TICHANGCO V. ENRIQUEZ, G.R. NO.

150629, JUNE 30, 2004

Facts:

This case originated from the filing of a land title verification request by Renato Tichangco, in behalf of
the homeowners’ association of Gagalangin and Sunog Apog, herein petitioners. The verification request
was prompted by an alleged claim of ownership of a certain Manotok over the land which they occupy,
and which they perceive as public land, being portions of the dried or filled bed of Estero de Maypajo and
Sunog Apog area. They also sought the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for legal
action on OCTs Nos. 820 and 7477 and the subsequent titles derived therefrom.

With respect to OCT 820, petetioners alleged that the same was null and void because: (1) it was issued in
the name of the Manotoks who were all minors at that time, and without a court appointed guardian, and
(2) it was issued before the completion of the magnetic survey of the lands covered by said OCT.

With respect to OCT 7477, petitioners alleged that the parcels of land it covers were formerly part of the
Estero de Maypajo, Estero de Sunog Apog, and Sapang Vista, or inalienable lands of the public domain
intended for public use, hence it must be declared null and void. The case was elevated to the CA, which
affirmed the findings of the LRA that there were no legal grounds to nullify the OCTs and the subsequent
titles derived therefrom.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals commits grave abuse of discretion tantamount to or in excess of
jurisdiction when it failed to declare OCT Nos. 820 and 7477 null and void.

Held:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that petitioners erroneously and baselessly speculate that the magnetic
survey of the land was the only survey conducted, or that no other plan was submitted to the registration
court, or that the land was not surveyed at all. Mere conclusions and speculations are not sufficient to
defeat or impair the title of the Manotoks. Further OCT 820 was issued under the Torrens Title more than
90 years ago and having been issued under the Torrens System, it enjoys a presumption of validity. It also
carries the presumption that the provisions of the law governing the registration of land under the Torrens
System have duly been followed. Also the decision of the LRC pertaining to the history of the two lots
embraced in OCT 820 stated that a survey of those lots have been undertaken by American surveyors on
or before 1905. The Decision is more reliable than the plain assertions of the petitioners who had no
personal knowledge of the original land registration proceedings.

As to the validity of OCT 7477, the Court ruled that the Manotoks have in their favor judicial
pronouncement showing prima facie at least that the expanded areas do not belong to the public domain,
and that they have acquired ownership over them by accretion. In brief, they have overcome the
presumption that the land is within an unclassified property of the public domain.
PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR. v. PNOC, G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008

FACTS:

PNOC Exploration Corporation (PNOC), herein respondent, filed a complaint for a sum of
money against petitioner Pedro Santos Jr. in the RTC of Pasig. The trial court allowed service of
summons by publication because the latter cannot be located in his last known address despite
earnest efforts to do so. Respondent caused the publication of the summons in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines and thereafter submitted the affidavit of publication and the
affidavit of service of respondent’s employee to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons by
registered mail to petitioner’s last known address. Petitioner still failed to answer within the
prescribed period despite the publication of summons. Hence, respondent filed a motion for the
reception of its evidence ex parte. Trial court granted said motion and proceeded with the ex
parte presentation and formal offer of its evidence.

Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer, alleging
that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court. Trial court denied the said motion
and the motion to admit petitioner’s answer. Hence, the petitioner appeals to the CA contending
that the court committed grave abuse of discretion since it has no jurisdiction due to improper
service of summons, failure to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes, and upholding
technicality over equity and justice.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a failure on the part of the trial court to furnish Petitioner with
copies of orders and processes issued in the course of the proceedings

HELD: No. the Court ruled that it is illogical to notify him of the order simply on account of the
reality that he was no longer residing and/or found on his last known address and his
whereabouts unknown thus the publication of summons. Santos could not reasonably demand
that copies of orders and processes be furnished him. His residence or whereabouts is not known
and he cannot be located. In the case at bar, there is obviously no way notice can be sent to him
and the notice requirement cannot apply to him. The law does not require that the impossible be
done. Nemo tenetur ad impossible. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility. Laws
and rules must be interpreted in a way that they are in accordance with logic, common sense,
reason and practicability. Be that as it may, a copy of the September 11, 2003 order was still
mailed to him at his last known address but it was unclaimed
MANOTOC REALTY VS CLT REALTY A. G.R. NO. 123346

CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT) sought to recover from Manotok Realty, Inc. and
Manotok Estate Corporation (Manotoks) the possession of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate. CLT's
claim was anchored on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-177013 issued in its name,
which title in turn was derived from Estelita Hipolito (Hipolito) by virtue of a Deed of Sale with
Real Estate Mortgage. Hipolito's title emanated from Jose Dimson's whose title appears to have
been sourced from OCT No. 994.

For their part, the Manotoks challenged the validity of the title relied on by CLT, claiming that
Dimson's title, the proximate source of CLT's title, was irregularly issued and, hence, the same
and subsequent titles flowing therefrom are likewise void. The Manotoks asserted their
ownership over Lot 26 and claimed that they derived it from several awardees and/or vendees of
the National Housing Authority. The Manotok title likewise traced as its primary source to OCT
No. 994. The trial court, in ruling for CLT, adopted the factual findings and conclusions arrived
at by the majority commissioners appointed to resolve the conflict of titles. It was established
that the entire Maysilo Estate was registered under Act No. 496 by virtue of which OCT No. 994
was issued; that Lot 26 was transferred to CLT by Hipolito whose title was derived from the
Dimson title and that on the basis of the technical descriptions of the property appearing in the
Manotok titles, the latter's property indeed encroached on the property described in CLT's title.
The Manotoks appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Eventually, a petition for review was filed with the Supreme Court, ascribing error to the
appellate court in upholding the trial court's decision which decided the case on the basis of the
majority commissioners' report and overlooked relevant facts in the minority commissioner's
report.

Ruling:

It was held that the trial court acted properly when it adopted the Majority Report of the
commissioners as part and parcel of its Decision. The case of overlapping of titles necessitates
the assistance of experts in the field of geodetic engineering. The very reason why
commissioners were appointed by the trial court, upon agreement of the parties, was precisely to
make an evaluation and analysis of the titles in conflict with each other. Given their background,
expertise and experience, these commissioners are in a better position to determine which of the
titles is valid. Thus, the trial court may rely on their findings and conclusions. It bears stressing
that the parties opted to submit the case for decision on the bases, among others, of their
respective objections/comments on the commissioners' reports. Thus, petitioners Manotok
Corporations, under the doctrine of estoppel, cannot now be permitted to assail the Decision of
the trial court.
NAVAL VS. CA

FACTS: In 1969, Ildefonso Naval sold an unregistered parcel of land, which sale was recorded
pursuant to Act No. 3344. Subsequently, Galarosa sold portions of the land to respondents
Balilla, Nacion, spouses Moya, and Camalla. All buyers occupied the portion they bought, built
improvements thereon, and paid the taxes due thereto. The controversy arose when petitioner
Juanita Naval, the great granddaughter of Ildefonso, was issued an OCT covering a portion of the
subject land. She claimed that she bought the subject land from Ildefonso in 1972.

Petitioner Juanita re-filed a complaint for recovery of possession against Aguirre, Balila,Moya,
and Nacion. After trial, the MCTC ruled in favor of Juanita, the same was affirmed by the RTC.
Respondents thereafter elevated the case to the CA. Finding the prior registration of the deed of
sale between Ildefonso and Galaura with the RD as a constructive notice to subsequent buyers,
the appellate court reversed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:

Who has the superior right to a parcel of land sold to different buyers at different times by its
former owner.

HELD:

RESPONDENTS It is not disputed that the subject land belonged to Ildefonso and that it was not
registered under the Torrens System when it was sold to Gregorio in 1969 and to the petitioner in
1972. Further, the deed of sale between Ildefonso and Gregorio was registered with the RD of
Camarines Sur pursuant to Act No. 3344, which provides for the registration of all instruments
on land neither covered by the Spanish Mortgage Law nor the Torrens System. Under this law,
registration by the first buyer is constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right
as such buyer in good faith; it binds third person who may subsequently deal with the same
property. Since the properties in question are unregistered lands, petitioners as subsequent buyers
thereof did so at their peril. Their claim of having bought the land in good faith, i.e., without
notice that some other person has a right to or interest in the property, would not protect them if
it turns out, as it actually did in this case, that their seller did not own the property at the time of
the sale. It is an established principle that no one can give what one does not have, nemo dat
quod non habet. Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the
buyer can acquire no more than what the seller can transfer legally.In the case at bar, since
Ildefonso no longer owned the subject land at the time of the sale to the petitioner, he had
nothing to sell and the latter did not acquire any right to it.
DIVINA VS CA

Facts:

A parcel of land in Sorsogon was originally owned by Antonio Berosa, who sold it to Teotimo,
who later sold the same to Gamus. Aside from the said parcel of land, Gamos also acquired a
property adjacent to it from Felix Arimado. He consolidated both properties and secured a single
tax declaration for both. Without Gamus’s knowledge, Teotimo sold to Vicente Divina a portion
of the parcel previously sold to him. The said sale was registered. Subsequent to the registration
of the said sale, Gamus sold the consolidated property to Gajo-Sy, who then applied for
Registration of Title therefor. Vicente Divina opposed pending the issuance of Decree,
contending that he was unaware of the registration proceedings due to Gajo-Sy’s failure to give
him notice, failure to post any notice in the subject lot. During trial in the RTC, it was found that
Elena Domalaon (cousin of Vicente Divina), made known to Gajo Sy’s sister, her apprehension
that their land is being included in Gajo-Sy’s application for registration. This fact was admitted
by Gajo-Sy’s sister. Divina contented that Gajo-sy misrepresented herself as the owner of the
disputed portion despite her knowledge that another person has acquired the same. Gajo-Sy, on
the other hand contended that the registration had become final and the court the court no longer
has any jurisdiction thereon and that lack of notice to Divina of the registration proceedings did
not constitute actual fraud.

Issue:

Whether there was a deliberate misrepresentation constituting fraud on the part of Gajo-Sy when
she failed to post or give notice to Divina of her application for registration of the contested lot.

Ruling:

Yes. Section 15 PD 1529 is explicit in requiring that in the application for registration of titles,
the application shall also state the full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those
of the adjoining owners, if known, and if not known, it shall state the extent of the search made
to find them. Mere statement of the lack of knowledge of the names of the occupants and
adjoining owners is not sufficient, but what search has been made to find them is necessary. In
this case, it was held that the trial court was correct when it took notice that Gajo Sy’s sister
admitted that she had a conversation with Divina’s cousin about the latter’s apprehension that
their land may have been included in Gajo-Sy’s application for registration of the disputed land.
Gajo-Sy’s omission of this material information prevented Divina from having his day in court.
The Court ruled that such omission cannot but be deliberate misrepresentation constituting fraud.
LABURADA VS LRA

Facts:

Spouses Laburada, herein petitioners, applied for the registration of Lot 3-A which was approved
by the trial court. After the finality of the decision, the trial court required the LRA to issue the
corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA refused. Hence, the petitioners filed an
action for mandamus.

The LRA revealed that based on the records, the subject lot is part of Lot No. 3, over which a
certificate of title has already been issued. The LRA contended that to issue the corresponding
decree of registration sought by the petitioners would result in the duplication of titles over the
same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and purpose of the Torrens Title Registration
System and destroy the integrity of the same.

Issue:

WON the LRA may be compelled by mandamus to issue a decree of registration if it has
evidence that the subject land may already be included in an existing certificate of title.

Ruling:

No. In ruling the case, the Court cited its ruling in De los Reyes vs De Villa that the issuance of
the final decree can hardly be considered a ministerial act for the reason that said Chief of the
General Land Registration Office acts not as an administrative officer but as an officer of the
court and so the issuance of a final decree is a judicial function and not an administrative one.
Indeed, it is well settled that the issuance of such decree is not compelled by mandamus because
it is a judicial act involving discretion. In view of the foregoing, it is not legally proper to require
the LRA to issue a decree of registration.