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PLACE: Library
Ambassador’s Residence
41, rue du faubourg St. Honor
Paris
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Kissinger: ThankDr. you. [Reads it] I have seen Le Duc Tho this morn
ing and told him what I told you yesterday I would tell him, and I also
requested a meeting for my delegation and me for tomorrow afternoon - -
to which he agreed. In the light of this reply I will now ask him for a
private meeting at 10 o’clock tomorrow, and I will request a postponement
of the full meeting for one week. If there is a breakdown, the cons e
quences for your government will be disastrous, and you will bear full
responsibility.
I also want to read you a message I have received from the President, of
which I will give you a copy:
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"You must tell Tbieu that I feel we have now reached the cross
roads. Whether he trusts me and signs what I have determined
is the best agreement we can get or we have to go it alone and
end our own involvement in the war on the best terms we can get.
I do not give him this very tough option by personal desire, but
because of the political reality in the United States it is not possi
ble for me, even with the massive mandate I personally received
in the election, to get the support from a hostile Congress to
continue the war when the North Vietnamese on October 8 offered
an agreement which was far better than both the House and the
Senate by resolution and directive to the President during this
last session indicated they thought we ought to accept.
"Tell Thieu that I cannot keep the lid on his strong supporters in
the House and Senate much longer. They are terribly disturbed
by what they read and hear out of Saigon. It is time for us to
decide to go forward together or to go our separate ways. If we
go separate ways, all that we fought for, for so many years, will
be lost. If, on the other hand, he will join us in going forward
together on the course I have laid out we can, over the long pull,
win a very significant victory.
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This is all I have to tell you. I will see Le Duc Tho at 10 o’clock in the
morning and seek a postponement of one week. If he refuses a negotiation,
we have no choice but to go our own way. If he accepts a negotiation you
have one week for consultations.
If you wish to get in touch with me before 10 o’clock, you are free to do so.
Kissinger: I don’t
Dr. know. It is fifty-fifty. You give us no choice.
Duc: Did you giveMr. him our November 19 proposal about withdrawal
of North Vietnamese troops and demobilization in two phases? What was
his reaction?
practically.
If the provisions on Laos and Cambodia and the DMZ are maintained
they cannot maintain their forces in the South. If these provisions are
not kept, adding an additional provision that is not maintained won’t help.
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The only context in which they are willing to nelgotiate is in the context
of demobilization, and in negotiation with the PRG. There is no chance
whatever that they will go beyond this.
Kissinger: They Dr.tell us that they have given up their demand for the
immediate resignation of President Thieu and the installation of a coali
ti.on government, and stripped their political demands to nothing.
Duc: You say theMr. agreement is a surrender for them, but there are
a number of obligations for the United States and South Vietnam, but what
obligations are there for North Vietnam?
If the President who has supported you all alone, all along
- - has lost
- -
his patience as this letter indicates, imagine how the others are.
You [Ambassador Phuong and Mr. Dud can come back with us if you like.
We are trying for a 4:00 p.m. departure.
Kissinger: If there
Dr. is another negotiation or not, you have run out of
time. I will leave Friday morning for Paris again.
Duc: Whatever the Mr. decision President Nixon has to take, we remain
grateful for all your help, particularly Vietnamization, which has suc
ceeded. But for us to accept an agreement that does not explicitly deal
with the North Vietnamese troops, our Government could not explain to
the people.
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Kissinger: I will Dr.ask him for one week. If he accepts you have a
deadline. If he refuses, the negotiations are at an end and the conse
quences described in the President’s letter will take place.
Kissinger: "Non-South
Dr. Vietnamese forces." We have submitted
every single change you wanted, but the limit to what they will agree to
is maybe "demobilization on a one-for-one basis" and to have the Council’s
members "appointed equally by the two sides. ‘ Maybe they will withdraw
some forces out of MR-l in conjunction with release of civilian prisoners.
Maybe they will accept this, maybe they will refuse.
Kissinger: We have
Dr. to look at it from our point of view. For four
years, by maneuvering and manipulation, we have managed to keep the
Congress from passing resolutions requiring United States withdrawal in
exchange for our POWs. This was my nightmare. On October 8 I thought
that their acceptance of our proposal plus your enthusiastic support would
make the American people so proud of what we had achieved that they would
enable us to support your government. Imagine now the attitude of a Mid
westerner who reads every day that we are accused of betrayal. If it is
portrayed as a worthless agreement, how can the American people support
it?
We think we are watching a suicide. You are losing your public support.
Why did we want an agreement in October, in November and flow? The
election meant nothing. If we got it now it would be our success. If it
happens next March, every liberal newspaper in the country would think
it had brought it about.
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If we had wanted to sell you out, we had more opportunities for this.
We have fought for four years and sent you another billion dollars of aid.
Due:You say theMr. best guarantee is not a scrap of paper but your
willingness to retaliate. I am not arguing with this. But if there is no
provision about the North Vietnamese troops, on what basis could you
retaliate?
Imust tell you, the next thing our opponents will do is try to undermine
any remaining obligation of ours to you. The more we disagree, the easier
it is for them.
Lam: You Ambas ador said you have gotten no response at all from
Saigon. I am obliged to be more precise, because I have transmitted to
you Saigon’s responses. Saigon’s decision not to respond concretely is a
choice, a decision between accepting the agreement or not accepting the
agreement. If it does not deal with the two main questions it is a difficult
choice for us, to weigh. the pros and cons.
Kissinger: I understand
Dr. your motives. You are in a difficult position.
The argument is not between you and me. The argument is now exactly
as the President put it. This is now the case. We have told you since the
end of October where we should go. We have been on a confrontation
course when we should be cooperating. There is no other choice any more.
If the talks break down the consequences will follow. If there is one more
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Haig: MutualGeneral confidence between us is the key and this has broken
down.
Kissinger: If youDr. say your vital interests are ruined, they will be
ruined. The agreement is better than anything we thought we could achieve
or than Congress was willing to support. Look over the Congressional
debates: did any of our supporters ever argue that your government had to
be maintained or that military aid had to be maintained or that anything had
tO be done for Laos and Cambodia? The only issue was withdrawal for
prisoners and the question of a ceasefire.
Sullivan: Ambas ador I told Ambassador Phuong the very same thing in
Washington two weeks ago, exactly as the President said. I want to say
three things. If you had driven out the North Vietnamese you would, of
course, be in a different position in a ceasefire. Secondly, an agreement
that does not limit your sovereignty and includes provisions that prevent
the reintroduction of the NVA and keeps your prisoners .
Kissinger: We hope.
Dr.
Sullivan: Ambas ador W had this on October 22. Le Due Tho looks at
this not as a North Vietnamese but as a leader of the Lao Dong party, and
he has to worry about his cadre in the South. The only thing he can point o
to Madam Birth or to Nguyen Huu Tho is the leverage of their troops.
So you ask,is there any realism in North Vietnamese forces being per
mitted in a ceasefire situation while preserving the principle that they
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If you face this situation saying "We don’t have confidence in ourselves and
don’t have confidence in the U. S. to back us up,!’ then how can we have
confidence in you? Many leaders in Congress lost their offices, defeated
because they supported you.
Kissinger: AllottDr. lost, and Margaret Chase Smith and Jack Miller.
These are serious losses. They had seniority and stood by us.
We kept the war going by always keeping North Vietnam in the position of
looking unreasonable on issues that Americans could understand, like over
throwing an ally. But even that would not last beyond next year.
There is another fact. We cannot keep all our carriers there beyond Jan
uary because of the operation of the military establishment.
Sullivan: Ambas ador You have the example of South Korea. In 1953 Syngman
Rhee did not like the agreement and did not trust us. But we have kept every
commitment to South Korea, and today South Korea is in the strongest posi
tion and North Korea has come to them and done things they have always said
were contrary to their principles.
Kissinger: Let’s Dr.face it. A unilateral deal will be,only our prisoners
in exchange for our withdrawal.
Sullivan: Ambas ador The military aid bill won’t come up until about June.
On economic aid we never got a bill last year, only a continuing resolution.
Therefore we have to submit new bills on January 3. They may never come
out of Committee.
Sullivan: Ambas ador Do you know this? Because the 1962 agreement was
forced upon them by Khrushchev. They violated it from the first moment.
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Due: But it says Mr.nothing about the big issue of North Vietnamese troops.
Kissinger: I would
Dr. point to the demobilization provisions. I would say
that we had repelled North Vietnamese aggression. I would claim victory.
Due: We repelledMr. the offensive but the North Vietnamese troops are
there.
Due: Though there Mr. is nothing in the agreement that gives them the
right to stay there, in Vietnamese eyes it is there indirectly. You and all
our allies have to leave. It mentions three Indochinese countries .
Kissinger: It is up
Dr. to you to say it is four.
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Kissinger: Look Dr.at October 26. You all misunderstood what I was
doing. I was preventing President Thieu from being isolated. I was saying
that the concerns are ours, not just yours. Or else you would have been
killed. It would have been easy to say that President Thieu was the one.
Kissingr: We know
Dr. who Nha is. We know it is instigated from the
Palace.
The choice isn’t between this agreement and the continuation of the war. It
is between this agreement and a Congressional cut-off of aid. We don’t like
it. Your choice is to join with us or destroy yourselves. These are facts.
I tried to tell you this in Saigon. General Haig tried to tell you this in Saigon.
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Kissinger: Militarily
Dr. and politically, because the cadres know what
they fought for. When I first told Le Due Tho our proposal for a ceasefire
some years ago, he laughed: "Did we fight for twenty years to stop fight
ing? We have fought to bring about a political solution. The objective of
war is victory." Yet now he is pushing for a ceasefire without a political
settlement. His cadre know what this means. The fruit of ten years of
revolutionary war is a eeasefire with your government still there.
They are pleading with us for economic aid. Do they think they can get
economic aid from us if they are fighting our ally?
Due: Suppose weMr.demanded that the whole Hanoi politburo had to resign
and the government had to be dismantled and then new elections held. And
then we dropped this demand. This would not be proof of goodwill.
poll was taken during the campaign which asked: "Do you support the GVN
if the resignation of President Thieu is the only obstacle to a settlement"?
Only eight percent said yes.
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Kissinger: That Dr.is your business. We offered you a ride on our plane
and thought it was accepted. But it is up to you.
Do not believe that by protracting your arrival it will change by one hour.
Due: No, we are Mr. not. I need instructions from President Thieu on
what I am to say to President Nixon.
I would appreciate, in view of the importance of this, you may want to stay
a few minutes and go over with General Haig and Ambassador Sullivan
what we have conveyed to you, just to make sure you have understood what
we have said.
Kissinger: It is up
Dr. to you.
Kissinger: No. ItDr. will break up. The only way to avoid a breakup is
to delay a week. If I go back on the issues .
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Kissinger: I frankly
Dr. think it is better not to negotiate tomorrow. It
would be a great mistake. If he gives you it "administrative structure"
he will ask for something back.
Our only hope is that at the last session we say: "This is our position.
We concede on this and insist on that. This is our final offer." If we ask
for things one at a time, he will come back one at a time. If they really
want peace they may agree.
Phuong: Ambas ador One thing I would like to ask. Yesterday you talked
about three options. What happened to Article 8c? Is it in or out?
Kissinger: Yes, Dr.you are right. I tried that with Le Due Tho today.
He laughed. The other option, our preferred ones is to say: we maintain
Article 8c; we add the phrase "appointed equally by the two sides" to the
political chapter we add "demobilization on a one-for-one basis" and "the
parties will do their utmost to accomplish this within three months"; and
we have an understanding with them to have you release some prisoners in
return for some withdrawal from MR-i. So our preferred one, which
yesterday was option 2, would keep Article 8c.
Kissinger: We have
Dr. not up to now agreed to have "three equal segments."
That would be our concession.
There is one thing: in the Laos and Cambodia chapter they have rejected
the phrase about "the principle that Indochinese forces shall stay within
their frontiers." We might try we can think if we have a week
-- using --
some phrase without the word "troops," such as "the Indochinese countries
will not use military pressure against each other."
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A November 24 1972
N VIT.NAM CONG.FIOA
de Ia Rpublique du Vi&-Nam
31. AVENUE RAYMOND P0INcARE
PARIS 16’
MEMORANDUM
Sincerely,