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Associated Communications & Wireless Services (ACWS) vs.

NTC 2003 Facts: On 1931, Act 3846 was enacted which requires a congressional franchise before a radio station can operate. On 1969, ACWS acquired a congressional franchise for radio which made it eligible to establish a radio station. In 1974, PD 576 was issued which requires radio and TV stations to obtain a permit from Board of Communications and DPWH. However, on 1979 EO 546, abolished BC and created NTC. There has been a conflict of interpretation with PD 576 and EO 546 and thus, DOJ issued on DOJ Opinion 98 of 1991 that EO 546 modified the requirements granted by PD 576. On 1994, MOU between broadcasting groups and NTC was established which requires a congressional franchise to operate. Petition, in the same year, tried to acquire a congressional franchise but failed due to lack of requirements. However, petitioner was given temporary permit to operate by the NTC which would expire in 1997. On 1997, NTC informed that ACWS needs to acquire a congressional franchise before it can operate. Yet, petitioner failed to gain such franchise. Therefore, NTC held an administrative case against petitioner and concluded that it its Channel 25 shall be recalled. Petitioner raised it to CA and said that it already filed for a congressional franchise and therefore the recall should be suspended. CA affirmed the decision of NTC. Issues: 1. Does it mean that, since television stations are not covered in Act 3846, television stations are exempted from obtaining a franchise? 2. Does PD 576 abolishes the requirement for a congressional franchise? 3. Did the CPC requirement in EO 546 repeal the franchise requirement in PD 576? 4. Should the DOJ Opinion 98 be followed? 5. Should the MOU be a basis of the courts decision? Held: 1. No. Though does not literally cover televisions, the subsequent PD 576 covers the congressional franchise requirement for television stations also. 2. No. Even assuming that Act 3846 only covers radio stations, PD 576 fills the gap. The petitioner contends that Sec 6 of PD 576 states that it abolishes the requirement of a franchise upon December 31, 1981. However, in reading the second sentence of the section, it depicts the word irrespective of any franchise which means that the intent of the law is not remove the franchise requirement but only to add an additional requirement which is the BC and DPWH permit. If the statute wanted to remove the franchise requirement, it should not have included the second sentence. This interpretation of the 2nd sentence adheres to the rule in statutory construction that words in a statute should not be construed as

surplusage/nonsense if a reasonable construction which will give them some force and meaning is possible. 3. No. Even in the PD 576, the BC has been issuing CPC and when EO 546 was enacted, it only stated that the issuance of CPC shall be done by the NTC. There is nothing new in the requirement nor does it imply that the franchise requirement has been abolished in EO 546. It adheres to legal maxim in pare materia, although containing apparent inconsistencies, statutes should, as far as reasonably possible, be construed in harmony with each other, so as to give force and effect to each. In the case at bar, there is no indication that the CPC has abolished franchise requirement in both PD 567 and EO 546. 4. No. The DOJ Opinion 98 stating that the requirements of the PD 576 have been modified by EO 546 does not express that there is no more need for a franchise requirement. The opinion is merely persuasive and not controlling. 5. Yes. The contention of the petitioner that the MOU should not be followed, which requires a franchise, because EO 546 and DOJ Opinion 98 does not require a franchise is faulty because MOU clarifies the franchise requirement under PD 576. Moreover, it is evident that the petitioner recognizes the need of a congressional franchise as it immediately filed for a franchise in 1994 after establishing MOU. Petition is denied.

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