CASE DIGESTS by KIM skrrrt
execution. Upon motion
RES JUDICATA
Eulogio v. Bell
G.R. No. 186322, July 08, 2015
FACTS:
The Bell siblings (respondents) are the unmarried children of
respondent Spouses Paterno C. Bell and Rogelia Calingasan-Bell. In
1995, the Bell siblings lodged a Complaint docketed as Civil Case No.
4581 at the (RTC) of Batangas City for annulment of documents,
reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against petitioners
Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio (the Eulogios). The
Complaint sought the annulment of the contract of sale executed by
Spouses Bell over their residential house and lot, as well as the
cancellation of the title obtained by petitioners by virtue of the
Deed.
The RTC granted respondents' prayers and ordered the Register
of Deeds of Batangas City to cancel TCT in the name of defendants
the Eulogios and to
reconstitute TCT as "family home" of the plaintiffs the Bell siblings
and Sps. Bell.
However RTC declared Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in the
amount of PI million
plus 12% interest per annum.
On 9 June 2004 the RTC issued a Writ of Execution, as a result of
which respondents'
property covered by the newly reconstituted TCT was levied on
by respondents, the trial court, on 31 August 2004, ordered the
lifting of the writ of
execution on the ground that the property was a family home. RTC
issued on 25 November 2004 an Order directing the issuance of a
writ of execution. Consequently, respondents filed before the CA a
Supplemental Petition with an urgent prayer for a temporary
restraining order.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Injunction before the
CA docketed as 87531. CA eventually enjoined the execution. On 09
February 2009, the CA denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: W/N a hearing to determine the value of respondents' family
home for purposes of execution under Article 160 of the Family
Code is barred under the principle of res judicata.
HELD:
YES. Res judicata applies, considering that the parties are litigating
over the same property. Moreover, the same contentions and
evidence advanced by the petitioners to substantiate their claim
over respondents' family home have already been used to support
their arguments in the main proceedings.
Res judicata (meaning, a "matter adjudged") is a fundamental
principle of law that precludes parties from re-litigating issues
actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. It
may be argued that the cause of action in the main proceedings was
the sale of the property in dispute, while in the execution
proceedings it was the indebtedness of Spouses Bell to petitioners.
The settled rule, however, is that identity of causes of action does
not mean absolute identity. Otherwise, a party could easily escape
the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the action or
the relief sought. The test to determine whether the causes of
action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will
sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity of the facts
essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts
or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the
same, and a judgment in the first case would be a bar to the
subsequent action. Hence, a party cannot, by varying the form of
action or adopting a different method of presenting the case,
escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause
of action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or
their privies.
GUERRERO v. DIRECTOR, LAND MANAGEMENT BUREAU
G.R. No. 183641, April 22, 2015
FACTS:
Petitioner Guerrero obtained an OCT over a parcel of land in
Quezon City which was issued in his name. However, the
Bustamantes protested on the the title's alleged encroachment.
The Office of the President remanded the case to the DENR for an
ocular investigation and resurvey of the disputed area.
Subsequently, the DENR was ordered to "take action" for the
correction of the technical description of the property based on the
findings of the ocular investigation and relocation survey. Hence,
the Director of Lands filed a Petition for Amendments of the Plan
and Technical Description in the name Guerrero with the RTC. The
RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the
RTC decision.
SC affirmed the decisions of the CA and RTC dismissing the petition
of the government based on the protest filed by Bustamante. In
that case, it was held that there was no proof that the titleholder,
Benjamin Guerrero, employed fraud in obtaining his title.
However, herein Respondent heirs of Bustamante filed another case
with the LMB, DENR, to again question Guerrero's title. They alleged
that that Guerrero’s property covers square meters on which the
house of Marcelo is standing. They also alleged that fraud and
misrepresentation was used by Guerrero which is a ground for the
cancellation of the title.
ISSUE: W/N Res Judicata applies.
RULING:
YES. Res judicata is applicable considering that the protest filed by
private respondents is subsequent to a final judgment rendered by
this Court.
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the four requisites of res
judicata exist.
This Court finds that Respondent heirs of Bustamante, in filing their
protest, are only repeating what had previously been done by their
predecessor Angelina Bustamante. The protest by Angelina with the
Director of Lands was what started the process that ultimately led
to the decision in Republic v. Guerrero, a process that merely
mirrors the currently pending protest of private respondents with
public respondent LMB-DENR, the successor of the Bureau of Lands.
Both protests essentially allege Guerrero's title's encroachment on
the Bustamantes' alleged property. Both pray for the government to
file a petition in court to question Guerrero's title. Both protests
ultimately seek the amendment or cancellation of the title, for the
allegedly fraudulent encroachment. Such matters, however, have
long been examined, decided and settled with finality.
YAMSON v. CASTRO
G.R. No. 194763-64, July 20, 2016
FACTS:
The petitioners and Danilo C. Castro & George F. Inventor
(respondents) are all officials and employees of the Davao City
Water District (DCWD). Engr. Wilfred G. Yamson (Yamson), Engr.
Rey C. Chavez (Chavez), Arnold D. Navales (Navales) and Atty.
William V. Guillen (Guillen) occupied concurrent membership in its
Pre-Bidding and Awards Committee-B (PBAC-B). Rosindo J. Almonte
(Almonte), meanwhile, was the Division Manager of DCWD's
Engineering and Construction Department, while Alfonso E. Laid
(Laid) was the Assistant General Manager for Administration
(collectively, the petitioners).
In Board Resolution No. 97-248 adopted on November 21, 1997, the
DCWD Board of Directors approved the recommendation of DCWD
General Manager Wilfredo A. Carbonquillo (Carbonquillo) to
undertake the Cabantian Water Supply System Project stage by
stage, with a budgetary cost of P33,200,000.00. Initial activities for
the project were the simultaneous drilling of two wells separately
located in Cabantian (identified as VES 15 Project) and Communal
(identified as VES 21 Project) in Davao City, both estimated at
P4,000,000.00 each. Included in Carbonquillo's recommendation
was the direct negotiation of the well drilling phase of the project to
Hydrock Wells, Inc. (Hydrock).
On November 24, 1997, Hydrock President Roberto G. Puentespina
(Puentespina) wrote Carbonquillo informing DCWD that his
company is "willing to take the risk of undertaking the project to
test the availability of water by drilling the pilot hole so that electric
logging could be done." Puentespina also wrote that they were
willing to undertake the drilling even without the approval of DCWD
as their crew and equipment were idle.
Thereafter, in Resolution No. 05-97 approved on November 25,
1997, the PBAC-B resolved to dispense with the advertisement
requirement in the conduct of the bidding and instead, opted to
send letters to accredited well drillers and invited their participation
in the VES 15 and VES 21 well drilling projects. Invited were
Hydrock, AMG Drilling and Construction, Inc. (AMG) and Drill
Mechanics Incorporated (DMI).
Only Hydrock and AMG responded favorably by submitting their
respective quotations for the projects. AMG, however, requested
that the project be implemented in July 1998 due to the
unavailability of its equipment at the time of the invitation. DMI, for
its part, sent its "regrets" as its drilling rigs are not available for
immediate use.
After more than six years, or on January 12, 2005, the respondents
filed a joint Affidavit-Complaint with the Ombudsman, charging the
petitioners with Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for the alleged
non-observance of the proper bidding procedure in the VES 21
Project and for allegedly giving Hydrock unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the "surreptitious" grant of the contract
to it. The case was docketed as OMB-M-C-05-0051-A.
Two weeks after, or on January 26, 2005, the respondents filed
another joint Affidavit-Complaint21 with the Ombudsman, likewise
charging the petitioners with Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, this time for the VES 15 Project, docketed as OMB-M-C-05-
0054-A.
Less than two months later, the respondents filed two separate
joint Affidavit-Complaints with the Ombudsman, administratively
charging the petitioners with Grave Misconduct, Grave Abuse of
Authority, Dishonesty and Gross Negligence. The respondents
adopted the allegations in the separate criminal complaints they
filed with the Ombudsman against the petitioners in OMB-M-C-05-
0051-A and OMB-M-C-05-0054-A as bases for the administrative
charges. For the VES 21 Project, the administrative case against the
petitioners was docketed as OMB-M-A-05-093-C, while the
administrative case for the VES 15 Project was docketed as OMB-M-
A-05-104-C.
Meanwhile, the Affidavit-Complaint filed on January 26, 2005 in
OMB-M-C-05-0054-A contained essentially the same allegations as
that filed in OMB-M-C-05-0051-A, albeit it referred to the VES 15
Project. The petitioners' allegations and defenses in the latter case
are likewise similar to the foregoing allegations and defenses in the
former case.
ISSUE: W/N Res Judicata applies
HELD:
NO. Clearly, the identity of these two cases is such that judgment in
one administrative case would amount to res judicata in the other
administrative case.
The finding of forum shopping does not, however, automatically
render the two administrative cases dismissible. The consequences
of forum shopping depend on whether the act was wilful and
deliberate or not. If it is not wilful and deliberate, the subsequent
cases shall be dismissed without prejudice. But if it is wilful and
deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions shall be
dismissed with prejudice on the ground of either litis
pendentia or res judicata.
In this case, the Court cannot grant the petitioners' prayer for the
dismissal of the two administrative cases as there is no clear
showing that the respondents' act of filing these was deliberate and
willful. Records show that these cases were premised on the two
criminal complaints for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019,
which were separately filed and entertained by the Ombudsman. At
the most, OMB-M-A-05-104-C (VES 15 Project), which was filed
subsequent to OMB-M-A-05-093-C (VES 21 Project), should be, and
is hereby, dismissed.
MEJIA-ESPINOZA v. CARINO
G.R. No. 193397, Jan. 25, 2017
FACTS:
On, August 25, 1998, Petitioner Espinoza filed an action for
ejectment against respondent Carino before the MTC of Pangasinan
City. It rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner ordering Carino
to vacate the respective properties and to pay rents from time of
default, litigation expenses, and attorney’s fees.
Petitioner filed a motion for a writ of execution which the MTC
granted on March 10, 2005. Sheriff Hortaleza was able to turn over
the property to petitioner’s attorney-in-fact when he found out that
respondent voluntarily vacated the place and levied the commercial
lot owned by respondent to cover the monetary awards for rent,
litigation expenses and attorney’s fees.
On September 19, 2005 or six months after, Carino filed a complaint
as “Annulment of Court Processes with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and/or
Prohibition, and Damages" before the RTC of Dagupan City. She
argued that she was deprived of the opportunity to ask for
reconsideration of the order granting Espinoza's motion for issuance
of writ of execution because she was not furnished a copy of the
order. Espinoza emphasized that the writ of execution was properly
served and received by Nena on March 16, 2005, and that Carino
had already removed all her personal belongings from the premises
weeks before the service of the writ.
The RTC dismissed the case for lack of cause of action and held that
the issuance of writ of execution was rendered moot because
Carino had already relinquished her possession of property. But on
appeal, the CA reversed the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the principle of res judicata applies.
HELD:
YES. Supreme Court was convinced that respondent’s complaint for
annulment of court processes, filed six months after she voluntarily
complied with the writ of execution, was a mere afterthought
designed to evade the execution of a decision that has long attained
finality. Public policy dictates that once a judgment becomes final,
executory, and unappealable, the prevailing party should not be
denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the
losing party.
The fact that she received a copy of the writ without any protest
and voluntarily vacated the premises and turned over possession to
Espinoza's representative are actions of respondent’s recognition to
the writ of execution and is therefore, estopped from questioning
its validity. Thus the principle of res judicata applies in this case.
RATIO DECIDENDI
GONZALES v. SOLID CEMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 198423, October 23, 2012
FACTS:
The current petition arose from the execution of the final and
executory judgment in the parties’ illegal dismissal dispute (referred
to as "original case"). The Labor Arbiter (LA) resolved the case at his
level on December 12, 2000. Since the LA found that an illegal
dismissal took place, the company reinstated petitioner Gonzales in
the payroll on January 22, 2001.
The series of developments in the original case and in the current
petition are as follows:
 October 5, 1999 Solid Cement terminated Gonzales
employment;
 December 12, 2000 The LA declared that Gonzales was
illegally dismissed and ordered his reinstatement;
 January 5, 2001 Gonzales filed a Motion for Execution of
reinstatement aspect;
 January 22, 2001 Solid Cement reinstated Gonzales in the
payroll;
 March 26, 2002 The NLRC modified the LA decision by
reducing amount of damages awarded by the LA but
otherwise affirmed the judgment;
 June 28, 2004 The CA dismissed Solid Cements certiorari
petition;
 March 9, 2005 The Court ultimately denied Solid Cements
petition for review;
 July 12, 2005 The judgment became final and an entry of
judgment was recorded;
 July 15, 2008 Gonzales was actually reinstated;
 August 4, 2008 Gonzales filed with the LA a motion for the
issuance of an alias writ of execution (with computation of
monetary benefits as of August 28, 2008 the day before his
termination anew, allegedly due to redundancy, shall take
effect);
 August 18, 2009 The LA issued an Order directing the
issuance of a writ of execution;
 February 19, 2010 The NLRC rendered a decision affirming
with modification the LAs Order by including certain
monetary benefits in favor of Gonzales;
 May 31, 2011 The CA reversed the NLRC and reinstated the
LAs Order
 November 16, 2011 The Court denied Gonzales petition for
review, questioning the reinstatement of the LAs Order;
 On February 27, 2012 The Court denied Gonzales 1st
motion for reconsideration;
 On April 12, 2012 Gonzales again moved for reconsideration
and asked that his case be referred to the En Banc.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred when it issued its May 31, 2011 decision.
HELD:
YES. We believe and so hold that the CA did not only legally err but
even acted outside its jurisdiction when it issued its May 31, 2011
decision. Specifically, by deleting the awards properly granted by
the NLRC and by reverting back to the LAs execution order, the CA
effectively varied the final and executory judgment in the original
case, as modified on appeal and ultimately affirmed by the Court,
and thereby acted outside its jurisdiction. The CA likewise, in the
course of its rulings and as discussed below, acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by using
wrong considerations, thereby acting outside the contemplation of
law.
The CAs actions outside its jurisdiction cannot produce legal effects
and cannot likewise be perpetuated by a simple reference to the
principle of immutability of final judgment; a void decision can
never become final. "The only exceptions to the rule on the
immutability of final judgments are (1) the correction of clerical
errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments. For these reasons,
the Court sees it legally appropriate to vacate the assailed Minute
Resolutions of November 16, 2011 and February 27, 2012, and to
reconsider its ruling on the current petition.
The resolution of the court in a given issue embodied in the fallo or
dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling factor in
resolving the issues in a case. The fallo embodies the courts decisive
action on the issue/s posed, and is thus the part of the decision that
must be enforced during execution. The other parts of the decision
only contain, and are aptly called, the ratio decidendi (or reason for
the decision) and, in this sense, assume a lesser role in carrying into
effect the tribunals disposition of the case.
When a conflict exists between the dispositive portion and the
opinion of the court in the text or body of the decision, the former
must prevail over the latter under the rule that the dispositive
portion is the definitive order, while the opinion is merely an
explanatory statement without the effect of a directive. Hence, the
execution must conform with what the fallo or dispositive portion of
the decision ordains or decrees.
Significantly, no claim or issue has arisen regarding the fallo of the
labor tribunals and the CAs ruling on the merits of the original case.
As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading under the Rules of Court.
PELEJO v. CA
G.R. No. 60800, August 31, 1982
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint for "Annulment of Deed, Title, Recon-
veyance and Damages" against private respondents over a parcel of
land titled in the name of the latter. The case was dismissed by the
trial court for lack of cause of action and prescription. There being
no appeal interposed, the decision became final and executory.
Consequently, on motion of private respondents, a writ or
possession was issued. On certiorari, petitioners contend that the
lower court acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse
of discretion when it issued the writ of possession because the
subject case was not decided on the merits and the rights and
obligations of the parties were not defined. They alleged that there
was no decision on who the owners were in the order dismissing
the complaint.
The Supreme Court, on August 31, 1982, nullified the writ of
possession and enjoined private respondents and the sheriff
concerned from enforcing the said writ. It turned out however that
as early as April 6, 1982, the sheriff had already ejected petitioners
and placed private respondents in possession of the subject
property. Hence this motion for reconsideration filed by private
respondents.
Reconsidering its previous decision, the Supreme Court set aside the
same and dismissed the instant petition since the writ of possession
has already been implemented and the subject property is
admittedly registered in the name of private respondents who are
therefore entitled to its possession, hence it would be an injustice
to allow petitioners to continue holding the property in question.
Motion granted. Petition denied.
ISSUE: W/N private respondents in not asking for affirmative relief
in the dispositive portion of the lower court’s order would prevail
over considerations of substantial justice.
HELD:
NO. The procedural error incurred by private respondents in not
asking for affirmative relief in the dispositive portion of the lower
court’s order dismissing the case and which led to the dispute
surrounding the propriety of the issuance of the writ of possession
is a mere technicality which would not prevail over considerations
of substantial justice. There is no point in prolonging the litigation
when private respondents are the owners of the property and
therefore are entitled to its possession. It would be an injustice to
allow petitioners to continue holding subject property.
LANDBANK vs SUNTAY
GR No. 157903, July 20, 2016
FACTS:
Respondent Suntay owned land situated in Sta. Lucia, Sablayan,
Occidental Mindoro with a total area of 3,682.0285 hectares. In
1972, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) expropriated
948.1911 hectares of Suntay‘s land pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 27.
Petitioner Land Bank and DAR fixed the value of the expropriated
portion at P4,497.50/hectare, for a total valuation of P4,251,141.68.
Rejecting the valuation, however, Suntay filed a petition for
determination of just compensation in the Office of the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of Region IV, DARAB,
docketed as DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00; his petition was
assigned to RARAD Miñas.
After summary administrative proceeding, RARAD Miñas rendered a
decision fixing the total just compensation for the expropriated
portion at P157,541,951.30. Land Bank moved for a reconsideration,
but RARAD Miñas denied its motion. Land Bank brought a petition
for the judicial determination of just compensation in the RTC
(Branch 46) in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro as a Special Agrarian
Court, impleading Suntay and RARAD Miñas. The petition essentially
prayed that the total just compensation for the expropriated
portion be fixed at only P4,251,141.67. Suntay filed a motion to
dismiss mainly on the ground that the petition had been filed
beyond the 15-day reglementary period as required by Section 11,
Rule XIII of the Rules of Procedure of DARAB. After the RTC granted
the motion to dismiss, Land Bank appealed to the CA, which
sustained the dismissal. As a result, Land Bank came to the Court
(G.R. No. 157903)
ISSUE: W/N the RTC erred in dismissing the Land Bank‘s petition for
the determination of just compensation.
HELD:
The Court has declared that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine just compensation under Republic Act No. 6657
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, or CARL) pertains to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) as a Special Agrarian Court; that any
effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and to
convert the original jurisdiction of the RTC into appellate jurisdiction
is void for being contrary to the CARL; and that what DARAB
adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a
preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to the
landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this
question.
Thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the Land Bank‘s petition. It bears
stressing that the petition is not an appeal from the RARAD final
Decision but an original action for the determination of the just
compensation for respondent‘s expropriated property, over which
the RTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction.
DELTA MOTORS v. CA
GR No. 121075, July 24, 1997
FACTS:
Private Respondent State Investment House, INc. filed action
against DELTA for a sum of money at the RTC of Manila, Branch VI.
DELTA was required to pay P20M to the private respondent. The
decision could not be served by DELTA due to its dissolution. It had
been taken over by Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the meantime.
Dec. 1986: SIHI moved for service of the decision by way of
publication. It was published in the Thunderer, a weekly Manila
newspaper. Afterwards, SIHI moved for the execution, which the
RTC granted on March 1987. Pursuant to the writ of execution,
properties of DELTA in Iloilo and Bacolod City were levied upon and
sold.
DELTA commenced a special civil action for certiorari with the CA,
alleging that a) the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over DELTA since
there was no valid/proper service of summons rendering the
decision void, and b) the decision never became final and executory

The CA ruled that against DELTA on the first ground, but ruled that
the decision never became executory because records show that
the assailed judgment had never been properly served against on
PNB (which assumed DELTA’s operation upon its dissolution). The
CA also stated that the publication was not a cure for such a fatal
defect.
Therefore, the CA decreed that since the decision had not yet
attained finality pending a service of a copy on DELTA, who may
appeal within the reglementary period.
DELTA filed an MR, insisting there could be no valid service of
summons since the RTC decision was not in accordance with the
Rules and hence void. Dismissed by CA. DELTA filed a petition with
the SC for review on certiorari. Denied.
DELTA filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC, indicating that it was
appealing from the earlier decision and prayed that records be
elevated to the CA. SIHI filed a motion to dismiss DELTA’s appeal on
the grounds that it was filed out of time (beyond 15 days period
after obtaining the copy of the decision). DELTA’s appeal was
dismissed.
0 The phrase was not raised by the petitioner expressly in its petition
DELTA filed an Omnibus motion with the CA to declare all acts and
proceedings relating to the earlier decision as void. The CA issued a
resolution on Jan. 5 1995. SIHI filed a motion for clarification, asking
for a deletion of a portion of the resolution for it being mere obiter
dictum (“While it is true that as a necessary consequence the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 22, 1991 ruling that
the decision in Civil Case No. 84-23019 "has not attained finality
pending service of a copy thereof on petitioner Delta, which may
appeal therefrom within the reglementary period", all proceedings
and/or orders arising from the trial court's decision in Civil Case No.
84-23019 are null and void x x x .”) SIHI claimed that the statement
was “not necessary for the case before it” (the denial of the
Omnibus motion” and therefore “could not be held binding for
establishing a precedent”).
CA decreed to amend its resolution and delete the assailed
paragraph.
ISSUE: W/N the assailed paragraph in the CA’s resolution was
obiter dictum.
RULING:
Yes, the assailed paragraph is considered obiter dictum.
Obiter dictum – opinion expressed by a court upon some question
of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it;
“by the way”. It is not binding as precedent (Cannot be basis for
stare decisis).
assailing the dismisssal of its notice of appeal. Hence, it could not be
considered a prerequisite in disposing of the issues.
EJERCITO v. COMELEC
GR No. 212398, November 25, 2014
FACTS:
Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 Elections, a petition for
disqualification was filed by Edgar “Egay” San Luis before the
COMELEC against Emilio Ramon “ER” P. Ejercito, who was a fellow
gubernatorial candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor
of the Province of Laguna.
Petition alleged Ejercito distributed orange card to influence voters
in his favor; and Ejercito exceeds the amount of expenditures
necessary. Ejercito was proclaimed Governor.
Ejercito claims that the advertising contracts between ABS-CBN
Corporation and Scenema Concept International, Inc. were
executed by an identified supporter without his knowledge and
consent as, in fact, his signature thereon was obviously forged. Even
assuming that such contract benefited him, Ejercito alleges that he
should not be penalized for the conduct of third parties who acted
on their own without his consent. Citing Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission decided by the US Supreme Court, he argues
that every voter has the right to support a particular candidate in
accordance with the free exercise of his or her rights of speech and
of expression, which is guaranteed in Section 4, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. He believes that an advertising contract paid for
by a third party without the candidate’s knowledge and consent
must be considered a form of political speech that must prevail
against the laws suppressing it, whether by design or inadvertence.
ISSUE: W/N the foreign jurisprudence cited by Ejercito is applicable
to this case
HELD:
NO. The rulings in Citizens United and Buckley find bearing only on
matters related to “independent expenditures,” an election law
concept which has no application in this jurisdiction. In the US
context, independent expenditures for or against a particular
candidate enjoy constitutional protection. They refer to those
expenses made by an individual, a group or a legal entity which are
not authorized or requested by the candidate, an authorized
committee of the candidate, or an agent of the candidate; they are
expenditures that are not placed in cooperation with or with the
consent of a candidate, his agents, or an authorized committee of
the candidate. In contrast, there is no similar provision here in the
Philippines. In fact, R.A. No. 9006105 and its implementing rules and
regulations specifically make it unlawful to print, publish, broadcast
or exhibit any print, broadcast or outdoor advertisements donated
to the candidate without the written acceptance of said candidate.
In any event, this Court should accentuate that resort to foreign
jurisprudence would be proper only if no law or jurisprudence is
available locally to settle a controversy and that even in the absence
of local statute and case law, foreign jurisprudence are merely
persuasive authority at best since they furnish an uncertain guide.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MERALCO
GR No. 141314, April 9, 2003
FACTS:
MERALCO filed with petitioner ERB an application for the revision of
its rate schedules to reflect an average increase in its distribution
charge. ERB granted a provisional increase subject to the condition We are not persuaded. American decisions and authorities are not
that should the COA thru its audit report find MERALCO is entitled per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive for
to a lesser increase, all excess amounts collected from the latter’s no court holds a patent on correct decisions. Our laws must be
customers shall either be refunded to them or correspondingly construed in accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers
credited in their favor. The COA report found that MERALCO is and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and
entitled to a lesser increase, thus ERB ordered the refund or the context of other local legislation related thereto. More
crediting of the excess amounts. On appeal, the CA set aside the importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public
ERB decision. MRs were denied. interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it
need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and different
MERALCO argues that deduction of all kinds of taxes, including from others.
income tax, from the gross revenues of a public utility is firmly
entrenched in American jurisprudence. It contends that the Public
Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 146) was patterned after Act
2306 of the Philippine Commission, which, in turn, was borrowed
from American state public utility laws such as the New Jersey
Public Utility Act. Hence, it maintains that American jurisprudence
on the inclusion of income taxes as a lawful charge to operating
expenses should be controlling. It cites the rule on statutory
construction that a statute adopted from a foreign country will be
presumed to be adopted with the construction placed upon it by
the courts of that country before its adoption.

ISSUE: W/N the Foreign Jurisprudence used by MERALCO is

applicable to the case
HELD:

NO. The foreign jurisprudence cited by MERALCO in support of its

position is not applicable in this jurisdiction.