Kimberly Mae Gango
Turla issued
CASES
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts
GR No. 187094 February 15, 2017
P: Liza L. Maza
R: Hon. Evelyn A. Turla
FACTS:
 Petitioners Maza, Ocampo, Casiño, and Mariano are former
members of the House of Representatives. Maza represented
Gabriela Women’s Party, Ocampo and Casiño represented
Bayan Muna Party-list, while Mariano represented Anakpawis
Party-list.
 Police Senior Inspector Arnold M. Palomo, Deputy Chief of the
Nueva Ecija Criminal Investigation and Detection Team,
referred to the Provincial Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City,
Nueva Ecija, 3 cases of murder against petitioners and 15 other
persons, who were allegedly responsible for the death of
Carlito Bayundag, Jimmy Peralta, and Danilo Felipe.
 Palomo’s findings show that the petitioners conspired,
planned, and implemented the killing of the supporters of
AKBAYAN Party-list, rival of Bayan Muna and Gabriela.
 Carlito Bayundag and Danilo Felipe were AKBAYAN
community organizers. Whereas Jimmy Peralta was mistaken
for a certain Ricardo Peralta, an AKBAYAN supporter.
 The panel of prosecutors issued on April 11, 2008 a Joint
Resolution. The panel found probable cause against the 19
suspects, for murder in the killing of the victims. However, the
panel considered one of the suspects, Julie Flores Sinohin, as a
state witness.
 On July 18, 2008, RTC Presiding Judge Evelyn A.
an order on the Palayan cases and held that the proper
procedure in the conduct of the preliminary investigation was
not followed in the Palayan cases and remanded the case back
to the prosecutor’s office for another preliminary investigation.
 Petitioners prayed to the Supreme Court that the July 18, 2008
and December 2, 2008 Orders of Judge Turla be set aside and
annulled and that the murder cases against them be dismissed
for failure to show probable cause. They also ask for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Turla from remanding
the cases to the provincial prosecutors, and "the respondent
prosecutors from conducting further preliminary investigation
[on] these cases."
ISSUE: W/N the petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts
in bringing their petition directly before this Court.
HELD:
NO. This petition is an exception to the principle of hierarchy
of courts.
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts
was created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary
performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial
courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the
evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to
determine issues of law which may include the validity of an ordinance,
statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To
effectively perform these functions, they are territorially organized into
regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach within
those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-
important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are
physically presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur
within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the 'actual
case' that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such
action. The consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There
are, however, some cases where resort to courts at their level would
not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed
before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.
This court leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or
further reiterating - in the light of new circumstances or in the light of
some confusions of bench or bar - existing precedents. Rather than a
court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of
Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it
truly performs that role.
In other words, the Supreme Court's role to interpret the
Constitution and act in order to protect constitutional rights when
these become exigent should not be emasculated by the doctrine in
respect of the hierarchy of courts. That has never been the purpose of
such doctrine.
Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad
rule. This court has "full discretionary power to take cognizance and
assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari ... filed
directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by
the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition."
As correctly pointed out by petitioners, we have provided exceptions to
this doctrine:
1. A direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine
issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most
immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes availing
of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition to assail the
constitutionality of actions of both legislative and executive
branches of the government.
2. When the issues involved are of transcendental importance. In
these cases, the imminence and clarity of the threat to
fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for
prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of
transcendental importance prevents courts from the paralysis
of procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for
substantial protection.
3. Cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court.
In cases of first impression, no jurisprudence yet exists that
will guide the lower courts on this matter. In Government of the
United States v. Purganan, this court took cognizance of the
case as a matter of first impression that may guide the lower
courts:
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the
important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it
best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings
constitute a matter of first impression over which there is, as
yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
4. The constitutional issues raised are better decided by this
court. In Drilon v. Lim, this court held that:
it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming
modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the
consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a
thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the
concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its
discussion.
5. Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for
direct resort to this court.
 6. The filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ
7. [there is] no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law[.]
The lack of other sufficient remedies in the course of law alone
is sufficient ground to allow direct resort to this court.
8. The petition includes questions that are "dictated by public
welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by
the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were
found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as
clearly an inappropriate remedy." In the past, questions similar
to these which this court ruled on immediately despite the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts included citizens' right to bear
arms, government contracts involving modernization of voters'
registration lists, and the status and existence of a public office.
It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at
the same time to justify a direct resort to this court. In First United
Constructors Corp. v. Poro Point Management Corp. (PPMC), et al.,[71]
this Court reiterated that it "will not entertain a direct invocation of its
jurisdiction unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate lower courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify the resort to the extraordinary remedy of a writ
of certiorari."
In this case, the presence of compelling circumstances warrants the
exercise of this Court's jurisdiction. At the time the petition was filed,
petitioners were incumbent party-list representatives. The possibility
of their arrest and incarceration should the assailed Orders be affirmed,
would affect their representation of their constituents in Congress.
Although the circumstances mentioned are no longer present, the
merits of this case necessitate this Court's exercise of jurisdiction.
Doctrine of Judicial Courtesy/Stability/Non-interference
GR No. 166859 June 26, 2006
P: Republic of the Philippines
R: Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
 Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, Urgent Motion for
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction during the pendency of its Petition for
Certiorari before this Court challenging the denial by public
respondent, the Sandiganbayan, of its Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment in Civil Case No. 0033-F.
 Petitioner insisted that the Sandiganbayan thereby committed
grave abuse of discretion: (a) in holding that the various
sources of funds used in acquiring the SMC shares of stock
remained disputed; (b) in holding that it was disputed whether
or not Cojuangco had served in the governing bodies of PCA,
UCPB, and/or the CIIF Oil Mills; and (c) in not finding that
Cojuangco had taken advantage of his position and had
violated his fiduciary obligations in acquiring the SMC shares
of stock in issue.
 Petitioner pleads that the issue it raised in its Petition for
Certiorari must first be resolved, as a continuation of the
proceedings in the civil case by public respondent might be
rendered unnecessary in the event that its Petition before this
Court is resolved in its favor.
ISSUE: W/N the elevation of an interlocutory matter to the Supreme
Court through a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, merits a suspension of the proceedings before a public
respondent
HELD:
No, it does not, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent.
Rule 65, Section 7 of the Rules of Court so provides:
SECTION 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. — The court in which the
petition [for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus] is filed may issue orders
expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order
or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the
principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding
in the case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The burden is thus on the petitioner in a petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus to show that there is a meritorious ground
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction for the purpose of suspending the proceedings before the
public respondent.
The Court finds that petitioner has failed to discharge the burden. The
ground on which it bases its urgent motion is the alleged futility of
proceeding with the trial of the case. This assertion, however, is
speculative, anchored on the mere supposition that the petition would
be decided in its favor.
The earlier quoted Section 7 of Rule 65 provides the general rule that
the mere pendency of a special civil action for Certiorari commenced in
relation to a case pending before a lower court or court of origin does
not stay the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order.
There are of course instances where even if there is no writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order issued by a
higher court, it would be proper for a lower court or court of origin to
suspend its proceedings on the precept of judicial courtesy. As this
Court explained in Eternal Gardens Memorial Park v. Court of Appeals
Although this Court did not issue any restraining order against the
Intermediate Appellate Court to prevent it from taking any action with regard
to its resolutions respectively granting respondents' motion to expunge from
the records the petitioner's motion to dismiss and denying the latter's motion
to reconsider such order, upon learning of the petition, the appellate court
should have refrained from ruling thereon because its jurisdiction was
necessarily limited upon the filing of a petition for certiorari with this Court
questioning the propriety of the issuance of the above-mentioned
resolutions. Due respect for the Supreme Court and practical and ethical
considerations should have prompted the appellate court to wait for the final
determination of the petition before taking cognizance of the case and trying to
render moot exactly what was before this court
The appellate court's failure to observe judicial courtesy which was
frowned upon by this Court lay in its recall of its Orders expunging
from the records the Motion to Dismiss filed by the therein petitioner,
which Orders were the orders being questioned before this Court via a
petition for Certiorari and Mandamus. Such act of the appellate court
tended to render moot and academic the said petition. No parity of
circumstances obtains in the present case, however, where merely
setting the case for trial would not have the effect of rendering the
present petition moot.
This Court explained, however, that the rule on "judicial courtesy"
applies where "there is a strong probability that the issues before the
higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of the
continuation of the proceedings in the lower court or court of origin.”
The SANDIGANBAYAN is, however, ORDERED, in light of the foregoing
discussion, to continue the proceedings in Civil Case No. 0033-F, as well
as in all other cases where its interlocutory orders are on challenge
before this Court but no Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction has been issued and there is no strong
probability that the issues raised before this Court would be rendered
moot and moribund.
GR No. 175303, April 11, 2012
P: Pacific Ace Finance Ltd. (PAFIN)
R: Eiji Yanagisawa
FACTS:
 Respondent Eiji Yanagisawa (Eiji), a Japanesenational, and
Evelyn F. Castañeda (Evelyn), a Filipina, contracted marriage
on July 12, 1989 in the City Hall of Manila.
 On August 23, 1995, Evelyn purchased a 152 square-meter
townhouse unit in Parañaque. The Registry of Deeds for
Parañaque issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 99791
to “Evelyn P. Castañeda, Filipino, married to Ejie Yanagisawa,
Japanese citizen, both of legal age.”
 In 1996, Eiji filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with Evelyn on the ground of bigamy (nullity of
marriage case).
 During the pendency of the case, Eiji filed a Motion for the
Issuance of a Restraining Order against Evelyn and an
Application for a Writ of a Preliminary Injunction. He asked
that Evelyn be enjoined from disposing or encumbering all of
the properties registered in her name.
 At the hearing on the said motion, Evelyn and her lawyer
voluntarily undertook not to dispose of the properties
registered in her name during the pendency of the case, thus
rendering Eiji’s application and motion moot.
 On the basis of said commitment, the Makati RTC rendered the
following Order dated October 2, 1996:
ORDER
In view of the commitment made in open court by Atty. Lupo Leyva,
counsel for the defendant [Evelyn], together with his client, the
defendant in this case, that the properties registered in the name of
the defendant would not be disposed of, alienated or encumbered in
any manner during the pendency of this petition, the Motion for the
Issuance of a Restraining Order and Application for a Writ of a
Preliminary Injunction scheduled today is hereby considered moot
and academic.
 Sometime in March 1997, Evelyn obtained a loan of
P500,000.00 from petitioner Pacific Ace Finance Ltd. (PAFIN).
To secure the loan, Evelyn executed on August 25, 1998 a real
estate mortgage (REM) in favor of PAFIN over the Parañaque
townhouse unit covered by TCT No. 99791. The instrument
was submitted to the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City for
annotation on the same date.
 At the time of the mortgage, Eiji’s appeal in the nullity of
marriage case was pending before the CA. The Makati RTC had
dissolved Eiji and Evelyn’s marriage, and had ordered the
liquidation of their registered properties, including the
Parañaque townhouse unit, with its proceeds to be divided
between the parties. The Decision of the Makati RTC did not lift
or dissolve its October 2, 1996 Order on Evelyn’s commitment
not to dispose of or encumber the properties registered in her
name.
 Eiji learned of the REM, deeming the mortgage as a violation of
the Makati RTC’s October 2, 1996 Order, Eiji filed a complaint
for the annulment of REM (annulment of mortgage case)
against Evelyn and PAFIN in RTC Parañaque.
 PAFIN denied prior knowledge of the October 2, 1996 Order
against Evelyn. It admitted, however, that it did not conduct
any verification of the title with the Registry of Deeds of
Parañaque City “because Evelyn was a good, friendly and
trusted neighbor.” PAFIN maintained that Eiji has no
personality to seek the annulment of the REM because a
foreign national cannot own real properties located within the
Philippines.
 Evelyn also denied having knowledge of the October 2, 1996
Order. Evelyn asserted that she paid for the property with her
own funds and that she has exclusive ownership thereof.
  The Parañaque RTC explained that Eiji, as a foreign national,
cannot possibly own the mortgaged property. Without
ownership, or any other law or contract binding the
defendants to him, Eiji has no cause of action that may be
asserted against them. Thus, the Parañaque RTC dismissed
Eiji’s complaint.
 Eiji appealed the trial court’s decision arguing that the trial
court erred in holding that his inability to own real estate
property in the Philippines deprives him of all interest in the
mortgaged property, which was bought with his money.
 CA annulled the REM executed by Evelyn in favor of PAFIN.
The appellate court determined that the Parañaque RTC’s
Decision was improper because it violated the doctrine of non-
interference. Courts of equal jurisdiction, such as regional trial
courts, have no appellate jurisdiction over each other. For this
reason, the CA annulled and set aside the Parañaque RTC’s
decision to dismiss Eiji’s complaint.
 Petitioner PAFIN seeks a reversal of the CA Decision, which
allegedly affirmed the Makati RTC ruling that Eiji is a co-owner
of the mortgaged property. PAFIN insists that the CA sustained
a violation of the constitution with its declaration that an alien
can have an interest in real property located in the Philippines.
ISSUE: W/N the Parañaque RTC can rule on the issue of ownership,
even as the same issue was already ruled upon by the Makati RTC and
is pending appeal in the CA
HELD:
Contrary to petitioner’s stance, the CA did not make any
disposition as to who between Eiji and Evelyn owns the Parañaque
townhouse unit. It simply ruled that the Makati RTC had acquired
jurisdiction over the said question and should not have been interfered
with by the Parañaque RTC. The CA only clarified that it was improper
for the Parañaque RTC to have reviewed the ruling of a co-equal court.
The Court agrees with the CA. The issue of ownership and
liquidation of properties acquired during the cohabitation of Eiji and
Evelyn has been submitted for the resolution of the Makati RTC, and is
pending appeal before the CA. The doctrine of judicial stability or non-
interference dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC over the
issue operates as an “insurmountable barrier” to the subsequent
assumption by the Parañaque RTC. By insisting on ruling on the same
issue, the Parañaque RTC effectively interfered with the Makati RTC’s
resolution of the issue and created the possibility of conflicting
decisions. Cojuangco v. Villegas states: “The various branches of the
[regional trial courts] of a province or city, having as they have the
same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and
coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot and are not permitted to
interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or
judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and
seriously hamper the administration of justice.” The matter is further
explained thus:
It has been held that "even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is, also,
axiomatic that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts."
In addition, it is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction
acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, its authority continues,
subject only to the appellate authority, until the matter is finally and completely
disposed of, and that no court of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere
with its action. This doctrine is applicable to civil cases, to criminal
prosecutions, and to courts-martial. The principle is essential to the proper and
orderly administration of the laws; and while its observance might be required
on the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it does not rest upon such
considerations exclusively, but is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive, and
dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of the process.
Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78944 is AFFIRMED.
GR No. 207682, December 10, 2014
P: Conrado B. Nicart, Jr. (Gov of Eastern Samar)
R: Ma. Josefina Titong
FACTS:
 A few days prior to the end of his term, then Governor of
Eastern Samar Ben P. Evardone (Evardone) issued ninety-
three (93) appointments between May 11, 2010 and June 29,
2010, including that of herein respondents Ma. Josefina Titong
(Titong) and Joselito Abrugar, Sr. (Abrugar), which
appointments were later confirmed by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. Consequently, the appointees immediately
assumed their respective positions.
 Upon submission, however, of the appointments to the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) Regional Office (CSCRO) No. VIII, all
93 appointments were disapproved for having been made in
violation of Section 2.1 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 16,
series of 2007.
 Meanwhile, on August 10, 2010, Titong and Abrugar requested
the assistance of the CSC with their claim for payment of their
first salary which was denied by the Commission on Audit
(COA) Provincial Office and by petitioner, who at that time was
already the incumbent Governor.
 Acting on the appeal, the CSC rendered Decision No. 10-02422
dated December 13, 2010, granting the petition, modifying the
CSCRO’s ruling, and declaring the appointment of Titong and
Abrugar valid on the ground that the two are qualified for the
positions to which they were appointed.
 The Motion for Reconsideration of Governor Conrado B. Nicart,
Jr., Provincial Government of Eastern Samar, is DENIED
 Undaunted, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a
petition for review of the above CSC Decision and Resolution,
presenting the sole issue of whether or not the appointments
of herein respondents are valid.
 CA rendered a decision granting the petition and ruling that
respondents’ appointments are not valid for having been
issued in violation of CSC Rules and for failure to comply with
the requisites set forth by jurisprudence. Consequently, the CA
held, respondents can no longer claim entitlement to the
payment of their salaries as directed by Section 4, Rule VI of
the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other
Personnel Actions. GRANTED.
ISSUE: W/N the lower court violated the principle of judicial courtesy
Yes. In this regard, the Court has, in several cases, held that there are
instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order issued by a higher court, it would be
proper for a lower court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings
on the precept of judicial courtesy. Unfortunately, the RTC did not find
the said principle applicable in Civil Case No. 4236 as it disregarded the
fact that there is an intimate correlation between the two proceedings–
–though technically no prejudicial question exists as it properly
pertains to civil and criminal cases.
To Our mind, considering that the mandamus petition heavily relies on
the validity or invalidity of the appointments which issue is to be
resolved by the CA, the court a quo incorrectly concluded that it may
take cognizance of the petition without erroneously disregarding the
principle of judicial courtesy. What is more, the RTC went beyond the
issues of the case when it affirmed the validity of respondents’
appointments, considering that the only issue presented before it is the
propriety of executing CSC Resolution No. 1100653 through a writ of
mandamus despite the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 119975.
Nevertheless, enforcement of the disputed CSC Resolution is no longer
proper and necessary in light of Our Resolutions dated February 27,
2013 and February 10, 2014, affirming the CA’s ruling that
respondents’ appointments were not valid, making the issue on the
propriety of enforcing the CSC Resolution pending appeal, moot and
academic.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable

controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline
jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.26
Whatever judgment is reached, the same can no longer have any
practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, can no longer be
enforced.27

Here, the supervening event contemplated is Our issuance of two

minute resolutions––one denying the petition, and the second denying
reconsideration thereof––thereby affirming CA’s finding against the
validity of respondents appointments and effectively reversing the
RTC’s affirmation of the CSC’s findings. It is well to note that although
contained in a minute resolution, Our dismissal of the petition in G.R.
No. 203835 was definitely a disposition of the merits of the case and
constituted a bar to a relitigation of the issues raised there under the
doctrine of res judicata.1âwphi1 When we dismissed the petition and
denied reconsideration thereof, we effectively affirmed the CA ruling
being questioned.28

Having written finis to the issue of whether respondents’ were validly

appointed or not, the mandamus now has no basis upon which its
issuance can be anchored under the principle of res judicata by
conclusiveness of judgment.