COURTS OF BOTH LAW & EQUITY rescind a contract unless there is restitution, that is, the parties are
cind a contract unless there is restitution, that is, the parties are restored to the status
G.R. No. 134241 August 11, 2003
Petitioners: David Reyes
Respondents: Jose Lim, Chuy Keng and Harrison Lumber
FACTS:
 Petitioner David Reyes filed a complaint for annulment of contract and damages
against respondents. The complaint alleged that Reyes as seller and Lim as buyer
entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land located along F.B. Harrison Street,
Pasay City which was occupied by Harrison Lumber, Inc.
 Lim requested a meeting with Reyes through the latter’s daughter on the signing
of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the payment of the balance but Reyes kept
postponing their meeting. Reyes offered to return the P10 million down payment
to Lim because Reyes was having problems in removing the current lessee from
the Property. Lim rejected Reyes’ offer and proceeded to verify the status of
Reyes’ title to the Property. Lim learned that Reyes had already sold the Property
to Line One Foods Corporation.
 Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the P10 million
down payment with the cashier of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque. The
trial court granted this motion.
 The trial court denied Reyes’ Motion for Reconsideration. In the same order, the
trial court directed Reyes to deposit the P10 million down payment with the
Clerk of Court.
 Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals and prayed that the
orders of the trial court be set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. But the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the equity jurisdiction is an applicable law on the matter.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that this was a case where there is hiatus in the law and
in the Rules of Court. If this case was left alone, the hiatus will result in unjust enrichment
to Reyes at the expense of Lim. Here the court exercised equity jurisdiction. The purpose
of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to
ensure restitution so that substantial justice may be attained in cases where the
prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate.
The Supreme Court also state that rescission is possible only when the person demanding
rescission can return whatever he may be obliged to restore. A court of equity will not
quo ante.
In this case, it was just, equitable and proper for the trial court to order the deposit of the
P10 million down payment. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.
G.R. No. 174689 October 19, 2007
Petitioner: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
Respondent: Republic of the Philippines
FACTS:
 Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his
first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 8. The petition impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
 Petitioner alleged that he is a male transsexual and that he underwent sex
reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr.
Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr, a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines,
who issued a medical certificate attesting that the petitioner had in fact
undergone the procedure.
 Petitioner then sought to change his name in the birth certificate from “Rommel
Jacinto” to “Mely,” and his sex from “male” to “female.”
 The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner.
 The respondent (Republic of the Philippines), through the OSG, filed a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the
change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
 The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. It ruled that
the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of
either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment
through surgery. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence,
this petition.
 Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth
certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and
108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. The petition lacks merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is allowed to change his name and sex in his birth
certificate on the grounds of equity.
HELD:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. The trial court opined that its grants of the
petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity in the absence of law.
It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone.
This is wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public
policy consequences. First, granting the petition will substantially reconfigure and greatly
alter the laws on marriage and family relations. Second, laws that underscore the public
policy in relation to women (i.e. Labor Code on employment of women) could be
substantially affected. It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that “no judge or
court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity and
insufficiency of law.” However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation.
The duty of the court is to apply and interpret the law, not to make or amend it. It is the
duty of the legislature to determine the guidelines that should govern the recognition of
the effects of sex reassignment. Thus, the remedies the petitioner seeks involve questions
of public policy to be address solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
G.R. No. 225973 August 8, 2017
Petitioners: Ocampo, et al.
Respondent: Enriquez, et al.
FACTS:
 Public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a
Memorandum to the public respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP, General Ricardo
R. Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani
(LNMB) in reference to the Verbal Order of President Duterte.
 Equitable consideration
Rosales et al. contend that the Court should apply equity and extend equitable
protection to the HRVVs because Marcos' burial at the LNMB causes them
irreparable injury as it re-inflicts their trauma and grief while the Marcos' heirs
have not shown any injury that they would sustain by its denial.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not equity jurisdiction can be exercised to hinder the burying of Pres.
Marcos at the LNMB.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondents that equity jurisdiction
cannot be applied in this case for there is a law applicable to it. That is, the AFP has laid
out its guidelines on who can be buried in the LNMB. Included in it are past presidents
and commanders-in-chief both of which pertain to Marcos. Therefore, burying Marcos in
the LNMB is valid.
Justice is done according to law. As a rule, equity follows the law. There may be a
moral obligation, often regarded as an equitable consideration (meaning compassion), but
if there is no enforceable legal duty, the action must fail although the disadvantaged party
deserves commiseration or sympathy.
Equitable consideration is applied only in the absence of and never against
statutory law or, as in this case, appropriate AFP regulations. Courts exercising equity
jurisdiction are bound and circumscribed by law or rules and have no arbitrary discretion
to disregard them. Here, while there is no provision of the Constitution, law, or
jurisprudence expressly allowing or disallowing Marcos' burial at the LNMB, there is a
rule, particularly AFP Regulations G 161-375, that is valid and existing. It has the force and
effect of law because it was duly issued pursuant to the rule-making power of the
President that was delegated to his subordinate official. Hence, it is the sole authority in
determining who may or may not be buried at the LNMB.
SHARI’A COURTS
G.R. No. 193340 January 11, 2017
Petitioner: Municipality of Tangkal
Respondent: Hon. Rasad B. Balindong
FACTS:
 The respondents, heirs of the late Macalabo Alompo, filed a complaint with the
Shari’a District Court of Marawi City against the petitioner, Municipality of
Tangkal, for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land. They
alleged that Macalabo was the owner of the land, and that in 1962, he entered
into an agreement with the Municipality of Tangkal allowing that latter to
“borrow” the land. The agreement allegedly imposed a condition upon the
petitioner to pay the value of the land within 35 years, or until 1997; otherwise
ownership of the land would revert to Macalbo. Private respondents claimed
that the petitioner neither paid the value of the land within the agreed period
nor returned the land to its owner.
 The petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper
venue and lack of jurisdiction. It argued that it has no religious affiliation and
represent no cultural or ethnic tribe. It cannot be considered as a Muslim under
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. Moreover, since the complaint for recovery
of land is a real action. It should have been field in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court of Lanao del Norte.
 In its Order, the Shari’a District Court denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss. It
held that since the mayor of the Municipality of Tangkal is a Muslim, the case “is
an action involving Muslims, hence, the court has original jurisdiction
concurrently with that of regular/civil courts.”
  The petitioner moved for a reconsideration, which was denied by the Shari’a
District Court. The Shari’a District Court also ordered the petitioner to file its
answer within 10 days. The petitioner timely filed its answer and raised as an
affirmative defense the court’s lack of jurisdiction.
 Within the 60-day reglementary period, the petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus and prayer for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) to the Supreme Court.
 The Shari’a District Court was issued a TRO from holding any further proceedings
related to the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Shari’a District Court of Marawi City has jurisdiction in an
action filed by Muslim individuals against a municipality whose mayor is a Muslim.
HELD:
As stated in Article 143 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, Shari’a District Courts have
jurisdiction over cases where both parties are Muslims. The word “parties” necessarily
refers to the real parties in interest. Moreover, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws defines
a “Muslim” as “a person” who testifies to the oneness of God and the Prophethood of
Muhammad and professes Islam.” The ability to testify to the “oneness of God and the
Prophethood of Muhammad” is, by its nature, restricted to natural persons. In contrast,
juridical persons are artificial beings with “no conscience, no beliefs, no feelings, no
thoughts, no desires.” They are considered persons only by virtue of legal fiction. The
Municipality of Tangkal falls under this category. It is an elementary principle that a
municipality has a personality that is separate and distinct from its mayor, vice-mayor,
sanggunian¸ and other officers composing it. And under no circumstances can this
corporate veil be pierced on purely religious considerations without running afoul the
inviolability of the separation of Church and State enshrined in the Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, the Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction under the
law to decide private respondent’s complaint because not all of the parties involved in the
are Muslims. Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED.
COURTS OF LAST RESORT:
G.R. No. 127022 June 28, 2000
Petitioner: Firestone Ceramics
Respondent: Court of Appeals
FACTS:
 The case is about the petitioners’ Motion to refer to the Court EN Banc the
consolidated cases in which the Third Division of the court has decided.
 The cases involve a vast tract of land with an area of 99 hectares presumably
belonging to the republic of the Philippines which was adjudged to private
individuals by a court alleged to be without jurisdiction.
 The petitioners submitted to the Court en consulta, a motion to the Court En
banc. A pleading entitled, “FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE COURT EN BANC,
EN CONSULTA” was presented but when the same was brought into attention on
March 7, 2000, the Third Division had not yet acted on the subject motions to
refer the cases to the Banc. However, the court warned the Third Division that
their decision on the matter would just be tentative.
ISSUES: Whether or not the court should treat the case at bar en banc.
HELD:
 YES. Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, as amended by the Resolution
of November 18, 1993: one of the enumerated cases that can be
considered as an en banc case:
All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual
membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention.
 On March 8, 2000, the Third Division voted 4-1 to deny petitioners' motion
to transfer these cases to the Banc. Thus, on March 14, 2000, the Court
deliberated on the consulta and thereafter, voted 9-5 to accept the cases
for the Banc to pass upon in view of the finding that the cases above
entitled are of sufficient importance to merit its attention. Evidently, the
action of the Court under the premises is a legitimate and valid exercise
of its RESIDUAL POWER within the contemplation of paragraph 9 of the
Resolution En Banc of November 18, 1993, which reads: "All other cases
as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of
sufficient importance to merit its attention."
 Taking into account the importance of these cases and the issues raised,
let alone the enormous value of the area in litigation, which is claimed as
government property, there is merit in the prayer of petitioners that their
pending motions for reconsideration should be resolved by the Court En
Banc.
 WHEREFORE, these consolidated cases are considered and treated as en
banc cases

G.R. No. 153690 February 15, 2011
Petitioner: David Lu
Respondent: Paterno Lu Ym
FACTS: The three consolidated cases stemmed from the complaint for “Declaration of
Nullity of Share Issue, Receivership and Dissolution” filed on August 14, 2000 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City by David Lu, et al. against Paterno Lu Ym, Sr. and
sons (Lu Ym father and sons) and LLDC. The RTC ruled in favor of David et al. by annulling
the issuance of the shares of stock subscribed and paid by Lu Ym father and sons at less
than par value, and ordering the dissolution and asset liquidation of LLDC.
Several incidents arising from the complaint reached the Court through the present three
petitions – G.R. No. 153690, G.R. No. 157381, G.R. No. 170899.
In G.R. No. 153690, David et al., assailed the appellate court’s resolutions dismissing their
complaint for its incomplete signatory in the certificate of non-forum shopping and
consequently annulling the placing of the subject corporation under receivership pendente
lite. In G.R. No. 157381, Lu Ym father and sons challenged the appellate court’s resolution
restraining the trial court from proceeding with their motion to lift the receivership order
which was filed during the pendency of G.R. No. 153690. In G.R. No. 170889, it involved the
denial by the appellate court of Lu Ym father and son’s application for a writ of preliminary
injunction.
By August 26,2008, the Court denied the petitions in G.R. Nos. 153690 and 157381 for being
moot and academic; while the petition in G.R. No 170889 is dismissed for lack of merit. In
August 4, 2009 Lu Ym Motion for Reconsideration was granted by the Court on the grounds
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for David Lu, et al.’s failure to
pay the correct docket fees, hence, all interlocutory matter and incidents subject of the
present petitions must consequently be denied. Thus, the Decision of the Court dated
August 26, 2008 is Reconsidered and Set Aside. Therefore, the complaint now on appeal
with the Court of Appeals is DISMISSED.
David Lu then filed for a Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Refer Resolution to the
Court en banc. The court denied his motion. On October 30, 2009 David Lu personally filed
a Second Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Refer Resolution to the Court en banc.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC en banc has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: Yes. The present cases were later referred to the Court en banc. The three cases fall
under at least three types of cases enumerated in The Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court (IRSC) which laid out the 15 different kinds of cases that the Court en banc shall act
on. Three of which are:
1. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the Court en banc or by a Division
may be modified or reversed;
2. Subject to Section 11 (b) of this rule, other division cases that, in the opinion of at
least three Members of the Division who are voting and present, are appropriate for
transfer to the Court en banc;
3. Cases that the Court en banc deems of sufficient importance to merit its attention;
At least three members of the Court's Second Division (to which the present cases were
transferred, they being assigned to a Member thereof) found that the cases were
appropriate for referral-transfer to the Court En Banc which subsequently accepted the
referral in view of the sufficiently important reason to resolve all doubts on the validity of
the challenged resolutions as they appear to modify or reverse doctrines or principles of
law.
It is argued that the assailed Resolutions in the present cases have already become final,
since a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited except for extraordinarily
persuasive reasons and only upon express leave first obtained; and that once a judgment
attains finality, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable, however unjust the result
of error may appear. The contention, however, misses an important point. The doctrine of
immutability of decisions applies only to final and executory decisions. Since the present
cases may involve a modification or reversal of a Court ordained doctrine or principle, the
judgment rendered by the Special Third Division may be considered unconstitutional,
hence, it can never become final. While it is true that the Court en banc exercises no
appellate jurisdiction over its Divisions, Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes opined in Firestone
and concededly recognized that "[t]he only constraint is that any doctrine or principle of
law laid down by the Court, either rendered en banc or in division, may be overturned or
reversed only by the Court sitting en banc."
DOCTRINE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS
G.R. No. 114732 August 1, 2000
Petitioner: Estrella Tiongco Yared (now deceased), sub by one of her Carmen Matilde
Tiongco
Respondent: Hon. Ricardo M. Ilarde
FACTS:
Petitioner Estrella Tiongco Yared filed an amended complaint before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 26, Iloilo City against private respondents Jose B. Tiongco and Antonio
Doronila, Jr. The action was one for "annulment of affidavit of adjudication, sales, transfer
certificates of title, reconveyance and damages." In brief, the amended complaint alleged
that respondent Tiongco, on the basis of an affidavit of adjudication alleging that he is the
sole surviving heir of the previous owner, Maria Luis de Tiongco, succeeded in having the
subject properties registered in his name, to the prejudice of the other surviving heir of the
previous owner, petitioner among them. Petitioner and respondent Tiongco's father were
siblings, and both were among several heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco. Petitioner prayed
that the properties be reconveyed to the original registered owners, subject to partition
among the lawful heirs, and that respondent Tiongco be ordered to pay damages and costs.
To protect her interest, petitioner caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the
Transfer Certificates of Title of the subject properties. The respondent judge issued a
Decision dismissing petitioners' complaint and private respondent's counterclaim on the
ground that the petitioner's cause of action had already prescribed. Petitioner filed a notice
of appeal. Respondent Tiongco then filed a motion for cancellation of notice of lis pendens.
His first and second motions for reconsideration were denied. He then filed his third Motion
for Reconsideration which was found to be persuasive, hence, in an Order dated February
14, 1994, the respondent judge granted the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens. When
the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, the court a quo reversed its order on the
ground, among others, that the records had been ordered elevated to the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Tiongco filed a motion for reconsideration and the respondent judge issued
this assailed order which installed an earlier order cancelling the notice of lis pendens on
the ground that the lis pendens is not a matter litigated in the appeal and the records have
not yet been transmitted to the appellate court. Feeling that a motion for reconsideration
would be fruitless, petitioner filed the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the instant petition filed by the petitioner is in violation of the
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts.
HELD:
The Court dismissed the petition, there being a clear violation of the doctrine of judicial
hierarchy which the Court has taken pains to emphasize in past jurisprudence. Only the
presence of exceptional and compelling reasons justified a disregard of the rule. Petitioner
has failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to her failure to comply with or non-
observance of the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no reason why the petition could
not have been brought before the Court of Appeals, considering all the more that the
appeal of the main case was already before it. Had petitioner brought the petition before
the Court of Appeals, the same could, and would have been consolidated with the appeal,
thereby bringing under the competence of the said court all matters relative to the action,
including the incidents thereof.
G.R. No. 187836 November 25, 2014
Petitioner: Social Justice Society Officers
Respondent: Mayor Alfredo Lim
FACTS:
 A Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by oil companies (Chevron,
Petron and Shell) and Department of Energy for the creation of a Master Plan to
address and minimize the potential risks and hazards posed by the proximity of
communities, business and offices to Pandacan oil terminals without affecting
security and reliability of supply and distribution of petroleum products.
 The Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) enacted Ordinance No. 8027 which reclassifies
the land use of Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and its adjoining areas from Industrial II to
Commercial I. Owners and operators of the businesses affected by the
reclassification were given six (6) months from the date of effectivity to stop the
operation of their businesses.
 A petition for mandamus was filed before the Supreme Court (SC) to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027.
 Unknown to the SC, the oil companies filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila an action to annul Ordinance No. 8027 with application for writs of
preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction. The
same was issued in favor of Chevron and Shell. Petron, on the other hand,
obtained a status quo.
 Mayor Jose Atienza, Jr. approved Ordinance No. 8119 entitled “An Ordinance
Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Regulations of
2006 and Providing for the Administration, Enforcement and Amendment
thereto”. This designates Pandacan oil depot area as a Planned Unit
Development/Overlay Zone.
 The SC granted the petition for mandamus and directed Mayor Atienza to
immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027. It declared that the objective of the
ordinance is to protect the residents of manila from the catastrophic devastation
that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.
 The oil companies filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR). The SC later resolved
that Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional and that it was not impliedly repealed
by Ordinance No. 8119 as there is no irreconcilable conflict between them.
  SC later denied with finality the second MR of the oil companies.
 During the incumbency of Mayor Alfredo Lim (Mayor Lim), the SP enacted
Ordinance No. 8187. The Industrial Zone under Ordinance No. 8119 was limited
to Light Industrial Zone, Ordinance No. 8187 appended to the list a Medium and
a Heavy Industrial Zone where petroleum refineries and oil depots are expressly
allowed.
 Petitioners Social Justice Society Officers, Mayor Atienza, et.al. filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 8187. The
respondents contended that:
o “The principle of the hierarchy of courts is violated because the SC only
exercises appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the constitutionality
or validity of an ordinance under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution”
ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of hierarchy of courts is violated.
HELD:
No. The SC held that it is true that the petitions should have been filed with the RTC, it
having concurrent jurisdiction with the SC over a special civil action for prohibition, and
original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. However, the petitions at bar are
of transcendental importance warranting a relaxation of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure
are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be eschewed. (Jaworski v. PAGCOR, 464 Phil. 375)
G.R. No. 198756 January 13, 2015
Petitioner: Banco de Oro, BoC, PBComm, PNB et al.
Respondent: Republic of the Philippines, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, BIR et al.
FACTS:
 This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus filed by
petitioners under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
 The case involves the proper tax treatment of the discount or interest
income arising from the P35 billion worth of 10-year zero-coupon treasury
bonds issued by the Bureau of Treasury. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue issued BIR Ruling No. 370-2011 (2011 BIR Ruling), declaring that the
PEACe Bonds being deposit substitutes are subject to the 20% final
withholding tax. Pursuant to this ruling, the Secretary of Finance directed the
Bureau of Treasury to withhold a 20% final tax from the face value of the
PEACe Bonds upon their payment at maturity on October 18, 2011.
 Petitioners contend that the retroactive application of the 2011 BIR Ruling
without prior notice to them was in violation of their property rights, right to
due process, as well as Sec 246 of the 197 NIRC. And that Commissioner of
Internal Revenue gravely and seriously abused her discretion in the exercise
of her rule making power.
 Respondents argue that petitioners' direct resort to this court to challenge
the 2011 BIR Ruling violates the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and hierarchy of courts, resulting in a lack of cause of action that
justifies the dismissal of the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not doctrine of hierarchy of courts was violated by the BIR and acted
outside its jurisdiction in connection with the 2011 BIR Ruling.
HELD:
No. The Court agreed with the respondents that the jurisdiction to review the rulings of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue pertains to the Court of Tax Appeals. In exceptional
cases, however, this court entertained direct recourse to it when "dictated by public
welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of
justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was
considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy." Non-compliance with the rules on
exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts had been rendered moot
by this court's issuance of the temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation
of the 2011 BIR Ruling. The temporary restraining order effectively recognized the
urgency and necessity of direct resort to this court.
G.R. No. 218787 December 8, 2015
Petitioner: Leo Y. Querubin
Respondent: COMELEC
FACTS:
 Before the Court is a petition for certiorari or prohibition under Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court, with prayer for injunctive relief, assailing the validity and seeking
to restrain the implementation of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en
banc's Decision for allegedly being repugnant to the provisions of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 68 (BP 68), otherwise known as the Corporation Code of the
Philippines, and Republic Act No. 9184 (RA 9184) or the Government
Procurement Reform Act. HTcADC
 The COMELEC en banc released the bidding documents for the "Two-Stage
Competitive Bidding for the Lease of Election Management System (EMS) and
Precinct-Based Optical Mark Reader (OMR) or Optical Scan (OP-SCAN) System."
 The joint venture of Smartmatic-TIM Corporation (SMTC), Smartmatic
International Holding B.V., and Jarltech International Corporation (collectively
referred to as "Smartmatic JV") responded to the call and submitted bid for the
project on the scheduled date.
 Indra Sistemas, S.A. (Indra), aside from Smartmatic JV, also submitted its bid.
 During the opening of the bids, Smartmatic JV, in a sworn certification, informed
the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) that one of its partner corporations,
SMTC, has a pending application with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to amend its Articles of Incorporation (AOI), attaching therein all pending
documents. On even date, Smartmatic JV and Indra participated in the end-to-
end testing of their initial technical proposals for the procurement project before
the BAC.
 Upon evaluation of the submitted requirements, the BAC, declared Smartmatic
JV and Indra eligible to participate in the second stage of the bidding process.
 The BAC then issued a Notice requiring them to submit their Final Revised
Technical Tenders and Price proposals, to which the eligible participants
complied. After careful deliberation of the submitted requirements, only
Smartmatic JV qualified.
 The BAC required Smartmatic JV to submit additional documents and a prototype
sample of its OMR. 13 The prototype was subjected to testing to gauge its
compliance with the requirements outlined in the project's Terms of Reference
(TOR).
 After the conduct of post-qualification, the BAC, disqualified Smartmatic JV on
two grounds:
o Failure to submit valid Articles of Incorporation (AOI); and
o The demo unit failed to meet the technical requirement that the system
shall be capable of writing all data/files, audit log, statistics and ballot
images simultaneously in at least two (2) data storages.
 The ruling prompted Smartmatic JV to move for reconsideration.
 In denying the motion, the BAC declared that Smartmatic JV complied with the
requirement of including the submission of a valid AOI, but was nevertheless
disqualified as it still failed to comply with the technical requirements of the
project.
 Aggrieved, Smartmatic JV filed a Protest, seeking permission to conduct another
technical demonstration of its SAES 1800 plus OMR (OMR+), the OMR
Smartmatic JV presented during the public bidding before the COMELEC en banc.
 Accordingly, Smartmatic JV was allowed to prove compliance with the technical
specifications for the second time, but this time before the electoral tribunal's
Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC). This was followed, by another technical
demonstration before the COMELEC en banc at the Advanced Science and
Technology Institute (ASTI) at the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon
City.
 Ruling of the COMELEC en banc:
o Though initially finding that the OMR+'s ability to simultaneously write
data in two storage devices could not conclusively be established, the
TEC, upon the use of a Digital Storage Oscilloscope (DSO) during the
second demonstration, determined that the OMR+ complied with the
requirements specified in the TOR. Adopting the findings of the TEC as
embodied in its Final Report, the COMELEC en banc, promulgated the
assailed Decision granting Smartmatic JV's protest.
ISSUES: Whether or not under the circumstances, the rule on hierarchy of courts may be
dispensed with.
HELD:
Anent the procedural issues, the OSG, in its bid to have the case dismissed outright,
questioned petitioners' failure to observe the hierarchy of courts. The expanded concept of
judicial includes the duty of the judiciary not only "to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable" but also, as an instrument of checks
and balances, "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government." The power is wielded not by the Court alone, but concurrently with the
Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts, as provided by law. So too has the
Sandiganbayan been vested with certiorari powers in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding the non-exclusivity of the original jurisdiction over applications for the
issuance of writs of certiorari, however, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates that
recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction
with a higher court.
In sum, there exist ample compelling reasons to justify the direct resort to the Court as a
departure from the doctrine of hierarchy of courts not in relation to but under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court on certiorari and prohibition, and to brush aside the procedural issues
in this case to focus on the substantive issues surrounding the procurement of the 23,000
additional OMRs for the 2016 elections.
Wherefore, petition is DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 217508 April 18, 2016
Petitioner: Joseph Scott Pemberton
Respondent: Hon. Leila M. De Lima
FACTS:
 A complaint for murder was filed by the Police- Olongapo City Police Office and
private respondent Marilou Laude y Serdoncillo (Laude) against petitioner Joseph
Scott Pemberton (Pemberton).
 Pemberton received a Subpoena issued by the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City
giving him 10 days from receipt within which to file a counter-affidavit.
 Laude filed an Omnibus Motion, which Pemberton opposed. During the
preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City stated that
Pemberton‘s right to file a counter- affidavit was deemed waived. The City
Prosecutor of Olongapo City continued to evaluate the evidence and conducted
ocular inspections in connection with the preliminary investigation. It found
probable cause against [Pemberton] for the crime of murder. An Information for
murder was filed against Pemberton before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo
City. The trial court issued a warrant of arrest.
 Pemberton filed his Petition for Review before the Department of Justice. On the
same day, he filed a Motion to Defer the Proceedings before the Regional Trial
Court. Secretary De Lima denied Pemberton‘s Petition for Review and stated that
based on the evidence on record, there was no reason to alter, modify, or
reverse the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City.
 Aggrieved, Pemberton filed this Petition for Certiorari with application for the ex-
parte issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. Pemberton argues that:
(a) Secretary De Lima took into account additional evidence which the City
Prosecutor allegedly had no authority to receive and which Pemberton had no
opportunity to address and rebut, thereby denying him due process of law;
(b) Secretary De Lima found probable cause to charge Pemberton with the crime
of murder when ―the evidence on record does not support the existence of
probable cause to indict [him] . . . with either homicide or murder; and
(c) Secretary De Lima found that ―the killing was attended with the qualifying
circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength, and cruelty despite
prevailing jurisprudence dictating that the elements of these qualifying
circumstances . . . be established by direct evidence.
 Secretary De Lima, through the Office of the Solicitor General, points out that
this Petition is procedurally infirm. The Petition assails the appreciation of
evidence and law by Secretary De Lima, which are errors of judgment . . . [that]
cannot be remedied by a writ of certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner violated the principle of hierarchy of courts.
HELD:
Yes. By filing this Petition before this court and not the Court of Appeals,
Pemberton violated the principle of hierarchy of courts. Moreover, the case is moot and
academic, considering that the Regional Trial Court has convicted Pemberton for the
crime charged. It is not clear why any action by the Court of Appeals, which has
concurrent original jurisdiction in petitions for certiorari under Rule 65, cannot be
considered as sufficient for review of petitioner‘s case. Furthermore, the possibility of the
conclusion of the trial of the case against petitioner is not a reason that is special and
important enough to successfully invoke this Court‘s original jurisdiction. Once there has
been a judicial finding of probable cause, an executive determination of probable cause is
irrelevant.
GR No. 187094, 2017-02-15
Petitioner: LIZA L. MAZA
Respondent: EVELYN A. TURLA
FACTS: Petitioners Liza L. Maza, et al. are former members of the House of Representatives.
Liza represented Gabriela Women's Party (Gabriela), Saturnino and Teodoro represented
Bayan Muna Party-List (Bayan Muna), while Rafael represented Anakpawis Party-List
(Anakpawis).

Inspector Palomo named 19 individuals, including Petitioners, who were allegedly
responsible for the death of Carlito Bayudang, Jimmy Peralta, and Danilo Felipe. His findings
show that the named individuals conspired, planned, and implemented the killing of the
supporters of AKBAYAN Party List (AKBAYAN), a rival of Bayan Muna and Gabriela. Carlito
Bayudang and Danilo Felipe were AKBAYAN community organizers, whereas Jimmy Peralta
was mistaken for a certain Ricardo Peralta, an AKBAYAN supporter.
Inspector Palomo recommended that a preliminary investigation be conducted and that
an Information for each count of murder be filed against the 19 individuals.
The panel of prosecutors issued on April 11, 2008 a Joint Resolution, reviewed and
approved by Officer-in-charge Provincial Prosecutor Floro F. Florendo (Prosecutor
Florendo). The panel found probable cause for murder in the killing of Carlito Bayudang and
Jimmy Peralta, and for kidnapping with murder in the killing of Danilo Felipe, against the
nineteen 19 suspects. On the same day, two (2) Informations for murder were filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Palayan City, Branch 40 in Nueva Ecija, (Palayan cases) and an
Information for kidnapping with murder was filed in Guimba, Nueva Ecija (Guimba case).
Presiding Judge Evelyn A. Atienza-Turla (Judge Turla) issued an Order on the Palayan cases.
Judge Turla held that "the proper procedure in the conduct of the preliminary investigation
was not followed in [the Palayan] cases"
Petitioner to Supreme Court:
Petitioners pray that the Orders of Judge Turla be set aside and annulled and that the
murder cases against them be dismissed for failure to show probable cause. They also ask
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin Judge Turla from remanding the cases to the provincial prosecutors, and "the
respondent prosecutors from conducting further preliminary investigation [on] these
cases."
Respondent's assignment of errors:
Respondents claim that the petition before this Court violates the principle of hierarchy of
courts.
Petitioners' Reply:
They added that direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction was allowed as their
petition involved legal questions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the hierarchy of courts was violated by the petitioners.
HELD:
No. This Court reiterated that it "will not entertain a direct invocation of its jurisdiction
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts, and
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the resort to the extraordinary remedy of
a writ of certiorari." In this case, the presence of compelling circumstances warrants the
exercise of this Court's jurisdiction. At the time the petition was filed, petitioners were
incumbent party-list representatives. The possibility of their arrest and incarceration should
the assailed Orders be affirmed, would affect their representation of their constituents in
Congress. Although the circumstances mentioned are no longer present, the merits of this
case necessitate this Court's exercise of jurisdiction.
DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL COURTESY/STABILITY/NON-INTERFERENCE
G.R. No. 166859 June 26, 2006
Petitioner: Republic of the Phil.
Respondent: Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
 Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction during the pendency of its
Petition for Certiorari before this Court challenging the denial by public
respondent, the Sandiganbayan, of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in
Civil Case No. 0033-F.
 Petitioner insisted that the Sandiganbayan thereby committed grave abuse of
discretion: (a) in holding that the various sources of funds used in acquiring the
SMC shares of stock remained disputed; (b) in holding that it was disputed whether
or not Cojuangco had served in the governing bodies of PCA, UCPB, and/or the CIIF
Oil Mills; and (c) in not finding that Cojuangco had taken advantage of his position
and had violated his fiduciary obligations in acquiring the SMC shares of stock in
issue.
 Petitioner pleads that the issue it raised in its Petition for Certiorari must first be
resolved, as a continuation of the proceedings in the civil case by public
respondent might be rendered unnecessary in the event that its Petition before
this Court is resolved in its favor.
ISSUE: W/N the elevation of an interlocutory matter to the Supreme Court through a
petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, merits a suspension of the
proceedings before a public respondent
HELD:
No, it does not, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has
been issued against the public respondent. Rule 65, Section 7 of the Rules of Court so
provides:
SECTION 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. — The court in which the petition [for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus] is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant
a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the
parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless
a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public
respondent from further proceeding in the case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The burden is thus on the petitioner in a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
to show that there is a meritorious ground for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
or writ of preliminary injunction for the purpose of suspending the proceedings before the
public respondent.
The Court finds that petitioner has failed to discharge the burden. The ground on which it
bases its urgent motion is the alleged futility of proceeding with the trial of the case. This
assertion, however, is speculative, anchored on the mere supposition that the petition
would be decided in its favor.
The earlier quoted Section 7 of Rule 65 provides the general rule that the mere pendency
of a special civil action for Certiorari commenced in relation to a case pending before a
lower court or court of origin does not stay the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ
of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.
There are of course instances where even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a lower court
or court of origin to suspend its proceedings on the precept of judicial courtesy. As this
Court explained in Eternal Gardens Memorial Park v. Court of Appeals
Although this Court did not issue any restraining order against the Intermediate Appellate
Court to prevent it from taking any action with regard to its resolutions respectively granting
respondents' motion to expunge from the records the petitioner's motion to dismiss and denying the
latter's motion to reconsider such order, upon learning of the petition, the appellate court should have
refrained from ruling thereon because its jurisdiction was necessarily limited upon the filing of a
petition for certiorari with this Court questioning the propriety of the issuance of the above-mentioned
resolutions. Due respect for the Supreme Court and practical and ethical considerations should have
prompted the appellate court to wait for the final determination of the petition before taking
cognizance of the case and trying to render moot exactly what was before this court
The appellate court's failure to observe judicial courtesy which was frowned upon by this
Court lay in its recall of its Orders expunging from the records the Motion to Dismiss filed
by the therein petitioner, which Orders were the orders being questioned before this Court
via a petition for Certiorari and Mandamus. Such act of the appellate court tended to
render moot and academic the said petition. No parity of circumstances obtains in the
present case, however, where merely setting the case for trial would not have the effect of
rendering the present petition moot.
This Court explained, however, that the rule on "judicial courtesy" applies where "there is
a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and
moribund as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court or court of
origin.”
The SANDIGANBAYAN is, however, ORDERED, in light of the foregoing discussion, to
continue the proceedings in Civil Case No. 0033-F, as well as in all other cases where its
interlocutory orders are on challenge before this Court but no Temporary Restraining
Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction has been issued and there is no strong probability
that the issues raised before this Court would be rendered moot and moribund.:
G.R. No. 175303 April 11, 2012
Petitioner: Pacific East Finance Limited
Respondent: Yanagisawa
FACTS:
 Respondent Eiji Yanagisawa (Eiji), a Japanesenational, and Evelyn F. Castañeda
(Evelyn), a Filipina, contracted marriage on July 12, 1989 in the City Hall of Manila.
 On August 23, 1995, Evelyn purchased a 152 square-meter townhouse unit in
Parañaque. The Registry of Deeds for Parañaque issued Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 99791 to “Evelyn P. Castañeda, Filipino, married to Ejie Yanagisawa,
Japanese citizen, both of legal age.”
 In 1996, Eiji filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Evelyn on the ground of bigamy (nullity of marriage case).
 During the pendency of the case, Eiji filed a Motion for the Issuance of a
Restraining Order against Evelyn and an Application for a Writ of a Preliminary
Injunction. He asked that Evelyn be enjoined from disposing or encumbering all of
the properties registered in her name.
 At the hearing on the said motion, Evelyn and her lawyer voluntarily undertook
not to dispose of the properties registered in her name during the pendency of the
case, thus rendering Eiji’s application and motion moot.
 On the basis of said commitment, the Makati RTC rendered the following Order
dated October 2, 1996:
ORDER
In view of the commitment made in open court by Atty. Lupo Leyva, counsel for the
defendant [Evelyn], together with his client, the defendant in this case, that the properties
registered in the name of the defendant would not be disposed of, alienated or encumbered
in any manner during the pendency of this petition, the Motion for the Issuance of a
Restraining Order and Application for a Writ of a Preliminary Injunction scheduled today is
hereby considered moot and academic.
 Sometime in March 1997, Evelyn obtained a loan of P500,000.00 from petitioner
Pacific Ace Finance Ltd. (PAFIN). To secure the loan, Evelyn executed on August 25,
1998 a real estate mortgage (REM) in favor of PAFIN over the Parañaque
townhouse unit covered by TCT No. 99791. The instrument was submitted to the
Register of Deeds of Parañaque City for annotation on the same date.
 At the time of the mortgage, Eiji’s appeal in the nullity of marriage case was
pending before the CA. The Makati RTC had dissolved Eiji and Evelyn’s marriage,
and had ordered the liquidation of their registered properties, including the
Parañaque townhouse unit, with its proceeds to be divided between the parties.
The Decision of the Makati RTC did not lift or dissolve its October 2, 1996 Order on
Evelyn’s commitment not to dispose of or encumber the properties registered in
her name.
 Eiji learned of the REM, deeming the mortgage as a violation of the Makati RTC’s
October 2, 1996 Order, Eiji filed a complaint for the annulment of REM (annulment
of mortgage case) against Evelyn and PAFIN in RTC Parañaque.
 PAFIN denied prior knowledge of the October 2, 1996 Order against Evelyn. It
admitted, however, that it did not conduct any verification of the title with the
Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City “because Evelyn was a good, friendly and
trusted neighbor.” PAFIN maintained that Eiji has no personality to seek the
annulment of the REM because a foreign national cannot own real properties
located within the Philippines.
 Evelyn also denied having knowledge of the October 2, 1996 Order. Evelyn
asserted that she paid for the property with her own funds and that she has
exclusive ownership thereof.
 The Parañaque RTC explained that Eiji, as a foreign national, cannot possibly own
the mortgaged property. Without ownership, or any other law or contract binding
the defendants to him, Eiji has no cause of action that may be asserted against
them. Thus, the Parañaque RTC dismissed Eiji’s complaint.
 Eiji appealed the trial court’s decision arguing that the trial court erred in holding
that his inability to own real estate property in the Philippines deprives him of all
interest in the mortgaged property, which was bought with his money.
 CA annulled the REM executed by Evelyn in favor of PAFIN. The appellate court
determined that the Parañaque RTC’s Decision was improper because it violated
the doctrine of non-interference. Courts of equal jurisdiction, such as regional trial
courts, have no appellate jurisdiction over each other. For this reason, the CA
annulled and set aside the Parañaque RTC’s decision to dismiss Eiji’s complaint.
 Petitioner PAFIN seeks a reversal of the CA Decision, which allegedly affirmed the
Makati RTC ruling that Eiji is a co-owner of the mortgaged property. PAFIN insists
that the CA sustained a violation of the constitution with its declaration that an
alien can have an interest in real property located in the Philippines.
ISSUE: W/N the Parañaque RTC can rule on the issue of ownership, even as the same issue
was already ruled upon by the Makati RTC and is pending appeal in the CA
HELD:
Contrary to petitioner’s stance, the CA did not make any disposition as to who
between Eiji and Evelyn owns the Parañaque townhouse unit. It simply ruled that the
Makati RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the said question and should not have been
interfered with by the Parañaque RTC. The CA only clarified that it was improper for the
Parañaque RTC to have reviewed the ruling of a co-equal court.
The Court agrees with the CA. The issue of ownership and liquidation of
properties acquired during the cohabitation of Eiji and Evelyn has been submitted for the
resolution of the Makati RTC, and is pending appeal before the CA. The doctrine of judicial
stability or non-interference dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue
operates as an “insurmountable barrier” to the subsequent assumption by the Parañaque
RTC. By insisting on ruling on the same issue, the Parañaque RTC effectively interfered with
the Makati RTC’s resolution of the issue and created the possibility of conflicting decisions.
Cojuangco v. Villegas states: “The various branches of the [regional trial courts] of a
province or city, having as they have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do
concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot and are not permitted to
interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary
rule would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice.”
The matter is further explained thus:
It has been held that "even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is, also, axiomatic that the court first
acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts."
In addition, it is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the appellate authority, until
the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that no court of co-ordinate authority is at liberty
to interfere with its action. This doctrine is applicable to civil cases, to criminal prosecutions, and to
courts-martial. The principle is essential to the proper and orderly administration of the laws; and
while its observance might be required on the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it does not
rest upon such considerations exclusively, but is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive, and
dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of the process.
Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 78944 is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 207682 December 10, 2014
Petitioner: Nicart
Respondent: Titong
FACTS:
 A few days prior to the end of his term, then Governor of Eastern Samar Ben P.
Evardone (Evardone) issued ninety-three (93) appointments between May 11,
2010 and June 29, 2010, including that of herein respondents Ma. Josefina Titong
(Titong) and Joselito Abrugar, Sr. (Abrugar), which appointments were later
confirmed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Consequently, the appointees
immediately assumed their respective positions.
 Upon submission, however, of the appointments to the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) Regional Office (CSCRO) No. VIII, all 93 appointments were disapproved for
having been made in violation of Section 2.1 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 16,
series of 2007.
 Meanwhile, on August 10, 2010, Titong and Abrugar requested the assistance of
the CSC with their claim for payment of their first salary which was denied by the
Commission on Audit (COA) Provincial Office and by petitioner, who at that time
was already the incumbent Governor.
 Acting on the appeal, the CSC rendered Decision No. 10-02422 dated December
13, 2010, granting the petition, modifying the CSCRO’s ruling, and declaring the
appointment of Titong and Abrugar valid on the ground that the two are qualified
for the positions to which they were appointed.
 The Motion for Reconsideration of Governor Conrado B. Nicart, Jr., Provincial
Government of Eastern Samar, is DENIED
 Undaunted, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for review
of the above CSC Decision and Resolution, presenting the sole issue of whether or
not the appointments of herein respondents are valid.
 CA rendered a decision granting the petition and ruling that respondents’
appointments are not valid for having been issued in violation of CSC Rules and for
failure to comply with the requisites set forth by jurisprudence. Consequently, the
CA held, respondents can no longer claim entitlement to the payment of their
salaries as directed by Section 4, Rule VI of the Revised Omnibus Rules on
Appointments and Other Personnel Actions. GRANTED.
ISSUE: W/N the lower court violated the principle of judicial courtesy
HELD:
Yes. In this regard, the Court has, in several cases, held that there are instances where, even
if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order issued by a higher
court, it would be proper for a lower court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings on
the precept of judicial courtesy. Unfortunately, the RTC did not find the said principle
applicable in Civil Case No. 4236 as it disregarded the fact that there is an intimate
correlation between the two proceedings––though technically no prejudicial question
exists as it properly pertains to civil and criminal cases.
To Our mind, considering that the mandamus petition heavily relies on the validity or
invalidity of the appointments which issue is to be resolved by the CA, the court a quo
incorrectly concluded that it may take cognizance of the petition without erroneously
disregarding the principle of judicial courtesy. What is more, the RTC went beyond the
issues of the case when it affirmed the validity of respondents’ appointments, considering
that the only issue presented before it is the propriety of executing CSC Resolution No.
1100653 through a writ of mandamus despite the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 119975.
Nevertheless, enforcement of the disputed CSC Resolution is no longer proper and
necessary in light of Our Resolutions dated February 27, 2013 and February 10, 2014,
affirming the CA’s ruling that respondents’ appointments were not valid, making the issue
on the propriety of enforcing the CSC Resolution pending appeal, moot and academic.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue
of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a
rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.26
Whatever judgment is reached, the same can no longer have any practical legal effect or,
in the nature of things, can no longer be enforced.27

Here, the supervening event contemplated is Our issuance of two minute resolutions––one
denying the petition, and the second denying reconsideration thereof––thereby affirming
CA’s finding against the validity of respondents appointments and effectively reversing the
RTC’s affirmation of the CSC’s findings. It is well to note that although contained in a minute
resolution, Our dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 203835 was definitely a disposition of
the merits of the case and constituted a bar to a relitigation of the issues raised there under
the doctrine of res judicata.1âwphi1 When we dismissed the petition and denied
reconsideration thereof, we effectively affirmed the CA ruling being questioned.28

Having written finis to the issue of whether respondents’ were validly appointed or not, the
mandamus now has no basis upon which its issuance can be anchored under the principle
of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment.

G.R. No. 180147 January 14, 2015

Petitioner: Sara Lee Phil.
Respondent: Macatlang

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING: