Aquino v.

Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, September 17, 1974 En Banc (all Justices wrote their opinion) Petitioners are: Ninoy, Mitra, F. Rordrigo, N. Rama, J. Roces, Locsin, Fadul, Galang, Go Eng Guan, Maximo Soliven, Constantino, Luis Mauricio, Jose Diokno and wife, Carmen, Voltaire Garcia (case were withdrawn bec. Petitioner died), Yuyitung, Tan Chin Hian, Doronila, Mercado, Abaya, Granada, Beltran, Bren Guiao, Cusipag, Ordonez, Almario, Baun, Guiao and T. Guiao (also died) and Rondon. Respondents are: Enrile as Sec. Natl Defense, Espino as Chief of Staff AFP, Ramos as Chief, Phil. Constabulary FACTS According to Chief Justice Makalintal: These nine cases are all about the petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested and detained unlawfully by the military by virtue of Proclamation no. 1081 dated September 21, 1972 through the President exercising his powers he assumed by virtue of Martial Law. The petitioners were arrested pursuant to Gen. Order no 2 for being participants or for having giving aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the Government by force (September 22, 1972). The provision of the 1935 constitution reads the President shall be commander-inchief of all armed forces in the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Art VII Section 10(2) Accdg to Castro, J.: On Sept 21 1972, the country was placed under Martial Law. From Sept 22 to 30, petitioners were arrested by the military authorities and detained, some at Fort Bonifacio, Rizal, Camp Aguinaldo and Camp Crame. They aver that the arrest and detention were illegal having been effected without valid order of a court of justice. Writ of habeas corpus were directed by the Court directing respondents to produce the bodies of the petitioners in Court. Respondents, through the Solicitor General, answered that such arrests were legally ordered by the President pursuant to Proclamation of Martial Law as participant or as having giving aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power and to take the government by force. Hearings were held on 26 and 29 September and October 6. Meanwhile, some of the petitioners, with leave of Court, withdrew their petitions, others were released from custody under certain restrictive conditions. Voltaire died after his release, the action was deemed abated. Only Diokno AND Benigno Aquino was still in military custody (September 9, 1972 the date of the supposed promulgation of the nine cases.) On September 11 1972, the petitioner Diokno was released. Eleven members voted to dismiss Dioknos

petition as being moot and academic except Castro, who find Dioknos derogatory imputations grave and highly insulting. On August 23 1973, petitioner Ninoy filed an action for certiorari and prohibition with this Court, alleging that on 11 August 1973 charges of murder, subversion and illegal possession of firearm were filed against him, that his trial held on August 27, 29, 31 was illegal because the proclamation of Martial law was unconstitutional and that he could not expect a fair trial because the President could reverse any judgment of acquittal by the military court and sentence him to death. Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. vs. Military Commission No. 2 On the other hand, December 28 1973, Jose Diokno filed a motion to withdraw his petition filed in his behalf, imputing the (1) delay in the disposition of the case, (2) that the decision of the Court in the Ratification cases contrary to the Courts ruling that the 1973 Constitution was not validly ratified and (3) the action of the members of the Court taking an oath to the new Constitution and which becomes a different court in which he filed his petition. Diokno asserts that a conscience that allows man to rot behind bars for more than one year and three months without trialof course, without any charges at allis a conscience that has become stunted, if not stultified.. and I can not continue to entrust my case to them; and I have become thoroughly convinced that our quest for justice in my case is futile. Issue(s): 1. Whether or not this court may inquire into the validity of Proclamation no 1081. Is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise of power to declare martial law subject to judicial inquiry? Is the question political or justiciable in character? Ruling: YES. Five justices held that the question is political and should not be determined by court. (Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Aquino) Fernandez adds that as a member of the 1973 Convention he believes that the as a member of the Convention, they have put an imprimatur on the proposition of the validity of a martial law proclamation Barredo believes that political question are not per se beyond the courts jurisdiction, judicial power vested in it by the Constitution being all-embracing and plenary but as a matter of policy should abstain from interfering with the Executives Proclamation. Esguerra finds that the declaration of martial law is final and conclusive upon the courts. Antonio finds that there is no dispute as to the existence of a state of rebellion and on that premise emphasizes the factor of necessity for the exercise of the president under the 1935 Constitution to declare martial law. Four on the side of justiciability: Castro, Fernando, Teehanke and Munoz Palma. The constitutional sufficiency may be inquired into by court and would thus apply the principle laid down by Lansang although the case refers to the power of President to suspend habeas corpus. The recognition of justiciability in Lansang is there distinguished from the power of judicial review and is limited to ascertaining whether the President has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of the act. The Test is whether in suspending the writ of habeas corpus, the president he did or did not acted arbitrarily (bias, capricious). Applying the test, the Justices find no arbitrariness in the Presidents proclamation of martial law pursuant to the 1935

Constitution. The bases for the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, with regards to the existence of a state rebellion in the country, had not disappeared but had even worsened. The question of the validity of the Proclamation no 1081 has been foreclosed by the transitory provision of the 1973 Constitution (Art XVII. Sec 3 (2)) that all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after the ratification of this Constitution. The political or justiciable question controversy has become moot and purposeless as a consequence of the referendum of July 27-28, 1973. The question which was overwhelmingly voted upon by a majority of voters, even between 15 and 18 years of age in affirmative: Under the 1973 Constitution, the President, if he so desires, can continue in office beyond 1973 and finish the reforms he initiated under martial law?
***If you want a more nakaka-nosebleed facts of the Case, refer to page 326 up to 336

2. Whether or not the petitions for writ of habeas corpus should be suspended contending that the proclamation of Martial Law was unconstitutional. YES. The petitions should be dismissed with respect to petitioners who have been released from detention but have not withdrawn their petitions because they are still subject to certain restrictions. Implicit in the state of martial law is the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation: to suppress invasion, insurrection, rebellion or to safeguard public safety against imminent danger thereof. RULING SUMMARIZED (Castro): 1. That the proclamation of Martial Law in September 1972 by the President was within the 1932 Constitution 2. That because the Communist rebellion had not been abated and instead the subversion had proliferated throughout the country, the imposition of martial law was an imperative of national survival. 3. that the arrest and detention of the persons who were participants or gave aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the Government by force were not unconstitutional nor arbitrary 4. that subsumed in the declaration of martial law is the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus 5. that the fact that the regular courts are open cannot be accepted as evidence that rebellion and insurrection no longer imperil the safety of the state 6. that actual armed combat has been and still raging in parts of Mindanao, Bicol and Cagayan 7. that the hosts of doubts with respect to the validity of the ratification and effectivity of the 1973 Constitution has been dispelled by the national referendum of July 1973 8. that the issue of the validity and constitutionality of the arrest and detention of all the petitioners and of the restrictions imposed upon those who were

freed, is now foreclosed by the transitory provision of 1973 CONSTITUTION (Article XVII Sec 3 (2)) which validates all acts made by the President.
**Habeas Corpus- the purpose of the writ is to inquire into the cause or reason why a person is being restrained of his liberty against his will and if there is no legal and/or valid justification shown for such restraint the writ will forthwith issue to restore to that person his liberty or freedom.

***The complete provision of Proclamaccion numero 1081, page 343-359

LANSANG VS. COURT OF APPEALS 326 SCRA 259 25 FEBRUARY 2000 QUISIMBING, J.

FACTS: Private respondents General Assembly of the Blind (GABI) were allegedly awarded a verbal contract of lease in 1970 by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), a government initiated civic body engaged in the development of national perks including Rizal Park. No document or instrument appears on record to show the grantor of the verbal license to private respondents to occupy a portion of the government park. They were given office and library space as well as kiosks for selling food and drinks along TM Kalaw. 40 % of the profits derived from the kiosks were to remit to NPDC again without anything shown on the record. With the change of the Government after the EDSA Revolution, a new chairman of the NPDC, Amado J. Lansang (herein petitioner), sought to clean up Rizal Park. Petitioner terminated the so-called verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the park. Notice was given March 5, 1988 and respondents were given until March 8 to vacate. The notice was signed by Jose Iglesias, GABI president, allegedly to indicate his conformity to its contents. However, Iglesias, who was totally blind, claims that he was deceived into signing the notice. GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the Regional Trial Court against petitioner. The trial court issued a TRO and expired on March 28, 1988. The following day GABI was finally evicted by NPDC. RTCs ruling: The case was dismissed ruling that the complaint was against the state which could not be sued without its consent. Court of Appeals ruling: Reversed the decision. The mere allegation that the government official is being sued in his official capacity is not enough to protect such official from liability for acts done without or in excess of his authority.

ISSUES: 1. W/N respondent court erred in not holding that private respondents complaint against petitioner, as chairman of NPDC, and his co-defendants in civil case no. 88-43887, is in effect a suit against the state which cannot be sued without its consent. 2. W/N respondent court erred in not holding that petitioners act of terminating respondent GABIs concession is valid and done in the lawful performance of official duty.

HELD: The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith. There is no question in the capacity of the petitioner as NPDC chairman and his authority to terminate the agreement. The question now is whether or not the petitioner abused his authority in ordering the ejectment of the private respondents. However, no evidence of such abuse of authority is on record. Rizal part is beyond the commerce of man, thus could not be subject to lease of contract. Private respondents cannot and does nit claim a vested right to continue to occupy Rizal Park. However, the petitioners cannot be awarded with moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees. There is no evidence on record to support Iglesias claim that he suffered moral injury as a result of GABIs ejectment from Rizal Park. ] WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside. Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff 75 Phil 875 August 20, 1946 Tuason, J. Facts: Outbreak of the war against Japanese invaders

Ramon Ruffy, Prudente Francisco and Andres Fortus, petitioners herein, were the Provincial Commander, a junior officer and a corporal of the Philippine Constabulary garrison stationed in Mindoro, respectively Japanese forces came to Mindoro which made Ruffys troop retreat to the mountains and organized a guerilla outfit called the Bolo Combat Team or the Bolo Area Civilians Jose Garcia, Dominador Adeva and Victoriano Dinglasan also became members of the Bolo Area Petitioners were promoted: Ruffy was named the Commanding Officer of the Bolo Area, Dinglasan became the Finance Officer, Garcia was named Captain while Adeva and Francisco were named 3rd Lt. and 2nd Lt, respectively Change in the command of the Bolo Area was effected relieving Ruffy of his position by Capt. Beloncio Capt. Beloncio was allegedly slain by petitioners

Issue: Whether or not petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense for which they had been placed on trial was committed Held: Yes, petitioners were still subject to military law at the time the offense was committed. The Court ruled that members of the Armed Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War and other laws relating to the Armed Forces even during the Japanese occupation. The act of unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, in defiance of the 95the Article of War, held subjects liable to military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, petitioners were officers of the Bolo Area and the 6th Military District, operating under orders of duly established and duly appointed commanders of the US Army. Aside from that, and in response to petitioners argument that courts-martial have no jurisdiction over the case, the Court ruled that courts-martial do have authority, being agencies of executive character. Petition is denied. Dissenting Opinion: Perfecto, J. The fact that enemy occupation does not relieve petitioners from their sworn duties as well as from the punishment they must incur for their conduct is affirmed. However, petition must be granted on the grounds that final judgments should come from the Supreme Court who has the authority to review, revise, reverse or modify judgments

by military tribunals. Courts-martial are, in fact, inferior courts established by law.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC 270 SCRA 106, MARCH 19, 1997 FACTS: Private respondent Delfin filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Art. Xii of the 1987 Constitution. R.A. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. The proposed amendments consist of the submission of this proposition to the people Do you approve the lifting of the term limits of all elective officials, amending for the purpose section 4 and 7 of Art. VI, Section 4 of Art. VII, and Section of Art. X of the Philippine Consitution? The COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Raul Roco, the IBP, DemokrasyaIpagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN) appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco movedto dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not initiatory party cognizable by the COMELEC. Petitioners filed a special civil action directing respondents COMELEC and DElfins Petition to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under sec.2 of Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners raise the following arguments: 1. The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed. 2. R.A. 6735 failed to provide subtitle initiative on the Constitutions, unlike in the other modes of initiative. It only provides for the effectivity of the law after the publication in print media indicating that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter takes effect only upon ratification and not after publication. 3. COMLEC Resolution No.2300, adopted on January 16, 1991 to govern the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative or amendments to the Constitution are concerned since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulation for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only the Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law. 4. The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, to the revision thereof. Extending or lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision and is therefore outside the power of the peoples initiative. 5. Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for peoples initiative, neither the COMELEC nor any other department, agency or office of the government has realigned funds for the purpose. The Supreme Court gave due course to this petition and granted the Motions for Intervention filed by Petitioners-Intervenors DIK, MABINI, IBP, LABAN, and Senator Roco. ISSUES: 1. Whether Sec. 2, art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision? 2. Whether R.A. 6735 is a sufficient statutory implementation of the said constitutional provision? 3. Whether the COMELEC resolution is valid? 4. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials as proposed would constitute a revision, or an amendment to the Constitution? HELD:

1. NO. Although the mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis, it is still dependent on congressional action. While the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if the Congress for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation. 2. NO. R.A. 6735 is insufficient and incomplete to fully comply with the power and duty of the Congress to enact the statutory implementation of sec.2, Art. XVII of the Constitution. Although said Act intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it is deemed inadequate to cover that system and accordingly provide for a local initiative required for proposing Constitutional changes. 3. NO. The COMELEC Resolution insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is void, as expressed in the Latin maxim Potestas delegate non delegari potest. In every case of permissible delegation, it must be shown that the delegation itself is valid. 4. The resolution of this issue is held to be unnecessary, it not academic, as the proposal to lift the term limits of elective local and national officials is an amendment to the Constitution and not a revision. Thus, the petition was granted, and the COMELEC is permanently enjoined from taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.