Administrative Law Digests Atty. Arreza

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N.
Manuel
2012
PEOPLE vs. VERA G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937 FACTS: This case involves the constitutionality of the old probation law. Respondent Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221, which grants provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that it is applicable to a cities like Manila as it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law, it is unconstitutional because it is violative of the equal protection clause of the constitution. It also avers that the said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards, thus it constitutes undue delegation of power. ISSUE: Whether or not Act 4221 or the old probation law is an undue delegation of legislative power on the ground that there is no standard set by congress for its implementation. HELD: Yes. There is undue delegation of power because there is no standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation.
ARANETA VS. DINGLASAN (THE FIRST EMERGENCY POWER CASE) G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949 FACTS: This case involves Commonwealth Act 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act. Antonio Araneta is being charged for violation of EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael Dinglasan is the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He avers that EO 62, issued by virtue of CA No. 671, is null and void as the effect of CA No. 671 granting emergency power to the president has already ceased. Three other cases were consolidated with the case of Araneta. These are: 1.) L-3055, an appeal by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; 2.) L3054 filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds pursuant to EO 225; 1
Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel
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and 3.)L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo attacking EO 226 that appropriates funds to hold the national elections. All the petitioners aver that CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect hence all E0s passed pursuant to it had likewise ceased. ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has already ceased when Congress has met in session? HELD: Yes. CA 671 became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate." Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly." Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal. Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined to mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or scope." It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law."
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, SR., ETC., ET AL. vs. VICENTE GELLA, ETC., ET AL. (THE SECOND EMERGENCY POWER CASE) G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953 FACTS: Eulogio Rodriguez, et. al. seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. These EOs were issued pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior to Araneta vs. Dinglasan, Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his perception that war is still subsisting as a fact. ISSUE: Whether or not the EOs issued issued have no force and effect on the ground that they are violative of the principle of separation of power.
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HELD: Yes, the EOs are invalid. As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EOs issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law. Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest. RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes) vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919 FACTS: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor. In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro and the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them. It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation. 3
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ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code is unconstitutional on the ground that it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial government? HELD: No, Section 2145 of the RAC is not unconstitutional. The legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law. The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made. Also, the Supreme Court explained that an exception to the general rule of non-delegation of legislative power sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF CARDONA vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN G.R. No. L-10202 March 27, 1917 FACTS: The Municipality of Cardona alleged that section 1 of Act No. 1748; entitled "An Act authorizing the adjustment of provincial and municipal boundaries and authorizing the change of capitals of provinces and subprovinces, as may be necessary from time to time to serve the public convenience and interest," is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in that it delegates legislative powers to the Governor-General, whereas the Act of Congress referred to lodges those powers in the Philippine Legislature. ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 1748 is "unconstitutional" on the ground that it confers on the Governor-General legislative authority? HELD: No, it is not unconstitutional. The delegation of the power referred to on the GovernorGeneral does not involve an abdication of legislative functions on the part of the legislature with regard to the particular subject-matter with which it authorizes the Governor-General to deal. It is simply a transference of certain details with respect to provinces, municipalities, and townships, many of them newly created, and all of them subject to more or less rapid change both in development and centers of population, the proper regulation of which might require not only prompt action but action of such a detailed character as not to permit the legislative body, as such, to take it efficiently. We find no provision of the Act applicable so far as it touches this case which is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.
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PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. vs. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. No. 47065 June 26, 1940 FACTS: Pangasinan Transportation Company Inc. (PTI) has been engaged for 20 years in the business of transporting passengers in Pangasinan, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija through TPU buses in accordance with the terms and conditions of the certificates of public convenience issued by the Public Utility Commission (later called Public Service Commission). The company applied for an authorization to operate ten additional Brockway trucks on the ground that they were needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its existing certificates and as a result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. PSC agreed to grant the authorization, but with two conditions as provided for by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454: First, that the certificates of authorization issued to it would be valid only for a period of 25 years counted from the date of promulgation; and second, that the company may be acquired by the Philippine Commonwealth with proper payment of the cost price of its equipment, taking into account reasonable depreciation to be fixed by the Commission at the time of it acquisition. PTI did not agree with the conditions, and instead asked the Supreme Court to declare Commonwealth Act No. 454. ISSUE: Whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 454 is unconstitutional for being undue delegation of legislative power on the ground that without limitation, guide or rule except the unfettered discretion and judgment of the Commission, constitute a complete and total abdication by the Legislature of its functions in the premises, and for that reason, the Act, in so far as those powers are concerned. HELD: No, the law is not unconstitutional. The law is made subject to a sufficient standard that the PSC must strictly follow. Inasmuch as the period to be fixed by the Commission under section 15 is inseparable from the certificate itself, said period cannot be disregarded by the Commission in determining the question whether the issuance of the certificate will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner. Conversely, in determining "a definite period of time," the Commission will be guided by "public interests," the only limitation to its power being that said period shall not exceed fifty years (sec. 16 (a), Commonwealth Act No. 146; Constitution, Art. XIII, sec. 8.) The Supreme Court had earlier ruled that "public interest" furnishes a sufficient standard.
CALALANG vs. WILLIAMS G.R. No. 47800, December 2, 1940 FACTS: The National Traffic Commission recommended to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
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Commonwealth Act 548 authorized said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. ISSUE: Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. HELD: There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest. The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly.
CERVANTES VS. AUDITOR-GENERAL G.R. No. L-4043 May 26, 1952 FACTS: Cenon Cervantes, Manager of the National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation (NAFCO) receiving P15,000 salary a year, assailed the decision of the Auditor General denying his claim for quarters allowance. By a resolution of the Board of Directors of NAFCO, Cervantes was granted quarters allowance of not exceeding P400 a month effective the first of August, 1949. The resolution was disapproved by the Control Committee of the Government Enterprises on strength of the recommendation of the NAFCO auditor, concurred in by the Auditor General, because of the following reasons: (1) that quarters allowance constituted additional compensation prohibited by the charter of the NAFCO, which fixes the salary of the general manager thereof at the sum not to exceed P15,000 a year, and (2) that the precarious financial condition of the corporation did not warrant the granting of such allowance. The President promulgated Executive Order No. 93 creating the Government Enterprises Council creating the Control Committee of the Government Enterprises pursuant to Republic Act No. 51 6
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approved by Congress authorizing the President of the Philippines, among other things, to effect such reforms and changes in government owned and controlled corporations for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operation. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 51 is unconstitutional on the ground that it is an undue delegation of legislative power. HELD: No. The rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a policy and a standard is established by the statute" there is no undue delegation. (11 Am. Jur. 957). Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the President of the Philippines, among others, to make reforms and changes in government-controlled corporations, lays down a standard and policy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent government of the Philippines and to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard was set and the policy fixed. The President had to carry the mandate. This he did by promulgating the executive order in question which, tested by the rule above cited, does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power.
PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR-GENERAL G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965 FACTS: President Diosdado Macapagal, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirtythree (33) municipalities. petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, questioned the said EOs and petitioned the court to restrain the Auditor General and his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the 33 municipalities is null and void on the ground that the President has no power to create municipalities. HELD: Yes, the creation of the 33 municipalities is null and void as the power to create municipal corporations is solely legislative in nature. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
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Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.
VIGAN ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY, INC. vs. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. No. L-19850 January 30, 1964 FACTS: This is an original action for certiorari to annul an order of respondent Public Service Commission ordering the reduction of rates of Vigan Electric Light Co. PSC averred that Vigan Electric making a net operating profit in excess of the allowable return of 12% on its invested capital, and that it is in the public interest and in consonance with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3043 that reduction of its rates to the extent of its excess revenue be put into effect immediately. Vigan Electric contended that the reduction of rate is unconstitutional because it has been ordered without notice and hearing, thus issued without due process of law. In defense, PSC maintains that rate-fixing is a legislative function; that legislative or rule-making powers may constitutionally be exercised without previous notice of hearing; and that the decision in Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil., 635) in which we held that such notice and hearing are essential to the validity of a decision of the Public Service Commission is not in point because, unlike the order complained of which respondent claims to be legislative in nature the Ang Tibay case referred to a proceeding involving the exercise of judicial functions. ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress validly delegated legislative power to the PSC? HELD: No. Congress has not delegated, and cannot delegate legislative powers to the Public Service Commission. Consistently with the principle of separation of powers, which underlies our constitutional system, legislative powers may not be delegated except to local governments, and only to matters purely of local concern. However, Congress may delegate to administrative agencies of the government the power to supply the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy laid down by it which is complete in itself. Such law is not deemed complete unless it lays down a standard or pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at least, determinable without requiring another legislation, to guide the administrative body concerned in the performance of its duty to implement or enforce said Policy. Otherwise, there would be no reasonable means to ascertain whether or not said body has acted within the scope of its authority, and, as a consequence, the power of legislation would eventually be exercised by a branch of the Government other than that 8
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in which it is lodged by the Constitution, in violation, not only of the allocation of powers therein made, but, also, of the principle of separation of powers. Although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines may partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a functionpartaking of a quasi-judicial character the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing.
III. Creation, Establishment and Abolition of Administrative Agencies LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010 FACTS: At the dawn of his administration, President Benigno Aquino III on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Petitioner Louis Biraogo in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer and petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives, assail Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor. The Executive Secretary avers that the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an "independent collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one. To accomplish its task, the PTC has all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions. 9
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ISSUE: Whether or not EO 1 creating the Philippine Truth Commission violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation. HELD: No. The creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority. It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations. On these premises, the SC holds the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General, "whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission." Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding. 10
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Note: However, Executive Order No. 1 was declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object.
LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC. vs. JOSE PAO G.R. No. L-27811 November 17, 1967 FACTS: Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land situated in Tamlangon, Bansalan, of Davao. He ceded his rights and interests to a portion (392,7569 hectares) of the public land to the Lacson-Magallanes Co. Such ceded portion was officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared agricultural land. Meanwhile, Jose Pao and nineteen other claimants applied for the purchase of ninety hectares of the released area. In turn, Lacson-Magallanes filed its own sales application covering the entire released area. This was protested by Jose Pao and his nineteen companions upon the averment that they are actual occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales application. The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict, dismissed the claim of Jose Pao and his companions. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources also dismissed the appeal of Pao. The case was elevated to the President of the Philippines. Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, "[b]y authority of the President" decided the controversy, modified the decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and (1) declared that "it would be for the public interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who depend on the land for their existence, be allocated that portion on which they have made improvements;" and (2) directed that the controverted land should be subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and allocated to actual occupants, without prejudice to the corporation's right to reimbursement for the cost of surveying this portion." ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Executive Secretary herein is an undue delegation of power on the ground that the Constitution does not contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. HELD: No. The Chief Executive may delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that he perform in person. The President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that "under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.
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IV. Powers and functions of administrative agencies. SIERRA MADRE TRUST vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DIRECTOR OF MINES, JUSAN TRUST MINING COMPANY, and J & S PARTNERSHIP G.R. Nos. L-32370 & 32767 April 20, 1983 FACTS: Sierra Madre Trust (SMT) filed two adverse claims over 12 separate lode mineral claims with the Bureau of Mines. On July 26, 1962, the SMTfiled with the Bureau of Mines an Adverse Claim against LLA No. V-7872 of the Jusan Trust Mining Company over six (6) lode mineral claims, all situated in Sitio Maghanay, Barrio Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya. The adverse claim prayed that the claims of respondent Jusan Trust Mining Company (JTMC) be denied and declared null, void, and illegal as the said lode minerals claims covered by LLA No. V-7872 (Amd) encroached and overlapped the eleven (11) lode mineral claims of SMT. SMT also filed an adverse claim against J and S Partnership (JSP) over another six (6) lode mineral situated in Sitio Gatid, Barrio of Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya on July 26, 1966, claiming that they encroached and overlapped the thirteen (13) lode mineral claims of SMT. These two (2) adverse claims were jointly heard in the Bureau of Mines, and also jointly considered in the appeal in the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The Director of Mines and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dismissed the claims. They said that there exists no conflict or overlapping between the SMT's and JTMC's and JSPs mining claims. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of administrative bodies, the Bureau of Mines and Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, must be overturned? HELD: No. The officers of the Executive Department tasked with administering the Mining Law have found that there is neither encroachment nor overlapping in respect of the claims involved. Accordingly, whatever may be the answers to the questions will not materially serve the interests of the petitioner. In closing it is useful to remind litigation prone individuals that the interpretation by officers of laws which are entrusted to their administration is entitled to great respect.' In his decision, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources said: "This Office is in conformity with the findings of the Director of Mines that the mining claims of the appellees were validly located, surveyed and registered.
ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION vs. THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HON. G.V. TOBIAS, in his capacity as General Manager of the National Housing Authority, THE HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant and VIRGILIO A. YUSON G.R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987 FACTS: Jose Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation under a Contract to Sell. On 28 August 1974, Hernando transferred his rights over the 12
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said lot to private respondent Virgilio Yuson, embodied in a Deed of Assignment and Substitution of Obligor. However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordance with its undertaking under Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell (subdivision beautification), Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment payments falling due thereafter. On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15. For his part, Mr. Yuson replied that he would conform with the request as soon as he was able to verify the truth of the representation in the notice. In a second letter dated 27 November 1976, Antipolo Realty reiterated its request, citing the decision rendered by the National Housing Authority (NHA) on 25 October 1976 in Case No. 252 (entitled "Jose B. Viado Jr., complainant vs. Conrado S. Reyes, respondent") declaring Antipolo Realty to have "substantially complied with its commitment to the lot buyers pursuant to the Contract to Sell. A formal demand was made for full and immediate payment of the amount of P16,994.73, representing installments which, Antipolo Realty alleged, had accrued during the period while the improvements were being completed i.e., between September 1972 and October 1976. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson. Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty before NHA. Antipolo Realty filed a motion to dismiss, which NHA denied. After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell. A motion for reconsideration of Antipolo Realty was also denied. ISSUE: Whether or not in hearing the complaint of Yuson and in ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the parties NHA assumed the performance of judicial or quasi-judicial functions which it was not authorized to perform. HELD: No. It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission) is well recognized in our jurisdiction, basically because the need for special competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged. The Court held that under the law creating NHA it is empowered to regulate the real estate trade and business involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman The Court held that under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to 13
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determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered."
THE CITY OF BAGUIO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, and ORLANDO GENOVE vs. FRANCISCO NIO, JOSEFINA NIO, EMMANUEL NIO, and EURLIE OCAMPO G.R. No. 161811 April 12, 2006 FACTS: The Bureau of Lands awarded on May 13, 1966 to Narcisa A. Placino a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 10 (the lot) located at Saint Anthony Road, Dominican-Mirador Barangay, Baguio City. Francisco Nio, who has been occupying the lot, contested the award by filing a Petition Protest on December 23, 1975 before the Bureau of Lands. The Director of Lands dismissed the Petition Protest by Order of November 11, 1976. Nio appealed the dismissal all the way to the Supreme Court but he did not succeed. The decision of the Director of Lands having become final and executory, the then-Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Cordillera Autonomous Region (DENR-CAR), on petition of Narcisa, issued an Order of Execution directing the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) Officer to enforce the decision "by ordering Petitioner Nio and those acting in his behalf to refrain from continuously occupying the area and remove whatever improvements they may have introduced thereto." Attempts to enforce the Order of Execution failed, prompting Narcisa to file a complaint for ejectment before the Baguio City Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC). Narcisas counsel, Atty. Edilberto Claravall, later petitioned the DENR-CAR for the issuance of a Special Order authorizing the City Sheriff of Baguio, the City Police Station, and the Demolition Team of the City Government to demolish or remove the improvements on the lot introduced by Nio. The DENR-CAR denied the petition, citing lack of jurisdiction over the City Sheriff of Baguio, the City Police Station, and the Demolition Team of the City Government but on July 16, 1997, the Demolition Team of Baguio City headed by Engineer Orlando Genove and the Baguio City Police, on orders of then Baguio City Police Officer-In-Charge (OIC) Donato Bacquian, started demolishing the houses of Nio and his herein co-respondents. Nio and his wife Josefina Nio thereupon filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City. The RTC denied the petition. However the Court of Appeals granted the petition on appeal. Mayor Mauricio Domogan thru the Demolition Team and City Engineers Office are ordered to cease and desist from enforcing the amended order of executionissued by Oscar N. Hamada, Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources, concerning the demolition or removal of the structures made by petitioners until private respondent applied for a special order abovementioned with the proper court. ISSUE: Whether or not the enforcement of the Amended Order of Execution needs a hearing and court order which Sec. 10(d) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court requires despite the fact that an the 14
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administrative agency which is clothed with quasi-judicial functions issued the Amended Order of Execution. HELD: Yes. In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. There is, however, no explicit provision granting the Bureau of Lands (now the Land Management Bureau) or the DENR (which exercises control over the Land Management Bureau) the authority to issue an order of demolition which the Amended Order of Execution, in substance, is. While the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve the disposition of public lands, the power to determine who has the actual, physical possession or occupation or the better right of possession over public lands remains with the courts.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by SECRETARY JOSE MARI B. PONCE (OIC), vs. DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T. SUTTON-SOLIMAN and HARRY T. SUTTON G.R. No. 162070 October 19, 2005 FACTS: The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law. A new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine. However, the Supreme Court in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR, ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land. In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL. Instead of granting the request, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL. Invoking its rule-making power under Section 49 of the CARL, petitioner submits that it issued DAR A.O. No. 9 to limit the area of livestock farm that may be retained by a landowner pursuant to its 15
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mandate to place all public and private agricultural lands under the coverage of agrarian reform. Petitioner also contends that the A.O. seeks to remedy reports that some unscrupulous landowners have converted their agricultural farms to livestock farms in order to evade their coverage in the agrarian reform program. DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order7 partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents land for grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition. Suttons move for reconsideration was denied. The Office of the President also denied the request. However, the Court of Appeals declared the AO No. 9 unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not DAR has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O. regulating livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. HELD: Yes. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution. The rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations. Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e., the power to make rules and regulations. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions. However, while administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not immune from judicial review. They may be properly challenged before the courts to ensure that they do not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative discretion is committed by the administrative body concerned.
JESUS CABARRUS, JR. vs. JOSE ANTONIO S. BERNAS A.C. No. 4634 September 24, 1997 FACTS: On August 30, 1996, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus, Jr. filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas for alleged violations of Article 172 of the Revised 16
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Penal Code and Code of Professional Responsibility. Cabarrus alleged that Bernas and his client Ramon B. Pascual, Jr. caused the preparation and filing of a criminal complaint for falsification of a public document on April 11, 1996, (three days before the filing of the aforecited Civil Case) at the AOED of the National Bureau of Investigation in violation of the non-forum shopping rule by the Supreme Court. The gravaman of the affidavit complaint of the respondent is forgery, the same legal issue in Civil Case No. 65646. Cabarrus contended that Atty. Bernas should be disbarred for having instigated, abetted and facilitated the perversion and subversion of truth in the said verification and certification of nonforum shopping. Contrary to Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, Canon 3, 3.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers. In his Comment, Bernas averred that he has not committed forum shopping because the criminal action is not an action that involves the same issue as those in a civil action and both suits can exist without constituting forum shopping so long as the civil aspect has not been prosecuted in the criminal case. He emphasized that forum shopping only exists when identical reliefs are issued by the same parties in multiple fora. ISSUE: Whether or not the filing a complaint before the National Bureau of Investigations when another action has already been filed in another court constitutes forum shopping as it is one of the courts, tribunals and agencies referred to under Circular No. 28-91, Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94. HELD: No. The courts, tribunals and agencies referred to under Circular No. 28-91, Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 are those vested with judicial powers or quasijudicial powers and those who not only hear and determine controversies between adverse parties, but to make binding orders or judgments. As succinctly put it by R.A. 157, the NBI is not performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The NBI cannot therefore be among those forums contemplated by the Circular that can entertain an action or proceeding, or even grant any relief, declaratory or otherwise. The functions of the National Bureau of Investigations are merely investigatory and informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to a party. It cannot even determine probable cause. It is an investigative agency whose findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative and as public welfare may require. It renders assistance when requested in the investigation or detection of crimes which precisely what Atty. Bernas sought in order to prosecute those persons responsible for defrauding his client. Requirements for enforcement of administrative issuances GMA NETWORK, INC. vs. MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD G.R. No. 148579 February 5, 2007
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FACTS: GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHF television station, EMC Channel 27. On January 7, 2000, MTRCB issued an order of suspension against the network for airing "Muro Ami: The Making" without first securing a permit from it as provided in Section 7 of PD 1986. The penalty of suspension was based on Memorandum Circular 98-17 dated December 15, 1998 which provided for the penalties for exhibiting a program without a valid permit from the MTRCB. GMA moved for reconsideration of the suspension order and, at the same time, informed MTRCB that Channel 27 had complied with the suspension order by going off the air since midnight of January 11, 2000. It also filed a letter-protest which was merely "noted" by the MTRCB thereby, in effect, denying both the motion for reconsideration and letter-protest. GMA then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari which was dismissed. The January 7, 2000 suspension order issued by MTRCB was affirmed in toto. ISSUE: Whether Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and binding on GMA. HELD: No. While MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject program, Memorandum Circular 98-17, which was the basis of the suspension order, was not binding on petitioner. The Administrative Code of 1987, particularly Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law Center three certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced. Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for the penalties for the first, second and third offenses for exhibiting programs without valid permit to exhibit, has not been registered with the ONAR as of January 27, 2000. Hence, the same is yet to be effective. It is thus unenforceable since it has not been filed in the ONAR. Consequently, petitioner was not bound by said circular and should not have been meted the sanction provided thereunder. Note: The Supreme Court held that "Muro Ami: The Making" is not exempted from the MTRCBs power of review. The only exemptions are (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels.
(The Second TAADA vs. TUVERA CASE) LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI) vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL. G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986 FACTS: This case is a move for reconsideration/clarification of the first Tanada vs. Tuvera case. Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was 18
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"otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. The subject of the contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows: ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. ISSUES: a.) Whether or not the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. b.) Whether or not the publication requirement covers all laws, including presidential decrees, executive orders, administrative rules and regulations. HELD: a.) No. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision,is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided." b.) Yes. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are: 1. Presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
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2. Administrative rules and regulations if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. 3. Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. 4. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. 5. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. Not covered are: 1. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. 2. The so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. 3. Instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION A. Limitation on the conferment of quasi-judicial power BILL MILLER vs. ATANACIO MARDO and MANUEL GONZALES G.R. No. L-15138 July 31, 1961 FACTS: These appeals present one identical question of law, namely, the validity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, prepared and submitted by the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission under the authority of Republic Act No. 997, as amended by Republic Act No. 1241, insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor created in said Plan to decide claims of laborers for wages, overtime and separation pay, etc. In G.R. No. L-15138, Manuel Gonzales filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, in Manila, a complaint against Bill Miller (owner and manager of Miller Motors) claiming to be a driver of Miller from December 1, 1956 to October 31, 1957, on which latter date he was allegedly arbitrarily dismissed, without being paid separation pay. He prayed for judgment for the amount due him as separation pay plus damages. Upon receipt of said complaint, Chief Hearing Officer Atanacio Mardo of Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor required Miller to file an answer. In G.R. No. L-16781, Cresencio Estano filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, a complaint (RO 3 Ls. Case No. 874) against Chin Hua Trading Co. and/or Lao Kang Suy and Ke Bon Chiong, as Manager and Assistant Manager thereof, respectively, claiming to have been their driver from June 17, 1947 to June 4, 1955, for which service he was not paid overtime pay (for work in excess of 8 hours and for Sundays and legal holidays) and vacation leave pay. He prayed for judgment for the amount due him, plus attorney's fees. 20
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In G.R. No. L-15377, appellant Numeriana Raganas filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a complaint (Civil Case No. R-5535) against appellees Sen Bee Trading Company, Macario Tan and Sergio Tan, claiming that she was employed by appellees as a seamstress from June 5, 1952 to January 11, 1958, for which service she was underpaid and was not given overtime, as well as vacation and sick leave pay. She prayed for judgment on the amount due her for the same plus damages. In G.R. No. L-16660, Vicente B. Romero filed with Regional Officer No. 2 of the Department of Labor a complaint (Wage Case No. 196-W) against Sia Seng, for recovery of alleged unpaid wages, overtime and separation pay. Sia Seng, filed an answer. In G.R. No. L-17056, Mariano Pabillare instituted in Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor a complaint (IS-2168) against petitioner Fred Wilson & Co., Inc., alleging that petitioner engaged his services as Chief Mechanic, Air conditioning Department, from October 1947 to February 19, 1959, when he was summarily dismissed without cause and without sufficient notice and separation pay. The petitioners questioned the authority of the regional offices to take cognizance of the subject matter involved in their cases as provided for by paragraph 25 of Article VI of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, which provided that: 25. Each regional office shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases falling under the Workmen's Compensation law, and cases affecting all money claims arising from violations of labor standards on working conditions including but not restrictive to: unpaid wages, underpayment, overtime, separation pay and maternity leave of employees and laborers; and unpaid wages, overtime, separation pay, vacation pay and payment for medical services of domestic help. ISSUE: Whether or not the jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases affecting money claims such as those sought to be enforced in these proceedings, is a new conferment of power to the Department of Labor not theretofore exercised by it. HELD: It is true that in Republic Act No. 1241, amending Section 4 of Republic Act 997, which created the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission, the latter was empowered (2) To abolish departments, offices, agencies, or functions which may not be necessary, or create those which way be necessary for the efficient conduct of the government service, activities, and functions. (Emphasis supplied.) But these "functions" which could thus be created, obviously refer merely to administrative, not judicial functions. For the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission was created to carry out the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the National Government (See Section 3 of R.A. No. 997, as amended by R.A. No. 1241), which plainly did not include the creation of courts. And the Constitution expressly provides that "the Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.(Sec. 1, Art. VII of the Constitution). Thus, judicial power rests exclusively in the judiciary. It may be conceded that the legislature may confer on administrative boards or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative functions. But in so doing, the legislature must state its intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as even such quasi21
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judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to or in connection with the performance of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts. If a statute itself actually passed by the Congress must be clear in its terms when clothing administrative bodies with quasi-judicial functions, then certainly such conferment can not be implied from a mere grant of power to a body such as the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission to create "functions" in connection with the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Government. B. Jurisdiction RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI) vs. BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS and DIEGO MORALES G.R. No. L-43653 November 29, 1977 FACTS: These are two cases involving complaints of inconvenience or injuries brought about by the failure of the RCPI to transmit telegrams informing complainants of the deaths of close relatives which according to them constitute breach of contractual obligation through negligence under the Civil Code. In one case, Diego Morales claims that while he was in Manila his daughter sent him a telegram on October 15, 1974 from Santiago, Isabela, informing him of the death of his wife, Mrs. Diego T. Morales. The telegram sent thru the petitioner RCPI however never reached him. He had to be informed personally about the death of his wife and so to catch up with the burial of his wife, he had to take the trip by airplane to Isabela. In its answer petitioner RCPI claims that the telegram sent by respondent was transmitted from Santiago, lsabela to its Message Center at Cubao, Quezon City but when it was relayed from Cubao, the radio signal became intermittent making the copy received at Sta. Cruz, Manila unreadable and unintelligible. Because of the failure of the RCPI to transmit said telegram to him, respondent allegedly suffered inconvenience and additional expenses and prays for damages. Meanwhile in another case, Pacifico Innocencio claim that on July 13, 1975 Lourdes Innocencio sent a telegram from Paniqui, Tarlac, thru the facilities of the petitioner RCPI to him at Barrio Lomot, Cavinti, Laguna for the Purpose of informing him about the death of their father. The telegram was never received by Pacifico Innocencio. Inspite of the non-receipt and/or non-delivery of the message sent to said address, the sender (Lourdes Innocencio has not been notified about its nondelivery, As a consequence Pacifica Innocencio was not able to attend the internment of their father at Moncada, Tarlac. Because of the failure of RCPI to deliver to him said telegram he allegedly was "shocked when he learned about the death of their father when he visited his hometown Moncada Tarlac on August 14, 1975," and thus suffered mental anguish and personal inconveniences. Likewise, he prays for damages. ISSUE: Whether or not the Board of Communications has jurisdiction to entertain and take cognizance of complaints for injury caused by breach of contractual obligation arising from negligence covered by Article 1170 of the Civil Code and injury caused by quasi delict or tort liability under Article 2176 of 22
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the Civil Code which according to it should be ventilated in the proper courts of justice and not in the Board of Communications. HELD: No. The Board of Communications, "being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication,. conferred upon it by statute". The functions of the Public Service Commission, now Board of Communications, are limited and administrative in nature and it has only jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by statute. As successor in interest of the Public Service Commission, the Board of Communications exercises the same powers jurisdiction and functions as that provided for in the Public Service Act for the Public Service Commission. One of these powers as provided under Section 129 of the Public Service Act governing the organization of the Specialized Regulatory Board, is to issue certificate of public convenience. But this power to issue certificate of public convenience does not carry with it the power of supervision and control over matters not related to the issuance of certificate of public convenience or in the performance therewith in a manner suitable to promote public interest. There can be no justification then for the Public Service Commission (now the Board of Communications as successor in interest) imposing the fines in these two petitions. The law cannot be any clearer . The only power it possessed over radio companies as noted was to fix rates It could not take to task a radio company for an negligence or misfeasance. It was not vested with such authority. That it did then in these two petitions lacked the impress of validity. In the face of the provision itself, it is rather apparent that the Public Service Commission lacked the required power to proceed against petitioner. There is nothing in Section 21 thereof which empowers it to impose a fine that calls for a different conclusion. C. Rules of Procedures
BONIFACIO ESPINOZA vs. PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR OF THE PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION OFFICE OF PAMPANGA and MARIA QUIBULOY G.R. No. 147525, February 26, 2007 FACTS: A complaint for ejectment was filed against Bonifacio Espinoza by Maria V. Quibuloy, as coowner and administratrix of three parcels of land, alleging that Espinoza had reneged on his obligations as tenant to pay the rent and till the subject landholding. Instead of answering the complaint, Espinoza moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. He cited Section 1, Rule III of the 1989 Rules of Procedure of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (1989 DARAB Rules), providing for conciliation proceedings before the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) prior to initiating the case. He contended that presentation of a certification from the BARC, attesting that the dispute had been submitted to it for mediation or conciliation without any success of settlement, was a jurisdictional requirement. On that note, he concluded that the provincial adjudicator could not take cognizance of the agrarian dispute due to Quibuloys failure to present the required certificate. 23
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The provincial adjudicator set the case for hearing but neither Espinoza nor his counsel attended the hearing. Thus, Quibuloy was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, the dispute was ordered submitted for decision. Just before the decision was rendered, Espinoza filed his answer assailing Quibuloys personality to bring suit. Petitioner also offered unsubstantiated denials of Quibuloys charges. As his defense, he denied allegations of non-payment of rents and non-tillage of the land for lack of knowledge and information to form a belief as to the veracity thereof. The provincial adjudicator was sufficiently convinced that Quibuloys allegations were true and correct. Accordingly, he decided the case against Espinoza. ISSUE: Whether or not DARAB is bound by technical rules followed in courts of law. HELD: No. Administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions are not bound by technical rules followed in courts of law. The adjudicator is given enough latitude, subject to the essential requirements of administrative due process, to be able to expeditiously ascertain the facts of the agrarian dispute. While there may have been a technical lapse on the part of the adjudicator in disposing of the motion to dismiss, the assailed acts of the adjudicator did not amount to a grave abuse of discretion justifying a writ of certiorari. Considering the technical flexibility afforded to agrarian adjudicators, the order may easily be construed as a denial of the motion to dismiss. What would have been the prudent recourse under the rules was to submit an answer immediately, participate in the hearing and appeal an adverse decision. Sadly, petitioner failed to do any of these. It is now too late for him to dispute the adjudicators decision. The 1989 DARAB Rules exempted parties residing in non-adjoining barangays from presenting the BARC certification. Since it is undisputed that Quibuloy resided in San Nicolas 1st, Lubao, Pampanga while petitioner stayed in San Agustin, Lubao, Pampanga, the former was not required to present the BARC certification before the adjudicator taking cognizance of the agrarian dispute. Needless to say, the provincial adjudicator did not err in entertaining the dispute notwithstanding the absence of the BARC certification.
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D. Privilege against self-incrimination
ROGER CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE WARDEN OF THE CITY JAIL OF MANILA G.R. No. L-29169 August 19, 1968
FACTS: An information was filed against Chavez together with other accused for qualified theft of a motor vehicle for stealing a Thunderbird car together with accessories. During the trial, Fiscal Grecia (prosecution) called Chavez to become the first witness for the prosecution. The counsel of the accused opposed, saying that said order will violate his clients right against self-incrimination. Fiscal Grecia contended that Chavez will only be an ordinary witness not a state witness, thus the trial court judge favored Fiscal Grecia on the grounds that (1) the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand including the accused (2) If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose his objection and the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would incriminate him. (3) Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer questions which would incriminate him. After the trial the court freed all the defendants except Chavez. His testimony was used by the lower court to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and even branded him as a self confessed culprit. The testimony of Chavez that was used against him is as follows: He saw Lee driving the car and asked if it is for sale. Lee answered yes. Chavez met Sumilang and informed him about the car. The two went to Asistio and made a plan to capitalize on Romeo Vasquez' reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as a buyer to someone who was selling a car and, after the deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run away with the car. Asistio would then register it, sell it to a third person for a profit. Chavez known to be a car agent was included in the plan. He furnished the name of Johnson Lee who was selling his Thunderbird. Chavez arranged the meeting with Lee. They agreed on the price and went to Dy Sunk which is the registered owner of the car. Deed of sale was drawn and signed by Sumilang. At Eugene's, a man approached Sumilang with a note which stated that the money was ready at the Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the same note that the money should be brought to the restaurant. At the same time he requested Lee to exhibit the deed of sale of the car to the note bearer. The two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. The two Chinese could not locate Sumilang and Chavez. They went out to the place where the Thunderbird was parked, found that it was gone. They then immediately reported its loss to the police. Much later, the NBI recovered the already repainted car and 25
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impounded it. Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio converged that same day at Barrio Fiesta, a restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak monument in Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to Sumilang P1,000.00 cash and a golf set worth P800.00 as the latter's share in the transaction. On the 14th of November, the registration of the car was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three days later, in the name of Asistio in Caloocan. ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional right of Chavez against self incrimination was violated by the trial court. HELD: Yes. During the trial, the petitioner declined to be a witness but the judge had impliedly forced him by saying that the prosecution has the right and that his testimony will not be used against him. Chavez was enveloped by a coercive force; they deprived him of his will to resist; they foreclosed choice. With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to testify. The Court also said that there is no waiver of the privilege of the said right on the part of the accused. "To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal, and intelligently, understandably, and willingly made; such waiver following only where liberty of choice has been fully accorded. After a claim a witness cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on vague and uncertain evidence. SATURNINA GALMAN AND REYNALDO GALMAN vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE MANUEL PAMARAN AND ASSOCIATE JUSTICES AUGUSTO AMORES AND BIENVENIDO VERA CRUZ OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE HONORABLE BERNARDO FERNANDEZ, TANODBAYAN, GENERAL FABIAN C. VER, MAJOR GENERAL PROSPERO OLIVAS, SGT. PABLO MARTINEZ, SGT. TOMAS FERNANDEZ, SGT. LEONARDO MOJICA SGT. PEPITO TORIO, SGT. PROSPERO BONA AND AlC ANICETO ACUPIDO G.R. Nos. 71208-09 August 30, 1985
FACTS: In order to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the killing of Sen Aquino at MIA, PD 1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board aka the Agrava Board. The board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and testified and/or produced documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the board. Among those who testified and produced evidence before the board are the respondents in this petition.
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Galman, et. al. contended that their individual testimonies before said board should not be admitted in evidence and prayed that the same be rejected as evidence for the prosecution. However, said prayer was denied by the Sandiganbayan contending that their testimonies could not be excluded because the immunity was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their right against self-incrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board. ISSUE: Whether or not the right against self incrimination extends to testimonies given before the Agrava board, thus the testimonies given by the respondents who did not invoke their rights against selfincrimination before the Agrava Board is inadmissible in evidence. HELD: Yes. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not. If in a mere forfeiture case where only property rights were involved, "the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself" is secured in favor of the defendant, then with more reason it cannot be denied to a person facing investigation before a Fact Finding Board where his life and liberty, by reason of the statements to be given by him, hang on the balance. The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other import except to make said provision also applicable to cases other than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself" applies to the herein private respondents notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case. Immunity Statutes: 1. One which grants Use Immunity - prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. 2. One which grants Transactional Immunity - grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates. It is beyond dispute that said law belongs to the first type of immunity statutes (Use Immunity). It grants merely immunity from use of any statement given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence do not render the witness immuned from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self-incrimination. He is merely saved from the use against him of such statement and nothing more. Stated otherwise, he still runs the risk of being prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self-incrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the hallmark of due process, demands that private respondents should have been informed of their rights to remain silent and warned that any and all statements to be given by them may be used against them. This, they were denied, under the pretense that they are not entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them. The provision on self incrimination renders inadmissible any confession obtained in violation thereof. As herein earlier discussed, this exclusionary rule applies not only to confessions but also to admissions, whether made by a witness in any proceeding or by an accused in a criminal proceeding or any person under investigation for the commission of an offense.
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The Board is in truth and in fact, and to all legal intents and purposes, an entity charged, not only with the function of determining the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing, but more importantly, the determination of the person or persons criminally responsible therefore so that they may be brought before the bar of justice. The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other similar investigation of its sort, to the ascertainment and/or determination of the culprit or culprits, their consequent prosecution and ultimately, their conviction. In the course of receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify will include not merely plain witnesses but also those suspected as authors and co-participants in the tragic killing. And when suspects are summoned and called to testify and/or produce evidence, the situation is one where the person testifying or producing evidence is undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense and not merely in order to shed light on the facts and surrounding circumstances of the assassination, but more importantly, to determine the character and extent of his participation therein. This notwithstanding, Presidential Decree No. 1886 denied them the right to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or be witnesses against themselves. Section 5 of P.D. 1886 leave them no choice. They have to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or refused to do so. The jeopardy of being placed behind prison bars even before conviction dangled before their very eyes. Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves, both of which are sacrosantly enshrined and protected by our fundamental law. Both these constitutional rights to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself) were right away totally foreclosed by P.D. 1886. And yet when they so testified and produced evidence as ordered, they were not immune from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them. JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE MILLS JR., LEONARDO GAMBOA, KURT BACHMANN JR., JOSE V.E. JIMENEZ, ERNESTO CALUYA, AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN ROXAS, ELVIE CASTILLO, and CYNTHIA SABIDO LIMJAP vs. THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by and through the CHAIRMAN, HON. WIGBERTO TAADA, respondents, JOSE S. SANDEJAS G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991 FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG Case No. 35) entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, et al.", for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. The complaint said Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, acting by themselves and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their relationship, influence and connection with the latter Defendant spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and strategems to unjustly enrich themselves.
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Conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG of the Romualdez corporations were carried in various newspapers. Other newspapersdeclared that shortly after the 1986 EDSA Revolution, the Romualdez companies were sold for P5 million, without PCGG approval, to a holding company controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the Presidents brother-in-law, had effectively taken over the firm. While the said case was pending in court, then Senate Minority Floor Leader Senator Juan Ponce Enrile asked the Senate to look into the matter of the alleged acquisition of the Lopa Group of the properties of Kokoy Romualdez which is a subject of sequestration by the PCGG. Senator Enrile cited probable violations of Republic Act No. 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5. The Senate was referred to the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. The petitioners representing Ricardo Lopa who passed away prior the decision of the court issued this petition for prohibition and an issuance a temporary restraining order and/or injuctive relief enjoin the Blue Ribbon committee of compelling them to appear before them. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners may be compelled by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence before it. HELD: No. The questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of government, ordained by the Constitution. The Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both Houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. But the power of both Houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or unlimited. As provided under Art. VI, Sec. 21, the investigation must be in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against ones self. The speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The purpose of the inquiry was to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Romualdez to the Lopa group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. This matter appears to be more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.
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JUDICIAL REVIEW A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL ROBERTO LASTIMOSO, ACTING CHIEF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT (DPRM), INSPECTOR GENERAL, P/CHIEF SUPT. RAMSEY OCAMPO and P/SUPT. ELMER REJANO vs. P/SENIOR INSPECTOR JOSE J. ASAYO G.R. No. 154243 December 22, 2007 FACTS: Sometime in 1997, a certain Delia Buo (Buo) filed with the Office of the Inspector General of the PNP an administrative complaint for abuse of authority/harassment against P/Senior Inspector Jose J. Asayo. The latter allegedly obstructed police officers from arresting his brother Lamberto Asayo, one of the suspects in the shooting of Buo's son. The complaint was referred to the Inspector General for pre-charge investigation. When summoned, Asayo did not appear but filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it was the People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) which had jurisdiction over the case. On September 23, 1998, the Inspector General submitted a report to the PNP Chief recommending the commencement of summary dismissal proceedings against Asayo. Upon approval of said recommendation, the administrative complaint was referred to the PNP Legal Service for summary hearing. Asayo was asked by the hearing officer if he wanted to cross-examine Buo and her witnesses but he declined and instead agreed to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings. On December 28, 1998, the hearing officer recommended that Asayo be dismissed from police service for grave misconduct. On January 22, 1999, the PNP Chief, then Deputy Director General Roberto Lastimoso, rendered a decision dismissing respondent from police service. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the PNP Chief's Decision but withdrew the same and instead filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC). The RTC granted his petition but the CA nullified such decision. ISSUE: Whether or not Asayo failed to exhaust all administrative remedies prior to the filing of case in court. HELD: No. Asayo rightfully invoked the jurisdiction of the courts without first going through all the administrative remedies because the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of exceptions, such as when the issue involved is a purely legal question. The only issue presented by respondent in his petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC was whether or not the PNP Chief had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint filed by a private citizen against him. Said
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issue being a purely legal one, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply to the case. NOTE: However, as to the question of whether the PNP Chief had jurisdiction to act on a private citizen's complaint against respondent, the Court finds merit in petitioners' position. The PNP Chief and regional directors are vested with the power to summarily dismiss erring PNP members if any of the causes for summary dismissal enumerated in Section 42 is attendant. Thus, the power to dismiss PNP members is not only the prerogative of PLEB but concurrently exercised by the PNP Chief and regional directors.
B. Scope of Judicial Review REPUBLIC vs. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. G.R. No. 141314. November 15, 2002 FACTS: On December 23, 1993, MERALCO filed with the ERB an application for the revision of its rate schedules. The application reflected an average increase of 21 centavos per kilowatthour (kwh) in its distribution charge. The application also included a prayer for provisional approval of the increase pursuant to Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act and Section 8 of Executive Order No. 172. On January 28, 1994, the ERB issued an Order granting a provisional increase of P0.184 per kwh, subject to the following condition: In the event, however, that the Board finds, after hearing and submission by the Commission on Audit of an audit report on the books and records of the applicant that the latter is entitled to a lesser increase in rates, all excess amounts collected from the applicants customers as a result of this Order shall either be refunded to them or correspondingly credited in their favor for application to electric bills covering future consumptions. In the same Order, the ERB requested the Commission on Audit (COA) to conduct an audit and examination of the books and other records of account of the applicant for such period of time, which in no case shall be less than 12 consecutive months, as it may deem appropriate and to submit a copy thereof to the ERB immediately upon completion. On February 11, 1997, the COA submitted its Audit Report SAO No. 95-07 (the COA Report) which contained, among others, the recommendation not to include income taxes paid by MERALCO as part of its operating expenses for purposes of rate determination and the use of the net average investment method for the computation of the proportionate value of the properties used by MERALCO during the test year for the determination of the rate base.3 Subsequently, the ERB rendered its decision adopting the above recommendations and authorized MERALCO to implement a rate adjustment in the average amount of P0.017 per kwh, effective with respect to MERALCOs billing cycles beginning February 1994. The ERB further ordered that the provisional relief in the amount of P0.184 per kilowatthour granted under the Boards Order dated 31
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January 28, 1994 is hereby superseded and modified and the excess average amount of P0.167 per kilowatthour starting with [MERALCOs] billing cycles beginning February 1994 until its billing cycles beginning February 1998, be refunded to [MERALCOs] customers or correspondingly credited in their favor for future consumption. The ERB held that income tax should not be treated as operating expense as this should be borne by the stockholders who are recipients of the income or profits realized from the operation of their business hence, should not be passed on to the consumers. Further, in applying the net average investment method, the ERB adopted the recommendation of COA that in computing the rate base, only the proportionate value of the property should be included, determined in accordance with the number of months the same was actually used in service during the test year. ISSUE: Whether or not findings and conclusions of the ERB on the rate that can be charged by MERALCO to the public should be respected. HELD: Yes. Settled jurisprudence holds that factual findings of administrative bodies on technical matters within their area of expertise should be accorded not only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence even if not overwhelming or preponderant. Courts should "refrain from substituting their discretion on the weight of the evidence for the discretion of administrative agency on questions of fact and will only reverse or modify such orders of the Public Service Commission when it really appears that the evidence is insufficient to support their conclusions." In the cases at bar, findings and conclusions of the ERB on the rate that can be charged by MERALCO to the public should be respected. The function of the court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is to determine whether under the facts and circumstances, the final order entered by the administrative agency is unlawful or unreasonable.20 Thus, to the extent that the administrative agency has not been arbitrary or capricious in the exercise of its power, the timehonored principle is that courts should not interfere. The principle of separation of powers dictates that courts should hesitate to review the acts of administrative officers except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion.
BATANGAS TRANSPORTATION CO. vs. LAGUNA TRANSPORTATION CO. G.R. No. L-9185 December 27, 1958 FACTS: This is a petition for review of a decision of the Public Service Commission granting to Laguna Transportation Company three additional round trips from Pagsanjan, Laguna to Manila and another three additional round trips from Batangas Piers to Manila.
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The application for increase was opposed by Laguna Tayabas Bus Company and Batangas Transportation Company on the ground that they have already a bus service from Pagsanjan to Manila with buses starting from Pagsanjan as well as coming from the municipalities of Paete and Sta. Maria, and vice-versa, which is more than sufficient to satisfy the needs of the residents of Pagsanjan as well as of intermediate municipalities; and that the Batangas Transportation Company has likewise a bus service from Batangas Piers to Manila and vice-versa, which is also sufficient to take care of the present volume of traffic.
The Commission granted the applications. The evidence presented by the applicant, according to the Commission, shows "that passengers at Pagsanjan have a hard time in getting accommodation at Pagsanjan as the buses coming from Sta. Maria, Paete or other points farther south, are already filled up upon reaching Pagsanjan; that the residents of Pagsanjan desire to start at Pagsanjan very early in the morning so that they can arrive at Manila and transact their business early, and then return on the same day to Pagsanjan; that the buses of the applicant are already full of passengers and freight upon starting from Pagsanjan, so that the passengers are forced to wait for other trips for one hour or more.
ISSUE: Whether or not the findings of the Commission regarding the need for additional trips can be disturbed. HELD: No. It is well-settled that "Where after a full hearing the Public Utility Commissioner makes finding of fact, and there is a material conflict in the evidence, such findings will not be disturbed where they are reasonably supported by testimony" (Inchausti Steamship Co. vs. Public Utility Commissioner, 44 Phil., 363). It was also held that "Whether public necessity and convenience warrant the putting up of additional services on the part of the appellee, is a question of fact which the Public Service Commission has found in the affirmative. This finding, being supported by sufficient evidence, should not be disturbed" (Raymundo Transportation Co. vs. Cervo, 91 Phil., 313). The Court "will refrain from substituting their discretion on the weight of the evidence for the discretion of the Public Service Commission on questions of fact and will only reverse or modify such orders of the Public Service Commission when it really appears that the evidence is insufficient to support their conclusions" (Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. and Acro Taxicab Co. vs. Danon, 58 Phil., 75; See also Padua vs. Ocampo, et al., G. R. No. L-7579, September 17, 1955).
Question Subject to Judicial Review METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST Co. vs. ASB HOLDINGS, INC. G.R. No. 166197 February 27, 2007 FACTS: Metrobank is a creditor bank of respondent corporations, collectively known as the ASB Group of Companies, owner and developer of condominium and real estate projects. The loans were secured by real estate mortgages.
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ASB Group of Companies filed with the SEC a Petition For Rehabilitation With Prayer For Suspension Of Actions And Proceedings Against Petitioners, pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A, as amended. ASB Group of Companies submitted to the SEC for its approval a Rehabilitation Plan, to which Metrobank objected, specifically as to the arrangement concerning the mode of payment by respondents ASB Realty Corporation and ASB Development Corporation of their loan obligations. Under the plan, ASB will dacion the bank's equity in St. Francis Square and apply the excess dacion value on its BSA Twin Tower loan. Further, Makati Hope, Buendia cor. Malugay, 21 Annapolis (which is expected to be released by PNB) and # 28 & 23 Eisenhower St., will be dacioned to Metrobank, the excess of which will also be applied to Metrobank's exposure on BSA Twin Towers. In return, State Condominium will be freed up and placed in the ASB creditors' asset pool. Further, Metrobank shall also undertake the completion of BSA Twin Towers. The SEC Hearing Panel, finding petitioner banks objections unreasonable, approved the Rehabilitation Plan. Metrobank then filed with the SEC En Banc a Petition for Certiorari, alleging that the SEC Hearing Panel, in approving the Rehabilitation Plan, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin its implementation. Subsequently, the ASB Group of Companies filed their Opposition to the petition, to which petitioner bank filed its Reply. SEC En Banc denied petitioner banks Petition for Certiorari and affirmed the SEC Hearing Panels approval of the plan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the SEC En Banc absent any showing of arbitrariness can still be disturbed by a judicial review. HELD: No. The SEC En Banc found that the SEC Hearing Panel "acted within its legal authority in resolving this case. Neither it overstepped its lawful authority nor acted whimsically in approving the Rehabilitation Plan. Hence, it cannot be faulted of grave abuse of discretion. The Court said that it found no reason to disturb such finding, it being a fundamental rule that factual findings of quasijudicial agencies, like the SEC, which have acquired expertise as their jurisdiction is confined to special matters such as the subject of this case, are generally accorded great respect and even finality, absent any showing that they arbitrarily disregarded evidence or misapprehended evidence to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion if such evidence had been properly appreciated.
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Appeal to the Office of the President LAND CAR vs. BACHELOR EXPRESS, INC. G.R. No. 154377 : December 8, 2003 FACTS: On 21 May 1999, Land Car filed with the Regional Office of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB), Region XII, a verified application to operate a public utility bus service from Davao City to Cagayan de Oro City via Butuan City. Bachelor Express and Vallacar Transit, themselves grantees of certificates of public convenience, opposed petitioners application alleging that the route applied for was sufficiently being served by them, and that cutthroat competition would only result if petitioners application were to be favorably acted upon. On 29 October 1999, the LTFRB rendered its decision granting petitioners application and directing the issuance of the corresponding Certificate of Public Convenience. Bachelor and Vallacar then appealed to the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), where in the DOTC Secretary reversed the decision of the LTFRB. After denial of MR, the respondents thereupon moved for the immediate implementation by the LTFRB of the decision of the DOTC Secretary. On 03 October 2000, the LTFRB granted respondents motion and directed petitioner to cease and desist from operating its buses along the contested route. On 07 October 2000, Land Car filed a letter-appeal to the Office of the President seeking to set aside the resolution and order of the DOTC Secretary. It then likewise filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari questioning the same resolution and order of the DOTC Secretary subject of the letter-appeal addressed to the Office of the President. Upon advice of its new counsel, however, petitioner filed a notice of withdrawal of its petition for certiorari pending with the appellate court. The CA dismissed the said petition. On 20 October 2000, the Office of the President issued a memorandum directing that the execution of the resolution and order of the DOTC Secretary, be meanwhile stayed. On 15 January 2001, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed C.A.-G.R. SP No. 62619, assailing the Memorandum Order of the Office of the President. Respondents argued that the Office of the President had no jurisdiction to issue the assailed order in the absence of any law providing for an appeal from the DOTC to the Office of the President. ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the President has the power to review the final determination of matters of the DOTC. HELD: Yes. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies empowers the Office of the President to review any determination or disposition of a department head. The doctrine allows, indeed requires, an administrative decision to first be appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review. Thus, if a remedy within the 35
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administrative machinery can still be had by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on the matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be priorly exhausted before the courts judicial power is invoked. The CA correctly ruled that the action of a department head bears only the implied approval of the President, and the latter is not precluded from exercising the power to review the decision of the former pursuant to the Presidents power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. The Office of the President validly acquired jurisdiction over the case upon the filing therewith of the appeal by herein petitioner, and said jurisdiction is not lost by the subsequent recourse by the petitioner of the certiorari proceedings before the Court of Appeals. Jurisdiction which has attached in the first instance continues until the final resolution of the case. Incongruently, the appellate court, while recognizing to be valid the exercise of jurisdiction by the Office of the President, ordered the dismissal of the appeal pending with the said office based on forum shopping.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM vs. UY G.R. No. 169277 February 9, 2007 FACTS: Dr. Vicente K. Uy, Wellington K. Ong, Jaime Chua, and Daniel Sy, among others, are owners of a 349.9996-ha parcel of land located in Barangay Camaflora, Barrio of San Andres, Municipality of San Narciso, Province of Quezon. The property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 160988. Sometime in 1993, some 44 farmers who occupied portions of the property filed petitions in the DAR, seeking to be declared as owners- beneficiaries. The DAR issued a Notice of Coverage under the CARP over the property. For his part, respondent, in behalf of the co-owners, filed an Application for Exclusion in the form of a letter, through Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) Durante L. Ubeda. To substantiate his request to exclude their landholding from CARP coverage under the Luz Farms ruling, respondent declared that their property had been exclusively used for livestock-raising for several years prior to June 15, 1988. The Provincial Task Force on Exclusion led by Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Belen T. Babalcon conducted an ocular inspection of the property and an actual headcount was conducted. PARO Durante L. Ubeda recommended the exclusion from CARP coverage a total of 219.50 has: 134 has. for cattle-grazing, 28 has. for horse and carabao grazing, 12.5 has. for infrastructure and 45 has. for retention of nine landowners. The applicants, through Uy, wrote a letter to DAR Region IV Director Percival C. Dalugdug requesting for a reinvestigation of the Report of PARO Ubeda. Dir. Daludug affirmed the findings of Ubeda. The applicants then appealed the order to the DAR Secretary. The DAR partially granted the appeal only with respect with the 219.50 hectares. The applicants appealed the order to the OP via an Appeal with Prayer for Status Quo/Stay of Execution. The President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona rendered a 36
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decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit, saying that private agricultural lands or portions thereof exclusively, directly and actually used for livestock, poultry and swine raising as of 15 June 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of CARP. Corona said By simple reading, it is obvious that the livestock, poultry and swine, in order to be included in the computation of the area to be exempted from CARP coverage, should have been existing in the area sought to be exempted at the time of the effectivity of RA 6657, which is June 15, 1988. However, on October 5, 1998, then Chief Presidential Legal Adviser Harriet Demetriou submitted the following Memorandum to the President, advising the latter to exclude the land in question completely. A second motion for reconsideration was filed and the OP acted upon the said MR. ISSUE: Whether or not the OP is empowered to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed before it. HELD: Yes. It is settled that rules of procedure are, as a matter of course, construed liberally in proceedings before administrative bodies. Thus, technical rules of procedure imposed in judicial proceedings are unavailing in cases before administrative bodies. Administrative bodies are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in the courts of law. Rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical manner, as they are used only to help secure and not to override substantial justice. The SC ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies empowers the OP to review any determination or disposition of a department head. In fact, the doctrine requires an administrative decision to first be appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review. Thus, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be had by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on the matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be priorly exhausted before the court's judicial power is invoked.
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Administrative Law Digests Atty. Arreza

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Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N.

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

D. Privilege against self-incrimination

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

JUDICIAL REVIEW A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel

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