PARTITION exhausted all remedies for the amicable settlement of the case, but to
no avail.
G.R. No. 168970               January 15, 2010
CELESTINO BALUS, Petitioner,
vs.
SATURNINO BALUS and LEONARDA BALUS VDA. DE
CALUNOD, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated May 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58041 which set aside the
February 7, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao
del Norte, Branch 4 in Civil Case No. 3263.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo
and Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died on September 6, 1978, while
Rufo died on July 6, 1984.
On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns,
as security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao
del Norte (Bank). The said property was originally covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-439(788) and more particularly described as
follows:
A parcel of land with all the improvements thereon, containing an area
of 3.0740 hectares, more or less, situated in the Barrio of Lagundang,
Bunawan, Iligan City, and bounded as follows: Bounded on the NE.,
along line 1-2, by Lot 5122, Csd-292; along line 2-12, by Dodiongan
River; along line 12-13 by Lot 4649, Csd-292; and along line 12-1, by
Lot 4661, Csd-292. x x x 2
Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was
foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at
a public auction held for that purpose. On November 20, 1981, a
Certificate of Sale3 was executed by the sheriff in favor of the Bank.
The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law.
More than two years after the auction, or on January 25, 1984, the
sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale4 in the Bank's favor.
Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of the Bank.
On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate5 adjudicating to each of them a
specific one-third portion of the subject property consisting of 10,246
square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions
wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father
mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they intended to
redeem the same at the soonest possible time.
Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein
respondents bought the subject property from the Bank. On October
12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of Registered Land6 was executed by the
Bank in favor of respondents. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-39,484(a.f.)7 was issued in the name of respondents.
Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot.
On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint 8 for Recovery of
Possession and Damages against petitioner, contending that they had
already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners
of the disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to surrender
possession of the same to them. Respondents claimed that they had
1
On February 7, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision9 disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the plaintiffs to
execute a Deed of Sale in favor of the defendant, the one-third share
of the property in question, presently possessed by him, and described
in the deed of partition, as follows:
A one-third portion of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-39,484 (a.f.),
formerly Original Certificate of Title No. P-788, now in the name of
Saturnino Balus and Leonarda B. Vda. de Calunod, situated at
Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan City, bounded on the North by Lot 5122;
East by shares of Saturnino Balus and Leonarda Balus-Calunod; South
by Lot 4649, Dodiongan River; West by Lot 4661, consisting of 10,246
square meters, including improvements thereon.
and dismissing all other claims of the parties.
The amount of ₱6,733.33 consigned by the defendant with the Clerk of
Court is hereby ordered delivered to the plaintiffs, as purchase price of
the one-third portion of the land in question.
Plaintiffs are ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.10
The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the
respondents his share in the disputed property was recognized by the
provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties
had executed before the respondents bought the subject lot from the
Bank.
Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents filed an
appeal with the CA.
On May 31, 2005, the CA promulgated the presently assailed Decision,
reversing and setting aside the Decision of the RTC and ordering
petitioner to immediately surrender possession of the subject property
to the respondents. The CA ruled that when petitioner and
respondents did not redeem the subject property within the
redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the
issuance of a new title in the name of the Bank, their co-ownership
was extinguished.
Hence, the instant petition raising a sole issue, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT CO-OWNERSHIP AMONG THE PETITIONER AND
THE RESPONDENTS OVER THE PROPERTY PERSISTED/CONTINUED
TO EXIST (EVEN AFTER THE TRANSFER OF TITLE TO THE BANK) BY
VIRTUE OF THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT PRIOR TO THE REPURCHASE
THEREOF BY THE RESPONDENTS; THUS, WARRANTING THE
PETITIONER'S ACT OF ENFORCING THE AGREEMENT BY
REIMBURSING THE RESPONDENTS OF HIS (PETITIONER'S) JUST
SHARE OF THE REPURCHASE PRICE.11
The main issue raised by petitioner is whether co-ownership by him
and respondents over the subject property persisted even after the lot
was purchased by the Bank and title thereto transferred to its name,
and even after it was eventually bought back by the respondents from
the Bank.
Petitioner insists that despite respondents' full knowledge of the fact
that the title over the disputed property was already in the name of
the Bank, they still proceeded to execute the subject Extrajudicial
Settlement, having in mind the intention of purchasing back the
property together with petitioner and of continuing their co-ownership
thereof.
Petitioner posits that the subject Extrajudicial Settlement is, in and by
itself, a contract between him and respondents, because it contains a
provision whereby the parties agreed to continue their co-ownership of
the subject property by "redeeming" or "repurchasing" the same from
the Bank. This agreement, petitioner contends, is the law between the
parties and, as such, binds the respondents. As a result, petitioner
asserts that respondents' act of buying the disputed property from the
Bank without notifying him inures to his benefit as to give him the
right to claim his rightful portion of the property, comprising 1/3
thereof, by reimbursing respondents the equivalent 1/3 of the sum
they paid to the Bank.
The Court is not persuaded.
Petitioner and respondents are arguing on the wrong premise that, at
the time of the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, the subject
property formed part of the estate of their deceased father to which
they may lay claim as his heirs.
At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with
respect to the fact that the subject property was exclusively owned by
petitioner and respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was
mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the parties during the
hearing conducted by the trial court on October 28, 1996. 12 Evidence
shows that a Definite Deed of Sale 13 was issued in favor of the Bank on
January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption expired. There is
neither any dispute that a new title was issued in the Bank's name
before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no question that the
Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot during the
lifetime of Rufo.
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment
of his death.14 In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the
property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of
his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the
opening of the succession.15 In the present case, since Rufo lost
ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows
that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer
formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated
differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot
from their father.
Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that
they became co-owners of the subject lot. Thus, any issue arising from
the supposed right of petitioner as co-owner of the contested parcel of
land is negated by the fact that, in the eyes of the law, the disputed
lot did not pass into the hands of petitioner and respondents as
compulsory heirs of Rufo at any given point in time.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds a necessity for a
complete determination of the issues raised in the instant case to look
into petitioner's argument that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an
independent contract which gives him the right to enforce his right to
claim a portion of the disputed lot bought by respondents.1avvphi1
It is true that under Article 1315 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
contracts are perfected by mere consent; and from that moment, the
parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been
expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according
to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.
Article 1306 of the same Code also provides that the contracting
parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions
as they may deem convenient, provided these are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
2
In the present case, however, there is nothing in the subject
Extrajudicial Settlement to indicate any express stipulation for
petitioner and respondents to continue with their supposed co-
ownership of the contested lot.
On the contrary, a plain reading of the provisions of the Extrajudicial
Settlement would not, in any way, support petitioner's contention that
it was his and his sibling's intention to buy the subject property from
the Bank and continue what they believed to be co-ownership thereof.
It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts that the intention
of the parties shall be accorded primordial consideration. 16 It is the
duty of the courts to place a practical and realistic construction upon it,
giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and
the purpose which it is intended to serve.17 Such intention is
determined from the express terms of their agreement, as well as their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts.18 Absurd and illogical
interpretations should also be avoided.19
For petitioner to claim that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an
agreement between him and his siblings to continue what they
thought was their ownership of the subject property, even after the
same had been bought by the Bank, is stretching the interpretation of
the said Extrajudicial Settlement too far.
In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is no co-ownership to talk
about and no property to partition, as the disputed lot never formed
part of the estate of their deceased father.
Moreover, petitioner's asseveration of his and respondents' intention of
continuing with their supposed co-ownership is negated by no less
than his assertions in the present petition that on several occasions he
had the chance to purchase the subject property back, but he refused
to do so. In fact, he claims that after the Bank acquired the disputed
lot, it offered to re-sell the same to him but he ignored such offer.
How then can petitioner now claim that it was also his intention to
purchase the subject property from the Bank, when he admitted that
he refused the Bank's offer to re-sell the subject property to him?
In addition, it appears from the recitals in the Extrajudicial Settlement
that, at the time of the execution thereof, the parties were not yet
aware that the subject property was already exclusively owned by the
Bank. Nonetheless, the lack of knowledge on the part of petitioner and
respondents that the mortgage was already foreclosed and title to the
property was already transferred to the Bank does not give them the
right or the authority to unilaterally declare themselves as co-owners
of the disputed property; otherwise, the disposition of the case would
be made to depend on the belief and conviction of the party-litigants
and not on the evidence adduced and the law and jurisprudence
applicable thereto.
Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended
to continue their supposed co-ownership of the subject property
contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where
they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject property
divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and
respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls for the
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property
owned in common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of
each co-owner, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific
property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate without
supervision or interference from the other.20 In other words, the
purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership,21 an objective
which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals, dated May 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58041,
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 161746               September 1, 2010
EUGENIO FELICIANO, substituted by his wife CEFERINA DE
PALMA- FELICIANO, ANGELINA DE LEON, representing the
heirs of ESTEBAN FELICIANO, TRINIDAD VALIENTE, AND
BASILIA TRINIDAD, represented by her son DOMINADOR T.
FELICIANO, Petitioners,
vs.
PEDRO CANOZA, DELIA FELICIANO, ROSAURO FELICIANO,
ELSA FELICIANO AND PONCIANO FELICIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to annul and
set aside the Decision1 dated June 26, 2003 and Resolution2 dated
January 15, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
61888. The CA had reversed the Decision 3 dated August 3, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 11, in Civil Case
No. 819-M-93 and dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground of
prescription.
The facts are as follows:
When Antonio Feliciano passed away on May 20, 1930, he left behind
his only property, a parcel of land located at Bunga 4 Mayor, Bustos,
Bulacan. The land had an area of 1,125 square meters and was
evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 14025 in his name. On March 28,
1972, Leona, Maria, Pedro and Salina, all surnamed Feliciano, declared
themselves to be the only surviving heirs of Antonio Feliciano, with the
exception of Salina. They executed an extrajudicial settlement of
Antonio Feliciano’s estate6 and appropriated among themselves the
said parcel of land, to the exclusion of the heirs of Esteban Feliciano
and Doroteo Feliciano, deceased children of Antonio Feliciano. On even
date, Leona, Maria, Pedro and Salina executed a deed of absolute sale
or Kasulatan sa Ganap Na Bilihan over the property in favor of the late
Jacinto Feliciano (Pedro’s portion), Felisa Feliciano (Salina’s portion)
and Pedro Canoza (Leona and Maria’s portions).7
During his lifetime, Jacinto Feliciano applied for a free patent over the
portion of land he bought, declaring that the same was a public land,
first occupied and cultivated by Pedro Feliciano. 8 Jacinto was issued
Free Patent No. (IV-4) 012293 on November 28, 1977 9 and the same
was forwarded to the Register of Deeds of Malolos, Bulacan, but
unfortunately, it was burned on March 7, 1987. Pedro Canoza, for his
part, also applied for a free patent over the portion of land which he
bought, claiming that the same was public land, first occupied and
cultivated by Leona and Maria Feliciano.10 He was issued Free Patent
No. (IV-4) 012292, now covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. P-364,11 on February 23, 1979.
On October 18, 1993, Eugenio Feliciano and Angelina Feliciano-de
Leon, surviving heirs of the late Esteban Feliciano, and Trinidad
Feliciano-Valiente and Basilia Feliciano-Trinidad, surviving children of
the late Doroteo Feliciano, filed a complaint 12 against Salina Feliciano,
Felisa Feliciano, Pedro Canoza and the heirs of the late Jacinto
Feliciano, namely Delia, Rosauro, Elsa, Nardo and Ponciano, all
surnamed Feliciano, for the Declaration of Nullity of Documents and
Title, Recovery of Real Property and Damages. They alleged that the
settlement of the estate and sale were done without their participation
and consent as heirs of Esteban and Doroteo. Likewise, they averred
3
that the ancestral home of the Felicianos is erected on the subject
property and that they have occupied the same since birth. Canoza
and Jacinto falsely declared that the property was not occupied, so
their titles to the property should be declared null and void on the
ground that they have made false statements in their respective
applications for free patent.
On November 4, 1993, before an Answer could be filed, the petitioners
amended their complaint to include the allegation that they sought to
recover the shares of their fathers, Esteban and Doroteo, which they
could have acquired as heirs of Antonio Feliciano.13
In their Answer,14 respondent Pedro Canoza and his spouse,
respondent Delia Feliciano, alleged that they were buyers in good faith
and for value. They likewise contended that assuming that there was
preterition of legal heirs, they never took part in it. As affirmative
defenses, they alleged that the complaint failed to state a cause of
action; the lower court had no jurisdiction as the subject of the case
were free patents and therefore prior exhaustion of administrative
remedies was required; the case was prematurely filed; no effort was
exerted towards a settlement; plaintiffs’ right has prescribed; Eugenio
Feliciano was a mere squatter who should be ordered to vacate; the
deed of sale was validly, genuinely and duly executed; Eugenio and
Angelina were guilty of misleading the court because there were other
heirs who were indispensable parties but who were not included; and
Presidential Decree No. 1508 or the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law was not resorted to by plaintiffs.
Respondents Rosauro Feliciano, Elsa Feliciano and Ponciano Feliciano
likewise filed an Answer15 containing the same allegations and
defenses as respondents Pedro Canoza and Delia Feliciano. The other
defendants, Salina Feliciano, Felisa Feliciano and Nardo Feliciano were
declared in default.
On August 3, 1998, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendants, as follows:
1. Declaring the extra-judicial settlement of estate of Antonio
Feliciano null and void;
2. Declaring the sale of the property in question to Pedro
Canoza, Felisa Feliciano and Jacinto Feliciano null and void;
3. Declaring the original certificate of Title No. 364 in the
name of Pedro Canoza and the certificates of titles in the
name of defendants over Lot 1874-Cad-344, Bustos
Cadastre (Tax Declaration No. 1402) as null and void;
4. Ordering defendants to reconvey ownership and
possession of said property to plaintiffs subject to a just and
equitable partition thereof by and between all interested
parties.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.16
The trial court explained that by operation of law, the plaintiffs (herein
petitioners) have as much right as Leona, Maria, Pedro and Salina
Feliciano to inherit the property in question, and they cannot be
deprived of their right unless by disinheritance for causes set forth in
the law. When Leona Feliciano, Pedro Feliciano, Maria Feliciano and
Salina Feliciano appropriated the disputed lot solely to themselves
through the extrajudicial settlement of estate, they committed a
fraudulent act. To the extent that Doroteo and Esteban were deprived
of their rightful share, the said out-of-court settlement was annullable,
said the trial court. The trial court also declared that Pedro Canoza was
not a buyer in good faith of Leona and Maria’s shares. Records show
that Pedro Canoza’s live-in partner, Delia Feliciano, was a relative of
the petitioners and the other defendants; thus, he could be reasonably
charged with the knowledge of petitioners’ status vis-à-vis the subject
property. The acquisition by Canoza and Jacinto Feliciano of free
patent titles over portions of the contested lot also did not legitimize
their ownership thereof, as they acquired no greater rights over the
property than their predecessors-in-interest, having merely stepped
into their shoes.17
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA with the following
assignment of errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF
ESTATE OF ANTONIO FELICIANO (EXHIBIT "B")[;]
II. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
DECLARING AS NULL AND VOID THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
OF ESTATE OF ANTONIO FELICIANO (EXHIBIT "B")[;]
III. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
DECLARING AS NULL AND VOID THE DEED OF SALE (EXHIBIT "C") IN
FAVOR OF JACINTO FELICIANO, FELISA FELICIANO AND PEDRO
CANOZA[;]
IV. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
DECLARING O.C.T. NO. 364 IN THE NAME OF PEDRO CANOZA AND
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OF DEFENDANTS AS NULL AND VOID[; AND]
V. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
ORDERING DEFENDANTS TO RECONVEY OWNERSHIP AND
POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY TO PLAINTIFFS SUBJECT
TO A JUST AND EQUITABLE PARTITION THEREOF BY AND BETWEEN
ALL INTERESTED PARTIES.18
On June 26, 2003, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision
reversing the trial court’s decision. The CA held,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Decision dated August 3, 1998 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 11 (XI), Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 819-M-93 is
hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and plaintiffs-appellees’ complaint
is ordered DISMISSED for being time-barred.
SO ORDERED.19
The CA ruled that prescription had set in, citing the case of Pedrosa v.
Court of Appeals,20 which held that the applicable prescriptive period to
annul a deed of extrajudicial settlement is four (4) years from the
discovery of the fraud. It reasoned that when petitioners filed the
instant complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial settlement of
Antonio Feliciano’s estate, more than four (4) years had elapsed from
the issuance of the free patents. As regards the portion claimed by the
late Jacinto Feliciano, sixteen (16) years had elapsed from the time the
free patent was issued to him before petitioners filed the complaint,
while in the case of Canoza, fourteen (14) years had elapsed from the
issuance of the free patent in Canoza’s favor. Hence, according to the
CA, the action for the annulment of the documents had prescribed.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision
but it was denied by the CA in the Resolution dated January 15, 2004
for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
The grounds relied upon by the petitioners are the following:
4
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN GRANTING THE APPEAL BY ORDERING THE
DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT ON GROUND OF
PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
ISSUE OF PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
RAISED ON APPEAL AS AN ISSUE, NOR ASSIGNED AS AN
ERROR, NOR DEFINED IN THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER AS
AMONG THE ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED;
B. ASSUMING THAT PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION MAY BE
TAKEN AS A GROUND FOR DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT
EVEN IF NOT RAISED ON APPEAL, NOR ASSIGNED AS
AMONG THE ERRORS COMMITTED, THE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING
THAT THE ACTION PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS, OR IN
NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACTION IS IMPRESCRIPTIBLE;
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT.21
Essentially, the issue for our resolution is whether the CA erred in
reversing the trial court’s decision.
Petitioners allege that the CA gravely erred in granting the appeal and
in dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription of action
because that issue was never raised on appeal, nor defined as one (1)
of the issues outlined and limited in the pre-trial order.
We do not agree.
While respondents have not assigned the defense of prescription in
their appeal before the CA, they raised such defense in their December
1, 1993 Answer as one (1) of their affirmative defenses. 22 In their brief
before the CA, respondents specifically prayed for the reliefs
mentioned in their respective answers before the trial court. Thus, by
reference, they are deemed to have adopted the defense of
prescription, and could not properly be said to have waived the
defense of prescription.
Moreover, Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, provides that when it appears from the pleadings or the
evidence on record that the action is already barred by the statute of
limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. Thus, in Gicano v.
Gegato,23  we held:
We have ruled that trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss
an action on the ground of prescription when the parties’ pleadings or
other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred x x x; and it
may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss, or an answer which
sets up such ground as an affirmative defense; or even if the ground is
alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for
reconsideration; or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as
where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings, or where a
defendant has been declared in default. What is essential only, to
repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive
period, be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the
record: either in the averments of the plaintiffs complaint, or otherwise
established by the evidence. (Underscoring supplied.)
But did the CA nonetheless commit error when it held that the
applicable prescriptive period is four (4) years?
Petitioners argue that the CA erroneously treated the action they filed
at the trial court as one (1) for annulment of the extrajudicial
settlement and applied the four (4)-year prescriptive period in
dismissing the same. They contend that the action they filed was one
(1) for Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Titles, Recovery of Real
Property and Damages, and as such, their action was imprescriptible
pursuant to Article 141024 of the Civil Code.
Respondents, for their part, maintain that the CA did not err in holding
that the deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including
some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of the partition and did not
consent thereto, is merely fraudulent and not void. They stress that
the action to rescind the partition based on fraud prescribes in four (4)
years counted from the date of registration, which is constructive
notice to the whole world.
We affirm the ruling of the CA. As the records show, the heirs of
Doroteo and Esteban did not participate in the extrajudicial partition
executed by Salina with the other compulsory heirs, Leona, Maria and
Pedro. Undeniably, the said deed was fraudulently obtained as it
deprived the known heirs of Doroteo and Esteban of their shares in the
estate. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including
some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same,
is fraudulent and vicious.25 Hence, an action to set it aside on the
ground of fraud could be instituted. Such action for the annulment of
the said partition, however, must be brought within four (4) years
from the discovery of the fraud.1avvphi1
In Gerona v. De Guzman,  respondents therein executed a deed of
26
extrajudicial settlement declaring themselves to be the sole heirs of
the late Marcelo de Guzman. They secured new transfer certificates of
title in their own names, thereby excluding the petitioners therein from
the estate of the deceased. The petitioners brought an action for the
annulment of the said deed upon the ground that the same is tainted
with fraud. The Court held,
Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned
deed of "extra-judicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud
in the execution thereof, the action therefor may be filed
within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud (Mauricio
v. Villanueva, L-11072, September 24, 1959). Such discovery is
deemed to have taken place, in the case at bar, on June 25, 1948,
when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new
certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively,
for the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement constitute
constructive notice to the whole world.27 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
Evidently, the applicable prescriptive period to institute the action to
annul the deed of extrajudicial settlement was four (4) years counted
from the discovery of fraud as held in the case of Gerona v. De
Guzman.28 However, the records show that petitioners’ complaint was
filed only on October 18, 1993, or almost sixteen (16) years after
Jacinto Feliciano was issued Free Patent No. (IV-4) 012293 on
November 28, 1977, and almost fourteen (14) years from the time
Pedro Canoza was issued OCT No. P-364 on November 28, 1979. As
petitioners are deemed to have obtained constructive notice of the
fraud upon the registration of the Free Patent, they clearly failed to
institute the present civil action within the allowable period. The same
result obtains even if their complaint is treated as one (1) essentially
for reconveyance as more than ten (10) years have passed since
petitioners’ cause of action accrued. The CA committed no error in
dismissing their complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The
Decision dated June 26, 2003 and Resolution dated January 15, 2004,
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61888 are AFFIRMED.
With costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183852               October 20, 2010
CARMELA BROBIO MANGAHAS, Petitioner,
vs.
EUFROCINA A. BROBIO, Respondent.
5
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated February 21, 2008, which dismissed
petitioner’s action to enforce payment of a promissory note issued by
respondent, and Resolution2 dated July 9, 2008, which denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The case arose from the following facts:
On January 10, 2002, Pacifico S. Brobio (Pacifico) died intestate,
leaving three parcels of land. He was survived by his wife, respondent
Eufrocina A. Brobio, and four legitimate and three illegitimate children;
petitioner Carmela Brobio Mangahas is one of the illegitimate children.
On May 12, 2002, the heirs of the deceased executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of the Late Pacifico Brobio with
Waiver. In the Deed, petitioner and Pacifico’s other children, in
consideration of their love and affection for respondent and the sum of
₱150,000.00, waived and ceded their respective shares over the three
parcels of land in favor of respondent. According to petitioner,
respondent promised to give her an additional amount for her share in
her father’s estate. Thus, after the signing of the Deed, petitioner
demanded from respondent the promised additional amount, but
respondent refused to pay, claiming that she had no more money.3
A year later, while processing her tax obligations with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR), respondent was required to submit an original
copy of the Deed. Left with no more original copy of the Deed,
respondent summoned petitioner to her office on May 31, 2003 and
asked her to countersign a copy of the Deed. Petitioner refused to
countersign the document, demanding that respondent first give her
the additional amount that she promised. Considering the value of the
three parcels of land (which she claimed to be worth ₱20M), petitioner
asked for ₱1M, but respondent begged her to lower the amount.
Petitioner agreed to lower it to ₱600,000.00. Because respondent did
not have the money at that time and petitioner refused to countersign
the Deed without any assurance that the amount would be paid,
respondent executed a promissory note. Petitioner agreed to sign the
Deed when respondent signed the promissory note which read —
31 May 2003
This is to promise that I will give a Financial Assistance to CARMELA B.
MANGAHAS the amount of ₱600,000.00 Six Hundred Thousand only on
June 15, 2003.
(SGD)
EUFROCINA A. BROBIO4
When the promissory note fell due, respondent failed and refused to
pay despite demand. Petitioner made several more demands upon
respondent but the latter kept on insisting that she had no money.
On January 28, 2004, petitioner filed a Complaint for Specific
Performance with Damages5 against respondent, alleging in part—
2. That plaintiff and defendant are legal heirs of the
deceased, Pacifico S. Brobio[,] who died intestate and
leaving without a will, on January 10, 2002, but leaving
several real and personal properties (bank deposits), and
some of which were the subject of the extra-judicial
settlement among them, compulsory heirs of the deceased,
Pacifico Brobio. x x x.
 3. That in consideration of the said waiver of the plaintiff
over the listed properties in the extra-judicial settlement,
plaintiff received the sum of ₱150,000.00, and the defendant
executed a "Promissory Note" on June 15, 2003, further
committing herself to give plaintiff a financial assistance in
the amount of ₱600,000.00. x x x.
4. That on its due date, June 15, 2003, defendant failed to
make good of her promise of delivering to the plaintiff the
sum of ₱600,000.00 pursuant to her "Promissory Note"
dated May 31, 2003, and despite repeated demands,
defendant had maliciously and capriciously refused to deliver
to the plaintiff the amount [of] ₱600,000.00, and the last of
which demands was on October 29, 2003. x x x.6
In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,7 respondent admitted
that she signed the promissory note but claimed that she was forced
to do so. She also claimed that the undertaking was not supported by
any consideration. More specifically, she contended that —
10. Defendant was practically held "hostage" by the demand
of the plaintiff. At that time, defendant was so much
pressured and was in [a] hurry to submit the documents to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue because of the deadline set
and for fear of possible penalty if not complied with.
Defendant pleaded understanding but plaintiff was adamant.
Her hand could only move in exchange for 1 million pesos.
11. Defendant, out of pressure and confused disposition,
was constrained to make a promissory note in a reduced
amount in favor of the plaintiff. The circumstances in the
execution of the promissory note were obviously attended by
involuntariness and the same was issued without
consideration at all or for illegal consideration.8
On May 15, 2006, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a decision
in favor of petitioner. The RTC found that the alleged "pressure and
confused disposition" experienced by respondent and the
circumstances that led to the execution of the promissory note do not
constitute undue influence as would vitiate respondent’s consent
thereto. On the contrary, the RTC observed that —
It is clear from all the foregoing that it is the defendant who took
improper advantage of the plaintiff’s trust and confidence in her by
resorting to a worthless written promise, which she was intent on
reneging. On the other hand, plaintiff did not perform an unlawful
conduct when she insisted on a written commitment from the
defendant, as embodied in the promissory note in question, before
affixing her signature that was asked of her by the defendant because,
as already mentioned, that was the only opportunity available to her or
which suddenly and unexpectedly presented itself to her in order to
press her demand upon the defendant to satisfy the correct amount of
consideration due to her. In other words, as the defendant had
repeatedly rebuffed her plea for additional consideration by claiming
lack of money, it is only natural for the plaintiff to seize the
unexpected opportunity that suddenly presented itself in order to
compel the defendant to give to her [what is] due [her]. And by
executing the promissory note which the defendant had no intention of
honoring, as testified to by her, the defendant clearly acted in bad
faith and took advantage of the trust and confidence that plaintiff had
reposed in her.9
The RTC also brushed aside respondent’s claim that the promissory
note was not supported by valuable consideration. The court
maintained that the promissory note was an additional consideration
for the waiver of petitioner’s share in the three properties in favor of
respondent. Its conclusion was bolstered by the fact that the
promissory note was executed after negotiation and haggling between
the parties. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
6
1. Ordering the defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of Six
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱600,000.00) which she
committed to pay to plaintiff under the promissory note in
question, plus interest thereon at the rate of 12% per
annum computed from the date of the filing of the
complaint;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of
₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
3. Ordering the defendant to pay to plaintiff the costs of this
suit.
SO ORDERED.10
On February 21, 2008, the CA reversed the RTC decision and
dismissed the complaint.11 The CA found that there was a complete
absence of consideration in the execution of the promissory note,
which made it inexistent and without any legal force and effect. The
court noted that "financial assistance" was not the real reason why
respondent executed the promissory note, but only to secure
petitioner’s signature. The CA held that the waiver of petitioner’s share
in the three properties, as expressed in the deed of extrajudicial
settlement, may not be considered as the consideration of the
promissory note, considering that petitioner signed the Deed way back
in 2002 and she had already received the consideration of ₱150,000.00
for signing the same. The CA went on to hold that if petitioner
disagreed with the amount she received, then she should have filed an
action for partition.
Further, the CA found that intimidation attended the signing of the
promissory note. Respondent needed the Deed countersigned by
petitioner in order to comply with a BIR requirement; and, with
petitioner’s refusal to sign the said document, respondent was forced
to sign the promissory note to assure petitioner that the money
promised to her would be paid.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the CA Decision. In a
Resolution dated July 9, 2008, the CA denied petitioner’s motion.12
In this petition for review, petitioner raises the following issues:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in the appreciation
of the facts of this case when it found that intimidation
attended the execution of the promissory note subject of
this case.
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it found that
the promissory note was without consideration.
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it stated that
petitioner should have filed [an action] for partition instead
of a case for specific performance.13
The petition is meritorious.
Contracts are voidable where consent thereto is given through
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud. In
determining whether consent is vitiated by any of these circumstances,
courts are given a wide latitude in weighing the facts or circumstances
in a given case and in deciding in favor of what they believe actually
occurred, considering the age, physical infirmity, intelligence,
relationship, and conduct of the parties at the time of the execution of
the contract and subsequent thereto, irrespective of whether the
contract is in a public or private writing.14
Nowhere is it alleged that mistake, violence, fraud, or intimidation
attended the execution of the promissory note. Still, respondent insists
that she was "forced" into signing the promissory note because
petitioner would not sign the document required by the BIR. In one
case, the Court – in characterizing a similar argument by respondents
therein – held that such allegation is tantamount to saying that the
other party exerted undue influence upon them. However, the Court
said that the fact that respondents were "forced" to sign the
documents does not amount to vitiated consent.15
There is undue influence when a person takes improper advantage of
his power over the will of another, depriving the latter of a reasonable
freedom of choice.16 For undue influence to be present, the influence
exerted must have so overpowered or subjugated the mind of a
contracting party as to destroy his free agency, making him express
the will of another rather than his own.17
Respondent may have desperately needed petitioner’s signature on the
Deed, but there is no showing that she was deprived of free agency
when she signed the promissory note. Being forced into a situation
does not amount to vitiated consent where it is not shown that the
party is deprived of free will and choice. Respondent still had a choice:
she could have refused to execute the promissory note and resorted to
judicial means to obtain petitioner’s signature. Instead, respondent
chose to execute the promissory note to obtain petitioner’s signature,
thereby agreeing to pay the amount demanded by petitioner.
The fact that respondent may have felt compelled, under the
circumstances, to execute the promissory note will not negate the
voluntariness of the act. As rightly observed by the trial court, the
execution of the promissory note in the amount of ₱600,000.00 was, in
fact, the product of a negotiation between the parties. Respondent
herself testified that she bargained with petitioner to lower the
amount:
ATTY. VILLEGAS:
Q And is it not that there was even a bargaining from ₱1-M
to ₱600,000.00 before you prepare[d] and [sign[ed] that
promissory note marked as Exhibit "C"?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in fact, you were the one [who] personally wrote the
amount of ₱600,000.00 only as indicated in the said
promissory note?
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q So, just to clarify. Carmela was asking an additional
amount of ₱1-M for her to sign this document but you
negotiated with her and asked that it be lowered to
₱600,000.00 to which she agreed, is that correct?
A Yes, Your Honor. Napilitan na po ako.
Q But you negotiated and asked for its reduction from ₱1-M
to ₱600,000.00?
A Yes, Your Honor.18
Contrary to the CA’s findings, the situation did not amount to
intimidation that vitiated consent.1awphil There is intimidation when
one of the contracting parties is compelled to give his consent by a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon
his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse,
descendants, or ascendants.19 Certainly, the payment of penalties for
7
delayed payment of taxes would not qualify as a "reasonable and well-
grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil."
We join the RTC in holding that courts will not set aside contracts
merely because solicitation, importunity, argument, persuasion, or
appeal to affection was used to obtain the consent of the other party.
Influence obtained by persuasion or argument or by appeal to
affection is not prohibited either in law or morals and is not obnoxious
even in courts of equity.20
On the issue that the promissory note is void for not being supported
by a consideration, we likewise disagree with the CA.
A contract is presumed to be supported by cause or
consideration.21 The presumption that a contract has sufficient
consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere assertion that it has no
consideration. To overcome the presumption, the alleged lack of
consideration must be shown by preponderance of evidence.22 The
burden to prove lack of consideration rests upon whoever alleges it,
which, in the present case, is respondent.
Respondent failed to prove that the promissory note was not
supported by any consideration. From her testimony and her
assertions in the pleadings, it is clear that the promissory note was
issued for a cause or consideration, which, at the very least, was
petitioner’s signature on the document.1avvphi1
It may very well be argued that if such was the consideration, it was
inadequate. Nonetheless, even if the consideration is inadequate, the
contract would not be invalidated, unless there has been fraud,
mistake, or undue influence.23 As previously stated, none of these
grounds had been proven present in this case.
The foregoing discussion renders the final issue insignificant. Be that
as it may, we would like to state that the remedy suggested by the CA
is not the proper one under the circumstances. An action for partition
implies that the property is still owned in common.24 Considering that
the heirs had already executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement and
waived their shares in favor of respondent, the properties are no
longer under a state of co-ownership; there is nothing more to be
partitioned, as ownership had already been merged in one person.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the CA Decision dated February
21, 2008 and its Resolution dated July 9, 2008 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The RTC decision dated May 15, 2006 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 151334               February 13, 2013
CAROLINA (CARLINA) VDA. DE FIGURACION, HEIRS OF
ELENA FIGURACION-ANCHETA, namely: LEONCIO ANCHETA,
JR., and ROMULO ANCHETA, HEIRS OF HILARIA A.
FIGURACION, namely: FELIPA FIGURACION-MANUEL, MARY
FIGURACION-GINEZ, and EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, AND
HEIRS OF QUINTIN FIGURACION, namely: LINDA M.
FIGURACION, LEANDRO M. FIGURACION, II, and ALLAN M.
FIGURACION, Petitioners,
vs.
EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1  under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the Decision 2 dated December 11, 2001 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 58290, which reversed and set
aside the Decision3 dated June 26, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 49. The RTC decision (1)
dismissed respondent Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla’s (Emilia) complaint for
partition, annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and
damages, and (2) annulled the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication  executed
by petitioner Carolina (Carlina) Vda. De Figuracion (Carolina).
The Facts
The parties are the heirs of Leandro Figuracion (Leandro) who died
intestate in May 1958. Petitioner Carolina is the surviving spouse. The
other petitioners – Elena Figuracion-Ancheta, Hilaria A. Figuracion
(Hilaria), Felipa Figuracion-Manuel (Felipa), Quintin Figuracion, and
Mary Figuracion-Ginez – and respondent Emilia were Carolina and
Leandro’s children.4
Subject of the dispute are two parcels of land both situated in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, which were acquired by Leandro during his
lifetime. These properties were: (1) Lot No. 2299 with a land area of
7,547 square meters originally covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 4221-P;5 and (2) Lot No. 705 measuring 2,900 square
meters and covered by TCT No. 4220-P. Both lands were registered in
the name of "Leandro Figuracion married to Carolina Adviento".
Leandro executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the above real properties
in favor of his six (6) children on August 23, 1955. Their shares,
however, were not delineated with particularity because spouses
Leandro and Carolina reserved the lots and its fruits for their expenses.
Also involved in the controversy is Lot No. 707 of the Cadastral Survey
of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, with an area of 3,164 square meters
originally owned by Eulalio Adviento (Eulalio), covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 15867 issued in his name on August 21,
1917. Eulalio begot Agripina Adviento (Agripina) with his first wife
Marcela Estioko (Marcela), whom Eulalio survived. When he remarried,
Eulalio had another daughter, herein petitioner Carolina, with his
second wife, Faustina Escabesa (Faustina).6
On November 28, 1961, Agripina7 executed a Deed of Quitclaim8 over
the eastern half of Lot No. 707 in favor of her niece, herein respondent
Emilia.
Soon thereafter or on December 11, 1962, petitioner Carolina executed
an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication9 adjudicating unto herself the entire
Lot No. 707 as the sole and exclusive heir of her deceased parents,
Eulalio and Faustina.10 On the same date, Carolina also executed
a Deed of Absolute Sale11 over Lot No. 707 in favor of petitioners
Hilaria and Felipa, who in turn immediately caused the cancellation of
OCT No. 15867 and the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in their names.12
In 1971, Emilia and her family went to the United States and returned
to the Philippines only in 1981. Upon her return and relying on
the Deed of Quitclaim, she built a house on the eastern half of Lot No.
707.13
The legal debacle of the Figuracions started in 1994 when Hilaria and
her agents threatened to demolish the house of Emilia who, in
retaliation, was prompted to seek the partition of Lot No. 707 as well
as Lot Nos. 2299 and 705. The matter was initially brought before
the Katarungang Pambarangay, but no amicable settlement was
reached by the parties.14 On May 23, 1994, respondent Emilia
instituted the herein Complaint15 for the partition of Lot Nos. 2299, 705
and 707, annulment of the Affidavit of Self- Adjudication, Deed of
Absolute Sale  and TCT No. 42244, reconveyance of eastern half
portion of Lot No. 707, quieting of title and damages.
In opposition, the petitioners averred the following special and
affirmative defenses: (1) the respondent’s cause of action had long
prescribed and that she is guilty of laches hence, now estopped from
bringing the suit; (2) TCT No. 42244 in the name of Felipa and Hilaria
have already attained indefeasibility and conclusiveness as to the true
8
owners of Lot No. 707; and (3) an action for partition is no longer
tenable because Felipa and Hilaria have already acquired rights
adverse to that claimed by respondent Emilia and the same amount to
a repudiation of the alleged co-ownership.16
During pre-trial conference, the issues were simplified into: (1)
whether or not Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 are the exclusive properties of
Leandro; and (2) whether or not respondent Emilia is the owner of the
eastern half of Lot No. 707.17
On the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties, the RTC rendered
its Decision dated June 26, 1997 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for partition,
reconveyance, quieting of title and damages is hereby ordered
dismissed whereas the affidavit of self-adjudication[,] deed of sale and
the transfer certificate of title involving Lot 707 are hereby declared
null and void.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.18
The RTC ruled that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 will be
premature since their ownership is yet to be transmitted from Leandro
to his heirs whose respective shares thereto must still be determined in
estate settlement proceedings. Anent Lot No. 707, the RTC held that
petitioner Carolina transferred only her one-half (½) share to Felipa
and Hilaria and any conveyance of the other half pertaining to Agripina
was void. While the RTC nullified the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication,
Deed of Absolute Sale  and TCT No. 42244, it refused to adjudicate the
ownership of the lot’s eastern half portion in favor of respondent Emilia
since a settlement of the estate of Eulalio is yet to be undertaken.19
Respondent Emilia appealed to the CA, which, in its Decision dated
December 11, 2001, ruled that the RTC erred in refusing to partition
Lot No. 707. The CA explained that there is no necessity for placing
Lot No. 707 under judicial administration since Carolina had long sold
her ½ pro indiviso  share to Felipa and Hilaria. Thus, when Carolina
sold the entire Lot No. 707 on December 11, 1962 as her own, the sale
affected only her share and not that belonging to her co-owner,
Agripina. The proper action in such case is not the nullification of the
sale, or for the recovery of possession of the property owned in
common from the third person, but for a division or partition of the
entire lot. Such partition should result in segregating the portion
belonging to the seller and its delivery to the buyer.
The CA, however, agreed with the RTC that a partition of Lot Nos.
2299 and 705 is indeed premature considering that there is a pending
legal controversy with respect to Lot No. 705 and the accounting of
the income from Lot No. 2299 and of the expenses for the last illness
and burial of Leandro and Carolina, for which the lots appear to have
been intended.
Accordingly, the decretal portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby
GRANTED and the decision appealed from in Civil Case No. U-5826 is
hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby rendered
declaring Lot No. 707 covered by TCT No. 42244 to be owned by
appellant Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla [herein respondent], ½ pro
indiviso  share, appellee Felipa Figuracion [herein petitioner], ¼ pro
indiviso  share, and appellee Hilaria Figuracion [herein petitioner],
¼ pro indiviso  share, who are hereby directed to partition the same
and if they could not agree on a partition, they may petition the trial
court for the appointment of a commissioner to prepare a project of
partition, in accordance with the procedure as provided in Rule 69 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.20
Respondent Emilia appealed the CA’s decision to the Court, docketed
as G.R. No. 154322. In a Decision promulgated on August 22, 2006,
the Court denied the appeal, concurring with the CA’s ruling that a
partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 would be inappropriate considering
that: (1) the ownership of Lot No. 705 is still in dispute; and (2) there
are still unresolved issues as to the expenses chargeable to the estate
of Leandro.
The present petition involves the appeal of the petitioners who
attribute this sole error committed by the CA:
THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENTIAL DICTA LAID
DOWN BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.21
In view of the Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 154322, the ensuing
discussion shall concern only Lot No. 707.
The Arguments of the Parties
The petitioners argue that respondent Emilia has no valid basis for her
claim of ownership because the Deed of Quitclaim  executed in her
favor by Agripina was in fact a deed of donation that contained no
acceptance and thus, void. The petitioners attached a copy of
the Deed of Quitclaim  and stressed on the following portions, viz:
I, AGRIPINA ESTIOKO ADVIENTO, of le[ga]l age, Filipino citizen,
single and a resident [of] San Vicenter (sic), Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan, for and in consideration of the sum of ONE PESO
([P]1.00), Philippine Currency and the services rendered by my niece
EMILIA FIGURACION, 20 years old, single, Filipino citizen and a
resident of San Vicente, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, do hereby by
these presentsw (sic) RENOUNCE, RELEASE and forever QUITCLAIM in
favor of EMILIA FIGURACION, her heirs, and assigns the ONE[-]HALF
(1/2) eastern portion of the following parcel of land more particularly
described and bounded as follows to wit[.]22
They further aver that the Deed of Quitclaim  is riddled with defects
that evoke questions of law, because: (a)  it has not been registered
with the Register of Deeds, albeit, allegedly executed as early as
1961; (b)  a certification dated June 3, 2003 issued by the Office of the
Clerk of Court (OCC) of the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, shows that
it does not have a copy of the Deed of Quitclaim; (c)  the Office of the
National Archives which is the depository of old and new notarized
documents has no record of the Deed of Quitclaim  as evidenced by a
certification dated May 19, 2003;23 and (d)  Atty. Felipe V. Abenojar,
who supposedly notarized the Deed of Quitclaim  was not
commissioned to notarize in 1961 per the certification dated June 9,
2003 from the OCC of the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan.24
Respondent Emilia, on the other hand, contends that the Deed of
Quitclaim  should be considered an onerous donation that requires no
acceptance as it is governed by the rules on contracts and not by the
formalities for a simple donation.25
The Court’s Ruling
Issues not raised before the courts a quo  cannot be raised for
the first time in a petition filed under Rule 45
Records show that there is a palpable shift in the defense raised by the
petitioners before the RTC and the CA.
9
In the Pre-Trial Order26 of the RTC dated April 4, 1995, the parties
agreed to limit the issue with regard to Lot No. 707 as follows:
whether or not respondent Emilia is the owner of the eastern half
portion of Lot No. 707. The petitioners’ supporting theory for this issue
was that "the Deed of Quitclaim  dated November 28, 1961 was
rendered ineffective by the issuance of [TCT No. 42244] in the name
of Felipa and Hilaria."27 On appeal to the CA, however, the petitioners
raised a new theory by questioning the execution and enforceability of
the Deed of  Quitclaim. They claimed that it is actually a donation that
was not accepted in the manner required by law.28
The inconsistent postures taken by the petitioners breach the basic
procedural tenet that a party cannot change his theory on appeal as
expressly adopted in Rule 44, Section 15 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:
Sec. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal.   Whether or not the
appellant has filed a motion for new trial in the court below, he may
include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has
been raised in the court below and which is within the issues framed
by the parties.
Fortifying the rule, the Court had repeatedly emphasized that defenses
not pleaded in the answer may not be raised for the first time on
appeal. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case
is decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be
permitted to change the same on appeal, because to permit him to do
so would be unfair to the adverse party.29 The Court had likewise, in
numerous times, affirmed that points of law, theories, issues and
arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be,
and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these
cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage. Basic
considerations of due process underlie this rule. It would be unfair to
the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further
evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done had it
been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.30
While a party may change his theory on appeal when the factual bases
thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the
adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in
the new theory,31 this exception does not, however, obtain in the case
at hand.
Contrary to the petitioners’ assertion, the Court finds that the issues on
the supposed defects and actual nature of the Deed of Quitclaim  are
questions of fact that require not only a review or re-evaluation of the
evidence already adduced by the parties but also the reception of new
evidence as the petitioners themselves have acknowledged when they
attached in the petition several certifications 32 in support of their new
argument. It is settled that questions of fact are beyond the province
of a Rule 45 petition since the Court is not a trier of facts.33
Accordingly, the Court will not give due course to the new issues
raised by the petitioners involving the nature and execution of
the Deed of Quitclaim.  For their failure to advance these questions
during trial, the petitioners are now barred by estoppel34 from
imploring an examination of the same.
The respondent can compel the
partition of Lot No. 707
The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue
of ownership. Such an action will not lie if the claimant has no rightful
interest in the subject property. In fact, the parties filing the action are
required by the Rules of Court to set forth in their complaint the nature
and the extent of their title to the property. It would be premature to
effect a partition until and unless the question of ownership is first
definitely resolved.35
Here, the respondent traces her ownership over the eastern half of Lot The petitioners posit that the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in the name
No. 707 from the Deed of Quitclaim  executed by Agripina, who in turn, of Hilaria and Felipa over Lot No. 707 on December 11, 1962 was an
was the co-owner thereof being one of the legitimate heirs of Eulalio. express repudiation of the co-ownership with respondent Emilia.
It is well to recall that the petitioners failed to categorically dispute the Considering the period of time that has already lapsed since then,
existence of the Deed of Quitclaim. Instead, they averred that it has acquisitive prescription has already set in and the respondent is now
been rendered ineffective by TCT No. 42244 in the name of Felipa and barred by laches from seeking a partition of the subject lot.
Hilaria―this contention is, of course, flawed.
The contention is specious.
Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does
not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under
Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the
coownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the
share of the other co-heirs or co-owners absent a clear repudiation of
registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have
the co ownership.43 The act of repudiation, as a mode of terminating
acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the
co-ownership, is subject to certain conditions, to wit: (1) a co-owner
certificate of title.36 Stated differently, placing a parcel of land under
repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly
the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership
made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear
thereof can no longer be disputed. The certificate cannot always be
and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open,
considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.37 In this case, co-
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the
ownership of Lot No. 707 was precisely what respondent
period required by law.44
Emilia was able to successfully establish, as correctly found by
the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
The petitioners failed to comply with these conditions. The act of
Hilaria and Felipa in effecting the registration of the entire Lot No. 707
The status of Agripina and Carolina as the legitimate heirs of Eulalio is
in their names thru TCT No. 42244 did not serve to effectively
an undisputed fact. As such heirs, they became co-owners of Lot No.
repudiate the co-ownership. The respondent built her house on the
707 upon the death of Eulalio on July 20, 1930. Since Faustina was
eastern portion of the lot in 1981 without any opposition from the
predeceased by Eulalio, she likewise became a co-owner of the lot
petitioners. Hilaria also paid realty taxes on the lot, in behalf of the
upon Eulalio’s death. Faustina’s share, however, passed on to her
respondent, for the years 1983-1987.45 These events indubitably show
daughter Carolina when the former died on October 18, 1949.
that Hilaria and Felipa failed to assert exclusive title in themselves
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication  executed by Carolina did not
adversely to Emilia. Their acts clearly manifest that they recognized
prejudice the share of Agripina because it is not legally possible for
the subsistence of their co-ownership with respondent Emilia despite
one to adjudicate unto himself an entire property he was not the sole
the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in 1962. Their acts constitute an
owner of. A co-owner cannot alienate the shares of her other co-
implied recognition of the co-ownership which in turn negates the
owners – nemo dat qui non habet.38
presence of a clear notice of repudiation to the respondent. To sustain
a plea of prescription, it must always clearly appear that one who was
Hence, Lot No. 707 was a co-owned property of Agripina and Carolina. originally a joint owner has repudiated the claims of his co-owners,
As co-owners, each of them had full ownership of her part and of the and that his co-owners were apprised or should have been apprised of
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto. Each of them also had the right his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership before the alleged
to alienate the lot but only in so far as the extent of her portion was prescriptive period began to run.46
affected.39
In addition, when Hilaria and Felipa registered the lot in their names to
Thus, when Carolina sold the entire Lot No. 707 on December 11, the exclusion of Emilia, an implied trust was created by force of law
1962 to Hilaria and Felipa without the consent of her co-owner and the two of them were considered a trustee of the respondent’s
Agripina, the disposition affected only Carolina’s pro indiviso  share, undivided share.47 As trustees, they cannot be permitted to repudiate
and the vendees, Hilaria and Felipa, acquired only what corresponds to the trust by relying on the registration. In Ringor v. Ringor,48 the Court
Carolina’s share. A co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share; had the occasion to explain the reason for this rule:
hence, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the
consent of the other co-owners is not null and void and only the rights
A trustee who obtains a Torrens title over a property held in
of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-
trust for him by another cannot repudiate the trust by relying
owner of the property.40
on the registration. A Torrens Certificate of Title in Jose’s name did
not vest ownership of the land upon him. The Torrens system does not
Accordingly, the deed of sale executed by Carolina in favor of Hilaria create or vest title. It only confirms and records title already existing
and Felipa was a valid conveyance but only insofar as the share of and vested. It does not protect a usurper from the true owner. The
Carolina in the co-ownership is concerned. As Carolina’s successors-in- Torrens system was not intended to foment betrayal in the
interest to the property, Hilaria and Felipa could not acquire any performance of a trust. It does not permit one to enrich himself at the
superior right in the property than what Carolina is entitled to or could expense of another. Where one does not have a rightful claim to the
transfer or alienate after partition. property, the Torrens system of registration can confirm or record
nothing. Petitioners cannot rely on the registration of the lands in
Jose’s name nor in the name of the Heirs of Jose M. Ringor, Inc., for
In a contract of sale of co-owned property, what the vendee obtains
the wrong result they seek. For Jose could not repudiate a trust by
by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-
relying on a Torrens title he held in trust for his co-heirs.1âwphi1 The
owner, and the vendee merely steps into the shoes of the vendor as
beneficiaries are entitled to enforce the trust, notwithstanding the
co-owner.41 Hilaria and Felipa did not acquire the undivided portion
irrevocability of the Torrens title. The intended trust must be
pertaining to Agripina, which has already been effectively bequeathed
sustained.49 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
to respondent Emilia as early as November 28, 1961 thru the Deed of
Quitclaim. In turn, being the successor-in-interest of Agripina’s share
in Lot No. 707, respondent Emilia took the former’s place in the co-
ownership and as such co-owner, has the right to compel partition at
any time.42

The respondent’s right to demand

for partition is not barred by
acquisitive prescription or laches

10
Further, records do not reflect conclusive evidence showing the
manner of occupation and possession exercised by Hilaria and Felipa
over the lot from the time it was registered in their names. The only
evidence of possession extant in the records dates back only to 1985
when Hilaria and Felipa declared the lot in their names for taxation
purposes.50 Prescription can only produce all its effects when acts of
ownership, or in this case, possession, do not evince any doubt as to
the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners. Hence, prescription
among co-owners cannot take place when acts of ownership exercised
are vague or uncertain.51
Moreover, the evidence relative to the possession, as a fact upon
which the alleged prescription is based, must be clear, complete and
conclusive in order to establish said prescription without any shadow of
doubt; and when upon trial it is not shown that the possession of the
claimant has been adverse and exclusive and opposed to the rights of
the others, the case is not one of ownership, and partition will
lie.52 The petitioners failed to muster adequate evidence of possession
essential for the reckoning of the 10-year period for acquisitive
prescription.
The express disavowal of the co-ownership did not happen on
December 11, 1962 when TCT No. 42244 was issued but in 1994 when
Hilaria attempted to demolish Emilia’s house thus explicitly excluding
her from the co-ownership. It was the only time that Hilaria and Felipa
made known their denial of the co-ownership. On the same year, the
respondent instituted the present complaint for partition; hence, the
period required by law for acquisitive period to set in was not met.
Anent laches, the Court finds it unavailing in this case in view of the
proximity of the period when the co-ownership was expressly
repudiated and when the herein complaint was filed. Laches is the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.53 More so, laches is a creation of
equity and its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It
cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice.
Neither should its application be used to prevent the rightful owners of
a property from recovering what has been fraudulently registered in
the name of another.54
Partition of Lot No. 707
Under the Old Civil Code55 which was then in force at the time of
Eulalio and Marcela’s marriage, Lot No. 707 was their conjugal
property.56 When Marcela died, one-half of the lot was automatically
reserved to Eulalio, the surviving spouse, as his share in the conjugal
partnership.57 Marcela’s rights to the other half, in turn, were
transmitted to her legitimate child, Agripina and surviving spouse
Eulalio.58 Under Article 834 of the Old Civil Code, Eulalio was entitled
only to the usufruct of the lot while the naked ownership belonged to
Agripina. When he remarried, Eulalio’s one half portion of the lot
representing his share in the conjugal partnership and his usufructuary
right over the other half were brought into his second marriage with
Faustina.59
When Eulalio died on July 20, 1930, ¼ portion of the lot was reserved
for Faustina as her share in the conjugal partnership.60 The remaining
¼ were transmitted equally to the widow Faustina and Eulalio’s
children, Carolina and Agripina.61 However, Faustina is only entitled to
the usufruct of the third available for betterment.62
The usufructuary of Eulalio over the ½ portion inherited by Agripina
earlier was merged with her naked ownership.63 Upon the death of
Faustina, the shares in Lot No. 707 which represents her share in the
conjugal partnership and her inheritance from Eulalio were in turn
inherited by Carolina64 including Faustina’s usufructuary rights which
were merged with Carolina’s naked ownership.65
Consequently, Agripina is entitled to 5/8 portion of Lot No. 707 while
the remaining 3/8 pertains to Carolina. Thus, when Carolina sold Lot
11
No. 707 to Hilaria and Felipa, the sale affected only 3/8 portion of the
subject lot. Since the Deed of Quitclaim, bequeathed only the ½
eastern portion of Lot No. 707 in favor of Emilia instead of Agripina’s
entire 5/8 share thereof, the remaining 1/8 portion shall be inherited
by Agripina’s nearest collateral relative,66 who, records show, is her
sister Carolina.
In sum, the CA committed no reversible error in holding that the
respondent is entitled to have Lot No. 707 partitioned. The CA
judgment must, however, be modified to conform to the above-
discussed apportionment of the lot among Carolina, Hilaria, Felipa and
Emilia.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58290 dated December 11, 2001,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows: (1) 3/8 portion of
Lot No. 707 shall pertain in equal shares to Hilaria Figuracion and
Felipa Figuracion-Manuel; (2) ½ portion of Lot. No. 707 shall pertain
to Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla; and (3) 1/8 portion of Lot No. 707 shall
pertain to the estate of Carolina (Carlina) Vda. De Figuracion. The case
is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
Branch 49, who is directed to conduct a PARTITION BY
COMMISSIONERS and effect the actual physical partition of the subject
property, as well as the improvements that lie therein, in the foregoing
manner. The trial court is DIRECTED to appoint not more than three
(3) competent and disinterested persons, who should determine the
technical metes and bounds of the property and the proper share
appertaining to each co-owner, including the improvements, in
accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. When it is made to
appear to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion thereof,
cannot be divided without great prejudice to the interest of the parties,
the court a quo  may order it assigned to one of the parties willing to
take the same, provided he pays to the other parties such sum or
sums of money as the commissioners deem equitable, unless one of
the parties interested ask that the property be sold instead of being so
assigned, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell
the real estate at public sale, and the commissioners shall sell the
same accordingly, and thereafter distribute the proceeds of the sale
appertaining to the just share of each co-owner. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 212413, June 06, 2018
MA. ROSARIO AGARRADO, RUTH LIBRADA AGARRADO AND
ROY AGARRADO, FOR THEMSELVES AND FOR THE BENEFIT OF
THEIR SIBLINGS AND CO-OWNERS ROBERTO AGARRADO,
REUEL ANDRES AGARRADO, HEIRS OF THE LATE RODRIGO
AGARRADO, JR., REX AGARRADO AND JUDY
AGARRADO, Petitioners, v. CRISTITA LIBRANDO-AGARRADO
AND ANA LOU AGARRADO-KING, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, JR., J.:
An action for partition of real estate is at once an action for the
determination of the co-owners of the subject property and an action
for the eventual conveyance of specific portions thereof to the co-
owners. While this subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation,
the proper court which would have jurisdiction over the action would
still depend on the subject property's assessed values in accordance
with Secs. 19(2) and 33(3) of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, as amended.1
The Case
Challenged before the Court via  this Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the April 19, 2013
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 02669,
which affirmed with modification the January 17, 2007 Decision 3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44, of Bacolod City in Civil Case No.
03-11893. Likewise cha1lenged is the subsequent March 27, 2014
Resolution4 of the CA which upheld its earlier decision.
The Antecedent Facts
As borne by the records of the case, it appears that the petitioners Ma.
Rosario Agarrado (Ma. Rosario), Ruth Librada Agarrado (Ruth), and
Roy Agarrado (Roy) are children of the late spouses Rodrigo (Rodrigo)
and Emilia (Emilia) Agarrado, who, during their lifetime, acquired a
287-square meter land (subject property) in Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental. The subject property was registered in the name of the
spouses Rodrigo and Emilia and was covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-29842-B.5
On August 18, 1978, Emilia died intestate, leaving Rodrigo and their
children as her compulsory heirs.
Meanwhile, unknown to the petitioners, Rodrigo was involved in an
illicit affair with respondent Cristita Librando-Agarrado (Cristita), with
whom Rodrigo begot respondent Ana Lou Agarrado-King (Ana Lou). As
it turned out, Ana Lou was conceived during the existence of the
marriage between Rodrigo and Emilia, but was born on September 27,
1978—one month after the dissolution of Rodrigo and Emilia's
marriage through the latter's death.
Eventually, Rodrigo married Cristita on July 6, 1981.
On December 8, 2000, Rodrigo also succumbed to mortality and died.
He left his surviving spouse, Cristita, his legitimate children by his
marriage with Emilia, and Ana Lou.
On January 23, 2003, Cristita and Ana Lou filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44, of Bacolod City for the partition
of the subject property, with Ma. Rosario, Ruth, Roy, "and other heirs
of Rodrigo Agarrado"6 as defendants. None of the other heirs were
however named in any pleading filed by either the plaintiffs (now
respondents) or defendants (now petitioners).
Eventually, the RTC rendered its January 17, 2007 Decision, which
ordered the parties to partition the subject property "among
themselves by proper instruments of conveyance or any other means
or method."7 The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, plaintiff Ana Lou Agarrado-King and the defendants
herein are ordered to partition the property subject of this case (Lot
10, Block 6) among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance
or any other means or method after which the Court shall confirm the
partition so agreed upon by them, otherwise the Court will appoint
commissioners to effect partition at the expense of the parties.
SO ORDERED.8
Aggrieved, the petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,
which, through the assailed April 19, 2013 Decision, affirmed with
modification the January 17, 2007 Decision of the RTC. The fallo of the
decision of the appellate court reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated
January 17, 2007, of the Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region,
Branch 44, Bacolod City in Civil Case No. 03-11893 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION in that:
1. We declare plaintiffs-appellees Cristita Librando
Agarrado and Ana Lou Agarrado-King as well as
12
defendants-appellants as co-owners of the subject
property;
2. We grant judicial partition in the following
manner:
(a) Plaintiff-appellee Cristita Librando Agarrado is entitled to 2/9;
(b) Ma. Rosario, Ruth and Roy Agarrado are entitled to 6/9 plus ¼ to
be divided equally among them unless they agree otherwise; and
(c) Ana Lou Agarrado-King is entitled to 1/9 of the property.
The partition and segregation of the subject property is hereby
ordered as outlined in Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.9
Despite the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the CA affirmed its
April 19, 2013 Decision via the March 27, 2014 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
The petitioners anchor their prayer for the reversal of the April 19,
2013 Decision and March 27, 2014 Resolution based on the following
issues:
a. Whether the Hon. Court of Appeals erred in excluding the
FIVE OTHER heirs (children of the first marriage) of their
inheritance by the alleged failure to prove their filiation in
the proceedings before the Honorable Regional Trial Court;
b. Harmonizing substantive and procedural law, whether the
Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating
Respondents' implied recognition or "admission by silence"
under Section 32 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as
evidence of the filiation of the five (5) other children of the
late Rodrigo Agarrado, Sr. (namely Reuel Andres Agarrado,
Rodrigo Agarrado, Jr., Rex Agarrado, Roberto Agarrado and
Judy Agarrado);
c. Whether the Hon. Court of Appeals in its contested Decision,
mathematically MISAPPLIED the formula under the pertinent
rules of succession in the Family Code and/or Civil Code to
determine the shares of both Petitioners and Respondents to
the subject house and lot;
d. Relatedly, whether the Hon. Court of Appeals is correct in
ruling that a family home cannot be recognized as such
simply because it was not registered as such;
e. Whether all the GSIS, PHILHEALTH and other benefits all
claimed, taken, and received by the Respondents are to be
charged against whatever share they may have over the
subject "house and lot" of the late Rodrigo Agarrado, Sr., as
well as the funeral expenses expended by the first family
alone?
f. Whether the Hon. Court of Appeals was correct in not
ordering the dismissal of the case for failure of Plaintiffs-
Respondents to allege the market value and pay the right
docket fees at the incipience of the Complaint.10
In sum, the submissions of the petitioners seek to determine the
following: (1) the compulsory heirs of the late Rodrigo; (2) the portion
of the estate to which each of the compulsory heirs are entitled; (3)
the propriety of collating to the total estate the medical and burial
expenses shouldered by the petitioners and the benefits (GSIS,
PHILHEALTH) received by the respondents; (4) the effect of the
allegation that the subject property is the petitioners' family home; and
(5) the effect on jurisdiction of the failure to indicate the market value
of the subject property in the complaint filed before the RTC.
The Court's Ruling
After a careful perusal of the arguments presented and the evidence
submitted, the Court finds merit in the petition.
For obvious reasons, the Court shall first consider the issue on
jurisdiction.
The petitioners argue that the complaint must be dismissed for the
failure of the respondents to allege the assessed value of the subject
property. They said that the appellate court failed to appreciate this
jurisdictional requirement, which was indispensable in the
determination of the jurisdiction of the RTC. They further averred that
the case should not have proceeded in the first place.11
The CA glossed over this issue by saying that the action for partition
instituted by the respondents in the RTC is one incapable of pecuniary
estimation, which would thus confer jurisdiction over the case to the
RTC. In ruling thus, the appellate court invoked the guidance of the
case of Russel vs. Vestil,12 and stated that:
We are guided by the ruling in Russel vs Vestil, 304 SCRA 739, March
17, 1999 wherein the Supreme Court considered petitioners'
complaint seeking the annulment of the document entitled
"Declaration of Heirs and Deed of Confirmation of Previous
Oral Partition," as an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation, rationalizing that the resolution of the same principally
involved the determination of hereditary rights. In effect, the partition
aspect is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)13
This, however, is an error that must be reversed. The appellate court's
reliance on Russel is misplaced.
The Court, in Russel, explained that the complaint filed by the plaintiff
is one incapable of pecuniary estimation because the subject matter of
the complaint is not one of partition, but one of the annulment
of a document denominated as a "Declaration of Heirs and Deed of
Confirmation of Previous Oral Partition." Considering that the
annulment of a document is the main subject matter, and that the
same is incapable of pecuniary estimation, then necessarily, the RTC
has jurisdiction.
This is not so in the present case.
In determining whether a case is incapable of pecuniary estimation,
the case of Cabrera vs. Francisco,14 in reiterating the case of Singson
vs. Isabela Sawmill,15 teaches that identifying the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought is primarily necessary. It states:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is
not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the
criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action
or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of
money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the Courts of First
Instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where
the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
13
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by Courts
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts).16 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
For actions on partition, the subject matter is two-phased. In Bagayas
vs. Bagayas,17 the Court ruled that partition is at once an action (1) for
declaration of co-ownership and (2) for segregation and conveyance of
a determinate portion of the properties involved. Thus, in a complaint
for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he/she is a co-
owner of the subject properties, and second, the conveyance of
his/her lawful share.18
The case of Russel, the very same case cited by the Court of Appeals,
determined that while actions for partition are incapable of pecuniary
estimation owing to its two-phased subject matter, the
determination of the court which will acquire jurisdiction over
the same must still conform to Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129, as
amended. Russel said:
While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable
of pecuniary estimation, the law specifically mandates that they are
cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of
the real property involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or
P50,000.00, if located elsewhere. If the value exceeds P20,000.00
or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the Regional Trial
Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2). (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
This is also the tenor of the case of Barrido vs. Nonato19 where the
Court upheld the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Branch 3, of Bacolod City over the action for partition because
the assessed value of the subject property was only P8,080.00. As
basis, Barrido likewise cited Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129, as amended.
To be sure, according to the recent case of Foronda-Crystal vs.
Son,20 jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to
hear, try, and decide a case. To exercise this, the court or adjudicative
body must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject
matter,21which is conferred by law and not by the consent or
acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the
court that it exists.22
Jurisdiction over cases for partition of real properties therefore, like all
others, is determined by law. Particularly, the same is identified by
Sections 19(2) and 33(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
as amended by Republic Act 7691.23
The provisions state that in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein, the RTC shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction where the assessed value of the
property exceeds P20,000.00 or, for civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such value exceeds P50,000.00.24 For those below the foregoing
threshold amounts, exclusive jurisdiction lies with the Metropolitan
Trial Courts (MeTC), Municipal Trial Courts (MTC), or Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts (MCTC).25
Thus, the determination of the assessed value of the property, which is
the subject matter of the partition, is essential. This, the courts could
identify through an examination of the allegations of the complaint.
According to the case of Tumpag vs. Tumpag,26 it is a hornbook
doctrine that the court should only look into the facts alleged in the
complaint to determine whether a suit is within its
jurisdiction.27 According to the case of Spouses Cruz vs. Spouses Cruz,
et al.,28 only these facts can be the basis of the court's competence to
take cognizance of a case, and that one cannot advert to anything not
set forth in the complaint, such as evidence adduced at the trial, to
determine the nature of the action thereby initiated.29
According to Foronda-Crystal, failure to allege the assessed value of a
real property in the complaint would result to a dismissal of the case.
The reason put forth by the Court is that:
x x x absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of
the property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the
MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
petitioner's action. Indeed, the courts cannot take judicial notice of
the assessed or market value of the land. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied, citations omitted)
This same ratio has been repeated in a number of cases, including the
cases of Spouses Cruz vs. Spouses Cruz, et al.30 and Quinagoran vs.
Court of Appeals,31 where the Court concluded that:
annexed to the complaint and as attached in the records of this case
indicates any such amount Thus, the petitioners are correct in
restating their argument against the RTC's jurisdiction, for it has none
to exercise.
Clearly, therefore, jurisprudence has ruled that an action for partition,
while one not capable of pecuniary estimation, falls under the
jurisdiction of either the first or second level courts depending on the
amounts specified in Secs. 19(2) and 33(3) of B.P. 129, as amended.
Consequently, a failure by the plaintiff to indicate the assessed value
of the subject property in his/her complaint, or at the very least, in the
attachments in the complaint as ruled in Foronda-Crystal, is dismissible
because the court which would exercise jurisdiction over the same
could not be identified.

Consequently, as the complaint in this case is dismissible for its failure

Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their complaint the
to abide by the rules in Foronda-Crystal, then the Court sees no further
assessed value of the subject property, the RTC seriously erred in
necessity to discuss the other issues raised.
denying the motion to dismiss. Consequently, all proceedings in the
RTC are null and void, and the CA erred in affirming the RTC.32
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the April 19, 2013 Decision and
March 27, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No.
Based on the foregoing, in Foronda-Crystal, the Court already
02669, as well as the January 17, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial
established the rules that have to be followed in determining the
Court, Branch 44, of Bacolod City in Civil Case No. 03-11893 are
jurisdiction of the first and second level courts. It said:
hereby SET ASIDE. The complaint is hereby DISMISSED without
prejudice to its refiling in the proper court.
A reading of the quoted cases would reveal a pattern which would
invariably guide both the bench and the bar in similar situations. Based
SO ORDERED.
on the foregoing, the rule on determining the assessed value of
a real property, insofar as the identification of the jurisdiction
of the first and second level courts is concerned, would be
two-tiered:

First, the general rule is that jurisdiction is determined by the

assessed value of the real property as alleged in the complaint; and

Second, the rule would be liberally applied if the assessed value of

the property, while not alleged in the complaint, could still be identified
through a facial examination of the documents already attached to the
complaint. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On the basis of this most recent ruling, the Court is without any
recourse but to agree with the petitioners in dismissing the complaint
filed before the RTC for lack of jurisdiction.

A scouring of the records of this case revealed that the complaint did
indeed lack any indication as to the assessed value of the subject
property. In fact, the only reference to the same in the complaint are
found in paragraphs six, seven, and eight thereof, which state that:

"6. Meanwhile, during the lifetime of Rodrigo Agarrado, he acquired

certain real and personal properties due to his hard work, one of which
is the parcel of land with improvements standing thereon, located at
Barangay Villamonte, Bacolod City, more particularly described as
follows, to wit:

xxxx

7. RODRIGO AGARRADO died intestate and leaving no debts. Upon his

death, plaintiffs by operation of law, became co-owners of the afore-
described property jointly with the other heirs, the herein defendants;

8. Demand thru counsel has been made by the herein plaintiffs upon
the defendants for the partition of the subject property, but the same
was simply ignored. Copy of the Demand Letter is hereto attached and
marked as Annex 'D' and forming part hereof."33

None of these assertions indicate the assessed value of the property to

be partitioned that would invariably determine as to which court has
the authority to acquire jurisdiction. More, none of the documents

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