The Royal African Society

The Ogaden and the Fragility of Somali Segmentary Nationalism Author(s): I. M. Lewis Reviewed work(s): Source: African Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 353 (Oct., 1989), pp. 573-579 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/723037 . Accessed: 25/01/2013 15:06
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Oxford University Press and The Royal African Society are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to African Affairs.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded on Fri, 25 Jan 2013 15:07:02 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE OGADEN AND THE FRAGILITY OF SOMALI SEGMENTARYNATIONALISM

I. M. LEWIS live who THEOGADEN, traditionally as herdsmenin the regionnamedafter them in easternEthiopia, borderingthe Somali Republic, are part of the wider Darod family of Somali clans. They attractedworld attention a decade ago during their abortive attempt to secure independencefrom Ethiopiain the 1977-78 warbetweenSomaliaandEthiopia. the In retrospect,it is easyto see thatthis represented high pointof Somali nationalistfervourin recent Somalihistory. It was also a testimonyto the strenuouseffortsof the presentSomaliheadof statein seekingto transform styleto a modernorganicmode. fromits old segmentary Somalinationalism Shortly after seizing power in 1969, the present Head of State, General Mohamad Siyad Barre,adopted 'Scientific Socialism'to unite the nation and eradicateits ancientclan divisions. 'Tribalism',whichwas associated with nepotism and corruption,was officiallybanned and ritually buried in 1971. Tribalistic behaviourbecame a serious criminaloffence. The collective payment of blood money was correspondinglyoutlawed, and marriage officially emptied of its corporate lineage sigrlificance. The universalterm of address'cousin',implyingclansman,was replacedby the term jaalle (comrade). Lineage genealogies and their use to identify people were banned;even the old circumlocation'ex-clan'was forbidden. as rhetoric In theirplace,the Headof Statewaspresentedin the revolutionary the 'Father'of a nationwhose 'Mother'was his Revolution. This stirring ideology, legitimatedby referenceto the holy trinity of Marx, Lenin and and Siyad, was thrust upon the masses throughintense radiopropaganda through the OrientationCentreswhich were set up throughoutthe state, which had itself been divided into new provincescutting acrosstraditional clanboundaries. Radiatingout fromthe Presidency,the locallyorganized people's vigilantes (or 'Victory Pioneers', led by the 'VictoriousLeader' Siyad)andthe sinisterNationalSecurityServicesharedthe taskof ensuring that this elaborate propaganda rhetoric fell on receptive ears. The repeatedlyproclaimedobjective was to replace archaic, divisive lineage to allegiance the nation. The National loyalty,by productiverevolutionary SecurityCourtsalso sparedno effortin theirzealto enforcethe new orderof l nationalism. revolutionary
and This articleis a revisedversionof a talkgiven at the Schoolof Oriental AfricanStudiesin at of February1989.Ioan Lewis is Professor Anthropology the LondonSchoolof Economics andPoliticalScience. 1. I. M. Lewis, A ModernHistoryof Somalia(Westview,Boulder,revised and updated, 1988). 573

This content downloaded on Fri, 25 Jan 2013 15:07:02 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

574

AFFAIRS AFRICAN

In the view of ErnestGellnerand othertheoristsof modernnationalism, the decisive ingredientin nationalself-consciousnessis literacy. Where herethemilitaryacteddecisively, had civiliangovernments faltered, previous scriptfor the nationallanguageand launchingintensive a adopting lloman nation-wideurbanand ruralliteracycampaignsin 1973 and 1974.2 The intentionwas, as PresidentSiyadput it, 'to give everybodythe opportunity to learn readingand writing . . . to give our people modern revolutionary education... to restructuretheir social existence ... to eradicatesocial into and balkanization fragmentation tribes and sects . . . to bring about an unity.' absolute clandivisionsandestablishWhilethesemeasuresdirectedat eliminating bonds of nationalsolidaritywere vigorouslypromotedat all ing enduring levels within the state, the Head of State himself was covertly relying on his ties older,time-honoured of loyalty. He had, in fact, constructed inner in significant fromthreerelatedclans,eachcritically members powercircleof fromhisownpatrilineal weredrawn His mosttrustedministers itsownway. clan,the Marehan. Next camemembersof the clanof his son-in-law(head of the National SecurityService),the Dulbahante. Straddingthe borders whoseunionconstituted betweentheformerBritishandItalianSomalilands, this clanwasa lynchpinin the new state. Finally,the the SomaliRepublic, third clan in this triangle was that of the President'smother's brother, the Ogaden of crucial significancein this discussion. This connection gave the President a privileged relationshipwith the turbulent Ogadeni nationalistswho had been chaffingagainstEthiopianrule since its effective impositionin the late 1940s.3 It is importantto emphasizethat these three clans (the President's,his mother's brother's, and his son-in-law's) all belong at a higher level of groupingto the Darodclanfamily. Althoughthe regimeat all segmentary of times includedrepresentatives other non-Darodclans, the magic letters Ogaden, Dulbahante) representedthe inner circle of MOD (Marehan, power. This, of course, remainedunofficialpublic knowledge;officially, discouraged and opposedto 'clanism' strenuously the regimewasimplacably its own circle. Indeed to breaththe acronymMOD clan activityoutside publiclywouldhavebeen to invite instantarrest. The chaos which spreadin Ethiopiain the initialyearsof the Ethiopian followingHaile Selassie'sdepositionin October1974encouraged revolution the Ogadeni Somalis to prepare to seize their opportunity. Following provincesby allies successfulrisingsagainstEthiopianrulein neighbouring of the Somalis,the forcesof the WesternSomaliLiberationFront(WSLF), aided by troops from Somalia,began in the summerof 1977 to push the
2. 3. (Blackwell, Oxford, 1983). andNationalism E. Gellner, Nationals in Historyof Somalia,pp. 29 ff; J. Markakis, NationalandClassConflict Lewis, A Modern theHornof Africa(Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 169 ff.

This content downloaded on Fri, 25 Jan 2013 15:07:02 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

OGADENAND SOMALI SEGMENTARYNATIONALISM THE

575

out Ethiopians of the Ogaden. The Somali victory was, however, shortlived. The conflicttriggereda seismic shift in superpower alignmentsin theHorn of Africawith the Russiansturningto supportthe Ethiopiansand them to regaincontrolof the Ogaden. enabling This defeatwas followed by the huge refugeeinfluxof the best part of a millionOgadenisinto Somaliain 1978 and 1979. This createdimmense problemsfor the Somali state which became increasinglydependent on aid, humanitarian bilaterallyfrom the Western bloc and via the United NationsHigh Commissionfor Refugees(UNHCR).4 Perhapsas manyas halfthe refugeeswereplacedin refugeecampsin the centreof the northern Regionsof the Republic where their main local hosts were people of the Isaaqclan family. Relationsbetween the refugeesand the local residents and good, given the long historyof confrontation conflict weresurprisingly water between pastoralistsof these rival groups. The over foragingand of majority the refugeesremainedin the huge camps,up to 60,000 strong,in whichthey weregathered. These were often poorlysuppliedwith sources of water,let alone endowedwith other naturalresourceswhich might have enabledthemto achievesomedegreeof self-sufficiency. The refugeeswere reliefsuppliesandtreatedby on totallydependent international consequently as temporaryresidentsof the Republicwho would the Somali authorities eventuallyreturnto theirOgadenhomelandin Ethiopia. This assumption was also fosteredby naming sectionsof refugeecampsaftertheir places of origin in the Ogaden. Of course, this did not prevent refugees trading surplus rations with the local northern and largely Isaaqi population. Some refugees also found local work outside the camps, and a few, who to to managed gainpassports,evenjoinedthe migrantSomali'muscle-drain' andthe Gulf States. SaudiaArabia The Ogadenwar had been immenselypopularin Somaliaand President Siyad'spublic standingwas never higher than at that time. The terrible publicdemoralization defeatandrefugeeinvasionquicklyled to widespread an upsurge of 'tribalism'as differentgroups sought scapegoatsto and to explain the debacle. Thus, hard on the heels of the Somali retreat, an unsuccessfulattemptedcoup wasmountedagainstthe regimein April 1978. This was led by militaryofficersof the Majerteyn(Darod) clan who had playeda dominantrolein the old civiliangovernments. Afterthe failureof this attemptedcoup, those who had escaped arrest regrouped,forming a guerrilaopposition group called the Somali SalvationDemocratic Front (SSDF) which made its operationalheadquartersacross the border in Ethiopia. After some initial successes, with Ethiopian support, this and organisation its clan-basein Somaliawere savagelysubdued. Today, the Majerteynseem dividedand, for the time being, neutralizedas a united opposition front, although the SSDF has not totally disappeared. That
4. Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia, pp. 246 ff.

This content downloaded on Fri, 25 Jan 2013 15:07:02 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

576

AFRICANAFFAIRS

the Majerteyn rebels sought support in Ethiopia is both a sign of their desperation and of the disintegration of Somali national solidarity. In the meantime, the spotlight has fallen on the main protagonist opposed to Barre in the current civil war in Somalia, the Somalia National Movement (SNM) which, despite its name, draws most of its support from the Isaaqi clans of central northern Somalia and articulates their profound disaffection from the Siyad regime. Like the SSDF, the SNM was able to make its operational headquarters across the border in Ethiopia from which it launched a number of daring raids. From the early 1980s, the north was administered by increasingly harsh military rule with savage reprisals meted out to the assumedly pro-SNM local population who were sub ject to severe economic as well as political harassment.5 The north, as I saw when I last visited it in 1985, began to look and feel like a colony under a foreign military tyranny. Since the Ogaden war defeat, Somalia had still continued to support, albeit somewhat nominally, the Ogadeni Western Somali Liberation Front which remained an irksome thorn in Ethiopia's side. However, the destabilizing pressures exerted by the SSDF and SNM drove President Siyad to seek an accomodation with Ethiopia. The Somali regime's anxiety to secure a deal with Ethiopia was increased by the insecurity which his clansmen felt when the President had a nearly fatal car crash in May 1986. Following the President's election, unopposed, as Head of State for a further seven year term in office at the end of that year, a new government was formed in February 1987. For the first time since the coup, the cabinet now included a Prime Minister in the shape of the faithful General Samatar. In reality, however, President Siyad had consolidated the position of his own clan and family within which rivalry over who should succeed him was beginning to become acute. The Marehan now unquestionably dominated the military, and Siyad's son, General Maslah, was put in charge of a special northern Command Unit. The old MOD alliance was beginning to crumble, at least at the highest levels, as the Marehan closed ranks in the face of mounting insecurity. The time had come to secure Ethiopian co-operation in cauterizing the SNM and SSDF. Further signalling the demise of pan-Somali solidarity, Presidents Siyad and Mengistu finally signed a peace accord in April 1988, normalizing their relations and undertaking to stop supporting each other's dissidents. Thus Siyad withdrew support from the WSLF, which was now opposed by an anti-Siyad organisation the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), and Mengistu withdrew support from the SSDF and SNM. This triggered the latter's audacious onslaught on military installations in Northern Somalia which quickly led to the present civil war between the regime and the Isaaq clansmen. This now seems to have reached an impasse, with Siyad's forces
5. Lewis, A Modern Historyof Somalia,p. 252.

This content downloaded on Fri, 25 Jan 2013 15:07:02 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

OGADENAND SOMALI SEGMENTARYNATIONALISM THE

577

remainslargelyin incontrolof the ruinedIsaaqtownswhilethe countryside civilianallies. thehandsof SNM guerillasand their The human cost has been terrible. Thousands of civilians have been and killed wounded,andat leasthalf a millionhavefled theirhomes seeking asylumacross the border in Ethiopia and in the Republic of Djibouti. Some 400,000 Isaaqis, mainly women, children and old people, are now in hastily constructedrefugee camps in the Ogaden. Meanwhile, male refugeesin northernSomalia,who havelong been subjectto illegal Ogadeni into Somalia'sarmedforces, have been conscriptedas a pararecruitment militarymilitia to fight the SNM and man check-points on the roads. Ogadenirefugeeshave been encouragedto take over the remainsof Isaaqi shops and houses in what are now ghost towns. Thus, those who were received as refugee guests have supplantedtheir Isaaqi hosts, many of whom, in this bitterlyironic turn of fate, are now refugeesin the Ogaden. The sudden reversalin statusof the erstwhileOgadenirefugees,as well as the generalinsecurity,led the UNHCR to announcethat it would cease to supplyfood to the northernrefugeecamps. This is bound to have serious for repercussions the Somalianmilitaryin the northlet alonethe 'refugees'. appealingto the West No wonderthe Siyadregimeis currentlydesperately for renewedaid for whatit calls 'reconstruction'. If the Ogadeniswere once the tail that waggedthe dog, drawingSomalia into theirfightfor liberationfromEthiopianrule, the situationtodayis very different. Those still in the Ogadenhave been desertedby Siyad while those outside in Somaliahave been co-opted into fightingto maintainthe regime. Here the appeal,also addressedto the disunitedMajerteyn,is to Darodsolidarityagainstthe Isaaq. Thus othernorthernDarodclanshave been armed by the regime and urged to join the fight. Other northern groups,who areneitherIsaaqnorDarod,havealsobeenarmedandexhorted to turn against the Isaaq. The regimes appealfor Darod solidarityhas attempt,so farunsuccessful,by the Isaaqto invokea evokeda corresponding wider-based 'Irrir' solidarity to include the importantHawiye clans in whose territoryMogadishu)the capitalof the Republic,is located. Partof the difficultyhere, I suspect, lies in the prior existenceof the SSDF with which the SNM also seeks allianceand which is a predominantlyDarod organization. Equally, as we have seen, while seeking Darod support to the whereit is appropriate, regimealsoendeavours securethe loyaltyof all to penetratethe ranksof the Isaaq. non-Isaaqclansand also, of course, Thus, I am not claimingthat currentSomalipolitics representa perfect application of segmentary lineage principles at the highest levels of segmentation. Lineage solidarity has rarely if ever been perfectly expressedat such high levels of grouping,where the 'lineages'involved in of severalcaseshavepopulations overa millioneach. WhatI amclaimingis its desperatefight for survival, Siyad's family and clansmen are that in

This content downloaded on Fri, 25 Jan 2013 15:07:02 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

578

AFRICANAPFAIRS

seeking to exploit to the full segmentary lineage rivalry within the Somali nation. They are also, of course, making abundant use of coercion and rewards of all kinds; corruption flourishes. In the present Somali vortex, then, clan and lineage ties are definitely born-again. In fact, of course, they never died, despite all the rhetoric which, as we saw, President Siyad himself ignored. How Siyad's successors will exploit this segmentary legacy remains to be seen. In the meantime, things have turned out well for Ethiopia. Somalia is hopelessly destabilized and Ethiopia is host to a Somali population which is bitterly hostile to the present Somali government. At the same time, those Somali Ogadenis who remain in Ethiopia have been incorporated in three new Cautonomous'regions and it remains to be seen how much support will be forthcoming for the recently formed ONLF or the gravely weakened and discredited WSLF. The Somali nation today is clearly deeply divided along traditional lines. The Pan-Somali ideal founded on a cultural identity rather than the political unity, which was so strong in the 1950s and 1960s, has taken a severe battering. This is not to say that the future will not see a swing of the segmentary pendulum, with a renewed upsurge of Pan-Somali nationalism. But any realistic assessment of possible future trends has to acknowledge that Somali nationalism evidently retains its segmentary character and has not been transformed into a modern organic mode. It also has to register the importance of the formation of the state of D jibouti in 1976, thus producing two adjoining Somali states, however dissimilar in size and population. Thus, one point of the five-pointed Pan- Somali star has been broken off and taken root in Djibouti. Two other points of this national symbol are, of course, combined in what currently seems a highly problematic union in the Somali Republic. Events over the last decade suggest that the large Somali community in Northern Kenya, the fourth point in the star emblem, tends to follow its own star and to be quite firmly integrated into Kenya. As long as conditions in Kenya are markedly better than those in neighbouring states, it seems reasonable to suppose that this situation will continue. Conditions may not be quite as rosy for the Somalis living in eastern Ethiopia (the fifth point in the Somali star). Nevertheless, thousands of Isaaq Somalis have found asylum there, and the local Ogadenis seem to be seeking a modusvivendi with the Ethiopian authorities. By September 1989, some Ogadenis had gone even further, breaking Darod ranks to attack Siyad's forces. President Siyad's peace initiative with Ethiopia, which is so beneficial to Ethiopia, has, as we have seen, brought civil war to Somalia. Any hostile pressure exerted by the Siyad regime in Mogadishu, or by its successors, might encourage the Ethiopians to aid the SNM guerillas to dismember

This content downloaded on Fri, 25 Jan 2013 15:07:02 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE OGADEN AND SOMALI SEGMENTARYNATIONALISM

579

Somalia permanently, either by annexing the north of the Republic (the former British Somaliland Protectorate), or by facilitating its secession to join D jibouti. Thus Ethiopia has Somalia in a corner which makes it in the Somali Republic's interest to maintain peace with her powerful neighbour. We may note in conclusion that there is no paradox between this external peace between Ethiopia and Somalia and the co-existent clan anarchy which currently rages inside the latter state. This is entirely consistent with the segmentary character of Somali nationalism.

This content downloaded on Fri, 25 Jan 2013 15:07:02 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions