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THE EXISTENTIAL COMPONENT OF AQUINAS’ CONCEPT OF FREEDOM
Writing a paper on Natural Moral Law, we could not but also tackle animportant philosopher/theologian in the Natural Moral Law tradition, St. ThomasAquinas. In the discussion of freedom, many of the critics of the traditional naturalmoral law theory would argue that the latter ignores the issue of the
authenticity
of ahuman person’s choice.The intention of this paper then is to argue for the existential component of thenatural law tradition. The term “existential” should be taken to mean that natural lawtheory is not only about concepts but it is also about the actual daily human existence. Itis not separated from life, as its critics would suppose, but it is rather relevant toexperience.
1.Man as Imago Dei
Who is man for St. Thomas Aquinas? Aquinas goes beyond the Aristotelian
hylemorphism
. For Aquinas, that which characterizes the rest of creation, and that whichseparates God from all creation is the distinction of essence and existence, for allcreatures are composites and only God is simple. In this respect, man is among the restof creation. But Aquinas believes that man has something which makes him unique fromthe rest of creation. As a Christian, Aquinas can never doubt the special dignity of man.He believes that man is an
imago Dei,
the being that bears the image and the likeness ofGod. The Divine image is seen in man’s rational soul.The human person’s rationality likens him/her to the Divine, and thatconstitutes his/her special character. It can be noted that Aquinas, though taking hisclue from the
hylemorphism
of Aristotle, modifies it and says that there is one uniquerational soul in man, which also serves as the
 form
of the human person. Hence, even if ahuman person is a material being (bodily), it is also a spiritual being by virtue of its soul.Furthermore, the soul is also immortal. Hence, even with the absence of thematerial body, the soul continues to exist. After the separation of body and soul, thecomposition of the soul would be
 form
and
existence
. Hence, Gilson is forced to arguethat though, “the human soul is the lowest degree of intelligent creatures,”
1
man still“belongs to the series of immaterial beings through his soul.”
2
 Aquinas’ doctrine about man as the image of God would separate the humanperson from the rest of God’s creation. It is quite explicit in Aquinas that because ofman’s rationality, man mirrors God in a more perfect way that the rest of creation. Infact, the human person can be interiorly united with the Divine. Fr. Aureada says that“since man is the visible creature closest to the Divine Governor, man as the
imago Dei
, is
1
Etienne Gilson,
The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas
. (Notre Dame:University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), p. 376.
2
Ibid.
1
 
the most gifted or favored of all visible creatures. It is to man’s alone that God wants tobe united in the most intimate and interior manner.”
3
 Fr. Aureada analyzes the Thomistic concept of Divine image and says that there aremany facets of the image of God in man: the
vestigium Dei, imago naturalis Dei, imagosupernaturalis Dei,
and the image by likeness of glory.
4
Based on this analysis, it can beseen that man’s oneness with the rest of creation is still maintained but only on the firsttype of presence in creation that is, as
vestigium Dei
. This is based on the causal theorywhereby every effect necessarily must have a cause. Since the cause produces an effectthat somehow resembles to itself, then God, in producing an effect through the bestowalof the thing’s
esse
in creation, has also produced effects that bear his image in them.Aquinas himself says, “thus, every creature is an image of the exemplar type thereof inthe Divine mind.”
5
 But other than the vestigial image, man has the
imago naturalis Dei
. This kind ofimage of God that is present in man makes man a spcial creature in the midst ofcreation. The
imago naturalis Dei
is “accorded only to rational or intellectual nature.”
6
This then supports our earlier claim that the rationality of man, as resultant faculty of hisrational soul, makes man as a special being in the realm of creation. Since man isrational, man is capable od receiving the
imago naturalis Dei
, which, as St. Thomas wouldargue, is not present among non-intellectual beings.In addition to this
imago naturalis Dei
there is another kind of image in man, the
imago supernaturalis Dei
. Fr. Aureada said that this is an “effect of sanctifying grace inman.”
7
But what is important with this is the fact that man is believed to be“supernaturally capable of knowing and loving God imperfectly by the theologicalvirtues of faith and love, and perfectly once he comes face to face with him in the BeatificVision.”
8
This then clearly separates man from the rest of creation.Man’s intelligence gives him the sense of responsibility, which cannot beexpected of non-intelligent beings. A non-inntelligent being is not accountable for theirends. But, a human person however can pursue his own end. In fact, Aquinas believesthat it is part of the definition of man’s nature to appropriate himself according to hisown mode of following the Divine.Man is a capax Dei because as a rational creature, “he can know and love Godhimself
explicitly.
”
9
 Fr. Aureada even says, “there is in man’s
esse
 
natura
itself... anobediential potency, a potency to image the divine according to its divinity.”
10
Hefurther adds that, “this requires sanctifying grace but the openness to sanctifying grace
3
Rev. Fr. Jose Aureada, “The Concept of Grace in St. Thomas Aquinas: (II) The Natureof Theological Participation,”
Philippiniana Sacra
, vol. 29, no. 87 (1997), p. 421.
4
Cf. Ibid., 429-436.
5
ST I, q. 93, a2, ad 4.
6
Aureada, p.430.
7
Aureada, p.433.
8
Aureada, p.432.
9
Aureada, p.432.
10
Aureada, p.432.
2
 
is present in man’s very nature.”
11
This obediential potency then does not just accountgreater perfection in man, but it also defines his responsibility. For man to be true to hisnature, he must endeavor to incarnate and imitate God in his life.
2.
Freedom and Aquinas’s Teaching on Voluntary choice
After seeing that Aquinas believes in man’s capacity to perfect himself because onlyman is
capax Dei
, thereby allowing man to utilize his intellect and pursue such godlyends, it remains to be a concern of this paper to prove that such notion of freedomindeed exhibits an existential character.First, Thomas Aquinas also believes that man is a moral being, and it is part ofthe constitution of man to experience and manifest his own expressions of freedom.Eleanore Stump realizes that contemporary pilosophical reflections on the freedom ofman follows a tradition that is non-Thomistic, whereby freedom is perceived to be aproperty of only one component of man, and that is, his will. In contrast, Stump argues,“for Aquinas, freedom with regard to willing is a property primarily of a human being,not of some particular component of a human being.”
12
In saying that freedom is a component of the entire human person, Aquinas hasclearly stated the mutual role of the intellect and the will in constituting a choice.Stumpagain argues that Aquinas “takes the will to be not a neutral faculty but a bentinclination.”
13
For as St. Thomas says, “the will is a hunger, an appetite for goodness.”
14
But that which presents a thing to be good to the will is the intellect. This means thenthat the intellect is also a factor that makes a person a moral and free being because theintellect can also influence the choice of a person. “The intellect presents to the will asgood certain things or actions under certain descriptions in particular circumstances,and the will wills them because it is an appetite for the good and they are presented to itas good.”
15
 In addition to the intellect, there is another element that can influence thefreedom and the choice of the person, and these are the passions. “The passions –sorrow, fury, fear, greed, etc. – can also influence the intellect, bcause in the grip of suchpassion, something will seem good to a person which might not seem good to herotherwise.”
16
 Hence, if there is a decision or choice that is about to be taken, that which isinvolved in that choice is the entirety of the human person, and not just simply thehuman will.But the uniqueness of Aquinas’ argument does not stop with this. Aquinas haseven made further distinction between “freedom of action and freedom of willing.”
17
11
Aureada, p.432.
12
Eleanore Stump, “Aquinas’ Account of Freedom,” in
Thomas Aquinas:Contemporary Philosophical Perspective
, Brian Davies, ed. (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 2002), p.275.
13
Stump, p.276.
14
ST I, q.82, a.1.
15
Stump, p.276
16
ST I-II, q.9, a.2; cf. Stump, p.278.
17
Stump, p.281.
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