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Contending paradigms of
Indian history: Did India lack
historical agency?
SHIVAJI SINH
ICIH2009
jointly organized by
Indic Studies Foundation, California &
ABISY, New Delhi
at
India International Center, New Delhi
Jan. 9-11, 2009
Distinguished Scholars, Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am immensely grateful to the organizers of this
International Conference on Indian History, particularly to its
convener Dr. Kosla Vepa, for the great trust they have
reposed in me by inviting me to chair this conference. Except
for single-mindedly devoting myself to Indian historical
studies for the last over half a century, I have done little to
deserve this honour. May be, behind this gesture of goodwill
is a generous urge, so I think, to recognize the work of Akhila
Bh€rat…ya Itih€sa Samkalana Yojan€ (ABISY) of which I have
the privilege to be the National President. With limited
resources at hand, but branches in almost every district of
India, the ABISY is trying its best to collect and synthesize
historical and socio-cultural data from every nook and corner
of the country; and this, you will agree, I hope, is something
creditable.
As you all know, history is indeed very important. As
a major portion of collective social memory and as a
significant segment of effective social psyche, history acts as a
vehicle of culture and civilization from generation to
generation. History of a people shapes and defines the
people's social identity. It invariably provides lessons to learn
from past experiences, and acts as a source of morale in times
of distress. This is why a continued presence of a positive
historical consciousness is considered to be essential for any
living and vibrant society.
Unfortunately, however, today in India history is
unable to play its expected useful role of keeping the people
emotionally integrated, and psychologically buoyant and
proud of their heritage. Instead, it is fast turning to be
perilous - a major source of division and discard, an
unnecessary burden on memory, and an impediment to
progress. This is because there have come into existence
several versions of Indian history that contradict each other
creating great confusion. History is admittedly an established
discipline, but the world of Indian historical discourse has
become so chaotic today that it would be a travesty of terms
to call it a discipline.
How did the history of India come to such a chaotic
condition? And, is there any way out of this mess? These two
questions are, I think, the most important ones demanding
immediate attention of all scholars who care for the discipline
called history and believe in its usefulness to society.
Let us have a broad look on the early history of
history in India.1
The antiquity and pre-modern stages of Indian historical
tradition
Ancient Indians had a sense of history and historical
tradition that goes back to the Rigvedic times. The ¬igveda
evidences the presence of three literary genres of historical
nature: royal and priestly eulogies, g€th€s, and n€r€aˆs…s -
all prevalent in those days, like the iks, in oral form
constituting a floating mass of literature. A verse of the
2 3
¬igveda (IX.10.3) clearly states that kings are graced (añjate)
with eulogies (praastibhiƒ). Several d€nastutis (hymns
composed in praise of liberalities shown by kings to their
priests) also tend to take the form of eulogies. Eulogies were
composed for priestly families too. ¬igveda VII.33 is an
eulogy of the Vasish˜has. ¬igveda III.33, which is a dialogue
between Viv€mitra and the rivers Vip€ (Beas) and ®utudr…
(Sutlej), is rightly taken by some scholars to be an eulogistic
anecdote of the Viv€mitras.
The term 'g€th€', in the ¬igveda, normally means
'song', but it gradually develops a more special sense in later
portions of the text and stands for songs of historical or
legendary content.2 The word 'N€r€aˆsa', from which
N€r€aˆs… is derived, denotes according to Y€ska 'praises
celebrating men' (Yena nar€ƒ praasyante sa n€r€aˆso
mantraƒ. Nirukta IX.9). The difference between g€th€s and
n€r€aˆs…s was that while a g€th€ could relate to human as
well as non-human beings (as in Indra-g€th€, Yajña-g€th€,
etc.), the n€r€aˆs…s pertained only to human beings.
In the later Vedic age, three new forms of historical
narratives also came into existence. They were: škhy€na,
Itih€sa and Pur€Ša. škhy€na literally means 'the
communication of a previous event'3. Composed in the form
of short historical episodes, škhy€nas had become quite
popular in the later Vedic times. The Aitareya Br€hmaŠa
(III.25.1) refers to škhy€na-vids (a class of literary men who
had specialized in škhy€na literature).
The word 'Itih€sa', literally means 'verily thus it
happened'. It appears probably for the first time in the
Atharvaveda (XV.6.4) but becomes very prevalent in the later
Vedic period itself. It repeatedly occurs in several Br€hmaŠas
such as the ®atapatha, Jaimin…ya, Gopatha, etc. Before the
term 'Itih€sa' acquired a broader sense of all forms of
historical narratives, including even law and administration,
as in Kau˜ilya's Artha€stra (I.5), it denoted only Pur€vittam
(history in the narrow sense of the term). This, as V. S.
Pathak rightly points out, is implied by the Nirukta (X.26)
and explicitly stated by the Bihaddevat€ (IV.46)4. That, a
distinction was made between Itih€sa and škhy€na, is also
attested to by the ®atapatha Br€hmaŠa (XI.1.6.9) wherein it is
told that Daiv€suram (the war between Devas and Asuras) is
related partly as škhy€na and partly as Itih€sa.
The term 'Pur€Ša', according to its etymology as
provided by the V€yu Pur€Ša, means 'that which lives from
ancient times' (yasm€tpur€ hyanat…dam Pur€Šam, V€yu P.,
I.203). As a form of legendary lore, Pur€Šas may have existed
from pre-Vedic period, that is, from times of antiquity even
prior to the composition of Rigvedic mantras. The
Atharvaveda (XI.7.24) refers to Pur€Šam along with ¬ichaƒ
(mantras), S€m€ni (chants), Yajush€ (formulae) and
Chhand€nsi (meters) indicating, thereby, that Pur€Ša was
fully recognized as a distinct literary category by its time. By
the time of the Chh€ndogya Upanishad, Pur€Ša definitely
denoted actual book or books (Chh€ndogya Up. VII.1.2).
According to A. D. Pusalker, a well-known scholar in the
field of Epic and Pur€Šic studies, "in the later Vedic Age,
Itih€sa preponderated over Pur€Ša, but gradually the latter
asserted itself"5.
By the close of the Vedic period, we meet with two
additional genres of historical compositions. They are known
as Vaˆas and škhy€yik€s. Literally meaning 'lineages', the
4 5
Vaˆas focus our attention on genealogies rather than on
history as such. A further development of this species of
literature is indicated by the distinction made between Vaˆa
and Vaˆ€nucharita, the former relating to the genealogy of
gods and ishis and the latter pertaining to the sequence of
dynasties. Both Vaˆas and Vaˆ€nucharitas were later
assimilated in the Pur€Šas. They were taken to constitute two
of the five characteristic features (Pañcha-lakshaŠas) of an
ideal Pur€Ša. škhy€yik€s denoted shorter škhy€nas. Both
škhy€yik€s and škhy€nas were later liberally utilized to swell
from time to time the body of the Mah€bh€rata as also of the
R€m€yaŠa, the two most well-known ancient Indian Itih€sa
works.
The early medieval period witnessed a further
flowering of Indian historical tradition. Several historical
works such as B€Ša Bha˜˜a’s Harsha-Charita, BilhaŠa’s
Vikram€nkdeva-Charita, and Jay€naka’s Pithv…r€ja-Vijaya,
etc., were written in this period by historians mostly attached
to royal courts. Persons of royal blood too, even if rarely,
distinguished themselves as a historian. Somevar III
Bh™lokamalla, the son and successor of Vikram€ditya VI of
the Ch€lukya dynasty of Kaly€Š…, is an example. Known
mainly for his famous work M€nasoll€sa, he had also written
a biography of his father entitled Vikram€‰k€bhyudaya.
The Indian historical tradition, thus, continued to
develop and proliferate unabated during several millennia
from its beginnings in Rigvedic times down to the end of the
medieval period. As a result, such a rich and huge mass of
historical literature came into existence that one could not
possibly adequately describe it without classifying it into
some sort of categories. Attempts have been made to classify
it according to its sources (like Vedic, Buddhist and Jain) or
in accordance with its chronology and provenance. However,
all such efforts present difficulties for Indian historical
tradition is one-piece, a 'whole' that cannot be segmented into
parts. Even A. K. Warder, who assumes that Indian
historiography becomes increasingly regional during the
medieval period, admits that "it (always) derives from the
universal ancient paur€Šika history".6
Why is Indian historical tradition so unique? Where is
its wholeness derived from? Let us find out.
Uniqueness and wholeness of the Indian historical tradition
A characteristic feature of Indian tradition, that has
played the central role in shaping its historical paradigm, is
acceptance of the existence of an Ultimate Reality or Essence
of which ‘¬ita’, ‘Satya’ and ‘Dharma’ are respectively the
mental perception, verbal expression and practical
application. In Indian tradition, therefore, historical events
and processes are judged in the light of their conformity with
¬ita, Satya and Dharma, the three modes of the Ultimate
Reality.
Let me explain this feature a bit more. The
cornerstone of Indian traditional value-system is the concept
called ¬ita. It is difficult to find a concept equivalent to it in
any other language or society. Its renderings in English as
'Eternal Order' or 'Cosmic Order' are inadequate. The ancient
Greek vocable 'anagki' and the ancient Chinese term 'tao'
appear to resemble the word ¬ita in meaning, but they too
fail to fully express its connotation. The concepts 'Lex
naturalis' and 'archetype' of Western thought are comparable
but not equivalent in conception to ‘¬ita’. In fact, in time-
6 7
span ‘¬ita’ is eternal, in its expanse it is cosmic, and by nature
it is proper, true, divine, pious, religious, perfect, glorious,
and noble all rolled into one.
It is also worth noting that ¬ita, Satya, and Dharma
are not different entities. They are three modes of the same
Reality. Commenting on ¬igveda 10.190.1, S€yaŠa clearly
states that ¬ita is another name of Satya (¬itamiti Satyan€m).
¬ita is the mental perception of the Reality (¬itam m€nasam
yath€rthasa‰kalpanam), and Satya is the verbal expression of
that Reality (Satyam v€chikam yath€rthabh€shaŠam). In the
motto: Satyamevajayate n€nitam (MuŠaka Upanishad, 3.1.6)
Anita is placed in opposition to Satya which also confirms
the identity of ¬ita and Satya. As ¬ita and Satya are identical,
Satya and Dharma too are one and the same entity. "Verily,
that which is Dharma is Satya" (yo vai sa Darmaƒ Satyam
vai), confirms the Bihad€raŠyak Upanishad (1.4.14). When
the Reality transforms itself from mental perception and
verbal expression into practical application it is called
Dharma.
Events and processes that constitute the subject
matter of history consist basically of human activities
performed through Mana (thinking), Vachana (speaking) and
Karma (acting). According to Indian value-system,
perceptions, statements and actions are right only to the
extent they conform to ¬ita, Satya and Dharma respectively.
Ultimate Reality or Essence in its three modes, thus, is the
standard by which all human actions and activities, that is to
say, entire history is to be judged or evaluated.
It is this concern for Satya (truth), a mode of ¬ita and
Dharma, that compels KalhaŠa, the author of the
Rajatara‰giŠ…, to unequivocally emphasize the importance of puerile, its poetry uninspired, its religion grotesque and its
objectivity in historical interpretations. "That man of quality ethics barbarous".7
alone is praiseworthy", says he, "who is above (the feelings
Most of these myths have been exploded and the ones
of) love and hatred and whose intellect remains steady while
remaining are in the process of meeting the same fate, despite
relating the meaning of (the facts of) the past".
the efforts of the intellectuals who still uphold the colonial
paradigm and try to redefine and reproduce the myths in a
®l€ghyaƒ sa eva guŠav€na r€gadveshabahishkitaƒ,
new jargon. However, the myth according to which ancient
Bh™t€rthakathane yasya stheyasyeva Sarasvat….
Indians had no sense of history may be said, in a sense, to be
(R€jatara‰giŠ…, 1.7)
a 'superb' myth of a sort for it continues and it continues as a
commonplace view!
A 'superb' colonial myth: Ancient Indians lacked the sense of
history The origin of the myth is traced back to German
philosopher G.W.F Hegel (1770-1831) and his Euro-
The colonial era of Indian history was an era of
centrism. Hegel is on record to have stated: "India not only
historical myth-making. Innumerable myths were created and
has old books of religion and brilliant works of poetry but
propagated to falsify history with a view to change Indian
also old codes of law ... and yet it has no history".8 He indeed
psyche and denationalize Indian identity. The Aryans
suffered from Euro-centrism, a bias shared by many scholars
constituted a race of people culturally backward and
of the colonial era. Rajeev Malhotra has exhaustively quoted
barbarous but physically vigorous and bellicose! They were
from his writings to demonstrate Hegel's Euro-centrism.9 I
the sole possessor of horses and horse-drawn chariots that
would like to add that Hegel was still more parochial in his
provided them superior maneuverability in battles against
outlook for he takes the Mediterranean region, not Europe as
their enemies! They invaded India, destroyed the Indus cities
a whole, to be the pivot of historical transformations. In fact,
and drove away their occupants, the Dravidians, to South
it was partly his peculiar metaphysic and his obsession with
India! Indian people had always been ruled by despotic and
thesis-antithesis-synthesis dialectic and largely his ignorance
tyrannical rulers! The Indian society was static; it remained
of ancient Indian literature that came in his way of
substantially unchanged throughout its long span of
recognizing the age-old Indian historical tradition. Be that as
existence until the arrival of the British! The root cause of
it may, his metaphysic and his dialectic are long since
India's backwardness was its (Hindu) religion! India as a
discredited. Years ago, Bertrand Russell had rightly observed:
concept never existed till the British imperialists invented it!
So on and so forth; the list of colonial myths is endless.
"I cannot see any justification, on the basis of his
Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan succinctly puts it: "The West tried [Hegel's] own metaphysic, for the view that world
its best to persuade India that its philosophy is absurd, its art history repeats the transitions of the dialectic, yet that is
the thesis which he developed in his Philosophy of

8 9
 History. It was an interesting thesis, giving unity and
meaning to the revolutions of human affairs. Like other
historical theories, it required, if it was to be made
plausible, some distortions of facts and considerable
ignorance. Hegel, like Marx, and Spengler after him,
possessed both these qualifications. It is odd that a
process which is represented as cosmic should all have
taken place on our planet, and most of it near the
Mediterranean. Nor is there any reason, if reality is
timeless, why the latter part of the process should
embody higher categories than their earlier parts --
unless one were to adopt the blasphemous supposition
that the Universe was gradually learning Hegel's
philosophy.10
Myths have their own life-time, their own duration of
existence. And, when, as in the present case, a myth is
created by an eminent philosopher like Hegel, whose
influence by the end of the nineteenth century had made
most of the intellectuals of America and England largely
Hegelian, it has got to last long. But, the real reason for its
longevity lies in British colonial interests in India that wanted
to show that the Indians were backward living in prehistory
and so in dire need of foreign help to modernize and begin
history. The rest of the story as to how the Colonial Power
launched on a major project of creating 'a class of persons
Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions,
words and intellect' is too well-known to be repeated here.
Writing years after Independence, A. K. Warder notes:
"The standard imperialist version of Indian history,
worked out during the colonial period, is now, most
remarkably, taken for granted among modern Indian
historians of almost all persuasions, not least among
them the 'Marxists' (who in this respect remain
10
Hegelians; S. A. Dange is an honourable exception), as
well as among academic historians in all other countries,
again regardless of political persuasions."11
In fact, as it is said, one can recognize a cat only if
he/she has a picture of a cat in mind, a mental model or an
idea of the cat, so to say. The history taught in the colonial
era infused in the minds of Indians the modern idea of
history which is European in origin. This idea of history had
sprouted in Graeco-Roman tradition and developed under the
shadow of the 18th century European Enlightenment. It is
very much different from the ancient Indian indigenous sense
of history, known as Itih€sa, that had originated and
developed in ancient Indian philosophic-cultural context.
History, as we know, 'develops in close juxtaposition and
with constant interactions of associated scheme of ideas'.
Since, the formations of the ancient Indian sense of history
and the modern European idea of history had occurred in
different cultural-intellectual environments, it was natural
that they differed in their tone and tenor and more
particularly in their ethos. As people allover the world,
including India, have at present the modern idea of history in
their minds, they fail to recognize ancient Indian historical
tradition or recognize it only to the extent to which it
anticipates the modern view.
Comparing the ancient Indian and modern ideas of history
and their validity
Despite the fact that the modern idea of history is now
globally accepted and the indigenous Indian sense of history
is rarely shared by historians even in India, it would be
worthwhile, I believe, to compare the two concepts of history
11
and judge their validity purely from an epistemological point
of view.
One significant difference between the two is that
while ancient Indian indigenous history, called Itih€sa, aimed
at man's self-fulfillment and self-realization, the history
current today has either only vague objectives like
furtherance of freedom, rationalism and individualism or a
hidden agenda to support this or that political ideology. The
other important difference is that while Itih€sa interpreted
historical change in terms of reasons, not causes, current
history, under the impact of positivism and other modern
concepts, emphasizes causality and value-neutrality.
Now, a point to ponder: Is the notion of causal
explanation, in which explanation is based on antecedent
causes and conditions, applicable to history? I doubt it. The
central concept of history, it must be noted, is action, not
behaviour. 'Behaviour is a quasi-physicalistic, physiological
and infra-rational category.' Action, on the other hand, is 'a
purposive, goal-oriented activity or conduct.'12 A human
action may be reasonable or unreasonable, right or wrong,
just or unjust and the like, but it can be interpreted only in
terms of its reasons, not causes. 'Intentions, purposes and
motives do not ‘cause’ actions, for, firstly, they are not
identifiable separately from them, and secondly, they are
semantically related to them.'13
And, what about the doctrine of value-neutrality, the
other postulate involved in modern idea of history? The
notion of value-fact dichotomy is totally wrong. Of course,
there is a distinction between fact and value, between
descriptive and prescriptive, between ‘is’ and ‘aught’, but it is
12
a distinction without dichotomy. Facts and values are the two
modes of the same reality. 'Facts qua facts do not exist. What
appears to be a purely factual statement contains an implicit
evaluation. A fact can only be understood in terms of a
corresponding norm.'14
Thus, we see that even from a purely epistemological
point of view, the modern idea of history is inadequate. In
traditional Indian history, on the other hand, value-fact
dichotomy is not accepted. Historical events and processes
are judged, as I have discussed above, on the basis of their
conformity with ¬ita, Satya and Dharma, the three modes of
the Ultimate Reality or Essence.
Confusion in contemporary Indian historical discourse
Indian historical discourse is in a state of chaotic
confusion and disarray today. Several paradigms of Indian
history are endlessly contending with each other for their
justification and supremacy. As a result, we have several
versions of Indian history current simultaneously. An
impartial person willing to know something about India's
past is in a fix, unable to decide as to which one is a
trustworthy version. In such a situation, the very utility of
history for society is becoming doubtful.
Until recently, books on historiography described only
three paradigms of Indian history: Imperialist, Nationalist,
and Marxist. Today we have at least as many more. The
colonial era is long since over, but the imperialist paradigm is
continuing, albeit it is now called 'Western Elitist'. The
Marxist paradigm is still alive despite the fall of Marxism. It is
now more generally known as 'Secular Marxist'. The
Nationalist paradigm has tremendously refined its historical
13
models making them more and more scientific. However, it
has been mysteriously renamed as 'Hindu Nationalist'!
Among the new ones, the most well-know is the
Subaltern paradigm. It emerged in 1980s inspired mostly by
Eric Stokes' historical writings.15 It started with the basic
assumption that history contains many more complexities
and paradoxes than what the 'monolithic and dogmatic
reconstructions of the past' have revealed so far. It has
apparently borrowed ideas and terminology from Italian
philosopher and political theorist Antonio Gramsci
(including the term 'subaltern' itself) but given them a new
context and meaning. Although there is no umbilical cord
connecting Subalternists and Marxists, who are in fact very
much critical of each other, the elite versus subaltern theme
is modeled more or less after the Marxist bourgeoisie versus
proletariat. In my view, however, the subaltern paradigm of
history in Indian context is a reflection of a larger ongoing
literary movement fostering identity politics of the left-
behind sections of the Indian society or what is termed as the
marginalized social groups. In Hindi literature, it goes by
such names as Dalita Vimarsha and N€r… Vimarsha.16
The upholders of this postmodern historical paradigm
analyze contemporary Indian historiography in two
categories: neo-colonialist and neo-nationalist. They are
critical of both the categories for they find that both share an
elitist perspective that wrongly paints the significant role and
contributions of the subaltern groups as a mere response to
an elite inspiration, influence or guidance. Elitist
historiography, according to them, 'renders invisible the
quotidian experience of ordinary people'. They, therefore,
plead for extending the historical narrative in scope "not only
14
to make room for the pasts of the so-called peoples without
history but to address the historicality of everyday life as
well."17 However, had it been only a question of extending
the scope of historical narrative, it would not have been a
matter of concern. But, of late, Subalternists have started
rejecting what they call "the imagined-into-reality framework
of the Indian nation"18 and raising several other such
alarming theoretical issues.
Another paradigm newly emerging in Indian historical
discourse is inspired by the 'Annales School'. Founded a
century ago by French historians, this school has been quite
influential in setting the agenda for historiography not only
in France but in other countries as well, particularly in Italy,
Poland and Venezuela. Although it has maintained its leftist
leaning all along, its focus has been shifting from time to
time. At one time it gave serious attention to the role of
mentalities in history, linking them with changing social
conditions, but now that has been almost given up. However,
taking a long-term view of history, emphasizing social rather
than political issues, a concern for marginalized peoples, wide
range of interests and differing methods of approach may be
said to be the hallmark of the Annales School. The Annales
School's approach to history has started influencing Indian
historians. Harbans Mukhia of JNU, Delhi, who has edited
(jointly with Maurice Aymard of Maison des Sciences de
l'Homme, Paris) two volumes on French studies in history, is,
to my knowledge, perhaps the most vocal admirer of the
Annales School. S. Settar's books Inviting Death (New York:
Brill, 1988) and Pursuing Death (Dharwad: Institute of Art
History, Karnatak University, 1990) too have an Annales'
imprint although not acknowledged openly.
15
 The 'Deconstructionist', though not a paradigm in the
technical sense of the term19, is yet another postmodern and
post-structuralist historical 'consciousness' that has added to
the current complexity and confusion in Indian historical
discourse. Its roots go back to a school of philosophy that
originated in France in late 1960s mainly through the
writings of its chief proponent Jacques Derrida. Derrida's
stand is based on two of his basic perceptions: one,
dichotomous categories such as mind/body, sacred/profane,
signifier/signified, etc., that are generally accepted and used
by philosophers and other scholars in their expositions, are
arbitrary; and the other, all such expositions contain implicit
hierarchies that impose a sort of order on realty
subordinating, partly hiding and even totally excluding from
our view many of its aspects. His intellectual efforts were
mostly aimed at exposing and challenging these dichotomies
and hierarchies that come in our way of a proper
understanding of reality. 'Deconstruction' is the designation
Derrida gave to his efforts in this direction and to the
procedure he adopted in making them.
Although the deconstructionists coming after Derrida
have sufficiently modified and refined the methods of
deconstruction, the aim of its application in historical
analysis remains the same. Looking in a broader perspective,
it may be said that they have, in fact, brought into sharp focus
the old problem of the extent of correspondence - or rather,
isomorphism or one-to-one correspondence - between
historical reality (history as it happened in some space-time
context) and the written history (constructed or
reconstructed by the historian). They do not deny the
existence of historical reality, which nobody can do, but in
16
tune with the spirit of the postmodern age, they challenge
"the old modernist certainties of historical truth and
methodological objectivity, as applied by disinterested
historians"20. They raise questions about the legitimacy of
empiricism in constituting history as a separate epistemology
(that is, a special form of knowledge) as also about the role
and use of historian’s theoretical and explanatory frameworks
in historical understanding.
The confusion is worse confounded since all these
different historical paradigms are current simultaneously.
What David Harlan observes in reference to postmodern
American historiography is equally, if not more, true in
context of contemporary Indian historiography: "If we ask,
'what is historical writing?' the answer can only be 'there is
this kind of historical writing, and that kind, and then again
that kind."21 The greatest problem before a student of Indian
history today is to cope with such a situation. Shall the
concept of validity become altogether irrelevant to history? Is
there any way out of this dilemma? I believe that there is one,
and now I come to that.
A basic knowledge of Indian psyche essential for
understanding Indian history
Long ago, in his famous book: The Idea of History,
published posthumously in 1946, R. G. Collingwood (1889-
1943) had stated that to know the past the historian must re-
enact it in his own mind. He tried to explain his point by
several examples. For instance, he said, suppose an historian
has certain edict of an emperor before him. 'Merely reading
the words and being able to translate them', said he, 'does not
amount to knowing their historical significance. In order to
17
do that he must envisage the situation with which the
emperor was trying to deal, and he must envisage it as that
emperor envisaged it' (emphasis added).22 His statement, as
expected, invited several objections. It was argued, for
instance, that "an act of thought by becoming subjective
ceases to be objective, and thus, by becoming present ceases
to be past."23 Collingwood continued to answer the
objections throughout his life and although he could not
satisfy the objectors, he succeeded in making out an
important point: an action can be judged properly only in the
light of the thoughts and intentions leading to it.
Can anybody judge history, which consists mostly of
individual and social actions, without knowing the thoughts
and intentions of the historical actor or actors concerned?
The answer is unequivocal: one cannot. Despite differences in
historical orientations and paradigms scholars in general are
unanimous on this point. Thus, Alum Munslow, even though
far from Collingwood in time, space and historical
perceptions, echoes the same feeling. "The most basic
function of the historian", writes he, "is to understand, and
explain in a written form, the connections between events
and human intention or agency in the past."24 It follows,
then, that Indian history cannot be understood and explained
without a basic knowledge of the specific structure or rather
architecture of Indian psyche, the fountain of all sorts of
intentions commonly shared by Indians.
The two most important 'building blocks' of this
architecture are Bharatiya Chitta and Mana, that have shaped
the psyche of a common Indian, the fundamental source of all
his thoughts, intentions and actions. Chitta and Mana are not
one and the same in connotation25 although both are
18
generally rendered as psyche in English. They must not be
confused with what the Annalistes designate as 'mentality'
too. These are characteristically Indian concepts. For
understanding them, we must begin with the Indian notion of
'AntaƒakaraŠa' or inner consciousness, the human faculty
that deals with almost all non-tangible matters. AntaƒakaraŠa
is said to have four constituent parts (together known as
AntaƒakaraŠa-Chatush˜aya). They are Mana, Chitta, Buddhi
and Aha‰k€ra related to each other in a hierarchical order.
The most potent of the four is Aha‰k€ra (self-
awareness), the sense of being, the consciousness that 'I am'
or 'I exist' (in Sanskrit 'asmi' from which the term 'asmit€'
meaning identity is derived).26 Ordinarily a person perceives
his self-consciousness in terms of his physical and social
being, and identifies his self with his body (deh€tma-buddhi).
This is an instinctive human tendency present everywhere
and in all ages. But, then, there is an ideal of self-awareness
too, 'which men accept, as distinct from their actual and
habitual self-awareness', and which is 'generally derived from
the cultural tradition to which they belong and varies
accordingly.'27 In Indian tradition individual self is taken to
be non-different from the Essence or Ultimate Reality. This
Ultimate Reality is described by many names like Brahma,
Ÿvara, Param€tm€, etc., and worshiped as Godhead under
various denominations. In essence it is ever-present (Sat),
pure consciousness (Chit) and limitless bliss (šnanda). Being
part of the Ultimate Reality, the individual self too shares all
the three attributes. It is deathless28, but bonded by the body
and Aha‰k€ra, its consciousness is diluted and bliss
jeopardized. The diluted consciousness is called Chitta as
against pure consciousness which is Chit.
19
 Both chit and chitta are derived from a basic concept
chiti and all these terms go back to Rigvedic times. Although
the concept is living in Indian tradition as attested to by the
popularity of a large number of names like Chidambara,
Chinmaya, Chid€k€a, Sachchid€nanda, etc., very little work
has been done on this significant cluster of concepts. To my
knowledge, Deendayal Upadhyaya is the first thinker who has
repeatedly drawn our attention to the concept of chiti.29
Fortunately, now some institutions like the Research and
Development Foundation for Integral Humanism and
Deendayal Shodh Sansthan are making commendable efforts
in properly explaining chiti and related concepts.30
Mana is also an old Rigvedic concept. While the
function of Chitta is reflection, that of Mana is paying
attention. Chitta is more powerful than Mana and if Mana
finds something pleasurable or desirable Chitta often takes it
over from Mana. However, the most important point to be
noted is that a considerable part of Chitta and Mana, as also
of Aha‰k€ra and Buddhi, is determined by the geo-cultural
environment in which it develops, although since human
being is a human being, different from other zoological
beings, a portion of his AntaƒakaraŠa-Chatush˜aya ever
remains universal as well.
Indian history stands distorted badly because the so-
called 'motivated' and 'committed' historians have been
intentionally distorting it continuously since the colonial
times to foster their political, religious or other ideological
interests. This is beyond doubt and by now well-known. But
what is not so well-realized is the fact that even those
historians who cannot be categorized as 'motivated' or
'committed' have brought in considerable aberration in
20
Indian history because being ignorant of Indian psyche they
have failed to recognize connections between events and
human intention or agency in pre-modern Indian history.
Judging Indian history from a wrong angle: A few
illustrations
The Aryans31 were a "non-urbanized people and semi-
barbarous" who destroyed the non-Aryan Harappan
Civilization.32 and "the ¬igveda is the epic of destruction of
one of the great cultures of the ancient world".33 This is the
view adopted and expressed in the prestigious UNESCO
publication entitled History of Mankind, Vol. 1. One may not
wonder on the assertion of the Aryan Invasion Theory in this
volume for it was published at a time when that theory was
accepted as a Gospel truth. But it is certainly surprising to
hear that the early Vedic people were 'semi-barbarous' people.
Can anybody degrade a people as semi-barbarous who have
the honour of bequeathing to posterity a literary composition
like the ¬igveda considered to be one of the earliest, if not the
earliest, human achievement of its kind, and which contains
high philosophical thoughts of several enlightened souls like
¬ishi D…rghatamas?
The reason for this anomaly lies in application of a
totally alien-to-Indian-psyche definition of 'civilization' in
Indian history. This definition, still prevalent among
historians and archaeologists, does not entitle non-urban
peoples like the Vedic šryas (who were erroneously
supposed to be merely a village folk) to be called
civilized. The definition is based on a materialist conception
of history. It was initially suggested by Lewis H. Morgan in
1877 in his book: Ancient Society, or Researches in the Lines of
21
Human Progress from Savagery through Barbarism to
Civilization. Frederick Engels adopted this definition in his
famous essay: 'The Origin of the Family, Private Property and
the State', written in German which appeared in Zurich in
1884, wherefrom it was applied in the fields of archaeology
and history by V. G. Childe. The definition is defective in
several respects, but we need not elaborate the points here.
Suffice it to say that a definition given from a particular view-
point cannot hold good for others who do not accept that
point of view.
Many more examples can be cited in which outlandish
concepts, totally unfit for Indian historical circumstances,
have been unduly inserted in Indian historical discourse. But,
instead of listing them I would like to draw your attention to
another type of unwarranted imposition on Indian history
pertaining not to concepts used in it but to its very structure.
The structure of any historical narrative depends
mainly on its periodization and a proper periodization must
indicate the major turns and twists in the spirit of the people
concerned, that is, the people whose history we are
considering. But, as we know, the periodization of Indian
history was done by James Mill on the basis of three major
influxes of foreigners in India, be they invaders or
traders/colonizers. He divided Indian history into three
periods: the Hindu, the Muslim and the British beginning
respectively with the (presumed) Aryan and successive
Muslim and British arrivals. But Mill was a knowledgeable
person, and he was aware that he was violating the basic
principle of periodization by keeping in view the outsiders
not the insiders. So he propagated the myth of Indian
passivity. He asserted that the Indian past had been that of an
22
unchanging, static society. Mill's periodization still continues
with cosmetic change as the ancient, the medieval and the
modern. The structure of Indian history he conceived
remains intact.
But, consider, for instance, the situation of India in the
17th century. We find an unmistakable upsurgence in the rise
of Ramdas and Shivaji in Maharashtra, the Gurus in the
Panjab and the Rajputs in Rajasthan. The upsurgence
continues through time and, despite political and economic
domination by Britain, finds expression in the Great Uprising
of 1857 and in thoughts and actions of Dayanand Sarasvati,
Ramakrishna Paramhansa, Vivekanand, Tilak, Shri Arvind,
and several other saints and savants. K. M. Munshi designates
this period in Indian history as the 'Age of Modern
Renaissance'.34 There have been periods of great expansion
and efflorescence in Indian history as well as times of distress
when Indians have displayed commendable resistance. The
monotonous periodization: ancient, medieval and modern
fails to project the paradigmatic trajectory of Indian spirit.
Finally a word about the 'Idea of India' that too has
been distorted because of westernized thinking. The Idea of
India and the understanding of Indian history are
interconnected. If you want to know about India, you need to
go through books on its history albeit a bit cautiously. But, if
you want to write the history of India, you must be
conversant with the personality of India before hand. Several
scholars do not appear to be sensitive to this interconnection
and take the issue of the 'Idea of India' lightly.
Thus, in his H. D. Sankalia Memorial Lecture entitled
'The idea of India and its heritage: The millennium
challenges' (delivered in 2000), D. P. Agrawal remarks:
23
"Nations are essentially spatio-temporal concepts, which
change with time and geography. So let us not get bogged
down into such mires but address the more substantive and
challenging issues".35 Agrawal is a senior scholar and an old
friend of mine whose scholarship I highly admire despite
differences of opinion on historical issues. However, I fail to
see why Agrawal taking the 'Idea of India' as a millennium
challenge finally whisks it away as a less-substantive or less-
challenging issue. India is not just a spatio-temporal entity
that has been changing with time and geography. India has a
personality of its own, and the millennium challenge is to
define that personality.
In his lecture, Agrawal quotes the famous words from
Nehru’s Discovery of India that depict India as "an ancient
palimpsest on which layer upon layer of thought and reverie
had been inscribed, and yet no succeeding layer had
completely hidden or erased what had been written
previously". It is true that Nehru emphasized the
miscegenation and accretion of cultures in India; and that
was true for most of the early epochs of Indian culture. Living
at a time when the Aryan Invasion Theory was accepted as an
article of faith, Nehru could not think of an original
indigenous culture of India. He could not see that the ancient
palimpsest he was talking about had, in fact, an original
inscription engraved on it so deeply that layer upon layer of
subsequent engravings could neither hide nor erase it.
Nevertheless, despite all British impact on his
education and personality, Nehru had occasional glimpse of
‘Indianness’. In his Foreword to Filiozat’s India (1962), he
writes: "There is an Indianness which distinguishes every part
of India ... That Indianness is something unique and deeper
24
than the external differences." Nehru felt this Indianness
emotionally and intuitively but he could not locate its
primary source (utsa).
In fact, Bh€rat…yat€ or Indianness cannot be defined in
geographical and political terms. It can be defined only
culturally as a set of values based on intuitive recognition of
transcendental spirituality. Spirituality, it may be noted, is a
category of perception higher than religion or even morality.
Bh€rat…yat€ or Indianness is distinguished by a spiritual vision
of life, which the Vedic ¬ishis have bequeathed to humanity.
Concluding message
Friends, we have to rewrite the history of India afresh.
In fact, we have to restore the status and prestige of Indian
history that it genuinely deserves. We have to correct the
image of the Vedic šryas that has been badly maligned. We
have to expose colonial and post-colonial historians' ulterior
motives. And, above all, we have to free Indian historical
discourse from all such notions, assumptions, orientations,
models and theories that are extraneous to Indian
experiences of the past.
Let's, friends, always keep in mind what our
enlightened Rigvedic ancestors most affectionately wished
and prayed for us all in the concluding ¬ich€ of the ¬igveda:
lekuh o vkdwfr% lekuk ân;kfu o%A
lekueLrq oks euks ;Fkk o% lqlgklfrAA
(_Xosn 10.191.4)
"One and the same be your resolve,
And be your minds of one accord;
United be the thoughts of all,
That all may happily agree."
25
 /kU;okn% ! 11. A. K. Warder (1972): op. cit., p. ix.

lkekU; uoo"kaZ 2009 12. Raghuveer Singh (1978): Causality, Meaning and Purpose in
Politics, p. 23. Published Presidential Address delivered at the
uopSrU;a nnkrq ! 38th Indian Political Science Conference, Patiala, Dec. 28-30,
1978.
NOTES 13. Ibid., p. 24.

1. I use the phrase 'history of history', not historiography, for the
latter implies 'graphing', that is, writing; and in India historical
narratives were composed but not written in the beginning. Like
the Vedic mantras, in the early stages they constituted a floating
mass of literature generated orally.
2. Vide, A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith: Vedic Index of Names and
Subjects, vol. 1, pp. 224-25. First published in London in 1912.
Edition cited: Reprint 1995, Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass.
3. See, M. Monier-Williams: Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p. 129.
First published in Oxford in 1899. Edition cited: Reprint 1994,
New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
4. V. S. Pathak (1966): Ancient Historians of India, p. 7. Bombay:
Asia Publishing House.
5. A. D. Pusalker (1952): Studies in Epics and Pur€Šas of India, p.
xlv. Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan.
6. A. K. Warder (1972): An Introduction to Indian Historiography. p.
x. Bombay: Popular Prakashan.
7. S. Radhakrishnan (1977): Indian Philosophy, vol. 2, p. 779.
London: Allen and Unwin.
8. Hegel, Reason in History, Translated by Robert S. Hartman, p. 75.
Paperback, Prentice Hall, 1995.
9. Rajeev Malhotra (2001): Euro-centrism of Hegel, Marx, Muller,
Monier Williams. The Infinity Foundation. Available online.
10. Bertrand Russell: A History of Western Philosophy, pp. 705-06.
First published in London in 1946. Edition cited: Unwin
Paperbacks, 1979.
14. Ibid., p. 10.
15. Eric Thomas Stokes (1924-1981) was a professor at Cambridge.
His major contributions include: The English Utilitarians in India
(1959), The Peasant and the Raj (1968), and The Peasant Armed:
The Indian Rebellion of 1857 (1978).
16. The Hindi word 'Vimarsha' means 'discourse'. 'Dalita' is a newly
coined term, a term hitherto totally unknown to Indian literature
in the sense of a social identity. It stands largely for the scheduled
caste peoples. 'N€r… Vimarsha' means 'discourse related to
women'.
17. See, Ranajit Guha (2002): History at the Limit of World-History.
New York: Columbia University Press.
18. See, Partha Chatterjee (1999): The Partha Chatterjee Omnibus.
First Edition 1999. Reprint 2004, New Delhi: Oxford University
Press.
19. For a discussion of the concept of paradigm, see Shivaji Singh
(1985): Models, Paradigms and the New Archaeology. Varanasi:
Dept. of Ancient Indian History, Culture and Archaeology,
Banaras Hindu University; Also Thomas Kuhn (1962); The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
20. Alun Munslow (2006): Deconstructing History. 2nd Edition, p. 1.
London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.
21. David Harlan (1997): The Degradation of American History, p. 31.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
22. R. G. Collingwood (1946): The Idea of History, p. 283. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
23. Ibid., p. 290.

26 27
24. Alun Munslow (2006): op. cit., p. 3. language, and being a construct, its validity is subject to
verification.
25. This is why in the Rigvedic line: Sam€no mantraƒ samitiƒ sam€n…
sam€nam manaƒ saha chittamesh€m (¬igveda, X.191.3), mana and 32. Jacquetta Hawkes and Leonard Wooley (1963): History of
chitta are mentioned separately along with mantra (counsel) and Mankind, Vol. 1, p. 406. London: Allen and Unwin.
samiti (assembly) when Agni (the ritual fire) is being invoked for 33. Ibid., p. 389.
fostering unity and accord in each one of them.
34. K. M. Munshi (1956): Epochs of Indian Culture, In K. M.
26. The meaning 'pride' for Aha‰k€ra popular in common parlance is Munshi and R. R. Diwakar edited Indian Inheritance, Vol. 2, pp.
a debased sense of the term - in fact, a shortened form of 112-23. Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan.
technical Malina Aha‰k€ra. Vide, S. B. Gogate's article 'The riddle
35. D. P. Agrawal (2001): The idea of India and its heritage: The
called mind' available online.
millennium challenges. In Man and Environment, No.26(1), p. 21.
27. G. C. Pande (1985): An Approach to Indian Culture and Tradition,
p. 133. Varanasi: Dept. of Ancient Indian History, Culture and
Archaeology, Banaras Hindu University.
28. Nainam chhindanti astr€Ši nainam dahati p€vakaƒ,
Na chainam kledayanty€po na oshayati m€rutaƒ. G…t€, 2.23.
29. See, for instance, Ramshankar Agnihotri and Bhanupratap Shukla
edited (1971): R€sh˜ra J…vana k… Di€, p. 81. Lucknow:
R€sh˜radharma Pustak Prakashan. Also, Deendayal Upadhyaya
(1979): Ek€tma Darana, p. 161. Delhi: Deendayal Shodh
Sansthan.
30. 'Ek€tma M€nava Darana evam Chiti Avadh€raŠ€' was the topic of
the 3rd Deendayal Memorial Lecture delivered by K. S.
Sudarshan at New Delhi on Sept. 25, 2002. The lecture is
published by Research and Development Foundation for Integral
Humanism, New Delhi. This publication contains a brilliant
exposition of the concept 'chiti' and the role of this concept in
the formation of Indian psyche by the main speaker besides the
valuable light thrown on this concept on the occasion by M. C.
Sharma in his introductory speech and L. M. Sindhavi in his
presidential address.
31. Designating the Vedic šryas as 'Aryans' is misleading. As I have
stated many a times in my writings, the term 'šrya' is a historical
reality because the Vedic people are known to have used it as a
self-designation. As against this, the word 'Aryan' or 'Indo-Aryan'
is purely a linguistic construct denoting speakers of a type of

28 29