China, Cyber Espionage and U.S. National Security: A White Paper

China, Cyber Espionage and U.S.
National Security
A WHITE PAPER prepared for PATRIOT MAJORITY
A political-military examination of state involvement in breaches of cyber
security, competing national strategies and the intelligence challenge to the
United States.
T/5/20'IO
20 'I 0 f\/iejius Rsoear.::h
FAIR USE NOTICE: This document may be copyrighted material. Such material is made available for educational & news reporting purposes only. This constitutes a 'fair use' of any such copyrighted material as provided for in Title 17 U.S.C. section 106A-117 of the US Copyright Law.
medius RESEARCH
Medius Research provides objective insight, analysis and survey research
for companies and nonprofit institutions alike. Since 2005, Medius, its
principals and subject matter experts, drawn from the ranks of journalism
and other research professions, have helped shed light on pressing public
issues.
Medius Research
1025 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20036
202.857.9710
www.mediusresearch.com
Electronic delivery
Reports are also available by subscription at the telephone number above
or online by download at Scribd.com.
Copyright
2010 Medius Research. All Rights Reserved. Neither this publication
nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in ,a retrieval system,
or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of Medius
Research.
All information in this report is verified to the best of the author's and
the publisher's ability. However, Medius does not accept responsibility
for any loss arising from reliance on it. To learn more, please contact
202.857.9710.
This report was commissioned by Patriot Majority. Formed in 2005, Patriot
Majority believes it is our patriotic duty as Americans to pursue new policies
that strengthen our national security, boost our economy, achieve energy
independence, make health care affordable, provide quality education and
protect public safety.
Patriot Majority
300 M Street NE, Suite 1102
www.patriotmajority.com
202.558.4945
1. Contents
1. Table of Contents
2. Executive Summary
3. Introduction
4. Welcome
6. Timeline
7. Origins and Development
8. Beijing, the PLA and Cyber Attacks
9. The PLA and Hainan Island
10. Cyber Attacks and Cyber Espionage
11 . Conclusion and Recommendations
12. Appendix: Chronology of Key Events
Foreword
13. About
Page 1
Page 2
Page 4
Page 5
Page 6
Page 7
Page 8
Page 14
Page 18
Page 21
Page 25
Page 26
Page 27
2. Executive Summary
In the first few months of 2010, the attention of U.S. leaders in both business
and government was drawn to the issue of cyber security and hacking of both
private sector and public sector computing infrastructure by unknown parties
believed to be in China. Yet neither news reports nor government briefings
have identified the parties responsible for these breaches.
The U.S. Senate, as a result, overwhelmingly passed a resolution sponsored
by Sen. Ted Kaufman, D-Del., asking that the government in Beijing conduct
its own investigation of these intrusions and make the results known. To date,
the Chinese government has not complied and has responded only by saying
that hacking in China is illegal; indeed it has challenged accusers to prove their
case.
The first key finding of this white paper is that the likeliest source of these
breaches - which resulted in the widespread loss of business and government
data that might include valuable secrets - is the Chinese military, known as
the People's Liberation Army (PLA). One particular installation of the PLA, on
the island of Hainan in the South China Sea, has been the focus of military
modernization and may have been the source of some previous cyper attacks.
A tourist destination, the island houses an underground submarine base, a
space launch facility and an airbase - and most importantly, one of China's
most important signals intelligence units, comprising some 1100 personnel.
The island is a focal point of China's military modernization through improving
asymmetric warfare capabilities. Other sites in China have been suspected,
most recently a trade school in Beijing cited by The New York Times, whose
report was variously substantiated and denied in China.
While there is indeed a vibrant and independent hacker culture in China, the
line between its work and that of the state has become increasingly blurred.
Canadian researchers have made the single most systematic, unclassified
effort to find the source of cyber attacks. The researchers concluded that
some early attacks may have from the island of Hainan. The lead Canadian
researcher told a U.S. congressional commission of his analysis last year,
revealing more than his original report, but it was not widely publicized.
In addition, there is a large body of evidence in the public record that points
to government and military involvement - over many years. In interviews on
background, experts in the U.S. government reached the same
In addition, it is the lead author's opinion that there is a significant body of
classified evidence pointing to Chinese state institutions, particularly the
military. This information has not been made public for reasons of both secrecy
and diplomacy, namely in order to not offend the Chinese government.
However, a reasonable observer would ask, "Who is benefiting most from
these cyber intrusions?"
"Let us be candid," said Larry Wortzel, a former U.S. Army counterintelligence
officer and vice chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission. "A logical person would conclude that some of this activity is
directed by the Chinese government."2
Our research comes to a similar conclusion. Our research is not of a technical
nature, though it relies heavily upon the work of others in these areas. Instead,
we attempt to take the technical question of attribution and approach it from
a po@ml militarv aod strategic context. Intelligence gathering, particularly
1 Confidential interviews with government officials, February to April, 2010.
2
finding new technologies, is a core mission of the PLA in peacetime. Increased
proficiency in network warfare is vital to the military's modernization for
potential wars. And there is substantial evidence of a blurring of the lines
between individual hackers and the state in China. To some degree, the
distinction is meaningless.
Cyber security breaches are part of an unprecedented wave of intelligence
gathering against the United States by Chinese military and intelligence
organizations. The U.S. Customs Department alone has opened 540
investigations into illegal technology transfers to China. In the last three
years, more than 40 people in the United States have been charged - many
convicted - of espionage for China.
Reconnaissance, surveillance and espionage are routine acts by governments
and their militaries, even in peacetime. However, the current Chinese breaches
of U.S. cyber security, combined with more traditional methods of intelligence
gathering, strongly indicate that the United States is currently the focus of the
single largest, most-intensive foreign intelligence gathering effort since the Cold
War.
The national security implications are Significant: Effective intelligence-gathering
on this scale will inevitably assist China in its preparation for a possible
high-technology conflict. And it is the open strategy of the PLA to wage an
asymmetric war against a superior enemy in the event of a crisis. In addition,
the economic costs are significant. By some estimates these intrusions may
already be costing the United States hundreds of billions of dollars per year.
Some experts have rushed to suggest that the federal government begin to
work aggressively on a new cyber war initiative. Others have promoted the
idea of corporations and the national security apparatus collaborating even
more closely than they already do. However, this paper notes that important
freedoms are at stake on the Internet, just as important threats loom, and
these freedoms should not be sacrificed in the name of expediency.
Some of the most comprehensive expertise on what to do next can be found
at the very doorstep of Congress, in the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, a bipartisan commission established by law in 2000. As a
result, it is the recommendation of this paper that the U.S. Congress hold open
hearings on the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission's
recommendations on this issue, issued in November 2009.
The commission's work provides to date the fullest analytical accounting of
the issue and broadest context and thus merits far greater attention from
the public, the private sector, and policy-makers. Further. Congress should
take oversight and legislative action as necessary to address each of the
commission's recommendations prior to the release of its next report in late
2010. As a result, we have republished its recommendations on human
intelilgence-gathering and cyber espionage in full at the conclusion of this
paper.
3
3. Introduction
Since 2005, Medius Research has conducted research projects for clients in a
variety of industries.
Our principals and research experts are drawn from journalism and other
research fields. We are nonpartisan and non-ideological, serving a small
number of clients with accurate, actionable information. Most of the time, we
furnish our findings and move on to our next assignment.
But in early 2010, a number of major news outlets reported on cyber attacks
emanating from China that resulted in damages to U.S. government agencies
and private corporations alike. Shortly thereafter, we received a telephone :::all
from Craig Varoga, a leading Democratic political consultant and president of
Patriot Majority, a very active, "independent, progressive political organization,"
as The Washington Post calls it.
Varoga wanted Patriot Majority to commission an analysis, which he also
wished to distribute in order to draw attention to the cyber security issue.
Whatever one's political views, the cyber security issue is an important one,
from the twin perspectives of national security and economic well-being. It is
particularly important in light of the larger, historic forces at work between the
United States, the dominant power of the 20th century, and China, a rising
power of the 21 st century.
Herein are the results of our research, investigation and analysis. We are
grateful to Patriot Majority for its assistance in underwriting this white paper.
But as in any assignment, the findings presented are entirely those of the
company, its principals, contributors and team members, namely Richard
Parker, Casey Blaine, Molly Maroney, Axel Gerdau and Kimber Wigley. Daie
Eisman, who wrote the foreword, was engaged to provide an independent
review and perspective on the work.
We alone retained complete research and editorial control over the project, and
its strengths and weaknesses are ours alone.
-Porter Davis, Managing Partner
Medius Research
4
4. Welcome
Cyber aggression is one of the bigger American security challenges
in the second decade of this century. It doesn't matter whether you're a
business leader, national security official, Democrat, Republican or concerned
citizen the threat is here, real, and we as Americans need to deal with it.
By one estimate, a sustained cyber attack could result in 40 million Americans
without electricity, 60 million without cell-phone service and Wall Street closed
for a week.
The collateral damage could devastate America's financial services, energy
sector, transportation systems, and first-responder networks, and affect
numerous government agencies and allies across the globe. Experts have long
warned of the dangers posed by cyber aggression against America and our
allies. The problem is that the experts' warnings have gone largely unheeded.
Take the case of Google. As far back as 11 years ago, in 1999, The
Washington Post noted, "No one is more aggressive in today's world than
the Chinese when it comes to stealing high technology and nuclear secrets.
And yet, years later, other media outlets reported of hacking into Pentagon
networks, followed by hacking into defense contractor networks. And no
doubt, after publication of this white paper, there will be new reports of cyber
aggression.
The only good news is that the Google episode may help to create a sense
of urgency. President Obama is "troubled by the cyber security breach that
Google attributes to China." Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted that cyber
attacks "pose a threat to our economy, our government and our civil SOCiety."
In congressional testimony earlier this year, National Intelligence Director
Dennis Blair warned, "When you look at the technological balance, right now
it favors those who want to use the Internet for malicious purposes over those
who want to use it for legal and lawful purposes."
The threat to America is not going away. Security experts expect the problem
to continue indefinitely. And, some warn, the problem could get far worse
before it improves, especially since China now views both the United States
and its Western allies as weakened by the global recession.
To win against cyber aggression - whether it originates inside China, a terrorist
cell or a criminal network will require strength and preparation. Victory will not
come overnight, and it will require a coherent effort enlisting business leaders,
national security experts and both political parties.
That is why Patriot Majority commissioned this white paper and why we urge
America's policy-makers, business leaders and citizens to answer this call to
patriotic duty. If we want to preserve the American Dream here at home and
remain a world power abroad, we cannot afford to fail.
-Craig Varoga, President
Patriot Majority
Craig Varoga is president of Patriot Majority. He is a Pittsburgh native, longtime
resident of Texas and has managed local, state, and presidential political
campaigns for 25 years.
5
5. Foreword
Military planners are forever accused of preparing for the last war, investing in
training and equipment conceived to defeat a prior enemy rather than a future
one.
American history is littered with unfortunate reminders of the results of
such planning from battleships sunk in Pearl Harbor by a navy that better
understood aircraft carriers to skyscrapers toppled in New York by terrorists
who learned to use airliners as missiles.
This white paper calls on government and business to address what could
be the next war, a conflict in which nations, groups or even individuals use
computers to infiltrate and cripple America's military, economic and political
structures - perhaps without firing a shot.
We've had ample warning of our vulnerability. In February, retired Adm.
Dennis Blair, the director of national intelligence, told a House committee that
"malicious cyber activity ... is growing now at unprecedented rates." He added,
"Cyber defenders right now - it's simply the facts of the matter have to
spend more and work harder than the attackers do, and our efforts frankly are
not strong enough to recognize (and) deal with that reality."
This paper focuses on China, America's top economic competitor and
home to an increasingly impressive military force, Drawing on earlier studies,
Congressional testimony and other information sources, all little-noticed
until now, it builds a powerful case that Chinese leaders and their People's
Liberation Army are engaged in a massive cyber espionage campaign against
the United States.
Particularly persuasive is the report's compilation of a 15-year history of
Chinese investment in cyber warfare technology, development of cyber warfare
doctrine and actual cyber attacks, The initiatives began after the United States
embarrassed Beijing by dispatching two carrier battle groups to the Taiwan
Strait in 1995 to counter Chinese attempt to influence Taiwan's elections.
Chinese chagrin over that incident, this paper argues, led the PLA to
aggressively search for an unconventional way to do battle with the United
States. The Chinese government denies responsibility for the cyber attacks
that have followed, and the report acknowledges that China is home to tens of
thousands of civilian hackers; however, evidence pointing to the PLA, including
published military thinking, is substantial.
"The idea of a separation between government and the people is an entirely
quaint, Western cultural paradigm that fails to understand the views of the
world's last dominant communist party," this paper argues. In the view of the
government, "the state and the people are one in the same, "Stili , espionage
is not war and this paper cautions against treating it as such, America's
challenge is to fashion defenses that protect our networks while not infringing
on our freedom,
-Dale Eisman
Dale Eisman has covered the military for 15 years, most recently for AOL
News.
6
2002
1998
2000
1995
The founder of the PLA's
The People's Liberation
Chinese hackers deface
network warfare strategy is
China triggers the Third
Army issues a paper saying
Indonesian websites as
reported to have drawn up the
Taiwan Crisis by launching
that control of the electro
riots target ethnic Chinese.
military's formal adoption of the
missiles and live-fire
magnetic spectrum is a
Hackers strike networks in
strategy as a cornerstone in its
exercises in an attempt to
prerequisite to successful
South Korea, Japan and
modernization.
sway Taiwanese elections.
combat operations.
the United States.
The Third Taiwan CriSis
ends in humiliation for the
People's Liberation Army
as two U.S. carrier task
forces sail unmolested in
the Taiwan Strait.
1996
2004
A PLA white paper flatly
states that at the core of its
transformation is "building
an informationalized
force and winning an
informationalized war."
A U.S. 8-1 bomber bombs
A U.S. Navy E-P3E Aries
The Communist Party
the Chinese embassy in
spy aircraft is forced into
presses entire public
Belgrade. Chinese hackers
an emergency landing on
companies into military
shut down the White
Hainan Island, home to a
service, including
House website and two
key signals intelligence unit,
telecommunications,
Chinese colonels publish
U.S. government websites
software and other
Unrestricted Warfare.
are hacked.
information companies.
1999 2001
2003
2010
Google threatens to quit
2006
2008
China over intrusions
Hu orders the PLA to
The PLA continues
into its networks. In the
focus on training in
to expand its
United States, hundreds of
"complex electromagnetic
network warfare
investigations and dozens
environments" - combined
capabilities by
of spy charges are under
electronic warfare and
creating new militia
way or pending.
network attack.
units.
The PLA operates a Canadian researchers
President Hu Jin Tao orders
the military to safeguard
economic growth, and
military units train to
seize control of adversary
computer networks within
seconds.
2005
dozen training facilities
that teach the PLA how
to wage full-spectrum,
electronic, information
and network warfare.
2007
indicate that cyber attacks
emanate from Hainan
Island, home to key
Chinese military units. U.S.
Navy vessels are harassed
near the island.
2009
7
The USS Kitty Hawk, pictured here, was one of two U.S. aircraft carriers to sail with
battle groups through the Taiwan Strait during the 1995 crisis with China.
Photo Credit U.S. Navy photo/Released
7. Origins and Development
In early 2010, news organizations in the United States and Britain began
to report that China was behind a series of cyber attacks, including against
Google, the world's largest search engine.
3
As a result, the National Security
Agency reached out to offer its assistance to private companies.A.
Indeed, it seemed that the federal government was pushing the story. The
State Department publicly scheduled for February 2010 a series of briefings
to the private sector on cyber security.5 However, government officials did not
explicitly point the finger at the Chinese government. Why?
After all, China is governed by the last successful communist party on earth
and is a strong centralized power; however, hacking there takes place against
a complex landscape: a culture of glorifying hackers as
1 (] Iv12,[, 20; ().
. !tIe NHN 'forv, T!rn88 12 201 C, Print
','i;C,,,,',." IT"" Tre \I\/ashlnJtCfl F'Gst 4
55c.-C4.
8
next-generation patriots, individuals, organizations, companies, third-parti8s
and the government itself. Explicitly identifying anyone actor is daunting. Rrst,
there are the technical challenges. Second, and most important, there is the
diplomatic challenge. China is the world's largest market and largest creditor,
and ties between Washington and Beijing are already strained; naming names
could make an already complicated matter decidedly worse.
Yet the sobering fact is that for the last decade, China's military has been
driven to find methods with which to gain huge amounts of intelligence in
peacetime and conduct asymmetric oonflict in wartime. Within China itself,
a dynamic, civilian hacker culture has arisen independently and yet the line
between individual and state, civilian and military has as quickly blurred.
The roots of today's cyber tensions between Washington and Beijing are
entirely military in nature and can be traced back 15 years, to 1995 and the
Third Taiwan Crisis. Intending to intim:date upcoming Taiwanese elections,
the People's Liberation Army (PLA) launched a series of missile tests and
oonducted live-fire exercises in the Taiwan Strait,a
The United States responded with a massive show of force, sailing not one but
two aircraft carrier battle groups into the strait where they passed unmolested,
the first U.S. combat ships to patrol these waters since 1976. The conventional
superiority of the U.S. forces dealt a public humiliation to the PLA, which could
only observe. But when it ended in 1996, the crisis also proved a watershed
event; China's officer corps scrambled to find asymmetric ways to defeat a
superior enemy.
In 1999, two Chinese colonels published the book Unrestricted Warfare,
advocating targeted assassinations of business leaders, propaganda
campaigns abroad and information warfare.? In China, the official press
promoted the book as required reading for officers; in America, it was
quickly translated into English by the intelligence community. "The first rule of
unrestricted warfare," said one of the authors, Qiao Liang, "is that there are no
rules, with nothing forbidden."s
At the same time, a vibrant civilian hacker culture - and capability - was
springing up on its own. From the mid to late 1990s, as Internet penetration
grew in China, individual hackers became groups, then organizations. Thev
had a decidedly and genuine patriotic bent. And in a society where political
speech is regulated and censored at home, they lashed out abroad.
As the 1998 Jakarta riots targeted ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, groups such
as the Green Army defaced Indonesian websites.
9
At home, hackers made
money as security experts, Internet entrepreneurs and extortionists. Abroad,
they inserted themselves in disputes between China, Taiwan and Japan
throughout 1999 and 2000.
10
In the same period, the Red Hacker Alliance was
formed, a loose, dynamic confederation of people between 20 and 45, most
,),'
h'{(lrnati-:::-n SS'"'dce. Beijing: Lte,rat1.i!'s anci Prinr
(Jiroc2'lian Foreign 8',:;ccic"-"St
9
with high school educations, many with college degrees, most with incomes
higher than average; its numbers would eventually rise to an estimated
380,000.
11
Increasingly, the United States became a target. In May, 1999, a U.S. 8-2
Stealth bomber, on a mission planned by the Central Intelligence Agency,
dropped satellite-guided bombs on the Chinese embassy in downtown
Belgrade during the Kosovo War. Chinese hackers shut down the White House
website for three days. 12 In April, 2001, a U.S. EP-3E Aries II operated by the
U.S. Navy's VO-1 reconnaissance unit - but on a signals intelligence mission
for the National Security Agency - was intercepted by a pair of Chinese F-8
jets over the South China Sea.
13
One collided with the U.S. plane, which went into a steep dive, repeatedly
signaling a mayday distress before landing at a Chinese air base on Hainan
Island. With the F-8 pilot lost and the crew of 24 detained for 11 days, the
United States was forced to apologize. Despite efforts by the U.S. crew to
destroy documents and sensitive equipment, the aircraft, later returned, proved
an intelligence windfall of classified information, nonetheless, for the Chinese
military.14
In addition, the incident provided a target for China's hackers. On the Friday
that followed, Chinese official media reported that U.S. government websites
would be hacked. On Saturday, the websites of federal agencies were defaced
with messages regarding the lost Chinese pilot: "China hack! ... The whole
country is sorry for losing the best son of China - Wang Wei forever, we will
miss you until the end ofthe day." 15
The following year, U.S. intelHgence officials reached new conclusions: The
scale of hacking was becoming bigger and more ambitious. The 2001 attacks
had the "tacit blessing" of the Chinese government and perhaps even official
help,16 And there was an explicit connection between the Chinese military and
new, wide-scale cyber attacks on U.S. and Taiwanese computer networks.
Publicly, U.S. government officials resisted linking the Chinese government
to the cyber attacks. But in April 2002, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
warned government officials in a classified report that authorities in Beijing
were "actively planning to damage and disrupt U.S. computer systems through
the use of Internet hacking and computer viruses."17
"The People's Liberation Army does not yet have the capability to carry out
its intended goal of disrupting Taiwanese military and civilian infrastructures
or U.S. military logistics using computer virus attacks," said the CIA
report. However, a Chinese virus attack is "capable of reaching e-mail
communications, laptops brought into China and U.S. Internet-based
computers."18
25 Apr. 20::)2. Fiint.
10
Inside China. the line between hackers and the government began to blur in
2002, as well, though it has never entirely disappeared. An individual by the
alias of Chang Wei described working for a secret department of the Ministry
of Information Technology and Telecommunication Industries. Known as
"Internet Warriors," recruits came often from university campuses.
19
The relationship between hackers and the government became a two-
way street. A member of the Red Hacker Alliance was approached by the
government to collect classified U.S. military information, for instance, but
passed on the assignment - though he did peruse the e-mails of a U.S.
general officer. Economic espionage was more attractive and paid well. Driven
by its desire to advance China's interests, the alliance, too, wanted to become
part of the government's burgeoning apparatus.
20
In 2003, the Communist Party simply pressed entire private companies into
military service. In the Dongshan District of Guangzhou, the Communist Party
purchased the provincial telecommunications company, data communications
bureau, microwave communications bureau and satellite corporation and
turned them into a militia information warfare battalion of the PLA Companies
such as Net Ease Guangdong and the China Unicom Paging Company in
Guangzhou were brought into the fold, as well.
21
Beijing was acting on a large, strategic ambition: It wanted to protect the
economic miracle that was unfolding and that guaranteed stability in the
world's most populous nation. It wanted to transform a large but ponderous
army and security infrastructure into a force capable of fighting and winning a
local war against a foreign adversary. Only then could China defend its territory,
assert territorial claims, project power in Asia, and credibly wield influence
around the world.
Technology held the keys to rapid results, and network warfare, like space and
electronic warfare technology, was one of those keys. The shift was "driven
by the perception that winning local wars against adversaries with greater
technological advantages, such as the United States, may not be possible
without a strong information warfare capability to first control enemy access
to its own information."22 To that end, two PLA papers, published in 2000
and 2005, described seizing control of an adversary's information flow as a
prerequisite to air and naval superiority.23
The result denying an enemy access to information essential to combat
operations - was Integrated Network Electronic Warfare, wangdian yitizha,l. In
1999, as the Chinese officer corps sought new ways of war, a member of the
faculty of the PLA's Electronic Engineering Academy, Maj. Gen. Dai Qingmin,
described seizing control of the electromagnetic spectrum. By 2002, the
time of the CIA warning, he may have drafted a report on the adoption of an
information warfare strategy that combined integrated network warfare with
electronic warfare, cyber war and jamming.
24
Fs.::>r::es of ChinEt Cn-lucr :::cpcitation. Fep.
virq!nia: f\Jcr:hrcp Grumm8.:i,
11
In 2004, a PLA white paper flatly stated that at the core of its transformation
was "building an informationalized force and winning an informationalized war."
Slimming down its force by more than 200,000 troops and investing at the rate
of nearly 12 percent per year, or between $50 and $100 billion, began to yield
"a qualitative transformation for the Chinese military:Z5 By 2005, the PLA was
better able to gather, use and disseminate information to conduct precision
strike warfare.
And it was better able to deny information to opponents through network,
electronic and space-based warfare. Of 10 notable achievements by the PLA
in 2005, the first three computing, space and so-called "assassin's mace"
weapons, capable of defeating an enemy by surprise all revolved around the
battle space of information technology and computer networks.26
At the highest levels, much of this was driven by Chinese President Hu Jin Tao,
who personally led the military revolution. Hu has not only qualitatively changed
the PLA but also provided it a new duty in Chinese society: safeguarding
dramatic economic growth, which in turn stabilizes a large, ethnically diverse
and geographically far-flung population.
In a 2005 speech to PLA officers, for instance, he said the country faced
"severe challenges" at home and abroad and that the PLA must do its all
in "safeguarding national interests regarding development."27 In 2006,
Hu ordered the PLA to focus on training in "complex electromagnetic
environments," meaning combined electronic warfare and network attack.
28
Officially, China has denied that cyber attacks have come from within its
borders. However. Scott Henderson, an American consultant and former
Army intelligence officer. traced attacks in 2005 against British networks back
to IP addresses for servers in China. While this alone did not conclusively prove
the attacks originated there, he found additional clues: the use of a "backdoor"
for infiltration, and the tools Gray Pigeon and NetThief all favored by the
Red Hacker Alliance. He also found congratulatory messages thanking "elder
hackers" for a job well done.
29
Since 2005. the PLA has trained its red units to seize control of enemy
blue forces' command and control enemy networks often within minutes.
Exercises have often combined information warfare and countering electronic
warfare attacks. PartiCipating units included conventional and nuclear missile
brigades and then an entire division in the Lanzhou Military Region.30
Although Maj. Gen. Dai Qingmin, the father of network warfare, retired fror.1
the military in 2007, Integrated Network Electronic Warfare was his lasting
legacy. As the first decade of the century ended, the army established at least
12 informationalized training facilities for field units and expanded exercises to
include as many as four military regions simultaneously.31
The Third Department of the PLA General Staff. home of signals intelligence.
is now responsible for computer network exploitation. The Fourth Department.
12
which conducts electronic warfare, now plays the lead role in computer
network attack. In addition to active-duty units, the PLA has turned to militia
units where personnel range in age, are often from academic backgrounds in
information technology and know foreign languages.
These militia units further blur the lines between the military and civilians,
between state-sponsored intelligence-gathering and freelance hacking.
between training for war and spying for country. In March 2008, the PLA
established just such a militia unit in Yongning County, in Ningxia Province. The
unit would "in peacetime extensively collect information adversary networks
and establish databases of adversary network data."32
In wartime, the militia would attack enemy networks and resist attacks.
However, it would undergo just 10 days of basic military skills training. And
given the rather specialized line of work as well as the need to keep up morale.
commanders would be able to relax the usually strict military age and physical
fitness requirements.
33
Hacking has its privileges, even inside the People's
Liberation Army.
U.S.-01ina EcorO';ir; and Se8Url1:/ C o r n ~
13
A crewmember on a Chinese trawler uses a grapple hook in an apparent attempt to
snag the towed acoustic array of the USNS Impeccable, which was 75 miles south of
Hainan Island.
Photo Credit: U.S. Navy photo/Released
8. Beijing, the PLA and Cyber Attacks
Even as Google seemed likely to shutter its Chinese operations, the Beijing
government continued to dismiss the original reports, noting that hacking in
China is illegal, and challenged critics to prove the government wrong. Google,
the government said, had not yet filed an official complaint.
34
In the weeks that followed the news reports of early 2010, official news outlets
in China said the network attacks had nothing to do with China or at most
were the youthful exuberance of China's hacker culture on display.35 Yet a
Financial Times account revealed that Operation Aurora, as the latest attacks
were known, was the work of a freelance security consultant; the government
simply had "special access" to his work, which he posted on a forum.36
The reality is that in China there is no clear line between its truly organiC hacker
culture and the government. The line is blurred and the two overlap. Hackers
are left alone to go after foreign networks. They are also given instructions via
state media to end attacks. China's historic use of a huge civilian network to
gather intelligence has merely extended itself online.
Hacker.s.
G(:(:gI8.' 2C: F e ~ I , 2010.
Rn8nci2J Tirres 21 Feb. ~ O 1 0
,-IU
'IJS. E'{'pelt
14
"Ultimately a loose connection between Beijing intelligence operatives and
patriotic hackers is more troubling than a strong one."37 Indeed, the idea
of a separation between government and the people is an entirely quaint,
Western cultural paradigm that fails to understand the views of the world's last
successful communist party. In the eyes of the party, the state and the people
are one in the same.
"In Chinese SOCiety, independence from government direction and control does
not carry with it the idea of separation from the state," writes Henderson, the
former Army intelligence officer, in his book, The Dark Visitor: Inside China's
Hacker Culture. The government maintains contacts with hackers, uses
selected ones in flexible operations and allows most to retain autonomy. "The .
masses figure heavily into China's strategic calculations and will be used in
times of conflict and peace."38
Beijing's Foreign Ministry has always denied government involvement and
dared those who complained to prove it wrong. But based upon the body of
historic and contemporary evidence, there seems little reason to take those
flat denials seriously. At the very least, a reasonable intelligence officer, forced
to make a choice about what is most likely, would choose to say that China's
government is most likely behind cyber attacks against the United States. Its
military and security apparatus has the most to gain in carrying out its mission.
"Let us be candid," said Larry Wortzel, a former intelligence officer and vice
chairman of the U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission. "A
logical person would conclude that some of this activity is directed by the
Chinese government. "39
"There may be a group of patriotic hackers in China who just hate criticism
of the Communist Party and would take such action," he continued, adding
that some economic espionage may emanate at the direction of Chinese
companies. "But I believe such persistent, systematic and sophisticated
attacks, some of which have taken place in the United States, in China, in
Germany and in the United Kingdom, most likely are state directed."40
lUI
III
To be very specific, much of the evidence for hacking abroad points at the
Chinese government, most likely directly at the People's Liberation Army itself.
State-sponsored hacking inside China is likely the work of the Ministry of State
Security.
Along with the Ministry of State Security, the PLA is China's chief intelligence
gathering organization. The State Security Ministry has the lead role in
collecting political intelligence, including monitoring dissident groups abroad.
But the army's Second Department, or Military Intelligence Department, has
collected strategic and military information - and has been the most active in
collecting technological information as far back as the 1 990s. 41
15
The Second Department is just one of five organizations within the PLA
with an explicit intelligence mission in peacetime, as well as war fighting
missions during conflict. The Third Department collects signals intelligence.
The Fourth Department conducts network operations. The International
Liaison Department collects additional foreign political intelligence. And 11
known defense companies are additionally charged with collecting foreign
technology.42
All these efforts are compiling vast amounts of information for both economic
and military purposes during peacetime and honing the military's ability to
conduct integrated network warfare in case of conflict. The Ministry of State
Security does not have an explicit foreign cyber espionage mission; only the
military does.
43
In 2009, Canadian researchers released a study that is the most detailed and
systematic analysis in an unclassified form to date. While most media accounts
seized on the discovery of armies of unwitting computers and laptops pressed
into service, buried in the report was the source of many cyber attacks: Hainan
Island.
44
The report's authors found that a server traced to Hainan Telecom was one of
four command servers directing infiltrations around the world.45 The authors
were careful to caution that an IP address alone does not indicate the actual
origin of the attacks. It simply might be a random or a criminal enterprise
employing servers in China as a sort of false-flag operation, or a random
coincidence. Alternate explanations were not "inconceivable."
But the obvious conclusion was also the inescapable one: state-sponsored
cyber espionage, which reached from India to Taiwan, was compared to
the arc of a giant radar, scanning China's most important problems. As the
researchers wrote:
"The most obvious explanation and certainly the one in which the
circumstantial evidence tilts the strongest would be that this set of high profile
targets has been exploited by the Chinese state for military and strategic
intelligence purposes. Indeed... many of the high-confidence, high-value
targets that we identified are clearly linked to Chinese foreign and defense
policy, particularly in South and Southeast Asia."46
"Many of the high-profile targets reflect some of China's most vexing
foreign and security policy issues, including Tibet and Taiwan. Moreover, the
attacker(s) IP addresses examined here trace back in at least several instances
to Hainan Island, home of the Lingshui Signals intelligence facility and the Third
Technical Department of the People's Liberation Army."47
In addition, there were other clues indicating state-sponsorship: 103 different
targets of primarily political, not financial, value - such as financial information
or personal data requiring an array of linguistic skill. Targets ranged from
16
Israeli to Russian to Laotian and Iranian government facilities, Third parties
were undoubtedly employed, but effective exploitation and analysis of their
results would be difficult at best - without the resources of a government
agency,48
In April, 2009, Rafal Rhozinski, one of the report's authors and chief e x e c u ~ i v e
of the SecDev group, told the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission that "all the circumstantial evidence pOints to a network that is, in
effect, Chinese-operated." Based upon more than IP addresses, the team had
"a high degree of certainty that the attackers were located in Hainan Island,
China. "49
"'Il,ij
17
YuHn (Sanya) Naval Base
Hainan Island, China
Tunnef to underground facility
This satellite photo shows details of the naval base of Hainan Island, China.
9. The PLA and Hainan Island
At 1822' and 1847' north latitude and between 10945' and 11008' eastern
longitude, Hainan Island is composed of 12,000 square miles in the South
China Sea, home to 8 million people, long sandy beaches, a lush rainforest
and a steady influx of tourists.
It is also home to a compex of military facilities network warfare, space
launch, air and naval that oombined represent the future of the Chinese
military, unfolding in the present. "Although appearing to be a tourist island
of native tribes and small villages, Hainan Island features an embedded, but
nearly invisible, strong military electronic infrastructure."5o
The island is part of a large complex that stretches from Guangzhou, home
of the PLA Navy's South Sea Fleet, out to a string of radars, communications
20J3,Cictot.:sr SIGNt.L
18
relays and bases reaching southward into the Paracel and Spratley Islands,
seized from Vietnam in 1974, Because of exposure on islands and reefs they
provide a rare glimpse into a military electronics complex otherwise hidden on
the mainland.
For over 40 years, this area has been the focus of the Chinese military's best
efforts to gather information about the region and the world as well as to
project force; the area around Hainan is one of the most strategically important
and sensitive in the world. Chinas great vulnerability has always been its
inability to defend this area of approach to its coast.
Its increasing strength here will determine its ability to collect vast amounts
of intelligence in peacetime and fight a high-tech, network-centric conflict in
wartime.
IlIIIIIllIIIIIiI1
IlIIIII
In the 1960s, the PLA began building upon military infrastructure left behind
by the Japanese during World War II, which included coal and ore mines,
railways, a submarine base at Yulin and long-range radar sites, likely at Yulin,
Basuo and Haikou.
51
In 1965, the PLA built a low frequency (LF) radio station, and from 1964 to
1982, erected very low frequency (VLF) communications for submarines and
surface ships. In the 1970s, the military built an over-the-horizon (OTH) radar
followed by the likely operational deployment of one in the 1990s.
52
Early electronic intelligence listening posts were likely built on Hainan's
southwest mountain tops. In 1968, one was established at the Lingshui
air base on the southeast coast and then greatly expanded in 1995 with
approximately 1 ,000 signal analysts, along with a large satellite downlink
facility, a computer complex and links to both Beijing and to a weather outpost
in Antarctica.
53
The electronic capabilities of ships and aircraft augmented the island
network. Much of the work involved intercepting and eavesdropping on
international satellite communications, particularly, Russian and American
communications.
54
The work at Hainan was so crucial to China that it became
of intense interest to the United States.
That interest frequently led to controversy and tragedy. As early as 1951, U.S.
Navy intelligence relied upon Royal Air Force Spitfire sUNeillance over flights
from Hong Kong,55 In 1954, PLA fighters shot down a Cathay-Pacific Airways
flight near the island, killing 10 of 19.
56
Beijing apologized, saying it mistook
the aircraft for a Taiwanese craft; both fighter pilots were rumored to be
executedY
In February 1970, an unmanned U.S. Navy SK-5 drone ran out of fuel while
heading for North Vietnam to assess pre- and post-strike targets and landed
;:'<)01. PD. 1610
19
on Hainan notably, on the eve of bilateral talks in Warsaw.58 In July 1995,
two U.S. naval attaches were arrested on the island for photographing and
videotaping areas of the Lingshui air base.
59
That August, the PLA informed
U.S. military contacts that in the interests of bilateral ties it would consider "the
incident to be over. "60
Indeed, in the late 1990s, the PLA and the U.S. military were on the verge of
their first official bilateral relationship in decades, culminating in a PLA navy
port call at Pearl Harbor in 1997.
61
But the name of the game, increasingly,
was space. On Hainan, Beijing was busy building a space port, to extend
intelligence-gathering, and war fighting, into space. In 2001, a report noted:
"In space and on earth, the island and region should become even more
important to China's intelligence-gathering effortS."62
As a result, the island continues to be of interest to U.S. intelligence-gathering
and reconnaissance. In 2001, the EP-3E Airies, in its emergency descent, likely
overflew the signals intelligence complex. And since that time, the U.S. Navy
has continued to ply the waters trying to learn more about the PLA's activities.
In March 2009, the USNS Impeccable, an unarmed electronic intelligence
vessel working for the National Security Agency, was harassed by Chinese
boats, 75 miles south of Hainan. In the Yellow Sea, Chinese naval vessels at
nearly the same time used high-intensity lighting to illuminate the bridge of
another surveillance vessel, the USNS Victorious. PLA aircraft overflew both
U.S. spy ships, revealing an increasingly well-networked effort to safeguard
modernization and military secrets.
63
Today, Hainan is an excellent example of the results of China's military
modernization, undertaken in the last decade as the United States, in
turn, has been bogged down in two grinding invasions, occupations and
counterinsurgencies. The island integrates space-based and ground-based
electronic intelligence gathering, electronic warfare and network operations
warfare, an underground submarine base, a surface fleet force, and a new
generation of fighter aircraft.
In its quest for strategic defense of the mainland, the PLA is building offensive
capabilities, too, which are not incompatible with strategic defense of China.
These include fourth- generation aircraft, better air defenses, increasingly
sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles and a qualitative improvement in the
officer corps.64
By most estimates, the PLA is still a decade from projecting power across
the Asia-Pacific region; however, China is spending as much as $175 billion
on its military each year. Its emphasis on space, cyber warfare, electronic
warfare and long-range precision strike could "enable China to achieve
strategiC surprise."65 At the heart of all this, just as at the center of Hainan, is
information warfare, where China has made its greatest strides.
dO,\'TlOf S. 0:\)116,' Leterto tr'le 1)f.k.. "':8
j.JaticmJ Sf)CCJrity
997L Plir-t.
E\ _'.,
20
The United States has its own cyber warfare capabilites. Pictures here are
members of the U.S. Air Force's Cyberspace Command.
Photo Credit: U.S. Air Force photo
10. Cyber Attacks and Cyber Espionage
In a recent article in The Washington Post, the former director of national
intelligence and former director of the National Security Agency, retired Vice
Adm. Mike McConnell, said, 'The United States is fighting a cyber war today
and we are losing. It's that simple. As the most wired nation on Earth, we offer
the most targets of significance, yet our cyber-defenses are lacking. "66
Comparing the current threat to the Cold War's existential challenge,
McConnell went on to suggest a Cold War-like crash course program that
binds together the federal government and the private sector, among other
elements, since most cyber expertise is within the NSA and most information
infrastructure is owned by private industry.
28 201::).
21
However expert McConnell's analysis was, it tended to conflate cyber war with
cyber espionage. It is true that many countries, specifically China, are "pinging
U.S. computer systems and preparing to use cyber warfare in a potential
future conflict."67 That is a grave potential threat if a conflict arises. But the
immediate problem is not cyber combat; it is cyber espionage.
Espionage may well lay the foundation for a potential conflict in the future. But
in the present, the Chinese government is currently stealing U.S. and private
sector data, trade secrets and defense information, and costing billions of
dollars. Indeed, China's efforts to collect data and information on network
vulnerabilities is a large enough threat by itself; adequately dealt with it begins
to forestall the possibilities of Chinese cyber-dominance in case of war.
"The U.S. information infrastructure, which includes telecommunications,
computer networks and systems and the data that resides on them, is critical
to most aspects of modern life in the United States," Lt. Gen. Michael D.
Maples, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said. "Recent hackin9
activities emanating from China underscore concerns about potential hostile
intelligence collection activities."63
Talk of future war aside, China's cyber espionage efforts are part of a much
bigger picture: an unprecedented wave of reconnaissance, surveillance,
intelligence gathering and old-fashioned spying, unlike any that the United
States has seen since the Cold War's end 20 years ago.
In contrast to targeted U.S. intelligence efforts, Chinese cyber espionage
is part of an historic intelligence methodology intended to scoop up every
available piece of information, known as the "grains of sand" approach. Where
once China's espionage was human, it is now also digital.
A simple review of public records, for instance, reveals at least 40 incidents
in three years in which people in the United States have been arrested for,
charged and in many cases convicted of spying for China. Most of these cases
prosecuted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation involve the iilegal transfer of
technology, often for potential military application.
69
The federal government has launched 540 investigations into illegal technology
transfers to China since 2000.
70
China poses "the biggest (espionage) threat
to the U.S. today," according to David Szady, former assistant director of the
FBI's counterintelligence division. Much of it is alleged old-fashioned, human
spying.
22
Here is a chronology of known cases in just the first three quarters of 2009:
In January 2000, one individual was arrested for exporting to China restricted
electronic components that were used in American tanks.71
In March 2009, a woman, her husband and a company were all charged
with illegally exporting components for a "miniature unmanned aerial vehicle" to
China beginning in 2007.72
In April 2009, a former employee of an environmental information
management portal tried to steal software that would allow the users to
control an environment, including air emissions, ambient water quality and
groundwater quality. The individual attempted to steal it after being fired and
worked to sell a modified version to the Chinese.
73
In May 2009, the owner of a company that produces electronic components
was sentenced to 60 months in prison with two years of parole for conspiring
to bring military electronic components to China, including technology that
could be used in radar and missile target acquisition systems.
74
In May 2000, a former civilian employee of the Department of Defense was
accused of conspiring to pass documents, including papers examining China's
military capabilities, to Chinese intelligence services. He was the second
Pentagon employee charged with working with a Chinese businessman, in an
alleged espionage ring. He was sentenced to three years in prison in January
2010.
75
In June 2000, one individual was charged with buying 12 infrared thermal
imaging cameras with the intent of illegally transporting them to China.7
6
In July 2009, one individual was charged with selling to the Chinese
technology used to encrypt military communications. He claimed to be
working for the Chinese government. 77
In August 2009, one individual was sentenced to 40 months in prison for
exporting 400 integrated circuits for military radar systems to China.
78
In October 2009, one individual and two companies were charged with
exporting defense articles and electronics to China.
79
By all authoritative estimates, China's intelligence services are among the most
aggressive of all foreign intelligence services attempting to penetrate U.S.
targets.
80
According to the office of the U.S. director of National Intelligence:
"The counterintelligence community considers the People's Republic of China
to be one of the most aggressive countries targeting U.S. military, political and
economic secrets as well as sensitive U.S. trade secrets and technologies. "81
While Chinese intelligence services continue to employ traditional and patient
methods of collecting large amounts of information, techniques are changing
as these activities become more aggressive. Agents have generally recruited
Chinese-Americans but are now turning to U.S. citizens of other ethnic
backgrounds. While the Ministry of State Security watches political dissidents
and ethnic separatists, the military's Second Department focuses on acquiring
technology with military applications.
82
\crk Times. 11'1::?- ~ ~ E : ? " v
Busi
.Alrny l1mes Puttlishir:9 COi!";par!y',
COiYlparlY, '.Neb.
23
The PLA relies upon collection through its military attaches in embassies,
front companies and other intelligence operations, including cyber operations.
Information from recent criminal indictments in the United States indicates
that there are four kinds of operations: "actuarial" intelligence gathered from
various sources, "professional" operations using Chinese agents, "enterprise
directed" acquisition of controlled technology by state scientific research and
"entrepreneurial" industrial espionage and illegal technology transfers.
83
The net result is the most widespread intelligence-gathering effort that the
United States has endured since the collapse of the Soviet Union two decades
ago. The effort raises serious national security challenges, no doubt. But as
in all things pertaining to China, cyber security can be prone to exaggeration
and lead to an increased - and unhealthy - relationship between the federal
government and the private sector.
Already, the NSA and telecommunications companies were caught in
warrantless wiretapping during the Bush administration; the companies were
granted legal immunity but the damage to personal freedoms was done. A
new collaboration in the name of thwarting cyber war can also pose a threat
to individual freedoms on the Internet. And it would be hypocritical in the
extreme not to acknowledge that the United States, through the U.S. Strategic
Command and the U.S. Air Force, is operating a very robust network warfare
capability of its own.
"As anyone slightly versed in the Internet knows, the net has flourished
because no government has control over it. But there are creeping signs of
danger," warned Ryan Singel in Wired.
84
While the national security challer.ge is
espionage today and potential war in the future, there is a current and pressing
economic cost to cyber espionage, too. And though estimating methodologies
are somewhat anecdotal and speculative, the damages do appear to be
climbing.
Worldwide losses to all cyber attacks were $226 billion for all forms of ove:'!
cyber attacks.
85
In January, 2010, one study surveyed 600 information
technology professionals at energy, transportation, water and sewage,
technology, telecommunications and financial services in 14 countries. It
concluded that the cost of cyber attacks from downtime alone - costs the
average corporation $6.3 million each day.8
0
However, a RAND report published in late 2009 concluded that the total
cost to the United States - including but not limited to the private sector,
shareholders, government and taxpayers - is actually measured in the
hundreds of billions of dollars per year.
87
,Ian "/\;2[:. .
C I ~ E T CBS rnteracti'J8, -Neb.
24
11. Conclusion and Recommendations
The costs and well-documented threats to the United States will no doubt
increase dramatically if the problem of cyber espionage and security is not
addressed aggressively and in the very near future. This white paper has
sought to shed new light on this subject and by doing so increase the sense of
urgency among America's pelicy-makers, business leaders and citizens.
Already, a significant resource exists that can help not just understand the
problem but provide much-needed solutions: the U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission. Created by law in 2000, the bipartisan
commission undertakes and publishes a comprehensive review of the
spectrum of bilateral relations, from economics and finance to national security.
It is our recommendation that Congress hold open hearings not just on the
commission's findings but its recommendations as they relate to all human
and cyber espionage matters, not just cyber security. Cyber espionage, as this
paper has put forth, is part of a larger national and economic security issue.
Viewing it in isolation as a technical problem dangerously obscures its roots
and implications.
In addition, Congress should conduct oversight work to ensure that the
recommendations of the commission are followed by the administration to the
best of its ability. Further, it is our view that Congress should adopt a sense of
deliberate haste and complete these tasks before the commission publishes
its next annual report in late 2010. The commission's full report is found on its
own website, www.uscc.gov.
Here we republish their recommendations on both human and cyber
espionage matters:
88
The Commission recommends that Congress assess the adequacy of
resources available for intelligence, counterintelligence, and export control
enforcement programs to ensure that U.S. government agencies are able to
meet the rising challenge of Chinese human intelligence and illicit technology
collection.
The Commission recommends that Congress assess the adequacy of
resources available for China-oriented counterintelligence awareness and
law enforcement programs throughout the U.S. government and contractor
community.
The Commission recommends that Members of Congress in their
interparliamentary exchanges raise U.S. concerns regarding the monitoring
and harassment of U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents by agents
of the Chinese government. China's Cyber Activities that Target the United
States, and the Resulting Impacts on U.S. National Security
The Commission recommends that Congress assess the effectiveness of
and resourcing for law enforcement, defense, and intelligence community
initiatives that aim to develop effective and reliable attribution techniques for
computer exploitation and computer attacks.
The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to
develop measures to deter malicious Chinese cyber activity directed at critical
U.S. infrastructure and U.S. government information systems.
:C'U.S-Chl:lB Econornio and
25
12. Chronology of Key Events
Today's Cyber Attacks: A Fifteen Year Political-Military History
1995, China triggers the Third Taiwan Crisis by launching missiles and
live-fire exercises in an attempt to sway Taiwanese elections.

1996, The Third Taiwan Crisis ends in humiliation for the People's
Liberation Army as two U.S. carrier task forces sail unmolested in the
Taiwan Strait.
1998, Chinese hackers deface Indonesian websites as riots target ethnic

Chinese. Hackers strike networks in South Korea, Japan and the United
States.

1999, a U.S. 8-1 bomber bombs the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.
Chinese hackers shut down the White House website and two Chinese
colonels publish Unrestricted Warfare.

2000, the People's Liberation Army issues a paper saying that control
of the electro-magnetic spectrum is a prerequisite to successful combat
operations.

2001, a U.S. Navy E-P3E Aries spy aircraft is forced into an emergency
landing on Hainan Island, home to a key Signals intelligence unit. U.S.
government websites are hacked.

2002, the founder of the PlA's network warfare strategy is reported
to have drawn up the mirtary's formal adoption of the strategy as a
cornerstone in its modernization.

2003, the Communist Party presses entire public companies into military
service, including telecommunications, software and other information
companies.

2004, a PLA white paper flatly states that at the core of its
transformation is "building an informationalized force and winning an
informationalized war." .
2005, President Hu Jin Tao orders the military to safeguard economic
growth, and military units train to seize control of adversary computer
networks within seconds.
2006, Hu orders the PLA to focus on training in "complex
electromagnetic environments" - combined electronic warfare and
network attack.

2007, the PLA operates a dozen training facilities that teach the PLA
how to wage full-spectrum, electronic, information and network warfare.

2008, the PLA continues to expand its network warfare capabilities by
creating new militia units.

2009, Canadian researchers indicate that cyber attacks emanate from
Hainan Island, home to key Chinese military units. U.S. Navy vessels are
harassed near the island.

2010, Google threatens to quit China over intrusions into its networks. In
the United States, hundreds of investigations and dozens of spy charges
are under way or pending.
26
1 About
Richard Parker was the lead investigator on this project. A principal at
Medius Research, he is a journalist and publishing executive. He writes an
occasional, syndicated column carried by McClatchy Tribune Information
Services to more than 400 newspapers and news sites. He is an advisor
to news organizations, was the associate publisher of The New Republic,
executive editor of Stratfor, and covered military affairs for Knight -Ridder
Newspapers. He has twice been the visiting professional in journalism at the
University of Texas at Austin, and holds a master's degree in political science
from Tulane University and a bachelor's degree from Trinity University.
Dale Eisman wrote the foreword to this report and provided an independent
perspective. He is a veteran reporter and editor who for 15 years covered
the Pentagon and Congress for the Virginian-Pilot. He has written extensively
about politics and defense issues, particularly naval affairs. He has most
recently written about defense issues for AOL News. He is a graduate of
Indiana University.
Casey Blaine edited this project. She is a former editor in the Hong Kong
bureau of Time magazine and was the acquisitions editor at Baylor University
Press, among a variety of assignments. She is a graduate of the University of
Missouri at Columbia with a bachelor's degree in political science.
Axel Gerdau contributed by reviewing this report. Having lived and worked
in Beijing, he interviewed the Dalai Lama for The Hamburg Abendblatt, and
has written for Suddeutsche Zeitung and Stern online. He is a master's degree
candidate at the LBJ School of Public Affairs.
Molly Maroney provided research assistance and helped coordinate this
project. She is an undergraduate at the University of Texas at Austin.
Kimber Wigley provided design direction. She is a graduate in journalism
from the University of Texas at Austin.
27
medius
Medius Research provides objective insight, analysis and survey research
for companies and nonprofit institutions alike. Since 2005, Medius, its
principals and subject matter experts, drawn from the ranks of journalism
and other research professions, have helped shed light on pressing public
issues.
Medius Research
1025 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 1000
202.857.9710
www.mediusresearch.com
Electronic delivery
Reports are also available by subscription at the telephone number above
or online by download at Scribd.com.
Copyright
2010 Medius Research. All Rights Reserved. Neither this publication
nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of Medius
Research.
All information in this report is verified to the best of the author's and
the publisher's ability. However, Medius does not accept responsibility
for any loss arising from reliance on it. To learn more, please contact
202.857.9710.
This report was commissioned by Patriot Majority. Formed in 2005, Patriot
Majority believes it is our patriotic duty as Americans to pursue new poliCies
that strengthen our national security, boost our economy, achieve energy
independence, make health care affordable, provide quality education and
protect public safety.
Patriot Majority
300 M Street NE, Suite 1102
www.patriotmajority.com
202.558.4945

China, Cyber Espionage and U.S. National Security: A White Paper

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

China, Cyber Espionage and U.S. National Security: A White Paper

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

China, Cyber Espionage and U.S.

You might also like