GONZALES VS MILLER, 69 PHIL 340

FACTS: Having issued writ of execution, is embargoed the lots 356 and
357, described in the certificates of title 8373 and 8372, respectively, which
lots had bought Catalina Climacus of Isabelo Front and Julian In Front on
26 November 1928 with money from its exclusive property. Having passed
the deadline for the retracted them and not having exercised the right, the
Sheriff of Zamboanga Provincial granted final deed of sale of these lots in
favor of the plaintiff.


ISSUE: Whether or not the lots in question are here paraphernal Catalina
Climacus or spouses of her and her husband, Charles H. Miller?


HELD: Article 1407 of the Civil Code states that "It inhere acquired all the
assets of the marriage while it is proved that privatimente belong to the
husband or the wife." While it is true that when Catalina Climacus acquired
by purchase from Isabelo Front and Julian before November 26, 1928 lots.
356 And 357 was already married to Charles H. Miller, consists for his
statement not contradicted or challenged of false that the money with which
the acquired was its exclusive property or parafernal. The fact that the
transfer certificates of title we. 8372 AND 8373, relating to the
menmencionados lots, does not say that the registered owners are
Catalino Climacus and her husband Charles H. Miller, but that is said to be
Catalina Climacus says, "the wife of Charles H. Miller," indicates the
paraphernal wife Catherine Climacus, since the English phrase "the wife of
Charles H. Miller" is simply a description of their marital status.


PEOPLES BANK VS REGISTER OF DEEDS, 60 PHIL 167


Facts: Appeal from CFI Manila judgment denying registration of instrument
entitled Agreement and Declaration of Trust in which Dominga Angeles,
married to Manuel Sandoval living in Palawan, conveyed in trust her
paraphernal property, trustee was to redeem mortgage constituted on such
property with funds derived from the rents or sale thereof, grant a loan of
P10000 with which to redeem mortgage and collect the rents to be derived
from said property while remained unsold.


Issues:
1. Whether or not the rents collected are fruits of the wifes property
which therefore belongs to CPG?
2. Whether or not management belongs to husband?
3. Whether or not contract is null and void since husband did not give
consent?


Held: Wife, as owner and administratrix of her paraphernal property, may
appoint trustee to collect the fruits of her property. The fruits are not yet
conjugal property since they still have to answer to expenses in the
administration and preservation of the paraphernal property. She may
likewise do such without consent of the husband, subject to recourse by
husband or his heirs, thus rendering such contract merely voidable or void.


PEREZ VS PEREZ, 109 PHIL 64

Facts: On 03 June 1985, a civil case for Annulment of Public Auction Sale
with Damages coupled with Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for
Restraining Order was filed by herein petitioners against the respondents
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Balanga, Bataan. It was originally
assigned to Branch 3, but was later re-raffled to Branch 1, presided over by
Judge Benjamin T. Vianzon. After trial, a decision was eventually
promulgated by the RTC on 11 August 1993. Finding no merit in the
complaint, it dismissed the case.
Not satisfied with the RTCs ruling, the petitioners filed an appeal with the
Court of Appeals. In a Resolution dated 15 June 2000, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.


Issue: Whether or not the essential requirements for the validity of the
sheriffs auction sale under Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118,
governing the extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage, have been
observed in the instant case?


Held: Paradoxically, the petitioners have not adduced any evidence to
support his theory. In fact, there was no attempt at all towards that end.
The supposition must, therefore, fall flat on its face. As correctly held by the
trial court and the appellate court, the deputy sheriff has in his favor the
presumption that his official duty was regularly performed. The petitioners
herein were unable to topple this presumption in the trial court, the Court of
Appeals, and now in this Court.
To be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that it is published
for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has
a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; and that it is published at
regular intervals.


RODRIGUEZ VERSUS DELA CRUZ, 8 PHIL 665

Facts: On the 21st day of August, 1905, the plaintiff, through her attorneys,
filed an amended complaint in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Albay for the purpose of recovering from the defendant certain pieces or
parcels of land described in the complaint, alleging: That she was the
owner of the said lands; that she had acquired said lands during her first
marriage from her deceased father. As a special defense the defendants
set up the judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay
of the 29th of March, 1905. The lower court found as a fact from the
evidence adduced during the trial that the lands described in the complaint
were acquired by Hilarion de la Cruz, the father of the present defendants,
"during his married life with his first wife, Andrea de Leon,".


Issues: Whether or not said property belongs to Hilarion dela Cruz?


Held: Article 1382 of the Civil Code provides that the wife shall retain the
ownership of her property which she brings to the marriage relation. It is
true that article 1384 prescribes that she shall have the management of the
property, unless she was delivered the same to her husband by means of a
public document, providing that he may administer said property; but it
cannot be claimed; from the mere fact that she has permitted her husband
to administer her property without having his authority to do so evidenced
by a public document, that she has thereby lost her property and that the
same has become the property of her husband. No such claim was made
in the court below on behalf of the defendants. Their claim was that the
said Hilarion de la Cruz had acquired said property during the existence of
his marriage with his first wife, Andrea de Leon.


BABAO VS VILLAVICENCIO, 44 PHIL 921


Facts: In the proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of Ignacio
Trillanes, Maria Babao, the herein appellee, petitioned the court below that
an additional inventory be made of certain properties of the deceased and
an allowance be made to her minor children for their support, pending the
distribution of the estate. These minors are children of Jose Trillanes. This
petition was opposed by the administratrix of the estate on the ground that
said minors are not entitled to the support applied for, because section 684
of the Code of Civil Procedure provides only for the support of the children
of the deceased and not of his grandchildren. The lower court, however,
held otherwise and allowed P15 monthly pension to. The administratrix of
the estate appealed from this ruling.


Issue: Whether or not the right to the provisional support granted by
section 684 of the Code of Civil Procedure extends to the grandchildren of
the deceased?


Held: The ordinary acceptation, therefore, of the word "hijo" or child does
not include "nieto" or "grandchild." The reference made in the aforesaid
section to "allowances as are provided by the law in force in the Philippine
Islands," does not, in the opinion of the court, have the effect of extending
the right to this provisional support to persons other than the children of the
deceased. Appellee does not, and cannot, invoke but section 684 of the
Code of Civil Procedure in support of her petition, whose provisions on this
point do not, in the opinion of the court, extend to the grandchildren of the
deceased. She cannot invoke the Civil Code because the grandfather
against whose estate the allowance claimed is to be charged is now dead,
and therefore the obligation of such a grandfather to give support was
already extinguished. (Art. 150, Civ. Code.)


MOORE AND SONS CO VERSUS WAGNER, 50 PHIL 128


Facts: It is also appears from the record on appeal that the claims against
the estate allowed by the said committee amount to P2, 457.99.
Notwithstanding this insolvent condition of the estate, the lower court
entered the order referred to of March 5, 1925, citing in its support article
1430 of the Civil Code and section 684 of the Code of Civil Procedure.


Issue: Whether or not support be demanded when the liabilities exceed the
assets of the estate of the deceased spouse?


Held: The judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain of May 28, 1896,
resolves this question affirmatively. Sometime after the death of her
husband, the widow applied for support from the general inventoried estate
of the property from the date of the death of the husband until the delivery
of her share. The court granted the application and the Audiencia affirmed
its decision. Mr. Manresa, commenting on said article 1430 relative to the
said judgment of May 28, 1896, wisely observes "That the support does not
encumber the property of the deceased spouse, but the general estate, and
that by the general estate or the inventoried estate is meant the dowry or
capital of the wife; wherefore, even if the indebtedness exceed the residue
of the estate, the wife can always be allowed support as part payment of
the income of her property. In any case, the support is given prior to the
termination of the liquidation of the partnership, and it does not seem
logical to deny the same before knowing exactly the result of the
liquidation, just because of the fear that the liabilities will exceed the estate,
or on the ground of estimates more or less uncertain, and without any
sufficient proof of its reality. The judge or the administrator, as the case
may be, must grant the support.


IN RE: JOSE BERMAS AND PILAR BERMAS,14 SCRA 327


Facts: Upon the filing of the petition, the court issued an order setting it for
hearing on July 7, 1962, and caused a notice to that effect to be published
in a newspaper of general circulation in Zamboanga City, once a week, for
three (3) consecutive weeks. After said hearing, the court rendered the
appealed decision, denying the petition upon the ground that, under Article
192 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, a conjugal partnership shall only be
dissolved once legal separation has been ordered, and this cannot take
place, pursuant to Article 191 of the same Code, except upon civil
interdiction declaration of absence or abandonment.


Issue: Whether or not conjugal partnership may also be dissolved, upon
agreement with judicial approval pursuant to Article 191?


Held: The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All
the creditors of the husband and of the wife as well as of the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the
voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors
may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the
petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such
measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.


PARTOSA-JO VS COURT OF APPEALS, 18 DECEMBER 1992

Facts: The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein
private respondent. The latter admitted to have cohabited with 3 women
and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a complaint against the husband for
judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to an earlier action for
support which was consolidated. RTC decision was a definite disposition of
the complaint for support but none of that for the judicial separation of
conjugal property. Jose elevated the decision to CA which affirmed rulings
of the trial court. The complaint on the separation of property was
dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by
agreement was not covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code.

Issue: Whether or not there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to
warrant judicial separation of conjugal property?


Held: Under the Art. 128 of Family Code, the aggrieved spouse may
petition for judicial separation on either of these grounds:
1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and
2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family
without just cause, even if she said spouse does not leave the other
spouse.
Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent
never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and
without in the meantime providing in the least for ones family although able
to do so. There must be absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and
rights, with the intention of perpetual separation.


TUMLOS VS FERNANDEZ, GR-137650, April 12, 2000


Facts: Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were the plaintiffs in an action for
ejectment filed before Branch 82 of the MTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila
against Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos and Gina Tumlos. Defendant
Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while the other defendants
promised to pay P1,000.00 a month both as rental. Spouses have also
demanded payment incurred for the last seven years. Such demands were
unheeded thus this present action of the spouses. The MTC promulgated
its decision on January 22, 1997. The defendants appeals to the RTC,
alleged in their memorandum on appeal that Mario Fernandez and
Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and acquired the property. It was
further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building.
Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees
of the other apartments, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to
the annulment of his marriage.


Issue: Whether or not Guillerma Tumlos is a Co-owner of the said
apartment under Article 148?


Held: Mario Fernandez is validly married to Lourdes Fernandez, Guillerma
and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other. Thus, the property
relation governing their supposed cohabitation is that found in Article 148 of
the Family Code. it is clear that actual contribution is required by its
provision, in contrast to Article 147 of the Family Code which states that
efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are
regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one
who has no salary or income or work or industry. Such provision is not
included in article 148 of the Family Code.