The August 2008 Breach of the Kosi Afflux Bund and

the Resulting Flood: An Assessment Paper Prepared for

the Bihar Judiciary Enquiry

Prepared and Respectfully Submitted by

J. Albert Rorabacher, Ph.D.

J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 1 of 31

 The August 2008 Kosi Afflux Bund Breach and Flood

Abstract
The flooding that resulted from the Kosi Afflux Bund Breach in Nepal, in August 2008,
approximately 12 kms upstream from the Bhimnagar Barrage, was unlike that of any flood that
has been associated with the Kosi in more than 60 years. It was unique because of the location of
its epicenter and extent. For the first time, an earthen levee, located in Nepal breached, spilling
water into areas that have not experienced Kosi related floods in nearly 100 years. While the
immediate causes of the flood can be attributed to the failure of an engineered structure, the
consequences of the subsequent flood must be apportioned among the engineers, contractors,
and politicians responsible for the construction, maintenance, and unrepentant commitment to
the use of earthen levees to affect flood control and protect the citizens of Bihar.

Introduction
Since time immemorial, the rivers of northern Bihar, with their headwaters in Tibet and
Nepal, have routinely caused extensive flooding in Bihar, eastern Uttar Pradesh, and Bengal, often
with catastrophic consequences. More recently, the nature and scope of the flood patterns have
changed. They have become less frequent, even less predictable but more devastating. It is not a
change in either the source of the flood waters or a change in the quantities – although there is
variability due to weather and climatic changes in the rivers’ headwaters and catchments. Levees,
cofferdams, embankments, or bunds, that have been built along many of the rivers of northern
Bihar are, first and foremost, the source and cause of these catastrophic floods.

The 2008 Floods – An Overview

The Kosi Floods of 2008 did not follow their normal pattern. First, breaches in the Kosi
embankments typically occur within Bihar. The breach in the Kosi’s bund, locally known as the
Eastern Afflux Bund or embankment, occurred well inside Nepal, approximately 12 kms north of
the Bhimnagar Barrage, near the village of Kusaha. This breach occurred on August 18th. The
first signs of the impending breach, however, were observed as early as August 5th. The breach
occurred within a portion of the cofferdam system supposedly controlled and supervised by the
engineers of the Bihar government; and according to reports, these on-site representatives
ignored initial indications preceding the breach. Initially the breach was small but increased to
nearly 400 meters during the first day, and just under 2 kilometers within two days.[1]

J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 2 of 31

 An Indian technical team was dispatched to the site of the breach, prior to the flooding of
adjacent Sunsari District in Nepal, only to be prevented from reaching the breach, due to disputes
between the Nepalese and Indian governments’ representatives and local laborers and
contractors. These disputes sabotaged early efforts to stem the tide of the breach.[2]
Subsequently, tensions were quelled and repair work was begun but by then, what had been the
beginnings of a minor breach had grown out of control.[3] An on-site observer noted:

If security concerns had been looked into and local cooperation was
forthcoming, the tragedy would have been averted.[4]

In addition, the lack of necessary repair supplies delayed construction and repair work. An
engineer from the Nepalese Department of Water-Induced Disaster Prevention (NDWIDP),
stationed at the site criticized the Indian repair efforts, stating:

If more materials are not immediately supplied to the sites, work will come
to a halt, he told the Post. According to him, workers rely on materials
DWIDP of Nepal provide to Indian authorities. We are running out of
stock provided by Nepal but the Indian side has not made any arrangement
so far, the engineer said.[5]

Subsequently, an Indian technical team estimated that the cost of reconstructing the
cofferdam would cost approximately Rs. 525 crore.[6] By late January 2009, the water of the Kosi
had returned to normal levels and repairs to the Eastern Afflux Bund were sufficiently complete
that the Nepalese and Bihar governments announced:

The Saptakosi river in eastern Nepal near the Indian border has been put
back on its original course after repair works in the cofferdams has been
completed, according to Water Resources Ministry officials here.

India and Nepal came together to complete the work of repairing the
embankment of Kosi river, which breached and triggered massive floods in
the bordering areas of the two countries.[7]

Second, the breach permitted the Kosi to return to long abandoned channels, especially the
so-called Supal Channel, as well as the Sursar, Mirchaiya and Belhi, 75 - 100 kilometers to the east
of its modern channel. See Illustration 1, and Maps 1 and 2, below. The breach returned water
flow to the channels that the Kosi had occupied 85 to 100 years ago, traversing the Districts of
Supal, Madhepura, Naugachia Subdivision of Bhagalpur and Banka, the western portions of
Araria and Purnia districts, and the eastern portions of Saharas and Khagaria districts. These
districts had not experienced what could be called extraordinary flooding in many years.

An estimated 80 percent of the Kosi’s flow was diverted through the breach from the channel

J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 3 of 31

that it had occupied since 1949. More importantly, some observers do not perceive the breach
and subsequent flood as a unique structural collapse event as much as the Kosi’s initial attempt to
change its course once again.[8] If these observers are correct, there is probably very little that can
be done, in the long run, to ‘persuade’ the river to return to its modern channel, permanently.

If it is, indeed, coaxed back to its modern channel, it will inevitably break out again. If we give
the river anthropomorphic Will, and it has ‘decided’ to return to an earlier course, in all
likelihood, there is very little that engineers and contractors can do to stop it. When a force of
Nature, like the Kosi, pits its strength against the works of Man, Nature is almost always the
inexorable victor; and Man must learn to adapt to the new realities.

These new realities will include but will not be limited to the acceptance of the fact that the
embankments along the river will become, for all intents and purposes, a testament to our
unabashed and naïve belief that we can subjugate Nature. The embankments will become useless
landmarks emerging from Bihar’s landscape, with the real possibility that the channel bed
between the levees will be significantly higher than the river’s headwaters at Bhimnagar and will
never again contain the river’s full water flow, except during the height of the monsoons. Most of
the year it will remain a dry, elevated river bed.

For years, a debate has been raging between the Government of Bihar and a number of
NGOs, as to whether or not the government should simply abandon or dismantle the state’s
system of embankments and let the rivers ‘run free.’[9] These groups have repeatedly suggested
that the embankments are the cause of the catastrophic flooding that plagues the floodplains of
the Kosi from Nepal to the Ganga. They are catastrophic because they are the result of breaches in
the levees that permits the river’s waters to cascade down onto the floodplain below, rather than
the gentle sheet flooding that occurred before the embankments were constructed. Admittedly,
sheet flooding was a nuisance to cultivators but at least they understood it – the depth of the
floodwaters, their duration, etc. – they prepared for it and could deal with it. It did not destroy
their homes, drown their livestock, and make them victims. It was simply a part of the annual
cycle of their lives. In fact, before the advent of the embankments, the monsoon months were a
time of celebration. The people coexisted with the rivers and their floods.

As early as 1883, the British colonial government feared that Kosi might make a sudden
change of direction and return to one of its former channels. WA Inglis, who was responsible for
surveying the region, commented: “it was not advisable to make any attempt to interfere with the
natural flow of the river." In 1896/97, the Calcutta Flood Conference also concluded that no
structures were feasible to control the Kosi's numerous channels. The conference did, however,
recommend the construction of short lengths of embankments that would be put in place by
'various interested parties.' The 1928 Orissa Flood Conference indicated that the existence of
embankments increased the adverse effect of floods and recommended demolition of bunds. In
fact, some zamindari bunds were demolished by the government despite their objections. The
J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 4 of 31
1937 Bihar Flood Conference centered on the “Embankments versus No embankments” debate
with the Bihar Chief Engineer, Captain G.F. Hall, surprisingly pushing for the removal of all
embankments on the ground that they did more harm than good. It was the 1941 report of Sir
Claude C. Inglis that brought Nepal into the Kosi picture. Sir Inglis concluded that the Kosi’s
excessive silt load should be checked, if possible, upstream in Nepal. The Viceroy, Lord Wavell, in
1945 referred the Kosi flood problem to the newly constituted Central Water, Irrigation and
Navigation Commission for advice. There it languished until the Government of Bihar pushed
forward its embankment policy and program in the mid 1950s.[10]

After the levees were constructed, the character of the floods changed, and with it a change in
the people’s lifestyle. As one writer suggested, they underwent a change in nomenclature – from
being flood worshippers to flood victims.[11] The floods that occurred, following the
construction of the levees. wreaked havoc on the countryside. Prior to the embankments, the
people coped with the floods, rather than falling victim to them. While this shift in attitude
toward the floods was a qualitative change, it was caused by a quantitative change in the nature of
the floods themselves during the post-embankment period.

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 Map 1: Extent of Flood Caused by the Breach in the Eastern Afflux Bund Near Kusaha, as of August 22, 2008

J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 6 of 31

 Illustration 1: Google Satellite Imagery of Bhimnagar Barrage, Embankments, and Approximate Location
of August 17-18, 2008 Breach

A = Bhimnagar (Kosi} Barrage, B = Approximate Breach Location.

The black lines represent the approximatel location of the Afflux Bunds and the barrage.
Source: Google Earth, January 31, 2009

The beginning of the end to this 125 year old debate may have begun on August 18th with the
advent of the Afflux breach, with Nature siding with the NGOs. Embankments have never
worked, long term, on the rivers of India, when flood protection has been sought.

Even before the repairs to the Afflux Bund were completed in January 2009, Nepal’s Dipak
Gyawali, former Minister of Water Resources, and who now heads the Nepal Water Conservation
Foundation, was asked, ‘will the Kosi return to its former modern channel?’ Gyawali responded:

I doubt it, simply because the breach now is no longer a rupture in the side
embankment that can be plugged once the water level goes down and the
Koshi starts flowing along its original main channel. What we are seeing is

J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 7 of 31

 Map 2: The Changing Path of the Kosi River, 1731-2008

Source: After (Gole, C. V. and Chitale, S. V., 1966)

the main stem of the river itself flowing through it, capturing centuries' old
channels and changing its course. To change it back is like damming
the Koshi anew with a new barrage, in addition to making the river do
a “high jump” of at least four meters to flow along its recently abandoned
bed. Believe me, it won't be too happy doing that now or in the coming
years, and will find some way to continuously breach the embankment in
other weak spots, and no engineer can guarantee that this won't happen,
although they will have lots of fun playing with all kinds of expensive toys
“to tame the Koshi”.

The problem now is no longer just the breach at Kusaha in Nepal: it is

totally uncertain where the new Koshi channel will be in the middle and
lower delta in Bihar. Currently, satellite pictures show that it might be
moving along the Supaul channel; but I think this might just be a massive
ponding that is occurring with Koshi filling every depression, canal, old
oxbow lake or the space between the indiscriminately built embankments.
Since the land naturally slopes eastwards, depending upon whether the
coming September floods are a four lakh cusecs flood or a nine lakh one (as
J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 8 of 31
 happened in 1968) the new Koshi could be as far east as Katihar. Even if it
does not go that far this year, it is inevitable it will do so in the years to
come. This river morphology dynamics has to be looked at before any new
embankments or repairs of old ones can be considered.[12]

The Government of Bihar has spent crores of Rupees to channelize the Kosi using unfaced
earthen embankments and annually appropriates millions of Rupees for their maintenance and
reconstruction.[13] The construction of these embankments was initiated in 1954 but continues
to the present day, although major new construction efforts ended in 1998 for the Kosi.
Additional embankments, however, are being constructed in the state as part of the on-going
Bagmati Project.[14]

The Kosi’s embankments represent only a very small portion of the total length of
embankments in Bihar, less than 7.5 percent.[15] Even so, the Kosi commands a
disproportionately large percentage of the state’s expenditures for maintenance and repair, and
an even larger share of the state’s relief services and compensation budgets. The embankments
were built and are maintained on the premise that they would protect the surrounding floodplain
from annual sheet flooding. They do not.

One must, then, ask some simple questions. Why is so much money being pumped into
maintenance and construction, and post-flood relief costs, when it is patently obvious that
embankments do not provide the flood protection they were intended to provide? Where are all
these monies going? How can incredibly huge amounts of money simply disappear with no
apparent long term cost-benefit being realized? One would, at least, expect to see the amount of
flood-prone area decrease, considering the huge annual expenditures made on these
embankments, these flood prevention systems. This is not, however, the case.

In 1954, before construction on the state’s system of embankments was initiated,

approximately 2.5 million hectares of land in northern Bihar were classified as flood prone. Upon
the completion of the state’s embankments, the flood prone area increased to 6.89 million
hectares![16] The flood prone area had increased by 275 percent! All one need do is consult a
topographic map of Bihar to see that the flood prone area is now nearly conterminous with the
area the government says is protected!

If we accept the proposition that the Kosi, once again, is in the process of changing its course
and cannot be permanently returned to its modern channel, we must accept the fact that the
politicians, planners, engineers, and contractors, who have profited from their commitment to
Bihar’s system of embankments, must now decide whether to attempt to contain the Kosi along
its new course; and simultaneously abandon the existing embankments and the people who live
within and along them.

J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 9 of 31

 If history is to guide us, the answer to this question has to be, no. Tremendous amounts of
money, material, effort and ingenuity were expended on the Kosi Embankments. They failed to
perform their mandated role of flood protection. The state’s coffers have been drained in support
of this untenable approach to flood abatement, and the associated corruption, graft, and
profiteering by politicians, contractors, suppliers, and other vested interests. Simply stated, in its
current fiscal state, the Bihar simply cannot undertake another round of large-scale embankment
projects along the Kosi’s new course, nor should it.

Some Specific Lessons Learned by the 2008 Breach

There can be no doubt that the Eastern Afflux breach in August 2008 resulted in the taking of
human lives, the lives of animals, the destruction of homes, and crops, as well as infrastructural
destruction to roadways, communications and electrical supply networks, railroads, and bridges.
Travel in all forms was disrupted, access to markets and food was severed or curtailed,
waterborne diseases increased, and the persistent plight of the rural population was exacerbated –
poverty and hunger. No amount of relief aid can adequately compensate those that lost loved
ones, their homes, their animals, or their livelihoods.

The plight of the flood victims and their resilience is legion. Others have and will comment on
the victims. Here we will look at some of the institutional problems associated with the breach –
their roots and consequences.

Accountability

Data Veracity

Each year, the WRD issues reports on the number of breaches that occur in the
embankments. Since 1953, there have been hundreds of breaches of varying sizes. Each year the
breaches carry the risk of greater human misery, for each subsequent breach begins at a higher
water level than in previous years. Each year the mean water level of the rivers rise due to
increasing siltation. In 1987, the WRD recognized 105 breaches, in fact there had been more than
300. In 2004, 55 breaches were recognized. The question, then, is how many breaches were there?
Obviously, we cannot rely on the WRD for accurate reporting, since they have a vested interest in
under-reporting the number of breaches. To account for every breach would undermine the
State's raison d'êtré for the embankments -- flood prevention.

J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 10 of 31

 Nepalese/Indian Relations

If initial news reports from the site of the breach are to be believed and, are in fact correct, ill
blood exists between the Nepalese and Indian officials who were at the site of the initial breach.
The tensions between the officials were only exacerbated by poor relations among local
contractors and laborers, as well as a lack of repair supplies on hand or those needed to effect the
repair of the breach. As a consequence, the breach grew from a minor breach into a
history-making and catastrophic event.

Had the breach occurred in Bihar, there would have been no official obstruction; although
time delays frequently occur due to slow response times. If breaches occur in Nepal, and are
understood to be within the purview of local Indian/Bihari officials, the Nepalese officials cannot
be permitted to interfere in emergency assessments or repair efforts, when human lives are at
stake.

The causes for Nepalese interference may have many political and economic causes but they
seem to have been inflamed recently by political conflicts between the Nepalese (Khas) ethnic
majority and the so-called Madhesi minority, people of Indian origin, and the emergence of the
revolutionary Madhesi Movement. Cultural and ethnic differences seem to have contributed to
the unwillingness or inability of the parties to work together without conflict and derision. These
kinds of disagreements cannot be tolerated during times of emergency.

The Treaty of "Peace and Friendship" between the Government of India and the Government
of Nepal, 1950, Article 7, provides:

The Governments of India and Nepal agree to grant, on a reciprocal

basis, to me nationals of one country in the territories of the other

the same privilege in the matter of residence, ownership of property,

participation in trade and commerce, movement and privileges of a

similar nature."[17]

Either government must be supported by the other to intercede on behalf of the people, and
insure the enforcement of this Article, especially as it relates to the mobilization of manpower for
the purposes of stemming human disasters, which has mutual benefits for both countries.

Emergency Warning System

Further, it would seem that, in light of the nearly annual occurrence of floods, a much better
system of early warning and relief would have emerged. This has not, however, been the case.
J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 11 of 31
With each new flood and flood season, the Government of Bihar seems to begin from scratch
with regard to relief activities, and there is virtually no life-saving early warning system. Experts
and aid agencies regularly and consistently blame government ineptness for not only failing to
warn people but also for mishandling relief. Even when warnings of impending disaster have
been issued by on-site authorities, they are regularly ignored by bureaucrats in Patna.

A Reuters report stated that:

But the tragedy is not entirely nature's doing. Experts and aid agencies
blame government ineptness for not only failing to warn people but also for
mishandling relief.

In the most shocking example, SOS fax messages sent by engineers at the
Kosi dam warning of impending disaster were ignored in Bihar's capital
Patna, the Mail Today newspaper said.

The faxes piled up on the relevant bureaucrat's desk because he was on

leave and no deputy had been appointed. No one reacted even when
warnings were sent to other officials, the paper said, calling for prosecutions
for criminal negligence.

"We have come across such reports, and we will definitely look into this
issue once all this is over," Nitish Mishra, the state's disaster management
minister, told Reuters in Bihar.

"There should definitely be some accountability."[18]

The monsoons come every year to Bihar and with them, flooding, especially along the Kosi. It
would seem that, over time, the Government of Bihar would have put in place an
emergency/flood assistance early warning system and formal flood assistance/relief/rehabilitation
programs. However, each year catches the government flat footed and scrambling to address the
recurring events. The authorities admit they were not prepared for the Afflux Bund disaster.
Unfortunately, history has not taught the administrators and bureaucrats in Patna any lessons.
Each disaster seems like, and is treated as if was a freak occurrence. The similarities between
present and past events seem to somehow elude the policy-makers in Patna, and for that matter,
the Centre. Somehow, the government officials, elected and unelected, alike, need to become
much more accountable for their actions, as well as their inactions.

Emergency Management

Governmental transparency and accountability is essential, especially as it relates to the

implementation of high value and high cost capital and infrastructural expenditures. It is essential
to the evaluation of governmental responses to disaster events, and is especially critical when

J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 12 of 31

providing post-emergency aid, relief, compensation, and rehabilitation goods and services. The
provision of post-event services appears to follow a pattern of event and a makeshift response.

In the current economic and political environment in Bihar, coupled with repetitious nature
of flooding and the pattern of ineffectual response, it is imperative that emergency or disaster
responses be based on well defined programs, policies and guidelines, that are integrated across
government and not compartmentalized by ministry or department. One of the problems heard
from the rural citizenry is the government’s failure to forewarn the public of the impending flood.

In a ReliefWeb article, based on Reuters reporting:

PURNEA, India, Sept 3 (Reuters) - For several days, Urmi Mahato and
her family were glued to the radio and TV, eager for information on rising
floodwaters and waiting for the government to tell them whether and when
to evacuate their home.

The warning never came, and officials assured there was no danger. Then
one morning a wall of water crumpled the river's mud embankment,
swamping the village and sweeping away her family.[19]

If this had been an isolated incident, it would be almost not worth mentioning but in light of
the fact that an estimated three million people were affected by the flood and a wall of water that
swept through the districts of Supal, Madhepura, and Naugachia Sub-Division of Bhagalpur, the
western portions of Araria and Purnia districts, and the eastern portions of Saharas and Khagaria
districts, it does become important. Apparently, there is no mechanism to alert the population to
the impending onslaught of a catastrophic flood. It is imperative that an Early Warning System be
created and activated in the event of an imminent environmental disaster.

The excuse that the technology does not exist to implement such an early warning system is
patently fallacious. Satellite imagery is readily available to track the progress of floods. See Map 1,
above. Radio, television, internet, and telephone (satellite, land lines, and cellular)
communication systems are already well established, to communicate the progress of floods and
the existence of breaches. All that is necessary is the willingness to implement the ground-level,
local alert systems -- sirens or radio or television announcement systems. This type of system has
yet to be constructed or implemented.

Bureaucratic Reforms

Equally, or maybe, more important is the government’s need to reform its bureaucratic
structure, eliminating bottlenecks caused by dereliction of duty or personnel absences, which
stalls the flow of crucial reports, information, and warnings. Even the best and most sophisticated
early warning system in the world will not function if those responsible for its activation are on

J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 13 of 31

leave or holiday, with no automatic organizational mechanism for the provision of fill-in staff. To
leave a critical information conduit position vacant is unconscionable.

While duplication of services is, generally, to be avoided, in the current bureaucratic structure
that pervades the Government of Bihar, it would seem imperative that emergency alerts not be
restricted to one endpoint. If the system were stable and reliable, a single endpoint for generating
national or regional alerts would be satisfactory.

Bureaucracies, by their very nature, are territorial and tend to be exclusive. In part, because of
this inherent tendency to be territorial, it is difficult to establish clear points of responsibility and
accountability when trying to determine if, in fact, there has been dereliction of duty or simply a
breakdown or bottlenecks in the communication network. For the public, these breakdowns and
bottlenecks represent a problem but for the bureaucrats, bureaucracies, and politicians, it affords
protection from the never-ending finger pointing that inevitably goes on following emergency
events.

Careers in government and government service, unfortunately, are frequently built on one’s
ability to avoid responsibility. However, power without responsibility or accountability is patently
antithetical. People make mistakes. It is inevitable. Most mistakes are typically based on
incomplete information but to wait for irrefutable and complete information frequently places
people and peoples’ lives at risk. In the case of pending disaster, it is always better to err on the
side of caution than to do nothing. Contra wise, to “cry wolf” too many times compromises the
decision-maker as well as the system. Somewhere between taking no responsibility or action and
responding too quickly to environmental threats lies a best effort position. If government and
government decision-makers can claim due diligence, they should not be castigated, but then,
that is not the way politics and politicians operate, unfortunately. Every effort needs to be made
to streamline government bureaucracies and make them responsible and accountable for their
actions and inaction. The unfortunate fact is that the current governmental bureaucracy is little
more than a slightly evolved colonial system of government, inherited from the British, where the
appearance of progress is oftentimes viewed the same as real progress or reform, when, in fact,
nothing has really changed.

Assessments

It may sound like harping but the Government’s response to emergencies or disasters is just
that – responses. Little seems to have been learned from previous emergencies, and as a
consequence, automatic and ready-made response mechanisms are still lacking. If the old adage –
Be Prepared – has any validity, its message has escaped the notice of the Government of Bihar.

Being prepared involves the anticipation of potential problems and designing responses to
those scenarios deemed most likely to occur. Not every eventuality can or should be anticipated.

J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 14 of 31

The ‘most likely’ scenarios should be anticipated and prepared for. Toward this end, some of the
earliest efforts should be the systematic collection and analysis of existing information and the
analysis of previous response strategies.

There currently exists a wealth of information, especially in the form of readily available
satellite imagery, geographic information system (GIS) databases, modern information
technologies, and the Flood Management Information System (FMIS). The 2008 Breach was,
undoubtedly, one of the best documented flood-related events in Bihar history. The information
gained from this devastating event should not simply be stored away as historically important
documents. The information should become the basis for the creation of future response
strategies.

The Government of Bihar does not seem to have, in place, a system for the routine evaluation
of the efficacy of the state’s flood control systems – the barrages and embankments. As conditions
change, the utility of these flood control components need to be assessed and reevaluated to
determine if they are, in fact, meeting the needs of both the Government and the people and
economy of the area they protect. Part of this evaluation process must include community
participation, as well as recognized NGOs. While the embankments and barrages are inspected by
Government agents, the local population is actually much more intimately familiar with the
structures than are the ‘professional’ engineers. Furthermore, the local population interacts with
these structures much more frequently than those who make routine, and often perfunctory site
visits. In the past, public input has been generally deemed irrelevant. Those who depend on the
embankments have a much greater vested interest in them than do government-paid inspectors.
Likewise, the local population sees day-to-day changes in the embankments that may not be
apparent during infrequent inspection visits.

While the professional engineers and contractors are familiar with the processes involved in
embankment breaches or water logging, it is the cultivator in the field adjacent to the
embankment that knows from experience what is actually taking place, even if it is only on his
small plot of land. The ‘locals’ are intimately aware of the causes of water logging, drainage
problems, the impact of infrastructural construction – bridges, roads, railroads, communication
and electrical lines, canals, and settlement. Failure to include ‘the people’ in the decision-making
process eliminates input from those who will be most directly affected by such projects. They
should have, at least, a say in what happens to them. Detached and academic decision-makers,
because of their insulation from the public, can oftentimes make decisions that are good on paper
but do not complement the realities of the cultivator in the field.

All too often, especially as applied to drainage and embankment projects, unrealistic and
impractical engineering solutions are imposed on the people being served. Time and again, the
untutored cultivator, who most intimately knows the local drainage and consequences of
embankments is completely ignored, in favor of the educated, clean-shoed, well dressed civil
J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 15 of 31
engineer, who spends the bulk of his time in an office somewhere and is not familiar with his
project area, except through surveys and topographic maps. He has not walked every square
centimeter of the land he will effect by his project. The local cultivator, on the other hand, knows
the land with an intimacy arising from day-to-day experience. Who is better qualified?

Norman Borlaug, speaking metaphorically about bureaucrats making decisions that directly
affect the lives of the rural masses, stated:

These [wheat] plants can speak to you, but they cannot shout. If you
are sitting at a desk in an office, you will never hear them.[20]

Without end-user input during the planning stages, many programs are destined to fail, or
will be exploited by the more powerful members of the society, without benefits accruing to those
for whom the programs were originally intended. The government bureaucrats, as well as the civil
engineers that oversee the embankments, drainage and land reclamation projects must become
intimate with the land and the people they are supposed to serve. They all should serve the public,
not vested interests. More ‘in the field’ fact finding by professional engineers is essential to the
development of genuinely worthwhile development projects. They cannot do this from the
confines of their offices or from the front seat of a moving vehicle. They must begin walking the
land that they alter with their projects.

The Question of Qualified Engineers

Although the qualifications of the state's engineering staff should never be called into
question; reality does not always reflect the basic principle of hiring those who are qualified for
any particular position. It has been suggested that, at least many of the field engineers and
embankment inspectors, are not technically or experientially qualified for their positions. The
hiring and assignment of engineers to important positions must be predicated on, at a minimum,
technical qualifications and should be complemented by relevant in-field experience. Having an
engineering degree does not, in and of itself, qualify an engineer for a specific engineering
position. Hiring a civil engineer, whose field experience is in road construction, does not qualify
him to be an embankment or hydraulic engineer. Positions requiring engineering degrees are not
necessarily interchangeable.

The government must investigate this allegation. Failure to hire and place qualified people to
critical positions, especially as regards embankment inspection and construction, is tantamount
to gross negligence on the part of the hiring authority. Further, if appointments are based on
influence peddling, or nepotism, the hiring authority, again, should be, in addition to being
charged with negligence, charged with conspiracy to commit fraud.

J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 16 of 31

 Embankments

Embankments, barrages, and dams have become the conventional solution to the problems of
flooding, when history has shown repeatedly that they routinely fail and cause more problems
than they resolve. There has been the unavoidable conclusion by governments that floods and
flooding cannot be managed through a process of containment. Irrefutable evidence suggests that
containment, at least as practiced in Bihar, with its unlined earthen embankments, simply does
not work. Even so, it continues to be the primary solution to flood abatement.

The system of embankments that have been perpetuated in the name of flood protection and
control, since the mid 1950s, is all but a myth. Embankments do not, nor have they ever fully
protected those seeking protection from floods – not on the Kosi or any other river with the
inherent characteristics of the Kosi. There are few rivers that can match the Kosi in terms of sheer
brute force or, at the other end of the continuum, tranquility. The embankments do little to
assuage the forcefulness of the Kosi during the monsoon months and there is no need for them
during its dry season dormancy.

The existing system of embankments was never capable of controlling the ferocity of the Kosi
during its annual four-month rampage. Unlined, earthen embankments, no matter how well
designed or constructed, are not capable of providing the level of flood protection necessary
against the hydraulic power of a river like the Kosi. At best, such embankments should be viewed
as temporary, make-work solutions to a much larger problem.

As a consequence of their built-in fragility, tremendous amounts of public money are

required to maintain the embankments. The only people benefiting from their construction and
maintenance are the laborers, contractors, engineers, and politicians who each have a vested
interest in their on-going upkeep; or repairs of the inevitable breaches. With each breach or the
letting of a maintenance contract, each of the vested parties participate in the milking of a
never-ending cash cow. Under the circumstances, is there any wonder why an inadequate,
unreliable, and ineffective system of embankments has been foisted on a population, whose only
desire was for protection, which they have never received. From the very beginning,
embankments in Bihar have been a large-scale boondoggle.

A number of facts must be recognized, regarding Bihar’s flood problems:

1. The scope of flooding in northern Bihar is life altering.

2. It is repetitive, and for many people, it is an annual event.

3. It is expensive in terms of lives lost and in terms of lives uprooted.

4. Rupees are and have been frittered away on unreliable flood control structures, relief

J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 17 of 31

 efforts, reconstruction, and compensation payments.

As one cycle ends the process begins all over again, with the first drops of rain of the
monsoon the next year, and the year after that, and the year after that, ad infinitum. Certainly,
there is something that can be done to break this cycle of misery.

The 2008 breach has resurrected discussions regarding ways to properly implement the 1954
treaty that governs usage of the Kosi river, which has been, essentially, defunct since 2004.
According to a treaty signed between India and Nepal in 1954, Bihar was entrusted with the
responsibility of maintaining and repairing the barrage on the Kosi river, which mostly irrigates
Indian land, as well as its accompanying embankments and spurs. Pursuant to the recent breach
and flooding in Bihar, new negotiations with Nepal will, almost inevitably include the issue of the
Barahkehetra Dam.

High Dams

There are those that claim that yet another ‘structure’ will ameliorate the specter of
flooding.[21] Since Independence, India has sought to engage the Nepalese government in a joint
venture, where the rivers that pour into Bihar, especially the Kosi, would be dammed and
flooding could be controlled, or at least managed, downstream. After 60 years of meetings with
the Nepalese government, following a multitude of proposals for studies and investigations,
nothing concrete or meaningful has been negotiated between the governments.

At the risk of being politically incorrect, or undiplomatic, the Nepalese government has
nothing to gain from the construction of dams or barrages for the purposes of flood control in
India. The only tangible benefit accruing to Nepal might be the electrical power the proposed
dam(s) would generate. They would, simultaneously, inherit a massive maintenance obligation.
Every river leaving Nepal carries with it a huge burden in the form of silt, sand, and gravel. The
faster the river flows, the larger the burden it can carry. If a dam were constructed, the burden of
the river would collect on the upstream side of the dam, just as it does at the Bhimnagar Barrage,
requiring a massive maintenance effort. If this accumulation of waterborne sediment is not
routinely disposed of, the functional life span of the dam is reduced markedly.

This type of maintenance would be massive, never ending, and expensive for either or both
governments. Under the circumstances, is it any wonder that neither government has truly
championed the Herculean effort such a dam would entail? For the purposes of political
economy, however, the politicians on both sides of the border benefit from the appearance of
concern, even though they all recognize the problems inherent in an undertaking the size of
which neither government has pledged to before. In the long run, delay and finger-pointing are
the best strategies.

J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 18 of 31

 While the prospects for the construction of the Barahkshetra Dam is shrouded in the mists of
good intentions and grandiosity, any discussion of such a project fails to recognize that structures
of any kind – whether barrages, embankments, or dams -- are ineffectual in long term control of
the rivers coming out of Nepal and making their way through India. One can claim that such
structures will control flooding, provide potential irrigation water, and generate power but, in the
long run, none of these claims have any basis in fact or history. Each time a new structure is built,
it generates more problems than it solves, and will exacerbate existing environmental and
ecological problems that, in all likelihood will only portend even greater human and
environmental catastrophes.

The Folly of Embankments and Disaster Relief

Once the Bihar Flood Policy was put in place in the mid 1950s, and was supported by the
Centre, a program was set in motion that would result in the creation of 3,465 kms of earthen
embankments along most of the rivers of northern Bihar.[22] Even before the system of
embankments was completed, the first breach occurred, and the problems that had plagued the
British on the Damodar, were plaguing the politicians and engineers responsible for the
embankments along the rivers of northern Bihar. The primary problems included:

1. The rapid build-up of silt, sand, gravel, and stone in the riverbeds.

2. Increased height of the mean water level of the rivers – elevations that, over time, have
become significantly higher than the surrounding floodplain, by as much as 4 or 5
metres.[23]

3. Increased water logging.

4. Scouring of the earthen embankments and catastrophic breaches.

All of these problems have been dealt with in endless reports, articles, forums, and inquiries,
and they need not be rehashed here. However, it must be noted that each of these problems,
individually and collectively, have resulted in losses of human life, the destruction of livelihoods,
the loss of homes and effects, and have destroyed or damaged valuable infrastructures – road,
bridges, railroads, service systems and grids, as well as the embankments and barrages. Equally
important is the repetition of huge expenditures related to relief operations, reclamation due to
water logging, resettlement, and compensation.

Equally important, within the context of a rapidly growing rural population, is the physical
loss of cultivable land. Already, well over 800,000 hectares have been lost to waterlogging and
sand casting. At every turn, the land base of the cultivators of Bihar is shrinking, which the
number of people that land must support increases.

J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 19 of 31

 For many of the rural inhabitants, relief and government compensation have become a way of
life. The word relief was not a part of the average villager’s vocabulary in the mid-1930s.
However, when relief became available for the first time in 1938, things began to change. Initially,
many villagers felt that these handouts were degrading and made them feel like beggars. There
were a proud people. Many outright refused the assistance. That was then. Now, a new generation
with a different set of values and a different work ethic occupies the embankments. With the
onset of the rainy season, “everyone is busy harvesting the fourth crop of the year: flood relief
funds.”[24]

What is important are the consequences of these problems? The cost of embankments is not
just limited to upkeep and maintenance, which amounts to millions of Rupees annually. The
maintenance of the embankments is big business for engineers, contractors, laborers, and
politicians. Each group has a vested interest in keeping the levees in place. None wants to cut the
throat of its own personal cash cow.

Added to the annual maintenance costs are the cost of disaster response and relief payments
or compensation. Again, contractors and politicians have no reluctance accepting the money or
praises their relief efforts engender among those being assisted. Entire humanitarian aid
organizations would lose their mandates without the annual cycle of floods in Bihar. They, too,
have no reason to resolve the problems of the people they serve, once and for all. If the reports are
to be believed, government-sponsored relief reaches no more than 10 to 15 percent of the affected
population. Where do all the monies and supplies go?

One need only look at the amount paid out for food and other relief materials that are
air-lifted to the needy during the annual flood relief efforts. In an article posted in the Times of
India, Depak Mishra mentions that relief material, valued at less than Rs. 10 million has cost the
government Rs. 80 million to deliver![25]

For a variety of reasons – ranging from corruption, misuse, waste, to mismanagement – only
a portion of the food or relief supplies and services ever get to the people displaced by the floods.
Nonetheless, relief activities is a good show. Helicopters drop food packets, oftentimes in the
water, and are either unrecoverable or ruined. Helicopters, flying at a cost of Rs. 80,000 per hour,
are an impressive sight but when food supplies worth Rs. 20 million cost Rs. 200 million to
deliver, someone should have stepped back and asked if this was the best use of the people’s
money. Obviously, no one did. One would think that if the government spent less on helicopter
relief, many more people would have benefited.

J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 20 of 31

 Illustration 2: Helicopters Appear Impressive to Refugees

Source: Getty Images by AFP/Getty Images

Illustration 3: Food Packets Dropped in Water During Relief Efforts

Source: Getty Images by AFP/Getty Images

For the politicians and relief contractors, relief efforts are little more than an exercise in
public relations. It is better to look concerned than take action that would eliminate the need for
such relief. Once the floodwaters recede at the end of the monsoons, the blame-saying and
finger-pointing begins; what compensation payments are to be made are doled out and,
J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 21 of 31
eventually, everything quiets down until the next flood season. The fate or plight of the refugees
that were forced to live on the embankments during the floods are forgotten. The misuse of
government funds is ignored. The construction and repair of damaged roadways, bridges,
railways, electric and telephone poles, public and private buildings and embankments begin. Life
returns to “normal” for everyone except those that will be displaced again next year and have had
to pick up the pieces of their lives after this year’s floods.

Following the 1987 floods, the government made two specific promises to the people in the
flood affected areas. Both were simple, inexpensive and potentially life- and cost-saving:

1. The construction of helipads in every block to ensure the speedy and reliable delivery
of relief supplies and materials.

2. The construction of raised platforms in every gram panchayat, where the people could
assemble and find food and shelter during times of emergency.[26]

To date, neither of these promises has been kept. From the point of view of relief workers, it
would make sense to have all the people who have been displaced concentrated in one area. The
helipads and shelter platforms would make relief efforts much easier. Instead the people
congregate on the embankments, which only serve to disperse them and strain relief efforts. The
cost of helipads and platforms would be nominal in comparison to the costs of ferrying goods,
material, food and people between warehouses and the scattered delivery points. The question,
then, is why have these simple facilities not been created?

From time to time, the refugees on the embankments are shooed away by the local police.
They encroach on the roadways and railways atop the embankments. They are despoiling the
embankments with refuse and human waste. Simultaneously, they are contaminating the
surrounding water with waste, both human and livestock. While concentrating the refugees in the
centralized relief centers, environmental contamination probably could not be avoided, it would
be much less widespread and more controllable, than if the refugees and their livestock are spread
along the embankments.

Admittedly, the embankments are not the best location for refugees and relief camps, but in
the absence of alternatives, where are these dispossessed people to go? The government, itself,
made proposals that would keep many of the refugees off the embankments, only to renege. So,
the responsibility for refugees residing on the tops of the embankments, and environmental
contamination, lies squarely with the politicians who failed their constituencies.

Disasters and Kosi Floods

Disaster preparedness, responses plans, and management have become all the buzz in the
halls of government and among many NGOs. The reason that they have become so important is
J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 22 of 31
that there are tremendous amounts of money being made available by national governments and
international development agencies to provide for disaster preparedness, management,
prevention, and relief. As a consequence, governments at all levels, as well as NGOs, are in
competition for these monies.

The breach of the Afflux embankment might well be classified as a disaster, because of its
unique nature. The annual flooding caused by the Kosi should not be deemed disasters, however.
They may be catastrophic but they are not disasters. They are a way of life, or as one write has put
it, they have been, and continue to be part of the lifestyle of the people of northern Bihar.[27]
They are and should not be deemed disasters. Disasters, by their very nature, are unique,
unanticipated, and irregular in their occurrence, for example, earthquakes. The floods of the Kosi
are not unique, they come and go with almost clockwork precision, and are regular events.

The value in calling the Kosi’s annual floods disasters lies in the fact that, if governments
classify an event as a disaster a number of things happen. First, the governmental authorities do
not have to assume any responsibility for the event and, therefore, are not liable for the resulting
damage caused by the ‘disaster.’ Second, large quantities of money are released by national
governments and international agencies in the event of a disaster. Therefore, disasters represent

Illustration 4: Makeshift Refugee Camp Atop Embankment

Source: Reuters Pictures

J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 23 of 31

 the opportunity for the influx of large quantities of, often, unaccountable cash flow for
entrepreneurs, disaster planners, disaster management organizers, suppliers and those involved in
rehabilitation programs. Finally, despite the graft involved in post-disaster recovery programs, it
is difficult for the citizens to fault the planners, organizers, and relief workers for their efforts, no
matter how profitable they may be. For the politicians, whether they benefit financially from the
relief efforts or not, they foster the impression among their constituencies of working on the
people’s behalf. It is simply good political economy and electioneering.

More importantly, by classifying the annual cycle of floods in Bihar as disasters, the real root
causes of the floods are, so to speak, ‘swept under the rug’ and are never addressed. If
governments and politicians never have to accept responsibility for floods that have grown in
both duration and ferocity, and they are called disasters, they then become Acts of God. However,
the floods of northern Bihar are not Acts of God. Their destructiveness is first and foremost the
result of unwise, ill informed, ill-conceived and poorly implemented land and water management
practices and the construction of the very embankments meant to protect the people. As such, the
government and politicians who stood behind these plans and construction projects must be held
accountable for their actions.

Some Specific Recommendations

An attempt has been made to divine some of the problems caused by floods and flooding.
This topic is, and has been, the subject of numerous books, learned articles, newspaper and
magazine reports, and endless blog discussions. Likewise, the issue of flood has been hashed and
rehashed among politicians, NGOs, and Select Committees and Commissions. In the end, little
has changed, either in the halls of government or on the individual cultivator’s plot of land.

The dragging of feet and the ignoring of repetitive reports and recommendations needs to
come to an end. The politicians lament the plight of the poor cultivators whose lands have been
inundated, waterlogged, or wasted by castings, or the loss of lives, livestock, and crops; yet year
after year, absolutely nothing changes, except that the plight of those whose lands and homes
become flooded requires ever larger relief expenditures and compensation payments. Simply put,
this cycle needs to stop. An already impoverished countryside can never recover, as long as the
real problems associated with floods are not faced head on and addressed once and for all..

The system of embankments and barrages were intended to protect the cultivators. They have
not. There is more flood-prone land now than there was before the first Kosi embankments were
constructed. During this same time period, numerous yield-improving technologies have been
introduced to Indian agriculture. These agricultural improvements, coupled with flood
protection, should have resulted in cultivators’ being able to work the land more intensely, longer,
and realize larger harvests. None of these things has happened. Agricultural productivity in Bihar
is, almost consistently below that of any other area, region, or state in India.[28] This situation
J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 24 of 31
cannot be laid entirely at the foot of the flood problem but flooding is the primary source of the
problem.

The only people to benefit from the embankments are the engineers, contractors, politicians
and, later, the relief workers. Billons upon billions of rupees are expended in the construction and
maintenance and repair of the embankments. Still more billions are consumed with the annual
cycle of relief costs, payments, and compensation. It is good money being thrown away after bad
judgment calls and decisions at all levels of government. The people of Bihar had asked for help.
They did not envision that their lives would become a functioning part of a larger system of
compensation and relief payments.

Instead of the embankments stopping the floods, they have exacerbated them. More land has
been lost to embankment-related processes than were ever lost due to over-cultivation. Today, as
a result of a socio-economic and political legacy, coupled with the consequences of the state’s
embankment and flood policies and endorsements, Bihar has become the least progressive state
in the union. This is a sad comment, especially in light of the fact that, at one time, Bihar was
perceived as being agriculturally, economically, and politically, a national leader and a state to be
emulated.

Recommendations

1. A realistic assessment must be made regarding the efficacy of maintaining the existing
system of earthen embankments. Repeatedly, private and government sponsored commissions
and inquiries have suggested that the existing embankment system is incapable of protecting the
citizens of Bihar from floods and is, in all likelihood, the source of persistent water logging and
catastrophic flood events. These reports and studies have been prepared; it is time to bring them
out into the light of day, even if they are not consistent with current political platforms or
agendas.

2. A system for early flood warnings must be implemented. Currently the individual
components and technological know-how exist but it must be integrated and activated.
Event-specific criteria must be established for the activation of the system and the system cannot
be based on a committee type mentality or response.

3. A detailed cost-benefit analysis must be undertaken to determine an economically more

prudent approach to flood control, relief implementation, reconstruction expenditures, and
compensation payments.

4. Assess and evaluate current civil engineering projects – such as roadways, railways, and
bridges – in terms of their role in exacerbating current flood problems and patterns, and as to
how these infrastructural projects interfere with the recession of floodwaters and normal drainage

J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 25 of 31

patterns.

5. Constructively evaluate and assess current embankment maintenance procedures,

budgets, and contract-letting standards, as well as a periodic review of engineers' and inspectors'
qualifications, and promote recertification where deemed necessary.

6. Review all existing flood control and flood assistance policies and programs in terms of
assessing transparency and accountability. This will require the impartial evaluation of the roles
and responsibilities of government ministries, departments, and agencies, with an eye to
removing the influence of vested interests, whether they be politically or economically motivated.

7. Corruption, graft, influence peddling, extortion, and power-brokering at all levels of

government must be rooted out and those that have violated existing law must be prosecuted to
the fullest extent of the law. This is particularly true regarding flood prevention, post-flood relief,
rehabilitation, and compensation programs. These programs cannot be used by politicians,
elected or otherwise, for the purposes of electioneering. They must be implemented impartially
and without political favoritism.

8. Critical positions within the government’s flood control or emergency response

bureaucracies cannot be left unmanned. A formal system for ‘covering’ personnel absences must
be put in place and monitored. Information cannot be bottlenecked due to holidays or sick or
personal leaves of absence.

9. Formal and informal agency territoriality or ‘turfism’ cannot interfere with critical
program response programs. Agency responsibilities must be clearly defined but they should not
be so rigid as to bring the system to a standstill because of personnel absences or vacancies. If a
decision must be made and the individual or group responsible for the making of that decision is
unavailable, the chain of command needs to be flexible enough to remain responsive, and at the
same time accountable.

10. The international flood control arrangement between Nepal, India, and specifically Bihar,
is untenable as it currently exists. The roles and responsibilities of the nations and state are vague
at best and ambiguous and, therefore, impractical. International diplomacy interferes with the
smooth running of the flood abatement system and inevitably results in political castigation and
finger-pointing, as well as causing delays in emergency response situations. Valuable time is lost
to questions of jurisdiction and personnel safety. That which is in Nepal must and should be
maintained by Nepalis. That which is in India or Bihar must and should be maintained by
Indians.

International treaties and agreements are always subject to political vagaries and political
personalities. In the case of flood protection, the roles, responsibilities, and accountability of both

J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 26 of 31

parties must be clearly spelled out. Failure to have clear cut roles places human lives in jeopardy.

The impact of, or consequences of international diplomacy, are inherently latent in explaining
and laying responsibility or accountability in the case of such incidences as occurred in August
2008. Flooding is not diplomatic. It is catastrophic and should not be handled diplomatically.

Khoma Raj Dahal, Deputy Director General, at the department of water-induced disaster
prevention, in Nepal’s ministry of water resources, statee that the repair and maintenance of the
Afflux Bund is the Indian government’s responsibility. Technically, this is correct. He also asserts
that

. . . there may be issues of corruption as well in maintaining the barrage

but I would not like to talk about it because we do not have information on
it. India and Nepal need to exploit the river jointly, but I think the problem
is more political in nature.[29]

11. Politicians must begin to understand that they are the servants of the people that elect
them. As such, it is their responsibility to make every effort to improve their constituents’
well-being. They need to realize that political ambition and success does not carry with it the keys
to a fiefdom or kingdom that they can plunder with impunity.

John Adams once commented:

Government is instituted for the common good; for the protection, safety,
prosperity, and happiness of the people; and not for profit, honor, or private
interest of any one man, family, or class of men; therefore, the people alone
have an incontestable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to institute
government; and to reform, alter, or totally change the same, when their
protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness require it.

If, however, the populace, or the electorate, tolerates thieves, corruption, and plunderers, they
have gotten the government they deserve.[30] Bihar, in the early 1950s, was heralded as the
shining star among the states of India, with regard to governance and the political awakening and
mobilization of its electorate. Now it has become totally discredited and has been given the title of
being the worst governed state in all India. Now, Bihar has become

. . . a macro-indicator for the measurement of backwardness and

reference point for institutional collapse. It lead the nation through the
Jayaprakash Narayan (JP) movement to fight corruption and misrule, but
itself plunged into massive corruption and misrule of family fiefdom.[31]

If Bihar were able to resolve its current governance and corruption problems, many of the
problems associated with the state’s embankments and flooding would, inevitably be openly

J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 27 of 31

debated and intelligently addressed. If that does not happen, each year will be a repeat of the year
before – unrelenting and unending misery and suffering caused by uncontrollable flooding.

Endnotes:
[1] (Mishra, 2008).
[2] (Pearson, 2008).
[3] (ICT by IANS , 2008).
[4] (AFP, 2008).
[5] (Bhusal, Thira L. and Shankar Kharel, 2008).
[6] (ANI, 2008).
[7] (Bureau Report, 2009).
[8] Between 1931 and 1949, the Kosi has changed its course numerous times and each time it had
moved westward to the channel it occupied until the Afflux breach of August 2008. For the first time,
the river returned to channels that it had occupied nearly a century earlier and had moved eastward.
[9] Among the scores of NGOs, two stand out – the Mahananda Tatvandh Virodhi Sangharsha
Committee and the Barh Mukti Abhiyan.
[10] See (Pun, 2008) for an excellent survey of the 'Kosi problem.'
[11] (Karunakaran, 2004).
[12] (WAFED-Nepal, 2008).
[13] In undivided Bihar, there existed a total of 3,465 kms of embankments, constructed at a cost
estimated between 746 and 1,327 crores Rupees. Of this amount, the Kosi comprises 251 kms (125 km
along the eastern side of the river and 126 kms along the western side.
[14] In the post-bifurcated Bihar, there are approximately 3,450 kms of embankments, which possess,
essentially, the same potential for failure; although the Kosi, because of its inherent nature, is most
prone to catastrophic failures and flooding.
[15] See endnotes 9 and 10 above.
[16] (Karunakaran, 2004).
[17] Treaty of "Peace and Friendship",
http://www.childtrafficking.com/Docs/indo_nepal_treaty_1950_4.pdf
[18] (Majumdar, 2008).
[19] (Reuters, Floods have pushed Bihar back by 50 years, 2008).
[20] As quoted in: For All the People . . . American Economic Cooperation with Indian Development,

J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 28 of 31

 1974, p. 19.
[21] (Priyadarshi, 2008).
[22] See endnote 10, above.
[23] (Reddy, D. V., D. Kumar, Dipankar Saha, and K. K . Mandal, 2008).
[24] (Mishra D. K., Harvesting Flood Relief, 2004).
[25] (Mishra D. K., 2005).
[26] (Mishra D. K., E-mail communication, 2007).
[27] Personal e-mail communication with Dinesh Kimar Mishra.
[28] (Yadav, C.P.; B.S. Gupta: and S. Kumar, 2000).
[29] (Bhaskar, 2008).
[30] A paraphrase of Alexis de Tocqueville's comment: "In a democracy, the people get the government
they deserve.
[31] (Rohtak, 2005).

I would like to thank Dinesh Kumar Mishra for his constructive and critical comments of an earlier
draft of this document.

All opinions expressed in this document are entirely those of the author.

References:

AFP (2008, September 04). India and Nepal Trade Blame Over Flood Defences. Retrieved February 03,
2009, from Mail and Guardian Online:
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-09-04-india-and-nepal-trade-blame-over-flood-defences.

ANI (2008, August 28). Koshi Embankment Reconstruction to Cost 5.25 Billion Rupees. Retrieved February
2, 2009, from Thaindian News:
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/business/koshi-embankment-reconstruction-to-cost-525-billion-r
upees_10089731.html.

Bhaskar, U. (2008, September 22). Nepal Says Kosi May Move East Another 150km; India Unaware.
Retrieved February 06, 2009, from LiveMint.com - The Wall Street Journal -- Lounge:
http://www.livemint.com/2008/09/22075502/Nepal-says-Kosi-may-move-east.html?d=1.

Bhusal, Thira L. and Shankar Kharel (2008, August 31). Bihar Floods, 2008. Retrieved February 1, 2009,
from India Water Portal: http://www.indiawaterportal.org/bihar/?m=20080904.

J. Albert Rorabacher 24 February 2009 Page 29 of 31

Bureau Report (2009, January 27). Kosi River Put Back on Original Course . Retrieved February 2, 2009,
from ZeeNews.Com: http://www.zeenews.com/states/2009-01-27/502228news.html.

Catholic Relief Services (2008). India’s Flood Camps Provide Raw Necessities. Retrieved February 05, 2009,
from CRS Home Newsletter:
http://images.google.ca/imgres?imgurl=http://crs-blog.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/shallow-trench-la
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