Link] so regardshim-
self,too. This area of responsibility
extendsalso overthe community as a whole- forall the
chiefsgenerally,and forthe premierchiefspecifically. But the relationhas severalfacets.
A chief'sresponsibility in thefieldofpagan religiousideas embracestherole ofintermediary
betweenhis people and the gods. The gods treathim in the Tikopia metaphoras their
'seatingmat'. This applies particularlyto the chiefof Kafika clan. If he is diseased,then
(as traditionstateshappened on one occasion) he should abdicate fromhis [Link] he is
veryold and feeble,thenthereis a possibility thathe maynot be so favouredby the gods as
a vehiclefortheirtransmission of [Link] I952 the ArikiKafikathoughin the regionof
eightyyearsold, and thoughhe had recentlyhad severalsevereillnesses,was formostof
the timehale and [Link],in the privateopinionof the people he had reignedfor
too long. Seniormen ofseriouscounseltoldme how in Kafikafamilythe old chief,toothless,
pounded his betel in a mortar;his eldestson and heir,toothlessalso, pounded his betel -
and now,theysaid, the eldestgrandsonin turnwas beginningto lose his teeth!It was time
forthe old chiefto die and hand on the successionto a youngerman. I was told thisfirst
by the ArikiTafua, who sententiously explainedto me how his own fatherPa Rangifuri,
who had succeededas chiefabout I940, had devotedhimselfto death by [Link] fell
ill (fromwhat was apparentlyinfluenza)in I95I. Plentyof food was offeredto him, but
he would not eat. Why? He lookedat his son,who had becomea man, and thoughtit was
timehe [Link]'surgingsto takenourishment, he decidedto die. Such was
the [Link] ArikiTafua then comparedthisfavourablywith the conductof the Ariki
Kafika,and said it was not good. 'My idea is thatPa Fenuatara (theheirapparent)will die
beforetheAriki,and thatthegrandsonwillsucceed'he said to me. He continued'It is good

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 SOME PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 9
fora chiefto go early, and to let a young man succeed.' Now this view could be regarded as
not [Link] ArikiTafua, succeeding as a young man, may have been rationalizing
h,isown position,and using thisas a point of contrastagainst his [Link] as a Christian
he may have been taking an opportunityto denigrate a pagan. This is quite likely. But he
was in fact also expressinga general view. Men of other clans, pagan and Christian, said
much the same thingin confidentialtalk. It was not good forthe Ariki Kafika to live so long.
It was a sign that the spiritdeities were rejectinghim. 'The deities have begun not to like the
chief; they have gone away from him. They have just left him to go on living.' Here
emerges the notion, not uncommon in Tikopia discussion about death, that death is a boon
granted by the gods to a man, since it means cessation of pain, and the pleasure of being
taken to live in their abode. In I952 the situation was complicated by the fact that though
people of Kafika clan, with the usual Tikopia foresight,had long since accumulated supplies
of perennial yams and other crops against the day of the old chief's death, they had been
forced by the food shortage afterthe hurricane to consume them all. So if he did die sud-
denly they would be in an embarrassingposition. (I did not, for obvious reasons, try to
ascertain the ideas of the Ariki Kafika himselfon all this.)
Then came a crisis. The chief's eldest grandson fell gravely ill. A message was sent to
my friendPa Fenuatara that his son was dying. When he hurried to the bedside he found
his son in convulsivemovement,with a severe pain in his lower ribs,on the rightside (possibly
a pleurisy). The Ariki Taumako and the Ariki Fangarere were laying hands on him to try
and effecta cure. Then, as is common on such occasions, the principal spiritmedium of the
clan became possessed - in this case by the spiritof the long-dead fatherof the Ariki Kafika.
The spirit discussed the illness and said that it was due to the fault of the Kafika lineage.
Pa Fenuatara asked how could this be. He had not abandoned any ritesnor shown disrespect
to the [Link] spiritanswered.'Because of your father!You have pulled him up to health.'
(Each time the old man had been ill, Pa Fenuatara had done his best to assist his recovery.)
In other words the illness of the grandson was a sign of the anger of the gods at the fact that
the old chiefstillwent on living. He would not yield up his lifethat theymighthave a younger
and more active 'seating mat'. The spirit said furtherthat Pa Fenuatara should deny his
fatherfood and drink to accelerate his death.
This put Pa Fenuatara in a terribledilemma. The occasion was one of great dramatic
intensity,with the assembled kinsfolkmourning round his sick son. To be faced by such a
spiritdemand at this time was a strongemotional strain. He met it [Link] answered
in this way. He said, 'How can I deny my fatherfood and drink? This is too much. Why
should I turn the guilt upon myself?If you press me, then I will take my son (the sick man)
and put him on a canoe and togetherhe and I will voyage out to sea.' By this he meant in
effectthat he was prepared to commit suicide rather than be unfilialand sacrificehis father.
This was a severe blow to the assembled crowd. It would have meant that they would have
lost theirmost precious leaders. The spiritmedium was undoubtedly expressingin dissociated
formwhat may be regarded as general public opinion. It was an example of the externaliza-
tion of [Link] the firmanswer of Pa Fenuatara turned the dilemma back upon
the medium. His reaction was characteristic; still in a state of possession he embraced Pa
Fenuatara's knees, pressed his nose to them in apology and muttered the conventional
formula of abasement, 'I eat ten times your excrement.' This restoredthe situation to what
may be termed [Link] more was said in public about the old chief.
A couple of days later the sick man recovered and things were as before. But after a
week or so I referredto this matterin a talk with Pa Fenuatara and he described to me what
had happened. Then after a pause he said in effect,'The spirit was right.' He went on to
explain to me how the premier god of Kafika clan, who is also in pagan belief the principal

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 IO RAYMOND FIRTH

god forthe island community as a whole,alwayswantsa relativelyyoungman as his chief.

'The expression is "The ArikiKafikabreaks(i.e. dies) whileyoung- to go to the God". But
iftheArikiKafikagrowsold enoughonlyto crawlwiththeaid ofhishands,thedeitybecomes
angry;he doesn'tlike the chief,because he has grownold. The God wisheshis seating-mat
to "break" whileyoungand go to him - such is the customof Kafika.' Pa Fenuatarahad
clearlyshared the public [Link] filialloyalty,ambition,and religiousrationalizationin
conflicthad had theirresultin public in a [Link] was a victoryalso of
[Link] it did not deny a basic religiouspremiserelatingphysicalhealthto
ritualfitness and in turnto welfare,it did assertwhatmaybe termedtheruleoflaw and the
primacyof familysentiment.'
This example illustratesthe complexoperationsof the principleof responsibility. It
showsan exercise of responsibility
by chiefsforthe people and the community;an imputation
of responsibility by the people to the chief;an externalization of responsibilityby the public
througha spiritmedium;a delegation or transferof responsibility to the chief'sheir; and an
acceptanceof it by him. The examplealso showsthe principleof moderationor expediency,
or what Nadel, I believe,has referred to as the 'principleof accommodation'.In a conflict
betweenstructuralprinciples,eitherboth manifestor one manifestand the otherlatent,it
may not be easy to predictthe [Link] thereis frequently a modification of the strict
implicationsof a structuralprinciplein favourof some measureof viable action. A person
concernedwill assume a lesserstatusor a different role than the structurewould imply.
This was illustratedin the behaviourof the [Link] enunciateda proper
courseof behaviourwithall the authoritygivenby a voice fromthe otherworld- and in
factexpressing subconsciously a public attitude- he moderatedhis behaviourand statusto
meetthe challengeof [Link] thishe was, of course,behavingin factas a member
of the clan and of the society.
Understanding of the entryof the notionof viable action involvesreferenceto ends,
to [Link] principleofavoidanceofextremes is verygenerallyoperativein Tikopia social
[Link] is an impliedcontrast here betweenthe value of the extreme in conductwith
the value of the [Link] value of the extremelies in its lack of [Link] its
aims are pursuedrigorously withoutcompromise, action derivesits strength fromthe sim-
plicityof its rallyingpoint. (Many charismaticleaders,both politicaland religious,have
been characterizedby this adherenceto the extreme.)The value of the mean lies in the
possibility of securingthe adherenceof manyto whomthe extremeis aesthetically or emo-
tionally,as well as economically, [Link] be pursueddependson
ultimateends. Now the conductof the spiritmedium,if he had insistedthatPa Fenuatara
should deny sustenanceto his father,would have shockedand alienated,to a certainty, a
large numberof the people. Moreover,he himselfhad to recognizea responsibility to the
community notto let heirsto thechieftainship [Link] theprincipleofaccommodation
involvedwith the principleof responsibility provideda solutionto the clash of structural
[Link] may pointout, too, thatthisresolutionwas at firstimpeded,but in the longrun
facilitated,by Pa Fenuatara'sfirmstatement- a social [Link] had almostcertainly
an elementof statusinvolvement - he was not preparedto be pushedaroundin his actions,
even by the spiritof his dead grandfather. Yet, when all was over he showedthat he too
sharedin the recognitionof the principleof responsibility of chiefto people expressedin
1I heard in June 1955 that the Ariki Kafika was still alive and active - 'that incredibleold man is stillgoing strong'.
My informant,the AssistantDistrictCommissioner,Eastern Solomons, to whom I am indebted for this note, added, 'I
cannot help feelingthat it must be a littlewearing for Pa Fenuatara, who does all the work withoutthe honour.' (Pa
Fenuatara was in factgiven great respectby the otherchiefsand by the people in general. Althoughnot a chief,he was
accorded near chieflystatus,and sat with the chiefsby invitationand almost of right,on public occasions. But he still,
of course,lacked the finalhonoursof the chieflyoffice.)Unhappily,it seems that both the ArikiKafika and Pa Fenuatara
died in an epidemic in August 1955.

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 SOME PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION I I

[Link] solution was only interim- the situation could well arise again. But at
least the immediate social tension was relieved by such organizational processes.

COMPARATIVE MYSTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES

It is interestingto follow this situation out a little furtherin organizational terms, and for
this purpose to compare it with the situation among the Shilluk, who have a somewhat
similar problem analysed in an illuminatingway by Evans-Pritchard (I948).
Like the Tikopia, the Shilluk have given a symbolicvalue to the physical vigour of their
political head - so much so that they have been reported to have ceremoniallyput to death
their kings when they showed signs of old age or ill health. This is one of the most famous
examples of the divine kingship. Evans-Pritchard has argued that such ritual destruction
probably never occurred, that it was a fiction.' He holds that Shilluk kings generally met a
violent death throughrebellion by another prince as the representativeof public discontent.
His opinion is that the idea that a sick or old kingshouldbe killed probably means that ten-
sions inherent in disaster become manifestin the attributionof the disaster to his failing
powers. This is strikinglysupported by the specificanalogue fromTikopia. But the Tikopia
do not kill theirageing king; theymerelywish that he were dead. They may, in extremecases,
make a suggestion for his demise, but they are unwilling to take any public responsibility
for this. To judge by tradition, in olden days to kill the Ariki Kafika was regarded as a
horrificcrime, but it was not unthoughtof. Yet it had nothingto do with his waning powers,
but was part of the struggleforpersonal supremacywhich went on among the Tikopia leaders
and is so interpreted,quite frankly,by the Tikopia nowadays. In present Tikopia condi-
tions such a challenge in the formof physical struggleis out of the question, and regarded
as inconceivable. But public opinion still pursues the theme of mystical linkage between
social and personal health of the chief. Like the Shilluk apparently, the Tikopia have some
organizational means of action to draw attentionto the situation,if not to resolve it. A spirit
medium in a state of possession,by serving as a vehicle of communicationof public disquiet,
can make the problem overt. Again, though physical force is out of the question to end the
life of an ageing Tikopia chief,starvationis conceivable or at least mentionable as a possible
means. This solution doubtless is likely to fail - as in the case cited, throughfilial sentiment.
But it would be both theoreticallyand practically possible. That it is not a fantasticidea is
indicated by the common Tikopia notion that an incurably diseased or very old person does
in fact oftendeny himselfnourishment,in order to end more quickly a lifewhich has become
painful to him. The idea of death by starvation,whether by self-denialor by the adamancy
of others,is not a strangeone to Tikopia. It is feasible that a sick chief,hearing of the public
commotion,mightdecide, throughshame, to end his life by such means, if he were allowed.
But direct physical action, by ritual killing or rebellion, is ruled out.
The same basic problem has very differentsolutions in these two societies. But the
Shilluk and Tikopia problem is in a sense [Link] is no necessary mysticalassocia-
tion between health of groups of people or of their social order, and the physical health of
[Link] would have seemed quite simple forthe Shilluk to have assumed
that the effectivenessof Nyikang can go on through the king no matter what his physical
state may be. Indeed, if Nyikang 'participates'in the king,he might be conceived to be able
to operate irrespectiveof how fithis human physical body is. So also with the Tikopia and
theiridea of the supreme god using the chiefas his seating mat and [Link] Shilluk
and the Tikopia have bound themselveswith chains they themselveshave forged.
One is forced to conclude then - and here I think one can add something to Evans-
Pritchard's interpretation- that it is not just the mystical bond which is the basic idea at
1S. G. F. Brandon (1955, p. 328), relyingon earliersources,stillrefersto the killingas an actual fact.

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 I2 RAYMOND FIRTH
the bottomof removalof an [Link] may well be equally the requirements of social
administration.
It is fashionablenowadaysto argue thatit is just as rationalforpeople to believethat
the healthand fertility of the land dependon thevirilityof the kingas to believeotherwise.
The gap in thisargumentis that'rational'is a categorywe employin philosophicand scien-
tificdiscussion,and by thesestandardsthereis no demonstrableconnexionof any direct
kind betweenfertility of vegetationand virilityof a [Link] say that the Shillukand the
Tikopia are makingsymbolicstatements about theirsocialorder(cf. Leach I954, p. I4) is a
preferableformof expression.
What is symbolized?That a societyneedsvigourin its representatives ifit is to remain
an effective entity,a [Link] is thesymboloftheeffective
stateof the society,that the people in each case phrasean administrative issuein mystical
[Link] theycould dropthismysticalbond and thesame problemwould [Link] does
in fact arise in all societies;leadershipmustfollowsome structurallines. But all societies
do not have structuralmechanismsof endingthe leadershipof a specificpersonwhen he
can no longerfulfilhis duties adequately. Many do, using the device of statuschange.
Retirementfromofficeinto privatelifeis an acceptedprocedurein [Link]
Japanesehistorically used the practicein a characteristically flexibleway, by means of the
institution of a 'Retired Emperor',to manipulatepower behind the governmental scenes
(BrinkleyI 9 I 5, pp. 2 7 I, 330, 34 I; Sadler I 946, p. 84) . In a restrictedform,retirement from
officehas even been a customamong such people as the Nyakyusa(Wilson I95I, pp. 279,
28I-2). Somesocietiesreducetheelementofpersonaldecisionby thedeviceofa limitedperiod
of service,or an age-bar,whichautomatically(or such is intended)eliminatethe difficulties
[Link] societieswhichdo not have structural mechanisms mustrelyentirely
on organizationalones. These have varyingefficiency. In traditionaltimes,the rebellion
measureoftheShillukwas probablyeffective; we wouldjudge thatit is virtuallyinoperative
now.' The Tikopia had nothing so [Link] theotherhand,theyhave evolveda working
the
practicewhereby acknowledged heirto the chiefactsin effect forhimin all politicalaffairs.
But thisis not finallysatisfactory; he lacks thatultimateauthority whichofficealone gives.
In Tikopia, and among the Shilluk, there are certainritualfunctions whichit is ideo-
logicallyessentialfora politicalhead to carryout effectively. But in factthe Tikopia chief
and, I think,the Shillukking,hardlyseem to need any particularbodily vigourforthese
performances, and certainlyno sexual prowessto performthe sacrificesforrain and other
ritualsattached to the [Link] in the administrative field some physicaland mental
competenceis [Link] the need fordecision is [Link] the societyis to maintainits
major politicalstructure, the functions of counsel,arbitration, control,mustbe exercisedby
its leader. As a sourceof appeal he mustbe in fullcommandof his [Link] the ritual
leadercannotexercisethesepoliticalfunctions, theneithertheymustbe separatedand assigned
to morethanone person,or anotherpersonmustbe chosento supersedetheineffective one.
In structuralterms,rebellionis the Shillukmechanismforretainingthe symbolismof
the kingshipunimpaired.('Structural'because the kingshipis a permanentoffice.)In
organizationalterms,this symbolismmay representthe requirementsof an underlying
administrative efficiency. ('Organizational'because such efficiency is a variable condition
needingcare.) At one levelit is care fortheritualpurityand efficacy oftheofficethatmoves
a princeto revoltand movespeople to [Link] anotherlevela princerevoltsbecause
of the statusincreasehe acquiresif he [Link] supporthim forloyaltyand
'Is itjustfeasiblethatthenotionofceremonially a fiction?
killingtheShillukkingmaynothavebeenentirely Could
have beenheldin reservein case he was notremovedby thenormalprocessofrebellionas hispowers
thispossibility
beganto wane?

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 SOME PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION I3
reward. But at another level they act because fundamentallythey require a more efficient
leader and decision-takerin their public [Link] at all these levels is important.
I thinkthe significanceof this administrativecomponent could be supported fromother
African societies. Oberg's (I95I, p. I57) material from Ankole shows the Bahima Mugabe
in the position of a divine king killed when his physical powers began to wane. This was
partly a reflexof belief in his magical powers being correlated with his physical condition.
But it was also linked with his capacity to performeconomic and political [Link] is
a heavy emphasis in the Banyankole traditional system,for instance, on royal efficiencyin
war, and also on royal accumulation and distributionof cattle. It is true that the Dinka
rainmakers,who seem to have had many administrativefunctionsand much civil authority,
are alleged to have been strangled for ritual reasons. But one probably becomes speedily
exasperated with rainmakers anyway, in any society, and Dinka may well have felt that
sooner or later they deserved strangling! More seriously,it would be interestingto have
details as to whetherthere had been also a parallel decline in their administrativecapacity.
An illuminating case is given from the Nyakyusa (Wilson ibid.), where an old chief is
believed usually to die soon after the 'coming out' of his sons - which means his partial
[Link] 'breath' of the people is believed to kill him because men love his sons
rather than himself; they preferthe younger generation. But on asking about one old chief
who did not die for about fifteenyears afterhis sons 'came out', the anthropologistwas told
that he was exceptional. 'The people loved him very much because he helped them with
the Government.' In other words, he was a good administratorand public servant,and the
ritual requirement did not take its toll.
I am not arguing that all these peoples, any more than the Tikopia, do not believe in
the mysticalbond between land and chief,or that they do not act, up to a point, according
to their beliefs. But I do argue that their mysticismin this respect does not flyin the face
of common sense. From an organizational point of view the symbolic quality in their belief
expresses and leads them to adopt good rational administrativepractice.
The Tikopia case I have cited was a succession crisis. Analysis of other cases, of actual
succession, would have shown differentsocial situations,but analogous pressures.

POSTULATES IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

What I am showinghere is how fromsituationsof alternativesthere have been solutionsby a
decision in referenceto certain guiding themes or attitudeswhich may be termed principles
or postulates of social organization. The principles of responsibility,accommodation, and
status involvementhave all been indicated as relevant. To some extent they operate in con-
junction with one another, even it may be in opposition to one another. Social action is to
be regarded in organizational termsas the resultantof the operation of such [Link]
principles might be examined in a similar way.
One of these is the principle of economy of [Link] illustrationof the operation of
this from quite another area but still within the field of succession is the practice which
Audrey Richards (I940, p. ioi) records for the Bemba [Link] the custom
of transmittingone large territorialchieftainshipafteranother within the immediate family
of the paramount chiefa traditionhas grown up that,forexample, the holder of the Mwamba
titleshould always succeed to the titleof Citimukulu,whatever the kinshipprioritiesinvolved.
This claim was put forwardin the succession dispute of I925, and according to Richards was
commonly supported by governmentofficials,who naturally prefer a fixed system of suc-
cessionto the discussionof rival candidates' rightsthat seems to have been the older procedure.
In the succession of chiefsa fixed rule such as primogenitureor automatic moving-upfrom
one grade to another is more economical of social effortsince it tends to avoid the expenditure

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 I4 RAYMOND FIRTH

of time and energyin election and to obviate the disruptiveeffectsof [Link] government
officialsconcerned with the smooth running of the administrativemachine the promotion of
such an economical practice has obvious appeal.
The principle of economy of effortis concerned with the disposal or allocation of
resources and restson the perception of their limited character. This principle, as has often
been pointed out, operates far beyond the sphere of resources conventionallyrecognized by
the economist as wealth, where price enters (e.g. Firth I 95 I, p. I 30; Stillman I 955, p. 82).
It has been expressed in many forms. (For example, as the general principle of least action
it has been given as an explanation in classical termsof the dynamic systemof nature.) Further
examples of its operation can be seen in the acceptance of persons as [Link] fre-
quently happens in societiesof large scale that people claim to be members of social groups
and therebyclaim personal rightsin social [Link] example, take case of an Australian
aborigine who, moving from one tribal territoryto another, identifieshimselfin sectional
and kin terms and is received on the same footingas persons in the local society. Here no
effortis normally made to check upon such claims; it is more economical of effortto accept
them at face value and fit the claimant into the scheme of social action accordingly. On
the other hand, advantage can be taken of this principle by people to elevate themselvesin
a graded series of [Link] happened when the migrationof labourers fromSouth India
to Fiji took place in the latterpart of the igth [Link] men were able to take advantage
of the fact that theirbackground was unknown,to claim and operate in the new environment
a social status in caste terms to which they had not been entitled in the old. Operation of
the principle of economy of effortin such fieldsof social action restsupon two assumptions:
a confidence that for the most part the initial statementsare true; and a confidence that
an ultimate check would be possible if the issue were of sufficient importance. Then a sacrifice
of effortwould be made.
This bringsup the point that the economy of efforttends to be relative to the issue con-
cerned. One may develop this by referenceto social organization in ritual.
Social operations in ritual are governed by certain basic criteria,some of which may be
stated in terms of firstprinciples under the general head of economy of [Link] firstof
these is the criterionof social [Link] implications of an action are proportionateto
the situation in which it occurs. The same kind of action in differentcircumstancesinvolves
the actor in very differentreactions. For instance, a Tikopia woman plaits a floor mat and
lays it on the floorof a house. In one case thisis a simple act offurnishing,providinga carpet.
In another it is an act of ritual and political significance,as when it is part of a more general
activityof recarpetinga sacred temple. For interpretingthe act an appreciation of situation is
[Link] with this is the concept of a critical act. A person in Tikopia may provide
the coconut frondsfor the mat and perhaps may even do the plaiting; it is the formallaying
of the mat that is the important thing. This indicates a relation between the social group
and god or dead ancestor. Again, there is the criterionof marginalityof [Link] is not
only applicable in the use of measurable resourcesof a material kind; it occurs also in actions.
Precisionin operations; intensity of taboos; continuityof activityare all subject to marginality.
Aftera time the utilityof what is done for the systemin operation [Link] finally
comes to a point at which the action can be changed or omitted,withouta practical diminu-
tion thought to occur in the ritual efficacyof the operation as a whole. For example, there
may be a rule that all the membersof a descent group should assemble fora rite. In practice
some may not, but it is not conceived that the ritual is [Link] the other hand, the more
who refrain,the higherrises the marginal worthof those who attend. Or again, there may be
a rule that loud noise is taboo during a certain stage of the ritual. Yet childrenmay be allowed
more licence than is given to adults; their actions are regarded as being marginal to the

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 SOME PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION I5
ritual scheme. Further, there is the criterionof climax and release of tension. Many ritual
operations build up to a climax and then tension is released.' The value of climax is clear
as focusingattention,helping to provide motivation in work. But to maintain a tension for
a long period at the same level is physiologicallyand psychologicallyimpossible, therefore
socially the cyclical rhythmallows of the interspersionof ritual by non-ritualacts - attention
to personal needs, eating, etc.
I now turn to the more general question of the use of such principles. I have cited four
principles or postulates in this discussion: responsibility;status involvement; accommoda-
tion; and economy of [Link] earlier work I mentioned the principle of co-ordination,the
principle of basic compensation, and the principle of foresight(Firth I95I, pp. 78, 9I-7,
234-6). Other principles may easily be adduced. I am not arguing that these are brought
forwardfor the firsttime - they have in fact been used by other social scientistsin various
ways - but that more systematicuse of them in conjunctionleads us to a betterunderstanding
of social action.
The question will be asked; how far can a systembe made out of all this, and how far
indeed is it necessaryto create a system? My own view is that in this whole field of explana-
tion of social action, once we leave the formalitiesof structural analysis we are yet a long
way from being able to produce schemes of any high degree of systematization,which at
the same time have explanatoryvalue. We are much indebted in anthropologyto the admir-
able systemformulationsof Talcott Parsons, Marion Levy, and [Link] withinsuch broad
constructsthere are many ways of describingrelevant social processes. The concept of social
organization and the identificationof principles or postulates within it are modes of con-
ventional description. They are not just personal [Link] aim in identifyingthem
is to retain correspondence with the phenomena observable in the external social world.
The test of this is a parallelism of descriptionand phenomena in behaviour, including the
validation of concrete prediction at various levels.
What kind of principlesof social organization are these? How far are they psychological
postulates, and sociologically irrelevant? They rest of course on a psychological base, that
is they correspond to mental activity, and are related to conceptions and motivations of
people. But so also do the principles of social [Link] principles of sibling unity and
lineage unity are based on recognitions. What gives them validity is that these recognitions
are homogeneous, i.e. all members of the society concerned recognize the division into cor-
porate kin-unitsof the type specified, and act upon this recognitionin someof their basic
daily behaviour. Any statementabout lineage segmentsof the same order being 'equal and
opposite' rests upon assumptions about the attitudes of people. The 'equality' is rarely, if
ever, in terms of numbers of persons, and thereforeinvolves translationof multiplicityinto
[Link] notion of segmentsas 'opposite' involves recognitionof theiroperation at a highly
abstract, even symbolic,level. In the concept of the 'unity' of the sibling group, siblings are
regarded as equivalent or united only for some social purposes, in defined conditions, and
not in others. A problem is to show what these conditions are, where they obtain and do
not obtain, and the implications in both eventualities.

SPHERES OF OPERATION
The principlesof social organization are not so 'automatic' or homogeneous as those of social
[Link] they can help to explain, in a way in which the principles of social structure
cannot, social operations in a wide range of spheres of fields of action. Let me mention
merely four of these.
1A clear example of thisis given in the communionceremonyknownas 'Hot Food' in Tikopia (Firth 1940, I, pp. 101-
3; I95, pp. 227-9).

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 I6 RAYMOND FIRTH

First, there is the sphere of allocationof rightsand dutiesamong_Persons, having regard to

structuralprinciplesof the societyconcerned, and the fact that they have to be implemented
among a varying number of persons. Arrangements for maintaining relations between
mother's brother and sister's child with varying numbers of each category were discussed
in my address last year (Firth I954). I might have added then that Malinowski (I935, I,
pp. I89-95) was one of the writerswho anticipated this problem and discussed it in terms
of his Trobriand material.
Secondly there is the sphere of rangeof social recognition and the degrees of conformity
which operate withinit. A clear example here is the non-verbalfieldof the classificatorysystem
of kinship. Terminologically persons are called siblings over a wide range of genealogical
relationship and this mode of identificationis followed logically in the terms used for their
descendants. But in the more concrete aspects of rightsand duties to kin - observance of
taboos, performanceof economical obligations,etc. - thereis a sharplydecreasing magnitude.
This illustratesthe principle of economy of [Link] there is an ideal uniformityin
practice there is a diminishingeffectsince resources and energy do not allow of indefinite
extension of practical aid.
Thirdly, there is the sphere of resolution of conflict
between two or more structuralprin-
ciples. One example here is the clash between ties of lineage or clan membershipand those
of membershipof a local group. Here the principlesof econonmy of efforton the one hand and
of status involvementon the other tend to operate to resolve the issue in favour of the ties
with the local group to the detrimentof the fulfilmentof lineage member obligations. As
Henry Maine (I875, p. 72) put it, 'fromthe moment when a tribal communitysettlesdown
finallyupon a definitespace of land, the land begins to be the basis of societyin place of the
Kinship'. Some of the conditionsof such resolutioncan be stated in termsof economic controls.
Another example is the conflict between the structural principle of lineage membership
and that of membershipof the [Link] is the type of situation analysed by
Malinowski fromhis Trobriand material, and taken up in an interestingmanner by Richards
in regardto theBemba (MalinowskiI927, pp. 8-i6, 84-6; I935 p. 37; Richards I940). A
furtherexample, closely related and relevant in understandingsocial changes, is the conflict
between joint family obligations and elementaryfamily interestsin the case of the Irava,
and Nayar (Aiyappan I9445 pp.7I-7; Gough I952, pp. 8I-2, 84, 85; Mayer I952, pp. I00
ff.). Here in general one may state a conclusion that the higher the 7statusinvolvement
and the greater the control of disposable wealth, the more is the tendencyfor the larger kin
units to maintain their cohesion. The wealthy, the gentry,keep theirjoint families, their
'big houses' longer than do people of lesserstatusand wealth (Aiyappan I944, p. 66; Fei 1946,
pp. 4-5). But significantalso are the opportunitiesfor consumptionof wealth, and especially
its degree of liquidity. The greater these, the more the tendency for the elementaryfamily
to become independent of the larger kin unit.
Finally there is the sphere of social [Link] we are not concerned so directlywith
the resolution of conflictbetween two or more structuralprinciples, but with the implica-
tions of crisesin the personal experience of individuals who have found theiractions or wishes
in conflictwith a structuralprinciple or with the actions or wishes of [Link] various stages
in the processesof expressionand social control come in the principlesof social organization.
They appear in the individual's own actions, but they are manifestedparticularly in the
mobilization of communityaction and the application of sanctions. Questions as to who takes
the initiative in mobilizing public opinion; as to the degree to which a sanction shall be
applied; as to the manner in which a final resolutionof the conflictis attained - all these
involve operation of some of the principles of social organization indicated earlier.
I have said that social organization, like social structure,can be recognized at all levels.

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 SOME PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 17
In the widest sense the actions of any individual resultingfrom his choices and decisions
and involving the actions of otherscan be regarded as social organization. At the other end
of the scale, social organization can be seen in termsof those actions which tend to promote
the integration of society. Hence we have the associated term of social disorganization
where the referentcommonly is to some major group in society or to society in its totality.
It is temptingto argue that the term social organization should be restrictedin its reference
to integrationof the total [Link] difficultyin this is that ofjudging what kind of actions
do in fact promote or are calculated to promote that integration- and what indeed are the
testsof such [Link] seems preferableis to look upon social organization as having
referenceto definable social ends, without necessarily relating these to the ends of a total
society. For example, one can define ends of lineage activityin terms of defence of lineage
territory,maintenance of lineage status, etc., without arguing whetherthis does or does not
maintain integrationof the total society. In other words, one may treat social organization
as a relative concept in termsof an agent or set of agents; a set of ends or purposes towards
which action is directed or thoughtto be directed; a set of choices, fromalternativecourses
of action; and a set of implications, effectsor results of decisions.
The explanation given by the kinds of principles of social organization outlined earlier
is admittedly a statementof postulates rather than of final generalisations.
And there are many questions still outstanding. How far are these postulates discrete,
or how far do they simply imply one another? Do the differentpostulates vary in their
weight fromone society to another? If so, will this variation not be random, but ultimately
fittinginto some classification of societies? Are some postulates more relevant for social
change than other - for example, does economic expansion demand a contraction of social
accommodation in a peasant society? How far does structuralchange demand not merely
an alterationin the objects of choice, but in the procedures and principlesof making choices?
It should be noted also that the very termsin which social structuresare described tend in
themselvesto point to the fieldsof choice which are open, and in that sense to lead towards
the identificationof certain principles of organization. Finally, let me make the point that
once the social anthropologistgoes beyond the formal description of static social systems
he is bound to introduce postulates of similar kind to those I have discussed. But he may not
recognize them as such. There is all the more need then forfurtheranalysis along such lines.
I think moreover, than we can already go some way in regarding such postulates as
having an explanatory value. Look at modern conditions in Africa or the Orient, at situa-
tions where members of large-scale corporate descent groups are faced by new economic
and social opportunitiesin an expanding universe of social contacts. We can say with some
confidence that the area of kinship responsibilitywill contract, that shiftsof authoritywill
occur in certain directions- frommother's brotherto father,fromhereditaryelders to new
income-gettingelites. But we can only show howsuch thingswill happen and whythey must
be so when we study the situationsmore fullyin termsof such organizational principlesas I
have outlined.
It is told of a medieval Abbot of St Albans how he incurred that mockery of which
mention is made in the Gospel, namely that he who is about to build should compute the
expenses which are necessary to finishthe building, lest, afterhe has laid the foundations,
being unable to finishit, all begin to mock him. In tryingto build up social anthropology
as a scientificstudy we have laid some solid [Link] we are likely to find that the
effortto raise the building furtherwill involve us in heavier intellectual expenditure than
we had anticipated. Yet anthropologyis not architecture,and no building of ours can ever
be completed. All that each of us can hope to do is to contributesome materials and labour
and a few suggestionstowards the plan,

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I8 RAYMOND FIRTH

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