Ting vs Velez-Ting, G.R. No.
166562, March 31, 2009 psychiatrist whose evaluation was limited to the
FACTS: Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and
respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in
1972 while they were classmates in medical school.
They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in
Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with
their first child. Benjamin completed the preceptorship
program by 1979 as anesthesiologist and began working
for Velez Hospital owned by Carmen’s family while
Carmen worked as a the hospital’s Treasurer. The
couple begot 6 Children. On October 21, 1993, after
being married for more than 18 years to petitioner,
Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu
City praying for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She
claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological
incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their
marriage, which, however, only became manifest
thereafter. In sum, Carmen’s allegations of Benjamin’s
psychological incapacity consisted of the following
manifestations:
1. Benjamin’s alcoholism, which adversely
affected his family relationship and profession;
2. Benjamin’s violent nature brought about by
his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of
which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the
family twice and the property he inherited from
his father on order to pay off his debts, because
he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamin’s irresponsibility and immaturity as
shown by his failure and refusal to give regular
financial support to his family.
In his answer, Benjamin denied being
psychologically incapacitated and all the other
allegations pointed out by Carmen. In his testimony,
Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family financial
support within his means whenever he could and would
only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending his
hard earned money on unnecessary things. He also
pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took
care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with
her friends twice a week. During the trial, Susana
Wasawas, who serves as nanny to the spouses’ children,
corroborated Carmen’s testimony. Carmen also
presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad Oñate, a
transcript of stenographic notes taken during Benjamin’s
deposition. He concluded that Benjamin’s compulsive
drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse of
respondent are clear indications that petitioner suffers
from a personality disorder. To refute Dr. Oñate’s
opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra,
evaluated Benjamin’s psychological behavior based on
the transcript of stenographic notes, as well as the
psychiatric evaluation report of a psychiatrist from the
University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obra’s
interview) with Benjamin’s brothers. Contrary to Dr.
Oñate’s findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing
wrong with petitioner’s personality, considering the
latter’s good relationship with his fellow doctors and his
good track record as anesthesiologist.
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its
Decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr.
Oñate’s findings and the admissions made by Benjamin
in the course of his deposition, and found him to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.
Petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the
CA rendered a Decision reversing the trial court’s ruling.
It faulted the trial court’s finding, stating that no proof
was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin
was psychologically incapacitated at the time he married
Carmen since Dr. Oñate’s conclusion was based only on
theories and not on established fact, contrary to the
guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals and in
Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina
Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for
reconsideration claiming that the Molina ruling could not
be made to apply retroactively, as it would run counter
to the principle of stare decisis. Initially, the CA denied
the motion for reconsideration for having been filed
beyond the prescribed period and was likewise denied
for lack of merit. In a Resolution dated March 5, 2003,
this Court granted the petition and directed the CA to
resolve Carmen’s motion for reconsideration. On review,
the CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling.
Thus, on November 17, 2003, it issued an
Amended Decision reversing its first ruling and sustaining
the trial court’s decision. A motion for reconsideration
was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was
denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA violated the rule on stare through the internet never pass the toll center of the
decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth PLDT's IGF, users of these prepaid cards can place a call
under the Santos and Molina cases; to any point in the Philippines (provided the local line is
NDDcapable) without the call appearing as coming from
HELD: No. Respondent’s argument that the doctrinal
abroad. On November 6, 2003 and November 19, 2003,
guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not
Mr. Lawrence Narciso of the PLDT's Quality Control
be applied retroactively for being contrary to the
Division, together with the operatives of the Philippine
principle of stare decisis is no longer new.
National Police (PNP), conducted an ocular inspection at
In Lambino vs COMELEC, it was pointed out in the 17 Dominic Savio St., Savio Compound and at No. 38
dissenting opinion that as a rule, early limits to the Indonesia St., Better Living Subdivision both in Barangay
application of stare decisis were recognized: (1) it would Don Bosco, Paranaque City and discovered that PLDT
not be followed if it were "plainly unreasonable"; (2) telephone lines were connected to several pieces of
where courts of equal authority developed conflicting equipment. On December 3, 2003, Police Superintendent
decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was Gilbert C. Cruz filed a consolidated application for a
the "actual principle or principles necessary for the search warrant before Judge Francisco G. Mendiola of
decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the the RTC, for the crimes of theft and violation of PD No.
decision." The leading case in deciding whether a court 401.
should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional
According to PLDT, the respondents are engaged in a
litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established
form of network fraud known as International Simple
a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine
Resale (ISR), which amounts to theft under the RPC. Four
whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in
search warrants were issued for violations of Article 308,
defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the
in relation to Article 309, of the RPC (SW A1and SW A2)
rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a
and of PD No. 401, as amended (SW B1 and SW B2) for
special hardship to the consequences of overruling and
the ISR activities which enumerated the objects to be
add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine
searched and seized. On January 14, 2004, the PLDT and
whether related principles of law have so far developed
the PNP filed with the Department of Justice a joint
as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an
complaintaffidavit affidavit for theft and for violation of
abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have
PD No. 401 against the respondents. On February 18,
so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have
2004, the respondents filed with the RTC a motion to
robbed the old rule of significant application or
quash the search warrants essentially on the following
justification.
grounds:
PLDT vs Razon Alvarez, G.R. No. 179408, March 5, 2014
first, the RTC had no authority to issue search
-
warrants which were enforced in Parañaque City;
FACTS: Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
second, the enumeration of the items to be
(PLDT) is the grantee of a legislative franchise , which
searched and seized lacked particularity;
authorizes it to carry on the business of providing basic
and enhanced telecommunications services Pursuant to and third, there was no probable cause for the
its franchise, PLDT offers to the public wide range of crime of theft.
services duly authorized by the National
On August 11, 2006, the CA rendered the assailed
Telecommunications Commission (NTC). According to
decision and resolution, granting the respondents'
PLDT, had an ordinary and legitimate call been made, the
petition for certiorari. The CA quashed SW Al and SW A2
screen of the calleridequipped receiving phone would
(for theft) on the ground that they were issued for "non-
not reflect a local number or any number at all. In the
existent crimes." According to the CA, inherent in the
cards they tested, however, once the caller enters the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of
access and pin numbers, the respondents would route
search warrant is the accompanying determination that
the call via the internet to a local telephone number (in
an offense has been committed. Relying on this Court's
this case, a PLDT telephone number) which would
decision in Laurel v. Judge Abrogar, the CA ruled that the
connect the call to the receiving phone. Since calls
respondents could not have possibly committed the
crime of theft because PLDT's business of providing
telecommunication services and these services
themselves are not personal properties contemplated
under Article 308 of the RPC. With respect to SW Bl and
SW B2 (for violation of PD No. 401), the CA upheld
paragraphs one to six of the enumeration of items
subject of the search. The CA held that the stock phrase
"or similar equipment or device" found in paragraphs
one to six of the search warrants did not make it suffer
from generality since each paragraph's enumeration of
items was sufficiently qualified by the citation of the
specific objects to be seized and by its functions which
are inherently connected with the crime allegedly
committed. The CA, however, nullified the ensuing
paragraphs, 7, 8 and 9, for lack of particularity and
ordered the return of the items seized under these
provisions. While the same stock phrase appears in
paragraphs 7 and 8, the properties described therein i.e.,
printer and scanner, software, diskette and tapes include
even those for the respondents' personal use, making
the description of the things to be seized too general in
nature. With the denial of its motion for reconsideration,
PLDT went to this Court via this Rule 45 petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in refusing to
reconsider it’s ruling in applying Laurel despite the
PLDT’s statement that the case is still subject of a
pending motion for reconsideration following the
principle of stare decisis.
HELD: Yes. In applying Laurel despite PLDT's statement
that the case is still subject of a pending motion for
reconsideration, the CA legally erred in refusing to
reconsider its ruling that largely relied on a nonfmal
ruling of the Court. While the CA's dutiful desire to apply
the latest pronouncement of the Court in Laurel is
expected, it should have acted with caution, instead of
excitement, on being informed by PLDT of its pending
motion for reconsideration; it should have then followed
the principle of stare decisis. The appellate court's
application of an exceptional circumstance when it may
order the quashal of the search warrant on grounds not
existing at the time the warrant was issued or
implemented must still rest on prudential grounds if only
to maintain the limitation of the scope of the remedy of
certiorari as a writ to correct errors of jurisdiction and
not mere errors of judgment. The Laurel En Banc ruling
categorically equated ISR activity to theft under the RPC.
In so doing, whatever alleged factual variance there may
be between Laurel and the present case cannot render
Laurel inapplicable.
PGBI v COMELEC
GR No. 190529, April 29, 2010
FACTS:
For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en
banc issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution No. 8679
deleting several party-list groups or organizations from
the list of registered national, regional or sectorial parties,
organizations or coalitions.
Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it
was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast
in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections.
Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in this Resolution that
any national, regional sectoral party or organizations or
coalitions adversely affected can personally or through
its authorized representative file a verified opposition on
October 26, 2009.
PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but
likewise sought, through its pleading, the admission ad
cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization under the Party-List System Act. One of
PCGIʼs arguments was that the Supreme Courtʼs ruling in
G.R. No. 177548 – Philippine Mines Safety Environment
Association, also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on
Elections – cannot apply in the instant controversy for
two reasons: (a) the factual milieu of the cited case is
removed from PGBIʼs; (b) MINERO, prior to delisting, was
afforded the opportunity to be heard, while PGBI and the
25 others similarly affected by Resolution No. 8679 were
not. Additionally, the requirement of Section 6(8) has
been relaxed by the Courtʼs ruling in G.R. No. 179271
(Banat v. COMELEC) and the exclusion of PGBI and the 25
other party-list is a denial of the equal protection of the
laws
ISSUE: w/n the MINERO case can be used as precedent
in the case-at-bar
HELD:
NO. Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of
Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBIʼs
delisting from the roster of registered national, regional
or sectorial parties, organizations or coalitions under the
party-list system.
We initially dismissed the petition in light of our ruling in
"MINERO" v. Commission on Elections (Minero); we said
that no grave abuse of discretion exists in a ruling that
correctly applies the prevailing law and jurisprudence.
Applying Section 6(8) of RA 7941, the Court disqualified
MINERO under the following reasoning: Since petitioner
by its own admission failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001
and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections, it
necessarily failed to get at least two per centum (2%) of
the votes cast in the two preceding elections. COMELEC,
therefore, is not duty bound to certify it.
PGBI thus asserts that Section 6(8) does not apply to its
situation, as it is obvious that it failed to participate in
one but not in the two preceding elections. Implied in
this is that it also failed to secure the required percentage
in one but not in the two preceding elections.
First, the law is clear – the COMELEC may motu proprio
or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the
last two preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-
list system in the two preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered. The word "or" is
a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and
independence of one thing from the other things
enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the
sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word.
Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the
law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent
of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBIʼs cited congressional
deliberations clearly show. Minero therefore simply
cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization
of the non-participation of a party-list organization in an
election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold
party-list vote. What Minero effectively holds is that a
party list organization that does not participate in an
election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the
party-list votes. To be sure, this is a confused
interpretation of the law, given the lawʼs clear and
categorical language and the legislative intent to treat
the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a
mixture or fusion of these two different and separate
grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application
of the law – in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation
not within the contemplation of the framers of the law
and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.
The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial
precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the
rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That
decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in
subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine
of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it
should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument.
Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty,
a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to
those that follow if the facts are substantially the same,
even though the parties may be different. It proceeds
from the first principle of justice that, absent any
powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought
to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions
relating to the same event have been put forward by the
parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated
and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a
showing that circumstances attendant in a particular
case override the great benefits derived by our judicial
system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is
justified in setting it aside.
As our discussion above shows, the most compelling
reason to abandon Minero exists; it was clearly an
erroneous application of the law – an application that the
principle of stability or predictability of decisions alone
cannot sustain. Minero did unnecessary violence to the
language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to
the rule of law in general.
Clearly, we cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the
continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, we now
abandon Minero and strike it out from our ruling case law.
Lazatin vs Decierto
GR No. 147097, June 5, 2009
FACTS:
On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence
Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a
Complaint-Affidavit docketed as OMB-0-98-1500,
charging herein petitioners with Illegal Use of Public
Funds as defined and penalized under Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 3, distinct entity from the Office of the Ombudsman.
paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as Petitioners conclude that, as provided by the
amended. Constitution, the OSP being a separate and distinct entity,
the Ombudsman should have no power and authority
The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in
over the OSP. Thus, petitioners maintain that R.A. No.
the use by then Congressman Carmello F. Lazatin of his
6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made the
Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) for the calendar
OSP an organic component of the Office of the
year 1996, i.e., he was both proponent and implementer
Ombudsman, should be struck down for being
of the projects funded from his CDF; he signed vouchers
unconstitutional.
and supporting papers pertinent to the disbursement as
Disbursing Officer; and he received, as claimant, 18 ISSUE: W/n the SC can apply the Doctrine of Stare Decisis
checks amounting to ₱4,868,277.08. Thus, petitioner in the case-at-bar where the lis mota of the case is its
Lazatin, with the help of petitioners Marino A. Morales, constitutionality
Angelito A. Pelayo and Teodoro L. David, was allegedly
HELD:
able to convert his CDF into cash.
Yes. Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of
Fourteen counts each of Malversation of Public Funds
R.A. No. 6770 is stale. It has long been settled that the
and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 were filed
provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting the Office of the
by the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau
Ombudsman prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP
(EPIB) after the preliminary investigation was conducted.
under said office have no constitutional infirmity. The
This was approved by the Ombudsman; hence, 28
issue of whether said provisions of R.A. No. 6770 violated
informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 26087 to
the Constitution had been fully dissected as far back as
26114 were filed against the petitioners before the
1995 in Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman.
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners now assert that the Court's ruling on the
Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed their
constitutionality of the provisions of R.A. No. 6770
respective Motions for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation,
should be revisited and the principle of stare decisis set
which motions were granted by the Sandiganbayan
aside. Again, this contention deserves scant
(Third Division). The Sandiganbayan also ordered the
consideration.
prosecution to re-evaluate the cases against petitioners.
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to
The OSP recommended the dismissal of the cases against
adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which
petitioners for lack or insufficiency of evidence. The
are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code
Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of the Legal
of the Philippines. The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins
Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP Resolution. The OLA
adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a
recommended that the OSP Resolution be disapproved
country to follow the rule established in a decision of the
and the OSP be directed to proceed with the trial of the
Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a judicial
cases against petitioners. The cases were then returned
precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all
to the Sandiganbayan for continuation of criminal
courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based
proceedings.
on the principle that once a question of law has been
Petitioners asseverate that the Ombudsman had no examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and
authority to overturn the OSP's Resolution dismissing the closed to further argument.
cases against petitioners because, under Section 13,
In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman is
compelling reason to convince the Court that the
clothed only with the power to watch, investigate and
doctrine of stare decisis should not be applied to this
recommend the filing of proper cases against erring
case. They have not successfully demonstrated how or
officials, but it was not granted the power to prosecute.
why it would be grave abuse of discretion for the
They point out that under the Constitution, the power to
Ombudsman, who has been validly conferred by law with
prosecute belongs to the OSP (formerly the Tanodbayan),
the power of control and supervision over the OSP, to
which was intended by the framers to be a separate and
disapprove or overturn any resolution issued by the
latter.
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY vs PILI
GR No. 202047, June 8, 2016
FACTS:
LRTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation
created under Executive Order (EO) No. 603 for the
"construction, operation, maintenance, and/or lease of
light rail transit systems in the Philippines." It entered
into a ten-year operations and management agreement
with Meralco Transit Organization, Inc. (MTOI) from June
8, 1984 to June 8, 1994.
MTOI, a corporation organized under the Corporation
Code, hired its own employees and thereafter entered
into collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with the
unions of its employees.
However, on April 7, 1989, the Commission on Audit
declared the Agreement between LRTA and MTOI void.
As a result, on June 9, 1989, LRTA purchased all the
shares of stock of MTOI and renamed MTOI to Metro
Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro) and formally declared
Metro as its wholly-owned subsidiary.
On July 25, 2000, the union of rank-and-file employees of
Metro staged a strike over a bargaining deadlock which
resulted in the paralysis in the operations of Metro. On
July 31, 2000, the Agreement expired when LRTA decided
no longer to renew. On September 30, 2000, Metro
ceased its operations.
Respondents were employees of Metro who have been
terminated upon the expiration of the Agreement. While
the rest of the respondents filed cases involving purely
monetary claims in the form of separation pays, balances
of separation pays, and other unpaid claims, respondent
Noel B. Pili, in addition to his monetary claims, alleged
that he was illegally dismissed.
On the other hand, the rest of the respondents filed
cases for purely monetary claims. They assert that under
Article 4.05 of the Agreement, LRTA contractually bound
itself to shoulder and provide all "Operating Expenses" of
Metro.
The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of the respondents
(Pili et al)
On December 5, 2005, LRTA appealed to the NLRC. NLRC
found that there was no illegal dismissal as Pili's dismissal
was valid on account of the termination of the
Agreement between Metro and LRTA. The NLRC issued a
Resolution modifying in part the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter. It ordered METRO and LRTA to pay complainant-
appellee Pili the balance of his separation pay in the
amount of P165,398.35 plus ten percent (10%) of the
award as attorney's fees and affirming the monetary
awards in the appealed Decision in its entirety including
the 10% attorney's fees to complainants appellees Lirio,
et al.
Thereafter, LRTA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 before the CA. The CA set aside the Resolution of the
NLRC and reinstated the October 27, 2005 Decision of
the Labor Arbiter in toto. The CA found that Pili was
illegally dismissed as the expiration of the Agreement
between LRTA and Metro was not a valid ground to
terminate Pili's employment.
The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: W/n the doctrine of Stare Decisis is applicable in
this case
HELD:
YES. We find that the application of the doctrine of stare
decisis is in order.
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere means
"to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things
which are established." Under this doctrine, when this
Court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable
to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle,
and apply it to all future cases, where facts are
substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties
and property are the same.
The basic facts in this petition are the same as those in
the case of LRTA v. Mendoza. Thus, we find that LRTA is
solidarity liable for the monetary claims of respondents,
in light of this Court's findings in said case. It is the duty
of the Court to apply the previous ruling in LRTA v.
Mendoza in accordance with the doctrine of stare decisis.
Once a case has been decided one way, any other case
involving exactly the same point at issue, as in the
present case, should be decided in the same manner.
QUINTANAR v COCA COLA
GR No. 210565, June 28, 2016
FACTS:
Complainants allege that they are former employees
directly hired by respondent Coca-Cola on different dates
from 1984 up to 2000, assigned as regular Route Helpers
under the direct supervision of the Route Sales
Supervisors.
Complainants allege that the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) conducted an inspection of Coca-
Cola to determine whether it is complying with the
various mandated labor standards, and relative thereto,
they were declared to be regular employees of Coca-Cola,
which was held liable to pay complainants the
underpayment of their 13th month pay, emergency cost
of living allowance (ECOLA), and other claims.
As soon as respondents learned of the filing of the claims
with DOLE, they were dismissed on various dates in
January 2004. Their claims were later settled by the
respondent company, but the settlement allegedly did
not include the issues on reinstatement and payment of
CBA benefits. Thus, on November 10, 2006, they filed
their complaint for illegal dismissal.
In support of their argument that they were regular
employees of Coca-Cola, the complainants relied on the
pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of
CCBPI vs. NOWM wherein it stated that Interserve was a
labor-only contractor.
The labor arbiter rendered its decision granting the
prayer in the complaint. It ordered Coca-Cola to reinstate
the petitioners to their former positions and to pay their
full backwages. Similar to the conclusion reached by the
LA, the NLRC found that the petitioners were regular
employees of Coca-Cola. In its decision, it found that the
relationship between the parties in the controversy bore
a striking similarity with the facts in the cases of Coca-
Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. National Organization of
Workingmen10(N.O.W.) and Magsalin v. National
Organization of Workingmen (Magsalin). The NLRC, thus,
echoed the rulings of the Court in the said cases which
found the employees involved, like the petitioners in this
case, as regular employees of CocaCola.
The CA, however, reversed the decisions of the LA and
the NLRC. They said that Interserve was a legitimate job
contractor, not a labor-only contractor. The petitioners
sought reconsideration, but they were rebuffed. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE: w/n the Doctrine of Stare Decisis can be applied
in this case
HELD:
YES. In Pacquing v. Coca-Cola Philippines, Inc.
(Pacquing),33 the Court applied the ruling in Magsalin
under the principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere
(follow past precedents and do not disturb what has
been settled). It was stressed therein that because the
petitioners, as route helpers, were performing the same
functions as the employees in Magsalin, which were
necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of
Coca- Cola Philippines, Inc., they were considered regular
employees of Coca-Cola entitled to security of tenure.
The Court determined the existence of an employer-
employee relationship between the parties therein
considering that the contract of service between Coca-
Cola and Interserve showed that the former indeed
exercised the power of control over the complainants
therein.
The Court once more asserted the findings that route-
helpers were indeed employees of Coca-Cola in Coca-
Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Dela Cruz and, recently,
in Basan v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. and that
the complainants therein were illegally dismissed for
want of just or authorized cause. Similar dispositions by
the CA were also upheld by this Court in N.O.W43 and
Ostani, through minute resolutions.
It bears mentioning that the arguments raised by Coca-
Cola in the case at bench even bear a striking similarity
with the arguments it raised before the CA in N.O.W and
Ostani.
From all these, a pattern emerges by which Coca-Cola
consistently resorts to various methods in order to deny
its route-helpers the benefits of regular employment.
Despite this, the Court, consistent with sound
pronouncements above, adopts the rulings made in
Pacquing that Interserve was a labor-only contractor and
that Coca-Cola should be held liable pursuant to the
principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere.
Coca-Cola has not shown any strong and compelling
reason to convince the Court that the doctrine of stare
decisis should not be applied. It failed to successfully
demonstrate how or why both the LA and the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the
pleas of the petitioners that they were its regular
employees and not of Interserve.
UCPB vs UY ISSUE: W/n the CA erred when it misconstrued the
GR No. 204039, January 10, 2018 applicability of UCPB v OʼHalloran to the case-at-bar

FACTS: HELD:

Prime Town Property Group, Inc. (PPGI) and E. Ganzon
Inc. were the joint developers of the Kiener Hills Mactan
Condominium Project (Kiener Hills). In 1997, spouses
Walter and Lily Uy (respondents) entered into a Contract
to Sell with PPGI for a unit in Kiener Hills.
On April 23, 1998, PPGI and petitioner United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB) executed the following:
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), and Sale of
Receivables and Assignment of Rights and Interests. By
virtue of the said agreements, PPGI transferred the right
to collect the receivables of the buyers, which included
respondents, of units in Kiener Hills. The parties entered
into the said agreement as PPGI's partial settlement of its
₱1, 814,500,000.00 loan with UCPB.
On 17 April 2006, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board Regional Office (HLURB Regional Office) received
respondents' complaint for sum of money and damages
against PPGI and UCPB. They claimed that in spite of their
full payment of the purchase price, PPGI failed to
complete the construction of their units in Kiener
Hills.Tthe HLURB Regional Office found that respondents
were entitled to a refund in view of PPGI' s failure to
complete the construction of their units. Nonetheless, it
found that UCPB cannot be solidarily liable with PPGI
because only the accounts receivables were conveyed to
UCPB and not the entire condominium project.
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed before the HLURB
Board of Commissioners (HLURB Board). It was GRANTED.
YES, the CA erred. It must be remembered that when a
case is appealed, the appellate court has the power to
review the case in its entirety. Thus, when UCPB
appealed the present controversy before the Court, it
was not merely limited to determine whether the CA
accurately set UCPB's liability against respondents. It is
also empowered to determine whether the appellate
court's determination of liability was correct in the first
place.
This is especially true considering that the issue of the
nature of UCPB's liability is closely intertwined and
inseparable from the determination of the amount of its
actual liability.
However, Stare Decisis applies only to cases decided by
the Supreme Court. As above-mentioned, respondents
bewail the reliance of the CA on 0 'Halloran arguing that
it was not a binding precedent since it was not issued by
this Court. In other words, the doctrine of stare decisis
becomes operative only when judicial – precedents are
set by pronouncements of this Court to the exclusion of
lower courts.
It is true regardless whether the decisions of the lower
courts are logically or legally sound as only decisions
issued by this Court become part of the legal system. At
the most, decisions of lower courts only have a
persuasive effect. Thus, respondents are correct in
contesting the application of the doctrine of stare decisis
when the CA relied on decisions it had issued.

Aggrieved, UCPB appealed before the OP. The decision of

HLURB was AFFIRMED by the OP.

Undeterred, UCPB appealed before the CA. The CA

affirmed with modification the OP decision.

In addition, the appellate court noted the

pronouncements of the CA in United Coconut Planters
Bank v. O'Halloran (O'Halloran). It explained that it
involved similar facts and issues where the CA ruled that
the assignment of the receivables did not make UCPB the
developer of Kiener Hills it being merely the assignee of
the receivables under the contract to sell and, as such,
UCPB cannot be deemed as the debtor with respect to
the construction, development, and delivery of the
subject condominium units.