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MEMORANDUM
THEWHITE
HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE
X C V
EYES
ONLY
MEMORANDUM
OF
CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:NguyenPhu
Duc,
Special
Assistant
to
President
ThieuPham
Dang
Lam,
Chiefof
GVN
Delegation
to
ParisPeace
Talks
Tran
Kim
Phuong,
Ambassador
to
theU.S.
NguyenXuan
Phong,
Deputy
Chief
of
GVN
Delegation
to
ParisPeace
Talks
Vuong
Van
Bac,
Ambassadorto
the
UnitedKingdom
Dr.
HenryA.
Kissinger,Assistant
to
the
Presidentfor
National
Security
AffairsMajor
General
Alexander
M.
Haig,
Jr.,
Deputy
Assistant
to
the
President
for
National
Security
Affairs
Ambassador
WilliamSullivan,
Deputy
AssistantSecretary,
Department
of
State
Ambassador
William
Porter,
U.S.
Chief
Delegate
to
the
Paris
PeaceTalks
Hayward
Isham,
U.
S.
Delegation
to
the
ParisPeace
Talks
Peter
W.
Rodman,
NSC
Staff
DATE
AND
TIME:
Friday,
November
24,1972
7:30
-
8:45
p.m.
PLACE:
Library
Ambassador’s
Residence
41,
rue
du
faubourg
St.
Honor
Paris
Ambassador
am:Saigon
gave
us
this
memorandum
to
give
you
which
indicates
our
instructions.
[Hands
overthememorandum
at
Tab
AJ
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY
YES
ONLY
 
TOP
SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY
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ONLY
2
Dr.
issinger:
Thank
you.
[Reads
it]
I
have
seen
Le
Duc
Tho
this
morn
ing
and
told
him
what
I
told
you
yesterday
I
would
tell
him,
and
I
alsorequested
a
meeting
for
my
delegation
and
mefortomorrowafternoon
--
towhich
he
agreed.
Inthe
light
of
thisreply
I
will
now
askhim
for
a
private
meeting
at
10
o’clock
tomorrow,
and
I
will
request
a
postponement
of
the
fullmeeting
for
one
week.
If
there
is
abreakdown,
the
cons
e
quences
foryour
government
will
be
disastrous,
andyou
willbear
full
responsibility.
I
also
wantto
read
you
a
message
I
have
received
fromthe
President,
ofwhich
I
will
give
you
a
copy:
November
24,
1972
"I
havechecked
today
as
to
theattitude
of
the
leading
Demo
crats
and
Republicans
who
supportus
in
the
Senate
on
Vietnam.
In
preparing
them
fortheconsultation
which
musttake
placeonce
agreement
is
reached
we
have
informed
them
of
the
key
elements
of
the
October
8
agreement:the
return
of
our
POWs,
a
ceasefire,
and
a
formula
under
which
Thieu
remains
in
powerand
all
South
Vietnamese
haveanopportunity
to
participate
in
a
free
election
to
determine
what
governmenttheywant
forthe
future.
The
result
of
thischeckindicates
that
they
were
not
only
unanimous
but
vehement
in
stating
their
conclusionsthat
if
Saigon
is
the
only
roadblockforreaching
agreement
on
thisbasis
they
will
personallylead
the
fight
when
the
new
Congress
recon
venes
on
January
3
to
cut
off
all
military
and
economic
assistance
toSaigon.
My
evaluation
is
thatthe
date
ofthecut-off
wouldbe
February
1.
They
further
believe
that
undersuch
circumstances
we
have
no
choice
but
to
go
it
alone
andto
makea
separatedeal
with
North
Vietnam
forthe
return
of
our
POWs
and
for
our
withdrawal."These
are
men
who
haveloyally
supported
us
on
November
3,
Cambodia,
andLaos,
andMay
8.
They
have
great
affectionfor
the
South
Vietnamese
people
and
great
respect
for
President
Thieu
personally,
but
theypoint
out
thatthe
votes
in
the
Senate
this
past
year
for
appropriations
for
support
of
theeffort
in
Vietnamhavebeen
wononlyby
great
effort
and
by
verysmall
margins.
They
also
point
out
that
thistime
the
House
cannotsave
appropriations
becausethe
Senate
would
block
any
Housemove
to
restore
funds
TOP
SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY
YES
ON
 
TOP
SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY
YES
ONLY
3
which,
incidentally,
inviewof
the
makeup
of
the
new
House,
is
highly
unlikely,
by
simplyletting
the
appropriations
bill
die
inconference."This
message,
unless
you
havestrong
feelingsotherwise,
should
be
immediately
passed
on
through
theSouth
Vietnamesenegotiators
to
Thieu.Tell
himthefat
isin
the
fire.
Itis
time
to
fishorcut
bait.
We
do
notwantto
go
it
alone.
I
personally
wantto
stand
by
Thieu
and
the
South
VietnameseGovernment
but
asI
have
told
him
in
three
separate
messages,
what
really
counts
isnot
the
agreement
butmy
determination
to
takemassive
action
against
North
Vietnam
in
the
eventthey
break
the
agreement.
The
NorthVietnamesetroops
in
the
South
meanabsolutely
nothing
inthateventuality.
If
they
had
no
forces
there
atall
and
I
refusedto
order
air
retaliation
on
theNorth
when
infiltration
started
to
begin,
thewar
would
be
resumed
and
the
outcome
wouldbe
very
much
in
doubt.
"You
must
tell
Tbieu
that
I
feel
we
have
now
reached
the
cross
roads.
Whetherhe
trusts
me
and
signswhat
I
have
determined
is
the
bestagreement
we
can
get
or
we
have
to
go
it
alone
andend
our
own
involvement
in
thewar
on
the
best
terms
we
canget.
I
do
not
give
himthisvery
toughoption
by
personaldesire,
but
because
of
thepolitical
reality
in
the
United
States
it
isnot
possi
ble
for
me,
even
with
the
massive
mandate
I
personallyreceived
intheelection,
to
getthesupport
from
a
hostileCongress
to
continue
thewar
when
theNorthVietnamese
on
October
8
offered
an
agreement
which
was
far
better
than
both
the
House
and
the
Senate
by
resolution
and
directive
to
the
President
duringthis
last
session
indicated
they
thoughtwe
oughtto
accept.
"Tell
Thieu
that
I
cannotkeep
thelid
on
his
strong
supporters
in
the
House
and
Senate
much
longer.
They
areterribly
disturbed
by
what
they
read
and
hear
outofSaigon.Itis
timefor
us
to
decide
to
go
forward
togetheror
to
go
our
separate
ways.
If
we
go
separate
ways,
allthat
we
fought
for,for
somany
years,
will
be
lost.
If,
on
theother
hand,
he
will
join
us
ingoing
forward
together
on
the
course
I
have
laid
out
we
can,
over
the
long
pull,
win
a
verysignificant
victory.
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY
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