Professional Documents
Culture Documents
-1
Hegemony File
Hegemony Index.............................................................................................................................................................1
***Heg Sustainable***..................................................................................................................................................1
Heg Sustainable..............................................................................................................................................................1
Heg Sustainable – Economy...........................................................................................................................................1
Heg Sustainable – Innovation.........................................................................................................................................1
AT: Realism Proves Unipolarity Unsustainable..............................................................................................................1
AT: Counter-Alliances Undermine Unipolarity..............................................................................................................1
***Heg Unsustainable***..............................................................................................................................................1
Heg Unsustainable (1/2).................................................................................................................................................1
Heg Unsustainable – Isolationism..................................................................................................................................1
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 2
Scholars Lab Hegemony
***No Balancing***......................................................................................................................................................2
No Balancing – Benign Heg...........................................................................................................................................2
No Balancing – Capabilities Gap....................................................................................................................................2
No Balancing – Interdependence....................................................................................................................................2
No Balancing – China.....................................................................................................................................................2
No Balancing – Russia....................................................................................................................................................2
No Balancing – Russia/China.........................................................................................................................................2
No Balancing – EU.........................................................................................................................................................2
No Balancing – India......................................................................................................................................................2
No Balancing – Asia Generic..........................................................................................................................................2
AT: Transition Now Better – First Line..........................................................................................................................2
AT: Transition Now Better – Second Line......................................................................................................................2
***Yes Balancing***.....................................................................................................................................................2
Multipolarity Now..........................................................................................................................................................2
Nonpolarity Now............................................................................................................................................................2
Yes Balancing – China (1/2)...........................................................................................................................................2
Yes Balancing – EU (1/2)...............................................................................................................................................2
Yes Balancing – Russia/China/India...............................................................................................................................2
Yes Balancing – Russia/China........................................................................................................................................2
Yes Soft Balancing..........................................................................................................................................................2
AT: Benign Hegemony....................................................................................................................................................2
AT: Benign Hegemony (Democracy).............................................................................................................................2
AT: Soft Balancing Won’t Work.....................................................................................................................................2
AT: Soft Balancing Empirically Denied.........................................................................................................................2
AT: Multilateralism Insulates from Balancing................................................................................................................2
AT We Solve Bad Parts of Heg (Multilateralism)...........................................................................................................2
***Enviro K US Leadership***.....................................................................................................................................3
Enviro Leadership K Heg (1/2).......................................................................................................................................3
Enviro Leadership K Heg – Relations............................................................................................................................3
Enviro Leadership K Heg – Energy Dependence...........................................................................................................3
Enviro Leadership K Heg – Competitiveness.................................................................................................................3
Enviro Leadership K Heg – Empirics.............................................................................................................................3
Climate Change Kills Heg..............................................................................................................................................3
Enviro Leadership Solves China/India...........................................................................................................................3
***Heg Bad***..............................................................................................................................................................5
Heg Bad – Disorder/War.................................................................................................................................................5
Unilateralism Bad for HIV/AIDS...................................................................................................................................5
Unilateralism Bad – Democracy/Backlash.....................................................................................................................5
Unilateralism Bad – Backlash.........................................................................................................................................5
Unilateralism Bad – Democracy.....................................................................................................................................5
Unilateralism Bad – Colonialism....................................................................................................................................5
Unilateralism Bad – Middle Eastern Instability..............................................................................................................5
Unilateralism Bad – Terrorism........................................................................................................................................5
Unilateralism Bad – Russia Relations – First Line (1/2)................................................................................................5
Heg Bad – Nuclear Terrorism.........................................................................................................................................5
Heg à China War (2/2)..................................................................................................................................................5
Heg à China War – At: Cooperation.............................................................................................................................5
Heg Bad – Blowback (1/3).............................................................................................................................................5
Heg Bad – Preemptive Wars...........................................................................................................................................5
Heg Bad – Middle East Prolif.........................................................................................................................................5
Heg Bad – Iraq Instability...............................................................................................................................................5
Heg Bad – Terrorism.......................................................................................................................................................5
Heg Bad – South China Sea............................................................................................................................................5
Heg Doesn’t Solve Caspian Instability...........................................................................................................................5
Heg Bad – Caspian Sea Stability (1/2)...........................................................................................................................5
Heg Bad – China Relations.............................................................................................................................................5
Heg Bad – Prolif.............................................................................................................................................................5
AT: Heg Solves Prolif.....................................................................................................................................................5
Heg Bad – Terrorism.......................................................................................................................................................5
Heg Bad – Blowback......................................................................................................................................................5
Heg Bad – Economy (1/2)..............................................................................................................................................5
Heg Bad – Space.............................................................................................................................................................5
AT: Heg Solves Terrorism...............................................................................................................................................5
Unipolarity Bad – War....................................................................................................................................................5
Hard Power Ineffective...................................................................................................................................................5
AT: Power Vacuum.........................................................................................................................................................5
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 6
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Sui 8 (Yu, Researcher with the Research Center of Contemporary World, 3/11, http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-
in-the-press/march-2008/us-still-committed-to-unilateralism/)
The status of the U.S. as a superpower reached its zenith after the Cold War as it single-mindedly
pursued a unilateralist global strategy and there seemed to be only one pole left in the world; while in fact the
world was in a relatively long transitional phase from a "bipolar" to "multi-polar" structure. The transition to a multi-polar is continuing. Multi-polarization is a
development trend, which does not mean we are already there. There is a relatively lengthy period of
transition when a new one is finally established. The basic situation during this transitional period is
that the US will enjoy the "sole superpower" edge unchallenged for a rather long time within "a setup
featuring one superpower and multiple major powers", but none of the major powers are strong
enough to rival the US and therefore have to find solace in statements such as "superpowers" no longer exist. If we see "the sole superpower" the US as one pole,
then we probably should view the "multiple major powers" as a collective "para-pole". It is these "pole" and "para-pole" that form the multi-polar world structure, while the ideas of
"unipolar world" and "non-polar world" do not reflect the reality of today's world. The number of "multiple major powers" is growing and the new comers are developing nations or
their alliances only, such as certain members of the BRIC nations and VISTA countries and perhaps the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The ongoing accumulation and
Today's America is hurting but remains a
advancement of regional multi-polarization will complement and enrich the multi-polarization of the world.
superpower nonetheless. The international situation in 2007 showed it was a year when the regional hot spots set on fire by the US sought a way out and achieved
limited success amid malignant escalation. Last year major powers tried to adjust their relations, with the US as the main cause of everything that was wrong, only to further
complicate them. Last year the US neo-conservatism was forced to make tactical adjustments with certain strategic implications after serious setbacks and under pressure to win the
next presidential election. The growing seriousness and complexity of the world situation last year was, in many ways and to a significant degree, a strong rejection of US
unilateralism. With the war in Iraq as a mark, the US has been relegated from hegemonic unilateralism to head-of-the-pack unilateralism. That means it is still committed to
unilateralism but cannot do it on its own and has to rely on cooperation by other major powers, including former arch rival Russia, in a "multilateral manner". The embarrassing
situation is evident in the war on terror and even more so in the anti-proliferation campaign. However, this situation does not mean the US will give up unilateralism in favor of
multilateralism, but rather it has been forced to go along with the latter. The same is true with multi-polarization, which the US would very much not have but cannot get rid of at the
moment. Because the gap between the "sole superpower" and "multiple major powers" is narrowing by the day, the idea of the world entering the era of "relative major powers" in the
next 30 to 40 years sounds original, but it is far from confirming the word "superpower" is already obsolete. The debate over the question of world structure has been going on since
day one, because the international situation has been complicated and changing all the time. Some people say multi-polarization will "cause instability", whereas things are easier to
. American advocates of unipolarism have time and again advertised the US as a
do in a unipolar world with one voice
"benign hegemony" capable of delivering order to the world community that will keep it mutually
beneficial. And the US government has validated this notion repeatedly through its involvement in the
Balkans and Middle East wars.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 11
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The US military is far above all others due to unprecedented military intelligence
Odierno, Brooks, and Mastracchio 8 (Raymond, Nichoel, and Francisco, lt. general, lt. col., and Intelligence Deputy
G2 for III Corps, p. 52, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i50.htm)
We have seen a significant metamorphosis of intelligence operations in Iraq. Indeed, we still have much
to learn, but we are on the right track. The capacity and capability of our intelligence systems have
improved greatly in just 3 years. The successes enjoyed by Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC–I) are
clearly demonstrated in the ability to leverage the sophistication of intelligence operations ongoing in
Iraq today at the lowest levels of command. Employment of ISR, according to the current
counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, sets the conditions for the initial success of the surge in Iraq.
Decentralization of ISR assets allowed BCT and regimental combat team (RCT) commanders (faced with
vastly different problem sets) to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. ISR evolved along with the
fight. The robust ISR currently available at the brigade level provides commanders with an
unprecedented level of situational awareness. Commanders now have the flexibility to push ISR assets
to the lowest tactical echelon, which is one of the most powerful enablers on the battlefield today.
King and Berry 8 (Douglas and John, Marine Corps Combat Development Command Director of Operations
and Plans and sr. analyst, p. 45-46, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i50.htm)
In recent years, this network of bases has been dramatically reduced, even as the United States is confronted
by a variety of strategic challenges and locked in a global struggle for influence. The ability to overcome
geographic, political, and military impediments to access has reemerged as a critical necessity for
extending U.S. influence and power overseas. Fortunately, the United States possesses an asymmetric
advantage in that endeavor: seapower. The American ability to cross wide expanses of ocean and to
remain offshore at a time and place and for a duration of its own choosing cannot be contested today to
the degree it was in previous eras. Although small in historical terms—and often stretched thin by current
operational commitments—the U.S. Navy is, for the foreseeable future, a navy without peer. This
asymmetric advantage means that the Navy-Marine team can use the sea as both maneuver space and
a secure operating area to overcome impediments to access. This seabased force—particularly its
aircraft carriers and amphibious ships with embarked Marines—is capable of projecting influence and
power ashore without reliance on ports and airfields in the objective area. It can do so in a selectively
discrete or overt manner to conduct a range of operations—from conducting security cooperation activities,
to providing humanitarian assistance, to deterring and, when necessary, fighting wars. This significant
advantage does not extend to the joint force as a whole, however. The sealift that transports the
preponderance of joint force materiel is still dependent upon secure infrastructure in a potential objective
area. Just as the amphibious innovations championed by the Navy and Marine Corps during the 1920s and
1930s benefited the entire joint and Allied force in World War II, the seabasing initiatives being pursued by
the Navy-Marine\ team today are intended to benefit joint, interagency, and multinational teammates.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 13
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America’s strategic partnerships are more important than ever. Our Air Force will strengthen and
broaden coalitions, capitalizing on the global community of like-minded Airmen, while attending to
interoperability between allies and partners. Building these relationships not only expands, extends,
and strengthens global vigilance, global reach, and
global power, but also leverages airpower’s value as an instrument of America’s diplomacy in an
increasingly interconnected world. The Air Force is formulating innovative operational concepts to
anticipate, adapt to,
and overcome challenges. We are transforming our thinking from considering the space and cyber
domains as mere enablers of air operations to a holistic approach that factors in their interdependence
and leverages their
unique characteristics. We must continue to push this conceptual envelope—and expand the
boundaries of existing tactics, techniques, and procedures—to fully exploit the synergies of cross-
domain dominance. We will accelerate the deployment of evolutionary and disruptive technologies as
are address the urgent need to recapitalize and modernize. We must bolster our advantage through
continued investment in our own science and technology, as well as outreach
and integration with industry, academia, and think tanks. We will reform our procurement and
acquisition system to ensure full transparency, open competition, and adherence to operational
timelines.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 14
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Readiness Up – $ing Up
U.S. military spending is high now
There are a number of measures underway and trends that should ease the strain on this small sliver of
our population who have borne the burden of this conflict:
More and better programs to improve the quality of life for soldiers and their families;
The ground forces are growing by more than 90,000 over the next five years – with a bigger
rotational pool of troops and units individual soldiers and Marines will deploy less frequently; and
U.S. force levels in Iraq will decline over time – the debate taking place is mostly over the pacing.
As I mentioned before, the discussion about the stress on the Army today is informed by the Vietnam
experience – and the terrible shape of the service afterwards, where there was a loss of nearly a generation of
NCO leadership and rampant discipline problems. So far, none of those ailments are present today.
Overall, our service men and women and their families have shown extraordinary resilience. Morale is high,
as is recruiting and retention – particularly among units either in or just returning from Iraq and Afghanistan.
Soldier for soldier, unit for unit, the Army is the best trained, best led, and best equipped it has ever been –
skilled and experienced in the arduous complexities of irregular warfare.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 18
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The US military can overcome any military challenge with appropriate resources – surge
proves.
Kagan 7 (Robert, Carnegie Endowment for Internatoinal Peace sr. associate, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/03/09/AR2007030901839.html?nav=rss_opinion/columns)
Four months later, the once insurmountable political opposition has been surmounted. The nonexistent
troops are flowing into Iraq. And though it is still early and horrible acts of violence continue, there is
substantial evidence that the new counterinsurgency strategy, backed by the infusion of new forces, is
having a significant effect. Some observers are reporting the shift. Iraqi bloggers Mohammed and Omar
Fadhil, widely respected for their straight talk, say that "early signs are encouraging." The first impact of the
"surge," they write, was psychological. Both friends and foes in Iraq had been convinced, in no small part by
the American media, that the United States was preparing to pull out. When the opposite occurred, this alone
shifted the dynamic. As the Fadhils report, "Commanders and lieutenants of various militant groups
abandoned their positions in Baghdad and in some cases fled the country." The most prominent leader to go
into hiding has been Moqtada al-Sadr. His Mahdi Army has been instructed to avoid clashes with American
and Iraqi forces, even as coalition forces begin to establish themselves in the once off-limits Sadr City.
Before the arrival of Gen. David Petraeus, the Army's leading counterinsurgency strategist, U.S. forces
tended to raid insurgent and terrorist strongholds and then pull back and hand over the areas to Iraqi
forces, who failed to hold them. The Fadhils report, "One difference between this and earlier -- failed --
attempts to secure Baghdad is the willingness of the Iraqi and U.S. governments to commit enough
resources for enough time to make it work." In the past, bursts of American activity were followed by
withdrawal and a return of the insurgents. Now, the plan to secure Baghdad "is becoming stricter and gaining
momentum by the day as more troops pour into the city, allowing for a better implementation of the 'clear
and hold' strategy." Baghdadis "always want the 'hold' part to materialize, and feel safe when they go out and
find the Army and police maintaining their posts -- the bad guys can't intimidate as long as the troops are
staying." A greater sense of confidence produces many benefits. The number of security tips about
insurgents that Iraqi civilians provide has jumped sharply. Stores and marketplaces are reopening in
Baghdad, increasing the sense of community. People dislocated by sectarian violence are returning to their
homes. As a result, "many Baghdadis feel hopeful again about the future, and the fear of civil war is slowly
being replaced by optimism that peace might one day return to this city," the Fadhils report. "This change in
mood is something huge by itself." Apparently some American journalists see the difference. NBC's Brian
Williams recently reported a dramatic change in Ramadi since his previous visit. The city was safer; the
airport more secure. The new American strategy of "getting out, decentralizing, going into the
neighborhoods, grabbing a toehold, telling the enemy we're here, start talking to the locals -- that is having an
obvious and palpable effect." U.S. soldiers forged agreements with local religious leaders and pushed al-
Qaeda back -- a trend other observers have noted in some Sunni-dominated areas. The result, Williams said,
is that "the war has changed." It is no coincidence that as the mood and the reality have shifted, political
currents have shifted as well. A national agreement on sharing oil revenue appears on its way to approval.
The Interior Ministry has been purged of corrupt officials and of many suspected of torture and brutality. And
cracks are appearing in the Shiite governing coalition -- a good sign, given that the rock-solid unity was both
the product and cause of growing sectarian violence. There is still violence, as Sunni insurgents and al-
Qaeda seek to prove that the surge is not working. However, they are striking at more vulnerable
targets in the provinces. Violence is down in Baghdad. As for Sadr and the Mahdi Army, it is possible they
may reemerge as a problem later. But trying to wait out the American and Iraqi effort may be hazardous if the
public becomes less tolerant of their violence. It could not be comforting to Sadr or al-Qaeda to read in the
New York Times that the United States plans to keep higher force levels in Iraq through at least the beginning
of 2008. The only good news for them would be if the Bush administration in its infinite wisdom starts to talk
again about drawing down forces.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 19
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There are lessons to be learned from the dazzling success of the surge strategy in Iraq. Lesson one is
that just about no mission is impossible for the United States military. A year ago it was widely
thought, not just by the new Democratic leaders in Congress but also in many parts of the Pentagon, that
containing the violence in Iraq was impossible. Now we have seen it done. We have seen this before in
American history. George Washington's forces seemed on the brink of defeat many times in the agonizing
years before Yorktown. Abraham Lincoln's generals seemed so unsuccessful in the Civil War that in August
1864 it was widely believed he would be defeated for re-election. But finally Lincoln found the right
generals. Sherman took Atlanta and marched to the sea; Grant pressed forward in Virginia. Franklin
Roosevelt picked the right generals and admirals from the start in World War II, but the first years of the war
were filled with errors and mistakes. Even Vietnam is not necessarily a counterexample. As Lewis Sorley
argues persuasively in "A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years
in Vietnam," Gen. Creighton Abrams came up with a winning strategy by 1972. South Vietnam fell three
years later when the North Vietnamese army attacked en masse, and Congress refused to allow the aid the
U.S. had promised. George W. Bush, like Lincoln, took his time finding the right generals. But it's clear
now that the forward-moving surge strategy devised by Gens. David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno has
succeeded where the stand-aside strategy employed by their predecessors failed. American troops are
surely the most capable military force in history. They just need to be given the right orders.
US Unilateralism Up
US Soft Power Up
US soft power high, and will continue with new president
Fullilove 8 (Michael, Director of the global issues program at the Lowy Institute, Visiting fellow at the Brookings
Institution, 6/17, http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/06/17/opinion/edfullilove.php)
In terms of soft power, too - the ability to get others to want what you want - the case for America's
decline is easily overstated. America retains its hold on the world's imagination. For most non-
Americans around the world, America's politics are, at some level, our politics as well. Why is the
world so interested? America's bulk is only part of the answer. Ultimately, it is not really the size of the
U.S. economy that draws our attention. It is not even America's blue-water navy or its new bunker-
busting munitions. Rather, it is the idea of America which continues to fascinate: a superpower that is
open, democratic, meritocratic and optimistic; a country that is the cockpit of global culture; a polity
in which all candidates for public office, whether or not they are a Clinton, seem to come from a place
called Hope. It's worth noting that the declinist canon has emerged at the nadir of the Bush years;
America's soft power account will look much healthier the instant the next president is inaugurated.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 23
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Asia proves leadership is high despite Bush policy and credibility loss.
China has low soft power – 2 reasons: 1) China has hard work to do till it gains soft power
2) The U.S. will always dominate China in soft power
US Newswire 8 [Washington, China Lags Behind U.S. in Using Non-Military 'Soft Power' to Gain Influence in Asia,
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS152332+17-Jun-2008+PRN20080617, June 17, 2008]
"The findings of this report clearly illustrate that China is recognized by its neighbors as the undisputed future
leader of Asia, but it still has real work to do to win hearts and minds in the region. To enhance its credibility in
Asia, China will need to invest more resources in building up its soft power, especially in the diplomatic, social
and cultural spheres," said Marshall M. Bouton, president of The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. The report also
reveals that contrary to other polls taken since the United States invaded Iraq which reflected negative views of the
United States, a majority of Asians in the surveyed countries still admire the United States on many fronts, including
economic, diplomatic, cultural and educational, and see its military presence in Asia as a stabilizing force, notably
preventing an arms race between China and Japan. "Considering negative perceptions of the United States elsewhere
in the world, it was somewhat surprising to see such strongly positive feelings about the United States among the
Asian countries we surveyed," said Christopher Whitney, executive director for studies at The Chicago Council. "It
is clear that the United States still has a strong foundation upon which to build in the region." Another unexpected
finding of the report focuses on the complex relationship between the United States and China. American feelings
towards China have deteriorated since similar surveys were taken by The Chicago Council in '04 and '06 and a
significant number of those questioned expressed general unease about the future of the relationship. In contrast,
Chinese perceptions of the United States have grown noticeably warmer compared to the 2006 survey and Chinese
demonstrate consistently positive attitudes towards U.S. influence in Asia. The Chicago Council on Global
Affairs and EAI conducted more than 6,000 interviews in China, Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and the
United States in January and February 2008, before the unrest in Tibet and the Sichuan earthquake placed a spotlight
on events inside China. The survey asked between 40 and 60 questions in each country designed to gauge how
citizens of these five Asian nations and the United States view each country's popular culture, commercial prowess
and brands, intellectual influence and appeal, universities, diplomatic reputations, different political systems, and
more. The results were organized to produce indexes of the pillars of soft power: economic, cultural, human capital,
diplomatic and political. The five indexes were averaged to produce an overall Soft Power Index. Change was
measured on a few key questions that were also asked in a 2006 Chicago Council survey. Among the key findings:
On China: -- Majorities or pluralities in every country are at least "somewhat worried" that China could
become a military threat to their country in the future (Vietnamese were not asked this question). -- China
trails the United States in perceptions of its diplomatic, political, and human capital power in Asia, though
perceptions are more positive in Southeast Asia than East Asia. China is also seen as less effective than the
United States in promoting its policies to people in Asia by all surveyed publics
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 26
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Parameswaran 8 [P, Writer for the China Post, China's soft power trails U.S., Japan in Asia,
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/asia/regional%20news/2008/06/18/161478/China's-soft.htm, June 18, 2008]
The United States in particular remains highly regarded in all five key areas of soft power addressed in the survey: economics, culture, human
capital, diplomacy, and politics, said the report by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the East Asia Institute of South Korea. "China's
growing economic and military might have not yet been fully translated into the elements of soft power that help
a nation wield indirect influence in its region and the world," said the report based on public opinion surveys in Japan, South Korea, Vietnam,
Indonesia, China and the United States. It revealed that perceptions of China's soft power -- the ability to wield
influence by indirect, non-military means -- "generally trail those of the United States and Japan." These
perceptions persist despite China's strong economic relationships in Asia and around the world, and concerted efforts by Beijing to leverage the
upcoming summer Olympic Games to bolster its public image, the report said. "The findings of this report clearly illustrate that China is
recognized by its neighbors as the undisputed future leader of Asia, but it still has real work to do to win hearts and minds in the region," said
Marshall Bouton, president of The Chicago Council. "To enhance its credibility in Asia, China will need to invest more
resources in building up its soft power, especially in the diplomatic, social and cultural spheres," he said.
According to the poll, Americans, Chinese, Japanese, and Indonesians all believe that China has the greatest economic influence of any nation in
Asia. South Koreans and Vietnamese see it trailing only the United States. More than 6,000 interviews were conducted in January and February
2008 during the survey in the six nations. It was held before the unrest in Tibet and the Sichuan earthquake placed a spotlight on events inside
China. The report also said that contrary to other polls taken since the unpopular U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, a majority of Asians in the
surveyed countries still "admire" the United States on many fronts, including economic, diplomatic, cultural
and educational. They see U.S. military presence in Asia as a stabilizing force, notably preventing an arms race between
China and Japan, it said. "Considering negative perceptions of the United States elsewhere in the world, it was somewhat surprising to see such
strongly positive feelings about the United States among the Asian countries we surveyed," said Christopher Whitney, executive director for
studies at The Chicago Council. "It is clear that the United States still has a strong foundation upon which to build in
the region," it said. Another "unexpected" finding showed that American feelings towards China had
deteriorated since similar surveys were taken by The Chicago Council in 2004 and 2006.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 27
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Heg Low
Klare 8 (Professor of Peace and World Security studies at Hampshire College, www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2008/05/12/russian_oil/)
Nineteen years ago, the fall of the Berlin Wall effectively eliminated the Soviet Union as the world's other
superpower. Yes, the USSR as a political entity stumbled on for another two years, but it was clearly an ex-
superpower from the moment it lost control over its satellites in Eastern Europe.
Less than a month ago, the United States similarly lost its claim to superpower status when a barrel of
crude oil roared past $110 on the international market, gasoline prices crossed the $3.50 threshold at
American pumps, and diesel fuel topped $4. As was true of the USSR following the dismantling of the Berlin
Wall, the USA will no doubt continue to stumble on like the superpower it once was; but as the nation's
economy continues to be eviscerated to pay for its daily oil fix, it, too, will be seen by increasing
numbers of savvy observers as an ex-superpower in the making.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 31
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Overholt 8 (Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy and holds the center’s chair in Asia policy
research. “In Asia, U.S. Still Guards the Fort but Surrenders the Bank”) online:
http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/spring2008/disoriented.html
Paradoxically, Washington is greatly increasing its military power but sharply degrading its political
influence. Throughout Asia, the talk is of declining U.S. influence. No one in Asia doubts that the
United States is the world’s biggest military power, the world’s biggest economy, and the world’s
greatest cultural influence, but it is seen as declining because it is preoccupied elsewhere, has weakened
its relationships with key quasi-allies, has lost its image as a partner in nation-building, has tarnished
its moral standing by its actions in Iraq, and has allowed its leverage through regional organizations
other than the U.S.-Japan alliance to wither.
The United States now finds itself torn between its increasing military reliance on the U.S.-Japan alliance and
its increasing political and economic reliance on its relationship with China. The United States copes with the
East Asian aspects of the war on terror, North Korea, regional crime, drug and human trafficking, and
Southeast Asian instability primarily through a partnership with China. China’s more open economy is much
more compatible with U.S. interests in free trade, freedom of investment, and modern agriculture than is
Japan’s more closed economy. The tension between military-ideological alignments and political-
economic interests is increasingly severe, untenable, and prone to crisis.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 33
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O’Halon 7 (Director of Research, 21st Century Defense Initiative. Director, “Opportunity 08: Independent Ideas
for Our Next President”) online: http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/0228defense_kagan_Opp08.asp
Facing the dangerous world of the 21st century, the U.S. military is too small to meet current needs or
expected contingencies. After opposing force increases for many years, the Administration, through the new
Secretary of Defense, proposed in January 2007 a combined increase in active-duty soldiers and Marines of
some 65,000 above current levels. Even greater increases in the size of the ground forces may be prudent.
Highly plausible scenarios involving Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other
large countries (such as Indonesia, Congo, and Nigeria) illustrate the need to provide the next President
with the capacity to muster large new forces without delay.
This growth should occur without a return to a military draft, which would be impractical in terms of
numbers and counterproductive in terms of maintaining personnel quality. Additionally, investments in
technologies are needed, in order to replace outmoded systems and to maintain our military’s edge.
Some savings can be achieved, but, in general, overall requirements portend a substantial increase in
the defense budget over several years.
Context
There is a rational need to worry about America’s security in a fiery world. Today, war is common and
ongoing; tomorrow, additional conflicts are quite possible. Consider, for example, the Iranian
government’s repeated rejection of international demands to stop enriching uranium. What will happen if a
U.S. or Israeli government becomes convinced that Tehran is on the verge of fielding a nuclear weapon? One
need not consider the military option the best or most likely instrument of American policy in this setting to
recognize the possibility that it may be used—and that the plausible capacity to threaten its use may be
critical for achieving a viable policy outcome. North Korea, of course, has crossed the nuclear threshold
already, creating significant regional ripples. Although in the background for now, Sino-Taiwanese tensions
remain serious, as do tensions between India and Pakistan, Venezuela and the United States, and others. Key
countries like Pakistan and Indonesia also continue to struggle with possible challenges to their internal
cohesion.
U.S. military is currently overstretched and lacks capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan
O’Hanlon 7 (Director of Research, 21st Century Defense Initiative. Director, “Opportunity 08: Independent Ideas
for Our Next President”) online: http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/0228defense_kagan_Opp08.aspx
The U.S. military now suffers from the greatest strain it has encountered since conscription ended in
1973. Soldiers and Marines are deploying for their third tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
historical evidence suggests that the third tour seriously erodes morale and reenlistment rates. We
must anticipate the possibility that our remarkable men and women in uniform at some point will
begin to crack, despite the resilience and dedication they have shown to date. Many analysts believe
that even multiple redeployments are not providing enough boots on the ground in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Indeed, in neither country have U.S. forces been able to provide security to the citizenry, an
essential precondition for successful counter-insurgency operations. The new “surge strategy” that one of
the authors (Kagan) has advocated (and the other has supported, at least on a provisional basis) will strain
the force further.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 42
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Nye and Armitage 7 (CSIS Commission on Smarter Power, Joseph, PhD in political science from Harvard,
Richard, President Armitage International, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf)
Recent U.S. administrations have struggled to get public diplomacy right. More than public relations,
effective public diplomacy moves both people and information and helps provide insight into the
policies and values of the United States. It also improves Americans’ awareness and understanding of the
world beyond our shores. Despite past successes during the Cold War, many U.S. decision makers dismiss
public diplomacy as ineffective or as mere propaganda. Although a number of independent commissions
have criticized the U.S. government for problems implementing public diplomacy, it remains a critical
part of U.S. smart power. Much of the current debate over revitalizing public diplomacy efforts has
centered on institutional arrangements and resource levels. It is a well-known story by now that during the
Cold War, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) undertook public diplomacy and helped to shape public
opinion behind the Iron Curtain. In the Cold War’s aftermath, however, the United States essentially
demobilized its public diplomacy efforts as part of a budget-cutting “peace dividend.” Beginning in
1995, Congress drastically cut funding for the activities of the USIA, which the Clinton administration
eventually merged into the State Department in 1999.
Shuja 8 (Sharif, Monash U Global Terrorism Research Unit Honorary Research Associate, “Why America Can Not Ignore Soft Power”,
3/22, p. 16-17)
Events such as the abuse of prisoners in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay have undermined the
attractiveness of American values, since that is based in part on international perceptions of the US as a
humane and law- abiding nation. The leading candidates in the US presidential elections well realise that.
The strongly pro-American William Hague MP, the Conservative spokesman on foreign affairs, told the
Daily Telegraph on 23 February: 'Certainly America does need to restore its moral authority in the world and
be a great advert for democracy. An Obama-McCain campaign will be that'. While the US continues to rely
on hard power, other nations have suc- cessfully used soft power to improve their global position. Polls
taken in 2005 report that a large majority of nations believe Europe and China play more positive roles
in the world than does America, indicating America's declining popularity. For example, a 2005 poll by
the Lowy Institute reported that just over half of Australians polled had a positive view of the US, but,
paradoxically, that around the same number saw the foreign policies of the US as a potential threat -
equivalent to the same number of Australians who worried about the threat of Islamic
fundamentalism. It should be remembered that Australia assisted the US with troops in Iraq. Even in the
UK, the US's closest ally, there has been a growing popular sentiment against the hard power of the
Bush Administration. Polls taken in other nations suggest similar anti-American sentiment. A poll by the
Pew Charitable Trust reported that the attractiveness of the US decreased significantly between 2001
and 2003 in 19 of 27 countries sampled.'^' Gallup International polls report that, for the majority of
people in 29 countries, US policies have had a negative impact on their opinion of the US.i'°
Coulthart 8 (Stephen, Graduate student studying diplomacy and international affairs at the Whitehead School of
Diplomacy, 6/28, http://dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=14663)
The event comes as a reminder of the limits of American military might, or "hard power". Indeed, the US easily toppled the Iraqi regime in days but it failed to win the peace after the
it is clear that the US must place greater emphasis on soft power than ever
conventional conflict ended. As a result,
before. But what is soft power? The term can be traced back to Joseph Nye who defines it as a country's "power of attraction" and influence "that is associated with [it's] ideas,
cultures, and policies". Many point to soft power as the main reason the US outlasted the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Certainly this historical event was accompanied in part by
Today, soft
hard power: the US built up a formidable defensive shield to counter the Soviets, but ultimately it was not violent combat that led to the current detente.
power proponents are saying we can take these historic lessons and apply them to the challenge of violent
religious extremism. Unfortunately however, the US government has done very little to utilize the soft
power dynamic, relegating the model to the domain of NGOs and non-profit organizations. Further,
there are several indicators that the US is missing out on key soft power opportunities; Americans are
going abroad less and the rules governing foreign student visas are elastic and frequently change,
making it difficult for them to enter the US. These students act as goodwill ambassadors between
countries, and this decline suggests that Americans are paying less attention to the world and becoming
disengaged. Ultimately this leads to a lack of communication and encourages policymakers to fall back
on hard power measures. But what can be done? In the aftermath of the December 2004 tsunami in Asia we saw an example of how the US government can use
its existing infrastructure, personnel and equipment to provide humanitarian aid, an example of soft power. So successful was the aid mission in the Indian Ocean that Robert Kaplan
stated," [the US disaster relief forces] probably did more to improve America's image in Asia than any conventional training deployment". The US needs to look outside of the
"military might" box when it comes to foreign engagement. Warfare is no longer the straightforward task of prior ages but a delicate affair that should only be used in the direst
circumstances. Interestingly, some of the backers of this idea are coming from the most unlikely of places: the military. Former NATO general Rupert Smith has stated the war has
moved from the battlefields to amongst the people. Indeed civilians now suffer more than ever before in war: in World War I approximately 10% of all deaths were civilian while in
Now that the battle is moving amongst the people, the
modern conflicts, such as in Iraq, civilian causalities account for 90% of all fatalities.
US government must take an active lead in developing soft power approaches to mitigate conflict.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 44
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US Unilateralism Low
Bush’s unilateralism falling now
Twining 7 (Transatlantic Fellow based in Oxford and New Delhi and concurrently the Fulbright/Oxford Scholar
at the University of Oxford. The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. The Washington Quarterly. “America’s Grand Design in Asia”)
U.S. policy seeks to build and bind together friendly centers of power in Asia to help maintain a
regional balance that preserves U.S. interests and values as China rises. “We want to encourage the rise
of friendly, independent Asian powers, but we also want to bind their interests to ours,” says former
National Security Council official Michael Green. The United States is trying to build strength in its
Asian partners, not subordinate or contain them in Cold War– type alliance structures in which the
United States institutionalizes its own dominance. This policy is attractive to Asian leaders who want to
build national capabilities and increase their respective country’s room to maneuver in the emerging
Asian order and who recognize that cooperation with the United States to strengthen their economic
and military capabilities will accelerate this process, enhance their autonomy, and countervail growing
Chinese influence. Yet, U.S. policy rekindles traditional wariness in India, Indonesia, and Vietnam about
perceived U.S. hegemonic designs. Ironically, although U.S. leaders welcome these countries’ determination
to protect their autonomy as China rises, thereby helping to preserve a pluralistic Asian security order, their
very independence also means that they are wary of U.S. dominance. Nonetheless, the United States values
its key Asian partners for their growing strength. As former Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran notes, “If
there is a greater focus today on India in the [United States], it is not because India is weak but because India
is strong. We are being recognized as a country which has [an] array of capabilities and has the potential to
emerge as a very important power in the future.” Former Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi
controversially maintained that building Japanese strength within the U.S. alliance would actually improve
Tokyo’s relations with Beijing. Washington’s policy of building new centers of power in Asia is premised
on a congruence of interests with states such as India and Japan in strengthening their national
capabilities and expanding their security horizons to shape the emerging order of the new century. The
United States is not pursuing this design to contain China but to shape its geopolitical options as a
country at a “strategic crossroads.” Washington is limiting China’s potential strategic choices by
strengthening and cultivating friendly Asian powers along its periphery that will constrain and constructively
channel Beijing’s regional and international ambitions. “It is very useful to remind China,” says one U.S.
official, “that there are other emerging powerful countries, such as India, who are setting standards we agree
with. This is very different from containment; it is more about encouraging or shaping China’s view of the
international system in a constructive way.”
Twining 7 (Transatlantic Fellow based in Oxford and New Delhi and concurrently the Fulbright/Oxford Scholar
at the University of Oxford. The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. The Washington Quarterly. “America’s Grand Design in Asia”)
Accelerating the rise of friendly, independent centers of power in Asia may allow the United States to
maintain its privileged position within an “asymmetrically multipolar” Asian security order
characterized by multiple power centers—China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and
ASEAN—that makes it naturally resistant to Chinese domination. Nonetheless, the implications for the
United States of trends in Asia are inescapable. Relative U.S. power will wane as China and India rise.
“It’s not possible to pretend that [China] is just another player,” said Singapore’s former prime
minister, Lee Kuan Yew, in 1993. “This is the biggest player in the history of man. … The size of
China’s displacement of the world balance is such that the world must find a new balance” within a
few decades. The United States is pursuing a grand design to shape that new balance in ways that
preserve its interests in a pluralistic security order that is dominated by no one regional power and
that aligns it increasingly closely with democratic and like-minded centers of strength is a rising Asia.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 46
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Anti-Americanism High
YOSHIHARA AND HOLMES ‘8 (IFPA Senior Research Fellow. Professor in the Strategy and Policy
Department at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Senior research associate at the University of
Georgia Center for International Trade and Security and teaches international relations. China’s Energy-Driven
‘Soft Power’)
Few would dispute that China’s naval priorities remain locked on Taiwan. The potential range of vexing
military contingencies surrounding Taiwan has been the primary driver behind China’s ongoing and rapid
naval modernization. Indeed, advances in the Chinese navy are being tailored specifically to meet the
challenges that the nautical environment separating the island from the mainland poses to Beijing. However,
there is growing evidence that Beijing is already considering and preparing for broader regional and
perhaps extra-regional missions that beckon far beyond the Taiwan Strait. The reason for this outward-
looking posture? Energy. As China’s energy dependence accelerates, influential voices within the
Chinese strategic community have forcefully called upon Beijing to develop the military means to
protect its vulnerable sea lines of communication, which stretch from the Bohai Sea to the Persian Gulf.
As one study asserts, ‘‘Many PRC energy security analysts from the neo-mercantilist school perceive the
global oil system to be controlled by the United States. They therefore advocate acquiring the naval
wherewithal to defend China’s growing dependence on secure seaborne oil imports.’’ Consider also
China’s most recent Defense White Paper, issued in December 2006. For the first time, the document
identifies access to raw materials and the various mediums upon which economic development depends as a
major national security concern. It observes that ‘‘Security issues related to energy, resources, finance,
information, and international shipping routes [emphasis added] are mounting.’’
YOSHIHARA AND HOLMES ‘8 (IFPA Senior Research Fellow. Professor in the Strategy and Policy
Department at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Senior research associate at the University of
Georgia Center for International Trade and Security and teaches international relations. China’s Energy-Driven
‘Soft Power’)
The concept has regularly been misinterpreted or dismissed as too vague to be of value to foreign-policy
practitioners. But if Nye is correct, then soft power creates real, tangible strategic opportunities denied to states
that rely too heavily on military coercion or economic inducements. If Nye’s analyses since the invasion of Iraq
in 2003 are accurate, for example, then the United States is seeing its own soft power deteriorate amid
widespread anti-Americanism. In consequence, the United States could see its ability to organize future
multinational initiatives suffer. Yet while Nye claims that the United States is losing soft power, this is not the
case among its rivals and competitors, in particular China. Despite oft- voiced European and North American
concerns over human rights and military modernization in China, Beijing’s economic success and diplomatic
prominence since the Deng Xiaoping reforms of the late 1970s have garnered acclaim in virtually every part of
the world. This has furthered China’s soft power.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 48
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***Heg Sustainable***
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 49
Scholars Lab Hegemony
Heg Sustainable
Hegemony is sustainable – this card assumes all their arguments.
Hegemony is sustainable – other countries are forced to adopt US economics and identify
with US economic and social philosophies.
( ) Even if alliances have counterbalanced in the past, the position of the US, separate from
Eurasia, makes it invulnerable
William Wohlforth, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign
Service at Georgetown. International Security, Summer 19 99. "The Stability of a Unipolar World."
The key, however, is that the countercoalitions of the past-on which most of our empirical knowledge of
alliance politics is based-formed against centrally located land powers (France, Germany, and the Soviet Union)
that constituted relatively unambiguous security threats to their neighbors. Coordinating a counterbalance
against an offshore state that has already achieved unipolar status will be much more difficult.48 Even a
declining offshore unipolar state will have unusually wide opportunities to play divide and rule. Any second-
tier state seeking to counterbalance has to contend with the existing pro-U.S. bandwagon. If things go poorly,
the aspiring counterbalancer will have to confront not just the capabilities of the unipolar state, but also those
of its other great power allies. All of the aspiring poles face a problem the United States does not: great power
neighbors that could become crucial U.S. allies the moment an unambiguous challenge to Washington's
preeminence emerges. In addition, in each region there are smaller "pivotal states" that make natural U.S.
allies against an aspiring regional power.49 Indeed, the United States' first move in any counterbalancing game of
this sort could be to try to promote such pivotal states to great power status, as it did with China against the Soviet
Union in the latter days of the Cold War.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 54
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***Heg Unsustainable***
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 55
Scholars Lab Hegemony
***No Balancing***
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 59
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No balancing – disparities in power between the US and other states are too great.
No Balancing – Interdependence
No balancing – interdependence makes the cost of disrupting geopolitical order too great.
No Balancing – China
It is important to emphasize that Chinese power has not taken the aggressive military form that simplistic
scaremongers like to stoke. China’s armed forces remain second-tier in quality, the report says, primarily
defensive in their posture. What’s more, Beijing’s military spending is still relatively low even if the highest
American estimate—$137 billion in 2007—is accepted. By comparison, the U.S. spent $450 billion on
defense in the same fiscal year, not including another $120 billion spent on Iraq and Afghanistan.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 63
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No Balancing – Russia
No Balancing – Russia/China
No Balancing – EU
No Balancing – India
Twining 7 (Transatlantic Fellow based in Oxford and New Delhi and concurrently the Fulbright/Oxford Scholar
at the University of Oxford. The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. The Washington Quarterly. “America’s Grand Design in Asia”)
U.S. policy seeks to build and bind together friendly centers of power in Asia to help maintain a
regional balance that preserves U.S. interests and values as China rises. “We want to encourage the rise
of friendly, independent Asian powers, but we also want to bind their interests to ours,” says former
National Security Council official Michael Green. The United States is trying to build strength in its
Asian partners, not subordinate or contain them in Cold War– type alliance structures in which the
United States institutionalizes its own dominance. This policy is attractive to Asian leaders who want to
build national capabilities and increase their respective country’s room to maneuver in the emerging
Asian order and who recognize that cooperation with the United States to strengthen their economic
and military capabilities will accelerate this process, enhance their autonomy, and countervail growing
Chinese influence. Yet, U.S. policy rekindles traditional wariness in India, Indonesia, and Vietnam about
perceived U.S. hegemonic designs. Ironically, although U.S. leaders welcome these countries’ determination
to protect their autonomy as China rises, thereby helping to preserve a pluralistic Asian security order, their
very independence also means that they are wary of U.S. dominance. Nonetheless, the United States values
its key Asian partners for their growing strength. As former Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran notes, “If
there is a greater focus today on India in the [United States], it is not because India is weak but because India
is strong. We are being recognized as a country which has [an] array of capabilities and has the potential to
emerge as a very important power in the future.” Former Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi
controversially maintained that building Japanese strength within the U.S. alliance would actually improve
Tokyo’s relations with Beijing. Washington’s policy of building new centers of power in Asia is premised
on a congruence of interests with states such as India and Japan in strengthening their national
capabilities and expanding their security horizons to shape the emerging order of the new century. The
United States is not pursuing this design to contain China but to shape its geopolitical options as a
country at a “strategic crossroads.” Washington is limiting China’s potential strategic choices by
strengthening and cultivating friendly Asian powers along its periphery that will constrain and constructively
channel Beijing’s regional and international ambitions. “It is very useful to remind China,” says one U.S.
official, “that there are other emerging powerful countries, such as India, who are setting standards we agree
with. This is very different from containment; it is more about encouraging or shaping China’s view of the
international system in a constructive way.”
Twining 7 (Transatlantic Fellow based in Oxford and New Delhi and concurrently the Fulbright/Oxford Scholar
at the University of Oxford. The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. The Washington Quarterly. “America’s Grand Design in Asia”)
Accelerating the rise of friendly, independent centers of power in Asia may allow the United States to
maintain its privileged position within an “asymmetrically multipolar” Asian security order
characterized by multiple power centers—China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and
ASEAN—that makes it naturally resistant to Chinese domination. Nonetheless, the implications for the
United States of trends in Asia are inescapable. Relative U.S. power will wane as China and India rise.
“It’s not possible to pretend that [China] is just another player,” said Singapore’s former prime
minister, Lee Kuan Yew, in 1993. “This is the biggest player in the history of man. … The size of
China’s displacement of the world balance is such that the world must find a new balance” within a
few decades. The United States is pursuing a grand design to shape that new balance in ways that
preserve its interests in a pluralistic security order that is dominated by no one regional power and
that aligns it increasingly closely with democratic and like-minded centers of strength is a rising Asia.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 68
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Kupchan 2K2
(Charles, Professor of International Relations @ Georgetown, The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and
the Geopolitics of the 21st Century, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, lexis)
America’s diminishing internationalism is not the product of political decay. Nor does it mark the return of
the dark and illusory brand of isolationism that so sorely misguided the nation in the past. It is the logical
consequence of the times, of America’s location, and of a strategic environment in which terror attacks
against the homeland, not hegemonic wars in Europe or Asia, represent the most immediate threat to the
country’s well-being. The nation’s politics are in the process of catching up with geopolitical realities.
At the same time, a waning internationalism does have the potential to turn into a dangerous
isolationism. Especially because of the natural security afforded by America’s location, the allure of
preserving that security by pulling back from commitments that may compromise it, and the isolationist
strains that have influenced U.S. foreign policy since the founding of the republic, a reduction of the
country’s global role does have the potential to go too far. A reining in of America’s overseas commitments
is one thing. It is inevitable and can be done gradually and with adequate preparation so as to mini-
mize the attendant risks. An American withdrawal from global affairs is another matter altogether. It
would have dire consequences precisely because global stability is at present so dependent on American
power and purpose. [P. 65]
And, Drawing out early leads to massive instability in the gulf and the Balkans
Kupchan 2K2
(Charles, Professor of International Relations @ Georgetown, The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and
the Geopolitics of the 21st Century, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, lexis)
If America’s politics soon come to rein in its foreign policy; the United States might well bow out before
others are prepared to fill the void. With no one around to mind the store, incremental threats of the
sort that recently emerged in the Middle East and the Balkans would go unchecked. No other country
has the combination of military capability and political clout needed to put together a campaign of the size
that drove Iraqi troops from Kuwait or the Yugoslav army from Kosovo. Had the United States chosen not
to contain Saddam Hussein in the early i99os, Iraq today could well be in control of not just Kuwait,
but also of Saudi Arabia and its massive oil reserves. And the Balkan Peninsula could be in turmoil,
doing irreversible damage to southeastern Europe and calling into question the relevance and
legitimacy of NATO and the EU. [P. 205-206]
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 71
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***Yes Balancing***
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 72
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Multipolarity Now
The world is now multipolar.
alone when it’s not even invited, as with the new East Asian Community, the region’s answer to America’s
Apec. The East Asian Community is but one example of how China is also too busy restoring its place as
the world’s “Middle Kingdom” to be distracted by the Middle Eastern disturbances that so preoccupy
the United States. In America’s own hemisphere, from Canada to Cuba to Chávez’s Venezuela, China
is cutting massive resource and investment deals. Across the globe, it is deploying tens of thousands of
its own engineers, aid workers, dam-builders and covert military personnel. In Africa, China is not
only securing energy supplies; it is also making major strategic investments in the financial sector. The
whole world is abetting China’s spectacular rise as evidenced by the ballooning share of trade in its gross
domestic product — and China is exporting weapons at a rate reminiscent of the Soviet Union during
the cold war, pinning America down while filling whatever power vacuums it can find. Every country
in the world currently considered a rogue state by the U.S. now enjoys a diplomatic, economic or
strategic lifeline from China, Iran being the most prominent example. Without firing a shot, China is
doing on its southern and western peripheries what Europe is achieving to its east and south. Aided by
a 35 million-strong ethnic Chinese diaspora well placed around East Asia’s rising economies, a Greater
Chinese Co-Prosperity Sphere has emerged. Like Europeans, Asians are insulating themselves from
America’s economic uncertainties. Under Japanese sponsorship, they plan to launch their own regional
monetary fund, while China has slashed tariffs and increased loans to its Southeast Asian neighbors.
Trade within the India-Japan-Australia triangle — of which China sits at the center — has surpassed
trade across the Pacific. At the same time, a set of Asian security and diplomatic institutions is being
built from the inside out, resulting in America’s grip on the Pacific Rim being loosened one finger at a
time. From Thailand to Indonesia to Korea, no country — friend of America’s or not — wants political
tension to upset economic growth. To the Western eye, it is a bizarre phenomenon: small Asian nation-
states should be balancing against the rising China, but increasingly they rally toward it out of Asian
cultural pride and an understanding of the historical-cultural reality of Chinese dominance. And in the
former Soviet Central Asian countries — the so-called Stans — China is the new heavyweight player, its
manifest destiny pushing its Han pioneers westward while pulling defunct microstates like Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan, as well as oil-rich Kazakhstan, into its orbit. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization gathers these
Central Asian strongmen together with China and Russia and may eventually become the “NATO of the
East.”
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Nonpolarity Now
( ) Soft balancing decreases hegemony—weakens the military power that the superior states
can bring to battle.
Robert A. Pape, professor of political science at the U of Chicago, 2005 (“Soft Balancing against the United
States”, International Security 30.1, 7-45, Project Muse)
How Soft Balancing Works States can also seek to equalize the odds through soft balancing. Balancing can involve the
utilization of tools to make a superior state's military forces harder to use without directly confronting that state's power with one's own
forces. Although soft balancing relies on nonmilitary tools, it aims to have a real, if indirect, effect on the military prospects of a superior
state. Mechanisms of soft balancing include territorial denial, entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening, and signaling of resolve to
participate in a balancing coalition. All of these steps can weaken the military power that the superior state can bring to bear in battle.59
Territorial Denial. Superior states often benefit from access to the territory of third parties as staging
areas for ground forces or as transit for air and naval forces. Denying access to this territory can
reduce the superior state's prospects for victory, such as by increasing the logistical problems for the superior state or
compelling it to fight with air or sea power alone, constraints that effectively reduce the overall force that a stronger state can bring to
bear against a weaker one. Entangling Diplomacy. Even strong states do not have complete freedom to ignore either the rules
and procedures of important international organizations or accepted diplomatic practices without losing substantial support for their
objectives. Accordingly, states may use international institutions and ad hoc diplomatic maneuvers to delay
a superior state's plan for war and so reduce the element of surprise and give the weaker side more
time to prepare; delay may even make the issue irrelevant. Especially if the superior state is [End Page 36] also a
democracy, entangling diplomacy works not only by affecting the balance of military capabilities that can be brought to bear in the
dispute but also by strengthening domestic opposition to possible adventures within the superior state. Economic Strengthening.
Militarily strong, threatening states that are the targets of balancing efforts usually derive their
military superiority from possession of great economic strength. One way of balancing effectively, at least in the
long run, would be to shift relative economic power in favor of the weaker side. The most obvious way of doing this is through regional
trading blocs that increase trade and economic growth for members while directing trade away from nonmembers. If the superior
state can be excluded from the most important such blocs, its overall trade and growth rates may
suffer over time. Signals of Resolve to Balance. Second-ranked powers seeking to act collectively against
a sole superpower confront intense concern that the needed collective action will not materialize. Soft
balancing, in addition to its direct usefulness in restraining aggression by a unipolar leader, may also
address this problem by helping to coordinate expectations of mutual balancing behavior. If multiple
states can cooperate, repeatedly, in some of the types of measures listed above, they may gradually
increase their trust in each other's willingness to cooperate against the unipolar leader's ambitions.
Thus, a core purpose of soft balancing is not to coerce or even to impede the superior state's current
actions, but to demonstrate resolve in a manner that signals a commitment to resist the superpower's future
ambitions. Accordingly, the measure of success for soft balancing is not limited to whether the sole
superpower abandons specific policies, but also includes whether more states join a soft-balancing
coalition against the unipolar leader.
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Task 8 [Aaron, Writer for Yahoo Finance, Oil Crisis: Blame Failure of U.S. Leadership, Not Big Oil, http://finance.yahoo.com/tech-
ticker/article/18396/Oil-Crisis-Blame-Failure-of-U.S.-Leadership-Not-Big-Oil?tickers=XOM,BP,COP,RDS-B,CVX,HAL,XLE, May 21,
2008]
With oil pushing past $130 per barrel, Congress is swinging into action with a series of boneheaded measures
designed to generate crowd-pleasing sound bytes vs. actually addressing the issue. In typical fashion,
Washington's approach to the problem is to take symbolic measures like last week's vote to stop filling to SPR, or
this week's House bill allowing the U.S. to sue OPEC (good luck with that) and Joe Lieberman's proposal to regulate
commodity trading, as if surging crude prices are entirely a function of evil speculators. Today brought another dog
and pony show with a Senate hearing "Exploring the Skyrocketing Price of Oil." Predictably, the hearing brought a
lot of heated rhetoric but few solutions, as Congress overlooks the critical point that major oil companies don't really
control much of the world's oil, much less its price. "We cannot change the world market," Robert Malone, chairman
and president of BP America said at the hearing. "Today's high prices are linked to the failure both here and abroad
to increase supplies, renewables and conservation." As Malone suggests, the sad truth is that Congress has failed
miserably to produce any serious energy policy, and politicians of both parties ignored the Hirsch Report on
peak oil. Bottom line: The politicians didn't like the report's conclusions and so ignored them. Speaking of
which, Congress' failure is matched, if not exceeded, by that of the Bush Administration, which may very well
be the worst in history. Beyond the horrific miscalculations in Iraq, the Bush administration has actually
discouraged conservation and gave people tax breaks for driving SUVs. Bush has also overseen a huge
increase in the deficit, which has undermined the value of the dollar. Given all that (and more), maybe we
should be thankful oil and gas prices aren't higher.
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The US has set itself up for a loss of leadership in the energy market
The US has restored its environmental leadership with Bali and MEM.
Levi 8 (Michael, CFR Energy and Environment sr. fellow, p. 27-28, June, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16362/)
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change process remains the main international forum for
addressing climate change. At the annual meeting of its parties in December 2007, governments, including
the United States, committed to an agenda for negotiating a new agreement that would follow theKyoto
Protocol when it expires in 2012. That so-called Bali road map establishes four negotiating tracks—
mitigation, technology, finance, and adaptation—toward an agreement that the parties aim to conclude by
the end of 2009.24 The Bali road map has been noted in particular for an agreement by the developing
countries to ‘‘commitments’’ and by developed countries to ‘‘actions’’ that in both cases would be
‘‘measurable, reportable and verifiable.’’ The Bali meeting also yielded notable but still nascent initiatives
on avoiding deforestation and on helping vulnerable countries adapt to climate change. Until Bali, the
Bush administration had chosen not to engage actively in theUNprocess. Its policy long rejected binding
country-by-country limits on greenhouse gas emissions, focusing instead on a long list of voluntary bilateral
and regional initiatives, of which the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) has
been the most prominent.25 These activities have produced some additional focus on technological
opportunities to control emissions, but they consist mainly of meetings and have mobilized only very small
sums of money and technological resources. More recently, the Bush administration’s series of Major
Economies Meetings on Energy Security and Climate Change has taken center stage in U.S. foreign
policy on climate change.26 The Major Economies Meetings (MEM), which held its first meeting in
September 2007, brings together sixteen countries responsible for roughly four-fifths of global
emissions, as well as representatives of the European Union, European Commission, UNFCCC, and United
Nations, with the stated goal of agreeing, by the end of 2008, on emissions reduction targets, and, by the
end of 2009, on a new international framework and strategy for meeting those targets. The effort is
intended to feed directly into the UNFCCC process. The Bush administration has also recently
expressed a new openness to binding country-by-country limits on greenhouse gas emissions, so long as
all major economies are included.27 As part of that effort, it has announced a willingness to commit
the United States to stop its emissions growth by 2025 and stop the growth of power plant emissions
within ten to fifteen years.
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Levi 8 (Michael, CFR Energy and Environment sr. fellow, p. 29-30, June, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16362/)
Consistent with that philosophy, the Bush administration has pursued a domestic climate change policy
that emphasizes the continuing study of climate science, research and development on potential
breakthrough technologies, and incentives for deployment of specific lowcarbonsources of
energy,mostnotably nucleargenerationandbiofuels.31 In fact, the U.S. government is the largest single
funder of climate science. The United States also played a leading role in the formation of the IPCC in
1988, the main international body for assessment of climate science. The administration has endorsed the
findings of the most recent round of IPCC assessments, which include statements warning of the large
dangers from unchecked climate change. The federal government also invests heavily in development
of climate-friendly technologies, although it is difficult to measure the exact level of investment, as the
effort is spread across government. That public investment is supplemented by steadily increasing
private investment in relevant technologies—much of it driven by the anticipation of a binding federal
climate policy in the near future and by the reality that some states are already imposing limits on the
emission of greenhouse gases
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Levi 8 (Michael, CFR Energy and Environment sr. fellow, p. 30, June, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16362/)
Recent years have also seen significant movement in Congress, particularly in the Senate. The Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007 contains measures that will lower greenhouse gas emissions
from what would otherwise have been their course. Most strikingly, a succession of proposed legislation
envisions deepmandatory reductions in U.S. greenhouse gas emissionsby2020 and 2050. Creatively
designed, they have attracted increasing bipartisan support in Congress. While each proposal has also
found critics among those calling for either stronger or weaker action, the proposals are widely regarded as
having been unthinkable a few years ago. The presidential candidates have either introduced or
cosponsored far-ranging legislation—and have included ambitious climate change plans as parts of
their campaign platforms.
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The US lacks environmental leadership – this can only be reversed in the next year.
Becker 8 (Bill, Presidential Climate Action Project exec. director, May, p. 2, http://www.aicgs.org/documents/facet/becker.facet08.pdf)
U.S. President George W. Bush delivered a speech in April acknowledging the challenges presented by
climate change, but he offered no policies for addressing the problem. He called for America “to stop
the growth of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by 2025,” leaving the world to assume that U.S. emissions
would continue to grow unabated for 17 years with no regulations to ensure that action is taken even
then. For many across the United States, it was a disappointment. But while Washington seems paralyzed on
this issue, pressure is growing for aggressive climate action at other levels across the country. In the same
week that President Bush delivered his climate address, a bipartisan group of governors of 20 states met at
Yale University to sign the “Governors’ Declaration on Climate Change.” They called for the federal
government to join states in developing cost-effective programs to drastically reduce greenhouse-gas
emissions nationwide.They also encouraged Congress and the President to develop regulations to move
thecountry forward quickly toward a new energy economy. Meanwhile, mayors in more than 800 U.S. cities
have signed the “Mayors’ Climate Protection Agreement,” which endorses the goals of the Kyoto Protocols.
Industry calls for mandatory action In the private sector, representatives from some of the biggest
corporations in theUnited States have issued “A Call for Action,” urging the federal government to confront
climate change. The United States Climate Action Partnership, which includes Alcoa, General Motors Corp.,
Caterpillar Inc., Ford Motor Co., General Electric, BP America Inc., Duke Energy, ConocoPhillips, PepsiCo,
Siemens Corp., Xerox, Johnson & Johnson, DuPont, Deere & Co., Dow Chemical and other major
corporations, has issued recommendations for a cap-and-trade program, mandatory emissions reduction
targets, incentives for improved energy efficiency across the economy, and subsidies for rapid development
of new technologies. Still, despite the drumbeat of support for climate action, little is expected from
Congress or the White House in 2008. Washington is too preoccupied with election- year politics. That
means in 2009 the new president and Congress will need to act quickly. With this in mind, a national
non-partisan organization, the Presidential Climate Action Project, is amassing the best research on climate
science and public policy, and developing a full slate of recommendations for action by the next president.
The U.S. lags behind in an enormous challenge The challenges are enormous. More than half of
America’s power is generated yb burning coal, which produces about 40 percent of the carbon dioxide
emissions nationwide. By some estimates, buildings in the United States are 30 percent less energy
efficient than their European counterparts. American cars also are less efficient than those in Europe,
and a third of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions come from transportation. More than 10 percent of
the world’s oil is going into America’s gas tanks. Per capita energy use and greenhouse gas emissions
are twice as high in the United States as they are in the European Union.
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Washington Post 8 (“Climate Action in the Senate; Sadly, even having a debate is proress”, 6/2, ln)
The world has clamored for U.S. leadership on climate change. Yet for seven years the Bush
administration denied and dithered while the planet warmed. Initially, it questioned the science
underpinning the warnings about climate change. Today, President Bush believes global warming is real,
but he has resisted concrete actions to address it. Chief among them is putting a price on carbon, as would
be required by the climate bill sponsored by Sens. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.), Joseph I. Lieberman (I-Conn.)
and John W. Warner (R-Va.)
Levi 8 (Michael, CFR Energy and Environment sr. fellow, p. 25-26, June, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16362/)
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the treaty, which has been the focal point of climate change diplomacy for
the last decade, attempted to address the lack of specifics. Under the protocol, participating developed
countries collectively committed to reduce their average annual greenhouse gas emissions between the years
2008 and 2012 to 5.2 percent below their 1990 levels. This was divided up through negotiations that assigned
targets to individual countries. (The European Union pooled its targets and, through its own internal
negotiations, reallocated its collective target to each EU nation individually.) Most countries have ratified
Kyoto; while the United States participated vigorously in all stages of the negotiations, it has chosen
not to ratify the protocol. The Senate indicated that this would be the case early on with its 95–0 vote in
1997 in favor of the so-called Byrd-Hagel Resolution, which signaled that the United States would reject
any international climate agreement that did not include ‘‘specific scheduled commitments’’ from
developing countries. (That resolution has in some ways been superseded by the bipartisan 2005 Bingaman-
Specter resolution, which called on the United States to lead at home with mandatory emissions reductions,
even while it chose not to ratify Kyoto.) This outcome— and the way that the United States withdrew, for
several years, from follow-on negotiations—has antagonized U.S. allies. Even those advanced
industrialized countries that sympathize with some arguments against Kyoto have argued that the
treaty is an important experiment in climate policy that can provide useful lessons for crafting future
approaches.
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Levi 8 (Michael, CFR Energy and Environment sr. fellow, p. 43, June, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16362/)
The rest of the advanced industrial world has, for the most part, adopted more aggressive policies than
the United States toward avoiding dangerous climate change, though with uneven results on the ground.
While those countries will need to continually intensify their efforts at home, U.S. foreign policy strategy is
unlikely to determine whether that happens there. The European Union, in particular, has already
promised, alone, to achieve a substantial (20 percent) cut in emissions by 2020, and offered to make an
even deeper cut (30 percent) if other countries make major efforts.
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Levi 8 (Michael, CFR Energy and Environment sr. fellow, p. 31, June, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16362/)
Still, the recent shifts, while large, should not be overestimated. In particular, increasing willingness in
Congress to approve aggressive domestic limits on greenhouse gas emissions should not be confused
with a similar appetite for new international treaties. The relative difficulty of having Congress
approve a traditional treaty—which requires sixty seven votes in the Senate—compared with the
challenges involved in passing domestic legislation must be kept in mind as a climate strategy is designed.
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Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., June, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
The United States still leads the world in science and technology. The United States accounts for 40
percent of total world R&D spending, 38 percent of industrialized nations’ (OECD countries) triadic
patents, and employs 37 percent of OECD researchers (1.3 million FTE). It produces 35 percent, 49
percent, and 63 percent of world publications, citations, and highly cited publications, employs 70
percent of the world’s Nobel Prize winners, 66 percent of its most cited individuals, and is home to 75
percent of the world’s top 20 and top 40 universities and 58 percent of its top 100. R&D spending is
rapidly increasing in developing nations such as China and Korea. But despite this rapid growth, the
U.S. share of world R&D spending (dollars at PPP) fell only by 1.5 percent to 36.1 percent between 1993
and 2003, while the EU-15 and Japan lost significant ground. In absolute terms, the United States
increased its R&D spending by $126.3 billion (nominal value at PPP), from $166.1 billion in 1993 to
$292.4 billion in 2003. This increase is more than in any other region: Over the same period, the EU-15
added $76.6 billion, Japan added $38.3 billion, and China added $60.8 billion. S&T employment is not
growing more rapidly in other nations/ regions than in the United States, though China showed remark-
able growth. The United States added a large number of researchers (299,000) between 1995 and 2003,
suggesting a vibrant R&D sector. At the same time, China added nearly as many (289,000), the EU-15
added 220,000, and Japan added 95,000. Both the EU-15 and China graduated more scientists and engineers
than the United States. While developing nations (China and India in particular) are starting to account for
a significant portion of the world’s S&T inputs and activities (R&D funding in dollars at PPP, research
jobs, S&T education, etc.) and are showing rapid growth in outputs and out- comes, they still account for a
very small share of triadic patents, S&T publications, and citations. Innovation and scientific discovery
are still led by the United States, EU 15, and Japan. The United States did lose 3 percentage points in its
world share in publications, citations, and top 1 percent highly cited publications between 1993–1997 and
graduated more scientists and engineers than the United States. But on measures such as additions to the
S&T workforce and patented innovations, U.S. growth in S&T was in line with or above average world
trends. By comparison, Japan grew more slowly in additions to the S&T workforce, and both the EU-15 and
Japan had slower growth in patented innovations
Lewis 4 (James A, CSIS Tech & Public Policy Program, Dec., www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/globalization_natl_security_execsum.pdf)
Innovative new technologies come from several sources, but one source is particularly important because it
provides the U.S. with comparative advantage. A combination of university research programs,
entrepreneurs, and financial support (from venture capital, corporations, or governments) provides an
increasingly strong source for innovation. The small, new firms this creates are a strong source of
innovation. The U.S. can take advantage of this to increase the pace of innovation. Examples of this ‘system’
include the research triangle in North Carolina, Silicon Valley and the area around MIT. This blend of
science and engineering expertise with entrepreneurial skills and capital is a leading source of
innovation in the US. One sign of its success is the effort by many countries to create similar centers
around their own universities.
Lewis 7 (James A., CSIS technology and public policy program, 3/14, p. 1,
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/TUTCtech031407/Lewis_Testimony031407.pdf)
The key to technological leadership is innovation. Continued technological leadership depends on the U.S.
capacity to innovate. Innovation is the ability to use knowledge to create new or better goods and services.
The U.S. innovation system, with its mix of university research, entrepreneurship and venture capital is
crucial for a steady flow of ideas that benefits both the commercial market and a military that often relies on
commercial technology. The U.S. has been one of the world leaders in innovation, and our political and
social makeup may provide America with something of an advantage over other nations when it comes
to the ability to innovate. The question is whether this comparative advantage is, by itself, enough in an era
of heightened global competition. The first thing to note, perhaps, is that there is a strange anomaly in these
concerns over the potential loss of technological leadership. That anomaly is that the U.S. spends more than
any other nation on science and on research and development. The U.S. spends more that the next five
nations combined. It is reasonable to ask how there can be a problem when we are spending so much more
than other nations
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Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., June, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
High growth in R&D expenditures, patents, and S&E employment, combined with continuing low
unemployment of S&E workers, suggest that U.S. S&E has remained vibrant. These signs do not
support the notion that jobs are being lost at substantial rates as a result of the outsourcing and
offshoring of S&T. U.S. gains in S&T occur against a backdrop in which R&D expenditures, S&E
employment, and patents are also increasing in the EU-15, Japan, China, Korea, and many other
nations/regions. Studies of the offshoring of high-skill work suggest that it does not result in job losses
in the originating country, as it is increasingly driven by the need to access scarce talent, but rather
that the overall number of jobs is increasing.
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Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., p. 25, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
Wage and unemployment trends do not show the traditional signs of a shortage of scientists and
engineers. Unemployment has not been decreasing but has been steadily low, as is typical in professional
occupations. Also, wages have not been increasingly rapidly relative to trend. Nevertheless, low
unemployment, the relatively steady wage growth in S&E, and claims of shortages can plausibly be
reconciled by off shoring and outsourcing. If firms cannot fill their S&E positions in the United States, they
may decide to offshore or outsource R&D to take advantage of foreign S&E labor pools. In addition, firms
may prefer to set up foreign production and research activities as part of a strategy of gaining entry to foreign
markets. Moving operations to foreign countries and drawing on their S&E workers may be less costly and
strategically more advantageous than bidding up S&E wages in the United States in an effort to hire S&E
workers. Thus, offshoring and outsourcing are options that can slow wage increases and remove
shortages. That is, shortages in the United States have not materializedor have been mitigated, by these
means. Under this explanation, it also follows that reducing the inflow of foreign high-skilled S&E workers
(e.g., by reducing the H1-B visa cap) will likely increase offshoring and outsourcing. It may not even induce
sufficient numbers of U.S. citizens to join the S&E workforce, as wage growth will still be slowed by the
decision to offshore or outsource the work. Increasing the inflow of foreign high skill S&E workers may, in
contrast, increase investment and employment at home as well as provide local spillover benefits.
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Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., p. 44, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
Despite the rhetoric and the intensive action on the Hill, some voices called for restraint. The reports and
testimony making a case for or arguing against an S&T crisis are part of an ongoing policy debate. One
line of counterargument is that such warnings are far from unprecedented and have never resulted in the
crisis anticipated. The author of a Washington Watch article noted that “similar fears of a STEM6
workforce crisis in the 1980s were ultimately unfounded” (Andres, 2006). Neal McCluskey, a policy
analyst from the Cato Institute, noted that similar alarm bells were sounded decades earlier (and in his
view, have had underlying political agendas): Using the threat of international economic competition to
bolster federal control of education is nothing new. It happened in 1983, after the federally commissioned
report A Nation at Risk admonished that ‘our once unchallenged preeminence in com- merce, industry,
science, and technological innovation is being overtaken by competitors throughout the world,’ as well as the
early 1990s, when George Bush the elder called for national aca- demic standards and tests in order to better
compete with Japan. (McCluskey, 2006) Roger Pielke of the University of Colorado observed that such
issues as poor student performance have an even longer history, with no negative outcomes. Arguments
that “certain other countries produce a greater proportion of scientist and engineering students or that
those students fare better on tests of achievement . . . have been made for almost 50 years,” he stated,
“yet over that time frame the U.S. economy has done quite well” (Pielke, 2006).
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Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., p. 37, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
First is that the effects of globalization—including the growing strength of other nations in S&T—will
make it much more difficult in the future for the United States to maintain a leadership position in
S&T. Advocates of this viewpoint cite the quickly rising S&T capacity of rival powers, the heightened
competition presented by white-collar workers in S&T in lower-wage countries, the ability for new
technolo- gies and information to be rapidly transmitted around the globe, and changes in the nature of
innovation, which is increasingly driven by private investment and international clusters of emerging
tech firms, capital markets, and research universities (e.g., Segal, 2004), rather than by large corporate
laboratories—such as Bell, GE, and IBM—4 U.S. Competitiveness in Science and Technology located in the
United States and by U.S. scientists supported by U.S. government funds. Second, it is argued that the
domestic building blocks of S&T leadership are eroding. For a nation to be a strong performer in S&T,
certain elements must be in place: Infrastructure: This includes physical infrastructure—such as laboratories,
equipment, and user facilities such as national and industrial laboratories—as well as substantial investment
in research and development (R&D) and laws, policies, and regu- lations to support that investment (e.g., tax
policies, intellectual property rights, efficient labor markets, etc.). Today, those laws would include favorable
immigration policies for foreign S&T talent. Education: The education system should be able to provide
highquality instruction in the sciences, engineering, and mathematics. This includes both K–12 and higher
education. Also, students should have the counseling, support, and financial aid to help them make well-
informed decisions and to finance their education. Workforce: S&T capability depends on having a well-
trained, well-prepared, and sizeable S&T workforce, and this depends in part on the challenges, incentives,
and rewards, both monetary and nonmonetary, found in S&T careers. Advocates contend that the United
States has for decades invested too little in sustaining its S&T leadership, and that is particularly so
given the increased pressures on the United States resulting from globalization.
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Lewis 7 (James A., CSIS technology and public policy program, 3/14, p. 1,
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/TUTCtech031407/Lewis_Testimony031407.pdf)
The answer is also relatively simple. We are not spending enough to maintain our lead, and we are not
spending enough on the things needed for military technology. While our spending levels are flat,
spending in other nations is increasing. If these trends continue without change, the long term result
will be that the U.S. will no longer have the lead in important technologies.
Lewis 7 (James A., CSIS technology and public policy program, 3/14, p. 2,
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/TUTCtech031407/Lewis_Testimony031407.pdf)
In a few key areas of research, scientists in other nations are publishing more than their American
counterparts. The number of U.S. authored papers increasing by only 13% between 1988 and 2001
while the number of papers authored by Europeans increased by 60% (and Europe overtook the U.S.)
while the number of papers authored by Asians more than doubled, increasing by 120%. Even more
worrisome is that half of the U.S. publications were in the life sciences, whereas other nations were
concentrated in the physical sciences. The age of our technological workforce in some key areas, like
aerospace, is another troubling trend. Many scientists and engineers will retire in the next few years
and will not be replaced. From an economic standpoint, this may not be bad – we do not want to train
engineers only to find that there is no work for them – but from a national security perspective these are
warning signs that suggest that the U.S. may want to consider whether if it is paying enough attention
to the connection between science, technology and security.
Technological leadership is low due to globalization and competition from China and India.
Lewis 7 (James A., CSIS technology and public policy program, 3/14, p. 2,
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/TUTCtech031407/Lewis_Testimony031407.pdf)
Part of this challenge is the result of what we call globalization - the increasing integration of national economies
into a single market. Globalization tends to diffuse technology around the world. Globalization has eroded the
national character of science, as research is increasingly carried out by multinational teams, but it has not
changed the need for nations to draw upon science for their security. Part of the challenge also comes from the
rise of strategic competitors, national like China or India, and perhaps Brazil or even Europe in the distant
future. These strategic challengers have seen how important science has been to U.S. military leadership and
they seek to copy what we have done
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Low numbers of skilled engineers and scientists in the US kill technological leadership.
Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., p. 37, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
Those who warn that the United States faces an imminent S&T crisis point to globalization as one of
two primary causes. Their concern lies in the belief that various effects of globalization are beginning to
impede the ability of the United States to compete in S&T. “Today, Americans are feeling the gradual
and subtle effects of globalization that challenge the economic and strategic leadership that the United
States has enjoyed since World War II,” opens the National Academies of Sciences (2006) report Rising
Above the Gathering Storm. Similarly, “We face complex changes in the increasingly globalized economy
that put significant stress on [our innovation ecosystem]” (President’s Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology, 2004) so that “the United States can no longer take its supremacy [in scientific discovery
and innovation] for granted” (Task Force on the Future of American Innovation, 2005). If America’s
leadership economically and strategi- cally depends on its ability to dominate in S&T, any threat to its
strong S&T performance is also a threat to its leadership in those spheres. Reports that take up the
globalization theme focus on four effects of globalization that they contend will endanger America’s
ability to retain its S&T leadership: the growing strength of other nations in S&T, heightened
competition from high-skill workers in low-wage countries that may lead toward offshoring of
American S&T jobs, the changing nature of innovation, and the increased global diffusion of
technology
Lewis 4 (James A, CSIS Tech & Public Policy Program, Dec., www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/globalization_natl_security_execsum.pdf)
Second and more importantly, the U.S. relative share of innovation will fall, potentially affecting
technological leadership. Globalization's most significant effect on U.S. interests is the leveling of
technological leadership. The increased international mobility of highly skilled labor and the diffusion
of technological know-how means that many countries now can compete with the U.S. in producing
cutting edge research and innovation. U.S. policy and regulation reinforces globalization’s
technological leveling. The U.S. may damage its ability to create new technologies because of funding
decisions for research, new homeland security policies and if it fails to compensate for decreased
manufacturing activity. Federal investment in physical sciences and engineering has fallen by half since 1970
as a percentage of GDP. Corporate R&D spending has changed significantly and focuses on development of
new products, in reaction to competitive pressures and the need to show near-term gains to financial markets.
The result is that the U.S. has seriously underfunded key research sectors. Homeland security initiatives
accelerate the loss of technological and economic leadership. In addressing legitimate security concerns,
we have inadvertently made the U.S. a less attractive destination for investors, students, and
researchers. The result is the erosion of a major source of economic and technological advantage. The
most important element of this is the damage to University research, which is a fundamental component of
U.S. strength, and it is likely that this damage outweighs any gains to security. While much of the concern
over the shift in the U.S. economy from manufacturing to services is misplaced, the relationship between
manufacturing and innovation is an area of risk. Innovation can come from ‘breakthrough
technologies,’ but also from incremental improvements to existing products. Those who make the
product are more likely to be able to improve it or develop the next generation. As the U.S. increasingly
depends on foreign manufacturing, it could lose the boost to innovation provided by hands-on
experience and will need mechanisms to compensate.
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Lewis 7 (James A., CSIS technology and public policy program, 3/14, p. 4,
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/TUTCtech031407/Lewis_Testimony031407.pdf)
Federal funding for basic research in engineering and physical sciences has experienced little or no growth in
the last thirty years. As a percentage of GDP, funding for physical science research has been in a thirty-
year decline and has fallen by about half. Total federal funding for R&D was essentially flat from 1988
to 2001. Spending on mathematics research was roughly $190 million in 1985 and $200 million in 2004;
spending on physics was flat between 1985 and 2001 and there were only slight increases in funding for
chemistry. Funding for engineering research increased from approximately $6 billion to $9 billion
between 1988 and 2001, but funding for some key research areas, such as electrical engineering, remained
essentially flat. The effect on security of underinvestment is acute and damaging in specific research
areas. These include physics, aeronautics, mathematics, computer sciences, and engineering. There are
three reasons for emphasizing the dangers of underinvesting in these areas. First, research in these areas
provides the basis for improved military performance. Second, in relative terms, these areas have been
the most seriously underfunded. Third, advances in these research areas enable other areas of scientific
research – by providing better sensors and measuring tools or improved computing power. The
problem of underfunding is compounded by changes in research and development in the Department of
Defense and in the private sector. In the past, about three percent of DOD spending on procurement
ultimately went to R&D. However, the decline in procurement of new equipment has reduced the
amount of funds for technological innovation for the military. In addition, government and private
defense R&D investments are skewed - understandably - toward near-term priorities (e.g., upgrades or
replacements for existing systems) rather than fundamentally new capabilities. Additionally, some
research problems are too expensive for any company to undertake. The combination of changing
research priorities in DOD and the private sector means that some key research areas are not adequately
funded.
Technological leadership is low – immigration policy forces out talented individuals and
encourages resource in competing states.
Lewis 7 (James A., CSIS technology and public policy program, 3/14, p. 4-5,
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/TUTCtech031407/Lewis_Testimony031407.pdf)
Another set of U.S. policies also threatens technological leadership. These are changes in immigration policy.
It is useful to remember that U.S. national security and military power was strengthened in the 20th
century by an influx of foreign scientists fleeing unstable conditions in Europe. The universities and
institutions that received these scientists became global leaders in research, a role which they continue to
play. Having these leading universities benefits the U.S., as leading students from other nations come to
the U.S. to study and contribute to research. However, several factors have made the U.S. a less
attractive destination for scientific talent than it once was. Measures imposed in the attacks of
September 11 have the unintended consequence of deterring some researchers from coming to the U.S.
Other changes prevent researchers form staying here once they complete their educations. This is
particularly damaging - when a foreign student has completed their training and is ready to begin
work, U.S. policy is to have them and work in another country. At the same time, other nations have
recognized the economic and military advantages provided by scientific leadership and have
attempted, with some success, to capture a greater share of scientific talent and to duplicate the success
of research centers found in the U.S. This means that the U.S. faces new competition for scientific
talent at the same moment that it policy is to discourage needs to compensate as foreign supplies of
scientists and engineers shrink in the face of increased demand from other countries
Lewis 7 (James A., CSIS technology and public policy program, 3/14, p. 4-5,
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/TUTCtech031407/Lewis_Testimony031407.pdf)
U.S. restrictions on technology transfer also works against maintaining technological leadership. In
some areas, there are restrictions that prevent scientists from exchanging unclassified information or
working together on research projects. In other areas, restrictions on U.S. exports have encouraged
other nations to invest in their own research and technologies. The unintended effect of these
restrictions, and the restrictions on immigration, has been to create incentives for people to move
research outside of the United States. The unintentional effect of some U.S. policies is to create new
competitors.
Technological leadership is low – India, China, and the EU are catching up.
Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., p. 37, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
An official statement from the National Summit on Competi- tiveness calls attention to “the resources
that other countries are pour- ing into building their science and technology enterprises” (National
Summit on Competitiveness, 2005). China and India are the most notorious examples of nations on the rise:
“The major development since the mid-1990s was the rapid emergence of Asian economies out- side of
Japan as increasingly strong players in the world’s S&T system.. . . China is growing at the most rapid
pace. . . . Fragmentary data on India suggest that it is also seeking rapid technological development”
(National Science Board, 2006a). According to economist Richard Freeman, this does not bode well for the
United States: “[A]s China and India grow and join Europe, Japan and other high-tech competitors,
the U.S. scientific advantage ‘is going down pretty rapidly and it’s going to continue to fall’” (Farrell,
2006). Other nations/regions certainly have ambitions to strengthen their competitiveness as knowledge-
based economies. China and the Euro- pean Union (EU) are two examples. In January 2006, China initiated a
15-year “Medium- to Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology.” China aims to
become an “innovation-oriented society” by 2020 and a world leader in science and technology by
2050, develop indigenous innovation capabilities, leap-frog1 into leading positions in new science-based
industries, increase R&D expenditures to 2.5 percent of GDP by 2020 (from 1.34 percent in 2005), increase
the contribution to economic growth from technological advances to 60 percent, limit dependence on
imported technology to 30 percent, and become one of the top five countries in the world in the number of
patents granted (Cao, Suttmeier, and Simon, 2006). In March 2000, the EU heads of states and governments
agreed to make the EU “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world”
by 2010—the so-called Lisbon Strategy (Eurac- tiv, 2004a). Two years later, the EU set a goal to increase
its average research investment level from 1.9 percent to 3 percent of GDP by 2010, of which two-thirds
should be funded by the private sector as compared with 56 percent at the time. Concern that the reform pro-
cess was not going fast enough led to a relaunch of the Lisbon Strategy in March 2005 (Euractiv, 2004b).
Some of the initiatives under way include
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Foreign media agencies and US politicians will spin any policy so that it erodes US
leadership.
US leadership is down due to Iraq and disillusionment with US economic policy – Latin
America proves.
America’s overzealous use of power has created a suicidal statecraft that kills US
leadership.
Roosevelt 6 (Theodore IV, chairman of Strategies for the Global Environment, Pew Center, July 20,
http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_congress/roosevelt_7_20_06.cfm)
Furthermore, financiers are projecting significant growth in demand for renewable energy technologies
and energy efficient products. Mandatory climate policy will spur U.S. leadership in environmental
and energy technology innovation, assuring U.S. competitiveness in the booming global market for
climate-friendly technology.
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AE = Soft Power
U.S. can use scientific and technological innovations in context of developing alternative
energies to increase soft power
AE = US Economy
Alternative energy key to US Economy
U.S. must kick oil dependency to maintain global leadership and national security
National Security Task Force on Energy ‘6 (“Energy Security in the 21st Century: A New National
Strategy”) online: http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/energy_security_report.pdf
President Bush has declared that America is addicted to oil and dangerously dependent on unstable or
hostile states for its energy supply. But while there is a consensus across the political spectrum
that the current energy strategy is failing, Democrats and Republicans fundamentally
disagree about what should be done to address the threats posed by America’s dependence
on foreign oil and the potentially catastrophic environmental damage caused by carbon
emissions from the use of fossil fuels. The Bush administration has demonstrated a willingness to
acknowledge the existence of such energy security challenges, but it has failed to implement a plan to
meet them. In this report, leading energy and national security experts present a new, comprehensive
energy security strategy that will put the United States on a path toward energy independence while
enhancing our national, economic, and environmental security.
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Shuja 8 (Sharif, Monash U Global Terrorism Research Unit Honorary Research Associate, “Why America Can Not Ignore Soft Power”,
3/22, p. 16-17)
For much of the past two decades, the United States has been relatively successful at imposing neo-
liberal reforms on oil-rich nations of the South in order to open up their economies and resources to
multinational energy com- panies. In countries where neo-liberal reforms were not possible, or proved
insufficient, such as in Iraq, US military intervention occurred in conjunction with economic
intervention. Under President George W. Bush, the historic links between US energy policy and US foreign
policy became even more pronounced, and it should be noted that the United States has been steadily
expanding its control of overseas territories since the turn of the twentieth century, though most
Americans do not think of their government as an'empire'. Now, with over 700 military bases worldwide,
the US holds sway over an area that dwarfs the great empires of history. Only last month there was a
heated debate in Parliament about the use of the US base on Diego Garcia which is on that small British-
owned island. British officials admitted that the US had used the base in at least two cases for 'rendition'
flights carrying terrorist suspects
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***Enviro K US Leadership***
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Environmental leadership, achievable only through new domestic efforts to cut emissions,
is key to hegemony.
Levi 8 (Michael, CFR Energy and Environment sr. fellow, p. 21-22, June, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16362/)
Without deep U.S. emissions cuts, it will be impossible to achieve a global reduction in emissions to half
of 1990 levels by 2050. An ambitious U.S. effort is essential since U.S. emissions are such a large share
of the world total, and because visible U.S. leadership is essential to getting other nations, especially the
rapidly growing developing countries, to make significant efforts. As of 2005, the United States
accounted for approximately 15 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, more than anyother country
aside fromChina—andmost analysts believe that China’s emissions surpassed the U.S. level in 2007.35 Those
emissions— most of which were CO2 from electricity and heat production and from transportation—were 20
percent higher than U.S. emissions in 1990.36 The IEA projects that, without new policies, U.S. carbon
dioxide emissions will increase by 10 percent by 2015 and by 20 percent by 2030. The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) projects that non-CO2 emissions will increase by 20 percent by 2020.37 A wide
range of scientific, business, and environmental groups have supported a path in which the United States,
along with the other advanced industrial countries, begins reducing its emissions immediately and ultimately
reduces them to roughly 60 percent to 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050, a trajectory reflected in several
bipartisan bills currently before Congress. These are extremely ambitious goals, but they are ones the Task
Force has previously identified as having the strong potential to be economically reasonable, assuming
flexible and carefully designed policy, particularly given the gravity of the climate challenge. If developing
countries control their emissions so that they are roughly the same in 2050 as today, that would be consistent
with a global goal of halving emissions from 1990 levels by 2050. In addition to the immediate
quantitative need to reduce the U.S. contribution to global emissions, there is also a broader case for
aggressive U.S. action and leadership. Without it, the United States will have far less leverage in
moving the rest of the world toward emissions cuts in a way that is most attractive to the United States.
Moreover, by not taking early action, the United States will give up opportunities to rebuild critical
alliances, to create jobs in new industries, and to bolster support for near-term measures that could
strengthen energy security. Indeed, it could endure real economic harm if, retaliating for a lack of U.S.
action, other countries imposed tariffs on emissions-intensiveU.S. exports, as some in Europe have
threatened to do. To be certain, precipitous action and inflexible policy would entail dangerous economic
risks—but, as the Task Force has already found, efficient, equitable, and adaptable climate policy would
make those risks far smaller. The Task Force finds that aggressive and mandatory domestic efforts to cut
U.S. greenhouse gas emissions are a prerequisite to effective U.S. engagement and leadership
internationally on climate change policy. A policy that begins reducing U.S. emissions now and that is
initially aimed at a goal of cuts as deep as 60 percent to 80 percent below 1990 levels in 2050 at reasonable
cost is appropriate.38 The Task Force finds that with emissions rising, current policies are nowhere near the
level of effort required to stop and then reverse growth in greenhouse gas emissions, let alone reach these
targets.
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Environmental leadership is key to global leadership – restores relations and builds new
partnerships.
Levi 8 (Michael, CFR Energy and Environment sr. fellow, p. 21-22, June, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16362/)
Climate change policy also provides an opportunity to mend U.S. relations with other countries. Among
the advanced industrialized nations, the United States is viewed as the country that has been slowest to
develop a credible climate policy. The shape of U.S. policy has many origins. The United States found it
especially difficult to meet the emissions targets set forth in the Kyoto Protocol primarily because its
own emissions rose rapidly during the economic boom of the late 1990s and because it chose not to require
emissions reductions; the European Union, by contrast, has seen its emissions rise much less sharply for a
variety of reasons linked to its slower population growth, generally less robust economic expansion,
fortuitous changes in its energy systems, and its active policies to cut emissions.20 The perceived lack of a
sufficiently aggressive U.S. policy, along with the United States’ failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol at a
time when many in the world view climate change as a paramount danger for the planet, has undercut
U.S. credibility in addressing global challenges. To be certain, the United States has adopted a variety of
policies that will lead emissions to be lower than they otherwise would be, something discussed in more
detail in the next chapter. But combined with an array of other policy differences, the U.S. approach to the
climate problem has harmed the transatlantic alliance, long a bedrock of U.S. foreign policy. With
climate change a top priority for most major U.S. allies in Europe, engaging in a way that is seen as
serious and constructive has the potential to rebuild weakened relationships and accrue goodwill that
would be useful across the U.S. foreign policy agenda. At the same time, climate change diplomacy,
which will involve every major country in the world, also provides the United States anopportunity to
build and intensify relationships that will be important well beyond the climate arena. U.S. leadership
on climate changewould also help steer any global approach in a direction that the United States finds
to be in its interests. The Task Force finds that engaging on climate change can help repair U.S.
relationships with historical allies and provide an avenue for strengthening relations with others.
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Levi 8 (Michael, CFR Energy and Environment sr. fellow, p. 23, June, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16362/)
Energy security has risen alongside climate change to the top tier of the foreign policy agenda—in much of
the United States it outstrips climate change in the priority assigned by the public. In the United States,
energy security concerns focus primarily on dependence on imported oil, which accounts for 65
percent of total U.S. oil consumption. In the coming decades it will also link to gas (already the focus of
European worries), which the United States imports in small quantities today but is likely to rely on more
heavily in the future.21 Imported oil and gas distorts the behavior of friends, allies, and competitors
alike in ways that are inimical to U.S. interests, exposes the U.S. economy to sharp shifts in resource
prices, and constrains U.S. options in dealing with oil- and gas-rich states, all while abetting corruption
and antidemocratic forces.22 Shaping global action to limit the emissions that cause climate change
offers the United States opportunities to advance its energy security agenda. For example, cutting
emissions around the world by making far more efficient use of energy would also lessen global
dependence on oil and gas, in turn depressing the revenues that flow to dangerous oil- and gas-rich
states such as Iran and Venezuela. Over the longer term, it is also plausible that large quantities of oil
currently used in transportation could be displaced by shifting to electricity for transportation. If future power
plants are built in ways that reduce greenhouse gas emissions—such as with advanced coal plants that
sequester their CO2 deep underground, large-scale deployment of wind turbines, fuller use of nuclear
power,or any of a host of other technologies—electrifying the transport sector would yield major climate
benefits at the same time
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Levi 8 (Michael, CFR Energy and Environment sr. fellow, p. 93, June, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16362/)
The report provides important insights and recommendations at a critical time both for U.S. political
leadership and in the global treaty negotiations. I particularly endorse the Task Force’s recognition that
climate change cooperation strengthens our international relationships: collaboration on clean energy
and climate change with the LatinAmerican governments in the 1990s built trust through shared
mutual challenges and opportunities, benefited their development objectives, and opened up new
markets for U.S. firms. It also diversified U.S. foreign policy relationships beyond long-standing
difficult issues like the illegal drug trade and immigration.
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Climate change’s erosion of US primacy is on par with great power war or terrorism.
Assuming environmental leadership would lead to mandatory emissions cuts that kill the
US economy.
Idso and Idso 1 (Craig and Keith, Center for the Study of CO2 and Climate Change pres. & VP, Aug.,
http://www.co2science.org/articles/V4/N32/EDIT.php)
It has become the mantra of nearly everyone worried about potential global warming: leadership. Just
last Thursday (2 August 2001), the most recent worthies to decry what they view as a lack of this virtue in the
Bush White House issued a call for U.S. power plants and industries to reduce their emissions of carbon
dioxide. Said Arizona's Sen. John McCain, as quoted in the next day's Washington Post, "the United states
has a responsibility to cut its emissions of greenhouse gases," adding that "the current situation demands
leadership." Likewise, saying he had been "extremely troubled by the failure of our government to engage on
this crucial issue," Connecticut's Sen. Joseph Lieberman claimed "this failure abdicates the United States'
position as a leader in environmental affairs." Nothing could be further from the truth. In leveling these
derogatory charges against the president and his administration, the two senators substitute a form of name-
calling for the more substantive discussion one would have hoped to receive from them. If President Bush
had allowed U.S. negotiators in Bonn to join with the rest of the world in seeking ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol, for example, he would have been hailed as a great leader and more: he would have been heralded as
an environmental savior. So, it's not lack of White House leadership the senators decry, it's the direction that
leadership might possibly take the nation that disturbs them; and, hence, their claims that the U.S.
administration is not leading on the issue are an affront to reason and sensibility alike. When the situation is
more objectively considered, in fact, an even better case can be made for the proposition that the two senators
are the ones who are lacking in leadership on the global change front. Particularly in the case of Sen. McCain
is this fact evident. During his unsuccessful challenge of Bush in the 2000 Republican presidential primaries,
McCain was pretty much lukewarm to the idea of global warming. Only over the past few months has there
been what the Washington Post describes as "a dramatic evolution in his thinking" on the subject, most likely
fueled by the senator's realization there is much to be gained by "greening up." In this transformation it seems
clear he is only following what his nose tells him are greener political pastures on campaign trails to come.
Ditto for Lieberman. To wax slightly more philosophical on this point, it is pertinent to note that great
leaders do not use coercive tactics to force the masses to go where they want them to go; they use reason
to encourage them to go where they truly believe they should be. Education, not legislation, is thus the key to
real leadership. Yet what do we have from the media-knighted leaders of today? Scientifically-
unfounded and economically-unsound proposals for treaties and laws that would bind, obligate and
enforce us to abide by a host of rules and regulations designed to reduce anthropogenic CO2 emissions
in a massive global program for which many scientists believe there is no compelling rationale. This
abdication of one of the most basic principles of leadership cuts across all party lines. The U.S. Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, for example, recently voted 19 to 0 to urge the administration to go to the
next international climate change conference in Morocco in November with a plan for ensuring U.S.
participation in "a revised Kyoto Protocol or other future binding climate change agreements." Note that
word binding. It's the primary characteristic of what is being sought; and that is why the nations of the
earth -- except for the freedom-loving United States -- were willing to accept such a watered-down Kyoto
Protocol in Bonn: it's binding ... and it's a foot in the door to future egregious binding. It's also the chief
ingredient of the plan of Senators McCain and Lieberman, who intend to introduce legislation later this year
to set an economy-wide cap on U.S. CO2 emissions. And that's exactly what it will do: put a nation-
wide cap on our economy.
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Lewis 7 (James A., CSIS technology and public policy program, 3/14, p. 3,
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/TUTCtech031407/Lewis_Testimony031407.pdf)
Part of the challenge also comes from changes in the ways societies create wealth. The most important of
these changes is the transition to an information economy. An easy way to understand this transition is to
look at earlier examples. In the 1800s, we saw a transition from agriculture to industry and manufacturing.
This transition meant that the best way to generate wealth lay in industry, not farming. Now we are seeing an
economic transition from manufacturing to information. This means that the best way to generate
wealth will be in the creation of new knowledge, not in industrial production. However, while this
transition away from manufacturing may be good for the U.S. our economy, it does have implications for
U.S. leadership in military technology. The cumulative effect of these changes is to put U.S technological
leadership under some pressure. Combined with problematic U.S. policies, they create a new kind of
risk for national security. The best way to describe this risk is that the vigorous research and
technological base that has given the U.S. a military advantage for decades is in danger of being
eroded. The U.S. and other nations realized in World War II that sustained scientific research provided
military advantage. The United States created institutions in the 1940s and 1950s to support scientific
research for national security, including DARPA, the service labs, the National Science Foundation and
others. These Federal institutions build upon and are closely intertwined with America’s strong University
system, and the graduate research programs found at these universities. The U.S. system of innovation, with
its mix of university and federal research, entrepreneurship and venture capital, provides a steady flow
of ideas that benefits both the commercial market and a military and it is the envy of the world.
Coalition for Security and Competitiveness 7 (organization for export reform, 3/6,
http://securityandcompetitiveness.org/media/show/2243.html)
“Security and competitiveness go hand in hand,” Engler said. “A strong, innovative industrial base not
only helps us maintain the best military in the world but also keeps our economy growing and supports
U.S. global leadership. The international marketplace is changing rapidly with new competitors emerging in
both developed and transitioning economies. We need a modern export control system that recognizes this
new environment and enables U.S. companies to compete and continue their technological leadership.” AIA
President and CEO John Douglass said modernizing the export control system will boost U.S. national
security and enhance our diplomacy. “Making these improvements will increase our ability to fight
shoulder-to-shoulder with our allies and friends around the world,” Douglass said. “Past experience has
made it clear that multilateral operations enhance success, and military interoperability is vital to this
endeavor. Improved defense trade and technology cooperation also helps ensure our brave men and
women in uniform have the best weapons and equipment available to do their job. It is hard to
overstate how important this is to our nation.” EIA Interim President and CEO Charlie Robinson said the
regulatory process must catch up with industrial advances. “We measure modern technology in nanoseconds,
but it often takes two months or more to complete this regulatory process,” Robinson said. “Federal officials
are making strides to bridge that gap, but we must do better. We need an export control policy that puts
security first, while helping our allies abroad win and our companies at home compete. These changes can
make America a more secure, prosperous nation.” National Foreign Trade Council President Bill Reinsch
said a more efficient and transparent process would make the country more secure and more competitive.
“The Coalition’s reform program will create a system fit for the 21st century – one that is more efficient and
transparent for business and one which is focused on controlling the things that really affect our security,”
Reinsch said. “If the Administration adopts our reforms, the country will be safer and our high tech industries
healthier, which, in turn, will enable us to continue to run faster than our competitors.” Information
Technology Industry Council President Rhett Dawson said the Coalition’s proposed modernization reforms
would increase U.S. companies’ competitiveness. “The technological leadership of U.S. companies
underpins the economic and military strength of America,” Dawson said. “We need to improve our
export control system to reflect the global nature of innovation and security and to enable American
businesses to remain competitive in the world economy. The modernization initiatives proposed by the
coalition are a much-needed step in the right direction.”
Lewis 4 (James A, CSIS Tech & Public Policy Program, Dec., www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/globalization_natl_security_execsum.pdf)
Finally, technological leveling and interdependence give opponents new opportunities to seek
asymmetric advantage. The emphasis is to avoid direct engagement with military forces. Civilian and
economic infrastructures are soft targets that are more vulnerable to asymmetric attack. Nations and
groups will exploit commercial technologies and services to mimic advanced military capabilities and
take advantage of unexpected vulnerabilities to gain asymmetric advantages. Globalization, by giving
opponents increased access to U.S. critical infrastructure, creates a new set of risks, particularly in
information technologies. Intelligence agencies are opportunistic and foreign production of hardware
and software gives them an opportunity to gain access to information or to disrupt critical
infrastructures. A potential opponent could take advantage of the access afforded by globalization to
intentionally introduce malicious flaws. A few hundred lines of code hidden in programs with hundreds
of thousands of lines may be enough to provide an advantage, while being very difficult to detect.
Foreign intelligence agencies could exploit opportunities provided by economic integration to insert or
recruit personnel with access to critical functions in the U.S.
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Technological leadership is key to hegemony – supplies the basis of economic and military
power.
Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., p. 41, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
Thus, capability to innovate and adopt new technologies, including those invented elsewhere, is crucial
to the employment, sales, and profitability of U.S. firms and hence to the U.S. economy and standard of
living. Science and technology have historically contributed significantly not only to economic growth
but also to well-being (improved public health, longer life expectancy, better diagnoses and treatments of
many illnesses, etc.), standard of living (refrigerators, cars, iPods, etc.), and national security (atomic
bomb, radar, sonar, etc.). The strength of the U.S. economy and military provide it with the foundation
for its global leadership. If claims of diminishing U.S. leadership in S&T are true and its future ability to
compete globally is in question, the prognosis is indeed serious. S&T is directly linked not only to
economic strength but also to its global strategic leadership.
Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., p. 48-49, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
Invention and Innovation: While nations may increase productivity and standard of living through usage
of technology invented abroad, countries receive royalties on usage abroad of inventions they make,
piracy aside, while they pay royalties on usage of inventions made abroad. Further, nations compete with
one another on the basis of comparative advantage,14 and international leadership in science and
technology gives the United States its comparative advantage in the global economy. Loss of
comparative advantage could hurt the United States, as it may have to reallocate resources, reduce
wages, and forgo market-leader rents from new products or innovations.
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Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., p. 10-11, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
High growth in R&D expenditures, employment of scientists and engineers, and patents suggests that U.S.
S&T has remained vigorous. These U.S. developments occur at a time when increases (though at different
rates) in each of these measures are also seen in the EU-15, Japan, China, Korea, and many other
nations/regions. In other words, strong growth of R&D activity, S&E employment, and innovation in
many countries suggests a future of significant innovation activity, and, because of the greater diffusion
of technology in a globalized world, the promise of economic growth for those nations that are capable of
absorbing (making economic use of) the new technology. Scientifically advanced nations and regions
such as the United States, the EU, and Japan are highly capable of implementing new technology and
will benefit from it. Developing nations such as China and India have par- tial capability, but are well
ahead of Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. Though, as we will discuss in more detail later,
develop- ing nations can continue to grow their economies rapidly by absorbing existing technology in
addition to new technology.
Technological leadership isn’t key – what matters is how the US implements technology
and innovation, not how it’s created.
Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., p. 10-11, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
Another opposing view suggests that fears of a looming S&T crisis may result from a misunderstanding
of concepts driving the issue. The July 2006 Economist noted the “wide range of potential remedies” being
suggested to the purported S&T problem, which include “getting more Americans to study science and
engineering, bigger tax breaks for research and development, and trade protection to prevent the innovative
hordes from China and India from storming America’s gates” (The Economist, 2006). The piece continues by
citing a new paper by Amar Bhidé, of Columbia University’s business school, who argues that these
supposed remedies, and the worries that lie behind them, are based on a misconception of how innovation
works and of how it contributes to economic growth. . . .This consists, first, of paying too much attention
to the upstream development of new inventions and technologies by scientists and engineers, and too
little to the downstream process of turn- ing these inventions into products that tempt people to part
with their money, and, second, of the belief that national leadership in upstream activities is the same
thing as leadership in generat- ing economic value from innovation. . . . Mr Bhidé argues that this
downstream innovation . . . is the most valuable kind and what America is best at . . . that most of the value
of innovations accrues to their users not their creators—and stays in the coun-Introduction 11 try where the
innovation is consumed. So if China and India do more invention, so much the better for American
consumers. (The Economist, 2006)
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Economic models show increased diffusion and spread of technological research will bring
research activity back to the US, reinforcing technological leadership.
Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., p. 157, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
Nations trade with one another on the basis of comparative advantage, and international leadership in
science and technology gives the United States its comparative advantage in the global economy. Loss of
comparative advantage could hurt the United States, as it would have to reallocate resources, reduce wages,
and forego market-leader rents from new products or innovations. As more centers of scientific excel- lence
develop abroad, R&D will become more globalized, but it is not clear that the United States is fated to
lose as this occurs. Eaton and Kortum’s (2006) model of innovation, technology diffusion, and trade
suggests that as long as trade barriers are not too high, faster diffusion shifts research activity toward
the country that does it better (which in many fields is the United States). This shift in research activity
raises the relative wage there. It can even mean that, with more diffusion, the country better at research
eventually obtains a larger share of tech- nologies in its exclusive domain. Increased trade and faster
diffusion of technology will probably not affect all sectors alike, however, and a loss of leadership in some
areas may be accompanied by a gain of leadership in others. Freeman (2006, 2007) argues that populous,
low-income countries such as China and India have a cost advantage and may be able to compete with the
United States in high tech by focusing in a specific area and by having many S&E workers, even though they
are only a small fraction of their workforces.
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Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., p. 41, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
In work published over a decade ago, economist Paul Krugman questions whether the notion of
competition in S&T is even relevant. He argues that the idea that nations “compete” is incorrect; coun-
tries are not like corporations and “are [not] to any important degree in economic competition with
each other” (Krugman, 1994). Major industrial nations sell products that compete with each other, yet
these nations are also each other’s main export markets and each other’s main suppliers of useful
imports. More broadly, international trade is not a zero-sum game. For example, if the European
economy does well, this helps the United States by providing it with larger markets and goods of
superior quality at lower prices. Further, he argues that the growth rate of U.S. living standards essentially
equals the growth rate of domestic productivity, not U.S. productivity relative to competitors; and enhancing
domestic productivity is in the hands of Americans, not foreigners. Part of the reason for this, Krugman
argues, is that the world is not as interdependent as one would think: 90 percent of the U.S. economy consists
of goods and services produced for domestic use, i.e., produced by Americans, for Americans. But this is not
to deny the importance of technological progress, and beneath it, science and technology, as a determinant of
economic progress and improvement in the standard of living.
International trade and technological development are not zero sum – no need to fear
competition in technological leadership.
Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., p. 54, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
Given the complexity of the problem, economists and policymakers do not know what the “right” amount of
effort and investment in S&T is for a nation; at a minimum, we can compare the United States with other
nations to learn how much they have chosen to invest and with what results, and reflect on that in considering
how much the United States should invest. The comparison with other countries is made from this
perspective and not from the viewpoint of competition between nations in S&T, which is the more common
motivation for such comparisons. As we discussed earlier, the notion of competition can be mis- leading
when applied to a comparison of countries. Neither international trade nor S&T progress is a zero-sum
game, and improvement in one country does not necessarily imply a loss for another country.
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***General Links***
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Competitiveness K Heg
Economic competitiveness is key to hegemony.
Multilateralism K Heg
Working within coalitions and with other governments and NGOs is key to preserve US
heg.
Zalmay Khalilzad, US Ambassador to the United Nations. “Losing the Moment? The United States and the
World After the Cold War.” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2. pg. 84 Spring 1995
Overextension is a mistake that some of the big powers have made in the past. Such a development can
occur if the United States is not judicious in its use of force and gets involved in protracted conflicts in
non-critical regions, thereby sapping its energies and undermining support for its global role. And
when the United States uses force in critical regions, its preference should be to have its allies and
friends contribute their fair share. Having the capability to protect U.S. vital interests unilaterally if
necessary can facilitate getting friends and allies of the United States to participate -- especially on terms
more to its liking. It is quite possible that if the United States cannot protect its interests without
significant participation by allies, it might not be able to protect them at all. For example, in the run-up
to the Gulf war, several allies did not favor the use of force to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait. If the military
participation of these allies had been indispensable for military success against Iraq, Saddam Hussein's forces
might still be in Kuwait and Iraq might now possess nuclear weapons. When it comes to lesser interests the
United States should rely on nonmilitary options, especially if the stakes involved do not warrant the
military costs. It has many options: arming and training the victims of aggression; providing technical
assistance and logistic support for peacekeeping by the United Nations, regional organizations, or other
powers; and economic instruments such as sanctions and positive incentives. The effectiveness of these
non-military options can be enhanced by skillful diplomacy.
Unilateralism K Multilateralism
Unilateralism inevitably leads to multilateralism
Krauthammer 2004 (Charles, Winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, "Democratic
Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World" – American Enterprise Institute)
Moreover, unilateralism is often the very road to multilateralism. As we learned from the Gulf War, it is
the leadership of the United States—indeed, its willingness to act unilaterally if necessary—that
galvanized the Gulf War coalition into existence. Without the president of the United States declaring
“This will not stand” about the invasion of Kuwait—and making it clear that America would go it
alone if it had to—there never would have been the great wall-to-wall coalition that is now so
retroactively applauded and held up as a model of multilateralism.
US unipolarity encourages states to help the US solve global issues rather than start them
William Wohlforth, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign
Service at Georgetown. International Security, Summer 19 99. "The Stability of a Unipolar World."
Neither the Beijing-Moscow "strategic partnership" nor the "European troika" of Russia, Germany,
and France entailed any costly commitments or serious risks of confrontation with Washington. For
many states, the optimal policy is ambiguity: to work closely with the United States on the issues most
important to Washington while talking about creating a counterpoise. Such policies generate a paper
trail suggesting strong dissatisfaction with the US.- led world order and a legacy of actual behavior
that amounts to bandwagoning. These states are seeking the best bargains for themselves given the
distribution of power. That process necessitates a degree of politicking that may remind people faintly of
the power politics of bygone eras. But until the distribution of power changes substantially, this bargaining
will resemble real-politik in form but not content.
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Consultation K Heg
Consultation is Key to US leadership
Ross 02 (Christopher, special coordinator for public diplomacy and public affairs at the Department of State.
Washington Quarterly, Spring, 2002. "Public Diplomacy Comes of Age." www.twq.com/02spring/ross.pdf)
In today’s world, the United States is more likely to meet with success if it structures activities in ways
that encourage dialogue. Although the wording of recriminations varies—ranging from hegemony to
multilateralism to cultural imperialism—the United States, as the world’s dominant power, will inevitably
be accused of heavy-handedness and arrogance. It will inform and influence public opinion effectively
only if it changes the paradigm of the past and establishes a two-way approach that builds credible
dialogue. To arrive there, the United States should experiment and take a few chances, developing
programs that encourage two-way engagement with the people it seeks to influence. Some efforts may
fail, but others will succeed; the U.S. government can use those successes to shape a sustained future effort.
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WASHINGTON--Last month's Putin-Bush summit at Crawford was deemed an arms control failure because
the rumored deal--Russia agrees to let us partially test, but not deploy, defenses that violate the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty--never came off. In fact, it was a triumph. Like Reagan at the famous 1986 Reykjavik
summit, at which he would not give up the Strategic Defense Initiative to Gorbachev, Bush was not about to
allow Putin to lock the United States into any deal that would prevent us from building ABM defenses.
Bush proved that on Thursday when he dropped the bombshell and unilaterally withdrew the United
States from the treaty, and thus from all its absurd restrictions on ABM technology. This is deeply
significant, not just because it marks a return to strategic sanity, formally recognizing that the ballistic missile
will be to the 21st century what the tank and the bomber were to the 20th, but because it unashamedly
reasserts the major theme of the Bush foreign policy: unilateralism. After Sept. 11, the critics (the usual
troika: liberal media, foreign policy establishment, Democratic ex-officials) were clucking about how the
Bush administration has beaten a hasty retreat from reckless unilateralism. President Bush ``is strongly
supported by the American people,'' explained former Senate leader George Mitchell, ``in part because he has
simply discarded almost everything he said on foreign policy prior to Sept. 11.'' Bush had wanted to go it
alone in the world, said the critics. But he dare not. ``It's hard to see the president restoring the unilateralist
tinge that colored so many of his early foreign policy choices,'' wrote columnist E.J. Dionne just two months
ago. ``Winning the battle against terror required an end to unilateralism.'' We need friends, they said. We
need allies. We need coalition partners. We cannot alienate them again and again. We cannot have a
president who kills the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gases, summarily rejects the ``enforcement
provisions'' of the bioweapons treaty, trashes the ABM Treaty--and expect to build the coalition we
need to fight the war on terrorism. We cannot? We did. Three months is all it took to make nonsense of
these multilateralist protests. Coalition? The whole idea that the Afghan war is being fought by a
``coalition'' is comical. What exactly has Egypt contributed? France sent troops into Mazar-e Sharif after the
fighting had stopped, noted that renowned military analyst Jay Leno. (``Their mission?'' asked Leno. ``To
teach the Taliban how to surrender.'') There is a coalition office somewhere in Islamabad. Can anyone even
name the coalition spokesman who makes announcements about the war? The ``coalition'' consists of little
more than U.S. aircraft, U.S. special forces, and Afghan friends-of-the-moment on the ground. Like the Gulf
War, the Afghan war is unilateralism dressed up as multilateralism. We made it plain that even if no one
followed us, we would go it alone. Surprise: Others followed. A unilateralist does not object to people
joining our fight. He only objects when the multilateralists, like Clinton in Kosovo, give 18 countries
veto power over bombing targets. The Afghan war is not a war run by committee. We made tough
bilateral deals with useful neighbors: Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Russia. The Brits and the
Australians added a sprinkling of guys on the ground risking their lives, and we will always be grateful for
their solidarity. But everyone knows whose war it is. The result? The Taliban are destroyed. Al Qaeda is
on the run. Pakistan has made a historic pro-American strategic pivot, as have the former Soviet
republics, even Russia itself. The Europeans are cooperating on prosecutions. Even the Arab states
have muted their anti-American and anti-Israeli rhetoric, with the Egyptian foreign minister traveling to
Jerusalem for the first time in three years. Not because they love us. Not because we have embraced
multilateralism. But because we have demonstrated astonishing military power and the will to defend
vital American interests, unilaterally if necessary. Where is the great Bush retreat from unilateralism?
The ABM Treaty is dead. Kyoto is dead. The new provisions of the totally useless biological weapons
treaty are even deader: Just six days before pulling out of the ABM Treaty, the administration broke up six
years of absurd word-mongering over a bio treaty so worthless that Iraq is a signatory in good standing. And
the world has not risen up against us--no more than did the ``Arab street'' (over the Afghan war), as
another set of foreign policy experts were warning just weeks ago. The essence of unilateralism is that we
do not allow others, no matter how well-meaning, to deter us from pursuing the fundamental security
interests of the United States and the free world. It is the driving motif of the Bush foreign policy. And
that is the reason it has been so successful
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That leaves Colin Powell, supposedly the epicenter of internal opposition to the hard line on Iraq. Well, this is
Powell last Sunday on national television: "It's been the policy of this government to insist that Iraq be
disarmed. . . . And we believe the best way to do that is with a regime change." Moreover, he added, we are
prepared "to act unilaterally to defend ourselves." When Powell, the most committed multilateralist in the
administration, deliberately invokes the incendiary U-word to describe the American position, we have
ourselves a consensus.It turns out that the disagreement among Republicans was less about going to Iraq
than about going to the United Nations. It was a vastly overblown disagreement, because even the most
committed unilateralist would rather not go it alone if possible. Of course you want allies. You just
don't want to be held hostage to their veto. And as the first President Bush demonstrated when he
declared that the United States would liberate Kuwait unilaterally if necessary, the best way to get
allies is to let others know you are prepared to go it alone and let them ponder the cost of missing the
train.
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Ask yourself: If you really wanted to reassert American unilateralism, to get rid of the cobwebs of the
bipolar era and the myriad Clinton-era treaty strings tying Gulliver down, what would you do? No need for
in-your-face arrogance. No need to humiliate. No need to proclaim that you will ignore nattering allies
and nervous ex-enemies. Journalists can talk like that because the truth is clarifying. Governments cannot
talk like that because the truth is scary. The trick to unilateralism -- doing what you think is right,
regardless of what others think -- is to pretend you are not acting unilaterally at all. Thus if you really
want to junk the ABM Treaty, and the Europeans and Russians and Chinese start screaming bloody murder,
the trick is to send Colin Powell to smooth and soothe and schmooze every foreign leader in sight, have
Condoleezza Rice talk about how much we value allied input, have President Bush in Europe stress how
missile defense will help the security of everybody. And then go ahead and junk the ABM Treaty
regardless. Make nice, then carry on. Or, say, you want to kill the Kyoto protocol (which the Senate
rejected 95-0 and which not a single EU country has ratified) and the Europeans hypocritically complain. The
trick is to have the president go to Europe to stress, both sincerely and correctly, that the United States wants
to be in the forefront of using science and technology to attack the problem -- but make absolutely clear that
you'll accept no mandatory cuts and tolerate no treaty that penalizes the United States and lets China, India
and the Third World off the hook. Be nice, but be undeterred. The best unilateralism is velvet-glove
unilateralism. At the end of the day, for all the rhetorical bows to Russian, European and liberal
sensibilities, look at how Bush returns from Europe: Kyoto is dead. The ABM Treaty is history. Missile
defense is on. NATO expansion is relaunched. And just to italicize the new turn in American foreign policy,
the number of those annual, vaporous U.S.-EU summits has been cut from two to one.
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Economy K Heg
Only by preserving productivity, can the US retain its economic strength, and therefore its
global heg.
Zalmay Khalilzad, US Ambassador to the United Nations. “Losing the Moment? The United States and the
World After the Cold War.” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2. pg. 84 Spring 1995
The United States is unlikely to preserve its military and technological dominance if the U.S. economy
declines seriously. In such an environment, the domestic economic and political base for global
leadership would diminish and the United States would probably incrementally withdraw from the
world, become inward-looking, and abandon more and more of its external interests. As the United
States weakened, others would try to fill the Vacuum. To sustain and improve its economic strength, the
United States must maintain its technological lead in the economic realm. Its success will depend on the
choices it makes. In the past, developments such as the agricultural and industrial revolutions produced
fundamental changes positively affecting the relative position of those who were able to take advantage of
them and negatively affecting those who did not. Some argue that the world may be at the beginning of
another such transformation, which will shift the sources of wealth and the relative position of classes and
nations. If the United States fails to recognize the change and adapt its institutions, its relative position will
necessarily worsen. To remain the preponderant world power, U.S. economic strength must be
enhanced by further improvements in productivity, thus increasing real per capita income; by
strengthening education and training; and by generating and using superior science and technology. In
the long run the economic future of the United States will also be affected by two other factors. One is the
imbalance between government revenues and government expenditure. As a society the United States has to
decide what part of the GNP it wishes the government to control and adjust expenditures and taxation
accordingly. The second, which is even more important to U.S. economic wall-being over the long run, may
be the overall rate of investment. Although their government cannot endow Americans with a Japanese-style
propensity to save, it can use tax policy to raise the savings rate.
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Soft power is key to solve warming, disease, terrorism, and organized crime.
Nye 4 (Joseph S, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy”, Harvard IR prof., vol. 119, no. 2, p. 264)
Because of its leading edge in the information revolution and its past investment in military power, the United States
will likely remain the world's single most powerful country well into the twenty-first century. French dreams of a
multipolar mihtary world are unlikely to be realized anytime soon, and the German Foreign Minister, Joschka
Fischer, has explicitly eschewed such a goal.^^ But not all the important types of power come out of the barrel
of a gun. Hard power is relevant to getting the outcomes we want on all three chessboards, but many of the
transnational issues, such as climate change, the spread of infec- tious diseases, international crime, and
terrorism, cannot be resolved by mili- tary force alone. Representing the dark side of globalization, these issues
are inherently multilateral and require cooperation for their solution. Soft power is particularly important in
dealing with the issues that arise from the bottom chessboard of transnational relations. To describe such a world as
an American empire fails to capture the real nature of the foreign policy tasks that we face.
Khanna 8 (Director of the Global Governance Initiative and Senior Research Fellow in the American Strategy
Program at the New America Foundation. Council on Foreign Relations: “The United States and Shifting Global
Power Dynamics”) online:
http://www.cfr.org/publication/16002/united_states_and_shifting_global_power_dynamics.html
To the extent that our grand strategy will involve elements of promoting good governance and
democracy, we will have to become far more irresistible as a political partner, offering incentives
greater than those of other powers who do not attach any strings to their relationships. Even if you are
agnostic on this issue, we are all aware that this is a perennial plank of American diplomacy and if we want
to be even remotely effective at it, we have to up our ante in this arena of rising powers. This I believe is
part of what you would call “non-military spending on national security,” a course of action I strongly
advocate for the Middle East and Central Asia.
An equally important component of grand strategy will have to be a realistic division of labor with these
rising powers, something both of us clearly emphasize. Whether the issue is climate change, public health,
poverty reduction, post-conflict reconstruction, or counterterrorism, we do not have the capacity to solve
these problems alone—nor can any other power. I argue that we need serious issue-based summit
diplomacy among concerned powers (and other actors such as corporations and NGOs) to get moving
quickly on these questions rather than (or in parallel to) allowing things to drag through their course in
cumbersome multilateral fora. This last point is crucial: the missing ingredient to a globalized grand strategy
is the U.S. foreign policy community cleverly leveraging the strengths, activities, and global footprint of the
U.S. private sector and NGO communities into what I call a diplomatic-industrial complex. It is in changing
our foreign policy process, as much as some of the goals, that our success lies.
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Nye 4 (Joseph S, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy”, Harvard IR prof., vol. 119, no. 2, p. 257)
But it would be a mistake to dismiss the recent decline in our attractiveness so lightly. It is true that the
United States has recovered from unpopular poli- cies in the past, but that was against the backdrop of
the Cold War, in which other countries still feared the Soviet Union as the greater evil. Moreover, while
America's size and association with disruptive modernity are real and un- avoidable, wise policies can
soften the sharp edges of that reality and reduce the resentments that they engender. That is what the
United States did after World War II. We used our soft power resources and co-opted others into a set of
alliances and institutions that lasted for sixty years. We won the Cold War against the Soviet Union with
a strategy of containment that used our soft power as well as our hard power. It is true that the new
threat of transnational terrorism increased American vulnerability, and some of our unilateralism after
September 11 was driven by fear. But the United States cannot meet the new threat identified in the
national security strategy without the cooperation of other countries. They will cooper- ate, up to a point,
out of mere self-interest, but their degree of cooperation is also affected by the attractiveness of the
United States. Take Pakistan for ex- ample. President Pervez Musharraf faces a complex game of
cooperating with the United States on terrorism while managing a large anti-American constitu- ency
at home. He winds up balancing concessions and retractions. If the United States were more attractive
to the Pakistani populace, we would see more con- cessions in the mix. It is not smart to discount soft
power as just a question of image, public re- lations, and ephemeral popularity. As I argued earlier, it is a
form of power—a means of obtaining desired outcomes. When we discount the importance of our
attractiveness to other countries, we pay a price. Most important, if the United States is so unpopular in a
country that being pro-American is a kiss of death in their domestic politics, political leaders are
unlikely to make concessions to help us. Turkey, Mexico, and Chile were prime examples in the run-up
to the Iraq war in March 2003. When American policies lose their legitimacy and credibility in the eyes
of others, attitudes of distrust tend to fester and further reduce our leverage. For example, after
September 11, there was an outpouring of sympathy from Germans for the United States, and
Germany joined a mili- tary campaign against the al Qaeda network. But as the United States geared
up for the unpopular Iraq war, Germans expressed widespread disbelief about the reasons the United
States gave for going to war, such as the alleged connec- tion of Iraq to al Qaeda and the imminence of the
threat of weapons of mass destruction. German suspicions were reinforced by what they saw as biased
American media coverage during the war and by the failure to find weapons or prove the connection to al
Qaeda right after the war. The combination fos- tered a climate in which conspiracy theories flourished.
By July 2003, one-third of Germans under the age of thirty said that they thought the American
govern- ment might even have staged the original September 11 attacks."
Nye 4 (Joseph S, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy”, Harvard IR prof., vol. 119, no. 2, p. 257)
According to the National Security Strategy, the greatest threats the American people face are
transnational terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and particularly their combination. Yet,
meeting the challenge posed by trans- national military organizations that could acquire weapons of mass
destruction requires the cooperation of other countries—and cooperation is strengthened by soft power.
Similarly, efforts to promote democracy in Iraq and elsewhere will require the help of others.
Reconstruction in Iraq and peacekeeping in failed states are far more likely to succeed and to be less
costly if shared with others rather than appearing as American imperial occupation. The fact that the
United States squandered its soft power in the way that it went to war meant that the aftermath turned
out to be much more costly than it need have been.
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Soft power is key to sustain hegemony due to alliances and information sharing.
Nye 4 (Joseph S, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy”, Harvard IR prof., vol. 119, no. 2, p. 261)
In the global information age, the attractiveness of the United States will be crucial to our ability to
achieve the outcomes we want. Rather than having to put together pick-up coalitions of the willing for
each new game, we will benefit if we are able to attract others into institutional alliances and eschew
weak- ening those we have already created. NATO, for example, not only aggregates the capabilities of
advanced nations, but its interminable committees, procedures, and exercises also allow these nations
to train together and quickly be- come interoperable when a crisis occurs. As for alliances, if the United
States is an attractive source of security and reassurance, other countries will set their expectations in
directions that are conducive to our interests. Initially, for ex- ample, the U.S.-Japan security treaty was
not very popular in Japan, but polls show that over the decades, it became more attractive to the Japanese
public. Once that happened, Japanese politicians began to build it into their approaches to foreign policy. The
United States benefits when it is regarded as a constant and trusted source of attraction so that other
countries are not obliged continually to re-examine their options in an atmosphere of uncertain
coalitions. In the Japan case, broad acceptance of the United States by the Japanese public "contributed
to the maintenance of US hegemony" and "served as politi cal constraints compelling the ruling elites
to continue cooperation with the United States.'"^ Popularity can contribute to stability. Finally, as the
RAND Corporation's John Arquila and David Ronfeldt ar- gue, power in an information age will come not
only from strong defenses but also from strong sharing. A traditional realpolitik mind-set makes it
difficult to share with others. But in an information age, such sharing not only enhances the ability of
others to cooperate with us but also increases their inclination to do so.'' As we share intelligence and
capabilities with others, we develop common outlooks and approaches that improve our ability to deal
with the new challenges. Power fiows from that attraction. Dismissing the importance of at- traction as
merely ephemeral popularity ignores key insights from new theories of leadership as well as the new realities
of the information age. We cannot afford that.
Soft power is key to hegemony – avoids backlash and provides staying power.
Nye 4 (Joseph S, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy”, Harvard IR prof., vol. 119, no. 2, p. 261)
Ironically, however, the only way to achieve the type of transformation that the neoconservatives seek is
by working with others and avoiding the backlash that arises when the United States appears on the
world stage as an imperial power acting unilaterally. What is more, because democracy cannot be
imposed by force and requires a considerable time to take root, the most likely way to obtain staying power
from the American public is through developing interna- tional legitimacy and burden sharing with
allies and institutions. For Jacksoni- ans like Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, this may not matter. They
would pre- fer to punish the dictator and come home rather than engage in tedious nation building. For
example, in September 2003, Rumsfeld said of Iraq, "I don't be- heve it's our job to reconstruct the
country."^' But for serious neoconservatives, like Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, their
impatience with institutions and allies may undercut their own objectives. They understand the
importance of soft power but fail to appreciate all its dimensions and dynamics.
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Shuja 8 (Sharif, Monash U Global Terrorism Research Unit Honorary Research Associate, “Why America Can Not Ignore Soft Power”,
3/22, p. 16-17)
However, it would be in the interests of the United States to create internal mechanisms for a more consistent
and stable foreign policy, one that is consis- tent with the long-term policy goals of the State Department.
Inconsistent uni- lateral actions, using hard power, by the United States both caused distrust by allies
and increased suspicions by many nations who believe that the United States masks evil goals behind
the rhetoric of idealism. On May 3, 2007, Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong stated in Washington
that in this tumultuous period, America's leadership and purpose has become more critical than ever. I
cannot help but fully endorse the sentiments of Prime Minister Lee. There is an urgent need for the US to
evolve and develop an overall foreign policy which has coherent principles and acknowledges the
merits of soft power.In contrast to hard power that rests on coercion and is derived from military and
economic might, soft power rests, not on coercion, but on the ability of a nation to co-opt others to
follow its will through the attractiveness of its culture, values, ideas and institutions. When a state can
persuade and influ- ence others to aspire to share such values, it can lead by example and foster
cooperation. Soft power includes propaganda, but is considerably broader. It is much more than 'image,
public relations and ephemeral popularity'. It contains very real power - an ability to gain objectives.
Shuja 8 (Sharif, Monash U Global Terrorism Research Unit Honorary Research Associate, “Why America Can Not Ignore Soft Power”,
3/22, p. 19)
Soft power has always been an important element of leadership. For example, the Cold War was won
with a strategy of containment that used soft power along with hard power. However, in the global
information age, we are seeing the increase in the importance of soft power. Communication
technology is shrinking the world and creating ideal conditions for projecting soft power through the
control of information.
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Nye 4 (Joseph S, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy”, Harvard IR prof., vol. 119, no. 2, p. 257)
Look again at Afghanistan. Precision bombing and Special Forces defeated the Taliban government, but U.S.
forces in Afghanistan wrapped up less than a quarter of al Qaeda, a transnational network with cells in
sixty countries. The United States cannot bomb al Qaeda cells in Hamburg, Kuala Lumpur, or De- troit.
Success against them depends on close civilian cooperation, whether shar- ing intelligence,
coordinating police work across borders, or tracing global fi- nancial flows. America's partners cooperate
partly out of self-interest, but the inherent attractiveness of U.S. pohcies can and does influence the
degree of co- operation. Equally important, the current struggle against Islamist terrorism is not a clash
of civilizations but a contest whose outcome is closely tied to a civil war between moderates and
extremists within Islamic civilization. The United States and other advanced democracies will win only
if moderate Muslims win, and the ability to attract the moderates is critical to victory. We need to adopt
policies that appeal to moderates and to use public diplomacy more effectively to explain our common
interests. We need a better strategy for wielding our soft power. We will have to learn better how to
combine hard and soft power if we wish to meet the new challenges.
Shuja 8 (Sharif, Monash U Global Terrorism Research Unit Honorary Research Associate, “Why America Can Not Ignore Soft Power”,
3/22, p. 19)
It is argued that both hard and soft power are important in US foreign policy and in the fight against
terrorism. The suppression of terrorism, and the achievement of a variety of other objectives including
efforts to promote democracy overseas, require the willing assistance of other nations and peo- ples.
There are places where the US cannot go in search of terrorist leaders. It needs broad cooperation for
intelligence gathering and the restriction of ter- rorist finances. The hard power of military and economic
strength is, of course, essential, but the use of 'carrot and stick' alone cannot achieve these objectives.
America's neglect of soft power is undermining its ability to persuade and influence others.
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China is taking advantage of low US soft power to remove US primacy in its region.
Shuja 8 (Sharif, Monash U Global Terrorism Research Unit Honorary Research Associate, “Why America Can Not Ignore Soft Power”,
3/22, p. 21)
With its declining soft power capabilities America is losing its persuasive power. In its attempt to
persuade North Korea to give up its weapons of mass destruction, the US has had to let China play a
major role. As its economy has rapidly grown over the last decade, China has sought to develop its soft
power capabilities. It has sought to influence other countries using regional aid, pub- lic diplomacy,
interaction with multilateral institutions and the embracing of free trade. Its appeal threatens to
outstrip that of the United States and cast it as the primary regional power, presenting a potential
danger to US influence and interests in the region. China is actually copying Nye's soft power concept:
building authority through persuasion rather than coercion. China's Office of the Chinese Lan- guage Council
International has opened 135 Confucius Institutes worldwide, aiming to teach Chinese. The Office is,
actually, part of a broad campaign involving investment and diplomacy as well as cultural outreach, all aimed
at hastening China's progress toward great-power status. The campaign, com- bined with China's
economic growth and military modernisation, forms a challenge that some US politicians, including
Democratic presidential candi- date John Edwards, are taking note of. 'China is capitalizing on the United
States' current unpopularity to project its own soft power In the coming years, China's influence and
importance will only continue to grow', he wrote in the September/October issue of Foreign Affairs
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Soft power breeds resentment – our culture is intrinsically offensive to other peoples.
Soft power fails to solve hegemony, proliferation or democracy while causing backlash.
Philadelphia Inquirer 98 (“Political Power is not Susceptible to the Charms of a Big Mac Attack”, 6/17, LN)
But what also struck me, as I munched fries in Yogya, was the gap between America's power to shape global
culture and its power to influence global affairs. Our domination of the airwaves, soundwaves and Web sites
won't bring democracy to Jakarta. Throughout Indonesia's recent political upheavals, America's influence has
been almost zilch. This disconnection is important to ponder. After the Cold War ended, many analysts
believed the nature of power had changed. "In an age of information-based economies and transnational
interdependence, power is becoming ... less tangible and less coercive," wrote Harvard professor Joseph Nye
Jr., who held key diplomatic and intelligence posts in the first Clinton administration. The kind of power
that matters now, Nye argued - in a phrase that became a buzzword - is "soft power." Soft power means
that a country's ideas (democracy, free trade, consumerism) are so attractive that others will imitate them.
America's culture (and the hold it has on the global imagination) are supposed to be an important source of
soft power. Nye and others thought the importance of soft power would continue to grow relative to that of
"hard power" - typified by military strength. Soft power was supposed to be an essential tool of the "world's
sole remaining superpower." It was supposed to make "them" want to be like "us." But as I watched events
unfold in Indonesia, soft power seemed irrelevant. It hardly served to bolster democracy. What
young Indonesians see as the essence of America is consumer goods and media images of sex and
violence. They know almost nothing about America's democratic values. Only those Indonesians with
deeper knowledge of the United States (from studies abroad or professors) know that America is defined
by both consumerism and democracy. Nor does the McWorld syndrome make leaders in other
countries saturated by U.S. cultural exports toe the U.S. line. Soft power won't soften up Chinese
leaders. McWorld won't make those leaders desist from exporting missile technology; that requires the
hardpower technique of sanctions, which the Clinton team has found difficult to apply. The same holds for
Japan, where a McDonald's sprouts in every neighborhood and an Elvis look-alike cult dances on Sundays in
a downtown park. The veneer of U.S./global culture, despite its omnipresence, does not penetrate the
foundation of Japanese-ness. Thus, American pleas for Japan to deregulate its economy and bail out its
failing banks so Tokyo can power a new Asian growth spurt fall on deaf ears. Japanese leaders are
willing to let the yen's value plummet, even though that drags all Asian economies down with it, because they
think cheap exports will get their country out of its recession. No hard-power tools are easily at hand for
Washington to pry open the Tokyo mindset. And all the McDonald's in Asia won't change Japanese thinking.
Soft power is even less effective in countries that have resisted U.S. consumer products. McDonald's is
in India (although it doesn't serve beef, since cows are sacred). But in a country long closed to Western
exports and deluged with its own, home-produced movies, the Ameri-global culture has yet to take hold.
But even if it had, that wouldn't have stopped India's government from exploding the bomb. The blasts
were about hard power. Perhaps therein lies the clue to the relevance of soft power, or its lack. Since the
Cold War's end, using hard power is tougher, because the objectives are less clear. A lot of wishful thinking
has emerged about the impact of America's global empire of burgers and bytes on the projection of U.S.
power. McWorld is great for exports (and for convincing foreign youths that their countries should go, and
stay, capitalist). But in real power terms, it is still hard power that matters. The only punch delivered by a
burger in Yogya is the bite of the hot chili sauce.
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***Heg Good***
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Second, increasing Asian nuclearization runs the risk of wild-fire proliferation and arms-
racing, leading to miscalculation and nuclear war.
Friedburg 1994
(Aaron, Professor of International Relations at Princeton University International Security, Winter, p. 8, p. lexis)
Assuming, for the moment that an Asia with more nuclear powers would be more stable than one with
fewer, there would still be serious difficulties involved in negotiating the transition to such a world. As
in other regions, small, nascent nuclear forces will be especially vulnerable to preemption. In Japan the
prevailing “nuclear allergy” could lead first to delays in acquiring deterrent forces and then to a
desperate and dangerous scramble for nuclear weapons. In Asia, the prospects for a peaceful transition
may be further complicated by the fact that the present and potential nuclear powers are both
numerous and strategically intertwined. The nuclearization of Korea (North, South or, whether through
reunification or competitive arms programs, both together) could lead to a similar development in Japan,
which might cause China to accelerate and expand its nuclear programs, which could then have an
impact on the defense policies of Taiwan, India (and through it, Pakistan) and Russia (which would also
be affected by events in Japan and Korea). All of this would influence the behavior of the United States.
Similar shockwaves could also travel through the system in different directions (for example, from India
to China to Japan to Korea). A rapid, multifaceted expansion in nuclear capabilities could increase the
dangers of misperception, miscalculation, and war.
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Collapse of US leadership in East Asia causes rapid Japanese renuclearization and a Sino-
Japanese alliance against the US.
Joseph S. Nye, Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. “U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq.” Foreign
Affairs. Council on Foreign Relations. July/August 2003. Lexis
Could a revived Japan, a decade or two hence, become a global challenger to the United States, economically
or militarily, as was predicted a decade ago? It seems unlikely. Roughly the size of California, Japan will
never have the geographical or population scale of the United States. Its record of economic success and its
popular culture provide Japan with soft power, but the nation’s ethnocentric attitudes and policies undercut
that. Japan does show some ambition to improve its status as a world power. It seeks a permanent seat on the
United Nations Security Council, and polls show that many younger Japanese are interested in becoming a
more “normal country” in terms of defense. Some politicians have started a movement to revise Article 9
of the country’s constitution, which restricts Japan’s forces to self-defense. If the United States were to
drop its alliance with Japan and follow the advice of those who want us to stay “offshore” and shift our
allegiance back and forth to balance China and Japan, we could produce the sense of insecurity that
might lead Japan to decide it had to develop its own nuclear capacity. Alternatively, if Japan were to
ally with China, the combined resources of the two countries would make a potent coalition. While not
impossible, such an alliance seems unlikely unless the United States makes a serious diplomatic or
military blunder. Not only have the wounds of the 193os failed to heal completely, but China and Japan
have conflicting visions of Japan’s proper place in Asia and in the world. China would want to constrain
Japan, but Japan might not want to play second fiddle. In the highly unlikely prospect that the United
States were to withdraw from the East Asian region, Japan might join a Chinese bandwagon. But given
Japanese concerns about the rise of Chinese power, continued alliance with the United States is the most
likely outcome. An allied East Asia is not a plausible candidate to be the challenger that displaces the United
States. [P. 24-25]
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Sustained American hegemony prevents Japan from both rearming and nuclearizing
Lind 07 (Michael, New America Foundation, Beyond American Hegemony,
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/beyond_american_hegemony_5381)
In the case of North Korea, for example, U.S. policy is motivated largely, although not solely, by the fear
that if Japan loses confidence in America’s willingness to protect it, Japan may obtain its own nuclear
deterrent and renationalize its foreign policy, emerging from the status of a semi-sovereign U.S.
protectorate to that of an independent military great power once again. But no president can tell the
American public that the United States must be willing to lose 50,000 or more American lives in a war
with North Korea for fear that Japan will get nuclear weapons to defend itself. Therefore the public is
told instead that North Korea might give nuclear weapons to non-state actors to use to destroy New York,
Washington and other American cities, or that North Korean missiles can strike targets in North America.
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( ) Second, A global economic collapse would escalate to full scale conflict and rapid
extinction
Bearden 2K
(Thomas, “The Unnecessary Energy Crisis”, Free Republic, June 24, lexis)
History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the
stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the
arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to
be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and
South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China-
whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States-attacks Taiwan. In addition to
immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations
into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under
such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are
then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD
concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only
chance a nation has to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out
its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full
WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on
site within the United States itself. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know
it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.
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Middle Eastern instability sky rockets oil prices, causing economic collapse.
Islam Online.Net, March 21, 2006 (“Frequently Asked Questions About Iraq”,
http://www.islamonline.net/english/In_Depth/Iraq_Aftermath/topic_15.shtml)
Oil is the lifeblood of the global economy. The Middle East has about 65% of the world’s total oil
resources. With this in mind, it becomes clear that any instability in the Middle East would threaten the
global oil trade. If the global oil trade were disrupted, it would cause a shortage in supply which would
cause oil prices to skyrocket. Skyrocketing oil prices hamper global economic growth and threaten the
world’s economies. At worst, it could cause a recession in many of the world’s oil dependent countries.
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low costs to both the sole pole and the other major powers. Unipolarity can be made to seem expensive
and dangerous if it is equated with a global empire demanding U.S. involvement in all issues
everywhere. In reality, unipolarity is a distribution of capabilities among the world's great powers. It
does not solve all the world's problems. Rather, it minimizes two major problems- security and prestige
competition-that confronted the great powers of the past. Maintaining unipolarity does not require
limitless commitments. It involves managing the central security regimes in Europe and Asia, and
maintaining the expectation on the part of other states that any geopolitical challenge to the United States is
futile. As long as that is the expectation, states will likely refrain from trying, and the system can be
maintained at little extra cost.
Hachigian 8 (Senior Vice President and Director for the California office at American Progress. Council on
Foreign Relations: “The United States and Shifting Global Power Dynamics”) online:
http://www.cfr.org/publication/16002/united_states_and_shifting_global_power_dynamics.html
More interesting is a difference we might have in what constitutes security. We define direct threats to
American security as outside agents that can harm our citizens. The only two forces that could take American
lives on a large scale soon are terrorists, especially armed with a nuclear device, and a deadly pathogen like
influenza.
Thus when you say, "I of course agree that we need to work with others wherever possible," that considerably
understates the urgency of the matter. Our very lives depend on collaboration. British police officers and
Chinese health officials, for better or worse, hold our fates in their hands. Further, we will not avoid a
climate crisis—the potential security implications of which seem to get worse by the hour—unless
every large emitter acts.
We have to prioritize, and these direct threats are more important than whether China or others are
empowering some of the despicable regimes you list, much as that troubles us. Moreover, Beijing has
shown it will act constructively under certain conditions—it has played a critical role in efforts to rollback
North Korea's nuclear weapons program. On Iran, America is the country being isolated. Instead of worrying
that we cannot get our way, America has to lead the world community toward a pragmatic solution that
others accept.
We do think American leadership remains an important ingredient to solving many of the world's
problems. It is easiest to see the need where we have not acted—such as on global warming. We are not
advocating the kind of leadership America has exercised recently, though. Instead, we have to build
consensus and motivate other powers to take responsibility.
We do not advocate that America seek specifically to retain its "dominance." The cooperation we need is
undermined by a pursuit of primacy. Unlike you, however, we do not think that the question of American
dominance is all that determinative. Of course, by pure logic, if other countries are getting stronger, then
America is getting relatively weaker. The more important question is: So what? Will that negatively impact
American lives? After an exhaustive survey, we conclude that it will not—if America finds a new way
to lead, harnessing the power of others, and invests in fixing some of its core problems at home.
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Hachigian 8 (Senior Vice President and Director for the California office at American Progress. Council on
Foreign Relations: “The United States and Shifting Global Power Dynamics”) online:
http://www.cfr.org/publication/16002/united_states_and_shifting_global_power_dynamics.html
In our book, Mona Sutphen and I lay out a new paradigm for thinking about what we call the “pivotal
powers,” China, India, Russia, the EU and Japan. America need not fear their strength. In fact, in
order to keep Americans safe and prosperous, we need to work with these powers as never before. If
America leads abroad and tackles its problems at home, we will continue to thrive in a more crowded
world.
Importantly, pivotal powers now want what we want—a stable world with open markets. None are true
ideological adversaries. Though hot spots remain, no intractable disputes divide us. Nation states seeking
order are on the same side against the forces of chaos—terrorists, climate change, disease, and
proliferation. Only together can they defeat these rotten fruit of globalization. For instance, China allows
American agents into China’s ports to help screen outbound shipping containers for smuggled radioactive
devices. A climate crisis will come unless all the big emitters act.
Nevertheless, near panic dominates the debate about emerging powers, especially inside the Beltway—they
are taking our jobs, luring away R&D, giving solace to enemies and reducing democracy’s appeal. There is
truth in some of these claims. But remedies to these problems, more often than not, begin with domestic
policy. For example, more innovation in China and India benefits America, as long as innovation continues
here. That requires investments in math and science education.
Thinking of big powers principally as competing rivals is not the right paradigm. Companies compete
for profits. Countries do not. Nor is there a vast zero-sum head-to-head battle for
influence. Policymakers need to shed the “us against them” Cold-War mindset.
We advocate “strategic collaboration” with the pivotal powers. The biggest challenge America faces is
not their growing strength. It is convincing them to contribute to the world order—regimes and
institutions that will tackle shared challenges like economic stability and nuclear proliferation. America
still has to lead, but in a new way that encourages others to take responsibility.
Of course, we have to be prepared in case a hostile hegemon ever emerges. But we’ve been notoriously bad
at predicting which powers will rise and which will fall, and we have little control over their trajectories. We
should strengthen the country we do control—our own—and seek the cooperation that will keep Americans
safe and prosperous.
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Overholt 8 (Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy and holds the center’s chair in Asia policy
research. “In Asia, U.S. Still Guards the Fort but Surrenders the Bank”) online:
http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/spring2008/disoriented.html
Much of the current national-security establishment in Washington expresses fear of being forced out
of Asia by China. China has indeed made disproportionate gains in recent years. But this is not because
it has forced the United States out. It is because Washington has deliberately stepped back from Asian
regional institutions that include the United States, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation,
and created a vacuum into which China has stepped with institutions that exclude the United States,
such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the East Asia Summit, and others. Likewise, South Korea
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have distanced themselves from U.S. policy and cultivated a
relationship with China that is much warmer than it was before. China’s disproportionate success in both Asia
and Africa has come from adopting policies that had been the core U.S. strategies in winning the Cold War.
The United States had a patent on those strategies but ceded the intellectual-property rights to China.
There is a real risk that future historians will conclude that the most influential foreign-policy decisions of
this era concerned not Iraq, not the war on terror, but rather the re-ignition and acceleration of Sino- Japanese
rivalry. Washington can still reestablish the old balances between military and economic priorities and
between China and Japan. Future U.S. administrations would do well to revive an Asia policy that
emphasizes diplomacy with all Asian countries, promotes economic liberalization throughout the
region, and abates rather than fosters hostility among regional neighbors.
Overholt 8 (Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy and holds the center’s chair in Asia policy
research. “In Asia, U.S. Still Guards the Fort but Surrenders the Bank”) online:
http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/spring2008/disoriented.html
China’s emergence triggered a reaction in the United States and Japan. China had joined all the major
economic institutions nurtured by the West in the Cold War, opened its economy far more than Japan did,
resolved most of its border disputes to the satisfaction of its neighbors, and engaged in a very successful
campaign for good diplomatic relations with most of its neighbors. All these seemed to support U.S. and
Japanese interests, particularly in comparison with an earlier era when China had been systematically
attempting to destabilize its neighbors and to spread communism globally.
Nonetheless, China’s success evoked various theories that rising powers are inherently destabilizing,
that undemocratic regimes are inherently aggressive, and that, since China is perhaps the only power
that could conceivably challenge the United States, American military planning should focus on China.
Tensions over Taiwan became a particular focus for the U.S. military, and thus, too, did the risk of
Sino-American war. That focus was greatly intensified by various U.S. interest groups that had much to gain
from building new weaponry for war against China or from hampering trade with China.
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Nye 4 (Joseph S, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy”, Harvard IR prof., vol. 119, no. 2, p. 255-256)
In many ways, the metaphor of empire is seductive. The American military has a global reach, with bases
around the world, and its regional commanders sometimes act like proconsuls. English is a lingua franca, like
Latin. The Ameri- can economy is the largest in the world, and American culture serves as a mag- net. But it
is a mistake to confuse the politics of primacy with the politics of empire. Although unequal
relationships certainly exist between the United States and weaker powers and can be conducive to
exploitation, absent formal political control, the term "imperial" can be misleading. Its acceptance
would be a disastrous guide for American foreign policy because it fails to take into account how the world
has changed. The United States is certainly not an em- pire in the way we think of the European
overseas empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries because the core feature of such imperialism
was direct political control.^"* The United States has more power resources, compared to other
countries, than Britain had at its imperial peak. On the other hand, the United States has less power, in
the sense of control over the behavior that occurs inside other countries, than Britain did when it ruled
a quarter of the globe. For example, Kenya's schools, taxes, laws, and elections—not to men- tion external
relations—were controlled by British officials. Even where Brit- ain used indirect rule through local
potentates, as in Uganda, it exercised far more control than the United States does today. Others try to
rescue the meta- phor by referring to "informal empire" or the "imperialism of free trade," but this
simply obscures important differences in degrees of control suggested by comparisons with real
historical empires. Yes, the Americans have widespread influence, but in 2003, the United States could
not even get Mexico and Chile to vote for a second resolution on Iraq in the UN Security Council. The
British empire did not have that kind of problem with Kenya or India.
Economist 8 (3/29, Power and Peril, 00130613, 3/29/2008, Vol. 386, Issue 8573)
What a difference a bungled war makes. These days the word "imperial" is usually followed by "overstretch". The bookshops
are full of titles cautioning against the folly of empire (Cullen Murphey's "Are We Rome?", Amy Chua's "Day of Empire"). Nobody doubts America's
unparalleled ability to project its military power into every corner of the world, but blowing things up
is not the same as establishing an "imperium". Enthusiasm for empire has been replaced by worries
about exhaustion and vulnerability. Americans are concerned that the army has been stretched to
breaking point, and that their country remains a terrorist target. If George Bush wanted to "fight them over there" so that
Americans do not have to "fight them over here", his successor will have to face the possibility that, in fighting them over there, America has overstrained its
army while leaving the home front vulnerable.
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***Heg Bad***
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Shuja 8 (Sharif, Monash U Global Terrorism Research Unit Honorary Research Associate, “Why America Can Not Ignore Soft Power”,
3/22, p. 17)
Because of its enormous hard power capabilities, US policy-makers have been conscious of the fact that
the United States potentially can, if it chooses, significantly influence its external environment. And
possession of this power often has given rise to the desire to use it.'^^^ Garry Leach, the editor of
Columbia Journal, observes: The Bush Administration's unilateralist and militaristic foreign policy has
made evi- dent the cracks in the new world order. In fact, in the face of a growing global resistance to
the US-driven neo-liberal project, the Bush Administration's military and economic policies have
contributed to a new world disorder. US military interventions have further destabilized already
embattled nations, while the Bush White House's support for authoritarian regimes and its insistence on
promoting free market reforms have spurred civil unrest among peoples of the South adamantly
opposed to such policies.'*' Since the end of the Cold War, the US has found herself fighting in the
former Yugoslavia, followed by the war in Afghanistan, and then again the ongoing occupation of Iraq.
And what has China been up to in the meantime?
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( ) US hegemony fails with health assitance and leads to human rights abuses.
David P. Fidler, Professor of Law and Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow at Indiana University School of Law,
Fighting the Axis of Illness: HIV/AIDS, Human Rights, and U.S. Foreign Policy”, Harvard Human Rights Journal,
2K4
Policymakers seeking to increase the role of international human rights law in U.S. foreign policy on
HIV/AIDS must also face the human rights dilemma. This dilemma begins with the point made above:
HIV/AIDS only became a prominent U.S. foreign policy issue after the pandemic reached disturbing
proportions in the developing world. U.S. foreign policy on global health, from Carter to Bush, combined
Westphalian and post-Westphalian elements. No administration has approached the axis of illness only on
post-Westphalian terms. The human rights element in U.S. foreign policy on health appears to depend
on the existence of disease threats serious enough to trouble material U.S. power and interests. The
stronger the link-age between Westphalian and post-Westphalian elements in U.S. foreign policy on
HIV/AIDS, the worse the human rights situation concerning HIV/AIDS seems to be. But disease problems
serious enough to trouble the United States typically involve a failure of national or international collective
action against deteriorating social determinants of health exacerbated by accelerating human mobility and
globalization. The public health turn toward international human rights law, evident from the preamble to the
WHO Constitution and the strategy of UNAIDS, was designed to prevent significant infectious disease
crises through respect for civil and political rights and fulfillment of economic, social, and cultural
rights. The Westphalian conceptualization of HIV/AIDS as a national security threat to the United
States demonstrates that the human rights prevention strategy failed on a global basis because the
pandemic has raged to the point of threatening the economic and demographic stability of many
developing nations.
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Gries 7 (Harold J. & Ruth Newman Chair in U.S.-China Issues and Director of the Institute for U.S.-China Issues
at the University of Oklahoma. Director of the Sino-American Security Dialogue (SASD) “Harmony, Hegemony,
and US – China Relations”)
And this is what strikes me as new, and potentially dangerous, about Chinese Occidentalism today. The
dialectic of similarity to and difference from the U.S. has swung decidedly in favor of difference. Unlike
China’s earlier “peaceful rise” and “peaceful development” discourse, which clearly had a status quo
orientation, focusing on China’s development within the existing world system, the new discourse of
“civilization modes” and “harmonious worlds” appears more revisionist, pointing to a distinctly
Chinese and different regional order. It evokes a hierarchical, China-at-the-center vision of East Asian
politics. Furthermore, the new Chinese Occidentalism depicts Americans as an aggressive, militaristic,
and threatening people. It certainly does not help that the current Bush administration’s embrace of military
and unilateral means to resolve international disputes in Iraq and elsewhere has provided ample fodder for
Chinese nationalist arguments. The danger is that heightened Chinese perceptions of U.S. threat could
promote the emergence of an acute “security dilemma” in U.S.-China relations. Feeling threatened by
a “hegemonic” U.S., Chinese could decide to step up their military modernization for defensive
reasons. Americans would likely respond to increased Chinese arms acquisitions with heightened
threat perception of their own, leading the U.S. to embrace its own defensive arms buildup. The
unintended result: a possible U.S.-China arms race in East Asia. Absent feelings of mutual trust, and
given the deep animosities that have led to the recent deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations and the
always volatile situation in the Taiwan Strait, there is a real possibility that the United States will get
drawn into yet another conflict with China in the first decades of the twenty-first century. What can be
done? While American and Chinese nationalists produce Orientalist and Occidentalist discourses based on
similar epistemologies of difference, other Americans and Chinese can construct discourses of similarity. At
its best, American and Chinese cultural products, like the special section on contemporary Chinese literature
in this issue of World Literature Today, celebrate our common humanity. Translation and cultural exchange
can reveal our shared challenges: modernization, globalization—indeed, the human condition. In the end,
cultural products that raise awareness of our common humanity can serve as a vital counterweight to the
discourses of difference and threat that undermine U.S.-China relations.
A hostile international environment causes Chinese nationalism that increases risk of war.
Glain 2004 (Stephen Glain, Newsweek International Writer, “Yet Another Game,”
12/20/04,
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Oil_watch/GreatGame_China_US_Oil.html)
While the United States appears to have conceded Sudan to China, it is active elsewhere in Africa. U.S.
President George W. Bush has made a point of meeting with leaders of such countries as Chad and Congo,
which in the past barely registered on Washington's foreign-policy map. The African Oil Policy
Initiative Group, a confederation of oil executives, members of Congress, White House officials and
consultants, has recommended that the United States work openly with Nigeria to secure Africa's oilrich
areas and enhance the prospects for foreign investment. It has also urged the Pentagon to build a
naval base at the oil-rich islands of Sao Tome and Principe, and to permanently deploy a large force of
U.S. troops there. Some analysts even suspect that the deliberate way in which the United States lifted
sanctions on Libya earlier this year was a move to check China's growing influence in Africa. If China
sees energy security as a zero-sum game, so, it appears, does its American rival.
Thompson 4 (Drew Thompson is the Director of China Studies and Starr Senior Fellow at The Nixon Center
in Washington, DC. He was formerly the National Director of the China-MSD HIV/AIDS Partnership in Beijing,
“ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOFT POWER: CHINA'S AFRICA STRATEGY”, Jamestown China Brief, December 07, 2004,
http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=395&issue_id=3170&article_id=2368982)
China's interests in Africa represent an opportunity for the United States and the international
community. China maintains friendly relations with most African nations, particularly nations that the
U.S. has limited contact or diplomatic leverage over, such as Libya and Sudan. If President Bush seeks to
address U.S. national security interests around the world, promoting social, political and economic
development in Africa will have to become a significant priority for the administration. China can
potentially be a strong ally in this effort. But, as the U.S. and China seek to further their interests in
Africa, whether they work together or at cross-purposes remains an open question. The U.S. could see
China as a competitor, and become increasingly concerned about its growing spheres of influence,
while China could see U.S. efforts to promote stability and democracy in Africa as an effort to cut off
their access to raw materials and further contain China's professed "peaceful rise." Of course, China is
always cautious of U.S. intentions, which might lead to suspicion of any overtures made to them to
cooperate on issues, particularly involving other nations' internal affairs. China is likely to be initially
reluctant to work with the U.S. on any efforts to coerce African countries to conform to a Western-centric
global strategy. Concerns about the subjugation of their own interests, as well as any precedent such
cooperation would set regarding a code of conduct for nations that China enjoys close relationships with,
are sure to dominate Beijing's thinking on these issues. The Chinese remain wary that their
cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue might encourage Washington to seek to use their
leverage on Sudan, Libya, Syria and Iran, without tangible benefits on the table for Beijing. U.S.
assertions that China's effort to defuse the North Korean crisis is in their best interest might not translate as
easily to problems in Africa.
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Second, Nuclear weapons in the Middle East would lead to regional nuclear war.
Military Review, November 1, 2K6 (“Military Planning for a Middle East Stockpiled With Nuclear Weapons”,
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-155824168.html)
The bad news is that these experts probably are dead wrong. The theory is appealing, but theory rarely, if
ever, conforms to reality. States armed with nuclear weapons in the Middle East might well wage war
against one another under a variety of strategic circumstances. Iran might undertake conventional
military operations against neighboring states calculating that its nuclear deterrent would prevent a
retaliatory American or Arab Gulf state response. Saudi Arabia, in turn, fearing its conventional forces
are inferior, could resort to the tactical use of nuclear weapons to blunt Iranian conventional assaults
in the Gulf, much as NATO had planned to do against Warsaw Pact forces in cold-war Europe. Egypt had no nuclear weapons in
1973, but this did not stop it from attacking Israeli forces in the Sinai. Along with other Arab states, Egypt could use conventional forces
in saber rattling against Israel, and conventional clashes could erupt into a general war. Right now, American forces cannot deter a Syria
without nuclear weapons from sponsoring jihadist operations against U.S. forces in Iraq. A Syria armed with a nuclear
deterrent might be emboldened to undertake even more aggressive sponsorship of guerrilla war
against U.S. and Israeli forces, and this could tip a crisis into open warfare. Sitting on hair triggers in
the narrow geographic confines of the Middle East, states armed with nuclear weapons would be under
strong incentives to use them or lose them and to fire nuclear ballistic missiles in a crisis. At the height
of a regional crisis, Iran, for example, might launch huge salvos of ballistic missiles armed with nuclear
weapons against Israel in order to overwhelm Israeli ballistic missile defenses, decapitate the Israeli civilian and
military leadership, and reduce the chances of Israeli nuclear retaliation. During the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union had
about 30 minutes of breathing time from the launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles to their impact. That was 30 potential minutes of
precious time to determine whether warnings of launches were real. In the Middle East, there would be only a handful of such warning
minutes, and regimes would feel even more vulnerable than the United States and the Soviet Union did during the cold war. Many
nation-states in the Middle East resemble city-states more than industrialized nations; they have much less time to hide their leaders
from enemy attack and fewer places to hide them. Nuclear-armed states in the Middle East could also transfer nuclear weapons to
terrorist groups. Iran is the top concern on this score. Over the past two decades, Tehran has nurtured Hezbollah with arms, training,
logistics, ideological support, and money to enable it to serve as an appendage of Iranian foreign policy. Iranian support helped
Hezbollah destroy the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon in the early 1980s and kill about 250 Marines. (4) According to a former director
of the FBI, senior Iranian government officials ordered Saudi Hezbollah to bomb Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1996. (5)
The explosion killed 19 U.S. airmen. Iran has used Hezbollah to do its dirty work and maintained "plausible deniability" to reduce the
chances of American retaliatory actions. The strategy worked because the United States has yet to retaliate militarily against Iran.
Calculating that its nuclear weapons would deter conventional retaliation against it, a nuclear-armed
Iran would be emboldened to sponsor even more aggressive and devastating attacks to push American
forces out of the Middle East.
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Excerpts from Putin’s speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy detail his views and follow: The
history of humanity
certainly has gone through unipolar periods and seen aspirations to world supremacy. And what hasn’t
happened in world history? However, what is a unipolar world? …It is [a] world in which there is one
master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this
system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within… I consider that the
unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world. And this is not only because
if there was individual leadership in today’s—and precisely in today’s—world, then the military, political and
economic resources would not suffice. What is even more important is that the model itself is flawed because
at its basis there is and can be no moral foundations for modern civilization. Along with this, what is
happening in today’s world…is a tentative to introduce precisely this concept into international affairs, the
concept of a unipolar world. And with which results? Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have
not resolved any problems. Moreover they have caused new human tragedies and created new centers
of tension. Judge for yourselves: wars as well as local and regional conflicts have not diminished…
Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force—military force—in international
relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts. As a result we do not have
sufficient strength to find a comprehensive solution to any one of these conflicts. Finding a political
settlement also becomes impossible. Putin explicitly blamed the United States for such developments.
“One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in
every way,” he charged, “This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it
imposes on other nations.” A full-fledged rupture in U.S.-Russia relations is still avoidable. In fact, the
relationship can still be repaired fairly easily, as unilateralism, and not a clash of critical interests
between the two nations, is at the root of the worsening relationship. A pragmatic, interest-driven U.S. foreign policy
that restores primacy to diplomacy, eliminates idealistic “Regime Change,” and returns emphasis to
relations between allies and great powers can overturn the unilateralism that is currently harming the
relationship.
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US hegemony provoked the social context for radical Muslims to embrace fundamentalism
vented in terrorism.
Glen M. Segell, Director of the Institute of Security Policy, Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society, March 2005
(“Wahabism/Hegemony and Agenic Man/Heroic Masculinity”, Strategic Insights, Issue 4.3,
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Mar/segellMar05.asp#author)
Explicitly the decline of Islamic hegemony and the rise of Western hegemony provoked the social-
historical context for an Islamic minority to embrace fundamentalism vented in terrorism. A Senate
Judiciary subcommittee on terrorism has taken evidence that the 9/11 attacks were an expression of anger
and rage expressing sentiments that embraced martyrdom rooted in an especially strict austere
minority Islamism traced back to the fanatical Puritanism of the Bedouin zealots known as the Wahabis.[5]
This article takes Wahabism through hegemony showing it as the systemic context key to unlocking 9/11 as
acceptance by the perpetrators that the ultimate sacrifice of a soldier is to give his life for a cause. The cause
was perceived to have been fueled by Wahabi fundamentalist sentiments, where jihad or holy war, became a
compensatory, default position. The Al-Quaeda terrorist network found this tolerable given the historical
Islamic suicide wars of AfIt. This gave substance to justify terrorism as a means where a warrior legacy
of “heroic masculinity” was resurrected within a framework of an anti-modern and anti-Western holy
war. The choice of America as the target is indicative of its hegemonic role expressing military
asymmetry—small players can harm the powerful easily.[6]
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reduce their stakes in the American economy, possibly trading their dollars for the increasingly
vigorous euro. Foreign investors now have claims on the United States amounting to about $8 trillion
of its financial assets. That's the result of the ever-larger American balance-of-payments deficits -
totaling nearly $3 trillion - since 1982. Last year, the balance-of-payments deficit, the gap between the
amount of money that flows into the country and the amount that flows out, was about 5 percent of
gross national product. This year it may be larger still.
Second, the threat of Islamic extremism the greatest to the whole world only a shift to
multipolarity can prevent the wars that come from Islamic extremism.
Abraham H. Foxman, National Director of the Anti-Defamation League, “The Threat of Islamic Extremism”, To
the ADL National Commission Meeting, October 2K6
Today I want to speak about another, greater threat to us – to democracy, to America, to the State of
Israel and Jewish people, indeed to the world – the threat of Islamic extremism. History will record the
20th century as one of triumph and tragedy…of miracles and massacres…of hope to make life better
through inventions and technology and mostly, of the horrors of the Holocaust that destroyed the life of
6 million Jews and a war that destroyed millions of others. This 21st century is starting out with a clash of
cultures, a clash of faiths -- Islamists against Western and Judeo-Christian values. This looms ominously as
the greatest threat to the safety of the world – to the safety of world Jewry and world peace. Radical
Islamists are arming their faithful with hate and rage, with a goal toward dismantling democracy and
creating a world ruled by Islamic law. This threat must be confronted with the same resolve that brought
triumph for democracy and freedom over fascism and Communism. This threat is especially dangerous
because its roots are in religion, thus there is no way to reason with it, as we, the Jewish people, know
too well from our history. Al Qaeda's chief in Iraq made our blood run cold when he said "killing the
infidels is our religion, slaughtering them is our religion, until they convert to Islam or pay us tribute."
How do you reason with these thoughts? How do you debate? How do you argue? How do you dialogue?
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The idea that the world will suddenly collapse without American hegemony is delusional—
US hegemony can only go down, and attempting to sustain it only breeds backlash.
Khanna 08 (Parag, expert on geopolitics and global governance, Director of the Global Governance Initiative and Senior Research Fellow
in the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, "Waving Goodbye to Hegemony".
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving_goodbye_hegemony_6604, January 27)
The self-deluding universalism of the American imperium -- that the world inherently needs a single leader
and that American liberal ideology must be accepted as the basis of global order -- has paradoxically
resulted in America quickly becoming an ever-lonelier superpower. Just as there is a geopolitical
marketplace, there is a marketplace of models of success for the second world to emulate, not least the
Chinese model of economic growth without political liberalization (itself an affront to Western
modernization theory). As the historian Arnold Toynbee observed half a century ago, Western imperialism
united the globe, but it did not assure that the West would dominate forever -- materially or morally.
Despite the "mirage of immortality" that afflicts global empires, the only reliable rule of history is its
cycles of imperial rise and decline, and as Toynbee also pithily noted, the only direction to go from the
apogee of power is down.
EU, china, and US will balance each other in the event of declined US supremacy
Khanna 08 (Parag, expert on geopolitics and global governance, Director of the Global Governance Initiative and Senior Research Fellow
in the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, "Waving Goodbye to Hegemony".
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving_goodbye_hegemony_6604, January 27)
Would the world not be more stable if America could be reaccepted as its organizing principle and leader?
It's very much too late to be asking, because the answer is unfolding before our eyes. Neither China nor the
E.U. will replace the U.S. as the world's sole leader; rather all three will constantly struggle to gain
influence on their own and balance one another. Europe will promote its supranational integration model as
a path to resolving Mideast disputes and organizing Africa, while China will push a Beijing consensus
based on respect for sovereignty and mutual economic benefit. America must make itself irresistible to stay
in the game.