Operations in Burma: 1942-1943 Gen.

(later Field Marshal) Sir Archibald Wavell (later 1st Earl Wavell), the commander in chief in India, made every effort to take the offensive to recapture Burma as soon as practicable, but the means were not to hand until time allowed his land and air forces to be assembled and trained and his communications to the eastern frontier built up. Nevertheless, he launched an offensive in October 1942 by one division to capture Akyab in coordination with an amphibious assault on the port. Maungdaw and Buthidaung were occupied on December 17, but the formation earmarked for the amphibious assault and its landing craft were delayed by extended operations to wrest Madagascar from the control of supporters of the Vichy French government. Wavell therefore decided to continue with the land advance and, when within striking distance of Akyab, to launch a short-range amphibious attack. The Japanese had meanwhile brought their forces in Arakan up to divisional strength, and early in March 1943 halted the land advance too far to the north of the port to make a short-range amphibious operation possible. They then launched a counteroffensive and by the break of the monsoon in May had recaptured Buthidaung and Maungdaw. Although Wavell's effort had failed, it brought to light defects in the organization and training of the rapidly expanding Indian Army. These were eliminated, and by the end of 1943 the British-Indian divisions had reached a pitch of training which made them equal to the Japanese. In July 1942, Wavell formed a long-range penetration brigade (Chindits) under the command of Brig. (later Maj. Gen.) Orde C. Wingate. On Feb. 14, 1943, the Chindits, some 3,000 strong, crossed the Chindwin River and, supplied by air, penetrated deep into Burma without meeting much opposition and damaged the railway south of Indaw. Wingate then crossed the Irrawaddy into a somewhat waterless area, but its many roads and tracks enabled the Japanese to surround his force, which had to disperse and get back as best it could. By early June, only 2,200 men had got out of Burma to Assam or China. This incursion had little strategic value in itself, but it gave a considerable moral fillip to Britain and India and showed clearly that troops in jungle country could be supplied by air. Its greatest effect, however, was that it made the Japanese decide to improve their defensive positions in Burma by taking the offensive toward Assam, a decision which was to prove fatal