SO SÁNH CPTPP, EVFTA vs WTO LAW
I. Anti-Dumping Measures
WTO Law (Anti-Dumping Agreement – ADA)
● Definition of Dumping: A product is considered dumped if its export price is lower than its normal value (the
comparable price in the exporting country’s domestic market).
● Conditions for Imposition:
○ Evidence of dumping (margin ≥ 2%).
○ Material injury (or threat thereof) to the domestic industry.
○ A causal link between dumped imports and the injury.
● Procedural Requirements:
○ Investigations may be initiated upon petition by the domestic industry or by authorities.
○ Provisional measures may be imposed after 60 days from initiation.
○ Final measures may remain in force for up to 5 years, subject to extension if necessary.
● Lesser Duty Rule (LDR):
○ Optional: Members may impose duties lower than the dumping margin if sufficient to remedy injury.
EVFTA (Chapter 3 – Trade Remedies)
● General Compliance: Follows WTO rules but introduces additional safeguards:
○ Enhanced Transparency (Article 3.2): Authorities must disclose essential facts and reasoningbefore final
determinations.
○ Public Interest Test (Article 3.3): Measures shall not be imposed if clearly contrary to public interest,
considering impacts on domestic industries, importers, and consumers.
○ Mandatory Lesser Duty Rule (Article 3.4): Duties must not exceed the dumping margin, and authorities
shall endeavor to apply a lower duty if adequate to remove injury.
○ Exclusion from Dispute Settlement (Article 3.5): Anti-dumping provisions are exempt from EVFTA’s
dispute settlement mechanism (Chapter 15).
II. Countervailing Measures
WTO Law (SCM Agreement)
● Definition of Subsidy: A financial contribution by a government conferring a benefit, provided it is specific
(limited to certain enterprises/industries).
● Categories of Subsidies:
○ Prohibited subsidies (e.g., export subsidies, local content subsidies).
○ Actionable subsidies (subject to challenge if causing adverse effects).
● Conditions for Imposition:
○ Subsidy margin ≥ 1% (or ≥ 2% for developing countries).
○ Material injury and causal link.
● Procedural Requirements: Similar to anti-dumping (investigations, provisional/final measures).
EVFTA (Chapter 3 – Trade Remedies)
● General Compliance: Aligns with the SCM Agreement but includes:
○ Transparency (Article 3.2): Full disclosure of key facts before final decisions.
○ Public Interest Test (Article 3.3): Measures must not be applied if against public interest.
○ Mandatory Lesser Duty Rule (Article 3.4): Duties must not exceed the subsidy margin; lower duties
preferred.
○ Exclusion from Dispute Settlement (Article 3.5): Countervailing provisions are not subject to EVFTA
dispute resolution.
3. Key Differences Between WTO Law and EVFTA
Criterion WTO Law (ADA/SCM) EVFTA
Transparency Requires disclosure but less detailed. Stricter: Authorities must disclose all
essential facts before final determinations.
Public Interest Test Not explicitly required. Mandatory: Measures barred if contrary to
public interest.
Lesser Duty Rule Optional for Members. Mandatory: Duties must be lower if
(LDR) sufficient to remedy injury.
Dispute Settlement Subject to WTO dispute mechanism Excluded from EVFTA’s Chapter 15
(DSB). (Dispute Settlement).
Conclusion
The EVFTA imposes stricter disciplines than WTO law, particularly on transparency, public interest considerations, and
mandatory application of the Lesser Duty Rule. Additionally, it excludes trade remedies from its dispute settlement
mechanism, reducing the risk of abusive measures while ensuring compliance with WTO principles.
This alignment reinforces fair trade practices while providing flexibility for domestic industries under a balanced legal
framework.
III. Safeguard Measure
1. Scope of Application
● WTO (Agreement on Safeguards – SA):
○ Applies to all WTO members on an MFN (Most-Favored-Nation) basis.
○ May be imposed on any imported product experiencing a sudden surge that causes or threatens serious
injury to domestic producers.
● CPTPP:
○ Applicable only during the transition period (typically three years, unless tariff elimination is phased over
a longer period).
○ Limited to originating goods from CPTPP member states.
2. Permissible Forms of Measures
● WTO:
○ Allows tariff increases, quantitative restrictions (quotas), or a combination thereof.
○ Provisional measures (e.g., temporary tariff hikes) may be imposed for up to 200 days.
● CPTPP:
○ Permits only tariff increases, excluding quantitative restrictions or tariff-rate quotas (TRQs).
○ The increased tariff rate must not exceed the lower of:
■ The current MFN applied rate, or
■ The MFN applied rate in effect immediately before the CPTPP’s entry into force.
3. Duration of Measures
● WTO:
○ Maximum initial period: 4 years, extendable to 8 years if domestic industry adjustment is demonstrated.
○ Progressive liberalization required if the measure exceeds 1 year.
● CPTPP:
○ Maximum initial period: 2 years, extendable by 1 additional year (total of 3 years).
○ Cannot extend beyond the transition period.
○ Progressive liberalization is mandatory if the measure exceeds 1 year.
4. Substantive Requirements
● WTO:
○ Requires demonstration of:
■ Increased imports (absolute or relative to domestic production).
■ Serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry.
■ Causal link between imports and injury.
○ Applies on an MFN basis (no discrimination among sources).
● CPTPP:
○ Similar substantive requirements but limited to originating goods from CPTPP parties.
○ Must prove that increased imports result from tariff reductions under the CPTPP.
5. Investigation and Transparency Procedures
● WTO:
○ Requires public investigations with participation from interested parties (producers, exporters, importers).
○ Authorities must publish detailed reports justifying the measure.
● CPTPP:
○ Incorporates WTO investigation standards (Articles 3 and 4.2(c) of the SA).
○ Additional transparency obligations, including:
■ Prior written notification to other CPTPP parties upon initiating an investigation.
■ Public disclosure of findings and decisions (e.g., injury determination, imposition/extension of
measures).
■ Consultation rights for affected parties upon request.
6. Compensation and Retaliation
● WTO:
○ The imposing member must provide trade compensation (e.g., equivalent concessions) to affected
exporters.
○ If no agreement is reached, affected members may retaliate after 3 years (if the measure is based on
absolute import increases and complies with SA rules).
● CPTPP:
○ Consultations on compensation must begin within 30 days of imposing the measure.
○ If no agreement is reached within 30 days, affected parties may immediately suspend equivalent
concessions (no 3-year moratorium).
○ Retaliation rights terminate upon the measure’s expiration.
7. Special Treatment for Developing Countries
● WTO:
○ Exempts imports from developing countries if:
■ An individual developing country’s share is ≤ 3% of total imports, or
■ Aggregate imports from all such countries are ≤ 9%.
○ Developing countries may apply safeguards for up to 10 years (vs. 8 years for developed countries).
● CPTPP: No special carve-outs for developing countries in transitional safeguards.
Conclusion
The CPTPP imposes stricter and more limited safeguard rules compared to the WTO, particularly by:
1. Restricting application (transitional period, CPTPP-originating goods only).
2. Narrowing permissible measures (tariff hikes only, no quotas).
3. Enhancing procedural transparency (notification, consultation, and reporting).
4. Expediting compensation/retaliation mechanisms (no 3-year delay).
These differences reflect the CPTPP’s deeper trade liberalization objectives, prioritizing predictability and minimizing
trade distortions among member states.
- cOMPLYING WITH wto law
- Rule
