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the past the proceedings of that Cornmittee were based on Article 15 of the

Covenant, which excluded the two parties to the conflict. Now the pro­

ceedings were different I said and China should be made a member of the

Committee.

M. Avenol replied that the Advisory Committee would, at its first

meeting, invite China and Japan to become members of the Committee.

Mr. Eden considered it important that all interested powers should be

associated in the work of the Committee.

Secretary-General Avenol then read out the prepared declarations to

be made by the President of the Council regarding the convening of the

Advisory Committee. When Messrs. Eden and Delbos both declared they would

say nothing at the Council meeting, I asked them both to say a few words

there on the gravity of the situation. Delbos was at first disposed to do

so, but then they both said that they preferred to say nothing. A decision

was taken that the Council meeting should be a private one.

The Secretary-General observed that it would be wiser to avoid express

at the Council meeting any gratification about American participation in th

Advisory Committee.

[We then proceeded to discuss the composition of theCommittee. ] The

British Foreign Secretary and French Foreign Minister said they would be

surprised if Japan accepted the invitation to take part in the work of the

Committee. M. Delbos asked whether Germany, having important interests in

China, should be invited to become a member of the Advisory Committee, and

I replied at once in the affirmative. M. Avenol was also in favor of

inviting her, although he was sure that Germany's reply would be in the

negative. Mr. Eden thought that the Advisory Committee could decide at

its first meeting which powers should be invited to join the Committee,

whereupon I reiterated that it was essential that China should be a member

of the Committee.
 E-645

government: in my speech^ Mr. Eden asked me whether I would state in the

Council exactly what concrete measures China wanted the Committee to adopt.

I told him that X would present such precise terms later.

The same day, a little later, I called on Mr. Harrison, accompanied

by Dr. Victor Hoo. I found him to be] a very cautious type and non-committal

on the points I raised. I informed the American Minister of the afternoon

meeting of the Council on the Chinese question and told him an outline of

the procedure that was to be followed. As it was expected that the President

of the Council would propose to refer the question to the Advisory Committee

of 1933, I explained the mandate of this Committee and asked Mr. Harrison

whether he had any indication from Washington as to its attitude. I recalled

to him that the United States was represented on the Committee following

its acceptance of an invitation from the League and the fact that the acceptance

had been issued by Mr. Hull, the Secretary of State.

Mr. Harrison said that he had received no indication whatever from

Washington and that he could not assume anything. He thought the question

would be considered in Washington only after the League of Nations had made

the first move. He said he understood that the Council would refer to the

Committee the two statements of the Chinese government on the situation and

my own speech in the Assembly, and asked whether it was correct that the

appeal itself would not be referred to the Committee.

I assured him that only the substance of the appeal would be referred

to the Assembly and not the formal appeal itself, of which the Council would

remain seized, and that I was going to make a reservation at the meeting of

the Council in the afternoon so that there could be no misunderstanding on

this point.

Just before I called on Mr. Harrison, I had had a brief conversation

with Sr. Negrin, Spanish Prime Minister and the current President of the

Council. I wanted to explain to him what I understood from the Secretary-

General to be the procedure to be followed at the Council meeting that

 E-646

afternoon on the Chinese appeal. It appeared that he had not yet been in

touch with the Secretariat, although he at once said that he would have no

objection to my making a speech in the Council at the meeting.

Our conversation drifted to other subjects. The Spanish Prime Minister

told me that the Spanish people had been taking a great deal of interest in

the Far Eastern situation and that they all showed a great deal of sympathy

for the Chinese people in their present crisis with Japan. He said the

Spanish people, because of their interest, had been learning a great deal of

the geography of China since the outbreak of the hostilities. He said he

wanted to assure me that Spanish sympathy was altogether on the Chinese side

and that Spain and China were faced in reality with the same problem, namely,

a struggle with the forces of militarism and aggression.

Thus far I have given a rather detailed account of my conversations

with the representatives of the different countries [and the League officials.

First, because the Sino-Japanese conflict was a very important question for

the League, and second, because the question of procedure was crucially

important from the point of view of adopting some effective action and of

knowing, at the same time, how far the friendly powers were prepared to go.

It was really a matter of finding out what was possible and asking for

the possible, so as to be of some practical help to China. Thus I am less

concerned with giving an account of what took place in the League than with

indicating what attitudes were held by the different countries, especially

the principal powers, towards China and Japan and towards the Sino-Japanese

conflict, which, because of the large-scale operations initiated by the

Japanese armed forces inside the Great Wall and south of the Yellow River,

had assumed a very serious aspect. China, of course, was more concerned

with the attitude and policy of the major powers than with what the League

itself could do, because the League depended upon the policy of the powers,

and not only those powers which were members of the League, but particularly
 E-647

the United States which was not a member. It was both essential to obtain

American cooperation and useless to force matters if the powers were unwilling.

[In a nutshell, the Council decided on September 16 to charge the Advisory

Committee with examining "the situation arising out of the Sino-Japanese

conflict in the Far East." The Committee was to meet for the first time

in this capacity within the week. The Secretary-General so informed all

the members of the Committee and the United States. The latter’s favorable

response--an agreement to attend on the same terms as in 1933, as an observer

without the right to vote--was made public on September 21, the day on which

the Committee reconvened. At this first meeting, it invited not only China

and Japan but Germany and Australia to send delegates. China and Australia

accepted of course, while Japan and Germany did not. The Japanese reply

reaffirmed the by-then-standard Japanese point of view that a solution to

the problem was really a matter for direct negotiation between China and Japan.]

[Earlier, on September 17, Mme. Tabouis again called to keep informed

of the situation from the Chinese point of view and to tell me what she

had learned.] She spoke of the fall of the franc and Premier Chautemps

telephone message to Foreign Minister Delbos to be cautious in Geneva and

not to be too firm in policy, lest the French public should fear war again.

The next morning, September 18, M. Delbos was one of the principal speakers

at the Assembly meeting. He spoke against war and aggression in general, but

made only a slight allusion to the Far East. He was rather disappointing

for me. [Eden, on the other hand, when delivering his speech to the Assembly

on Monday, the 20th,] dwelt upon the Far Eastern situation at some length.

I thought it was a good speech. Later Eden told me that Lord Cranborne of

the British delegation had urged him to say more, but he had not, for fear

of "shying off" America.

Mr. Litvinov of Soviet Russia on September 21, made an excellent speech

 E-648

in the Assembly [from the Chinese point of view.] He was frank and to the

point. [Dr. H. H. Rung, who had arrived in Geneva on Sunday night (September

19th), had spoken to Litvinov on the 20th. The Soviet Foreign Minister had,

according to Rung, further] suggested a conference of Pacific powers to

reinforce the action of the League of Nations. [This, of course, was an

idea which I had had much earlier. But the failure of the Chinese government's

note to the signatories of the Washington Nine Power Treaty (plus Germany and

the Soviet Union) to elicit much of a response had led me and the government

in Nanking to shelve this idea for the time being. Therefore it was

something of a surprise when M. Bruce of Australia, in his speech to the

Assembly of September 21, advocated a conference of the Pacific powers to

deal with the Far Eastern situation. This was an antecedent of the Brussels

Conference and I will have more to say about it in that context. ]

[In the morning,] of the 21st, before M. Litvinov spoke in the Assembly,

I took Dr. Rung to see French Foreign Minister Delbos. [I had similarly

arranged for Dr. Rung to see Foreign Secretary Eden the evening before and

had prepared him with the necessary background materials. So Rung and

Eden had already had a good talk on the 20th. As for Rung's talk with Delbos,

I prepared notes and would like to take them up, particularly with reference

to a new development, the Japanese air attacks on the Chinese capital,

Nanking, and Japanese warning to the diplomatic corps in Nanking to evacuate

the capital for their own safety.]

The Japanese armed forces ruthless air bombing of Chinese cities and

town, of civilian populations and of educational, cultural and health

facilities had been occupying the attention of the Chinese delegation all

along. [However, a new element was introduced when I learned, late in the

evening of September 20, of a Japanese air raid on Nanking, which the Waichiopu

rep'0rted as the biggest since the war began, ] and the Japanese threat to the
 E-649

foreign diplomats to evacuate the Chinese capital or face the consequences.

After due consideration, I sent a note on the subject to the Secretary-

General of the League. At the same time, I wanted to approach the major

powers at Geneva directly. Therefore, I took advantage of the opportunity

afforded by Dr. Rung's interview with the French Foreign Minister to raise

die subject with M. Delbos.]

[At the beginning of the interview^ however, Rung and Delbos discussed

the situation at the League and the French attitude toward the Sino-Japanese

conflict. In the first place, Dr. Rung expressed his appreciation of the

sympathetic and helpful attitude of France and emphasized the fact that China

in resisting Japanese aggression, was also fighting for the cause of peace

and order in the world and for safeguarding the interests of the foreign

powers in China as well as the interests of the League of Nations itself.

He explained to M. Delbos China's desiderata in bringing her case to the League.

For example, following the lines I and the delegation had been taking,

he reaffirmed China's desire that the League proclaim Japan as aggressor

and condemn the illegal blockade and the inhuman bombing of the civilian

population on the Mainland. Secondly, he said that measures should be

taken to prevent Japan from getting any assistance from abroad, while making

it possible for China to obtain as much aid as possible, particularly with

regard to credit, arms and the facilities of transit.

M. Delbos reiterated the sympathetic attitude of France and the

willingness of his government to do everything possible to help China in

the situation. As regards a declaration of aggression against Japan,

he agreed with Dr. Rung that the League of Nations should pronounce such a

moral judgement, but cautioned that care should be taken not to provoke

"inevitable" action from the United States by making such a declaration.

He himself felt that if such a declaration were made, the United States

government would at once apply the Neutrality Act. This was an interesting
 E-650

as well as an important point, inasmuch as what the United States government

told the Chinese Ambassador to Washington was not so clear-cut . We did

not, therefore, get the impression that the United States would apply the

Neutrality Act, if the League should take such a strong step as a clear-cut

declaration of Japan as aggressor. On the other hand, both London and

Paris kept warning me and the Chinese government in Nanking to be cautious

and not to insist too much upon such a declaration. Perhaps the truth

lay in the fact that London and Paris themselves felt they would be put

in the difficult position of having to consider applying sanctions against

Japan, once she was declared aggressor. They themselves feared the ultimate

consequences of such an action. In other words, they seemed to be trying

to "pass the buck" from themselves to another.

I at once pointed out to M. Delbos what I had already said to him

before, that the declaration of aggression and the acknowledgement of a

state of war were really two different things. I said China would not

insist upon a finding to the effect that Japan had resorted to war, but

merely to the effect that Japan had resorted to aggression.

M. Delbos said that he fully appreciated the distinction, but that he

was uncertain how it would be taken by the United States. He said it would

be desirable to first find out how the American government would view such

a declaration.

I told him that the Chinese delegation had already cabled again to the

Chinese Ambassador in Washington to ascertain the American attitude and that,

in view of the importance of the matter, Dr. Kung would likewise telegraph

to my colleague in the United States. At the same time, I informed the

French Foreign Minister that the latest indications of the American attitude,

as revealed in a conversation between President Roosevelt and C. T. Wang,

the Chinese Ambassador, were that the United States not only had no intention

of applying the Neutrality Act, but was not prepared to prevent merchant
 E-651

ships from carrying arms to Hongkong or Indochina for China's use. I

added that the American President's declaration prohibiting government

ships from carrying arms to China and Japan was intended, as I now understood

it, to assuage pressure by certain sections of public opinion in the United

States for the application of the Neutrality Act.

M. Delbos said he was very glad to hear of these indications, because

the American attitude and American collaboration were of vital importance

to any action which the League might take.

The conversation then shifted to a discussion of Mr. Bruce's proposal

on a conference of Pacific powers. Then I told the Foreign Minister that

I had just received a cablegram from my government asking me to see him on

the question of the warning issue by the Japanese Naval Commander-in-Chief

A
to the diplomatic corps in Nanking and the civilians there to evacuate the

Chinese capital before noon, September 21, in order that the Japanese

war planes might have a free hand to bomb Nanking. I pointed out to M.

Delbos that such action was contrary to international law and international

conventions and should not be tolerated. It amounted not only to an act

of terrorization against the Chinese government, but also to an act of

coercion against the foreign powers. I said if the threat should be - < v‘ *

igaor-e<i, surely it would create a dangerous precedent for the future of

aerial warfare, which would effect all countries. I urged M. Delbos to

protest in Tokyo and to instruct the French diplomatic mission to remain

in Nanking as the British had decided to do.

M. Delbos said that such a matter was really very serious and that

the French government had already made it known to Japan that it could not

accept such a warning as being well-founded. He was, however, puzzled

by the action of the American Embassy in withdrawing at once from the capital.

[(United States Ambassador Johnson, in consequence of the Japanese warning,

had on September 20, boarded the U.S.S. Luzon, anchored off Nanking. He
 E-652

was accompanied by most of his staff. This outraged the government at

Nanking and put the other members of the diplomatic corps in a quandry

as to what to do, though^ most finally choose to stay put.) 1

I emphasized to M. Delbos that all the other missions were remaining

behind and that a strong protest might yet induce the Japanese authorities

to change their attitude.

M. Delbos , in response to my request, then said he would make another

demarche in Tokyo and instruct the French Embassy to remain on the spot

in Nanking. When I askedhim whether I could cable back to my government

what he had just told me, M. Delbos answered in the affirmative. But

he added that his statement was subject to two conditions: 1) that the

French government would consult first with the British government; and

2) that the French mission in Nanking, while instructed to stay, would be given

discretion to leave in case of real immediate danger to their safety. He

said that that was essential because he could not leave them to be exposed

to serious danger to their lives. That, of course, was quite reasonable.

 E-653

The following day I was glad to receive a report of the British^

American and German protests to Tokyo against the threat of air bombing

Nanking to extinction. [In fact, oral representations by the foreign powers

in reply to the Japanese threat had been prompt. The British, American and

Franch Ambassadors in Tokyo had made immediate oral protests to the Japanese

foreign office. The British and American protests of the 22nd were actually

reply's to Japanese Foreign Minister Hirota's answer to their original oral

protests. Moreover, the latter United States response was a strong one in

writing. This was followed, on the 23rd, by a written note to Tokyo from

the Soviet Union.]

[In the meantime, 50 Japanese airplanes had bombed Nanking in the morning

of the 22nd; other Japanese planes had dropped incendiary bombs on Nanking's

residential areas hours later. Refugee camps along the waterfront were hit

and hundreds of Chinese lost their lives. After Canton was also bombarded

from the air on the 23rd, France, Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet

Union and both Germany and Italy made additional representations to Tokyo.]

[In a talk with Dr. Kung and others of my delegation on September 24

to consider tactics, we agreed on the] advisability of emphasizing the

horrors of the air bombing to arouse sympathy and to lead the way for asking

for a declaration of aggression and an embargo on oil to Japan. [At the time

public opinion all over the world seemed justly horrified by the nature

and extent of the Japanese air bombardments, especially as this aspect of

modern warfare was a relatively new development.]

The Soviet attitude towards China at the time was friendly, a friendship

which was naturally not based upon altruistic considerations. Soviet Foreign

Minister Litvinov, [like other delegates at Geneva,] was favorably impressed

with the Chinese resistance. In fact he was so impressed that for a few

days he assumed an optimistic attitude and told Madame Tabouis, [who really

knew everyone in Paris and Geneva, ] that China saved the world from another
 E-654

World War because, with Japan weakened by Chinese resistance, Germany would

not dare to move in Europe. [When Madame Tabouis questioned him about Soviet

aid to China,] he told her Russia was already helping with materials.

The reason he gave her for Soviet resistraint in resorting to any military

action against Japan to help China was that any action on Russia's part

might be considered as an act of aggression against Japan. [So Madame

Tabouis told me in September 22.]

M. Vladimir Sokolin, a Soviet member of the Secretariat, gave a luncheon

on September 23. I conversed with him, emphasizing the far-reaching effect

of the Far Eastern situation created by Japanese aggression and the need

of Soviet help to China. I pointed out it was also an opportunity to solve

the problem of the Japanese menace once and for all, or at least for the

next ten years, if China and Soviet Russia could completely cooperate.

It was true that Moscow was sending material aid to China, but that was

insufficient to achieve the objective which I had in mind and which I

tried to urge him to see.

Mr. Sokolin, for his part, thought Soviet Russia would act only in

common with Great Britain and the United States. [He had just made this

point when the other guests joined in our conversation, and all of us

centered our attention on the possible development of the attitude and policy

of the United States. We agreed that the American public opinion depended

upon development. A sudden change of policy was always possible from

Washington, as indicated recently by Secretary of State Hull's written

protest to Tokyo against Japan's threat to bomb Nanking.

At a reception given on the 25th by the Aga Khan, India's delegate and

president of the Assembly that fall, Dr. Rajchman informed me that the

Secretary-General had just prepared a memorandum for France and Great Britain

on the Sino-Japanese situation. It contained five points; 1) an objective

statement of the situation as it existed at the time without any word of

^ i rm • ^ H pr 1 p r p t-i nn of n on-r er op m* t i on of anv change resulting

 E-655

from the present invasion by Japan; 3) a refusal to recognize the Sino-

Japanese situation as one of concern only to the two countries^ and an

insistence upon the view that thereby the situation was also a problem for

the League of Nations and other countries as well, in the interest of peace;

4) a recommendation that aid be given to China on the basis of humanitarian

considerations; and 5) a statement on keeping the situation open for any

possible mediation or other similar measures in the future. The underlying

thought of this memorandum appeared to me clearly to be that the League felt

that it could do something and that it should do something, although what

was to be done must necessarily be of a limited character.

The memorandum evidently had been drawn up after consultation with

the British, for in the same evening the British delegation gave out to the

press the statement that Great Britain was going to help China. Financially,

she was going to propose a remission of China's dues for the current year,

and on humanitarian grounds, she was going to make a contribution for relief

work for Chinese refugees. I was glad to receive a cable from C. T. Wang

in Washington that same evening, informing me that Secretary of State Hull

had told him the United States would give the same favorable consideration

[to any concrete proposal from the League] as it had in the case of the

Advisory Committee [as to the argument that the United States would have to

apply the Neutrality Act in the event the League declared Japan an aggressor,

Hull had said action by the League would not make any course of action on

the part of the United States "compulsory."]

By Sunday, the 26th I was working hard on my speech [for the Advisory

Committee meeting on Monday afternoon, when China would be represented for

the first time. I was contemplating whether and how to raise the] question

of an oil embargo against Japan on humanitarian grounds for her ruthless

aerial bombardment of China and that of positive measures against Japan and

for China. [In this regard I worked out some draft resolutions.]
 E-656

At noon on t e 27th I had a conference with French Foreign Minister

Yvon Delbos^ Mr. Walter Elliot and Lord Cranborne of the British delegation

and Secretary-General Avenol [in preparation for the afternoon meeting.

In general I found they were much afraid of any semblance of sanctions and

tried hard to persuade me not to present the resolution I had drafted nor to

propose any concerte measures at the meeting.]

[I was accompanied at this conference by Quo Tai-chi and Victor Hoo,

whom I asked to prepare notes. According to his notes, I] opened the discussion

by outlining the speech I intended to give at the meeting in the afternoon

and the proposal I intended to make in a draft resoltuion. I told them

I would ask for a condemnation of certain acts, such as the Japanese aggression,

the use of the International Settlement in Shanghai as a basis of military

operations and the aerial bombardment of non-combattants. I explained that

such a declaration of condemnation was essential not only for China, but also

for the League of Nations for world opinion expected the League to state

clearly its attitude regarding right, justice and principles of peace. As

to practical measures, I said no aid should be given to Japan to obtain

credits, arms and raw material, such as cotton, wool, rubber, iron, etc.

Moreover, in view of the gravity of the situation,the League even from

a purely humanitarian point of view should also take concrete measures to V-

reduce, if not to put a stop to aerial bombardments of civilians. To that

effect, I said the League should recommend to its members to abstain from

furnishing fuel to Japan or to Japanese forces in China .

Mr. Delbos shared my feelings and found what I wished to ask of

the League only natural. But he said it was necessary to first see what

was possible. He pointed out that what I asked for were in fact sanctions,

without the invocation of Article 16. He thought that it would be easier

to obtain a condemnation and that it was doubtful whether one could, without

expressly invoking Article 16, obtain the same consequences, i.e., sanctions.
 E-657

In his view, a subcommittee should be appointed to see whether it was

possible to apply the practical measures I had mentioned. The opinion of

the countries that would have to apply the sanctions ought to be known first.

He suggested that I should make a speech of a more general character in the

Advisory Committee that afternoon and use the draft resolution I had mentioned

in the proposed subcommittee.

Mr. Elliot, [who was British Secretary of State for Scotland,] agreed

with Mr. Delbos. He, too, thought that the discussion at the first meeting

of the full Advisory Committee should be of a more general character. If the

Chinese demands for concrete measures were presented, he felt it would mean

that China was asking for sanctions and that this would cause the British

government great uneasiness.

Lord Cranborne also found it premature to table definite proposals.

He said what I asked were in fact sanctions. But the lessons we had learned

during the last few years showed it was not advisable to embark on sanctions

unless one was sure to succeed. Otherwise, it would be unwise for the League

and of no benefit for China. If sanctions were applied, there would be a

state of war. Therefore the consequences of such a course of action would

be of more damage to China than any assistance to Japan. The Committee

would have to greatly modify China’s draft resolution, he added, and this

would be neither to China’s advantage nor to that of the other members

of the League.

I insisted on the gravity of the situation. Thousands of civilians

were being killed every day. Public opinion everywhere in the world was

indignant and expected the League to do something. We were not asking for

sanctions, I said, we were akking that the League recommend to its members

to abstain from supplying four or five articles produced only in a few

countries. Moreover, the aerial bombardment of non-combattants should be

condemned. As for the refusal to supply oil to Japan, it would be an

encouragement to the Chinese people as well as a satisfaction to public

opinion.

Mr. Elliot said that the British government could not prohibit the

export of goods unless the League had passed a resolution on sanctions.

A formal demand and acceptance of sanctions by the League was necessary.

Lord Cranborne said that they were unable to prohibit the export of

some of the article I had mentioned, and that this would constitute a setback

for the League. While a condemnation of Japanese action would be agreed

to by the members of the League, the Chinese resolution, at present, would

be unacceptable to them. A milder resolution would then be adopted by the

League and this would be a great disappointment to China.

Mr. Delbos wondered whether it was necessary to present the resolution

that evening. He advised me not to specify what was necessary and possible

to do. He said he could do that on a later occasion. The application of

Article 16 would not be accepted, but internal agreements or adjustments

between some powers could be arrived at. He mentioned the instance of the

Nyon Conference. He pofated out that one tried to agree to the maximum,

and that one could do without the League, if the interested powers could

agree. He therefore suggested that we should not specify too much and should

examine in a subcommittee what practical things could be done.

When I said I wanted to avoid any delay as far as possible, M. Delbos

said the subcomittee could meet the next day or the day after that. Mr.

Elliot found it desirable to make some pronouncement at an early date, lie

said the formal prohibition of some exports, such as cotton and oil, was

not under tkeir ^British£3 control. And while England controlled finance,

a formal demand to stop credits to Japan was difficult to put into operation.

He thought that what I could achieve with my speech was to mould public

opinion and explain the situation to the public.

Lord Cranborne realized the difficulties of China and her representatives.

 E-659

Public opinion in Cliina naturally demanded strong measures and it was

difficult to tell the Chinese public that such measures could not be

adopted. However, he said, even when things were not said publicly, it

did not mean they could not be done. The present situation was not stable

and the door remained absolutely open.

Quo Tai-chi asked what could be done to stop aerial bombardments. He

emphasized that public opinion was thoroughly roused and that the present

situation gave the League a chance to regain its lost authority. For a

desperate disease a desperate remedy was needed, said Quo, and the present

grave situation therefore called for effective measures. What was necessary

first of all was a firm declaration that the League was shocked at the

bombardment of non-combattants.

Mr. Elliot thought the first thing to do was' rally public opinion. As
h
to the bombardments, nothing but a declaration of war by the powers would

stop it.

Mr. Quo said, in that case, we must resign outselves to see the bombardments

continue.

I then said it would be a deception if that afternoon's meeting of the

Advisory Committee would adjourn after having only appointed a subcommittee.

Lord Cranborne agreed that the situation should be faced in the main

committee, but he thought one should not attempt to do something which could

not be done. He said I could indicate in my speech the sort of action the

League could take, without putting up formal demands.

I asked whether the Committee could adopt a declaration condemning

aerial bombardments that afternoon. As to concrete measures, I agreed that

they could be discussed in a subcommittee.

M. Delbos concurred and Mr. Elliot said the resolution of condemnation

should be passed as soon as possible. After that, he said, the subcommittee

 E-660

could meet, but one should not create the impression that it was working

on sanctions,

I said the League was proceeding under Articles 10 and 11 and not

under Article 16.

Secretary-General Avenol then said that one of the members of the

Advisory Committee had very limited powers as regards measures to be taken

under the Covenant; and that this created a very delicate situation. He

added that this member had just arrived in Geneva and might have some

apprehension as to the terms of his mission.

I said that Mr. Hull had told Dr. C. T. Wang that he would consider any

concrete proposal [from the League] in the same favorable spirit as that

concerning the meeting of the Advisory Committee. I said further that the

League itself had definite obligations under the Covenant^ and that it would

not make a favorable impression at Washington^ if the burden of its decisions

should be put on the United States.

Lord Cranborne said that the situation in the world and in Europe

was very difficult. The cooperation of the United States was essential. We

could not take decisions without knowing whether the United States would

join in. If I would put forward my proposals of concrete measures, the

result would be a deception of the Chinese people.

I reiterated that the Committee that afternoon could condemn aerial

bombardments, and that the other questions might be examined by a subcommittee.

M. Delbos thought one should proceed by stages in order to see

what attitude the United States would adopt in the subcommittee. Though

the United States would not take the lead, he believed that it should at

least follow us, and that otherwise it would all be a catastrophe.

M. Avenol asked whether my proposals would be very precise and whether

they would be referred to the subcommittee.

M. Delbos thought I should not make too precise proposals. Mr. Elliot
 E-661

said that if I made precise proposals and they were referred to the subcommittee,

it would mean that we referred them to the subcommittee for action. But

the subcommittee could not possibly adopt them [in reality] and people

would be deceived. He said what the subcommittee could propose were some

humanitarian measures.

Secretary-General M. Avenol said that if governments were to do something,

it would be by way of mutual agreement and negotiation. Therefore, the

less the subcommittee was entrusted with a definite task under the Covenant,

the more freedom it would have to do something. He said this was the only

way of finding out the possibilities.

Mr. Elliot thought it upadvisable to place concrete proposals before

the subcommittee. For instance, he said, if the subcommittee were asked

to refuse credits to Japan and if this proposal were not accepted by the

subcommittee, it would mean that those who wished to give credits to Japan

were at liberty to do so.

Lord Cranborne said the subcommittee was not however a useless body.

World opinion was evolving and one did not know how.

When I therefore asked whether the Advisory Committee or the subcommittee

would remain in session, M. Delbos replied that the subcommittee should

meet as soon as possible and have a permanent character. Lord Cranborne

thought the chairman of the subcommittee must be able to convene it

whenever he thought necessary.

I then reserved the right to propose concrete measures to the subcommittee.

Lord Cranborne said that that afternoon the first resolution of the

Advisory Committee would deal with aerial bombardment.

When I said that the subcommittee should study how to implement the

condemnation of aerial bombardments, M. Delbos said the subcommittee would

be seized of the whole problem. He said it would have a general mandate.

 E-662

[This led Lord Cranborne to] observe that people in China should not think

that the subcommittee would take measures against air bombing.

[At that point, the conference was drawing to a close. The Secretary-

General stated that the subcommittee would substitute itself to the

Advisory Committee. Lord Cranborne added that the subcommittee could have

the same terms of reference as the Advisory Committee.

I went from the conference to a luncheon given by Soviet Commissar

of Foreign Affairs Litvinov. His deputy, Ambassador Boris Stein, seated

on my left, chatted with me on various points. It was interesting to hear

him say that Count Ciano was only taking orders from Mussolini, who was

the real boss in Italy. In his view, Ethiopia should wait it out for the

Second World War, which would provide her with an opportunity to liberate

herself again from the Italian domination. He said that Italy could not

really wage successful war and was only bluffing, due to British supineness.

The Advisory Committee met at 5:30 that afternoon. I was the first
Jv i'/t. '- <

speaker. When I noticed there was no audience^, I asked the President,

Mr. Munters, if he had given notice that the meeting was a public one.

He seemed tobe very taken aback by this and right away asked me to speak.

[I addressed myself to the question of what the League could and should

do in full consideration of the realities of recent experience. At one point

I stated:]

If the League cannot defend right in the face of might, it can

at least point out the wrongdoer to the world. If it cannot stop
aggression, it can at least denounce it, and if it cannot enforce
international law and the principles of the Covenant, it can at least
make it known that it has not abandoned them. If it cannot prevent
the ruthless slaughter of innocent men, women and children and the
wanton destruction of property by the illegal and inhuman method of
aerial bombardment, it can at least make clear what its own sentiments
are, so as to reinforce the universal demand of the civilized world for
its immediate abandonment.

[In conclusion I proposed that the League should condemn Japan's "flagrant

violation of international law, treaty obligations and the elementary

 E-663

principles of justice, and humanity."]

In an entry in my diary of that day, I recorded that Lord Cranborne

and M. Delbos lived up to their promise to speak in support of a condemnation

by the League of Japanese aerial bombardments of Chinese towns. And through

their influence, the Swedish representative^ Sandler, proposed a drafting

committee to work immediately on a resolution. Subsequently, I had to run

the gauntlet of both Cranborne and Delbos in regard to certain phrases in

the draft. But I succeeded in my effort to insist upon certain amendments

and finally the resolution was adopted. [It condemned the bombing of open

towns by Japanese aircraft and stated that there was no excuse for such

acts, "which have aroused horror and indignation throughout the world."]

I felt very tired after the meeting and skipped my dinner. When I tried

to draft some cables to Nanking (I had this entry) "my head simply refused

to work." [But I felt better after a night's rest and the next day the

Assembly, in a morning meeting, unanimously] passed the Advisory Committee's

resolution. I spoke to express my appreciation to the Assembly.

[In the afternoon I had a talk with] Mr. Leland Harrison, who was

returning my call. I again found him very noncommittal and diplomatic and

prudent in speech. [He was evasive when I expressed China's hope that the

various members of the League might undertake to refuse Japan credits,

arms, oil and raw materials, such as cotton, wool, rubber and iron, while

furnishing the same to China. I showed him the Chinese draft resolution

to the above effect. As to the proposed subcommittee and United States

participation in its work, he told me he was authorized, if invited, to sit

on it on the same terms as on thefull committee.]

[The same day it was learned that the United States had made public

and informed the Secretary-General of the League that it, too, held the

view, which it repeatedly made clear to the Japanese government:

 That any general bombing of an extensive area wherein there
resides a large populace engaged in peaceful pursuits is un­
warranted and contrary to principles of law and of humanity.]

[In the late afternoon of the 28th] I spoke both to Mr. Sweetzer and

M. Delbos separately about Harrison's views with regard to the potential of

the proposed subcommittee. In the evening I had a rather disagreeable talk

with Secretary-General Avenol on such questions as the composition of the

subcommittee and the status of the Chinese representative on the Advisory

Committee. At dinner that evening, given by the delegation of Finland, I

spoke to Lord Cranborne about some of the same matters. His remarks showed

that he preferred elasticity and intimacy in discussion in the subcommittee.

In a meeting of the Advisory Cornmittee on the 29th [the French delegate

proposed the setting up of the subcommittee "to facilitate and expedite the

work of the Committee." A favorable vote was taken, but no agreement was

reached on the terms of reference for the subcommittee or its composition. I

I had to speak several times on the necessity of having the Committee adopt

a resolution declaring Japan the aggressor. I also spoke on the terms of

reference [of the proposed subcommittee--I wanted the subcommittee to

consider some positive measures against Japan and for China--] and what,

in my view, would constitute a suitable composition. However, I found that

besides me, only Lord Cranborne was disposed to speak a few words; others

preferred to remain silent. It seemed that the attitude was one of great

prudence all around.

Later in the evening at a dinner party given by the Danish delegation,

I spoke to Sandler, the Swedish Foreign Minister and Representative to the

Council and Committee, about the importance of having the Committee pass

a resolution denouncing the Japanese aggression before the Assembly adjourned.

M. Herriot of France, who was present, said sympathetically that China should

continue to insist upon that desire and that we must not weaken our demand
 E-665

for such a declaration.

On the 30th, I worked on the two resolutions to be presented to the

Committee^ one on the declaration of aggressor against Japan, and the other

on the terms of reference of the subcommittee. [The terms of reference and

composition of the subcommittee were to be decided, I thought, at the

Advisory Committee meeting that day. At the lunch party given by the French

Foreign Minister, [I discussed related questions with some of the other guests.]

The Polish delegate said that he had had a discussion with the Swedish

Foreign Minister after my talk with the latter. They both thought that a

drafting committee [of the Advisory Committee] to work on a resolution on

Japan's aggression was desirable. They also thought it would be useful to

appoint a subcommittee to follow the situation after the adjournment of the

Assembly the following week. The Belgian Foreign Minister also supported the

Chinese view. He thought it would be wise for us to draft and present a

resolution to the Assembly as a basis for discussion.

Later in the afternoon, at the request of Mr. Munters, the Latvian

Foreign Minister, who was President of the Advisory Committee, I went and

saw him, but we had a most agitated and dramatic conversation. I was so

overwhelmed with a sense of injustice and grievance at his attitude, which

appeared to me to be entirely misplaced, although he must have been told

to say what he did to me by the delegates of the principal powers, that I

must have shown my emotion on my face. It was so unexpected from the

representative of a country that, as a small country, had itself been the

victim of aggression from its stronger neighbors. A spell of silence fell

on us both, at the end of which I just got up brusquely and bid him good-bye.

As I recalled in my diary, my posture was cold and hard, but I restrained

myself from saying anything more.

 I was so upset that I had no appetite at the Peruvian delegation's

dinner. Mr. Hunters was there, too. To my surprise he came over and told

me in a most pleasant manner that I would be satisfied with the composition

of the subcommittee, when the announcement was made, and that he had spoken

to me earlier only in an attempt to sound out my views. [(Had he really

expected me to respond favorably to his suggestion that China should not

participate in the subcommittee since Japan would not be present!)]

I was just feeling easier, when I received the upsetting information

that the meeting of the Advisory Committee for that evening had again been

postponed. When on returning to my lodge, Victor Hoo telephoned to me

to say that M. Vigier, the Director of the Political Section in the Secretariat

now asked us to withdraw our resolution, I was more indignant than ever. I

simply told Mr. Hoo that we would not withdraw our resolution and I declined

to see M. Vigier. I simply felt that the timidity, manipulation and tricks

of the Secretariat of the League were really too enervating.

[As it turned out, the Advisory Committee meeting on the morning of

October 1 agreed on the composition of the subcommittee, which included

China, and on its terms of reference: "to examine the situation arising out

of the Sino-Japanese conflict in the Far East, discuss the questions involved

and submit fitting proposals to the Advisory Committee. Thereafter I presented

my draft resolution, which set down various aspects of the Japanese aggression

against China, such as the maritime blockade and aerial bombardment, and

asked the Committee to condemn these "violations of international lav; and of

contractual obligations" and the "illegal blockade of the Chinese coasts"

and to declare that what was stated constituted "a case of external aggression

against a member of the League of Nations under Article 10 of the Covenant."

This draft resolution was discussed briefly and referred to the subcommittee,

which was to report back to the full committee so the latter could, in turn,
 E-667

report to the Assembly before the close of the session on October 5. The

subcommitte held its first meeting immediately thereafter.]

[In the next few days the subcommittee took a decision to and began

to draft a report including a summary of the facts of the case and con­

cluding with a statement as to whether or not Japan's actions were justified.

The first draft was circulated on the evening of October 3 by Mr. Munters,

the chairman of the subcommittee as well as the full committee.] On the 4th

there was a morning, afternoon and evening meeting of the subcommittee. The

Polish delegate at these meetings spoke so much in favor of Japan and against

the Chinese proposal I presented on the draft statement summarizing the facts

of the situation that anyone would have thought that he was a Japanese

representative, rather than a representative from Poland. In the afternoon

I felt I had to speak to him frankly and told him my government was so

surprised at the Polish attitude as represented by him, that it had cabled

our Minister to take it up with the Polish Foreign Minister, Josef Beck,

in Warsaw. I also tried to persuade him to modify his apparently hostile

and unfriendly attitude on the grounds that it would be in the interest

of our [own] mutual relations. He excused himself by saying that he had been

trying to be impartial and wanted to voice his objection to the procedure

adopted. However, my intervention appeared to have produced some effect,

because from that time on he simply refrained from saying very much in the

discussions.

At the night meeting. [I proposed a newT paragraph for the subcommittee

report, which, if adopted, could pave the way for the adoption of the positive

measures I had contemplated to hinder Japan and aid China.] Then Lord Cranborne

brought out the proposal for a conference of the Washington Treaty powers,
 E-668

[that is in essence^ that the most effective step the League could immediately

take would be to initiate consultation among the signatories of the Nine

Power Treaty of Washington to terminate the Sino-Japanese conflict by

agreement; or, failing that, to submit other proposals to the Assembly of

the League.]

Lord Cranborne's proposal fell like a bomb, deadening all senses of

those present for a while by its unexpectedness and the evident cleverness

of the maneuver to "pass the buck" to the United States. Minister Harrison

was present. He tried hard to get some elucidation and raised a number of

questions. The situation became somewhat embarrassing, and a suspension was

found necessary, as the chairman said, in order to provide an opportunity

for the members to consult one another informally. Coffee was served as a

placatory gesture.

Towards 11:30 p.m. the meeting was resumed, and I made what I recorded

in my diary as a "telling speech on the proposal," giving my views (supporting

it and hoping that it would be considered and upheld together with the

Chinese proposal. In other words, I continued to insist on some positive

action by the League, at the same time as arrangements were made to

effectuate Lord Cranborne’s proposal for a conference of the signatories of

the Washington Treaty. (I did not want a conference to replace League action,

for that would only lead to further inaction or procrastination.) J My speech

seemed to move the members of the subcommittee to a great extent and from

that moment on it was comparatively easy sailing.

[The evening meeting closed after appointing a drafting committee to

draft a second report to be presented to the Advisory Committee along with

with the first. This was to be based on the British and Chinese draft proposals.

When the drafting committee met the next morning, ] Lord Cranborne presented

a new draft of his proposal. The conclusions which he presented in this new
 E-669

proposal appeared to be better from the Chinese point of view, having

incorporated more of my ideas. In fact, he said in his speech before the

drafting committee that he had been impressed by my speech in the subcommittee.

I, in turn, introduced a formula suggested by Mr. Litvinov about the

importance of aid to China. [Then other drafts wer# put forward. The] one

presented by Mr. Bruce of Australia left out the non-recognition doctrine.

Though I fought hard to retain it, Bruce practically said that my proposed

insertion might embarrass everybody in the future, by which I supposed him

to mean that it might obstruct peace. My insistance on the insertion of a

clause concerning aid to China made some headway, but it was necessary to

accept the President's challenge that I should raise it in the subcommittee

that afternoon. This I did and in fact I won my point on the question. In

the meantime at the drafting committee, at just about 12 p.m., my secretary

sent me a summary of President Roosevelt's speech as released before it was

delivered. [This was the famous Quarantine speech delivered at Chicago

wherein Roosevelt referred to the need of quarantining aggressors and hinted

at the shortsightedness of American isolationism. ] I passed it around to

Cranborne, Bruce and others. They were all visibly moved by it. The compromise

proposed by Lord Cranborne may even have been influenced by President

Roosevelt's speech.

The final draft report of proposals presented to the subcommittee both

stated (1) that the Assembly should invite the members of the League, who

were signatories to the Nine power Treaty, to bring about a conference of

the nations party to that treaty plus other nations with important interests

in the Far East and (2) that the Assembly should recommend that the members

of the League "refrain from taking any action which might have the effect

of weakening China's power of resistance and thus increasing her difficulties

in the present conflict. "Moreover, in the subcommittee meeting the latter

point was even strengthened, when, as I stated, I proposed the insertion of

 E-670

a clause, on aid to China. With the strong support of New Zealand's repre­

sentative^ William Jordan, a phrase was added recommending that each League

member consider how far it could go in extending aid to China individually.

In the afternoon first the subcommittee, then the Advisory Committee

accepted the drafted reports, which were then submitted in the evening to

the Assembly. It was hoped the Assembly would vote its approval at once,

thereby enabling the current session to close. But the Assembly meeting

was a fizzle due to Norwegian delegate Hambro's motion to adjourn till the

next day. After Elliot of Great Britain made a somewhat tactless motion

urging that the draft resolution be passed unamimously, accordingly the

meeting adjourned to be resumed the following day.

It was necessary, of course, at the same time to report what had taken

place at Geneva, to Nanking. On October 6 I asked Ambassador Tsien Tai to

draft a cable on the purpose, bearing and effect of the Advisory Committee's

reports and proposals. The resolution which it adopted really contained

a great deal more than appeared on the surface. I also asked Ambassador

Wunsz King to draft a cable to the Waichiaopu on the attitude of rha different

members of the subcommittee and the drafting committee on the Sino-Japanese

conflict.

In the afternoon, I had a talk with Lord Cranborne on the question of

further procedure, particularly as regards initiating consultation of the

Washington Treaty powers. I was afraid that there might be delay. But

Cranborne told me that he had just talked with Mr. Eden on the telephone,

and he assured me that I need have no qualms about delay. At 5 p.m. the

Assembly reconvened. There were very few delegates present. Two delegates

spoke accepting the two reports of the Advisory Committee but Poland and

Siam abstained. The reports were finally adopted unanimously. Thereafter

I gave a dinner at a well-known Genevan restaurant to thank my colleagues

 E-671

for their strenuous collaboration.

[The first report, while avoiding formally labelling Japan the aggressor

in the conflict, had nonetheless found Japan guilty of breaking her treaty

obligations. The second report, as we know, both proposed what became the

Brussels conference and recommended, first, that members of the League refrain

from actions which might weaken China or increase her difficulties in the

Sino-Japanese conflict and, second, consider how far they could go individually

in extending aid to China.

[My personal reaction at the time, to what had been achieved in limiting

circumstances can be gathered from a letter I wrote to Ambassador T. F.

Tsiang in Moscow about a week later. I told him that: ]

The outcome of the League's action on our appeal, though falling

entirely short of what had been desired on our part, was according
to the consensus of opinion better than had been expected at the
beginning of the Assembly meeting. The European countries represented
there were so preoccupied with the unsettled conditions in Europe
that they were very chary of getting further involved in the Far East.
We had to feel our way, so to speak, as we proceeded in order to get
the maximum result obtainable under the circumstances.

The last two points in the final resolution adopted by the

Assembly will, I hope, be of some practical value in strengthening the
hands of certain countries from either keeping off the application of
the Neutrality Laws or the recognition of the maritime blockade, and
also providing an international cover for those countries who are
disposed to aid us in various ways.

[For the rest, I had entered the Genevan arena, knowing that China's only

certain success could be in the area of moral effect, if our case was

properly handled.] [After the dinner to my colleagues, I returned to the

delegation headquarters to work on the outgoing cables.] Then at 1 a.m.

having just received a report of the State Department's declaration

approving the League's adoption of the reports or resolution on the Sino-

Japanese question. I at once dictated a statement for United Press to be

cabled to the United States as a reaction from China.

The following day, I sent a cable to the Waichiaopu and the whole
 E-672

Government on the need of profiting by the offer of aid in the resolution

adopted by the League Assembly^ and the desirability and wisdom of approaching

the powers concerned with a concrete plan or definite proposals as to what

kind of aid China would need and which China would like them to supply.

I also made a proposal regarding the line of action we might take at the

forthcoming conference.

On October 8 I left Geneva for Paris to see the French government

leaders about the question of transit for Chinese goods through Indochina.
 Part E. 1937.A Crucial Year in Europe and the Far East

Section 4. Efforts to Secure Material Assistance from

Abroad Following the Lukouchiao Incident;
June-October 1937
This memoir was made possible by grants
from the Ford Foundation and the National
Fndovment for the Humanities to Columbia
University for the Fast Asian Institute.

Copyright C 1076. The Trustees of Columbia

University in the City of New York. All
rights reserved. This work may be cited
and brief passages may be quoted as with
any scholarly work, but the memoir may not
be published, nor sold, nor otherwise re­
produced in any form without written per­
mission from the Fast Asian Institute of
Columbia University, New York, New York 10027.
 E-673

4. EFFORTS TO SECURE MATERIAL ASSISTANCE FROM ABROAD FOLLOWING THE

LUKOUCHIAO INCIDENT

As far as China was concerned, after the Lukouchiao incident occurred,

one of the main tasks of Chinese diplomatic representation abroad was to

secure military assistance--to purchase arms and planes, to engage foreign

pilots and to seek financial loans. China had to get financial loans from

France as well as from other nations, such as Germany, Italy and England,

[to finance her purchases of war materials.] As for the request made by

the Chinese government to the Paris Embassy to engage French volunteer

pilots for our air force, the matter was urgent. In fact, it was equally

as important to engage volunteer pilots as to buy the airplanes, since the

Chinese air force was just in the initial stages of organization, and far from

being a fighting force. Japan was all too easily reaping the benefits of

air superiority.

Fortunatdy even before the Chinese Minister of Finance, Dr. H. H.

Rung, left Nanking in April 1937 for London to attend the coronation of King

George VI, invitations came to him from Rome, Berlin and Paris for a visit.

The bankers of those countries showed themselves well disposed to hold talks

with him regarding financial aid to China, and so did the munition makers

and the armament manufacturers. The Italians, who were already helping us

in the way of training Chinese pilots, had also just concluded negotiations

with China for the setting up of an airplane plant in China.

Therefore, once he had attended the coronation in London in May 1937,

Dr. Kung travelled to the major European capitals in his capacity as Minister

of Finance to arrange for credits and the purchase of arms and war materials

for China. His visit to Paris in the first week of June was cordially

received by the French government, but it was short. He was anxious to

proceed to Berlin, where preliminary soundings had impressed him with the
 E-674

eagerness of German banks to extend substantial loans and credits for the

purchase of German arms.

As regards his visit to Germany, I remember that my friends at the

Quai d’Orsay unofficially mentioned that they understood Dr. Kung to be very

much taken in by the Germans because he was so well received there. The

Germans had accorded him such a reception that he was greatly delighted.

In his conversations with the Germans he even intimated his disappointment

at the reception in France and his high praise for the [comparatively

grand treatment accorded him by the] Germans. Therefore, I was asked by my

French friends in the Quai d'Grsay what they could do to change Dr. Kung's

impression. They told me that the French bankers had had a very thorough­

going conversation both with him and some financial advisors of his mission

as to what they could and would do to help China in the delicate situation

in which France found herself vis-A-vis Japan because of Indochina.

My remark in reply was simple but frank. Although Dr. Kung had not said

anything to me about his dissatisfaction with the French during his first

visit to Paris, I felt that perhaps the French could have done more. They

asked how. [I recalled that] people close to Dr. Kung had come to Paris

from Germany and told me that one of the things which most pleased Dr. Kung

in Germany was that, wherever he went, he had a police patrol with [blaring]

sirens and his car went through all the red lights. He felt happy and was

impressed, recalling that when he was in Paris his car had to stop at every

red light. Therefore, I said that was something the French could easily do,

but that I would not suggest it myself, as it might endanger traffic. They

said they could certainly do that.

Later, when Dr. Kung came to Paris the second time, he confirmed what

I had understood from other sources. He said that he had had a great time

with the Germans and that thaV had gone out of their way to accord him a

royal reception. He said wherever he went he was headed and followed by

 E-675

police cars stopping all traffic along the road, so that his procession

fl^ould go through alone.

' PX. \
There are probably several reasons why the Germans gave Jaifn su6h a

good reception. In the first place, although Germany and China had

difficulties from time to time, they had always been good friends. Germany

wanted to cultivate China's friendship in order to get a better position

in China, as she was still envious of the British and American positions.

In the second place, there was already a German military advisory mission in

China that was very well treated by the Generalissimo and the Chinese

government. They, in turn, conducted themselves correctly, were really

loyal^P and very much liked by our leaders. General von Falkenhausen, the

head of the German group, always manifested high respect and much friendship

for the Generalissimo. In the third place, German bankers always found

themselves in competition with the British and Americans and even with the

French. As far as making loans and getting special concessions for railways

and public utilities in China were concerned, Germany nearly always found

herself left behind. Therefore, Germany wanted to develop her influence in

Asia and particularly in China.

I doubt there could have been another reason based on the political

ideology of Nazism. [Though Germany was anti-Communist and would have been
most happy to have seen China join Japan and Germany in the ^nti-Comintern'^act

directed at Soviet Russia,] Germany was realistic first. Her Nazi leaders

were pursuing a definite policy of expansion abroad, and they were preparing

to expand by force if necessary. They looked upon China as a very important

country in the world, both as a source of raw materials and as a market for

German manufacturers. And it was not only China's immense territory and

great natural wealth that was of interest. China's geographical position

vis-a-vis the vast colonial possessions of Great Britain and France was of
 I -(>70

of great strategic value. In short, I think that to Germany, expecially to

Hitler and the other German leaders, China's attitude at this juncture, when

the second world war was in the offing, was of great importance. German

interest and concern was confirmed throughout the war by one development

after another.

(The real point, however, is that even before the Lukouchiao incident,

China met with some success in her attempts to arrange financial help from

abroad. Perhaps, as I have suggested, it was this very success that con­

tributed to the Japanese decision to initiate, with the Lukouchiao incident,

the second phase of their aggression in China. At any rate,) with the outbreak

of this new phase in the Japanese aggression, it became extremely important to

step up the efforts to obtain help from abroad. For example, Dr. Kung continued

his travels in Europe to arrange for credits and the purchase of arms and war

materials for China. P.W. Kuo, Dr. Kung's assistant in trying to get financial

assistance abroad, also carried out important negotiations, mostly in France

and Great Britain. At the same time, the regular diplomatic representatives

abroad also extended themselves to encourage both sympathy and aid in their

respective posts.*

(In the following section I plan to take up first some of the conversations

pursued during Dr. Kung's first visit to Paris in June 1937, by way of providing

some background for the relevant situation after the ourbreak of Sino-Japanese

hostilities. Second, I will take up my own efforts in Paris in the latter part

of 1937 to promote French sympathy and aid, paying particular attention to the

increasingly important question of transit facilities for China through the

French colony of Indochina.)

*ed. note: The above introductory section is not directly based on documentary
materials and any details cited have not been ascertained by the editor. C.S.
 E-677

m'i
[When Dr. Kung arrived in Paris on June 1,I took him to call on
A

French Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos at the Quai d'Orsay. They had been
& J-4 f

speaking c'oxdliaJLAy for some time^ when Dr. Kung mentioned his desire to

further cement the cordial relations between France and China by promoting

Sino-French economic and financial collaboration.

lit
M. Delbos said that this agreed precisely with his own wishes. China
A

and France, both loving peace and devoted to the ideals of liberty and

democracy, were thus inspired by the same sentiments and ideals, and he

would be glad, on his part, to cooperate with Dr. Kung and me in the

promotion of Sino-French collaboration.

Dr. Kung then said he was contemplating that, during his visit, some

financial arrangement could be effected to inaugurate this collaboration

in the field of currency and exchange. He hoped that the French Foreign

Minister would lend his influence in support of this idea.

M. Delbos assured Dr. Kung of his sympathy and approval and suggested

that Dr. Kung would only have to speak to his colleague, M. Vincent/Auriol,

French Minister of Finance, about it. He was confident that Dr. Kung would

find in the latter a sympathetic friend.

[I had already arranged a luncheon at the Chinese Embassy for Dr.

Kung to meet M. Vincent/Auriol, other members of the French Ministry of

Finance and M. Labeyrie, the Governor of the Bank of France, on June 2.

This luncheon was followed by a lengthy conversation, the gist of which

foilows.

Dr. Kung said that recently in London he had had conversations with

Mr. Neville Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and British bankers

with a view to advancing Sino-British economic cooperation. As a result,

he was on the point of concluding a loan of 20 million pounds sterling. Now,

he said, he would like to do in Paris what he had done in London, for he was
 E-678

equally desirous of promoting Sino-French economic collaboration. He

noted that since the monetary reforms of November 1935, the Chinese exchange

had remained quite stable and there was a general business recovery in

China. The Chinese government had set its heart on a program of economic

reconstruction a’-'d had been able to make considerable progress in the development

of the means of communication and transportation with the building of railways,

motor roads, air transport, etc. The new government budget was balanced and
l\
there was no need for loans to meet current expenses. In fact, ive said,

he had large sums of sterling on deposit in London and of gold dollars on

deposit in New York, which he had not had occasion to draw upon for a long

time.

Dr. Kung then explained that his present idea was to raise a loan

abroad for the purpose of consolidating the domestic loans outstanding.

He said these loans amounted in round figures to two billion Chinese

dollars, which at the current market rate was costing the Chinese government

an average of 8 percent. If he could raise enough money to redeem the whole

amount with new issues at 4 percent, it would mean a saving to the government

of 80 million dollars, which, he said, he would like to devote to economic

reconstruction entirely. As a first step toward economic collaboration

between China and France, he said he therefore wished to ask whether it

would not be possible to arrange a loan of an amount and on terms similar

to those agreed upon in London. It was not his (Kung's) idea to remit the

proceeds of such a loan to China, but to leave them on deposit in French banks

as a kind of reserve against which bank notes could be issued in China .

Should the French Treasury need funds for any urgent purpose at any time,

Dr. Kung felt the same could be used.

The French Minister of Finance said he was in full agreement with

Dr. Kung as to the desirability of economic collaboration between France

 E-679

and China. He said he had listened with interest and appreciation to the

account of financial reform which Dr. Kung had been able to accomplish

in the face of difficulties which he, as Finance Minister, could understand

the more keenly. He thought Dr. Kung's idea of further improving the state

of China's finances and promoting economic reconstruction was sound and

statesmanlike. He would be glad,, he sai^to see the plan realized. As to

the idea of arranging a loan from the French government, he said he thought,

in the present state of the French financial market^it would be hard to

arrange. [(One will recall that France was having difficulties at the time,

which eventually brought down the Blum government.)]

Dr. Kung said that the question of a loan was not an urgent matter.

He had no need of it to meet current expenses of the government. He told

the Minister that, in speaking of a loan, he was animated by the desire to

advance the cause of Sino-French collaboration.

At this juncture, M. Labeyrie and M. Rueff, the Director of Movements

of Funds at the French Ministry of Finance, leaned toward M.«yinccm»—

Auriol for an exchange of views. Then M. Auriol said what he had

in mind in regard to the proposed loan was not the question of principle,

in which he fully concurred, but the question of the form the proposed

financial arrangement should take. He thought the same result could be

obtained by arranging a form of credit between the Chinese Central Bank

and the French banks.

Dr. Kung approved the idea of a credit and asked what would be the best

way to discuss the matter with a view to a definite arrangement .

M. Vroeewt—Auriol said he would suggest, if it met with Dr. Kung's

approval, that both he and Dr. Kung would designate one or two representatives

to pursue further discussions and to work out the details of an arrangement.

Dr. Kung thought this was a good procedure. Thereupon M. VlrnreiU

 E-680

Auriol designated M. Rueff and M. Alphand, the Director of Commercial

Agreements at his Ministry, and Dr. Kung designated Dr. Wong Wen-hao and

Dr. P. W. Kuo for the purpose.

f |0^
%(f
l£
The next day, at the dinner given in honor of Dr. Kung by the French

Minister of Finance at his Ministry, M. Auriol told me that the

Chinese and French secretaries had met and the meeting was satisfactory.

He felt certain that it would lead to some concrete result. Two days later

at the French government’s luncheon in honor of Dr. Kung at the Quai d’Orsay,

presided over by the French Foreign Minister, I told M. Delbos of the progress

in the financial discussion. Thereupon M. Delbos told me that he had understood

from M.-¥inccnf*A'uriol that the matter was well on the way to success.

[In the meantime, on June 3, I had taken Dr, Kung to call on Minister

Pierre Cot at the Air Ministry and, on June 5, I had taken Admiral Chen

Shao-kuan, the Chinese Minister of the Navy, who had also come to Europe

in Dr. Kung's party, to call on the French Minister of the Navy, M.

Gasnier-Duparc . The Air Ministry had entertained Dr. Kung royally and Dr.

Kung began his conversation with M. Cot by thanking him and his Ministry

for the hospitality and his, Kung's, review of the aerial maneuvers of a

magnificent squadron of French warplanes of different types at Bourget.

He^was much impressed by the skill of the French aviators and the good

qualities of the French planes.

The French Air Minister said that he was only too glad to have been

of service to Dr. Kung as a token of French friendship for China. Knowing

China’s great interest in the development of her airforce, he said he was

\
ready to help China in any way she desired in order to build up this important
Ca
arm of her national defense. He recalled the agreement Dr. Kung made some

years ago for the purpose of enlisting French help in developing her air force

and assured him that he was ready to render China any assistance needed
 E-681

whether in men, material, machines or for financial credit.

Dr. Kung thanked the Minister for his friendly offer and thought it

would be a great help to China. He said hitherto China had been purchasing

airplanes, for one reason or another, mostly in other countries. Some years

ago an order was placed in France for a certain number of planes, but they

were not found to be of the newest type and did not yield satisfactory results.

Possibly the fault was due to carelessness on the part of the merchants in

charge of the order. Dr. Kung said that ^if he were^ to buy more French
/< <. < * < V
planes, he would like to have the very latest.
A

M. Cot said that he was no diplomat and wished to speak frankly.

He agreed with Dr. Kung in what he had just said. The manufacturers did
/j fitr n/1 >
not take a farsighted view. Now the situation was different. A great part
J A

of the aircraft industry had been nationalized and the whole business of

export had been placed under supervision of his Ministry. He said he

therefore could assure Dr. Kung that he would see to it that the most up-

to-date planes, such as were used in the French force itself, were furnished
/(,( j 6- x ei *
to China. He was the more ready to do it because between China and France
JA

there was absolutely no conflict of interest. France would only be too

glad to see China become strong and able to defend herself against external

aggression. For many years, he said, he had advocated the cause of China

and in Geneva he had pleaded for sympathy and support for China. In those

days he was practically alone in this plea, but friends of China had since

grown in number and collaboration between the two countries could be more

easily effected. So far as his own Ministry was concerned, he said^he could

assure Dr. Kung of his whole-hearted readiness to help. In the matter of

financial credit, there was a special department in charge and he would be

pleased to use his influence to obtain it for China. In fact, he told u^

he had reason to believe that that department was ready to give credit.
 Dr. Kung again thanked the Minister for his spirit of friendly

helpfulness and said he would try to work out a concrete plan as to what

he might need. Meanwhile he would like to know whether it would be possible

to give some Chinese aviators a special training in different branches of

the French airforce.

\
The Minister said that not only could this be done, but that he was

prepared, if China desired, to detach some experts from the French airforce

for service in China.

In the latter conversation between Admiral Chen and M. Gasnier-Duparc,

the Admiral, at one point remarked that China, in view of the need of

building up her national defense, was desirous of developing her navy and

would like to start with the placing of an order for a few submarines . He

noted that until this arm of naval warfare was definitely prohibited by

international agreement, every nation was free to build or have ._Lhejn, and

asked to know whether the French Ministry of the Navy could help China to

obtain them.

M. Gasnier-Duparc said that his Ministry took care only of technical

matters. The question Admiral Chen had raised was a matter for the French

government to decide and beyond his own competence. He wished to assure

the Admiral, however, that once the question of principle was approved by

the French Government, all the technical departments of his Ministry would

be glad to help. He intimated that the matter might be discussed between

the Chinese Embassy and the French Foreign Ministry.

Admiral Chen thanked the French Minister and remarked that he was

glad to have had this opportunity for a friendly exchange of views. At that

point, we rose to take our leave.]

At the luncheon given by the French government on June 5 I spoke to

M. Delbos of the above conversation, too, and referred to him the question
 E-683

of policy. M. Delbos confirmed what the Minister had told us by saying that

naturally M. Gasnier-Duparc had charge only of the technical questions and

that the question of policy was for him, Delbos, to handle. Asked for his

opinion, M. Delbos said that in principle he saw no objection to the

French government helping China in the work of building up her navy and //* / tv
j { .> A < <(f 'I^A-ly
would indeed be glad to see it done. As he had already stated on a previous
/l
occasion, France, appreciating the community of ideals and interests

between herself and China, would like to see China become strong and

capable of defending herself against external aggression.

[A few days later, one of my contacts with the French armament

manufacturers called, wanting] to know about the question of engaging

French specialists in aeronautics for China. He thought it was necessary

for Dr. Kung, after having received such fine hospitality, to do something

by placing an order for planes. He said the French Ministry of Air was

prepared to send mechanics along too. He also thought it would be best to

iS
found a factory to repair the planes and have French experts to teach

Chinese aviators. He agreed it was advisable to buy the newest and the best.

[Dr. Kung left Paris on June 6, and it will be recalled that it was

toward the end of that same month that the Blum cabinet fell and was replaced

by the cabinet of M. Chautemps. An improvement in the French financial-

{ kt. . nt it* %ue ^ k m < wT
economic picture in July enhanced the prospects for a resolution of the

negotiations initiated by Dr. Kung for a French credit, although the French

remained anxious on another count. Especially after the full-scale resumption

of Sino-Japanese hostilities, they feared the Japanese might object to a

French credit to China on the grounds the money would be spent for purchasing

airplanes and arms to be used against Japan.

[On July 13, 1937, I had a conversation with Foreign Minister Delbos

in which I raised the question of the credit under negotiation, asking]

 E-b84

how the matter stood at the moment. He replied that his Ministry had already
dx
given its consent and the Finance Ministry and Bank of France had sanctioned

it. The matter only awaited final confirmation by Mr. Tseng upon his return.

,[By Mr. Tseng, the French Minister meant T. K. Tseng 'Tseng Yung-fu],
■fyk tyJti­
the Vice-Minister of Railroads, who had come in Dr. Kung's party and was
A.

assisting him in Europe. Mr. Tseng had recently gone to consult Dr. Kung

and get his approval of the arrangements so far made in Paris, the hitch

being a condition placed by the French government on the uses to which the

credit could be put. Therefore,] when I asked M. Delbos whether the Bank of

France would raise any difficulties about it, he told me the Bank of France

had no risk to run, the money was provided by private banks and the Bank of

France was only called upon to discount bills and treasury notes, whenever the

private banks desired to do so, and to quote the discount rate. But, he

also said that the crisis in North China was rather unfortunate and might

produce an unfavorable influence upon the whole transaction. He said the

conclusion of an agreement at the present moment was likely to give the impression

that France was not disinterested in the Sino-Japanese conflict, and it might be

taken as direct aid to China for military purposes. He said, in view of the

fact that France was trying to bring about a peaceful settlement of the

dispute, he felt that conclusion of the credit arrangement might have a

harmful ^ffect in Tokyo. He told me this was the only consideration that

might prevent its immediate confirmation. But he had made it clear to Mr.
/A
Tseng that the only condition for the arrangement was that China should give

an assurance that she would not use any part of the credit for military

purposes, and Mr. Tseng had assured him that that would cause no difficulty

as China had no intention of using it for purposes of a military character.

// C lAm* y
On July 22, two weeks after Lukouchiao, an encouraging item of news
f\ ^
came from M. Audinet, [an agent of the French armament industry who kept
 E-685

in close touch with the French government and the Embassy). He came to report

his interview with Dr. Kung in London with regard to aviation and the proposed

200 million franc credit, this being the amount so far agreed upon. He said

the negotiations were continuing and he had succeeded the previous week in

obtaining 50 million francs extra credit from the French government for the

purchase of ships. He told me further the Pierre Cot, the Air Minister, was

favorable to letting us have the latest planes and anti-aircraft guns. He

added that if all members of the French government were like Cot., France would

even send troops to help China.

Mr. P. W. Kuo also reported to me from time to time and brought up

matters for consultation, as he had been directed by Dr. Kung to do so.

On July 24 He came to report his conversations with the representatives of

the International Minerals and Metals Company and the United States Smelting
0
Company,with the Deputy-Police Commissioner of New York about importing crude
^A

oil to China and refining it there and with the French bankers about the French

credit under negotiation. There were some difficulties of a rather detailed

, ,i7f/,
character. I took the occasion to advise him to view the^question from a broad

political standpoint of Sino-French collaboration, not to haggle over small

details, but to devote more attention to important points, such as the relative

high cost of the proposed financial assistance to China.

1 he next day, July 25, I went to London on Dr. Kung's invitation, for

consultation among Chinese diplomats on the best policy for China in light

of Japanese aggression. Side by side with these consultations, were discussions

of economic questions, such as the development of China's oil resources and

foreign credit arrangements.!

When I went to see Dr. Kung on July 27, he handed me a letter from my

counselor in Paris, reporting on the credit arrangement with the French. After

reading it, I told Kung that I was ready to give the French a letter of

assurance to the effect that the funds thus obtained from French financial
 E-686

sources would not be used for military purposes. I told him that 1 was in

favor of taking anything offered without haggling too much about detailed terms,

in view of the crisis in North China, where we would need all the help we

could get from abroad.

[Eventually my view prevailed. During Dr. Kung's second visit to Paris

from August 5-10, the question of the credit was resolved. I sent a letter

to Foreign Minister Delbos agreeing to the French stipulation on the uses

of the 200 million franc credit. The agreement was signed on August 9, 1937.

As to the proposed aviation contract. Dr. Kung was also hesitant to conclude

it at first, but after I spoke to him several times, conveying my own view

of the desirability of concluding the aviation agreement for political con­

siderations- -in time of crisis, I told him, it was wise to keep open as many

sources of supply as possible and to take as many planes as we could get--

Dr. Kung on August 8, also signed a contract for airplane purchase.

[The successful conclusion of the negotiations for credits in Paris

coincided with the Shanghai Aerodrome incident and the spreading of hostilities

in China southward. Even earlier than that, the loss of Peking and Tientsin

and the numerous signs of Japanese preparations for general war on China, had

made it exceedingly important to ascertain the French attitude toward according

China transit facilities trhough Indochina in the event of a Japanese blockade

of China's own ports.

[In July 30, 1937 I sounded out the views of M. Alexandre Varenne, the

former Governor-General of Indochina, who had recently visited the far hast

and who was sympathetic to the Chinese cause. I told him: the first question

I wanted to consult him about was this: If China should go to war wit r Japan

and the latter should declare a blockade of Chinese ports, would France, in

his opinion, allow China the free use of the coast of Indochina for importing

arms and materials of war.

[According to my notes of the conversation, j M. Varenne thought that

 E-687

would be a difficult thing for France to do. He said the only port suitable

for this purpose would be Haiphong which was situated closest to the Kwangsi

frontier. Alternatively transit could be effected by railway to Yunnan.

([lie was referring to the possible use of the Yifnnan Railway running from

Hanoi to Kunming, the capital of Yunnan.)] In his mind, there were two points

to be considered, one of which was a practical point. The distance from

Indochina to the scene of fighting being so great, he wondered if it was

desirable, from the Chinese military point of view, to send materials by

way of Indochina either to Canton through Kwangsi or to Yunnan by railway.

_ _ I U( t » V 3 / (
I observed that at pre&e-nt the timerequired for transporting shipments

to the fronts in the North was not very long. There were motor roads connecting

Yifnnan and the central provinces, and the distance from Kwangsi to Canton was

also comparatively short. And from Canton, shipments could be conveyed by

the Canton-Hankow Railway.

M. Varenne then said the second difficulty was of a political character.

The coast of Indochina was not protected. If access was given to Chinese arms

and war materials, it might involve France in great complications with Japan.

In that case, France would be unable to defend the Indochina coast or to avert

collision with Japan in the Far East. Even if the French government were

able to send reinforcements to that region, Varenne stated the time required

was so long that when they reached their destination, they would be of no avail.

He was of the opinion that Hongkong, which was well fortified, would be more

suitable for transshipments. He also felt the Trans-Siberian Railway might

prove another useful channel for this purpose, as it was closer and less

exposed to Japanese attack. He added that France by herself might not feel

disposed to let China use the Indochina coast.

I told him that, in case of conflict with Japan, China would naturally

arrange to use all these three channels and would not rely entirely upon

Indochina. [Then I brought up the Soviet attitude, which we discussed at

1 1
 E-688

[On August 2, having brought French Foreign Minister Delbos news of

the gravity of the situation in China and of the signs of Japanese preparations

for general war on China, I went on to tell him that I had been instructed

by my government to ask whether, in the event of a blockade of Chinese ports

by the Japanese navy, the French government would assure the Chinese government

of the right of transit of war materials through Indochina into China. I added

that this was a right assured to China by the treaty between China and

Indochina [only] in time of peace, but since, under the Covenant of the League

of Nations, any aggression against a member state of the League was considered

as an aggression against all other members, once such a decision was taken there

could be no question of neutrality in this case. (I was referring to the

League decision of February 1933.) I expressed my confidence therefore that

the French government would find no difficulty in giving a favorable response

to the question of transit which the Chinese government had asked me to raise

with him.

The French Foreign Minister replied that that was really a question for

the Minister of Colonies, but that he would take it up with the Minister and

also submit it to the Cabinet for a reply.

[In actuality, as M. Delbos had also explained, I would probably be

hearing from M. Chautemps on the French cabinet's answer, and not from him,

since he, Delbos, would be taking a short vacation and the Premier would

temporarily be acting as Foreign Minister for him. In fact, I saw M. Chautemps

only four days later. The occasion for this talk with the French Premier and

Acting Foreign Minister was Dr. H. H. Kung's second visit to Paris, when I

arranged an appointment between them and accompanied Dr. Kung on the call.

At the time, August 6, I pointed out to M. Chautemps that the right of

transit through Indochina was assured to China by the treaty between China

and France which had been signed in 1930 and came into effect in 1935. I

said the Chinese government would of course continue to exercise its right,
 E-689

but 'it the same time it wanted to know whether there would be any special

difficulty on the part of the French government. When M. Chautemps said that

M. Delbos had not, in fact, spoken to him about this question^ I recalled

M. Delbos remark that this question was in the first instance for the Minister

of Colonies to study before the French government could take a decision.

M. Chautemps then said that in Indochina there was only one railway

leading to China and the question of its carrying an increased volume of traffic

was a practical one. He felt it would be desirable to study how much additional

traffic the railway could carry. Besides, he said, in the event of hostilities

between China and Japan, the problem of the supply of war materials and their

transportation would at once give rise to the question of neutrality, and

should also be considered in that light.

I observed that, according to the Covenant of the League of Nations,

any aggression committed against a member state should be considered, after

a decision by the Council, as an aggression against all members of the League.

From the juridical point of view, I said, there could, therefore, be no question

of neutrality.

M. Chautemps said if the League of Nations could apply sanctions in

conformity with the Covenant, it would be highly desirable. But unfortunately

ii x^as now impotent after its unsuccessful handling of the Manchurian question,

the Ethiopian conflict and lately the Spanish war. The outcome of it all was

that complications were likely to arise as a result of the supply of war

materials and permission to transit, and they would at once become a direct

problem to the powers concerned, who would have to assume the necessary

responsiblity involved and deal with the situation thus created accordingly.

When I saw M. Leger, the Secretary-General of the French Foreign

Office, on August 16, to discuss the Shanghai bombing incident at his invitation.
 E-690

I took the opportunity to again raise the question of transit through

Indochina. I said it was of special importance, especially in view of the

possible Japanese maritime blockade of the Chinese coast. I also mentioned

that the French Foreign Minister had told me the question would be referred

to the Minister of Colonies for study, and expressed my hope to be informed

as to whether the Foreign Ministry had already received a reply.

M. Ldger said this question was really not one for the Ministry of

Colonies, but one of general policy. When I pointed out to him that the

right of transit was assured by the Sino-French treaty relating to Indochina,

M. Ldger interjected, saying: "Not during time of war." He went on to say

the Indochina had always observed neutrality in the past during the wars

between China and other powers. Even during the Chinese civil war, Indochina

had remained neutral.

I remarked that in the present case Japan was clearly the aggressor

and China the victim of aggression. Since China, France and Great Britain,

for example, were all members of the League and since an act of aggression

against one member of the League was considered according to the Covenant as

an act of aggression against all others, if a decision was taken to that

effect by the Council, the question of neutrality would not arise and, from

the juridical point of view, there would be no difficulty on the ground of

having to observe neutrality.

The Secretary-General pointed out tome, however, that from the practical

point of view, there were difficulties. He said if France allowed Indochina

to be used for the transit of arms and munitions, it might be considered a

hostile act by Japan. She might then enter the French Concession in Shanghai

or even make trouble in Indochina, trouble which France would not be in a

position to deal with. He pointed out, that, in the French Concession in

Tientsin, the Japanese had already demanded to take over the control of the
 E-691

Chinese post Office and that the British refusal was considered as taking

sides with China and as hostile to Japan.

I pointed out that it was not likely that Chinese troops would be sent

across Indochina, but only arms and war materials. WhenM. L£ger asked whether

there were no arsenals in South China and what arms and ammunitions could

be usefully sent across Indochina, I told him that shipments from Europe and

America, in case of a blockade, could be sent across Indochina. Of course,

I said, there were other channels, namely, Hongkong and Canton. But I

understood the British government would raise no objection to Hongkong being

utilized for this purpose, as commercial relations between Hongkong and Canton

were very close. This was also true of Indochina and South China, I added, the

two being bound together in trade and economic welfare. I therefore expressed

my earnest hope that the French government would take the matter into sympathetic

consideration.

M. L£ger then assured me that the greatest amount of sympathy would be

shown to China. [However, on making a notation of the talk in my diary, I

commented that] the "Occidental powers [were] very realistic, untempered by

sentiment or principles unless [their] own interests were concerned."

[I next took up the question of transit, directly with the French Foreign

Office on making my return call on the new Under-Secretary at the Quai d'Orsay,

M. Francois de Tessan, on August 19. By that time the question of obtaining

and transporting supplies had grown more critical. Late in the evening of

the 16th, for example, my first secretary had phoned me at home to say that

a Waichiaopu cable, just decoded, wished me to immediately approach the French

authorities for supplies to be loaned. On August 17 the Waichiaopu further

cabled asking for certain bombs and cartridges for guns of non-French make,

and asked if we could purchase them from Indochina. At the same time,

though the Chinese air force was doing credit to itself, considering that
that it was newly organized. I reasoned that its consumption and waste

must be extensive. Accordingly^ as I told H. H. King when he telephoned me

from Genoa, Italy, on the 17th, airplanes as well as munitions were urgently

needed. ]

[When I saw M. Tessan on August 19, I therefore presented this question

of supplies with some urgency. I told him the hostilities were in full

swing in Shanghai and the Chinese were determined to resist the Japanese

aggression to the end. Therefore, the supply of arms and munitions from

abroad was a matter of first importance. I told him that the Chinese government

had placed several orders in France for arms, munitions and airplanes. I expressed

a hope that the French government would facilitate in every way possible the

shipment of these goods, and that in case of necessity the Chinese government

might unload these shipments at some Indochinese port and forward them to

China overland. I said that since the right of transit was assured by treaty

between China and France, I felt confident that this course would cause no

difficulty to the French government.

The Under-Secretary of State replied that he could not speak in behalf

of M. Delbos, who was absent from Paris, but personally he saw no reason

why there should be any change in the normal relations between China and

France regarding questions of trade, commerce and transit. He said that

Japan had insisted that the military operations in China in which she was

engaged were of a local character, as if they were colonial expeditions and

she refused to admit that they possessed any nature of an international war.

If so, M. Tessan continued, Japan could not claim the right of belligerency

recognized by international law. Therefore, so far as other countries were

 E-693

concerned, they were entitled to sell, ship and treat articles sold to China,

including arms and ammunition, as in no way different from normal items.

He realized that this principle of buying and shipping was of great importance

to China. That was another reason, he added, why as a friend of China, he wished

to urge the Chinese government to avoid any incident that might disturb the

sympathetic feeling of the French people and impel the government to pursue

a policy of strict neutrality. [(He was of course referring to the accidental

bombing by a Chinese plane of the French concession at Shanghai)].

I assured M. Tessan that the Chinese government desired as much as

France to avoid any such incident. I told him that I fully appreciated

the wisdom of conserving the sympathies of the friendly powers, including

France, and also appreciated the importance to China of the freedom of trade.

[Immediately after seeing the Under-Secretary of State, I made a call

on M. Cosme of the office of Asiatic Affairs at the Quai d’Orsay. I first

discussed with him the recent British proposal to neutralize Shanghai.

Then I told him, as I had told M. Tessan, that it was essential that the

shipments to China of orders placed in France for planes, arms and munitions

be expedited now that largescale hostilities with Japan had broken out.]
1
I expressed to him my hope that he, being in charge of the issue of permits

for exportation from France, would help by expediting the procedure in every

way possible.

He said in reply that in normal times this was merely a matter of

routine entrusted to his department, but since China was presently engaged

in serious warfare with Japan, he had referred the matter to the Premier

for a decision, as it involved the supply of arms and war materials to one

of the parties in conflict.

I pointed out to him that while hostilities had broken out, there

had been no declaration of war on the part of Japan against China. From
 E-694

the juridical point of view^ therefore, there could be no question of neutrality.

The situation since the outbreak of hostilities remained the same as it was

before.

M. Cosme explained by saying that a shipment from Marseilles to China

required at least five weeks, and that, in the present state of the armed

conflict between China and Japan, it was difficult to tell what further

developments might take place within this five-week period. If Japan should

meanwhile declare war on China, the shipment was liable to seizure and

confiscation by the Japanese navy on the high seas. In that event, said

Cosme, it would involve the French government in very great responsibility.

(He was a good functionary and was looking ahead to what might happen.)

I said that if it was a matter of financial responsibility, an understanding

might be reached without prejudice to the right of having these shipments

authorized for expedition as soon as possible.

Cosme then said that, speaking frankly, he would like to make clear

that, as the articles ordered belonged to the category of war materials, it

was in the first instance a question of general policy going beyond the scope

of ordinary routine administration. Besides, he added, if things in transit

should be seized on the high seas, it would amount to France's practically

making a present of these shipments to Japan for conducting war against

China, a friend of France. But more particularly, he said, these goods had

been paid for, and before delivery their title remained with the French owners.

As they were paid for out of the credit extended by the French government,

the loss through seizure or confiscation would fall upon the French government.

Therefore, this was a responsibility about which a decision should be taken

by the government beforehand^

I again pointed out to M. Cosme that the question of financial responsibility

might be arranged. I urged that shipments should be expedited as much as

possible. In any case, I expressed the hope that M. Cosme would so use his
 E-695

influence that no unfavorable decision might be taken by the French Premier.

I told him that neither the British nor the American government had taken

any step with a view to restricting the freedom of purchasing and shipping

arms and war materials to China from their countries. Therefore^ I hoped

that France would not be the first country to bring about a change in the

situation.

M. Cosme told me that he did not think that any unfavorable decision

would be handed down, but that a decision would be taken to authorize

shipment to China under certain restrictive conditions along the lines he

had just mentioned, that was to say, the question of responsibility for the

loss would be made clear. He expected that a decision of this nature would

be arrived at in three or four days.

[One may recall the Waichiaopu's request received on August 17 for

certain bombs and cartridges, which it hoped to purchase from Indochina. I

immediately made inquiries to find out if any stock existed there and consulted

with one of the Embassy's agents (Morshand) and my military attaches, but

could not consult the French authorities as the Minister of Colonies was

out of town.

On August 19, Mr. Li Yii-ying came to discuss with me the most effective

way of approaching the French for help, particularly in the supply of arms

and munitions for China's resistance tc the Japanese aggression. He told

me that Marius Moutet, the Minister of Colonies who was also his close friend,

would be back in Paris and that, he would arrange a meeting between him and

me for a good talk on this topic. On the 20th he telephoned to say he had

seen M. Moutet and arranged an appointment. He added that he had suggested

to the Minister more efficient cooperation. The problem was that T. V. Soong

had asked Jean Monnet to help in the same matters of securing supplies that

Li YU-yin was handling also at the behest of Dr. Soong. So there was

confusion and an overlapping of duties.]

 E-696

[The same day, the Embassy's agent reported back to me after talking

with officials of the French Foreign Office. He said] the Quai d'Orsay

officials were afraid of taking the responsibility of authorizing shipments

of arms and ammunitions and it was necessary to appeal over their heads to

secure political decisions.

[I already had an appointment, on the following day, August 21, to see

M. Chautemps, the Premier, with regard to China's proposed appeal to the

League of Nations. I had also intended to talk to him about the question

of war supplies, and this added some urgency to the matter. Therefore, when

I met M. Chautemps, I told him, as my second point, that] I wished to speak

to him about the question of the supply of arms and munitions for which China

had placed several orders in France. As there did not exist a state of war

despite the present hostilities. I said, I hoped there would be no question

of the freedom of trade and shipment of these war materials. The matter of

supply was of primary importance to China now that she was forced to conduct

hostilities on a large scale. I told him that, according to information that

had reached me, the situation in England remained the same and in America

President Roosevelt, notwithstanding the clamor of a section of opinion

*
favoring it, had decided not to apply the Neutrality Act.

“ed. note; The United States Neutrality Act of 1937 in part provided;

(1) that the president upon finding that a state of war existed between
foreign nations should proclaim such fact; (2) that once the president
had so proclaimed, it would automatically become unlawful to sell or
transport arms, ammunition, and implements of war to any of the belligerents
or to grant them loans or credits other than those customarily involved in
"normal peacetime commercial transactions;" and (3) that the president should,
at his discretion, establish lists of commodities that might thereafter only
be exported to the belligerents on condition that their ownership passed into
foreign hands before they left American shores and that they were transported
in foreign ships. The latter stipulation was the main innovation of the 1937
Act and constituted the so-called "cash-and-carry" plan.

Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-38, Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964, p. 335.
 E-697

M. Chautemps said the question had been discussed by the cabinet

informally and the deliberation would be resumed after the return of M.

Delbos, the Foreign Minister. There were several aspects of the question

which should be considered. In view of the present state of hostilities, goods

leaving France in peacetime might reach China after war had already been

declared. In that case, Japan was sure to declare a blockade of Chinese coasts

and the only port of entry would be Saigon. If the Japanese knew it, they

would consider this as an act of aiding China against Japan and make trouble

for France. The French naval force in the Far East was very limited. In

fact, M. Chautemps understood the squadron was composed of not more than

four ships. Therefore, he said, any incident arising between Japan and France

from the supply of arms and munitions to China might take on a serious

character and France would not be in a position to deal with it effectively,

especially in the present European situation, which did not permit her to

divide her forces elsewhere.

M. Chautemps went on to say thatM. Ldger had reported to him the

conversations that he had had with the British and American Ambassadors as

to the views of Great Britain and the United States on the question of supply.

He understood that the American Ambassador had told M. Ldger that while the

American government had not applied the Neutrality Act, it had intimated

to American factories to abstain from the further supply of arms and munitions

to the Far East . Chautemps felt this showed that caution and prudence were

necessary.

i said I understood, according to the information I had received, that

the American attitude remained unchanged. The intimation referred to by

M. Chautemps had probably been given against supply to Japan. As regards

the possibility of a declaration of war on the part of Japan^ I told him I

thought that, in view of the Japanese attitude, that was remote. Very recently
 E-698

I said, the Japanese cabinet had decided to call the conflict between China

and Japan a "Sino-Japanese affair" instead of the "North China incident."

In other words, Japan still wished to avoid bringing into existence a state

of war. And so long as there was no belligerency, I hoped that the freedom

of trade and shipment would be maintained.

M. Chautemps said the French government was very sympathetic towards

China and realized the importance of supply to her. Though no decision had

yet been taken by the cabinet, the tendency of the discussion that had already

taken place showed that probably private companies would be allowed to supply

China at their own risk and without any restriction, but that government

arsenals and nationalized factories would not furnish China directly.

I said then that the Chinese government desired to know if it were

possible to arrange for a cession to China by sale of some stocks in the

possession of the French government, such as munitions for certain arms.

M. Chautemps replied this would be really difficult for the French

government to arrange. Firstly, the program of rearmament was in full force.

In view of the present German manace, the present stock of the government

was judged insufficient by experts. Secondly, France's own self-defense

was of such supreme importance that any act which would weaken it would

readily arouse protests from public and parliamentary circles. It was the

more delicate, he added in view of the fact that the German military mission

was still in Nanking. He felt sure that China would not want to see France

weakened. Moreover, he was of the opinion th«t small quantities of supply

would not be of much avail to China, while large quantities would surely

retard the rearmament program adopted by the French government for France

herself .

I said I understood that there were certain stocks of arms and munitions

in Indochina belonging to the Colonial government, and asked whether it

would not be possible to arrange for their sale to China.

 E-699

M. Chautemps said he did not tlink there was any great amount of available

stock in Indochina. Whatever there had been had probably been used by the

two battalions of French soldiers recently despatched from Indochina to

Shanghai. In view of the largescale upon which the hostilities were being

carried on at present, M. Chautemps, however, thought there must be a

practical solution to the problem of supply.

Speaking not as the head of the French government but as a friend, M.

Chautemps considered that China should explore the possibilities of other

means of supply. He said that previously, as a Minister of State, he had had

one-year's experience in dealing with the Spanish situation, where the question

of the supply of arms and munitions was of equal urgency and importance to

the Spanish government. He himself had always believed that once a word was

uttered pledging non-intervention, it should be kept. But it was no secret

that Spain had been receiving supplies from parties to the non-intervention

agreement, including France. The procedure employed by Spain was the organization

of a company in some small country ostensibly for the purpose of transacting

importing and exporting business. All purchases and shipments were to be

made in the name of the company. He thought this example might be of value

to China. He said that goods ordered by a foreign company of a known and

neutral nationality could be shipped freely and the government was not bound

to intervene.

I asked if the freedom of trade was to be confined to private companies.

I said I felt the supply might be limited as a number of important factories

had already been nationalized and as, I understood, more important articles

were manufactured by these nationalized factories.

M. Chautemps replied that if orders were placed by a company of a

third country with private companies, the latter always had ways and m^ans

to arrange with nationalized companies for the parting of certain articles

 E-700

that were available from the nationalized factories. Such matters could be

easily arranged between factories^ and on the face of things the nationalized

companies could not be charged with supplying one belligerent government

against another.

I thanked M. Chautemps for the information and suggestions, and observed

that what he had just said was certainly preferable as a solution of the

question of supply. [This concluded our lengthy conversation.]

[When I returned to the Embassy, I received a telephone call from M.

Audinet. He said] he could assure the export of airplanes to China (the

Ministry of Air under M. Cot was imaginative as well as sympathetic to China),

but the War Ministry's goods would be more difficult to obtain and export. |I

also saw Mr. Li Yii-ying. Mr. Li had seen the Minister of Colonies, who, like

Pierre Cot, was very sympathetic on this question of the supply of arms and

their export. Li had discussed with Moutet possible enlargement of the French

arsenal in Indochina.]

[Gradually then, during the summer of 1937,] one of my principal

task' in Paris became that of pressing for French assistance in obtaining

and moving arms, ammunition, spare parts and other military supplies as

quickly as possible, without any obstruction in any quarter. When, on August

23, I learned of the news of the landing of 50,000 Japanese troops in Shanghai

and the bombing of the ^incere^^>4jp^department^tore^ and other buildings

in the International Settlement, killing some 500 persons and showing the

brutality of the Japanese troops, I was more than anxious to expedite the

shipments of military supplies. The supply from abroad was absolutely essential

because China was not yet fully equipped, for example, to manufacture arms

and ammunition herself. The guns and rifles in the Chinese armed forces

were of different types bought originally from different countries. Many

of them came from France, where it was then necessary to secure the cartridges
 E-701

and shells to fit the arms.

When, on August 23, M. Audinet called at my request, he confirmed that

all orders subject to the Air Ministry's control would be authorized for

shipment without any difficulty or delay, but that those under the control

of the Ministry of War might be stopped. I, therefore sent a representative

to see the Minister of Colonies, M. Moutet, so that the latter would pass

a word to the Vice-Premier, M. Blum, to leave the situation regarding the

shipments for China as it was and refrain from having the French Cabinet take

any new decision, which might not only cause delay but also complicate the

situation as regards the movement of China's military supplies.

That afternoon I saw Ambassador Bullitt as I was anxious to know what

exactly was the attitude of the United States on the question of the supply

of arms and munitions to China, and I asked him, too, to give a word of

support on the side to my representations to the French. [According to my

notes of that conversatioiy ] I explained to him that now that hostilities

were in full swing in Shanghai and elsewhere in China, the question of supply

of arms and munitions was one of primary importance to China. I said that,

in the course of conversations with members of the Quai d’Orsay I had gotten

the impression that, although the United States had not applied the Neutrality

Act, the American government had given an intimation to the munitions plants

to exercise extreme prudence in the supply of arms and ammunition to the

Far East . Heretofore, I said, the issue of export permits in France for

arms and munitions ordered by China was a routine matter in the Quai d’Orsay,

but recently the department concerned referred the question to the government

for a decision as a matter of policy. The French cabinet had discussed it

and would probably make a decision on Wednesday (the 25th) . The French, in

the meantime, were very desirous of knowing what was being done in America

and England. Therefore, I said, I would appreciate it if he could give me

any information on the attitude of his government as regards the sale and
 E-702

shipment of arms and munitions from America.

Mr. Bullitt replied that he had had a talk the other day with M. Ldger

who asked him the same thing. He had told him that the United States government

had not applied the Neutrality Act because the situation remained as it had

been. Afterwards he cabled to the State Department for information and had

received a cablegram. The message, which he handed me to read, stated that

the American government did not consider the existing hostilities between

China and Japan as constituting a state of war. Until that state came into

being, the Neutrality Act would not be applied. It stated that, as the

President had declared in a press conference, the situation as regards its

application really rested on a 24-hour basis,since it was not possible to

foresee how the hostilities would develop.

Mr. Bullitt then said he knew nothing of any intimation given to the

American munitions factories not to supply arms and munitions to the Far

East for the present. The situation remained unchanged, he repeated, although

according to the cablegram, it was difficult to say anything for a period of

more than 24 hours.

I said I myself had also received information from Washington to the

effect that there was no change in the situation, and I was glad therefore

to hear a confirmation from him as to the position of his government on the

question of the sale and shipment of arms and munitions. I expressed the

hope that Mr. Bullitt would use his influence to retard the application of

the Neutrality Act as long as possible.

Mr. Bullitt said he understood that the Japanese were also opposed to

its application. He wondered what was the real motive behind this: Was

it that the Japanese had also to buy arms abroad for use in her present campaign?

I said I was inclined to think that the Japanese opposition was unreal,

and that it was voiced more to confuse opinion abroad.

Mr. Bullitt observed that in case of a Japanese blockade of Chinese

 E-703

coasts the only possible route of supply would be either Indochina or the

north-western route through Sinkiang. He thought that whatever could be

sent from Russia overland was bound to be limited, and asked whether Nanking

had effected any rapproachement with Moscow already.

|I had not yet received the Waichiaopu*s cable informing me of the

signing on August 21 of the Sino-Soviet non-aggression agreement.] I told

M. Bullitt, therefore, [only] there had been an improvement in the attitude

of Soviet Russia towards the Sino-Japanese conflict. I said while it was

impossible for her to offer military assistance, I understood she would be

disposed to render material aid in the supply of equipment.

The American Ambassador said that airplanes could probably be flown

over to China, but he did not know how goods could be carried overland. He

asked if the aid from Moscow had actually started.

When I said that while there had been a promise of aid, I did not know

whether assistance had already started, he stressed that the question of

Soviet assistance was of great importance.

[Later in the conversation, I told Mr. Bullitt] that Dr. Kung telephoned

the day before, stating that the State Department, in reply to Dr. C. T.

Wang's appeal to invoke the Nine Power Treaty, declared that if China insisted

on its application, the United States would be obliged to apply the Neutrality

Act. I said neither Dr. Kung nor I could understand the connection between

the two questions. I asked whether Mr. Bullitt could throw some light on the

mat ter .

The American Ambassador answered that all the official records of

the conversations held between the Chinese and Japanese Ambassadors and the

State Department were sent to him, and that he could not recall that this view

had been expressed. Possibly it meant that China would not invoke the Treaty
 E-704

until there was a state of war between China and Japan. In that case, the

United States would be obliged to enforce the Neutrality Act. When I observed

that the Nine Power Treaty made no reference to the existence of a state of

war and that its application did not, therefore, need a state of war as a

prerequisite, Mr. Bullitt said if I could give him the date of the particular

conversation from which Dr. Wang had gathered this impression from the State

Department, he would be able to give a more precise answer.

I said possibly Dr. Wang in Washington had not understood what was

said to him, and that I would cable to Washington to find out the date of

the conversation. Subsequently I was able to tell Mr. Bullitt that Dr.

Wang's conversation took place on August 6, whereupon Mr. Bullitt took the

matter up with Washington. On the 25th he called me up to say that the

State Department had replied to him that neither Mr. Hull nor any one else in

the Department had ever made the statement linking the Neutrality Act with the

contemplated invocation of the Nine Power Treaty. That cleared up the

situation in my mind and so I at once cabled Ambassador C. T. Wang to that

effect.

[In the meantime, Mr. Bullitt had told me on the 23rd that he would

telephone to M. L6ger to clarify the United States attitude in the sense

indicated to me. I myself saw L£ger later that same day to give him the

Chinese government's reply on the bombing incident and to also discuss with

him the question of military supplies and their transit through Indochina, j

[When I raised the question of the supply of arms and munitions to China

M. L6ger confirmed that the matter would be discussed by the cabinet on

Tuesday (the 24th) and by the Council of Ministers on Wednesday. He added that

the American Ambassador had telephoned to him to correct the impression, which
 E-705

he had wrongly gathered, that the American government had intimated to the

American factories to abstain from furnishing arms and munitions to China

and Japan. The American Ambassador, he said, pointed out to him that there

was no foundation for the impression, and that the American government had

not applied the Neutrality Act because a state of war did not exist at present.

I told M. L6ger that I, too, had received information that there was no

change in the attitude regarding the sale and shipment of arms and munitions

to China whether in America or in England.

M. L6ger said he had asked the British government for its views on the

question and understood it had not yet come to any decision on the matter.

In fact, he added, it appeared that London did not know precisely what to do.

But, he said, he could tell me that the French government could probably take

a decision to the effect that private companies would be left entirely free

to supply China with arms and munitions and to assume, along with the Chinese

government, any risk after the goods had left French territory. But as regards

the supply to China of arms from the government arsenal, either through the

Metropolitan government in Paris or the Indochinese government, that was out

of the question.

I asked since there was no state of war existing, could not the present

situation be left as it was? I said the differentiation just explained to

me. between private companies and government arsenals, really should not

apply until there was a state of war declared or actually existing. But I

supposed that private companies would include factories that had been

nationalized. I also expressed the hope that the government would take no

decision at present, but leave the situation as it stood.

M. L4ger replied that since the question had been raised, a decision

would be necessary even to leave the situation as it was. As regards factories,

the Air Ministry had nationalized certain factories in part and some factories

completely, but those nationalized by the Ministry of War were completely

 E-706

nationalized. There was a difference of opinion, he added, among the

members of the cabinet. They had discussed the question the previous Friday,

but on account of the divergence of views, another meeting would take place

the following day. He thought there would be no difficulty as to the goods

ordered from the factories nationalized by the Air Ministry, but those ordered

from the factories under the Ministry of War, he said, stood in a different

category. The War Ministry needed all the goods that its nationalized factories

could manufacture, and they were not manufacturing things fast enough for the

needs of the government. He told me that he himself had been pleading the

cause of China by asking the government to leave the private factories

entirely free, just as I had wished. He asked me when the orders which I had

just referred to had been placed in France.

I told him that most of them were placed long before the North China

incident and certainly before the Shanghai incident. M. Ldger said he fully

understood the importance to China of keeping the foreign sources of supply

open. He thought the enforcement of the American Neutrality Act would be

to the advantage of Japan and to the disadvantage of China, because he understood

that, under the Act, America could still sell arms and munitions [to the

belligerents] provided they were to be carried in the ships of the purchasing

country. He understood that the original purpose of the Act was in favor of

Great Britain and France,who controlled the sea and would control it in case

of war in Europe. But in the case of the Far East, it was now seen that its

application would mean that only Japan could buy and ship since she possessed

a large mercantile marine for ocean transportation and China did not.

I told him I understood that the Act also provided that the purchases

must be paid for in cash. I said that while the Japanese could carry their

goods in their own boats, whether they would be able to pay for them in cash

was also a factor to be considered. France and Great Britain, on tne other
 E-707

not only had the ships to carry but also the funds to pay for the purchases

in America .

He said that, in this connection, he would like to bring up the question

of transit through Indochina which I had asked of his government. He said

although no formal decision had yet been taken, he could tell me that un­

officially the reply would probably be along the following line. The question

of the right of transit through Indochina for Chinese arms and munitions would

arise only when there was a state of war. The French government hoped,

however, that through international good offices and mediatory efforts the

present hostilities could be brought to an end without ever reaching the

stage of a formal war. The French government, therefore, did not feel called

upon to asnwer the question at present, but wished to reserve it for consideration

when necessary.

He explained that this attitude meant that for the present there was no

question about transit through Indochina or any other region, because China

could still effect importation through her own ports. But in the event of

a state of war, which would surely be followed by a Japanese blockade of

Chinese coasts, the question would then have to be considered. In other

words, said M. Ldger, the French government had no idea at the present moment

of denying China the right of using Indochina for transit. On the contrary

it was very sympathetic and friendly towards China. The United States and

Great Britain, on the other hand, were very reserved in their attitude and

appeared to be very cautious. As to Soviet Russia, whose attitude I had

asked the French government to sound out for China, he said it did not seem

to move at all. Only France was strongly disposed to do more than any of

the other powers, and he, M. Ldger, hoped that China would do nothing on her

part to diminish this sympathy and friendship.

On the whole, the French attitude was really one of great sympathy and

friendliness to China, as M. Ldger had stated. The French government tried

 E-708

ways and means of meeting China's needs as much as possible, [although within

the framework of] the general policy of not openly antagonizing or irritating

Japan. On the other hand, the attitude and policy pursued at the time in

London and Washington seemed to be far more cautious then was really necessary

from the Chinese point of view or, in fact, [from the viewpoint of] the

ultimate interests of their own countries.

I think the Chinese government at the time, and probably as always,

thought the British and American governments could do more, and probably

expected, at heart, less from France. But as Chinese Ambassador in Paris

and as one fully aware of the serious situation in China and the rampant

activities of the Japanese military forces, I naturally felt that I must

do all I could to persuade the French to do as much as possible. It so happened

that the French government of the time was one of the Left, and generally

opposed to the configuration of Italy, Germany and Japan and their aggressive

expansionism. Several cabinet members; for example, the Air Minister M.

Pierre Cot, sa# eye to eye with me on the Far Eastern situation. M. Ldger himself

was a man with a great appreciation of oriental culture. Through his patroX^

M. Philippe Eerthelot, considered to be a great authority on the Far East,

particularly on China, he had undoubtedly learned to appreciate the importance

of China in the Far East, particularly from the point of view of French interests

in Indochina. [Therefore, there was considerable sympathy and, at times,

support for China even in high government circles.]

Then I would like to say a word about the French people's sympathy

for the Chinese cause. While the government and the authorities in genera]

were very cautious in expressing their views towards the Sino-Japanese War,

the people at large were very muc/ton the side of China, considering Japan

as the aggressor. [This became more evident as the war continued. The

Embassy received a large number of letters and even contributions from men
 E-709

mid women unknown to me or to miy member of my staff. A French girl sent

her engagement ring, received from her boyfriend, saying that she was a poor

girl, but because she sympathized with China so much, she wanted to contribute

her ring to whatever fund the Embassy had. I was much touched but I could

not possibly accept the ring. I sent her an appropriate letter expressing

our gratitude for her sympathy but returning the ring. Although this was

an extraordinary case, it was really indicative of the general attitude of

the common people of France. Of all the peoples in Europe, the French people

were probably the most sensitive to the cause of international justice, and

it was a case which clearly reflected the general sentiment of the French people.

[When I saw Foreign Minister Delbos on August 25, I told him] it was

my understanding that the question of the Supply of Arms and Ammunition from

France had been discussed at the meeting of the Council of Ministers that

very morning.

M. Delbos answered that the French government had adopted the principal

of maintaining complete freedom of trade for private companies. As regards

the possibility of direct supply form the French government to China, he

said that was considered to be really unfeasible. But, he said, the principle

as defined and approved at the meeting of the Council of Ministers left a

wide field in which China could obtain supplies. The Air Minister, for

example, had stated that as far as his Ministry was concerned, all the orders

placed by China for airplanes, motors, etc., could be completely supplied

without difficulty. When I expressed my appreciation for this decision,

M. Delbos remarked that, of course, this point should be kept entirely

confidential and he hoped nothing of it would be given out for publication,

I told him that I understood there were also orders for such things as

guns and cannons, which could only be manufactured by factories under the

jurisdiction of the Ministry of War. I hoped there would be no difficulty

 E - 710

as to the fulfillment of these orders either.

The Foreign Minister assured me that the same principle as decided by

the cabinet would apply. In other words, orders placed with private companies

could be fulfilled at liberty regardless whether the supplies belonged to

categories falling within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War or the

Ministry of Air. When I asked, however, whether this would not mean that

orders placed with nationalized factories under the Ministry of War would

be subject to restriction, M. Delbos replied that the Ministry of War did

not make any statement and that he took it for granted that the principle

would leave sufficient latitude for the fulfillment of orders placed by China.

I then referred to the question of transit through Indochina for goods

ordered by my government. M. Delbos said the same principle would apply in

this case also. In other words, he said, the private companies which had

accepted orders from the Chinese government would have complete liberty of

trade and transportation.

I wanted to make certain and, therefore, asked M. Delbos whether

this meant that goods supplied by factories, aside from those goods belonging

to the French government, would be entitled to transit.

He said the question would not arise, in his view, because the government

could not supply arms and munitions to China directly. If they were meant

for the use of the French government, then of course, there could be no

question as to the matter of transit. Replying to another of my questions

which I asked in order to clarify the French position, he confirmed that

the decision taken was intended to leave the situation as it was, namely,

complete liberty of trade and transportation in the matter of supplies to

China.

Then he brought up a rather embarrassing though important point. He

said that the Japanese somehow or other had been able to know everything

about the details of the agreement and orders placed in France by Dr. Kung
 E-711

for airplanes, arms and munitions, and that even the question of supply

and transit, which I had been discussing with the French government, seemed

to be known to the Japanese. He said the Japanese Ambassador had repeatedly

protested against the attitude of France, sometimes on the very morrow of

the convers&tions which had taken place between the French government and me.

I wondered how they could have found out so quickly, because as far

as the Embassy was concerned, I had given strict orders to keep everything

secret. Of course, there were some Chinese representatives in Paris who

had been specifically charged with handling the negotiation of orders for

supplies and the signing of contracts and some Frenchmen who were helping

us as well. All were kept informed of my conversations in order to facilitate

their work. I do not know to what extent these people had been careful about

security. That was the question, because there were at least half-a-dozen

Chinese and several Frenchmen who had daily conferences with me and who were

specially assigned the work of attending to these matters.

At any rate, M. Delbos said that the Japanese considered that the

French government was really aiding China against Japan. He had replied to

the Japanese complaint, however, by stating that since there was no state of

war, there could be no restrictions on the liberty of commerce, and that he

had understood that Japan herself did not consider the present hostilities

between Japan and China as constituting in any sense a state of war.

I told him that that was precisely the situation. I understood that

Japan herself did not wish to attribute the character of an international

war to the present fighting in China.

M. Delbos remarked that there were, of course, certin advantages to Japan

if she made a declaration of war on China, and undoubtedly some disadvantages

and inconveniences if she refrained from recognizing a state of war with

China. But since Japan had chosen not to consider the preeent hostilities
 E-712

as war, there could be no question of neutrality on the part of France.

He went on to say that the fact that the Japanese seemed to know practically

everything that had been discussed and arranged between the Chinese and the

French clearly indicated that there must be a vast organization of espionage

and a leak somewhere either at the Embassy, or among the entourage of Dr.

Kung or at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Nanking.

I told Foreign Minister Delbos that this really astonished me. And

after he expressed a desire that I do so, I told him that I would certainly

report to Nanking and telegraph to Dr. Kung personally to take all possible

precautions in the future.

[The same day, Quo Tai-chi, who telephoned from London to report to me

on the British government’s response to our request that it support a Chinese

appeal to the League, mentioned the results of his latest conversation with

the Soviet Ambassador in London.] He said Ambassador Maisky had told him

Soviet Russia would render material help to China, but wanted to know how it

could be transported. [This suggests how difficult the question of transport

was even before news of the Japanese announcement of a blockade of about 800
A . ,
mis of China s coast on August 25 reached the important capitals and before

this Japanese blockade against Chinese shipping was extended, on September 6,

to cover the entire Chinese coast with the exception of Tsingtao and the

leased territories.]

As I stated more than once, transit facilities constituted a question

of vital importance, in fact of life or death, to China's policy of continued

resistance to Japanese aggression. The Japanese declaration of a blockade

of the China coast, [closing the ports to Gtensux: shipping, j only rendered

the problem more urgent and criticial. Therefore, when the blockade was

declared the Chinese government needed to seek the cooperation of the powers

in trying to induce Japan to lift the blockade or otherwise meet the situation
 E-713

collectively so as to facilitate the transit of arms and other military goods

t o China.

|Mr. Li Yu-ying had arranged for me to meet with M. Moutet on August 21,

at which time we had a good discussion. We covered] the cession of government

stock [in Indochina to China,] transit through Indochina, the organization

of a [Sino-French arms purchasing] company [and the Japanese blockade.]

I suggested to Moutet to promote a joint foreign declaration on Japan’s

declaration of blockade, which, as I told him, was abnormal and illegal.

M. Moutet was all for it.

A few hours later I had a talk with a correspondent of The Times of London

who called on me for news of the Far Eastern situation. He did not think

Great Britain could do much about the Japanese blockade nor about the recent

shooting of the British Ambassador to China, which took place when the latter's

car was attacked by Japanese military aircraft.] But he said Secretary of

State Hull's message of sympathy to the British government] was obviously

designed to show esprit de corps. [I noted in my diary that] The Times of

London had called the incident of the shooting unprecedented and one which

rendered the situation "intolerable." [The moderate conservative] Intransigean

in pans [ goue even further, viewing] the incident as the prelude of the

expulsion of European interests from the Far East and the loss of prestige

of the "White Race."

[The real point was that for a while, it looked as if the British were

becoming increasingly pressed by the effects of the Japanese aggression in

China. Many interpreters of the international scene with whom I spoke saw

the British as being more willing than theretofore to assume responsibility

in the Far Eastern situation. There was therefore some hope of joint

action by the powers with regard to the Japanese blockade, though such help

never materialized.]

On September 3 Poland's Ambassador Lukasiewicz called because, as he

 E-714

told me. he had received instructions from his government asking him to get

in touch with the Chinese Minister of Finance, Dr. Kung. Certain commercial

interests in Poland were desirous of exploring the possibilities of trade

with China, and his government thought that it should avail itself of the

presence of Dr. Kung in Europe to discuss the question. He wished to know

whether Dr. Kung was now in Paris and whether he would have time to visit

Warsaw, where the Polish government would be glad to welcome him .

I said in China there was also a great deal of interest in the possibility

of developing trade relations with Poland, and I felt certain that Dr. Kung

would be glad to discuss the question. However, Dr. Kung was now in Bad

Nauheim, where he was taking a cure on account of his heart trouble, and

he had tentatively decided to sail for China on September 18.

Ambassador Lukasiewicz asked whether, on his way back, Dr. Kung would

go through Berlin and, if his time was pressed, whether he could send a

representative to Warsaw to discuss the matter. When I said that Dr. Kung
.s
expected to sail from Italy, the polish Ambassador asked whether it would
A
be possible to arrange a meeting between Dr. Kung and himself in Geneva at

the time of the League Assembly. He said he would be glad to make a trip to

Geneva for the purpose.

I said I would inform Dr. Kung either by telephone or otherwise and

would be glad to let him know as soon as I had received a reply. Within

the week I spoke to Dr. Kung on the phone about the matter. The final

arrangements were that P. W. Kuo would go to Warsaw for discussions with the

Polish government. When I telephoned the Polish Aimbassador to this effect,

he was delighted.]

[Mr. Kuo, who had just returned from Italy on similar business, ] called

on me on September 6 to report. He told me about a conversation he had had

 E-715

with Count Ciano in Rome. He said the latter agreed to supply a list of what

Italy could furnish to China and also to terms for the supply. But Ciano

complained to him rather animatedly of what he saw as Chinese hostility towards

Italy in spite of Italian friendship for China. The same day I was able to

engage three French pilots for the Chinese air force, all of whom had done

good fighting in Spain. This made it a cheerful day for me.

|On September 9 I left Paris for Geneva to attend the League of Nations

session and present China's case against the renewed Japanese aggression.

The day before news dispatches had reported that the Japanese had invaded

Shansi Province and that the Japanese navy had occupied Pratas Island and

was about to attack Hainan Island.]

[I was only in Geneva a few hours, when] I viewed a Waichiaopu cable

asking me to see the French government at once regarding its attitude toward

Japan's blockade and in the event arms bound for China on a French ship

were seized or preempted by Japan. The following day at lunchtime, Li Yu-

ying as T. V. Soong's personal representative in Europe, came to inform me

that he had just received a cable from Dr. Soong asking for a definite

assurance from the French government as to the right of transit through Indochina

in order that the Chinese government might at once start on the work of

installing facilities on the road to Indochina from China, and also begin

[construction of] a light railway from Kwangsi Province to connect up with

the Indochinese rail lines.

[I already had an appointment to see French Foreign Minister Delbos

at Secretary-General Avenol's luncheon. In fact, I went straight to the

luncheon after my talk with Li to meet M. Delbos. According to my notes of

that conversation,] I told M. Delbos that I had just received a cablegram

from my government asking me to speak to him on the question of the illegal

blockade proclaimed by the Japanese navy of the coast of China. My government

 E-715

wished to emphasize the illegality of this measure and would like to see

the French government along with other powers taking steps to protest

against it and not give it any recognition. The intention of Japan, I said,

was evidently to stop all supplies of arms and materials of war to China from

abroad. But such supplies were of supreme importance to China in order to

continue her resistance to the Japanese invasion. I emphasized to him that

in offering resistance to Japanese aggression, China was not only defending

her own territory and interest. Her action must necessarily have the effect

of safeguarding the interests of foreign powers in China.

M. Delbos told me that the French government had felt a great deal of

concern about this blockade and that it had already taken steps to concert

action with Great Britain and the United States. The French cabinet had

discussed this subject and had decided to make a demarche at Tokyo. There

were two possible alternatives, he told me. One was to instruct the naval

commanders of the respective foreign fleets to notify the local Japanese

naval commander of the nationality of their respective merchant ships approaching

China at certain points, and not to allow the Japanese naval officers to

board these merchant vessels. The other measure, he said, was to allow the

Japanese naval officers to board the ships solely for the purpose of ascertaining

their nationality. The French government was in favor of the first alternative,

that is to say, not allowing Japanese naval officers to board the French

merchant vessels, and had told the British and Americans that conversations

were still going on. He hoped very much that a united front could be achieved

as well as a common action taken. He agreed with me that if the three

maritime powers in the Far East adopted a common attitude of firmness the

Japanese navy would not insist upon interfering with foreign merchantmen.

•k
ed. note; The Japanese action was a "pacific blockade." It was not raised
against neutral shipping in virtue of a Japanese declaration of war, but
only against Chinese shipping. Foreign ships continued to be able to carry
war supplies to China, although a number of them had already been stopped
by Japanese warships whose officers wished to verify their true nationality,
making certain they were not Chinese ships in disguise.
 E-717

Immediately after I ended my conversation with the French Foreign

Minister, I sought out Mi. Litvinov for an expression of his views. The

Soviet Foreign Commissar apparently was equally anxious to see me about the

Far Eastern situation, because the moment he saw me, he said that the splendid

Chinese resistance must be quite a surprise to Japan, and asked for the

latest news from the Far Eastern front.

I told him that the Chinese troops were still holding their lines in

the Shanghai sector, while in the North the rapid advance of the Japanese

troops was what had been forseen, and more serious resistance would be

offered further inland. Then I told him that the most important question

confronting China was that of supplying arms and materials for war. I

expressed a hope that the Soviet Union would render as much assistance and

aid as possible. I told him that it was not necessary for me to emphasize

the community of interest between China and Soviet Russia in the then prevailing

Far Eastern situation. For it was clear to me that after China, it would

be Soviet Russia that would bear the brunt of Japanese aggression.

The Soviet Foreign Commissar said that the Soviet Union was already

doing a great deal, and there were conversations in Moscow as well as in

Nanking about the matter. In fact, he said, Soviet Russia had already done

something, what he wanted to know was if China was getting any help from France,

Great Britain and the United States.

I told him in reply that China was receiving a reasonable amount of

both credit and materials for war from them. But the Japanese blockade

made the question of transport more difficult than ever. It meant that

China would have to rely more upon Soviet Russia for supplies, although

she was still getting supplies through the south in spite of the blockade.

I observed that Soviet Russia seemed to be maintaining quite normal relations

with Japan, although her own interests in the success of the Chinese resistance

should be as great as China's.

 E-718

Mr. Litvinov asked how Soviet relations with Japan could he considered

as normal.

I replied that they certainly appeared normal to me because China was

fighting Japan and Soviet Russia was not. I thought that the Soviet

government could certainly help China by bringing some pressure to bear

upon Japan, without running the risk of provoking direct hostilities

against herself.

Mr. Litvinov then said that he had already adopted a firm attitude

towards Japan. He had ordered the closing up of all Japanese consulates

in Siberia except two, and more recently, more than 20 Japanese fishing

vessels had been seized [in Soviet waters.] Meanwhile, he said, the Japanese

attitude appeared to be very conciliatory, with Tokyo viewing these steps

taken by Moscow without any serious reaction.

I [felt this was insufficient and] told Mr. Litvinov that, for one

thing, Soviet Russia could make a military demonstration at the frontier

bordering on Manchuria. This would oblige Japan to keep part of her military

forces in Manchuria, instead of sending all of them to China to fight the

Chinese.

He said all along the Soviet frontier were already stationed strong

military forces, which constituted a permanent demonstration. When I told

him that that sort of demonstration could not have the desired effect,

because Japan knew very well that the Soviet Union would not send them across

Manchuria, he retorted by saying that this still had the effect of making
o
Japan very fearful and anxious.

I pointed out then that in South Manchuria the Chinese people were

rising against the Japanese, and that recently over 200 Japanese soldiers

had been killed by the so-called Chinese bandits. There was a similar

movement in North Manchuria. However, I said, the ultimate question resolved

 E-719

itself into that of the supply of the necessary arms. I told him that the

Soviet Union might take steps to organize such help in North Manchuria.

Mr. Litvinov then said that perhaps that could be done.

[In reporting the gist of my several conversations to the Waichiaopu

that evening by cable, I added that I had discussed] the French view on the

blockade with Ambassador Quo Tai-chi, who had agreed to see British Foreign

Secretary Eden. I asked if the Waichiaopu could cable Ambassador C. T.

Wang in Washington to urge Hull to adopt a firm attitude on the blockade,

since only the combined action of Britain, France and the United States

could effectively stop the blockade.

[When I saw Mr. Litvinov again the following day,] I asked him to

support an Anglo-American-French demarche on the blockade. I also told him

an exchange of views on the question of material assistance to China was

going on with Great Britain and France, and I was hopeful that something

would be done.

In the footnote to the record of my conversation with Litvinov there

was an interesting addition. [As it stated,] I saw Mr. Litvinov again on

the occasion of a luncheon given by Baron Rothschild on September 18

at his Chateau de Pregny, where Mr. Litvinov was also a guest. In talking

with him, I referred to the press report that Japanwas sending Viscount Soga

to France for the purpose of asking the French government to use its good

offices to persuade the Soviet Union to conclude an agreement of non­

aggression with Japan. I asked the Soviet Foreign Commissar what he

thought of the possibility of success of the Japanese mission. He replied

at once that since there was a pact of non-aggression between China and

Soviet Russia, Moscow could not possibly conclude aiy such agreement with

Japan because it would be against the terms of the Sino-Soviet agreement.

It was a reply which was rather reassuring, at least for the moment.
 F.-720

[Four days earlier, on September 14, the Chinese government and I

myself had been much taken aback by the American State Department dec 1arat ion

which seemed to dash all hopes of any joint action by the powers to curb

the Japanese blockade. The announcement stated:

Merchant vessels owned by the Government of the United States will

not hereafter, until further notice, be permitted to transport to
China or Japan any of the arms, ammunition or implements of war which
were listed in the President's proclamation of the first of May, 1937.
Any other Merchant vessels, flying the American flag, which attempt to
transport any of the listed articles to China or Japan will, until
further notice, do so at their own risk. The question of applying
the Neutrality Act remains in status quo, the Government policy
remaining on a twenty-four hour basis.

[When I called on the American Minister to Bern, Mr. Harrison, at

Geneva on the 16th, I had not yet received the official text of the statement

and so asked Harrison for it and for some interpretation of the wording as

printed in the papers. I tried to sound him out as to American intentions,

etc., but as I stated in an earlier section, Harrison was very cautious and

non-committal. Subsequently, Ambassador C. T. Wang pursued the matter in

Washington, where he learned there was little possibility for a revision of

the ruling on American government vessels. However, Wang understood the

American government’s intentions were not as bad as Nanking had feared on

first hearing the news.]

[On September 21 I escorted Dr. H. H. Kung to call on M. Delbos. One

may recall that Dr. Kung had come to Geneva for a few days during the Assembly

session and that I had arranged this visit with the French Foreign Minister

for him. Here I would like to review our three-way conversation since it

shows concretely how my representations to the French government to secure

its assistance and my representation at the League for collective international

action supported each other.]

 E-721

(In the first place, China's desiderata at Geneva were summed up for

M. Delbos as follows; China wished the League to proclaim Japan as aggressor,

to condemn the illegal blockade and to condemn the air bombing of open

towns and civilian populations; China also wished the League to recommend

measures to prevent Japan from getting foreign assistance and to see that

China was extended as much aid as possible, particularly in the form of

credit, arms and facilities of transit. This presentation of China's

desiderata led in turn to a discussion of the possibility of obtaining a

declaration of aggressor against Japan by the League of Nations. M. Delbos

emphasized that this might provoke the United States to apply the Neutrality

Act. I naturally argued against the inevitability of this. In fact,] I

explained to him that the latest indications of the American attitude, as

revealed in a conversation between President Roosevelt and Dr. C. T. Wang,

made it seem that the United States government not only had no intention

of applying the Neutrality Act, but was not prepared to prevent merchant

ships from carrying arms to Hongkong or Indochina. I told him the President's

declaration prohibiting government ships from carrying arms to China and

Japan was intended, as I understood, to assuage the pressure of certain

sections of American opinion for the application of the Neutrality Act.

[It was several weeks later that the League, in adopting the reports

of the Advisory Committee on the Far East, gave China the moral and even

some of the juridical support ^he was seeking in her quest for assistance

form the powers. The very next day, October 7, 1937 I had] a cable sent

to the Waichiaopu^. one, on the need of profiting by the offer of aid

[implied in the League's recommendation to its members to consider how far

they could each go in extending help to China] and, two, on the wisdom of

approaching the powers concerned with a concrete plan or proposals. 'Itill

I was feeling a little uneasy about the French position. The French government
 E722

intimidated by subtle Japanese threats, seemed to be growing more hesitant

about extending China assistance in the form of transit facilities.]

The French Minister of Colonies had been in contact with me on the

question of transit of certain materials purchased by the Chinese authorities

of Kwangsi for shipment through Indochina. While the Minister had sent

a message assuring me of his perfect willingness to help, he was feeling

anxious about the situation, because of a warning he received from the

French military attachd in Tokyo.

yyi
As Moutet informed me confidentially the
A

attachd had warned him that if the report of the French government agreeing

to accord transit facilities through Indochina to Chinese purchasers of war

OS
materials turned out to be fact, the Japanese authorities would take necessary
A
measures to prevent it. M. Moutet therefore urged extreme caution and

secrecy on our part in handling these matters, and advised us to avoid

chartering German boats for fear of leakage [of information.] I cabled the

above to the Waichiaopu on October 7.

On October 8, after arriving in the French capital from Geneva at

9 p.m., my counselor called to report to me on the matter of engaging French

pilots for the Chinese air force and on that of obtaining permits in France

for the exportation of needed supplies to China. [The problem was that we

could not get the permits rapidly enough .

[I took up this matter and the question of transit facilities through

Indochina directly with the Quai d'Orsay myself on October 12, when I called

on M. Hoppenot, the new Assistant-Director for Asian Affairs, by appointment. ;

In the course of our conversation, I emphasized to M. Hoppenot that it was

of vital importance that the supply of arms and war materials to China from

abroad should be kept up uninterrupted.

M. Hoppenot said theretofore there had been no difficulty raised and

the matter .£of transit facilities ^ in fact was again before the government
 E-723

for a decision to cover the action of the separate ministries. (In other

words, theretofore it was a ministerial affair. The matter had been handled

by the ministries concerned, without reference to the government as a whole.

China had found this very convenient because both the Minister of Air and

the Minister of Colonies were quite sympathetic toward the Chinese cause,

though of course for reasons of their own, principally in the interest of

France as they saw it.)

M. Hoppenot explained that Japan had been paying particular attention

to the use of Indochina for the transit of Chinese shipments of arms and

war materials. He said the Japanese had repeatedly made polite but firm

representations to the French government, to the effect that if China were

given transit facilities in Indochina, Japan would be obliged to contemplate

measures to deal with the situation. He said that this action was again

emphasized by the Japanese in connection with the representations made by

the French naval attachd in Tokyo regarding Hainan Island.

[Hainan Island, of course, lay off the Southeast coast of China not so

far from Canton and Hongkong, on the one side, and French Indochina on the

other. Ics occupation by Japan would, therefore, pose a constant threat to

the British in Hongkong and to the large French colony of Indochina. Earlier

in September the Japanese navy had occupied the Pratas Island and attacked

Hainan, causing not only the Chinese but the French some anxiety. Evidently

this had led to the military attache's representations, the results of which

had already been brought to my attention by the Ministry of Colonies.]

As I pointed out to M. Hoppenot, however, so far the Japanese had not

succeeded in effecting a landing on Hainan Island.

M. Hoppenot remarked that while that was true, the Japanese warships

had been cruising around the island, possibly with a view toward its occupation.

He said in any case, the action to be considered in the event the extention

of transit facilities to China were continued^ was the possible consequent

effect upon China if Japan should carry out her threat "to deal with the

situation." What Japan contemplated, in M. Hoppenot's view, was evident ly

the bombing of the Yunnan Railway and also the roads from the Indochina

frontier into the interior of China. Moreover, as the plan of building a

railway from Lang Son" to Nanning in Kwangsi Province was also about to he

put into operation, M. Hoppenot thought that might be bombed by the Japanese

air force also. He said that, in view of the damage that had already been

inflicted on the peking-Hangkow Railway by Japanese aircraft, resulting in

a temporary suspension of the operation of parts of it, he thought it would

not be difficult for the Japanese to destroy either the YUnnan Railway or

the motor roads inside the Chiriese frontier. In that case, shipments

through Indochina would not be able to reach the Chinese government. The

result would be the same as if there had been an interdiction (by France)

of transit facilities to Chinese shipments through Indochina.

I interrupted his argument by saying that this did not mean that t lie

French government was contemplating denying China such facilities.

He said that was not the intention, but the French government was now

searching for a way whereby the desired assistance could be extended to

China in conformity with the spirit of the League resolution, without

causing complications to France from the Japanese side.

I said that, of course, I realized such assistance extended by France

should be utilized by China discreetly in order to avoid any embarrassment

to the French government.

ed. note: Lang Son was an Indochinese Railway terminus near the border
between Indochina and Kwangsi Province. The Railway sometimes referred
to as the Lang Son-Dong-lang Line, connected with Hanoi, and was thus
easily accessible to the port of Haiphong. As for the planned railway
which would extend the line to Nanning, the concession for it had been
obtained by a group of French banks just prior to the Lukouchiao incident
and actual construction was supposed to be imminent.
 E-725

M. Hoppenot then said, in view of the various considerations, he thought

that it would be advisable not to depend entirely upon Indochina as a

channel of supply and that Hongkong and Isowloon might also be used for transit.

I told him that they were in fact being used also. Then I raised the

issue of export permits for shipments of airplanes and aeronautical material.

Mr. Hoppenot simply said the necessary permits had already been issued

and there was no difficulty.

I then asked about the shipment of war materials from factories under

the control of the War Ministry.

M. Hoppenot replied that the question of giving permits for materials

from such factories was already before the government for a decision. He

thought a suitable solution/would be found before very long.

[I next brought up the question of permitting airplanes bound for China

to be assembled in Indochina.] I told him, as regards shipment of airplanes,

that the bulk of the machinery was often found to be so great that its

transportation inland would be difficult. I said the Chinese government

hoped that it would be possible to assemble the parts in some place or

places near the border of Indochina, and .from there fly them over to China.

M. Hoppenot said that he could understand the advantage to China in

this course. However, in view of the difficulties which had been experienced,

he thought it would be hard to arrange for the assemblying of planes in

Indochina. He said one shipment for which the Quai d'Orsay had already

given an export permit for China was to be shipped through Indochina un­

assembled. I confirmed this by saying the shipment in question was destined

for Changsha. But I said it would be desirable if later shipments could be

unpacked and assembled at Haiphong. When M. Hoppenot asked me whether

Hongkong was also being used for this purpose, I told him that it was

possible that planes were also sent there for assembling. [Our conversation
 E-726

then turned to the difficult international situation in Europe, j

[October 18 was quite a day. First] M. Hoppenot sent for and told

Mr. Kuo of my Embassy that the French government had decided to prohibit

transit of war material for China through Indochina, but to allow arms of

nationalized factories and airplanes to be exported to China. [This French

prohibition on transit facilities] was terribly disappointing, although I

had had forecasts and indications a week earlier.

Mr. Li Yii-ying, who called at one o’clock that afternoon, told me the

Minister of Colonies, M. Moutet, had not been asked to the National Defense

Council meeting at which the decision was taken. When Moutet inquired why

he was not asked, he was told it had been forgotten. Li, who was a close friend

of M. Moutet’s, said Moutet was furious and would raise the question again at

the next day's cabinet meeting.

I dictated an aide-memoire to the French Foreign Office opposing the

closure of transit facilities and tried to arrange a meeting with Foreign

Minister Delbos. Delbos not being free, I saw M. L6ger, the Secretary-

General of the Foreign Office at 7:30 p.m. We had an hour's talk that was

quite animated at times. When I returned to the Embassy, Mr. Li Yii-ying,

Mr. Kuo my counselor, and Gustav Moutet, the Minister of Colonies' son

were waiting for me. Gustav had come to get a copy of my aide-memoire

and the text of the League Assembly resolution of October 6. Mr. Kuo reported

having seen a friend of M. Deladier, from whom he had learned that Deladier,

then Minister of War, was the only one present at the National Defense

Council meeting to object to the refusal of transit facilities to China.

The friend also told Kuo that M. Deladier was dissatisfied and would speak

again on his views at the next day's [cabinet ?] meeting. I gave Kuo a

copy of the aide-memoire and the Assembly resoltuion for Deladier, who®.

Doctor Kuo was about to see.

[As for my evening interview with M. L6ger, according to the notes I

 E-727

dictated at the time, j I first referred to M. Hoppenot's statement to my

counselor in the m rning, and expressed my appreciation that the French

government had decided to remove the distinction between the products of

nationalized and private factories. But as regards the decision to prohibit

transit of Chinese government war supplies through Indochina. I told M. L6ger

that I had received the information with vague surprise and felt sure it

would be received with disappointment by my government in Nanking. I said

that China, having built up no reserve of war supplies, had to depend upon

supplies from abroad for the continued use of arms, munitions and other war

materials. The Japanese blockade had rendered access to the coast difficult,

if not impossible. And as the Japanese were about to reinforce their

blockade of the China coast, the Chinese government counted upon Indochina

as the principal channel of supply from abroad.

I told M. L6ger that the facility of transit through Indochina was

assured to the Chinese government by certain conventions concluded with

France, and therefore had a conventional basis. Besides Articles 23 and 24

[of the agreement] relating to the construction of the Yunnan Railway by

a French company, there was Article 6 of the Sino-French Convention of May

6, 1930, regulating the relations between Indochina and the Southwestern

provinces of China. This article provided that arms, munitions and war

materials belonging to the Chinese government would enjoy exemption from

all customs duties in transit through Indochina. Since Japan had never

declared a war and did not admit the existence of a state of war between

Japan and China, I said, the situation, from a legal point of view, remained

unaltered and the convention of the right of transit from Indochina to China

should not be prejudiced. Besides, I continued, the resolution recently

adopted by the Assembly at Geneva recommended that the members of the League

among other things, abstain from taking any measure which might weaken China's
 E-728

power of resistance and thereby aggravate her difficulties in the present

conflict. The decision taken by the French government to refuse transit

facilities to the Chinese government would, of course, greatly weaken China's

power of resistance and be contrary to the letter and the spirit of the

resolution to which the French delegation had fully subscribed.

I went on to say that the Chinese government certainly had no idea

of throwing the burden of transit entirely upon the French government . I

said, in fact, a cablegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Nanking,

which had reached me just before I left for the Quai d'Orsay, informed me

that an arrangement had been made with the British government whereby

transit facilities through Hongkong would be given by the governor of

Hongkong upon the request of a Chinese delegate sent there for the purpose,

thereby obviating the delay of making arrangements through the British Embassy

in China and the British government in London. As to the American position,

I said that in a conversation with the Chinese Ambassador in Washington a

month ago, Pre*sident Roosevelt, explaining the declaration of the American

government prohibiting government-owned ships from transporting war supplies

to China, intimated that American private vessels could transport such supplies

to China and deliver the shipments to China by way of Indochina, if the

blockade should prove it desirable. When Roosevelt was asked what the

American government would do in case such ships should be molested by the

Japanese navy, he stated that full protection would be given by the

American government to such ships en route to Indochina. Accordingly, I

expressed to M. L6ger the hope that the French government would do at least

as much as the other governments to help China.

After listening to my long statement, M. L6ger asked me first of all

to explain matters to my government and ask it not to be disappointed. He

said the French government, ever since the beginning of hostilities between
 E-729

China aid Japan, had been doing its utmost to be of help to China. It had

always associated itself with every demarche made by other powers in Tokyo

in favor of China. It had decreed a suspension of existing laws with regard

to the supply of arms and airplanes to countries at war and had now removed

the prohibition against export to China of arms and munitions from the

nationalized French factories. Even the recent decision on the question of

transit was not to be applied to airplanes, which might fly to the Indochinese

border and on into China, this being by way of an air route and not the so-

called transit on land. He added that at Geneva the French delegation had

helped to create a favorable atmosphere for China and had rendered as much

help as it could. He asked me not to feel as if the French government had

done nothing for China. On the contrary, he said, it had done a great deal.

As regards the conventional basis of the matter of transit, that was a question

of law, which he would not dispute. But in practice, he said, the Indochinese

government had often prohibited transit facilities for shipments into China.

Such prohibition, for example, was always enforced during a time of civil war

in China.

[In reply to his argument, I said] that was an entirely different situation.

In the case of civil war, naturally there were two parties who claimed authority

on China. But in the present conflict with Japan, it was a united China

who had auwAt—f always ^ claimed the right of transit assured to her by treaty.

M. Ldger said that ever since the present hostilities began, China had

not been able to utilize the transit facilities through Indochina, so she

could not feel disappointed at not having them now. As regards the equal

arrangement for transit via Hongkong, it appeared to him that its value was

merely theoretical. In reality, he said, the British Ambassador [in Paris]

had also expressed a desire that shipments in Hongkong be allowed to Jptsrfead

to China through Indochina, because, with the destruction of a part of the

 E-730

Canton-Hankow Railway by Japanese aircraft, China could desire no benefit

from the transit privilege in Hongkong. He added that the British were ilso

anxious to have their shipments go through Indochina because they feared the

Canton-Kowloon Railway might also be bombed, if shipments from Hongkong

were to travel that route. Then he asked me what the United States and

Soviet Russia had done for China, and whether China had received supplies

from the United States.

I answered affirmatively to the latter question.

He pointed out that the United States had no common frontier with China,

so it was not involved in the question of transit. As regards Soviet Russia,

he said though she had a long, vast frontier with China overland from Mongolia

to Sinkiang in the Northwest, she did not seem to be helping China very much

by sending material across the land frontier.

I explained that Russia had now commenced to help a great deal. But

owing to the lack of roads and communications, across the frontier, only

airplanes which could fly over, could be sent by that route. Other supplies

had to be sent by sea, and they depended also upon Indochina for access

to Chinese territory.

M. L6ger remarked that my statement proved the difficulty in which France

was placed. She was asked to bear the brunt and to be the only one exposed

to Japanese complications because of transit through Indochina. He said that

from different sources of information, the French government felt certain

that Japan would act if Indochina were used for the transit of the Chinese

government’s war supplies. If Japan acted, it would bring no benefit to

China, but would cause complications and embarrassments to France. For one

thing, the Japanese air force would certainly bomb the Yunnan Railway and

the roads in Kwangsi Province connecting with the Indochinese border. If the

railway were bombed, which could easily be done, neither China nor Japan
 E-731

would hold herself responsible for the damage. The French holders of the

bonds would have to bear the loss. If the roads were damaged, and if the

work on the new line from Langson und Lungchow to Nanning was involved,

China could not send through her supplies, even after she got them from

Indochina, just as she could not send war material by the Canton-Hankow

Railway because of the damage inflicted by the Japanese air bombing.

I said, with regard to the danger of destruction by aerial bombardment

in Chinese territory, that China could take certain precautions in the way

of defense against air bombing.

M. L6ger thought that the regions through which the roads passed were so

mountainous and the railway was so long that it would be difficult to defend

them with anti-aircraft guns.

I said that China, faced with foreign invasion, was in a desperate

position and ready to run any risk. The argument which he (L£ger) used

could be disproved by the case of the Shanghai-Nanking Railway. In spite

of its frequent bombing by Japanese planes, China was able to defend the

line against such attacks and preserve it as a principal artery for the

transportation of troops and munitions to tie Shanghai front.

M. L6ger then said there was another danger. If France accorded

facilities of transit to China, Japan would surely occupy Hainan Island and

the Paracels. He said these two groups of islands were so situated as to

threaten not only Indochina, Hongkong and Singapore, on the one hand, but

also China's mainland on the other. If the Japanese occupied them, they

could make it their air base and a place for the concentration of their

military forces with a view to attacking South China. It was very'important

to keep these islands from Japanese occupation, he said, and General Chiang

Kai-shek had himself requested the French government, through the French

Ambassador, M. Naggiar, to make representations at Tokyo in order to persuade

 E-732

Japan not to carry out her threat of occupation. The Trench government,

he added, had made three representations to the Japanese Ambassador in Paris,

and had also made a demarche at the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo. But up

till now Mr. Hirota had not given an assurance, always contending instead

that the matter was within the competence of the Ministry of Navy and that

he would have to wait for its consideration. The British Ambassador in Tokyo

had begged the French Ambassador to insist upon an answer from Hirota on

the grounds that Great Britain, presently looked upon by the Japanese as

the center of hostility against Japan, was not favorably situation in Tokyo.

M. Ldger, continuing, said there was another aspect which might not be

of importance to China, but was of great concern to the French government.

It was the attitude of Siam, which country, being under the influence of

Japan, might easily make trouble for Indochina through Japanese instigation.

He then told me that the French naval attachd, in his conversations with the

Japanese Minister of Navy at Tokyo, had gathered the impression that Japan

would surely take positive measures (occupy the islands) in case Indochina

accorded to China facilities for transit. He said M. Moutet, the Minister

of Colonies, who was working wholeheartedly for China, also received information

from the Governor-General of Indochina expressing his anxiety as to the

possibility of the occupation of Hainan Island by the Japanese. If such

occupation should be effected by the Japanese, he stated, Indochina would

be at Japan’s mercy, as would be the communications between Hongkong and

the mainland and Hongkong and Singapore. France could not deal with such

a contingency, because she had not important vessels nor an air force in

Indochina. As for the other powers, like Great Britain, the United States

and Russia, so far they had not shown much inclination for concerted action

to face the Japanese situation. France would, therefore, in case of

complications with Japan, be obliged to face Japan alone. The Soviet Union,

through its common frontier with Manchuria, could easily take some action
 E-733

to relieve Japanese pressure on China and compel Japan to withdraw a great

part of her troops northward, he added, but it had done nothing yet.

I told M. Ldger that the Soviet Union might well make some demonstration

on her frontier. Then I said there was another aspect of the matter which

should not be lost sight of in dealing with the question of transit facilities

through Indochina: If France were the first to yield to Japanese pressure,

it would convey a very unfavorable impression in the Far East as to French

prestige. I told him I was decidedly of the opinion that, notwithstanding

her threats, Japan would not dare to act against any western power. She

had enough on hand in China and she had to watch the attitude of Soviet

Russia in the North. Japan's was a policy of blackmail, also practised by

certain other nations in Europe. I said I hoped that France would not fall

into its trap .

M. L6ger appeared to be roused by these observations and said that Japan

had never told France directly that she would adopt positive measures. She

had not threatened France in any way, but all sources of information convinced

the French government that Japan would greatly aggravate the state of affairs

by either occupying the islands or bombing the communications inside the

Chinese territory.

I said I felt there was eveiy reason for France to help China as much as

possible so that her resistance against Japanese aggression might eventually

be successful, for if China should fail in her present policy of resistance,

Japanese aggression might go beyond the Chinese frontier and affect others.

Besides, I said, the refusal to accord transit facilities might set a

dangerous precedent for the future, because no one could be sure as to

developments in the years to i ome. It was possible that some day Indochina

might need facilities of transit from the Chinese side.

M. L£ger said he appreciated all these considerations, and they had

led the French government to do much to aid China thus far; nonetheless, the
 1 E-734

question must be viewed from the practical point of view in the light of

the existing circumstances.

I asked whether the witholding of transit facilities through Indochina

was the result of an understanding with Japan in return for an assurance not

to occupy Hainan Island and the Paracels.

M. Leger denied that there was any connection between the two. He said

the two subjects had never been mentioned together. He had no assurance

from Hirota that Japan would not occupy Hainan and the Paracels. He said

it was true that Japan asked the French government about its policy regarding

the supply of arms and munitions to China, but the French government merely

notified Japan of its decision from time to time. It considered the question

of the supply of arms a matter for itself and, therefore, never entered into

discussion with Japan on this subject. However, the French government did

inform the Japanese, as it always did the Chinese.

I said I understood that the French policy in regard to the supply of

war material was to furnish supplies equally to China and Japan. Therefore,

it could not be taken as being particularly helpful to China.

M. L6ger remarked that he understood that Japan did buy from France,

but that the quantity had been considerably less than what China had been

purchasing.

I said that the decision to withhold transit facilities to China would

affect seriously China’s power of resistance against Japanese aggression.

Already a great deal of goods had been accumulated in Singapore awaiting

ships for Indochina; in fact, there were three French ships laden with war

material bound for Chinese ports. I asked whether the decision was definitive,

or whether it was only a provisional act.

M. L6ger seemed to hesitate for a while and then said that, at any rate,

it was definitive for the present. But if the other powers at Brussels were
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 E-735

to adopt a more active attitude and were prepared to undertake more

concerted and energetic action to aid China, the French government would of

course reconsider its decision.

[M. Ldger was of course referring to the pending conference of the

signatory powers of the Nine Power Treaty and other states interested in

the Far East, as proposed and adopted at Geneva by the League of Nations .

Only two days before, the Belgian government, having accepted the

responsibility of being host to the Conference, had sent out invitations

to the parties to the Treaty, suggesting the conferees should meet at

Brussels on October 30, 1937.]

I then asked M. Ldger whether, in view of the shortness of the interval

before the convocation of the Conference, the French government could not

defer its decision until the Conference met. I said the intervening period

would be of the greatest importance to China, because Japan would surely

try to force a rapid victory in order to impress the Conference.

M. Ldger answered that, in fact, the refusal of transit facilities

applied only to arms and munitions and not to airplanes. He added that

this was, of course, a point which he would not like to have announced

from the top of a roof.

I asked whether, in that case, arms could not be carried by airplanes

across the frontier. I said each plane could ordinarily carry at least

two tons, and a score of them could carry 40 or 50 tons. I requested him

to report to M. Delbos what I had told him.

Just at the moment M. Ldger received a telephone call from M. Delbos.

When he put down the phone, he said as he was going to see the Minister,

he would ask him to consider the suggestion about allowing the transportation

of arms and numitions in airplanes across the frontier.

 On October 19, the day following the important conversation with the

Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry in regard to the crucial

question of transit facilities for China, I had an interview with Edwin R.

Wilson, the American Chargd d'Affaires, who came to ask me about the latest

developments in the Sino-Japanese conflict that might be of interest to his

government.

I said that the developments in the military situation had no doubt

come to his attention through the press. But here in Paris, the developments

of the previous day--a verbal notification from the Quai d'Orsay to the

effect that the French government had decided to withold transit facilities

through Indochina for Chinese government supplies and war material--had

caused me a great deal of concern and anxiety. I told him of the conventional

basis of China's right to transit through Indochina and also the contents

of the League Assembly's resolution which recommended that member states,

among other things, not take any measures which might weaken China's power

of resistance and thereby aggravate her difficulties in the present conflict.

I said the Japanese blockade had rendered access to China's coast difficult.

Supplies from abroad, upon which the Chinese forces depended so much, had

to come through Indochina or Hongkong. The refusal of the French government

to allow Chinese supplies to go through Indochina would thus greatly affect

China*s effort at resistance. The French cabinet, I explained, was divided

on the subject. The so-called decision was taken by a meeting of the Council

of National Defence and had to be ratified by the cabinet, which was meeting

again that very morning. Probably there would be an animated discussion

before a final decision was reached.

Mr. Wilson took notes of what I said, especially on the articles of

the Yunnan Railway Agreement and the Sino-French Convention regulating

the relations between Indochina and South China. [Then he raised the subject
fix*.
of his Brussels Conference, which we proceeded to discuss.]
 E-737

[The next day I went to call on the French Foreign Minister. As I

told him, I] had just received a telegram from my government instructing

me to express to M. Delbos its feeling of profound regret and disappointment

at the French government’s decision. I said that, as had been explained

to M. Ldger, the right of transit through Indochina was assured to the

Chinese government implicitly by the agreement for the construction of the

Yunnan Railway and more particularly by the Sino-French Convention of May 18,

1930 of which Article 6 provided that arms, munitions and war materials

belonging to the Chinese government should enjoy in transit through Indochina

exemption from all customs duties. In other words, I said, the French

government's decision, if maintained, would amount to depriving China of a

right which had been assured to her by treaty. I said too that the decision

was all the more surprising because it came after the adoption of the resolution

by the Assembly in Geneva, because the proposed denial of transit facilities

to China’s supplies of war materials would greatly weaken China's power of

resistance. In fact, I said, the telegram from my government stated that

the question of the uninterrupted supply of arms and war materials was one

of life and death to China in her present resistance against aggression.

The refusal of such facilities would mean a terrible blow to her. The

Chinese government, in view of the grave consequences which might flow from

this action, had not made it known to the public in China lest it might have

a very serious repercussion on the fighting forces at the front. I had left

an aide-memoire with M. Ldger on Monday, I added, and hoped that the Minister

had been acquainted with its contents.

M. Delbos, after taking notes of what I had stated, remarked that there

were three considerations which led the French government to take the decision

referred to. In the first place, it was clear that the Japanese, having

repeatedly protested against the use of Indochina for transit, might resort
 E-738

to aerial bombardment of the communications in Indochina, a contingency which

M. Delbos himself did not, however, think was likely to take place. Secondly,

the Japanese were such good spies that it was quite probable they would

employ people to carry out a terrorist campaign by destroying roads and bridges

in Indochina. These works traversing an open, mountainous and sparsely

populated region had cost a great deal of money. It would be relatively

easy for terrorists to carry out their work of such destruction. Then it

was thought also that Siam might make difficulties for Indochina under

Japanese influence or instigation. Thirdly, there was the possibility of

Japan’s occupying Hainan Island, and France would be exposed alone to

complications with Japan, without the backing of Great Britain and the United

States.

M. Delbos, continuing, said he had associated himself with the decision

taken by the government, but he wanted to say frankly that he had not reflected

upon the serious consequences of the decision. Since then he had been informed

of the serious consequences to China and he had asked M. Chautemps, the

President of the Council, to convoke a meeting of the cabinet in order to

re-examine the whole question. The decision had not been taken in any

spirit unfriendly to China, he continued, and asked me to persuade my

government not to misunderstand the spirit of the French government. The

utmost possibility of helping China had been examined. The removal of

the ban on the export of arms from nationalized factories to China as well

as the permission for airplanes to be assembled in Indochina and to fly

over the frontier into China had been designed especially to help China in

compensation for the inconvenience that might result from the refusal of

transit facilities. Of course, he said, such information should be kept

secret .

I said I understood the anxieties of the French as regards the safety

 E-739

of the communications in Indochina. But if it was feared that Japanese

aircraft might bomb Chinese territory^ necessary precautions could be taken

to reinforce air defense. The Shanghai-Nanking Railway, for example, had

been subjected to Japanese air raids almost everyday, yet the Chinese

government had been able to preserve it as a line for the transport of

troops and supplies to the Shanghai front.

M. Delbos said he was thinking more of the probable damage to the

communication of the roads in Indochina. With all vigilance and care, it

fa
would still not be possible to prevent such damage the Japanese were such

good spies, like the Germans in Paris. In fact, he said, a Havafl[jdespatch

from Tokyo indicated that the Japanese knew precisely what had been shipped

to Haiphong for China. He then sent for and showed me the Tokyo despatch

which gave a list of the arms and war materials which had been disembarked

at Haiphong and which were claimed by the Japanese to have been intended

for the Chinese government.

After looking over the list, I remarked that this was the familiar

Japanese game of misrepresenting the situation. As a matter of fact, no

Chinese government shipment had reached Haiphong as yet.

M. Delbos thought it was desirable to take every precaution against

Japanese espionage. He recalled that the Japanese Chargd d’Affaires had

shown to him what Dr. Kung had ordered in France in all its details

from A to Z.

I said I had reported the fact to my government and that old codes

had been replaced with new ones .

Delbos thought that that was a wise move. He said that somewhere

in the government Apartment in Nanking there must be some leakage.

I said I understood that my government had already shot a great number

of people suspected of spying.

 I said it was a question of exercising prudence so as not to cause any

embarrassment to the French government from the Japanese. My government

was prepared and would be glad to cooperate with the French government in

every way possible in order to ensure complete secrecy as regards the

enjoyment of transit facilities.

M. Delbos suggested that an arrangement might be made along the line

which the British government had just made with China. (Instead of making

arrangements through the British Embassy in Nanking and the British government

in London, it was now agreed that the Governor of Hongkong would be authorized

to arrange for the transit of Chinese war materials with the Chinese government

delegate on the spot .)

I said that some such arrangement^ if it was made with France, leaving

it entirely to the local authorities in Indochina to make arrangements with

the Chinese representative on the spot, would relieve the French government

of any embarrassment. The Metropolitan government indeed could take no

notice of what was going on locally.

M. Delbos thought that some way must be found whereby the transit

facilities could be arranged without the knowledge of the French government.

He again noted on a piece of paper what I had suggested as to a local

arrangement. Then he went on to say that it had been asked why, on the eve

of the Brussels Conference, the French government should have taken a

decision which appeared to be unfavorable to China. He thought, however,

that the decision taken might in a way turn out to be a useful argument in

dealing with Japan. If at the Brussels gathering the other Powers decided

to aid China and approve transit facilities of war supplies through their

respective territories, the French government would then find itself in a

much stronger position in according transit facilities to the Chinese

government through Indochina by telling Japan that France had previously

prohibited aich transit but that the Conference itself had made a common
 E-741

decision_, which the French government was obliged to respect and carry out.

I said, in my view, the fact that the conference was approaching was

another reason for not taking any action that would compromise or weaken

China's power of resistance. I said it would be best to leave the situation

as it had been originally, without introducing any unfavorable element in it.

I again pressed for the reconsideration of the decision taken by the French

government.

M. Delbos assured me that it would be re-examined and that he hoped

that a way would be found whereby satisfaction would be given to the

Chinese government. He again begged me to ask my government not to mis­

understand the motive of the French government's action.

The question of transit facilities through Indochina for Chinese

government war supplies was so important in view of the aggravation

caused by the Japanese declaration of a blockade [and by the Japanese

bombing of the Canton-Hankow Railway, ] that I next sought and obtained an

appointment to see M. Camille Chautemps, President of the Council, on

October 22, in order to appeal to him especially for help [and to find out

what decision the cabinet had taken upon re-examining the question.]

[The day before I saw M. Chautemps I received Dr. Rachjman of the

League Secretariat. He called to report on recent developments at Geneva,

but also told me that] M. Ldger was of the opinion that China's resistance

to Japan could not last and Japan was sure to win; so it was senseless to

offend the eventual victor. [On the more positive side, Mr.] Li Yii-ying

phoned from Lyon to tell me that M. Moutet, in the struggle to help China

with transit facilities, had threatened to resign.

My conversation with the French Premier took place in the morning of

the 22nd at his office at Hotel Matignon. I told him at the outset that

the question of uninterrupted supplies from abroad was one of life and death
for the continued Chinese resistance to Japanese aggression. Unlike

Japan, China had no reserve stocks and had to depend upon a constant flow

of supplies from Europe and America. The decision of the French government

not to grant transit facilities had been received by the Chinese government

with a sense of deep disappointment. Nanking was scrupulously keeping the

news away from the public for fear of repercussions on the morale of the

fighting forces at the front. China's right to transit through Indochina

had a conventional basis, I told him, providing the details. I referred to

the resolution of the League Assembly and stated that the refusal to China

of transit facilities through Indochina would greatly weaken China's power

of resistance. I said this was important not only to China herself, but also

to the cause of peace and security in the Far East in general. So far, I

said, China had been resisting Japanese invasion with splendid results; both

in Shanghai and in Shansi Province, Chinese armies had been successful in

keeping the Japanese in check. If China's resistance should fail on account

of the shortage of supplies from abroad, then the danger of Japanese aggression

going beyond China and effecting other countries would increase. I therefore

earnestly requested him to bring about a reconsideration of the decision in

question.

After listening to what I stated, M. Chautemps smiled and remarked that

it seemed to be the fate of France to have her neighbors both in Europe and

in the Far East invaded by foreign aggression. But the so-called decision

was not a decision of the government yet. On account of the absence of a

secretary at the time, the different members of the cabinet did not interpret

the conclusion in the same sense. Therefore, the matter would be the subject

of a discussion by the cabinet that afternoon. In the meantime, he said , M.

Delbos had talked the matter over with M. Moutet several times, and they now

had reached an agreement whereby the Chinese war supplies would be allowed
 E-743

to go through Indochina. Instructions were already en route. Even before

the cabinet took a decision in the afternoon, such materials would be allowed

to land without issuing the regular permits for landing. The only decision

already taken was to leave the whole question of transit through Indochina

in suspense until the Brussels Conference. M. Chautemps further said that

the consideration which led to a desi® to stop transit facilities was the

danger of the destruction of the costly single track in the Indochina-

Yixnnan Railway, which destruction could be easily brought about by bombing

from the air. He understood also that Indochina would practically be the only

channel of supply for China, thereby exposing France alone to Japanese

reprisals. He stated that that was also a preoccupation of the French

government.

I asked whether I understood correctly that, pending the conference to

be held at Brussels, the situation remained as it had, and that supplies

could continue to go through Indochina in transit.

M. Chautemps replied that, in order to be sure not to misinform me,

he wished to telephone to M. Delbos for confirmation. He called up the

Foreign Minister and, after talking for a few seconds, told me his memory

was correct, although he had thought he had only a vague idea. He explained

that pending a formal decision by the cabinet in the afternoon, instructions

had been given to allow supplies to go through, though without the granting

of official permits for them, so that those shipments already en route would

also land without difficulty in Indochina. He went on to explain why the

French government intended to raise the question of the granting of transit

facilities to China through Indochina at the Brussels Conference for a general

decision. He said if that were done and Japan should still complain to

France, the French government could then say it was simply committing itself

by virtue of the joint decision of the Conference. Her action would thus

be covered. If Japan should threaten reprisals against France for such action
the other powers would be under the obligation to extend mutual aid and

assistance to France, who would not have to bear the brunt of Japanese

complaint alone. Pending consideration by the.Conference, if Japan should

complain against the use of Indochina for transit^ the government could say

that the materials were for the use of Indochina herself.

M. Chautemps then paused to say that M. Ldger had sent him a report

on the question, which he had not yet had time to study, but which, with

my permission, he would like to look over. On turning over the report,

which appeared to be five or six typewritten pages long, M. Chautemps said

that, in view of the damage done to the Canton-Hankow Railway, Indochina

appeared to be practically the only channel of transit for China, thereby

exposing France to Japanese reprisals in a way no other power was exposed.

As he came toward the end of the report, he re-emphasized that it was the

intention of the French government to refer the question to the Brussels

Conference so that a common decision might be taken in solidarity with other

countries, applying the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations

to help China. Thereby any action taken by France in granting transit

would be in the nature of collective action with other powers.

r£

I then explained to him that ameliorating the^danger f-^orn^Japanese

bombing in Chinese territory was a matter of reinforcing air defense. The

Shanghai-Nanking Railway connecting Shanghai and Nanking was the principle

artery for the transit of troops and supplies to the Shanghai front. I

pointed out that it had been daily attacked by Japanese aircraft, but that,

owing to China's air defense, the railway still remained intact for service.

M. Chautemps said he thought the other powers were not doing as much

as France. The Soviet Union had vital interests in the Sino-Japanese

conflict and should, in his opinion, be aiding China more than any other

country. Yet she appeared to be doing nothing to help China, and was only
 E-745

carrying on propaganda to force other countries to aid the Chinese.

I told him that, in fact, Soviet Russia had begun to aid China with

materials of different sorts. When M. Chautemps asked me how these materials

were transported to China, I said that there were two routes; the overland

route to the common Sino-Soviet frontier and the sea route through Indochina.

M. Chautemps appeared to be a little disturbed and said that if Russian

supplies were also going through Indochina, then surely it would be looked

upon as a hostile act because of the relations between Japan and Soviet

Russia. He feared that reprisals might follow at once.

I tried to reassureM. Chautemps by saying that the Russian supplies

were also going through Hongkong. For the present they would have to go

through Indochina because the Canton-Hankow Railway was temporarily under

repair. But the repair would not take too long. As soon as it was completed.

Russian supplies would again go through Hongkong. I suggested [to M.

Chautemps as I had to M. Ldger ] that the French government, in order not to

be embarrassed, might make an arrangement along the lines of that which the

Chinese government had already made with the British government as regards

transit through Hongkong. That is to say, all matters relating to transit

through Indochina, should be handled by the local authorities with the

Chinese representative on the spot, without referring the matter to Paris

for action.

M. Chautemps took note of what I said. He remarked that Mr. Bullit,

the American Ambassador in a conversation with him the day before also

expressed surprise at the decision of the French government to refuse transit

facilities to Chinese supplies. Mr. Bullitt had said that he would report

to his government. But, M. Chautemps added, he had told the American

Ambassador how the matter really st^od, and that the French government had

decided to propose the question for consideration by the Brussels Conference.

Then Chautemps suggested that I should meet Mr. Bullitt and try to explain

to him the actual situation and disabuse him of the impression that the French

government had alone decided to make a show of weakness before Japan. He

said that that was not the intention of the French government^ which merely

wished to avoid being exposed alone. If the forthcoming conference should

decide in favor of aiding China generally and approve the grant of transit

facilities^ France would not hesitate to continue to allow these facilities.

I told M. Chautemps that I knew the American government was much

interested in the Far East and also in the impending conference at Brussels.

[I tried to counter his impression that President Roosevelt and the United

States were not going to live up to the level of the President's Chicago

speech, ]

M. Chautemps then told me that Mr. Bullitt had shown a great deal of

interest in the question of transit for Chinese supplies through Indochina.

He said he hoped that China would not merely send French and Russian goods

through Indochinaand that it would be well als^/send some of the British

and American supplies by the same route, so that it would be clear to Japan

that Indochina was really an international channel of supply for China.

[At that time Ambassador Bullitt had just returned to Paris from the

United States. In fact, as I knew he was about to return, I had telephoned

to Edwin Wilson, the American Chargd d'Affaires, on the 2lst to ask him to

speak to Mr. Bullitt about the French attitude on transit and to request

Bullittt to put in a word with the French. On the 22nd, after seeing M.

Chautemps, I] telephoned to Mr. Bullitt to thank him for his intervention

with the French about the transit question. [We arranged to meet for] a

tete-a-tete luncheon and confidential exchange of views the following day.

On seeing the American Ambassador, I again expressed my appreciation

of his timely intervention on the question of transit.

 E-747

He told me that he had seen M. Delbos subsequently, on the evening of

the 22nd. M. Delbos had told him the French government had now decided to

submit the question of transit facilities at the Brussels Conference, but,

pending such submission, the French government would continue to accord

transit facilities to all Chinese shipments already on route. He said

M. Delbos had asked him to pass the information on to me, knowing of the

projected meeting between us, and emphasized the advisability of keeping

this information very confidential. Mr. Bullitt then told me his understanding

from M. Delbos as to the object of bringing up the question at Brussels,

namely, that if a general decision was made in favor of granting such transit

facilities, France would be able to call upon the other powers for support

in case of complications with Japan arising from her grant of transit.

I explained to Mr. Bullitt as regards a cover for the French in

granting transit, that there was not only the League resolution, which would

not countenance France’s refusal to accord such facilities, but also a

special convention between China and France of 1930, which assured China

of the transit of Chinese war materials through Indochina. I therefore

expressed the hope that the United States would render as mcuh support as

possible to China's position, when the question was raised at Brussels.

The American Ambassador expressed his admiration for China's resistance

and said that this time China had really raised her prestige in the whole

world. He considered the resistance to be magnificent and asked confidentially

how long, in my view, China could hold out and how much she really depended

on supplies from abroad.

I gave him the information I had and stated that continued supplies

were essential to China's resistance in any case, and that with the Japanese

blockade ofChina's coast, it was becoming more and more necessary to depend

upon Indochina as a channel of transit.

 Mr. Bullitt asked whether the Russians were helping China much and

whether they could not send their supplies to China overland.

I told him that since the adoption of the resolution by the League of

Nations in Geneva, giving a cover to Soviet Russia for help to China,

Russia had commenced extending us help rather seriously. It was quite

probable that some airplanes had already arrived in the North overland.

However, it was still necessary to send the bulk of supplies by sea, because

of the lack of facilities and roads.

Mr. Bullitt remarked that, from the information he had, he gathered

the impression thct Soviet Russia was not really helping China as much

as she could. In his opinion, Russia wanted to see the war dragged out to

exhaust Japan. In all events, he said, military assistance from Russia was

out of the question. When I said that had been my understanding for six

months, Mr. Bullitt said the Russians could not be trusted and one could

not depend upon what they said; they had a habit of telling different

people different things. Still I told him it was probable that Russia

would arrange some demonstration on the Mongolian frontier.

Four days later I had occasion to speak with Soviet Ambassador Souritz.

Toward the end of our talk I brought up the French intention to raise the

question of transit facilities through Indochina for Chinese war supplies

at the Brussels Conference. I told him of the recent refusal of the French

government to accord such facilities, my efforts to persuade the French

government to alter its decision and the modus viyendi reached to leave the

situation open and to continue to accord such transit facilities pending

the submission of the question by the French delegation to the Conference.

M. Souritz said that the grant of such facilities to China by France

was quite in accord with the spirit of the resolution adopted in Geneva at
 E-749

the beginning of the month. I commented that it was not only in accord

with the recently-adopted League resolution^ but also with a special convention

concluded between China and France in 1930, which assured China of such

facilities.

Mr. Souritz thought, however, that if the question were brought

before the Brussels Conference, it might mean the reopening of the

question which had already been settled in Geneva. (I understood him to

mean the question of whether the member states ought to aid China as

much as possible and refrain from doing anything which might be of assistance

to Japan.) He said that since an affirmative decision at Brussels was out

of the question, with Germany and Italy participating in the conference,

it would merely amount to the annulment of the force of the League

resolution.

I explained that the Japanese blockade made it necessary for the

concentration of Chinese war supplies to go through Indochina for transit

to China, and, in the French view, exposed France to Japanese complications.

I told him it was my understanding that Japan had repeatedly protested

and even made threats to bomb the railway in Indochina and occupy certain

islands near the Indochinese coast. I said that if such threats were carried

out, France would be exposed alone, and therefore hoped that a general

decision would be taken at the Brussels Conference, so that, in case of

difficulties arising from the Japanese side, France could call upon the

other powers to support her in dealing with Japan. I then told M. Souritz,

it was in this connection that France had asked several times what use

was being made of the land frontier with Soviet Russia.

M. Souritz said the attitude of the French delegation at Geneva had

 E-750

led him to think that French policy was probably determined by the con­

sideration that while a Japanese victory would be undesirable from the

French point of view, a Chinese victory might give rise to a movement for

independence in Indochina, which would be equally undesirable for France.

M. Souritz then told me that he had spoken to M. Delbos of M. Lagarde’s

attitude at Geneva, which had impressed him (Souritz) as being strange.

M. Delbos had told him that he had known nothing of it, and even asked

what M. Paul-Boncour1s attitude was. (M. Paul-Boncour was the chief

French delegate to the Assembly at Geneva and M. Lagarde was his deputy.)

But, M. Souritz added, M. Delbos himself was quite sympathetic toward China.

I told M. Souritz that the Chinese delegation was very much dissatisfied

with M. Lagarde's attitude in Geneva on the Sino-Japanese question. His

intervention was always favorable to Japan and unfavorable to China.

[Around that same time I again heard from Mr. Li Yii-ying. He telephoned

to say that M. Moutet had insisted, by threat of resignation, on the question

of transit, [which helped bring about the altered decision.] Li also said
/f a.«C flCtX
M. Blum s-aid the previous decision was no decision at all. Moreover, if
A
the cabinet had not given in to M. Moutet, the latter would have gone to

the public over the controversy.

[According to Li Yii-ying, Ministers] Moutet and Cot were also working

on a scheme to provide [airplane] assembling factories in Indochina. As

for M. Herriot, he was still strongly for collaboration with the Soviet

Union, as well as for setting up small factories to begin manufacturing

[supplies ^]. He was looking for someone to go to Moscow before or

after Li Yii-ying himself.

[I spoke to Mr. Norman Davis and Dr. Stanley Hornbeck, the same day,

October 28. Mr. Davis had been appointed chief United States delegate to

the Brussels conference and Dr. Hornbeck was his deputy. They were on
 E-751

their way to the Belgian capital for the conference^ which naturally

formed the substance of our conversation.]

[In discussing China's goals at the conference, a subject I will return

to, I inevitably stated China's belief that the powers should decide to and

then do something concrete, witholding aid and assistance to Japan and

extending to China such aid and assistance including war supplies and the

facilities to transport them to China. In this regard, I told Mr. Davis

that] the French government might bring up the question of transit facilities

at the Brussels Conference for a general decision.

Dr. Hornbeck then asked whether there was anything coming across the

Northwest from Soviet Russia.

I said certain things were coming across the land frontier, but the

most bulky ones had to go by sea. Some materials were now en route and

others were being readied. But due to the lack of transportation, it would

still take some time before they could be transported. When they asked me

what bulky things must be shipped by sea, I said tanks and heavy guns.

Mr. Davis, however, said that what China needed most were machine guns

and airplanes, and Dr. Hornbeck added that tanks were not of much use as

had been shown in the Shanghai fighting.

I said that in Shanghai there were many creeks and pools, but in the

North they would be useful because there were vast plains upon which they

could be effectively used.

Dr. Hornbeck thought they could be used after the ground was frozen.

Mr. Davis thought that the heavy guns did not matter very much.

I told him that they were not of much use in defense, but in offense

they were necessary, as had been proven in recent fighting. Whenever the

Japanese started an offensive, they did it by battering the Chinese position

first with heavy guns.

 E-752

[Our conversation shifted back to the possibilities of the Conference

its&f.] Mr. Davis thought that mediation and positive measures were

irreconcilable at any one time, and only after mediation failed could the

question of positive measures be taken up. [This was not very promising

with regard to a favorable decision by the conference on the transit

question. M. Ldger himself was to tell me a few days later that he was

personally of the opinion that positive measures could more appropriately

be discussed at Geneva.]

[I sawM. Ldger, Secretary-General of the Foreign Office, on October

30, the eve of my departure for Brussels to head the Chinese delegation to

the Nine power Treaty Conference. We spoke of the prospects of the conference,

the French attitude towards it and the French intention to raise the transit

question at Brussels.

I mentioned what M. Delbos had told me the previous week in this

regard, and stated that it had since occured to me that, in view of the

presence of certain powers at the conference, which might presumably take

the side of Japan, it would be inadvisable to raise the question of transit

for Chinese war supplies through Indochina formally at the conference

because it was not likely to be unanimously approved. Those countries

which were pro-Japanese would surely raise objections and that would

make the situation worse than it was. Therefore it would be better merely

to talk it over with the principal powers interested outside the Conference.

M. Ldeer took note of this observation and remarked that certain powers
fli /£*/
were sure to obiect to it. It was necessary to see to it that nothing was

done which would weaken or invalidate what had been accomplished in Geneva

for the purpose of helping China. He then stated that he himself thought

that logically the question of taking positive measures or sanctions should

be discussed in Geneva and not at the conference.' On the situation relating

 E-753

r /
U• %
to the question of transit, Jae* reqliested me to ask my government not to

misunderstand the sentiment of the French government, which had in no way

changed its friendly character towards China. The decision, of which he

had spoken to me before, was rather one of a theoretical character. In

practice, the French government had decided to allow all supplies, which

had already been ordered, to go through Indochina without any hindrance.

He understood that certain airplanes had already flown over the Indochinese

frontier. As regards arms, munitions and other war supplies, he said they

were to be allowed to pass through Indochina as part of the orders for

internal consumption.

What mattered to China, inM. Ldger’s view, was the practical result

and not the theoretical principle. He said M. Delbos had telegraphed

to M. Naggiar, the French Ambassador in Nanking, asking him to explain to

the Chinese government and especially to Marshal Chiang Kai-shek that the

French government had in no way wished to alter its sentiment of friendliness

and helpfulness to China and that if it was going to bring the question to

Brussels, it would be doing that in a spirit of international solidarity

and cooperation.

I said that I had already cabled explaining the attitude of the French

government, and that I was glad to have it confirmed again by M. Ldger.

I said it was necessary and gratifying to know, as I had already understood

from M. Delbos and M. Chautemps, that not only supplies from France were to

be allowed to go through Indochina but materials ordered from all quarters

pending a settlement of the question with the other powers.

M. Ldger agreed, saying that what had led the French government to

hesitate at first was the practical consideration of possible Japanese

action. He understood that Japanese airplanes had already flown over

certain parts of Kwangsi Province, and that at present a Japanese detachment

 E - 7 54

had landed at Pakhoi, though it could not make much headway with Pakhoi

as a base. On the other hand^ he said^ if ths Japanese should occupy

Hainan Island and the Paracels, they would surely make them into military

and aerial bases for operations on the mainland. In such a case, a landing

effected at Pakhoi would be able to penetrate further inland. Any such

development would merely prejudice China's interests rather than help her.

It was out of a desire to avoid these unfavorable developments that the

French government was anxious for a time to reconsider the question of

transit through Indochina for Chinese supplies .

[I thanked M. Ldger for his explanation before raising a few more

points with regard to the Brussels Conference, which was then scheduled to

open on November 3, 1937. In fact, I left by car for Brussels early the

next afternoon.]

[The ride through the European countryside,]some of which had formed

the battlefields of World War I, led me to reflect that although the youthfulness

of the trees and the relative newness of the buildings still told the story

of the razing to the ground of the old towns during the war, the world had

learned little from it. A new war was in the atmosphere everywhere.

'pakhoi is a port town in western Kwantung Province, below Kwangsi. To

the west was northern Indochina; to the southeast was Hainan Island.
s
V

This memoir was made possible by grants

from the Ford Foundation and the National
Fndowment for the Humanities to Columbia
University for the East Asian Institute.

Copyright C 1076. The Trustees of Columbia

University in the City of New York. All
rights reserved. This work may be cited
and brief passages may be quoted as with
any scholarly work, but the memoir may not
be published, nor sold, nor otherwise re­
produced in any form without written ner-
nission from the Fast Asian Institute of
Columbia University, New York, New York 10027.
Part E. 1937; A Crucial Year in Europe and the
Far East;
January-December 1937

5. The Brussels Conference on the Sino-

Japanese Conflict:
October-November 1937

a) The Background of the Conference:

October 1937
5. The Brussels Conference

a) The Background of the Conference

The operations that the Japanese carried on in China after the Lukouchiao

incident made rapid progress and extended even to the area of Shanghai and

its vicinity, evidently with the design of overthrowing the Kuomintang

government in Nanking altogether. The Chinese government, however, took a firm

stand, quite different from that taken by the Chinese authorities in Manchuria

and Nanking after the Mukden incident. It decided to put up a real resistance.

Military operations took place in the north and in and around Shanghai.

The resistance put up by the Chinese military forces in the Shanghai

area was able to check the progress of the Japanese at first. The line of

defense built by the government’s military forces with the help of the German

military experts proved to be effective for quite a while. In fact, initially

the Japanese were pushed back, because the Chinese forces engaged in this

resistance were the best the government was able to send forward.

The evident intention of the Japanese militarists then was to occupy

and to dislodge the Chinese government from Nanking, and to gain control along

the coast, in the hope of bringing down the government altogether effecting

a settlement in favor of Japan. Therefore, after Nanking's effective

resistance, they kept on increasing and reinforcing their forces with the

determination to overcome the Chinese resistance. On top of that they

started bombing heavily populated centers, like Shanghai, Nanking and Canton,

causing a great deal of civilian casualties. That was one thing which greatly

aroused world opinion.

Under these conditions^China was most anxious to intensify her efforts

to enlist not only the sympathy of the Western powers, but also their increased

aid and cooperation. China lost no time in bringing the case before the

League of Nations once more and asking that effective measures be taken by

the League to restrain the Japanese militarists.

 E-756

I remeniber^ in presenting China's case, I laid special emphasis on the

total disregard of the Japanese militarists of the laws of the international

community against bombing undefended towns, such as Chinese cities along the

coast and populous centers like Shanghai, which contained foreign settlements.

The Chinese delegation, which I led, insisted that positive measures be

taken by the League to restrain the Japanese. But while the situation

aroused a great deal of sympathy, it was evident that the League itself and

the great powers which were members of the League would not adopt any

effective measures [in view of the League's recent experience and of the

greatly-troubled European situation.]

[At the same time, since] the second phase of Japanese aggression was

a continuation of Japan's so-called continental policy of expansion along

the lines of the Tanaka Memorial, it naturally caused great apprehension

on the part of China. This time the Chinese people rallied to the support

of the government in a way that showed that the movement for political unification

had progressed very far compared with the situation existing at the time

of the Mukden incident. But the most that Geneva was able to offer the

Chinese people was [the adoption of the Advisory Committee's reports declaring

Japan a treaty violater and a resolution enjoining] the members of the League

not to take any measures which would prejudice China's cause or reduce her

power of resistance, and to consider how far they could individually go

in extending aid to China . [The second report also provided that the Assembly

should, as its first step, invite the members of the League who were parties

to the Nine Power Treaty to initiate consultation, as provided for under

Article VII of that Treaty, between themselves and other states with special

interests in the Far East, to seek an end to the Sino-Japanese conflict "by

agreement." The Assembly of the League adopted these proposals on October 6,

bfoc ciifi,
1937.] On 0G'tober~.6 the Assembly adopted both reports along with an

appropriate resolution setting out the essential recommendations.

 E-757

It was only two days earlier, at the near midnight meeting of the

Advisory Committee's Subcommittee, that the holding of a conference on the

basis of the Nine power Treaty was first proposed by Lord Cranborne on

behalf of the British delegation. The discussions had been going on for

hours, without the participants being able to reach any definite conclusions,

while the Chinese delegation, of which I was the spokesman, had kept on

pressing them for some effective action. [In fact I had just made a definite

proposal to spur some sort of commifcfcal by the League members to concrete

action to try and stop the Japanese aggression, when Lord Cranborne made the

proposal, to the surprise of practically everybody at the meeting, that the

question could best be handled by a conference to be called on the basis

of the Nine Power Treaty of Washington, or more specifically, on the basis

of Article VII of that Treaty. That article provided for full and frank

consultation among the signatory powers in regard to any situation that

might arise in Asia requiring attention. Leland Harrison, the American

Minister to Switzerland, who was designated to be an observer at the

meetings of the Advisory Committee and its subcommittee, was present, but

he was visibly surprised when the proposal was made, just as surprised as

the other members of the subcommittee [who did not expect then and there to

be presented with a definite proposal that the matter be taken out of the

hands of the Leauge and taken up by the said special conference.]

Obviously, the British proposal provided a way, so to speak, of throwing

the hot potato in the basket of the Washington Treaty, which really meant

into the lap of the United States government. When I asked Mr. Harrison

what he thought of the proposal, whether the idea had been discussed in

Washington and whether the United States government was made aware of it

[beforehand by London,] he said as far as he knew, nothing at all had been

 received from Washington^ ^in the last few days ^ f*concerning this idea."

[Actually of course the proposal had its history.] As far as China

was concerned, this idea of handling the matter through the Washington

Treaty had originated [independently] and had the support of the Chinese

government. Soon after the Lukouchiao incident occurred, the government was

hard put, on one si;1e, to meet the Japanese aggression with determined resistance

and, on the other side, to redouble its efforts to enlist the support and

aid of the friendly powers. As regards the latter, it was evident that two

categories of help were needed: 1) aid aid support in concrete form, such a

financial credit, arms and munitions; and 2) the concerted action of the

powers in siding with China and bringing combined pressure upon Tokyo to

modify its policy, which meant some form of international action.

Hard put to think of some way to deal with the situation, the Nanking

government, in order to effect the second point, proposed to look over the

treaties relating to China and the Far East. Among such treaties, the

Washington Treaty was one which provided for mutual consultation in the event

that any serious situation arose affecting the interests of the powers concerned.

In this case a breach in the observance of Article I of the Treaty, providing

for respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, was

directly involved. The Washington Treaty also had the obvious advantage

of including the United States among its signatories. Certainly it was

this consideration which led me personally to recommend reference to it

to the government in Nanking, in the circumstances prevailing in early

July 1937.]
i<
[When later at Brussels I sounded out Dr. Stanley Hornbeck of the American
delegation, telling him] I had the suspicion at first that London had consulted
Washington before the proposal was made by Cranborne, he said London did not
do so. He said, as the question had been brought up earlier, Washington
had already cabled to Mr . Harrison, telling him that the American government
did not approve of it. [This conversation with Hornbeck took place on November
17, 1937].
 E-759

At any rate, the idea of holding a conference based on the Nine Power

Treaty was conceived of and raised [on the Chinese side in July 1937.]

However, no formal proposal was made. The conversations [with foreign

governments] that took place--[for example, between French Foreign Minister

Delbos and myself on July 26th and 28th when I first mentioned a round-table

discussion of the signatories to the Nine Power Treaty and subsequently stated

that my government was contemplating proposing such a conference--] were

all of a confidential nature and informal character, in order to get the

maximum amount of sympathy and cooperation from the powers. Thus, this

idea of utilizing the WashingtcnTreaty was mentioned by the Chinese Ambassador

in Washington and by myself, first, in referring to the attitude of caution

and discretion adopted by Washington at the time, and then in discussing

possibilities for future action.

It will be also recalled that there were several references among the

delegates to the League to the related but more general idea of holding

a conference of Pacific powers. This happened just after the Council of

the League passed the Sino-Japanese question on to the Advisory Committee

for discussion and before that Committee actually met for the purpose.

Thus one may recall that on September 20, 1937 Soviet Foreign Commissar

Litvinov, in a talk with Dr. H. H. Kung, suggested a conference of the

Pacific powers to reinforce the action of the League of Nations. One may

further recall that on September 21 Mr. Bruce, the Australian representative,

in his speech to the Assembly, also advocated a conference of the Pacific

powers to deal with the Far Eastern situation. Bruce states:

In the conflict now being waged in East Asia not only League states
but great states outside the League have direct and vital interests.
Surely the action that would be, in the words of Article No. 11 [of the
Covenant], 'wise and effective[' ] at this stage would be for the Council
to endeavor to arrange for a conference of the powers most vitally
concerned in the position in the Far East, whether members of the
League or not, with a view to such a conference getting in touch with
the countries concerned in the dispute and endeavoring to arrange some
settlement or concerting such measures as may be necessary and practicable.
 [That same day, I took Dr. Kung to see French Foreign Minister Delbos.

At one point in the conversation, Dr. Kung referred to the idea of having

a conference of the Pacific powers having direct interest in the Far East

in order to deal more directly with the Far Eastern problem. Dr. Kung

said that such a conference should not try to replace the League of Nations

or the Advisory Committee, but reinforce them. Being a smaller body composed

of those powers possessing interests in the Far East, he said, it might be

able to act more rapidly and effectively, expressing the hope that the French

government would approve such an idea and concert efforts with Soviet Russia

and Great Britain, both of whom had indicated their approval.

The French Foreign Minister said that such a conference would be

entirely in conformity with France's desires and wishes, but that once

again, here as in other matters concerning the Far East, American participation

and collaboration would be indispensable. The French government would

naturally try to concert efforts with the other powers, but he hoped China

would also use her influence in Washington to obtain American approval.

[At the Advisory Committee meeting that evening there was some discussion

of bringing about a conference of the powers interested in the Far East,

outside of the League but its action. However, this idea was

soon discarded in favor of another, the setting up of a subcommittee of

the Advisory Committee and asking the United States to participate in it,

which idea was soon carried out. Thus] while the British Dominions group

had intimated the desirability of holding a conference of Pacific powers,

they did not make any definite proposals, nor was serious attention paid

to the intimation before Lord Cranborne launched the idea at the meeting

of the Advisory Committee about two weeks later.

It is likely that by that time there had been a lot of discussion

amongst the Dominion representatives in regard to the proposal as made by

Bruce. Surely Ambassador Quo T'ai-ch'i had already brought up the idea
 E-761

with British Foreign Secretary Eden. Great Britain and the Dominions were

groping for some definite idea. They were aware of the situation in the

Far East and at heart, were sympathetic to the Chinese cause. But they

were more aware of the situation in Europe and the limited capacity of

Great Britain to do anything effective, because of the dispersion of the

British navy in five sections scattered all over the world. They were anxious,

therefore, to enlist the active cooperation of the United States, an idea

they held to throughout.

I think at that time not only Great Britain and Australia, but also

France and Soviet Russia all thought that, in the international situation

at the time, only the United States had its hands free and had the necessary

power and influence to do something effective. That was the reason why

Captain Bruce, head of the Asutralian delegation, brought forward this idea

at the Assembly meeting of the League on the 21st of September, and two

weeks later the British put forward a more concrete proposal in the same vein.

[The result was that the Assembly of the League, on October 6 unanimously

adopted the two reports of the Far Eastern Advisory Committee, the second

of which suggested that the League invite those members of the League who

were parties to the Nine Power Treaty to initiate at the earliest possible

moment the consultationand full and frank communication provided for by that

Treaty. Of course, it also suggested, with a view to involving the United

States, that other states with special interests in the Far East should, if

possible, be associated with this work.]

[On October 6, even before the Assembly met to adopt the proposal, I

was conferring with my assistants on the procedure to be followed in initiating

the ''consultation." Then I had a tajk with Lord Cranborne on the same subject.
&
& bo recalled Ll’rarl he told me he had already talked with Foreign
A
Secretary Eden on the telephone and that he assured me I need have no qualms

about delay.
 [On October 7 I had further meetings with my assistants.] I

proposed that we should adopt two lines of action in preparation for "consultation.

One, on the supposition that Japan would come to the proposed conference^ we

should have a concrete plan of settlement of the Manchurian problem, the

North China question and the general question of conflict between China and

Japan, etc. Two, on the supposition that Japan would not attend, we should

have a plan for establishing a united front of China and the other principal

powers and for concluding a regional pact of non-aggression and mutual aid, etc.

[Dr. Koo: Were you feeling unusually optimistic in view of President

Roosevelt's Chicago quarantine speech having just been delivered on October

5, 1937? C.S.]
’ 4 ; <:

In the morning of October 8, I convened a meeting of our delegation

in Geneva, and discussed with Ambassadors King and Tsien Tai and Minister
i • :'■ ■ ■! ft :
Victor Hoo, \ancl the question of non-aggression and mutua 1 aid ^ Georges

Padoux, French advisor to the delegation. Finally I was to take up the

question of policy and decision myself. Then I left for Paris. It was

shortly after noon.

[Several days later I received a letter from Ambassador Wunsz with

A
two enclosures, one, suggested headings in connection with the economic and

financial aspects of our problems for my approval, and two, a cable from

Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Hsu Mo, dated October 9, 1937. It stated:]

The resistance in the North is unsuccessful...but the highest

military authority believes it difficult for the enemy to penetrate
the long-prepared defense line south of the Yellow River.... We are
still holding out in the Shanghai front and the gallantry of the defenders
is indeed exemplary. The enemy cannot reach Nanking without breaking
three strong defense lines--Soochow, Wusih and Chinkiang--which cannot
be done without more heavy reinforcements and more sacrifices.

Government leaders, disappointed at the failure of sanctions,

now anxiously await the deliberations of the Nine Power Conference.
Personally I am of the opinion that whatever measures, including a non­
recognition policy and even economic sanctions, [might be taken,] short
of a united, strong stand backed by threats of force, will not deter
 E-763

Japan. The only feasible policy [for China] at present consists in

stubborn resistance moving world opinion and action against Japan.

If the powers mediate with concrete reasonable terms, we will

accept though Japan will certainly reject....

[As I told Ambassador King in my letter of reply, ] I agreed with Hsu

Mo’s view as to our feasible policy at present. [I added that] the latest

indications of Japan’s attitude seemed to have been influenced by the

developments in Europe, especially the attitude of Italy and Germany, and

that it still remained to be seen whether Japan would attend the conference.

[My letter was sent out on October \k, 1937.]

At this point I would like to give a brief picture of both the

Lk u. P'":
international situation/ftoward the ead^f 1937 ] and the policy and attitude
A
of the powers vis-&-vis what the Japanese called the China incident, but

what, in the eyes of China, was a flagrant policy of aggression. This account

[is necessary in order to understand the atmosphere in which the Nine power

Treaty Conference was held, ] and all the more necessary in order to understand

how and why the Conference eventually failed.

Some of the cables I sent to Nanking from Paris are very informative

in this regard.] Thus, on October 8 I sent a cable to the Waichiaopu

containing some observations on the international situation as it related

to the Sino-Japanese conflicts, based on press clippings which I reviewed

on arrival in Paris that day. I said that the Italian press had come out

openly for Japan. Virginio Gayda, Mussolini's spokesman, considered Japan's

actions in China to be in defense of legitimate interests and a "work of

purification." Mussolini himself had writtai in Popol d’ltalia that Japan's

method of penetration into China was legitimate. I therefore suggested

to the Waichiaopu that representations by the Chinese Embassy in Rome might

possibly have some restraining effect. [Turning next to the question of

American views,] I said that isolation die-hards, like Senators Borah and Nye,
in Washington also needed special attention lest President Roosevelt's

stand be totally nullified. [(I was referring to the President's stand as

expressed in his Chicago speech of October 5.)] I suggested that personal

visits by our Ambassador to Washington, Dr. C. T. Wang, and a supply of

suitable literature on the Sino-Japanese conflict might be of some use in

eliciting sympathy in Washington over China's precarious situation.

[As to the French attitude, I felt a little uneasy that it could and

would not remain firm, in its support of China, limited as that support was,

in the fac‘f of Japanese pressure. This has already been suggested in the

previous section on aid and transit facilities for China. There were other

indications.]

On October 9, I cabled the gist of a confidential report that I had

just received to the effect that, at the French cabinet meeting the day

before, the Minister of Marine had requested a special credit of 350 million

francs to send a fleet to reinforce French naval forces in Indochina to

forestall any untoward incident along the coast of Indochina in view of

the Japanese threat. The French cabinet, however, had taken no decision because

of the Finance Minister's opposition. The Minister had opposed the

proposal on the ground of national economy. The report further stated that

the cabinet was also divided on the question of French policy toward Italy.

The latest word was that the pacific elements in the cabinet prevailed and

that the government had decided it would talk with Italy in spite of her

rejection of the original French proposal to discuss the Spanish situation

once again in the Non-Intervention Committee in London.

My cable went on to say that the real French attitude and policy not

only on the European problem, but also on the Far Eastern problem could be

clearly inferred from an address which the French Premier made at the American

Club in Paris. The gist of the Premier's speech was that Roosevelt's address
 E-765

in Chicago would make a deep and lasting impression on the world and that

it had enunciated all the principles to which France herself was passionately

attached. France believed that the life of a nation^, like that of an

individual^ was based upon permanent laws of right and morality. Betrayal

of the contractual or given word, or any deliberate attack against the

integrity of a nation or the liberty of a people, gravely affected the

interests of other peoples and, indeed, of peace as a whole. To prevent

such abuses, the Premier said, isolated action by any single nation was

futile and dangerous. Only the firm, concerted determination of all the
#
1
pacific nations would provide ^surmountable obstacles to any aggression

against international law. (The Premier emphasized that it was a source

of the greatest encouragement to France, therefore, that these principles

expressing the general conscience should be proclaimed as sovereign authority

by the head of the world's most powerful state.

I added in my cable that the French Foreign Minister had expressed

to the American Chargd d'Affaires in Paris the French government's gratitude

for Mr. Roosevelt's declaration. The effect of the President's message in

France, I said, was all the greater because of its unexpected sternness

of language, especially since it was assumed that even a man of less

political acumen than Roosevelt would speak thus only when certain of the

nation's support. The popular verdict here in France, I concluded, was

that Roosevelt offered to the democratic nations an opportunity which must

be seized now or never.

In short, not only French official reaction to President Roosevelt's

Chicago speech, but also the view of the French public, as reflected in the

French press, indicated clearly that, at bottom, France was feeling uneasy

in light of the deteriorating situation in Europe and felt that the only safeguard

lay in the interest and willingness of the United States to join in a common
effort to preserve a peace of the world. [This attitude was shared by other

western democracies.]

The attitude of the European powers in general was complicated by the

situation in Spain, where Generalissimo Franco had taken up arms to overthrow

the liberal Spanish regime. [To review the situation there very briefly,]

Franco was supported by Germany with military aid in the form of advisors,

materials and arms, and by Italy, whereas Soviet Russia was on the side of

the new government, which was then generally believed to be Communist inclined.

Great Britain and France, both very interested in the Spanish situation,

were anxious to bring about a settlement of the Spanish problem. They had

tried to maintain a policy of non-intervention in Spain in line with the

Non-Intervention Committee in London. [But "non-intervention" had proved

unworkable in the absense of cooperation by all the powers involved and

seemed on the point of being totally discarded.]

[When on October 12, I questioned the Assistant-Director for Asian

Affairs at the Quai d’Orsay about the Spanish situation,] M. Hoppenot

said that Hitler's refusal had rendered the situation more difficult (that

is to say, the refusal to adhere to the policy of non-intervention).

However, the drift of opinion in the French government was in favor of not

immediately opening the Pyrennes frontier for the sending of arms and war

materials into Spain, but rather in favor of making another attempt at

negotiations through the Non-Intervention Committee in London.

[I asked French Foreign Minister Delbos^ on October 15,] what he

thought of the Spanish question and the Mediterranean situation. I said I

hoped that the concession France and Great Britain had made to Italy on

the question of procedure might facilitate a settlement of the whole problem,

which would in turn have a salutary effect upon the Far Eastern situation.

Mr. Delbos said that France and Great Britain wanted to give Italy

another chance to come to an agreement, but that he was not very optimistic.
 E-767

He thought there was not much hope of a general settlement coming out of

the proposed meeting of the Non-Intervention Committee. He had the impression

that Italy wanted to remain in Spain. When I remarked to him that the

Italian insistence upon referring the question of the Spanish situation

back to the Committee of Non-Intervention in London might have been due to

her desire to gain time in order to obtain a final victory for Franco, M.

Delbos thought that was precisely what Mussolini had in mind.

On the position of France and Great Britain in regard to the Spanish

situation as it was connected with the holding of a conference to seek a

settlement of the so-called China question in the Far East, the comment of

Mr. Souritz, Soviet Ambassador in Paris, made to me when I called on him on

October 27, seemed to be very much to the point. I was eager to understand

the significance of the Spanish question in connection with the general

world situation and in its bearing upon the Far East, and therefore had

raised a number of questions about this matter .

M. Souritz said the Pyrenees frontier was of vital importance to France.

It used to be a frontier that was hardly defended at all, with a friendly

Spain on the other side. But Germany's assistance to Franco was for the

purpose of detaching Spain from France. Germany’s activities in Spain and

in the Mediterranean in collaboration with Italy were also for the purpose

of cutting off the relations between metropolitan France and her African colonies.

According to Mr. Souritz, such a situation was really of grave significance

to France as well as to Great Britain, whose strategic position at Gibraltar

was also thieatened. But it did not seem to him that France and Great Britain

whose strategic position at Gibraltar was also threatened---- But it did nnt

f-p him Frfinrft had fully realized the significance

of the whole matter. That was the Russian point of view, about which I will

have more to say later.

 [Earlier on October 16, I had a reply from Ambassador Quo Tai-chi in

London to my inquiry as to the latest British position and attitude. He

said] although the British government professed to share China's desire for

the Nine Power Conference to meet as early as possible, it was evidently

preoccupied with the Mediterranean question, which during the previous few

days had been allowed to overshadow the Far Eastern situation. He said

both the Permanent Under-Secretary and Lord Cranborne had told him that so

far they had no definite proposal or agenda for the conference, but they

had promised to discuss the matter with him before the conference met. He

said their first idea was dearly to try to bring about a settlement [of

the Sino-Japanese conflict] by mediation and agreement.

[Mr. Edwin Wilson, the Charge d'Affaires at the American Embassy in

Paris while Mr. Bullitt was in Washington, called on me several days

later for a good talk.] On the question of French foreign policy, [which

we had been discussing in connection with transit facilities through

Indochina,] Mr. Wilson said, [according to my notes] that he felt the French

government had been so occupied with the situation in Spain and the

Mediterranean, that it took no deep interest in the Far East. His conversations

with the people at the Quai d'Orsay confirmed his impression.

I said the French officials like M. Ldger and M. Hoppenot were well

informed on the Far Eastern situation. The leaders of the French government,

however, did not seem to be sufficiently interested in it. I had tried, I

added, to impress on them the fact that a settlement of the Far Eastern

situation through concerted international action would have a salutary

effect upon Europe.

Mr. Wilson said that "the indivisibility of peace" (a phrase used by

President Roosevelt in his Chicago Speech) was in fact a French phrase,

It was their policy and it was peculiar to find that the French government
 E-769

and people did not seem to realize the connection between the Far Eastern

and European situations^ a connection which President Roosevelt had made

clear to his Chicago speech. It was evidently in Mr . Roosevelt's mind,

said Wilson, that in order to make an effort at the promotion of peace in

the world, the Far Eastern question was a good starting point, because it

was one with which the American people were familiar and in which they

were most interested. [By starting there,] it would therefore be easier

to arouse American public support for his policy of peace in the world.

[Mr. Wilson said this toward the end of our conversation. At an earlier

point in our discussion I had already asked him] what were his impressions

of the views of the American government .

He answered that officially he had heard none. But as a purely personal

opinion, which might not prove to be entirely wrong, he had gathered that

President Roosevelt, by his speech at Chicago and subsequent statement at

Hyde Park, had in mind an idea of bringing about a settlement of the

Sino-Japanese conflict by peaceful means. In fact, the statement made at

Hyde Park had made it clear that America hoped to effect a settlement by

mediation and not by war." He added that the Rumanian Minister in Washington,

who was on intimate terms with American government circles, recently passed

through Paris. He told him (Wilson) that Roosevelt had received intimation

of Japan's willingness to accept mediation. This, said Wilson, was before

the President's Chicago speech.

When I commended the Chicago speech of President Roosevelt, Mr. Wilson

agreed by saying that it was a very strong speech. He said it clearly indicated
* in- ^ i , ^ — — — — ^ m m -n — - — —----- — - - w —- i

"ed. note; According to the (RIIA) Survey of International Affairs, 1937

vol. I, p. 276: "In a 'fireside chat' delivered on the 12th of October the
President carefully avoided any mention of [the] concerted action [implied in the
Chicago speech], and foreshadowed the line of policy which America would take...
by informing his listeners that the purpose of the proposed Nine-Power Conference
would be solely mediation."
 a change of policy, and it was a development which he himself had not expected.

In fact, he added, when certain American journalists telephoned him on the

5th saying that President Roosevelt had made a speech indicating his

intention of going to war with Japan to bring about a settlement of the

Chinese question, he did not believe that it was true. And from a careful

study of the speech itself, of Secretary of State Hull's declaration of

July 16 and statement of August 23, Mr. Wilson thought there was a distinct

connection between them all. He said that President Roosevelt's speech was,

as it were, a natural climax to the two previous statements of the Secretary

of State, and its meaning was made clear by the President's subsequent statement

at Hyde Park.

I asked about the reception given by American public opinion to the

President's Chicago speech.

Mr. Wilson said that, on the whole, he found that it was well received,

the majority being in favor of the idea of the speech, namely, that America

should take some action to promote peace. He said only a minority, especially

in the Mid-West, the Far West and the states immediately bordering on the

Pacific, was critical of it for fear that America might become involved

in war.

[Mr. Wilson's remarks in interpretation of President Roosevelt's

speech were closely in line with the question he had raised by way of introducing

the subject of the impending Nine-power conference in our conversation.

He had asked me] how China would view the probability of mediation by the

Conference and whether the establishment of an autonomous regime in North

China would be acceptable to China.

I said in reply that my government had not yet communicated to me its

views on this point. But it might be recalled that the Chinese government,

in its communications to the other government in July, had made known that
 E-771

it was ready to accept any peaceful means of settlement known to international

law, namely, conciliation, mediation, arbitration and negotiation. In

regard to the terms of settlement, I pointed out that I had declared in

the Advisory Committee in Geneva that any peaceful settlement of the present

conflict between China and Japan must be based upon existing international

treaties. I said it should also be recalled that General Chiang Kai-shek

by his declarations at Ruling and Nanking in August, had made known the

conditions for a pacific settlement. These conditions were incorporated

in the report of the Advisory Committee in Geneva. I told Mr. Wilson that

reference to them would give him a clear idea of China’s desiderata, but

that, of course, the application of the principles involved was subject to

discussion and negotiation.

[Several days later American Ambassador Bullitt returned to Paris

from Washington and, as one may recall^ we quickly arranged a tete-a-tete

luncheon for a good exchange of views.] When I asked him what he thought

of the prospect of the Brussels Conference, Mr. Bullitt replied that President

Roosevelt had made an important speech at Chicago and just at the right

moment.

I told him that it had helped the Chinese delegation in the discussions

at the last meeting of the drafting committee in Geneva.

Mr. Bullitt commented that the newspapers had reported that he had

inspired the President’s speech at Chicago, but that it was all nonsense.

The speech had been prepared a week or ten days before delivery and he

had not learned of it until two or three days after it was delivered. He

said he had nothing to do with it. people jumped to the conclusion that

he had inspired it merely because the President's Chautauqua talk of a

year ago had been written by him.

 E-772

[As for the impending conference on the Far East, ] Bullitt said that

at the time of his departure from the United States to return to Paris, he

knew the American government had made no plans for it. He said President

Roosevelt wanted to make the Conference a real conference, that was to say that,

in accordance with the spirit of Article VII of the Nine Power Treaty, the

representatives of the signatory powers were really to consult one another

and to confer as to what could be done. For that reason, he said, the

American delegation was going to the Conference with no fixed propositions,

nor had there been any understanding with other governments, such as had

often been the case in connection with international conferences in the past.

[The previous day, October 22, I had spoken with French Premier Chautemps

primarily about transit through Indochina. It may be recalled that the

latter had maintained that France would not hesitate to continue to allow

these facilities to China, if the Nine Power Treaty Conference decided in

favor of aiding China generally. This had led me to remark that] the American

government was much interested in the Far East and also in the impending

conference .
M. Chautemps then stated tha^Thf^United States was interested, nonetheless
A

his conversation with Mr. Bullitt had not given him the impression that the

United States was going to live up to the level of President Roosevelt's

Chicago speech. He said he understood that the speech had caused much

unfavorable reaction in America, and it seemed that President Roosevelt

now wished to be more cautious in his attitude. To M. Chautemps it appeared

that President Roosevelt would continue to advocate all the moral principles

involvei in the situation, but that the President did not seem to indicate

any determination to act upon them.

 E-773

I tried then to parry the uneasiness shown by the French Premier,

remarking that, perhaps, the reserved attitude on the part of the American

President lately was due to his desire to persuade Japan to attend the

Brussels Conference and to give her no excuse for a refusal. If Japan did

not come, I said, then of course a different situation would be created,

and it was then likely that the United States would approve the adoption

of a firm attitude by the Conference. I also expressed to the Premier my

hope that the Conference would achieve practical results, and I said my

government hoped that France would support the cause of China at the gathering.

M. Chautemps said he, too, was desirous of seeing the Conference

achieve some concrete results for China. Asked whether the French delegation

had been nominated and who would go to attend the Conference, he replied

that M. Delbos, the Foreign Minister, would attend it on behalf of the

French government. When I further asked how many delegates were appointed,

M. Chautemps replied that M. Delbos was the delegate and that M. De Tessan,

[the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,] was the assistant-

delegate .

On October 26, at a lunch party, I saw M. Albert Sarraut, Minister of

State without Portfolio, former President of the Council and former Governor-

General of Indochina. He was a leading French statesman, not only familiar

with the problem of the Far East, but greatly experienced in handling that

problem. He was the French plenipotentiary at the Washington Conference in

1922 and he had signed the Nine power Treaty for France. Therefore, we

were long acquainted and I was glad to have a conversation with him on the

prospects of the impending conference on the Sino-Japanese conflict.

In speaking of the impending Conference, I expressed the hope that it

would be a success not only for the interest of China, but also for the same

of the peace and security of nations in general, as this was, in my view,

the first attempt in recent years in which the United States agreed to

collaborate with Europe to find a solution of a concrete international

problem. I told him that if this experiment of collaboration succeeded,

it might lead to further cooperation between America and Europe for the

maintenance of world peace. It would certainly have a salutary effect

upon the situation in Europe.

M. Sarraut, however, said he was afraid the Conference might not be

able to accomplish very much. The key to its success or failure was in

the hands of Great Britain and the United States. President Roosevelt had

taken a very strong attitude in his Chicago speech, which was all for the

good, but since then, Roosevelt had given no indication that he had the

intention to live up to it with any concrete measures to bring Japan to terms.

Of course, he (Sarraut) understood the United States was in a different

position now from that of 1922, at the time of the Washington Conference.

At that time the United States was in such a strong position that she had

been able to talk firmly and even brutally, as he himself observed at that

conference. But no^the United States was preoccupied with social and

economic problems at home. Probably, it felt that it was not in a position

to adopt a strong attitude vis-A-vis Japan.

As regards Great Britain, M. Sarraut conceded that the British fleet

assembled together would be the strongest fleet in the world. But, he said,

the German-Italian-Japanese combination, which, in his view, was really

aimed at Great Britain, made it necessary for the British fleet to be

chopped up into five parts; one in the North Sea to watch Germany, another

in the Balearic Islands [off the Spanish coast,] the third in Palestine,

the fourth in the Suez to watch Italy and the fifth in the Far East to

watch Japan. With her naval forces thus dispersed in different parts of

the world, no army to speak of and her air force just beginning to expand,
 E-775

M. Sarraut thought Great Britain could not pursue as strong a policy vis-S-vis

Japan as she wished. He said, naturally, she felt that her interests in

the Far East were very much compromised. He said the success of Japan's

army might even endanger the communications of the British Empire in India.

Her position was vulnerable and she had to depend upon the United States.

As regards France, M. Sarraut stated that her sympathy as well as her

material interests were on the side of China. She was confident that China,

even if successful in the present conflict with Japan, would not pursue

an aggressive policy vis-S-vis Indochina. It was not in accord with

Chinese culture or tradition. But France was preoccupied in Europe. She

had no strong force to speak of in Indochina, and she was not able to defend

herself in case of complications with Japan. He assured me, however, that

he would help in the French cabinet as much as possible.

[The lunch party at which I spoke to >1. Sarraut was being given by

Mme. Genevieve Tabouis, whose other guests included M. de Tessan of the

Quai d'Orsay, Ambassador Bullitt and some of the host's colleagues in the

press world. At one point] Mme. Tabouis told me that M. de Tessan (who was

to be Assistant French Delegate at Brussels) was not well disposed to help

China as he thought Japan might wreck the Yunnan Railway or occupy Hainan

Island near the Indochina coast. [(In light of the recent crisis in the

area of transit facilities for Chinese war materials, I was already quite

familiar with this attitude in French government circles.)] I therefore

told M. Sarraut, [with whom I was speaking at length, ] that Japan would

neither wreck the Railway or occupy Hainan and why she would not. But
A
Sarraut countered by telling me what the Japanese had done to the British

and Americans at Shanghai.

Mme. Tabouis also had the impression the United States would not do much

either. [At the same time I learned that] the date for the conference had

been postponed to November 3rd and that Chinese losses in the Shanghai area
had caused the Shanghai line to be shaken. [It seemed to me, at that

moment, that the] prospects for the conference were poor.

[The previous^lerr von Ribbentrop, the German Ambassador to London,

A
had made a visit to Rome, the purpose of which was a matter of serious

speculation in other capitals. When I spoke with Soviet Ambassador Souritz

on October 27, I therefore also asked him what he thought was the real

purpose of Herr von Ribbentrop's visit to Rome. As I told him, I had heard

from certain sources in Rome, which were usually reliable, that one of the

objects of the German Ambassador's trip was to persuade Italy to adhere

to the German-Japanese Anti-Commintern Agreement of November 25, 1936.

Mr. Souritz said when he first read about it in the newspapers, he

had not believed it. While Italy had not joined in the German-Japanese

Anti-Comintern Agreement, she had in fact been pursuing the same policy as

those two powers. So he believed that what was more likely to occur was a

German attempt to induce Italy to join in the political and military agreement

behind the Anti-Comintern Agreement.

I suggested that the real purpose of this maneuver on the part of

Germany was to bring pressure to bear upon England. I said I had always

understood that Germany's true desire was to separate England from France

and bring England to her side.

Mr. Souritz said that this was precisely the German policy. She had

always wished to break up Franco-British solidarity first, and then to

separate France from Soviet Russia. It was part of German foreign policy

to isolate France. This, according to him, was the real reason Germany had

tried to weaken the Little Entente, cultivate friendly relations with Poland

and detach Belgium from France. It was the same policy that guided Germany

in her attitude towards the Spanish issue^ he added.

In order to encourage him to continue his exposition of the situation,

 E -777

I remarked that it was also possible that Herr von Ribbentrop wished to

come to an understanding with the Italian government on the policy to be

pursued in the forthcoming conference on the Far East . I told him that I

understood both Italy and Germany, while sympathetic with Japan's campaign

in North China, did not like her extending her military activities into

the Shanghai sector for fear that it might waste too much of Japan's strength

and diminish her resources and fighting power in the North.

The Soviet Ambassador said that this was quite likely among the objects

sought by Italy and Germany. Both were anxious that Japan should be in a

position to carry out her anti-communist policy in North China.

I also asked the Soviet Ambassador whether he had noticed any important

changes in French foreign policy since the resignation of the Blum Cabinet

in June and the constitution of the Chautemps Cabinet.

Mr. Souritz thought that the main line of French foreign policy had

remained much the same. While M Blum was more committed toward the Spanish

question and the Second International, he was nevertheless in favor of non­

intervention. And with regard to Germany, M. Blum was entirely in favor

of a policy of peace and conciliation. Mr. Souritz said M. Chautemps had,

of course, more liberty to act than M. Blum, but the policy of his Cabinet

was very much the same, in broad outline, as that of the Blum cabinet.

It was for non-intervention in Spain and the maintenance of Franco-British

collaboration. As to Germany, Mr. Souritz thought Chautemps and, more

particularly, Deladier [then Minister of Defense,] were probably less

conciliatory than Blum. According to Mr. Souritz, M. Chautemps seemed to

understand German intentions, and therefore advocated greater prudence,

suspicion and watchfulness. So there might be some nuances of change in

application of the policy, the Soviet Ambassador said, but the policy itself

remained the same.

 When I asked whether he noticed any difference in the attitude of the

French government toward Soviet Russia^ Souritz thought that there was no

conspicuous changes here either. Even during the time of the Blum Cabinet,

Soviet Russia had never mentioned the question of implementing the Franco-

Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance by a military arrangement. As he told me,

the French government "then as now" had a high consideration for British

susceptibilities and did not wish to implement that Pact. Soviet Russia

had never proposed any such implementation. In fact, the Pact was of more

importance to France than to Russia. Germany, said Souritz, had always

tried to undermine this Pact, not out of a desire to embarrass Soviet Russia,

but to isolate France. Soviet Russia had no common frontier with Germany

as France had. Any arrangement for military cooperation would be of

greater value to France than to Russia because, in case of aggression in

Europe, France would be invaded by Germany, while Soviet Russia could not

be because she had no common frontier with Germany.

[Such was the atmosphere of fear, mutual distrust and tension in Europe

which formed part of the background to the conference on the Sino-Japanese

conflict. As regards the conference arrangements once the idea was adopted

in Geneva, the question arose as to how and when the Conference was to be

held and what procedure was to be adopted, for its composition and its

program or agenda. On the face of it, [these arrangements] should have been

a simple matter, because the Washington Treaty itself provided a legal basis

for calling such a conference. But this was not the case. As to who should

be invited, it turned out to be a more delicate and complicated question

than one might have thought. The Signatory Powers of the Treaty were

naturally all to be invited, including Japan and China. But these were also

certain countries, which, though not having actually participated in the

Washington Conference, were afterwards invited to adhere to the Treaty,

such as the Scandinavian countries, Mexico and Bolivia and even Germany,
 E-779

though Germany had never ratified the treaty. Because of these complications^

the question of which countries were to be invited became quite a question

at the time .

On October 12, when I had gone to the Quai d'Orsay to see M. Hoppenot,

I asked him about the progress made in convoking the proposed Nine Power

Treaty Conference. He said that certain exchanges of views had been taking

place in London and Washington. The questions of how to hold such a

conference and whom to invite to it were actively under discussion. He said,

in order to illustrate the complexity of the latter question, that there

were several categories of powers that might be invited. The United States

and Japan were parties to the Treaty but were not members of the League.

Then there were members of the League, such as Bolivia, Mexico, Denmark

and Sweden, who had adhered to the Treaty, [but had no direct interest in

the Far East . ] Soviet Russia and Germany, on the other hand, had interests

in the Far East, but while Russia was a member of the League,she was not a

party to the Treaty, and while Germany had adhered to the Treaty, she had

not yet ratified it and was no longer a member of the League.

There was also the question of where the Conference

should be held and in whose name the invitations should be extended.

It was evident from the beginning that no country was very anxious that

such a conference should take place within its own borders. As M. Hoppenot

told me on the 12th, the United States did not favor making Washington the

site of the conference and suggested Switzerland. But after consultation

with London and Paris, it w^s thought that perhaps Belgium or Holland would

be preferable. [Soon after, I learned that] Belgium herself was not at all

anxious to have the Conference. She hesitated for a while before she

was finally persuaded to agree to holding the conference at Brussels.

[When I called on Foreign Minister Delbos on October 15, I told him

the Chinese government wished the proposed Nine Power Treaty Conference

to be held as early as possible. I explained that the Japanese had recently

launched a fifth offensive on the Shanghai front. It had failed as its

predecessors had, but according to the latest information, they would try

to force a rapid victory over the Chinese forces before the opening of the

proposed Conference and to this end, were preparing to use all available

means. They had already used poison gas in their recent attack against

the Chinese, I told the Foreign Minister. This fact had been certified by

two doctors--Dr. Ettiger of the RedL Cross Society in Shanghai, and Dr.

Borcic, representative of the League of Nations Health Section in China.

Therefore, I said, the longer the Conference was put off, the more aggravated

the situation would become on account of Japan’s aggressive intentions

and particularly her natural desire to achieve a complete victory so as to

foreclose any action at the conference.

M. Delbos told me that he agreed fully with China's desire for an

early convocation of the Conference, but he understood the Belgian government

had not yet made a formal reply as to holding the Conference in Brussels.

(Belgium's hesitation was explained on the ground that if it were to take

place in Belgium, the invitations would have to be sent out in the name

of the Belgium government, and if the Conference should fail in the end, the

responsibility of tl^ Belgian government would be too great to bear. Accordingly,

Brussels had suggested that, in its view, it would be best to have the

invitations issued in the name of Great Britain and the United States,

[and it was this question that was awaiting settlement.]

[I next referred to the possibility that certain countries, having

been extended an invitation,might not accept, depending on the basis of the

invitation.] It had, for example been made clear, I said, that if the

invitation were based upon the League's resolution, Germany, Italy and

Japan might refuse to come on account of their known attitude towards the
 E-781

the League. I said there was also the question of inviting the Soviet

Union and Germany.

M. Delbos replied that the basis of the invitation was not a matter

of great importance. He believed that if it was inadvisable to base it

upon the League of Nations resolution, it would well be issued in the name

of the Advisory Committee or still better on the basis of the Nine Power

Treaty itself. He said the important thing was to hold the Conference.

[In any case,] he was definitely of the opinion that Soviet Russia and

Germany both had important interests in the Far East and both should

therefore be invited or both excluded. It would not be wise, in his opinion,

to invite one and exclude the other.

I told the French Foreign Minister that I shared his point of view.

If it was objectionable to mention the League of Nations resolution, then

the parties to the Nine Power Treaty could convoke the conference in their

own name. As regards the scope of the conference, I told him that it

depended, of course, upon whether Japan would agree to attend or not .

(At that time that was the biggest question mark.)

M. Delbos thought, in fact, that, nine chances out of ten, Japan would

refuse to attend.

I told him that if Japan did not come, the situation of the Conference

would certainly become mere difficult. Then there would be only one course

to pursue, and that was to adopt some positive measures with a view to

bringing pressure to bear upon Japan in order to induce her to modify her

policy.

M. Delbos thought, however, that the presence of Germany and Italy at

the Conference, would make it difficult to obtain unanimity for any measure

proposed there.

I agreed and went on to askM. Delbos what his impression was and

whether he had any information, received either from Washington or Tokyo,

in regard to the attitude of Japan toward the Conference.

M. Delbos said that the information he had received as of the same

general character as mine. Japan had always considered the present conflict

in the Far East as a matter concerning only China and Japan, which should

be settled by them alone. When I told him that that was a basis which the

other countries should not and could not admit, M. Delbos agreed and said

that was the Japanese view, and certainly not that of the other powers.

[That evening, October 15, Ambassador Tsien Tai telephoned from his

post in Brussels to say the Nine Power Conference would take place on October

30 at Brussels. The following day Ambassador Quo Tai-chi informed me from

London that] as a result of discussions between the Belgian and British

foreign office in London on the 15th, the various points which had made

the Belgian government hesitant had been cleared up. [He added that] the

delay in that government's decision had been due, as I knew, to Brussel's

desire not to assume the iniative or responsibility and to avoid possible

unfavorable reaction in Germany, Italy and Japan.

[Invitations were sent out that same day to the signatories of the

Nine Power Treaty (both the original signatories, which aside from Belgium

were: the United States, China, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, the

Netherlands, Portugal, and the adhering powers, which were: Bolivia,

the
Mexico, Sweden, Denmark and Norway.) In/terms of the invitation, the

conference was being called for the purpcose "of examining in accordance

with Article VII of the Nine Power Treaty, the situation in the Far East

and to consider friendly peaceable methods of hastening an end of the

regrettable conflict now taking place there."]

[As Mr. Quo stated in his letter to me of the 16th,] the first idea

of the British was clearly to try to bring about a settlement by mediation.

He said that, as he understood it, this point was furthermore stated in the
 E-783

invitation as the object of the conference in order to make it easier for

Japan, and also Italy and Germany, to attend. He added that the British

authorities had not received any clear indication as regards Japan's

acceptance, but they seemed to think Japan would probably agree to participate.

[Mr. Wilson of the American Embassy on October 18 had] asked me what

I thought of the possibility of Japan's attending the Conference. [At that

time] I replied that the possibility was not excluded, according to my

information. Mr. Wilson then said the Rumanian Minister to Washington,

while just in Paris, had told him he had heard nothing [in Washington (?) ]

to indicate Japan's disposition to attend the meeting.

[On October 23, when I spoke to American Ambassador Bullitt and] Mr.

Bullitt asked me whether Japan was likely to attend and whether Germany

and Russia would be invited, I now replied that it was certain that Japan

would refuse to attend and that she would also object to Russia being

invited along with Germany. Mr. Bullitt then said that he had been struck

by the attitude of Italy as announced in the press and that the part Germany

and Italy would play in the Conference would be well worth watching, because

from all quarters he understood they were to defend Japan in her absence.

(The latter was also my understanding. All indications seemed to point

at least to Italy's acceptance and intention to fight Japan's case in the

latter's absence.)

[On October 22, Tsien Tai had telephoned from Brussels to say that

Germany and the Soviet Union would both definitely be sent invitations to

attend the Conference. However, when I spoke to Soviet Ambassador Souritz

on the 27th, this had not actually been done yet. The powers were first

waiting for the Japanese reply.]

When Mr. Souritz asked me whether I had any information concerning

the reported attempt of Great Britain and the United States to negotiate

a settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict, I told him that my information

 E-784

indicated that the representations made at Tokyo by London, Washington

and Paris were all of a general character with the object of persuading

Japan to participate in the Brussels Conference, and that no effort was

made to indicate any concrete basis for a settlement of the conflict itself.

Toward the end of our conversation, Mr. Souritz further asked me

whether the invitations to Germany and Soviet Russia had been sent out,

because, he said, M. Litvinov, the Soviet Foreign Commissat, did not mention

it in his latest telegram.

I replied that the invitations had not yet been sent as Belgium was

still waiting for a reply from Japan. I added that while it was certain

that Japan would refuse to participate in the Conference, it was necessary

to wait for her reply as regards the proposed invitations to Germany and

Soviet Russia, Japan being a signatory of the Nine Power Treaty.

Ambassador Souritz thought it was quite possible that Japan would object

to an invitation being sent to his country.

I said I understood a Japanese reply would reach Brussels either that

same evening or the next day, though it was unlikely that Japan would

propose that Russia be invited along with Germany. I asked whether Mr.

Litvinov would attend the conference.

Mr. Souritz thought it uncertain as Mr. Litvinov was very much

occupied in Moscow. However, as Mr. Litvinov was in touch with all the

aspects of the situation, Mr. Souritz felt he would be the best Soviet

representative.

[As it turned out the Japanese reply, the then expected refusal to

attend the conference, was received at Brussels later that same day.

Thereupon, the Belgian government extended invitations to the German government

which subsequently declined on the ground that Germany was not a party to

the treaty, and the Soviet government, which accepted. The date of the
 E-785

conference had already been postponed to November 3^ 1937.]

[The German reply, I might add, contained the evasive offer to cooperate

"in any effort towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict when the

indispenable conditions for a friendly adjustment were present." The fact

was that Germany did not want to offend Japan, her ally, but also wished

to avoid damaging her friendly relations with China.

[As Ambassador Ch ’ enj|^T ’ ien-f ang, my colleague in Berlin, told Mr.

Norman Davis later, on November 6, when I accompanied him to call on the

Chief American delegate at Brussels, ] Germany’s attitude, since the hostilities

began between China and Japan, had been rather divided. The Nazi Party

leaders, like Goering, Goebbels and von Ribbentrop, were strongly for Japan,

whereas Blomberg, von Neurath and Schacht, backed by the German industrialists

who were doing a great deal of business with China, were for China. On the

whole, Germany had wished to remain neutral in the conflict. But when the

Japanese extended hostilities to Shanghai, Germany did not like it for fear

that it might weaken Japan’s power vis-A-vis Soviet Russia. Recently, he

added, the German press had been openly pro-Japanese. News from Japanese

sources was fully reproduced, while Chinese news and statements were ignored.

[The foregoing account of the international atmosphere and situation

in Europe and the course of the various arrangements for the conference all

provide some idea of the background of the conference, including the expectations

of what the conference might accomplish. Here I would like to summarize

more concretely the differing expections of the conference which eventually

took place at Brussels,]

As regards what the Conference could do or should do, opinions did

differ, not only between China on one side and the other members of the

Conference on the other, but also among these other members themselves.

What China desired most was to obtain an outright decision of the Conference
to declare Japan as aggressor in view of the principles of international

law and the maintenance of world peace. In the second place, China wished

to obtain an assurance of material support in the form of credit, arms and

ammunition and not excluding other demonstrations of the Power's common

intention, such as naval and/or military demonstrations; naval demonstrations

by the United States, Great Britain and France and military demonstrations

on the Sino-Siberian border by Soviet Russia. However, most of the other

powers were not thinking of the Conference on those terms. They centered

their thoughts on the idea of bringing about a peaceful settlement between

China and Japan, with the collaboration and assistance of the other signatories

of the Nine Power Treaty in the form of mediation or conciliation. In order

to do this, they wanted, first of all, to bring about an armistice or

cessation of the fighting, and to induce Japan to accept mediation by

inviting her to attend the Conference so they all might talk things over

directly. The other Powers were evidently doing some wishful thinking.

China said that Japan would not accept mediation and was determined to push

forward what she called her "continental policy."

Thus, the objectives of the powers, on one side, and China, on the other,

really did not tally with each other. The conversations I had with the

representatives of the powers, as well as the conversations my colleagues

in London and Washington had with the authorities there, all showed that

these countries placed emphasis on a quick settlement through mediation or

conciliation after bringing about a cessation of hostilities. [(Even the

smaller countries had these expectations. As early as October 12, Dr.

Wunsz King wrote to me from Holland, saying] he had just seen Patyn, the

new Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the latter appeared to have the

impression that Japan might join the conference and that the first thing

the conference would do would be to arrange an armistice.) Furthermore,

because of this preference for or emphasis on the idea of a quick settlement,

 E787

the powers were disinclined to discuss what could be done to help China.

They said that they were going to talk to Tokyo to bring about a cessation

of hostilities and could not at the same time contemplate a continuation of

hostilities^ because it would be self-contradictory.

On the face of it, this seemed to be logical, but I and my colleagues

pointed out to them at different times and places that not only was there no

real chance of success at mediation or conciliation, there was even a great

danger of intensified Japanese operations in order to bring about a quick

victory for Japanese arms before the Conferee would take place or just

as it was convening. The Japanese certainly did not like the idea of the

Powers stepping into the situation and trying to bring pressure upon Japan

to expedite a settlement. Therefore, we said it was more likely that the

greater effort the powers made to persuade Japan to come to terms through

mediation and conciliation, the greater effort would be made by the

Japanese military authorities to push forward their military operations.

That meant that China, in the actual situation, was in even more urgent

need of material aid from the powers than theretofore.

As I will show later, the hopes and efforts of the powers vis-S-vis

the Sino-Japanese conflict were continually being frustrated by Japan, and

they became disappointed. They felt powerless to do anything effective

without, however, at the same time deciding to pursue a definite course of

censuring Japan or extending effective aid and assistance to China to

continue her resistance. Probably, what I have just said gives a fairly

clear, if general, idea of what the Conference aimed to do and how the

initial hopes and objectives of China on one side and the other prospective

members of the conference on the other side, were really at loggerheads.

[A more pre 'i • ^ idea of the Chinese position and realistic expectations

with regard to the Brussels Conference can be culled from the successive

telegrams on policy to be pursued at Brussels, which I exchanged with the

the government in Nanking prior to the opening of the Conference.] As I

was anxious to get instructions from the government as to the policy to be

pursued at the then impending Conference, I cabled to the Waichiaopu on

October 13, stating that questions of policy needed crystallization on our

part. I suggested there were three alternatives that might confront us at

the Conference, and asked the government to send me instructions. One,

Japan might refuse to attend, but continue aggression. Two, she might refuse

to attend, but might agree to negotiate a peace settlement the conflict.

Three, she might attend the Conference. In the event Japan refused to

attend the Conference and continued aggression, then questions of positive

measures against her had to be adopted by the conference. In the event

she refused to attend but agreed to negotiate a settlement, we would have

to insist upon fc#?'' participation in or presence at the negotiations bfltwe-en J

China and Japan of the powers having substantial interests in the Far East,

which had declared the situation concerned them too, as was done in the

case of negotiations on the Shantung question at the Washington Conference

in 1922 and in the Shanghai armistice negotiations in 1932. In the third case

wherein Japan agreed to attend the Conference, it was likely, I said, that

general principles for a peaceful settlement would be discussed at the

Conference, with the outstanding Sino-Japanese questions to be negotiated

directly. But, I stated, such negotiations also had to be conducted with

a neutral observer or observers, the results to be reported back to the

Conference and to the Assembly of the League of Nations.

I indicated that among the outstanding questions that might be brought

up at the Conference were: 1) the Four Eastern Provinces, that is to say,

Manchuria; 2) North China; 3) the Shanghai neutral zone; 4) the so-called

economic cooperation with and the supply of raw materials to Japan; 5) the

question of smuggling and customs duties; 6) the question of air communication

 E-789

7) the so-called anti-Japanese movement and the Chinese boycott of Japanese

goods; 8) cancellation of the right of Japan to station troops under the

1901 Protocol; 9) the question of responsibility for damages to lives and

property suffered by third parties as a result of Japanese aggression in

China.

I concluded my telegram by saying that in order to be well-prepared,

it was desirable for the government to consider such questions and decide

upon a policy, cabling instructions to the delegation as soon as possible.

Once the Conference was in full swing, there would be a tremendous rush

again as in Geneva, and there might not be time to ask for detailed instructions.

Thus, the opportunity to clinch favorable deals should be missed.

On October 22, [after it had been decided to hold the Conference in

Brussels and the Belgian government had sent out invitations,] I received

a cablegram from the Waichiaopu advising me that I and two other delegates

had been appointed by the government to the Brussels Conference and that the

Chinese Embassy in Brussels had been notified to communicate the names of

the Chinese delegates to the Belgian government. In acknowledging this

cablegram, I observed that this Conference was of particular importance.

I said if Japan should agree to attend, it was likely that the other Powers

would exert their best efforts to bring about a settlement between the two

parties to the conflict. It was even possible that they might bring

pressure to bear upon us, in order to induce us to make serious concessions

with a view to a settlement. On the other hand, if Japan refused to come

the Conference, which might include Germany, Italy and Portugal, would find

it difficult to adopt positive measures against Japan, because such measures

could not be adopted unanimously.

In concluding, I told the government that, in view of the circumstances ,

 E-790

I considered the responsibilities placed upon me as a chief delegate to be

unusually heavy, and that I might not succeed in carrying them out. Therefore,

I asked the government with all earnestness to take a decision, in the light

of the existing international situation and the state of public opinion in

China, as to the objectives the delegation should pursue at the Conference.

On October 23 I further requested by cable a statement of the development

of Japanese aggression from the close of the League Assembly to date. The

government apparently anticipated such a request because, in the evening of

the same day, a telegram came enumerating eighteen items of manifest Japanese

acts of aggression since September 18, 1931.

On October 24, the instructions of the government were embodied in a

cablegram to the three delegates. It said that the government had decided

upon the following directives:

1) According to a reasonable appraisal of existing circumstances,

there was no hope of success from our point of view. This point should
be fully recognized and kept in mind.

2) At the same time, our attitude at the Conference should be that

of maximum moderation. We should even adopt a conciliatory attitude
toward Italy and Germany, and not make them feel uncomfortable at
the Conference vis-^-vis China. At the same time, we must indicate
our earnest hope of success at the Conference in accordance with our
desiderata, and show that we would seek a settlement on the basis of
the spirit of the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty. This is a funda­
mental principle of our policy vis-S-vis the Conference. If the other
powers should raise concrete questions and ask us to express our views,
we should make it clear to them that since Japan was pursuing a policy
of military aggression and had invaded our territory, we were entitled
to know, first, the purpose and thinking of Japan. Thus we should ask
them to put these questions to Japan first, so that we might give them
our full consideration.

3) We should make the participating powers at the Conference

recognize that the responsibility for the failure of the Conference
rested entirely with Japan. Our delegation should be careful lest,
because of the stiff attitude of China, the other participating
powers have an excuse to blame China for the failure of the Conference.

4) The Shanghai problem should be settled as part of the whole

Sino-Japanese problem. We should avoid acquiescence in any attempt
to merely solve the Shanghai question, without solving at the same
time the other problems between China and Japan.
 E-791

5) Our objective at the Conference is to make it possible for the

other powers, after the failure of the Conference, to adopt measures
of censure against Japan.

6) We should do our best to persuade Great Britain and the United

States to endorse and encourage the Soviet Union to adopt military
measures vis-^-vis Japan.

Two days later, on October 26, 1937, the delegation received another

telegram relating to the activities of the delegation outside the Conference

and the objectives which should be pursued through these activities. It read:

1) Continue activities vis-S-vis the participating governments

and their people to [encourage them to] accelerate their policies of
putting economic pressure on Japan, for example, positively by boycotting
Japanese goods and negatively refraining from sending financial and
material aid to Japan, so as to be able to implement the resolution of
the League of Nations, blaming Japan for her policy vis-S-vis China,
in a practical way.

2) We should seek war loans and other financial aid for our
purchases of arms and munitions from the participating powers, and
we should especially seek assistance from them in regard to transportation
so that China's power of resistance might not be diminished. Thereby,
the resolution of the League of Nations, not to do anything to reduce
China's power of resistance and to aid China in a positive way would
be given practical effect .

The government's latter telegram was relevant to another telegram I

had sent out on the 13th, in addition to the telegram asking for clear

instructions on the policy that we should pursue at the Conference. In it

I had said that, in view of the widespread movement among the peoples of

England and America and among socialist and labor circles in France to

promote a voluntary boycott of Japanese goods, several friends had suggested

to us that we send a good group of Chinese labor leaders, versed in French

or English, to appeal for help from the labor organizations abroad, thereby

stimulating interest in and hastening the organization of an effective boycott.

I said the International Secretariat of the World Federation of Labor at

Amsterdam was also ready to set upon any Chinese appeal, and Nitti, the former

Italian Premier (during the Versailles Conference) and now anti-Facist leader

in France, was willing to help us along this line too.

 On October 28, a conversation at Hotel Bristol in Paris with Norman

Davis, assisted by Stanley Hornbeck, brought out some interesting points

in regard to the intentions of the powers, the attitude of the United States

government and the expectations or rather the limited expectations of the

Conference's ability to efect a settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict.

[It will be recalled that, at the time, Japan's refusal to attend the

Conference had just been received.']

Davis opened the conversation by remarking that in the course of a

*
conversation with Ambassador C. T. Wang and Dr. Hu Shih in Washington,

President Roosevelt had made some suggestions as to the strategy which would

be desirable for the Chinese delegation to follow at the Conference in Brussels

Davis said the United States wanted to be helpful in the situation and desired

to see the Conference succeed. He thought that I had handled the situation

in Geneva Skillfully and obtained the maximum obtainable £«r the League of

Nations. Japan, however, was dissatisfied and was critical on the grounds

that the League of Nations was too partial towards China in the absence of

Japan. In order to meet this point, Mr. Davis thought perhaps the Chinese

delegation to the Brussels Conference might adopt a certain strategy.

Mr. Davis suggested that I might first make a speech saying that China

realized Japan's need of raw materials and an outlet for her surplus population

He thought that I might even add that China was willing to cooperate with

Japan economically and that this would be of mutual benefit to the two

countries and was desired by the Chinese. But economic cooperation would

not be promoted by the Japanese invasion of China and the killing of tens-

of-thousands of Chinese people.

He also suggested that I should say that China, on her side, desired

/V

ed note; Dr. Hu Shih was in Washington on a special mission to elicit

American support and sympathy.
 E-793

to devote herself to the work of econoiT.ic reconstruction free from outside

influence^ as she was entitled to under Article I of the Nine Power Treaty,

while Japan had the obligation to refrain from interfering in Chinese affairs.

I might point out that Japan, by invading China, had not only rendered

economic collaboration between the two countries impossible, but had also

violated the Nine Power Treaty. In defense of her sovereignty and territorial

integrity, China, on her part, had been doing her utmost to resist Japanese

violations. But Japan's action was not only an act against China. It

was also an act against the other signatory powers of the Nine Power

Treaty. They, therefore, also had an obligation to take steps to deal with

Japan's violation of the Treaty. Besides, their own interests had been

prejudiced by Japan's action. It was, therefore, now up to the powers to do

their part. In order not to influence their deliberations, China was willing

to withdraw and leave to them full liberty of discussion.

This last thought really was the main thought Mr. Davis had in mind

in suggesting what China should say and how it should end up, namely, with

a voluntary offer by China to withdraw from the Conference. It was really

a crucial point. I therefore said in reply that, while I did not wish to

speak in diplomatic terms, what he had just said was so important that it

was necessary for me to report to my government for instructions.

Mr. Davis said that by all means I should report to my government,

and it was for that purpose that he wished to have a talk with me first.

[He went on to explain that what he had said] was not a proposition or

recommendation on the part of the American government, but merely a suggestion

that the Chinese government might consider. He did not wish it to be

understood that the American government wanted to impose anything upon

China. He said that, in view of the vital interests involved, China

should decide for herself. (Evidently, these few words were added because
 E-794

I said that I could only ask for instructions before expressing ray views.

He probably correctly gathered the impression that I was somewhat surprised

at, rather than not agreeable to, what he said.)

I told him that China was going to the Conference as one of the signatory

powers and not as a plaintiff. Article VII of the Treaty, I added, provided

for a general consultation by all the signatory powers. It would be very

difficult for the Chinese government, even if it could see its way clear to

to accepting Mr. Davis' idea, to explain to the public in China that China

should deprive herself, at the very start, of her right to participate

in the consultation, a right to which she was as entitled as the other

signatory powers, merely because Japan had just refused to join in the

consultation. I told Mr. Davis that, in my view, Japan's refusal was another

act in disregard of the Nine Power Treaty. In fact, I said, if China offered

to withdraw from the consulation, she might appear to be violating the Treaty

herself.

Mr. Davis said it could not be looked upon in that way because there

were certain parts in the Treaty, Article I for example, to which China was

not a party. The other nations were parties to this article and, therefore,

it was for them to consult among themselves, with regard to it. China had

been resisting Japan because of Japan's violation of her sovereignty and

territorial integrity, but Japan's act was also a violation against the

powers whose interests in China were being prejudiced by Japanese action.

They, therefore, wanted to see what they could do about aggression against

themselves. That this was not a matter that concerned China was Mr. Davis'

explanation.

I then said that, if I understood him correctly, he (Davis) meant the

signatory powers were to divide into two groups and the consultation was to

be divided into two parts, a view which I could not quite understand. It
 E-795

was true that China was not a party to Article I, because it provided for

respect of her sovereignty and territorial integrity. But, I recalled, the

Chinese delegation at the time had asked not to join in the discussion of

the Article because it would appear ridiculous for Chins to do so, giving

the impression that China herself had no intention of respecting her own

sovereignty and her own territorial integrity.

Dr. Hornbeck intervened by saying that although China was not a party

to Article I, that was not a position unique to her. There were certain

parts of the Treaty to which the other signatories were not parties, such

as that regarding Chinese neutrality. He thought that while the different

signatories took part in different articles, their signature to the whole

Treaty implied that they had accepted the statement of all the articles.

Therefore, juridically there could be no distinctions between the signatory powers.

Mr. Davis then explained that he did not wish to press the juridical point,

upon which I was perfectly right. What he meant, he said, was that while I had

every right to participate in the consultation, he thought that the Chinese

presence at the meeting at which the powers were to discuss the ways and

means of mediating between the two parties might be erobarrassing to the

powers. Centain of them might think it would be advantageous to sell part

of China in order to bring Japan to terms.

Dr. Hornbeck added that there would also be certain powers who would

wish to uphold the cause of China entirely. In either case, he said, it

would be delicate for the delegates to express themselves freely, if the

Chinese delegate were present.

I asked whether the suggested withdrawal was for this meeting only

and how long this meeting would last.

Mr. Hornbeck thought that the word "withdrawal" was not a very happy

or accurate word. He said what Mr. Davis had in mind was to stand aside

or to retire from the meeting, to which the Chinese delegation might return
 E-796

at any time it wished.

Thereupon^ I asked whether the withdrawal was to be entirely voluntary

and whether Chinese participation was to be considered as on an equal footing

with the other powers^ for example, would notices for every meeting be sent

regularly to the Chinese delegation as well.

Mr. Davis answered in the affirmative, and added that the Chinese

delegate might just offer to leave the room and wait in the next room to

join in at any time the other delegates might wish it or at any time China

might wish to come back.

I then said that China hoped the Conference would succeed and was

disposed to collaborate to the fullest with the other participating powers.

But, personally, I doubted whether Japan in her present mood would accept

mediation. I made it clear that since the Conference was meeting on the

basis of the Nine Power Treaty, I assumed that any mediation to be undertaken

and any peace to be arranged must be based upon that Treaty.

Mr. Davis affirmed that my assumption was absolutely correct snd said

that Article I of the Treaty was the only basis upon which peace should be

established.

I said that this was a very important point. I said that China in

pursuing the policy of resistance against Japanese aggression, was backed

by a nation united, All parties in the country were behind the government

in this policy of resistance. As I told him, I had been surprised the

of her day when a friend, who had just arrived from China,told me that

even the shop merchants in China, who had been given a brief period of

military training in the summer, were all anxious to take up arms and join

in the fight against Japan. This was a striking fact in view of the traditional

attitude of the Chinese people against soldiers and the traditional contempt

for a military career. I said there could be no doubt that China, having
 E-/97

now embarked on a policy of resistance, was seriously prepared to resist

to the end. Any peace, except one conceived on the basis of Article I of

the Nine Power Treaty, would be difficult for the present government or any

government in China to accept, because public opinion was strongly behind

the policy of resistance to the end.

In reply to my question on what would be the agenda of the Conference,

Davis said that the American government would first try to stop the hostilities

and then make the Nine Power Treaty respected.

I assued him that China was willing to cooperate to the utmost to make

the Conference a success on the basis which he had just indicated. But I

wondered whether Japan was in the mood to accept mediation. I said the war

party was in power in Japan; unless the powers showed a united and fi-m

front and a determination to take positive measures to deal with the situation,

the war party would not feel disposed to stop their military adventure in China.

But if it were made clear that the powers might resort to other measures,

if Japan failed to listen to the liberal elements in Japan, those elements

might exert their influence against the policy of the war party. The internal

situation in Japan was unlike that existing in China, I emphasized. The

Japanese people were really divided on this military invasion of China. An

important part of the people were against the war in China, although their

voice was muzzled by the military authorities.

Mr. Davis said that he used to hear a great deal aboat the liberal

elements in Japan being opposed to the policy of the military group, but

he thought that recently he found it had been proved that such elements

did not exist or did not count very much in Japan.

I explained that it was not merely a question of opinion that was dividing

the Japanese people, it was also a question of material interests that were at

stake. The Japanese army was pursuing a policy which internally meant the
nationalization of the big industries. This policy was really opposed by

big financial interests in control of those industries. The army's policy

also meant the destruction of a market in China that was essential to

Japanese industry. Therefore^ if it were made clear that the powers were

determined to act in a way that would isolate Japan and seriously prejudice

her overseas commerce and trade and her internal economic position, she

would be compelled to weigh her real interests against the present policy of

military conquest. The seven or eight families really controlling the

principal industries in Japan were, I said, all opposed to any policy of

military venture that would threaten their own interests in Japan and abroad.

Mr. Davis said he thought Japan would listen to the powers, unless she

were certain of effecting a complete conquest of China and convinced that

the powers were unable to do anything positive together. He asked me

what China had expected from Geneva and what she thought the other powers

should do now.

I told him that both in Geneva and now China believed that the powers

should withhold aid and assistance, direct or indirect, to Japan and extend

such aid and assistance to China. To be more precise, I said, Europe and

America should refuse to supply Japan with the things she was in need of to

carry on the war in China. After all, it was known that Japan as well as

China had been buying a great deal abroad in the form of arms and munitions.

As to how this could be done, I said, it was a matter to be discussed. There

were various ways of doing it, without necessarily introducing an embargo.

Dr. Hornbeck asked what was contemplated as regards aid and assistance

to China.

I replied: arms, munitions, war materials, credit and transit facilities.

I said China had no reserve stocks as Japan had and depended upon supplies

from abroad. She did not need direct military assistance from other countries

as she had all the men to do the fighting. But she did need supplies with
 E-799

which to carry on her resistance. I told Mr. Davis then that the French

government might bring up the question of transit facilities through Indochina

at the Conference for a general decision. [This led to the discussion

between us, which I related in the previous section, about supply routes for

military materials and about which supplies were most needed by China.]

Mr. Davis then said he thought that embargos and sanctions would be

useless unless backed by military force. He said that in the case of the

United States, an embargo on oil, for example, which should force Japan to

come to terms, would require Congressional legislation [to be adopted].

Mr. Davis asked me how long a period of withholding assistance from Japan

did I think would be necessary before it could influence Japan to modify

her policy. He himself was of the opinion that Japan's reserve stock could

suffice for a considerable time.

I told him that that was true to a certain point. However, China was

not going to give up resistance. Japan might win two or three important

battles, but that would not force China out of the fighting. Moreover, the

territory Japan had won in fighting would have to be garrisoned with troops,

which would in the end drain Japan's military power.

Mr. Davis agreed, and said that Japan might win the war but could

not conquer China. As regards taking positive measures, he thought that it

had really became a question of Anglo-American cooperation, and he asked me

what I guessed to be the British attitude.

I told him that in Geneva I had talked very frankly with the British

representatives. One leading member of the British delegation had stated

that Britain was ready to cooperate with the United States in the Far

Eastern situation, and in fact, would go to any length the United States

would. When I had pointed out to him that in 1932, when Washington wished

to take action in the Far East, the British let the United States down,

the British delegate answered that this time inaction would not be due to
 E-800

to any want of collaboration on the British side. Apropos I remarked that

I noticed that the British spirit in 1937 seemed to be quite different

from what it had been in 1932.

Davis agreed, but remarked that Great Britain had her hands full in

Europe. He wondered how much she could really do.

I said that so long as Japan believed that the powers were not in

earnest about taking concrete steps, Japan would continue bluffing. Only

if it were made clear to her that other consequences would follow if she

did not a«: ept mediation, would mediation succeed.

Mr. Davis thought that while the powers were trying mediation, it

would be illogical and inadvisable to discuss other plans. He was of the

opinion, [as one may recall,] that mediation and positive measures were

irreconcilable at any one time, that only after mediation failed could the

question of positive measures be taken up. He said the United States meant

to help in the Conference and make it a success. She wished to bring to

an end the present hostilities and make the Nine Power Treaty respected.

The American delegation was not on a joy ride. What could be done after

mediation failed depended upon the development of the situation in China,

the state of public opinion in the United States and the attitude of the

otho: powers. As regards the position of the American government, he said

it wanted to help, but it could neither guard the front door nor take the lead.

At the time, the military situation in Shanghai was developing unfavorably,

therefore Mr. Davis next asked me whether that situation was not too dis­

couraging .

I replied I did not; feel it was discouraging, because the withdrawal

m.eiely meant a retreat to the originally-planned line of dei'ense. I said

 E-801

the withdrawal was long overdue as a matter of fact. To continue holding

Chapei and Kiangwan created a weak point in the line, which made it difficult

to hold, but the Chinese military authorities had not wished to give them up

withbut making the Japanese pay for it. I added that China was desirous

of seeing the hostilities ended only on the basis of the Washington

Treaty.

Mr. Davis [again] agreed that the Nine Power Treaty was the only

basis available.

Dr. Hornbeck added that it must be a peace with justice.

Mr. Davis soon asked me what I guessed to be the German and Italian

attitudes.

I said I understood the German attitude was divided between the Nazi

Party people, who were pro-Japanese, on the one hand, and the Foreign Office,

army and business people, on the other. As to Italy, I said, while lately

Mussolini had openly declared Italy to be in favor of Japan I understood

from information reaching me from Rome that Mussolini at heart wanted to

be neutral in the Sino-Japanese conflict. On the surface, however, both

Italy and Germany were pretending to be [wholely] on the Japanese side.

Mr. Davis agreed with my analysis and information on the German attitude,

but regarding Italy he said he had no information.

Toward the end of the conversation, Davis emphasized that he wanted

me to understand that what he had said about strategy to be adopted by the

Chinese delegation was not a proposition, proposal or recommendation from

the American government. In fact, he understood that President Roosevelt

had also indicated the same thing in his conversation with C. T. Wang and
that China of course
Hu Shih. He said again/with vital interests at stake, had to decide for herself.

Asked if the information given out by the newspapers to the effect that

the American government, as well as the British and French governments,

had had certain conversation with Tokyo in connection with the invitation
 E-802

to Japan to participate in the Conference was correct, Mr. Davis said that

no such conversations had taken place. What the American and British

governments had done was to tty to persuade Japan to accept the invitation

to participate in a conference. There had been no discussion of any

concrete question.

Mr. Hornbeck added that there were no inducements given to Japan for

her acceptance.

Since the attitude of the United States at the Conference was crucial,

I was taken aback by Mr. Davis’ suggestion and intimation that it was originally

suggested by President Roosevelt himself in a conversation with the Chinese

Ambassador at Washington. So I telegraphed to Dr. C. T. Wang in Washington

to ascertain the precise situation concerning this question following my

conversation with Mr. Davis. Three days later Ambassador Wang replied that

Roosevelt did made the suggestion as Davis had informed me, and that he (Wang)

had reported it to the Generalissimo. He added that he himself had made

no commitment, although personally he believed that it would be a good

gesture, provided China was first assured of the support of the Conference.

Dr. Wang also added that he believed Roosevelt would go as far as

Great Britain and France. This last point was not reassuring, in my view,

because it seemed Washington wanted to pass the buck to London and Paris,

while I had found out definitely from the French and British governments

that they were not prepared to act alone, but were disposed to act jointly

with Washington and would go as far as the government of the United States

would go.

[Immediately after seeing Mr. Davis on the 28th, I also sent a confidential

telegram to Nanking reporting Mr. Davis' suggestion as presented in our

conversation. I asked to be] cabled explicit instructions. [On October 29,

having consulted my colleagues, Ambassadors Quo and Tsien, I cabled again

 E-803

strategy that we retire from the mediators' discussion was delicate vis-S-vis

public opinion at home. However, the Occidental psychology would consider

such a move as evidence of a spirit of fairness and helpfulness on our part.

If we did not agree to retire, the powers could meet behind our backs anyway.

They might also blame the failure of mediation on our refusal. In any event,

I said, it was desirable to make clear that our offer to absent ourselves

was entirely voluntary and that we reserved the right to attend at any time.

[I also stated that the] attempt at mediation was unavoidable before consideration

of any other plan to bring Japan to terms. I asked for the government's view.

Finally I pointed out in my telegram that the powers were sure to press

us for concrete proposals and definite concessions and that Mr. Davis was

already pressing us. I said we could not persist in refraining from being

concrete, without incurring some disadvantage etc. [I emphasized that the]

"final breakdown must be made to come from the Japanese side" and asked for

fuller instructions on the concrete questions I had posed in [some of] my

earlier telegrams. [The government's answer arrived when I was already in

Brussels. ]

[On October 30, I had a long talk with M. Alexis Ldger. As I explained

to the Secretary-General of the French Foreign Office at the outset of our

interview,] I wished to talk with him, before my departure for Brussels,

in order to find out what would be the attitude of the French government

towards the Conference, whether there was any proposal it would present

to the Conference and what in its view the agenda of the Conference should be.

M. Ldger said, half jokingly, that the French government at present did

not exist because the Foreign Minister and a great number of the cabinet

ministers were all attending the annual Congress of the Radical Party at Lille.

He said M. Delbos would not be back till Monday (November 1) and he (Ldger)

was hoping there would be a discussion before M Delbos' departure Monday

 E-804

evening for Brussels. He told me that M. Guillaume, the Belgian Ambassador

in China, had been sent to Paris by the Belgian government to ask the French

government the same question. According to M. Guillaume, Mr. Eden had

formulated no concrete idea either as to what should be done at Brussels.

M. Delbos hoped to talk the matter over with Mr. Eden by Tuesday morning at

the latest. It would be only then that something definite would be formulated.

As for Mr. Norman Davis, the American representative, he had no concrete

proposition to make either. According to M. L6ger, all that Mr. Davis

said was that the American delegation was going to the Conference with a

full desire to participate to the utmost.

I said that China would go to the Conference in a spirit of cooperation

and hoped it would produce some satisfactory results and be a success. I

said that, according to the press, there was a possibility of mediation

being proposed at the Conference for the reestablishment of peace, and I

asked M. Ldger what he thought of the probability of such mediation and

what was likely to be the Japanese attitude. I told him that China regretted

the decision of Japan not to attend the Conference; a decision which only

served to accentuate Japan’s disregard of her treaty obligations. But China,

on her part, would do her utmost to collaborate with the other signatory

powers in order to make the Conference a success . I added that I took it

for granted that any attempt at mediation would be made on the basis of

Article I of the Nine Power Treaty, and that the other signatory powers

attending the Conference convoked under the Treaty could do no less than

show their own respect for the treaty obligations they had undertaken.

Besides, I stated, Article I of the Treaty provided the basis for any

settlement.

M. Ldger said he did not know what the Japanese attitude was likely to

be. The Brussels Conference, while suggested by the League of Nations, was
 E-805

being convoked on the basis of the Treaty. In order to avoid all complications,

he said, logically the Conference must be considered as a separate diplomatic

and political attempt to bring about a settlement of the Sino-Japanese

conflict. Whether it would succeed or not in its task remained to be seen.

But in order to assure the greatest possibility of success, it should be

kpet apart from the League of Nations. M. L6ger added that it was also the

view of the Belgian government. He said, according to M. Guillaume, even

the technical parts of the Conference were to be exc'^wcfe^-4-^3 so as not to

give the impression that the Conference had any close connection with

the League of Nations. If the Conference failed, then one could still go

back to Geneva. M. L6ger did not think the question of sanctions should

be discussed at the Conference. In his view, all such questions should be

taken up in Geneva.

I said a few days ago the press reported that the French government,

along with the American and British governments, had made a demarche at Tokyo.

I wondered whether that was not confined to persuading Japan to accept the

invitation to participate in the Conference, or whether there were other

questions discussed.

M. L6ger replied that the demarche was made solely for the purpose of

persuading Japan to accept the invitation to participate in the Conference.

No question of a substantial character was raised.

[It was at this point in our conversation that I suggested to the

French Secretary-General that it wouV. be inadvisable to formally raise the

question of transit for Chinese war supplies through Indochina at the conference

because the presence there of pro-Japanese countries would prevent its

unanimous approval. It may be recalled that M. L6ger, in replying, remarked

that] it was necessary to see to it that nothing was done to weaken or

invalidate what had been accomplished in Gene.va for the purpose of helping
China. He also reiterated his view that logically the question of taking

positive measures or sanctions should be discussed in Geneva and not at

the Conference.

[Later on in the conversation] I asked him how soon the French delegation

would leave for Brussels and whether M. Lagarde was going to accompany it.

I told M. Ldger that M. Lagarde's attitude in the discussions of the Advisory

Committee at Geneva had EStonished not only the Chinese delegation but also
%

other delegations by his unfriendliness. I said that Lagarde seemed to

be hardly sympathetic towards the Chinese cause, and that every intervention

on his part was favorable to Japan and unfavorable to China.

M. Ldger said this time the Quai d'Orsay had appointed M. Hoppenot,

to accompany the delegation. Incidentally, he thought it was curious that

foreign servicemen spending a period of time in China returned either

strongly pro-Chinese or severely critical of them. He thought those who

became very friendly towards China must have been influenced by Chinese

culture, civilization and the friendliness of the people, and those who

turned unfriendly must have found their life in China disagreeing with them.

But he recommended M. Hoppenot highly as a man who had come back from China

with a great deal of sympathy for the Chine ~.e people, and who was very

intelligent, capable and had a delicate sense of propriety. M. Ldger hoped

that I would find in him no cause for complaint.

I said M. Hoppenot impressed me as being capable and as possessing

a deep understanding of the new China and her spirit.

M. Ldger said he appreciated my frankness in telling him about M.

Lagarde's attitude. He told me M. Lagarde would be sent to Brussels not

to take any prominent part but to assist M. Hoppenot, Lagarde having

been in touch with all questions connected with the League of Nations while

Hoppenot had just come back from the Far East and was still not faniliar
 E-807

with events that had been going on through the League in connection with

the Chinese question. Ldger added that Lagarde had been told, therefore,

not to make himself too conspicuous, because it was not desirable to give

the impression that the Conference was closely connected with the League

of Nations. When I said I understood from M. Delbos that the Foreign

Minister would go to Brussels but not stay there very long, M. Ldger said

that, in M. Delbos’ absence, M. de Tessan would take his place and not

M. Lagarde.
Part E. 1937, A Crucial Year in Europe and in the
Far East:
January-December 1937

5. The Brussels Conference on the Sino-Japanese

Conflict:
October-November 1937

b) Defending China's Course at Brussels:

November 1-15, 1937
5. THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE ON THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT. E-808
b) Defending China's Cause at the Brussels Conference

I arrived in Brussels for the Conference on the Sino-Japanese conflict

on the evening of October 31, 1937, leaving myself several days for

preliminary talks with the other delegates to the Conference who were also

arriving in Brussels a few days early. On arrival, I found the general

atmosphere somewhat discouraging. For example, in the afternoon of

November 1, two American correspondents called on rne to say that] the atmospher

in the American delegation and in the press circles was rather pessimistic

about the prospects of the Conference. However, they said, the American

delegation would not sign anything that the Chinese delegation did not

want to sign, nor would it force the Chinese delegation to accept anything

not acceptable to China.

[On Tuesday afternoon, November 2, I saw the heads of the Belgian,

American, British, French and Soviet Russian delegations in succession.

M. Spaak of Belgium, whom I saw first, spoke of again inviting Germany and

Japan to attend the Conference. Mr. Litvinov, whom I saw after nine in the

evening, was] passive, pessimistic and cynical. [I gathered] he would behave

as a guest and make no speech at the opening day of the conference, [though

this proved not to be the case.] Norman Davis questioned me closely on

what China would be willing to give [in the interest of reaching a settlement

with Japan.] British Foreign Secretary Eden, who was heading the British

delegation, told me, with regard to procedure that the procedure for the

opening meeting on Wednesday, November 3, had just been agreed upon: Davis

was to speak first after Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister,

who was to be elected President of the Conference. Then Eden and Uelbos,

though preferring to speak in the afternoon, would speak, they having

agreed to speak in the morning on Mr. Davis' request. The idea was that

by having all three speak first, they could influence the Italian delegate,

who might thus be made to feel it would be quite unbecoming to give a violent
speech in the opposite sense of the three speakers in question. As to China,

I would speak for her at the afternoon meeting.

I paid a visit to the French Foreign Minister, M. Delbos, an hour later,

and found M. de Tessan, his deputy, also pres nt. M. Delbos opened the

conversation by saying that he presumed that Mr. Eden had already told me

of the arrangements to take place at the opening of the Conference, as

agreed upon at the meeting between them--Mr. Davis, Mr. Spaak, M. Delbos and

Mr. Eden in the same afternoon.

I told M. Delbos that I understood that he, M. Delbos, would speak at

the first meeting.

The French Foreign Minister said he had intended to speak at the second

meeting in the afternoon. However, since Mr. Davis had insisted that he

(Davis) should be followed by Mr. Eden and himself he would have to speak

in the morning instead. He added that he had not prepared his speech and

would probably have to sit up until midnight to do so.

I told M. Delbos that my government had asked me to demonstrate to

France the willingness of China to collaborate at the Conference. My country

was anxious that the Conference should succeed and was disposed to contribute

to the utmost to make it a success. As the first attempt of the Conference

would be to bring about a restoration of peace between the parties, China,

who had always cherished peace as her ideal, would welcome it. But, I said,

China would not want peace at any price, but only peace with justice. She

was not making war on Japan, but simply resisting Japanese aggression.

She had been fighting for a just peace. If not, she could have obtained

peace at any price without any fighting at all.

M. Delbos said he agreed entirely with the views of the Chinese government.

There was only one basis for peace ,nd that was the Nine Power Treaty of

Washington. He said France had always maintained the sanctity of treaty

 E-810

obligations, and he assured me of the sympathy of France for the Chinese

point of view.

I asked M. Delbos whether he had received any information from Tokyo,

or any indication of Japan’s attitude toward the Conference.

He told me he had a report from the French Ambassador to Tokyo, from

which it appeared that Japanese opinion was rather divided. While the

army and the air force had achieved enough success and glory for themselves

and were truly disposed to call a halt, the navy insisted upon going forward

with the hostilities, for it had not yet obtained much glory for itself

and was desirous not to be outshown by the army and air.

I then took up the transit of shipments of war materials through Indochina.

We had discussed this for a while, when the Foreign Minister again

reverted to the question of the Conference. He said if Italy took Japan's

side, it would create difficulties in the Conference. Hc-ooid—i-f Italy Ujok

Japan's nidr; it wnnlri rreat0 di.f fl^n 1n rnnf P-^n^ He understood

on the other hand, Portugal would not create any difficulty with China, on

account of her interests in the Far East. Though Portugal was deeply

interested in the Spanish question and therefore usually took the side of

Germany and Italy, he understood that in the Far East her interests were

on the side of China.

[I wished to personally ascertain the position of Italy and her attitude

toward the Brussels Conference, and therefore sought an interview with]

the Italian delegate, Count Aldrovandi-Marescotti, Wednesday morning. The

Count, who had jimst arrived from Italy, had been one of the members of

the Lytton Commission sent by the League of nations to inquire into the

Manchuri.m situation after the Mukden incident. After we had recounted

souvenirs of our association on the Commission, I asked the Count what,

in his opinion, the agenda of the Conference should be.

He said that since his arrival in Brussels the previous evening he had
 E-811

seen M. Delbos^ but did not have a chance to speak to hirn about the Conference.

He said he saw M. Delbos at the railway station, and M. Spaak had spoken to

him hurriedly in the car. (Evidently the two gentlemen had gone to meet him.)

The Japanese Ambassador, after hearing of his arrival in Brussels from Rome,

called on him and talked for an hour, he added. (This was not surprising

to me, because I and others understood the Italian delegate would more or

less indirectly represent Japan at the Conference, by presenting the Japnese

point of view.) He then told me that he had understood that for the opening

meeting only Mr. Spaak, as President of the Conference, would speak and not

the others.

I told him that the latest arrangement was that the other principal

delegates would speak immediately after Mr. Spaak. Mr. Davis would start

and be followed by Mr. Eden and M. Delbos.

He said that he had intended to speak only in the afternoon, but if the

others were to speak in the morning, he would have to speak in the morning

also. As regards the attitude and policy of the Italian government vis-^-vis

the Conference, he told me for my confidential information, that he would try

to make it clear in any speech that the Conference was entirely independent

of the League of Nations and could not take upon itself to judge the facts,

which were difficult to understand after all. Italy, he said, had accepted

the invitation to participate in the Conference because she was a signatory

power of the Nine Power Treaty of Washington. There could be no attempt

to condemn either party to the conflict. The question of who fired the

first shot, an important point in determining responsibility, would be

difficult to .decide. In his view, the only useful thing the Conference could

do would be to bring the parties together for direct negotiations of a settlement

by themselves. (This was precisely what Japan had already insisted on in

her dealings with China, namely, chat anything concerning matters between
 E-812

China and Japan should be settled directly between the two countries, without

any intervention or interference from the other powers.)

The Count continued by saying that the restoration of peace was to be

the main objective or to be the objective of the Conference which could

help only by establishing contact between the two parties to the conflict.

After that, the Conference should consider its work as terminated. He

said, too, that Italy considered both China and Japan her friends, and she

wished to be entirely neutral vis-a-vis the conflict between them.

In the midst of this statement, the telephone rang. Evidently, it was

a call from Tokyo. Count Aldrovandi kept asking the other side to call up

later, and then said not before eight o'clock in the evening. Apparently

he felt embarrassed, and he said, by way of explanation, that it was a

request from a newspaper in Tokyo asking for a statement, jl do.'t know

how true that was.) He said newspapermen were troublesome everywhere, and

asked whether there was a wireless telephone service through to Nanking.

I told him there was, but it was not so easy to arrange. We resumed our

conversation. But after the conversation resumed, the telephone rang again.

The Italian delegate appeared rather annoyed, and I heard him say into the

receiver in an irritated tone that he was engaged and could not speak at

the moment. (I deduced that a colleague of his was conveying some Japanese

message.

Before terminating the conversation, I expressed the hope that the

Chinese delegation could count on the support of the Italian delegation at

the Conference, pointing out the friendship between China and Italy, and

especially [the friendship] between the Count and myself, the Count's

personal knowledge of the Far East and his sympathy for the Chinese people.

The Italian delegate said what he had to say did not of course represent

his own personal views. His speech had been written in Rome (I m sure not
 E-813

by himself but written for him) and he would have to follow the instructions

of his government. But he could assure me, he said, that the question of

the Sino-Japanese conflict was one thing, outside of which his personal

relations could not in any way be affected. He hoped our two delegations

would maintain most friendly contact. (He was a nice fellow, but, of

course, an accomplished diplomat.)

[Preparing my own speech for the first meetings of the Brussels Conference

which formally opened right after my talk with the Italian delegate, was

not an easy matter. China's position at the Conference was, after all,

a difficult one. The principal powers were not disposed to adopt any

concrete measures to enforce their position vis-^-vis Japan, but China,

confronted with a military situation, that was deteriorating rather

rapidly, needed concrete assistance. Just on the eve of the opening of the
utr
Conference the Japanese had broken the Jine of defense around Shanghai.
/I
With her vast reinforcements, Japan wa-s^able to land on both flanks of the

Chinese line of resistance, in the Yangtze River and in Hangchow Bay,

evidently wi^-h *-ke intent-tORh+of occupying Hangchow and pursuing a pincer

movement towards Nanking.

[Dr. Koo: Could you please correct this synopsis of the military

picture on the eve of the Brussels Conference, which opened on November «?*£

in light of the point you were trying to make.

I am attaching two items; 1) a xerox copy of pages 2^-211 of the English

-5J.

version of the History of the Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945, covering the

military operations around Shanghai from October /-November 1937; 2) some X

pages extracted from the next section of your memoirs on the Brussels

Conference. It is in view of these pages that it se ms important to

ascertain the chronology of the fighting at Shanghai vis-4-vis the early

developments at Brussels. C.S.] ' ^ /;/ l O rxf C

V ^ / W {nt /SfiUA ifft b ')h 'jj'u b .h iC
 E-814

At the informal consultations among the principal delegates of Great

Britain, the United States, France and China, as to what the Conference

could and should do, I was repeatedly counseled to pursue a policy of

moderation so as not to slam the door either on the possibility that Japan

would accept an invitation or on the prospect of Japan's participation in

the Conference in one form or another. They were even indisposed to talk

much about discussing the possibility of effective aid to China because

it might lead to an allegation that the Conference was not sincere in seeking

to mediate between China and Japan for a peaceful settlement.

T was, therefore, confronted with a problem of what to say in my first

speech before the Conference. Before I started to prepare that statement,

I talked, directly or indirectly, with representatives of the principal Powers,

including Soviet Russia and Italy, as well as the chief delegates of the

Scandinavian countries. Both Mr. Eden and Mr. Davis urged strongly that I

should be moderate and pointed out the undesirable effect of any strong

statement upon Japan's final decision to either participate in the Conference

or accept mediation. But in China, on the other hand, while the military

situation was deteriorating, Chinese public opinion was rising and demanding

continued resistance to the end.

I prepared a speech taking into account the advice of my colleagues

in the other delegations, the situation in China, and the embarrassment to

my government in view of the deteriorating military situation and the rising

temper of the Chinese people to continue resistance. I did not wish actually

to say anything which might be taken by our friendly colleagues at the

Conference as being responsible for its failure. Nonetheless, I felt it

was necessary to present China's just cause through the Conference to the

world and to emphasize China's determination to continue her resistance

until a just peace could be had. We sought peace but not peace at any price.
 I kept revising ray prepared speech either to add something or to

delete something, as a result of my conversations with the principal

delegates and in order to conform as much as possible with the views and

suggestions stated in the Waichiaopu's cables to me. As I recorded in

my diary on November 2, the day before the Conference:

I was tired mentally as well as physically and felt [for the first
time] a great strain in dictating a few final paragraphs [for my
speech.] I did not finish it until 4:30 a.m. Several others [of my
staff] worked on copying, translating and mimeographing all night.

The Conference opened at 11 a.m., November 3, Wednesday, at the Palaise

d’Academie. It was held in a long narrow hall with lamps standing three

feet above the table, like street lamps. The opening speech by the Belgian

Premier, Spaak, was fair. Norman Davis' voice was low, [when delivering

his speech, so it was difficult to hear. In fact,] the acoustics of the

room were not good, while the press photographers never seemed to stop taking

pictures. Mr. Eden's speech was short, evidently to give the impression

that Britain was following the American lead. M. Delbos stressed the

principle of the sanctity of treaties. Aldrovandi followed with a prepared

speech defending Japan's interests in a rather timid way, and was cautious

in language.

The meeting was resumed in the afternooi^M. Litvinov changed his mind

several times as to whether he wanted to speak before or after me. Finally

he spoke first at the afternoon meeting, and I followed him with my speech

taking 40 minutes. In the course of the years attending international

conferences, it was rare that I felt the strain of the work. But this time

I was feeling very tired and was actually perspiring perhaps because of loss

of sleep the night before. But I was told that my speech was well received.

The secretary to the press officer of my delegation later said that the

comment in the press was "conciliatory but firm." I thought that was

exactly the effect I wanted to produce. Mr. Davis, Dr.Hornbeck, Sir Alexander
 E-816

Cadogan and Mr. Spaak all came to tell me that it was good. Sir John

Pratt^ one of the counselors of the British delegation^ told me that I

had mastered the art of understating. (I thought that was a British art.)

He said that my speech was moderate but effective, the more so because of its

moderation.

After the opening of the Conference, the question arose of arranging

mediation by a limited number of powers, some delegates hoping that

Japan might agree to participate, in the conference, if there was mediation

by a small committee, though she had refused to participate in the Conference

as a whole. [The private formal and informal meetings of the delegates on

the second day of the Conference were devoted to this question] of having

or not having this smaller committee or subcommittee and of what its mandate

or function should be. There was also much lobbying about ii'S composition,

[but no decision was made.]

[In the evening there was a dinner party by Mr. Spaak as President of

the Conference,] I talked to Dr. Hornbeck and Mr. Litvinov at length and
A
also to Mr. Davis, who was rather cynical about the difficulties over the

appointment of the subcommittee. [Mr. Litvinov, on the other hand, was

seeming more positive than he had previously been.]

[According to the notes of my conversation with Mr. Litvinov, when

I asked what] information he had about the Conference, he said he had had

a talk with Mr. Davis, and gathered the impression that the American

attitude was better than he had thought. Davis did not say what America was

going to do if Japan declined the offer of mediation, but Mr. Litvinov

believed the United States wanted to do something and was not going to let

the Conference fail so easily.

Then he told me what had taken place at the informal meeting of seven

signatory powers of the Nine Power Treaty and the Soviet Union in M. Spaak's

office that morning, ^e idea, he said, was to set up a small subcommittee to

undertake the work of mediation. The Italian delegate had tried to obstruct

it, but found himself in the isolated position of one and gave in towards

the end. When the informal meeting concluded at 1:30 p.m., it was thought

that a unanimous agreement had been reached on the proposition, but that

belief, he said, was belied by the Italian attitude at the private afternoon

meetings of the Conference at 2j30 p.m.

When I asked Dr. Hornbeck about the progress of the negotiations for

the constitution of a subcommittee as the mediating body between China and

Japan, Dr. Hornbeck said that eight powers met from 11 a.m. to 1:30 p.m.

The Italian delegate first stood out against mediation and for bringing

together the two parties to the conflict to reach a settlement by direct

negotiation. The idea before the group, however, was the constitution of a

small subcommittee as a mediating body. Davis had suggested a committee of

three, composed of Great Britain, the United States and Belgium. After a

great deal of discussion and debate, he thought that they had finally reached

an agreement to have such a committee. But the Italian delegation must have

referred the matter back and received new instructions. That, thought Hornbeck,

was the only reason that could explain the uncompromising Italian attitude

in the afternoon meeting. Moreover, Hornbeck said, the French also wanted

to be on the committee, and this was considered by Italy as a good reason

for asking for Italian representation as well. But if the Italians were

represented, then Soviet Russia wanted to be on the subcommittee too. So,

he said, all that was done in the morning turned out to be for nothing.

Now Davis was again talking with Eden and Delbos, trying to induce the French

not to insist upon a seat on the subcommittee.

Referring to the military situation in China at the time, Dr. Hornbeck

said that M. Lagarde had talked to him about it and given him the impression

the Chinese could not hold out for very long. According to M. Lagarde,
 E-818

Chinese resistance would come to an end before the end of the year. Therefore,

in M. Lagarde's opinion, not much could be done by the Conference in the way

of backing the Chinese cause. Dr. Hornbeck said, however, that he had told

Lagarde that Chinese resistance would continue, and he offered a bet, which

Lagarde accepted, that six months hence China would still be resisting no

matter what unfavorable developments might take place in the meanwhile. Dr.

Hornbeck asked my opinion. I said I agreed with him, and added that the

whole country was unanimous in supporting resistance against Japanese aggression

and determined to see the conflict through.

Dr. Hornbeck told me that it was not his habit to make bets, but in

this case he felt so certain, he had made one with Lagarde. He said people

were apt to judge the possibility of holding out merely by looking at the

statistical figures to i he neglect of the psychological factor in the situation.

But the Chinese spirit was strongly for resistance and ready for sacrifice.

Even in Washington, he said, the military authorities would judge the situation

merely by figures relating to the number of troops and pieces of artillery,

tanks and airplanes, without considering the morale and the spirit of the

troops.

Since Dr. Hornbeck was a civilian, I thought his insight quite remarkable.

Of course, he was an expert on the Chinese situation and had headed the Far

Eastern Division of the State Department for nearly ten years, and had even

earlier taught in Hangchow, China. Therefore, he understood the situation

much better than either the Defense Department in Washington or the French

in Paris.

I told Dr. Hornbeck that while the Japanese people were not unanimously

behind the Japanese military adventure on the mainland, the Chinese people

were thoroughly behind the policy of resistance as one man.

 I was asked at a private meeting of the principal delegates to the

Conference to declare my willingness to retire from the discussions when

the method of offering good offices and of a:hieving a settlement was being

discussed by the delegates contemplating to undertake mediation. (It may

be recalled that this subject had been broached to me by Norman Davis and

I had written to my government for instruction. The Waichiaopu's reply had

arrived late on Monday^ saying we could agree under certain circumstances .

Nonetheless,] it was a difficult matter for me.

As a signatory power of the Washington Treaty, it was China's right

to be represented at the proposed discussion. On the other hand, the

question was delicate. From the point of view of the prospective mediators,

they would naturally feel much easier, if they were able to discuss what

terms they might propose both for China and Japan among themselves. But I

felt that China, as a victim of aggression and as a victim of Japan's

aggression in violation of the Treaty itself, was entitled to ask that the

Treaty be respected. On these grounds, I felt that China should certainly

take full part in the discussions. Accordingly, there was a great deal of

discussion between Mr. Davis, Mr. Spaak, Mr. Eden and me. I said that I

had to make my position understandable in China too. I was sent as the

chief delegate to participate in the Conference, particularly to represent

China as a victim of aggression. Why should China's delegate be excluded?

The matter was only settled after they explained it was not a matter

of excluding the delegate from China, rather I would, as a matter of discretion

to facilitate agreement among the prospective mediators, voluntarily offer

to withdraw. They assured me that any time I wanted to rejoin, I was

perfectly free to do so. On that understanding, that it was to be a voluntary

withdrawal to facilitate the process of mediation, I agreed to declare my

willingness and finally agreed to withdraw on a voluntary basis [if asked

to do so by the conference, and with the right to rejoin the discussion at

 E-820

any time. Then we started to discuss how I would put it so that nobody

would be embarrassed. Count Androvandi, the Italian delegate, who was

informally acting as Japanese spokesman, surprised us by saying that the

Chinese delegate should be perfectly free to remain and would not have to

retire. Thus he saved the situation for us. The President then immediately

declared that the meeting was unanimous in wanting the Chinese delegation

to remain present at the discussion on the draft proposing mediation to Japan.

[Dr. Koo: the diary merely says:

November 5, 1937 10:30; Conference meeting in private. Had a

hard time to arrange for our declaration of willingness to retire from
discussions. Spoke to Hornbeck, Davis, then to Spaak, then to Eden.
Surprised that Androvandi spoke to ask us to stay. He saved the situation
for us as the President followed with a declaration that the meeting
was unanimous in wanting us to remain.

Your rendition above seems slightly at variance with your remarks in

light of your conversation with Davis on October 28, 1937 on page

I understand, that , at the time of the above private meeting, you had

already agreed to make such a declaration, thinking it a wise move to show

China’s cooperativeness, and already had if; prepared. The /.roblem at the

November 5th private meeting, at least vis-a-vis the United States delegation,

was your insistance that you would only make the said declaration, if askai

to do so by the Conference. The United States representatives, and I

suppose the British as well, did not want to appear to be pressing China

in this way, etc. You, for some of the reasons stated above in your

rendition, felt you could not simply exclude yourself.

Which interpretation is correct? Have you any recollection as to the

government's instructions? C.S.]

As to why Aldrovandi made the suggestion that it was not necessary for

China to withdraw, ostensibly it was to show a friendly attitude toward

China. But I think the real purpose was to seize the opportunity once more

to oppose anything that Great Britain and the United States might propose
in connection with this Sino-Japanese question, provided that it would not

prejudice Japan's position. In this case, evidently, it would not. Japan

would not attend the Conference anyway, and would not accept medi-.tion. I

was certain of this, as Aldrovandi must have been. It was the British and

Americans who were doing some wishful thinking that Japan might yet accept

mediation, if the other powers appeared to be taking no side and putting

China exactly on the same footing as they were putting Japan. In making

this gesture of support to the Chinese viewpoint, Aldrovandi was in no way

causing any disadvantage to the Japanese position. Thus, I interpreted his

show of friendliness to China as an indication that the Japanese refusal

would be absolute.

The meeting went on to discuss the draft proposal to Tokyo that was

to ask Japan to designate some representative to enter into an exchange of

views with a small group of representatives of the Conference, with a view

toward conciliation and mediation. In the discussion of the draft, both

Eden and Davis did not like the idea of specifically mentioning Japan's

grievances against China. [I think they wished to avoid] taking up Japan's

grievances against China, which were emphasized in the statement of the

Japanese government accompanying Japan's refusal to attend the conference,

for several reasons. First, I don't think the powers were then thinking

much of the so-called Japanese grievances, because they were, in view of

what Japan had been doing since the Lukouchiao incident, really mere excuses.

In a sense, mentioning these grievances would only give^ them tacit

recognition or call unnecessary attention to them. At the same time, if such

grievances should be mentioned, naturally the declaration would also have

to mention China's complaints against Japan. That would make the document

unnecessarily long, change its tone and perhaps irritate Japan.

 E-822

Eden and Davis further expressed a preference for a small group to

make the draft. They both asked me to speak in support of their two ideas,

but I did not wish to be the first one to start discussion on these points

so soon after my declaration of willingness to retire from the meeting.

[As to the setting up of a subcommittee and especially the question of its

composition, it was decided to put off this difficult question until Japan

replied to the second communication from the conference.]

[The conference worked on the draft communication to Tokyo the following

day, November 6. Besides attending the meeting, I took Ch’eng T'ien-fang,

our Ambassador to Berlin who had just arrived in Brussels the previous evening,
5
to call on Norman Davis^, a-ad also called myself^'on Mr. Malcolm McDonald,

the British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and se -nd delegate to

Brussels. ]

[The thrust of the conversation with Norman Davis was really directed

toward the question of possible German mediation of the Sino-Japanese

conflict outside the context of the Brussels Conference. But this was a very

delicate subject, while the conference was still attempting mediation itself.

In fact, there were many rumors at the time that Germany was attempting

to bring about a peace agreement between China and Japan and that China

and Japan were themselves holding discussions on the terms of a settlement.

(Only the day before press correspondents in Berlin had mistakenly reported

that Hitler had communicated to the Chinese and Japanese representatives

at Berlin a formal offer to mediate and that it had been accepted.)] I

was even somewhat anxious that these rumors might have an unfavorable effect

at the Brussels Conference. Therefore, the delegation immediately denied

what was blatantly false and I cabled to the Waichiaopu to ascertain the facts,

of the situation and to ask them to rigorously deny such rumors if they were

false. On November 6, that same day, a telegram from the Waichiaopu reassured
me that ] a Waichiaopu spokesman had categorically denied reports that terms

for settling the Far Eastern conflict were being discussed between China

and Japan or that mediation was going on outside the Brussels Conference.

[What I wished to do, in introducing Ambassador Ch'eng to Norman Davis

on November 6 was, therefore, to simply report the German attitude to the head

of the American delegation and to sound out his reaction. (?) Accordingly,]

I told Mr. Davis that my colleague, Mr. Ch'en.g, had just come from Berlin

with a letter of introduction from the American Ambassador, William Dodd,

and that, therefore, I was glad to introduce him to Mr. Davis, so that
IL, ' ft- ■

he would have an opportunity of telling of his impressions gathered from

conversations with members of the German government.

After Davis expressed his appreciation and his keen desire to hear

about the attitude and policy of the leaders of the German government,

Ch'eng stated, [as one may recall, that Germany’s attitude, since the hostilities

began, had been rather divided. He went on to describe more concretely what he

meant . ]

Davis remarked that his own impression had also been that the German

attitude toward the Sino-Japanese conflict was rather divided.

Mr. Ch’eng then said he had spoken to von Neurath, the German Foreign

Minister several times after the outbreak of the hostilities in North China.

He said he had asked von Neurath why Germany did not propose to Japan to

stop the aggression and urge her to come to a settlement with China. Von

Neurath had answered by asking the question: Why should Germany do so?

Ch'eng said he had replied by saying that Germany was Japan’s friend and

therefore trusted by her, whereas England and America were looked upon

by Japan as enemies.

Davis, looking intensely interested and somewhat surprised, asked what

von Neurath said in reply. Ch'eng answered that the German Foreign Minister
 E-824

first said he would consider his proposition^ but later, at their second

interview, when he (Ch'eng) asked von Neurath whether he had considered the

question, the reply was that the time was not yet ripe for Germany to propose

mediation.

At this point, I intervened by saying I had understood that Mr. Ch’eng

had spoken to von Neurath of this matter as his personal view long before

the idea of holding the present conference was even thought of. I said

this because while I was emphasizing the point of China's determination to

resist to the end, unless a just peace could be established, Mr. Ch'eng gave

the impression that China was anxious for a settlement through the mediation

of a third party. So I explained and emphasized that Ch'eng had spoken to

von Neurath of this matter as his personal view.

Then Ch'eng pointed out that he had first spoken to von Neurath in

July, next in August and again in September. He added that he had also

asked von Neurath at the time about the report that Italy might join the

German-Japanese Anti-Communist Agreement of November 25, 1936, and that von

Neurath's answer was that Germany did not want Italy to join it. The day

before Ch'eng left Berlin for Brussels, he said, he called on one of the

department chief's of the German Foreign Ministry, who explained in reply

to his same question that Italy's adherence to the agreement was due to the

Spanish question. When asked how Japan could help in the Spanish question,

the department chief did not answer. But on the earlier occasion, von

Neurath had explained to him (Ch'eng) that the German-Japanese agreement

ed note; Italy formally signed the protocol providing for the adhesion
of Italy to the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement of November 25,
1936 on November 6, 1937, the day of the conversation between Ambassadors
Koo and Ch'eng, on the one hand, and Mr. Norman on the other.
 FILMED
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 E-825

had been concluded for the purpose of opposing Conmunist propaganda and

Comintern activities^ and that, as Italy had always been anti-communist,

it was not necessary to have her join in. (That was an official or diplomatic

explanation.)

Mr. Davis said a Chinese gentleman, whom I had introduced to him in the

morning, had just come from Rome, where he had seen Mussolini. I said that

he was referring to General Chiang psk-li and that General Chiang’s impression

of the Italian attitude was that Italy was taking the side of Japan purely

in the interest of her own European problems. I said, according to General

Chiang, who had a conversation with Mussolini himself, the idea was to form

a bloc to impress England and France that Italy, too, had friends. It was

not so much for the purpose of securing real Japanese support as for bringing

pressure to bear upon the Anglo-French combination. General Chiang had

understood Mussolini to have said that so long as Italy's problems in Europe

were not: satisfactorily settled, he was determined to continue opposing

Anglo-French collaboration. Italy would call black what England and France

declared white and vieeversa. (That was quite true at the time. Rather

deliberately, Mussolini especially went out of his way to denounce England

and France without any hesitation, just to impress Paris and London.)

Mr. Davis turned the conversation back to the question of the possibility

of German mediation in the Sino-Japanese conflict.

I said that the rumor, which had been circulated all over the world, of

Hitler's offer of mediation to China and Japan had at once been denied by

the Chinese delegation. Furthermore, I understood that in the same evening

Nanking, Tokyo and Berlin had all denied it as well. I said China had

always considered that the Sino-Japanese conflict was a matter of general

concern and that it fell within the purview of the Nine Power Treaty. She

had always desired to hold a conference. Now that this conference was being
 E-826

held, it was out of the question for China to go behind its back, and accept

mediation from any outside power.

(I gave this report and explanation in order to dispel any confusion

or suspicion that China was playing her hand on all fronts. [As I have

said and as the telegrams from the government in Nanking indicated, China was

not expecting the Conference to succeed at mediation, but she did wish to

cooperate as fully as possible with the Conference and did not wish to

appear to be acting behind the back of the Conference, as she would appear

to be doing, if she accepted an offer of mediation independent of the

Conference. She hoped such cooperation would lead eventually to the power

concerned extending some concrete measures of aid to China. (?) ]

Mr. Davis next asked Dr. Ch'eng what he would do, if Germany were to

offer mediation to China; would he accept such mediation?

Dr. Ch'eng said that would depend upon the terms.

Davis then asked what terms Ch'eng would like to have in order to make

an offer acceptable to China.

Ch'eng' replied "the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and the

restoration of the status quo before July 7, 1937." When Davis asked whether

Germany could get Japan to do that, Ch'eng'said he did not think so.

Then Mr. Davis suggested that if Germany were to propose mediation to

Mr. Ch'eng again, he should tell the German government that as the end to

the Sino-Japanese conflict was a matter of concern to all the signatory

powers of the Nine Power Treaty, China alone could not truly accept mediation

from Germany, because she was attending a conference which was discussing

this subject. He added that, of course, it would not be wise to say that

China did not want to accept, but only to explain that she could not do so.

I asked Mr. Davis what he thought should be the next step taken, now

that the Conference had decided to send a reply to the Japanese communication

and statement.
 E-827

Mr. Davis said he understood at the meeting that the Conference could

not keep on waiting for a reply from Japan, but that there was other work

which it might usefully perform. In his view, the next step would be the

constitution of a ways and means committee to prepare the way, perhaps for

mediation.

I remarked that the question of a subcommittee had been broached for

several days now. I asked what its size should be and whether the difficulties

as to its composition had been smoothed out.

The American delegate said that a small subcommittee of three,

composed of America, England and Belgium, would be the best. But France

wanted to join, and if she got on the subcommittee, Italy would want to be

represented also.

I asked whether it could not be arranged just to have France on the

committee and to leave Italy out, so as to avoid a big committee. Now that

Italy had joined the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement, I said, she

had definitely taken the side of Japan, and it would definitely be a good

reason for not including her on the committee.

Mr. Davis thought that that would probably be done.

I asked if Italy was tote on the committee, would Soviet Russia not

want to join too.

[As I expected,] Davis said that that was precisely what Soviet Russia

would want if Italy were represented. He added that there had been so much

difficulty regarding the composition of the subcommittee that he had suggested

that if anybody wanted America's place on it, he would be glad to give it up.

I remarked that that would be out of the question, for it was indispensable

for the committee to have the United States as a member, and I even understood

that it had been suggested that the committee be composed of only the United

States .
 E-828

Mr. Davis said emphatically that that would not do.

I asked Mr. Davis whether he had had any indication from Tokyo that

Japan would reply favorably to the communication from the Conference.

The American delegate replied that he had had no indication from Tokyo,

but thought it was possible that Japan might consider the communication

favorably. The Italian delegate, Count Aldrovandi had told him that Japan

would designate someone to get into contact with the Conference.

Dr. Ch'eng asked if Japan did not do so, what would the Conference do then.
/
Davis replied that they might cross that bridge when they came to it,

and it was not time to talk about it yet. When I remarked that if America

made up her imind to cross the bridge, she would not be doing it alone this time,

Mr. Davis said that he was not sure and that it remained to be seen. [Then,

in a more concrete vein,] Mr. Davis said that if Japan did not reply by

Tuesday (November 9) and showed signs of delaying matters, the subcommittee,

after being constituted, might ask China whether she would accept mediation

from the Conference and on what terms. If China accepted mediation, then

the Conference could make another communique to Japan, stating that China

had already accepted the offer and asking Japan to say whether she would

do likewise or not. According to Davis, such a demarche would be the next

step to take, in order to hasten and persuade Japan to reply favorably. If

Japan still rejected the proposal, he thought there were other steps which

could be taken. He thought it must not appear that, in the absence of a

favorable Japanese reply, the Conference was paralyzed. He said it could

not declare itself to have failed so easily. It must go on and try to

explore other possibilities. Some one power, acceptable to Japan, might

then be asked to undertake conversations with her.

Dr. Hornbeck intervened by saying that he did not quite understand my

statement at the morning meeting in regard to paragraph 6 of the draft text

 E-829

of the communication to Japan, and asked what I was aiming at .

I answered that I had no objection to the substance of the paragraph.

However, as regards the part expressing the possibility of dissipating

Japan's misgivings (as expressed in reply to the original invitation to

attend the Conference) and the desire of the Conference to request Japan

to designate one or several representatives for an exchange of views, I

felt it was really a thing of imprudence and, as such, it was hardly

appropriate for China to associate herself with it. Therefore, I said, I

thought it was best for me to make a declaration to that effect.

Mr. Davis seemed to have understood my point and said he had taken my

declaration [of that morning] in that sense, and that he felt it was all

right. [He had another thought then, and asked whether Germany was really

giving China much help. He said that, on the surface, she appeared to be

on the side of Japan. Mr. Ch'eng said actually Germany was still shipping

arms and munitions to China. When Mr. Davis asked whether there were also

airplanes, he answered, "yes," adding that Japan had protested to Germany

for sending arms and munitions to China and had also asked Germany to recall

German military officers in China, but that the German government had refused

both of these requests. Up till then, Ch'eng said, Germany had not consented

to recall them. General Blomberg, [German Minister of War, ] had even said

it was a matter of personal honor for those officers to remain in China in

her present difficulties.

I observed that at the time of engaging these officers, all had voluntarily

signed a pledge or oath to be loyal to General Chiang and China at a ceremony

which took place in the German Embassy in Nanking.

[Mr. MacDonald, whom I saw an hour later, was acting chairman of the

British delegation while Mr. Eden was temporarily in London. I asked him, too,]
 E-830

what the next step to take would be^ now that the Conference had agreed upon

sending Japan its communication.

Mr. MacDonald said according to Mr. Davis we might consider the setting

up of a Steering Committee on Tuesday. Replying to my question whether he

had received any indication from Japan through British channels regarding

the possibility of Japan's agreeing to send someone to negotiate, Mr.

MacDonald said he thought that it was not impossible. When I asked, in the

event that Japan should refuse again, what would be the next step, Mr.

MacDonald replied, in that event, there were other possibilities that

one could examine, such as the setting up of a small committee to watch

and follow the situation in the Far East until a more favorable time for

further action.

I expressed the hope that Mr. MacDonald would remain at Brussels.

f(Not only Mr. Eden, but M. Delbos had left Brussels. More departures would

have an unfavorable effect.)]

Mr. MacDonald said he would remain in Mr. Eden's absence, but that how

long he would do so depended upon the developments of the Conference. If

Japan refused, he thought it would not be necessary for him to remain,

especially if a small committee was set up to watch developments. Referring

to the discussions of the draft communication to the Japanese government,

Mr. MacDonald said the draft text did require a great deal of discussion

to prepare before it was submitted to the meeting in the morning. He thought

the discussions which took place at the meeting really improved the draft,

especially after certain parts were omitted and the whole document was made

shorter. He thought this was a rare result, because, as a rule in the

matter of drafting, a large committee usually would endup producing something

in
incongruous. However,/the present case, he felt, the final product really

read better than the original draft.

 E-831

[This coinmunication frcm the Conference to the Japanese government was

actually sent out the following day, November 7. It was both a reply to

the October 27th Japanese refusal to attend the Conference and] the proposal

that Japan accept mediation, the delegates offering to appoint a small

committee to exchange views with representatives of the Japanese government,

if it so desired. The Conference then bided its time, waiting for the

Japanese reply.

[In the evening of November 7, there was a soirde at the Soviet Legation .

I took the opportunity to have a talk with Mr. Litvinov] In reply to my

question, Mr. Litvinov said he felt pessimistic about the future of the

Conference. He did not think it could do very much because the United

States would not take the initiative to do anything. He himself was preparing

to leave Tuesday, November 9. When I expressed regret for his early departure

and urged him to stay, if possible, he said he thought the British could

not do anything and the Americans would not do anything. When I told him Lhe

Italians let it be known that Japan might give a favorable reply to the

communication of the Conference, M. Litvinov thought that that was out of

question. He had great doubt that Japan would consent to accept the offer

from the Conference.

[Of course, I myself, also greatly doubted that the Japanese would

reply favorably. From the Chinese point of view, the merit in having the

conference '-end out the second invitation to Japan was the potential effect

on public opinion of a second Japanese refusal to cooperate.] If Japan again

failed to respond cooperatively, it: was expected that public opinio' in the

United States, particularly, would come out in favor of more positive action,

and it was hoped that a small group of interested states would then contemplate,

jointly or individually, measures of assistance to China or against Japan.

[I had another conversation with Mr. Litvinov on November 9. There

 E-832

had been] reports that he had decided to withdraw the Soviet delegation from

the Conference over the question of its exclusion from the proposed subcommittee

of the Conference. For a time there was quite a bit of excitement over the

news. When I contacted the Soviet Legation in Brussels, I was told the Soviet

delegation would leave Brussels by train at 7 p.m. I went to the station,

but did nor see anybody. So I telephoned the Soviet Legation from the station

and finally arranged to see Mr. Litvinov at once. He left Brussels shortly

thereafter. But the storm had already blown over, as Norman Davis, at 5 p.m.,

agreed to drop the idea of having a subcommittee, altogether.

When I spoke to Mr. Litvinov he was still feeling upset and talked

feelingly. [At first] I told him that, having heard of his departure, I

went to the Care du Nord to see him off, but not finding him there, had

therefore arranged this meeting. He thanked me and asked what was the latest news.

I then said I had intended to see him earlier, but as I wanted to have

a talk with Mr. Eden first, I had not been able to. ([Eden had only returned

to Brussels that morning.]) Now Mr. Quo Tai-chi, who h^d just seen Mr.

Eden, had given me to understand that, according to Mr. Eden's information,

Japan's answer would probably be in the negative. The question would then

be what the Conference should do next. I said the Chinese delegation had

pointed out to Mr. Eden that if Japan refused all reasonable offers, the only

thing to do would be to adopt positive measures in the form of sanctions. I

said Mr. Eden thought that there were two kinds of sanctions, effective and

ineffective, and that if they were to be employed at all, they must be

effective to produce results. Eden did not know that it would be easy

to adopt them, but stated Great Britain was prepared to go as far as the

United States. I further said that Mr. Davis had impressed me as being

desirous of taking some action at the Conference, and that the United States

appeared not to wish to see the Conference fail and admit defeat. Therefore,
 E-833

on the question of fixing a date for the next meeting of the Advisory Commii tee

of the League of Nations, Mr. Davis had intimated that the United States

did not like seeing the question referred back again to Geneva, where its

own hands would be tied.

Mr. Litvinov said he had told Mr. Eden that there were effective and

ineffective sanctions and that the latter were of no use. M. Litvinov said

he had also told Mr. Davis yesterday, in reply to the latter's question,

that the powers must keep China going in resisting Japanese aggression by

supplying her with materials of war and keeping the sea routes open. [This

lei us to discuss the crucial question of transit facilities for China.]

[Then toward the end of our conversation,] Mr. Litvinov said there was

something else he wanted to tell me. He said at a luncheon the day before,

Mr. Davis had told him about the formation of a ways and means committee

for the Conference and made it clear to him that it would be better ic the

Soviet Union were not to be on it for the present. M. Litvinov said the

Italians had been circulating a rumor that Japan might come to Brussels,

if Soviet Russia were not on the committee. But that was a purely Italian

maneuver, and it was more than probable that if Russia were kept away from

the committee, japan would refuse to come just the same. Mr. Litvinov said

he also told Mr. Davis that the Soviet Union was not a signatory power of

the Nine power Treaty, that she did not ask to join the Conference, but

was invited to come, and no reservation was made in the invitation that it

might not be convenient to have her. He said to me that Davis told him that

the United States had not wished to invite Soviet Russia at the beginning,

intending first to talk things over at Brussels and then decide whether

or not to invite her. Davis said it was Great Britain who insisted on

sending an invitation to Soviet Russia at once. According to Mr. Litvinov,

he then told Mr. Davis that it would be ridiculous to have the representative
 E-834

of a great power waiting outside the door of the Conference to be called

in at any time ii- was thought necessary. If the presence of the Soviet

delegation was considered unnecessary, then the delegation would withdraw

from the Conference.

M. Litvinov, continuing, said that he felt very much upset by what

Mr. Davis had said to him and that he had been ready to withdraw from the

Conference entirely. Mr. Davis had told him that day, however, that, in

view of the opposition of the Soviet delegation, he would have to drop the

proposition to have a ways and means committee at all. In reply to my

question, Litvinov said he was leaving that evening, but might come back

after a week, if it was necessary. Meanwhile he would leave M. Potemkin in

charge. M. Litvinov asked me to watch out and try to prevent any such

unreasonable situation from arising again.

I then expressed the hope that he would come back in any case,

because he could be so helpful to the Conference.

[There was a 3 p.m. meeting of the Conference on the 10th.] But if

it were not for the unfortunate death of Mr. Ramsey MacDonald, [the British

Lord President of Council,] there would have been nothing for the meeting

to do. As it was, several of the delegates made speeches of condolence,

and I spoke, too. After the meeting, I took the opportunity to speak briefly

first with Norman Davis then with Foreign Minister Delbos,[who like Mr. Eden

had just returned to Brussels.]

I told Mr. Davis that a cable from my colleague in Tokyo that morning

reported that the Japanese government had decided to answer the communication

from the Conference in the negative, but was now drafting the text of the

reply in a conciliatory manner. Furthermore, Japanese public opinion had

stiffened because of Italy's having joined the German-Japanese Anti-Communist

 E-835

Pact and the lack of unity and harmony in the Conference. I said the cable

also reported that there was a strong current of opinion in Japanese

government circles in favor of the renunciation of the Nine Power Treaty

altogether.

The last point seemed to impress Mr. Davis very much and he said that,

if true, the Japanese government would have to change its mind very soon

(perhaps meaning that he (Davis) was contemplating to propose strong measures

to make Japan change her mind).

I pointed out that it was evident there was no hope of Japan's willingness

to cooperate with the Conference. I said China was determined to continue

her resistance, but the most important thing was supplies from abroad. We

went on to discuss the question of transit facilities.

[When I spoke with M. Delbos] I gave him, too, a gist of the telegram
Ur** ^ 4 ?
from Ambassador Hsu Shih-ying in Tokyo, though [again] not mentioned the point

about the latest developments in the military situation in China, [which

were all too discouraging.] I also said to M. Delbos that there vas no

more hope of Japan's cooperating with the Conference, but that China had

made up her mind to continue resisting the Japanese aggression.

[Two days later, on November 12, Japan's reply to the second

communication of the Conference arrived in Brussels. It was a flat] refusal

to send a representative to exchange views with the Conference on mediation

or conciliation by a few of the Conference members, [since Japanese action

in China was "a measure of self-defense.” At the time I recorded that it

was an insolent reply, and I began at once to work on a speech to deliver

before the following day's conference meeting. When correspondents of two

important American papers called In succession to ask for a reaction to

Japan's reply, I said it was in deliberate disregard of the spirit of

conciliation and moderation of t.he Conference, and its language bordered on

 E-836

insolence.

The Conference meeting was held at 11 the next morning. By previous

arrangement with Messrs. Davis and Eden, I spoke first, followed by Delbos,

Eden and Davis. All three struck the same note against "ideological"

crusade, [that is to say, they refuted the Japanese thesis that Japan had

the right to invade China to protect herself against pro-communist

tendencies in China. In general, they spoke of the broad principles they felt

the conference ought to uphold.] [In my own speech, I stated that:]

The refusal of the Japanese government is more resolute and

absolute than ever, and both the language and tone of its reply seem
to indicate clearly that all the painstaking efforts of the Conference
to secure her collaboration have been taken as a sign of weakness and
served apparently only to inspire insolence. The claim that Japan's
present action in China is resorted to as a measure of self-defense
is not only a deliberate distortion of the meaning of the time-honored
term, it could in no way justify her claim that the matter lay outside
the scope of the Nine Power Treaty. The "full and frank communication"
envisaged in Article VII of the Treaty is intended for just such a
situation.

[At this point in my speech, I made a direct appeal for the adoption of

positive measures. I said:]

Now that the door of conciliation and mediation has been slammed in
your face by the latest reply of the Japanese government, will you
not decide to withhold supplies of war materials and credit to Japan
and extend aid to China? It would be a modest way in which you can
fulfill your obligation of helping to check Japanese aggression and
upholding the treaty in question.

[The same day, November 13, the Chinese delegation circulated a memorandum

delineating the vulnerability of Japan's financial and economic situation

and the possible effect therefore of economic restrictions on Japan, such

as the withholding of credits and loans. There had been some feeling among

the principal delegates in the past few days of wanting to adopt a more

positive stand. Thus I noted in my diary under the date of November 11,

that I called on Messrs. Eden, Delbos and Davis at 12 noon, taking Ambassador

King with me, and that, when] I left them , [I was] feeling happier because

they all showed a new attitude toward Japan and were evidently tired of her
 E-837

intransigence.

[After the speeches at the meeting on the morning of the 13th had

all been delivered, ] the text of a draft declaration wirh reference to

Japan's second refusal was circulated. It had been first prepared by Dr.

Hornbeck and later modified by the British and Franch. [It stated that the

conference could not accept the view that the conflict concerned only Japan

and China and felt, to the contrary, that it was of concern to all the parties

to the Nine Power Treaty and, in fact, to the whole world. It said there

existed "no warrant in law for the use of armed force" by any country for

the purpose of intervening in the internal affairs of another. Since a just

and lasting settlement could not be expected to result from direct negotiations

between Japan and China, the powers at Brussels hoped that Japan would not

persist in her refusal to discuss the matter with all or a few of them. If

she did persist, then, stated the final paragraph:

The states represented at Brussels must consider what is to be

their common attitude in a situation where one party to an internatio:.al
treaty maintains against the views of all the other parties that the
action which it has taken does not come within the scope of the treaty
and sets aside provisions of the treaty which the other parties hold
to be operative in the circumstances.]

Clearly, this declaration, while couched in moderate language, was

intended to indicate that the Conference was contemplating the adoption of

a firm attitude toward Japan and undertaking consultation to line up the

powers toward this end. That was the purpose of the declaration, in view

of the curt and almost insolent Japanese refusal, which caused the powers

to feel rather upset. The latter also explained various reports brought

to me by the foreign correspondents, American, English and French, to the

effect that the attitude of Great Britain, the United States and France was

hardening and that China would be able to get some satisfactory results.

The general impression of the hardening of the attitude of the principal

powers at the Conference was evidenced by the concluding paragraph of the

 E-838

draft declaration as quoted above. Diplomatically, this was fairly clear

language, implying that the powers were going to consult with a view to

the adoption of a common action vis-S-vis Japan. [In fact, this led to

some difficulties with the Italian delegation and, less expectedly, the

Scandinavian delegations . ]

In the afternoon of the 13th, the Conference met again to discuss the

draft declaration. But I had to speak up first in order to stop the

Italian delegate's maneuver to delay the proceedings by suggesting that Tokyo

be asked for an explanation of the meaning of one sentence in the Japanese

reply. [Except for Italy, the delegates all appeared ready to accept the

draft, though its final passage was put off for Monday, the 15th, to give

the Scandinavian delegates time to consult their governments.]

On the morning of the 15th, I called on M. Hoppenot, who one may recall

was with the French delegation.] In reply to my question, he expressed the

view that, at that afternoon's meeting of the conference, the draft declaration

would be adopted without much difficulty. He said it was expected that: the

Italian delegation would oppose it, but that the Scandinavian delegations

would merely abstain from voting. He did not think that the latter were

inspired by Berlin in their attitude, but that they objected to the statement

on the juridical ground, which appeared to him to be rather academic, namely,

that the question of sanctions should be brought before the League of Nations

in Geneva and not brought up at Brussels. He understood, however, that in

abstaining they would merely make a mild declaration, without going into

the real reason for it.

[That afternoon, before the conference met, I called first on Count

Aldrovandi and then on the heads of the Norwegian and Danish delegations

in an effort to persuade each to recant. The Count told me that the last

paragraph in the draft statement went beyond the invitation of the Conference
 E-839

and^ in view of the intentions I had revealed in my speech on Saturday (the

13th) this paragraph would seem to indicate that positive measures were in

contemplation. He said this was a statement of principle to which the

Italian delegation had to object.

I told him the phrase itself did not indicate what measures, if any,

were to be adopted, but simply announced the intention of concerting a

common policy for the purpose of bringing about an early restoration of

peace in the Far East. Since the object of the Conference was to bring

about a termination of hostilities and as I understood that was also the

purpose of the Italian government in participating in the Conference, I

regretted that there should be a difference of opinion as regards the means

and methods of achieving this purpose. I pointed out that the Conference

had tried by conciliation to persuade Japan to accept its mediation and

that her refusal was unnecessarily harsh and stiff, with the result that a

number of delegations were rather irritated and became impatient. I said

even if measures were adopted, they would be only for the purpose of achieving

the same object, namely, to presuade Japan to agree to a cessation of

hostilities .

Count Aldrovandi said he did not think that the adoption of positive

measures would serve the purpose at all. On the other hand, if the paragraph

in question meant only what I had explained, it might be less objectionable.

In any case, he said, it would be preferable to delete the whole paragraph.

I said since the Conference had failed to achieve its object by

conciliatory means and since Italy, I understood, was just as anxious as

the other powers represented at the Conference to see peace restored in

the Far East, I wondered what other peaceful methods the Count had in mind

to suggest, if he was opposed to the adoption of any measures to persuade

Japan to accept good offices. I said that surely the Conference could not
 E-840

declare its work to be terminated just because of the refusal of Japan to

accept its good offices.

Count Aldrovandi said that that was reason why he called [at the Saturday

meeting, ] attention to the sentence in the Japanese reply asking the powers

at the Conference to cooperate with Japan by contributing their efforts to

the stability in the Far East. He thought that that was the sentence which

indicated that the door was still left open. But he had been sorry to see

that the Canadian and Dutch delegations, as well as I, had opposed making

another demarche in Tokyo for a clarification of the Japanese intention.

I said it was one thing if it had been the intention of Japan to

leave the door open through that sentence, but I was afraid it was merely

a maneuver to gain time, which was an important element in the situation.

Count Aldrovandi said he realized, as I had pointed out at the meeting,

that every day's delay meant more suffering and misery. He had not suggested

another formal communication to Tokyo. What he had had in mind was an

inquiry at the sj-me time by the Belgian Ambassador in Tokyo, for example.

I asked if the Japanese explanation were favorable, what would be the

outcome.

Count Aldrovandi replied that Japan was ready to accept the efforts

of the powers to bring China and Japan together for direct negotiation.

I said that direct negotiation was not only objectionable from the

Chinese point of view, but also unacceptable to the majority of the powers

at the Conference, as they had already declared that the conflict was of

concern to them all.

Count Aldrovandi said that Japan's view was that there were questions

that concerned only the two countries. The feeling of hatred on one side

or the other between the two countries was a matter which only they themselves

could understand and explain away. He said Japan further maintained that

the present conflict was outside the scope of the Nine Power Treaty, just
 E-841

as was the British squadron's bombardment of Nanking in 1927, which did not

raise the question of consultation on the basis of the Treaty. He said that

was also the reason he had stated, in reply to Mr. Davis' question at the

beginning of the Conference, that, in so far as the rights and interests

of third powers were concerned, the matter could be taken up by them after

a settlement was reached by China and Japan directly. Besides, he stated,

Japan took the view that Soviet Russia was not a party to the Treaty and

yet was taking part in the Conference. That was also part of the reason

Japan objected to coming to the Conference.

I said the British attack on Nanking was merely a local incident,

which was settled within a short time. At present, the powers party to the

Nine Power Treaty were holding the Conference on its basis. Making that

instrument respected was a matter of concern to all of them and [was] not [a

matter] merely confined to China and Japan. I said I took it for granted

that Italy, being a party to the Treaty, was equally desirous of seeing it

respected. I said since Italy's declared object in attending the Conference

was to see peace restored in the Far East, I would be sorry to see her

taking sides, which would indicate a break of the solidari-y of the great

powers under the Nine Power Treaty. I told the Italian delegate that China

desire to be a friend of all powers and looked forward to cordial collaboration

with them all. She did not wish to see the division of the Conference into

two groups. The solidarity of the Conference was all the more necessary not

only for the restoration of peace in the Far East but for general appeasement

in Europe as well. Looking beyond the Sino-Japanese conflict, I hoped

that, in the interest of world peace, the experience of collaboration and

stability obtained at this Conference might lead to further cooperation on

the broad basis of world appeasement and the restoration of world stability.

As regards the relations between China and Italy, I said, China had
 E-842

always been cordial^ as he knew personally, especially when he was in China

serving as a member of the Commission of Inquiry of the League of Nations.

I said he must have found the spontaneous evidences of friencfehip for Italy

and the Italian people. But the Chinese people felt that the future should

hold forth greater hopes of close cooperation between the two countries,

not only in the cultural field but also economically. Something of this

nature had already been started and found to be mutually beneficial. I

said I could not see how collaboration with Japan on the part of Italy

could bring equally important advantages to Italy. I observed that Japan's

policy in the Far East regarding the interests of European and American

countries must have been well known to him. I said I did not think there

was any pracitcal benefit which Italy could derive from her policy of

cooperation with Japan, and asked the Count to take a broader and more far

sighted view of the problem before the Conference. I said although it

had been said by others that the Italian delegation was working entirely

for Japan's interest in the Conference, I did not believe it personally,

but I did feel that the attitude of his delegation had practically placed

Italy at the crossroads as regards the future of Sino-Italian relations.

I said it was of course for Italy to choose, but I hoped that Italy would

make a far sighted choice.

Count Aldrovandi said he fully shared my sentiments regarding the

future of Sino-Italian relations. But as he had said at the opening of the

Conference, Italy did not wish to take sides in the present conflict and

wanted to remain friends with both China and Japan. While he had received

instructions of a general character, he was still expecting instructions

regarding that afternoon's meeting and was expecting to hear from Count

Ciano on the telephone at three o'clock.

In response to my request, Count Aldrovandi said he would certainly

convey what I had said to Count Ciano. But later that afternoon, at the
 E-843

meeting, he came over to tell me he was sorry he was unable to reach

Count Ciano on the telephone and, therefore, did not have an opportunity

to comply with my request. He said he had received instead a despatch

which gave him the necessary instructions, and he was sorry to say he had

to maintain his opposition to the draft declaration.

[Both the Scandinavian delegates made if: clear to me, when I spoke

with them, that they could not vote in favor of the proposed declaration

becausa of the last paragraph which seemed to imply the adoption of measures

in the nature of sanctions. In concluding my conversation with Mr. Aubert

of Norway, I therefore] urged him to vote for the statement while making a

declaration stating his point of view. But he said he had already discussed

the matter over the telephone with his Foreign Minister, who had just

returned from the United States, and he had received instructions to abstain.

He added that Mr. MacDonald had also spoken to him in the morning, trying

to persuade him to modify his position. However, in view of his instructions,

he could not do so. But, as he had assured Mr. MacDonald, he would try

to make it clear in his statement that Norway was in favor of the general

principles [embodied in the declaration] and that her abstention was not

because of such principles .

[In speaking with Mr. Henrik de Kauffmann of Denmark, I pointed out,

as I had to Mr. Aubert, that] the Conference had tried conciliation and

failed, so it was natural it should consider other possibilities. However,

the paragraph in question did not engage the responsibility of any participating

power. Full freedom was given to the participating powers to accept any

measure proposed or none. The statement was merely intended to impress

Japan with the solidarity of the Conference and the united purpose of the

participating powers to work for a peaceful solution of the conflict. I

said if Denmark were to abstain from voting, it might weaken the spirit of
 E-844

solidarity of the Conference and would place her before the world on the

side of Italy.

M. Kauffmann saw the force of what I said and stated he would be

Willing not to abstain from voting, but to merely make a declaration to be

recorded in the minutes. However, he added, the time was short and, under

the Oslo Agreement, his country had to take a common stand with the other

Scandinavian countries diplomatically. The Norwegian government, was

insisting on abstaining and he had already spoken to M. Aubert in Brussels

and to Dr. Munch, the Danish Foreign Minister, who was disposed to reconsider

the position. M. Kauffmann therefore suggested that if the meeting could

be postponed for a day or so, it might give Dr. Munch an opportun ity to

speak to the Norwegian Foreign Minister again. He felt confident that the

Danish position could be modified.

When I said that, from what I had heard from the other delegations, I

doubted whether a postponement could be accepted, M. Kauffmann said although

it was almost time for the meeting, he would try to speak to his Norwegian

and Swedish colleagues again. He intimated that Sweden was not inclined

to insist on abstention and that it was the Norwegian delegate who was

strongly for it.

[Shortly after my talk with Kauffmann, the meeting convened. Just

before we all took our seats, Messrs. Davis and Cadogan approached me,

intimating to me that I should say very little at the meeting for fear of

provoking a debate and upsetting the adoption of the declaration by the

Conference. I had, as a matter of fact, thought of the same point and

intended to follow the same tactics, that is to say, to say very little

about the text itself.

[The meeting itself proceeded more or less as expected. The declaration

was adopted with only the Italian government voting against it. But the
 E-845

three Scandinavian countries abstained. They stated their ground for doing so,

however, was the smallness of their material interests in the Far East. Right]

after the 4 p.m. meeting, Mr. Kauffmann spoke to me, expressing his regret

that a postponement of the meeting had not been possible for, he said, he

realized the awkward position in which Denmark was placed by his abstention.

He assured me, however, that he did not mean any lack of appreciation of the

importance of the statement or of sympathy for China.

[When I saw Mr. Davis about a half hour later,] he said, referring

to the declaration of abstention by Scandinavian countries, that he had been

doing some missionary work with Sweden and Norway in the hope that they might

modify their attitude. However, he thought on the whole it was a good

thing that a statement was adopted, even though there were abstentions. He

said a postponement of the meeting would have been rather dangerous. He

also said the Scandinavian delegations were afraid of sanctions. He felt

sorry that in my speech on Saturday I had mentioned the word "sanctions",

as they were evidently frightened by it.

To correct his impression, I said I did not use the word "sanctions"

at all, but merely referred to the measures to be taken.

Dr. Hornbeck, who was also present, confirmed that the word was not

used in the speech at all, whereupon Mr. Davis said he misunderstood from the

Scandinavians.

I then took the opportunity to express to Mr. Davis and the American

delegation, in accordance with instructions, the appreciation of the

Chinese government for their sympathetic and helpful attitude at the Conference.

Mr. Davis said he had only been trying to do what he thought was best

and that it was very good of the Chinese government to express its appreciation.

Dr. Hornbeck said he hoped that I would not make it known outside that

the United States was China’s best friend. He said such a statement might
 Et846

convey the impression to the people in America that the American delegation

was trying to take the lead at the Conference and carrying the whole load.

Mr. Davis said that was an important point. As a matter of fact, the

British government had been exceedingly good all the way through and just

as friendly to China as the United States. He said he was entirely satisfied

with the attitude and collaboration of Mr. Eden.

I said my colleague, Mr. Quo Tai-chi, was at that moment also seeing

Mr. MacDonald and conveying to the British delegation a imilar message.

[(Mr. Eden as well as M. Delbos had already left Brussels.)]

[Dr. Hornbeck's point, which was heartily seconded by Mr. Davis, was

very revealing of the then current tenor of American public opinion. American

public opinion at the time [was not ready to take a firm stand.] It was

very clear, as reflected in Congress, where Congressional members seemed to

attach great importance to the Neutrality Act. They were apprehensive

about the situation in Europe, which indicated that war in Europe was very

much in the offing, and they wanted to keep out of it. The American people

seemed to sense and entertain a fear that any strong attitude on the part

of the United States, either in Europe or the Far East, might involve the

United States in another world war.

[After the November 15th meeting, the Conference adjourned presumably

until Monday the 22nd, so the delegates could consult with their governments

on the "common attitude" to be adopted and the next steps to be taken. In

the intervening week,] the principal powers abandoned any idea of adopting

a hard attitude toward Japan for several reasons. One reason, [at least,]

was the unfavorable reaction in Congress in Washington, where Mr. Davis'

speeches and statements were criticized as not being in line with the spirit

of the American people. The people were afraid that any encouragement

might aggravate the international situation and eventually lead to war.

 E-847

Norman Davis had first appeared to us to be very desirous of doing

something effective at the Conference. This point was repeatedly confirmed

to me and to the other members of the Chinese delegation by Dr. Hornbeck,

who said, "don’t misunderstand Mr. Davis, he really meant to do something

which would be helpful to China." But, of course, at the time the United

States was officially pursuing a policy of neutrality, with the Neutrality

Act very much on the statute book, although President Roosevelt himself was

sympathetic toward the Chinese cause, and even probably understood that

unless Japan was restrained in time, the situation in the Pacific and the

Far East might become greatly aggravated and eventually involve the United States.
Part E. 1937_, A Crucial Year in Europe and the
Far East:
January-December 1937

5. The Brussels Conference on the Sino-Japanese

Conflict:
October-November 1937

c) Questions of Foreign Assistance, Particularly

in Transit Facilities, During the First Stages
of the Conference:
November 1-15, 1937
 E-848

5. THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE ON THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

c) Questions of Foreign Assistance, Particularly in Transit Facilities,

during the First Stages of the Conference

[In mid-October 1937 the French government had] suddenly refused to

accord transit facilities [through Indochina for Chinese war supplies.]

After days and nights of effort, I had succeeded in keeping openthe only

real channel for Chinese supplies, until, as the French told me, the Brussels

Conference could decide on the whole question. [From the Chinese point of

view, this seemed a satisfactory temporary solution, until it became clear

that Italy would attend the conference at Brussels more or less as a Japanese

spokesman, and that therefore the contemplated French proposal to the Conference

on the whole question of transit would meet serious opposition. I therefore

suggested to French Foreign Minister Delbos, right before my departure for

Brussels, that it would be better to merely talk the question over with

the principal interested powers outside the conference.

At Brussels, on the eve of the Conference, I spoke to M. Delbos about

the question of transit again, first with reference to shipments of German

arms and munitions which were en route or had just reached Indochina for

transit to China. I told him that I had been informed by Nanking that these

shipments had been held up by the local authorities in Indochina, who desired

to obtain instructions from Paris. I told him that Nanking was most anxious

that they should be allowed to go through as quickly as possible and had

directed me to make a special appeal to him to cable instructions as soon

as possible to let these shipments pass through.

The French Foreign Minister said he was not in touch with the details

of the question and would ask M. de Tessan to look them up and inform him.

But he observed that if the shipments were of German origin, it would be

difficult to arrange for their transit. He said he did not like the Germans

and suspected there might be a trap laid by them to obtain proof of French

aid to China. (I suppose he meant for the information of the Japanese.)

 E-849

He said if the Japanese should attempt either to destroy the railway

connecting Indochina to China or occupy the islands near the coast of Indochina,

it would expose France to serious complications with Japan. M. Delbos

added that, for France, it was a practical question of facing the situation.

In the circumstances then prevailing, France could not face any such crisis

alone.

As regards the general question of transit, I recalled M. Delbos' intention

to bring it up before the Conference in Brussels and expressed the hope

that he would refrain from doing so officially, as with Italy’s participation,

it was a foregone conclusion that no decision could be expected from the

meeting. (I had decided to take this position with the approval of my

government, after consultation with Mr. Norman Davis, with Mr. Eden and

with Mr. Souritz, all of whom agreed that, if brought up before the Conference,

the question could not receive any unanimous decision.)

M. Delbos said he agreed with my point of view and would talk it over

with both Mr. Eden and Mr. Davis unofficially. He emphasized that, in view

of the possible complications to which France alone might be exposed, in

granting transit facilities to China, an action to which Japan had been

objecting strongly, it would be necessary for the French government to

obtain an assurance from the United States and Great Britain that in case

France should be attacked on account of her aid to China in this respect,

the other two powers would support her and extend her their aid and

assistance in order to face the situation jointly. Such an assurance, M.

Delbos added, should be in writing and not merely verbal.

I advised M. Delbos that I had already spoken to Mr. Davis, urging

the United States to consider the French point of view sympathetically.

M. Delbos said he was glad to hear of it and thought it was very desirable

that I should have mentioned it to Mr. Davis. He said there was no question
 E-850

of French sympathy being entirely for China in the matter of arms and airplanes

and France was already doing a great deal. He understood that airplanes

were being assembled in Indochina and were allowed to fly over the frontier.

But all this, he said, exposed France to complications with Japan. He felt

certain that I could understand his anxiety for an Anglo-American assurance

of mutual aid and collective security.

Among the topics I discussed with Mr. Litvinov in our interview of

November 4, [the day after the Brussels Conference opened, ] was that Of

transit facilities through Indochina. I was anxious to gather from the

Soviet Foreign Minister what his impression was from his own conversations

with the chief American delegate, Mr. Davis.

He told me that he had gathered from a talk with Mr. Davis that the

latter did not understand why the French should be so anxious for an

assurance from the American side, which the American government could never

give.

I then asked him why the Soviet Union did not collaborate more actively

with China in her resistance to Japan. When Mr. Litvinov replied that his

country was already giving a great deal of help in the supply of war

materials, I said that the Soviet Union could render more help to China in

her resistance. For example, she might start activities in Manchuria, which

might serve as a diversion to the Japanese military forces.

Mr. Litvinov remarked that not very long ago the Chinese government

had applied for permission to let a party of Chinese organizers go from

Siberia into North Manchuria. That permission was given, but he

understood that that mission had not yet arrived and that China did not

make use of that facility.

I told him that I knew several important leaders, including General Ma

Chan-shan, had already got into Manchuria. Isaid, however, that the most
 E-851

important thing was the supply of arms, and that without it, of course,

no effective campaign could be undertaken in Manchuria or elsewhere. I then

asked the Soviet Foreign Minister about Mr. Bogomolov, the Soviet Ambassador

to China, and whether he had returned to his post from Moscow.

Mr. Litvinov, in replying to my question, stated that Bogomolov did not

keep himself well informed. He said Bogomolov was very nervous all the

time and had been reporting to Moscow that China could not hold out very

long in her resistance to Japan. But, said Litvinov, it turned out that

China had been quite able to hold out. He, Litvinov, had reprimanded

Bogomolov for getting so easily excited and for not keeping himself accurately

informed about the situation in China. Litvinov added that he would, however,

send him back to China in the near future.

[My exchange of views that same evening with Dr. Hornbeck on the Conference

and on the prospects of the military situation in China, led him to ask me]

about the question of supplies.

I said, in this connection, I would tell him about the question of

transit through Indochina. I outlined to him the course of the developments

in the past fortnight and pointed out that at one moment the situation had

been very critical as a consequence of the sudden decision of the French

government to stop all transit by way of Indochina. After moving heaven

and earth, I said, that decision was set aside and the status quo ante

was maintained for the time being, so that goods could continue to pass

through Indochina. But it was only on the understanding that the question

would be brought up before the Brussels Conference by France. Subsequently,

however, on my persuasion, the French Foreign Minister had agreed that he

would not bring it up officially before the Conference, as it would

certainly not be passed.

 E-852

Dr. Hornbeck agreed with my view, and said that with Italy in the

Conference there could be no hope of reaching a unanimous decision on the

question.

I then told him that the French would probably raise the question

unofficially and expressed the earnest hope that the American delegation

would not discourage them too much, because the question of transit was

one of life and death to China in her resistance. I told Dr. Hornbeck that

the French would not only want a verbal assurance, but one in writing so

that, in case of complications with Japan, they could count upon Great

Britain and the United States for mutual aid and assistance.

Dr. Hornbeck, like Mr. Davis, said that that would be clearly impossible

for the United States. He said it had always been the policy of the United

States not to commit itself. The American people would not stand for it

and the French should know that. He added that not only were the French

dreaming in their desire for a written assurance, but even a verbal one

would be out of the question.

I then told him that while I myself understood the American policy

and shared his view, the French anxiety, in my opinion, was not an unnatural

one, considering the situation in Europe and the exposed position of Indochina

from the point of view of defense against possible complications with Japan.

I expressed my earnest hope to Dr. Hornbeck that if and when M. Delbos should

speak of this matter again to Mr. Davis, the latter would view it with as

much sympathy as possible.

[I believed the French position was sincere, and that France was not

merely putting China off by her insistence on American support.] Not even

the British fully understood the workings of the American government. They

could not understand why the President could not carry out an assurance

once he had made it, and why it should be subject to the review or approval
 E-853

of Congress. In Europe it was always understood that the President of the

United States was not only much more powerful than the sovereign heads of

the European monarchies, but that he was the most powerful head of a great

power. But, actually, the American President was under obligation to

observe the constitutional limitations, which are rather unusual from the

European point of view and, therefore, not really femiliar to Europeans.

They did not quite see that in foreign relations the United States Senate

was really a sort of collaborator of the President.

[I spoke to Mr. Litvinov again on November 7 and 9, in the latter case

when he was just about to catch a train for Moscow, presumably in annoyance

at the other powers' maneuvers to exclude Soviet Russia from the proposed

conference subcommittee In the course of our conversation on the 9th, Mr.

Litvinov revealed that] he had told Mr. Davis the day before, in reply to

the latter's question, that the powers must keep China going in resisting

Japanese aggression by supplying her with materials of war and by keeping

the sea routes open. He said Mr. Davis then asked him about the overland

route from the Soviet Union. He told Davis that the overland route was long

and difficult and not organized for quick transport.

I said the question of transit through Indochina was of vital importance

to China's resistance. I told him that in view of Mr. Davis' refusal to

give France an assurance, I was afraid the French government might again

withdraw the transit facilities. I asked M. Litvinov to use his influence

with France.

M. Litvinov said he had spoken to Mr. Davis, who appeared to be disinclined

to give an assurance. He had also talked with Mr. Eden, who said that M.

Delbos had not spoken to him about it. Moreover, Mr. Eden had given him,

Litvinov, the impression that he did not think that Japan would feel

disposed to make trouble either for Great Britain or France on account of their
 E-854

granting transit facilities to China. Mr. Litvinov added that he understood

from M. Delbos that the present transit facilities were limited to orders

which had already been placed.

I then told Mr. Litvinov of Mr. Howe's jjJJ report to Mr. Eden to the
4 j . i

effect that the spirit and morale of the Chinese soldiers and the Chinese

people were excellent, and that the relations between the Chinese tr©ps

and their high command were most harmonious. It stated there was a sentiment

of unity in China that was even stronger than that at the beginning of the

hostilities. I told Mr. Litvinov that Mr. Eden was very much satisfied with

this report from China, I also went on to say that Mr. Davis had told me that,

according to an American report, Japan now had 600,000 troops in China, a

much greater number than she had ever expected to send at the beginning.

I said she was evidently making an extraordinary effort to meet the situation

and finding her task more difficult and more trying than she had ever imagined.

This was really an opportunity, I told Mr. Litvinov, to bring about a

fundamental solution of the Japanese problem. In order to do that, it was

necessary for the Soviet Union to adopt a more positive policy than merely

extending material help. The Soviet Union could take some kind of military

action or make demonstrations of a military character along the frontier,

which would have a great effect on the Japanese.

M. Litvinov said General Bliicher [(the Commander-in-Chief of the

Soviet Far Eastern Army)] was making preparations and that the Soviet Fleet

in the Far East was holding maneuvers, which would cause the Japanese

to pay a great deal of attention.

I then mentioned to Mr. Litvinov that the Chinese government was sending

Mr. Li Yii-ying to Moscow. ([This was one of the matters I had spolken to M.
4. . J
Litvinov about on November 7, asking him to facilitate the quajat-irtry of a

visa to Li and] giveng him a brief account of Mr. Li's career. [At that time,]
 E-855

Mr. Litvinov had said to me there would be no difficulty about the visa.

But he had asked what was the object of his mission. When I had replied

that Mr. Li had been asked by General Chiang Kai-shek and Dr. C. H. Wang

to visit Moscow in order to keep in touch with the Soviet Union more closely,

Mr. Litvinov remarked that there was already a Chinese military mission in

Moscow, which was maintaining very close contact with the Soviet authorities.)

[On November 9, I further told Mr. Litvinov that] Mr. Li, who was a member

of the Central Executive Committee, had advocated, in the last three years

a rapproachement between China and Soviet Russia. Mr. Litvinov again stated

that China already had a military mission in Moscow in close touch with

the Soviet government.

[On November 10, I spoke in quick succession with Mr. Davis and M.

Delbos about the transit question in light of the most recent developments.

First were the reports from Tokyo that Japan had definitely decided to answer

the second communication from the Brussels Conference in the negative,

thereby cutting off all hope of Japanese cooperation with the Conference in

its attempt to mediate the Sino-Japanese conflict. Second were the reports

from China of the serious deterioration of the Chinese military position.]

After pointing out to Mr. Davis that there was no longer any prospect

of Japan's cooperation with the Conference and assuring him of China's

determination to continue resistance, X said that the most important thing

was supplies from abroad and that, in order to get them, the facilities of

transit were vital to China. I told him the French seemed to be feeling

rather discouraged by his refusal to give an assurance of assistance to

them in case of their getting into difficulty with the Japanese as a result

of their granting transit facilities to China. I also told him that, while

I myself realized that no American government could give a guarantee or an

assurance of this kind, I hoped he would not be too discouraging to the French

in talking with them about this question. I added that, in my view, the
 E-856

French might be told that if complications should arise from the Japanese

side against the French, France might raise the question and ask for consultation

with the powers most concerned, namely, England and America, and that Article

VII of the Nine Power Treaty would seem to cover this point. I thought

it might also be comforting to the French if it could be arranged that the

three squadrons of France, Great Britain and the United States in the Far

East would exchange information and keep in contact with one another vis-S-vis

the Japanese. I said that such steps would not be in the nature of a

commitment, but might satisfy the French.

Mr. Davis said, as regards cooperation of the three navies in keeping

in touch with one another, that he did not know whether or not it could be

arranged. As to the consultation under Article VII, he said he would like

to look it up to see whether it actually covered such a question.

Of course it did. I had referred to that article of the Nine power

Treaty because, according to its language, such a situation as I contemplated

was certainly covered. In fact, the language is broad enough to cover any

type of question relating to the Far East. The Article itself reads:

The contracting parties agree that, whenever a situation arises,

which in the opinion of any one of them involves the application or the
stipulations of the present Treaty and renders desirable discussion of
such application, there shall be full and frank communication between
the contracting parties concerned,

[When later the same day I saw M. Delbos, I also] told him that there

was no hope of Japan's cooperating with the Conference and that China had

made up her mind to continue resistance to Japanese aggression. I said

that this determination made the question of French facilities through

Indochina ^Ll the more important to China, that in fact, they were vital and

essential to enabling her to continue her resistance. I recalled that he

had told me a few days ago of his desire to ask the Americans for written

assurance that, in the event of complications arising from the Japanese

side on account of the grant of transit facilities, the United States and
 E-857

Great Britain would come to the assistance of France. I told him that I

had again spoken to Mr. Davis about the French wish, but that Davis found

it difficult to make any promise. I remarked that it was contrary to the

traditional policy of the United States to make any commitment beforehand,

although the United States, when the time came, would usually do her utmost

to contribute her share.

I said it had occurred to me that, instead of asking for a formal

assurance, he might ask for a consultation in the event of such complications

arising, since Article VII of the Nine power Treaty provided a juridical

basis for such a request. I also suggested the proposal regarding the

three squadrons of France, Great Britain and the United States in the Far

East, namely, that they might exchange information and keep in touch with

one another vis-3-vis the situation there. I said such an arrangement would

also convey an impression of solidarity and might be the beginning of

cooperation amongst them. I added that while Mr. Davis had told me he

thought an arrangement for naval cooperation might be difficult, he had

said he would study the question of consultation based upon Article VII

of the Treaty, as he was not certain whether such a situation could be

covered by it.

M. Delbos said he had discussed the question with Messrs. Eden and

Davis at lunch. The French position was that France would join in any

common measure and any sanctions to the fullest extent. In fact, she would

do anything provided she would not be the only one doing it. That was

what he understood to be the principle of solidarity. If there should

be reaction from the Japanese side, France would not withhold her cooperation

in any positive measures. But she would also ask the others to support her
 E-858

in the event of reaction against her because she had taken such positive

measures. It would not be fair to France, he said, if she were left alone

to face risk and danger as a result of her participation in joint measures.

As regards the question of transit, he reiterated, France was perfectly

willing to help China, but it was not fair to ask her to face the situation

alone. That was the reason why he had asked Mr. Davis for an assurance on

the principle of solidarity. However, while Mr. Eden had been quite in

agreement with him, Mr. Davis had not seen eye to eye with him.

I said that Great Britain would continue to keep Hong Kong open for

transit of Chinese materials of war, and did not think that Japan would

seriously cause difficulties either to herself or to France because of

the grant of transit facilities. I added that I was also of the opinion

that Japan would not feel disposed to cause complications with any one of

the three powers.

M.Delbos said if such complications should arise, the French Parliament

and French people could not excuse the French government for having failed

to obtain a guarantee before it adopted the policy of granting transit

facilities to China. In the present situation in Europe, France could not

reinforce her small fleet in Indochina which, without reinforcement, was

unable to face a serious situation. He had proposed to Mr. Davis the

cooperation of the three squadrons, but Davis had rejected it. As to the

second point I had suggested, he said he would also look up Article VII to

see whether it would cover it.

When I said I understood that everything would be allowed to go through

Indochina meanwhile, M. Delbos answered that present facilities applied to all

orders placed before the opening of the hostilities between China and Japan,

and that he understood all these orders would arrive on or before November 15.

I said I did not think all these orders would arrive by that time, and

certainly not before the end of the month.

 E-859

[I had one more conversation with the French side about the question of

transit before the Brussels Conference temporarily adjourned upon the adoption

of the declaration of November 15. In this case, I saw M. Hoppenot, the head

of the Asian Affairs division at the French Foreign Ministry, he also being

a member of the French delegation.]

[After briefly discussing with him the prospects of that afternoon's

meeting to adopt the declaration, I raised the question of transit through

Indochina. I told him that] M. Delbos had referred to November 15 as the

last date for the arrival of goods in Indochina for transit, but that I

had understood from another source that the question remained on the basis

of the decision taken by the French cabinet on October 13, 1937. I asked

M. Hoppenot for clarification.

He said the decision of the government on October 13 was that goods,

regardless of origin, (in other words, wherever they had been made] would

be accorded transit through Indochina, if they were already on the sea when

the decision was taken, namely, October 13, 1937. As regards orders placed

in France before the outbreak of the hostilities between China and Japan,

namely July 15, 1937, all goods would be accorded transit at any time. Furthermore,

this decision applied to goods for transit overland and did not apply, for

example, to airplanes going over the frontier by air.

I told M. Hoppenot that I had understood from both M. Delbos, when in

Paris, and M. Ghautemps sometime agoythat it was not a government decision

[which had been] taken on October 13 and, that at any rate, a new formula

had been adopted later whereby transit facilities would be accorded to all

goods regardless of date or place of origin, until the matter had been

settled at the Brussels Conference.

M. Hoppenot said that it was not a decision. However, on October 23

an arrangement was adopted whereby the original decision was to stand and
 E-860

the question was to be referred to Brussels for an understanding with

England and America. If no satisfactory arrangement was reached at Brussels

for mutual support in case of complications with Japan,thien the decision of

October 13 would be applied. In the meantime, all goods, regardless of time

or place of order, were to be accorded transit facilities through Indochina

provided they were already on the sea by October 13. In other words, unless

an arrangement was reached at Brussels, the restrictions embodied in the

original decision would be applied. In reply to my question, M. Hoppenot

added that he had talked with the representatives of the United States and

Great Britain about the matter, but that both had refused to give any

assurance of mutual assistance. Therefore, the original restrictions of

the decision would have to be applied.

He also stated that the Japanese had threatened to destroy the Yunnan

Railway and occupy Hainan Island, and that the French government had

approached Tokyo in accordance with the 1907 Agreement, trying to persuade

Japan not to occupy the island. When I remarked that the British did not

think japan would feel disposed to cause difficulties to Hongkong or Indochina,

M. Ifcppenot said that he himself did not believe that Japan would attack

Indochina or bomb the railway on the Indochinese side, but that it was

possible they would try to destroy the railway on the Chinese side, in which

case, transit rights would be of no help to China. France might continue to

accord transit facilities to China, but if a fortnight later the railway

in Yunnan should be destroyed, it would not help her, but cause a great deal
-k
of loss to French citizens.

^According to Norman Hanwell, the Yunnan Railway was the largest single French
investment in China. The railway, which ran from Haiphong, the most important
northern Indochinese seaport to Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province, was
legally the property of a French Corporation, but received government subsidies
from Indochina and was, to some degree, under French government control. However,
its construction was primarily an economic and not a political venture. Receipts
from operation were more than 45 million francs in 1936 and 60 million francs
in 1937. Norman D. Hanwell, "France Takes Inventory in China," Far Eastern
Survey, September 28, 1938, p. 220.
 E-861

M. Hoppenot then said the real consideration inspiring French action

was the possibility of the occupation of Hainan Island by Japan. If such

occupation should take place, and it would be easy for Japan to carry it

out, it would be a great menace to Indochina, which was situated so close

to the coast. It would also be a great danger to China, for it would

facilitate the penetration by Japan into the interior of the mainland

from the southern coast.

I said that I fully realized this possibility, and that my colleague

in London had asked the British to use their influence in Tokyo towards

dissuading Japan from occupying Hainan Island. (Japanese occupation would,

of course, also seriouslyendanger British interests.) The impression of

the Foreign Office in London was that Japan was not likely to carry out the

threat .

M. Hoppenot said that dispatches from the French Naval. Attach^ in

Tokyo indicated that if Indochina was not to be closed to the transit of

Chinese arms and war materials, Japan would surely carry out her threat. He

added that the granting of transit facilities to Chinese shipments in the

interval had already caused great difficulty in explaining to Japan.

I said that the Chinese government had also taken up the question in

Washington with a view to persuading the American government to help

France as much as possible in the event of trouble. But, I said, I believed

that if Indochina should be closed to China in her present crisis, it would

greatly disturb the Chinese government again.

[At the time of my talk with M. Hoppenot, the situation at Brussels had

changed. Japan's second refusal to attend the Brussels Conference or

accept mediation had been received.. Its intransigence had apparently

hardened the attitude of the principal powers. The conference declaration,

adopted that same afternoon, November 15th, stated that the powers would
 E-862

now consider what was to be their "common attitude" when "one party to an

international treaty maintains against the views of all the other parties

that the action which it has taken does not come within the scope of the

treaty and gets aside provisions of the treaty which the other parties hold

to be operative in the circumstances." There was an impression at Brussels

that the powers might now move toward adopting some form of pressure to

force Japan to accept mediation towards a settlement of the Sino-Japanese

conflict. This, of course, could have included direct or indirect aid to

China, which was after all China’s ultimate objective in approaching the powers

collectively and individually at Brussels.]

[On a collective basis, I had just told the assembled powers in my

speech of November 13, as I had told them numerous times before, that:

In our struggle against the forces of Japanese aggression

with a whole nation behind us, resolute in purpose and undaunted in
spirit, we [Chinese] do not ask the other signatory powers to
fight for us, but we need material help to enable us to continue
our effective resistance.

At the same time I continued to approach the delegates of the principal

powers on an individual basis to pursue concrete action.]

[I spoke to Norman Davis on November 15, right after the meeting to

adopt the declaration.] I said now that the statement had been adopted, I

would like to discuss and inform him of the situation in the Far East. I

told him that since the tactical withdrawal from the Tazang (Tachang), Kiangwan

and Chapei sector to the main line of defense, the Chinese forces had had to

take a little time to consolidate their lines, but the Japanese, knowing the

situation, had redoubled their forces and started to take advantage of the fact

by advancing rapidly against them. Their success in landing at Chapoo in the

Hangchow Bay threatened the right wing of the Chinese line, while the landing

of the Japanese troops at a point west of Liuho on the Yangtze River endangered

the Chinese left wing. I explained that both these points were behind the
 E-863

Chinese line, and that in this part of China there were three railways and

a good system of motor roads, which contributed to the rapid operations of

the Japanese troops with their motorized units. I said that during the

last few days the pressure from the Japanese had been particularly severe, and

the Chinese forces might have to retire to their second line of defense. It

was evident that the Japanese would now try to capture Hangchow on the one

hand and Soochow on the other, with a view to advancing on Nanking. The

situation on the whole was rather critical.

The question of supplies was causing the Chinese government a great deal

of anxiety, I continued. Unless there was an assurance of an uninterrupted

flow of supplies of arms and munitions from abroad, the Chinese government,

while determined to continue its resistance, could not do it with confidence

as regards the future. There had to be something definite to look forward

to in the way of supplies. But recently the question of transit through

Indochina had been a great discouragement to the Chinese government. Two

shipments of German arms and munitions had reached Indochina three weeks

earlier, and were still being held up there because the French would not allow

them to go through the frontier.

Mr. Davis said this was most discouraging and he could not understand

why the French should refuse such transit facilities and make so much trouble.

He thought it was to the interest of France to enable China to continue her

resistance, and said: If China should fail in her resistance and be dominated

by Japan, where would Indochina be? Would not Japan try to take Indochina?

I said the French were uneasy about the Japanese threat of bombarding

Indochina and occupying Hainan Island.

Mr. Davis thought the Japanese were no more likely to bombard Indochina

than Hongkong.

I said the French said they would continue to accord facilities only
 E-864

after obtaining a guarantee of assistance from the United States and England.

Mr. Davis said the French had asked for one, but that was an impossible

thing for the United States to give. The United States could not enter into

any commitments towards any country. In the Far East, France, with her

Indochina, had much bigger interests, which were equal and even bigger than

those of the British. The United States had no great interests out there.

It had already decided to give up the Philippines and had had no other

territorial interests there. The interest of the United States in the Far

East was to uphold the principle of respect for treaty obligations and to

make the Nine Power Treaty respected.

I said the French fear of the Japanese occupation of Hainan Island seemed

to be well founded. The Japanese were sure to occupy it and, if it was

occupied, it would be a great threat to Indochina, being very close to the

Indochinese coast.

Mr. Davis still appeared skeptical of the French reasoning.

I then said that besides the uncertainty of supplies from abroad which

would continue unless there was a definite plan worked out for their continuance

and the assurance of transit, there was another factor which weighed heavily

with the Chinese government.

Dr. Hornbeck interrupted me by saying that in Washington the Chinese

representatives, including Dr. Hu Shih, had told them that China's war

supplies could last at least four or five months, and he could not understand

why the stock of supplies should now be on the point of exhaustion.

I explained by saying that Dr. Rung had told me that same thing. When

asked how long the supplies already in China would last, the Minister of

Finance had aid they would last at least until the end of January. But I

explained that, judging by the fierceness of the fighting in the last three

months in the Shanghai area and the rapid extention of the operations in North
 E-865

China^ I felt certain that the original estimate of the rate of consumption

of munitions and supplies had been greatly exceeded.

Mr. Davis thought this was probably the real situation.

I said that China had expected that the Japanese forces in Shanghai

would not be more than 50,000 men. But before the fighting had gone very

far, Japan had increased her troops to 100,000 and had now augmented them

to 180,000 at least. I added that I did not mean to say, however, that the

supplies were now on the point of exhaustion. What I meant was that what

remained could not amount to very much and could not make the Chinese

government confident nor suffice to keep up the morale of the troops, if

there was no definite assurances of early and steady supplies from abroad.

Mr. Davis said he wished he could help immediately, but he did not know

what ways and means to suggest. He realized it was an urgent, critical

situation, but he could only suggest that the matter be taken up at once in

Washington, where such matters could be arranged.

[Later in the conversation, after I had agreed with Mr. Davis that it

had become clear that Japan would not listen to anything but force, I again

broached the idea of a naval demonstration of the American, British and

French squadrons in the Far East. I thought such a demonstration of

close collaboration would cause Japan to think twice and could especially

impress Japan if Soviet Russia could at the same time be persuaded to make

some sort of military demonstration on the northern Sino-Soviet frontier.

I informed him of my previous conversations with M. Litvinov, in which I

tried to get the latter to seize the opportunity of the present situation

to cooperate with China in seeking a solution to the Japanese menace for

both China and Russia's sake.]

In concluding this part of my conversation with Mr. Davis, I said that,

in short, the situation was such that it called for action along three lines
 E-866

a joint naval demonstration of America, Great Britain and France; a military

demonstration by Soviet Russia; and a definite arrangement for the continued

supply of arms and war materials to China by sea. I asked Mr. Davis to talk

the matter over with the representatives of Great Britain and France, but

Mr. Davis thought it would be best if China took the matter straight to

Washington.

In other words, at that point in time, the question of aid to China,

including aid in the form of supplies and their transit to China, became

inseperable from the Conference at Brussels, as I and my colleagues in the

jin
Chinese delegation tried to convince, "The principal powers assembled there

V* work out and adopt a plan for the continued supply of arms to China,

backed by the implied threat of the use of force, if not the use of force

itself, in the form of a usual military demonstration. On the one hand,

such a plan had been made temporarily somewhat more feasible by the Japanese

refusal to cooperate with the powers and by the failure of plans for mediation.

On the other hand, and perhaps more to the point the concrete action

contemplated in the plan was desperately needed by China in view of the

Japanese march toward Nanking and the dangerous shortage of Chinese military

supplies. What happened to the plan when the conference reconvened is a

subject of the next chapter.]

[I would like to add a word here about China's successful recruitment

of French pilots for the Chinese airforce, because of the light it throws

on the French attitude and position regarding assistance to China.]

Certainly, in the recruitment of French pilots for the Chinese air­

force, there was less difficulty from the French government [than in the case

of transit facilities.] Pierre Cot, the Air Minister, was highly sympathetic

to the Chinese cause. Officially, nothing was said to the French [by the
 E-867

Chinese government or the Embassy, ] because we did not want to embarrass

them, but they knew what was going on. The perspective candidates always

sounded out the French authorities just to see whether they could go or not.

Invariably there were no objections raised.

The Chinese Embassy in Paris was given full power to engage the pilots,

and I took personal charge of the matter. I personally interviewed each

prospective candidate. Nearly all those French pilots I engaged had been

volunteers in the Spanish Civil War on the side of the Spanish Republic.

I cannot remember now how many pilots were engaged over the years.

Certainly more than a dozen, but perhaps not 100. Of course, each pilot

was engaged individually under a written contract. We offered them attractive

conditions. The salary was very substantial, higher than pilots normally

received in their own country, and there were provisions for personal compensation

in case of injury and compensation for their families in case of death in

service. That was the only way to get them. My task was made easier when I

engaged a French airforce captain who had commanded a squadron of French

volunteers in the Spanish Civil War. He had great prestige and authority

in Spain. Thereafter, whenever we had volunteer offers from other quarters,

we consulted him as to their qualifications.

On the whole their fighting record in China was pretty good, according

to the Chinese Air commission (Commission on Aeronautical Affairs) . The

establishment of this Commission [which had ultimate charge of the engagement

of foreign pilots,] was an innovation in the Chinese military system. Madame

»
Chiang,, its Secretary-General, was the highest authority under the Generalissimo,

who was Commander-in-Chief of China's armed forces. Although a civilian, she

proved an able and effective administrator [over the years.] In carrying out

the assignment from the Air Commission, I encountered no difficulty as she

 E-868

understood conditions abroad and the standard of living of people in the

West. She was not only able to find the necessary funds, but was prompt

in remitting them for the recruitment. As a result we had more offers than

we could take.

[The success of the Embassy in engaging pilots in France is not widely

know, because,] of course, the matter was kept a close secret. But in fact,

the Embassy even received offers from French Legionnaires to volunteer

for the Chinese army. [No engagements were made;] there was no shortage of

soldiers for the Chinese army. Our great need was for trained pilots, [and

this remained the case] until General Chennault later helped us train and

organize the Flying Tigers to fill the needs of the Chinese airforce.

To sum up, on the whole question of transit facilities for China and

the support of friendly powers in supplying materials of war, I found the

French government, whether under M. Blum or M. Chautemp , to be not only

sympathetic but actually very helpful. They were really doing their utmost.

Moreover, it seemed to me that their anxiety about the possibility of

complications with Japan was not unnatural. Because of the tense situation

in Europe, due particularly to the Italian policy in the Mediterranean

and North Africa, and the Spanish revolution in Spain, where Franco’s

campaign to overthrow the Negrin government was supported by Hitler and

Mussolini, while Soviet Russia supported the revolutionary regime in Madrid y

it was understandable that the French should have been feeling very uneasy

about the Far Eastern situation, especially since few units of the French

navy were present in the Far Eastern waters. From the practical point of

view, I think the French were right in saying that if Japan should create

difficulties for the French in Indochina, France would not be in a position

to meet it effectively.

There were also prominent members of the French government and some
 E-869

French leaders who were most sympathetic to the Chinese cause. Besides M.

Chautemp and M. Delbos, one who was particularly friendly; to China, who
A

understood fully the importance of the Chinese policy of resistance and who

earnestly desired that China should continue to resist was the Minister of

Colonies M. Marius Moutet. He was so convinced of the necessity of France's giving

full support to China as regards the question of transit through Indochina

that, at one time, he threatened to resign after the government decided,

in his absence, to suspend transit facilities. It was partly at his

insistance that the decision of October 13 was modified and made less

stringent. By postponing the whole question until it was brought up at the

Brussels Conference, transit facilities were in effect continued. [M.

Moutet was alsoof great help in another situation.] In consequence of my

suggestion that the matter of transit could be handled locally in Indochina

(as it was in Hongkong), without always referring to Paris or without

always asking for instructions from the French government, so that Paris

in case of a strong Japanese representation of protest, would be in a

position to deny [responsiblity or knowledge,] the French government agreed

to try. M. Moutet was good enough to send out and arrange the matter with

the Governor-General of Indochina, in order that the latter would understand

and act accordingly.

M. Pierre Cot, the Minister of Air, was equally sympathetic. [He

was helpful in the matter of recruiting pilots and also] did what he could

in the way of obtaining permission for China to buy airplanes, even from

French government factories. M. Edouard Herriot, the veteran statesman,

was also very helpful. He suggested, for example, that arrangements be

made to install small factories in Indochina for assembling airplanes. He

even offered to suggest to the Russians to extend us help in the way of the

supply of materials and parts for such factories. As one of the advocates
 E-870

of the Franco-Russian Pact of Mutual Assistance [and as the person

responsible for the negotiations, he had some influence with the Russians.

Soviet Russia was then sending China certain amounts of military supplies

by sea, but was short of merchant vessels for shipments. Therefore, I

recall, my Embassy in Paris attempted and was able to arrange to charter

|French’ vessels to go up to Odessa on the Black Sea and bring supplies

out by ship to Indochina.

All in all then, France was really doing its best to help China,

not only in connection with the question of transit facilities, but also

in the supply of credit and of airplanes and munitions financed with private

loans from French banks. Even such loans could only be accorded with the

approval of the French government. The required approval was always given.

There was far less similar support from Great Britain in the matter of

financial credit. Bpt Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Eden promised to consider

[such credit] and indicated there might be a possibility. But on the question

of the supply of war materials, arms and munitions, they were almost adamant

in their refusal to consider it, on the ground that they themselves were

buying from other countries to strengthen their own defenses and build their

own arsenals, and because Great Britain was not manufacturing enough for

her own use. In the case of the United States, the great stumbling block

in the way of effective aid to China was the so-called Neutrality Act.

With United States opinion strongly in favor of neutrality, even in the

Sino-Japanese conflict, President Roosevelt and his administration was

naturally handicapped. In fact there was an executive order prohibiting the

transportation of arms and munitions to China in government ships. But

it was explained to our representatives in Washington that the order prohibiting

transportation in American government ships did not apply to private ships

so that American private freighters and merchant vessels were not prohibited
 E-871

from transporting war materials to China, if they were bought and paid for

by China .

On the question of effective aid and support to China in her resistance

to the Japanese aggression, one could say then that France was doing the

most, even though her international situation in Europe on the whole was

not very reassuring from the French point of view. I must add, however

that in terms of practical aid even Germany and Italy were not altogether

adamant in refusing to help us. Certain amounts of materials were purchased

in Germany and certain aeronautical parts were, for example, obtained in

Italy. But, of course, the assistance thus obtained from the two countries

had to be arranged always under cover, at the insistence of the authorities

of those two countries because they were both practically allies of Japan.

In Germany, as I said, there was a strong kernel of opinion in favor of

China. Even the government was divided between a pro-Japanese section and

pro-Chinese section, which was quite substantial. In the case of Italy,

the policy vis-^-vis the Sino-Japanese conf liet "began to harden against

China only after she joined the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact in

November 1937. As Mussolini told the Generalissimo's representative in

Italy, General Chiang pEi-li Italy could not afford to help China at the

expense of Italy's interests in Europe.

 REMINISCENCES OF WELLINGTON KOO

Part E. 1937, A Crucial Year in Europe and in the

Far East:
January-December 1937

5. The Brussels Conference on the Sino-Japanese

Conflict:
October-November 1937

d) The Conclusion of the Conference and of Efforts

to Obtain Assistance under its Aegis;
November 15-24, 1937
 E-872

5. THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE ON THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

d) The Conclusion of the Conference and of Efforts to Obtain Assistance

under its Aegis

Just before the Brussels Conference received the second Japanese

refusal, the military situation in China began to take a serious turn for

the worse. In the North, the Japanese, after much effort and great difficulty,

finally took Taiyuan, the capital of Shansi Province, on November 8-9, 1937.

In the Shanghai area, after the Chinese forces had finally been forced to

withdraw to a new defense line somewhat further inland. Japanese reinforcements

effected a landing at Chapoo, a town on the northern shore of Hangchow Bay.

This put them in position to close in on the Chinese defenders of Shanghai

from a new direction. On November 8, there were reports of these newly-

landed Japanese forces advancing rapidly toward Sungkiang, from where they

would soon be able to cut off the Chinese defenders of Shanghai from the rear.

As a result part of the Chinese troops were again forced to withdraw.

The heavily-reinforced Japanese troops were able to encircle Shanghai and

begin their pincer move toward the Chinese capital, Nanking.

I was much disturbed by the uninterrupted flow of unfavorable news

from the war front in China, and, at the same time, by telegrams from the

Waichiaopu, reporting the German Ambassador's repeated intimation of Berlin's

desire to mediate a settlement and asking the views of tte Chinese delegation

at Brussels.] Japan, feeling encouraged by the success of its army, as a

result of the reinforcements from the North, not only in breaking the

Chinese defense line, but also in pushing toward Nanking along two fronts,

one along Hangchow Bay and the other along the Yangtze River, was perhaps

counting upon confronting the Conference at Brussels with a fait accompli

at the time her second reply was received. This would strengthen her position

and further discourage the powers from doing anything to help China.

As I was so disturbed by both the unfavorable news of the fighting on

 E-873

the Chinese front that day and by the report of the German Ambassador's

suggestion that Germany mediate in the situation by bringing the two sides

together for direct negotiations, I discussed the military situation with

General Chiang pjik'-li, when, on November 8, he came to dinner with the

delegation. The General was a recognized Chinese authority on military

matters, and furthermore had recently come from Germany [/?] and Italy.

When I told him of the news that I received through the Waichiaopu about

the military situation, he thought Nanking's intention was on the side of

peace, and the difficulty [in pursuing it openly] was of a political character.

He could not see how the Generalissimo could advocate abandonment of resistance.

I telegraphed to Dr. T. V. Soong in Shanghai for further information

on the military situation. His rather disquieting reply came in on the

11th, confirming the breach of the Chinese line of defense by the Japanese,

the withdrawal of the Chinese troops to the rear and the effort to form a

new line of resistance. But he said that the new lines were not quite

consolidated yet.

[The next day the conference received the second Japanese refusal.

The circumstances were somewhat unusual.

In Brussels I had an item recorded in my diary for November 12, which

said that 1 first received a copy of the reply by way of the foreign corres­

pondents, and got the reply from the Conference, as circulated by Belgium,

only late that evening, I wrote: "Much mystery about the delay in receiving

it from the Belgian Embassy." It was possible that Japan, while giving the

reply out to the press in Tokyo, took its time in communicating it to the

Belgian government itself. This might have been accounted for by the

rapidly deteriorating military situation in China, particularly in and

around Shanghai .

Earlier that day Hsu Mo, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, replied to

 E-874

King W^nsz's cable, which was sent at my request, for more authentic

information on the situation in China. (King Wqnsz, the Chinese Minister

at the Hague in Holland was with the delegation in Brussels as one of the

advisors. He and Hsu Mo were personal friends.) Hsu Mo's reply said;

"Difficult to hold the present line; enemy heading for Hangchow and Nanking."

At the same time the assistant to the [Chinese] military attach^ in

Brussels called and said that if there was a chance for peace, we should

seize it. He explained that Chinese soldiers, when defeated, lost their

spirit easily. He considered that China's power of resistance had already

reached its maximum. He thought that an armistice could be arranged on the

basis of the present status quo of the military situation. I told him that

would be impossible for China to accept. I suspected him to be speaking on

behalf of the Chief-of-Staff at Nanking, and of conveying its views to the

delegation.

In view of the continuous flow of disquieting news as regards both

the military situation and the possible intentions of the government in Nanking,

about which I felt rather disturbed, I held a conference, on Sunday, the

14th, including not only my colleagues, Ambassadors Quo of England and Ch'eng

of Berlin, Ministers Victor Hoo of Switzerland, then Secretary-General of

the delegation, and King Wensz, but also Mr. Li Yif-ying, then in Brussels.

My purpose was to enlist their support and agreement to make a recommendation

to Nanking to remain firm in the present situation. Li was strong for

resistance and felt sure of Chinese victory in the end, a feeling which we

all shared.

Later I had a talk with the secretary to Ch'en Kung-po, [whom I wanted

to deliver a message to Ch'en for me.] [Ch'en Kung-po, the former Minister

of Industries who was a close associate of Wang Ching-wei, had been in Italy

for the past few weeks on a special mission to ascertain the Italian position
 E-875

if possible elicit Italian support for China. Ch'en had been quite friendly

with Italian Foreign Minister Ciano, when the later was on post in China

in the 1920s. ]

I asked the secretary, who was about to leave for Rome to join Ch'en

Kung-po, to tell Mr. Ch'en that direct negotiations between China and Japan

would be unacceptable to China and why. I said Mr. Ch'en should just sound

out Ciano on Japan's terms of peace, in order to know what Japan was contemplating

for our information. Meanwhile, King Wensz received another cablegram from

Hsu Mo. It said the Chinese line was collapsing.

The next afternoon, after the Conference meeting adopting the draft

declaration in regard to Japan's refusal to accept conciliation or mediation

closed, I had a long talk, as one will recall, with Mr. Davis, in part

explaining how the situation in China had become very critical. On that

day alone I had received eight cablegrams in all from H. H. Kung and the

Waichiaopu, urging that an effort be made to bring about a cessation of

hostilities in China. Kung, in his telegrams, also confirmed the German

offer of mediation.

[In light of the critical military situation, I spoke to Mr. Davis

about China's urgent need of supplies and of assurance that she would continue

to be accorded transit facilities. (Mr. Quo, incidentally was simultaneously

pursuing the same subjects with the British delegation at Brussels.] I also

told Mr. Davis that there was another consideration which weighed with Nanking.

I said the rapid push of the reinforced Japanese troops rendered it difficult

for the Chinese forces to consolidate cheir new lines of defense, and they

needed a respite to consolidate their positions in order to be able to

withstand the fierce attacks of the mechanized and motorized units of the

Japanese army. I therefore thought that, from the military point of view,

it would be necessary to arrange for a cessation of hostilities, if it

could be done.
 E-876

Mr. Davis said he did not see how it could be arranged. The Conference

had twice approached Tokyo and twice received a refusal.

I said perhaps it might be arranged for the United States and Great

Britain to approach Tokyo through diplomatic channels as it had been the original

plan to have these two powers undertake mediation.

Mr. Davis thought that Japan was sure to refuse.

I said that Germany had in the last few days approached

the Chinese government with an intimation of its willingness to act as a

mediator and had urged China to come to terms with Japan at once. I said

I understood that one of the terms was that China should join the Anti-

Comintern Pact. The gesture was made in order to threaten China to the

effect that if she should refuse to come to terms with Japan now, the

Japanese would continue their advance until they captured Nanking. I added

that, of course, the Chinese government would, if necessary, evacuate Nanking

and remove the capital. In fact, plans had been made for doing so even

before the outbreak of hostilities this time.

Mr. Davis said that would not surprise anybody. He thought the

evacuation of Nanking and the removal of the capital would take place

anyway and therefore it would not surprise anyone. He said the important

thing after removing the capital was that China should continue her

resistance.

I said meanwhile the former German returned-students in China had been

urging certain sections of the government to accept the German offer on

the ground that, in the present condition of the military situation, China

might yet reach a not too unfavorable settlement with Japan, as it would

still be possible to save the bulk of the Chinese army in that area.

I said the Chinese government of course did not accept their suggestion as

the matter was for the Conference to handle, and China continued to act on
 E-877

the basis of the Nine Power Treaty. But at the same time the Chinese

government felt that it had to examine the whole situation to see what were

the prospects of help from abroad and the possibility of success in continuing

the resistance. I said I understood the desire of the government for a

cessation of hostilities, which would enable it to reorganize and reequip

the troops in order to be sure of a more effective resistance.

Mr. Davis asked what were the terms, and said if a settlement could be

reached through German mediation in accordance with the Nine power Treaty,

it would be all right. But he doubted very much such a settlement could

be had.

I agreed that it was not likely, as the very first condition was

that China should join the tripartite Anti-Comintern Pact, which indicated

that Japanese intention.

Mr. Davis thought that if Germany should again approach China, she

should first be asked to join the Nine Power Treaty and then asked to carry

out her mission, so that any settlement would be on the basis of the Treaty.

Meanwhile, he thought the best policy for China would be to continue

resistance. He said even if Nanking should be captured, China should continue

to resist. It would draw the Japanese further inland and weaken her more.

I said this was the desire of the Chinese government. But it was

afraid that if resistance should be continued and China's military position

was thereby further weakened, there would be less prospect of help from the

United States, Great Britain, Soviet Russia and other countries, and she

would be confronted with a more difficult situation still.

Mr. Davis uttered an emphatic, "No," and said the worse the situation

in China, the more determined would be the desire to help her from abroad.

In his view, after the repeated refusal of Japan to come to the Conference

and to accept mediation, it was perfectly clear that Japan would not listen
 E-878

to or understand anything but the language of force.

I agreed with him entirely and therefore thought that, in the

situation, even an assurance to China of supplies from abroad and of transit

facilities might not be sufficient to meet the situation. Only a demonstration

of force indicating a firm front on the part of the peace-loving countries

would have an immediate effect. I again expressed the t|ifln*ght that a naval

demonstration of the three squadrons of the United States, Great Britain

and France already in the Far East could be arranged, and that the mere

fact that the three fleets were getting together and showing close collaboration

would at once be understood by Japan and make her think twice.

Dr. Hornbeck, [who was present and assisting, said the three fleets

there were so small that even their combined strength would not impress the

Japanese very much.

I said of course it would be necessary to reinforce them with new units.

Mr. Davis thought that might impress the Japanese without risking the

danger of war.

I agreed and said it would be highly desirable at the same time to

persuade the Soviet Union to make some sort of military demonstration on the

northern frontier.

Mr. Davis said emphatically that was a very important thing to do. He

said the Soviet army was a very strong force and the Japanese were afraid

of it. Even if Soviet Russia did not join in the war and merely confined

her action to a demonstration, it would impress the Japanese surely and

force them to stop their operations in China.

I said I had spoken to Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov [at Brussels

and Geneva] and the Chinese government had sounded the Soviet government in

Moscow. I myself had pointed out to the Soviet Foreign Minister that the

problem of the Japanese army was also one for Soviet Russia, and that now
 E-879

that China was already engaged in hostilities with Japan, the moment had

arrived for Soviet Russia, in cooperation with China, to seek a solution of

the Japanese menace for 25 years, and certainly for ten or 15 years. Japan

was already deeply engaged and exhausted from the hostilities with China,

wherein she utilized a considerable part of her stocks and reserves, so it

would be relatively easy for Soviet Russia to deal with her. I told Mr.

Davis how Mr. Litvinov agreed with my point of view, but said that, in the

first place. Soviet Russia could not jump right in without a suitable pretext,

and that second, which was the real consideration, Soviet Russia could not feel

safe in joining in the military action unless assured of support from Great

Britain and the United States. She could not and would not participate on

the Chinese side alone, but felt she must be doing it as a result of a

collective arrangement, the reason being Moscow's fear that as soon as she

joined in the fighting in the Far East, Germany would move against her in

Europe. I said that it was to provide against this contingency that she

insisted on seeking a cover by an assurance of Anglo-American cooperation.

Mr. Davis said he knew that Germany was not in a position to make war,

and that the United States could not commit itself ot give any assurance of

military support to any country beforehand. He said it might be thought that

in the Far Eastern situation force would have to be used, but the United

States government could not take a previous commitment. Even if it had made

up its mind to use force next week, it would not promise it to any country

because the American people would not stand it.

I said I fully understood the traditional policy of the United States

and the susceptibilities of the American people. I suggested that Mr. Davis

might have a round-table talk with the representatives of Great Britain

and France along the lines which I had suggested. I said that, in short,

the situation was such that it called for three things, namely, a joint naval
 E-880

demonstration by Great Britain, the United States and France; a military

demonstration by Soviet Russia; and a definite arrangement for the continued

supply of arms and war materials by sea.

[This led] Mr. Davis to ask me about the overland route of transportation

from Soviet Russia. He thought that was the best course because it could be

done secretly and would not be exposed to Japanese attack.

I said Russians were already doing something of this kind. But the

distance was very great and the road system was not completed. There

were roads in certain parts and none in other parts, and even where roads

existed, it would still take some time to install facilities for gasoline

and repairs. So the immediate important thing, in my mind, I said, was the

three points that I had just mentioned. I said, of course, I did not expect

to receive an offhand answer from him, but I hoped that he would talk the

matter over with the representatives of Great Britain and France.

Mr. Davis suggested that China should approach Washington, London and

Moscow, where final decisions could be taken, and he asked whether Dr. C. T.

Wang our Ambassador in Washington, had acquainted the American government

with what I had just stated.

I said I did not understand this to be so because the intention of the

Chinese government was centered on the Conference in Brussels, since the

Foreign Ministers of the three countries were present and America was represented.

Mr. Davis thought it was necessary for the Chinese government to speak

to the American government.

I said I would ask him (Davis) at the same time to cable a gist of our

conversation to President Roosevelt, and leave it to his discretion whether

to do it that evening or the next day in view of the fact that the President
 E-881

was about to send a message to Congress in the next 24 hours.

Dr. Hornbeck asked what sort of report Dr. C. T. Wang had sent to me

as to the attitude of the American government.

I said the impression I had gotten from Dr. Wang's telegrams was that the

American government was determined to do something effective and to bring

about a settlement of the situation, but that it would not do it alone.

Therefore Dr. Wang had asked the Chinese delegates to use their influence

with the British and French delegates to support the American policy whole­

heartedly, as the American government was ready to go very far and certainly

as far as the others. I said further that it was my impression that the

American government's attitude was in advance of public opinion and that the

government was working to bring public opinion in line with its own intentions.

When I asked what Mr. Davis understood to be the situation, both he and
they
Dr. Hornbeck thought that was about the picture/had got of the situation in

America^.

[At the time of our conversation, the Conference, having adopted its

declaration, had just adjourned until Monday, November 22, to give the delegates

a chance to consider, in consultation with their governments, how next to

proceed, and how to close the present session of the full Conference. It had

been more or less agreed by them that the present session would be terminated

by a meeting which would pass a more comprehensive declaration or resolution

and would determined the conditions for a recess of the Conference, these

conditions perhaps including the Constitution of a Subcommittee that would

continue to meet during the recess.]

[During the week's adjournment, Messrs. Davis and Hornbeck were the

only chief representatives of principal powers left in Brussels. This perhaps

gave me an added opportunity for lengthy discussions with both of them. In

any case, I saw Dr. Hornbeck in the afternoon of the 16th, and Mr. Davis in
 E-882

the afternoon of the 17th.]

[When I saw Dr. Hornbeck,] I expressed to him the hope that at the

next meeting of the Conference on Monday something definite would be done

and that it would not lead to the end of the Conference.

Dr. Hornbeck said, speaking confidentially and not wishing to be quoted,

that the next meeting might well mean the beginning of the end. It might

extend to two or three days. At all events, it would take a decision to

adjourn as there was nothing more that the Conference could do.

I said I did not see how the Conference could adjourn without having done

anything. It could not just publish a declaration admitting its own failure.

Since conciliation had failed, other ways and means might be devised to uphold

the Treaty.

Dr. Hornbeck asked what I was contemplating.

I replied it would be along the line, which I had explained before the

Conference, of aiding China and adopting measures to reduce the resources

and strength of the forces of aggression.

Dr. Hornbeck said he did not like to be beating about the bush but

talking frankly. The Nine Power Treaty provided only for full and frank

communication Such communication had taken place before the Conference,

and it could have taken place without any treaty. The Treaty did not provide

any positive measure or for the adoption of measures to enforce the Treaty

when one of the parties to it had failed to refrain from doing certain

things which the Treaty enjoined and after consultation had taken place.

The Treaty did not provide an obligation of the signatory powers to adopt

measures. Whatever was to be done would have to be done not under the
if/ *
Treaty or in the Conference ua-l-e^s the parties were willing to do f
A
,bj*t outside the Conference^ by the powers who were disposed to do it. But

then they would be doing it not as an obligation under the Treaty, but out

of their own volition. They could do it without the Conference.

 E-883

Dr. Hornbeck said economic measures gainst Japan could not be adopted

as far as America was concerned, unless the American people made up their

mind either to risk war or came to the conclusion that there was no risk in

these measures. But for years the average American citizen had taken the

decision that the troubles between China and Japan were troubles of those

two countries alone. Those countries being so far off, it was not the business

of the Americans to interfere in them. Their sympathy was on the side of

China, but when it came to taking concrete action which might involve the

risk of war, the average American hated to take such a risk because the

recollections of the last war were still recurring in his mind. That

supreme attempt to establish peace in the world had failed and America

not only got nothing from it but feltShe had been deceived by Europe. The

American people knew that the United States had a bi g navy, but they did

not wish to use it. The United States had money, but it did not wish to

spend it on war. There was trade and the nation reasoned that if war came,

it would disrupt trade. The people who were interested in trade with Japan

felt that war with Japan would disrupt that trade. The cotton planters in

the South feared that an embargo on cotton to Japan would mean ruin to them.

They did not want war, which would temporarily disrupt trade, though it would

be recovered in a fuller measure after it was over. They did not reason

that Japan would not buy cotton in America if the textile industries of other

countries would take up the task of supplying them with piece goods for

their clothing.

At present, he continued the state of public opinion in America was

not strong enough to enable the American government to run the risk of war.

It would depend upon developments. If the situation in China became worse,

public opinion would strengthen proportionately. It meant that it realized

 E-884

the misery and suffering and sacrifice on the part of China. He was certain

that if the present situation continued, American public opinion would rise

strongly in favor of the government taking concrete action. He said when he

first went out to China in 1913, he was so impressed by the lack of unity

in China that he thought that if Japan should attack Manchuria and seize it,

it might force the Chinese people to unite and build up a strong nation. In

the present case, the deeper the Japanese brought pressure to bear on the

body politic of China, the stronger would be the feeling in the United

States. He said European statesmen always thought that the American President

was all powerful, without knowing that he had to depend upon the support of

public opinion.

I quite agreed with him and said that the trouble was that nearly all

the leaders in European countries had not spent any length of time in America

and knew little of American conditions. They always viewed world problems

through their own spectacles or in terms of their own interests.

Dr. Hornbecksaid, in his opinion, the Conference was held at a bad

time, and he did not understand why itshould have been proposed in Geneva

at the time Japan had just been condemned for her aggression in China.

I said I felt the Conference should have been held earlier, if it

had to take place, and probably it would have been more useful.

Dr. Hornbeck said Dr. C. T. Wang always asked that the Nine Power

Conference be held, but Dr. Wang, at the same time, was unable to answer

the question of what the Conference could do and what was to be expected from

the Conference. Dr. Hornbeck thought that, far from being helpful, an

international conference often made it more difficult to solve a problem

because the countries represented would stick to their individual positions.

In view of American public opinion, Dr. Hornbecksaid the American

Delegation to Brussels had placed the Far Eastern problem as a world issue
 E-885

of peace and law and security of nations. If it was handled merely as a

quarrel between two nations, whatever the rights or wrongs there were, the

American people would not feel interested enough. As it was, the issue was

squarely stated and American public opinion might develop to a point where

it would want to see the treaty upheld.

I agreed with him and said that a plan should be worked out by the

Conference for the continued supply of arms to China.

Dr. Hornbeck said it all depended upon the willingness of the powers.

They could do it outside of the Conference.

I referred to the question of naval demonstration, which I had

mentioned the day before to Mr. Davis and himself.

Dr. Hornbeck said it would be of no use if Japan knew that force would

not be used.

I said the mere fact of the presence of the three fleets acting in

concert would impress Japan.

Dr. Hornbeck said Japan knew that America, with its Neutrality law

and the present state of public opinion, would not fight, and therefore she

would not feel impressed by it.

I said the collaboration of the three fleets, especially with reinforcements,

would certainly impress the Japanese enough to a point where they would not

interfere freely with the transportation of Chinese war supplies. In other

words, the freedom and safety of the sea route would be better ensured. It

would certainly give more confidence to the French who seemed to be very

much worried over the possibility of Japanese complications because of

the granting of transit facilities.

Dr. Hornbeck said it might serve that purpose but something should be

done to organize the land transportation. China should employ one million

coolies for transporting supplies, for example, from Canton to the front and
 E-886

also along the route from Soviet Russia through the Northwest into northern

China.

I said the difficulties of transportation were enormous.

Dr. Hornbeck said the experience of the last few months showed that

China did not need heavy armaments. What had been most effective were

machine guns and anti-aircraft guns in defense. There could be transported

by coolies stationed along the route. The system might not be easy at first

but once it started it would be like a stream of water flowing continuously.

I said it was being done in the Northwest but it would take some time

before it could be completely organized. Coming back to the adjournment

of the Conference the following week, I said it would be a great pity for

the Conference to admit its own failure and asked in what way could China

keep it going.

Dr. Hornbeck said it would serve no purpose if the Conference could

not do anything. The trouble was that China was alone doing her part in

upholding the treaty and the others did not feel called upon to take steps

to uphold it themselves. He added that Mr. Davis was very strong in his

desire to do something at the Conference for China. It all depended upon

the next few days, when the different delegates were talking things over

with their respective governments. It was possible that something might be

done. However, it all depended upon the outcome of the next few days.

The situation in China was such that on November 17, only two days

after the adoption of the declaration by the Conference in reply to

Japan’s refusal to accept mediation, Dr. Hu Shih cabled from the United

States suggesting that China should ask the United States to be delegated

by the Conference as sole mediator, pending conference recess. I recorded

in my diary that this suggestion "seemed to agree with the general tone of

Davis' statement" of. that day.

 E-887

[I had seen Mr. Davis at the Hotel Metropole in Brussels at 5 p.m.,

prior to receiving Dr. Hu’s cable. Mr. Davis had asked me whether I had

received any news of the military situation in China. I had explained to

him there had been no important change in the last 48 hours. The Chinese

counter-offensive in the vicinity of Hashing (half way between Chapoo and

Soochow) and Kashan was holding the Japanese back, while the Chinese troops,

reinforced from Nanking were able to hold the Japanese where they had

landed on the bank of the Yangtze River behind Liuho. I also said that no

official news had come of the removal of the capital from Nanking, but a

message from the Publicity Department of the Waichiaopu said that evacuation

might be imminent. I had asked Mr. Davis whether he had received any reply

from Washington [on the points I had raised (?) ]

He said, "No," and added that President Roosevelt had not mentioned

any foreign question in the message to Congress, which had been called in

an extraordinary session for the purpose of passing legislation on certain

domestic questions. He could not say whether the president would send a

special message on foreign affairs. He went on to tell me that M. Kauffmann,

the Danish Minister, had been to see him and, that he had asked Kauffmann

to speak to Dr. Munch (Danish Foreign Minister) in the hope that his government
—frH,
might reconsider its position and not persist in abstention or. the Conference

delegation. Davis said Kauffmann told him that since the adoption of the

League Assembly's resolution, the Danish government had lifted the ban on

the sale of arms to China, although under its laws ordinarily no arms could

be sold and sent to either party in a war. M. Kauffmann had emphasized

that this was evidence of the Danish attitude towards China.

I said that I did not understand Japan had been buying in Denmark, and

that it would be interesting to know if Denmark would refuse an order from

Japan for arms.

 E-888

Mr. Davis said he had a suspicion that the Scandinavian countries were

much afraid of Japan and probably had struck some bargain with her in the

commercial field in return for their attitude at the Conference.

I then expressed the hope that the Conference would continue the following

week and proceed to implement the priciples which it had adopted. In

reply to Mr. Davis’ inquiry, I said the implementation could take the form

of incorporating [in its proposed resolution the two principles

embodied in the League Assembly's resolution adopted the previous October.

Mr . Davis thought that under the neutrality law of the United States

the American delegation could not openly declare its desire to aid China,

and the Conference in its present composition could not pass it.

I suggested that, in that case, the Conference might nominate a small

committee composed of the United State^, Great Britain, France and Soviet

Russia for the purpose of implementing the general principles adopted by

the Conference. I said since Italy had openly declared against consideration

of a common attitude on the part of the powers at the Conference, the Italian

delegation could not ask to be represented on the committee. I suggested

that in order to avoid difficulties, it might be desirable to announce first

the object of the committee and then leave it to the powers, who wished to

join, to declare their intention to do so.

Mr. Davis said he had just met Count Aldrovandi when he was on a

walk and was told by him that Italy would like to be on the committee, if

it was organized. Of course, he (Davis) thought Italy's presence would not

be helpful because she would surely oppose anything the committee might

propose to do. But nevertheless, he said, Count Aldrovandi had indicated

he would insist on Italy being placed on the committee. (The Count also

told Mr. Davis,who told me, Mussolini's policy in the present Far Eastern

conflict was to try to retain the friendship of both China and Japan
 E-889

and to utilize the situation to maneuver in such a way as to benefit Italy's

situation in Europe. The Count's idea was to adopt the procedure followed

in the Shanghai incident in 1932 which, in Mr. Davis' opinion, was designed

to set aside the Conference-~a thing which could not be done.)

Mr. Davis, continuing, said he had been thinking that it might be

desirable to define more clearly the attitude of the powers at the Conference

and then take a recess in order that the delegates might return to their

countries and consult their governments as to the common attitude to be

adopted. But the period of recess would not be long and the delegates

would return to Brussels to resume the work of the Conference.

I said, in my opinion, the Chinese government and people would be

greatly disappointed and discouraged if the Conference should adjourn without

rendering some effective help to China. Failure to do so might have a

demoralizing effect upon the spirit of the Chinese troops. I told Mr.

Davis the least that should be done, in my view, would be to set up some

sort of a committee of the four powers mentioned to get in contact with

the Chinese delegation and work out with it an arrangement for rendering

effective aid to China as well as for working on the questions of transit,

economic pressure upon Japan, naval demonstration in tne South China sea

and military demonstration on the northern frontier.

Mr. Davis thought that with the difficulties necessarily attending the

composition of a committee it would be better not to have one, so that the

powers, who were disposed to help China, would feel freer to get together

and discuss measures.

I said while China was determined to continue her resistance, the

carrying out of this intention was a practical matter and depended upon

what supplies she could get from abroad. The Chinese government had to look

to the future in order to continue pursuing resistance with confidence. I

 E-890

said at present the question of transit was already disturbing the Chinese

government.

Mr. Davis said an Associated Press representative had been told on the

16th by the Quai d'Orsay, in reply to a question about the truth of the

reported Japanese ultimatum to France, that 15 days earlier the French

government had already closed Indochina to the transit of Chinese shipments

in consultation with the British and the Americans. Davis said the evident

intention of this French declaration was to throw the blame onto Great

Britain and the United States. But they had nothing to do with it.

I said what the French had in mind was probably the refusal of the

two pot ars to give the necessary guarantee, which the French government had

requested.

Mr. Davis said if France was not willing to protect her Indochinese

colony, which represented an interest far more important to France than

Hongkong was to Great Britain or anything of the United States in the Far

East, how could she expect others to undertake the protection of Indochina

for her? He thought that China should tell France that it was really an

unfriendly act for France to refuse such facilities.

Dr. Hornbeck, [who was as usual assisting Mr. Davis,] said the United

States could not assume such a righteous attitude because the American

government, in the case of prohibiting American government ships from

carrying arms to China, was not very friendly either.

Mr. Davis said at that time the President took the step in order

to counter the agitation for the application of the Neutrality Act. He said

France was really unnecessarily frightened by the Japanese threat. He

could not believe that Japan, with all her troubles, would take on more

troubles by creating difficulties with France.

I said I had also told the French that Japan would not dare to cause
 E-891

difficulties to them and told them too that England, who was similarly

situated, was not worried about the possibility of Japanese complications.

I mentioned that I had had a talk with M. Hoppenot on the 15th and understood

from him that the Japanese threat was quite positive, I said M. Hoppenot

felt it was certain that if France did not stop transit facilities through

Indochina, the island of Hainan would be occupied, a thing which the French

were very much afraid of, because it would constitute a threat to Indochina.

Dr. Hornbeck said the danger to Indochina was not from the occupation

of Hainan Island. It was the conquest of China. If China should be

conquered, the danger to Indochina would be much greater than the present

occupation of Hainan Island. He thought the real reason for the French

attitude was their fear of the Japanese bombing of the Yiinnan railway.

They were afraid of having their pocket-book touched.

Mr. Davis thought that was the real reason too.

I said I had talked with M. Delbos and M. Chautemps and understood

that the French fleet in Indochinese waters was very small consisting of

four small ships. I said that, in the present situation in Europe, France

did not feel able to send much reinforcement there. The French position

was that since Indochina was practically the only channel of transit for

China, France was alone exposed to the danger of Japanese attack, and that,

in order to provide against this contingency, she must be covered by an

assurance of international cooperation. I said that there was something in

the French argument and that one could understand their uneasiness about

the situation in the Far East, in view of their preoccupations in Europe.

I added that a naval demonstration, which I suggested the other day, might

serve to ease the French mind. France might be told that in the opinion

of the United States there was no danger from the Japanese side, but that

in the event of such danger appearing it would be ready to enter into

consultation with France and Great Britain. The mere fact of England and
 E-892

American declaring their readiness to enter into consultation might satisfy

the French and allay their uneasiness.

Both Mr. Davis and Dr. Hornbeck said it would not be desirable to hold

forth false hopes, and that it would be misleading if France expected action

as a result of consultation. Dr. Hornbeck thought that the best thing to do

would be to organize the overland route from Soviet Russia for sending supplies

to China. He said it would not take a great deal of labor or time to do so.

Supplies could be sent to the frontier and thence over the north-western route.

The Japanese could not possibly destroy or threaten its safetly.

I said China was already doing this, but it would still be some months
U4
before the was completed. However, at the moment that route would

also be exposed, considering that the Japanese had already bombed Sian the

other day.

Both Mr. Davis and Dr. Hornbeck said that bombing from the air could

not destroy that route or the caravans easily.

I said at present even Russian shi; were still going by sea. I hoped

that Mr. Davis and the British, French and Soviet delegates would get together

a round table and work out together a plan of aid to China, outlining what

each of them was prepared to do. I observed that the British had said it

would be easier for them to grant financial credit than to supply arms and

war material because their own rearmament program needed all that their

factories could manufacture. France had provided 200 million francs of

credit, out of which 100 million francs had already been utilized for buying

airplanes from France. If the United States could also give a certain amount

of credit to China and supply her arms, that would be a great help.

Dr. Hornbeck said, under the present Neutrality Law, if the United

States should make a loan, say $100 million in gold, to China, it would

have to do the same thing to Japan if the latter should ask for it. As
 E893

regards arms and airplanes, etc., he thought the American factories could

be told to supply them to China freely.

When I asked whether these things could not be bought on credit, Dr.

Hornbeck said if Great Britain was not able to supply arms, etc., the British

credit could Oily be used abroad and could be made to pay for purchases in

America .

Mr. Davis said he had always been against the neutrality law before

it was passed, but as it was now on the Statute Book, it left no leeway to

the American government.

I said, in the present situation in China, the Chinese government

found it necessary to really know the prospects of positive assistance from

abroad in order that it could take a comprehensive view of the situation

and make a decision accordingly. While it was determined to continue

resistance, it must have something to look forward to in the future. If the

Conference should adjourn without giving some concrete help to China, I said

it would be a great disappointment and have a demoralizing effect.

Mr. Davis said that Sir Alexander Cadogan of the British delegation was

coming back to Brussels the next day and that he (Davis) would talk things

over with the British, and afterwards discuss them again with me.

Referring to the news of the reported removal of the capital from

Nanking, I said there had been a plan some time ago which provided for the

removal of the different government departments to different places and

not to any one place. I said it was possible that the President might go
tV SA-. ‘ /
to Szechwan, but various departments would probably be near the Yangtze

Valley.

Mr. Davis thought this was a good plan.

Dr. Hornbeck thought that would render communication between different

departments difficult, and if the Japanese cut the telephone wires, it would
 E-894

make communication impossible.

On seeing me to the door, Dr. Hornbeck, in reply to my question, said

the Russians had been to see Mr. Davis, asking the United States to do

something positive for China. But what they asked amounted to an alliance,

which the United States, as I knew, could not agree to in view of its

traditional policy.

[Even before I had spoken with Mr. Davis, who had seen Mr. Kauffmann

of Denmark, I had myself received the Danish delegate at my hotel. I told

him I was sorry that the Danish delegation had not seen its way clear to

refraining from an abstention on the declaration of the Conference the

other day, and that the feeling of regret was not confined to the Chinese

delegation but was also shared by the other delegations.

M. Kauffmann said he knew it and was sorry that he could not do something

to help China .

I said the Chinese Minister in Copenhagen had also seen Dr. Munch and

urged him to support the declaration.

M. Kauffmann said the scope of the invitation to Brussels was confined

to an effort at mediation, in other words, to bringing about a restoration

of peace by agreement. He thought the last paragraph in the statement went

beyond the scope of the invitation. It was more of a threat to Japan which

could hardly help China and which perhaps would do China harm in light of

her experience in Geneva in 1931-32. He said Denmark also held that if the

question of positive measures were to be taken up, it should be taken up at

Geneva and the Conference was no place for considering it. He added that

Denmark, as a member of the League of Nations, would live up to her obligations

under the Covenant. However, in Norway the opinion had been expressed from
 E-895

time to time that she would not join in any sanctions, even when voted by

the League of Nations. If the question should arise between staying in

the League by accepting sanctions or pursuing a policy of neutrality by

leaving the League, Norway would of course choose the latter. However,

neither in Denmark nor in Sweden had opinion advanced to such a point.

They believed that the Treaty, under which the Conference was sitting, did

not provide for the adoption of any concrete measures.

I said that was true. But the Sino-Japanese conflict was placed squarely

and rightly on the broad issue of law and order and of respect for treaty

obligations. The signatory powers had an obligation to make the Treaty

respected and, if conciliation failed, other possibilities for the purpose

of upholding the Treaty were not excluded.

M. Kauffmann said Denmark adhered to the Treaty with a great deal of

reluctance at the time. She was not invited to the Washington Conference

and when she was asked to adhere to the Treaty, she considered the matter

very carefully. He recalled that Denmark adhered to it merely because she

had an old treaty with China similar to that which the other power had.

He recalled also that Germany adhered to the Treaty but did not ratify

it, because she noticed that China was opposed to that treaty herself and

Germany did not want to offend the susceptibilities of the Chinese people.

In so far as the provisions of theTreaty were concerned, M. Kauffmann said

Denmark, as a small country, did not feel that she could do very much on her

own part. Moreover, she had no intention, as a small power, of violating

China's integrity or sovereignty. Besides, he said, the sanctity of treaties

was a principle which was not an absolute one. Conditions might change

which would justify a modification. He referred to the Chinese policy of

abrogating the old treaties granting extraterritoriality to foreign nationals.

He regretted that Denmark could not join in any concrete measures .

 E-896

I said the paragraph in question merely aimed at presenting a united

front in support of the principle of law and order and respect for treaties.

It was to show the united and firm intention of the powers at the Conference

to defend the principles which they had announced. In the face of such a

nation as Japan who would listen to no reason and use force as an instrument

of policy, it was necessary to take a step which would indicate to Japan

that the powers were prepared to defend the principles which they believed

in. I said it was a pity that Denmark, who had all along been working for

the general cause of world peace,should this time have stepped aside. Besides,

I pointed out, the paragraph in question left complete freedom to any power

which might not be in a position to accept any concrete measure when adopted.

M. Kauffmann said Denmark was always ready to cooperate with others

morally. But when it came to the question of concrete measures, they should

be undertaken in Geneva, if they were to be of general application.

I said what the Chinese delegation had in mind was not to insist upon

an answer if M. Kauffmann did not feel free to give it .

M. Kauffmann said he felt no hesitation in answering the question.

As regards the form of economic pressure to be taken for restraining

the forces of aggression, I said the measures which the Chinese delegation

had in mind could be applied by a small number of powers and did not call

for general application. I said, for example, that cotton, which was necessary

for manufacturing gunpowder, was largely an American product, and that Japan

took 45 percent of her cotton from America, while Denmark produced none.

So if an embargo should be placed on cotton , it would not affect Denmark

at all. In a case like that, I thought that Denmark could adhere to the

principle without running the risk of being prejudiced materially. I asked

whether Denmark suffered a great deal at the time of the Abyssinian sanctions.

M. Kauffmann replied that there was a certain amount of loss of course,

 E-897

but it was not very considerable because Danish commerce with Italy was

limited. M. Kauffmann said, in the view of his government, it would be

easier to render positive aid than to adopt restrictive measures against

Japan. In the case of arms, the Danish policy had always been not to sell

arms to either party in a civil war or to either belligerent in an international

war. Her foreign policy was always based upon the principle of dealing only

with the recognized government. Since the adoption of the League Assembly's

resolution, he told me, Denmark had lifted its embargo on selling arms to

China and not to Japan. This indicates clearly Danish sympathy for China.

[(This was the same point Mr. Davis later told me Kauffmann had made to him

and which I questioned slightly, wondering whether Denmark would actually refuse

to fill an order placed by Japan.)]

I told M r. Kauffmann that the Chinese delegation had not mentioned any

concrete measures to any delegation, not even an embargo on cotton. I said

he was the first one to whom I had said it. I added that there was also the

possibility of a boycott of Japanese goods, which might be easier to adopt

because countries were more willing not to buy than not to sell. I told

him there was already a movement in England and America and recently in

France among the people to promote a boycott of Japanese goods .

M. Kauffmann thought the difficulty of the Conference was due primarily

to the absence of Germany and to the presence of the Soviet Union. He

said he was leaving for Copenhagen in order to report to Dr. Munch.

I expressed the hope that after discussion with Dr. Munch, the

Danish Foreign Minister, Denmark might see her way to change her attitude.

I said the papers that morning had reported that the declaration was open

to signature by other delegations, and I was hoping that Denmark might modify

her attitude.
 E-898

M. Kauffmann said he had seen the same notice while unable to understand

its purport. At any rate, he said, the Danish delegation had no intention

of changing its position. But certainly he would report to Dr. Munch

what I had just said.

The following evening another telegram underlining the seriousness of

the military situation in China came to me from the Wacihiaopu. It confirmed

the removal of the capital of the Chinese government from Nanking to Chungking,

and asked me to explain this to the governments of Great Britain, France

and the United States. It also asked me to explain to them that only

concerted measures of force could bring about a reasonable settlement with

Japan, and even supplies of military materials to China and sanctions

against supplies to Japan (though still desired) might prove too slow to

be of help. I at once prepared an aide-memoire embodying the views of the

Chinese government, which was communicated to the three powers [in the next

few days. (I myself handed a copy Dr. Hornbeck for Mr. Davis in Brussels

and handed another to M. Delbos in Paris, while Mr. Quo handed a copy to

Mr. Eden in London.)]

Some slight encomagement came in the form of a report of November 19,

saying that although the fighting at Hashing, to the north of Hangchow Bay
U(r< ' fo ' .../*•<

in Chekiang, [had turned out badly, that at] Fushan, just northeast of Changshu

in Kiangsu Province, about midway between Shanghai and Nanking, turned out

successfully. Hashing itself had been taken by the Japanese. At the same

time, another cable arrived from H. H. Hung, indicating Japan's desire for

peaceful negotiations, and informing me of the talks of the Chinese government

with the German Ambassador and the British Charg6 d'Affaires. [From the

United States came more discouraging news reflecting the fact that] the

international situation was really deteriorating for China. The correspondent

of the United Press called on the 19th, especially to tell me that he hoped
 E-899

to be able to report good news, but that he felt pessimistic , not only

about the prospects of the Conference, but also about congressional opinion

in the United States, for it was against active aid to China and critical

of Mr. Davis' attitude at the Conference.

In view of this development in Washington and the latest cablegrams

from Nanking, [I made arrangements to see M. Delbos in Paris and] telephoned

to my colleague, Ambassador Quo, who had gone back to London to see Mr.

Eden. I asked Mr. Quo for news from the London side. He told me that Mr. Eden

had the impression that the United States was not only unwilling to proceed

itself, owing to congressional opposition, but was intimating to London and

to others as well not to go ahead too fast.

[I arrived at Paris late that same evening (November 19) and saw M.

Delbos the following morning at the Quai d'Orsay. I told him about] the

critical situation that had developed in China and explained to him the gist

of the telegram I had received from the Waichiaopu and put in form of an

aide-memoire, which I handed to him following my explanations. I urged that

t he Conference, having sat for nearly three weeks, should not aijourn without

taking some concrete decisions. I said the situation was urgent and

effective action was promptly needed.

M. Delbos said, in his opinion, the best thing for China in the

present circumstances was to ask the Brussels Conference not to close

but merely to adjourn so that it could meet again when a more opportune

moment arrived. He himself was entirely in sympathy with the suggestions

made in the aide-memoire and, in fact, had himself proposed at Brussels to

the British and the Americans concerted action in the form of aid to China

and naval collaboration amongst the three powers. In the matter of according

transit facilities through Indochina to China, M. Delbos said he had asked

the United States and Great Britain to guarantee that if Indochina should be
 E-900

attacked or if a French ship should be attacked by the Japanese navy, they

would come to the support of France. But Mr. Norman Davis objected to such

a guarantee and did not give any encouragement as to the possibility of

action in solidarity. He, Delbos, could not accept the idea, that France should

expose herself alone to Japanese complications. If peace was to be maintained,

he stated, there must be concerted action and mutual assistance.

I said that I sympathized with the French attitude and that it was

only just, but I knew that Mr. Davis could not give such a guarantee as it

would be contrary to the American tradition. I said that China had also

approached Washington with a view to urging it to consider more favorably

the French point of view, and that I understood that President Roosevelt had

intimated to the French Ambassador in Washington that the question of transit

facilities for China through Indochina was one which interested him very much.

M. Delbos replied that President Roosevelt merely said he would like

to see such transit facilities continue; Roosevelt gave no assurance whatever

of American collaboration in case of trouble arising from the Japanese

side to the French. He, Delbos, had suggested to Great Britain making a

second demarche jointly on the question of transit in Indochina, but the

British government preferred to wait until after the next meeting of the

Conference.

I urged that transit facilities be kept open because they were of

vital importance to China in her resistance to Japanese aggression,

and asked whether I could take it for granted that they were kept open.

M. Delbos replied that, for the present, Indochina was still open for

transit, but he could not keep it open eternally. There must be some

arrangement for an assurance of joint support. He realized that all the

rights of the question were on China’s side, but said that the realities

of the situation must also be considered by France.

As regards positive measures to be taken to restrain the forces of

 E-901

aggression, M. Delbos thought that if they were taken, they were sure to

have a good effect. He believed if the four powers--Great Britain, the United

States, France and Russia--could act jointly, indicating a firm and united

front, the combination would be so strong that all the rest of the world

would follow them with the exception of Germany, Italy and Japanese, though,

in the presence of such a powerful combination, even those dictator countries

would come to terms.

As to economic measures, M. Delbos told me, he had even suggested an

embargo on oil, which was bound to make Japan think.

I suggested that the application of economic measures would affect

only a few countries. I took cotton, as an example, and said that nearly

50 percent of Japan's requirements was supplied by the United States .

In the case of silk from Japan, I said the American market absorbed as

much as 85 percent of Japan's total exportation.

M. Delbos thought that [measures involving] these articles would touch

the pockets of the traders in America too much and would raise a storm of

protest, which would make it difficult to apply them. In the case of oil,

however, it was a commodity that could be easily sold elsewhere. France,

for example, could take, if necessary, a great portion of what America

used to sell to Japan. But here again said Delbos, the question of a guarantee

for assistance was raised by Holland, whose Dutch-Indies furnished a good

portion of Japan's oil needs. He said that Holland, a small country, would

not dare to join in an embargo unless assured that in case of an attack

from Japan, she would be supported by the other powers.

I then said I had spoken to Mr. Davis about setting up a small committee

by the Conference for the purpose of working out an arrangement for rendering

assistance to China and considering measures against Japan.

M. Delbos thought that such a committee would not serve any useful
 E-902

purpose. He pointed out that neither Mr. Eden nor himself would be able to

attend, and that Mr. Davis would have to return to the United States. He

felt if the work were to be done by diplomatic representatives^ it would not

be effective. Besides, he thought the conference as such could not officially

pass any arrangement of this character. He stated it had better be done

quietly on the side. With the American Neutrality Act still in force,

unofficial pressure would be easier and preferable to official proclamations

of what was to be done.

I urged that the situation in China had become so critical that even

economic measures might prove to be too slow to produce theircfesired effect

and that a demonstration of force, such as a naval demonstration, would

bring about a quicker result. I said there were elements in Japan in favor

of calling a halt in China and negotiating a settlement. Even a part of

the Japanese army and the navy was in favor of this, but the more radical

elements, seeing no pressure of force from other quarters, were insisting

upon pushing their conquest further into the interior. I was convinced, I

said, and my convinction was confirmed by a telegram I had received from

Nanking conveying certain information from Japan, that if some show of

force was effected, it would have a strong influence upon Japan at the

present moment.

M. Delbos said he was in favor of such demonstration and he felt that

nothing short of some show of force could make Japan listen. But it depended

upon the United States, which had a powerful fleet free from preoccupations.

If America agreed. Great Britain and France would give her all moral support.

I said their support should not merely be of a moral character, they

should also send ships.

M. Delbos said they could, but only a few ships because of their pre­

occupations in Europe.
 E-903

I said the Chinese government’s idea was that this naval demonstration

should go side by side with a military demonstration on the northern border

by Russia. I asked M. Delbos to use the influence of the French government

with Russia.

M. Delbos said Russia could do it easily near the Manchurian border.

Such a demonstration would certainly draw the attention of Japan and relieve

her pressure upon China. But while Russia was so active in Spain, which was

far away from her, she seemed to be very cautious as regards the Far East,

which was of vital interest to her.

I said I understood that Russia would do it only if she were assured

of support from the other powers.

M. Delbos said that France could not assure Russia of support in such

a case alone. If the United States would do so, France would gladly join,

but he doubted whether Russia would do it. He thought the continued purges

had weakened the Soviet army and made Soviet Russia hesitate to take any

positive military action.

I said if the Conference should fail, China always had Geneva open to

her as she had reserved her right.

M. Delbos thought that Geneva could not do much to help China except

by moral declarations, which, however, China had already received. Besides,

he stated, most powers interested in the Far East were represented at Brussels.

The most important point, however, was that at the Brussels Conference

America was participating fully, whereas in Geneva American cooperation

would be very limited. In his view, the attitude of the United States in the

present situation was of vital importance. M. Delbos understood that President

Roosevelt himself was favorably disposed to do something, but that public

opinion in America was not yet ripe. He referred to certain proposals of

American congressmen and senators [in the recently-convened Congress) in

 E-904

favor of taking a plebiscite before deciding on the question of peace or war

or important foreign policy. He thought such opinion indicated the difficulties

with which President Roosevelt must be confronted. He said at present American

public opinion seemed to be sympathetic towards China, but it did not wish to

see the government taking any action lest it might involve America in war.

He thought unless some sudden incident like the sinking of an American ship

by the Japanese navy or some attempt against the American Embassy should

excite American public opinion, it would not move to support the government

in any active policy to help China. American public opinion was of vital

importance to China, in his view as well as mine,] and he suggested that

China should consider how to develop American publcc opinion in her favor.

!On this point our interview ended, and I took my leave of the Foreign Minister.]

Despite the unfortunate news from China and the apparent unwillingness

of the powers to take positive measures, I was, just as were my colleagues

in the delegation, strongly in favor of continuing the resistance in China.

Thus I had felt somewhat heartened by the visit of the elder statesman, Li

Yii-ying. [He called on me in Paris on the morning of the 20th, right before

I left for the Quai d'Orsay.] He came to tell me that he had received a

telegram fran T. V. Soong, indicating that the latter was fully in accord with

our views in favor of continuing resistance to the end. He assured me,

[on the basis of Soong's telegram] that it would be impossible to stop the

policy of resistance, given the present state of internal politics in China.

Evidently, opinion in China was divided. While some members of the

government were for a patched-up settlement, other leaders of the government

and public opinion in China as a whole were all for continuing the resistance.

[Taking the government as a whole,] the government appraisal of the situation,

just as my own, was that Japan had been trying to expedite her military

operations in China in order to bring about a decisive victory and impress

 E-905

the Brussels Conference and the powers that it was no use to intervene.

China knew that and therefore, the government repeated its instructions to

the delegation to ^attempt to] bring about an armistice. Thus, such instructions

[or intimations] came not only from the Waichiaopu, but also from Dr. Kung

and the military attachd. But opinion in China was divided.

On the question of policy toward Japan, there were always two camps

in China, just as in Japan, Japanese opinion was divided into two 'main] groups,

the military on one side and the civilians, including diplomatic and business

leaders, on the other. But even among Japanese military ranks there were

groups of older leaders who were inclined to pursue a policy of moderation

in the hope that eventually it would bring about cooperation between the

two countries, while at the s^me time meeting to some extent Japan's

objectives in Asia. The younger group, on the other hand, which we call

the young military officers group, held rather radical views and were

impatient. They wanted to strike and achieve the objectives of the Tanaka

Memorial within the shortest time possible.

On the Chinese side the division of opinion was between those who

believed that China should not and those who believed that China should

and could come to terms with Japan in regard to cooperation. The latter

group, [as I have stated earlier] included many government leaders and

leaders in other walks of life, but particularly those in the political,

diplomatic and industrial worlds in China who had been more or less associated

with Japan or with the Japanese. Their views were also shared by a

substantial section of the Chinese military, because many of the officers

were trained in Japan.

One may recall the long history of friendship of important Chinese

leaders with Japan and the Japanese, and the admiration of some Chinese for

Japan's rapid strides in industrial and military modernization. Even Dr.

 E-906

Sun Yat-sen himself had many Japanese friends. When Yiian Shih-kai ordered

his arrest in 1913, for rebelling against the government, he fled to Japan

ardtook exile there. There he received quite a number of Japanese leaders

in all walks of life, and he had some very good personal friends, such as

Inukai. Wang Ching-wei, Hu Han-min and Chang Ch'iin, leaders of the Kuomintang,

had made Japan a base of their activities. Moreover, there were far more

Japanese returned students in China than there were returned-students either

from the United States or Europe. In any case, their influence had been

much greater than that of the Western-returned students. In fact, many

Japanese returned-students were already in the government even before the

Republic and playing an important role, whereas the influence of the

Western-returned students was very insignificant.

The former group, what the people in general called the pro-Japanese

group, argued that in Japan the policy of military conquest of China was

not favored nationally, that it was entertained by the military group,

particularly by the group of young officers, while the business and industrial

leaders in Japan whose objective was to get a lions share of the trade in

China in comparison with the Western countries, felt the Japanese could

cooperate with the Chinese or at least certain elements of the Chinese

population that favored cooperation with Japan, such as Chinese business

leaders and influential Japanese-returned students. [In short, the "Pro-

Japanese"] group felt there was a possibility and a fair chance of reaching a

satisfactory settlement between China and Japan for cooperation. They

assumed and believed that Japan was not committed to a policy of invasion

and conquest of China in the end, that Japan was jealous of the West and

resentful of the Western influence in Asia, particularly in China, and that

Japan wanted to get her legitimate share of the influence, business and

resources. This group said that all China should do was deal with the right
 E-907

people in Japan and, as the Japanese always phrased it, show our sincerity

in our desire to cooperate with Japan. They said in Japan there was also

a substantial group of the population, and even, to a small extent, among

the military, who really wished to work out a plan of cooperation between

China and Japan as sister nations. The Chinese had always quoted the saying,

whenever we had trouble with Japan, namely, that "the relation between China

and Japan is like the relations between the lips and the teeth," implying

they were so close together that really one could not to without the other.

For a long time this "pro-Japanese" group prevailed. Thus, when the

Mukden Incident took place, China was taken by surprise. Of course, the

policy of dealing cooperatively with the Japanese was inopportune and unrealistic.

It encouraged the aggressive elements in the Kwantung army to go forward

and carry out operations far beyond what was intended and what had been

agreed to by the Governor-General of the Kwantung army. That was a fact.

It was confirmed to me by the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces

then in Manchuria at the time of the visit of the Lytton Commission, and

also by Baron Uchida, who was then President of the South Manchurian Railway.

I recall he said what a pity it was that there was no show of resistance

for if some resistance had been put up by the Chinese, these young officers

would not have gone forward.

In China, face to face with the group that the people called pro-

Japanese (I think that is too strong a word for them as they believed in the

possibility of cooperation between China and Japan on a mutually satisfactory

basis) was another group to which I myself belonged. This group believed

that Japan was a country strongly under the influence of the militarists,

and that wheneve-ra crisis came, it was always military headquarters that ^

had the last word.

At bH the time of the Mukden Incident and ensuing S ino-

<C~
Japanese Crisis J&y}, London, Washington and Moscow vem* very much persuaded
 E-908

that Japan did not really intend to absorb China at all, but wanted cooperation

with her, and that it was China which was not offering cooperation, that

was antagonizing Japan, boycotting her goods and so forth. They were

persuaded of this by a number of prominent Japanese in the diplomatic

corps, like Shigemitsu, who were very much in sympathy with the Japanese

business leaders. The British foreign officers, in particular, were vary

much persuaded [by their arguments]. One, who cited Shigemitsu, even told

me that they found him very reasonable, putting forward Japan's real

needs and aspirations in China to the effect that there was nothing

political or aggressive, Japan simply wanted to be able to cooperate with

China so that she could get raw materials and a Chinese market, a reasonable

desire considering Japan's situation.

[But this was not the actual case.] In truth the younger Japanese

diplomats, many of them, were cooperating with the military elements and

even with the young officers group. They were for quick results. The

only difference between the Japanese diplomatic group and the military,

taking these groups as a whole in each respect, was in their methods; their

objective was exactly the same. I told the British not to believe Shigemitsu,

that he spoke in such a way as to emphasize the milder technique and methods,

which he believed in and his group believed in, but the objective was

exactly the same as the military's: the control of China, whether as part

of Japan or as a dependent nation. The diplomats wanted to go about it in

a diplomatic way, in a way that would be tolerable in the eyes of the West,

whereas the military were impatient and wanted to reach the objective quickly,

and therefore pursued methods which were scandalous in the eyes of the

reasonable man in the street .

I always suspected Japan's ultimate objective and had said so, and

therefore I was looked upon as a sort of die-hard anti-Japanese. But simply,

 E-909

by my own reasoning, I felt I could not trust the Japanese. When the Tanaka

Memorial was brought up [at the League of Nations in the discussions of

the Lytton Report,] I made a speech, even then, and not only brought out

the contents of that memorial, but also gave the reasons why I believed it

was authentic. (At the time Japan had denied its authenticity and claimed

it was a fabrication, a counterfeit document. Londcnand Paris, I must add,

believed the Japanese claim. Even Washington doubted that a memorial could

be so outrageous, [and reasoned, therefore, that] it could not possibly

be [authentic.] I said it was and gave reasons why.) I emphasized that

this was plain, just as plain as daylight, and that any doubt thrown on it

was merely wishful thinking.

It took the skeptics quite a while, but when Lukouchiao came, they

began to realize that what was said in the Tanaka Memorial and the subsequent

Amau Statement was in fact true, because, as they looked back, each step

taken by the Japanese was executing the program outlined therein. They

had called me anti-Japanese, but I said I was not anti-anybody or any nation,

but a Chinese simply trying to serve and defend the interests of China

first. I was saying this even at that time, but also after the Lukouchiao

incident, and especially in October, about a month before the inauguration

of the Brussels Conference, when the Japanese redoubled their efforts and

tried to achieve a decisive victory that would prove to the world that it

was no use to call a Conference. [This is why I strongly believed the only

course for China was to resist . ]

At the time cf the Conference itself, all our delegates agreed, except

one who felt that perhaps it was not quite wise or advisable, to urge the

government to do its utmost to hold the line [of defense] and make a good

showing before the world. There were several reasons for China to take a

determined stand, regardless of cost, in the fighting in and around Shanghai.

 E-910

In the first place, the hostilities between China and Japan were not given

the attention which they should receive abroad. The people in the West,

for example the man in the street, never paid much attention to the

hostilities, and did not feel that the war had its relation to the world

situation and to the whole problem of peace in the world. Only by taking

a determined stand and continuing to fight the so-called Sino-Japanese

incident, as Tokyo loved to describe it, would China attract public attention

abroad and promote understanding of the significance of this fight.

In the second place, the people abroad in the West, and not only the

people in general, but even the chancellories of the West, usually took

it for granted and had from the very start believed that up against a

modern, well-armed country like Japan, China, being disunited politically,

U
undeveloped economically and in communications and military^ hampered

by poorly-organized and badly-equipped forces, would have no chance whatever.

Therefore, they had assumed that China's resistance would be useless. They

felt in the end Japan would overrun China anyway, so what was the use of

rendering help to China. China was so poorly run that whatever aid the West

could give would not be sufficient and wou+d' not be quick enough. In other

words, the West, both the governments and the people, were in the habit

of taking a superficial view of China. They never had bothered to make a

study nor tried to acquaint themselves either with the rising spirit of the
«/ tV.. A/ ^ '
people and the great efforts that were being made, or with the serious

consequences of the Sino-Japanese conflict upon the world at large.

In the third place, the delegation in Brussels was confronted with

the very powers which China hoped would help most, yet which were disposed

to take the view that I have just described. These powers were in great

doubt, first, as to how much assistance and aid they could render China,

and. secondly, that even if they could extend quantities of aid, it would
 E-911

have a real effect upon the general situation, assuming as they did that

China was in no position to resist Japan for any length of time. (One

may recall the report I received of a study by the department of the French
n (fa
Foreign Minister in charge of League of Nations matters. fit contained

policy suggestions to be pursued in regard to the Sino-Japanese questions.]

Among other things the report said that the news of the fighting from China

was not helpful to the situation as regards support from other powers. It

expressed a hope that the Chinese troops might achieve a few victories,

which would make the question of supplies and positive help from abroad

much easier, because the general disposition in the chancellories seemed

to be that they were more willing to help the strong than to help the weak.)

The Chinese delegation in Brussels, seeing the state of mind of those

powers which China looked upon as being in the best position to help,

wanted to remove as much as possible their misunderstanding and underestimation

of China's power of resistance. They also wanted to convince those powers

of the importance of the issues at stake, not only for China but for Europe

and the world at large.

Militarily, of course, the delegation did not feel that it was in a

position to offer any effective opinion. It did not dispute the arguments

of the Chinese military authorities, reinforced by the advice of the German

advisers, as communicated to the delegation, that in order to save the

strength of the Chinese military effort, it would be better to withdraw

to the rear and take a stand at a better stralghtar and shorter line further

up in the interior. A number of the generals also felt that since the next

step of the Japanese would be to move to Nanking, it was more necessary

to defend the capital than to defend Shanghai.

The delegation, including myself as its head, felt that, as far as

we could see from abroad, there would be no question that the sacrifice
 E -912

of the Chinese effort would be very great and that the best elements of

the Chinese forces on the Shanghai front would be lost anyway. It was a

question of whether to use those forces to take a stand in Shanghai and produce

an effect psychologically abroad, or to withdraw them and fight in some

obscure corner. Nobody would know where it was and nobody would pay any

attention, but the loss would be just the same. The whole world knew where

Shanghai was and what the fighting was about. There in Shanghai, the

greatest interests of the Western nations were concentrated, people in the

West would read the newspaper reports of fighting very carefully, and would

be immediately impressed. Therefore, we urged the government to hold the

line if possible.

The underlying prominent consideration, which I and most of my colleagues

abroad had in mind from the very start of the renewed Japanese aggression

in China, was [that of where China's hopes lay.] China was not in a position

to hope to check the military advance of Japan in any one single battle

and make it decisive. China's hopes lay in awakening the interest of the

powers and their people and their understanding of the importance of the

outcome of the fight and its bearing upon the problem of peace in the world,

and more particularly and immediately, upon the international situation in

Europe. In other words, it was China's only hope to arouse public opinion

abroad to see that China's struggle against Japanese aggression was not a

matter of China's own interest alone, but a matter of importance and

general interest to the world at large. If China succeeded in effecting

this understanding, even though not to a hundred percent, it would help

China's cause and make it easier for China to appeal to the West for support
\ Mi 1
and material aid UuJiot the traditional view that China was a backward nation
A
and fourth-class country and that the outcome of the fighting there would

not have much effect on the rest of the worldUyowl^ pravtihl.

 E-913

This recommendation to take a strong stand at Shanghai and the urging

of the Chinese delegates at Brussels provoked great discussion in Kuomintang

government and military circles as to its efixe^ey. As I indicated, the

Western-educated returned-students in the government were all in favor of

continued resistance in the Shanghai sector, whereas many of the generals

trained in China and those officers educated partly in Japan were even

overawed by the apparent superior fighting power and strength of the Japanese

armed forces, and concluded it was of no use to keep on fighting with great

sacrifice. In fact, as the Japanese forces pushed further inland, they

were more and more disposed to come to terms with Japan, a policy that was

opposed by the Generalissimo with the support of his Western-educated leaders

in the government. Finally the Generalissimo saw the meaning and importance

of the recommendation and he took a decision himself, persuading the others

to support it.

As to how the decision was taken, the answer is not simple. The question

of how momentous political decisions as to policy in general were taken

in [Kuomintang] China is rather puzzling. The Generalissimo was the most

dominating figure in China, not only personally, but also as regards power',

which centered in him as the de facto head of the Party, the Commander-in-Chief

of the armed forces, and as the man [oftentimes] holding the important positions

in the government. Normally, he would provoke a discussion and see what

views were held. But, having often made up his mind already, this was

only to see how the drift of discussion went. Then he would have supporters

who would put up arguments in refutation of the opposing arguments. Finally,

a decision would be taken. Constitutionally, even the high decision of the

highest military body should have been confirmed by the highest authority

of the Party, that is the Political Council of the Kuomintang, which really

was supposed to exercise the highest authority in matters of governmental and

 E-914

national policy. Actually the system was rather, I would not say nebulous,

but, somewhat vague, leaving always the Generalissimo as the one single

dominating factor in the situation.

In any event, the decision was taken to continue to take a firm stand

at Shanghai. The Generalissimo not only sent the best division^, called '

the Model Regiment, to Shanghai, but gave orders to hold the line. The

sacrifice was terrific, but it was worth it in the end. It was the fighting

in Shanghai that impressed the world of China's power to fight back. 7^^

before the battle ended, we did achieve something.

L - 1 1 - * —•— -—

[One can only emphasize that] China held out at Shanghai for quite

some time, to the great surprise not only of the Western diplomats, but
 E-915

even the Western military authorities. This excited the attention of the

world as well as the diplomats at Brussels. It convinced the West that

China's potential in the end was very great. In the first place, they

found that the Chinese nation was more united than they had believed. This

was confirmed both by reports of the newspaper correspondents and by

important personnages who had returned from China to say that they were

surprised at the degree of unity which they found. In the second place,

they realized that the Chinese army was poorly

organized and still more poorly equipped compared with the Japanese army,

but that the morale in China was very high, not only among the people, but

among the fighting forces. These were things they did not expect to see.

[There were even new possibilities that military supplies might be extended

to China, on the expectation that the Chinese could do their own fighting,

if given the- propg^a£A4-s-t-anc-&..~,—

[Unfortunately, however, the eventually deteriorating] military situation

in China coincided with [other factors, particularly] the hardening of the

sentiment of neutrality in the United States as reflected, for example, in

the vociferous isolationist tendencies of the new Congress which opened

on November 15. At Brussels, this led the principle delegations to the

Conference, aside from the Chinese delegation, to hasten the conclusion of

the Conference. It became apparent and evident that [under existing circum­

stances, ] the Conference itself could not do anything more after issuing

its declaration of November 15, engendered by the abrupt Japanese refusal

to cooperate.

[I left Paris on the afternoon of the 20th, a few hours after seeing

M. Delbos, and reached Brussels in the early evening. There I had a

conversation with Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, Lord Cranborne, and Sir Alexander

Cadogan of the British delegation and Mr. Norman Davis and Dr. Stanley Hornbeck
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 E-916

of the American delegation. Mr. Eden had not returned to Brussels because

of his health, while the French then had no representation at Brussels at all.

I was myself accompanied by Ambassador Quo, who had returned to Brussels

from London. In fact, the various delegations, with the notable exception

of the French, were all reassembling in view of the scheduled meeting of

the Conference on Monday, November 22.]

[To open the conversation with the heads of the British and American

delegations, I reiterated my appeal, most recently s4iat«d to Delbos, ]

as regards aid to be extended to China and restrictive measures to be adopted

by the conference against Japan .

/'i '
[Dr. Koo: Could you elaborate on your tactics or purpose in continuing
/ (, -
^f (Sc
to press the chief delegations at Brussels for concrete action by the (U Ia, 11 w .i
•f
Conference, when you have said it was apparent the conference could not do J ^
i . ^
anything more? What effect did you expect it to have? Were you following t /, »« '.j
/. ir - /
instructions? This is just to have it spelled out, if possible. C.S.]
c *•/- •*7
j / yc t £
I said that, in view of Monday's meeting, I was anxious to keep in

contact with them in order not to appear working at cross purposes at the .
u\
meeting. I told them I thought it would be impossible for the Conference
(f'oi. - h ^
/
to adjourn without giving some concrete result. I said that in the acutal^ . , •

circumstances the difficulties for China were very great. There was no / ^’
} >. ^y
assurance of continued supplies from abroad and even transit facilities

were attended with obstacles.

Mr. Davis said he understood that I had seen M. Delbos in the morning.

He inquired about the French attitude towards the transit through Indochina.

I said, in reply to his question, that M. Delbos had said that France

was leaving Indochina open to transit still, but that she could not do

so eternally without coming to an understanding for mutual support in case

 E-917

of complications from Japan.

Mr. Davis repeated what he had told me several times before about

France having asked the United States for a guarantee of protection for

Indochina, a thing which the United States could not give.

Mr. MacDonald said Great Britain was keeping Hongkong open all the

time, although it had also been demanded that Great Britain should close

Hongkong to Chinese transit. He said the British government had decided

to keep it open.

Mr. Quo then said that in London he had seen Mr. Eden on Friday morning

(November 19) and had learned that Mr. Eden was in favor of the Conference

giving a mandate to Great Britain and the United States to approach Japan

with a view to mediation. [(I, of course, had broached the same matter to

Mr. Davis in Brussels, receiving a suggestion to refer the matter to

Washington, without any encouragement that the reply might be favorable.)]

I said that this was not an alternative to the extension of aid to

China and the adoption of restrictive,.measures against Japan, which was

' jj a ’ ’ /,/>■ , • ,t * • *
to be a parallel action . * * -
“ “ V ■*'
Mr. MacDonald said what was'most desired was an armistice. If the

question of aid was raised and if Japan knew that it was to be given, it

would kill the prospect of an armistice.

I said, while hoping for the best, China must be prepared for the

worst. The fact that the powers were standing behind China by assuring

her of their aid might influence Japan to modify her attitude. I said I

understood that, according to the latest information from Japan, not only

the moderate elements but also a part of the army were in favor of calling

a halt to the military adventure in China. It was the extreme, young

officers in the army who were still holding out. But if it were made clear

that unless Japan agreed to stop her aggression, she would have to face a
 E-918

far more difficult situation because of the support of the powers on the

side of China, the prospect of an armistice would be much greater.

Mr. Davis said in America there was the Neutrality Act and the government

could not officially undertake to aid China. Supplies could be had only

privately.

I said if there was objection to an open statement in the Conference

Resolution to be adopted, then a general expression, including both aid to

China and good offices to bring about an armistice, might be used. Besides,

I said, the difficulty of the Neutrality Act in the United States did not

apply to Great Britain or France, and there should be no difficulty on

their part to mention expressly certain concerted steps to be taken to help

China and restrain Japan.

Mr. MacDonald said, as regards Great Britain, all that was possible

to be done was being done. Credit might be considered, but as regards arms,

Great Britain, on account of her own rearmament program, could not do very much.

Sir Alexander Cadogan said Great Britain was even buying outside the

country for her own use.

I said, in fact, the situation was so urgent that something even

more than an arrangement for aid to China and restrictive measures against

Japan was necessary. That was the reason why I had spoken of the desirability

of a naval demonstration by Great Britain, France and the United States,

and a military demonstration by the Soviet Union.

Mr. Davis said he thought that China did not expect them to fight for

her.

I said China did not wish them to fight, but a show of force would be

sufficient to induce Japan to modify her attitude.

Mr. Davis asked if it was true that Germans had been urging China to

abandon the defense of Nanking.

I denied it. Coming back to the main question of action to be taken

 E-919

at the next meeting of the Conference^ I said I wanted to emphasize, for

assuring world opinion as well as for supporting China, that the Conference

could not end where it had begun or even before it had begun. I thought the

Conference had been overly conciliatory toward Japan. I said China had

foreseen that Japan would refuse, and she made her view known even at

Geneva, when the proposal for calling the Nine Power Conference was first

made at the meeting of the Advisory Committee in the first part of October.

Now that Japan had steadfastly refused to collaborate, I said, the Conference

must resort to other means to hasten the termination of the hostilities.

Something positive should be done to enable China to continue her effective

resistance and to persuade Japan to modify her policy.

Mr. Davis said, in his view, the best way for China was to continue

resistance. In six months' time Japan would feel her difficulties increased

and not diminishing. She would then feel obliged to call a halt to her

hostilities in China. But, in the present circumstances, there was no hope

of securing reasonable terms from her.

Mr. Quo said that was the view of the Chinese government also. The

only course to follow was to continue resistance, for at present, even if

Japan agreed to have an armistice, the terms would not only be unacceptable

to China but to the other powers as well.

Mr. MacDonald said resistance was certainly desirable, but if the

situation six-months thence should be more unfavorable than it was at present,

he was afraid that the terms would be more unacceptable than what could be

obtained today.

There was a further exchange of views. Afterwards, it was agreed that

all would get in touch with one another and that Mr. MacDonald and Mr.

Davis would arrange another talk for Monday, when they hoped they would be

able to say more to the Chinese delegates as regards the program for the next
meeting of the Conference [Monday afternoon].

[Evidently] the problem then [for the chief delegates of Britain and

the United States] was how to close the Conference and at the same time

allow the principal parties to save face, though having done nothing effective

either to discourage Japan in her policy of aggression or to encourage

China in her policy of resistance. For the Chinese delegation, the question

was what to say in view of the certain failure of the Conference and the

weakening of the attitude of the principal powers like Great Britain and

the United States, though we had not been expecting any remarkable definite

results. We had to decide what final position to take in order to wind up

China's case and make her attitude vis-^-vis the Conference clear to the world .

The British and Americans, confronted with the delicate situation for

themselves, were still discussing what attitude to adopt and what to

say to wind up the Conference, as late as Sunday evening, November 21. It

was reported and understood that the Americans wanted the Conference to

adopt a full final statement, whereas the British favored a short one,

believing that the less said the better for everyone. They evidently paid

little attention to the aide-memoire that I had sent to them on instructions

of the Chinese government, pointing out the necessity of effective concerted

action and suggesting such measures as a naval demonstration, because, as

I pointed out a little earlier, in the view of the Chinese government even

the acceleration of aid and the flow of military supplies to China might

not meet the urgent situation in China.

The Soviet delegation was evidently equally anxious [as the Chinese

delegation] to know what Great Britain and the United States might do. The

Soviet delegate to the Conference called on me late Sunday afternoon,

asking for news and about my plan for a naval demonstration, as suggested

in the aide-memoire I sent to the principal delegations.

 E-921

[As for the French, they were still unrepresented at Brussels until

the following day, when only M. de Tessan returned.]

[Monday was a hectic day, with much to be done before the 5 p.m. meeting

of the Conference. At noon, having left Tsien Tai to see Mr. Potemkin,

then chief Soviet delegate, I saw Messrs. MacDonald, Cranborne, Cadogan,

Davis and Hornbeck in Mr. MacDonald's room in the Hotel Metropole, where the

British delegation was quarters. I was accompanied by Mr. Quo. The British

and Americans showed me a copy of the draft statement that they had worked

out [for submission to the meeting in the afternoon.] After I read it, I

expressed my great disappointment and said I would have to refer the matter

to my government.

[According to the notes of the conversation, I told them ] that the

first impression I gathered was that the draft contained nothing more than

a reaffirmation of certain general principles, without any mention of

concrete measures, which I had emphasized in a statement before the Conference

the previous week, particularly with reference to the question of aid to

China and the adoption of restrictive measures against Japan. I said that

the contents of the present draft fell far short of what China had expected

from the Conference, and that I wanted to express frankly my feeling of

disappointment.

Mr. Davis said [flatly that] any question of aid to China could not

be approved by the Conference. In America there was a movement to force

the government to apply the Neutrality Act to the present conflict.

Although he did not believe himself that the movement would succeed, yet

if it were openly stated in the declaration that the United States and the

other powers were to aid China, it would certainly give the advocates of the

movement an added argument to say that the United States was being dragged

into war with Japan.

 E-922

Mr. MacDonald said it was important not to make the situation more

difficult than it was. He thought if the Conference openly declared its

intention to aid China, Japan would declare a war blockade, which would cut

off supplies that China was presently getting.

Mr. Davis asked if supplies were to be given to China, howwnald they

be sent if there was a blockade?

I referred to the suggestion of a naval demonstration to ensure the

safety of transit.

Mr. Davis emphasized that the United States could not do it.

I said it was necessary for the Chinese government to have some definite

assurance of continued supplies to look forward to. If no arrangement was

made for such supplies, I was afraid it would have a great demoralizing

effect on the spirit of the fighting forces at the front . A definite arrangement,

on the other hand, would increase the confidence of the government and

enable it to continue its resistance more effectively.

Mr. Davis said the only way was to do it quietly on the side. If it

was done openly, it would surely rouse reaction from Japan and render

impossible even the present supplies being given to China.

Dr. Hornbeck said if it was to produce a moral effect upon the

spirit of the troops, it would have to be published, but publicity was

just the thing to be avoided.

Mr. Quo said it was really for the purpose of reinforcing the confidence

of the government.

I said if the question of positive aid to China could not be incorporated

in the declaration, the matter might be arranged on the side. I would suggest,

I told them, that a round-table conference of Great Britain, America, France,

 E-923

Soviet Russia^ Holland and Belgium might take place in order to arrive at

a general understanding of giving aid to China.

Mr. Davis said he doubted if he could join such a conference.

Dr. Hornbeck said if it was known in the United States that Mr. Davis

was taking part in such a conference to consider the question of aid to

China, the first thing he would get would be a cable from Washington

recalling him to the United States.

Mr. MacDonald asked what was really needed by China.

I replied that, roughly speaking, China needed, among other things,

financial credit, airplanes and big field guns, anti-aircraft guns and

machine-guns .

Mr. MacDonald suggested that I send a list of China's requirements to

them and give them a chance to consider it and decide whether it was necessary

to proceed collectively with other powers or to make arrangements separatel y .

Mr. Davis said so long as the American neutrality law was on the Statute

Book, he could not make an arrangement binding the United States.

Dr. Hornbeck raised the question of the wisdom of submitting a list

to a round-table conference. He said such a list would, in fact, amount

to a revelation of China's military secrets. There was a possibility that

such secrets might be passed on to Japan.

I said I had confidence in the six powers I had just mentioned. Four

of them had, as a matter of fact, been rendering some aid to China. As

regards Holland, the Chinese Minister at The Hague had talked the matter

over with Dr. Colijn, the Dutch Prime Minister, who had assured him that

Holland would be prepared to do something, if the other powers did. The

Chinese Ambassador at Brussels had also ^joken to the Belgian government,

and while the reply was not so definite as that of the Dutch, it was also

sympathetically inclined.
 E-924

Mr. Davis said: "Take credit, for example. The United States government

cannot give money to China without an act of Congress and I presume that

the same ia true of Great Britain."

I said I understood it was not so difficult in the case of Great Britain.

Mr. MacDonald said an act of Parliament would not be necessary, but

a decision by the Treasury was necessary.

Mr. Davis asked what financial help France was rendering to China.

I replied there had been arranged a credit of 200 million francs,

of which 100 million had already been used in purchasing airplanes.

Dr. Hornbeck asked whether it was a government loan or an arrangement

with private banks.

I answered it was an arrangement with a group of private banks which

had been formed at the suggestion of the French government, and the credit

arrangement was concluded afterwards on the strength of an official letter

or approval from the French government. I asked whether, in the case of the

United States, an arrangement could not be made with the Exports’ Bank as

had been done before.

Dr. Hornbeck said that bank had been liquidated.

Mr. Davis said the United States had recently given a $50 million credit

to China and he thought that was a considerable help to her.

I confirmed that it was a great help and hoped that another credit

might be arranged.

Mr. MacDonald said he understood the credit was extended to China not

as a gift from the American government but as a loan.

Dr. Hornbeck said that, as private loans, the matter could be arranged

with the private banks in the United States.

I said the Chinese government was anxious to get credit and if it was

impossible to obtain it from goverment banks, the government was prepared

 E-925

to offer suitable securities for loans from private banks.

Mr. MacDonald said the best way, in his opinion, was for me to give

them a list of China's requirements, after which they could form a better

opinion of what was to be done. In the case of Great Britain, he thought

arms and guns would be difficult to get because the government's rearmament

program required all that could be manufactured in Great Britain.

Mr. Davis said, as regards arms and military supplies, that China could

buy as much as she wanted in the United States .

I said after a general understanding was reached for arranging aid to

China, I would designate some expert to go into details and thought that

it was possible that Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Davis could also designate

someone to arrange details.

Mr. MacDonald thought that the matter could be best arranged after

having seen the list of requirements, without necessarily calling for experts.

I said, in that case, I would cable to my government and send them a

list as soon as possible.

[Fifteen minutes before the Conference meeting was held, Mr. Spaak

of Belgium, the President of the Conference, came over to talk to me in

the Palais des Academies.] He asked me what I thought of the draft declaration.

I replied it was very vague and very weak, containing nothing more

than the last declaration of the Conference.

M. Spaak said it had nothing in it at all, and he felt sure that I

must be feeling disappointed. He said the British and American delegations

had at first asked the Belgian delegation to propose the draft, but he did

not see his way to doing it. He said he had agreed, however, that it be

stated in the draft that the three delegations had made up the draft [(presumably

France had asked to be included in the sponsorship) ] at the request of the

President. In fact, he told me, he had made no such request. In his view,
 E-926

instead of insisting upon the procedure of a settlement through the Conference^

it would be more advantageous to China to have it stated in the declaration

that the settlement must be made on the basis of the Nine Power Treaty,

while leaving the door open for direct negotiations between China and Japan

to be brought about through the good offices of the powers.

I said if the choice was between the two, I would certainly prefer

to have the basis of the settlement fixed and leave alone the question

of procedure, because between the two, the question of principle, upon

which the settlement was to be made, was certainly more important than that

of procedure.

M. Spaak said that was his opinion also, at which point our conversation

ended as we both had to take our seats.]

When it was my turn to speak at the five o'clock closed meeting of

the Conference, I made a speech on China's demand for concrete measures.

I said of the declaration that It contained nothing more than a reaffirmation

of certain general principles. No indication was given of the common

attitude which the representatives of the Conference had agreed to consider

in accordance with the declaration adopted on November 15, and it contained

no provision for the concrete methods of assisting China which the Chinese

delegation appeals to the conference for concrete action. Just as domestic

order requires more than laws on the statute books, mere words are insufficient

to restore peace and order in the face of international violence which had

prompted the convocation of the present conference. It may be asked whether

by its refusal to grant aid to China the Conference wishes China to cease

to resist aggression or whether she should continue in her resistance without

adequate means. The Chinese delegation believes that solidarity in purpose

should be followed by solidarity in action, and that by such abortive ending

as evidenced by the terms of the draft resolution the Conference would

unwittingly augment the prevailing sense of general insecurity, rather than

 E-927

contribute to world order and stability.

Mr. Davis and Dr. Hornbeck both expressed their disapproval of my

statement^ saying that I was not helping them before American public

opinion. Mr. Davis said: "You are throwing up the only government which

could help you." But MacDonald said to me after the meeting: "You have

your position; you could not have said less." [The opinion of the press

was more positive.] All the American and British as well as other journalists

who were attending the meetings said to me afterwards that it was the best

speech of the entire Conference, and that they had cabled fully to their

papers, which included the Times of London. [The next meeting of the Conference

was slated for the 24th.]

At the luncheon meeting on the following day (November 23) between

Mr. Potemkin, Soviet Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs and chief delegate

at Brussels, Minister [Roubine ?] the Soviet Minister at Brussels, myself

and Ambassador Tsien Tai, we had a long talk on the Conference agenda and

related topics. Tsien and I told them about the Chinese attitude and our

intention to propose an amendment on "concrete action" to the draft declaration

closing the Conference. We also discussed the Chinese suggestion for a

round-table conference on aid to China and the "American suggestion" for

a Soviet military demonstration on the Mongolian and the Manchurian border.

In the latter regard, I referred to the Soviet obligation under the Czechoslovak
c*~y
Soviet Pact I was citing^, this pact of mutual assistance, including military

assistance, as a possible precedent for Soviet demonstrations on the Soviet

borders with Mongolia and Manchuria, fin imiiLementatijoa^of the Sino-Soviet

Non-Aggression pact (?)]. Mr. Potemkin replied that the Czechoslovak-

Soviet Pact was subject to a condition, namely, French mobilization to help

Czechoslovakia, which was in turn expected to compel the implementation of

the German plan to withdraw from the Czech frontier. Potemkin was implying
 E-928

that a parallel could not in fact be drawn, because Soviet Russia’s obligation

to come to Czechoslovakia’s assistance in a military way depended upon French

mobilization. In other words, Soviet Russia was assured backing by a third

power, France, If she acted to support China by military demonstration, on

the other hand, she had no assurance whatsoever of the assistance of a third

party, so that we were asking Soviet Russia to expose herself to Japan alone.

In the afternoon of the 23rd, I first took Mr. Ch’en Kung-po to see

Mr. Davis. This was followed by a conference between myself, Davis and Hornbeck

and Cranborne and cadogan over amendments to the draft declaration, and,

an hour or so later, by a talk with Cranborne, who called on me with Cadogan

about [the insertion of a reference to] £id to China” and [about China's idea

of preparing] a communication to the League of Nations [on the work of the

Conference. The British were opposed to the former, but, :unlike the Americans,

favored the latter.]

[On Monday morning (the 22nd)] Ch'en Kung-po had arrived from Rome,

having seen Mussolini and Ciano about the Sino-Japanese conflict. At that

time he had told me that Mussolini had urged an early settlement of the

conflict on the basis of China's recognition of Manchukuo and the establishment

of an autonomous regime in North China. Mussolini had also told him that

the Conference could not be and was of no help to China, and he himself

was disposed to offer mediation to both parties to the conflict.

My purpose in taking Ch'en Kung-po to see Mr. Davis on the afternoon

of the 23rd was to give Ch'en the opportunity to inform the head of the

American delegation of the Italian attitude as gathered in Rome from the

framers of Italian policy. Ch'en accordingly conveyed the Italian position.

Mr. Davis remarked that Italy could not have much influence upon Japan's

terms of settlement, after Ch'en said that Mussolini had advised China not

to believe in the Conference nor in an Anglo-American promise of help, the

 E-929

poor results of which were illustrated previously in the Manchurian and

Ethiopian situations.

Finally on November 24, the Conference closed its doors, rather on an

ambiguous note. It simply said toward the end [of its final resolution

that, "The Conference deems it advisable temporarily to suspend its sittings."

Further on, in a final short paragraph, it tried to give some dim hope of

its resumption by saying:

The Conference will be called together again whenever its Chairman

or any two of its members shall have reported that they consider that
its deliberations can be advantageously resumed.

But as we all know, the Conference closed its doors on November 24 for good.

It never was resumed.

[The report, which accompanied the resolution, merely summarized the

main phases of the Conference’s work. The resolution itself merely reaffirmed

general principles and urged in general terms the suspension of hostilities

and the resort to peaceful processes. In my final speech I had asked:

Do you realljr believe that simple declarations of principles

and pious professions of faith in the pledged word will be sufficient
to make one and the other observed and respected in the world?

By refusing to aid China do you mean die should cease to resist

aggression or that she could resist indefinitely without adequate
means? After clearly and emphatically establishing the difference in
law between the policies of Japan and China in the present conflict,
do you still wish to make no distinction in fact in your treatment
of them between the aggressor and the victim, as your refusal to cease
contributing to Japan's material and economic resources for continuing
aggression against China would seem to indicate?

[While the answer of the Conference as a whole had offered no encouragement

to China, it was still hoped that the individual powers might be responsive

to China’s requests for concrete measures of assistance.]

[In fact, after the closing meeting of the Brussels Conference on the

afternoon of the 24th, both Mr. Davis and Lord Cranborne approached me with

sympathetic words]. Davis said he had forgotten to say a few words of

sympathy and admiration for China and the Chinese delegation. He said he
 E-930

was impressed by our spirit of moderation and dignity in conciliation. He

told me: "It had done a world of good for China and won more friends for

her than ever." Lord Cranborne, when I thanked him for his cooperation,

said everybody was moved by the Chinese attitude of collaboration and

conciliation, which had earned for China great sympathy and admiration.

He added he had telephoned to Foreign Minister Eden of our coming list [of

items needed by China in her military effort, ] and he assured me it would

be given urgent consideration upon receipt.

I would like to say a few more words [to conclude this chapter on

Brussels, ] about the real function of the Conference and my appraisal of

its results. From the very beginning it appeared that the holding of a

conference to deal with the Far Eastern situation was conceived not so much

as an instrument to render effective assistance to China or to solve the

Sino-Japanese conflict, but as a method of providing a way out of the

embarrassing situation confronting Great Britain and France, and particularly

Great Britain because her interest in the Far East were predominant compared

with the other western powers. The Conference was contemplated as the sole

means of enlisting the cooperation and support of the United States in

dealing with the Far Eastern situation. Without Washington's participation,

Great Britain and, in a secondary place, France and Soviet Russia, felt

that it was out of the question, in view of the situation then prevailing

in Europe, for them to do anything effective either to stop Japanese

aggression or to help China to resist it.

China, for her part, welcomed the idea [of holding a conference].

In fact, it had been discussed among her leaders and also informally brought

up in the representations of the Chinese Ambassadors in London and Washington

and in my own communications with Nanking and representations at Paris. As I

 E-931

repeatedly indicated in my telegrams to the government in Nanking, the

holding of such a conference would be a means of further publicizing the

problem before the world, as was done to some degree already through our

appeal to the League of Nations. But more particularly [I indicated that

such a move should be taken] in order to enlist the participation and active

support of the United States, which was unable to fully cooperate with the

League of Nations officially, but which as one of the signatories to the Nine

Power Treaty would, under that Treaty, be fully justified in taking an

active part.

[The United States did not decline. In fact,] the appointment of Mr.

Davis, who was such a prominent public leader, as American delegate to the

Conference indicated the importance as well as the interest which President

Roosevelt attached to the Conference. But the Conference turned out to be a

disappointment, a result that was not unforeseen. In fact, no country,

including China, expected very great results from the Conference, considering

the international situation, especially as prevailed in Europe, and the

domestic situation in the United States. When, prior to the opening of

the Conference, the chief delegates of the principal signatories of the

Treaty, including China, discussed informally what should be the agenda

and what should be the different steps to be taken with a view to achieving

some results, the international atmosphere in Europe as well as in the Far

East [was tense. It] was so tense, that it was even difficult, in the

beginning, to find some signatory power willing to sponsor the Conference, to

undertake to hold the Conference within its borders and to invite countries

to participate. The United States, which sponsored the original Nine Power

Treaty of Washington, did not feel disposed to act as host of the Conference,

and no other signatory seemed willing for a time either. It was only

through the actual persuasion of France and Great Britain that Belgium
 E-932

finally agreed to undertake the role of host.

Regarding the question of what should be done by the Conference, the

brochure by Ambassador Tsien Tai, then Chinese Ambassador at Brussels, China

and the Nine Power Conference at Brussels in 1937 has already given a fairly

comprehensive picture of what was attempted and what was actually done.

Therefore, it is not necessary for me to dwell [any further than I have] upon

the actual work of the Conference.

To put the matter in a nutshell, Great Britain and the United States felt

chiefly responsible for conducting the Conference and trying to bring it to

achieve some results. This goal, however,, was destined to be unrealizable

for several reasons. In the first place, the composition of the Conference

was such as to make any effective accomplishment out of the question. Germany

was invited but did not accept. Italy joined the Conference, but not unexpectedly

played the part of Japan's spokesman at the Conference. The Scandinavian

countries like Denmark, Norway and Sweden, situated so close to the border of

Germany, hesitated to join actively in any demarche against Japan, because

of their apprehension that it would displease their powerful neighbor,

Germany, and I suppose also because of their substantial trade with Japan.

So from the very outset, Great Britain and the United States, being the leading

participants of the Conference, tried for some achievement by the Conference,

fortified with unrealistic hopes that Japan might be persuaded to join the

Conference at some point.

China,on her side, saw no indication that Japan would accept any

invitation. Therefore, China counted upon and hoped to have the Conference

adopt some concrete measures in the form of sanctions against Japan on the

one hand, such as denial of aid and support in credits and the supply of war
 E-933

materials^ and, on the other hand, measures of substantial aid to China,

such as the supply of financial credit, arms and munitions, as well as

facilities for transport and transit.

Japan's initial refusal to join the Conference, an event which was not

unforeseen, led to the idea of proposing mediation, not by the whole

Conference, but by a small number of the powers having substantial interests

in the Far East, or even through the efforts of any one country. The Chinese

government was not undisposed to favor mediation either, provided a settlement

could be reached which would be fair to China. It is necessary to understand

the feelings of the leaders of the government in Nanking. In the face of the

military situation in China and the threat to Nanking itself, they were

really willing to support [alternate methods of] mediation, provided the

result would not be too unacceptable.

The suggestion to Japan of mediation by a small number of Powers

actually became the second step of the Conference. But it also turned out

to be abortive, because it was unrealistic in view of Japan's persistent

stand that questions relating to Japan and China were none of the business

of the other powers and should be settled only by direct negotiation. This

had always been the Japanese policy. Therefore, the possiblity of conciliation

through a third power, who would undertake to bring the two countries together,

but take no part in the actual discussion of the problems and issues between

the two countries was also suggested. Of course, it was suggested by the

Italian delegate at the Conference, Count Aldrovendi, as Japan's spokesman.

the
At any rate when/japanese reply to the Conference's proposal of mediation

arrived at Brussels, it was found to be a great disappointment. Japan's

second refusal was even more absolute than the first, and couched in language
 E-934

that bordered on insolencs. Howevor^ it put a definite end to the idea^

first conceived by the British and American delegations, to constitute a

small committee to undertake the work of mediation. This proposal had not

been faring well in Brussels either. It had already floundered because

of the difficulty of making its composition acceptable, particularly to

French and Soviet Russia. France wanted to join, to be honored, but if

France became a participant, Soviet Russia insisted that it could not be

left out. Litvinov took such a strong stand that he told Mr. Davis that

if his country were not included, it being a great Power, he would withdraw

from the Conference altogether.

Although Mr. Davis gave up the idea of a committee in the face of this

difficult and awkward situation, M. Litvinov still withdrew and left Brussels.

After the second Japanese reply came [and the Conference had issued its

declaration of November 15/; Mr. Eden also departed as did M. Delbos,

leaving "half" a conference to carry on the work. As for China's appeal for

effective aid, it received no practical results. Both the British and American

delegation chiefs were disposed to consider and consult, but there was no

indication of any serious intention to act. It was evident they were playing

for time. So concluded what we might justly call an abortive international

conference.

I think that the Chinese government was not too disillusioned. While

the military situation continued to deteriorate and while they had been

desirous of getting some concrete results from the Brussels Conference, my

cable reports continually kept them informed of the developments of the

Conference and of the actual situation in Europe and the attitude of the

principal powers, including the United States and Great Britain, towards this

problem. Perhaps, at heart, the powers were desirous of doing something,

but, in fact, they found either the international situation or their domestic

situations such as to preclude any effective action on their part. Thus

 E-935

China never placed much hope in effective or positive results from the Conference^

because of the preoccupations of Great Britain and France in Europe [and

the Mediterranean] and because of the position of the Soviet Union in Asia

vis-S-vis Japan and in Europe vis-A-vis Germany. The possibility of the

United States doing very much had also been discounted because of the state

of American public opinion against running any risk of involvement in another

war and because of the strong wave of a sentiment of neutrality, as

evidenced by the Neutrality Act on the Statute Book and by the attitude of

Con gress.

This does not mean that China was not disappointed. She was greatly

disappointed, not so much that the Conference itself had found itself unable

to do anything, as that the individual powers who had substantial interests

in the Far East were indisposed to adopt any effective measures whatsoever

to restrain Japan, not merely in the interest of China, but in their own

interest and in the interest of the cause of world peace.

I had alluded to the danger [implicit in] any manifestation of a lack

of intention or ability to deal with the Sino-Japanese problem in a practical

and effective way in my speech before the Conference on November 13, 1937.

In concluding that speech I had said:

International peace, Mr. President, like national peace, if it is to

be made durable, must be defended. The restoration and defense of
peace in the Far East at present calls for concerted action of a
moral, material, financial and economic character on the part of the
other participating powers in the Conference. Such action must also
be timely, for if it is delayed too long because of hesitation and
doubt, then the violence and disorder now raging in the Far East will
soon reach such proportions as will be impossible to restrain and
control without undergoing the tf^ls and tribulations of another
world war .
 THE WELLINGTON KOO MEMOIR

Volume IV:

Mission to France, 1932-1941

PartF: The Legation and Embassy

THE LEGATION AND EMBASSY

In 1932 the Chinese legation in Paris consisted of a working staff of about

eleven or twelve people, not including, of course, the foreign personnel, servants,

messengers, and chauffeurs. By working staff I mean the people properly appointed

by the ministry of foreign affairs and graded in accordance with the regulations then

in force. The Paris Legation was not considered to be of foremost importance.

Therefore the staff was smaller than, for example, that of the mission in Washington.

After I arrived in Paris I increased the number of attaches by one, plus two

student attaches. We even had what was called an honorary student attache, who was

listed on the staff but did not get any pay. He was actually enrolled in a French

university.

The minister plenipotentiary was the head of the mission, and under him was a

counselor. I introduced the counselor in Paris because I expected the amount of work

would make it very necessary. My counselor was Kuo, from Fukien province, who had

been director of the treasury department when I was minister of finance. He was

educated in Belgium and a French scholar. The job of the counselor was to supervise

the working staff of the legation on less important things such as administrative

matters and ordinary, routine correspondence with the foreign office or the other

ministries.

Under the counselor, there were two first secretaries. One was Hsieh Tung-fa,

who had been there for a long time. He had been a journalist on French newspapers

and spoke French like a Frenchman, because his mother was French. He usually took

care of the drafting of the French dispatches and communications with the Quai d'Orsay

and other government departments, or with the public in general. Besides Hsieh I

brought in Shih, who had passed successfully the counselor and diplomatic examination

in Peking. I assigned to him a great deal of the important work on Chinese communications.

Later, when the staff was enlarged, there was a second secretary. There were

two third secretaries, and two attach4s. The latter usually translated or copied,
and often acted as aides to the head of the mission. One would be assigned to keep

the accounts. After the government moved to Chungking, it introduced a new system

of accounting under which the finances of the larger missions in the principal countries

would be accounted for by a special appointee of the office of the comptroller of

finance. The accounts would then be sent to the Waichiaopu, which would transmit

them to the auditing department. That reform was not instituted until the 1940s.

In Paris, I don't think we had an accountant, but in London and Washington we did.

The secretaries were usually under the supervision of the counselor of the mission.

The secretary would be asked to make a draft communication, which would be submitted

to the counselor first. Then after he went over it and found everything all right,

it would be sent to the head of the mission for his signature. One of the attaches

would be in charge of the seal of the legation, be in charge of issuing passports,

where there was no consular officer in the capital. For example, in Washington, the

nearest consulate was in New York, although we had an assistant consul in Philadelphia

for awhile. But in Paris, the consulate-general was right there and the issuance of

passports was taken care of by the consulate.

Let me explain how varied in practice was the organization of a mission. When

I was in London, I had a press counselor who was appointed by the minister of

information, George Yeh, and subject concurrently to the orders of the ambassador.

The financial secretary was appointed by the minister of finance. Dr. P. W. Kuo.

In addition, there was a financial attache who was also the manager of the Bank of

China office in London. There was also a director of Chinese government students

in England, who was appointed by the minister of education, subject to the orders of

the ambassador.

In the case of the Embassy in Washington something very unusual existed, and

set a rare precedent. I had under me a minister-counselor, who had formerly been

Chinese minister to Brazil and to Mexico. Because he liked me and was almost my

right hand man in the assessor's office, he agreed to serve under me. His name was
Dr. S. H. T'an. He had been asked by Wei Tao-itiing, my immediate predecessor as

ambassador, to come from Mexico to Washington, while T'an was still minister to

Mexico, so that T'an might help Wei. T'an was a Ph.D. from Chicago University and

I had great admiration for his judgment just as he had for mine. Therefore, when I

took up the office he wanted to remain. I more than welcomed him. But he had been

the head of two independent missions—Mexico and Brazil. So he was not simply made

counselor but minister-counselor. On top of that, I had Y(1 Ta-wei, a Harvard Ph.D.,

who had been minister of communications, a cabinet rank, as minister-advisor to the

ambassador. Pei Tsu-yi was also on my staff in Washington. He had both been

general-manager of the Bank of China and president of the Central Bank of China, one

of the very highest financial posts. He was head of the technical mission to the

United States attached to the embassy and also a part of the embassy. While he had

to deal directly with Chungking, of course a good man questions were referred to me,

since Chungking was too far away. I was then also Chinese representative on the

council of UNNRA, a post which T. 3. Tsiang had held. After he resigned to become

head of CNNRA, he insisted on me taking this post. I was also Chinese representative

on the Far Eastern Commission, which had its separate staff but was attached to the

embassy also. Therefore the work load at the embassy was very heavy.

These posts or titles mentioned above were specially created to accommodate

persons and situations outside the sphere of the regularly promulgated regulations.

In the case of Yd Ta-wei, for example, the official title which we communicated to

the State Department was Special Assistant to the Ambassador. He had been Minister

of Communications, a cabinet officer, and therefore was given that title. I'm sure

that title was inspired by a similar title in the United States of Assistant to the

President of the United States at the White Hdise.

In France when someone had been ambassador before, for facilities and courtesies

he would be temporarily attached to the embassy to give him diplomatic status, vis-a-vis

the French government. But that was not in the regulations.

3
 In London the other ministries did not have such large staffs stationed abroad,
f
so those who were sent abroad to serve as military attaches were comparatively rare

posts and usually held by people of experience. Thus they were favorably treated and

by comparison they were better paid than the regular diplomatic staff. For example,

the military attach4 would have a great big Cadillac, with a very liberal allowance

for personal expenses, especially when General Kuei Yung-ching came to England. He

had a bigger allowance than the ambassador, paid for by the defense department, of

course. Kuei had been head of the military mission to Germany. After China joined

the Second World War, he was transferred to London as my military attache and head

of the military mission.

The regular diplomatic staff in Paris was paid according to rank, in accordance

with a promulgated schedule of payment, called a schedule of treatment. In those

days, it was passed by the parliament and promulgated by presidential decree. Usually

the pay was higher abroad because the cost of living was higher, but not much higher.

The Chinese pay for consular-diplomatic officials was much lower than that of the

average country abroad, especially the so-called big powers.

As for my own salary, when I became minister the scale was copied after that of

the dynasty. Under the dynasty there were no embassies, simply first class ministers,

second class ministers, etc. Those abroad were usually second class. Even when I

was minister in Washington, we had no first class ministers abroad. China did not

even have an embassy abroad. Countries abroad did not think that China was entitled

to an embassy. So they were all second class envoys in Chinese terms, and the pay

was in taels. The second class pay was 1800 Chinese dollars, equivalent to 1200 taels.

The first class pay would be 2400 Chinese dollars, or 1600 taels. Later the ambassadors

were paid according to the salary for a first class minister, so that I received

1600 taels, 2400 Chinese dollars. There was not even an additional personal allowance.

Our salaries naturally fluctuated according to the foreign exchange rate. So I

tell you, actually the salary that was given to me each month as ambassador was $528.
That included a 12.5 percent deduction for income tax. When I was in England, the

government would just issue a series of domestic loans, like war bonds, and they

assigned so many bonds for you, deducting the amount from your salary and sending you

the balance.

It would appear from this description to be very hard for the ambassador to live.

But, as a matter of fact, the government usually provided a house or residence, as

well as an office. So the ambassador did not have to pay rent. Also a car was

provided, and official entertainment was paid for by the government. For traveling

expenses, it depended upon the nature of the trip. If I had to make a speech for a

public organization on invitation, the secretary in charge of accounts usually would

put it down in the report to the Waichiaopu and pay it out of the mission's funds.

Only in the case of a matter of doubtful official character or of personal things,

would I have to pay.

There was no fixed system for providing these things to the staff. As the war

went on, both in China and later abroad, it became quite a hardship on the staff,

so, on the recommendation of the chiefs of missions, the government gave what they

called a "house allowance." That amount varied with rank. The allowance did not

go up as the inflation continued in China, however. That used to be a point of

dispute between the man who took charge of accounts and expenses and the Waichiaopu.

Later the Waichiaopu stuck to one rate, somewhere in the middle. Curiously, as

ambassador I was also given a house allowance, even though I had a regular residence

belonging to the government. I did not need the money, so I never accepted it.

I assigned money matters to two people. First was the official accountant, the

auditor, appointed through the Waichiaopu, but belonging to the ministry of audit.

His accounts went through the Waichiaopu, but always whether they were approved or

not depended upon the goodwill of the auditing department. Therefore, I also had a

first secretary of the regular diplomatic service to oversee expense reports. Even

in London, I always had two men to look after the accounts and sign the checks. On

r
the matter of my housing allowance, both agreed not to send it back to the Waichiaopu.

In Paris, there was not any house allowance at all. It did not come up until

the cost of living had gone up tremendously due to the war. In other words, there

was no compensation made in those days for the depreciation of the fapi in China.

As far as the pay is concerned, there is no question that China's diplomatic officials

were not adequately paid, although the minister of foreign affairs, Dr. George Yeh,

raised the question before the Legislative Ytian in the 1950s.

I would like to describe the embassy staff in a little more detail. First,

about provincial affiliations. In the old days, and even in the early years of

the Republic, favoritism was generally practiced, which meant that the newly appointed

chief-ffT-mission or the minister would reorganize the staff of the mission he was

going to head. This would usually mean introducing many changes. This was one of

the disadvantages of the service, a disadvantage which Minister Lo, when he became

the first minister of foreign affairs of the Republic, deplored a great deal. He

tried to make the service abroad as w’ell as the personnel of the foreign ministry

in the capital as steady as possible, so that no great changes would take place

merely because of a change of Chinese minister in the mission. It was then that a

system of examinations was introduced to admit young candidates. Appointments were

supposed to be confined to the successful candidates of those examinations, which

each succeeding minister tried very hard to do, but which they found very difficult

to completely respect because of the pressure of recommendations—political pressure

mainly from the members of parliament and ministers in the government. Men like

Tsai Ytian-pei, for example, would not hesitate to write eight-line letters of intro­

duction for anyone who approached them. It was no secret that in the course of a

week, Tsai would sometimes write ten, fifteen, twenty letters of recommendation to

the foreign minister and probably also to some other ministers. Well, what was a

minister to do? He could not very well accept them all. In the case of Mr. Lo, he

found it a headache because he preceded me by at least ten years as Chinese foreign

minister. He offended many friends by refusing. His confidential secretaries

would try to suggest a compromise—if there were five recommendations, they would

suggest appointing two of them, and it turned out three.

This system was bad for the work and bad for the service, depending upon who

was to head the mission. Some of the experienced, capable people on the staff would

have to be transferred to make room for the recommended person. Therefore, Mr.

Lo started a new system, and each succeeding minister tried to further his reform.

When I was first appointed Chinese minister to Washington and Mexico, I tried to

set an example by going over the list. Those who were very well qualified would

all be retained, and I would only replace the relatives of my predecessor. If they

were qualified, I would have retained them. I started my public career in the first

year of the Republic. I had never taken any imperial examination, so I had no

colleagues of the same year and no classmates like that. So in the case of the French

legation, I think there were twelve members representing eleven provinces. Actually,

I never bothered about what province a person came from. One, a Mr. Hsiao, was

from Kwangsi, a distant province, which, like Ytlnnan, was regarded by Chekiang and

Kiangsu people as not fully civilized.

I never had any following in China. All I wanted was to select what I considered

to be the right men for the right post. It used to be a subject of comment among

my colleagues—"how foolish you are" or "he must have some confidential relatives

or personal friends, so that they could be relied upon in case of any conspiracy."

But I was not afraid of that.

In those days, party affiliation did not carry very much weight. In my French

mission there was only one active member of the Kuomintang, and that was Yang Ytl-ch'ing.

He was in the secretariat of the president's office. He was a Hupei man, very nice,

public-spirited, and very intelligent. Scie Tong-fa was nominally a Kuomintang man.

He was born and brought up in Paris, and belonged, I think to the Kuomintang in

France. Even when I was in Washington much later, I had very few Kuomintang members.

7
It was only after the Chen-ta (shih) hsfleh-hsiao diplomatic class began to train

students for the diplomatic service, and send the whole graduating class to the

Waichiaopu; that the Kuomintang came into prominence in the diplomatic service.

Now if you look over the list of the Chinese personnel in the diplomatic service,

I should think at least two-thirds are Kuomintang members.

Most of my staff were college graduates, whether Chinese colleges or abroad.

That was the general standard I tried to observe, but it was not always possible.

In my case I was fairly successful. Even those who had never been abroad, for example,

were graduates of Peking University, St. John's, or the German college in Shanghai.

Shih, the first secretary when the mission was raised to an embassy in Paris, had

never studied abroad, but had studied in China and passed the consular diplomatic

examination. Scie Tong-fa, of course, was French born and French educated. Fu

Kuan-hsiung had never been abroad until I first took him to France. But he was a

literature graduate of Peking University. Mr. Yang, a third secretary, was a

graduate of Yale-in-China. He had also studied in Japan. Ch'en Jih-kuang was a

son of an Overseas Chinese, and had been in the United States. I don't remember

what his education was. Wang Ssu-ch'eng had never been abroad, but was a graduate

of a Chinese college. Wang Yung-yuan, a typist, had only studied in a YMCA night

school. Y. Y. Wang was number two in the typists' pool in the office of the Accessor,

and assistant to the head, a Chinese woman from Hawaii, trained in steno and a typist.

In the mission in France, I usually made the recommendations of staff people.

Each in turn was approved by the ministry. Most of my recommendations were merely

reaffirmations of people already in the post, but I brought certain people in who I

believed could fulfill special requirements. None of those whom I took abroad had

been either my schoolmates or my relatives, I do not want to appear to be claiming

credit I did not deserve. It might appear as if I was a perfect person in that

respect. I had the advantage of having been in the foreign office as minister myself.

I knew the personnel and therefore it was easy for me to pick from among them. I

8
had been foreign minister in more than four or five cabinets, so I knew the personnel

of the foreign service and the members of parliament who were the most suitable for

the jobs I had in Paris.

I brought in Kuo Chih-fan, for example. He had not been a member of the foreign

office, but had been treasurer in the ministry of finance. He was a financial man,

familiar with China's foreign loans and with foreign banks abroad. He was Belgian-

educated and spoke French very well. That is why he fulfilled a definite need in

Paris, where I was expected to negotiate loans and financial credits. I needed

somebody who was familiar with Chinese finance and also with financiers and bankers

abroad. Political affiliations, nepotism—none of those things entered my mind. I

needed many French-speaking people but I also wanted someone who spoke English well,

because I knew Paris was a great diplomatic center with a lot of English-speaking

people. I had made up my mind that it would be necessary to maintain close contact

with the American embassy and the American community there in Paris, because the

influence of the United States was growing all the time. Then I always needed

someone who was good in Chinese. Not everyone spoke Mandarin. Those who had been

to Peking were able to speak some Mandarin. Since the first years of the Republic

we had begun to have less and less difficulty, because Mandarin was introduced in

the schools. Even a man from Kwangsi or Ytlnnan could understand a man from Peking.

Manchurians spoke Mandarin with a very strong accent, and you could tell they were

not Mandarin, but it was very akin to Mandarin. The same thing with a man from Ytlnnan.

Hupei dialect was harder to understand than Szechwan dialect, but Hupei dialect was

still intelligible to anyone who spoke Mandarin. Dialects were overstressed by

people abroad, because they never penetrated the interior. In fact, they were not

allowed without passport into the interior. Therefore, their impression of China

was that it was divided by hundreds of dialects, but that was true only along the

coastal provinces.
 Before I left China, I had to organize a staff and discuss it with the ministry

of foreign affairs. They might have some ideas of their own, so I had to reach

agreement with them and then they would do the appointing. So I usually made out a

tentative list and would see the vice-minister, the head of administration. I

do not believe I ever had any difficulty with a single individual in the government.

They took it for granted that I knew the job, for I had been minister several times

before. My recommendations were really surprising from the old Mandarin point of view,

because none of my recommendations appeared to be relatives or fellow provincials,

and usually they were all service men in the ministry or abroad.

The recommendations would go to the cabinet first of all, and in the case of

the first secretary, counselor, second secretary, and third secretary, a report had

to be made to the president. The president's office or the cabifSsjjt would then prepare

a presidential order and send it to the president.

The general principle of legation work was to cultivate good relations between

China and the particular country. Implementing that principle depended upon the

personality of the chief of the mission, on the instructions of the ministry of

foreign affairs, and often even the President of National China would try to point

out that China wanted to clear a certain policy. You would be expect to be able
A
to raise loans to help China's finances, or to try to negotiate for the financing

of an aviation school in China or a factory for the manufacture of airplanes, for

example. Xn the case of France, Indochina was a big question. It

was the biggest and richest colony of France, but it was also contiguous with China.

We still had a large number of Chinese in Indochina carrying on a great deal of

local and international commerce. When the Japanese war broke out and the question

of transit became more and more important, France was considered a leading power

with a great deal of influence on world diplomacy. French statesmen were usually

regarded in China as liberal-minded, especially as we had a number of top Kuomintang

men who had either lived or studied in France. They were elder statesmen of the
Party and often aired their views, which even the Generalissimo would not turn down.

In France, I therefore knew that I wanted to cultivate relations with that sort of

person. They had a voice in the higher councils of the Kuomintang and, in France,

they would often come, like Li Shih-chen. He was a great friend of Marius Moutet,

Painleve, and Eduard Herriot, who were all leaders in French politics.

There was little formal pattern to my working day. I had my way of going out

and trying to cultivate relations. Probably some people thought I was overactive,

but I had my views. The old-fashioned Chinese diplomat would only keep in touch

with the Quai d'Orsay and a few intellectuals. They would confine their activities

to strictly diplomatic work of an official character. I had a different view: I

felt that diplomatic relations were only the final expression of relations between

two countries and two peoples. In order to improve relations, it was necessary to

learn all about the country, the nature of the society, and the powers behind the throne.

And that meant you had to cultivate and to know the leaders of parliament whose voices

carried weight. Especia-|ly in France, where political parties played such an

important part and the government was always falling and being reformed, the Paris

politicians were very active and very mobile. They changed constantly--during my

ten years in Paris, something like 20 cabinets were formed and fe^l, some lasting a

year, some lasting only three days. So I made it my policy to know these people—

not only those in power but the leaders of the parties aspiring to overthrow the

existing government.

The French press was also important, for it was quite free and daring. The

newspapers played politics much more than the newspapers in the United States. The

big papers in the United States confine their activities to newspaper work and to

making more money, whereas in France several newspapers were the mouthpieces of

different groups of politicians. Therefore, it was important to knowT not only the

editors of the papers backing the existing government but also those backing the

asp^ing politicians.

ii
 Then there were the intellectuals, the university crowd and members of

the Academie Franchise. For some reason they enjoyed a great deal of prestige

in French society. They were looked upon as wisemen of the nation.

Then of course there was the banking world. France is a capitalist country and

there is no question that the banks exercise a great deal of influence in domestic

politics. Also there was the Catholic religious establishment. One of my friends

was the Nuncio, wTho represented the Vatican. He knew the bishops and the archbishops

and the cardinal in France and often, through him, I came to know the Catholic leaders.

France was much more Catholic than Protestant or any other religion.

In other words, I found it necessary to know the country, and analyze where the

real sources of power wTere and then try to contact them. I was considered to be one of

the well-informed diplomats in Paris. French government personnel were impressed by

the information I brought to them, especially in regard to the United States, whose

position was gaining importance in the councils of the world. Having been educated in

the United States and having served there, I knew a good deal about American politics

and American conditions. To my great surprise even the British did not seem to under­

stand the Americans very much. Once Anthony Eden was surprised at something that happened

in Washington. I told him that that was the working of the American constitution. A

committee could introduce a bill and it could pass the House and Senate, and be

signed by the president, only to be subject to the appropriations committee. The

committee could chop off this and that item, which neither Congress nor the president

could avoid. In England the parliamentary system allowed the prime minister and the

cabinet minister to sit as members and participate in the debate. Not so under the

American constitution. The President never appeared except to deliver the State of the

Union Message, or on ceremonial occasions.

Thus, European leaders found me rather useful to talk to, especially concerning

the United States. I also kept constantly in touch with my colleagues in Washington,

London, Berlin, Rome, and Moscow. My colleagues often referred to me, informed me,

la
and asked my advice as to the questions they were handling. Especially during the

war, we all wanted to work together. I was in sort of a special position, and that

was my view of how I should represent China. I never hesitated to assume responsibility.

I always happened to be sent to what China considered the most important countries

and therefore I found it necessary not only to work hard myself but also to keep my

staff working with me. Indirectly, I would hear sometimes that my staff felt they were

being overworked. I sympathized with them and tried to bring relief to them as far

as possible. But Sundays or evenings did not matter with me, and while I did not

require the whole staff, there were two or three people I would call on. When I was

in Washington the foreign office would call on me at two o'clock in the morning to ask

a question or give me instructions. The general complaint of my staff was that they

never kept regular hours. They sometimes had an important social engagement and I

would still be working at half past seven. I liked to have two or three confidential

secretaries wait for me to finish my telegrams. And the cable office was also kept

twenty-four hours, in this case, by rotation. But in the case of the confidential

secretaries, especially my Chinese secretary, there was not any rotation. I wanted him

to go over my Chinese, as I had drafted hurriedly. He was a Chinese scholar and would

quickly recognize mistakes.

When I heard that in South America our embassies and consulates would start work

at ten in the morning and stop work at two in the afternoon, I thought that was a

luxury. But I could understand—after all, they did not have very much to do. In

Washington and in Paris, however, it was impossible to keep hours. There were all sorts

of visitors from China, because the two countries were very important to China. I

would have to entertain these visitors. Normally we would always have guests at

luncheon or dinner. The pattern that I followed was not a regular pattern. It was

unusual, and an unusual period.

13
 Under the national government, Party instructions and the orders of the

Generalissimo called for a memorial service every Monday, which I found to be useful

in the sense that it provided an occasion for hearing reports. I turned it into a

general conference for the whole service, including members of the embassy, the consulate,

the military attache's offices, and the representative of the Party quarters. All

joined to make reports. The Party representatives reported what they had heard from

Chungking, from Party headquarters, and how they found the Chinese community. The

military officers would report on their conversations with the other military attaches

or information they had received about the military affairs of the French armed forces.

Generally speaking, there were different kinds of work at the Paris legation. There

was the diplomatic work, which usually the ambassador and counselor carried out by

seeing the members of the government, the parliament, or the press. There was also

the work of reporting to the government, either to the ministry of foreign affairs or

the executive ytian. I often received direct telegrams from the Generalissimo and would

reply to them directly. We had a staff of codists. We did not have a wireless

station, although some of our embassies abroad had. We found the telegraph service in

Paris was fairly satisfactory. For the ambassador, there was always a round of semi­

official public functions, keeping in touch with the authorities of the municipality

of Paris, with the different embassies and legations, and with the important

public institutions like the universities and society. Entertainment played an important

part of the job. During the ten years I was in Paris, I found that phase of the work

pretty heavy. After the government moved from Nanking to Chungking the volu|di!}) of

Chinese visitors grew immensely. Government and civic leaders found themselves

isolated and anxious to get information on the outside world in relation to China's

situation. They were anxious to have a commission of one kind or another and come

abroad, either to keep themselves up to date on the situation of the outside world

with reference to their particular interests, or to get a change from austere life in

Chungking.

14
 The routine work of the embassy, while heavy, was not particularly difficult. It

went along in a normal and smooth manner. The staff handled the regular,routine work.

The telegraph office often found itself overburdened because of the great number of

telegrams that came in and went out. I suppose in comparison with other missions

abroad, the work load of the Chinese embassy in Paris was very heavy, heavier than

even the mission in London. I had been in public service longer and had been minister,

cabinet minister, and premier, so I had lots of friends. Whenever they wanted to have

something done abroad, they thought of me first. I would always try to do what I could,

looking after their sons, or giving financial assistance from time to time. Often the

provincial governments that had sent students to France for education found it difficult

to get foreign exchange and would telegraph the embassy. We would try to finance the

crisis.

There was also a certain amount of public speaking which I found necessary. I found

the social side just as important for the reason that many of the functions—dinner

parties, reception, and luncheons—to which I was invited were given in honor of some

important visitor. I was anxious not only to make their acquaintance, but to inform

myself on specific questions relating to their countries. Liekwise I would entertain

Chinese diplomats and high officials in Paris at my embassy, to which I would invite

some of my close colleagues in the diplomatic corps.

As for setting policy, in my own sphere in Paris, Washington, and London, I did

not feel it quite the right thing to do to simply wait for instructions from the

government. In the wartime conditions in Chungking, where cabinet ministers were

kept very busy with meetings, conferences, and ministry work, if they were to initiate

something, they would usually telegraph me to get all the information, to get my view

as to what the situation was, and to ask for suggestions. They would say they were

studying such and such a problem with a view to adopting a new policy or revising a

policy. They often asked for my personal views and suggestions because I had been

Chinese representative both in Washington and in London. My reports on the diplomatic

situation abroad and on international relations were not confined merely to China and

France, because it was an obvious fact that China had interests all over the world.

In other words, whatever took place in any important part of the world China should

know, because it often would affect China.

Take, for example, the Chinese in Indonesia. Holland had a direct say over

Indonesia and my colleague in Holland and I worked together very closely. He would

inform me after every important interview he had with the Dutch foreign minister, as

would my colleague in Brussels.

During those years when China was in a very difficult position, trying to resist

foreign aggression and the capital was moved to the interior and the whole country was

disrupted by foreign invasion, I felt all the more that it was a duty of Chinese

representatives abroad to do more than their ordinary share as diplomatic representa­

tives. Therefore, on the question of policy, my mind constantly centered upon what

wTas the best course for China. Generally speaking, the government had fixed its line

of policy by continuing resistance to the Japanese aggression. But in order to implement

that policy, it was necessary to get as much aid and support and sympathy from abroad

as possible. I found that whenever I spoke to either important French government

officials or officials at the League of Nations, they always asked: What is your

practical suggestion, what is your practical need? They would feel disposed to

consider concrete suggestions. I would have done the same thing in their position,

because they could not be expected to have been thinking about China's problems all

the time. When they were asked to extend their support to help China, they wanted to

know in what way they could do so.

It was my plan always to think along practical lines. I must say that in that

respect, I not only considered France as my main field of activity, but I was interested

in what Great Britain could do, what the United States could do, what Germany and Italy

could do, and what the Soviet Union could do. I communicated with my colleagues, who

were more or less equally inspired. But with the possible exception of my colleague
in London, who was favorably situated, those in Berlin, Rome, and Moscow could not be

as well informed as I.

The major policy question was whether China was to conclude a nonaggression pact

with Soviet Russia, s subject which Moscow proposed more than once. The party would

decide that, first in the Political Council and in the Central Executive Committee and

then, after a decision was taken, would refer to the government. But then that was a

general thesis. I do not know whether the minister of foreign affairs, unless he was

a member of the Political Council, would be informed of the pros and cons in the debate.

On more than one occasion, we diplomats abroad conceived a policy that China should

follow and agreed that what they were following was not quite correct. We would

instigate, inspire, and recommend a policy for reasons we outlined in the communication.

The minister of foreign affairs would not decide for himself, but would report to the

government—to the Generalissimo first. The Generalissimo would think it over and

then probably bring the question before the Party. Then the Party process would

start.

I would summarize in this way: the initiation of policy considerations took place

at Nanking or abroad. I would usually be the one to suggest something and would not

want to initiate it myself, but would want the views of my colleagues. Those I would

consider most often were in London, Berlin, Moscow, and Rome—Rome least of the four.

We often talked over matters with the important visitors from China, and then would

put our recommendations in writing and telegraph them to the government.

Methods of policy implementation, once the major decisions were made, were usually

left to the representative abroad. In the case of France, I would often just go ahead

and do something and then report to the government, because what the government wanted

was the result. They did not care about the strategy and in any case, would not be in

a position to offer advice because they were not on the spot. In that way, I must say,

the Chinese government was very realistic, not like some of the foreign ministries,

which tried to direct every little detail.

17
 When I arrived in Paris I rearranged the division of work, enlarged the staff,

and increased the work connected with the League of Nations. It was necessary that

I arrange the schedule in such a way that it would enable me to perform my duties in

a more effective way. The work, for example, which I had to carry on with the League

of Nations constituted a distinct phase, but it was a fairly heavy responsibility.

From the very outset I wanted to make the legation a center of activity in the country,

to keep in touch with the Chinese community and the flow of visitors and students from

China. There were more Chinese students in France than in England, Germany, Italy, or

Belgium. I found it necessary to arrange the work load so as to be able to carry out

the new conception of the work of a diplomatic mission in a foreign country.

The Chinese diplomatic service was still based upon rather old-time concepts.

There was no plan whereby the division of the work could be carried out in a scientific

way. In other words, the specialization that is so important in many foreign missions

was not possible to carry out completely. Therefore, it was left to the head of the

mission. In my case, I did not have much difficulty because it was relatively simple

to assign different kinds of work to different people. For example, one category is

the gathering of information and required knowledge of the conditions in France.

Diplomatically speaking, it meant also being familiar with official circles of the

French government and with the leading groups in the French society business, economic,

press, etc. Other people had special qualifications to allow7 them to handle

communications with the home government. The language qualification—foreign language,

French language, or the Chinese language—was essential in making assignments. In

Paris I had two or three men who were able to cope with English. They would be

assigned to keep in contact with the English-speaking embassies and the large number

of foreign correspondents from English-speaking countries. Then there was another set

of younger members of the staff who liked making friends and engaging in social life.

They were assigned the work of looking after entertainment and attending social events.

There are the special class of staff members—usually only one or two who would

handle student questions. Then there was the strictly administrative work, such as

16
handling the business arrangements of the embassy, looking after the servants,

dealing with questions of wages or leaves of absence or holidays. On top of them we had

an accountant.

No matter how many posts I held concurrently, as long as they were related to the

conduct of foreign affairs I would distribute the work among the embassy staff according

to its capability. If this work became too much for the existing staff, I would

engage a well-qualified student to help. Translation, for example, or a long report.

When I was in London, I set up a bureau and engaged about four or five people qualified

ho prepare the work for my League of Nations mission. They were paid by the ministry

at my request.

Although I had extra help in Paris, they were all taken from the ministry of foreign

affairs. In 1936 I started a library in Paris—a reading room at first. I felt that

a diplomat should be familiar with at least some of the current periodicals and newspapers

Some of the staff subscribed to French journals, some to English periodicals. They

had to payout of their own pockets, so I decided to set up a reading room and assign

the work of looking after it to one of the attaches. Later I tried to organize a

systematic file. The difficulty was that each person would take all the pertinent

documents with him. Usually he had to send the documents to the filing office after

he had finished handling the question, or at least after the question had reached one

stage of development and the next stage was being awaited. There used to be trouble

when the person who had charge of the question controlled the file and was reluctant

to let anybody see it. But I thought this applied more to a ministry, where the number

of staff members was much greater than in a small mission like an embassy. But even

before I came it was very difficult for anybody to prepare something that came under

the immediate charge of another person. The latter would be most reluctant to let

anyone else read the file or even talk about it.

When I arrived I explained to my staff that we are all here to serve only one

master, the Chinese government, and so whenever we could we should wTork together. In
China we always say that "three cobblers are worth as much as one Chu-kuo Liang."

Therefore, I said if a man has no axe to grind personally, the more friends to help

him the better.

There were five grades of officials. First, the top class, the cabinet minister

rank was called "specially appointed by the president." Then came the "selected

officials," which covers vice-ministers and secretary-generals. The third category

was the "recommended" classes; this included a legation or embassy secretary. Fourth,

there was the class of officials appointed directly by the minister himself without

having to be submitted to the cabinet for approval. Finally there was the class of

employees such as copyists, cooks, and gardeners. They were all engaged without any

official orders from the minister or head of the department.

These regulations were not revised unless it was necessary. The regulations I

operated under in Paris in 1932 were issued by the national government on the basis

of those already in existence from the first years of the Republic. In the old days,

there had been no special regulations for the ministry of foreign affairs, because all

ministers and employees were classified in the same way as officials and ministers in

any other ministry. Those who were sent abroad were given special titles but it

was clear that they were equal to officials in other ministries. There were a lot of

changes in the treatment of the staff while I was in Paris. For example, under the

service regulations, every three years the members of a consulate or a legation were

entitled to have home leave with pay. As China went to war and finances of the government

became tighter and tighter, however, home leave was cancelled. So I never got any in

six years, until I was transferred to London. Also, under the regulations the head

of the mission was usually entitled to first class passage for himself and his wife,

and three third class passages for servants. Later that was reduced to two. The

first secretary was allowed to bring his wife, also first class, and one servant.

Later the servant's passage was cut out.

 In the main, not many changes were made. The pay scale was ridiculous. It was

based upon the pay at the time of the Ch'ing dynasty, except taels were converted

into dollars, each silver tael counted as $1.50. When I went to Washington I recommended

that staff pay be raised.

There were two different sets of regulations for relations between the legations

and the consulate-general. One set governed the conduct of the work of diplomatic

missions, legations, and embassies. Another set governed the consulates and consuls.

In the early days, there was one set of regulations divided into two parts. If the

consulate or consulate-general happened to be in the same place as the embassy or

legation, there was one set of relationships.

Another factor was the personality of the ambassador or minister in the mission.

Sometimes there would be a consul-general of long years of experience, an elderly man.

Because of his knowledge of either local conditions or the problems of the overseas

Chinese community, he would be kept in the office. But we might have at the same time

a very young, inexperienced diplomat as head of the diplomatic mission. In that case,

of course, there was less likelihood that the consul-general would go to him for advice.

I myself had been foreign minister, a senior diplomat. Thus even the elderly consul-

general had been appointed by me when I was foreign minister.

Another factor was the nature of the work of the consulate. Even if the consulate

did not happen to be in the same city as the embassy in question, the two might work

closely together. For example, the consul-general in Hanoi worked very closely with

the Paris embassy. As the highest Chinese representative in Indochina, he had to keep

in close contact with the governor-general of Indochina. But the governor-general

himself, vdiile having great latitude of authority over certain matters, was nonetheless

subject to the orders of the French government in general. Therefore on the one

hand the consul-general in Hanoi was asked to handle questions of a diplomatic charcter,

but the governor-general could only act within his authority or on instructions from

the minister of colonies. Therefore it was necessary for the Chinese consul-general to
keep in close touch with me. Often when he found the governor-general adamant on

certain matters, he would be desperate, because Chungking, being much nearer to Hanoi

than Paris, would keep urging him to act, while he found himself in a helpless position.

Normally the ministry of foreign affairs, after a few attempts to get results in Hanoi

had failed, would telegraph me to take the matter up. Often I would receive the requests

from the consul-general concurrently.

On the other hand, there were consulates in the different British dominions. In

those cases, the embassy in London would have very little to do because of its

distance from the place in question. Often it was more convenient for the consulate

to report and get orders directly from the ministry of foreign affairs in Chungking

or Nanking.

The consulate usually operated as an independent unit, and would report directly

to the ministry, with only a duplicate copy to the consulate-general to keep it informed.

Even in London in my time, for example, there was a consulate-general in London, a

consulate in Bristol and a consulate in Manchester. Only in strictly routine matters,

for example, when they were asked to make a census of the Chinese nationftl^in their

respective districts, would they send a copy of their reports to the consulate-general.

The Chinese community in Paris normally comprised Chinese who had established

themselves in business or trade, some of whom had French wives. Then there were what

we call the overseas Chinese, who often had lived in a place for generations and had

established businesses there. There was also the student class—both private and

government-supported, and the relatively few Chinese who had gone there to carry out

a temporary mission. There were a few Chinese residents, visitors who had decided

to settle down in France. This was true particularly after the Japanese invasion of

the mainland. The young Marshal's brother, for example, came to live there with his

wife.

Finally, there was a stream of temporary visitors coming to attend international

conferences or for their own pleasure.

 The Party usually spoke for the overseas Chinese, especially in France. Most

of them were members of the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang branches in other countries

were subsidiary to the one in Paris. Many Kuomintang leaders—elder statesmen—had

taken up residence in France. Men like Wang Ching-wei, Li Shih-chen, Chang Ching-

chiang, and Wu Tze-hui lived in France for many years when Yuan Shih-kki was in power.

So France had played a very important part in the history of the Kuomintang,

just as in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. Comparatively speaking, a great

percentage of the Chinese community in France were members of the Kuomintang. I

worked very closely with the head of the Kuomintang in Paris, who used to come very

frequently and report to me and ask for my advice. At that time I was not a Party

member. My Party affiliation was sort of erratic, but at that time I was no longer

a member. The Party connection with me did not play a very important part, but I

found it very easy and useful to work with the Kuomintang headquarters.

When Ambassador Yang Chieh had an office in the annex of the consulate, for

example, a member of the Chinese community who claimed to be in the Kuomintang was

working closely with him to issue passports. The man reported everything to me on the

illegal sale of passports. I naturally instructed him to submit his evidence to Nanking.

Usually, I found it a very good principle to place myself above all parties.

The only question I asked was what good it would do for China or the Chinese cause. In

this we would have a common ground, which nobody could argue with. Even if they were

to say that such and such was good for the Party, I could say yes, but the Party did

not represent whole China. Sometimes the Chinese community would organize a committee

to raise funds--for the benefit of the Chinese Red Cross, or to support wounded

Chinese, or for orphanages. There would be rival committees which sometimes gave me a

headache because I would have to put my foot down and say they should not have

separate ones in one country. I would usually urge them to unite into one body.

I remember in one case in England I received a warning from the manager of an English

bank. He said a Chinese lady who was treasurer of a campaign for raising money to aid

wounded soldiers was depositing the money in her own account. I found it very disagreeable

95
to straighten out that case.

Many times students would come into the Legation and ask us to telegraph home

for money—they could not afford the cable expenses. Usually I would lend them

money for a month, on the condition that they refund it when their remittance arrived.

There are also stranded visitors, sometimes people of very good standing. Often

travel was difficult—passage could be booked but when the day arrived, there was

not a plane. When war broke out in Europe commercial lines were not operating at all.

The same thing with hotels. Therefore budgets were often in disarray.

The embassy would usually try to help but we always made it clear that we were

not a bank or a philanthropic institution. Sometimes if I knew the person was of good

standing, I would ask the men in charge of the treasury to see if we could afford to

lend 1,000 francs. If they were really hard up and the situation was very bad, I would

give them the money out of my own pocket.

In the legation there were two classes of documents—confidential and general.

The confidential ones were kept in the charge of a confidential secretary. The

codists were more or less under the supervision of this confidential secretary, who

kept the confidential files. In the case of the ordinary telegraphs relating to

administrative matters, there was no need to observe any precautions. The first

secretary, who later became counselor, was in charge of the decoding. The ministry of

foreign affairs introduced a reform under which the codists were trained in coding

and decoding, as well in devising codes. The Generalissimo's office was particularly

efficient in this respect. Sometimes they would change the code every month and have

a special confidential emmissary bring it out. Or if I happened to be in Chungking

they would hand it to me personally.

When I was in Paris I not only received information and telegrams from the

Generalissimo and the various ministries, but sometimes provincial governors would

send me a code for use in case of need. So I had many codes, and I entrusted them to

the counselor in charge of the secret codes. Members of the telegraph office in the

embassy were all appointed by the ministry from its special staff. They were later
trained as a separate class altogether, a great improvement over previous practice.

They were instructed to keep things absolutely secret and confidential. So in the case

of a confidential telegram the particular person who did the decoding would often

come to me and hand it to me personally. These telegrams constituted a special file

in the charge of my special counselor. In Chinese fashion, there were degrees of

secrecy. Sometimes telegrams were marked "ten-thousand times secret" or "strictly

confidential." In my case, some of the personal telegrams were not supposed to be filed

in the regular official files and were also marked confidential.

Once I was embarrassed when the foreign office told me that our codes were not

dependable at all. The same thing was said to me in Paris. The Generalissimo's office

was much better in that respect, but codes from the provinces or the consulates were

known by everyone, including the Japanese.

Certain things were considered strictly confidential, such as the matter of

negotiations for the draft for military cooperation between China and France, which

was sent to the Generalissimo by Ambassador Yang Chieh. Telegrams from the air ministry

concerning the purchase of airplanes or the engagement of pilots were also strictly

confidential.

After 1936, when I returned as ambassador and the legation was elevated to an

embassy, we added an air attach^, a naval attache, and assistant attaches. I also had

a financial counselor, v/hich not every embassy had. Later, a cultural attach^ was

also added. There were no fixed regulations for adding personnel when a legation was

upgraded.
 FILMED
BY

^Microfilming
Corporation of
America
MS109-1973
THIS BOOK IS THE

;EST COPY AVAILABLE

VT TIME OF FILMING
 THE WELLINGTON KOO MEMOIR

Volume IV:

Mission to France, 1932-1941

Chapters 1-20
(November 1937-June 1941)
This memoir was made possible by grants
from the Ford Foundation and the National
Fndowment for the Humanities to Columbia
University for the East Asian Institute.

Copyright C 1076. The Trustees of Columbia

University in the City of New York. All
rights reserved. This work may be cited
and brief passages may be quoted as with
any scholarly work, but the memoir may not
be published, nor sold, nor otherwise re­
produced in any form without written per­
mission from the Fast Asian Institute of
Columbia University, New York, New York 10027,
 THE REMINISCENCES OF WELLINGTON KOO

VOLUME IV: MISSION TO FRANCE

PRELIMINARY DRAFT FORM

(covering November 1937 - December 1940 in 18 units)

The Preliminary Draft consists of the original transcript as

edited for English style (punctuation, spelling, grammar) , for internal
consistency and fluidity and to avoid repetition. The transcript in
this case relies most heavily on the Diaries (not available for December
29, 1939 - April 14, 1941) and the Notes of Conversations.
No attempt has been made by the editor to rigorously check the
transcript against the original documents and outside sources, nor in
general to ascertain the facts, including the identification and
spelling of the names of persons mentioned in the text. Brackets,
[], indicate material added by the editor, including questions
addressed to Dr. Koo.
The editor did not correct the typed version of the Preliminary
Draft. It has however been approved by Dr. Koo, to whom each section
was handed on completion. All penciled or blue-ink notations are
Dr. Koo's.

->ections 19 and •.,•, January to 4une 19^1, were edited and

retyped from orginal transcripts of interviews r,;/ Arf ta O' rlen
in June 1978.
C.M.W.
REMINISCENCES OF WELLINGTON KOO

VOLUME IV MISSION TO FRANCE

(PRELIMINARY DRAFT FORM)

1. The Aftermath of the Brussels Conference:

Late November 1937-mid-May 1938

A Proposals for an Armistice and Coordinate

Action by the powers:
Late November 1937-January 1938
1. THE AFTERMATH OF THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE

A. Proposals for an Armistice and Coordinate Action by the powers

X propose to add a word relating to the aftermath of the Brussels Conference.

The situation in China on the eve of the closing of the Conference was very

serious. The Chinese government was anxious to secure an armistice on the one

hand, and on the other hand, a definite assurance that the powers, principally

the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union, would undertake

some concrete action. The concrete measures that were most desired by China

were of two kinds; one, a concrete plan of aid to China in the form of credit

and munitions, accompanied by some naval and land demonstration; two, a definite

plan to refuse any sort of aid to Japan in the form of credit or munitions.

However, the series of conversations which I had had with the heads of the

delegations of the principal powers showed clearly that none of them was

disposed to act alone. Each said that it would do something and that it felt

sympathetic toward the Chinese cause, but that it could not undertake any action

alone. Any measure must take the form of concerted action of the powers, which

meant mainly Great Britain and the United States.

On the question of transit through Indochina, for example, the French

government had been doing its best and was prepared to keep Indochina open,

if it could get some kind of assurance of concerted action from London and

Washington. This assurance, however, was refused. In the case of London,

the British were willing, provided Washington also agreed. But the United

States^ with its Neutrality Act on the statute book, did not feel free to act,

even though President Roosevelt was very sympathetically disposed toward China.

The same situation existed as regards a military demonstration on land by the

Soviet Union. Moscow did not object to the proposal and intimated it was

willing, provided that it could have a guarantee of support in the event that

such a demonstration provoked a Japanese reprisal against Soviet Russia. Again

this was something that neither Great Britain nor the United States was

disposed to give.
 2

Putting the situation in a nutshell, the whole problem of securing

effective aid from the principal powers for China's cause became a sort of

game of passing the buck among the three Powers substantially interested in

China and the Far East, namely, Great Britain, the United States and the

Soviet Union. Therefore, it became necessary for China to insist on some

plan of aid and cooperation from the four Powers, especially since the Conference

was a failure.

China's need had become all the more pressing as the Conference drew to a

close. The great increase of Japanese reinforcements and the consequent

serious push of the Japanese armed forces at the Shanghai front in the direction

of Nanking had produced an increasingly critical military situation in China.

Because of the critical military situation, the Chinese government was, as I

said, desirous of obtaining an armistice and had asked the principal powers

represented at the Conference to use their efforts to obtain this objective, in

order that it might give time to the Chinese military command to rearrange the

Chinese line of defense. At the same time, the government still wished to

secure a definite guarantee of a continued flow of arms and munitions to enable

it to continue the resistance.

On the question of arranging an armistice, I had several conversations

with the chief delegates of the United States, Great Britain and France at

Brussels. Mr. Norman Davis, however, indicated in our conversation of November

26. 1937 that he would like to have a statement for his own use of what he

described as "the things that China could agree to in any arrangement with Japan

for the cessation of hostilities." He explained that even though the Conference

had adjourned he would continue, nevertheless, to devote all his attention

and thought to the situation in the Far East. But he felt that should the

American government try mediation, it would be useless to merely act as an

intermediary, passing information back and forth between the two parties.
 3

He thought the only practicable approach would be for the third party, in

this case the United States, to propose something which it believed would m^et,

to a reasonable extent, the views of both sides. In other words, he said there

must be a practical basis for an arrangement. He explained that without such

a basis and [with a third party] acting merely as an intermediary, Japan was

sure to propose demands which would be unacceptable to China, just as China

would propose conditions which Japan could not accept . He said that the

United States, for example, would certainly not be willing to transmit to China

proposals from Japan which were sure to be impossible for China to accept.

When asked whether the United States would be willing to act as a mediator

alone, Mr. Davis said the United States wanted very keenly to do so, provided

there was some indication from Japan that she was willing to accept such

mediation as the United States had in mind, but there was no such indication

up till that moment. He believed, however, that other powers would also be

willing to join in mediation.

I referred to the reported German offer of mediation, and indicated to

Mr. Davis the willingness of Berlin to act as a mediator. When Quo Tai-chi,

my colleague, remarked that he understood Japan had asked Germany to pass the

idea of mediation on to China, Mr. Davis remarked that it was his understanding

that it was the other way around. Germany, he said, had wanted to do it

in order to draw political advantages for herself in Europe. It was evident

Germany could not propose conditions which would be favorable to China, because

Japan expected her to mediate only in a manner favorable to Japan. Thereupon,

Mr. Davis said he would like to have the Chinese delegation give him a statement

of the things China could agree to without prejudicing in any way her sovereignty

and territorial integrity. I replied that I would be quite willing to comply.

I told him then that a cablegram from General Chiang Kai-shek the day

before had asked the Chinese delegation to mention confidentially the question

of economic pressure against Japan. If the powers could quietly use their
 4

influence to withhold commercial credit from Japan, I said, it would be

very useful and helpful to China under the circumstances. Mr. Davis said

the United States government had long ceased to give credit to Japan, and as

regards commercial credit, American private banks would give credit to Japan

only after the earmarked gold had left the Japanese islands, which meant an

accommodation of only ten days or so.

When Dr. Hornbeck came to see me before leaving Brussels for the United

States, he again asked me for a memorandum on those questions on which China

and Japan could come to an agreement at present. What he wanted was a private

and unofficial statement from the Chinese delegates of the things which, in their

opinion, China could agree to in effecting a settlement with Japan. He said the

reasons he desired Mr. Davis to have such a memorandum was that if the American

government was to be of any help in trying mediation, it would be desirable,

from the point of view of the mediator, to formulate such terms as would be

acceptable to both parties. This course, he thought, would be better than

asking both parties officially for their terms. Besides, he explained, there

were questions of a political character, such as that of Manchuria, for which

there could be no acceptable solution to both parties at the moment.

The Sino-Japanese problem, he said, was of such a delicate nature and

covered such wTide fields that it would be too ambitious to make a final settlement

of the whole problem. Nonetheless, in his opinion, there were a number of

things which Japan expected from China and which China could reasonably give,

without in any way prejudicing her political sovereignty and territorial integrity.

He thought that there might be a chance for a temporary agreement, which might

at least serve as the basis for an immediate armistice and save the face of

Japan in coming to an agreement. Dr. Hornbeck*s idea was that the Chinese

delegation would prepare and give such a statement as confidential and unofficial.

He explained that he would not even like to ask the Chinese delegation to
 5

telegraph to their government what he had just said, so that nothing received

by him from the Chinese delegation would be considered as binding on China,

but purely as for his own reference.

Dr. Hornbeck recalled that in my speeches before the Conference I referred

to the questions of raw materials and economic cooperation in general. I replied

that, in addition to these, there were of course other questions upon which

China had indicated her willingness to come to an agreement with Japan during

the last few years, for example, the question of the supply of cotton from

China for Japan's textile industry. I told him that I understood that while

Japan bought a good deal of long-stable American cotton, she needed short-staple

Chinese cotton for mixing. Certain Japanese industrialists desired to promote a

movement for increasing cotton production in China for Japan's needs, somewhat

along the line of tobacco production promoted by the British-American Tobacco

Company. There was also the question of the Tsangchow-Shihkaichwang railway

concession, which the Japanese had always desired to obtain, though there was

a preliminary arrangement already concluded with the French. There was also

the question of the Lungyen iron and coal mine, as well as the supply of salt

from the Changlo salt fields, and the question of the Fu-kong air line. All

these were questions brought up by Japan in the previous negotiations.

On the question of salt supply, [I pointed out that ] the Japanese not only

needed it for the manufacture of soda, but also for her war industries. She

had already made a great effort, at the time of the Shantung negotiations, to

this end. In fact, China had reached an agreement with Japan as regards the

Tsingtao salt fields. [As for] the establishment of an air line, I told him

that was acceptable in itself, but Japan must stop illegal flying, especially

by her military planes in North China, in spite of Chinese protests. There

was also the question of lowering the Chinese customs tariff and that of a
 6

reciprocal tariff agreement, [I said, adding that] these were matters subject

to negotiation provided Japan would stop her smuggling in North China.

I told Dr. Hornbeck that all these questions could and should be negotiated,

subject to a general understanding that the negotiations would not be of an

exclusive character between China and Japan, but would apply equally to other

powers on the principle of collaboration. In other words, I told him that such

negotiations should not run counter to the spirit of the Open Door policy. Dr.

Hornbeck observed that that was the reason why he had thought the last declaration

of the Conference was important, because it contained certain principles emphasizing

the necessity of the collaboration of the other powers in any settlement that could

be reached between China and Japan. He believed that the fact that there were

foreign interests to be safeguarded was also a safeguard to China.

In this connection I would like to refer to a conversation which I had

with M. Leon Blum, who was then Vice-President of the Council of State, a

position equivalent to that of Vice-Premier. The occasion was the visit of

Mr. Ch'en Kung-po to Paris from Rome, where he had seen both Mussolini and Ciano.

[One may recall that in talkingviih C- 'en, both men had advised China to entertain

the suggestion of mediation from Italy.] I took Mr. Ch'en to see M. Blum to have a

talk about the situation in Europe and French policy toward the Sino-Japanese

conflict. After an exchange of views and an analysis by Blum of the situation

in Europe, I mentioned the failure of the Brussels Conference.

M. Blum explained that it was really due to the negative attitude of the

American delegation caused by the situation in the United States. He said

that it was evident that opinion in Congress and outside of it was not in

favor of President Roosevelt's taking a strong course of action at Brussels.

America was not ready to follow through with action, although at first it

had appeared that the United States was prepared to pursue an energetic policy

at the Conference. He expressed the view that the experience of 1931, when the
 7

American government was let down by Sir John Simon, who refused to cooperate

with the United States in connection with the Manchurian incident, stirred

rancor in the hearts of the American people. He said it was for this same reason

that, at the time of the Ethiopian question in Geneva, the United States had

refused to accept an oil embargo proposed by Great Britain. At that time, it

was also necessary to secure the cooperation of Holland which, being a small

country, had not felt justified in joining without an assurance from the great

powers of support in case of complications.

Mr. Ch’en remarked that in Rome, Mussolini had told him that authoritarian

states always favored positive action, whereas democratic countries always

pursued a negative policy. 1 commented, however, that democratic countries

always moved slowly because of the necessity of enlisting the support of

public opinion, whereas authoritarian states could move rapidly, without paying

any attention to public opinion. M. Blum expressed agreement with my view,

and added that democratic countries, when they did move, could not move

together, which was also a self-evident fact. They always moved out of pace,

as it were. For instance, when America was ready to take action in 1931, Great

Britain did not follow up; and this time, when Great Britain and France were

prepared to do something to help China, the United States could not move.

M. Blum thought that the only way to bring about a settlement of the

Sino-Japanese conflict was for Great Britain, the United States and Soviet

Russia to concert together and present a united front. This was indeed also

my own conviction; so I observed that if these three countries spoke jointly

to Japan, they could impress her without risking war. M. Blum thought that

in that case they could impose a settlement upon Japan without any risk.

Then Mr. Ch’en urged that France might use her influence to bring about

such concerted action among the other three powers and mentioned that China

had hitherto to deal separately with each of them and had found it difficult
 8

to bring about common action on their part, Blum said the difficulty was that

the relations between the United States and Soviet Russia, while good, were

not intimate. It was the same as regards the relations between Great Britain

and Soviet Russia. In the Far East the close collaboration of the two last

mentioned countries was essential. If they could work together in confidence,

then the United States, which did not wish to take the lead, would certainly join.

I expressed the hope that France, being in the happy position of close

friendship with them both, would apply her efforts to bringing about a close

rapproachement between Great Britain and Soviet Russia. M. Blum thereupon said

that this was precisely what he had been trying to do, namely, to form a bridge

between the two of them.

On December 2, I called on Mr. Norman Davis at the Hotel Bristol in Paris.

His delegation had just come from the Brussels Conference. I handed him two

memoranda, both of which he had requested, one on China's immediate needs and

the other outlining the basis for economic cooperation between China and Japan.

Mr. Davis told me that he had been giving a great deal of thought to the

possible terms of peace between China and Japan and believed that the question

of Manchukuo was the stumbling block. He asked whether China would not be

well advised to accept the actual situation for a period of ten years to see

what the developments in the interval were. He believed that Japan was sure

to ask for recognition of Manchukuo, which China could not accept. I said

that in my view a practical basis for a settlement of the Manchurian question

had already been given by the Lytton Report. In Mr. Davis' opinion, however,

Japanese acceptance of that basis was out of the question.

Thereupon, I remarked that the suggestion for a ten-year waiting period

might be a feasible one for consideration, if it were understood that China's

rights and position were in no way thereby compromised. This would be along

the same line of settlement concerning Bessarabia. In entering into diplomatic

 9

relations with Rumania and even in concluding a treaty of non-aggression in

London, Soviet Russia reserved the position as regards her claims on the province

of Bessarabia. Mr. Davis thereupon said what he had just suggested was more or

less the same idea.

I told him that there were two other principal questions, namely, Shanghai

and North China. As regards the former, a temporary solution might be proposed

by suggesting to restore the agreement of 1932 made between China and Japan with

the assistance and participation of Great Britain, the United States, France and

Italy. Mr. Davis observed that it had been suggested to him that the Shanghai

question diouId be settled on the basis of complete neutralization so that China

could save the great commercial and financial metropolis for herself. I replied

that that would be contrary to the principle of sovereignty and territorial

integrity of China. Thereupon Mr. Davis said that that was also his view, that he

did not think that neutralization would be the best thing.

As regards the restoration of the 1932 agreement, Mr. Davis said the Japanese

had been claiming that it was China who first sent troops into the demilitarized

zone and took the offensive against Japan. I said that that was only a Japanese

allegation. The truth was that Japan had so greatly increased her marine force

in Shanghai that China was obliged to take precautionary measures in self-defense.

If Japan objected to the presence of armed gendarmerie and peace preservation

corps as different from the police force, she should also be willing to have

her own marine force strictly limited to a number sufficient for the protection

of her nationals in the Settlement. However, such an agreement should be placed

under the supervision of the international commission, which was set up as a

result of the 1932 agreement, and should have a fixed term of years. Mr. Davis

commented that this would be a more practical arrangement.

Turning to the question of North China, I said Japan should in any case

withdraw all her troops. If she was really sincere about the need for economic
 10

cooperation in North China, then a feasible suggestion from a third party

might be to have a demilitarized zone on both sides of the boundary, between

Hopei and Chahar on the one side and Manchuria and Jehol on the other, so

as to prevent thereby any possible clash of arms.

Mr. Davis thought this would be impossible for the Japanese to accept.

He said he had come to realize that Japan was really bent on the conquest of

China and the destruction of her independence. Economic cooperation alone would

not satisfy Japan in the present circumstance^ nor would the idea of a

demilitarized zone as I had suggested.

I said as an inducement to Japan to withdraw all her troops from North

China, the powers might propose to abolish the military clauses of the Boxer

Protocol of 1901, thereby saving the face of Japan, because in agreeing to

withdraw her troops, and other powers would also withdraw theirs. The abolition

of these military clauses would be really well advised on the part of the powers

because the stationing of a small number of troops served no useful purpose

inasmuch as Peking was no longer the capital of China. (As a matter of fact,

this same idea, abolition of the military clauses from the Boxer Protocol, had

been proposed in one of the memoranda, called the Chinese Desiderata, presented

to the Versailles peace Conference in Paris and was again proposed at the

Washington Conference.)

In Mr. Davis' opinion this was a good idea, and he said that it would be

a good reason for asking Japan to withdraw all her troops from North China. He

also thought that perhaps some form of federation of the northern provinces

within the orbit of the Central government would be a feasible compromise, and

asked me for my view. I said in reply that that was a political reconstruction

question, which China might be willing to consider provided that it was freely

decided by China alone and that Japan would promise not to interfere in any way

and would withdraw all her troops, and further provided that such reconstruction
 11

was to be confined only to the provinces of Hopei and Chahar and not to the

other provinces in the North. Mr. Davis remarked that of course that would

have to be understood.

Mr. Davis went on to say that, taking this situation as a whole and in view

of the increased rigor of Japan's operations in China, he thought there were only

two ways in which Japan could be made to stop and come to a settlement. One was

China's defeat of Japan and the other collective intervention of the powers. In

the absence of the first alternative, the second was the only one which would be

able to impose a settlement upon Japan. A third possibility, he said, was Japan's

gaining a decisive victory over China. While that would not mean her permanent

conquest of China, it certainly might mean that for 50 or 100 years China would

not be able to recover her strength to throw off the Japanese yoke. What was

more regrettable was that Japan would thereby be able to halt permanently the

work of political and economic reconstruction, which had been making so much

progress in recent years in China.

I told Mr. Davis that the Japanese had been pushing China very hard, and

while she was determined to continue her resistance, the situation was becoming

more critical every day in the absence of prompt aid from abroad. I urged that

intervention was certainly the most effective step for the powers to take

and that that greatly depended upon the United States. I said I understood that

the recent Anglo-French conversations in London also came to the conclusion that

while Great Britain and France were ready to cooperate with the other powers in

any action, they were not prepared to act without such collaboration. Nevertheless,

I added, Great Britain was quite anxious about the Far Eastern situation and

earnestly desired that some common action should be undertaken.

Mr. Davis expressed agreement with my view, and said that up till the

time of the Brussels Conference, Great Britain had not been worried bout the Far

East, but recent events had increased her anxiety and made her strongly desirous
 12

of acting in concert with other powers. He did not know whether the United

States would be able to join in any collective intervention^, but he was hurrying

back to talk things over with Washington. He told me that, judging from an

editorial in the New York Times, he felt public opinion in the United States was

developing in favor of a more active policy. He said London would like to see

the United States take the initiative, but the latter could not do it without

the support of public opinion. He also told me that Japan had intimated her

desire to see the United States acting as a mediator alone, but he believed that

that was a move to separate England and the United States and cause jealousy

between them. He knew that the same intimation had been given in London to the

effect that Japan would like to see Great Britain acting alone as mediator. In

any case, Mr. Davis said, the United States would not agree to act as mediator

alone unless it received a positive assurance from Japan that she would not make

exorbitant and unreasonable demands. Without such an assurance, it would be

useless for the United States to act. He added that the Japanese in Paris had

been trying to see him and have a talk with him, but he had declined because he

knew that they could not speak in the name of their government, just as the

Japanese Ambassador in Brussels had been saying things which did not reflect

the wishes of Tokyo.

Referring to the London conversations, which I had mentioned, Mr. Davis

said he understood the French had been telling people that they had proposed an

oil embargo in Brussels and that he, Davis, had rejected it. When I told him that

I had been told this by two members of the French government, Mr. Davis said it

was not true. The French had made no such suggestion to him, and it was not fair

that they should be saying things to cover up their own weakness. Even if an

oil embargo were to be adopted, it was evident that France could not contribute

very much, because she was not an important oil-producing country. It would mean

that theburden would fall upon the United States, Great Britain and Holland. He
 13

recalled that somebody else had mentioned the subject but certainly not the

French. I said possibly the Dutch had mentioned it, but then they would not

join in any embargo unless they were given an assurance for the Dutch Indies.

Mr. Davis told me that that was precisely the Dutch position. They would

ask for an assurance of protection by Great Britain and the United States, which

was something the United States could not promise. It would be easier for the

United States to send a fleet out there without saying anything and if necessary

just act, but it could not commit itself to any foreign country to any action

of this character.

I expressed the hope that the United States would make some move in the near

future, whereupon Mr. Davis expressed the hope that China would hold on until the

end of the year. He said he was hurrying back to the United States, and after

talking things over with the President, there might be a move, but it could not

come before the end of the year. (It was a hope, which didn't materialize.)

On December 14, I paid a visit to M. Alexis L£ger, Secretary-General of the

French Foreign Ministry, to discuss with him the question of what the powers

would do in connection with the Sino-Japanese conflict. I told him that on the

eve of his departure for London he had been good enough to tell me that he would

inform me of the outcome of the conversations there upon his return. I added that

I had noticed in the communiqud published in London that the question of the Far

East was referred to.

M. Ldger said the Far Eastern question had only been touched upon in a genera]

way, and there was no discussion. There were so many questions to be discussed

that the question of the Sino-Japanese conflict was not considered in any detail .

It was the same with the Spanish problem.

I then referred to a statement in the communique which said that England

and France were ready to collaborate with other powers and that they fully

realized the gravity of the situation. M. L^ger explained that when they came
 14

to draw up a draft communique, they felt that the Far Eastern question should not

be left unmentioned. Therefore reference was made to it in the document, but

there was no more than two-minutes' discussion over it. (What appeared in black

and white was so different from what actually took place behind the scenes. But

I suppose that was the purpose of issuing a communique.)

I said the Brussels Conference had been a disappointment to China and it

had been hoped that the conversations in London might result in some new move

being undertaken toward a settlement of the Far Eastern problem. The Secretary-

General informed me, however, that there was nothing in the sense of a new move

and that the opinion in both Great Britain and France was that the situation

should be watched carefully. (That was a threadbare diplomatic phrase to cover

a lot of inactivity and unwonted neglect.) He added that, whenever a new opportunit

should arise for cooperation in the world with other powers, they were prepared

to act, but they were not contemplating any new demarche.

I asked whether M. L6ger meant that no new move was contemplated as regards

the whole situation. He said it was not, because, in the first place, there had

been no new development since the Brussels Conference; secondly, China had not

asked for any new demarche; and thirdly, there was no harmony of views among the

powers as to what should be done in the circumstances, more particularly because

of the negative attitude of the United States.

I told him that Italy and Germany had appraoched China several times,

intimating their readiness to act as mediators between China and Japan. I told

him that even two days ago the German Ambassador in Nanking had again approached

the Chinese government for the same purpose. China, however, had heretofore

refused to entertain the idea of German-Italian mediation. The Chinese government

had always maintained the position that the Sino-Japanese conflict was a matter of

concern to all the signatory powers of the Nine power Treaty, and therefore had
 15

always remained loyal to the idea of collaboration with Great Britain, France,

the United States and the others. Since the situation had become more critical

every day, however, the Chinese government was anxious to know what could be

expected from the British, French and American governments as regards the

possibility of an early settlement. The Chinese government, I said, was anxious

to know that in order that it might consider the whole situation and, if necessary,

take a decision as to the line of policy to be followed in the future.

M. Ldger said the offer of mediation by Italy and Germany could not be

real mediation. It could only mean bringing pressure upon China to enter into

direct negotiations with Japan. If they were to benefit Japan, it must be at the

expense of China, just as a direct settlement with Japan would be at China's

expense. According to information received in London and Paris from Japanese

sources, Japan would not accept the good offices of any third party, except for

the purpose of bringing China and Japan together for direct negotiations.

I replied that I believed the interest of Italy and Germany in offering

mediation to China was not really confined to the Far East. In my view, it was

more for the purpose of advancing their European policy. Both of them had intimated

their desire to see China join the Anti-Comintern Pact, in return for which they

would persuade Japan to reduce her demands on China.

The Secretary-General then remarked that he had always understood that

China was determined to continue the resistance in order to exhaust Japan in the

end, and thus be able to make a reasonable settlement. If she was now anxious

to make peace with Japan, either to prevent the disruption of political unity or

for other reasons, it was of course for China to decide for herself. But in his

view seeking a settlement through the intermediary of Italy and Germany uould be

tantamount to a capitulation to Japan.

I told him that, in so far as political unity was concerned, there was

no danger of its destruction. On the contrary, the whole nation was still determine
 16

to continue its resistance against the Japanese aggression. But to be able to

resist there must be means with which to do it. China, in order to continue her

resistance, must depend in great part upon supplies from abroad of arms and

credit. The stock of reserves which she had could not last very long. It was

for that reason, I said, that the Chinese government had told the powers of its

needs in the circumstances, as explained in the memorandum which I had handed

to him earlier. I asked him whether the memorandum (the same memorandum that

had been communicated to the British and American governments and to Mr. Davis

the other day in Paris) had been discussed in London. When M. Ldger remarked

that the British did not mention it and so it was not discussed, I told him that

the British government had stated it would take the matter into urgent consideration

I then asked M. L6ger what I could tell my government as to the reply of the French

government to the memorandum. He said that the memorandum was brought to London,

and M. Delbos, the Foreign Minister had been fully informed of it. The French

government, like the British government would take it into consideration.

M. L4ger also stated that, considering the problem with China, he thought

the attitude of the Soviet Union was of the greatest importance. He wondered

whether Russia was d;oing much to help China. I told him that Soviet Russia was

not doing too badly and that China was getting a great amount of material help

from her already. He thought that if the Soviet Union could take a step forward

and take a more positive action in the form of a military demonstration, it would

serve to draw a?ay at least half of the Japanese troops in the North and thereby

relieve the pressure upon China. He thought such action on Russia's part would

also encourage the United States to feel more disposed to act in South China.

Thereupon I told him that Soviet Russia was prepared to act only if other

powers would assure her of Collective action, which assurance I understood they

would not give.

When M. L6ger said that China should send someone to Moscow and Washington
 17

to discuss ways and means of help, I told him that Dr. Sun Fo, President

of the Legislative Yuan, was already on his way to Moscow by air, and that

Dr. Hu Shih was in America keeping in touch with President Roosevelt. M. L6ger

thought that these moves were all very important. If Soviet Russia could act

more positively, the United States would be encouraged and give more help, which

in turn would enable Great Britain and France to follow.

All my conversations with the leaders of the French government, as well as

with the delegates of the other powers while I was still in Brussels, indicated

very clearly that none of them was disposed to take the initiative. Each tried

to stay behind the backs of the others, hoping that some other powers would

take the lead, a situation which was most discouraging to Clina at the time and

which really did not serve the general cause of world peace, either in Europe or

in the Far East.

The situation in both Europe and the Far East was deteriorating. In China

the rapid success and advance of the Japanese armed forces had finally forced the

evacuation of Nanking, and on the day of my conversation with M. Ldger, December 14,

the Japanese actually took over the city. The defense of Nanking lasted nine days.

The Chinese defenders made heroic sacrifices and exacted a heavy price from the

enemy. Casualties suffered by Japan were extremely heavy, though casualties on

both sides were also very heavy in the street fighting, until December 14, when

the Chinese authorities ordered complete withdrawal from the city.

People in China as well as the friendly powers in the West, hoped that China

would be able to ride this storm and continue to resist Japan without yielding to

her increasingly oppressive action, in spite of the deterioration of the international

situation to the detriment of China’s position abroad. The Generalissimo, who, like

President Roosevelt, always had an ear to the ground as to the feelings and sentimentf

of the people as a whole, issued a timely statement on December 14 from Field

Headquarters. He declared that China would continue to resist Japanese invasion

 18

notwithstanding the evacuation of Nanking. He stated in part, that "withdrawal

from Nanking will have no effect upon the government’s policy of resisting

Japanese aggression, but actually strengthens the national determination to

continue fighting. Since the seat of government has moved elsewhere, Nanking no

longer holds either political or military significance. I therefore ordered

withdrawal of forces from Nanking to other lines, in accordance with our

plan to withdraw whenever the enemy's superior armaments makes necessary too great

a sacrifice."

The situation was really very critical not only because of the steady advance

of the Japanese troops, but also because of the audacious conduct of the Japanese

military and naval authorities in China, even in dealing with the United States

and Great Britain. It will be recalled that on December 12, the United States

gunboat, Panay, was bombed by Japanese planes flying just above Nanking, and was

finally sunk, resulting in a number of casualties. At about the same time that

the panay incident took place, a number of British merchant ships were also

attacked by Japanese planes near Wuhu and Nanking, and the H.M.S. Ladybird was

fired upon. One seaman was killed and several others were wounded. According to

the British-owned Central China Post, there was no mistake about the attacks being

intentional on the part of Japan.

Shortly before these incidents, Italy had announced the recognition of

"Manchukuo." which led to China filing a protest in Rome. When I had first learned

of the news, I telegraphed to the Waichiaopu, suggesting that the Chinese government

should make a strong protest, not only in Rome but also to the League of Nations,

with the request that the text of the protest should be communicated to the

governments of all member states on the ground that Italy had in 1933 approved

and voted for the League's resolution not to recognize "Manchukuo" and that therefore

her act in extending recognition of "Manchukuo" was in violation of her own promise

as recorded in her vote in support of the League resolution.

 19

Four days later, on December 3, 1937, a telegram from the Waichiaopu informed

me and Ambassador Tsien Tai, who was associated with me in the original telegram

to which this was a reply, that Ambassador Liu in Rome had protested to the

Italian Foreign Minister in accordance with instructions from the Ministry. Now

the Waichiaopu had issued a formal statement condemning the Italian action as being

in violation of the Nine Power Treaty of Washington, the Covenant of the League of

Nations and the repeated resolutions of the League relating to the Sino-Japanese

conflict. The statement further declared that the Chinese government therefore

reserved its firm stand in this matter. The telegram added that a copy of the

statement was sent to the League Secretariat for the record and for communication

to the different member governments, and also to the American Ambassador for the

information of his government.

My conversation with M. L4ger on December 21, threw much light upon the

situation in China, the attitude of the principal powers relating to it, and the

position and the intention of the Chinese government in dealing with the situation.

According to my notes of the conversation, I said that, as I had told M. L6ger the

week before, a Japanese attack on Canton now appeared imminent, and the British

government seemed anxious. I understood there was a possibility of making a naval

demonstration in South China. The British press suggested that in case Great

Britain should be obliged to reinforce her Far Eastern squadron by sending ships

from her Mediterranean fleet, France would replace with French ships the slack

left by the British vessels so as not to weaken the Anglo-French nav »1 strength

in the Mediterranean. I asked whether the French government had been approached

by the British government on the matter, and whether the French government would

be disposed to collaborate with Great Britain in this respect.

M. L6ger replied that France herself could not send ships to the Far

East owing to her preoccupations in Europe. The attitude of Germany and Italy,

in cooperating with Japan in the Far East, was not too reassuring for Europe.
 20

After the conclusion of the Versatile Treaty, it was understood that Great Britain

would provide one-fifth of the necessary naval strength in the Mediterranean and

France four-fifths. At that time, the Italian navy was far less powerful than it

was now and the German navy had been greatly reduced as the result of the war.

But Great Britain, without consulting France, made a naval agreement with Germany

allowing the latter to rebuild her navy. Today the German navy was not to be

neglected and the Italian navy had become far more powerful. There was no

certainty that Italy would not take advantage of any reduced naval strength

on the part of England and France in the Mediterranean to make trouble for France.

The transfer of the American fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific, said

M. L6ger, offered at the same time a temptation to Germany, because, after all,

American participation in the next war was a possibility upon which Germany must

count. In his view, not only was France unable to replace Great Britain in the

Mediterranean, but Great Britain herself could hardly afford to transfer any

important part of her fleet in the Mediterranean to the Far East. Japan had

evidently timed her action in China in order to take full advantage of the

unsettled situation in Europe. Germany and Italy also knew that the Soviet Union

was not in a position to pose any serious threat in Europe, when the situation in

the Far East was so threatening for her.

M. L6ger doubted whether the reported naval demonstration would take place.

At any rate, the British government had not approached the French government on

the subject . He pointed out that at the Brussels Conference the French government

had proposed cooperation among the French, British and American fleets in the Far

East on the ground that Indochina, being called upon to help most, was necessarily

more exposed than either of the other two powers to Japanese retaliation and that,

therefore, in order to continue this help in the form of transit for Chinese arms

and war material, it was necessary that the three countries should collaborate

in full solidarity. But the French proposition was turned down, the the American
 21

refusal was rather brutal. In view of the rejection of the French proposal

made in the interest of China, M. L6ger did not think that the British government

would feel justified in asking for the cooperation of the French navy in the Far

East. France had proposed an arrangement of common action in the Far East which,

if accepted, would have served a very useful purpose in the present circumstances.

The British, he thought, would find it more embarrassing to propose such action

now, because what they had in view was evidently not to help Chinii but really to

protect Hongkong.

I told M. L6ger that the situation created in the Far East by Japanese

aggression was becoming more critical every day, and that relations between Japan,

the United States and Great Britain were becoming more tense as a result of

Japanese attacks on British and American ships on the Yangtze. Both Washington

and London had asked for specific and definite assurances that similar incidents

would not occur again. It seemed to me, I said, that the best guarantee against any

such repetition would be the cessation of Japanese hostilities in China. I

wondered whether France, who had a greater liberty of action because of the

absence of any similar incidents between France and Japan, would feel disposed to

make a suggestion to Japan, when an opportune moment came, for the cessation of

hostilities. I felt that such a suggestion would be of service not only to Sino-

Japanese relations but also to Anglo-Japanese and American-Japanese relations. It

would also serve the cause of world peace, because unless the hostilities should

stop in time, there was no telling that they would not so aggravate the situation

as to cause a general conflagration.

M. Ldger said certainly Washington and London, with their hands full in

dealing with the incidents on the Yangtze, could not make a suggestion for the

cessation of hostilities. As regards the French government, he did not think

that China could justifiably urge it to make the suggestion. Not very long ago,

the Chinese government had softly accepted German mediation, although the
 22

acceptance was a great surprise and gave rise to suspicion not only in Paris but

also in London and Washington. It was felt in all three capitals that Germany

was obviously an ally of Japan. Her mediation could only mean Germany working in

the interests of Japan by persuading China to accept Japan's conditions of peace.

She herself certainly had a definite object in proposing such mediation. It was

to persuade China to join the anti-communist pact. If her mission should succeed,

surely China would then have gone to the side of the anti-communist bloc in

opposition to Great Britain, America and France. It was evident that General

Chiang was ready to join the Italo-German-Japanese camp. In view of such an

inclination on the part of General Chiang, the French, British and American

governments had felt it necessary to maintain an attitude of prudence and caution.

He felt that the best thing for them to do would be to watch how German mediation

would succeed, and certainly to refrain from taking any initiative on their own part

I said that General Chiang, in his conversations with the German Ambassador,

asked for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops as a condition precedent to the

opening of negotiations for peace. This was really a polite way of refusing

German mediation, as it was well known that Japan would not accept such a condition.

M. L6ger said it meant, nevertheless, that negotiations had been started

through German mediation. If the withdrawal of Japanese troops was a Chinese

condition precedent to the opening of negotiations for peace, he thought there

could be no prospect of success for any mediation on the part of the Anglo-American-

French group .

I said that would, of course, be subject to negotiation, if Great Britain,

America and France offered mediation. A month ago there was a small section of

public opinion in favor of accepting any mediation, because the policy of China

had been one of peace. But this feeling, on the part of a small section of the

people, had disappeared now. The great bulk of opinion, in and outside of the

government, was in favor of cooperation with democratic countries in Europe and

 23

America, and preferred their mediation to that of either Germany or Italy. There

was no question of China’s joining any anti-communist pact. In fact, the

Chinese government had made it known to the German Ambassador that China could not

accept it.

M. Ldger said if the mediation succeeded, China's joining such a pact would

be one of the conditions, and that at the conclusion of peace, China would be

found on the side of Germany and Italy. I assured him that that would not take

place.

M. Ldger said that democratic countries would not take any initiative, unless

requested by the Chinese government, and he asked me what I had said really

represented the desire of the Chinese government. I said I was not speaking in the

name of my government. It had merely occurred to me that, in view of the tense

relations between Japan and Great Britain and America, as well as the aggravated

situation between China and Japan, the best way to solve the whole situation would

be to bring about a cessation of hostilities, thereby removing the danger of

further aggravation. What I was most interested in knowing, I said, was M. Ldger's

personal reaction to the possibility of the French government’s taking the initiative

in making such a suggestion.

M. L6ger said his personal view was that the present was not the moment to

make such a suggestion. Before the fall of Nanking there was a moment when it

appeared that a cessation of hostilities might be arranged. But the situation

had become much worse now and the Japanese, in the flush of their military success,

had become more uncompromising than ever. If peace was to be asked of Japan now,

it would be on conditions which China could not accept. He himself felt that he

could not recommend such a suggestion to the French government, at any rate at

present. The best thing for China to do now, in his opinion, was to continue her

resistance. He understood that China was determined to carry on a w-.r of

exhaustion against Japan. That, he thought, was a right policy to follow. As the

Japanese pushed further into the interior of China, their position would become
 24

more and more difficult. The moment would arrive when she would find the burden

too heavy to bear, and that would be the moment to talk of peace. Already the

Japanese financial situation was very precarious. He' expenses for carrying on the
A
war in China, on top of the financial burden of running "Manchukuo," had become

a great strain on her. She could not borrow a cent in New York or London, and still

less in Paris. In his view, Japan could not continue long without finding it

necessary to call a halt.

As regards the probability of a naval demonstration, M. L6ger thought that

if the British sent out a naval reinforcement to the Far East, they would be

doing it not to frighten Japan but as a measure of precaution for the defense

of Hongkong. They did not think that Japan would provoke a war with Great Britain.

They were rather afraid of further incidents, and felt a strong force would prevent

their recurrence. The civilians in Japan did not want war with Great Britain nor wit

the United States, knowing full well the severe financial and economic strain

already experienced by their country. Only the extreme militarists in Japan were

blind to the different aspects of the situation-political, economic and financial.

He believed that Japan's present incidents with Great Britain and the United

States would all be settled when the Emperor was informed of them and called

upon to make a final decision, unless a military coup d'etat should take place in

the meanwhile. For China the best thing, he thought, would be to continue

resistance and to hold together unless, in the interest of internal unity, it was

absolutely necessary to stop fighting.

I told him that as far as the internal situation was concerned, it had never

been better. People of all classes and parties were determined to continue the

policy of resistance. There was no danger of any disruption of the political unity

which had recently been achieved.

Speaking of the British policy in the Far East, M. L6ger said that the week

before the British government had proposed to the French government and also, he
 25

understood^ to the American government the withdrawal of the diplomatic personnel

in Peiping and of the respective North China garrisons. It was a proposition that

the French government could not accept, and it had given a negative reply two days

ago, outlining the reasons for the French refusal. He proceeded to read the reply,

which dealt with the legal and political aspects of the French position. Legally,

the reply pointed out that the right of stationing guards and the garrison in

North China was derived from an international agreement . It was part of a

collective arrangement, and it was not only a right vis-a-vis China but also a

common obligation amongst the powers signatory to the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Accordingly, the French government believed that any alteration of the arrangement

should be brought about by common consent of all the signatory powers.

Politically, M. Ldger said, the withdrawal would be tantamount to consecrating

the Japanese gain in North China and giving the impression that the northern

Chinese provinces were recognized by the powers as having been definitely removed

from the authority of the Chinese central government. Far from weakening the

present regime, the proposed withdrawal would rather fortify it in the view of the

Chinese people and of the world, because it would amount, in fact, to the

recovery of a right that the Chinese Central government had tried unsuccessfully

for years to bring about. The puppet regime in Peiping would claim it to its credit.

M. Liger said the note also pointed out that, as regards the existence

of a puppet regime in Peiping, the situation had existed at other times in the past

notably in 1924. He said the continued presence of the diplomatic staff and the

guards did not necessarily imply any recognition of such a regime. In this

connection, I handed him a copy of the Chinese government's declaration defining

its position with regard to the puppet regime.

M. L6ger said the real reason for the British proposal was the fear of

isolated attack on the British garrison in case a clash should take place

in defense of Hongkong. Of course, the question of the proposed withdrawal

 26

might be taken up for consideration and negotiation at a diplomatic conference,

especially if the Japanese should insist upon it. But he thought the present

was certainly a bad moment for any of the powers to take the initiative itself.

Two days later I took Mr. Ch’en Kung-po to see French Foreign Minister

Delbos, who had recently returned from a visit to Eastern Europe and the Balkan

Countries. When I asked for his impressions, M. Delbos thought the situation

showed some improvement in the direction of relaxation. He said all the agree­

ments and pacts that France had concluded with different countries in that

region remained in force.

Mr. Ch'en expressed, through me, the hope that, in view of the improvement

in the European situation, France would find herself in a position to take a

more active part in the Far Eastern situation. M. Delbos said unfortunately the

attitude of Italy in the Mediterranean appeared rather disconcerting. Italy’s

ultimate intentions in that region were still unpredictable. Therefore, France

could not relax her attention in Europe. The French navy was far weaker than

that of either Great Britian or the United States. France could not then

extend extensive support with her navy. Besides, she had preoccupations on

three fronts, namely, Germany on the Continent, Italy in the Mediterranean,

and Spain behind her. She would certainly support Great Britian and America

in the Far East morally, but really Washington held the key to the situation in

the Far East. The United States had the most powerful navy and was free from

all preoccupations.
Mr. Ch'en said Italy had by recognition of "Manchukuo" disclosed her

unfriendly attitude towards China. He would like to know whether M. Delbos would

agree with him in saying that the German policy was not necessarily the same as

that of Italy. M. Delbos said that Mr. Ch'en might be right, but that he was

inclined to think that Germany and Italy, as signatories of the anti-communist

pact with Japan, all intended to exploit the troubles in the Far East to their

own advantage in Europe.

Mr. Ch'en said some time ago there was an offer of German mediation, but he
 27

had just received a telegram from General Chiang stating that China had

rejected the German mediation and preferred to cooperate with Great Britain,

France, the United States and Soviet Russia, not only to solve the Far Eastern

problem but also to uphold the cause of peace. The burning of the Japanese cotton

mills in Tsingtao under orders from the Chinese High Command was a measure of

retaliation against Japan. The transfer of the capital first to Hankow and now to

Chungking all went to show the determination of China to continue the policy of

resistance. Mr. Ch'en hoped that France, in collaboration with Great Britain

and the United States, would render as much aid to China as possible in her

resistance against Japanese aggression.

M. Delbos assured Mr. Ch'en of France's sympathy and efforts in the past both

in Geneva and in Brussels. She had proposed close collaboration with Great Britain

and the United States, he said, but the United States did not approve of the idea

and preferred to follow an independent policy. France alone, he added, could not

do very much.

I said in London there was talk of the possibility of making a joint

naval demonstration with the United States in the Far East. I expressed my hope

that France would cooperate in such a measure if it materialized. M. Delbos said

the French navy was not as strong as that of Great Britain or the United States.

She could only support the demonstration morally and could not send ships to the

Far East in view of the situation in Europe. When I asked whether France could

not render support to Great Britain in the Mediterranean by strengthening the

naval force there after Great Britain removed part of her fleet to reinforce her

naval strength in the Far East, M. Delbos replied that France could of course do

that, although Italy, at the time of the arrangement for joint naval patrol in

the Mediterranean, had declared that, in case Great Britain should reduce the

number of her ships in the Mediterranean, Italy could not agree to the gap being

filled by the French navy. In other words, Italy would not agree to France's
 28

adding to her fleet in the Mediterranean. When I observed that that was a

unilateral declaration on the part of Italy and I presumed that France had not

accepted it, M. Delbos concurred in this observation.

Mr. Ch'en said three weeks ago, when talking with M. Blum, the latter

expressed the view that if it was impossible to secure the cooperation of the

United States, then the close collaboration of Great Britain, France and the

Soviet Union would be sufficient to impose a settlement upon Japan. But last week

when he, Ch'en, was in England he had seen both Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Eden, and

the two British statesmen expressed the same view, namely, that the situation in

the Far East really depended on the close cooperation of Great Britain and the

United States. Mr. Ch'en thought that both courses of action might be followed

at the same time resulting in the eventual cooperation of the four powers, namely,

Great Britain, the United States, France and the Soviet Union.

M. Delbos said a united front of the four powers would be strong enough

to settle any problem. But he wished to point out that the key to the whole

situation was in the hands of the United States. As regards Soviet Russia, both

Great Britain and America did not feel the same confidence in her as in France,
'Vl
now were the relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union as intimate

as those between France and Moscow. As desirable as the four power cooperation

was, he did not think that it could be realized in the immediate future.

On December 30 I again called on Foreign Minister Delbos and had an important

conversation primarily on the terms for a settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict

recently proposed by Japan and conveyed by Trautmann, the German Ambassador in

China. I began by telling M. Delbos that I had been asked by my government to

inform him confidentially of the recent demarche made by the German Ambassador

in China, transmitting to the Chinese government the four conditions of peace

conveyed to him through Berlin by the Japanese government. They were as follows:

1. Abandonment by China of the so-called pro-communist policy and of the so-

called anti-Japanese and anti "Manchukuo" policies, and cooperation by China

 29

in the execution of the anti-communist policy;

2. Establishment of demilitarized zones and special regimes in necessary areas;

3. Close economic cooperation between China, ''Manchukuo,M and Japan and

4. Indemnification to Japan.

These conditions, I told him, appeared inacceptable to the Chinese government,

which deemed them even difficult to consider. Nevertheless, before formulating

a reply, the Chinese government would like to know the reaction of the French

government.

M. Delbos expressed his appreciation of the confidence which the Chinese

government placed in him in communicating to him the gist of the conditions of

peace. Of course, China was the best judge in a matter of such great importance.

But while he could not at once speak in the name of the French government, his

personal impression was that the conditions appeared rather hard. For one thing,

there were foreign interests in China which Japan entirely ignored. The proposed

demilitarization of Chinese territories and the setting up of special regimes meant

that Japan wanted to put its hand on China's political and military sovereignty,

whereas the so-called close economic cooperation was evidently intended to obtain

the control of China's economic resources. The demand for an indemnity was really

comical in the midst of a tragedy. It was impossible for him to understand why the

aggressor should be compensated for his acts of aggression.

I observed that this was the third time that Germany had taken the trouble to

transmit conditions from Japan, testifying to Germany's keen desire to see the

Sino-Japanese hostilities terminated. Italy, on her part, had also on previous

occasions persuaded China to come to terms with Japan. Judging from these actions

of Germany and Italy, I said, I could not but emphasize the bearing of the Sino-

Japanese conflict on the situation in Europe. It was evident that Germany and

Italy would like to see that Japan was not too deeply engaged in China in order that

Japan's armed strength was not weakened too much. For as long as Japan was fully
 30

occupied Iti China, she could not render effective assistance to the anti-communist

group, and thereby weakened, to that extent,the strength of the group's position

in Europe vis-S-vis Great Britain and France. I asked whether M. Delbos viewed

the situation in the same light.

M. Delbos said undoubtedly Germany and Italy would like to see Japan conserve

her strength in order to confront the Soviet Union in the Far East. The weakening

of Japan's armed strength meant the diminution of the power of the anti-communist

group. I then said the Chinese government was determined to continue to resist

Japanese aggression, but that the urgent need was that of supplies from abroad.

[This was the second matter I wished to discuss with M. Delbos.]

M. Delbos said he fully agreed with me on this point. He stated that the

Minister of Colonies, M. Moutet, had just told him that morning that he

(M. Moutet) had received a telegram from the Governor-General of Indochina

complaining of the want of discretion on the part of the Chinese agents in

Indochina. According to the telegram, the latter went about testing the

airplanes and assembling them openly without any regard for the need of secrecy.

Their careless attitude had been worrying the Governor-General and caused him

great embarrassment. He said that as I knew, the Japanese had been protesting

to France against her grant of transit facilities to Chinese shipments of arms

and munitions. In the face of Chinese indiscretions, not only the Governor-

General in Indochina, but he himself had been confronted by the Japanese Charge

d'Affaires in Paris with facts and evidence of such shipments going through

Indochina. The Japanese had intimated they would take measures of retaliation

against Indochina and occupy Hainan Island--measures which would in the end

react as much against China as against Indochina. He hoped that the Chinese

government would cooperate with France in this matter.

Detecting signs of great dissatisfaction on his part, I assured him at once

that I would telegraph again to my government, asking it to give strict orders

 31

to the Chinese representatives in Indochina to observe the greatest care, ^

because I fully appreciated the necessity of taking the utmost precaution for

secrecy. M. Delbos said in a matter of this sort it was useless to cry out on the

roof. Secrecy was essential to success.

I said what was needed in China most now was heavy guns. I told him I had

just received a telegram from Dr. Kung asking me to approach the French government

with a view to obtaining 120 Scheneider cannons with a range between 21 and

13,000 mm., and four cannons with a range between 25 and 26,000 mm. M. Delbos

said he did not know whether the French government, which was also pursuing

its own program of rearmament, had these guns in stock.

I said, if necessary, the Chinese government would buy them from France.

In any case, I hoped that M. Delbos would speak to M. Daladier, the War Minister,

who might be of help. M. Delbos said he would do so, and speak to M.

Chautemps, the President of the Council, about it as well. ^

I asked whether M. Delbos had been able to consider the contents of the

aide-memoire on aid to China, [which I had presented to the French government

previously.] M. Delbos replied that on account of activities in parliament

during the last few days, he had not been able to talk it over with M. L6ger,

who had been absent, but who was expected to return that evening.

[In short,] the situation in December 1937 was an anxious time for China.

I continually sent many telegrams to the government on both the situation in

Europe and on our own expectations of aid and support from the European powers.

I also had discussions with my colleagues from Berlin, London and Brussels,

and with special envoys from China, such as Li Yii-ying, Chiang Pai-li, and Ch'en

Kung-po, trying to evaluate the world situation as a whole as bearing upon the

Chinese situation, and trying to find some practicable formula with a view to

seeking and obtaining some effective aid from China's friends abroad. The

results of our discussions in the Embassy in Paris were summarized in a telegram

 32

which we all approved, but which was sent in the name of Ch'en Kung-po, as a

member of the government in China, to the Generalissimo, to Wang Ching-wei,

and to H. H. Kung.

[The telegram, dated December 29, stated that] Great Britain, France and

Soviet Russia were all looking to the United States to take a lead in connection

with the Sino-Japanese conflict. Germany and Italy were pursuing a policy of

their own, and their stand was entirely different from that of the previous four

powers. What policy we should adopt before Great Britain and the United States

could agree to cooperate effectively was a problem that the government should

consider very carefully. We said that, in our view, to reconvene the Nine Power

Conference would probably not be an effective measure in the circumstances. On the

other hand, if China were to return to the League of Nations and make another

appeal, it would necessarily imply the sidetracking of the United States. Moreover,

we understood that more than half the League members were already contemplating^

and would be in favor ofjthe abolition of all provisions in the Covenant relating

to the application of sanctions against any member. Therefore, it would be

difficult to expect that any proposal, even for a limited embargo, could be

adopted by the League. In the light of these factors in the situation, and

weighing them all carefully, we said we were inclined to consider that the

first step should be to consider the possibility of reconvening the Brussels

Conference, in view of the fact that Norman Davis, the U. S. representative at the

Conference, had repeatedly declared that the Conference had not been terminated,

that it had only been adjourned and that he would return to Washington, report

to his government and hold consultations as to what the next step should be.

In view of the critical situation in Europe, we stated that it seemed to us

that the key to the whole Sino-Japanese problem rested really with the United

States. Therefore, we all believed that we should begin by consulting the

United States wholeheartedly to ascertain its attitude. We could approach it

by suggesting the reconvening of the Brussels Conference, in order thus to sound out
 33

its real intention. If the United States diould feel that the time was stil l

premature for another meeting of the Brussels Conference^ then we could raise

the question and ask its views toward our bringing another appeal to the League

of Nations. We suggested that Ambassador C. T. Wang should be asked to take steps

at once to consult the United States government in Washington.

[Earlier, ] on December 17, I had received instructions from the Waichinopu

stating that the government was disposed to and intended to bring the Sino-Japanese

conflict before the Advisory Committee on the League of Nations once again. I was

directed to consult my colleague in London, Quo Tai-chi, and then give our views

on the proposal.

[In my conversation of the 30th, I also brought this subject up with Del bos. |

I said that the Chinese government was considering the advisability of again taking

the question of the Sino-Japanese conflict either before the Advisory Conmittee or

before the Council of the Assembly in Geneva I said I would like to know M. Del bos

view of the prospect of such a step.

M. Delbos said he did not see what concrete result could be expected from the

League. As far as sanctions were concerned, it had been evident the last time in

Geneva that a number of nations tried to curry the favor of Germany and Italy and

were against sanctions. There were others who even appeared to be opposing China.

This want of unanimity, he added, was also evident in the Spanish question.

I said if economic sanctions could not be adopted, possibly an embargo on

oil might be taken up more easily, as it would touch the interests of only a few

nations. M. Delbos agreed that for an oil embargo, the cooperation of only three

countries was necessary, namely, the United States, Great Britain and Holland.

He understood that American supplied at least 40 or 45 percent of Japan's oil.

But he added that for the adoption of such a measure, it was not necessary to

bring it before the League, which, in trying to put it through, might run the risk

of complicating matters. If, on the other hand, the three countries agreed, M.
 34

Delbos felt the measure could be put into effect at once. Asked about the

possibility of an embargo on arms to Japan, M. Delbos said it could not be passed

in the present circumstances of the League. At any rate, he thought that it would

be desirable, before taking up the question again at Geneva, to do some sounding

out at different capitals.

Following the interview with M. Delbos, I received a visit from M. George

Padoux. M. Padoux was advisor to the Chinese government. When in China he had

acted as legal adviser, particularly to the Chinese Codification Commission; when

in France, he acted as advisor to the Chinese Embassy. He had also acted as our

advisor at the Brussels Conference. He was particularly qualified to be of

assistance to China and to the Embassy because of has experience. At one time he

was French Minister to Thailand, and he was familiar with the general problems

of the Far East and French policy in Indochina.

As I reported in a telegram I sent to the Waichiaopu on December 30, M.

Padoux told me that he had been given to understand that China would again bring

the question of the Sino-Japanese conflict up before the Advisory Committee at

Geneva. He was afraid that, in light of the latest developments in the internationa

situation, the outcome of such a move would be even less satisfactory than had

previously been the case. He told me that was also the view of the Quai d'Orsay.

My telegram to the W dchiaopu of the 30th was sent partly in response to

the Ministry's instructions of the 17th. It will be recalled that the latter

included directions to consult Ambassador Quo in London and in theneact week I

continued to do so. The impression of the attitude in London that Quo was able

to get from Anthony Eden in the course of a conversation on this question appeared

to be a little less discouraging than the attitude in France.

In his letter [to me] of January 5, 1938, Mr. Quo wrote that he had seen Eden

on December 31 and informed the Foreign Secretary of the terms of peace proposed

by Japan. He said that Eden had said that the terms seemed to him to be exacting

and almost cruel, and that he fully agreed with China in refusing to consider them.
 35

As far as British aid to China was concerned, Eden had given him the impression

that financial assistance could be taken up and discussed, but in the supply of

military equipment and arms, Great Britain could only assist in a very limited

area. When Quo told Eden that a satisfactory settlement of the Far Eastern

problem could lead to the stabilization of the situation in Europe, Mr. Eden agreed,

but stated that the cooperation of the United States in seeking such a solution

was absolutely indispensable. Of course, if Japan should threaten and actually

invade Hongkong, Eden said, Great Britain might then find it necessary to act

singly by dispatching a naval force to the Far East.

As to the question of the Chinese bringing an appeal to the Advisory Committee

in Geneva again, Eden did not give a definite answer. He said he would first

consult with France and sound out the views of Washington. He suggested that we

should wait until the meeting of the Council of the League in Geneva, at which time

he would try to get together with the Chinese representatives and the French and

Soviet Foreign Ministers for consultation. He said until then, he could^ say anything

definite.

My conversation with M. Alexis L6ger on January 10, 1938 was also important,

not only because it manifested clearly the French policy toward the Sino-Japanese

conflict and the question of French support to China, but also because of the

light the Secretary-General threw upon the deteriorating situation in Europe

and the possibility of war breaking out in the near future. I went to see M.

L6ger in the first instance about the list of articles of war material and

implements called for in my aide-memoire.

M. L§ger said, as he had anticipated, the different departments concerned

could not see their way to furnishing the articles China had requested. He went

on to explain that the situation in Europe was very serious and the year, 1938,

would probably be a most criticial one. He said a year ago he had told me that

peace could be preserved for a year, but now the situation was different. Italy

was on the brink of bankruptcy.

 36

In two or three months she would have to pay for her wheat purchases abroad,

but there was no money for them. Taxes had been doubled and her financial plight

remained desperate. It was more than likely that Mussolini would find a way out

by resorting to war as an adventure. That would seem to be the only way out for

him. If he lost, he could still say that he had sacrificed himself in the

interest of his country. Here in France, M. L6ger continued, the program of

rearmament had fallen behind on account of the social unrest, which had caused

delay in the factories. In view of the grave situation, France was obliged to

conserve and concentrate all her resources for her own needs.

In this connection I mentioned my interview with M. Delbos and inquiry as to

whether the French government could make a cession to China of 120 guns of 75

millimeter caliber and four guns of 155 millimeter caliber. I said that at the

time M. Delbos had promised to speak to Messrs. Chautemps and Daladier about

these guns, and I asked if M. L6ger could give me some information. M. L6ger

said the said the Minister had not spoken to him and he took note of the details.

He observed, however, that these were the guns also needed by France. He under­

stood there were not enough of them in the French army, and the War Ministry was

already taking steps to ask for an extension of dates for delivery of guns ordered

by other countries. He added that if the guns needed by the French army were

ceded to China, it would take six to eight months to replace them, and such a

delay would not be justifiable in the present circumstances.

As regards the question of credit, M. L6ger said the French government

had been trying to save as much as possible from different quarters in order

that what was saved could be spent for expediting the rearmament program,

particularly the development of the air force and the navy.

Besides, M. L6ger understood that the position of Great Britain was very much

the same as that of France. Inquiries in London and Washington indicated that

their attitude on the question of help to China had become more negative than ever.

In the case of Great Britain, she might spare a few guns because, according to an
 37

Anglo-French understanding, in the event of war in Europe, the responsibility

for military operations on land fell largely on France, while Great Britain was

to cooperate mostly on the sea and in the air. M. L6ger said it meant that France

had to bring her army, as quickly as possible, to the highest state of development

in order to meet anyemergency.

I told him that I found his statement very disappointing, and it would be

dissaflpointing to my government as well. I pointed out that China's continued

resistance to Japanese aggression also served the cause of peace in Europe by

engaging Japan in China and thereby weakening the total strength of the anti­

communist bloc. I said Germany and Italy had been anxious to see the Sino-Japanese

hostilities cease, because they realized that so long as Japan was fully occupied

in China, they were not able to benefit by her cooperation. It was evident that

Germany and Italy had their attention focused on Europe and would like to force

a showdown in Europe against the so-called democratic group of powers. Such an

attempt required Japan to bring pressure to bear in the North on Soviet Russia and

in the South on Great Britain--a thing that Japan could not do so long as

hostilities in China continued. Therefore, I said, China's continued resistance

had the effect of preserving peace in Europe, certainly for the time being. I

added that Japan would like to engage Soviet Russia in war as part of the understand!

with Germany and Italy. In that case, it would also paralyze Soviet Russia in

Europe.

M. Ldger did not think that Japan, even upon the termination of hostilities

in China, would be able or disposed to make war on Soviet Russia at once,

because her strength must have suffered a great deal from these months of fighting.

As far as Russia herself was concerned, Ldger said she did not count in Europe at

present, because she had to fix her attention on the Far East and watch Japan.

The only policy for China, he said, was to continue resistance and to

refuse to talk peace with Japan. He thought that China had already talked too

much of peace. By continuing a sort of guerrilla warfare, China could exhaust

 38

Japan in the end. The only important consideration, of course, was that General

Chiang should be able to hold the government and the country together and

eliminate the peace elements, as he seemed to have done by his recent reorganization.

To seek peace with Japan now would indicate willingness to surrender, ,:for Japan

now would indicate willingness to surrender^ for Japan was not disposed to accept

anything less than surrender. In other words, he said, one could not hope to

negotiate successfully with thieves and brigands. As Japan was compelled to extend

the field of operations in China, she must in the end seek peace herself.

I replied that in order to carry on guerrilla warfare and continue the policy

of resistance, war material was needed. But M. Ldger thought that China could very

well adopt a policy of passive resistance by refusing to engage in a pitched

battle, but always seeking to trouble Japanese communications and attacking their

flanks. I concurred in his view, but pointed out that even passive resistance

required arms and munitions.

I observed that if Italy should make a move in the spring to start war,

Germany would be tempted to join, although she was not quite ready. In fact,

Germany would probably feel obliged to help Italy and would perhaps even encourage

the latter to embark on the adventure. Besides, I said, the Sino-Japanese conflict

served to distract the attention of the United States from Europe and to tie the

hands of Great Britain to a certain extent. Both these factors would encourage

Italy and Germany to take the risk in Europe. In addition, Germany was anxious

to see the Sino-Japanese conflict stop in order to free Japan's forces. Three

times she had tried to offer her good offices for the restoration of peace in

the Far East .

M. L£ger thought that Germany and Italy were working for the cessation of

hostilities for different reasons. Italy had already started negotiations with

Japan for the monopoly of the Yangtze navigation, while Germany hoped to replace the

United States and Great Britain in China after persuading China to accept the harsh

Japanese terms.
 39

I said it was possible, of course, that Great Britain might still try

to make a last effort to come to an arrangement with Italy, but whether the

next attempt would be successful was a question. He replied that if Great

Britain should make another effort, it would not be surprising to him. But he

always thought that the British method was wrong. The central core of the

problem in Europe was Germany. Anglo-French effort should be directed to bring

about a settlement of the German problem, and this could be accomplished by a

firm collaboration between Great Britain and France based upon the combination

and cooperation of the two forces. When Germany saw that the Anglo-French

combination was too strong for her to oppose, she would come to terms. Italy,

finding herself isolated, would take the initiative to make advances. In other

words, Great Britain should deal with Germany first and cooperate with France.

M. L6ger continued by pointing out that Lord Halifax had gone to Berlin only to

sound out the German viewpoint, and not with the idea of negotiating with Germany.

He said the next few months were very serious ones and would show whether peace

could be saved at all.

I remarked that at present Great Britain was as preoccupied as France, but

the United States was not. M. L6ger said if Hongkong should be endangered,

Great Britain might send a few ships to preserve her dignity, but she had no

intention of being drawn into a war for Hongkong.

In M. Lager's opinion, even after hostilities in China ceased, Japan

would not feel disposed to make war on Russia, unless a successful military

coup d'etat should take place and a military dictatorship be established.

He said a section of Japanese opinion held that Japan h.d already gone farther

than she should in China, but people were hard pressed and peace elements were in

abeyance. I said in reality the present Japanese Cabinet had already taken

on the aspect of a quasi-military dictatorship, since the recent reorganization

included an admiral in the Ministry of the Interior and a general in the

 40

Ministry of Public Health.

[The seriousness of the situation in Europe and its effect on French and

British policy in the Far East was confirmed in general talks I had two days later.]

On January 12, the Chinese Ambassador to Moscow, T. F. Tsiang, who was on his way

back to China from the Soviet post,came to see me. He told me that Soviet Foreign

Minister Litvinov had told Li Yii-ying that not only did France not wish to help

China, but she had even asked Soviet Russia not to get mixed up in the Far East

with Japan for fear of the European explosion.

Later M. Padoux came to tell me that the French Ambassador to Tokyo had cabled

to the Quai d'Orsay that it had been Japan who had asked the German Ambassador in

Tokyo to transmit the conditions of peace to China. Therefore, Sir Alexander

Cadogan was of the opinion that Great Britain had better yield to Japan on the

Shanghai question, pending the continuation of hostilities. Sir Alexander

said that, in view of the situation in Europe, there was no way for Great Britain

to adopt a firm policy vis-A-vis Japan.

y
At this point I would like to discuss another aspect of the Chinese effort

to seek assistance and support abroad. After the Lukouch'iao Incident took

place and fighting between the Japanese and Chinese forces not only in North

China, but in around Shanghai„became very serious, the government decided,

on the one hand, to continue resistance to its best ability while waiting

first for action by the League of Nations, and later, for the possible results

of the Brussels Conference. On the other hand, it decided upon a program of

intensifying its diplomatic effort abroad. In addition to the permanent embassies

in the capitals of the principal powers, the government sent out special envoys.

These emissaries were not of the regular diplomatic service and they were not

career diplomats. They were important, leading members either of the government

or the Kuomintang. Thus, Sun Fo, President of the Sino-Soviet Frie^ship

 41

Association, was sent to Moscow to seek aid and cooperation from Soviet Russia;

Li Yii-ying, one of the elder statesmen of the Kuomintang who knew a great many

leading politicians, mostly of the socialist camp, in France, Belgium, Switzerland

and even in Spain and Italy, was sent to Moscow in addition to Sun Fo, and to

France as well; Ch'en Kung-po, right hand man of Wang Ching-wei, was asked to visit

Rome especially, in addition to London; General Chiang pai-li, a Japanese-returned

student, one of the first Chinese graduates of the Japanese military University

in Tokyo, and at one time President of the paoting Military Academy which turned

out many leaders of the Chinese army, was sent to Germany and Italy. Their

common objective was to secure diplomatic and material support for China's cause

of resistance. I would like to give a brief survey of their visits, the results

of their activities and the nature of their observations of both the situation

in Europe and the particular internal situation of each country with reference

to the Far East.

The Embassy in Paris was the center of communication between the special

envoys and the government in China. Thus I received a telegram from Wang Ching-wei

in early January for transmission to Ch'en Kung-po, describing the situation in

China at the moment. Wang said although the military-political situation had not

changed since Mr. Ch'en's departure, China's weak points in the resistance had

become more obvious. Wang was intimating, as I recorded in my diary of the same

date, January 6, that a desire for peace in the country had been growing. At the

same time a telegram from the Waichiaopu asked me to inform Sun Fo, on his

arrival in Amfeterdam, of the international situation as I had reported it in my

cocimunications to the Ministry, and of the general nature of the conversations

I had had with different quarters in Paris. The telegram suggested that Dr. Sun

ought to know the real situation abroad as well as in China, and ought not to

entertain further illusions about help from abroad.

This telegram from the Waichiaopu probably requires some explanation,

because the instructions that not only I but also my colleagues in London,
 42

Washington, and even Rome and Berlin had received were to seek moral and material

support for China's cause of resistance, [while this telegram suggested that

illusions of help should not be entertained.] Of course, the efforts of China’s

representatives in each capital had not been very successful [in eliciting a

construtive response.] The French government, which had been doing its part in

according transit facilities through Indochina at more or less its own risk and

in supplying different forms of arms and munitions including airplanes, was the

only possible exception. But even the French support was rather precarious and

often interrupted or complicated by the situation developing in Europe to the great

anxiety of the French. However, the Waichiaopu*s caution to Dr. Sun Fo on not

entertaining too great hopes of support from abroad probably referred [more

specifically] to Dr. Sun's belief that the Soviet Union was really China's best

friend in the situation, because of its problem vis-cl-vis Japan and also because

of its own situation in Europe where Germany was giving Moscow cause for a great

deal of anxiety. Accordingly Sun's great hopes centered upon Moscow, the one

quarter, Sun must have felt, from which China could expect most assistance and

support. Sun's opinion, however, did not reflect the opinion of the Chinese

government as a whole, which seemed to be divided on the question of policy, whether

to rely more on support and aid from the democratic countries, such as Great Britain,

France and the United States, or from Berlin and Rome, or from Soviet Russia. Each

side in the controversy over policy had its reasons, but they were at loggerheads

as to the correct line of policy to follow.

Dr. Sun Fo for his part was anxious to go abroad and seek positive aid and

assistance from the Soviet Union. He was convinced that the interests of the Soviet

Union and China vis-S-vis Japan were identical. Both China and Soviet Russia were

equally suspicious and apprehensive of Japan's design on their respective countries.

It was no secret that Japan was anti-conmunist and anti-Soviet. In fact, her

recent proposal to China for a peace settlement conveyed the conviction that

China's anti-Japanese attitude had been greatly inspired by the communist elements
in China with Moscow at their back.

The government wished Dr. Sun Fo to ascertain the actual situation with

reference to what China could expect of the Soviet Union. In fact, I suppose

that all the different important leaders sent out to Europe were not only expected

to seek assistance^ but also to find out the actual truth in the situation and to

help the government, with their newly-acquired information and each standing for

his own views, to facilitate a final determination of the policy to be followed.

Dr. Sun Fo's impending visit to Moscow was the occasion [for arranging] for

a conference of my colleagues in the other European capitals and myself and

the special envoys. Dr. Sun himself telegraphed to say that he would like to see

me at Amsterdam where he would land on January 13, en route to Moscow. [So it

was eventually decided to have the conference take place in Amsterdam.]

On January 9, General Chang Pai-li called on me at the Embassy to inform me

A

of his visit in Rome. He said at Venice he had seen Signor Stenfani [?] who told

him that Italy could attack Egypt with an army and Gibraltar by air to force

England's hand, and that Mussolini was feeling quite upset by President Roosevelt's

speech in Chicago (January 3) in defense of democracy.

In Amsterdam on January 13 I met Dr. Sun Fo, and had an exchange of

information with him concerning the military, financial and general situation

in China and abroad. I felt his account [of the military situation in China]

was rather discouraging. According to Dr. Sun, the armed forces seriously

lacked organization and coordination. Experience in handling such a huge army,

so important for the individual soldiers in the fight, as well as for the

country as a whole, he said, was also lacking. Nonetheless, I had recently received

a telegram from the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hsu Mo, and another from

Dr. Kung, in reply to my inquiry, saying there was no prospect of peace with Japan.
 44

On the morning of January 14, I had a second talk with Sun Fo. When I

arrived for our meeting, I found Li Yii-ying. He spoke of his conversation in

Moscow with Mr. Litvinov, with General Yang Chieh, the new Chinese Ambassador in

succession to Tsiang Ting-fu, and his interview with the American Charge d'Affaires.

He spoke too of Tsiang Ting-fu's lack of experience in practical diplomacy in

dealing with the Soviet authorities.

He also reported on his visit to Warsaw, and told us that Zaleski, had

told him that Colonel Josef Beck, Polish Foreign Minister and the dictator of

Poland, did not intend to desert France, but was playing the dangerous policy of

courting Germany in order to frighten France into listening more attentively to

Poland.

I remember Joseph Beck from Geneva, when he represented his country on the

Council of the League of Nations. He appeared to me to be a man with a strong will,

always sure of what he wanted and willing to go after it. Whenever he could

not get his way, he resorted to very strong language to the surprise of the Council

members since it was rather unusual.

Sun Fo told us of his mission to Moscow. He said that prior to the outbreak

of Japanese hostilities in 1937, during Wang Ching-wei's term, the Soviet Union had

asked first for a non-aggression pact. If that was not possible, Moscow had asked

for the conclusion of a commercial treaty. Both, however, were refused by China.

Now he said China wanted to have a mutual assistance pact with Soviet Russia, but

the Soviet Union's Ambassador Bogomolov in Nanking insisted upon receiving instruction

from Moscow first. According to Bogomolov, the order of negotiations should be;

first, to negotiate a Pacific pact of collective security among the powers of the

pacific of collective security among the powers of the Pacifi^ Ocean; second,

to negotiate a non-aggression pact with China; and only third, to negotiate a pact

of mutual assistance with China.

Sun Fo said he would try this time, with the Generalissimo's approval and
 45

direction, to appease the Soviet Union—as regards the possibility of China

making peace with Japan without the Soviet Union--by offering Moscow a defensive

and offensive alliance, and by also offering to help to work for Anglo-American-

French collaboration, if this were the preoccupation of Moscow. Ambassador Tsien

Tai from Brussels, who had also come to participate in the conference, added

that the Soviet Minister in Brussels had told him that Moscow was not even certain

that Great Britain and the United States would remain neutral in the event of the

Soviet Union joining in the fight against Japan.

The following day I saw Sun Fo again, and asked him about his plan of

negotiation with Moscow. Li Yii-ying, who was present, spoke of the absolute

need of China continuing her resistance. In fact, the day before he had suggested

that the conference should cable to the Generalissimo, the Foreign Minister and

and Dr. Kung, with Dr. Sun Fo as the chief signatory, not to send any further

cabled instructions abroad relating to China's need of peace and mediation. He

was strong for continued resistance, and so were the other members of the

conference. But apparently the leaders in Nanking, facing the actual situation,

seemed to feel the need of coming to some sort of settlement with Japan, at least

for the time being.

I dissuaded the conference members from following Li's suggestion. I thought

it was so unnecessary. On the one hand, if the leaders in Nanking really felt

that to make peace was imperative, a telegram would not do much good. On the

other hand, I asking them not to send further instructions might close the door

for more information, which we needed in order to know the actual situation in

China.

We all saw Dr. Sun Fo off for Moscow at the railway station in the morning

of the 16th. Afterwards, we had another talk amongst ourselves, including Li

Yii-ying and Ambassadors Quo and Tsien, and discussed the question of asking

Dr. T. V. Soong to come abroad to promote the materialization of our planof

getting financial aid from the United States, Great Britain and France. That
 46

evening I left for Paris.] On January 10, 1938, before I had gone to Amsterdam,

the French Minister of Colonies' personal representative had come to tell me that

the Minister's son had cabled him that the first Russian shipment of materials

that had arrived in Indochina had not yet been unloaded. He said the Minister

was sorry not to have sent his draft cable ordering its release, that M. Ldger

and M. Hoppenot (Assistant-Director of the Asiatic Department) were the real

obstacles at the Quai d'Orsay, because they always tried to insist upon the

cabinet's original decision of October 1937. He told me that M. Moutet was

contemplating raising the question again in the cabinet, in order to force

a decision or a showdown, but Li Yii-ying had counselled against it, as it might

result in an unfavorable decision. Therefore, on behalf of M. Moutet, this

representative had come to ask for my advice as to what would be the best thing

the Minister of Colonies could do in the situation. I suggested that M. Moutet

might sound out the cabinet's opinion first. If the President, M. Chautemps, felt

favorably, as I understood he did, it might then be advisable to raise the question

at the cabinet meeting. The representative left and later telephoned to say he
oic
had seen the Minister, who said he would as I had suggested and would also ask v

for a committee of three of the cabinet to handle and direct the matter of transit.

By this time the French cabinet was again on the verge of falling, and there

was general speculation as to the composition of the new cabinet. I was particularly

anxious to know the new Minister of Colonies, because his Ministry would have so much

to do with the question of transit facilities for China's war goods. I was relieved

by M. Moutet's representative who came to see me and, [aside from discussing

the above matter, assured me that M. Moutet would continue to help, whoever might

be his successor, especially as regards the establishment of the proposed

factories for manufacturing war goods in Indochina for China.

The cabinet crisis in Paris continued for some days in mid-Japan 1938.

It was not until midnight of the 18th that the prospect of M. Chautemps forming a
 47

new cabinet became assured of success. The following morning Chautemps

actually formed a new cabinet, but this time the Socialists refused to participate

and it was a cabinet of the R dical party.

This was unfortunate for China because, as I feared, it meant the departure

of M. Moutet, who had been one of China’s stalwart friends in the French government.

The new Minister of Colonies was M. Steeg, whose attitude was not nearly as

sympathetic and friendly as M. Moutet's for example, in regard to the question of

transit through Indochina. At the time I was given to understand, from a report

of what M. Moutet had discussed with M. Steeg, that Steeg made no objections to

the policy of his predecessor; but that remained to be seen. Moreover, the new

cabinet, because of the aggravation of the European situation, promised to be more

cautious than its predecessor. M. Delbos, who continued to hold the foreign

portfolio, advocated more strongly a policy of giving first consideration tothe

situation in Europe and using great caution and circumspection in regard to the

Chinese problem, because of the danger of becoming involved with Japan in the Far

East without any assurance of support either from London or from Washington

especially.

In a conversation of January 24, at a luncheon given by the Academy of

Diplomacy, M. L6on Archimbaud, Chairman of the Committee on Colonial Affairs

and rapporteur of the Colonial pageant [in the Chamber of Deputies, ] summed up the

situation. He saidM. Sarraut, who was [Minister of the Interior] in the new

cabinet, was the man of influence in policy towards the Far East. M. Sarraut, he

said, was cautious lest Japan should be provoked, but his sympathies were with

China. As for M. Delbos, the Foreign Minister, was, according to Archimbaud,

ignorant of the Far East, and the Quai d’Orsay was timid.

[It was however the general impression that the new cabinet would not

last very long. What would this mean to China?] As M. Moutet informed me,

the Socialists were certain to come back into the government before very long.

But the general opinion (aside from that of the Socialists) was that the
 48

Front Poptilaire, which had heretofore dominated the political situation in

France, was dead and that the new Chautemps cabinet was only an interlude

toward a more rightist ministry in the near future.

As to the situation in the Far East, particularly with reference to the

maneuvers of Japanese diplomacy, it seemed to take a new turn in the latter part

of January. On January 16, the Japanese government had issued a statement pretending

to withdraw recognition from the Chinese National government. It openly declared

the establishment and growth of puppet regimes in China. When I saw M. L6ger

on January 19, I told him that, judging from the contents of the Japanese

statement, it was evident that Japan did not wish to declare a state of war with

China nor to continue normal diplomatic relations with her. I said it was a

declaration self-contradictory in the extreme. It also said that, judging by

Japan’s recent conduct vis-^-vis the Chinese Embassy and Consulates in

Japan and Korea, Japan apparently desired to force China to break off diplomatic

relations with her, but did not wish to take the initiative herself.

In fact, my immediate purpose in calling on M. L6ger was to inform the

French government of the series of unjustifiable acts of interference and

pressure brought by the Japanese authorities on the various Chinese consulates,

in Korea and in Japan with evident intention of forcing China to break off

diplomatic relations with Japan. I also wanted to see if France had any intention

of making a demarche. China, seeing the Japanese design, had not fallen in with

it, and had refused to break off diplomatic relations. Therefore, I went on to

tell M. L6ger that the Japanese police and the gendarmes had been interfering

with the administration of the Chinese Consulate-General in Seoul, by demanding

that it hoist the five-colored flag and shift its allegiance to the puppet regime

in Peiping. (This was certainly a most extraordinary act.) On the refusal of

the Chinese members to accede, the local Japanese authorities made all sorts of

difficulties, rendering it impossible for the consulate to continue to function.

 49

fhe Chinese government, after filing protest with the Japanese government in

Tokyo, was obliged to order the closing of the Seoul consulate. A similar

situation, I added, existed as regards the Chinese Consulates in Pusan and other

Korean cities. In Japan, in Yokohama, a meeting of certain Chinese elements was

instigated by the Japanese special agents with a view to inducing those Chinese

to declare their allegiance to the Peiping regime. It was only on the

intervention of the Chinese Consulate-General that the meeting was dispersed.

I went on to say that although the Japanese government was understood to have

recalled Kawagoe, the Japanese Ambassador in China, the Chinese Ambassador in

Tokyo was leaving Japan only on leave. The staff of the Embassy had been ordered

by the Chinese government to remain as long as possible. I told M. L6ger too that,

in view of the new Japanese declaration, the Chinese government would like to know

whether the French government was contemplating any demarche in Tokyo.

M. L6ger said that he could not answer the question because it was of such a

general character, and that he did not quite catch the meaning of the inquiry.

Therefore, I said I understood the Japanese government had instructed its

diplomatic representatives abroad to explain the new policy to other countries,

and asked whether the French government had been so approached.

M. Ldger, after telephoning to M. Hoppenot for confirmation, said neither

the Japanese government nor the Japanese Embassy in Paris had sent a copy of the

Japanese declaration [of the 16th] to the French government. Sugiyama, the Japanese

Ambassador in Paris, had not called either. It was possible that he had been

asked to speak to the Quai d'Orsay, but he had not done so. M. L6ger thought that

Sugiyama understood better the reactions in Europe, and that the latter had always

tried to attenuate, around the corners, the instructions which he received from time

to time, in explaining the Japanese policy in China. The French government was not

contemplating any demarche in the circumstances.

Speaking generally, M. L6ger thought that the reaction vis-a-vis the new
 50

declaration was to the effect that it evidenced Japanese embarrassment in the

face of the Chinese refusal to accept the humiliating peace terms and China's

continuation of her policy of resistance. The reaction was favorable to China

in that Japan had been placed in an awkward position as to what she should do

in the circumstances. It was evident that Japan knew that her efforts had now

reached the highest point of success. From this moment on, if China continued

her resistance, Japan's advantage would begin to decline. The important thing

for China, in his opinion, was to hold herself together and to preserve the

unity of purpose. The embarrassments of Japan would increase as time went on.

Information from Berlin, continued M. L6ger, indicated that even Germany was

dissatisfied with Japan's policy. Germany certainly did not like to see Japan

persist in her policy of further penetration in China, where she found a commercial

market of great value to German industry. Besides, the continuation of the

hostilities meant that Japan would continue to exhaust herself and weaken her

position vis-a-vis Soviet Russia. He added that it was unfortunate that the

situation in Europe was such that the powers in the Occident could not do very

much in the Far East.

Asked what he thought of China's desire to bring the question of Japanese

aggression before the Advisory Committee of the League of Nations again, M. L6ger

replied that he understood from a recent report of the French Ambassador in

London that Mr. Eden had told the Chinese Ambassador that while Great Britain

did not wish to object to China's bringing the case up again before the League

of Nations, he felt that it was not in the interest of China to do so. There was

nothing that China could gain by doing it. The application of sanctions was out

of the question. The adoption of an embargo on petroleum, for instance, in the

British opinion, might cuase difficulties with the United States and Holland--

a thing Great Britain would like to avoid in the present circumstances. The

French point of view was much along the same line.

I said that the Chinese government was contemplating taking the matter up
 51

before the League of Nations, and that I felt the League should make it clear

as to what it could do and what it could not do. After all, it was an institution

established for the avowed purpose of checking aggression and upholding peace.

Membership in it carried very definite obligations, including a considerable

financial contribution every year. China had been subjected to aggression for

half a year, yet the League of Nations had not done anything effective to help.

I thought it was time that the League should be put to a practical test as to its

ability to render any service to the cause of peace. If it were absolutely

powerless to do anything in the interest of peace and justice, then a real test

would make it clear to the whole world, so that false hopes would not be raised

among peace-loving nations.

M. Lager's reply was both cynical and realistic. He said as the impotence

of the League had been made perfectly clear and was known to the world tor some

time he thought no test was necessary to make it manifest again. I then observed

that although conditions had changed in recent years to the detriment of the

League, those who remained in it could still try to live up to their obligations.

I said the core of the problem really lay in the attitude of the great powers

like France and Great Britain. In other words, the extent to which the League was

able to discharge its responsibilities depended upon the attitude and policy of

its principal member states.

M. L6ger concurred in this view, and said that if Great Britain and France

could adopt a positive attitude, the League could be a real force. But unfortunately

the situation in Europe did not permit it. It still remained a question whether

war in Europe could be averted in the year 1938. The attitude and internal

conditions of Italy gave reason for serious apprehensions in the next three or

four months. Japan, he added, always chose the psychological manent to launch

her policy of invasion against China, and she had again chosen well for her purpose.

I asked whether it was not likely that Great Britain would still make an effort

to conciliate Italy in order to avoid a crisis in Europe. M. L6ger thought she

 52

might, but if she did so, it would be a mistake, since yielding to Mussolini

would merely encourage Italy and Germany to be even more exacting. He said

the pivot of the European situation was Germany. So long as the German problem

was unsolved, there could be no appeasement or peace in Europe. On the other

hand, if a settlement could be made with Germany, Italy would be obliged to

follow. Any effort to compromise or yield to Italy prior to a solution in

Germany, he concluded, would simply encourage further bluff and blackmail from them.

In reporting my conversation to the Waichiaopu in a telegram of January 19,

I said, [as regards that part of our conversation dealing with the latest turn in

Japanese diplomacy, ] that the French Secretary-General listened with great attention

and noted down everything I said. He told me that he had seen the news items about

it, but had received no communication whatever from the Japanese government nor

any elucidation from the Japanese Ambassador in Paris. The French government

[he further indicated] had no intention to change her friendly attitude toward

China. I reported that L6ger also told me that the general comment in French

political circles was to the effect that the Japanese statement was really a sign

of Japan's predicament in the situation. Because of China's determined resistance,

Japan found herself at wit's end to adopt a better policy in the hope of hastening

a settlement with China. In his opinion, the victorious progression of Japan's

armed forces had reached its zenith; henceforward so long as China remained united

internally and continued to resist the Japanese aggression, Japan's difficulties

were bound to increase from day to day. He assured me that the French government

was not contemplating any measure vis-a-vis Japan's latest manifestation of her

intentions, that is to force a break in the relations between Japan and China.

And he told me that, as far as he understood, neither the United States nor

Great Britain had a different idea.

The dinner given by the President of France at the ElysSes palace that day

was. as usual, a grand social affair, but I took the opportunity to have a few

words with Soviet Ambassador Souritz, who was also present, about the situation
 53

in the Far East. It was very frank of him to tell me that Great Britain had

first thought of yielding on the question of Shanghai in order to compromise

with Japan, but that now, finding Japan would not stop and was even certain to

attack Hongkong, Britain was stiffening her attitude, although she was still

undecided about taking any action without American cooperation. Then as the

evening wore on, I began to find it a rather unpleasant experience despite the

gala atmosphere, for I was constantly being reminded of the unhappy situation

in China. Among others, the Turkish Ambassador, Suad Davaz, the Belgian

Ambassador’s wife and the Venezuelan Minister brought up the subject.

I was also present at a luncheon given by Count and Countess de pels

the following day, and attended by a number of French statesmen, including the

Minister of State, the Ambassador to Switzerland, the Secretary-General of the

foreign office and , of course, their wives. M. Bonnet, [then Minister of State]

remarked contrary to general opinion that there would not be war in Europe,

thought crises would occur from time to time. (It was uncertain whether the

remark was made out of conviction or as a matter of expediency.) He said ways

and means would always be found to avoid it. His reason was, as he said,

"Nul peut supporter une guerre." As to the United States, he was sure it was

more interested in Europe than in the Far East. He added that while Roosevelt

was in favor of a positive policy vis-A-vis the Far East, Congress, with its

ignorant, narrow-minded view of the world outside and interested only in wheat

and pioiie, could not agree with the President.

[After all the discouraging news of the past week,] I was somewhat

relieved when Li Yii-ying came on January 21 to tell me that he had seen M. Moutet

again and that Moutet had told him that he had explained the policy of helping

China on transit to his successor, M. Steeg, and to the Under-Secretary of State,

M. Monnerville, and that the new Minister made no objection to the policy of his

predecessor in principle.
REMINISCENCES OF WELLINGTON KOO

VOLUME m ^MISSION TO FRANCE

(PRELIMINARY DRAFT FORM)

1. The Aftermath of the Brussels Conference;

Late November 1937-mid-May 1938

B. China Continues to Seek Assistance and

Support Abroad from the Individual Power
and from the League;

a) Late January-Late March 1938

1. THE AFTERMATH OF THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE 54

B. China Continues to Seek Assistance and Support Abroad from the

Individual powers and from the League
a) Late January-Late March 1938

I left Paris for Geneva to attend the hundredth meeting of the Council

of the League on January 25. On the same day I received the Waichiaopu's

instructions regarding the pfOpOsed appeal to the League of Nations. It

consisted of two parts; the first part, a reply to an earlier telegram of mine,

dealt with what I had suggested should be said in my speech before the Council;

the second part dealt with terms and measures to be negotiated with the

representatives of the powers in Geneva,, I telephoned Ambassador Tsien Tai of

Brussels to come to assist with the delegation, and also got in touch with

Minister King Wunsz from the Hague for the same purpose.

The main item on the agenda of the Council meeting was the proposed

deletion of Article 16 on Sanctions, formally referred to as the reform of the

Covenant. This reform was of immediate interest to China* who hoped the powers

would someday soon see their way clear to enforcing sanctions against Japan.

The Article was also one of the terms of reference for the Committee of 28

appointed in 1933 to deal with the question of implementing the resolution of

the Assembly that proposed to consider in what respect the League of Nations

could aid and support China in her resistance to Japanese aggression.

[On January 26th, the opening day of the session,] I first spoke to Mr. V.

Munters, Latvian representative and Chairman of the Committee of 28. Munters

was at the customary lunch party given by the Secretary-General for all the

representative members of the Council on the opening day of the session.

In reply to my question, Mr. Munters said that he was not contemplating

to speak at the Council meeting either on the question of the reform of the pact

or even on that of the reaffirmation of its principles. (The latter measure

was generally favored by the representatives of the major powers because they

did not want to tackle the question of amending the Covenant, and still less

wanted to deal with the specific question of the deletion of Article 16.) Mr.

Munters said that he did not think that the Council was the place where one

could enter into a full discussion of the question of revision of the Covenant,
 55

or even discussion on an interpretation of the provisions of the pact. Nor did

he think the time was opportune for the Committee on reform of the pact to

take up any discussion, either on the proposal of reform or on the interpretation

of any of its provisions.

On the same occasion, I had a conversation with the British Foreign Secretary

Anthony Eden. I raised the same question with him as I had to Mr. Munters. I

also told Eden that the final instructions [from my government] had arrived the

evening before, directing the Chinese delegation to bring the Sino-Japanese

question up before the Council on the basis of China's reservation made in

September, and more particularly on the basis of Article 17 of the pact.

I told him that the situation had become more aggravated since the adoption

of the resolution by the Assembly last October. The Chinese people, I said,

demanded that the League do what it could as regards the Japanese aggression.

This was the more necessary since the League resolution last October had not

brought China much help. Though I realized the circumstances were not favorable

to the League doing all it could under the Covenant, still it would be better to

let China understand what help she might expect from the League. In other words,

China wanted to know what the League could do and what it could not do; and if

it could do nothing, China felt that that should be made plain.

Mr. Eden replied, saying that he sympathized with my view, but thought that

sanctions were out of the question in the present atmosphere. What mattered, in

his view, was practical aid to China. Just before leaving London, he had rung

up the Air Ministry, asking whether there were planes that could be spared for China.

He thought that Great Britain had been doing a great deal since last October. She

had given China 50 planes and intended to send them through Burma, if the road

on the Chinese side were built. But I remarked that those planes had been ordered

even before October. (That is to say, before [the October 6th resolution

of the League.])
 56

Mr. Eden said that to force the League to show its weakness could do no

good to China. There was nothing the League could do which the powers were not

already doing. I told him that some positive action was really called for; China

needed the League most and needed it right now. She had joined it just

because it was capable of rendering her the kind of help she was most in need of

at the moment. An effort on the part of the League to take some positive action

vis-A-vis the Sino-Japanese conflict might also serve to instill new life into the

League and restore some of the lost confidence in its effectiveness.

I said I understood that certain members on the Council would make statements

reaffirming the principles of the Pact, but I thought that, in the presence of such

a grave conflict in the Far East, mere reaffirmation would serve no useful purpose.

It was time for action, which alone could be convincing in the circumstances. If

the whole set of sanctions were not feasible, and I understood the reasons why

they were not, I thought that the League might try some limited action by declaring

an embargo against Japan on a few articles, such as oil.

Mr. Eden replied that it was useless to try an oil embargo without the

cooperation of America and other oil-producing countries. Holland had made it

known in October, at the subcommittee meeting, that she was opposed to any sanctions.

At Brussels, Holland had asked for the protection of the British fleet, if she were

to join the oil sanction, but Great Britain could not give such an assurance of

protection given the present state of Europe. The application of sanctions meant

the use of force eventually. Great Britain might have to send the whole fleet

to the Far East later if necessary, but certainly could not give the promise now.

What would the French think if Great Britain sent the British fleet from the

Mediterranean? (This shows once again how the Far Eastern situation was closely

tied up with the situation in Europe, or, in fact, with the general situation in the

world) .

I merely observed that the application of any embargo must be done in a unified
 57

way, and it was not a question of individual responsibility. I went on to say

that I understood indirectly that the French had suggested to Great Britain

and the United States not to decide upon any energetic action in the Far East,

and I asked the Foreign Secretary whether my information was correct. (The only

way to find out the truth was to check here and there and compare information. Only

then would one be able to form a correct, accurate picture of the situation.)

Mr. Eden replied that the French had not precisely said that, and he would leave it

up to me to draw my own conclusions by saying that the French would feel very

much worried if Great Britain were to send her whole fleet from the Mediterranean.

(I reflected that while I was diplomatic in my language, Mr. Eden was no less

diplomatic in his comments.)

Coming back to the question of partial sanctions, Mr. Eden thought the

question of an oil embargo would .e^ither be practical nor effective. He understood

that Japan had a great deal of oil in reserve, and that, as her navy was not

engaged, her needs were relatively small. But I told him that Japan was drawing

upon her stock and she needed to replenish it in order to be prepared against

Soviet Russia. If it were impossible for the League to adopt such a sanction

officially, I suggested, an understanding among the oil-producing countries not

to sell to Japan would also be helpful. Thereupon, Mr. Eden said that Great

Britain was not selling oil to Japan, and asked what countries were doing so at

the time. [Answering his question indirectly,] I said the oil embargo should be

undertaken by Holland and Rumania, to which two countries Mr. Eden added the

United States as the most important.

Mr. Eden said that he wanted to help, but in the present circumstances

it was understandable that Great Britain could not send a fleet to the Far East

without American cooperation. I remarked that America was stiffening her

attitude and taking one step after another in the right direction, it seemed to me.

He agreed and said that Anglo-American collaboration had never been better than it

was today, and it was still developing. He said the decision of the American
 58

government to send three warships to Singapore to participate in the inauguration

of the Singapore naval base was one proof of the beginning of the cooperation

between Great Britain and the United States. He had no doubt in his own mind that

this action, while it was decided upon independently by the United States, had the

effect of deterring Japan from carrying out her attack on Canton because she was

wary of Anglo-American cooperation.

I remarked that information from Washington indicated that the United

States would consider favorably any action decided upon by the League of Nations.

It was therefore up to the League to take a decision first, before asking for

American cooperation. Mr. Eden said that in the circumstances, [such a vague

assurance] was not enough , because Great Britain, for example, could not take a

chance on deciding upon a course and waiting upon America to consider whether

she would or would not join in it. Thereupon I remarked that Mr. Eden must have

understood that the United States could not commit itself beforehand to what it

would do if the League did this or that.

The Foreign Secretary then asked what other measures China would like to

see taken by the League. I said, besides oil, an embargo on arms against Japan

would be very useful. While she had a great deal already in stock, she still

had to replenish them. Mr. Eden said that Great Britain was not selling arms

to Japan. Since the outbreak of hostilities there had been only two shipments,

one of machine guns and another of something that was not important. He had been

repeatedly pressed in Parliament for an answer, but he carefully avoided giving a

direct answer by saying that the supply to Japan was negligible.

I told him that, according to my information, six weeks or [till ?] two

months ago, France was issuing export licenses to Japan for the shipment of arms

from France. Mr. Eden thought that France should not have done it. In Great

Britain they were trying in every way to delay the issuing of export licenses

for arms to Japan. I told him that I understood that Belgium was doing very much
 59

the same thing as France. In the matter of arms, I thought that what was

necessary would be an agreement among the six or seven nations that manufactured

arms, which would make the embargo effective without affecting the entire

membership of the League. In other words, I was suggesting application of an

arms embargo by the arms producing countries. Mr. Eden said it would be more

effective to do it quietly, without making a hullabaloo of it.

In London, M. Eden said, Ambassador Quo had told him that Soviet Russia

felt that Great Britain, France and America were not keen on seeing Soviet

Russia helping China. That was, he said, a wrong impression. He understood that

Litvinov was arriving in Geneva the following morning and suggested that all of

us have a talk together. I told him that Russia had been doing much more than

other countries to help China, but she had reached a point where she felt the

need of knowing precisely what the other countries would do before giving further

help to China. She wanted to know not only whether the other countries were

favorable to her help to China, but also whether they were equally prepared to

render as much aid. The Foreign Secretary said that Soviet Russia was in a

position to render more aid to China because she had more things on hand, and with

her land connection with China it was easier for her to do it. He said there

was no doubt that Great Britain would like to see Soviet Russia continue her aid,

and that Britain was also ready to do as much as was possible, considering her

own requirements. He added that it would be a different matter if Soviet Russia

wanted Great Britain to join in a military action—a thing which Great Britain

could not do. Then he asked what France had been doing.

I told him that France had not been doing very much recently, that recently

I had asked the French government for a small quantity of certain guns of 75

and 155 millimeters and the request was turned down. Mr. Eden appeared surprised.

Summing up the situation, Mr. Eden said that he believed that it was more important

to work out some plan of aid to China, rather than to press the League for any
 60

definite action.

I think this conversation makes the situation at the time very clear, that

is,the situation both as regards the League and as regards the question of

concerted action of aid and support to China. The knot of the problem seemed

to be the attitude of the United States. The other Powers all wanted to

include the United States government in any plan of aid and support, evidently

because of the situation in Europe.

At the same lunch party, I had a chat with Mr. Souritz, the Soviet

representative, and we again compared notes as regards our information on

the Far Eastern situation. He told me that he had had a talk with M. Delbos,

who had given him the impression that, if China brought up the [Sino-Japanese |

question in Geneva, the most that could be done would be to reaffirm the decision

of the resolution of October 1937. Souritz asked what China's intention was.

I told him that I would raise the question in the Council on the basis of

Article 17 of the Pact, and that I would argue for the adoption of some positive

measures in restraint of Japanese aggression. I told him also that I was going

to have talks with the British and Franch Foreign Ministers, and was glad that

Mr. Litvinov, the Soviet Foreign Commissar, was arriving the next day, because

in all probability all could have a talk together.

M. Spaak, the Belgian delegate, was also present at the luncheon, and I

had a short conversation with him. 1 asked for his views as to the proposed

declarations to be made by the British and French Foreign Ministers on the

question of Italy's withdrawal from the League. M. Spaak said that he understood

M. Delbos was going to reaffirm the principles of the Pact. He himself had not

yet made up his mind as to what he would say, but he felt that it was not only

necessary to have a reaffirmation of principles, but also necessary to take

action in the presence of a grave situation like the Sino-Japanese conflict in

the Far East.

On the question of the recognition of the Italian conquest in Abyssinia,

 61

I asked him whether the views of his government were along the same line as

those of the Nordic countries. His reply was to the effect that in Belgium

the opinion of the majority of the people was in favor of arranging some

modus vivendi with Italy from the practical point of view, without prejudicing

the principle of non-recognition de jure. He told me he was in a most difficult

position, because while all the other parties in the Belgian Parliament were in

favor of reaching some arrangement with Italy on the basis of de facto recognition,

his own party was against it. Belgium, he said, used to enjoy a favorable balance

in trade relations with Italy. But with the application of sanctions against Italy

two years ago, the trade had turned against Belgium, and to date she had not

recovered that trade fully, although it did not amount to very important figures

in the total trade of Belgium.

To illustrate how the smaller countries representing the League of

Nations were all for some measure of positive action in the face of the Sino-

Japanese conflict, I would like to refer to a conversation I had with William

Joseph Jordan, New Zealand representative in the Council. On January 26, just

before the Council meeting, he told me that he was going to make a statement in

the Council following the British and the French declarations. In reply to his

question, I told him I was going to say some plain truths as regards the League

of Nations. Mr. Jordon then asked that he be allowed to follow me in speaking,

so that in his speech he could refer to my statement. He was decidedly of the

opinion that it was no use to reaffirm principles in the presence of a grave

situation in the Far East. It was time for action and not for words.

The hundredth session of tte Council opened with a public meeting on January

27, which started at 5:30 but did not finish until 8:20. Mr. Eden was the first

speaker, followed by Messrs. Delbos and Litvinov, then [came Mr. Beck] of

Poland. I was the fifth speaker, and the remaining members spoke after me.

Out of the series of speeches, at least three different views on the League were
 62

presented, although Eden and Delbos had tried hard to conciliate and persuade

the polish, Swedish and Rumanian representatives to join harmoniously with them.

My own speech presented rather a strong condemnation of the League's past policy

but reaffirmed China's faith in it.

At a meeting with the British, French and Soviet foreign secretaries afterward,

we discussed China's appeal to the League, and I emphasized our purpose to take

up the appeal on the basis of our last reservation, especially under Article 17

of the Covenant. Eden and Litvinov were helpful, but Delbos appeared to be

less active and took refuge in the need of American cooperation.

The following day, a luncheon was given by the President of the Council,

as was customary at each session. In this case the Iranian representative was host.

I took advantage of the occasion to have a brief exchange of views with Mr. Ouden,

the Swedish Foreign Minister, attending the Council meeting as the Swedish

representative. He explained the attitude of his country on Article 16 of the pact.

He said the Powers had not always applied sanctions, but preferred the exercise

of discretion in regard to it. So he asked why could not the small powers

do likewise, that is to say, be allowed to use their own discretion in implementing

it or not once a decision was taken, since one could not have confidence or

certainty in the Covenant.

At a later meeting to discuss the draft resolution on China's appeal, Mr.

Eden, M. Delbos and Mr. Litvinov were all present, but they all appeared to be

doubtful, and hesitated to speak. There were, I recorded in my diary,

embarrassing moments of silence. Finally, Mr. Litvinov suggested a formula and

proposed two amendments, which were all accepted.

The following morning, January 29, we had another meeting with the Brit ish,

French and Soviet foreign secretaries to discuss the second draft of the resolution

for the Council on the question of aid to China. The French seemed to have

changed it into a still milder one, with the result that the Chinese delegation
 63

had a rather pointed discussion, especially with Delbos, who stood on what he

said was the decision of the French cabinet to insist upon the necessity of

securing simultaneous American cooperation for adopting any measure of aid or

constraint against Japan. As a result, I said I had to reserve acceptance of the

resolution, so as to enable me to have time to ask for instructions.

Shortly after, I had a conversation with Mr. Litvinov. He expressed the view

that the wording of the resolution was really of secondary importance. (With the

presence of the Polish and Italian delegates, who were sympathetic to Japan, at

the meetings, no wording would really be acceptable since no wording could please

them.) Litvinov thought that I had placed too much -mphasis upon the question of

practical assistance, which would be given anyway, if it could be given, whatever

the text of the resolution. (Here he evidently had in mind the policy of the

Soviet government to aid China in her resistance to Japanese aggression, to the

extent considered advisable by Moscow, but quietly. Soviet Russia did not want to

publicize what she did in order to preserve appearances of neutrality, and also to

avoid indicating to Germany that Moscow had trouble in the Far East.)

Mr. Litvinov said that those who were not prepared to aid China would not

do it under any resolution. He thought that China might emphasize more the

necessity of adopting some positive measure, and mentioned the adoption of financial

sanctions as an example. He thought such a measure was not likely to be opposed

by the small powers represented on the Council, because they were not in a position

to furnish any credit. (I think the Soviet Union was not in a position to furnish

any credit, either, so what he suggested would also be convenient to Moscow.)

He said it would affect merely two or three financially strong powers. He realized

they would not do it, but he felt it would be a beginning in the right direction

of positive action.

According to his information, the Japanese had been approaching bankers in

London and, more particularly, in Switzerland with a view to obtaining loans and

credits. He said they were persuading the Swiss to borrow money from London and
 64

and re-lend it to Japan, He said he knew the names of the bankers approached by

the Japanese. (His information, if true, would certainly confirm the intricacy

and complexity of foreign relations, and the detours to which diplcxnacy will

resort in seeking credit.)

Speaking once more of the text of the resolution, Mr. Litvinov said he was

afraid that even the second draft, weak as it was, would probably not be approved

by the Council as it was. It would therefore be wise to insist upon the first

draft so that, in case of objections, the Chinese delegation could make a

concession by accepting the second as it stood. (That was a very clever practical

suggestion.) I asked him why the French seemed to be so firm in their refusal to

accept the first draft, which draft really meant calling for nothing more than

consultation with the United States for practical measures. M. Litvinov evidently

had a clear understanding of the international situation in Europe, because

he said the French were very much worried over the situation in Europe. In his

view, the French anxiety was rather exaggerated. Nonetheless, he said, they were

really afraid that if the United States should be too preoccupied in the Far East

along with Great Britain, France would be left alone to face the situation in

Europe and particularly in the Mediterranean.

As a matter of fact, at the meeting of the Committee of 28, on the question

of Covenant reform two days later, on January 31, the French attitude seemed

to have taken a turn for [still] less active participation. The reason was given

to me by Mr. Souritz. He told me M. Delbos was worried because of the report from

Berlin of an Italian push in Spain in the coming month of Morch, and of German

action in Austria, that is to say, the German plan to incorporate Austria in the

Reich.

In the midst of our efforts to get our first draft of the resolution on

China's appeal adopted first by the Committee and then by the Council of the

League, there arose a very curious and puzzling incident. It was apparently

an inspired campaign to discourage the League of Nations from adopting any firm
 65

stand on China's second appeal. The gist of the propaganda being carried on

in Paris, particularly in Le Matin, one of the influential morning papers, was

an attack on the Chinese delegation for attempting to drag the United States and

France into war in connection with the Far Eastern conflict. This was entirely

untrue, but the press campaign was disconcerting. I asked my publicity officer at

once to draft, a statement for the press and to notify Mr. Bucknell, an official

representative of Washington in Geneva, of the actual facts, and see if he were

willing to say that he would at once cable these to Washington for its information.

This matter again drew my attention when, on my return to Paris, I had the

opportunity of reading fully the articles in Le Matin of January 30 and February

1. They were a violent attack on the Chinese delegation and on me personally

as its chief, saying that in my demand for collective action to aid China, I must

have considered the French as a collection of jabots. It referred to me and

Litvinov as two sinister compares (schemers) in Geneva, attempting to involve

France in war in connection with the Sino-Japanese conflict. I felt more annoyed

because my Embassy staff had never reported to me in Geneva or called my attention

to the article upon my return. It was my Military Attachd, General T'ang, who

came to show me the clippings from the French newspapers. I at once dictated a

letter to the editor of Le Matin, and issued a communique to the press.

Returning to the proceedings in Geneva, ray presence there was dictated

by my work as head of the Chinese delegation in respect of two matters: one, China’s

appeal to the League of Nations in regard to the Sino-Japanese conflict; and two,

the question of revising the Covenant of the League, particularly Article 16.

The latter question, as I have said, consisted the terms of reference of the

Committee of 28. China's position was made clear. For example, at the morning

meeting of the Committee of 28 on February 1, I spoke and dwelt upon the need of

living up to the obligations of League membership, and thereby strengthening the

League as an instrument of world peace. I emphasized the importance of abiding

 66

by the principle of collective security. Following my speech, Mr. Litvinov

took the floor and dealt with the question along the same lines and with

practically the same arguments.

In the afternoon of the same day, February 1, the Council met to consider

the draft resolution on the Chinese appeal. The meeting turned out to be a

fiasco because of the oblique opposition of the representatives of the small

powers. For example, Equador and Peru insisted upon the need of referring to their

governments for instructions before they could express their views. The reasons

for their uncooperative attitude was that they felt ignored in the matter. The

resolution had been drafted by a small body of the representatives of the principal

powers, without including their representatives.

Later at the afternoon meeting of the Committee of 28, the French representative

then M. Paul Boncour, made an eloquent speech, though it was not very convincing

in view of the French attitude as adopted by M. Delbos in regard to the draft

resolution the day before. When I spoke to M. Paul Boncour afterward and expressed

my appreciation of his speech and referred to the attitude manifested by M. Delbos

earlier, he told me that he had the Chinese question in view when he spoke out

to emphasize the principle of collective security. But he said he was not

responsible for the French attitude taken by the French Foreign Minister on the

draft resolution relating to the Sino-Japanese conflict.

At the meeting of the Council on February 2, the representatives of the

smaller powers again manifested dissatisfaction, and asked that the question of

the Sino-Japanese conflict and the resolution itself be taken up in a public

session of the Council. At least the representatives of Equador, Bolivia and Peru

urged it strongly. Both Lord Cranborne and M. Tessan felt uneasy at the suggestion.

I myself was also in favor of keeping the discussion private for the time being,

and finally succeeded in squashing the proposal of discussing it in public by

offering a compromise to the effect that the resolution should not mention the

names of the countries whose representatives participated in framing it. I was

 67

the more anxious to do that because I was not satisfied fully with the

resolution itself, and did not feel that I deserved credit for being one of its

authors.

[The result of the voting that day, February 2, 1938, was the adoption of

the following:

The Council,

Having taken into consideration the situation in the Far East,

Notes with regret that hostilities in China continue and have been
intensified since the last meeting of the Council,

Deplores this deterioration in the situation the more in view of the

efforts and achievements of the National Government of China in her
political and economic reconstruction,

Recalls that the Assembly, by its Resolution of October 6th, 1937,

has expressed its moral support for China and has recommended that Members
of the League should refrain from taking any action which might have the
effect of weakening China's power of resistance and thus of increasing her
difficulties in the present conflict, and should also consider how far they
can individually extend aid to China,

Calls the most serious attention of the Members of the League to the
terms of the above-mentioned Resolution,

Is confident that those States represented on the Council for whom

the situation is of special interest, will lose no opportunity of examining,
in consulation with other similarly interested powers, the feasibility of any
further steps which may contribute to a just settlement of the conflict in
the Far East . ]
and
I left Geneva for Paris on February 3/[on February 8] General T'ang

brought M. Berray of Le Matin editorial staff to the Embassy in regard to the

campaign against China and Soviet Russia in the French press, particularly in Le

Matin. We had a frank exchange of views which seemed to clarify the situation in

regard to China. But the French uneasiness about the Sino-Japanese conflict and

the discussions in Geneva was further stimulated by the turn of events and the

developing situation in Europe.

It was confidentially reported to me that Great Britain was trying to come

to terms with Italy, in view of the impending German plan of aggression in Europe

and of the aggravation of the Far Eastern situation by Japan. This information
 68

was confirmed on the 10th, in the course of a conversation with M. Archimbaud.

He also told me that M. Delbos, the French Foreign Minister, was too subject

to the influence of M. ..L6ger, the Secretary-General. [At the same time,] he

said, M. Chautemps, the Premier, was really trying to direct foreign policy for

the government. As a result, the President of the Republic, at the meetings of

the Council of Ministers, often had to exercise arbitrary influence in the

discussions, when for example the views of the Premier and the Foreign Minister

clashed. He told me that M. Boncour would like to be foreign minister, and

therefor had declined the offer that would have made him minister without

portfolio. In the cabinet, M. Paul Reynaud and M. Flandin were also at loggerheads

over policy vis-A-vis Soviet Russia. M. Flandin was very much in favor of

effecting a rapproachement with Italy and Germany.

Three days later, on February 13, I left for London in order to make a

speech at a meeting organized by the International peace Campaign Committee

at the Royal Opera House, presided over by Lord Robert Cecil. This committee

had not only been very active in condemning aggressive policies of the Axis

Powers in Europe, but had also been strongly sympathetic towards the Chinese

people in their resistance to Japanese aggression in the Far East. At this

meeting, Lord Lytton was also present.

A little incident took place. Mr. Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador to Great

Britain was present at the meeting, not only prehaps to hear what I had to say,

but more to support the activities of this Committee, whose membership was

largely composed of what was then known as the liberal elements in Great Britain.

After my speech, he left abruptly. As I learned later, he had asked the Chairman

for permission to speak, but Lord Cecil turned his request down. His abrupt

deparutre was, of course, very much noticed by the audience. Toward the end of

the meeting, when the chairman called for the singing of "God Save the King,"

his call was answered by an outburst of the "International."

In the afternoon of February 15, I received an interesting visitor in

 69

the person of General Li Tu, one of the two heros who continued to resist

the Japanese in Manchuria after the Young Marshal and his armed forces had

evacuated those provinces. [He had been in Paris, from whence he left for

Moscow, on a mission to urge Soviet aid to China.] He told me that he had

just returned from Moscow and that his mission did not accomplish very much,

because, as Dr. Sun Fo had told him in Moscow, the help that he had asked

for was party of the general question of Soviet Russia’s participation or

non-participation in the conflict on China's side.

General Li Tu told me also that at the time he was leaving Moscow, Sun Fo

had already seen some leaders in Moscow, and was reported to have had satisfactory

talks with them. General Li said he understood that Soviet Russia would not

and could not move a step further in the policy of helping China, because of the

situation in Europe and because of her unwillingness to tackle two fronts, in

the West and the East, at the same time.

[Earlier in February I discussed both the situation in Europe and the

situation in the Far East with M. L6ger. The point of departure of our interview

was my desire to press the Quai d'Orsay once again on the question of transit

facilities through Indochina for Chinese war materials and to more particularly

take up the release of supplies contained in the first Russian shipment

to Indochina for China.

By this time the Chinese government had moved its capital from Nanking

first to Hankow and then to Chungking. After reaching Chungking, which is a

river port of the hugh interior province of Szechwan, it began to make plans

for long-term resistance. But the question of getting supplies from abroad

was a big problem [and China more than ever had need of French sympathy and

support for the continued use of the Indochina route.]

I reintroduced the question of transit for Chinese arms and munitions

through Indochina almost immediately, and recalled to M. L6ger that I had left

an aide-memoire on the subject last October and had never received a reply. I
 70

wanted to know, I said, precisely what the situation was since the constitution

of the new cabinet. M. Ldger replied there had been no change as regards this

question. The position of the cabinet of last October remained in force.

I told him that during the last few days I had received a number of telegrams

concerning a shipment of Russian cargo, unloading in Haiphong a mongh ago. It

seemed that for several reasons only half of it had been sent to Yunnan. There

still remained 1,500 tons, which the Chinese representative on the spot was

anxious to send to China. However, he had received a communication from the

Governor-General, asking him to re-export this balance of the Russian shipment

from Indochina and refusing to give permission to transport it overland. I told

Ldger that the matter was so urgent I had been instructed not only by the

Waichiaopu but also by the President of the Executive Yuan to approach the French

government in the interest of seeing that instructions were sent to the Governor-

General to let the goods pass. This permission was necessary and desirable

because, in the first place, it was difficult to get boats to take them out

of the country and,secondly, two-thirds of the remaining cargo consisted of bombs,

shrapnel and cartridges amounting to 1,100 tons which, if left too long, might

endanger public safety.

M. Ldger confirmed the fact that instructions had been sent to the Governor-

General to refuse permission to transport overland the rest of the Russian cargo.

The Ministry of Colonies had reported to the Quai d'Orsay, transmitting a report

of the Governor-Genera 1 that the Chinese representative on the spot did not

observe any discretion in handling the matter. The tanks, armored cars and

machine guns were spread through the streets of Haiphong as if it were a July

14th parade, attracting an enormous crowd of people. Both the French and the

Japanese had been able to take photographs of these armaments, and the Quai

d'Orsay had these pictures before them. The whole transit was now public

knowledge and the Japanese had protested repeatedly both in Indochina and in Paris.

They even had details of the various kinds of arms and war machines . He thought
 71

it would be impossible in the circumstances to let them pass overland. As

regards the question of public safety, it was only a matter for local authorities.

I observed that as regards the question of discretion, I had repeatedly

telegraphed to both Indochina and China, urging the exercise of utmost care and

prudence. I had no doubt that hereafter greater discretion would be observed. As

regards this particular cargo, it was urgently needed. I urged M. L£ger to find

a way out to permit the transit, and mentioned that I had been especially

asked to communicate with the Ministry of Colonies again.

M. L6ger said that he felt certain definite instructions had been

previously sent to stop the transit of this cargo, and that it would be impossible

to change the position. If, however, a new case were presented, he might favorably

consider it. Upon my repeated persuasion, he said he would try to approach the

Ministry of Colonies, but he thought he could not hold out any hope for a

favorable reply.

I then said China, in resisting Japanese aggression, was really serving

the interests of other powers. If Chinese resistance should fail, it was

certain that Japanese aggression would go beyond China and the position of

Indochina might be affected. M. L6ger said he appreciated the point and agreed

with me. But the fact was the Japanese had been protesting all along, and it

was quite certain that if Indochina should continue to openly afford transit

facilities, Japan would seize the islands in the China Sea. Japanese marines

had already landed three times in Hainan Island and attempted to occupy the

Paracels and the Pratas. He said the Japanese occupation of Hainan Island

would threaten the safety of Indochina. The Japanese would also use it as a

base for attacks against South China. The Paracels, whose sovereignty was still

a question pending between China and France, were also an important group of

islands which the Japanese coveted. As to the Pratas, M. L6ger said it was

a French island group, but its occupation by the Japanese would result in its

serving as an important air base threatening not only South China but also Indochina
 72

He thought in the interests of China as well as France, the Japanese should

be held off from occupying any of these islands.

In the recent representations at Tokyo, he continued, France acted alone

in urging the Japanese to withdraw the Japanese marines landed on the islands.

The British did not join. In his opinion, the question had to be viewed

practically. It would not help China if any of these islands were occupied.

Besides, he said, the Japanese had always threatened to bomb the Yunnan railway.

In France the railway shareholders were apprehensive lest the Japanese

destroy it from the air. There was also a parliamentary group in the Chamber

which was opposed to any government policy that might give rise to complications

with Japan. If the government did not act prudently, it was certain that this

group would raise another storm in Parliament.

I told M. L6ger that, in my own view, there was really no danger of Japan's

attacking Indochina. I said the British at Hongkong had been keeping the doors

open for transit, and they were not feeling uneasy about the possibility of

Japanese complications. But M. L^ger said the fact that the Japanese had

attempted to occupy Hainan and other islands proved they were serious in their

intention. In the case of Hongkong, it was, he said, not important for Japan.

He quite believed also that there was no likelihood of Japan's attacking

Hongkong.

At this point I said that recently the press dispatches reported a statement

of Hirota, the Japanese Foreign Minister, in the Diet to the effect that

negotiations had been opened with different countries to stop the supply of

arms to China. I said I wondered if such negotiations had been taking place

between France and Japan, and whether the recent French attitude as regards the

question of transit was the result of an understanding with Tokyo in exchange

for an assurance of Japan's refraining from occupying the islands in question.

M. L6ger said there were no negotiations nor any understanding on the question,

and there was no connection between the question of occupying the islands and
 73

that of according transit facilities to China in Indochina. The Japanese military

and naval authorities had openly spoken to the French military and naval

attaches of their intention to retaliate. The French government had always kept

apart the representations regarding the islands and the question of transit.

Then I said that when Sugiyama, the Japanese Ambassador, had first arrived

in Paris, he said he would try to promote Franco-Japanese amity and friendship

by enlarging the basis of the Franco-Japanese Agreement of June 10, 1907 relating

to the policy vis-S-vis China. I asked whether conversations had been initiated

with this object in view. M. L6ger said Sugiyama had such an idea in his mind,

but he was not able to obtain instructions form his government. The Japanese

navy was opposed to reaffirmation of this agreement of 1907, because it wanted

full freedom of action in South China. It did not wish to have its hands tied.

It was the French government which had repeatedly invited the Agreement of 1907

in trying to keep the Japanese from occupying the islands mentioned.

I recalled that, in his recent statement replying to an interpellation in

the Diet, Mr. Hirota had said that the Sino-Japanese conflict had in fact developed

into a major war, but had added that events in the Far East should not be judged

by the standards of the West. Therefore, I said I would like to know whether

the Japanese government had made any communication to the French government on

the Japanese view of the present hostilities in the Far East, and whether Tokyo

had notified the French government as to the precise status of the conflict in

the Japanese view. M. L6ger, after telephoning to M. Hoppenot of the Asian

department for confirmation, said that no communication had been received. He

had noticed the same reference in the press as I must have, but nothing official

had been received from Japan, either from the Japanese Embassy or from the

French Embassy in Tokyo.

I once again urged that the question of aid to China be considered by

the French government. I said that China, in pursuit of her policy of

resistance against Japanese aggression, was in fact defending the interests

 74

of France in the Far East as well as those of other powers, because the

collapse of Chinese resistance would bring the danger of Japanese aggression

nearer to French possessions and interests in that region. M. Ldger fully agreed

with me. He also said that after having gone through a period of hesitation in

the face of the Japanese offer for peace, China had at last made up her mind to

continue her resistance. I said China was more determined than ever to go on, but

in order to resist successfully, she must have an adequate supply of arms and

munitions from abroad. This was the reason she was urging the French government

to aid her as much as she could.

M. L6ger thought that that was a practical question, that considering the

situation in Europe and the backwardness in the production of French war industry,

it was not possible to give much help to China. He said he was, however, convinced

that the sacrifices that China was undergoing would bring her a greater future.

He felt it was the only way for her to secure her sovereignty and independence.

France, he said, was helping as much as she could. China was permitted to buy

as much as she could in France, whereas Japanese attempts to make purchases had

always been put off by the French government on one pretext or another.

There was little I could add at the moment, and so I asked what M. L6ger

thought of the recent reshuffle in the army and government of Germany, and whether

it would not lead to serious developments in Germany’s foreign policy. M. L6ger

said, according to his information, the victory of the party over the army was

more apparent than real. The fact that the control of the national defense

was not given to Goering but kept by Hitler for himself indicated that the

influence of the army had by no means been eliminated. Diplomatically, changes

were important and the effect would probably be seen in Germany's foreign policy.

What that would be, he added, must wait for the statement of Hitler promised for

the near future.

 75

Since the question of transit facilities was so vital to China in her

resistance to the Japanese aggression, I called on Mr. Bullitt, American

Ambassador in Paris on February 21. My purpose was to keep him informed of the

situation, as well as to get his views of the general situation in Europe, about

which he always impressed me as being well informed. I chose to speak with

him the more so because he himself had been speaking with the French to urge

them to accord help and assistance in the form of transit through Indochina.

I first mentioned the difficulties I had been encountering from the

French government, especially the Quai d'Orsay, and observed that evidently

France was dominated by fear of complications with Japan and that the subject

had also been made a matter of internal politics. Mr. Bullitt said that judging

from his talks with M. Chautemps and M. Delbos, he thought the French defenses

of Indochina were not sufficient to face any attack from Japan. The French

government wished to avoid by all possible means the rise of any situation such as

an incident with Japan, because France, in the present situation of Europe, would

not be able to send forces to the Far East to defend Indochina and at the same

time she could not ignore such an incident on'-a it occurred.

I outlined to him the gist of the conversations I had with the French,

British and Russian Foreign Ministers at Geneva, and also expressed my disappointment

with the French attitude. Now Indochina was practically barred to Chinese

shipments, I said, and, in the case of the remaining portion of the Russian

shipment, the French position seemed to be uncompromising. This was all the more

disappointing, I said, in view of the resolution adopted by the Council three

weeks before and the resolution of the Assembly last October, both of which

were approved by the French delegation.

Mr. Bullitt said that was not the way in which the United States did

business. Thanks to the far sightedness of some senators, America did not

join the League of Nations after the War. He thought it was much better for a

country that had any self-respect not to enter into obligations it could not
 76

io deSa
put into effect/ did no good either to oneself or to others.

Replying to a question, Mr. Bullitt said it was not true that M. Delbos

had asked him over the telephone to cable to Washington intimating to the

American government that the European situation would be aggravated if Great

Britain were encouraged to commit herself to a policy of more active participation

inthe Far East. What he understood was that the French government was afraid that

if Great Britain should get more and more involved in the Far East, she might be

obliged to remain neutral in the event France were attacked by Germany or by

Italy in the Mediterranean. The French position in Europe was very exposed

on three fronts, namely, in the East, in Spain and in the Mediterranean, Bullitt

said, and she counted upon British cooperation at all costs. Her position as

regards the communications with her colonial possession in Africa had been so

endangered by Italo-German activities in Spain that, in her position, the

United States would long ago have taken steps to deal with it.

I asked what Mr. Bullitt thought of the present situation in Europe, and

whether he was as optimistic as he had been a year ago when he said there

would be no war in a year's time. He replied that August 1938 would be a critical

period. In fact, the situation had now reached a point where trouble might break

out at any time, if an unforeseen incident should take place. Hitler's speech

was a clear indication of what was in store for the future.

I then referred to my exchange of cables with [Ambassador] C. T. Wang

[in Washington] and the latter's intimation that Iresident Roosevelt had

determined upon a course of action, the nature of which Wang was under obligation

not to reveal. Mr. Bullitt thought that could not be true. He said the State

Department regularly sent him the proc6s-yerbaux of all important conversations

the President or Mr. Hull had with C. T. Wang. He did not recall that there

was any such intimation, as Wang put it, and the latter should be spanked for

conveying such a thing.

 77

I said in Geneva the question of the feasibility of reconvoking the

Brussels Conference was mooted. The view was expressed that before taking

such a step it would be necessary to sound the opinion of the American government.

Therefore, I said I wanted to ask whether the American government was contemplating

to make another demarche, either with a view to reassembling the Conference or

for the purpose of hastening the restoration of peace in the Far East.

Mr. Bullitt said that up to last week he had heard nothing of the kind, and

he did not think it likely that anything had happened since then. The

discussions on a naval program in Congress indicated that the pacifist element

was still influential. American public opinion, he stated was still backward

as regards the pursuit of an active policy of world cooperation and peace. In

the case of the Far East, he reassured me that there was no question of the

widespread sympathy for China. He added that it was not a question of material

interests which had caused the sympathy, but it was a fact that the American

people liked the Chinese and China. However that sympathy was a different thing

from a desire to take active steps to help China.

Last December, Mr. Bullitt continued, a French journalist called on him

and said he would write an article attacking the United States for not pursuing

a more vigorous policy in the Far East in favor of China, especially as it

was in the interest of America herself to do so. When he (Bullitt) had

explained to him that the total American investment in China was not quite

as much as one-half of a single instalme t of the European war debt to America,

the visitor said he would drop his idea of writing that article. Mr. Bullitt

said the material interests of the United States in China were very small,

and the view of the American people did not justify America's going to war with

Japan for China. What would move the American people was considerations of

honor. That was what led the United States to enter the last world war against

Germany. The American government had full transcripts of the prQces-yerbaux

 78

of the discussions in the Imperial War Council in Berlin, according to which

Admiral Scheer [?] head of the War Operations of the Naval General Staff, had

assured the Kaiser under oath that the United States would never have landed

any soldier in Europe except that the German submarine policy had been put into

full effect in the Atlantic. The stupidity of the German Naval Staff in

launching that policy determined the attitude of the United States to enter

into war, the American government having previously always stated that the

pursuit of such a submarine policy would compel the United States to enter the

war against Germany. Accordingly, Mr. Bullitt said, nothing short of a second

Panay incident would move the American people to approve a more positive policy

in Washington vis-a-vis the Far Eastern conflict.

Mr. Bullitt agreed with me in saying that the Chinese defense seemed to

have been better organized in the last few weeks, and that the situation

did not appear so discouraging as it had at one time. As regards the question

of help from the West, Mr. Bullitt did not think that the Soviet Union was prepared

to join on China's side in the conflict against Japan. In the present situation

of Europe, it was not a question of personalities, he said. No matter who w-is

sent to Moscow, he would not be able to move the Soviet government to adopt a

different policy. But China should continue to press the Soviet Union, Great

Britain and France for more active aid to China. These countries had their

obligations to fulfil under the Covenant, and the more they were pressed

the greater the possibility that they would aid more. As regards the United

States, it situation was different. The United States might be more helpful

perhaps by using its influence indirectly to bring about the realization of

such aid.

Again replying to a question, Mr. Bullitt said, financially, the United

States might be in a position to give greater aid if the matter were handled

in the right way. Then I told him of the possibility of Mr. T. V. Soong's
 79

coming abroad--and he would come--if the prospect of attaining some concrete

results was good.

Mr. Bullitt said C. T. Wang might be asked to sound out the possibility

of any financial assistance in the United States. In Paris, he (Bullitt) was

not able to judge what the prospect was of any financial arrangement for

China in America. He understood, however, that the American Federal Reserve

Bank, through the Bank of Importers1 and Exporters' Credit, had already given

a certain amount of financial assistance to China.

Referring to the Brussels Conference, Mr. Bullitt said that while Mr. Davis

was in Europe, he had been left entirely in charge of the Far Eastern situation,

and he (Bullitt) had abstained from interfering with it altogether. Mr. Bullitt

went on to say that he had been impressed that General Chiang Kai-shek had made

up his mind to continue resistance. Now what was needed was, as I had said, a

continuous flow of supplies from abroad. He understood that the new route

via Burma (the Burma Road) would be completed by March. If so, Great Britain

might be in a position to help more by sending supplies through that route

free from any interference from Japan.

When I asked him, he said he was leaving in three days on leave for

the United States and expected to be back by the first of April. But, he

added, the present situation in Europe was so uncertain that if anything

developed he might return any time before that date.

Several days later I had a report on the same two subjects, namely, the

question of transit facilities and the question of the international situation

in Europe as affecting French policy in the Far East, from M. George Padoux.

Under my standing directive to him in his capacity as Embassy advisor, he

saw and visited important personages in the French government and French political

world in general. On February 23, he called and reported on a conversation

he had had with M. B^renger, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission in

the French Senate.

 80

According to M. B^renger, Hitler’s recent speech ([of February 20, ] in

which he declared Germany's need for expansion ii view of her growing population

and the necessity of raw materials to feed her industries) and Mr. Eden's

resignation were both important events for France. But although there was a

great deal of discussion and anxiety as to the far-reaching effect of these

developments^ M. Bdrenger did not think there would be any radical change in

French foreign policy. He said that the fundamental problem of Franco-British

cooperation remained a basic principle of French policy.

M. B^renger had told M. Padoux that after the last war, French foreign policy

was based upon two objectives, namely, to promote the security and prosperity of

the French colonial empire and to act as gendarme in Continental Europe. But the

rehabilitation of Germany with her far greater manpower resources had made it

plain that France, with her limited manpower resources, would have to abandon

one of these two objectives. It was the pursuit of her ambitious policy which

had led France to form a series of alliance in Europe. But the moment had

arrived now for her to be frank with herself and give up the role of policeman in

Central Europe. While the Quai d'Orsay felt that France ought to adopt a firm

policy vis-a-vis Hitler and the French army held that France must adopt such a

policy, opinion in Parliamentwas divided, and the man in the street knew very

little and cared less about any policy of defending Austria or Czechoslovakia

against German invasion.

On the question of the Sino-Japanese conflict, M. B^renger's impression was

that the situation seemed to turn in China's favor and that Japan's difficulties

appeared to have commenced with China's determination to conduct a long war.

M. Padoux said that recently an important Japanese personage had given M.

Bdrenger the impression the Japanves ready to conclude peace with China, but that

any attempt on the part of a third power or a group of powers to intervene or

act openly as mediator would be opposed by Japan. If Great Britain, however,

should be willing to extend her good offices in the background for the purpose
 81

of bringing about peiiceful negotiations between China and Japan, such a move

would be welcome in Tokyo.

Dr. Sun Fo came to Paris [early in March,] having completed his mission in

Moscow. I was glad to receive him and to see him visit Paris, which I had

suggested to him before. At his arrival, I arranged several visits for him. The

first was to the Elysde palace to pay a courtesy visit to M. Lebrun, the President

of the Republic. I escorted him there on March 16.

At this audience at the palace, the President first asked for Sun Fo's

impression of Soviet Russia during his stay in Moscow, especially in the light

of the repeated public trials of the so-called traitors. M. Lebrun, being a

member of the Radical Party (and therefore not very radical in his political views),

was, like many of his colleagues in the same party, very suspicious of Soviet

foreign policy and the Soviet system of government. Dr. Sun Fo, on the other hand,

was pro-Soviet and had left Soviet Russia with a very favorable impression of the

conditions in that country and of the Soviet attitude and policy as well. Dr.

Sun said he found the Soviet Union a new country filled with a new spirit in the

midst of economic and industrial reconstruction. The people had appeared to him

to be contented, and great progress had been made in economic development,

particularly in the building up of heavy industries.

This information probably altered Lebrun's impression somewhat, and evidently

surprised the President, who observed it was difficult for an outsider like himself

to understand what was going on in Soviet Russia. He thought that the

prosecution of scores of former leaders of the Soviet regime was really disheartening

and did not help to promote confidence in the stability and strength of Soviet

Russia. Either, he said, the charges leveled against these prominent Soviet leaders

were true or false. If they were false, one would shudder at the method of

prosecution for political reasons# jf they were true, it was incredible that
 82

great responsible leaders of the state could have been so blind as to be willing

to be traitors against their own country. In either case, he said, it disheartened

the foreign friends of Soviet Russia and tended to undermine their confidence

in her. (This was a sincere view, rather inclined to the right.) Dr. Sun then

said he knew nothing of the latest trials while in Moscow, and it was only after

he reached Prague on his trip to Paris that he learned of them in the papers.

The interview that I arranged for him with the Minister of Colonies--again

M. Moutet [following the fall of the last government after less than two months

in office--] and on which I accompanied him on March 21, was more extended and

the exchange of views more fruitful. [But before taking it up, I would like to

say a few words about the turn of events in Europe.]

In early March 1938 the situation in Europe deteriorated fruther as Hitler

.
embarked on the occupation of Austria. On the 11th, at a luncheon for M.

Edouard Herriot, Speaker in the Chamber of Deputies, and Dr. Sun Fo, at which

Soviet Ambassador Souritz, M. Archimbaud, rapporteur of the Foreign Affairs

Committee in the Chamber, and others were also present, the conversation

centered on the Austrian crisis. The French guests there all felt extremely

perturbed about it. [German officials had closed the Austro-Cerman border

and several German ultimatums had been delivered to the Austrian Chancellor,

Schuschnigg, the previous day, while the German army stood poised for invasion.]

At the same time there was another cabinet crisis going on in Paris.

[(The Chautemps cabinet had resigned the previous day and the government had

fallen.)] The general impression, as conveyed by the French guests at the

luncheon, was that a national cabinet would emerge and that M. Blum would try

to form such a cabinet.

Toward the evening of that day the Austrian situation seemed to be even

more serious. Dr. Schuschnigg announced his resignation as head of the Austrian

government, and German troops were reported to have crossed at the Austrian border.
 83

[The next day the German army moved in to Austria unopposed.]

On March 14, another luncheon was arranged for Sun Fo, this time to meet

M. Chautemps, still the French Premier [until a new cabinet could be formed.

A number of statesmen were] also present, [including members of the foreign office,]

the Argentine Ambassador and Jean Hennessy, a prominent deputy in the Chamber of

Deputies. Again Austria was the general subject of conversation around the table.

M. Hennessy insisted the Austrian crisis had been provoked by Chancellor

Schuschnigg's insistence on a plebiscite and then his carrying it out. M. Massigli

of the Quai d'Orsay, reflectipgthe French attitude, said the absorption of Austria

by Germany had already become an accomplished fact and nothing further could be

done. The only thing for France and the other countries to do was to take a

lesson and accept it as the final warning to France and Great Britain of the danger

ahead in Europe. M. Pierre Cot agreed with M. Massigli, and remarked that there

was nothing pointing to the possibility of an improvement in the international

situation, which was to say that war was in the offing.

It was the general impression of those present around the table that the

Austrian coup was carried out by Hitler as a result of an apparent mutual

understanding between Hitler and Mussolini. The Marquise of Landre was

certain that Great Britain did not want to be involved in Europe, so that she

might be free to act in the Far East. The French newspapers that next day

announced the conversion of Austria into a German province by Hitler. That was

quick work indeed.

The absorption of Austria by Germany remained a topic of public discussion

and general concern for quite a few days. On March 17 I took Sun Fo to visit the

Chamber of Deputies and hear M. Blum speak. [The latter had finally formed

a new government on March 14, but this time without the participation of the

communists.] We heard Blum make a dramatic and pathetic appeal for national

unity in the face of the international crisis. But the atmosphere of the

Chamber clearly indicated a want of sympathy and confidence in him personally

 84

by the Right. The polish Ambassador and the Soviet Ambassador, who were in

the gallery, both said they were not satisfied with the Blum speech either.

[It was, therefore, not surprising when less than a month later, Blum, too,

was forced to resign on much the same grounds as Chautemps.]

At a reception given at the Argentine Embassy the same day, March 17,

in honor of the new Argentine Foreign Minister en route to Buenos Aires, the

Argentine Minister said that Italian people were dissatisfied with Germany's

absorption of Austria and that Mussolini saw no way out except to accept it

graciously. He was well informed about Italy because a good part of the

Argentinian population was composed of Italian immigrants.

[On March 21, as I said, I took Sun Fo to see M. Moutet, who was once again

Minister of Colonies in the new cabinet.] When Dr. Sun expressed his appreciation

and thanks to M. Moutet for all that he had done to help China in her resistance

to Japanese aggression, especially during his last administration of the Ministry

of Colonies, M. Moutet said he had been trying to do his best because the cause

was just, but it was not always easy for him to do so. In connection with the

Russian shipment [of war materials] carried [to Indochina] by the steamer,

"Lord Cochrane," he said the Governor-General of Indochina had reported to him

and asked for instructions. The Governor-General had added that if he did not

receive these instructions before a certain date, he would be obliged to let

the steamer unload. It so happened, M. Moutet said, that he had taken a cold

at that time, and so he decided to remain at home without attending to his

work at the Ministry. This absence enabled the Governor-Genera 1 to allow the

unloading of the Russian arms.

I then told M. Moutet that of this shipment, 1,500 tons were still being

held up in Indochina,as the Governor-General would not allow them to be sent to

China overland without instructions from Paris. I told him I had tried to

persuade the Quai d'Orsay and his predecessor, M. Steeg, without success. I also
 85

explained that what was left included 1,100 tons of explosives, bombs and

cartridges, and it was dangerous to leave them where they were. I urged M.

Moutet to authorize the transit of these goods.

The Minister told me he had already been advised of the situation and would

send an order to the Governor-General that same day to let these goods pass. He

explained that they had been held up because of repeated Japanese protests, as

the Japanese had not only learned of their arrival but had also taken photographs

of them.

After thanking M. Moutet, I referred to the situation in Europe, particularly

the German absorption of Austria. I asked whether any step would be taken by

the French government or if the latter would simply accept the fait accompli.

M. Moutet said the German act of aggression was the most brutal of recent years,

but it was a natural consequence of the policy of indifference and weakness

pursued by democratic countries. Unless the democratic, peace-loving countries

could unite together and present a common front, the aggressive nations would

continue to pursue their policy of aggression. He said he always believed that

if a sufficient number of countries united together, their power and strength

would be so overwhelming that they would constitute an effective deterrent to

the forces of violence and aggression, but alas!, these countries were shortsighted

and unwilling or unable to work together.

Referring to Mr. Chamberlain, M. Moutet thought that the British Prime

Minister had many illusions, but one day might be forced to realize that he was

pursuing a mistaken policy, when he tried to come to terms with Italy or Germany.

He thought that Chamberlain, in order to save his face, would make some kind of

agreement with Italy, but he did not see how Chamberlain could effect a fundamental

solution of the principal questions upon which Great Britain and Italy were at odds.

England wanted to yield very much, especially as Italy was backed by Germany

who, because of Italian support in her absorption of Austria, was under obligation
 86

to help Italy. In reply to my question, M. Moutet added that whether enough

opposition to Chamberlain on his international policy would develop to upset

his cabinet remained to be seen.

When I asked what he thought of the Litvinov suggestion for an international

conference to check aggression, he said he thought it was merely a gesture

on the part of Soviet Russia. England was not likely to agree, and America had

already disapproved it. He himself was of the opinion that the method of

effecting international agreements by conference was a difficult one, and that it

would be easier to reach understandings through the ordinary channel of diplomatic

negotiations .

I asked about the possibility of American collaboration in the present state

of affairs in Europe and whether there was a prospect of America's uniting her

efforts with those of peace-loving countries in Europe in order to stop the drift

to a second world war. M. Moutet said if workmen in France could not understand

the rightness of upholding international law and order in the case of Austria, it

was difficult to expect American laborers situated so far away to take an active

interest in Europe. He thought it was sad that the forces of peace and democracy

were so disunited, and that was a chief reason for the present state of disorder

in the worId.

I then inquired about the political situation in France, and whether the

[large] favorable vote in the Chamber [for the new government! had not cleared

the way for the new Ministry to look forward to a period of calm and stability

in the political situation. M. Moutet shook his head and said that the forces

of opposition were still working hard to upset the government, particularly on

the question of demanding a national union government. What they really wanted

was to exclude certain members of the government on personal grounds. But his

party, being the most numerous group in the Chamber, was not going to accept

such a challenge. He did not see how a national union government could be
 87

formed, without the support and collaboration of the biggest group in the Chamber.

He intimated that the greatest opposition would come from the Senate and

that the political situation remained insecure. He suggested that it was not

unlikely that a change might take place in the near future.

On March 2k, I saw M. L6ger again. Our conversation grappled with the real

problem of transit and the actual situation prevailing in Indochina with

reference to the transit of Chinese war materials. Moreover, his views on the

European situation were not only enlightening but almost prophetic in light of

later events.

I first brought up the question of the orders for certain arms placed in

France and that of transit through Indochina. I said I had understood from

M. L6ger before that transit facilities through Indochina would be accorded to

orders placed in France before July 13, 1937, and that there would be no difficulty

in fulfilling contracts for such arms signed before that date. But recently

several cases had occurred where difficulties had arisen, one of which was

in reference to an order for a battery of guns of 75 millimeters placed by the

Yunnan government as far back as June 12, 1936. I said I understood that in this

case, the export permit had been refused on the ground that transit could

not be given to this shipment. There was also a contract for 100 automatic

ma hine guns placed with Hotchkiss and another contract for 40 mortars placed

with Brant, the permit for manufacture of which had been refused. I emphasized

that both of these contracts had been signed on July 1, 1937, before the

Lukouchiao incident itself had arisen.

In short, I told him, the situation had become so confused in my mind

that I would appreciate it if the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs would

make a reply to the memorandum which I had sent to it on March 4, 1938. Of

course. I reported the situation to my government from time to time, but lately,

I said, my government had been puzzled by the difficulties that had arisen in

connection with the fulfilment of orders placed prior to the outbreak of the
 88

Sino-Japaneee hostilities and with the according of transit facilities through

Indochina. There were indications of dissatisfaction in Hankow which I

would like to prevent from developing further, as I would not like to have ray

government misunderstand the real position of the French government on this

question.

M. L6ger said he recalledthe memorandum of March 4, and would try to send a

reply to me so that I might be able to explain the situation to my government.

As regards the battery of guns ordered by the Truman government, he said that

upon the representations made by the factory’s representative, he had written

to the Ministry of War urging it to accord the necessary authorization.

The War Ministry, in its reply, had stated that the matter was held up because

of a general order to take all infantry arms in stock so as to determine how

far the needs of national defense had been provided for. Before he, M. Ldger,

cousend a reply, however, to the factory, a new Ministry had come into

existence. He had since written again, but he had not yet received a reply yet.

His letter dealt with the Yunnan government's order and also with certain orders

placed through M. Audinet.

As regards the contracts placed with Hotchkiss and Brant, M. Ldger said that

he had not yet written to the Ministry of War because he understood they were

not signed on July 1, but in September, 1937. I interrupted by saying that

those contracts were not concluded through the Embassy, but directly between

Dr. Kung's representative and the French representatives. I added that just

before I left the Embassy, the French representative had assured me that they

were signed on July 1. M. L6ger said, that being the case, he would like to

look up the matter again and go through the file in order to ascertain the

precise position. He asked me to explain to the Chinese government so that

it might not misunderstand the position of the French government in these matters.

[At this point I changed topics. As] I told M. L6ger, the Chinese government

had received a communication from the German Ambassador in China, notifying it

_ ___ __ nna 1 1 sn r*r»r s s i n o Austrian indenendence and incor norat in^

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\T TIME OF FILMING
 89

Austria as a part of the German Reich. It added that the affairs of the Austrian

Legation in China would be placed thereafter in the hands of the German

Embassy. I said that, before answering this communication , the Chinese government

wanted to know, assuming that a similar communication had been addressed to the

French government, what the latter would say in its reply and what steps would be

taken to deal with the French Legation in Vienna.

M. L6ger said no reply had as yet been sent, but the question was still

the subject of consultation with London. The French government wanted to consult

the British, government in order that the general tenor of the French and British

replies would be the same. This consultation had not yet been terminated.

I asked whether the general lines upon which the reply would be based

had already been determined and whether reference would be made either to the

Covenant of the League of Nations, or to the Treaty of St. Germain and the Peace

Treaties. M. Ldger said the tenor of the reply would be of a general character,

merely making a general reservation concerning the German incorporation of

Austria, without making any specific reference to any international instrument.

As regards the French Legation in Vienna, no mention would be made of it

in the reply because that was a matter which the French government itself could

decide. But, of course, it would be converted into a consulate before the date

of the German plebiscite.

I then observed that the Incorporation of Austria in the German Reich was an

act of flagrant violation of Internationa 1 treaties and asked whether the French

government would raise the question in Geneva M. Ldger replied that the French

government had no such intention. The question of the violation of treaties

would not arise because this was not the first time that Germany had violated

treaties. She had already done so in connection with her rearmament. I added

that Germany had perhaps also violated treaties in the reoccupation of the

Rhineland .

M. L6ger went on to say that France had not particular obigation toward
 90

Austria. Such obligations as she had were of a general character applicable to

many other countries. Nor had the Austrian government asked France to intervene

on its behalf.

Asked whether the French government would send a reply to the communication

from the Secretary-General of the League of Nations containing the text

of the German note to the League notifying it of the act of incorporation,

M. L6ger said he had not yet seen it. But it did not seem likely to him that

any answer would be made to it.

I asked what M. Ldger thought of the general situation in Europe now since

the German coup d'etat vis-A-vis Austria. He replied the situation remained as

it had been--neither worse nor better. Referring to Czechoslovakia, M. Ldger

said what Germany would do depended upon her opinion of the possible risk that

might be involved in a new act of aggression against Czechoslovakia. The French

government had made it clear that France would uphold her treaty obligations

towards Czechoslovakia iidependently of what the British might say. From the

latest reports he did not believe that Great Britain would make a pledge of military

support to maintain Czechoslovak independence. But Czechoslovakia was France's

ally and, therefore, stood on a different footing from Austria. Unless Germany

misinterpreted the earnestness of the French intention to intervene in case of

aggression against Czechoslovakia by Germany, the latter, he thought would not

provoke aggression. It was more likely that Germany would direct her attention

towards Hungary and Yugoslavia, with whom neither France nor Great Britain had

undertaken any special obligations of support.

I remarked that I understood Germany was not yet prepared for war and,

therefore, might be more prudent when there was a risk of war. M. L6ger thought

that Germany was not ready for a long war. But if there was a chance of "getting

away with it" or if she knew that she would only run the risk of a short war.

he thought she might still do it.

On March 25, I paid a visit to M. Paul Boncour, the new French Foreign
 91

Minister, at the Quai d'Orsay. I expressed my gratification at seeing him take

up once more the direction of the Quai d'Orsay and congratulated him upon his

success so far in dealing with the Czechoslovakian problem.

M. Boncour said the situation following the German coup in Austria was

indeed very grave, -and within one hour after he had assumed office, he telegraphed

instructions to the French Ambassador in London to urge the British government

to collaborate with France in her effort to face the situation. He knew the

British government thought the French government was determined to live up to its

treaty obligations toward Czechoslovakia in any case, and he hoped the British

government would support France in her stand.

I remarked that the declaration which Chamberlain made in the House of

Commons concerning Czechoslovakia should have a stabilizing effect in Central

Europe. M. Boncour said while the declaration did not go as far as he had hoped,

it certainly went farther than any previous British stand. He was also of the

opinion that as a result of the firm French stand and Chamberlain's declaration,

the tension between Germany and Czechoslovakia had eased. They certainly had

produced a restraining influence upon Germany, he said. This did not mean,

however, that the whole Czechoslovak problem had been settled. There were

naturally questions of political, economic and racial character which would still

have to be negotiated between the two countries concerned. But he could say that

the danger had passed. The next step for him would be to turn his attention to

southwestern Europe. He believed that Yugoslavia and Rumania, seeing that France

and England were not indifferent to developments in other parts of Europe, would

have more confidence in cooperation with the powers of western Europe.

I might add that the polish Ambassador, M. Lukasiewicz also agreed with the

view that the tension in Central Europe had eased as a result of the French stand

and the British declaration concerning Czechoslovakia. [He told me this when I

met him that same day at the Quai d'Orsay.]

 92

In reply to M. Boncour's question, I told him the military situation in

China had been steadily improving recently and that the power of China’s

resistance had augmented. China had been able practically to stop the advance

of the Japanese invading forces, especially on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway front.

The morale of the Chinese troops was excellent and the spirit of the people

was more united than ever to continue their resistance to Japanese aggression.

But the eventual success of China's resistance depended in a large measure upon a

regular flow of supplies of arms and war material from abroad.

I referred to the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations

in October 1937, which M. Boncour had approved in an excellent speech. But in

less than a fortnight after the adoption of the resolution, the French government,

I said, had tried to stop all transit facilities for shipments of arms and

munitions destined for the Chinese government. Upon representation, exceptions

were made from time to time until the end of January, when Indochina was

almost entirely closed to any Chinese shipments. I pointed out that this changed

attitude on the part of France had thrown the burden of transit on Hongkong, which

had been passing an enormous tonnage for transit to China. I said the attitude

of the French government was causing embarrassment to the Chinese government in its

resistance, and the situation appeared confusing to China. I asked M. Boncour

to use his influence to remedy the situation in favor of China, who had been

resisting not only for her territorial integrity and political independence,

but also for upholding the cause of international law and order.

M. Boncour said that, as I knew, he had profound sympathy for China

and he regretted to find the situation had already become so aggravated that

he could not help as much as he might have been able to at the inception of

the conflict. He appeared to be quite impressed by my statement and asked

me for a note outlining the situation for his personal reference. He said he

could not. of course, promise as to what he could do, but he would study t^e
 93

question and try his best.

As regards the strain on Hongkong, he said that M. Naggiar, the French

Ambassador in China, had already cabled asking the government to facilitate

transit through Indochina. He pointed out that the defenses of Indochina were

inadequate and that she was more exposed to outside attack than Hongkong was.

If I would be good enough to send him a note personally, he said, he wouid be

glad to look into the matter and try to help as much as possible. [But as

a matter of fact the Blum Cabinet fell in less than a month and a new Foreign

Minister, M. George Bonnet, replaced M. Paul Boncour. The latter Ad not have

much time to carry out his intentions.]

REMINISCENCES OF WELLINGTON KOO

VOLUME IV MISSION TO FRANCE

(PRELIMINARY DRAFT FORM)

1. The Aftermath of the Brussels Conference:

Late November 1937-mid~May 1938

B. China Continues to Seek Assistance and

Support Abroad from the Individual power
and from the League:

b) Late March-Mid-May 1938

1. the AFTERMATH of THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE 94

B. China Continues to Seek Assistance and Support Abroad from the

Individual Rowers and from the League

b) Late March-Mid-May 1938

To summarize the international situation in the first part of 1938 and

the different irreconcilable policies of the major powers in the West, or at

least of the democracies [and Soviet Russia], I propose the real difficulty lay

in the fact that Great Britain, France, Soviet Russia and the United States, for

example, were on the side of preserving peace, but, to use a Chinese proverb,

t^ng chuang i meng, they were sleeping in the same bed but dreaming different

dreams, which therefore made it difficult for them to agree on any single effective

measure of cooperation to help China and stop the tide of Japanese aggression.

[They could hardly cooperate to help themselves.]

France, while wishing to preserve the status quo in Indochina and doing

nothing overtly that might provoke Japan to take action against Indochina, was

essentially concerned with the situation in Europe and continuously afraid of

finding herself isolated, such isolation being an objective of Germany diplomacy

vis-^-vis France. In order to avoid isolation, France was most anxious to work

together with Great Britain and, in fact, a pact of Franco-British cooperation

had b ;en made in London, However, Great Britain had the whole Empire to look

after. She was anxious to conciliate Italy, even by making some substantial

concessions in order to preserve Italian friendship, and thus safeguard Great

Britain’s line of communication through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal to

the Far East . France, on the other hand, felt that any rapproachement between

London and Rome, by improving Italy's strategic position in the Mediterranean, would

threaten the French line of communication with Africa and French colonies

and interests there. That was one reason why France was strongly in favor of

non-intervention on the part of all the powers in the Spanish Civil War, while
*r»
Germany and Italy had been aiding Franco curreptitiously at the beginning, and

openly at a later stage, without regard to the accord of non-intervention and

the Non-Intervention Committee sitting in London. The French reasoned that the
 95

British intention of coming to an understanding with Italy in order to safeguard

the British line of communication in the Mediterranean was primarily directed

toward the vast British interests in Asia and that therefore, it was mean that

Britain would be prepared, willing and disposed to send part of her naval force

in the Mediterranean to the Far East, in case Hongkong should be threatened by

Japan. This move would be detrimental to France, because it would weaken the

French position in the Mediterranean aid threaten French communication with Africa.

As for Soviet Russia, France, compared with the other democratic powers,

looked upon her more amicably, with less apprehension, and even with more

appreciation of Soviet potential. But Soviet Russia was anxious about the Far

East as well as the situation in Europe. She had two fronts to look after and,

therefore, was wary in undertaking any commitment without the full cooperation

of the other powers, namely France, Great Britain, and the United States. And

even France, while more favorable to Soviet Russia than the other powers, was

divided on the question of a policy of cooperation with Soviet Russia and the

reinforcement of the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance. At least nearly

half of the French political leaders, especially those around to the Right,

and the great majority of the French public were fearful of communiam, and therefore

suspicious of Soviet intentions. Consequently, the French Right minimized the

value of the pact, and was even inclined to favor some kind of rapproachement

between French and Axis powers.

Great Britain felt herself unable to move freely without an assurance

of cooperation from Washington. London frankly recognized the United States as

the most powerful country and the country in a position to render the most

assistance in the event of a crisis either in the Far East or in Europe. At the

same time, London was inclined to come to an understanding and arrangement with

Berlin, just as she was with Italy. To Great Britain, it seemed that British

interests on the Continent were limited, and that her substantial interests were
 96

outside of Europe. In other words, she looked upon her Empire as her greatest

asset, calling for the greatest effort to preserve and protect it. That

presumably would explain why Chamberlain later went to the limit of coming to

an agreement with Hitler in Germany in regard to Czechoslovakia's Sudentenland . At

the expense of CzechoslovakLa, Britain gained time, in a move which she carried

out with the support of Deladier's cabinet, and to the great dissatisfaction of

the Leftists in France. [(At was Deladier who replaced Blum in April.)]

China, finding herself in a world of conflicting interests on the part of

the powers, also found her efforts to enlist aid and support to be more than

usually difficult. It was practically the eve of the Second World War in

Europe, a war which many Europeans expected would be inevitable. jTheir

preoccupation and the preoccupation of their governments] was greatly exploited

by Japan and her military leaders. Out of the turbulent vortex of international

polities and the clash of rival interests among the principal powers, there rose

constantly the fear of war on one side and the threat of war on the other. [here

was, however, one country which seemed with self-confidence and ability

to meet all eventualities, although with some anxiety. This country was Switzerland

whose new Minister to France, Walter Stucke, gave me a good picture of the

situation, when he came to make a courtesy visit on March 29, 1938.

When I asked him about his view of the European situation as it stood then,

he said that Switzerland was now obliged to look after her own defense and to

redouble her efforts against any unexpected attacks from outside. He said the

recent events in Austria and Central Europe had undermined all confidence in

the efficacy of the rule of law. The geographical position of Switzerland, hedged

in on three sides by three great powers, was such that it was now necessary for

her to prepare for all eventualities.

One happy fact, he said, was that the traditional love of liberty in

his country was so strong that all the racial movements outside the borders

of Switzerland did not interest the people of the same racial origin in Switzerland
 97

Thus the Swiss Germans, far from associating themselves with the Nazi Germans

in Germany, were more anti-Nazi than the people in other parts of Switzerland.

They appreciated the precious value of liberty and did not wish to lose it

under the Nazi regime. It was the same with the Swiss French in the section

of Geneva, who were horrified at the continued unrest and class struggle in

France, and admitted the strict discipline and order maintained in the

dictatorial regimes of Italy and Germany. But it was necessary just the same,

he said, to be prepared for any emergency. He also said that to further promote

the unity and solidarity of the spirit in Switzerland, even the little canton,

Grisons, with a population of 12,000, was admitted as being entitled to its own

language, "Romansch," which was recognized as the fourth official language

of the Swiss Confederation. Now all laws and public documents were published in

four languages. The adoption of the new language had naturally greatly increased

the printing bill, but the cost was worth incurring in the interest of national

unity and solidarity. While hurriedly strengthening her national defense,

Switzerland, M. Stucke continued, was confident of the future. Her traditional

love of liberty ^nd the mountainous character of her borders made it certain

that she could never beeasily conquered.

In reply to my question, the Minister said that commercially and economically,

Switzerland and Germany were interdependent to a very great extent. A great

deal of trade existed between the two countries and the total balance, including

invisible payments, was in favor of Switzerland. The conventions and agreements

regulating trade relations between the two countries had grown to several

volumes, indicating that every detail had been a subject of agreement. I asked

how M. Stucke could explain the gigantic volume of trade between Germany and

Switzerland when both of these countries were highly industrialized. The Swiss

Minister said that for a century and a half there had been a division of labor

between the industries of the two countries. Germany specialized in heavy

industries and in the industry of mass production, while Switzerland specialized

 98

in the lighter industries--such as electrical goods requiring a greater amount

of trade skill. Take the manufacture of automobiles in C7ermany, for example, he

said. While the chassis and the body of a car were made in Germany, it was

Switzerland who furnished the wheels and all electrical fittings in these cars.

Therefore, instead of keen competition there was close cooperation between the

German and Swiss industries.

He added that this was his first entry into the field of: diplomacy and he

was not a career man. He also said that in view of recent events in Central

Europe and political developments in Germany and Italy, Switzerland found it

advisable to cultivate closer relations with France, a country, like herself, having

a democratic tradition and attached to the ideal of liberty.

Earlier, on March 23, I had a conversation with M. Francois pietri,

former Minister of Marine, at a dinner party in the Hungarian Legation. He was

one of the active leaders of the French political world, and usually frank in

expressing his views about the political situation in the country. He said that

France was not under a strong government of great personalities, free from alI

partisan and class quarrels , but that he thought such a government was already

overdue, and he was confident that it would come in the near future. M. Deladier, a

strong personality and the leader of the Radical [Socialist j Party in France,

was then [Vice-Premier and] Minister of National Defense. According to M. Pietri,

he would be the head of the next government. As to the program of the expected

new cabinet, it would consist in pursuing a firm policy internally, in order to

stop all the social unrest, and in accelerating all phases of national production

in the face of the serious international situation. He said M. Deladier would

call upon every Frenchman to do his duty to France, as Nelson had done in

England at the time of the Napoleonic war, and he would issue a plain statement

to the country, asking for the support of the French people. He would tel 1 the

working class that if they did not give up the 40-hour system themselves and
 99

work 60 hours instead, perhaps in a year or two, they might be obliged to do so

by Hitler, the danger to French security being so grave at the moment. He would

ask for a delegation of powers from the Chamber of Deputies, and if necessary,

he would dissolve the Chamber so that he could carry out his program more

effectively. M. Pietri thought that the country had reached a state, where the

French people would be ready to accept a strong government, as they had always

done so before in the face of a grave crisis.

Turning to the international situation, M. Pietri said it was very serious

and would surely result in war unless something were done in time to prevent

it. He felt that at the time of the German occupation of the Rhineland, France

should have reacted strongly, and that then she would have succeeded in stopping

this continued downward slide. He said now people all saw that France should

have taken firm action in 1936. It was evident to him that if nothing were done

at present to save the situation, two years hence people would find it too late

to do anything to prevent further aggravation.

I was much impressed by his view and thought that his picture, not only of

the situation in France at the time, but also of the possibility of peace or war

in Europe seemed to be well justified. With regard to the internal situation

of France, it was growing clearer that a stronger government was in the offing,

in light of internal tensions and the continually deteriorating situation in Europe.

A substantial group in France was dissatisfied with the way things were done

by the successive Front Populaire governments, and that dissatisfaction was not

confined to political leaders who, at the time, had not yet been able to control

a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. It was really the people of the country

who were getting tired of the Front Populaire and were hoping for a strong

government. That was the reason why M. Pietri felt that a strong one was bound

to come within a very short period.

 100

The successive French cabinets, formed with the support of the so-called

Front Populaire, relied upon a policy of enlisting the cooperation of Great

Britain and the conclusion of a Franco-British pact of mutual assistance,

believing that with British cooperation assured, France together with Great Britain

could deal with the European situation and be strong enough to prevent the Central

powers, particularly Germany under Hitler, from carrying out further aggression

to the extent of provoking war.

I recall that, in a speech, one of the French Foreign Ministers (I think

it was Georges Bonnet) conveyed that he fully realized that the situation in

Europe was serious. But he felt that war could be avoided because France and

Great Britain, acting together on the basis of a Franco-British pact of mutual

assistance, would be able to deal with the situation and would so impress Germany

and Italy with their combined strength that they would not dare to push their

policy of aggression to the extent where war would become a reality.

I think these French leaders believed sincerely that with Great Britain

cooperating with France to deal with the European situation, the combined effort

would succeed in [preventing a war inj Europe. Of course, one of the principle

items of the Front Populaire program was to preserve peace and they felt they

would be able to do it in that way. Theretofore, they had been supported first by

the people. That was how they got a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. The

French people, like the people of any other country, did not like war and would,

up to a point, support any government that promised to safeguard the peace for them.

[To recapitulate, M. Pietri's views seemed well justifiedjbecause he

seemed to me to be fully familiar with the political situation and its elements of

strength and weakness as regards France, and with the deterioration of the

international situation under the successive Front Populaire governments. He

himself was a Radical Socialist, like Daladier, and Daladier's supporter.

In the Front Populaire, the Radicals had no controlling voice because the

socialists and communists combined had a greater number of votes than what the

Radicals could command in the chamber of Deputies. He himself rI understood tLflL-ie

not only dissatisfied sincerely with both the international situation and the

political situation in France, but also convinced that something must be done and

done in time. I understood that he would, holding the views he did, like very much

to go back to the government and help a new government to pursue a new and stronger

policy.

[I raised more points for discussion with M. Pietri.] He was [for example]

certain that Germany and Italy would provoke a war at a time convenient to them.

He told me that the reliable information, which the French government had received,

indicated that they would start the war in North Africa after Franco conquered all

of Spain and Germany established air bases in Spain and Italy her submarine bases

in the Mediterranean. France would then have her close communication with

North Africa cut seriously if not entirely.

M. Pietri [again expressed his] confidence in M. Daladier's emergence

as the head of the next government, whereupon he (Daladier) would be able to do

something for France with a policy of strengthening France and stabilizing Europe.

Germany was at the core of the European problem, M. Pietri continued. Her policy

had always been to isolate France in order to be able to defeat her easily. All

the doctrines and the ideologies that German propaganda had put forward were merely

slogans to disturb France's allies and prevent the close cooperation between France,

England and other powers friendly to France. Thus the German campaign against

the non-Aryan races did not prevent Germany from joining hands with Japan. The

present anti-Semitic campaign in Germany was also intended to sow the seeds of

dissension in democratic countries. As for the anti-communist campaign, it was

not inspired by any fundamental opposition or real fear of the spread of communism.
 102

It was merely [being used] as an instrument to separate France from Russia

and keep England away from France. The purpose was to destroy the Franco-Soviet

Pact. If France yielded to the influence and gave up the Pact, M. Pietri said it

would bring internal dissensions in France between the Socialists and communists

on the one side and other parties on the other. But if France stood firm

and held on to the pact notwithstanding the German propaganda against communism,

then England, especially under the present Unionist government with Chamberlain as

Prime Minister, would become suspicious of France and hesitate or refuse to

cooperate with France. In either case, the German objective would succeed in the

end.

M. Pietri pointed out that the people in France, especially the moneyed class,

were blind enough to think that Germany stood for the defense of capital and

property, and to welcome every utterance of Hitler's against communism. He was

certain that as soon as France gave up Soviet Russia and the Franco-Soviet Pact,

Germany would lose no time in allying herself with Moscow. Such rapproachement

had existed after the World War I and there was every probability that Germany

would want to have Soviet Russia on her side again. The tree object of Germany

was to establish German hegemony in Europe.

M. Pietri added that so long as France presented a picture of confusion and

instability, it was no wonder that her allies began to lose confidence and hope

in her, and to curry favor elsewhere. But he was sure that as soon as France

had a strong National Union government, pursuing a firm policy with determination,

her allies would all want to join her in defense of their liberty and independence.

For there was nothing for them to fear in France, while the real aims of German

policy were not unknown to them.

[I would point out one implication of M. Pietri's final remarks.] The

European leaders actually felt that whatever measures they took in Europe, if

successfully pursued, would automatically solve the world situation as a whole.

 103

[Then and for many years to come,] European leaders, generally speaking, were

unable to integrate the situation in the Far East into a total, viable picture

of the world situation as a whole.

On the subject of the situation in Europe, which was developing in the

direction of the Second World War, my conversation on April 1, 1938, with the

Belgian Ambassador, Count Kerchove de Denterghem, who had been transferred

from Paris to Rome and who had just presented his letters of credence to the King

of Italy and Emperor of Abyssinia, was of unusual interest as it threw light on

the international situation in Europe as he saw it. He had come back from Rome

just to wind up his mission in France, and to say good-bye to a number of his

close colleagues.

In the Count’s letters of credence, the King of Belgium had referred bo

the head of the Italian government as the King of Italy and also as the Emperor

of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) . I was somewhat curious to know precisely what significance

Belgium attached to this addition of a new title to that of the King of Italy,

particularly with respect to the question of diplomatic recognition of Abyssinia.

This was a question which China had been considering, and she had already disclosed

her reluctance [to extend such diplomatic recognition] to the chancellories of

principal powers in the West.

The Count said in reply to my question, that that was a delicate question.

Mussolini bore hard feelings against all the sanctionist countries (that is to

say, the countries which tried to apply sanctions against Italy as a result of

the resolutions of the League of Nations.) As Belgium was one of them, Mussolini

also had felt a grudge against her. When an Italian friend of his informed him

of Mussolini's feeling on this question, he wrote to his government asking it

not to make any change in the Belgian ambassadorship in Rome. But as usual,

he said, governments did not pay much attention to the advice of its own diplomats
 104

and the then Belgian Ambassador in Rome was recalled. Officially, however, he

remained as the Belgian Ambassador to Rome until his own (Denterghem's) appointment

as his successor was officially announced.

The question which I put to him, M. Denterghem continued, had been a difficult

one for M. Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister. M. Spaak's own party was against

any sort of recognition of Italy's conquest of Ethiopia, while all the other

parties in Belgium were in favor of it. So the course he decided to take was that

of de facto recognition, that is to say, merely addressing the King of Italy also

as Emperor of Abyssinia without any discussion and without any other document or

communication touching on the subject. In his (Count Denterghem's) own conversation

with Count Ciano, neither Ciano nor himself had touched upon the question <£

Ethiopia, because any reference to it would have opened up a discussion in which it

would have been difficult to bring about an agreement. In any case, he went on to

explain, the title did not mean anything very serious. The King of England, until

less than a century ago, had always carried the title of the King of France as well.

The Belgian Ambassador told me that a high political personage of France

had said to him the other day that France could not do what Belgium had done.

But he had asked him to whom the French Consul-General in [the Ethiopian capital ofJ

Addis Ababa was accredited and to whom the notice of the appointment of the

Consul-General had been sent by the French Embassy in Rome. It was found, he s.iid,

that the appointment of the Consul-General was subject to the ratification

of the Foreign Office in Rome and the Consul-General was accredited to the

Italian authorities in Ethiopia. The Count thus explained that de facto recognition

was necessitated by the actual situation. If the Ethiopian Emperor should be able

to enter his country and rule again, it would not affect the position of the

Belgian Ambassador in Rome.

I asked him then whether Belgium had taken this action in agreement with

Holland and the Scandinavian countries. The Belgian Ambassador replied that
 105

Holland, having large territorial possessions in the Far East, could not afford

to have an unfriendly Italy, since Italy occupied such an important position

in the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, from the naval point of view. So Holland,

he said, proposed to the Scandinavian countries to accord recognition to the

King of Italy as Emperor of Abyssinia, and actually appointed a Minister to

Rome with letters of credence addressing the King of Italy also as Emperor of

Abyssinia. The Belgian action had followed along the Dutch line.

As the Belgian Ambassador had just returned from Rome, I asked him what

was the opinion in Italy with regard to the recent German coup d'etat in Austria.

He replied that two years ago, when Italy was engaged in the Ethiopian war and

unable to look after Austria and Hungary, she had prepared herself to see a

modification of the status of Austria. But what she had in mind was a limited

change of status in the form of a federation, and limited cooperation with Germany

along economic lines. Italy never expected the complete absorption of Austria

by Germany. The way the absorption was performed by Germany also startled the

Italians, he said. He thought that if Italy's negotiation with England resulted

in an entente cordiale, Italy in a year's time might veer towards England and

France and leave the fold of Germany.

When I asked him what he thought of the prospect of the current Italian-

British negotiations, the Belgian Ambassador expressed the belief that they

would surely be successful, especially as they were animated on both sides by a

desire to come to an understanding of the outstanding questions between them.

I then told him I understood that if an agreement were reached between Italy

and Great Britain, its conclusion would be subject to two conditions. Italy,

on her part, would like England to recognize Ethiopia, and England, on her part,

would like to have Italy withdraw her volunteers from Spain first. Count

Denterghem confirmed my view as being correct. But he thought it would not be

difficult for England to grant a de facto recognition, and neither would the
 106

withdrawal of volunteers from Spain prove difficult for Italy. He said Belgium,

for example, was a country opposed to communism, but she also had volunteers

fighting on the Republican side in Spain. These volunteers all had passports

and false names so they could not be easily identified. A similar practice could

be easily adopted by Italy, if it were necessary to keep the volunteers there

any longer. In other words, he thought Italy might officially agree to withdrawal,

but leave the volunteers there.

I remarked that some people had told me that while Mussolini was at heart

favorably disposed towards France, Ciano was a Germanophile. The Belgian

Ambassador said the impression he had got in Rome did not bear out my statement.

He thought that for the present, whatever their real sentiment, both Mussolini

and Ciano had no alternative except to continue the Italian policy of cooperation

with Germany. When events turned out more favorably, for example, on the

final success of the Anglo-Italian talks and on an agreement with France, there

would be no doubt that Italy would veer towards the Anglo-French group.

On April 21 [when the Blum cabinet had already fallen and M. Daladier had

become Premier;] I paid a visit to M. Georges Bonnet, French Foreign Minister

in the new [Daladier] Cabinet. While congratulating him on his assumption

of the foreign portfolio, I wanted, at the same time, to ascertain the views

of the new French government on the Ethiopian question and the British government's

intentions to raise it at the next meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.

[(The Chinese government had received a British note informing it to that effect.)]

I told him that although it was not expressly stated, I had the impression that

the British government's real purpose was to recognize the Italian conquest of

Ethiopia. I told him that my government presumed that the French government had

received a similar note and would like to know what were its views before

replying to the British government. I added that while the Chinese government

had taken no decision yet, I believed it would find it difficult to support the
 107

British proposal in Geneva. The principle of non-recognition of territorial

change affected by force of arms was one of primordial importance to China, not

only as regards Manchuria, which was occupied by Japan in the years 1931-33, but

also as regards certain provinces of China, which were then under occupation by

Japanese troops. China, I told the French Foreign Minister, could not possibly

accede to the British request for support without compromising her international

stand and prejudicing her vital interests.

M.Bonnet said that Great Britain had raised the question before he himself

took up office, and that M. Boncour,his predecessor, had already answered,

pledging the support of France at Geneva for the British proposal. He himself

saw no reason for change, and the French government therefore would support it.

But he fully appreciated the stand taken by China, as he himself was fully

sympathetic with the cause for which China was fighting and the important issues

involved in the struggle.

In the case of the Ethiopian question, M. Bonnet said, the French government

was obliged to take a different view because of the fact that relations with

Italy were of great importance to France. The question of sanctions had greatly

embroiled France in difficulties in her relations with Italy. So long as the

question of the Italian annexation of Ethiopia remained unsettled, so long

there could be no hope of bringing about a general appeasement in the European

situation. That was the reason France would second the British effort to

liquidate the situation and why France, following the British example, had

initiated preliminary conversations with Italy with a view to the normalization

of the relations between the two countries. But because, M. Bonnet ssid, he

attached great importance to the question of principle involved, he had declined

to nominate a new ambassador to Rome and had chosen instead to send a

special mission to open negotiations. He had decided to send a new ambassador only
 108

after the position of France had become regularized in Geneva at the coming

meeting of the Council. He had taken this position in spite of the insistence on

the part of the public and the press upon the necessity of France's having

an ambassador in Rome at once. He realized that it would be to the great

disadvantage of France not to have an ambassador in Rome at the coming visit,

for example, of Hitler to Mussolini, as a charge d'affaires could not possibly

have the same authority and prestige as would an ambassador. But in the interest

of safeguarding the principle of solidarity and regularity of action, he,

Bonnet, preferred to wait until after the meeting in Geneva was over. He said

he hoped, therefore, that China would see her way to supporting the British

position.

I told the French Foreign Minister that the Chinese government was anxious

to cooperate, as it had always done, with democratic countries and particularly

with France and Great Britain in Geneva. But in this case, the difficulties in

China's way were really very great. Perhaps, I said, it might be possible to

find a formula which would meet the needs of the occasion as regards the Ethiopian

question, and at the same time safeguard the principle of non-recognition which was

of vital importance to China. I emphasized that the safeguarding of this principle

was not in China's interests alone, but of importance to the world at large. In

view of the recent developments in Europe, I said it was all the more desirable

that thi-> principle should be safeguarded for the future.

M. Bonnet felt sure that some formula could be devised that would meet the

requirements of the situation. He thought a resolution could be worked out,

which, while giving a solution to the Ethiopian question, would at the same time

repudiate in the strongest terms possible, Japanese aggression against China.

He surely would support such a position, he said, because while Italy was the

next door neighbor to France who must try to remain on good terras with her

lest the latter be pushed into the arms of Germany, Japan was far away and

France's relations with her were less important. There was not the same
 109

consideration for France as in the case of Italy. Here in Europe, by remaining

at loggerheads with Italy, France would merely be playing Germany's game of

preventing Franco-Italian collaboration.

In reply to his question, I said that I expected to attend the meeting

of the Council as the representative of my government. I added that, in my view,

it would be desirable to do more than safeguard the principle of non-recognition

of changes of territorial limits by aggression. I said that while the Italian

conquest of Ethiopia was already an event of the past, Sino-Japanese hostilities

were still continuing, and Japanese aggression was a current fact. Would it not be

well, I asked, for the Council, in its coming meeting, to solve, on the one

hand, the impasse as regards the Ethiopian question, and on the other, to take

up some concrete step to aid China, the victim of aggression? Such a step, I said,

would prove to the world that the League of Nations had not intention of abandoning

its own principles. I expressed my belief that a large body of public opinion both

in England and France supported the League of Nations, and that such action on the

part of the Council to aid China would serve to dissipate the feeling of

discontent, which would surely be aroused by a compromising decision in favor of

Italy at the expense of Ethiopia.

I suggested to M. Bonnet that, on his approaching visit to London, he

could speak to the British and point out the wisdom of such a course of action as

I suggested. The French Foreign Minister said he could promise me that he would

surely speak to Lord Hailifax of my views, and asked me to call on him on his

return from London in order that I might be informed of the result.

[Aside from wishing to discuss the Ethiopian question with the new French

Foreign Minister, I wanted to take up the urgent question of military supplies

for China and their transit. Therefore,] when the French Foreign Minister

congratulated me upon the success of the Chinese forces in recent months and

inquired about the present situation, I gave him a brief account of the actual
 110

situation, and added that although the Chinese resistance had greatly improved,

China still needed supplies from abroad, particularly arms and war material. I

said that to ensure such a continuous flow, the question of transit through

Indochina was of great importance to China. I told him that while Hongkong

allowed 60,000 tons of Chinese war material to pass through it every month, in

the last nine months only 3,500 to 4,000 tons were permitted to pass through

Indochina to China, and that at the moment Indochina was practically closed to

transit of Chinese war supplies. I further told him that there had also been

difficulty in obtaining prompt delivery of arms and war material ordered by the

Chinese government in France, and of the permits of fabrication for those orders

placed with French factories. I added that, at time, it had been difficult to

obtain even the permits of exportation, and that even orders placed before the

commencement of the Sino-Japanese hostilities had been held up by the Quai

d'Orsay, and permits of fabrication refused on the ground that such articles, when

fabricated, could not be sent through Indochina. I emphasized China's urgent

need of such supplies, and asked the Foreign Minister not only to facilitate the

issuance of necessary permits by his Ministry, but also to use his influence

with his colleagues in the government to speed up the manufacture of the things

ordered and to facilitate their transit through Indochina.

The Foreign Minister appeared unfamiliar with this question and asked me

whether his Ministry had received communications from the Embassy on the subject .

On being told that several memoranda had already been sent to the Ministry by

the Embassy, he promised that he would order his Chef de Cabinet to look

the file up, and that he would give his immediate attention to the matter. He

would do it all the more gladly, he said because he realized that China, in

resisting Japanese aggression, was also defending the principles of peace and

democracy.

On April 24, at a luncheon at the home of Mme. Tabouis, I had a conversation,

which I consider to be very important, with M. George Mendel, who had returned
T h m nf f-hp fav/Drahlti
turn in the military situation in China, M. Mandel said that China's prolonged

resistance had been unexpected. It had impressed many of his colleagues in the

government as well as the French public. He said that within three days of

assuming office at the Ministry, he had again studied the whole file relating to

French policy towards China. He found M. Moutet had been very sympathetic and

helpful to China, but this was not true of other important persons connected

with the execution of the policy. The Governor-General of Indochina, whom he

did not know and who had been appointed by his predecessor, seemed unable to

comprehend the views which he had in mind to carry out.

I told him that the Governor-General appeared to me to be exceedingly

cautious and even timid and that he assumed no responsibility except for actions

he had been expressly ordered to carry out by Paris. The Minister responded that

M. Brevier, the Governor-General, seemed to be anxious at all time to have his

action covered by instructions from the government. He also said that the staff

of the colonial Ministry was different from that of other ministries. In any

other ministry, the minister would have close contact and acquaintance with the

heads of principal departments, but this was not so in the case of the Colonial

Ministry. Most of the orders were transmitted over the telephone from the

Minister of Colonies to the department heads. In the case of the Governor-General

for Indochina, he, M. Mandel, might send for him for conference, but the

situation demanded that the Governor-General remain in Indochina.

He further explained that the Colonial Ministry was one that had contact

with, and a bearing upon, all the principal problems of French foreign policy.

He said the security of French colonies in North Africa, the problem of the Jibut

railway, the demarcation of the frontier with Italian Somaliland, the relations

between Liberia and Tunisia--these questions, for example, formed a part of the

impending Franco-Italian conversations.

Our conversation developed into a frank,as well as friendly, exchange of

views. The Minister told me that he had studied the problem and appreciated the
 112

stronger factor than China in international politics, but with her commitments

to Germany and Italy, she was sure to be France's enemy in the event of war

breaking out. He even believed that there was some understanding as to military

cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy, in the case of the outbreak of a

Second world war. He said China, on the other hand, had always been on friendly

terms with France and had not modified her policy since the last war. In the

event of another war, China would be a useful friend, and it should be the policy

of France to make as many friends as possible before the sinister event.

He then gave me a brief account of the evolution of the French policy

in regard to the question of transit facilities through Indochina, particularly

during the Chautemps government. He thought it was part of prudence to adopt

the restrictions against China, without going deeply into the issues involved in

the problem. When I referred to the British policy of allowing Chinese war

materials to pass through Hongkong without manifesting any apprehension of the

possibility of Japanese attacking Hongkong, the Minister said the British defenses

in and around Hongkong were much stronger than those of the French in Indochina.

He told me that he knew that while the British had allowed in the past few

months something like 90,000 tons of Chinese war material to pass through

Hongkong, France had permitted scarcely more than 3,000 tons to pass through
.------ . \ I- L irJ
Indochina to China. H«—had,| however^ He told me decided to make a change in the

policy.

M. Mandel, continuing^said that the Governor-General of Indochina had

recently cabled him, stating that China, according to the Chinese government,

would like to have greater facilities for transport through Indochina, and that

both he (M. Brevier) and M. Naggiar, the French Ambassador in China, were in

favor of extending greater assistance to China. He told me that he expected to

have a discussion with the Quai d'Orsay, which had not yet received a report

from the French Ambassador. Meanwhile, he told me, he had spoken to M. Daladier,
 113

the Premier, and had already obtained h s approval, for M. Daladier had told him

to go ahead with what he liked to do and assured him that he entirely endorsed

his views .

I told him of my talk with M. Bonnet, the new Foreign Minister, and that I

had urged Bonnet to use his influence with the French government in favor of

extending greater assistance to China. I asked M. Mandel to speak to M. Bonnet

also before the latter's visit to London. The Minister of Colonies said, however,

that since he had already secured the approval of the Premier, he would go ahead

without running the risk of obtaining a veto from the Quai d'Orsay.

M. Mandel went on to say that one of the arguments used by his colleagues

for not rendering help to China was that Chinese resistance might not last

and that a Japanese victory might bring the Japanese danger to Indochina much

nearer, if the Japanese should act against France in revenge for her help to

China. Another argument was that, in the event of China's emerging victorious

or of her being able to obtain an honorable peace in the present conflict, she

would certainly become anti-foreign in her foreign policy and France could expect

no friendly cooperation from her as regards Indochina.

I commented in reply that this was certainly not in the spirit of the

Chinese people, who always believed in peace and friendly collaboration with

China's neighbors. There was no ground for the fear that China might adopt any

such policy as would be anti-foreign. If there was real anxiety on the point, I

said, it might be possible to make an arrangement giving China's assurance against

any such eventuality. I myself, I added, always favored the conclusion of some

kind of agreement for Franco-Chinese cooperation, not only in the economic field

but also beyond that. It was clear in my mind that, while China needed a

certain amount of assistance from France, especially as regards transit through

Indochina in the present conflict, there were a great many ways in which China

could be of help to France in the event of serious complications arising in

Europe involving France. I told the Minister that there was already a treaty
 114

between China and France relating to Indochina, assuring China the transit

of the Chinese government's war supplies through Indochina. This treaty should

also serve as a basis for the extension of transit facilities by France to China

in the present conflict. But an agreement of a wider scope could be usefully

made. I told the Minister too that, during the last war, China had supplied

France with about 80,000 laborers working behind the trenches of the French

soldiers, and she also helped in supplying raw materials to France. Similar

help would be of great value to France in the future. M. Mandel said that os

regards the last war Japan also helped France and could even have given a greater

amount of assistance, if the French policy had been more skillful. But in the

event of another war in the future, he was convinced China’s cooperation would be

very desirable.

I mentioned the possibility then of China's supplying important minerals

for the manufacture of arms, such as antimony and wolfram which were essential

for the fabrication of arms, munitions and guns. In the present Sino-Japanese

conflict, I said China had all the manpower she needed to face the situation, but

only lacked equipment and supplies. And there was a possibility of China helping

France with her manpower, if necessary. M. Mandel said a political agreement

with China at the time might not be opportune nor easily understood by the

French public, which seemed already to be frightened by the prospect of France

becoming involved in war on account of Czechoslovakia. The recent resolution of

the postal Workers’ Union against France's helping Czechoslovakia in case the

latter should be attacked was an illustration, he said. He believed however, in

the desirability of some agreement envisaging military cooperation, not because

France should help China on altruistic grounds, but because such an arrangement

would be to the interest of France herself.

He asked how long China's resistance could last, and whether China could

strengthen her defenses on Hainan Island so as to ward off the possibility of

Japanese occupation. If China could do that, he said, it would greatly strengthen

 115

France's position in carrying out her new policy towards China. I told him

that I would gladly report what he had just said to my government. As regards

the prospect of China's resistance, I assured him at once that, provided supplies

of arms and war materials were continued, China could continue to resist for a

long time. The country was more united than ever in its determination to oppose

the Japanese invasion, whereas in Japan the government and the people were divided

in the pursuit of her aggressive policy in China.

Toward the end of our conversation, the Minister asked me to exercise the

greatest care in transmitting the report to my government. He said if anything

should leak out and be learned by the Japanese, the Minister would find himself

in the greatest embarrassment, and it might impair the prospect of carrying out

the new policy. I assured him that the greatest care would be taken to prevent

any such possibility from arising.

When I brought up the subject of the forthcoming Anglo-French conversations

in London and what France would expect to obtain as a result, M. Mandel replied

that the most important result would be some financial arrangements for the

defense of the franc and the conclusion of a loan for the purpose. When I

mentioned the report of the possibility of discussion of the problem of pooling

the resources of the two countries and working out a general agreement for

the manufacture of arms and particularly airplanes, M. Mandel said that the

problem had already been discussed and an understanding reached at the time of

Mr. Churchill's visit to Paris.

I then raised the question of the relations between France and Soviet

Russia and the possibility of a military agreement between them. M. Mandel

said the relations were good, but the question of implementing the Pact of

Mutual Assistance by a military agreement had been complicated by the considerations

of internal politics. In his own case, he said, the press of the Right had been

attacking him for being under the influence of Moscow, although he had been
 116

M. Clemenceau's collaborator from the beginning. He said he favored close

cooperation between France and Soviet Russia^ that was true, but that was for the

reason that the friendship and help of Russia was indispensible to France.

His pro-Russian policy was inspired by his conviction on this point . But the

public was misinformed and the press was always prejudiced by considerations of

internal politics.

Then he said the Communist Party in France, which controlled 72 votes in

the Chamber of Deputies, had proved very stupid in regard to making the fullest

use of its advantageous position in the Chamber. That Party lacked the

leadership of capable men. I remarked that I personally did not believe that

Moscow was really playing any game in French internal politics, and asked

M. Mandel whether the French Communists were under the influence of Moscow.

He replied that perhaps Moscow was not directing the policy of the Communist

party in France, but that he believed whatever the Soviet Ambass idor wished to

be done by the Communists in France, it was usually done. He said, however, the

Soviet propaganda was very stupid. It utilized only the press of the Left and was

easily found out, whereas Germany and Italy dispensed funds freely to the whole

preSs--to the Left as well as to the Right. The public was told that Moscow

was carrying on propaganda, while the press did not say that Germany and Italy

were also doing the same thing in their own interests.

Reverting to the question of the military pact between France and Soviet

Russia, M. Mandel said that friends of Soviet Russia were rather disgusted

with the continued persecution and trials in that country. Such action did not

inspire confidence, It was no use to negotiate an agreement with the leaders of

army today who might be shot tomorrow as traitors to their country.

Then I asked what he thought of the political situation in France] now as

the new government had been able to reestablish calm and confidence. M. Mandel

said the government had started in the most favorable atmosphere. It had been well

received by the country. It now remained for it to justify its coming into
 117

existence by action. Parliament had been sent away on a vacation and would

be back in July for two weeks, [after which it] would again adjourn, so that

the government would have full freedom of action. If uneasiness in financial

circles had again appeared, M. Mandel said that was due to the delay in

announcing the government's financial program. He said M. Deladier had desired

to postpone this announcement until after his return from London, when he would

have learned the possibility and extent of the assistance he could count upon

from Great Britain. But in view of the reappearance of feelings of uneasiness,

M. Daladier would announce his financial program, or at least part of it, before

his departure for London.

M. Mandel was anxious to know whether Germany and Italy had been continuing

their supply of arms and war materials to China, and whether the German military

mission remained in China. I told him that the German military advisors were

still in China, but that they all belonged to the old Imperial army and were

not in sympathy with the present regime in Germany. As regards war materials,

I said old contracts were being executed but no new ones had been made. The

supplies delivered under the old contracts were being sent through neutral

countries in order, it was assumed, to disguise their origin in the fact of

Japanese insistence against the continuance of supplying them to China.

When I again referred to M. Mandel's new policy and assured him that it

would also produce a favorable impression in Washington, where the desire was

frequently expressed that France should help China as much as other democratic

countries, he said it might promote the cooperation of the democratic front

and help to interest America more in the problems of Europe. He also said he

had heard that American financial interests had been extending financial help to

Japan, and asked how far that was true. I told him that American industrial

companies like General Motors, the Ford Motor Company and General Electric had

all established branch factories in Japan and invested considerably in the

 118

Japanese field. It was possible that these people had been in favor of not

being hostile to Japan. But the financial interests in America were, I said,

all opposed to the Japanese policy in China. I told him that Mr. Norman Davis

had told me, at the time of his departure from Europe, that American banking

firms allowed to Japanese purchasers in America only 12 to 14 days of credit,

which was just to cover the period of shipment of gold from Japan. Such

credit was to start from the time when gold left Japan to the time of its

arrival in the United States. Beyond that there was no other financial facility

extended to Japan. The Administration in Washington was entirely opposed to

giving any help to Japan.

I then brought up the question of the importance of Soviet Russia . I

remarked that Chamberlain did not seem to be very friendly towards Soviet

Russia, and said this was a pity as the cooperation of Moscow was desirable

in my view, as much for the appeasement of Europe as for the stabilizing of

conditions in the Far East.M. Mandel said he himself was convinced of the peaceful

intentions of Soviet Russia and that Soviet cooperation was highly desirable in

order to help safeguard the interests of peace. He also believed Great Britain

would eventually get together with Russia by way of the Far East, where the

Japanese threat to British interests was becoming more serious every day.

Here in France, he said, M. Daladier's government, being the first

that was not a Front POpulaire government, was favorably viewed by Chamberlain,

who would therefore, in his (Mandel's) view, like to support it. He said

Chamberlain certainly preferred M. Daladier to M . Blum, whohad acted very

clumsily, both internally and externally. He added that the successful settlement

of the strikes by the new government in Paris had been a humiliating blow to

M. Blum, who had all along claimed to be the leader and spokesman of the working

class and yet was unable to persuade the French workingmen to listen to him.
 119

Nonetheless, M. Mandel was afraid that, as regards policy toward Europe, Chamberlain

could not see eye to eye with France.

M. Mandel explained that Chamberlain’s chief concern seemed to be to gain

time in order to carry out the rearmament program of Great Britain. He said

Chamberlain would therefore continue to dodge any definite pronouncement of the

British attitude on the urgent questions of the moment, the Czechoslovak problem,

for example. In M. Mandel’s view, a clear-cut declaration on the part of

Great Britain to stand by France, if she went to the aid of Czechoslovakia, would

have the effect of checking any further adventure on the part of Germany. But he

felt certain that Chamberlain would not make such a declaration, [In M. Mandel’s

view, ] this uncertainty was really an element of danger in the situation and

might encourage the dictatorship countries to make further bluffs. It also

reacted unfavorably upon public opinion in France and made it more afraid than

ever of France’s being involved in war alone.

In taking leave of the Minister, I expressed a desire to see him from

time to time, and asked what would be the best way of arranging a meeting.

The Minister said he had been very pleased to have had this talk with me,

and thought it would be best to call him on the telephone for an appointment

at his house, as a visit to the Colonial Ministry, which I had contemplated making,

would have drawn a great deal of undesirable attention, particularly from the

Japanese.

[In my several conversations with members of the new French government,

reference was made to the improved Chinese position vis-a-vis the Japanese.]

Following the evacuation of Nanking and removal of the capital to Chungking, as

well as the definite rejection of proposals of peaceful settlement and the offer

of mediation made by the German Ambassador in China, evidently, with Japanese

approval, the Chinese government definitely decided to carry on the war of resistance

to its utmost. The Generalissimo, who all along had doubted the possibility of
 120

obtaining a reasonable settlement with Japan, redoubled his efforts to fight

the Japanese. During April and May 1938, the Chinese military forces were
4o
able not only hold back the Japanese operations and attacks on the Lunghai
A
Railway and the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, but in some places, the spirited resistance

and counter-attacks of the Chinese forces^even enable them to retake several towns

along the two main lines to the railway, particularly on the borders between

Shantung Province and Kiangsu Province, and between Anhwei and Honan Province.

The Embassy received a succession of favorable fighting news from China.

The Chinese air force, reinforced with new planes obtained from abroad, was able

to play its part. It not only bombed the Japanese garrisons on the islands at

the mouth of the pearl River in Canton, but was even able to send a detachment
(l'Met
of Chinese planes to Japan. On-M^ 20, by crossing the East China Sea, the

Chinese planes were able to reach the southernmost island in the Japanese

archipelago (Kyushu) early in the morning. The Chinese planes did not drop

bombs on Kyushu but unloaded tons of propaganda material, huge quantities of

leaflets, and then flew northward toward Osaka, where they were able to circle

around over the city for 20 minutes, dropping handbills. They all returned

safely, and there was no retaliation or resistance by local Japanese anti­

aircraft .

Even in early April news had reached me that Japan was feeling tired of the

war and trying desperately to make a final effort and secure a rapid and

decisive victory in order to be in a position to impose Japan's settlement of the

war upon China. Pfere Robert, a French Catholic father, [was, for example,

one who] brought information to the effect that Japan was feeling very tired

of the war. [Later,] on the 29th of April, M. Buell, Secretary -General of the

American Foreign policy Association, called to discuss with me the possibility

and the conditions for settlement of the conflict with Japan. He also said he

was impressed with China's rising confidence and strength and Japan's growing

weakness in the pursuit of her military efforts in China. On May 7, one of the
 121

leading correspondents of the French press came to tell me that, according to

information her office had received, Japan was growing more tired of the war

and Japanese leaders were divided as to the policy to be pursued toward China.

Mr. Litvinov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, with whom I had a long conversation

on the situation in the Far East on May 9, started his remarks by congratulating

me on China's military successes. He added that reports from Japan indicated

the existence of a great deal of anxiety in Tokyo. The Japanese had begun

to feel in doubt as to what to do. Sugiyama, the War Minister, had recently

made a tour in China and Manchuria, to inspect the Japanese armed forces and

found the situation was not at all favorable to Japan. Prince Konoye, the

Japanese Premier, wanted to wind up the Chinese situation quickly and

advocated sending reinforcements to enable the Japanese army in China to

secure a rapid victory, thereby restoring to Japan her lost face and enabling

her to make peace. But, added Mr. Litvinov, Mr. Sugiyama was opposed to it

and refused to send reinforcements to China, evidently because it was difficult

to send still more reinforcements. (I might add this difficulty was understandable

because, at the time, Japanese forces were already spread all over China, and

were facing serious and obstinate resistance.)

M. Litvinov pointed out that China was in a very favorable situation if she

could only hold out and remain firm, without giving Japan any impression that

she was on the point of making peace. He said Japan would probably propose

peace again herself. The trouble in China was that there were still a lot

of pro-Japanese elements telling Japan that if she could modify her peace

conditions a little so as to save China's face, China would be willing to

negotiate peace with her. He believed it was this kind of information that kept

Japan continuing to struggle along in spite of her increasing difficulties, in

the hope that another big Japanese victory would bring China to her knees.

I assured him that only recently, General Chiang had declared that

there would be no posiibility of peace with Japan unless Japan withdrew her
 122

troops from China. I told the Soviet Foreign Commissar that the Generalissimo

stood firm on this point. He thought, however, that while the Generalissimo

was firm, there were people around him still wanting peace quickly and willing

to yield to Japan. In his view, these people were really spies, and the Soviet

Union had means of getting information in Hankow(where the Generalissimo was then,

where some of the government departments were temporarily installed, while other

ministries had already been moved to Chungking.) I told him that in China recently

quite a batch of people suspected of being spies were executed. M. Litvinov said

it was not enough; more people should be shot for this kind of treason. (At the

time several prominent Chinese had been caught, including a prominent figure

in the Waichiaopu, Mr. Wang, and shot for treason.)

Several days earlier I had had another discussion on the same topic of

the rising spirit of determined resistance on the part of China and the

growing feeling of war weariness in Japan with M. L£ger, Secretary-General of

the French Foreign Office. I went to speak to him about the difficulties encounteret

in transporting Chinese war supplies through Indochina. M. L6ger again excused

France on the ground that Japan might cause difficulties to France, having already

intimated that she might take appropriate action to stop transit. He emphasized

also the difficulties which France was facing in Europe, and France's desire

therefore to avoid anything which might further complicate her position in the

Far East. Thereupon, I told M. L6ger that Japan was not in a position in the

present circumstances, to cause any complications with France. I reiterated that

the British, for example, fully realized the actual situation and were therefore

not feeling uneasy at all in allowing Chinese shipments to pass through Hongkong.

M. L6ger then told me that, according to reports from Tokyo, the Japanese

were feeling tired of the war and were feeling more uncertain every day as to

the outlook. But he said it was altogether quite possible therefore that, in

their desperation, they might resort to desperate means to hasten the termination

of the present war by cutting off China's supplies from abroad. He said it was
 123

possible that the Japanese might bomb the Yunnan railway and occupy Hainan island.

I said that I did not agree with him in this view and that, according to my

information, the Japanese, rather than being apt to provoke complications vis-a-vis

France or Great Britain, were anxious to avoid complications with another power.

The point that I have tried to bring out thus far is that in the early

spring of 1938 the military situation in China began to improve for her, while the

Japanese were becoming increasingly anxious to terminate the hostilities, if she

could find a way of saving her face in doing that. As to the general international

situation in the Far East, and particularly in China, I would like to make further

reference to my conversation with M. Litvinov, the same conversation of May 9,

1938.

I had asked the Soviet Foreign Commissar about the situation on the

Manchurian frontier with his country, and whether it w&e-e not true that

the Japanese military authorities were having their eyes turned towards the

north and watching for an opportunity to attack Soviet Russia. I said this

possibility was suggested partly by the fact that Japan's military leaders

were finding it difficult to send more reinforcements to China proper, because

of the necessity of increasing Japanese military forces in North Manchuria.

The Soviet Foreign Commissar said that, according to his information, Japan

had increased her troops in Manchuria and they now numbered up to 400,000. He

said evidently Japan suspected that the Soviet Union would attack Manchuria.

When I expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would not take any step to dispel

such suspicion on the part of Japan, he replied that his government would do nothing

to alleviate the Japanese suspicion.

When 1 asked him about the prospect of the Soviet-Japanese negotiations

in the interest of settling outstanding questions between Japan and Soviet Russia,

M. Litvinov said that the negotiations were limited to questions of a secondary

importance. The Soviet Union had determined the program and scope of the

negotiations beyond which she would not go. He said that while Japan had
 124

asked to include all questions, Moscow had refused to agree. He added that the

negotiations were not making much progress because of this disagreement, and

the relations between the two countries were rather tense.

[I mentioned earlier that Mr. Buell, Secretary-General of the American

Foreign Policy Association, had called on me on April 29 to discuss with me the

possibility and the conditions for a settlementcf the conflict with Japan. In

fact, I entertained him at a luncheon in order to have a fuller opportunity for

an exchange of views. He said that the United States was wholly sympathetic

with China. The pacifist movement in his country was on the decline. The

United States would like to make another attempt at mediation together with

Great Britain at an opportune moment, which, in his view, had not yet arrived.

He said the time would arise only when moral pressure had grown sufficient to

settle the Spanish problem, [to obtain] the passage of the naval bill in

Congress, and [to assure that] the fortifications of the pacific naval bases

were built. He said that China's rising confidence in her own strength, Japan's

growing weakness and the Anglo-Italian Agreement just concluded all favored the

prospect of a satisfactory settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict.

He said the American air base in the Lusha tv Islands fLuzon^ ?] and the

British naval base in Singapore, working together, could bring Japan to terms by

imposing peace on the basis of China's economic concessions and Japan's political

and military withdrawal from China. He understood that Japan feared that if nnd

when such a settlement were made, China would not observe it. Dr. Buell

himself believed Japan was disposed to make peace on an economic basis, but he

had doubts that China would keep her word.

Dr. Sun Fo, also a guest at the luncheon, remarked that three conditions

were necessary for the success of American mediation with Japan. The first was

that, in the event of Japan's refusal [to reach a settlement], the United States,

Great Britain and other countries would definitely aid China in her continued
 125

resistance; the second was the necessity of Anglo-American cooperation in the

F.'r East; and the third was the passage of the naval expansion bill in Congress.

Dr. Sun said China would require a guarantee of the execution of a peace

agreement also.

As regards China's policy and China's conditions for peace, Dr. Sun said

there must be a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Japanese troops

first, and free negotiation afterwards. Dr. Sun expressed the view that Japan,

if she succeeded in her present attack on Hsu£.how, would again be willing to l

propose negotiations for peace.

I would like to add a statement here as to the question of financial aid

from the growers to enable China to continue her resistance effectively, and the

problems arising from it. With Soviet Russia there was the problem of

liquidating the debt of U.S. $ 10 million, incurred as the cost of transportation

to China of Soviet war materials and supplies. Dr. Soong, whom I invited

to go to Geneva, in connection with the impending Council Meeting of the League

on the Chinese question as well as on the Ethiopian question, said he was unable

to go because he was waiting anxiously for word from General Yang Chieh, Chinese

Ambassador in Moscow, on the question of the settlement of the financial

arrangements with Soviet Russia. It appeared that Dr. Soortf had told Dr. Sun Fo

that the U.S. $10 million remitted [from China] was for repayment for the cost

of transportation, [but] that the Russians insisted [it] should be for partial

payment of the $100 million worth of Russian war materials supplied to China.

As regards the matter of financial aid from Great Britain, I telephoned to

Mr. Quo Tai-chi in London the following day [April 30t], and suggested that should

be possible for Great Britain to extend, [requested] credit facilities to China

with a moral guarantee of the British treasury. Mr. Quo suggested a League loan,

which Lord Halifax had promised to consider.

Uj

On the following day,'TMay 1, £jMr. P. W. Kuo, [who was handling aid

 126

questiocr^or the goyernment\in Londorvj returned to Paris and reported on his

talks with Sir Frederick Leith-Ross and with several bankers in London. He said
j/ M-
that a public [bond issue and a political loan, which would ^quire

parliamentary approval, were both out of the question. He said there were

a number of factors which accounted for the impossibility: one,ignorance

of the British people of the Far Eastern situation; two, the opposition

of the Unionist Party and the lack of unanimity in the British Cabinet on the
J^/y\ Cm M
question of aid to China, objections being based on the ground that since the w, r
A
between China and Japan was continuing, further help from Great Britain would

make it appear that Britain was taking sides against Japan; three, the uncertainties

of the situation in Europe, which made it difficult to float or make any

loan. Financially, he said, Leith-Ross favored an inter-bank credit arrangement.

So Leith-Ross and he (Kuo) both approached several British banks likely to be

called upon to subscribe or to share under a credit arrangement from the Bank of

England. They both found these banks well-disposed.

Mr. Kuo said further that the idea of arranging a loan for currency

stabilization in China had also been raised again, and he himself had discussed

it when he was in London. He said such an arrangement would appear to have only

a commercial character, though its proceeds could be put to other uses or could

replace other funds for use. He thought American participation in the proposed

gritish loan or a League loan would solve half the problem at least.

[At the time X was preparing to leave for Geneva and the next meeting of

the Council of the League of Nations, which would deal, most importantly

from the Chinese point of view, with the Sino-Japanese question and the question

of Ethiopia. To begin with the latter,] the problem of Ethiopia and recognition

of the Italian conquest was temporarily a most urgent question in the minds

of the Quai d’Orsay and the British Foreign Office in view of the impending

meeting of the League Council. China was interested in the same question, because
 127

of the British government's request for support of her attitude on it.

[But, as I had told the French Foreign Minister on April 21,] China had found

the British proposal unacceptable, for fear that it would compromise China's

stand on the principle of non-recognition of territorial acquisition by force

and for fear of the implications of such recognition by the League of Nations for

China's vital interests in the light of the Japanese aggression in China.

At a luncheon given by the new French Minister of Economy, M. Raymond

patenotre, on May 5, 1938, M. Souritz, the Soviet Ambassador, and I were both

guests. In reply to my question, M. Souritz said he had seen M. Bonnet after

his return from London and learned from him that, concerning the Ethiopian

question, Lord Halifax would sound out the opinion of the Council members

before deciding upon the official action he would take. If Halifax found

there was no unanimity, he would then propose a recommendation to be adopted

by the Council, leaving each member state to do what it liked. His original

intention remained, however, to seek, if possible, a resolution of the League

Council authorizing or recognizing the Italian conquest.

In reply to his question as to what China's stand was, I told M. Souritz that

China could not support the British theme, and I said that I supposed Soviet

Russia could not endorse it either. The Soviet Ambassador said he did not know

what the attitude of his government would be, but he expected instructions by

that afternoon's diplomatic post. He himself was anxious to know them, especially

as he understood he would have to go to Geneva to represent his country at

the Council meeting, although there was still a possibility that M. Litvinov

would after all go to Geneva himself.

I told him that I understood that, besides New Zealand, another member of

the Council at the time, Bolivia^would also oppose the British suggestion. He

then mentioned to me that there was also a difficulty in connection with the

Ethiopian Emperor's demand for representation at the Council meeting.

When I raised the question of the results of the Anglo-French conversations

 128

in London, the Soviet Ambassador said the main problem was with reference to

Czechoslovakia. It seemed, he said, that France had acceded to the request

of Great Britain to bring joint pressure to bear upon Czechoslovaki i. I

M. Osusky, the Czechoslovak Minister in Paris, he said, hfid talked with him on the

eve of his (Osusky's) departure from Paris. According to Mr. Osusky,

Great Britain appeared to be in favor of persuading Benes to yield to the

Sudeten Germans to the extent either of transforming the Czechos1ovakian state

into a federation or giving the Sudetan Germans political autonomy. In either

case, M. Souritz thought it would place Czechoslovakia entirely under the

influence of Hitler. If Benes found it necessary to yield to Germany to this

extent, he said, Benes could do so on his own initiative, without seeking

the support or the influence of Great Britain and of France.

In M. Souritz’s view, French Foreign Minister Bonnet was afraid of France

being dragged into a war on account of Czechoslovakia without the support of

Great Britain. As a matter of fact, M. Souritz thought that if France should

be involved in war on account of Czechoslovakia in discharge of her treaty obligation

Great Britain would sooner or later be obliged to join in on the French side.

But the first stand which had been taken by the previous Blum government,

M. Souritz added, seemed to have been abandoned by the present French cabinet.

Already, he told me, certain members of the French government were rguing in

favor of an interpretation of the French-Czechoslovak Treaty of Alliance in a

manner that would relieve France of the obligation of going to the aid of

Czechoslovakia in case the latter should be attacked.

I asked the Soviet Ambassador whether the Soviet Russia would, in any case,

support Czechoslovakia if she should be attacked. The Ambassador said that the

Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement depended upon the carrying out of the French-

Czechoslovak agreement. It would come into play only if France carried out her

obligations vis-A-vis Czechoslovakia. Of course, he added, this was a juridical

 129

aspect of the pact of mutual assistance between Prague and Moscow. There

would also be the political consideration, which was often different from the

juridical consideration, and the Soviet Union often attached more weight to

political considerations than to juridical ones.

In reply to a question, M. Souritz said the problem of working out a

military pact between England and France was really more to the advantage of

England, who with her army of 80,000 could not do much on the Continent vis-a-vis

two great powers like Germany and Italy. But France was apprehensive, feeling

herself isolated externally and internally in a period of difficulties. She

was therefore anxious to secure British cooperation at all costs, though her

own army was a real force on the Continent.

Asked what he thought of the possible outcome of the Hitler-Mussolini's

conversations in Rome, M. Souritz thought they would concern mostly the Spanish

question. He said Mussolini was anxious to achieve success in Spain and would
V'lVO
like to have German support in this plan. As t^ thp prnepprf—nf f^pnb-Hrinn

swece^a-irr-Spai n and.-woi11 d—Tfefina-n -support'In thti'S 'plan-. As to the

prospect of Republican success at present, he said in spirit and morale

A
Republican Spain was superior, especially since its army had been reorganized.

But in equipment, particularly in air force, it was at a disadvantage. There

was on the Republican side only 100 planes, against 600 on Franco's side

furnished by Italy. France was practically doing nothing for Republican Spain

in the way of supplier except according her transit facilities. In this case,

France was again under the influence of Great Britain, who insisted upon the

maintenance of the policy of non-intervention for fear of a general conflagration

in Europe.

Asked about the prospect of a four-power pact, M. Souritz thought it

would be difficult to achieve at present. (Madame Patenotre, at the tfibl;e,

7
ulso said that France was not anxious for direct talks with Berlin because
 130

France believed that the prospect of success was very poor.)

M. Souritz said that M. Bonnet had explained in London the importance

of the French-Soviet Pact in the general scheme of European appeasement,

and the British were impressed by M. Bonnet's statement. I said, as regards

the Far East, Great Britain should really try to work more closely with Russia

as the cooperation of England and Russia would have a great influence upon

the Japanese policy in the Far East, which was after all not only against China

and Russia but also menacing to the British interests in that region.

M. Souritz said the implications of the Far Eastern conflict seemed to be

little understood in France. French statesmen had expressed to him the

apprehension that if China should win, there might be a wave of Chinese

nationalism which might threaten French colonial interests in the Far East.

I said a French cabinet minister had recently told me of the same thing, but

I had pointed out, in reply, that this was not in the spirit of the Chinese people.

M. Souritz said this idea of possible Chinese zenophobia was evidently due
fitiu ! < •-•f o W
to Japanese propaganda. He had not talked with ^Sugimura himself for a long time,

but the latter must have been doing a great deal of underground work. It was

Sugimura's way of disseminating lies in French government circles and in the

French press in order to advance his country's cause. I said Sugimura, -who wmi

thfl in Paric, might pretend to have liberal views himself,

but, in any case, he did not represent either the views of the Japanese militarists

or those of his government in his pretended liberalism.

[On May 9, in my interview with Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov, (mentioned

earlier in connection with the situation in China), I also took up the Ethiopian

question in relation to the League of Nations. In fact, our interview took place

in Geneva, my
w ^ $ there for the impending Council meeting.] I

showed M. Litvinov a copy of the memorandum Mr. Quo Tai-chi had given to Lord

Halifax in London outlining the views of the Chinese government on the subject,
 131

and spoke of Lord Halifax's reply to it. I also informed Litvinov of my

conversation with M. Bonnet on the same subject. The principle of non-recognition,

I added, was of essential importance to China, and it should in no way be prejudiced

by any settlement of the Ethiopian question.

M. Litvinov said the Ethiopian loss of independence was a fact and no

power would try to restore it. The sovereignty had in fact passed to Italy.

Soviet Russia had no interest in Ethiopia, but the principle of non-recognition

was of great importance, and it should not be undermined in any way. He thought

it would be desirable to draw a distinction between Ethiopia and Manchuria. He

said tyanchukuo" was a camouflaged Japanese protectorate. In the case of Ethiopia

the transfer of sovereignty to Italy had become a reality, whereas as regards

"Manchukuo,M it was the Japanese who were really exercising the sovereignty and

not the people of Manchuria. Besides, he said, China was still resisting

and contesting. He believed it was important not to allow the Ethiopian question

to create a precedent which would react unfavorably upon that of Manchukuo. I

assured him that this was precisely the Chinese position and policy, and that I

was going to take that stand on the Ethiopian question.

M. Litvinov then asked about the Chinese attitude on the Swiss demand
relating to her perpetual neutrality. I answered that/petition of Switzerland

was unique. For historical, geographical and juridical reasons China was not

opposed to accepting the Swiss request by the Council. But it must nor be

viewed as a precedent for other countries to do likewise, thereby disrupting

the whole League of Nations. M. Litvinov said he, too, realized that the

situation of Switzerland was altogether special. But if she asked to be

relieved of the obligations of enforcing sanctions, he thought it should be

made clear that she would not have the right of participating in future discussions

and decisions concerning the application of sanctions, for otherwise her delegate
 132

could always obstruct the application of sanctions. Then it should also be

made clear, he said, that she would no longer enjoy the protection of the

League in regard to sanctions. Otherwise it would be an inducement to a

number of countries in Northern Europe, especially the Baltic States and

Scandinavian countries, to ask also to be relieved of their obligations under

Article 16. I agreed with him and considered those points he had raised of

importance to the future of the League.

The French Foreign Minister, M. Bonnet, and I had an exchange of views on

the Ethiopian question the same day, at a luncheon given by the Secretary-

General of the League, M. Avenol. M. Bonnet, at the outset, expressed the

hope that I would support the Franco-British attitude at the coming Council

meeting on this question. He explained that the Italian conquest had become

an established fact and no power, least of all Ethiopia herself, was in a

position to upset it. On the other hand, he added, the necessity of peace in

Europe demanded that that question should be disposed of so that a way might

be paved for a reconciliation with Italy. With the easing of the tension in

Europe, Great Britain and France would feel freer to take a greater interest

in the Far East, which was, he thought, what China wanted.

I told him that I saw the force of his statement and that, following

instructions from my government, would certainly do nothing to obstruct Great

Britain and France on this question. At the same time, I said that M. Bonnet

must realize that the principle involved was one of great importance to China;

not only in view of the situation regarding Manchuria for which the League

had passed a number of resolutions, but also on account of the fact that the

Japanese aggression was still continuing and that Japan had in the meantime

set up puppet regimes in Peiping and Nanking. It was therefore of great

importance that nothing should be done by implication to prejudice the vital

interests of China in regard to her sovereignty and territorial integrity in

her present resistance to Japanese aggression.

 133

The Foreign Minister said he fully realized the bearing of the question,

but he thought that China's case was entirely different from that of Ethiopia.

For one thing, he said, the Italian hold on Ethiopia was practically complete,

while China was still resisting and carrying on a vigorous fight in defense of

her independence.

As upon arriving in Geneva I customarily paid visits to the current

President of the Council and to various important members who would usually

take an active part in the discussion, on May 9 I also saw Mr. Munters, the

Foreign Minister of Latvia, who would, in accordance with the scheduled

rotation, be the President of the meeting of the Council. He informed me

of the proposed agenda and suggested that I might speak on Tuesday, the following

day. We discussed the question of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia and the

problem of recognition by the League of Nations. His own views reflected

entirely those of the British, that is to say, to regard the matter as an

accomplished fact and to take a stand that there was nothing left for the

League to do, except to give de facto recognition.

Late that afternoon there was a secret meeting of the Council to discuss

the question of the request of Ethiopia to be represented. The question of the

proper credentials was raised at once, evidently for the purpose of debarring

the presence of any Ethiopian representative. Litvinov, Jordan of New

Zealand and I took a strong stand, on the gounds of law and equity, to urge

admission of an Ethiopian representative as the Covenant provided in matters

of this sort. The Polish representative appeared to be very unfriendly,

and said that the most the Council could do was to admit a spokesman for

Ethiopia purely for information and not as an equal representative to participate

in the discussions. Sandler, the Swedish Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax and

Bonnet took a middle course, and favored regarding the Ethiopian representative

as a de facto representative.

At a luncheon given by M. Munters as President of the League Council on

 134

May 12, I had another exchange of views with M. Bonnet, bearing on the

international situation in Europe and the Ethiopian question. Asked about the

progress of the French-Italian conversations, M. Bonnet told me they were not

making as rapid a progress as he had expected. There were certain questions of

interest to France, besides those upon which Great Britain had already come to

an understanding with Italy. The question of Spain was one, and that of the

status of Italians in Tunis was another. The number of Italians in Tunis was

another. The number of Italians in Tunis was very great, and their position

under the agreement of 1936 was very favorable. Italy wanted to further strengthen

it. But Tunis was of special importance to France as was the safety of communi­

cations in the Mediterranean between France and her African colonies. Public

opinion in France, M. Bonnet added, was very aixious that the French-Italian

conversations should be pushed forward as rapidly as possible and that an

ambassador should be appointed to Rome. In view of the importance of the

conversations now in progress, the absence of an Ambassador was a handicap to

France, but he had refrained from appointing one before the action of the

Council. By doing so, he was criticized by a section of the French press. He

went on to say that the question of Ethiopia must be liquidated, however.

After all, he said, Ethiopia was dead, and one must think of the living who had

a greater claim than the dead.

As regards Spain, M. Bonnet said he had always advocated the establishment

of contact with Franco, but certain parties in Parliament and in the government

were against it. M. Bonnet maintained that from the economic and financial

point of view, the importance of maintaining contact with Franco must not be

overlooked. The Germans and Italians had been establishing themselves in

commercial and industrial fields in the territories under Franco. Even the

British had for sane time maintained an agent near Franco, he said. By refusing

to have anything to do with Franco, France might find herself altogether at a

 135

disadvantage from the commercial and economic point of view, when the civil war

in Spain should be over. Asked about the Czechoslovak question, M. Bonnet

remarked that Germany would certainly one day force the issue.

Lord Halifax, whom I spoke to several days later, when asked how he felt

about the situation in Europe, told me it was still uncertain because one could

never tell what the dictators might not decide to do over night. Still, he said,

he himself felt that the French were rather too anxious about Europe, particularly

about the intentions of Germany.

As China also desired to press the question of the Chinese appeal at the

101st Council meeting, I was anxious to line up support, as much as possible, from

the various members of the Council. Therefore, after I arrived in Geneva for the

meeting, I at once began to contact the different important or active representative

who would attend the meeting [for this purpose. At my interview with Mr.

Litvinov on May 9, I also brought up] the proposals I would make at the Council

meeting in regard to the Sino-Japanese conflict. I expressed my hope that he

would see his way to supporting my statement. The Soviet Foreign Commissar said

that he would support anything the League would do, but that it did not appear to

him that the League was in the position of doing much.

When he asked about the British and French attitude, I told him that while

negotiations for obtaining aid had been going on since the Brussels Conference,

nothing had come out of them. My colleague in London had mentioned the idea of a

League loan to Lord Halifax, British Foreign Secretary, and I myself had spoken to

M. George Bonnet, French Foreign Minister, about the same thing. They both

appeared interested, but merely said they would consider it. M. Litvinov

thought that such a proposal would come to nothing because a guarantee by the

League would mean nothing at all. I told him that my idea was that the British

and French governments might be asked to undertake the guarantee. M. Litvinov

 136

said that, in that case, it would still be necessary to secure the support

of American banks before these two governments would really agree to it.

I spoke to Lord Halifax the same day at Secretary-General Avenol's luncheon.

In fact, I was seated next to him at the table and we had a good chat. He asked

about Japan's attitude towards peace and the prospect of a success. I told him

Japan was weary of the war, but was divided internally on matters of policy as

to the immediate future. I told him that Italy had conveyed Japan's desire for

peaceful settlement, but the Chinese government told her to consult London first.

Lord Halifax said that Italy had said nothing to London on this question, that

is to say, on the question of a peaceful settlement desired by Japan.

In line with my practice of contacting the various members of the Council

of the League before the meeting at which the Chinese question would be taken up,

I had an exchange of views with Mr. Sandler, Foreign Minister of Sweden on May 10,

1938. His view was that the most that could be done about the Chinese appeal was

to reinforce the last resolution of the League and urge its execution. In his view,

the Czechoslovak problem at the time was the real menace for the near future in

Europe, because Germany insisted that it was a question for Germany and Czechoslo­

vakia alone. [Mr. Jordon of New Zealand, whom I also saw,] was very sympathetic,

but afraid that the present "outfit" could not do very much.

Another of the representatives I contacted was the Foreign Minister of

Rumania, whom I visited on May 13 at Hotel des Bergues. I first gave him a gist

of the measures that I would propose at the secret meeting of the Council to

discuss the Chinese question that day, and I asked him if he saw his way to

supporting China.

Mr. Comnen-Petrescu, the Foreign Minister, said he fully sympathized

with China and her people in their ordeal brought about by external aggression.

He assued me that he would be glad to give his support, subject to certain

considerations. Rumania, he continued, was a small country in Europe and had

 137

no commercial interests or commercial relations in China. It would therefore

be almost ridiculous for him to take a definite stand on the Chinese question

in the presence of other powers that had important interests in the Far East.

He would have to adjust his statement in accordance with the attitude of France

and Great Britain. But knowing that these two powers were sympathetically

disposed towards China, he added, he would have no difficulty in supporting their

a ttitude.

In the second place, he said, if it were merely a matter of Rumanian

foreign policy, he would have no difficulty in acting on his feelings towards

the Sino-Japanese conflict and towards China in particular. But Rumania was a

member of the Little Entente and also of the Balkan Entente. His statements in

the Council would therefore have to be in accord with the general line of the

common policy of these two groups of countries. Within these limits, he assued

me, he would do his best to suppofct me.

M. Comnen'also expressed the hope that China and Rumania could cooperate
A
in some way, as there were not yet diplomatic and commercial relations between

the two countries. Rumania was very much interested in extension of her trade,

he said, and China was a great market. He was certain that if the relations

between the two countries could be inaugurated and extended,there would be a field

of cooperation between them. I agreed with his view and said that as Rumania

was a principal exporter of wheat and oil, that alone could furnish a basis for

trade with China. Although China was an agricultural country, she imported

every year a large quantity of cereals and other foodstuffs. Wheat was one of the

main items of China's importation. Petroleum was another and its consumption

in China had been increasing every year. On the other hand, I said, China could

find a market in Rumania for some of the Chinese products.

M. Comnen believed that it would be a desirable thing if China could, for

example, establish a legation in Bucharest. He said the minister could be

 138

accredited at the same time to other countries of the Little Entente and the

Balkan Entente, for instance, to Sofia, Belgrade, Athens and even Budapest, with

Bucharest as the center. In this way, he believed the Chinese minister could

travel and live a few months in each country every year. He pointed out that

other countries had already done that, and that the expenses of maintaining a

legation would thus be relatively low. Rumania, he added, could establish a

consulate-general in China with a view to starting trade relations and promoting

commercial connections. He hoped very much that I was in agreement and that

the Chinese government could see its way to considering his idea. I assured

him that I would report it to my government and keep him informed through the

Rumanian Minister in Paris.

Earlier on May 10, in a speech before the Council I had formally renewed

China’s appeal under Article 17. When, on the 13th, the Council met in secret,

I had outlined China's desiderata and urged action. Halifax spoke opposing the

application of Article 17 of the Covenant and the adoption of coercive measures

under it. However, he pointed out that other proposals fell within the scope of

former resolutions adopted by the League. Litvinov, on the other hand, had

supported China's proposal in its totality.

The result of the meeting was the appointment of a drafting committee to

prepare a resolution. Great Britain, France, Soviet Russia, China and Rumania

were appointed to constitute the committee, but on my proposal Latvia was also

added. At the meeting of the drafting committee that afternoon, we went over a

draft prepared by] the Secretariat as a basis of discussion. I found it very

empty. M. Munters of Latvia brought up a copy of the Japanese Press Bureau's

statement on the use of poisonous gas by the Japanese, evidently a piece of

Japanese propaganda. I was very disappointed in the course the discussion took.

Later in the evening, at ten o'clock, the drafting committee on the Chinese

question met again to prepare its draft. I had to take a firm stand on China'u-
 139

China's disiderata and finally my obstinacy resulted in a much better draft,

though^ it was still weak. The meeting only adjourned at 12;30. I had found Lord

Halifax very conciliatory and the French representative, M. Hoppenot, rather

timid and even obstructive and unsympathetic. Souritz, as representative

for the Soviet Union, this time said very little, but his counselor was

quicker in seeing the implications of the ruling. On the whole, I found

the situation, to put it mildly, rather awkward.

The following day, at the secret meeting of the Council, we discussed the

Chinese question and the Swiss question. The former Council President, Motta,

asked the Swiss representative to speak on the question of Swiss neutrality.

Litvinov took offense at the exclusion of Soviet Russia from the drafting

committee [for this question], and showed it at the meeting by saying that

since Soviet Russia was not needed, he would no longer participate in the

discussions of the question. Motta explained to Litvinov, with a deferential

attitude, that he had had no intention to be disobliging the night before

[when the committee was formed ]. Then George Bonnet intervened as a

peacemaker. Only then did Litvinov offer to abstain from voting on the Swiss

question. There was then no more opposition to the proposed resolution.

On the question of Chile's announcement to withdraw from the League of

Nations, [which question was also on the agenda,] Lord Halifax said that

since Chile had already decided to leave, there was no use to consider the

question of any compromise in the hope of satisfying her amd meeting her point

of view. Finally after the several long statements by various members of

the Council on the question of Swiss neutrality and more statements on Chile's

announcement of her decision to withdraw from the League, the Chinese question

was taken up. Both Bonnet and Halifax made very sympathetic and eulogistic

speeches about China's resistance to Japan. Halifax, apparently, had been

anxious about my speech for he spoke to me before the Chinese question on the
 140

agenda was taken up.

The British Secretary first inquired of the length of my proposed statement

on the Chinese question, and expressed himself as being rather surprised at its

brevity, when I told him that it would not take more than five minutes. He was

pleased as I would refer to the needs of China in the formula that he had

suggestad the night before at the Drafting Committee, and he added that since I

was carrying out my part of the agreement, he would do likewise. Lord Flail fax

hoped that I had not thought of him as having been too sticky on his stand. He

wished he had found it possible to do more for China, but said what was

agreed upon was really the most that the British government could undertake. I

replied that while I wished the draft resolution had been stronger than it was,

I found Lord Halifax very helpful. What mattered,after all, was not so much the

text as carrying out the spirit of the resolution by giving China positive aid.

Lord Halifax then said that, in order to show his sincerity, he had written

to Sir John Simon, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, right after the Drafting

Committee meeting the previous evening, and urged the Chancellor to expedite the

matter of making credit arrangements for China on the basis of certain minerals

for sale in London. (He was referring to antimony and molybdenum, essential

to the manufacture of heavy armaments.) He said the matter had been under

discussion between Mr. Quo and the Foreign Office and also with Sir. Brederick

Leith-Ross. He thought this time China might get something done. I thanked him

and said the question of financial aid was very important.

I then told him I had just received a telegram from Dr. H. H. Kung asking

me to speak to him, Lord Halifax, about the possibility of obtaining some support

from the British government for the recent issue of sterling bonds secured on

certain internal revenues in China. Any support in the form of either a

guarantee or a recommendation would help the sale of these bonds, I said.

Lord Halifax said that he would be glad to consider it. He asked me to ask
 141

Mr. Quo to call on the Treasury on his return to London so that a direct

discussion might be arranged between the Treasury and the Chinese Embassy.

I said as regards the needs of China, I had approached the French

government with a view to obtaining a quantity of field guns, of which China

was in great need. If an opportunity should present itself, I hoped that

Lord Halifax would speak to M. Bonnet about it. Lord Halifax said if

he saw an opportunity, he would speak to the French about China's request.

In London he had spoken to the French about the transit through Indochina aid

he found they were rather sticky about it. I said the French seemed to be

apprehensive lest the Japanese cause complications. Lord Halifax said he, too,

felt that the French were overanxious about it. As the Japanese were fully

occupied in China, he did not think either that they were in a position to,

or would, provoke difficulties with other powers.

[Thereafter, when the various representatives had all delivered their

statements on the Chinese question, the draft resolution was adopted. Once

more the members of the League were urged "to do their utmost" to put the

previous resolutions of the League into effect and "to take into serious and

sympathetic consideration" any requests they might receive from China in

conformity with those resolutions. And since I had also charged that the

Japanese were about to use poisoned gas, having already dispatched several

chemical warfare units to Shantung, the Council resolution also recalled that

chemical warfare was condemned by international law and requested any new

information concerning its use in the war in China to be reported to the League.]

[Under the difficult circumstances of the time, the resolution was all that

could be expected. On the following day, May 15, I received cables from

Dr. H. H. Kung in China and Dr. C. T. Wang in Washington congratulating me on

China's stand and success at Geneva.

On May 24 the Chinese government, through the Waichiaopu, also sent a

reply to my cable of recommendation sent on the 15th, which fully endorsed the
 142

idea which had been discussed the Rumanian Foreign Minister

Comnen in our conversation of May 13. The same day I conveyed to Comnen

China's willingness to conclude a treaty of amity and commerce with his country.
REMINISCENCES OF WELLINGTON KOO

VOLUME IV MISSION TO FRANCE

(PRELIMINARY DRAFT FORM)

2. The Need for Aid Becomes More Urgent and

Sometimes More Difficult to Obtain in View of
a Deteriorating Military Situation in China
and Europe’s Drift Toward War:
Late May-August 1938
2. the need for aid becomes more urgent and sometimes more 143
DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN IN VIEW OF A DETERIORATING MILITARY SITUATION
IN CHINA AND EUROPE'S DRIFT TOWARD WAR

[Soon after the League Council meeting of May 1938, the fight around

Kiangsu-Honan grew in intensity. Hsiichow fell to the Japanese on May 19,

whereupon the Japanese forces 'advanced westward along the Lunghai (?) railway

to Chengchow, a principle city in Honan, taking Lanf^ng on May 24 and Kiafeng,

the capital of Honan, two weeks later. On June 9 the Japanese began a concerted

land and naval attack on Hankow via the Yangtze River. Needless to say, questions

of aid and transit were of the utmost importance.]

I had a conversation with M. Mandel, the Minister of Colonies, on May 21,

1938, on the occasion of introducing Archbishop Yu Pin, who was about to make

a visit to Indochina on his way back to China from Europe. The Minister said

he was glad to be informed of this coming visit and offered to cable to the

Governor-General of of Indochina to accord facilities on his arrival. Then our

conversation shifted to the situation in the Far East and the need of defense for

Indochina .

M. Mandel said he had just arranged a loan with three banks interested in

Indochina for 45 million piastres, which would amount to about 500 million francs.

Of this sum, he proposed to spend 200 million; 100 million for the augmentation

of the military forces in Indochina by 20,000 men, and another 100 million for the

strengthening of the fortifications around the coast of Indochina. The rest he

contemplated to spend in some of the colonies in Africa, where financial

conditions did not allow them to bear the burden of additional defense.

I then spoke to him of the Soci6t6 Francaise de Montage et de Fabrication

de.1'Aviation, and told him that the Chinese government would like to make

use of the facilities the Soci6t£ would offer for assembling airplanes. The

minister inquired about the number and kind of airplanes ordered in France

by China, and said he himself knew nothing of this Soci6t6. He asked what help

he could give in this matter. I told him I understood the company could not

start working because the Indochinese government had not yet given it permission
 144

to proceed with its work.

M. Mandel sent for M. Gaston Joseph, head of the Commercial Department

in the Ministry. It was explained to the Minister, by Joseph, that the company

had already been organized and that the Chinese government had paid $100,000

to its credit. The enterprise was backed by the united credit of a group Of

French banks, but it was waiting for the grant of a guarantee from the French

government before it could go ahead with its program. In reply to a question by

the Minister, M. Joseph explained that the guarantee requiredv^s a moral

guarantee and was not financial in character.

M. Mandel, once informed, appeared to be rather displeased with the delay

and spoke very sharply to M. Joseph, stating that such a company was evidently

in the interest of France as well, and that he could not understand why the

matter had been held up. If the guarantee demanded had been for financial

assistance from the French government, that was another question. But a moral

guarantee should certainly have been given. He did not understand why there

should have been a delay. The head of the Commercial Department explained

that there was nothing in writing from the Embassy and that the Ministry had

only been approached verbally. (That was a lame excuse rather.) The Minister

retorted by saying that he did not care whether there had been any document

or not from the Embassy; what he did care about was why the matter should have

been held up. At M. Mandel’s suggestion, M. Joseph decided to send for

the Director-General of the Bank of Indochina for a talk in order to push the

matter. (All this showed how bureaucracy had been able to hold up things

and how an efficient minister could surmount it, as it were, and get things

done quickly.)

M. Mandel recalled the memorandum and the list of Chinese orders placed

in France, which I had sent to him before my departure for Geneva, and told

me that he had spoken to M. Daladier, President of the Council already.

 145

M. Daladier was entirely favorable to the idea of expediting the delivery

of the orders and agreed to send word to Hotchkiss, the manufacturing firm, to

hurry the Chinese orders at once. The Minister asked me not to hesitate to let

jDfi know if there was anything else with which he could help the Chinese. I

thanked him for his assistance and said I would not fail to avail myself of

his kind offer.

Clearly, a farsighted and understanding Minister could get things done

quickly. M. Moutet, his predecessor, was also a great friend of China and

wanted to help, but he evidently did not feel confident of such influence

and authority over the Ministry as M. Mandel did. M. Mandel was a great

friend of the Premier, and an experienced politician, belonging to the Radical

Party. [As a member of this party, he was experienced in carrying ministerial

responsibilities, whereas the Socialists, like M. Moutet, under a Socialist

government headed by M. Blum, had not had so much experience in administration

and parliamentary matters.

On June 2, I saw M. Herriot about the recall of German advisers [from China]

and the prospect of obtaining French advisers [to take their place.] The

question of the recall of the German advisers, as urged by Berlin, had been

under discussion by the Chinese government. The government was at first

disinclined to dispense with their services, especially as these advisers

were serving in China by virtue of personal contracts, although these had

been made with the approval of the Berlin government, and especially as the

German advisers were themselves reluctant to leave China. This, I suppose, was

due principally to the reason that they were not in sympathy with the Hitlerite

regime in German. [However, in the spring of 1938, the German government's

position on their recall became more emphatic. It was only a matter of time;

hence the matter of replacing their services] became an important and urgent

question. Accordingly, I dso visited a number of members of the French cabinet,

 146

including Paul Reynaud, then Minister of Justice, a very prominent political

leader who was later to become even more important, and M. Alexis L6ger, Secretary-

General at the Quai d'Orsay.

I found M. Ldger rather reticent and even somber on the subject. When I

mentioned it to him, he appeared somewhat taken aback with the suggestion

of replacing German military advisers in China with French advisers, and he

said that, while war was going on in China, the French government could not

send any military officers in active service there. I explained to him that,

in the case of the German advisers, the contracts of employment were signed

by the German advisers as individuals, and that, although this was, naturally,

after approval was given by the German government, they were in fact serving

on their own responsibility.

The Secretary-General reiterated that the French government could not

give its approval to any officer in active service to go to China to help in

her resistance with Japan. However, he said, there were other officers that

had already retired. Such people would be entirely at liberty to do what

they liked, he explained, adding that the French government could not stop

them from accepting employment in China. Nonetheless, I had a definite

impression that M. L6ger was not at all sympathetic with the idea.

I brought up the question of building a railway from Chengtu, the capital

of Szechwan, to the Burmese frontier via Yiinnanfu, and told him that a groupwas

being formed in England for the purpose of financing the construction of this

line. I remarked that this might interest the French banks and I expressed the

hope that they would participate in the undertaking. M. L6ger said that the

proposed line from Chengtu to Yiinnanfu had already been reserved for French banks.

If the British wanted to finance the undertaking, they could start to build

the line from Yunnanfu to Burma.

I explained to him that, in view of the continuance of the war, China

considered the proposed line as being very necessary. Together with the line
 147

from Indochina to Yiinnanfu, it would serve as an important channel of supplies.

I told him that I understood the French banks were not very much interested in

this project. If this were so, I said, the Chinese government could see no

objection to its financing by the British.

M. L6ger said the French banks had already undertaken the financing of

the railway from Chengnan (on the border between Indochina and Kwangsi

Province) to Nanning, and they could not at the same time engage themselves to

finance another line. He thought that if the British were interested, they

could start to build the line from Yflnnanfu to Burma, leaving the line from

Chengtu to Yunnanfu to the French, but I pointed out to him that the time

element was important and that China wanted to have the line constructed as soon

as possible. I said that, in order to gain time the two lines should be

built simultaneously. Personally, I added, I would like to see the French banks

financing the line from Chengtu to Yunnanfu.

The Secretary-General said he would aiudy the question. He thought the

French would be interested, if the British were to cooperate. When I requested

him to do something to stimulate the interest of the French banks as they

did not seem at the time to be keen on the project, M. Ldger promised that

he would glad to be of help.

On the same question of engaging French military officers as advisers

in place of the German officers I had a conversation with General Decamp,

Chief of the French General Staff, at a luncheon to which I invited him. This

took place on June 2. I told him at the outset of the decision of the German

government to recall the military advisers from China and my intention to

see Premier Daladier about the possibility of obtaining French advisers as

well as about the question of securing certain materials of war. General Decamp

told me that M. Daladier had been quite sympathetic towards the Chinese cause.

I emphasized the fact that the decision of Germany to recall the military
 148

advisers was evidently inspired by the desire to aid Japan to hasten the

conclusion of the war in China, in order that Japan might conserve her strength

and resources, thereby adding to the power of the anti-communist group and

enabling Germany to have more freedom of action in Europe. I told the general

also of the attempts made by both Germany and Italy to persuade China to come

to terms with Japan and their disappointment at China's flat refusal. I said

the situation in Europe was, therefore, bound up with that in the Far East.

China's continued resistance really served the purpose of tying the hands of,

Germany and Italy by keeping Japan busy in China.

General Decamp said that was also his view and suggested that in speaking to

M. Deladier of China's need of material and technical aid, I should approach

him from this angle. It was true, he added, that France was carrying out a

program of rearmament and that it was difficult for her to supply things of

which she herself was in need, but there were certain arms like artillery

of 75 millimeters and machineguns that might be had, as there were plenty

of them in stock.

General Decamp thought that for China the important arms now were not

the big heavy armaments for offensive warfare, but rather light ones for

defense. He said the first thing to do was to stop the invasion. After having

successfully stopped the invading forces, [it was time to] take the second step

of chasing them out. It was only in the latter case that heavy armaments would

be needed. He suggested that I might propose to M. Daladier to consider the

possibility of sending detached parts to the Far East to be assembled there. He

thought it was relatively easy to establish factories for such assembling purposes.

He felt such an enterprises would serve the needs of Indochina in case of

necessity as well as help the Chinese cause at present.

He suggested also that I might after my conversation with M. Daladier,

send to M. Daladier a memoramdun outlining in detail the things China needed

 149

both as regards war material and technical aid. He did not mean that what

was put down in the memorandum could be obtained, but he thought that if only

a part of it could be secured, China would be the gainer by it. Besides, he

said, the memorandum would serve as a basis for further study by the departments
Vw
concerned and would force a conclusion to be reached withoj*t two or three

days or at most within a fortnight. I thanked him for the suggestion and said it

was an excellent one.

The contemplated visit to M. Daladier was actually made on June 3. I told

the Premier at the outset that, in connection with the question of extending aid

to China, there were two matters which I wished to bring to his attention

and about which I wanted to consult with him concerning the possibility of French

cooperation. First, as regards the question of material aid, China was, I said,

in need of arms such as machineguns and artillery of 75 millimeters. 1 said I

realized that France was herself busily carrying out a program of rearmament

and building up a stock of material reserve, but I understood that the two kinds

of arms just mentioned were not subject to any shortage. I suggested that if no

stock were available, it might be possible to send material and detached parts

out and have them assembled on the spot by factories to be established in

the neighborhood of the Indochinese frontier.

In the second place, I said, the German government had recently decided

to recall the German military advisers in China. I explained that thase

advisers had been in China for nearly ten years, rendering useful service.

Their assistance had been particularly helpful since the beginning of hostilities,

and in the circumstances, the Chinese government found such assistance essential.

The advisers were not in sympathy with the present Nazi regime in Germany, since

they belonged to the former Imperial German army. They were disposed to remain

in China especially as their contracts of employment were all made out in their

personal names, although they would probably find it difficult to refuse to

 150

return to Germany, if the German government insisted. If the Chinese government

asked them to stay, they would be only too glad to remain. The matter was

now under consideration by the Chinese government. It desired to know, before

taking a final decision, whether, in the case of dispensing with the services

of the German advisers, similar technical military aid could not be obtained

from other countries, principally from France.

M. Daladier, the President of the Council, said he himself had been deeply

interested in the Sino-Japanese conflict and had been following the developments

from day to day. At the beginning of the hostilities a great many people

thought that China could not hold out long and would soon surrender, but

they turned out to be wrong. Month after month China had been able to resist

Japan, and this prolonged resistance had made it clear that China was a factor

worthy to be paid attention to.

I said China's resistance was important, not only to herself, but also to

Europe. The decision of the German government to recall the military advisers,

after it had earlier decided to stop furnishing arms to China, was evidently

inspired by a desire to aid Japan to hasten the termination of the hostilities

in her favor. It was also apparent that Germany did not wish to see the

Berlin-Rome-Tokyo triangle weakened by the gradual exhaustion of Japan's strength

in the prolonged war with China. The fact that Japan was continuously occupied

in China was, I said, disturbing to Germany and made her anxious to have an

early termination of the whole conflict. In the past months, I continued,

Germany, as well as Italy, had tried to persuade China to come to terms with

Japan. China's refusal to come to terms unless they were honorable ones

was disappointing to them all. It was easy to understand that if Japan could

wind up her adventure in China and thereby conserve her strength, it would increase

the combined strength of the anti-communist camp and enable Germany and Italy

to have more freedom of action in Europe in order to carry out their own policy.
 151

Therefore, the Sino-japanese conflict and the European situation had a

relationship between them. China’s continued resistance was keeping Japan

occupied in China and helping to tie the hands of Germany and Italy in Europe.

I expressed the hope that M. Daladier, in considering the question of aid to

China, would take note of this aspect of the situation.

M. Daladier said he fully recognized the importance of China's continued

resistance and he thought, too, that the continuation of China's resistance

had a bearing upon the situation in Europe. For that reason, he said, he

himself had been paying personal attention to the whole matter, and he had

facilitated the dispatch of nearly 20 of the latest planes to China. He had

likewise paved the way for transit facilities through Indochina for Chinese

shipments of arms and munitions.

As regards the question of material, M. Daladier pointed out that, as

France was herself engaged in rearmament, there was no surplus material

available to be sent to China. However, regarding the establishment of

factories and the dispatch of detached parts to be assembled in the Far

East, he himseaf had wanted to push the matter as rapidly as possible. M.

Georges Handel, the Minister of Colonies, had also discussed the project

with General Buhrer, former Commandant of the military forces in Indochina.

The General had told M. Handel that the local labor in Indochina was excellent,

and that the workmen were already able to manufacture rifles, bullets .md

certain small arms. ,, ,

I said such labor would be cheaper in the long run because labor was

cheap. M. Daladier said not only that, but there were ot’ier advantages in

the project. To send the finished material out to the Far East would mean a

long delay and easily attract attention, whereas the material assembled in

Indochina could be shipped to China without attracting any attention.

The French Premier went on to say that there was of course certain

opposition in France to the policy of intervention in the Sino-japanese

 152

conflict. Therefore^ the project would have to be presented as a measure of

defense necessary for Indochina, personally, he had always declared himself

to be in favor of building up the defense of Indochina. Three months ago,

M. Daladier added, Siam (Thailand) who was not apparently allied with Japan

had adopted a rather aggressive policy towards Indochina, upon seeing Japan's

military successes in China. Recently, as China's power of resistance became

stronger every day, the Siamese attitude had become more moderate. But she

remained a menace in collusion with Japan. So the project had also to be

presented as a necessary measure in view of such a threat .

As regards the question of technical aid, M. Daladier said that M.

Bonnet, the Foreign Minister, was opposed to it. He himself, however, was in

favor of it. But in order to meet the objection that such a move on the part of

France would expose her to the charge of overt intervention, he was proposing to

ask England and Belgium to join in such a project so that it would take the

character of an international mission. Meanwhile, said M. Daladier, he knew

that the German advisers had been rendering excellent service to China. He thought

that China should at least keep those whose contracts had not expired, for in

the present circumstances she could not have too much technical assistance

from abroad.

I said M. Bonnet was probably influenced by M. L6ger, who, as was natural,

wanted to be very discreet. M. Daladier said it was the fear that Japan

might occupy the island of Hainan, thereby threatening the safety of the

coast of Indochina. It was also feared that Japan might bombard the railway

from Indochina to Yiinnanfu. He himself did not think there was any danger from

the Japanese side, but the Quai d'Orsay was afraid that such a danger might

arise.

I pointed out that the British had been allowing Chinese shipments to

pa^s through Hongkong without any fear of attack from the Japanese. I said

Hongkong had been passing Chinese war materials at the rate of about 60,000 tons
 153

per month, while probably about 3,000 tons in all had been passing through

Indochina since the beginning of hostilities. The Canton-Hankow Railway, I

added, had, up to the end of May, been bombed 40,000 times, but it had never

for a day stopped working. There were shifts of labor waiting on the side

day and night so that after an air raid the damage of the road could be

repaired immediately. \

M. Daladier said the Japanese had been protesting to the French government

against the passage of Chinese shipments through Indochina, and some months ago

the Japanese Consul at Hanoi made strong protests to the Indochinese government

with some veiled threats. The Japanese Consul was told, however, that if Jhpan

wanted to, she could do as she liked. He went home and reported to his government

For [the next] several months, the situation was calmer as regards the Japanese.

But lately, said M. Daladier, there wereagain signs growing of Japanese impatience

It was evident that Japan, finding herself in the position of an angry man,

was ready to do something desperate. She had first counted upon a short war,

the disunity of the Chinese people and, therefore, the want of effective

resistance from the Chinese side. But in all this she was disappointed. She was

now worried and unable to see clearly what the future had in store for her.

I said the French army had been recognized in China as probably the

best in the world. Its prestige was very great. Therefore, I hoped that

if it was necessary to ask the British and the Belgians to join in the mhsion,

the main part of it would be composed of French officers. M. Daladier said

that was also his intention. The inclusion of the British and the Belgians

was merely intended to give an international complexion to tit mission.

I said the German advisers had hitherto not been sent to the front to

participate in the fighting, but remained at headquarters to render advice

and help in the formulation of plans. M. Daladier said he could understand

that their service was rendered at headquarters. China was such a big
 154

country and there were so many fronts that the missions of different nationalities

could be easily quartered in different parts of the country.

Reverting to the question of aid, he asked what the British attitude was.

I told him that it had been very sympathetic and favorable. In Geneva, Lord

Halifax had assured me that he and his government would do the best to help.

Moreover, I said, the British authorities in Hongkong and China were being

very helpful to the Chinese.

M. Daladier inquired about the amount of Russian help and how the Russian

material was transported. I told him that Russian aid amounted to more than

that of all countries put t^ether. While some of the material had been

transported overland through Sinkiang, the bulk of it had been shipped by

sea. In fact, I myself had arranged for the charter of four ships to transport it.

Another road from Hankow to the Burmese frontier had been under construction for

some months, (I Tliad, referring to the "Burma Road.''^ About 150,000 workmen

had been working on it and it was hoped that the road would be built by the

end of August.

I went on to say that the recent reorganization of the Japanese cabinet

by nominating three more generals, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs,

indicated, in my view, Japan's desire to intensify the prosecution of the war

in the hope of terminating it at an early date. It was more than probable that

this had been carried out after consultation with Germany, whose decision to

recall her military advisers and stop selling arms to China coincided with

the intensification of Japan's war operations.

M. Daladier thought that was a sign of desperation on the part of Japan.

So long as China remained united and her morale was excellent, he believed

firmsly that the final triumph would be on the Chinese side. I replied that

China's morale was excellent. As an illustration,! mentioned the fact that,

in spite of repeated Japanese air raids on Canton, the people of that city

remained as calm as ever and became more determined to continue to resist

 155

aggression.

On the same day, earlier in the morning, I saw M. Paul Reynaud, Minister

of Justice, and spoke to him of the indiscriminate bombing by Japanese aircraft

of open towns in China, and informed him that a memorandum on the same subject

would be delivered to the Quai d'Orsay. M. Reynaud deprecated such practice

and suggested that China might approach the Vatican. He said the Pope, by his

moral prestige, might exercise an influence upon world opinion to bring

pressure to bear upon Japan.

Then I mentioned the decision of the German government to recall their

military advisers from China and its relation to Germany's policy in Europe,

emphasizing the point that Japan, Germany and Italy as a result of the anti­

communist pact, were pursuing their respective policies in a spirit of close

collaboration and mutual assistance. I pointed out to him, too, that the

anxiety of both Germany and Italy to see an early termination of the Sino-

Japanese conflict and their repeated attempts to persuade China to come to

terms with Japan was so that they, the two European members of the tripartite

group, might have more freedom to carry out their policy of blackmail in Europe.

M. Reynaud fully agreed with this view and said that not only the Sino-japanese

conflictv but also the Spanish war had, he thought, the same bearing. It was

evident that Germany and Italy wanted to wind up the Spanish conflict and

secure a rapid victory for Franco in order that they might have greater freedom

of action elsewhere.

As regards the international situation in Europe, it was interesting

to know the views of H. Marius Moutet, who had recently been succeeded by

M, Georges Mandel as Minister of Colonies. I had called on him earlier, on

May 18, to bring him an invitation from the Generalissimo to visit China.

I assured him of a cordial welcome, as so many people in my country desired

to make his personal acquaintance and welcome him. We discussed arrangement

 156

briefly before turning to the situation in Europe.

Speaking of the situation in Europe, he said it was still very disquieting.

The Spanish situation was one pregnant with dire consequences for peace in

Europe. The Czechoslovak problem was another. When I asked him whether the

people in France would fight for Czechoslovakia, he said, in his opinion, France

would have to live up to her engagements or else suffer a serious blow to

her prestige and lose all her allies and friends in Europe. He was not very

optimistic as to the outcome of the French-Italian negotiations.

The foreign policy of Soviet Russia in Europe always had a bearing on

her policy in the Far East. On June 3, I had a conversation with M. Le Tellier,

the new Belgian Ambassador to Paris on this topic. He had lately been

Minister to Moscow, and earlier Secretary of the Belgian delegation at the

Washington Conference and Director of the Political Department of the Belgian

Foreign Ministry. Thus he was acquainted with the Far Eastern problem as

well as the Soviet attitude and foreign policy. After he gave me an account

of conditions in Russia, about which I had questioned him, the conversation

turned to Soviet foreign policy. M. Le Tellier remarked that Poland was

always looked upon as a future enemy seeking someday to undo the Soviet

Union. With Rumania, Soviet relations were normal, but Rumania was always

afraid of her big neighbor, Russia. She was in no position to oppose, if danger

arose, the penetration onto her soil of the Soviet armed forces.

I asked him what Soviet Russian would do in case Czechoslovakia were

attacked. Le Tellier answered that it would depend upon the attitude and

action of France. If France moved to defend Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union

would also move. But she could, if she wished, always find a juridical excuse

for not acting. For example, he said, she could say that unless Poland agreed

to the passage of Soviet Troops, Soviet Russia could not go to the aid of

Czechoslovakia. It was the same with Rumania, he said, although the territory
 157

separating the Czech frontier from Russia was much narrower.

On June 10, I had an important conversation with Bonnet, the French

Foreign Minister . As I first told the Foreign Minister, the Chinese government

had decided to close the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo. I explained that soon after

the opening of hostilities by Japan against China, the Chinese Ambassador

returned to China on leave, leaving the Embassy in the hands of the Chargd

d’Affaires. He and his staff had been remaining there in the hope of protecr.ing

Chinese nationals and Chinese interests, but they found difficulties arising more an

more in the way of discharging their duties. On May 19 and 22, I continued, bands

of disorderly elements had invaded the Chinese Embassy and made impossible demands

in a threatening manner. The Japanese police was requested to intervene but they

declined. Among the crowds which invaded the Embassy were members of the

Japanese secret service and Formosan subjects. In view of the extraordinary

circumstances rendering it impossible for the Chinese Embassy to exercise its

functions, the Charg6 d'Affaires had asked and obtained the permission of the

Chinese government to return to China, turning the Embassy over to the Japanese

government for custody and protection.

I added that, in taking this decision, the Chinese government had no

intention of breaking off diplomatic relations with Japan and that its decision

should not be interpreted in that way, notwithstanding the interpretation

placed upon it by Japanese propaganda. M. Bonnet said he took note of my

statement.

I next said the Chinese government had received information indicating

an intention on the part of the Polish government to recognize "Manchukuo." In the

view of the Chinese government, I said, such a step, if it materialized, would be

contrary to the collective decision of the League of Nations not to accord

recognition to the "Manchukuo" regime. I therefore conveyed to the foreign

minister the hope of the Chinese government that the French government would use

its influence to persuade the Polish government to desist from taking such a step,
 158

which would injure the prestige and authority of the League as well as the

interests of China. I added that a similar demarche had been made in London

and that the British Foreign Office had told the Chinese Ambassador there

that they would certainly find opportunity to approach the Polish government

in this sense.

M. Bonnet was good enough to tell me that he was expecting to see the

Polish Ambassador at five o'clock that afternoon and that it would be very

convenient for him to speak to the Ambassador about it. He assured me that

he would do so energetically. I thanked him for it.

[Coming to my third point,] I asked whether M. Bonnet had been able to

speak to the British or Belgian Ambassadors about the question of recalling

the German military advisers and the possibility of obtaining technical military

aid from France, since I understood there was an idea of France's approaching

the British and Belgian governments, invitipg their participation. M. Bonnet

appeared not to be au courant with the idea of an international mission, which

he himself had mentioned to me on a previous occasion. He said that the

organization and despatch of a French military mission or of military officers

in active service might expose France to criticism and draw too much attention

and embarass the French government. But as regards officers in the reserve,

he said he not only saw now objection but welcomed their going to China.

I said the important point was to obtain practical military aid from

French military officers. The prestige of the French army was very great

and was very much appreciated, especially in the Far East. It was the French

officers whom China desired more than anybody else. As regards the form and

manner of sending them out, that was of secondary importance, I said. I quite

agreed with M. Bonnet that the matter should be handled in the most discreet

manner possible.

M. Bonnet then said that so long as he had some satisfactory explanation to

 159

give to the Japanese Ambassador when he protested, he saw no objection to doing

it. In the case of reserve officers, he could very well say that they were

entirely free to accept any offer and that the French government was not in a

position to interfere with them.

I then brought up the question of the orders placed by the Yunnan government

in France and reminded M. Bonnet that he had already on another occasion promised

to have them approved for fabrication and transit. I said I would appreciate it

if M. Bonnet would take steps to expedite the matter, as I understood there was

still delay in obtaining the permit of fabrication. M. Bonnet said I could count

upon him to do that.

In reply to a question concerning the Spanish situation and particularly as

to the possibility of mediation and the early liquidation of the civil war,

M. Bonnet said the British had thought that it might be possible to settle it by

mediation. But this was a case of civil war and both sides were prepared to go

on for years. Nevertheless, the British felt very much annoyed by the continuance

of this conflict, the settlement of which would bring appeasement to the

European situation and enable the British to pay more attention to the Far East.

Concerning the Franco-Italian conversations, M. Bonnet said in reply to a

question that he felt certain that as soon as the Non-Intervention Committee

in London sat again, the conversations would be resumed.

The French Parliament gave China support and sympathy. One of the

sympathetic members of the Chamber of Deputies was M. Archimbaud, deeply interested

in international problems, particularly an ardent advocate of peace and familiar

with the problems connected with the world situation. He undertook to form a

group, the Franco-Chinoise group in the Chamber of Deputies, with a view to gaining

support in the Chamber on matters relating to helping China obtain aid from France.

He called on me on June 11 to tell me that his proposal had met with the whole­

hearted approval of Premier Daladier, who had given him a carte blanche to find

out where the chain of support in facilitating transit of Chinese war supplies
 160

through Indochina had broken down. At his request, I sent him a list of the

orders of war goods in France to be sent through Indochina t±J?«**gh China, and also

a collection of printed literature relating to the Sino-japanese conflict.

[On June 16, he called again and we] had an interesting and important

interview. He said that he had visited Daladier the day before and urged two

things; 1) to accord transit facilities through Indochina for Chinese war

materials; 2) to accelerate the execution of orders placed by the Chinese

government in France for war material.

He said that, on the first point, M. Daladier was entirely of the opinion

that it should be done. As to the second point, M. Archimbaud had found out

that the Hotchkiss factory had received orders from the War Ministry to expedite

the manufacture of the Chinese orders and was already carrying out such orders.

As to Brandt, which had orders for mortars from China, M. Archimbaud said

there seemed to be some difficulty which, however, could be overcome. Regarding

Scheneider and Renault, M. Archimbaud was going to look up the orders placed with

them.

[M. Archimbaud went on the say that] later in the evening he had seen

M. Bonnet, the Foreign Minister, who seemed more recalcitrant. M. Bonnet had said

that the Quai d'Orsay was practically having its hands tied by the conversations

with the Japanese Ambassador. The Japanese had made it plain in the form of a

threat that if Indochina continued to accord transit facilities to Chinese war

supplies, the Japanese armed forces would be compelled to occupy Hainan Island

or to bombard the railway from Hanoi to Yiinnanfu. M. Archimbaud said M. Bonnet

was afraid of complications arising from a too liberal policy towards China in

these respects.

Not satisfied with the interview, M. Archimbaud then saw M. Daladier again

in the evening at a meeting of the leaders of the Radical Party, and [as he told

me,] urged the President of the Council to speak to M. Bonnet, in order to

persuade him to modify his attitude. He had urged too that there was no reason
 161

why transit facilities could not be accorded quietly and in a discreet manner.

If the constant use of the railway for such purposes exposed France to Japanese

suspicion, the road and the waterways could be utilized in order to cover up

the track. He had argued also that, inasmuch as a great deal of war material

was actually allowed to go over the frontier to Spain in spite of the policy

of non-intervention, the same should be done in regard to China. M. Daladier

had agreed with him, and was going to talk to M. Bonnet again.

I thanked M. Archimbaud for his efforts and informed him that Jj* had

already sent him a list of literature on China and the Sino-japanese conflict,

with a collection of the same for his own use. M. Archimbaud asked me for two

copies of the list of orders placed by China with French factories for war
material, which I hac^sent him. I informed him that a letter would be sent

to him, which would reach him in the course of the day.

In the name of the Generalissimo, I also expressed appreciation of his

efforts in connection with the Sinp-French group in the Chamber of Deputies

and asked him to convey the Generalissimo's thanks to the members of the group.
i
M. Archimbaud said the entire Communist group and a large number of the Socialists

as well as Radicals had joined this group. He could have the entire membership of

the Radical Party in the Chamber join the group, he added, but he thought that,

as a beginning, it was better to enlist only those actively interested in China

and not a list of names without real interest back of it. I expressed complete

agreement with this point of view.

M. Archimbaud kept in close toulch with the Embassy, and on the 23rd he saw

me again and gave me an account of his latest conversation with M. Daladier

and M. Bonnet. He told me that he found the Premier always very sympathetic

and most helpful. But the Foreign Minister, M. Bonnet, was, in his view,

altogether too prudent, and that explained why there was delay in facilitating

the transit of the Chinese war goods through Indochina.

[In the meantime, there were important developments in the Sino-japanese

 162

conflict. Militarily, the Japanese seemed to be moving rapidly up the Yangtze

in the direction of the vital Wuhan area. Anking was taken by the Japanese

on the 12th. At the same time, according to a Waichiaopu telegram, the government]

had received information to the effect that 1,300 Japanese young officers had gone

to Bangkok, Siam, for the purpose of setting up aerodromes and preparing

air raids to attack the rear of the Chinese army and also to destroy the new

road for transportation of war material from Burma to Yiinnanfu.

On June 15 I went to see M. L6ger at the Quai d'Orsay to inform him [of

this information and ask him] whether the Quai d'Orsay had received similar

information. M. L6ger replied that recently the French Minister in Bangkok

reported that two Japanese warships had arrived in Siam and their officers

had visited the leaders of the Siamese government with a view to enlisting Siam

on the Japanese side against China. The Siamese Foreign Minister had told the

French Minister as well as the British Minister at Bangkok that Japanese efforts

had entirely failed. Siam, having a great number of Chinese within her borders

and being friendly to both China and Japan, wished to remain neutral without

taking sides. The refusal on the part of Siam to accede to the Japanese

wishes had brought about an estrangement at present with Japan, and the Siamese

Foreign Minister feared that the Japanese might seek to display their dissatisfactioi

towards Siam in other ways.

M. L6ger added that, beyond this information, there was nothing to indicate

what I had just told him. He would nevertheless cause an inquiry to be made at

once. He then asked M. Hoppenot, the Assistant-Director for Asia, to come

in and dictated, in my presence, a telegram to the French Minister in Bangkok

asking him for another report. I thanked him for his action.

Referring to my representation to M. Bonnet the week before about the

reported Polish intention to recognize "Manchukuo," M. L6ger said that three

days ago a telegram had been sent to the French Minister at Warsaw instructing
 163

him to exert his best efforts to prevent the polish government from carrying

out such an intention. He agreed with me in saying that such recognition

would certainly have the effect of further weakening the prestige and authority

of the League of Nations.

Then I told M. L6ger that I had noticed in the newspapers that the State

Department at Washington had recently advised the American airplane manufacturers

not to sell airplanes to Japan. I asked M. L6ger if the Americans had informed

the French government of this step. M. L6ger answered in the negative, and

remarked that since the Brussels Conference, where the French had proposed and

failed to receive approval for concerted action to help China, the American

government had been very quiet about the Far East. But, so far as the French

government was concerned, it was always prepared to cooperate in any concrete

proposal for concerted action to help China.

I then told M. L6ger that, according to Dr. Butler, the President of Columbia

University, who had talked with me, public opinion in America was growing in favor

of a more positive policy on the part of the Administration towards the Far East.

M. L6ger warned me, to my surprise, not to place too much confidence in Dr.

Butler's statement. He said the French people admired and liked Dr. Butler, but

the latter was more of an advance guard of American public opinion, often thinking

things of a wishful character. M. L6ger said time and again President Butler had

conveyed to France that America would do this and that, and it always turned

out that his statements were over optimistic. I said that Dr. Butler, in my view,

appeared well informed of American public opinion, but that as an internationalist

and a great apostle of peace, it was not unnatural that he should always take an

optimistic view of the whole situation.

I inquired whether the French government had taken any decision in regard

to the [recent] Japanese warning against foreign navigation on the Yangtze and

whether M. L6ger was aware of the British and American stand. M. L6ger replied

that he had read it in the papers, but the French government had taken no decision
 164

yet . If the French government should be approached by the United States and

Great Britain, he had no doubt it would take the same view as they on this

question.

In reply to my inquiry about the movements of M. Naggiar, the French

Ambassador in China, M. Ldger said he should by now have already reached Shanghai.

He said M. Naggiar's trip to Hankow had provoked a great deal of comment in the

Japanese press, which had opened a campaign against France, such as it had done

against Great Britain sometime ago. Now it was concentrating its attack on

France and complaining that she was aiding China by according transit facilities

through Indochina to Chinese war supplies, and that M. Naggiar had gone to

Hankow this time to propose the conclusion of an agreement of the character

suggested by M. Li Yii-ying.

Asked whether M. Naggiar had any specific instructions on this question,

M. L6ger said his trip to Hankow was one taken on his own initiative and

the French government had sent him no instructions. It was an ordinary visit to

resume contact with the Chinese government, and made also in view of the probability

of having to evacuate French nationals from Hankow. M. L6ger added that, while in

Hankow, M. Naggiar had seen Mr. T. V. Soong, but it was not for any special mission.

M. L6ger surmised that the Japanese press campaign against France was to prepare

the ground for an eventual attack against Hainan Island or Indochina and seek a

justification for Japan’s act of aggression.

[Just one week later] I had another rather important conversation with

M. L6ger. The inmediate reason for my visit was a telegram from the Waichiaopu,

asking me to inquire what position the French government would take in case

Japan should carry out her threat to occupy Hainan Island. [In relating this to

M. L€ger,] I added that I had read in the press that Foreign Minister Bonnet had

seen the Japanese Ambassador in Paris, while the French Ambassador in Tokyo had
 165

talked with General Ugaki, the Japanese Foreign Minister. [I said that,]

according to my own information, the Japanese were by no means decided to

effect an occupation of the island.

M. L6ger said it was difficult to answer the question I had raised. Hainan

Island was part of Chinese territory. The Japanese had repeatedly assured

the French government that Japan had no territorial ambitions in China and

was not contemplating the occupation of Hainan. But recently the Japanese

assurance was by no means so definite as the previous ones. In fact, they had

told the French government that the Japanese Navy might occupy it, if such

occupation should be necessary for certain military operations. The French

government, M. L6ger continued, could do nothing other than use its diplomatic

efforts to persuade the Japanese government not to occupy the island. It had

told the Japanese government that Hainan Island, although part of Chinese

territory, was of vital interest to Indochina as it was to Hongkong, and

that it would not like to see the island occupied by the Japanese. The French

government had now approached the British government for a consultation as to

the situation. According to his information, the Japanese Navy was still

hesitating to carry out its intention of occupying the island because such a

step might give rise to complications with Great Britain and France, but he

thought it was probable the island would be occupied.

Asked whether the Japanese attitude was reconcilable with the Franco-

Japanese Agreement of 1907, M. L6ger said while the press had referred to it,

the question of Hainan Island really had nothing to do with the said agreement.

In reply to my query whether, in the course of the conversations with the

Japanese on the question, the French government had undertaken any engagements as

regards the supply of arms and the according of transit facilities through

Indochina to China, M. L6ger answered in the negative. He said that that was a

separate question which had never been discussed with the question of Hainan
 166

Island. The Japanese, M. L6ger added, had protested from time to time and

complained that the French had been supplying arms to China and allowing them

to pass through Indochina. But the French government had invariably replied

that it always wished in the Sino-japanese conflict to maintain an attitude of

neutrality as much as possible, and that there was no intention on the part

of the French government to take sides at all. Diplomatically, [said M. Ldger

for clarification, ] the two questions had never been linked together, though of

course the Japanese wished to consider them as having a close relationship.

I then referred to the press report of the arrival of three American

submarines at Saigon, and asked whether there had been any conversations lately

with Washington on the Sino-japanese conflict. M. L6ger replied that since the

Brussels Conference there had been no discussion with the American government

concerning the Far East. The presence of three American submarines at Saigon had

nothing to do with the question of Hainan Island either.

M. L6ger said the French government had received a notification from the

Japanese announcing their intention to extend the zone of military operations

running from Sian in the North to Pakhoi on the southern coast of China, thereby

leaving Hainan Island within the extended zone of military operations. I

observed it vms extraordinary that Japan should have sent such a notification as

she had never declared war. I asked M. L6ger whether there would be any reply,

and if so, what would be its tenor. M. Ldger said notifications of this

character had been made before by the Japanese, and the American and British

governments had already taken note of them, as in the case of the notification

to search commercial ships in order to identify their nationality. The French

government could not do otherwise, he said. However, it did not intend to

reply to th lotification regarding the extension of the zone of military

operations as no reply was called for. But, he added, the note indicated that
 167

Japan wanted to conclude her military operations.

I agreed with M. L6ger and remarked that Japan was evidently anxious to

bring the present hostilities to an end as quickly as possible. I told him the

prolongation of Chinese resistance was disturbing her seriously.

M. Ldger said the extension of military operations to South China gave an

excellent opportunity to Soviet Russia to act in the North. He thought it was

striking that she remained as inactive as ever. I said that Dr. Sun Fo, who

had just returned from his second visit to Moscow, was quite satisfied with

the results of his conversations with Stalin and Voroshilov, [the Minister of

Defense.] The Soviet Union was continuing to extend material aid to China. As

regards military cooperation, I said that would depend upon the development

of the situation in Europe, as Russia apparently had two fronts to watch

instead of one.

I then said the press had referred to the Agreement of November 1937 made

between France and Japan concerning the question of transit through Indochina.

M. L6ger denied there had been such an agreement and gave me the impression

that France kept her freedom of action vis-A-vis the Sino-japanese conflict.

The present Japanese press campaign against France, said M. Ldger, was

continuing. It complained that France was supplying arms to China, according

transit facilities through Indochina, sending military instructors to China

and agreeing to finance the construction of a railway from the Indochinese

frontier to Nanning. All thrse alleged grievances were put forward for the

manifest purpose of finding a justification in the eyes of the public for

the subsequent Japanese push in South China. I said while Japan was anxious to

bring the war to a rapid end by extending the military operations to South China,

she would be disappointed as she had been before because China was determined

to continue her resistance.

I asked him whether a reply had been received to the wire which he
 168

had been good enough to send to the French Minister at Bangkok relating to

the despatch of a large number of young Japanese officers to Siam to attack

the rear of the Chinese armed forces. M. L^ger, after calling up M. Hoppenot

on the telephone, said the reply of the Minister merely stated that the

Japanese attempt to enlist Siamese aid on their side had failed, but that it

was suspected Japan would renew her efforts in this direction. As to the

specific points asked, he said the telegram said nothing, but simply mentioned

that a report would be sent by mail. In that case, I said, I would speak to

M. L^ger on another occasion.

Replying to M. Lager's question, I said the Yellow River flood favored

China rather than Japan as regards military operations, but the damage

suffered by the people in that region was naturally enormous. [(I was referring

to the intentional flooding of the Yellow River, by breaking sections of the

dikes east of Chengchow, in order to stop the Japanese advance.)]

[As I mentioned to M. L6ger, Dr. Sun Fo had returned from his second

visit to Moscow quite satisfied with the results of his conversations with

Russian leaders. In fact, I had had] an enlightening conversation with Dr.

Sun on June 9, the day of his return from Moscow after his second mission

there to seek aid and support for China. He gave me an interesting account

of what had transpired. First, he had made an arrangement to renew supplies

from Moscow with a 160 million ruble credit, which he said actually amounted

to about 400 million rubles in terms of world prices because the prices charged

China by Soviet Russia were especially low. As an example, he said the charge

for each airplane was only 30,000 dollars in terms of United States currency,

and the charge for equipping each Chinese division was 1.5 million dollars, in

terms of Chinese currency. These terms were agreed upon in telegrams between

Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Second, Soviet Moscow

informed him that the Soviet forces in Siberia had been increased to 70 divisions
 169

amounting to two-fifths of Soviet Russia1 s total army. Third, politically,

Dr. Sun had suggested the formulation of a plan for populating Manchuria,

Mongolia and Korea. (I would imagine he meant he had asked Soviet Russia

for financial assistance to proceed. I doubt very much that he meant

demographically, that is to say, to have the Soviet Russian people join in

the settlement of those areas.

YU Ming, a close personal secretary to Sun Fo, and Hsia Chin-lin,

counselor to Sun Fo on his mission, also called to acquaint me with the work

of Dr. Sun’s mission in Moscow. As regards another matter, the question of

Ambassador T. F. Tsiang's difficulties with Soviet Russia, they said those

difficulties had dated back to Tsiang's first visit with Litvinov through an

introduction given by Ambassador Bullitt in Moscow. I was interested in

finding out the cause of the difficulties of Ambassador Tsiang in Moscow

for he had left rather abruptly. They said that was due to his indiscrete

questions and his relations with the Generalissimo at that time. They also

told me that his brusque retorts to Litvinov at the time of the Sian Incident

had ruffled Litvinov's feelings. (I understood that Tsiang was so shocked by

the news of the Generalissimo's capture by the Young Marshal that when, on

instructions of H. H. Kung, he went to see Soviet Foreign Commissar Litvinov,

his state of mind at the moment was such that he blurted out that, in his view,

Soviet Russia should not have caused the incident, putting the blame on

Soviet Russia. He was reflecting the view in China that it was the Communists

who provoked the Young Marshal to take action and the Soviet Union who commanded

the Communists, However, I think that while Kung's instruct ions asked Tsiang

to call on the Foreign Commissar, it was with a view to enlisting Moscow's

influence over the Chinese Communists. I would doubt very much, though this

is merely subjective speculation on my part, that Dr. Kung made any suggestion

that the affair was due to the intrigues in Moscow. Probably Dr. Tsiang
 170

inferred that the incident had been concocted or, at least, inspired by Moscow.)

Yu Ming and Hsia said that they found out in Moscow that, [at the time

of the Sian Incident,] Dr. Tsiang was very indiscrete in putting questions to

Litvinov, which annoyed him. Thus when Litvinov, before giving a reply to

Tsiang’s request, said he would consider whether he would first protest to

Nanking, Dr. Tsiang said brusquely that the Sianfu incident was too serious

and there was no time for delay. This only served to annoy Mr. Litvinov still

further. According to Ambassador Yang Chieh, who succeeded Dr. Tsiang, the

meeting broke up very abruptly, and Litvinov told Tsiang that he would not

want to see him again.-

The facts of the matter are not clear, but there was some kind of

incident and misunderstanding which brought about Dr. Tsiang's abrupt departure

from Moscow. The account related to me was only from one side, that is, the

two Chinese in question must have gotten their story from the Soviet side.

In the late Spring of 1938, the Japanese were pushing their military

operations on all fronts. Tokyo evidently felt disappointed at the refusal

of China to come to terms with her on the basis of the Japanese proposal,

even though she had used the good offices of both Berlin and Rome, which

countries had strongly urged China to reach a settlement with Japan.

[China, instead of agreeing to a settlement of Japanese making, seemed

to grow stronger in her spirit of resistance, while Japan was reported to

be suffering the effects of waging an aggressive war.] According to a report on

June 14 from Professor Escarra, an advisor to the Chinese delegation, who had

just come back from China by air, two weeks earlier he had spent fifteen days

in Hankow and seen about 60 people of various countries, besides Generalissimo

Chiang Kai-shek, Mr. Wang Chung-hui, and Foreign Minister C. H. Wang. His

conclusions [on the whole] were encouraging because, he said, he found: the

country united and unity was perfect; 2) tJj^rtT was a determination to continue
 171

resistance and Chinese morale was good; 3) Soviet Russia would not join the

war; 4) the strength of the Chinese army was gradually rising; 5) even if no

victory could be obtained in the end, China would have an honorable peace,

whereas Japan could only hope for a thorny peace. Professor Escarra also said

that General van Faulkenhausen, head of the German military advisors in China,

had told him the Japanese army could not hold out against any European army

for ten minutes, but the Chinese army lacked good staff work, although the

provincial Chinese armies were improving.

On the same day that I spoke with Escarra, June 14, my military attache.

General T'ang, told me the gist of a conversation he had had with General

Buhrer, Inspecter General of French Colonial Forces According to General

Buhrer, a great friend of China, who was well-advised on Japan's ambitions

as well as on Japan's internal situation, the Japanese army, with all its

superior equipment and good staff work, had failed in China and had miscalculated

the Chinese army's strength. According to General Buhrer, Japan was now short

on munitions, for their manufacture was way behind demand, and there was also a

shortage of good subordinate officers in the army.

[In any event, the Japanese were hoping] t&: bring about an early end to

the hostilities, and the Japanese military authorities evidently saw no other

way of doing so than by intensifying military efforts to bring China down to her

knees in the battlefield. The outcome of the fighting, even though China

continued her resistance, was not very encouraging for China. Prominent

cities like Hsiichow in Kiangsu, one of the principal cities along the Tientsin-

Pukow and Lunghai Railways and Kaifeng, the capital of Honan Province and

an important center of communications form the coast into the interior of

China along the Lunghai Railway, [had fallen to the Japanese earlierin June.]

The loss of Hankow, the new seat of government was imminent.

The success of the Japanese army during that period seemed to bear directly

upon the attitude of the powers in the West, particularly as regards tlie
 172

the negotiations for financial credit in London. France had been extending

credit of one kind or another to facilitate the purchase by China of arms,

munitions and airplanes, but the efforts, continuously made in England, to get

British financial support had not been successful. Negotiations dragged along,

though it will be recalled that during the time of the Council meeting in May,

Lord Halifax had indicated the prospect of securing substantial financial

aid from London was more hopeful. But these negotiations, while making progress,

had not reached a final conclusion. Aware of the outcome of the fighting in

the late Spring in 1938, the British, it seemed, again began to drag their

feet. Thus on June 7, 1938, Mr. P. W. Kuo, representative of the Chinese

Ministry of Finance, reporting to me, said that while the first two conversations

he had had with Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, the financial representative of the
\

Exchequer, appeared still helpful, the latest discussions with Leith-Rossy

had said, for example, that loans of a political character must wait government

decision, which then seemed very uncertain in coming, while commercial loans

had to have adequate security. But tungsten and antimony, the two mineral ores

which China offered as assets for sale in London, were not sufficient because

princes in London fluctuated all the time and because the precise quantities

available were uncertain. Kuo said the fact of the matter was that these

points had been obvious from the beginning, but only Jjafcn were they being put

forward to explain why it was necessary to give still further consideration

to China's request for positive financial aid. ^

At the time of P. W. Kuo's report, the situation stood thus. Dr. Kung

had originally prepared a program of four items of financial aid: 1) the

raising of a 10 million sterling domestic loan in China to be guaranteed

by Great Britain; 2) the extension of the Anglo-French loan of 1908 for

500,000 pounds; 3) a 20 million pound loan, which had been proposed the year

before; 4) an export credit. These were the definite items of discussion and
 173

negotiation between Mr. P. W. Kuo and Sir Frederick Leith-Ross. But the

outcome of the negotiations was unsuccessful because, according to Leith-Ross,

the first item was entirely political in character and must await a government

decision, the second category had not been discussed previously, and the

third and fourth categories depended upon acceptable security.

It was evident that the apparent rapid push of the Japanese into the

heart of China, both in the North and in the Yangtze Valley, had again raised

doubt in the minds of the leaders in England as to the ultimate outcome. It

seemed that the British again wanted to be careful not to do anything which

might not be helpful in the end, but which would only irritate the Japanese,

their former allies, and possibly cause the extensive British interests in

the Far East, particularly in China, to suffer.

[One might ask if the replacement of Anthony Eden by Halifax in February

1938, as well as the Japanese advances in China, affected British willingness

\
to extend financial aid to China.] From my own experience, Anthony Eden, a

much younger man than Lord Halifax, appeared to be more sympathetic and

understanding, and his political views seemed to me to be more progressive.

Therefore, he was quicker to understand the significance of China's resistance

to Japan and its possible bearing upon the international situation in Europe,

and in fact upon the whole problem of world peace. [From that point of view, ]

Eden showed himself to be more sympathetic and easier to deal with. However,

in the British system, matters of financial credit were in the hands of the

Exchequer. The Foreign Office could suggest, recommend and even advocate

policy, but the final word had to be said by the Chancellor of the Exchequer,

who remained Sir John Simon.

[One must also consider that at the same time Halifax replaced Eden in London,

in Japan General Ugaki became Foreign Minister. The latter was considered by the

British as more amenable than his predecessor. In any event, discussions

began between Britain and Japan about rapproachement. As they continued, the
 174

British seemed more anxious to encourage good relations with Japan.] That

is why I said that although Eden was more understanding and easier to talk with,

the controling factor of the situation was the policy of the British government,

as a whole, toward Japan.

\

To say the least, the policy remained one of circumspection. For

example, China, having decided to continue resistance against Japan at all

costs, wanted to take all the necessary measures for long term resistance,

such as the building of new roads for transportation to bring supplies in

from abroad for the armed forces, and had approached Britain on the building

of the Burma Road. Great Britain, from the very beginning, raised all sorts of

objections. This lasted until after Pearl Harbor, when the Americans and the

engineering corps of the United States army said that it was not impossible and

decided to pursue the matter and take the problem into its own hands. The Burma

Road was finished, utilizing Chinese labor and American skill. This showed that

the British were not keen on really going out of their way to help China for

fear that their outflung interests in the Far East might suffer by an act of

Japanese retaliation. It was really over cautious, amounting to timidity on

the part of Great Britain, and probably due to the traditional British belief in

Japan's supremacy in the Far East.

The difficulty of securing financial assistance from Great Britain

having become so great. Dr. Sun Fo, on discussing the matter with me on June

24, suggested a way of hastening British credits by proposing to the Soviet

Union that it act as intermediaty and pay some gold to Great Britain, as a

guarantee for the British grant of financial assistance to China. He also

suggested to get French guns through Soviet Russia, that is to say, by asking

Moscow to approach Paris, apparently for her own use but really for China's use.

Those suggestions, however, seemed to be rather Impractical, and of course

they were not taken up.

Mr. P. W. Kuo reported to me on June 26 that Sir Frederic Leith-Ross,

 1 75

had told him that credits were not very helpful now. The Chinese government

had become so impatient, it had sent Mr. Rogers, a Britisher who was an advisor

to China, to London to ask for an answer, yes or no, on the matter of credits

for it had been dragging too long.

The newspapers were of course much interested in the Sino-japanese conflict.

On June 25, one of the correspondents of a Dutch paper came to see me. He had

just come back from a visit to Japan and China. He said in Japan he had seen

General Ugaki and he had talked with Dr. Kung in China during March. The

latter appeared depressed at the time and disposed to talk about peace with

japan, he said. I reflected that this did not seem likely, since Kung took

his stand, normally, with the group favoring continued resistance. The Dutch

journalist also said Hankow would be lost in September, after which China's

position would be more difficult. In his view, peace could be had by China, by

letting Japan keep North China and by demilitarizing Shanghai, because, he said,

the powers were not likely to give much help to China with material or credits.

[The view of the Dutch journalist was certainly pessimistic, and in fact

the situation was discouraging, not only militarily in China, where the Japanese

were threatening Hankow, but diplomatically abroad, where china was having

trouble eliciting aid and support.] In view of the discouraging situation at

the time, I was anxious to have a talk with my friend and China's friend, the

French Minister of Colonies, Georges Mandel. This I did on June 29 in his

private residence in Paris. It was a most confidential conversation in which

we gave our views freely, with the mutual understanding, although unexpressed,

that our talk was to be considered as absolutely in confidence. I consider this

conversation to be of great importance in understanding French policy and

intentions and how much China could expect from France in the way of support

and material aid.

[According to my notes I first referred to the threatened occupation of

 176

Hainan Island, the reported conversation between Geroges Bonnet and the

Japanese Ambassador, the statement made by Butler, Under-Secretary for Foreign

Affairs, in the House of Commons declaring the intention of the British

government to support France in the event of Indochina being threatened by

the occupation of Hainan Island, and my conversation with L€ger [the day

before, on June 28.] According to L£ger, I said, the British reply to the

French inquiry had not yet arrived. But Hoppenot later told my counsellor

at the Chinese Embassy that the British reply was a favorable one.

I added that, according to information from Berlin, the Japanese threat to

occupy Hainan Island at present had really been inspired by the German government.

Immediately after the Japanese defeat at Taierchwang, Japan had approached

Germany insisting upon the recall of the German military advisers from China.

The German navy insisted, as a counterpart for the recall of these officers,

that the Japanese Marine should help to bring pressure to bear upon Great

Britain and France in order that Germany might find it easier to carry out her

policy in Europe. All this, I said, showed that the Far Eastern situation

was linked up with that in Europe. As I had told L6ger yesterday, I said, if

Great Britain and France could adopt a firm attitude vis-^-vis the Japanese

threat to occupy Hainan, it would be sufficient to forestall such occupation,

japan, being fully occupied in China, was certainly not desirous of provoking

complications with either Great Britain or France. A firm attitude on the part

of Great Britain and France would, moreover, enable Japan to excuse herself

before Germany and effectively prevent her from carrying out the threat.

M. Mandel said the Japanese Ambassador had reproached the French

government on various counts, and Georges Bonnet seemed to have assumed that

the Japanese reproaches were well founded. However, he had told Bonnet that

the Japanese protests were without foundation. As a matter of fact, he said,

they were not true and it would be impossible for the Japanese to bring facts
 177

to prove them. Thus, for example, the allegation that French warships had

been carrying munitions of war for the Chinese government was absolutely false.

As for the French engagement to finance the construction of a railway from

the Indochinese border to Kwangsi Province, it had been the subject of

negotiations-* for the past two years, and had already been agreed upon before

the outbreak of hostilities between China and Japan.

M. Mandel thought that the Quai d'Orsay, instead of explaining the ill-

founded charges brought by Japan, should pass from the defensive to the offensive.

He knew that four Japanese motor boats and two submarines had passed through

Indochina to Siam. Now there were also in Siam 200 Japanese airplanes, of which

100 had been sent from Japan. Japan should be asked what was the purpose of

these shipments which had gone through the territorial waters of Indochina.

Besides, said Mandel, an extensive espionage system had been in operation

under Japanese control in Indochina. He added that he had caused this

information to be passed on to London and Washington, and it was this information

that had helped to expedite the British reply [regarding Hainan.]

I told M. Mandel that the relations between China and Germany were rather

strained on account of the recall of the German officers. General Chiang

had been willing to let them go, but suggested keeping five or six of them, who

had been in possession of the secrets of the Chinese plan of military operations,

not with the idea of retaining them for China, but detaining them for a few

weeks. But Hitler insisted upon the departure of all the officers and even

set a date whereby such departure should be effected, failing which the

German Ambassador would be recalled. Dr. Trautmann (the German Ambassador)

had now, I added, actually left Hankow for Hongkong.

Mandel
M.' asked whether a new German Ambassador had been appointed. I answered

in the negative and said that Berlin decided to recall the Ambassador evidently

for two reasons. First, Trautmann had been pro-Chinese. The new German
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 178

Ambassador in Japan, Ortt, who was formerly German military attach^ in Tokyo,

was, hoever, altogether pro-Japanese in the policy of assisting Japan to

expedite the termination of the Sino-Japanese conflict. General Ortt was

strongly in favor of Japan liberating herself from the Chinese war and

conserving her strength with which to help Germany. Trautmann was in close

touch with the German industrial and commercial interests and was of the

opinion that China would be of greater help to Germany than Japan in future.

But General Ortt's view prevailed in Berlin, which now wished to replace

Trautmann with a new ambassador to China, who would be less sympathetic

towards her. As for the second reason for Trautmann's recall I said it was

the desire to bring pressure to bear upon China in order to facilitate the

departure of the German advisers.

M. Mandel agreed with me in thinking that Germany desired to exploit the

Anti-Communist Pact for her own advantage. Then I observed that the British

declaration in the House of Commons was a positive one, and asked whether it

meant that, in case Hainan should be occupied. Great Britain would be prepared

to use means other than mere diplomacy to prevent it. M. Mandel said Hainan

was of as much interest and importance to Singapore and Hongkong as it was

to Indochina. While there was no understanding for armed cooperation in the

event of the Japanese occupation of Hainan, he thought that after this

declaration. Great Britain could not refuse to support France, if necessary

with armed force, without losing face.

I referred to my conversation with Daladier about three weeks earlier on

the two questions of a French military mission and the establishment of

factories along the Indochinese frontier for the manufacture of light arms.

I asked the cause for the matter not having been followed up. M. Mandel

said Daladier was entirely favorable to the ideas and would like to see them

carried out. He was also in favor of according transit facilities to China

 179

through Indochina. But Bonnet was an obstacle and did not see eye to eye

with Daladier. As the latter had taken office in difficult times and there

were still internal problems to be faced, he did not wish to act hastily. If

international complications should arise, Bonnet could say that action was

taken against his advice and that Daladier should be held responsible for

what happened. Bonnet's idea was to upset the present majority as both the

Socialists and the Communists were opposed to him.

I asked what Bonnet would gain if the present majority was upset.

M. Mandel replied that Bonnet belonged to the right wing of the Radical Party.

He was a man well versed primarily in finance and economics, and he belonged

to the traditional school. He was naturally influenced in his foreign

outlook by his views on finance and economics.

The people of the Left in France, M. Mandel continued, were correct

in their views on foreign policy, which were based upon three major

principles, namely, the building up and maintenance of a system of alliances

and friendships, close Anglo-French collaboration and energetic action against

threats of aggression. M. Mandel said if Germany should be successful in

establishing hegemony over Europe, France would find herself entirely

isolated and deprived of her friendships. Daladier felt that he must move

cautiously in order not to give a chance to Bonnet to disturb the cabinet.

I said perhaps public opinion might be better educated so that it would

support a sound foreign policy on the part of the government. M. Mandel said

public opinion was learning but slowly. For 15 years different governments

had been telling the people there was no danger of war. But recently there

was a war in Africa, one in Spain and in the Mediterranean and another in the

East. Even European problems were not very clear to the French people, let

alone the situation in the Far East. But the day would come when they would

understand, but, said Mandel,it would only come slowly.

 180

I referred to my letter to M. Mandel of a few days earlier on the

question of the 32 armored cars. M. Mandel said he had not yet replied to

it because he was not in a position to do so. He had asked the Governor-General

in Indochina for confirmation, and found that the information in my letter was

correct. But, he said, the Governor-General did not reply to specific

instructions. M. Mandel explained that he thought it best not to have the

Governor-General ask for instructions for each case, especially as the code

was known to the Japanese. So he had cabled to the Governor-General, M. Brevier,

saying that the policy of the present government vis-^-vis the Sino-Japanese

conflict and its attitude towards China had not changed, and that his own

policy was the same as that of his predecessor. He therefore asked the

Governor-General to act in accordance with that hint, without cabling back for

instructions in each case.

But the Governor-General, M. Mandel went on, was not a political man.

All his life he had been only a civil servant, and he was not accustomed nor

willing to assume any responsibility for himself, with the result that even

after his (Mandel1s) telegram no action had been taken. The only thing to do

now, said Mandel, was to send for him and ask him to fly to Paris early in

July for a personal talk with him.

The post, M. Mandel added, really required a man of political vision

and comprehension, capable of acting on his own responsibility in accordance

with the policy of the government. He had been looking round for a new man,

and asked me what I thought of M. Lamoureux. There were many aspirants to the

situation, he said. The difficulty was not so much to find a successor as to

seek a suitable position for the present Governor-General, who for over 30

years had been a loyal public servant and could not be set aside on the shelf.

M. Mandel told me he had approached the Bank of Indochina for a directorship

on the Board of Directors, but it appeared there was no vacancy available

 181

in the near future.

I said, M. Varenne had been a Governor-General before and knew the Far

East well. I said I understood Varenne was also desirous of going out again.

M. Mandel said he knew Varenne well, but then he was already 60 years of age,

and he (Mandel) could not remove and retire one in his 50s and replace him

with another ten years older. He added that Varenne had been a Socialist,

then left the Socialist Party and now belonged to the Party of Republican

Socialists, the same as Paul Boncour. He also said it would be a great help

to him if the Governor-General for Indochina was a man who understood his policy

and in whom he had complete confidence. He said it would be useless to make a

change unless a new man of the right sort was found, who could continue to

carry out the policy even after a change in the political situation in Paris.

[Several more points were made:]

1. M. Mandel said a Japanese military officer had been caught doing espionage

work in Indochina, but instead of punishing him, those in charge allowed

him to go back to Japan where he had now been appointed to the cabinet of the

new War Minister.

2. I was informed that Mandel had suggested to Daladier to make the proposed

military advisory mission to China international in character--a Yugoslav/

-&e-
a Belgian, a Swede, etc., thought the bulk should remain French. The idea was
A
to prevent people from saying that France sought to replace Germany in China.

3. M. Mandel said the Daladier Cabinet had now to find 20 billion francs

before the end of the year. When one was in need of money, one had to be

careful not to make enemies of people who could lend.

4. He also said the loan of 450 million francs for colonial development and

defense was extended to the end of the month, so as to give a chance to

the service to subscribe.

 182

[The following day I called on M. Archimbaud at his residence.]

M. Archimbaud said_, in the course of the previous day? he had seen Daladier,

L6ger and Mandel on the Chinese question. He found Daladier entirely

disposed to do what he could to expedite the manufacture and delivery of the

Chinese orders placed with French factories. Such factories as Scheneider,

Brandt and Hotchkiss had already received the necessary instructions. M.

Archimbaud added that L6ger had now been entirely won Over to the Chinese

cause and could be counted upon for help. L6ger's difficulty was that Georges

Bonnet did not always see eye to eye with him. Daladier knew this disagreement

and now often sent for L6ger for information on the Far East. At times L6ger

was wise enough to have Daladier speak to Bonnet direct rather than to speak

to Bonnet himself.

I said M. Bonnet probably did not quite understand the situation of

the Far East as well as L6ger, who had spent several years in China and still

counted many friends among the Chinese. M. Archimbaud said Bonnet was always

afraid of provoking complications. However, with the cooperation of L6ger,

Daladier and Mandel, he thought the Chinese cause would be well looked after.

As regards the question of the 32 armored cars, M. Archimbaud said he

had had another talk with Mandel, who was altogether disposed to get them passed

and had even telegraphed to the Governor-General in general terms. [Confirming

what Mandel had told me, Archimbaud said Mandel] could not give specific instructions

because the code in use with the Governor-General dated back to 1884 and it was

certain the Japanese had got hold of it. Mandel did not wish to run the

risk of their knowing the instructions to the Governor-General and then making a

case out of them against the French government. M. Archimbaud also said that

Mandel had now sent out a confidential agent to tell Brevier, the Governor-

General, of his views. He added that, in Mandel*s opinion, it was possible that

the Indochinese authorities would from time to time seize a small portion of

Chinese shipments so as to prove to the Japanese that they were actually prohibiting
 183

transit for Chinese shipments. But that was merely for window dressing,

which would, however, help to facilitate the giving of aid to China.

I referred to British Under-Secretary Butler's statement in the House of

Commons on the question of Hainan Island, and asked what M. Archimbaud thought

of it. He replied that the declaration had been received with a great deal of

satisfaction by the French government, and he thought it served to forestall

the threatened occupation. He added that it was a good thing that a parliamentary

group had been formed which would enable him to push the matter of aid to China

with greater facility.

I said the Chinese government and Marshal Chiang, as well as myself, were

very grateful to him for his efforts in organizing this group. M. Archimbaud

said he had received a message of thank® ||om me and carried it in his pocket

in order to show it to some members of his group.

Several hours earlier I had received the Papal Nuncio at the Embassy with

regard to the indiscriminate bombing by the Japanese airforce of heavily-

populated cities. The Japanese were then not only pushing forward their military

operations into Central China, but were also sending more and more planes

to bomb important and densely-populated centers of resistance, such as Canton and

Hankow. On June 30, for example, the situation had become so critical, due to

the bombing, that the government was seriously preparing its evacuation [from

Hankow] and calling upon the civilian population to proceed with evacuation as

fast as possible. The same situation developed in Canton where Japanese bombing

was taking a very severe toll of civilian lives.

On the instructions of my government, I had [earlier] approached not only

the French government, but also, at the suggestion of M. Ldger, called upon the

Nuncio, the apostolic delegate in Paris, who by tradition was always the

Dean of the diplomatic corps. I saw him and handed him a memorandum on the

indiscriminate bombing of heavily-populated cities in China, which had resulted

 184

in a great loss of civilian life. The memorandum pointed out that all this

was against the rules of war and international law and contrary to all

humanitarian considerations.

On June 30, the Nuncio came to the Embassy and handed me a reply to

the Chinese memorandum. The reply took the form of a memorandum on the

subject of Japanese bombardment of open towns in China, particularly Canton.

The representative of the Vatican observed that the Japanese reply to the

demarche made by the Apostolic legate of the Vatican in Tokyo was that the

losses were unavoidable. He also said that was only the Japanese version,

which the Vatican did not share. He said the Japanese government, however,

would be ready to consider any suggestion the Vatican might make. Meanwhile,

it was contemplated to create a safety zone for the civilian population in Canton.

When the Nuncio asked what I thought of it, I thanked him for his visit

and the communication, and told him I would at once communicate with my

government. I said I was certain that my government would feel equally grateful.

I asked the Nuncio to convey my appreciation to the Vatican. I said that as soon

as I received a reply I would pass it on to him.

The Nuncio deplored war and said that the pope was moved by humanitarian

considerations to make the requested demarche in Tokyo. He said it was the

best the pope could do under the circumstances, and he would be glad to

pass on to Tokyo for its information any suggestion the Chinese government
*
might make.

A private telegram from the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hsii Mo,

received the same day, informed me that the situation had become more critical

and that the fall of Hankow was imminent. Further indication of the deteriorating

military situation was a Waichiaopu telegram confirming the loss of Matang, a

' [Later, on August 10, 1938, the papal Nuncio called on me, inquiring] about
China's reaction to the proposal he had made, in the name of the pope to establish
a neutral camp at Canton for the safety of civilians.
 185

strategic point on the approaches to Hankow. At the same time, there was a

disturbing report that several foreign ambassadors and ministers were proceeding

to Hongkong to have a meeting with a view to, it was rumored, promoting a

peaceful settlement. While this report was not confirmed, it was, however,
"HI
disturbing. I'On July 1, Mr. P. W. Kuo called to report that Sir John Simon

seemed to be less unfavorable[at present with regard to] the matter [of

extending financial credits to China, ] and that the whole question would be

He told me that while Prime Minister

Chamberlain remained noncommital s ome progress had been madq®j.t had been

agreed that the question of a currency loan would be discussed as a separate

matter apart from the matter of export credit . In order to facilitate and

expedite negotiations, I suggested to Kuo to interest Sir Frederick Leith-Ross,

or other Englishmen connected with the matter, in the possibility of China

agreeing to some concessions, such as the participation of a British representative

in the control of China's foreign exchange that is to say, he might be given a

seat on the Chinese foreign exchange control commission.

On July 18, Mr. Kuo again reported on the progress of his conversations in

London. He said Sir John Simon remained unfavorable to the extension of financial

credit and was actually the cause of the failure to get a loan for China. Sir

Alexander Cadogon aid Sir Frederick Leith-Ross had told him (Kuo) that the only

way left was to push the matter of the export credit, instead of continuing

to try to obtain financial assistance directly from the government.

In short, the question of obtaining financial aid from Great Britain to

facilitate China's resistance to Japanese aggression continued to drag on. No

concrete results were obtained after almost a year, dating from the time of

the Lukouchiao Incident and t-han a year; co»ru-ing

, I"" ,.,,J l,v
3rtt£-^‘f the resolution the Advisory jCommittee^jif the League calling
A J\/
upon member states to aid China and to refrain from doing anything to assist Japan.
 186

The question of getting aid from Great Britain [--and France for that

matter--] depended to a large extent upon the attitude and policy of the United

States. Repeatedly the British had indicated their desire to know what the

United States was prepared to do first. [This was one of the reasons it was
A
always] my policy to keep myself informed of the developing attitudes of

Washington. I was interested in knowing the state of public opinion in the

United States and the progress^ if any, in the development of a positive policy

in Washington to assist China. Accordingly, I was glad to receive a visit from

Dr. Jacob Schurman, who had been President of Cornell University and at one time

American Minister to China. He was highly regarded in Washington and I think

at one time also appointed American Ambassador to Germany.

In the course of our conversation, he told me that the United States was

still dominated by pacifist sentiment and the fear of war. But he said, referring

to the Neutrality Act, the primary factor standing in the way of direct effective

aid to China was likely to be amended. I emphasized my view that the granting

of material aid to China was not likely to involve the United States in war.

Dr. Schurman's view and forecast of an amendment to the Neutrality Act

was confirmed to me by Myron Taylor,when I met him at a luncheon in Paris.

Mr.Taylor had been President of the U.S. Steel Corporation. He had been sent

to Europe to study the international situation for the White House, and at one

time was appointed the President's personal representative at the Vatican. He

told me that he felt certain that the Neutrality Act would be revised soon, so

as to enable President Roosevelt to give more help to China in her resistance to

Japan.

In this connection, I would like to mention what Edgar Mowrer, the well-

known American journalist, told me on July 12 after his return from a trip in

China. He expressed the view that any credit to China to buy wheat, cotton and

sugar in the United States would be viewed with favor. He also said he had
 187

been well-impressed by the spirit of unity in China and by the discipline

and high morale. It was his opinion that China might yet avoid a total defeat.

[Also very much to the point was the long conversation I had with Henry

Morgenthau, United States Secretary of the Treasury, on July 26, at the residence

of the American Ambassador, who was also present. Knowing that Mr. Morgenthau

was on vacation and probably not prepared to enter into discussion, except that

of a private character, I first expressed some hesitancy about discussing the

possibility of obtaining aid from the United States. But Mr. Morgenthau told me

to speak to him openly and frankly and not to feel embarrassed. He said he

realized that the situation was very grave and that what I had in mind was

urgent. At the same time the American Ambassador, Mr. Bullitt>advised me to

fire whatever questions I wanted to ask and to feel perfectly free to say all I

wanted to say.

Mr. Morgenthau said perhaps it would be easier to discuss the matter which

I had in mind if he told me what had been done in Washington before he 16ft . The

agreement had been renewed for the purchase of silver from the Chinese government

at a little above the market price. The American government would buy 20 million

ounces at the outset, and thereafter ten million each month. He said Dr. C. T.

Wang had told him there were 100 million ounces of silver left. Therefore, this

agreement would take care of the Chinese exchange situation down to the end of

the year. What was to be done after that date was a matter which required

consideration.

I then asked what, in his view, was the best way whereby China could

obtain financial aid from the United States. Mr. Morgenthau replied that he

realized there were certain difficulties involved for the United States, but he

felt there must be ways whereby aid could be extended to China without embarrassing

the American government.

He said the Ambassador and he himself, in anticipating my visit, had already

discussed the matter and would now like to make a suggestion, which I might
 188

in turn report to my government for a reply. Mr. Morgenthau then said that

if K. P. Chen could be sent to Washington again, he would be glad to discuss

the question with him. However, he would like me to understand that it was not

a definite promise on his part, but that, as Secretary of the Treasury, he could

assure me that he would try his best to bring about some agreement .

Mr. Morgenthau proceeded to say that recently Chinese Ambassador C. T.

Wang had asked him if it was possible to make use of the unused portion of

the wheat and cotton loan negotiated in 1933 with the Export and Import Corporation.

He said he had told Dr. Wang that that matter had already been liquidated aid

that it was not possible to reopen it. In reply to my inquiry as to whether a

new arrangement could not be made whereby China could get credit through that

same corporation for making purchases in the United States, Mr. Morgenthau said

that was precisely the matter about which he thought something could be done.

He expected to be back in Washington by the end of August, and if K. P. Chen

could be there at the beginning of September, he would be glad to take it up with

him.

I said that Mr. Chen, on his way back to China [several years ago] after

having concluded the agreement for the purchase of silver, thanks to Mr,

Morgenthau's helpful cooperation, had passed through Paris. He had told me that

he had become an admirer of Mr. Morgenthau for the cordial and friendly way in

which he had helped to realize the object of Mr. Chen's mission. Mr. Morgenthau

said he found Mr. Chen a straight-forward and absolutely trustworthy businessman,

in whom he had complete confidence. He said Mr. Chen had told him that he

was no diplomat nor statesman, and never wished to enter politics on the

ground that politicians died earlier and that he wished to live to a ripe old

age. If the Chinese government agreed to appoint Mr. Chen again and Mr. Chen

was willing to go to the United States, he (Morgenthau) would ask Mr. Nicholson,

the United States Treasury agent in China, to accompany Mr. Chen to the
 189

United States, as he had on Chen’s last mission. Mr. Morgenthau added that

Mr. Chen found Mr. Nicholson very helpful. At the Japanese port, where his

ship touched, Mr. Chen had handed over all his documents to the care of Mr.

Nicholson. Mr. Morgenthau also said that he himself would be glad to extend

the same help to Chen as he had done before.

I thanked him and said I would cable the suggestion to China. Mr.

Morgenthau said if the reply were favorable, he hoped I would inform Mr. Bullitt

and ask him to pass the information on to him, so that he could make the necessary

preparations.

I asked whether, in addition to the export and import credit, there was

any possibility of making arrangements with private manufacturers for supplying

goods. Mr. Morgenthau said there was certainly a possibility. Mr. Chrysler,

of the Chrysler Automobile Company, had told him he was sympathetic towards

China's cause and would like to help. Chrysler had indicated he would be

prepared to supply China with all kinds of motor trucks, and would accept Chinese

treasury notes for everything, except the cost of labor and material. In other

words, Chrysler was willing to gamble on the profit to be made.

Mr. Morgenthau went on to say that it would also be well for the Chinese

government to ask Mr. Chen to look up the matter of purchasing in the United

States. He understood that the conditions and the terms under which China

had been making purchases there were not the most favorable. Prices were high

and terms were hard. In the present crisis, he said, it would be to China's

interest to make the purchase at the lowest prices possible and to make as

much of a saving as could be made. I told Mr. Morgenthau that I was in

entire accord with his idea, and that a group from Great Britain had made

the same suggestion to me as regards purchases in Europe. This British group

had offered to centralize and coordinate purchasing for China, and had said it

had behind it certain American banks such as the Chase Bank and the First

National of Boston.
 190

Mr. Morgenthau thought it would be desirable to deal directly with

manufacturers and, in arranging credits from foreign governments^ to deal

directly with such governments. He said that not very long ago an American,

claiming to represent certain groups in America, had approached him on behalf

of the Chinese government to negotiate a loan. He had been surprised because

he would prefer to deal directly with the Chinese government and not through any

third party. If Mr. Chen went to the United States, he said, he thought an

arrangement, such as had been offered by Chrysler, could also be negotiated

directly by Mr. Chen with Chrysler.

In the case of government credit, Mr. Morgenthau thought that China

could negotiate for purchases of cotton textiles and flour, articles which

required the initial processing of the raw materials to take place in the

United States. He added that the purchase of such goods by China would therefore

be of benefit to American labor and industry, and therefore be welcomed by the

American public. When I asked about sugar, Mr. Bullitt thought it could

certainly be brought up for discussion.

In reply to Mr. Morgenthau’s question, I then gave some information on the

attitude of Great Britain and France as regards the extension of financial aid

to China. Mr. Bullitt said he understood that neither the British nor the

French were disposed to render any financial aid to China before knowing what

the United States would do and was doing for China. He thought the only way

to ask London and Paris to help would be, first of all, to arrange something

with the United States. He said it would be advisable, however, not to say

anything to the British and French governments of the American intention to help,

because if Washington should be asked by London and Paris as to what America

was going to do for China, no definite answer could be given at first, and

the absence of a favorable answer would only make London and Paris hesitate

all the more. So he said he would advise me not to say anything to the people
 191

in Paris or London until something definite was effected between China and

the United States.

I said that since the failure of the loan negotiations in London, due

mainly to the opposition of Sir John Simon, the matter of financial

assistance from Great Britain was being pursued in the form of an export

credit. I said it had also been suggested that a loan could be effected, if it

were put on an international basis, with France and the United States joining

in it. Mr. Bullitt said he could tell me that as he knew the underlying

principles of American policy, he did not think there was any chance of the

United States agreeing to a joint loan with Britain and France. America was

disposed to pursue the idea separately, or if one liked to put it in that way,

parallelly. Mr. Bullitt assured me, however, that he would be glad to work

together with me, and press for similar aid from the French and British

governments. Meanwhile, if I obtained a reply from my government on the

possibility of sending Mr. K. P. Chen to the United States, he would report

to Washington and the State Department and ask them to be prepared for discussions.

At this point Mr. Morgenthau prepared to leave and I thanked him for his

sympathetic discussion and friendly and very valuable suggestion. After he had

left, Mr. Bullitt asked me to stay on and continue the conversation. He said

he would put himself entirly at my disposal for anything he could do to help,

and hoped that I would keep him in touch with the situation in the Far East

as I had been doing. I naturally agreed.

In the course of our conversation, I asked whether Mr. Bullitt had had

the impression that before Mr. Butler, British Under-Secretary for Foreign

Affairs, made a declaration in the House of Commons giving assurance of

collaboration with the French regarding the possible occupation of Hainan

Island by the Japanese, the British had sounded the views of Washington out.

But Mr. Bullitt said he had not heai^ of it and could not confirm it.
a,
 192

I also asked Mr. Bullitt if he had seen M. Bonnet after the visit of

British royalty to Paris. He said he had and understood from M. Bonnet that

the Anglo-French conversations were mainly devoted to the Czechoslovak question

and that the Far Eastern situation was not touched on at all.

One will recall that the French had been feeling that, in order to preserve

peace in Europe, their real hope lay in close cooperation and mutual assistance

between France and Great Britain. In other words, in the minds of French

political leaders, close Franco-British collaboration in Europe would be a

safeguard against the outbreak of a war resulting from the expansionist

program of the Axis powers. They had been pressing the British along that

line when finally the British came to see the wisdom and need of such mutual

assistance and cooperation to meet the situation in Europe. [Following the

visit of Daladier and Bonnet to London toward the end of April 1938, there was

a new Franco-British understanding or entente.] The royal visit of George VI

and Queen Elizabeth to Paris, from July 19-21, was, in customary fashion,

intended to put a public seal on this new policy of entente. Accordingly,

a great deal of interest, attention and work was put into the preparations

for the visit.

The royal visit, having been postponed for a week, because the Queen

caught a cold, began on July 19, on which day there was a reception given by

King George, at the Quai d'Orsay, to receive the diplomatic corps in Paris.

The ceremony was very simple, lasting only eight minutes. Each diplomatic

representative was introduced to the King in order of precedence, and

shook hands with him. The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, who had

accompanied the King to Paris, stepped out and greeted me when it was my turn.

[(Not only did we know each other from the League of Nations, but he was

also in the Colonial Office as Under-Secretary, when I was Minister to London in

1921.) ]

Later there was an impressive dinner at the Elysges palace in honor

of the British King and Queen. _ I^was seared between

 193

the former French Foreign Minister and President, on my left, and Madame
\
Souritz, wife of the Soviet Ambassador, on my right. After dinner, as was the

custom, the King sent for a few of the prominent guests to speak to them. So

I had a chat with King George, who first asked about the situation in China.

Then our conversation turned to a lighter vein. He asked me what I would do when

confronted with the Japanese Ambassador. When I responded that I would try to

avoid him, King George laughed.

Queen Elizabeth also sent for me and we exchanged a few remarks. I found

her most charming. She said she remembered my sojourn in London very well,

referring to the time I was Chinese Minister in London. I was also introduced

to a number of British aristocrats, including Lord Hardinge,the Duke of Boford,

Lady Spencer and Lady Duff-Cooper, who were in the royal suite for this state visit.

The following day there was a garden party at Bagatelle (a great public

park on the outskirts of Paris) in honor of King George VI and Queen Elizabeth.

There was a beautiful presentation of ballet dancing on the stage built in the

center of the lake, with all the fountains going. I found Mr. Winston Churchill

seated next to me in a row of chairs, and we engaged in very friendly and

interesting conversation. He told me that China seemed to be doing very

well and should win in the end. He said he wished that he could do more

to help China. Paul Reynaud, the Minister of Justice, also spoke to me for

a few minutes. He made the shrewd comment that China, with space and time on

her side, was beginning to wear out Japan. I think the fact that China was a

tremendously large country with a big population impressed him very much, as

a French statesman.

At the Opera that evening, in honor of the King and Queen, I suddenly

encountered Mr. Sugimura, the Japanese Ambassador. We were seated close

to each other, with only Soviet Ambassador Souritz and German Ambassador

Welczek between us, but I managed to avoid him without shaking hands. I
thought to myself that although King George could not possibly have observed
 194

this, he would have been glad to know that I meant what I said when I answered

his question.

In the evening of July 21, there was a dinner given at the Quai d'Orsay

to the royal guests. The dinner was very elaborate, but the table plan was

printed upside down, so most people had to go around the long table to find

their places. I noticed, as a matter of protocol, that Lord Halifax, the

British Foreign Secretary, and M. Daladier, the French Premier, were seated

below the ambassadors, just the reverse of what had been done at the Elysdes

palace, when the President of the Republic gave his dinner in honor of the

royal guests. There was a light program of entertainment following the

dinner, with Maurice Chevalier and Yvonne Printemps as the principle entertainers,

speaking half in English. There was repeated acclamation outside [from the

thousands of Frenchmen who had gathered] on the Quai [to acknowledge the] royal

party. The King and Queen were shortly after taken to their apartments upstairs

at the Quai d'Orsay by the French Foreign Minister and Madame Bonnet.

[Two days later, I duscussed the Anglo-French Entente and related matters

with M. Raymond patenotre, the French Minister of Economy. The occasion was]

a luncheon I gave for the new Spanish Ambassador, to which I invited among

others M. and Madame patenotre, a charming couple (and probably he was

the youngest member of the French cabinet).

In reply to a question I asked him, M. Patenotre said that at the

cabinet meeting that morning, July 23, M. Georges Bonnet had made a report

of the Anglo-French conversations with Lord Halifax during the royal visit.

Nothing had been mentioned as regards the Far Eastern question and he would,

therefore, conclude that it had not been discussed in the Franco-British

talks, M. Patenotre went on to say, however, that he understood that, in response

to French persuasion, the Soviet Union from then on would be prepared to go

further in its policy vis-a-vis the Far Eastern conflict, which would be

entirely in China's favor.

 195

The President of the Council (Daladier), he continued, was entirely

sympathetic and favorable to China, and the members of the French cabinet

appreciated the relation of the Sino-Japanese conflict to the general problem

in Europe. The situation in Europe, however, was still tense under the surface.

It still remained to be seen whether German would pursue her policy of force

vis-a-vis the Czechoslovakian problem. On account of these preoccupations in

Europe, France was not in the best position to take an active interest in the

Far East. But he wished to assure me that if there were anything I would care

to ask him to pass on to the President of the Council, he would be glad to do

so. Thus I found him very friendly and sympathetic to me.

I would like to go back now to my relations with French statesmen in

connection with the various questions concerning particularly Indochina,

Hainan, and the problem of transit facilities. M. Marius Moutet, a great

friend of China, had left the government for the time being, and had been invited

by the Generalissimo to make a visit to China. I gave him a luncheon on July 6,

and we had an interesting conversation. It was not a large party. Madame

Moutet was present as were Maurice Viollette, [a prominent Senator sympathetic

to China,] L6on Archimbaud and their wives.

M. Moutet told me, in the course of conversation, that it was he who

had given an order the previous Fall to occupy the Paracel Islands in order to

forestall Japanese occupation. I raised this subject with him, because [the

French government had recently sent Annamite soldiers from Indochina to the

Paracels, the islands in the South China Sea between Hainan and the Indochina

coast, claimed by both China and France. In fact I had often discussed the

Paracels with M. Moutet, when he was Minister of Colonies, in the hope of

trying to settle this question between our two countries.]

[When I] asked M. Moutet what the intention of the French government was in

sending Annamite soldiers to the Paracels, he replied the question was considered
 196

last Octoberwhen he was at the head of the Ministry of Colonies. He had

persuaded M. Delbos to agree to the French government taking steps to ensure

the islands against Japanese occupation. Therefore, steps had been taken for

the construction of a lighthouse and a meteorological station that winter.

Recently, he continued, Annamite gendarmes were sent there to further

strengthen the islands. But all this was done in order to safeguard navigation

to, and transit through, Indochina. It was al® intended as an indication

of the French attitude in the event of the occupation of Hainan by Japan.

As regards the question of the sovereignty over the islands, M. Moutet

said it was in no way to be prejudiced by any action which the French government

had taken. That was to be settled afterwards by negotiation between our two

governments. M. Moutet added that soon after hostilities broke out between China

and Japan, it was evident that the Japanese had the idea of occupying these

islands, and that such occupation would be a menace to the security of navigation

and to the Indochinese coastal areas. M. Moutet thought the French occupation

of these islands might, on the other hand, perhaps serve as a deterrent to Japan

in her desire to occupy Hainan Island. M. Moutet further said that, in his view,

the Chinese government could consent to France establishing a commercial airline

to Hainan Island with an aerodrome on the islands. He said it would serve as

a further warning to Japan not to interest herself too much in Hainan.

After this conversation with M. Moutet, I reported to the Waichiaopu.

I indicated that the French had no ulterior motive, according to M. Moutet,

in occupying the Paracels, especially as he had made it clear that the legal

position of the islands, their ownership, would be left unaffected that the

whole question should be solved at the end of the Sino-Japanese conflict by

mediation or arbitration.

On July 15, I received instructions from the Waichiaopu, indicating

that the government had taken a decision in light of the assurance which
 197

M. Moutet had given and also in light of the real motivation behind the French

occupation. In accordance with the decision, the Waichiaopu asked me to send

a memorandum to the French government, reserving China's rights in the Paracels

dispute, and cancelled the former instructions I had received to file a protest

with the French government.

On July 29, I had another conversation with Moutet, this time directly

concerning his impending visit to China on the invitation of the Generalissimo.

He told me that he would start for China in September, but before he left he

would want to know the French government's [latest] views so that he would be in

a position to contribute something effective and concrete to the cause of

Franco-Chinese collaboration. He said he was asking that a retired general, a

friend of Premier Daladier, accompany him, together with a former secretary

of M. Edouard Herriot. He believed that with these two leaders' support

he might be able to accomplish more on his trip. He was still dissatisfied

with the policy of the French government vis-S-vis China. He believed that policy

was too timid and too fearful of Japan.

[A few days earlier, I had received a visit from Jawaharlal Nehru, [whom

I described in my diary at the time as] "the well-known popular leader from

India" and the "head of the Congress party." He was accompanied by Krishna

Menon, [who was even then] his devoted collaborator. Both men had only recently

returned from Moscow, where Nehru had gone to seek aid and support for Indian
^ n
independence. At the time [Dr Koo; Was this your first meeting with Nehr.u? CS]

I found Mr. Nehru firey and dogged in his views, but rather refined in manner

and choice of words. Nehru thought that India's independence was bound to come

very shortly. He said the Indian army of 250,000 men were all paid by the

Indian tax payers. About 75,000 men in the army were British, and these were
 198

mostly officers of different grades. He also said that the Indian princes

were able to hold themselves up only because of British support. Their influence

and power were not favored by the people of India as a whole.

On July 27 I was much perturbed by a report from M. Audinet concerning

the question of military supplies from France. [I had asked M. Audinet, a

contact between the Embassy, the government and arms and airplane manufacturers

in France, to look into the reasons for the delay in delivery of airplane accessories

He told me that M. Guy LaChambre, the Minister of Air, had told M. Bossoutrot,

the Chairman of the Air Commission in the Chamber of Deputies, that he, the

Minister, could not authorize any delivery to China of the goods ordered,

nor any of the accessories for DeVoitines (a type of plane), though the latter

were all ready for shipment. There Yg&r additional specific problems. I told him

that I would write at once to M. Daladier, the French Premier and Minister of

National Defense, personally.

After I sent the letter to M. Daladier, I had occasion to see M. Georges

Bonnet, the Foreign Minister at the Quai d'Orsay. It was a week later, on

August 5. I went to the Ministry mainly for the purpose of discussing with

Bonnet the possible effect on the general situation in Europe of Moscow’s

adoption of a strong attitude vis-S-vis Japan, but toward the end [of our

conversation] I brought up the matter of guns and airplanes ordered in France.

I told him that out of 24 DeVoitines, which had been ordered and delivered

in China, only five were provided with cannons, while the other 19 were

without guns at all. I added that thecannons for the 19 planes had all been

ready for shipment, but an order from the Air Ministry prohibited their

exportation. I told the Foreign Minister that the matter was urgent, as

airplanes without guns were of little use, and that I therefore wished to

make a personal appeal to him to exercise his influence with M. Guy LaChambre,

and urge him to raise the interdiction and release the 19 cannons. The

Foreign Minister said he could not understand why these cannons should have been
 199

held up. If the airplanes had already been delivered, he said, certainly

the guns should have been allowed to go out with them. He promised to speak

personally to M. LaChambre about the matter.

[The real thrust of our conversation, however, concerned, as I have

said, the possible effect on the European situation of a stronger Russian

posture toward Japan in the Far East. Two days earlier, on August 3, I had

been to see M. Souritz, the Soviet Ambassador, to pursue the same matter.

According to my notes of that interview I first told the Soviet Ambassador

that I] wished to keep in touch with him as regards the situation on the

Korean-Manchurian-Siberian border. The press reports relating to the recent

conflict between the Soviet and Japanese troops were rather contradictory, and

I felt sure that he could enlighten me on the true state of affairs prevailing

there.

The Soviet Ambassador said news from Moscow indicated that the situation

was quite grave, far more so than [that resulting from] any of the previous

incidents. There were, he observed, three currents of opinion in Japan.

One was in favor of forcing an incident in that part of the world in order

not to have to transfer Japanese troops from Korea to the front in China.

Another view favored forcing an issue with Soviet Russia by throwing responsibility

for the conflict upon her. The third current of opinion, held mostly by

civilians and politicians, was in favor of avoiding an open conflict with

Soviet Russia since Japan was already so occupied in China. He had at first

thought that the latest border incident was provoked by the Japanese army in

Korea for the first reason stated but, he said, further information had now led

him to believe that it was Tokyo that was really directing the clash.

As regards the policy and official attitude of Moscow, M. Souritz said

he had received no particular instructions. But from the general line of his

government's policy he could tell me without fear of contradiction that the

Soviet Union had no desire to engage in a war with Japan, but if an inch of
 200

its territory was invaded, it would be obliged to defend it. The territory

in dispute now was unquestionably, in accordance with the Russo-Chinese Treaty

of 1886 and the map attached to it, part of the Soviet Union. The Japanese,

by forcibly occupying it, made it necessary for the Soviet military

authorities to answer force with force.

I said it seemed to me that the Japanese had deliberately provoked the

incident in order to stimulate popular enthusiasm and war spirit in Japan.

Heretofore the Japanese people had been divided and were either lukewarm or

even opposed towards the Japanese adventure in China. The Japanese military

authorities, finding themselves in a very embarrassing and difficult situation

and full of uncertainties for the future, wished to divert attention and

stimulate popular war fervor. M. Souritz thought that that was also a likely

cause of the Japanese aggression on the Siberian-Korean-Manchurian border. He said

the present situation was very critical and it was difficult to foretell

whether it might not be developed into a more serious one.

In answer to my inquiry about the attitude of the other powers towards

the incident, M. Souritz said he was about to see M. Bonnet, who had asked

him to visit him at his house at 11 o'clock the previous evening. He, Souritz,

had found it was too late and, therefore, made the appointment for 12 o'clock

that day. He thought he could anticipate what M. Bonnet would say to him.

The French were very much preoccupied with the situation in Europe and would

counsel moderation and patience. He, Souritz, would of course affirm that

the Soviet Union had no desire to resort to force, but that there was a limit

to the degree of patience it could have. He would affirm that if Japan was

bent upon forcing a conflict upon the Soviet Union, the latter was fully

prepared to meet it.

I observed that, in my view, the Japanese maneuver was not in conformity

with the policy of the Berlin Rome-Tokyo triangle, and that a firm attitude
 201

on the part of the democratic powers such as France and Great Britain would

help to discourage Japan from going further. Japan^ in her present circumstances^

could not wish another war to take place at the same time as her aggression in

China. And Germany and Italy, knowing that Japan, confronted with such odds

against her, could not come out victorious, could hardly wish in their hearts

to see Japan further weakened. I added that morning s press reports had
A
stated that Italy, seeing that Japan was running forward headlong and engaged

in another conflict in the North while she was carrying on a war in China,

considered Japan's situation dangerous and had begun to show a tendency of

cooling off in her attitude towards Japan. M. Souritz said the Italian people

might feel that way, but the official policy of Italy was all for Japan. This

was also certainly true of Germany. Hitler had all along wis.hed Japan to provoke

a war against the Soviet Union in order that she might have a free hand in Europe.

As regards France, M. Souritz thought she was little interested in the

Far East. I said France did not seem to realize the bearing and significance

of the Far Eastern situation upon Europe. M. Souritz said in the course of the

last two days he had tried to size up French public opinion and had talked

with representatives of different walks of life. Among the journalists, he

/V
talked with Pertinax. The general impression he gathered was t hat the French

did not wish to see any trouble arising between Japan and Soviet Russia for fear

that it might aggravate the situation in Europe and lead Germany to take a step

forward in her program of expansion and aggression. All the French press comments

seemed to concur in the general desire to see the incident localized. M. Bonnet

probably would tell him, when he saw him later, that if a war should break out,

France would remain neutral or perhaps observe a benevolent neutrality. But

the Soviet Union, M. Souritz continued, did not expect any country--not even

France--to help it in dealing with Japan. The Soviet military forces were very

/V
[Andrd G^raud, the famous French political journalist.]
 202

strong and the Siberian army was a unit by itself, not only from the military

point of view but also as regards supplies, organization and control.

I observed that I had understood that the Franco-Soviet Pact was confined

to Europe. I said if that was the case, France had not reason to feel uneasy

vis-&-vis the firm attitude held by Moscow [in the Far East]. M. Souritz said

the Franco-Soviet Pact had nothing to do with the Far East. But it was natural

that France, being an ally of Soviet Russia in Europe, would not like to see her

hands tied in the Far East in case a crisis should arise in Europe. He could

understand the French anxiety because Germany was certainly watching for an

opportunity to make another jump as regards Czechoslovakia.

Replying to my question about the scope and purport of the Soviet-

Czechoslovak Pact, M. Souritz said that was made to depend upon the application

and execution of the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty of Alliance. The Soviet

Union would have the obligation of coming to the aid of Czechoslovakia only

after France had come to her aid first. This, however, was a legal and

juridical position. It would not prevent Moscow from coming to Czechoslovakia's

aid sooner, if the occasion should demand it. Moscow retained all the freedom

of action, if Czechoslovakia should be attacked.

As regards Great Britain, M. Souritz thought that probably she would not

be as anxious as the French to see the incident localized. She might reason

that another war between Japan and Russia, so long as it was confined to the

Far East, would wear out both and, therefore, be of some benefit to herself.

So far, however, there was no clear indication of the British official attitude.

M. Souritz agreed with me in observing that if a war between Japan and Russia

were likely to aggravate the situation in Europe and lead to the outbreak of a

general conflagration, then Great Britain would also try to prevent it.

The Soviet Ambassador criticized the British policy vis-^-vis Czechoslovakia.

He thought that Lord Runciman's mission in Prague was not likely to succeed,

unless Great Britain took into consideration the viewpoint of Czechoslovakia

 203

as well as that of Germany. Up to the present, it appeared to him that Great

Britain had been trying to bring pressure to bear upon Prague to continue to

make concessions to Germany. The unfortunate part in this problem, he thought,

was that France had approved Lord Runciman's mission, although she had made

certain reservations as regards the necessity of preserving the independence

and territorial integrity and all the rights regarding the national defense of

Czechoslovakia .,v

M. Souritz was of the opinion that the situation in Europe was still far

from satisfactory, and that, whether it could improve or deteoirate, another

month would tell. The danger in the situation was the vacillating attitude of

France and the British inclination towards the side of Germany. He felt that the

policy the present French government was pursuing indicated a desire on its

part to divest itself of the obligations under the Franco-Czechoslovakia Treaty

of Alliance. If such was the case, he said^t would certainly mean a further

temptation to Hitler to try his game of bluff. He held that, in reality France

had no cause to fear or be frightened by the situation in Europe. For one

reason or another, he said, the French seemed to exaggerate their own weaknesses

and overlook their strength. In the present international posture, if France

should become involved in a conflict with Germany in defense of Czechoslovakia,

Great Britain would have to come to her aid, take sides with her and join

in the conflict. So long, therefore, as the Franco-British solidarity

remained, [M. Souritz felt] the danger of German aggression could not be imminent.

Upon my thanking him for this hearty talk and taking my leave, M. Souritz promised

to keep in touch with m- from time to time, if any interesting information should

*[Sir Walter Runciman, British Lord President of Council reached Prague

the same day, August 3. His mission, as announced by Chamberlain to
parliament on July 26, was to seek a solution to the whole Czech problem.
The ensuing negotiations in Prague broke down within two weeks.]
 204

reach him.

[When I saw M. Bonnet the following morning, ] I told the French Foreign

Minister, at the outset of our conversation, that I wished to have an exchange

of views with him on the Russo-Japanese incident in the Far East. I told him

that, according to my information, it appeared that the Japanese army in Korea

had provoked the incident for two purposes: 1) to stimulate popular war spirit

in Japan, because the Japanese people had been either indifferent or even

opposed to the continuation of the Japanese military adventure in China,

and 2) to test the intentions and the power of resistance of the Soviet Union.

A year ago\ I told M* Bonnti^ the Japanese had taken advantage of the occupation

of certain islands on the Amur River by the Russians. They had, moreover,

apparently arrived at the conclusion that the Soviet willingness to settle

the matter peaceably indicated a state of unpreparedness and the absense of any

intention to make trouble for Japan on the Soviet-Korean frentier--hence the

beginning of the Japanese aggression in China in 1937. But the present

situation was different, I said. Japan had been fighting in China for over a

year. Not only had she already spent a great deal of her financial, economic

and military resources, but the future was still full of uncertainties for her.

In these circumstances, Tokyo, in my view, certainly would not and could not

carry on another war at the same time against Soviet Russia.

What was important was this, I added. Should Soviet Russia manifest too

much moderation and conciliation, such an attitude would again be interpreted as

a sign of weakness. It would be a temptation to the Japanese militarists and,

in the end, it would greatly aggravate the situation in the Far East. If, on

the other hand, the Soviet Union should remain firm, Japan would wish to come

to terms and the incident would thereby be localized and eventually liquidated.

Moscow, I said, seemed to know this and was, therefore, adopting a firm attitude.

I expressed the view that the outcome of this incident might have an important
 205

bearing upon the situation in Europe. I stated that if Japan again succeeded

in her policy of bluff, it would only encourage her to try a new adventure

Moreover, such enhancement of her prestige

would also stimulate her allies in Europe. On the other hand, a firm attitude

on the part of Soviet Russia would bring Japan to terms and thereby produce a

salutary effect upon the intentions and policy of her European associates in

the anti-communist triangle. Even if the incident should unfortunately develop

into a real conflict, I said, the outcome might not then be undesirable for

the general cause of peace in Europe and in the world.

The problem of the Japanese menace, I continued, was as much a problem for

Soviet Russia as for China. Sooner or later, Soviet Russia would have to

face it. That being the case, the present moment, when Japan had already

spent at least 35 to 40 percent of her armed strength and financial and

economic resources in the Chinese war, would certainly be the most favorable

moment for Soviet Russia to deal with her. The state of preparedness of

the Soviet Union would be more than sufficient to cope with Japan in her

present plight. The outcome of such a struggle, if unfortunately it should

take place, could be foreseen. The curbing of Japanese militarism would, I added,

not only remove a constant danger of aggression against Soviet Russia in the

East and China, but would also remove a latent threat to the security of the

vital interests and territorial possessions of countries like France and England

in the Far East. It would also mean the weakening of one of the members of the

anti-communist triangle and facilitate greatly the task of appeasement in

Europe, which France and Great Britain had undertaken to carry out in the

interest of peace.

Therefore, in my own view, I said, France and other countries would be

well advised to leave the incident to take its natural course and not try to

influence Moscow against the adoption of a firm attitude. I said the question

really resolved itself into this: Would it be better for the united front of the
 206

democratic countries to confront the so-called anti-communist triangle as a whole

and thereby make a general conflagration inevitable, or would it be better to deal

with the members of the triangle one at a time, separately. I said the latter

course would seem to be all the more desirable because sucess in tackling

one of them might obviate the necessity of dealing with the other two. Thus

the purpose of general peace could be more effectively served.

M. Bonnet said my view was entirely in harmony with his own. The Japanese

now found themselves in a very difficult position, but that was of their own

seeking. He was also of the opinion that Japan, being engaged in a very

costly and trying war with China and uncertain of the future, would not dare to

provoke another war against Soviet Russia. The present, therefore, was the most

favorable moment for Russia to show her fist and pound on the table; Japan

would have to come to terms. He quite agreed with me too that the situation in

Asia was linked with that in Europe, and that Japan's associates in Europe

were watching. I said I had learned that the two situations were linked to

such an extent that the Japanese threat to occupy Hainan Island and the Paracels

was inspired by Berlin, which insisted on the Japanese Navy bringing pressure

to bear upon France and England in Europe.

M. Bonnet said he thought also that firmness on the part of the Soviets

would produce a salutary effect not only in the Far East but also in Europe.

That was the reason that he in his conversation with M. Souritz the other day,

had not offered any advice of moderation or conciliation. Nor, he said, had

he asked the French Ambassador in Moscow, to say anything in his conversation

with M. Litvinov in the nature of counsel against firmness.

M. Bonnet went on to say that Moscow was, of course, also anxious about

the attitude of Germany. He said it was not unlikely that Germany, seeing

that Russia was engaged in a conflict with Japan, would take advantage of the

situation and make trouble, for example, in Czechoslovakia. But the presence
 207

of Lord Runciman in Prague was an important factor, the value of which did

not seem to be fully appreciated either in France or abroad. While Great

Britain, through Lord Runciman, was occupied with the Czechoslovak problem,

M. Bonnet thought it was not likely that Germany would make any move.

I said Anglo-French solidarity was really a guarantee of peace in Europe.

M. Bonnet said that last December, M. Chautemps had never expected that Anglo-

French cooperation could be developed to such an extent as it was now. Neither

was there any indication that Great Britain could be induced to cooperate so

closely with France, when M. Daladier and he had gone to London in April or

when M. Osusky had asked France and Great Britain to offer the service of

mediation together. M. Bonnet said the British attitude then was that, in

no circumstances, would Great Britain commit herself on the Czechoslovak problem

or intervene directly. He said he, Bonnet, realized all along that France

could not handle the Czechoslovak problem alone, and he had aimed to induce

Great Britain to march together with France. After making great efforts, he

had at last succeeded in bringing this about. A letter from a member of the

British government and another from Lord Halifax himself all indicated their

full confidence in France. Last night, he said, he had attended a banquet

at Hotel Claridge, where a number of the British were present, and his

presence, as the man who had successfully directed Anglo-French cooperation,

was welcomed with an almost unprecedented acclamation. The Foreign Minister

added that as I had lived in England and known the English people, I knew

it was not easy to win their confidence. They were apt to be cold and reserved.

But this time the British had come fully round to the French viewpoint of

close cooperation.

I said that Great Britain was not only marching together with France now

in appointing Lord Runciman to go to Prague to undertake the work of mediation,

but was actually going ahead of her. Having appointed Lord Runciman to undertake
the task, even though the British government declared it was not assuming the
 208

responsibility directly, Great Britain could not naturally wash her hands of

this problem, if the mediation should fail. M. Bonnet said, "exactly."

Whatever might happen to the mediation, Great Britain would always go together

with France now. That was a point of which Germany fully appreciated the

signifcance, and it should have a restraining influence upon her.

I said the importance of sending Lord Runciman to Prague did not seem

to be fully appreciated by the public, and it was a pity because it was so

full of significance. M. Bonnet said he could have made it know^y giving a

A
statement to the press that would make the people realize how valuable this

result was to the cause of general peace. But such a move, though it might

bring about a general appreciation of his efforts by the people in France^

would produce a rather undesirable and possibly injurious impression in

England, where people would think that Great Britain had been maneuvered

into this policy by France. "As you well kn^w," he said to me,"what the British

people dislike most is to feel and suspect that they have been influenced

and manipulated to suit some other country's policy." They liked to act on

their own initiative, not by suggestion or influence from without. Knowing this,

he said, he had all along been conducting his discussions with the British in

such a way as to show absolute loyalty to the British people and make them feel

that they had to do something.

So in the case of the Spanish question, he continued, he had insisted on

taking steps to close the Pyrenees frontier as had been designed by the British.

As to the French-Italian negotiations, he told me he had carried out all the

steps that had been suggested by Great Britain. He had even sent for M.

Blondel [(the French Ambassador at Rome)] to come to Paris, trying to do his

utmost. If after having done everything desired by the British, still no

progress could be made in the negotiations with Italy, the British would

understand that it was not due to any omission or want of goodwill or energy
 209

on the part of France. It took two parties to make an agreement, he added,

and all the goodwill, energy and effort on the one side unreciprocated by

the other would be of no avail . Coining back to the question of the Soviet-

Japanese incident, M. Bonnet said he was in entire agreement with my views.

When he next saw M. Souritz, he said, he would speak to him in the same sense.

From the Quai d'Orsay I went to the American Embassy to see Mr. William

Bullitt. Following my July 26th conversation with the American Secretary

of the Treasury, Mr. Morgenthau, relating to the possibility of finaicial aid

to China from the United States, I had reported, naturally, to the Finance

Minister Dr. H. H. Rung, and to the Foreign Ministry, Dr. C. H. Wang, expecting

a reply, which I had promised to communicate to Mr. Morgenthau through Mr.

Bullitt as quickly as possible. This reply came in due course and was my

primary reason for calling on the American Ambassador on August 5. Before

I was able to bring the subject up, however, Mr. Bullitt asked me what I thought

of the Soviet-Japanese incident.

I told him that the Japanese had provoked it in order to test the intentions

and the state of preparedness of the Soviet Union. But I understood the Soviets

were remaining firm. I said it was still difficult to say how the incident

might develop. The Japanese were now wishing to come to terms with Russia

and therefore had proposed to evacuate the occupied hill, Changkufeng, provided

that a neutral zone could be temporarily established pending negotiations

for delimination of the frontier.

Mr. Bullitt commented that the fact was that neither Soviet Russia nor

Japan wished war. He said the Japanese, with their hands full in China, certainly

could not carry on another war against Russia. Stalin, on his side, involved

as he was in purging the army and the party, evidently did not like war

either, because he always felt a war might upset his regime. Besides, Mr.

Bullitt added, Soviet Russia must also be thinking of the situation in Europe
 210

and Germany on her back, although Germany was not likely to effect any coup on

Czechoslovakia, while Lord Runciman was going about in the streets of Prague.

Then the conversation turned to the subject of United States aid to

China. In reply to the American Ambassador's question, I told him that I had

just received a reply from Dr. Kung about the matter which the Ambassador,

Mr. Morgenthau and I had discussed the week before. Dr. Kung had asked me to

thank Mr. Bullitt and the Secretary of the Treasury for the friendly manner

in which they had discussed the matter and for their spirit of helpfulness.

Mr. Bullitt said the spirit of helpfulness alone was of no help to China.

The important thing was results.

I then told Mr. Bullitt, and through him Mr. Morgenthau, that Dr. Kung

would send K. P. Chen to America, as suggested by Mr. Morgenthau, and that Mr. Chen

would surely arrive in Washington just about the time suggested by Mr.

Morgenthau, in other words, the first part of September. Although I understood

Mr. Chen had had an attack of malaria and had just recivered, I was sure he

would be able to go to Washington on schedule. However, I said, as there was

still a month before the Secretary of the Treasury would be back in Washingon,

Dr. Kung was anxious to push the matter. I asked, therefore, if it would not be

possible for the Ambassador and myself to prepare theground a little bit

by taking advantage of the presence of Mr. Morgenthau in Europe.

Mr. Bullitt said he had himself already spoken on the telephone to several

members of the American government in Washington and found they were all in

favor of this idea. But the President was away cruising around the western

coast of South America (qqite a long way off) and would not be back in Washington

until the middle of August. Under the American Constitution, the members

of the government could not do very much without the President, who, in fact,

controlled and directed everything of importance. He felt sure that if Mr.

Morgenthau should be asked what could be done before his return to America,
 211

the answer would be that he could not do anything. Thereupon I suggested that;

in the circumstances^ it would be best to ask Dr. Kung to supply Mr. Chen

with all the necessary data and proposals so that Mr. Chen would be fully

prepared to enter into discussion with Mr. Morgenthau on arrival in Washington

and thereby lose no time. Mr. Bullitt said he still thought that cereals and

flour were the best things for which to negotiate credits because they were

the things which would be welcomed by American public opinion.

Mr. Bullitt inquired about the state of talks in London for obtaining

financial assistance. I told him that P. W. Kuo had just returned from London

and reported to me. Some officials of the British government still held that

Sir John Simon’s declaration in the House of Commons regarding the inadvisability

of granting a loan to China did not preclude the reopening of the question

at a suitable moment from three to six months [hence]. But the question to be

taken up at present was that of credits. I told Mr. Bullitt that the British

officials had manifested much sympathy in that regard, and declared that they

were ready to consider any proposal the Chinese government might submit. So I

had referred the matter to Dr. Kung for presentation of more concrete proposals

by China. Meanwhile, I said, three matters had been brought up, namely, the proposec

purchase of tractors for use in China, the supply of materials for the construction

of a railway between Yunnan and the Chinese-Burmese border and the supply of

telephones and accessory materials for installation in six southwestern provinces.

I quickly added that, in my opinion, the United States might also help in

supplying tractors and telephones. Mr. Bullitt said that might be so, but

that these could not be discussed in connection with the request for import and

export credit. Whereupon, I reminded him of what Mr. Morgenthau had stated

about the proposition of Chrysler, the automobile manufacturer. Mr. Bullitt

then said that was to be taken up directly with Chrysler by Mr. Chen when

he arrived in the United States. Bullitt thought the proposal should be

of great help to China because Chrysler would be satisfied with payment in cash
 212

only for the cost of production^ leaving the margin of profit to be paid in

paper. He told me that he understood the cost of production would be a

relatively small amount in comparison with the margin of profit, although he

had no official information. It might even be less than 50 percent of the

total price, he said.

'Vj—
I next spoke to the Ambassador about the cannons for the 19 De^Toitine

planes shipped to China and requested him, in the event the occasion presented

itself, to speak to M. Guy 4b La Chambre, as Mr. Bullitt knew the Air Minister

very well. Mr. Bullitt was good enough to assure me that he would make an

effort, although he could not foretell what the result would be.

On August 7, I took Dr. Sun Fo for a drive to Cherbourg on the Atlantic

Coast. It will be recalled that Dr. Sun Fo had already made two visits to

Soviet Russia, with a view to not only seeking financial aid and material

support from Soviet Russia for China but also to sound out the attitude and

intentions of Soviet policy as to how far Soviet Russia was prepared to work

together with China vis-A-vis the common enemy, the government having made a

definite decision to seek some kind of agreement from Moscow to cooperate

in the Far East in regard to Japan.

During the ride to Cherbourg, Dr. Sun told me that he had jusc received

a cable from the Generalissimo, urginghim to make another visit to Moscow, a

step which I had also been urging upon him, although he himself had begun

to doubt the usefulness of another mission. He told me the telegram he

had received from the Generalissimo asked him to tell Moscow that China was

positively prepared to cooperate with Soviet Russia, regardless of whether

the Soviet government itself was ready to take another step in the furtherance

of this idea, and that China was prepared to follow the lead of Soviet

Russia in regard to resistance to Japanese aggression. The Chinese phrase was

 213

"ma t'ou shih chan,11 to follow the direction in which the horse turns its head.

I again urged Sun to make another visit to Moscow, but Dr. Sun replied that he

would do so only if the government could give him specific instructions and a

concrete plan for cooperation between China and Soviet Russia.

We spent the night on the Atlantic coast and the following day enjoyed

a swim and tea at the Trfoville swimming pool. There we had another talk.

I told Sun that information that had reached me from Paris, in connection

with the clash at Changkufeng on the Korean-Manchurian-Siberian border, conveyed

that there was talk in the French capital of the possibility of an agreement being

reached between Litvinov and Shigemitsu, the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, on

the basis of further concessions from Japan. This report said, however, that

fighting continued. At the same time, I told him, the report from China said

there was a Chinese counter-attack on the north bank of the Yangtze River,

resulting in heavy casualties for the Japanese. This counter-attack had, evidently

been well timed, in view of the report of further Japanese troop transfers from

North China to the Korean-Siberian border, ordered by the Japanese military command

Two days latter, Sun Fo sent his counsellor, Mr. Wu Shang-ying, to tell

me that he, Sun, had received the visa for his approaching visit to Moscow

and that General Yang Chieh, Ambassador in Moscow, had again wired to him (Sun),

stating that the Soviet government had indicated its keen desire to receive him

once again in Moscow. Acording to Mr. Wu, who had accompanied Sun Fo on his

earlier visits to Moscow and who was a member of the Foreign Affairs Coiranission

in the Legislative Yuan, his own impression was that the Soviet leaders were

earnest and honest. He said only time would tell whether her great communist

experiment would succeed in the end. In short, Mr. Wu had been favorably

impressed in Moscow by the Soviet leaders generally and on the subject of

collaboration between Soviet Russia and China in the Far East.

During the same afternoon Yu Ming, another counsellor to Sun Fo, came to
 214

tell me that he had been urging Dr. Sun Fo to go to Moscow once more, but

Dr. Sun was hesitating because the Generalissimo had not yet replied to his

request for concrete political proposals to present to Moscow. A second

reason for his hesitation, according to Yu Ming, was that the movement for

peace negotiations with Japan was still going on in some circles of the

Chinese government. Thirdly, he said an armistice agreement had just been

concluded between Soviet Russia and Japan in regard to the Changkufeng incident.

I urged that Dr. Sun go as soon as possible because, even if China should

decide to really seek an armistice with Japan, Soviet Russia's support to

China would still be necessary. I said that there were only three possible

alternatives for China to consider vis-S-vis Soviet Russia: 1) Moscow might

have already decided to ultimately engage in war with Japan. In that case, the

present armistice with Japan was only for the purpose of gaining time, and

creating a favorable impression, both internally and in the outside world

by appearing publicly as a peace-loving nation forced into war. 2) Soviet

Russia might still be undecided as to her ultimate policy vis-^-vis Japan,

because she considered a knowledge of China's real attitude one of the

prerequisites for making a final decision on the question of war or peace with

Japan. 3) It was possible that Moscow had made up its mind to pursue a policy

of peace and that the conclusion of an armistice with Japan was merely a

preliminary step to the conclusion of a definite peace agreement. I said

that in any of these three possible eventualities, Dr. Sun Fo's visit would

be desirable from the point of view of China. Even if the third possibility

came to be true, Sun Fo could ask the Soviet leaders for their reasons, and

Moscow would certainly be obliged to explain them. I added that, in any

eventuality, it was important to know Soviet Russia's real policy and intentions

On August 13 I called on M. Massigli, the Director of the Political Section

of the French Foreign Ministry. As I told him at the outset of our conversation
 215

I had come to see him for an exchange of views on the Soviet-Japanese situation.

I had noticed in the press that the German Ambassador had seen M. Bonnet

and told him that Germany did not wish to see the Soviet-Japanese conflict

aggravated. On the other hand, I told M. Massagli, I had received information

from Berlin to the effect that Germany had advised Japan to stop or limit her

military operations in China in order to devote all her attention towards Russia,

and that, in case war should arise between Japan and Russia, Germany, in

response to Japan's request, would be prepared to send a military mission to

Japan to assist the Japanese general staff. I wondered whether M. Bonnet, in

his conversation with the German Ambassador, had received such an impression.

The Director told me that the German Ambassador's statement was of a

very general character, simply declaring that Germany did not wish to see the

situation aggravated and that tl^ German Ambassador at Tokyo had been instructed

to persuade the Japanese government to follow a policy of moderation and

conciliation. When I asked whether the Japanese Ambassador, in his conversation

with M. Bonnet, had given any indication that Japan intended to extend her

military operations in China since an armistice had already been effected with

Russia, M. Massigli answered in the negative. He added that the Japanese

Ambassador merely emphasized the peaceful intentions of his government and

looked forward to an amicable settlement of the Soviet-Manchukuo frontier incident.

In reply to another question, M. Massigli said the British government, from

the very beginning, thought neither Japan nor Russia intended to make a real

war and therefore showed little anxiety regarding the clash. I then asked

whether there was real cause for anxiety regarding the situation in Europe. I

added that reports of feverish war preparations in Germany continued to come

in at my Embassy, and I inquired what significance should be attached to these

reports.

M. Massigli replied the Quai d'Orsay had all this information also and

that reports of war preparations were true. He thought there was certainly
 216

cause for anxiety. But whether war was imminent or would occur some time

away, or whether there would be no war at all, opinion was divided. He

himself did not see that it was imminent, but there were others who believed

that it might happen anytime between then (mid-August) and the end of September.

Toward the end of our conversation, I brought up the matter of two

DeVoitine airplanes detained on the Indochinese frontier on their way to

China. M. Massigli said this was something new. He had understood that

the two DeVoitine planes were detained by order of the Ministry of Colonies .

However, he said he would write to the Colonial Ministry to inquire, and

try to ask it to release them. As regards the 19 cannons in which M. Audinet

was also interested, I found out that the Foreign Ministry had already written

to the Air Ministry urging strongly that they be delivered to China.

The previous day Professor Escarra, the advisor to the Chinese government,

called to report. He told me that two days earlier he had seen the French

Foreign Minister, M. Bonnet, with whom he had had a frank exchange of views.

M. Bonnet had told him that France was willing to help China, but not alone,

and that after the Brussels Conference, France had again as.ked for assurances from

the United States and Great Britain as regards her extention of help to China,

but he had received none. Neither London nor Washington was prepared to give

France such assurance.

The question of French policy toward the Sino-Japanese conflict was

always considered to be of great importance to China, because of the matter of

transit facilities as well as material support in the form of China’s purchases

and France’s supply of war goods for China. But French policy, as it has been

clearly seen, always seemed to depend upon the evolution of the international

situation in Europe and the attitude and intentions of London and Washington.

Of course, it had been clear all along that France’s attitude and

policy in the Far East, and more particularly toward the Sino-Japanese conflict,

also hinged primarily upon the evolution of the international situation in Europe.
 217

The Czechoslovak problem at the time was engaging the serious attention of

the chancellories of Europe, and in fact there was much talk and apprehension

about the possibility of war breaking out in Europe. Thus, on August 26, at a

luncheon I gave to Mrs. Chang Ch'iin, wife of the former Chinese Foreign Minister

and then Vice-President of the Executive Yuan, my conversation with one of my

guests, the Polish Ambassador, naturally centered upon the situation in Europe.

The Ambassador, in reply to my question, said that whether there would be war or

not would be decided in the next fortnight. In his opinion, Lord Runciman’s

talks in Berlin would fail. Another guest, SenSf Mane, the Minister of

Uruguay, said the only thing to be done was to have Chamberlain and Daladier

convoke a meeting with Hitler and Mussolini and ask them directly and personally

how peace could be maintained in Europe. M. Massigli, the Director for political

affairs at the Quai d'Orsay, thought that the whole situation now depended

upon one man, Hitler. M. Massigli himself was afraid that Europe was now

drifting into war.

The Chinese Ambassador to Berlin, Ch'eng Tien-fang, and his wife came

from Berlin three days later. I was most delighted to receive them, especially

as I wanted to know more about the attitude and intentions of Germany as our

Ambassador there understood them. Mr. Ch’eng said that Goering had personally

told General Chiang Pai-li, during the latter's visit to Germany and the German

industrialists interested in China as well, that Japan in the end would win

against China and Germany would then be able to do more business with the Far

East through Japan. But, Mr. Ch'eng added, Ribbentrop (then head of the Foreign

Office) himself was quite ignorant and naive as to the situation in the Far

East, having been too much influenced by Japanese propaganda. As to Hitler,

Ch'eng said he "thinks a lot and says very little, but he always seizes a

good moment to act." In Ch'eng's opinion. Hitler was also bluffing (that is
 218

to say, as regards strong action in Europe) because, according to Chfeng,

economically and with regard to her naval strength, Germany was not yet

ready at the moment [to make war.]

REMINISCENCES OF WELLINGTON KOO

VOLUME IV MISSION TO FRANCE

(PRELIMINARY DRAFT FORM)

3. The Failure of a New Appeal to the League of

Nations in 1938 in View of the European Crisis:
September 1938
 219
3. THE FAILURE OF A NEW APPEAL TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN 1938 IN VIEW
OF THE EUROPEAN CRISIS

At the beginning of September 1938 the situation in Europe continue to

deteriorate. [Lord Runciman's mission to Czechoslovakia was unproductive.

No settlement between the Czechs and the Sudenten Germans was in sight, despite

more Czech concessions. German mobilization and maneuvers along the Czech and

French borders were proceeding, but surprisingly without any parallel action in

France until September 5. On that day France began mobliization.] I made this

entry in my diary under September 5, 1938: "European situation tense with

Czechoslovakian crisis, French cancellation of the Military League, and a calling

up of certain classes of special reservists.

At the same time the war news from China was also depressing. The

Japanese were advancing in Kiangsi, Kwangsi and sectors of Hopei. The

Chinese military attach^ to Moscow, Colonel (?) Wang, just back from China,

reported to me on September 6 that the Chinese military reserves were barely

enough to meet needs, but not adequate. The newly-trained soldiers were brave,

but inexperienced,, whereas the veteran fighters were experienced but, on the whole,

rather limited in their educational qualifications. There was a particularly

felt lack of higher-level officers with modern training. The provincial

levies raised in different parts of the country, with the exception of those from

the three provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Kiangsi, all appeared to be below

the required standard as regards their general education. However, Wang said,

improvement was seen in the handling of equipment, and the change of machine gun

replacements, since the discovery of the defects during the fighting in Shanghai

and Nanking proved to be of great help.

[At the same time the Japanese had] stepped up their military efforts in

China with a view to bringing the so-called China Incident to an early conclusion

in favor of Japan. Their particular object was to destroy by force the Chinese

national government and place China under Japanese political and economic
 220

domination. Thus in the summer of 1938 they began to increase their military

strength to the extent that by September 1, 1938, according to a cable report

from the Waichiaopu, Japan had inside the Great Wall 31 regular divisions plus

one division about 25,000 men operating on a part-time basis. First line

strength of the Japanese air force in China amounted to 500 machines, while the

Japanese navy had already mobilized all the units of its Second and Third Fleets

to operate in Chinese water. In fact, the cablegram added that there was reason

for thinking that the above estimates had already been exceeded.

Actual hostilities, raging on land, had already engulfed 11 provinces,

including Suiyuan, Chahar, Hopei, Shansi, Shantung, Kiangsu, Kiangsi and Hupeh,

which were partially invaded. Practically all the principal railways, which

were important lines of communication in China, had been seized by the invader,

namely, the entire Shanghai-Nanking, Shanghai-Hangchow, Tientsin-Pukow,Peiping-

Suiyuan, Chenchow-Taiyuan, Kiangnan-Kiangsu-Nanchang, Huichow-Anhwei, as well

as large sections of the Pinghan and Lunghai railways. However, the Japanese

were not in undisputed control of these lines. Still less were their occupations

effective as regards the control of the hinterland served by the above-mentioned

railways. Chinese guerrilla attacks continued to disturb and weaken Japanese

control of a number of key towns situated along these lines of communication.

The government estimated that about 30 million people fled from their homes

situated in the affected areas, and several millions besides were rendered

destitute and dependent upon government relief or private charity. Normal life

was completely dislocated, and the huge population suffered enormously behind

the Japanese lines, especially in the areas contested by the opposing armies.

Tb'-i Japanese troops often fired on undefended whole towns and villages and

resorted to large-scale massacre of helpless civilians, in the attempt to

 221

inspire terror among them and to prevent them from aiding the Chinese guerrilla

forces.

The Japanese air force also intensified its attacks in China. The

incident that took place on August 24, in the morning, was a typical example.

Japanese air raft pursued and attacked a passenger plane, belonging to the

Sino-American China National Aviation Corporation and flying on a scheduled

route from Hongkong to Chungking. The Japanese mercilessly machine-gunned

the plane, even after a forced landing in water. Only three out of a total

of 17 occupants, including three women and two children survived. According

to a signed statement of pilot H. L. Woods, an American, even after the plane

landed, Japanese pursuits "roared down one after another, opening up a terrific

hail of machine gun fire of bullets, which spattered everywhere like hailstones

and honeycombed the plane in different parts. Most passengers were killed

outright. The Japanese military planes returned again and again maintaining

merciless fire at close quarters until the victim machine finally sank."

As an indication of the Japanese purpose in pushing forward in China--

clearly to eliminate foreign interests as well as to dominate and control

China—a few illustrations of actual policies pursued by the Japanese in

regard to foreign nationals and foreign interests in China could be given.

For example, in the attempt to place all foreign nationals in China under

their own controlled jurisdiction, there were many cases of arbitrary arrest,

detention and assaults committed upon nationals of third countries by Japanese

soldiers. They also published a revised schedule of customs tariff rates, plainly

favoring goods of Japanese origin. The Japanese revised tariff, instituted by

the Japanese for North China as a temporary measure in January 1938, was

extended on June 1, to cover all occupied areas in China. They placed a ban on

foreign shipping in the lower Yangtze River. Foreign vessels were prohibited

to navigate that section of the Yangtze under Japanese control, although

Japanese commercial lines advertized publicly in the Shanghai newspapers,

soliciting cargo for their vessels on regular Nanking-Wuhu runs. They

 222

announced their refusal to issue any military permits to foreign businessmen

or missionaries to return to their homes or their properties in the occupied

areas, while Japanese merchants entered the same areas in ever increasing numbers.

The foreign-financed railways which they seized were placed under Japanese

administration by newly-formed Japanese companies. They obstructed dredging

operations on the Whangpoo river, which were under international supervision,

in their desire to undermine the position of Shanghai as the leading port of

East Asia, and further down the river they built a new port completely under

Japanese domination.

[Such was the situation in China and Europe, when, in early September,

I was already preparing again for the next meeting of the Assembly and the

Council of the League of Nations. My colleague in London, Ambassador Quo

Tai-chi, who would as usual be part of the delegation, came to Paris to see me.

On September 7 we discussed our demands to be presented at Geneva, and Lord

Halifax's first reaction to our proposal for the application of Article 17

of the Covenant as being unfavorable on the grounds that so many European

states, members of the League, had manifested their opposition as anti-sanctionists .

-k

Editor's Note: Article 17. 1. In the event of a dispute between a Member

of the League and a State which is not a member of the League, or between
States not members of the League, the State or States not members of the League
shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for
the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just.
If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to 16 inclusive
shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council.

2. Upon such invitation being given, the Council shall immediately institute an
enquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may
seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.

3. If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership

in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against
a Member of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as
against the State taking such action.

4. If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations
of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may
take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and
will result in the settlement of the dispute. /
 223

On the same day, September 7, I called on M. Alexis Ldger, the Secretary-

General of the French Foreign Ministry. I was anxious to seek support from

the French government at the forthcoming meeting of the Council and Assembly for

China's proposal to apply Article 17 of the Covenant in regard to the Sino-

Japanese conflict. I expressed the hope to him that the French Delegation at

Geneva would be instructed by the French government to support the Chinese

/

request.

M. Ldger spoke with unusual frankness. He said that the proposed Chinese

move was very unwise, as in the present circumstances of Europe it was bound to

produce no result. He told me that he had just received a report from London

indicating that Lord Halifax had also expressed the same view to the Chinese

Ambassador in London.

I observed that the Chinese government was not unaware of the present

tense situation in Europe. But I told him that the war of aggression against

China and China's single-handed resistance had been going on for 14 months.

China was suffering great sacrifices, without having obtained the aid and

assistance to which she was entitled as a member of the League. I told him it

was true that the Council and the Assembly had adopted sympathetic resolutions,

but these remained unexecuted. The Chinese government had therefore come

to the conclusion that perhaps it would be impossible to obtain any practical help

without invoking the procedure outlined in Article 17, which was particularly

intended for a case of this kind.

M. Ldger asked what would be the use of insisting on something which

would bring China no material benefit, and which perhaps was destined to fail.

What mattered, in his opinion, was to secure concrete results for China and

not a great deal of empty debate and discussion. I agreed with him, but

said that so far the member states of the League had done practically nothing

to aid China. Even in the matter of checking the aggression by withholding

 224

the supply to Japan of arms, munitions and airplanes--instruments which

helped Japan to carry out her policy of mass killing in China--the powers

had taken no steps.

M. L6ger said he could not say for other countries, but so far as France

was concerned, the Japanese had not been able, since the outbreak of hostilities

last year, to purchase anything in the nature of arms and munitions. Even

spare parts for arms and munitions were politely refused. He said the

French attitude was considered by Japan to be so unsympathetic that she at

one time concentrated all her propaganda attacks on French policy. While

neither England nor France, on account of the critical situation in Europe, was

in a position to render either financial or material aid to China, yet they

had not assisted Japan in any way, whereas their attitude towards China was

entirely one of sympathy and friendly concern. Diplomatically, they had tried

in every way to speak in the interest of China.

I said I personally realized that the application of sanctions would

not be easy to carry out in the present circumstances of Europe. What the

Chinese government had in mind was not the enforcement of the whole range of

sanctions, but certain measures of a material and economic character that

would help to reduce Japan's power of aggression and increase China's power of

resistance. M. Ldger said he could quite understand the desire of China

for such measures, but the way to bring them about was to negotiate confidentially

with the principal powers through the diplomatic channel. He thought that

to bring them up before the League of Nations would get China nowhere.

I observed that an embargo, for example, on petroleum, which was so

essential for the motorized and mechanized forces of the Japanese army, had

not beei attempted. M. Ldger suggested that was also a good subject to be

taken up with the governments concerned. France would have no objection

whatever. In any case, she was not a petroleum producing country. But

there was no reason China should not raise the question with those countries
 225

that were the principal producers.

I said the Czechoslovak crisis was rocking Europe and producing a state

of anxiety. I said I did not know whether the interested powers proposed

to bring the question before the League of Nations, if the situation should

become further aggravated. However, I thought if a conflict should arise on

account of this problem and the powers intended to invoke Article 17, the

preliminary application of the same article to the Sino-Japanese conflict

would serve to prepare the ground and make its application easier later.

M. L6ger said nobody was thinking of bringing the question before the League

of Nations, except possibly the Soviet Union. And there was certainly no

idea of invoking Article 17 or the help of the League to settle the European

crisis. The League was evidently not in a position, for example, to

obtain the aid of Poland on the side of Czechoslovakia. Even the suppression

of Austrian independence by Germany was not brought before the League. If the

League was powerless to do anything effective in the case of a European

state, he added, how much less possibility there was for it to intervene

effectively in the Far East.

I said I regretted very much that not a single European state member of

the League had voiced a protest against the destruction of Austria as an

independent State. Such indifference certainly had not helped to promote

confidence in international relations. I added that, according to M. Ldger's

view of the League, it would appear the Geneva institution was already a dead one.

M. Ldger said unfortunately that was a fact, although nobody wished to proclaim

it to the world.

Coming back to the question of the Sino-Japanese conflict, M. Ldger said

the attitude of the French government was one of sympathy and willingness

to help China. But, in the French view, such help must be given quietly,

because officially France like England would want to maintain its policy of
 226

neutrality in order not to complicate her relations with Japan. This did

not mean, however, that they were not disposed to help. In fact, they were,

provided it was arranged through the diplomatic channel.

Then I took up the question of the European situation and asked the

Secretary-General what he thought of the Czechoslovak crisis. I told him that,

according to information I had received from Germany, Germany was really

not prepared for war and did not wish at heart to provoke one. M. L6ger said

he fully believed that it was a gigantic bluff on the part of Germany, but

the danger still remained. Hitler might make a fatal decision. It all depended

on whether Hitler fully realized the determination of Great Britain and

France to intervene, if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia by force. He went

on to say that while Hitler himself might be cautious, his entourage, it was

known, was in favor of a quick war, believing that neither Great Britain nor

France would move, if a war against Czechoslovakia was quickly brought to

a successful close. He added that the belief in being able to wage a local

war without provoking a general conflagration was strong among the extreme

elements around Hitler, but that Hitler would himself certainly decide

against plunging into war, if he was told of the British and French determination.

I next: spoke to M. Ldger about the Chinese government's desire to

engage three French high military officers to serve as instructors in the

National Military College in China, and added that the Ministry of National

Defense had already intimated to my military attach^, General Tang, that

the idea was acceptable to them, but that a demarche should be made by the

Embassy through the French Foreign Ministry. M. Ldger at once showed hesitation,

saying that the outside world would take it that these French officers were

substituting for the German advisers who had been recalled by Germany. He

supposed that for the stated purpose officers in active service rather than

those on the retired list would be preferable. If so, he said, they would
 227

be of little help to China, even if they were engaged, because in the present

situation they would before long be recalled for service here in Europe.

He added that the Ministry of National Defense was already restricting the

number and size of military missions abroad, and that, in the event of war

breaking out, all of them would be summoned back.

M. L6ger then gave me an illustration to indicate the sentiment of the

Ministry of National Defense. He said that General Desmaillet, formerly

a French military adviser to the Chinese government, had recently gotten

the permission of the Ministry of National Defense to make a voyage to the

Far East. But after he had started, the Ministry asked the Quai d'Orsay

to reach him and recall him, revoking its original permission in view of

the present state of Europe. He pointed out that General Desmaillet had

already been on the retired list for a long while, and added that if this

were necessary in the case of retired officers, how much more so would it

be in the case of officers on active service. I remarked that, in order to

avoid embarrassment to the French government, the contracts might be signed

by the President of the Military College in China, as was usually the case,

and by the officers personally. M. Ldger said he would consult the Ministry

of National Defense and let me know his answer.

I brought up the Chinese government's intention to purchase certain

plants for the manufacture of products such as selenium, acid, ammonia and

other explosives in China and said that a representative from China had found

certain suitable plants in France. I wanted to know whether there would be

any objection on the part of the French government to the sale of such

plants to China. M. Ldger said there would be no objection. He did not think

it inopportune on the part of the French government, since the plants for

the manufacture of the products mentioned fell under the category of industrial

plants for commercial purposes. He promised to submit the request, if I would

 228

send him a memorandum, to the appropriate ministries. When I brought up

the question of the Devoitine planes held up from passing through Indochina,

at the Yunnan frontier and at Haiphong, and pressed him for their release,

he promised to look up the matter and give me an answer. He did not appear to

have any objection to my request.

On September 8 I had a talk with the Chinese Minister at the Hague,

Mr. Wunsz King, who was also an assistant to the Chinese delegation at Geneva

during the Assembly sessions. He came to Paris to report before going to Geneva

with me. He told me he had had a talk with the Netherlands Foreign Office

before his departure. He had learned that Holland would participate in a

loan to China, if it were sponsored by Great Britain. He also said the Dutch

delegate to the Assembly meeting would make a statement in the Assembly

as regards Article 17, the application of which China had decided to propose

in Geneva .

On September 10 I left for Geneva, once more to head the Chinese delegation,

with Ambassador Tsien Tai, Minister King and my Counselor, Mr. Sze. Ambassador

Quo had already left.The journey by car took a whole day and we did not

arrive in Geneva until late in the evening. Upon arrival, I received a

report from Victor Hoo, Director of the Chinese delegation's permanent

Office in Geneva, relating to the agendas of the Council and Assembly

meetings. Although it was late, I at once drafted and sent a communiqud

to M. Avenol, Secretary-General of the League, asking the Council to give

immediate effect to Article 17 of the Covenant.

The question of invoking Article 17 was, of course, a debatable one at

the time. I favored it, not so much because it would produce much concrete

results, but as a way of bringing pressure to bear upon those powers

represented in the Council that were in the best position to give effective

aid to China on the basis of the repeated resolutions on the Sino-Japanese

 229

conflict, adopted by the League of Nations, or its Advisory Committee.

In other words, it was a way of prodding them to individually assist China.

There were other Chinese statesmen who did not agree with me. At a dinner

party at Geneva the following evening, September 11, Mr. Li Yii-ying, the

aider statesman of the Kuomintang, and I discussed the question, joined by

fa 'l ■
a Chinese member of the Secretariat, Mr. Wou Sao-feng. Both of them seemed

disinclined to force the issue in the League. Later Dr. Hu Shih, who had

arrived in Geneva earlier that day, also joined the discussion. In view of

the discussion, I cabled to the Waichiaopu for final instructions on the

tactics to be adopted in dealing with the League on the matter.

On September 12, the Assembly session opened. As President of the

Council at the time, Jordon, representative of New Zealand on the Council,

acted as Chairman pro-tem of the Assembly at its first meeting. He made a

brief but good speech, emphasizing worldwide condemnation of air bombing

of civilian populations, a subject, the importance of which I had emphasized

to him, in connection with the indiscriminate bombing of undefended cities

and civilian populations by the Japanese aircraft in China. Then deValera

of Ireland, was elected as the new President of the Assembly. His inaugural

speech centered on the situation in Europe, and emphasized his hope that

the Assembly would c±.ose its session without seeing war in Europe. It was

a depressing speech, but it gave a clear indication of the tense situation

in Europe and the imminent danger of war.

[That afternoon, in the Assembly building, I had a long talk with Mr.

Butler. As my conversation with M. L6ger prior to my departure from Paris

indicated, the French government seemed ill-disposed to support China's request

that the Council of the League of Nations apply Article 17 of the Covenant

on her behalf. But the British objected to it even more strongly. The interview
 230

with Mr. Butler, British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, which

took place at his request, turned out to be not only a long one, but one

in which the exchange of views was at times even somewhat acrimonious.

Mr. Butler said he had read my communication to the Secretary-General

asking the Council to give immediate effect to Article 17, and he felt that

this action rendered the task of the Council all the more difficult in dealing

with the Far Eastern question. He said to me that, with my experience, I

must be fully aware of the difficulties which stood in the way of the League's

accomplishing anything useful for China under this article. He asked me

what I thought was likely to be the outcome of the proposed application.

I replied there were two possibilities. In the first place, when an

invitation was sent, Japan might accept it, this would mean she would send

a representative to the Council table for discussion with a view to a solution.

This was not altogether an impossibility, in view of the drift of sentiment

in Japan seeking closer cooperation with the powers. The second possibility

was that she would reject the invitation, in which case, the Council,

according to the procedure of the Article, would pass on to Article 16.

This was probably the more likely outcome, I said. I went on to explain

that, in the present circumstances of Europe, the Chinese government did

not intend to press for military sanctions, but it hoped that economic

sanctions of a reasonable character would be adopted. It wished to have

the League take certain positive measures, on the one hand, to restrain

the Japanese aggression, for example, with an embargo on the supply to Japan

of arms, munitions, airplanes, petroleum and iron ore, and, on the other

hand, to assist China,..the victim of aggression, with-material and financial aid.

These measures, I felt, would not require the cooperation of the whole body

of the member states but, on the contrary, would concern only half-a-dozen

countries.
 In reply to a question from Mr. Butler, I said that, as regards an

embargo on arms, munitions and airplanes, the cooperation of not more than

half-a-dozen countries, such as Great Britain, France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia

and Sweden, would be necessary. An embargo on oil and iron ore would concern

only Great Britain, Rumania, the Soviet Union, the United States and one

or two other countries. As regards financial aid to China, I said, Great

Britain, France and Holland, so far as the member states were concerned, could

render the necessary help. In view of these facts, I suggested that it did

not seem impossible to obtain action from the League. Replying to another

query by Mr. Butler, I said that Holland would be disposed to join in any

financial aid to China, if the initiative were taken by Great Britain and

France.

Mr. Butler referred to theattitude of the so-called Oslo Powers, which

were insisting upon an interpretation of Article 16 to the effect that economic

sanctions were also optional. I said even as regards these powers, their

attitude was not an insurmountable difficulty. In fact, one of these

countries had given our Minister to understand that their attitude did not

apply to sanctions to the Far East. Therefore, I expressed the desire that

Mr. Butler might invite the representatives of the half-a-dozen countries

concerned to discuss and come to an understanding on the concrete measures

for restraining Japan and aiding China.

Mr. Butler said this would have been possible if the Chinese delegation

had not formally invoked Article 17. As it was, he did not believe any

such meeting would bring forth any result. He said China's request for

applying Article 16 had been discussed last year, and it had been found

iinPossible to apply it. In the present circumstances, it was much more

difficult to apply it. The reasons making the application impossible the
 232

year before still remained, and with even greater validity.

I recalled that Mr. Eden and M. Delbos had persuaded me not to insist

upon that Article the previous September and again in January, and that Lord

Halifax had done the same thing in May. I told Mr. Butler that I had

agreed, on the understanding and in the hope that help would be forthcoming

for China through negotiations outside the League. I said it was true that

nicely-worded resolutions were adopted each time in the League, but they

brought no practical benefit to China. In spite of these resolutions, the

League had practically done nothing to help China in restraining Japan.

Mr. Stevenson of the British delegation, who was assisting Mr. Butler,

intervened by saying that the League had sent three anti-epidemic missions to

China, which since January had been doing very useful work in China. I

agreed as to the usefulness of their work, but observed it was of no help

in mitigating Japanese aggression. Besides, I said, three-quarters of the funds

appropriated by the League were made up of China’s contributions, both regular

and special.

Mr. Butler said, as regards financial aid to China, that I must have

read Mr. Chamberlain's statement and his own statements in the House of Commons.

While it was found impossible to give a loan to China, the British government

was disposed to consider the question of extending her export credit. But in

this matter it was rather up to China to take the initiative and bring forward

concrete proposals. I said I regretted very much that the British government

had turned down the proposed request for a loan, especially as it was sought

to stabilize the Chinese currency--an object entirely in harmony with the

policy of so many countries, especially as if granted, it was bound to benefit

China's foreign trade, particularly with Great Britain. As for the question

of export credit, I remarked that certain concrete proposals had, in fact,

been brought forward by China. Mr. Butler agreed and recalled the proposal

to buy railway material, telephone apparatus for certain provinces and motor

lorries .
 233

I said I understood that while arrangements for the grant of commercial

credit must be made on a commercial basis, China's request for financial

aid should not be viewed entirely as a commercial proposition. It really

had an important political aspect to it, and was based upon the successive

resolutions adopted by the League.

Mr. Butler said if China had proposals to make, his government would

consider them sympathetically. But to insist upon the application of Article 17

was a step he felt certain would bring no result whatever and would, therefore,

in no way benefit China. I replied that I had accepted this advice in the

past and China had followed it during the past 14 months, but it had brought

nothing concrete to China. Meanwhile, the war of aggression had been continuing,

bringing tremendous suffering and sacrifice to the Chinese people. I said

his view would carry much greater weight with me if during the last 14 months

there had been definite assistance rendered to China. Certainly, I said,

Mr. Butler could appreciate the state of feeling of the Chinese people, when

everyday meant more sacrifice and more suffering. Mr. Butler said he fully

sympathized with the tragedy and horror of the war and understood the sentiment

of the Chinese government.

I said the Chinese armed forces at the front and the people in the rear

had been looking to the League of Nations, of which China had remained a loyal

member for 20 years, to render some help. But after 14 months none had been

received. This failure to aid China made the position of the Chinese delegation

vis-^-vis its government difficult, and also made it difficult for the government

to explain to the people why China had not insisted upon the application of

Article 17 and the enforcement of sanctions under Article 16. For the delegation,

the embarrassment was a relatively unimportant matter, but for the government

it was a serious thing.

 234

I recalled that three years ago, at the time of the Ethiopian case, China

faithfully carried out the collective decision of the Assembly, even though

she had no grievance against Italy, which, in fact, had been seeking her

friendship in many ways. A few months later, in 1936, Italy had approached

China with a strong inducement to suspend the sanctions. But she, being always

faithful to the collective action of the League, declined it and waited for

another collective decision before terminating the sanctionist measures.

Today, when she herself was the victim of aggression, I said, naturally

she expected that the League would discharge its obligations towards her and

that the member states would render her the necessary aid.

Personally, I said, I saw there was another reason for the League to apply

Article 17 now. In the present critical situation of Europe, it would be

highly desirable to show that the peace front constituted by the League was

after all not so badly broken up as some quarters in Europe would like to

see it. The application of the Article in the Far Eastern case would

establish a precedent for the future. If unfortunately a conflict should

arise in Europe out of the present tense situation, the application of Article

17 now would serve the purpose of preparing the ground for its application later.

Such a decision of the League to give effect to Article 17 would strengthen

the League's prestige and, as it were, reaffirm its authority as an organ

for the defense of peace.

Mr. Butler said the British government also desired to strengthen the

authority of the League. But the course I proposed would, in his view, not

lead to the strengthening of the League, but would rather have the effect of

weakening it. In the present circumstances, he thought it was desirable to

conserve it and not to expose its weakness further. Mr. Butler asked, if 1

insisted upon the application of Article 17 and Japan failed to come, and

no sanctions could be applied, what purpose it would serve and what aid it

could render to China. I said it would at least enlighted China as to

 235

what she could expect from the League and what she could not expect from it.

Mr. Butler asked what China would do after knowing itsv^akness. I said,

in that case, the Chinese people would know what the League really was, and

they would no longer have false hopes about it. Of course, I added, such a

discovery was bound to influence the future attitude as regards the relations

between China and the League.

Mr. Butler said this really touched the question of the reform of the

League. Lord Halifax was contemplating to make a statement, pointing out

the necessity of placing the League on a realistic basis and not overburdening

it with responsibilities impossible of fulfilment. Lord Halifax would urge

that greater attention be paid to Article 9-, providing for the revision of

treaties.

In reply to Mr. Butler’s question, I said instructions from my government

were very categorical. The Chinese government would wish to insist upon

its request because there was no other alternative open to it. Mr. Butler

said of course he understood that I was bound by instructions to press for

the application of the Article. And of course, he said, the Council would

have to discuss it, although he himself had to point out again that he did

not see how it could produce any beneficial result. However, he appreciated

this confidential exchange of views. He asked me not to consider our talk

as an official demarche from his government, because I had already sent my

communication asking for the application of Article 17, but merely as a

personal talk. He added that when Lord Halifax arrived, he would surely

want to talk to me himself.

I expressed my appreciation of the conversation and assured Mr. Butler

that I would be glad to talk the matter over with Lord Halifax upon his

arrival. Meanwhile, I said, I would try to keep in touch with Mr. Butler.

He said then that he would be glad to place himself at my disposal.

 236

[I not only saw Mr. Butler on September 12, but also began a round of

talks with] practically all the important representatives on the Council,

explaining to them the situation in the Far East and its relation to the

general situation in Europe, in the hope of lining up as much support as

possible for the Chinese appeal. In my conversations with the different

representatives, I also emphasized the urgent need of China for prompt and

effective aid from the friendly powers.

One of those I saw on September 12 was the Rumanian Minister of Foreign

Affairs, Mr. Comnen-Petrescu. Like the other European statesman, he was

anxious about the critical situation in Czechoslovakia. When I opened the

conversation with him by expressing my disappointment that he did not put

himself forward as a candidate for the presidency of the Assembly, as I

would have been glad to vote for him, he explained that he did not want

to put himself up because, in the prevailing tense and critical situation

in Europe, he wanted to retain his liberty of movement. If the situation

should become worse he would have to run back to his own country. Besides,

he said, on the question of Article 16, which would be the subject of a

declaration by the Oslo powers, he wished to retain all freedom of expression

and be able to present the Rumanian point of view (which would not be the

case if he had been elected) .

I told him of China's request to the League to apply Article 17, and

said my government had asked me to approach him with a view to obtaining

his support for the request in the Council. He said he was sympathetic

towards the Chinese case and interested in the question of Article 17. But

Rumania, being a member of the Petite Entente and the Balkan Entente, had to

act in concert with the other powers of these two groups. He said he had

already discussed this question the night before with his colleagues, whose
 237

countries were members of the two groups, and they were trying to reach an

identical point of view. He expressed the view that it would be best if

China would negotiate directly with the powers with a view to obtaining

some material aid. In such negotiations, he thought, China could use Article

17 as a kind of pressure to obtain what she needed.

[I also had interviews on September 12 with Mr. Litvinov of the Soviet

Union and M. Paul Boncour, acting first delegate of the French delegation.]

M. Paul Boncour told me, and it was true, that his view regarding the Sino-

Japanese conflict had always been favorable to China. He felt it was a

shame that the League had not done more for China and that the powers had

not given her more aid. He appreciated China's desire to press for the

application of Article 17. Nonetheless, he said, he could not speak for

the French government, and he asked whether I discussed the matter with

the Quai d'Orsay. When I told him of M. Ldger's views, he thought it was

a shame that France and Great Britain had let China down and ignored the

interests of the League.

He entirely agreed with my view that, the application of the Article

to the Far Eastern situation would prepare the ground for future application

in the event of conflict arising in Europe. He also thought it would serve

to show that the peace front, which other quarters in Europe wished to

consider as dead, was not really so paralyzed or broken up. But he added

that the Oslo powers were going to make a statement declaring that economic

sanctions under Article 16 were optional, a view which he himself could not

accept as he had already made clear on other occasions. Moreover, he said, the

Oslo powers were going to make an argument of the League's failure to apply

the sanctions in the Chinese case—using it not as an argument for supporting

China's demand but as an argument for their own claim that economic sanctions

under Article 16 had already been made optional by the League's own failure.
 238

When I remarked that that was all the more reason why China's demand to

apply Articles 16 and 17 should be accepted^ and that the fact that the

League had failed heretofore to apply sanctions in the Chinese case certainly

was no reason preventing the League from carrying them out now, M. Boncour

only said that was not the Oslo powers' intention.

On meeting Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov in the lobby of the Assembly,

I asked him to support the Chinese request for immediate application of

Article 17. He told me he personally was all for the Chinese demand and

would support it, but he doubted whether it would be approved by the council.

I therefore explained the reasons why China wished to insist upon the

application of this Article. I reminded him that while the Assembly, the

Council and the Advisory Committee had adopted certain resolutions with a

view to aiding China, these resolutions remained unexecuted. I stated that

while China was fighting for her own independence and territorial integrity,

the success of her armed forces would also be a victory for the principle

of the League of Nations. For 14 months, I said, China had in fact been upholding

the cause of the League singlehandedly and had received no practical support

from the members of the League, aside from M. Litvinov's own country. I added

that, in the present critical situation of Europe, it was necessary that the

League should give some sign of life and activity. To give effect to Article

17 now in the Chinese case would not only prepare the ground for a similar

application in case a conflict should arise in Europe but would also

demonstrate to certain quarters in Europe that the peace front was after

all not entirely broken up. I told him I felt such a demonstration might

help to make reason and sobriety prevail in those quarters. The Soviet

Foreign Commissar said he entirely agreed with my view and believed that

the League of Nations, weakened as it was, should still try to do something

to uphold its prestige.

 239

As usual, he asked me what France and Great Britain had been doing to

help China. I told him that while conversations had been going on to obtain

certain export credit from the British government not much headway had been

made. As regards France, a certain amount of war material had been allowed

to pass through Indochina, but each time it was necessary to negotiate for

it. I said the attitude of France and Great Britain vis-S-vis China was

really disappointing as a whole. M. Litvinov then told me he had definite

information that before Sir John Simon made his announcement refusing a loan

to China, the Japanese Ambassador in London had been pressing him toward

that end. Great Britain, M. Litvinov added, was anxious to safeguard her

interests in China and therefore was afraid of Japan.

He went on to say that the British attitude was really difficult ^o

understand. He told me the British Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs

had seen him and spoken to him of the intention of Lord Halifax to make a

statement at the Assembly pointing out that it was necessary to consider that

economic sanctions under Article 16 were optional, and that attention should

be concentrated on Article 19 of the Covenant, providing for the revision of

treaties between nations. But M. Litvinov said he had told Mr. Butler that

he entirely disagreed with the British view, and that he understood the

French viewpoint to be the same as his own. The British theme, according

to M. Litvinov, would seem to go even further than that of the Oslo powers,

which merely wished to make a unilateral declaration effective for themselves

only. The British would have this interpretation of economic sanctions as

optional in character take the form of a resolution and be considered as

binding on all the member states. In M. Litvinov's view, such a resolution

would really amount to the destruction of the very foundation of the League

of Nations as representing the collective system of peace.

 240

He agreed with my remark that the gesture the British had intended to make

was really an appeal to Hitler and to others who were hostile to the League

of Nations as it now stood. Howeverhe said he understood that Lord Halifax

had now abandoned his idea of making such a declaration in view of the Soviet

and French opposition.

In reply to my question, he said he did not think there would be war in

Europe because after all Hitler was really bluffing. There was no need,

he said, for Great Britain to be so apprehensive of Germany. Such an attitude

on the part of Great Britain would merely serve to play into the hands of

Germany.

When I asked what he thought Japan would do if China pressed for a vote

on the question of applying Article 17, M. Litvinov said that was what had

been done in the case of Spain. He would vote for it himself, but he did

not think China would be able to have it adopted. When I remarked that it

was possible the vote would be split--half of the members voting favorably

and the other half unfavorably, M. Litvinov thought China was not likely to

obtain even half of the votes by her appeal, because he felt that several

countries that might at heart be favorable to China’s cause would abstain

from voting in the present circumstance. He cited New Zealand as an example.

I called upon Mr. Jordon of New Zealand the next day. As one will

recall, he was then President of the Council. In view of his office and

also in view of Mr. Litvinov's statement, I particularly wanted to personally

enlist his support for the Chinese appeal to be discussed in the Council. I

explained to him the reasons which had led the Chinese government to insist

upon the immediate application of Article 17, and told him that neither

Great Britain nor France had done very much to carry out the resolutions

previously adopted by the Assembly and the Council. Mr. Jordon expressed

his surprise and said he would certainly make a statement in the Council to
 241

support China,and ask how far the members represented on the Council had

gone in carrying out the resolutions already adopted by the League.

The Chinese delegation sought an early meeting of the Council to discuss

the Chinese proposal, but the other powers seemed unanxious to have a meeting

early, and tried to persuade me to agree to a postponement. Thus, M. Boncour,

[whom I had just seen the day before] invited me to have another talk with

him shortly after noon on September 13. He began by telling me that Mr. Butler

and he had had a talk and he found the British attitude towards the Chinese

appeal for the application of Article 17 less resistant than was supposed.

He told me that he had the impression that the English were disposed to

propose some measures of the kind desired by China. But in view of the

increasingly critical situation in Europe, which seemed to become worse hour

by hour, it would be unwise for the Chinese delegation to precipitate a

discussion in the Council. He said if a meeting of the Council were to be

held in the next two days, both Mr. Butler and he felt that the minds of the

members of the Council would be so occupied with the European situation that

they would sabotage the whole Chinese appeal.

This shows again how much the question of the Far Eastern situation

was linked together with the European situation in the minds of Western

statesmen and governments, but only to the disadvantage of China. That is

to say, they had come to realize the relationship, but not its real implications

as I saw them. Instead it only led them to feel all the more that the European

situation was the far more urgent and important of the two and that, therefore,

they were less in the position to do anything for China or become involved

in the Far Eastern situation.

[ItJ truth the European situation at the moment was exceedingly hazardous.

The previous day, September 12, Hitler had demanded in a speech that the

Sudeten Germans be given the right of self-determination, meaning, the right

 242

to break away from Czechoslovakia and become part of Germany. This signaled

the outbreak of widespread riots and disorder in Czechoslovakia and by the

end of the day (the 13th) martial law was in effect in Czechoslovakia,

though the government was having difficulty in enforcing it.]

[As for my conversation with M. Boncour,] he went on to explain that

he did not think anybody could object to an invitation being sent to Japan

under Article 17. But in case of a refusal by Japan, he presumed the members

of the Council would not feel disposed to do anything practical for China.

He said that as a friend of China and as my personal friend, he therefore

wanted to suggest that I tell the Secretariat not to have a meeting of the

Council immediately for discussing the Chinese appeal. He thought I could

very well say that, before asking for a decision in the Council, I would

like to talk it over with Lord Halifax and M. Georges Bonnet, who were

expected to come to Geneva to attend the meeting of the Council. He said

this would give the Council a perfectly good reason for asking for a delay,

while the Secretariat was of course anxious that the matter should be taken

up as soon as possible so that it could be disposed of and buried.

When I asked whether the Secretariat had already been told of his

and Mr. Butler’s desire for postponement, M. Boncour answered in the affirmative,

and said that the Secretary-General had said that as the Chinese delegation

had asked for an early meeting, he, the Secretary-General, could not put it

off unless requested to do so by the Chinese delegation. M. Boncour then

urged that the postponement would really be in the interest of China, especially

as he felt that the Chinese request for the application of Article 17 would

have to be applied by first sending an invitation to Japan and as Japan's

refusal was a foregone conclusion. In that event, he said the Council would

be called upon to take some action. He personally hoped that something

could be done this time. He added quickly that the cooperation of the United

States government would, of course, be necessary, and that without it no action

 243

of the Council could go very far. In fact_, it was in this quarter that he

thought China should make her effort to move ahead.

Thereupon^ I told him that Mr. Hull, the U. S. Secretary of State,

had told our Ambassador in Washington that the American government would do

its best to cooperate with the League of Nations, if positive action was

taken. But M. Boncour said the League could not take action without America

and that the American attitude towards cooperation seemed always to be

accompanied by an "if."

I told him that I had contemplated, at first, awaiting the arrival of

Lord Halifax and M. Bonnet before making my statement in the Assembly.

But as the situation in Europe was getting worse every day, I felt it was

best to make it as soon as possible, lest there might be no opportunity

to make it at all, in the event of a conflict arising in Europe. M. Boncour

said as far as speech^making was concerned, I could very well deliver my

statement on Thursday, the 15th, as I had originally intended. It was the

discussions of the Council that he wished to see postponed.

In reply to a question from me, M. Boncour said if a conflict should

arise in Europe, the Assembly would continue to sit as then that conflict

would also be brought up in Geneva. He said he himself and M. Bonnet were

of course interested in the Far Eastern question, but it would be natural

if events in Europe preoccupied them more at the moment. In other words,

he said, the present moment for discussing the Chinese question was,in his

view, unpropitious. I quickly stated that was another reason why I would

urge the Council to take effective action as regards the Chinese appeal.

I told him that such action at the present moment would serve to demonstrate

to certain quarters that after all the peace front was not entirely inactive

or helpless.

On this point, he entirely agreed and even suggested that, in my speech, I

 244

might take the opportunity to point out the connection between the Far

Eastern situation and that which prevailed in Europe at the moment. Peace

was indivisible, he added, and the security of nations was interdependent . He

thought that emphasis laid on this point would arouse interest and attract

attention. I told him that I had the same idea in my mind and would certainly

make use of it in my speech.

When I asked whether M. Boncour had been in communication with the

French Foreign Minister, he said he was in touch with him several times a day.

But knowing how preoccupied M. Bonnet was with the situation in Europe, he

could not and did not speak to him about the Far East. He told me too that

Mr. Butler was very much in the same position. In other words, neither

he nor Mr. Butler could say very much to me about aid to China, and the only

wise thing to do was to await the arrival of M. Bonnet and Lord Halifax.

However, he was not at all certain that the British Foreign Secretary and

the French For ign Minister would be able to come, their coming being

contingent upon developments in Europe.

At that point, I asked M. Boncour about the news from Czechoslovakia.

He said it was very bad that morning. A number of conflicts had recently

occurred on the frontier and the Sudeten Germans had fired on the Czech policea

It was evident that Germany had been seeking a pretext for resort to forceful

intervention. If the Czech police retaliated by firing back and the bullets

fell in German territory and killed some Germans, that would be seized as a

justification for Germany's armed intervention. In other words, M. Boncour

said, it was German corpses that Germany was looking for in the present clashes

on the Czechoslovak frontier between the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans.

Of course, the tone of M. Boncour*s conversation was different from

that of his previous conversation with me, and he appeared to be more

cautious and less encouraging to the Chinese delegation and to China's appeal.
 245

It was evident to me that he must have been influenced by Mr. Butler's

request to use his own influence to induce me to agree to a postponement

of the meeting of the Council to discuss the Chinese appeal.

[That afternoon I saw M.,-ivenol, ] Secretary-General of the League, for

the purpose of expediting the preparations in the Secretariat for discussion

in the Council of the Chinese appeal and for the application of Article 17.

I told him that I hoped the Council would take an early opportunity to discuss

it. I said I proposed to make a statement on the Far Eastern situation in

the Assembly first. On the following day the Council might take the question

up for discussion. I said it was my view that the invitation to be sent to

Japan should not be difficult to draft, and probably the Secretary-General had

already made the necessary preparations.

The Secretary-General, while saying that preparations had been made

to a certain extent, asked me what my understanding was of the terms of

Article 17. He added that the meaning and purport of this Article were not

quite clear to him. I told him it was sufficiently clear as to preclude any

doubt as to the procedure to be followed. There were two possibilities: either

Japan accepted an invitation to her based on Article 17 or refused it. In

the first case, she would send a representative to sit round the Council

table. In the second case, the Council would, as a matter of course, pass

on to Article 16 in order to take the necessary action.

M. Avenol said the jurists were somewhat excited over the Chinese appeal,

although he always distrusted the opinion of the jurists. In his own view,

the application of Article 16 depended not upon the failure of a reply to the

invitation or its rejection, but upon the fact that the particular non-member

state resorted to force. That was a question of fact, he added. Therefore,

the failure of Japan to reply to an invitation would make no difference.

 246

What was important in his view, was the fact of aggression. On this point, I

was able to make a ready reply to the effect that the fact of aggression had

already been established last year. M. Avenol said that was quite clear, and

the situation as regards that fact had not altered. But in his view, the

procedure provided under that Article was intended to be applied before the

resort to force, while in the present case force had been resorted to for over a

year.

I asked him what would be the consequence if his interpretation of the

Article should be accepted. As my question was not easy to answer, he avoided

it, and said that it was simply his way of looking at it, which, he saw, was quite

different from my view. It was up to the Council, he said, to decide how the

Article was to be applied.

Then he tried to minimize the importance of the Article, for example, by

saying that the Swedish government had already made a very strong statement in

the Assembly declaring thit, in its view, economic sanctions, like military

sanctions under Article 16, were optional. He said that this view had been

supported by the Dutch. I remarked that this view would not necessarily prevent

the application of Article 17, as measures desired by China would require the

cooperation of only a few countries. I said I understood that Lord Halifax at

one time also intended to make a statement with reference to Article 16, but now

he appeared to be hesitating about whether to do it or not. M. Avenol said,

in his view, it would make little difference whether Lord Halifax made a speech

or not. In the present situation of Europe speeches would not alter things.

I asked whether he had any information about the coming of M. Bonnet,

the French Foreign Minister, and whether the latter would make a speech. The

Secretary-General said the present situation in Europe was so bad that he

was uncertain whether M. Bonnet would come at all. As regards speech-making,

the situation was changing every minute, and speeches would be of little help.

(What a cynical view he was taking of the whole situation.) When I asked
 247

whether he saw any light that would bring appeasement in the situation, he said

he himself saw none. With the exception of three countries, which were prepared

to accept war, all the others were always seeking to avoid it.

A half hour later I saw Mr. Sandler, the Swedish Foreign Minister. I

learned that Mr. Sandler had not seen the Chinese Minister in Stockholm, though

the latter had asked for an appointment to see him. So I explained to him the

nature of the Chinese request for the application of Article 17 and the reasons

underlying it. He said at once that he could well understand the reason China

was insisting that time upon the application of Article 17, but he felt that

it would bring no result to China in the circumstances. He explained that

the cooperation of the United States in the Far Eastern situation was "absolutely

necessary." Therefore, in his view, it would be desirable to turn the matter

over to the Advisory Committee of the League, on which the United States was

represented. Thereupon I said that the Advisory Committee had been charged

with the matter last year, but the onlysuggestion it made was to hold the

Brussels Conference which turned out to be a complete failure. It brought

no benefit to the Chinese cause whatever.

The Swedish Foreign Minister then said the meaning of Article 17 was not

quite clear. If China expected that Sanctions would be applied as a result

of its application, he doubted whether she would succeed. He said the Swedish

people were sympathetic towards the Chinese cause, but the Swedish government did

not believe in sanctions either for Europe or for the Far East, and he had

already made a statement in the Assembly that afternoon to this effect.

I said China had asked for the application of Article 17 from the very

beginning. It was only die to the persuasion of both Mr. Eden and M. Delbos last

year and again in January and in May this year that I had refrained from insisting

upon the immediate application of that Article. But I had done so on the

understanding that, and in the hope that, concrete aid would be forthcoming
 248

for China, and only after repeated assurances had been given to that effect

by the French and the British. Now a year had passed, I said, and nothing

had come out of the resolutions adopted. The people in China were disappointed

and would like to see Article 17 applied,it being the most relevant for the

case. They wished to know where the League stood and whether one could still

expect something from it. M. Sandler said he could understand the position of

China, and it was just as well to find out what the Article could do in the

circumstances for her.

I then said that, in the case of sanctions against Italy in the Ethiopian

war, China had loyally carried out the collective decision of the League against

a country which sought in many ways her friendship. When Italy offered her

inducements to suspend sanctions in 1936, China declined them because she wished

to remain loyal to the League of Nations. She did not wish to act individually,

without awaiting a new collective decision. Now, I told Mr. Sandler, China

herself had been the victim of aggression for 14 months, and she expected the

League would come to her aid. She did not expect that the whole group of

sanctions would be applied, but there were certain concrete measures, such as

an embargo on arms and munitions against Japan and the withholding from Japan of

airplanes, oil and iron ore, which could be carried out. Such measures would

not affect the whole body of the member states, but require the cooperation

of only a few of them.

The Swedish Foreign Minister said that, in order to carry out such measures,

it would be necessary to secure the cooperation of the United States. Without

that cooperation, he did not see how any of them could be put into effect.

As far as Sweden was concerned, he knew the supply of arms and munitions to

China had not been restrained in any way. On the other hand, the Japanese,

knowing the Swedish attitude, had never approached Sweden for any supply of

arms and munitions. He did not know whether the Japanese got any supplies

from other member states of the League, but he understood a great deal went to
 249

Japan from the United States. When I said the taking of a decision by the

League would facilitate the carrying out of a general embargo on the different

articles I had just mentioned, M. Sandler said this depended upon the attitude

of Great Britain and France.

Detecting the concern in the back of M. Sandler's mind, I asked him about

the general situation in Europe. He at once said the general situation in

Europe was quite bad. He saw no light except the possibility that the people

in those aggressor states themselves might take steps to prevent war and improve

the general situation. He understood that the people in Japan were not at

all anxious for Japan to continue the war with China, nor were the German

people, for example, anxious for Germany to go to war. He expressed the belief

that the peoples themselves would stop their leaders from plunging their

countries into war eventually. (That was rather optimistic.)

X noted that the people in Japan had at the beginning supported the

militarists in making war on China because they had believed that war would

be over in three months, as the militarists had told them. But as it had

been dragging on for over a year, their patience with the militarists was

getting rapidly exhausted. The economic and financial strain was also being

felt more and more by the Japanese people and the Japanese government. I

said the difficulty of the people in the dictatorship countries, however,

was their lack of organization and power to make their voices heard. I expressed

my fear that by the time the people were able to impose their views on their

respective countries, their leaders would have already gone ahead with their own

schemes of aggression.

In order to inform myself of the precise state of mind of the British at

that point, I sought another interview with Mr. Butler and I had an opportunity

to talk to him at a luncheon, on the 14th, given by the International Commission

for the Relief of Children Refugees in Spain. I was anxious to know, first of all,

whether Lord Halifax was coming to Geneva or not, because Mr. Butler was putting

his final word off and asked me to get it from Lord Halifax. T learned from
 250

Mr. Butler that it was very unlikely that Lord Halifax would be able to come

at all, although he added that the British Foreign Secretary was desirous

of making a visit, hcwever, brief it might be.

Then I referred to the conversation which I had had with M. Boncour and

to the question of the desirability of postponing the discussion of the Chinese

appeal in the Council. I told Mr. Butler that I was prepared not to ask for

a meeting for the next two days. Mr. Butler said that, in view of the

developments in Europe, he thought it would be bery wise not to send an

invitation to Japan just then, lest it should appear that Japan was asked to

send a representative merely for a discussion in connection with the European

situation. I told him that I understood his point of view and would not

press for a meeting of the Council immediately, but that I was going to make

a statement in the Assembly, as I had originally contemplated. Mr. Butler

thought it would be quite all right to make a statement as I had originally

planned.

Continuing my difort to get as much support as possible from different

member states of the League in order to apply Article 17, and particularly to

enforce sanctions or an embargo on a certain limited number of war-related

supplies, including oil, I saw the Mexican delegate, who was formerly Minister to

London, on September 15. In reply to a direct question, he said although

he could not speak for his government, as he had no instructions on the subject,

he felt his government would not object if the other oil-producing countries

joined in such an embargo. He explained, however, that the production of oil

in Mexico in recent years had declined steadily. At one time, Mexico was

third in the scale of production, but now her capacity of production was

ranked seventh or eighth among the world's oil-producing nations.

On September 16, I saw M. Joseph Avenol, the Secretary-General, again and

urged him to arrange a meeting of the Council to discuss the Chinese appeal

as soon as possible. He explained it would be impossible to have it on Saturday

 251

afternoon^ [the 17th^ ] as X wished^ for there were so many other questions

that had to be liquidated for the present Council. He thought it would be best

for me to find out from the other members whether they were ready to discuss

the Chinese question. He suggested I might raise the question at the Council

meeting, when the matter of fixing the agenda for the next Council would be

taken up for consideration.

On the same day [the day on which, incidentally, I made my planned speech

before the Assembly stating what China would ask of the League, I had a talk

with Mr. Hunters, the Latvian Foreign Minister. As he was rapporteur of the

Council on the opium question, I first discussed that question with him.

As I had proposed an amendment to his original report, I wanted to know whether

my amendment had been incorporated. He at first excused himself by saying

that, as rapporteur, he could net show too much leaning to one side, i.e.,

the Chinese side. But I explained that I had proposed the amendment because

otherwise the report would not be presenting the true situation. I said the

phrase "deterioration in the situation in China" in his original report

would seem to throw responsibility for [the increasing use, etc., of opium

in China] on China, whereas it was Japan's action which was the cause of the

general apprehension, as expressed by several representatives, especially

the American representative on the Advisory Committee on Opium. The Committee's

own amendment would be acceptable to me, I said, provided the point I had just

raised was made clear and the phrase "in China" was replaced by the phrase

"in the Far East" in the revised text. Mr. Hunters accepted this and promised

to make a statement the next day to clarify the matter of responsibility.

When I raised the question of the application of Article 17, Mr. Hunters

said he had talked the matter over with his government. His government felt

that, as the application of Article 17 would involve the application of Article 16,

it would find it difficult to support it in the present circumstances of Europe.

 252

He assured me, however, that this was a tentative opinion and he would see
what the other members of the Council thought of it.

[Late in the afternoon] I againsawMr. Butler of Great Britain. I told

him that I had asked the Secretary-General to arrange a meeting for the Chinese

question to be taken up at the Council's meeting on Saturday, [the 17th ?].

M. Avenol's view was that the necessity of liquidating a number of questions

in order to wind up the current Council session would make it impossible for him

to do what I asked on Saturday, but that it could perhaps be arranged for Tuesday of

the following week. I told Mr. Butler that, in order not to press the Secretariat

too hard, I could put off the discussion until Monday, [the 19th ?], and asked him

if the British delegation was ready to discuss it.

Mr. Butler said he had understood from M. Boncour that, as a result of the

latter's discussion with me, I was disposed to put it off for ten days or so. I

at once said that that must have been a misunderstanding because I had told

M. Boncour clearly that I would not press for a meeting for two or three days

and not ten days.

Mr. Butler expressed his regret that I had asked for the application

of Article 17 because, as he had told me at our last conversation, China would

not get anything out of it. I, however, said I could not see what difficulty

there was in following the procedure of Article 17 by inviting Japan. Mr. Butler

agreed that as to that, there was no difficulty, although the jurists did

not seem to agree on the invitation. He said, according to British jurists, the

dispatch of an invitation to Japan would follow automatically the Chinese demand,

but the French jurists seemed to think otherwise. The difficulty, however,

Mr. Butler pointed out, was not the sending of an invitation, but the application

of Article 16 which should follow it. In the then prevailing circumstances

of the League, he did not think that sanctions could be adopted. He knew the

British government could not accept the application of Article 16 in the present

circumstances, and he understood that the French held the same view. Mr. Butler

f n amp rhinp unuld instead be orenared to negotiate

 253

peace with her. He thought that China's real desire might be to have Japan

near her in order to reach a settlement with her. I told him at once that

that was not China's intention. Her purpose was to insist upon the application

of Article 17 or to get some action taken through Article 16 to restrain Japanese

aggression. He then rephrased his question, asking me if Japan should come,

would China negotiate with her or refuse to do so? I said China had always

been ready to enter discussions with Japan round the Council table, but not

with her directly. So far as China's stand was concerned, I added, it was made

clear at Brussels. China had always been prepared to make peace with Japan

on the basis of international law, and especially Article 1 of the Nine Power

Treaty.

I told him I had reported my last conversation with him to my government.

The Chinese delegation was still instructed to carry out its original instructions.

That was the reason I was anxious to press for a discussion in the Council. Mr.

Butler then expressed his willingness to see the Secretary-General to find out

what could be done as to early meeting.

At the same time, he again emphasized the advisability of China's

continuing to negotiate with the British government for financial aid. He had

talked the matter over with the Far Eastern Department in the Foreign Office,

he said, and felt that China was just as much to blame as Great Britain for

Britain's not having done anything to help China. The British government,

he added, was still waiting for concrete proposals for Great Britain to help

China financially. I told him that China, confronted with the necessity of

carrying on a way, naturally found it difficult to formulate very definite

proposals. The matter really could not be placed on a normal commercial basis.

Besides, financial aid was only one aspect of it. In the face of Japan's

continued war of agression, I felt the League should take some action to

discourage the aggressor. I said that, as I had already pointed out to him,

China was not asking for the application of Article 16 in its entirety, but

•Ppr
only for limited application as^a^^begjjTrmTa^^^TbL^^L^ ■’sure:
mam
 254

had in view for adoption by the League could be carried out only by a few

countries.

Mr. Butler said at once these countries could not accept them. Besides,

he added, the cooperation of the American government would be indispensable.

(So he let the cat out of the bag. He had said only a short while before that

they had been waiting for China to make concrete proposals in order to give

the necessary help. But here he had just implied that they were not able to

help China anyway; it all depended upon the American government.)

I said, according to the Chinese Ambassador in Washington, the American

government was disposed to cooperate with the League if a definite decision

was take by the League. The Under-Secretary commented that the Americans

always made their decision contingent upon League action. How far they could

be counted upon tocooperate was therefore always a question mark.

Butler then said that, in view of what I had said, he would suggest

that the discussion should not be pressed for the following day, but perhaps

early the next week. Meanwhile, he would telegraph to London asking for the

view of his government. (That was always a good excuse for not giving a direct

reply.)

As regards the situation in Europe, he said there was no improvement.

Prime Minister Chamberlain [(who had gone to Berchtesgaden on the 15th for

a personal conference with Hitler)] had gone back to London and had already

made a broadcast speech in which he denied all the fantastic rumors. The

conversation with Hitler was carried out in a most friendly manner. He, Butler,

could not say more at this time, before he had further discussions with his

colleagues in the cabinet. Anyhow, there was no easy solution to the question.

When I asked whether Chamberlain would make a second visit to Germany as reported

in the press, Mr. Butler said the report was true and the place of the next

meeting would be near Cologne, as Hitler did not wish Chamberlain to travel
 255

so far again. He explained that the important thing now was not to have

incidents. If they should occur again, of course the situation would become

even more grave.

[I had already had another long talk with Soviet Foreign Minister

Litvinov earlier in the day, when] we met in the Assembly lobby. I started

by telling him about the conversations I had already had with Mr. Butler and

M. Boncour, in which I had been asked not to insist upon an immediate meeting

of the Council to discuss the Chinese request, because, in the circumstances,

neither Mr. Butler nor M. Boncour was in a position to make a statment on behalf

of their respective governments.

M. Litvinov said M. Boncour had also seen him and asked him to speak

to me to the same purpose, but he had declined. He told M. Boncour that, in

the first place, he had not been consulted by the Chinese delegation. (This

was, however, a diplomatic excuse.) Secondly, the Chinese delegation had

received categorical instructions in insist upon the application of Article 17.

Thirdly, the Soviet government was ready to accept sanctions under Article 16

and disposed to help China. Besides, said M. Litvinov, he had pointed out to

M. Boncour that, after all, while the European situation was causing anxiety to

France and Great Britain, the war in the Far East was a grim reality to China.

However, the Soviet Foreign Commissar added, he was also of the opinion that

perhaps it would not be inadvisable to postpone the discussion in the Council

until next Monday, because just at present the situation in Europe was still

critical. At the same time, he understood there would be a new Council (right

after the present one was wound up) in which Yugoslavia would take the place

of Rumania and be less favorable to China. This was also true, he said,

with regard to Peru, which would preside instead of New Zealand. A delay

of two days, in his view, would therefore be really desirable, in order to

think about how to meet the new situation on the Council, [while a longer
 256

delay would not.]

As regards the situation in Europe, M. Litvinov said Chamberlain was

once more staking his personal prestige and political future by trying to

get into direct contact with Hitler. But he thought the sale of Czechoslovakia

would not succeed in stopping Hitler from pursuing his policy of aggression,

just as the British concession to Italy did not stop Mussolini. Nor had

Chamberlain been able to put into effect the Anglo-Italian agreement. Mr.

Litvinov thought it was evident that Chamberlain's purpose was to make concessions

to Hitler. Moreover, the latest news he heard from France was that the French

government was also weakening and trying to sacrifice Czechoslovakia.

When I observed that if France this time again failed to live up to

her obligations towards her ally, shewould lose all her friends, M. Litvinov
but
said not only that,/France would lose her position as a great power. He

thought that even if Hitler accepted the concessions offered by Chamberlain, the

detente would be of short duration. He also thought Chamberlain would succeed,

as the Prime Minister wished to have a finger in the pie. But the real difficulty

was the maintenance of permanent peace.

Then I asked what Mr. Litvinov understood to be the meaning and

significance of the Japanese spokesman's declaration concerning the Czechoslovakian

crisis. He replied that he had not paid much attention to it, because the

Japanese spokesman's declarations were often made one day and denied the next.

On the face of it, he thought it meant nothing, except that Japan wanted to pay

back Germany with the same coin German paid to Japan at the time of the

Changkufang incident. I asked him about the situation in the Far East and

whether Soviet Russia was prepared for all eventualities as a result of Japan's

statement in connection with the European situation. M. Litvinov said the

Soviet position in Siberia had been greatly strengthened.

On the morning of the 19th, I had another long talk with Mr. Butler
 257

of the British delegation. I started out by telling him that I had reported

the gist of my last conversations with him to my government and that further

instructions had been received. The Chinese government was of the opinion

that the question could be divided into two parts: 1) the request for immediate

application of Article 17, and 2) the carrying out of the resolutions the

League had already adopted. I said it was about the second part that I

wished to consult him.

I told him that the second part could again be divided into two questions.

First was the question of financial aid to China, which had been the subject

of conversations in London between the interested departments of the British

government and the Chinese Embassy as well as Dr. Kung's representative there.

I said I understood that the grant of export credit could be effected, provided

satisfactory and concrete proposals were submitted by the Chinese side. As

regards the question of a loan, I said I was of course aware that Sir John Simon

had already announced the decision of the British government not to give a

guarantee for it. I understood, however, that the reason for this decision

was the British government's wish not to be embarrassed by it vis-^-vis

Japan. I said I could well understand this feeling in the actual circumstances of

Europe and of the world, and if that were the real reason (Mr. Butler nodded his head

then I would suggest an indirect way by which a loan could be made. I suggested

it be made through the intermediary of a third party, namely, the banks of

a small country in Europe friendly to China. The British would obstensibly

be making a loan to the banks of this country, which would relieve Great

Britain of any embarrassment for financing China in the present crisis. Besides,

X said, it might be possible then to obtain the participation of two or

three other countries, which might take a share in the loan. Thus the loan

would take on the character of an international loan.

I told him that the Chinese government had also desired to propose a loan
 258

by the League of Nations, but since, in the last analysis, any such loan

would fall upon the particular member states which were in a position to

lend, I had not brought it up previously. Moreover, I thought the machinery

of the League loan would not be pracitcable at all. It would not be different

from one by the member states, but would only be complicated by the League

machinery.

I said that if the idea of an indirect loan was acceptable to the

British government in principle, something might be done to try it as a means

of expediting the negotiations both as regards the loan and arrangements for

export credit. I said I would recommend to my government to despatch an official

mission with full powers and concrete plans to come to Europe and undertake

the negotiations. I thought this would be the only way of pushing the matter

to an early and definite conclusion. But all Mr. Butler said by way of commenting

on my statement was that he would consider the matter and consult his government.

Then I brought up the question of doing something to restrain the aggressor,

and told him that I had already mentioned the measures which the Chinese

government would like to see adopted in order not to weaken China's power of

resistance. If these measures, could not be adopted in the form of a general

resolution, I told him I would suggest that the matter be taken up through

the diplomatic channel by the British government with some half-dozen other

countries concerned. I told him that I had understood from Mr. Butler on an

earlier occasion that, in fact, Great Britain and other member states had

been supplying Japan with very little. If that were so, I said, it would

seem all the easier to arrive at an agreement with these powers to withhold

the sale of arms, munitions, airplanes, oil, war materials and financial

credits. Such an arrangement would not be generally known and would, therefore

cause no embarrassment to the governments concerned. Butler's comment was

that negotiation through the diplomatic channedl was certainly a far better

way of finding what China wanted than pushing the matter through the League.
 259

I next turned my attention to the question of air bombing and the use

of poison gas by Japan. I said they were really two aspects of one question.

The Spanish delegation had already raised the question of air bombing and

it was before the Third Committee of the Assembly. As I told Mr. Butler,

I intended to support the Spanish proposal and also to emphasize another

aspect of it, namely, the use of poison gas. I expressed the hope that the

British delegation would see its way to support my views. Mr. Butler told

me the question of poison gas was on of serious interest to the British people.

Before he left London, he had already made a study of it . There were two

kinds of poison gas; one from ordinary bombs (the effect of the explosion

of the bombs) and the other the regular toxic gas discharged by means of

bombs. He asked which of the two I had in mind. I told him I was referring

to the regular toxic gas bomb.

Mr. Butler(with an eye to avoiding doing anything that would irritate Japan)

then said evidence of the use of toxic gas by the Japanese armed forces in

China, according to what he had received from the British medical experts

and military and air attaches in China, was not conclusive. In fact, it was

conflicting. He felt the Chinese had exaggerated the extent to which toxic

gases were used by Japan. He said he would, however, be glad to receive further

evidence corroborating the Chinese allegation. I at once referred him to

the communication of the Chinese delegation to the League of September 15, 1938

in which ample evidence was given of the number of times the Japanese had

used poison gas. In several instances I said, whole battalions or companies ^

were killed. The official documents taken from the Japanese prisoners of

war conclusively proved that the Japanese army was equipped with chemical

warfare units for using poison gas bombs But I assured him that the Chinese

government was perfectly ready to give every facility for inquiry and collection

of facts, and added that I would propose that a commission of neutral observers
 260

be sent to China to watch the situation on the different war fronts in China,

to investigate the facts and to report back to the League.

Mr. Butler said that in the Spanish case he had had charge of the question

and negotiated all the arrangements. But even then he had had great difficulty

in persuading other government to accept the arrangements. He said some of

them were refusing to cooperate because they had not recognized the Franco regime.

Finally, the British government had despatched an unofficial mission of British

observers. Their task was relatively easy to carry out because they were

stationed at Toulon. Whenever a case of air bombing arose, they could fly to

the spot in two or three hours. In the case of China, he said, the distance

was great and the territory to be covered was extensive. Therefore, his first

reaction was that it would not be easy to arrange for the despatch of observers,

although the matter was of great interest to the British government and

the British public opinion. When I said that the presence of a few impartial

observers would have a restraining influence upon the Japanese, he replied

by saying the Chinese case had already succeeded very well through the wide

publicity that had been given to it.

Mr. Butler then asked me whether I intended to go on with Article 17.

I answered in the affirmative and expressed the hope that Mr. Butler would

see no difficulty on the British side in supporting it. He assured me that

Great Britain would not try to obstruct it. But he thought an invitation

would be sent on the basis of paragraph one of Article 17 and that it would

be well to wait and see what Japan’s reply would be, the Chinese delegation

leaving the other parts of the Article in abeyance, at any rate for the present.

Mr. Butler understood that, according to the Chinese view, the sanctions

of Article 16 were also automatic. I told him that I did not necessarily

accept this interpretation of the Article juridically. But the fact that a

number of the delegations had already insisted upon the automatic character

of the economic sanctions under Article 16 was after all a factor which I could
 261

not ignore. For this reason, I said, the Chinese government had been asking

for the adoption of feasible measures requiring the cooperation of only a

few countries concerned. It was results the Chinese government wished to

obtain, regardless of the method and manner pursued.

Then I referred to the question Mr. Butler had asked me at our last

interview, as to whether the Chinese government, in insisting upon the

application of Article 17, was really looking for an opportunity to bring Japan

near to hand in order to discuss the possibilities of a settlement. I

reiterated that the Chinese government had no such idea and that, as I had
£
already told him, the position of the Chinese government remained the name as that

which it had taken at the time of the Brussels Conference. The war had been

imposed upon China, who had been obliged to resist. She was ready now, as

she had always been, to discuss a settlement on the basis of existing treaty

obligations. If therefore either the League of Nations or interested powers

offered good offices to facilitate a settlement, the Chinese government would

certainly not obstruct their efforts. But I quickly added that of course

this did not mean that direct negotiations would ,be acceptable to China. The

question was one of concern to more than two countries, and naturally,

any settlement brought about through the good offices of the League or the

other powers would be a collective settlement with the participation of the

League or the powers.

Mr. Butler told me that he considered our conversation of great importance

and that he certainly would like to make a full report to his government and

consult it for its views. He said he would give me a reply as soon as he

obtained it from London.

As regards the European situation, he was able to sound a note of cautious

optimism. In reply to my question, he said the British Cabinet was then

deliberating upon the views expressed by the French government before making a
 262

reply to Herr Hitler. Although the situation remained critical, he thought

the question now centered upon the matter of international guarantees, which

he thought would not constitute a great difficulty. He added that the points

of difference and disagreement had been considerably reduced so that now a

peaceful settlement should be within reach.

[At the Council meeting that day I spoke, emphasizing China's right to

collective and individual aid and reiterating China's request to the Council

for the immediate application of Article 17. I also reiterated China's request

that the Council implement the previous League resolutions on the Sino-Japanese

conflict by recommending certain measures of embargo against Japan and of

financial and material aid to China . The Council acted on the Chinese request

the same day, by sending an invitation to the Japanese government to be

represented in Geneva in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 17.]

The Assembly meeting in September 1938 and the meeting of the Council of the

League were held under the most discouraging and difficult circumstances. The

main reason for the difficulty was the rapidly deteriorating condition in

Europe. The minds of most of the delegates, if not all, were deeply preoccupied

with the international situation and the possible outbreak of war. The

gatherirg found itself meeting under heavy, dark clouds, overhanging to such

an extent that the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and France failed to

come at all and left their respective delegations headed by their deputies.

The Sudeten question, made the core of the European problem at the time

by Hitler, continued to worsen. It was mainly a question of what Great Britain

and France would do, more than what Czechoslovakia herself would do. As

far as Czechoslovakia was concerned, the Czech delegate, told me, on September 20,

the army of his own country was hesitating because of the certainty of defeat.

He complained to me bitterly of the French betrayal. France had now told

Czechoslovakia definitely that she could not come to her aid.

 263

Munters, the Latvian Foreign Minister, thought the possibility of Soviet

assistance to Czechoslovakia was poor, because, in his view, conditions in

Soviet Russia were not favorable to its giving effective assistance to the

Czechs. He said the arricultural production had fallen very short that year, and

even potatoes had to be sent in to meet the needs of the Latvian Legation in

Moscow. If he had not had this done, he said, he would have had to pay

eight times the price for potatoes.

M. Bdrenger [the President of the Foreign Affairs commission in the

French Senate ?], who was then with the French delegation, said the Czechs had

accepted the Anglo-French plan of concession to Hitler. However, at the same

party [at which I spoke to him, ] namely, a luncheon given by the Soviet

Foreign Commissar on the 20th, the host, M. Litvinov, told us that the latest

information from Prague indicated that the Czechs would fight and that they

had already mobilized. In any case, surprise developments would come in two

days. It was also reported that six members of the French government disagreed

with the Premier Daladier's yielding to Great Britain's viewpoint. B^renger

said that if the Czechs refused to agree in the end, France would be in a

difficult position. All this showed that the question of Czechoslovakia,

and more particularly the Sudeten problem, which led to the meeting of

Chamberlain and Hitler to negotiate a settlement, had given rise to political

difficulties in France, as they would later give rise to political difficulties

in Great Britain.

In the afternoon [of the 20th] I called a conference with my colleagues,

including the newly-appointed Ambassador to Washington, Dr. Hu Shih, Ch'en

Chieh, the new Chinese Ambassador to Germany, Quo Tai-chi from London, Tsien

Tai from Belgium, King Wunsz Chinese Minister f*t the Hague, and Victor Hoo,

Chinese Minister at Bern and Director of the permanent Bureau of the Chinese
 264

Delegation in Geneva, to discuss the best line of conduct for the delegation

and the best policy to follow given the actual circumstances of Europe. As

there was a constant flow of Chinese statesmen and diplomats visiting Europe

and stopping to talk with me about China's policy and/or the situation in

Europe, I also had a good talk with P. C. Chang [Chang Peng-chiin], brother

of Chang Po-ling, the President of Nankai University and Deputy-Speaker of

the People's Political Council. [P. C. Chang himself was an educator of note

and a member of the People's Political Council.] He had just come from

Washington D. C., and told me that "President Roosevelt was well-informed

and desired to do something. But, in the President's view, the moment for

big action had not yet arrived." He said President Roosevelt asked China

to fight on until a stalemate was reached. This would compel Ji-pan to come

to terms with the United States, with the latter offering Japan non-fortification

of the islands in the Pacific Ocean which were already surrounded by the

fortified Aleutian Islands, Hawaii, Manila and Singapore, The following

day, I had a good talk with Dr. Hu Shih, who was on the point of departing

for Washington to take up his post as Chinese Ambassador. We discussed the

question of the possibility and the mode of seeking American aid. I asked

him particularly to seek President Roosevelt's advice and to be frank with

him as to China's condition and requirements.

On September 22 the press reported that Chamberlain had flown to Godesberg,

Germany, to see Hitler for a second time on the Czech question. That evening,

at a dinner party for Colonel Boothby of Great Britain, the latter, who was

quite a well-known British political figure, told me that the French had

surprised Chamberlain by insisting upon peace at any price. He said that

the French air force was only 50 percent ready, and that Daladier had told

Chamberlain that France would not and could not aid Czechoslovakia, when

President Benes intended to say no to Hitler's demands and proposals of

 265

outright concession. He said Chamberlain then asked Daladier whether France

would or would not aid Czechoslovakia by carrying out her treaty obligations

to Czechoslovakia, and the answer from Daladier was a clear-cut no.

In the afternoon of the 22nd, at a meeting of the Sixth Committee,

Mr. Butler, as acting head of the British delegation, had made an important

declaration on Article 16, [in the sense indicated earlier, namely, endorsing

the optional character of economic as well as military sanctions (?) ] which

I naturally found rather disappointing. So I made a reservation of my right

to submit Reservations on his statement. It seemed that the British were

[going to all lengths to pursue] a policy of caution and even timidity vis-S-vis

Germany in Europe as well as vis-A-vis Japan in the Far East. Whatever the

reason was, the British policy at the time, seemed clearly to pour water on

any fire at the expense of other countries.

At a meeting on September 23 on the Third Committee's drafting committee,

which was dealing indirectly with the question of China's proposal for the

League to adopt some action on indiscriminate air bombing by Japanese aircraft

of undefended towns and the civilian population in China, I actually had

a sharp tiff with Butler. At the Sixth Committee meeting the same day,I

made a statement commenting on the declaration Butler made the day before.

I clarified China's stand on the meaning and interpretation of Article 16.

The Canadian delegate told me, after I sat down, that my argument was well put.

The Egyptian Minister said he found my statement was very closely argued.

[I felt somewhat cheered.] But the League of Nations still under dark clouds,

created by the Anglo-German negotiations over the Czechoslovakian problem.

At a dinner party given by the Indian delegation on September 23, I was

placed between Mr. Butler, Director-General of the International Labor Organization

and the Honorable Mr. Butler of the British Foreign Office. The first-mentioned
 266

Butler told me that he had been optimistic about the Czech situation all

along, but that night he had begun to feel very anxious. He confirmed what

was being said in the corridor of the Assembly: France was asking Britain to

yield to Hitler. The second Butler said to me that, in answering questions

in the House of Commons, he found personal friendship was most important.

Taking too official an attitude would arouse criticism and stir up hard feelings

and so that was his tactic in dealing with international negotiations as well.

Dr. Raichman of the Secretariat was called away suddenly at dinner. When he
A

returned to the table, he wrote [quickly] on the menu card and pushed it to me.

It said: "Great pessimism in London. War expected any time."

At noon the following day, after making a broadcast of part of my

Assembly speech for transmission on 46 stations, I rushed to see Mr. Butler

of the British Foreign Office with regard to the Chinese appeal. He told me

that with reference to the different questions I had raised with him, he had

not received a reply from his government. As to the suggestion of making a loan

to a small country as an intermediary, his government felt that, in the first

place, it would be difficult to find such a country. In the second place, the

political difficulty experienced in connection with the question of a direct

loan would remain. His government still felt that some arrangement for

utilizing export credit could be made, as that would be the simplest form

in which to extend financial aid to China. But it was necessary for China

to give the British government a concrete plan. Heretofore conversations

had taken place, he said, but somehow it seemed difficult to bring the two

sides together.

Reflecting that China had certainly provided a plan as concrete as possible

in the circumstances, I told him that the British government had already been

given a formal plan. But he replied that the plan must indicate what the

security would be and what the requirements were. In order to put the matter

entirely on a commercial basis, he thought it should be secured by the pooling of

 267

raw materials and mineral ore. His government felt that China must indicate

what ore could be available for security and in what quantity. (This made

it clear that the British government was not going to help China at all in

her predicament as a result of Japanese aggression, but was merely ready

to give regular commercial loans.)

As regards the idea of pooling available mineral ore and raw materials,

I told him the Chinese government had already set up an organization, under

the chairmanship of a very capable and experienced banker, Mr. K. P. Chen, whose

object was to centralize and control the available raw materials and products.

As a matter of fact, I said, that organization, a commission, had been

availing itself of the services of several established British firms, such as

Jardine, Matheson and Company, to collect and purchase such products and materials

for it. Mr. Quo Tai-chi, who was with me at the interview, said as regards

exporting from China and selling in Europe, that the commission had established a

company in London called the Fuhwa Company for handling purchases in Europe.

He said it had also been proposed that the purchasing commission of the

Chinese Ministry of Railways should be charged with the work.

After Mr. Butler fsaid he had heard something of a plan formulated by

some British group in London, I told him that referred to the scheme drawn up

by the Industrial Facilities Ltd., which had been in close touch with the

British Board of Trade. I said I understood that the Board of Trade had

already received a copy of the scheme drawn up by that group. Mr. Butler

expressed the hope that when the plan was decided, it would be communicated

to the British government through the Foreign Office.

As regards the question of sending a mission to England, Mr. Butler

said his government felt that it might attract too much attention and give

rise to a great deal of publicity, which would be undesirable in the circumstances.

(His remark, as well as his general attitude, clearly indicated how cautious
 268

and even timid his government's position was because of anxiety and concern

to avoid any cause for irritation or complaint in Tokyo.) I told him that

the purpose of sending a mission was to push the matter to a conclusion. If

some leading member of the Chinese government could come with full powers

and all the necessary data, the matter could be brought to a successful

conclusion much more easily than through the Embassy in London or in Paris,

as neither of them was staffed for this kind of negotiation. When Mr. Quo

said that Sir Frederick Leith-Ross favored the sending of T. V. Soong by the

Chinese government and when I said Mr. Soong would be eminently suitable

because he was not at the moment serving in any post in the government as

President of the Bank of China (that is to say, as a banker), Mr. Butler

thought such a prominent person might attract unnecessary attention.

I remarked that the procedure of any Chinese mission could be arranged

and take place without making any noise. If the idea of sending Mr. T. V.

Soong was inadvisable from the British point of view, I said Mr. Butler

would recall that I had also suggested the alternative of sending some

specialists. The important thing, from our point of view was to see something

done quickly and produce results. The manner and form in which such results

could be secured I was willing, I said, to leave to the discretion and

preference of the British government. Thereupon Mr. Butler said that he

thought it would be preferable to have some specialist come to England attached

to the Embassy in London, for example, as commercial counsellor. He could

then carry on negotiations and make an arrangement in the normal course of work.

Mr. Butler said he had also received instructions from his government

on the question of air bombing. He commented that, on looking over the text

of the Chinese proposal again, he thought the last paragraph relating to an

embargo on airplanes and oil against Japan was really a political question of

sanctions. As such, his instructions were very definite, and he therefore

 269

felt obliged to raise objection to it. But as he realized the strong feeling

which ray government and I felt on this question^ he had used his influence

with his government to get something done. The reply of the British government

was that while it could not set up another commission, such as it had done

in the case of Spain, the British delegation in Geneva would not object to

the dispatch of a League commission, if it was agreed to by the League.

Mr. Butler suggested the addition of the phrase "in the Far East" after

"Spain" to the draft resolution to be presented to the Third Committee,

I thought while it would improve the text, it was not enough. I felt the

Chinese situation must be mentioned and something more must be added. So

Mr. Butler suggested that, in that case, he might add the phrase, "the

appeal of China" in the body of the resolution. When I continued to press

for [the resolution to advise] the taking of some practical measures,

Mr. Butler said that since the resolution to be presented to the Committee

was one of a general character, he did not want to spoil the chance of getting

it accepted by adding something that might be objected to by the Committee.

He suggested that since the question of air bombing had also been raised in the

Council, I ought to press there also. But as far as the British delegation

was concerned, he added that he must say clearly that it could not accept it.

As to the question of the use of poison gas by Japan, Mr. Butler said

the reply from London, as he had already told me, was that evidence received

in London did not show conclusively that the Japanese had used poison gas

on a large scale. One would suppose his government maintained that the use

of a moderate quantity of poison gas should not be objected to.) There was

some evidence of its use, he said, but in most cases the gas was the fumes from

the explosives. He said the evidence received from the British authorities

in China, in response to most recent requests for information, was insufficient.

He told me he would be glad, however, to receive further evidence, if I

could get it frcjm China. I told him I had just sent another communication to the
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League transmitting the information concerning the use of gas by the Japanese

on several fronts on September 19. I said my government had no doubt that

the Japanese had been deliberately using gas, but knowing that whatever

evidence came from the Chinese side would be considered as partisan, the

Chinese government had asked the League to appoint an impartial and neutral

commission to establish the facts. I expressed the hope that Mr. Butler

would be able to support this proposal.

He said he did not see that this proposal could be worked into the draft

resolution in the Thrid Committee, relating to bombing in the Spanish Civil War.

When I again urged that he should support our stand by making a reference

in the draft resolution to the prohibition of the use of gas in connection

with air bombing, and reminded him that this porhibition had been agreed to

already by the countries represented on the Disarmament Conference in the

resolution of July 3, 1932, Mr. Butler said he would try to see if something

could be mentioned in that connection in the body of the resolution.

[Two days earlier, on September 22, Japan had replied to the Council’s

invitation under Article 17 with the expected refusal, thus rendering Japan

legally and automatically liable to the sanctions contemplated in Article 16.

As I next told Mr. Butler, I] was going to ask the Council to take action under

paragraph 3 of Article 17 now that Japan had definitely refused the invitation

of the League, I asked him what line of decision the British delegation would take

Mr. Butler said he had already stated the attitude of the British government

vis-A-vis Article 16 and also paragraph 3 of Article 17. He said no doubt

other delegations would make similar statements defining their respective

position. A discussion would surely take place afterwards. He felt certain

that I realized that, in the present circumstances, it was not practical politics

to try to apply Article 16.

I told Mr. Butler that it was because I realized that I had refrained

theretofore from making such demands, and I had insisted only upon certain
 271

concrete practical measures such as those I had already explained to him in

our previous conversations as well as in my statements before the Assembly

and the Council. He suggested that it would be well for me to mention that

in my statement at the next meeting of the Council. I told him I could not

very well do so. My statement would ask for the application of Article 16 and

leave it to the members of the Council to decide what they could agree to.

While I could see that the ^plication of Article 16 in toto was impracticable

in the circumstances, I said, I felt equally convinced that certain measures

could be adopted and carried out under that provision. I felt confident also

that Mr. Butler, in making clear the attitude of the British government

vis-A-vis Article 16, did not think either that nothing at all could be done

under that article. We concluded the conversation upon Mr. Butler saying

that he would report the result of the conversation to London and let me

know when he received further replies.

Following this conversation, there was an untoward incident, which for

a time affected the position of the delegation before the League. On

September 26, the Council was to meet in the afternoon in order to elect the

judges of the permanent Court. The Assembly was meeting at the same time.

I told Mr. Quo to attend the Council and I would attend the Assembly, because

I had arranged to see Mr. Litvinov in the Assembly to talk about our appeal

and proposal to the League. Then right after the Assembly meeting, I attended

the Sixth Committee meeting, where I was to speak on Article 11 of the Covenant

relating to the provision; "that any war or threat of war, whether initially

effecting any of the Members of the League of not, is hereby declared a

matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action

that may be deemed wise or effectual to safeguard the peace of nations." It

was important from China's point of view because the provision made it clear

that any threat of war was a matter of concern to all the members of the League
 272

While I was still in the Committee Room, Mr. Yu Ming came to tell me

that Quo Tai-chi had asked me to go at once to the Council, as the question

of China's appeal was being brought up for discussion. I went at once, but

when I arrived, the meeting was already about to adjourn. Then Mr. Quo

told me that he had already told the Council and Mr. Butler in particular

that China would not press for application of Article 16, if Great Britain,

France and Soviet Russia would have a talk with China on the question of aid,

and would work together to help her. I was extremely surprised, because

it was all too early to reveal our final position. I felt that Mr. Quo's

premature revelation of our final stand took all the weight from my position

in the negotiations with Mr. Butler. And in fact, several times thereafter

he retorted to my arguments on the question of applying Article 16 that

Mr. Quo had already asked for conversations on aid instead, in accordance

with the instructions of the Chinese government. I had to tell Mr. Butler

plainly that that was based upon a private cable from a vice-minister, and

did not have the character of official instructions from the government.

That day my discussion in the Council with Mr. Butler was rather disagreeable

and almost acrimonious. M. Paul Boncour of France was more sympathetic, but

said little and only gave a sigh. Mr. Litvinov, whom I brought along to

the Council Room [from the Sixth Committee meeting,] to participate in our

discussion, left prematurely on thinking the Council meeting was already over

and on hearing Mr. Butler say he would like to have a private talk with China's

representatives prior to an open discussion.

[A secret or closed meeting of the Council on the Chinese appeal was

scheduled for the following day, September 2?.] In the hope of finding out

whether it would be possible to arrive at some agreement before the secret

meeting on the Chinese appeal, in view of the differences of opinion between

Mr. Butler and the Chinese delegation, I arranged to call on Mr. Butler again,
 273

and explained to him that I was anxious to bridge these difficulties which
u- ■• . . v
were separating our two points of view, in order to avoid an open opposition

in the meeting of the Council itself. Our interview took place in the

afternoon of the 27th, just before the secret Council meeting.

I told Mr. Butler that the Chinese delegation had received another

telegraim from the Chinese government again asking it to demand the application

of Article 16.But after carefully considering the point, my delegation had

come to the conclusion that, in the present critical circumstances of Europe

and in view of the declarations already made by several delegations relating

to their interpretation of Article 16, it would perhaps be futile to try again

to ask for the complete application of the measures provided for in that Article.

I told him I realized that was a difficulty in fact. However, in my statement

before the Council, I would emphasize the juridical position of the Chinese

delegation with reference to the Covenant. In other words, I explained that

since the conditions stipulated in Article 17 for making applicable Article 16

were now completely fulfilled, it must be admitted that Article 16 had become

applicable. But whether all the measures or any of them were applied by

the members of the League was a matter that must be left to their judgment.

The Chinese delegation maintained the view that the obligations were automatic

and should be carried out in full by all the member states. Nevertheless it

realized there was no way of making others, who had already declared it

otherwise, agree to the Chinese viewpoint. I said that, in the second place,

the grave situation in Europe was a fact which naturally had given cause

for anxiety and hesitation on the part of certain member states to carry

out their obligations under Article 16. That was also a question of fact.

I then said that these two facts, while making it difficult for certain

member states to discharge their obligations fully under the said Article, did

not mean that no member state needed to do anything within their power. The
 274

Chinese delegation still hoped that all the members would do their best.

In any case, the fact that the obligations of Article 16 were not fully carried

out by all the member states should not prevent others who were well in a

position to fulfil them from doing so. In fact, I said, all the members

would henceforth be entitled to take any of the measures provided for in Article

16, not only as a matter of obligation but also as a matter of right. Thus

juridically Article 16 would remain in force and its incomplete application

would merely be due to temporary difficulties, which the Chinese delegation

hoped would disappear eventually thereby enabling its full execution by

all the member states. Mr. Butler said he appreciated the decision of the

Chinese delegation not to take an extreme stand which would lead nowhere,

but to be prepared to take not of the real difficulties at the moment in Europe.

He thought that was a much better course. He himself would not then make

a statement in the sense he had intended by again declaring the attitude

of the British government vis-A-vis Article 16, but would merely say a word

to approve the Chinese stand.

I told him there were two other points I wanted to draw to his attention.

The Chinese delegation would continue to insist on the carrying out by the

member states of the resolutions already adopted by the Assembly and the

Council, and ask the Council to go farther than it had done in May 1938 on the

question of the use of poison gas. The Chinese delegation had sent at least

four communications during the last few months giving evidence of the

employment of poison gas by the Japanese. The latest one had been addressed

to the League only a few days ago, showing that on September 19 the Japanese

had again employed gas on a large scale. I said this was a matter to which

the Chinese government and genearAl-ly Chiang personally attached great importance.

Mr. Butler said he understood my desire to reinforce the resolutions

and considered it a natural one. He was good enough to promise that he would
 275

support me, if I brought it up at the meeting of the Council. He said he

thought all the member states should do their best to carry out these

resolutions. As regards poison gas, he thought the Council might be able

to do something futher. If I brought it up at the meeting, he told me he

would say a word in support of my position.

[The upshot of the Chinese appeal was the adoption by the Council on

September 30 of a resolution to the effect that the members of the League

were entitled to adopt individually the measures provided for in Article 16,

but that it was evident, as regards any coordinated action in carrying out

such measures, that the necessary "elements of cooperation" were "not yet

assured." The members of the League were also urged to extend sympathy and

aid to China, just as they had been urged, ineffectually, to do so many times

in the past year. No action was taken with regard to Japan's air bombing

of civilian populations. As regards the use of poisonous gas by Japanese

troops in China, the Council on September 30 adopted a resolution inviting

governments represented on the Council and Advisory Committee to use regular

diplomatic channels to investigate cases of the use of toxic gas brought to

their notice and submit reports of their findings. I accepted this resolution

while again suggesting the advantages of an international committee of investi

gat ion. ]

The international situation in Europe continued to deteriorate as

Great Britain and France persisted in practical capitulation to German

intimidation and to German and Italian claims. Inevitably the Italian

conquest of Abyssinia and the Anschluss in Austria were followed by the

extortions which Hitler was able to make and obtain from Chamberlain and

Daladier at Godesberg and finally at Munich.

The sacrifice of Czechoslovakia by Chamberlain and Daladier at Munich

was followed a few days later by the resignation of President Benes of

of Czechoslovakia. It was reported that, in his letter of resignation, Benes

explained that his action was taken "in order not to be a hindrance for the

development of the state in future."

The lack of determination to stand up to the threat of intimidation, as

practised by Hitler, for example, indicated not only to Germany and Italy, but

also to the world at large how and to what great extent the spirit of opposition

and resistance was lacking on the part of Great Britain and France. [To make

matters worse for China, ] the Munich settlement of late September showed

Japan as well how weak and frightened the Western democratic powers in Europe

were in their cfealings with the Central Powers, allied to Japan. The successive

steps of capitulation taken by London and Paris simply further encouraged

Japanese aggression in China.

As an illustration of [the degree to which] the French spirit showed a

lack of any intention to resist international aggression, the Chamber of

Deputies gave a big vote of confidence to Daladier on his Munich settlement,

and at the same time voted to confer on the French Premier "full powers" until

November 15. [And since the Communists had voted in opposition to the Munich

agreements and the Socialists had abstained, the vote marked the end of Lhe

Popular Front in France.]

It will be recalled that the British Parliament in London likewise approved

Chamberlain's capitulation at Munich. However, in the British case it led

to the resignation of several members of Chamberlain's cabinet, who disagreed

and disapproved his settlement. But, on the whole, the Munich settlement gave

great relief to the people in Europe at large. For several days prior to

its conclusion the fear was prevalent that war would finally and certainly

break out. This general apprehension was manifested in the blackout tests,

undertaken even in Geneva by Switzerland, as a precautionary measure against

air bombing, if war should break out. In the evening of September 27, all
 277

lights in the streets of Geneva were turned off or smothered, thus bringing

the imminence and danger of war home to all the delegates from all over the

world and to the Swiss people. It presented a most depressing sight. I*f .■/'v

necessity I continued to work in my room, but I had to close all the windows

and pull the curtains, and the air became stifling.

When the sensational news of the agreement arrived at by the conference

of four at Munich reached Geneva, there was a widespread feeling of great

relief. Everybody felt that war was, at last, avoided. [Initially, at

least, they ignored the cost that had been paid.] Mr. Hambro, Speaker of the

Norwegian Lower House, thought the whole situation was theatrical. He

said he knew that Chamberlain had been prepared to yield more [if Germany had

insisted.] But Mussolini definitely did not want war; his mediation was

a good way for Hitler to climb down.

[Several weeks later, when I had already returned to Paris, ] I addressed

an audience of about 120 of the Chinese colony, [who had gathered at the Embassy

to celebrate the "Double Tenth."] The Assembly and Council meetings of the

League of Nations in September had obtained for China as much as possible,

in the form of another resolution in support of China in principle, but this

was hardly satisfactory. I was feeling very depressed. Therefore, in speaking

on the 10th of October, I spoke feelingly and emphasized three points. [First,

I said] it was of no use to rely upon the Western powers after China's experience

in Geneva and the settlement of the Czechoslovakian crisis. Second, I said China

must look to herself redoubling her efforts and strengthening her means of

resistance, especially the cardinal factors of space, time and number (the great

factors, which M .Edouard Harriot had once reminded me were China's greatest assets.)

I said China should not feel desperate in her effort to resist the Japanese aggressio

We Chinese should begin by making use of our great numbers. They had to

be guided as to how best to serve China. Third, I told them that everyone of the
 278

Chinese people should work hard in the interior of China to help in industrial

and agricultural cooperatives, with a view to increasing production to

strengthen China's power of resistance. Those who could not take active

part in this field should also do something; women especially, should take

on some work in helping to look after the orphans, the sick and the wounded

of the families of the soldiers.

This memoir was made possible by grants
from the ford Foundation and the National
Hndowment for the Humanities to Columbia
University for the last Asian Institute.

Copyright C 1076. The Trustees of Columbia

University in the City of New York. All
rights reserved. This work may be cited
and brief passages may be quoted as with
any scholarly work, but the memoir may not
be/published, nor sold, nor otherwise re­
produced in any form without written per­
mission from the Fast Asian Institute of
Columbia University, New York, New York 100^7.
REMINISCENCES OF WELLINGTON KOO

VOLUME IV MISSION TO FRANCE

(PRELIMINARY DRAFT FORM)

4. Diplomatic Efforts in View of the Initiation of

Japan's Southward Expansion Movement and the
Decline of Individual Initiative among the Western
Powers:
October-Mid-November 1938
 2 79

4. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN VIEW OF THE INITIATION OF JAPAN'S SOUTHWARD EXPANSION

movement and the decline of individual initiative among the western powers

The barren results of the Chinese appeal to the League of Nations and the

weakness of the Democratic Front in dealing with the Central Powers in Europe,

shown particularly in the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia's territorial integrity

and independence by Great Britain and France to Germany, called for a

comprehensive review of China's policy in her resistance to the Japanese

aggression and China's expectations and hope of aid and assistance from the

outside world. On October 4, 1938, I cabled a rather comprehensive report

and analysis of the international situation and its bearing upon China's policy

vis-A-vis Japan, addressing my cable to the Waichiaopu and also to the Generalissimo

and the President of the Executive Yuan, Dr. H. H. Kung. It gave my views and

conclusions as follows:

1. The consequences of the situation stemming from the Anschluss effected by

Germany in Austria and the dismantlement of Czechoslovakia as a result of

capitulation on the part of Great Britain and France out of their fear of war,

are not limited to the general situation in Europe, but also bear heavily upon

the Far Eastern situation.

2. France had been an ally of Czechoslovakia for more than ten years as a

result of their Treaty of Alliance. Yet she disregarded her Treaty obligations

and coerced Czechoslovakia to give up a part of the country to Germany as a

price for peace, thereby throwing overboard her policy of containment of Germany,

built up with great pain and effort extending over a 20-year period. From now on,
\i & ■■y
I qm afraid that the small and weak countries will not da^e to look up to

France for help, and that the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance and

the Franco-Polish Treaty of Alliance have in fact lost their practical effect.

As to the Franco-British agreement of cooperation, [it resulted in] the

French placing great hope and reliance upon Great Britain. Yet this time

the British Prime Minister in concluding his [initial] agreement with Hitler

did not consult France beforehand, nor immediately inform France afterward.
 ([Parenthetically, I might note some of the reasons for Great Britain’s

bypassing of France in concluding the original agreement with Hitler.] In

the first place, historically, there had always been, beneath the surface,

suspicion on the part of Great Britain of French intentions, and probably

of France's ambition to dominate the continent of Europe, while holding an

attitude of looking upon Great Britain as not entirely belonging to the

continent itself. There was also a feeling on the part of many British statesmen

that French internal politics was too much of a distracting force, giving

rise to a lack of unity, a struggle for power and the instability of any French

government after the First World War. In the third place, there was always

a strong element in the British political world, and even in British society,

which had close relations with Germany, and there was always a belief on

their part that Germany was Great Britain's natural ally to cooperate to

further the interests of both countries.)

It appears clear to me that from now on France will in fact, find

herself isolated internationally. Her position [as a country] with 14 million

people facing a Germany with 18' million indeed be a difficult one.

Mr. Litvinov, the Soviet Foreign Commissar, went so far as to conclude that

henceforward France could not be looked upon as a first class power.

I understand the real cause for France's capitulation was the unpreparedness

of her air force, its buildup having been only 50 percent completed. At

the same time, there was dissension among the French political leaders, who
, ( *« **
could not unite to work for France effectively. It seem< to me that

those French statesmen who favored cooperation with Italy would come to the top.

3. Great Britain's eagerness to avoid war at any price was also due to the

lack of preparedness; besides the Prime Minister was an old man whose thoughts

were antiquarian. He payed no attention to obligations under international law

or the principles of international morality. He appeared to me to be still

 281

dominated by a desire, which was prevalent in the 19th century, to pursue

a policy, once represented by the phrase "The Concert of Europe," which set itself

to dominate and control the weaker and smaller powers and thereby maintain the

peace of Europe. He seemed to believe that for this purpose Germany and Great

Britain were the two principal powers. His attitude toward the League of Nations

was determined by his desire and purpose to meet the wishes of Germany and Italy

and to abandon altogether the principle of collective security, sabotaging

the principle of automatic application of Article 16 of the Covenant and

laying emphasis instead upon Article 19, which provided for revision of

treaties by agreement, and also modifying Article 11, which required

unanimity of approval for any change in the basic constitution of the League.

His belief, where conflicts arose between small powers, was that they could

be coerced into accepting a settlement imposed by the big powers.

As regards his [Chamberlain's] attitude toward Soviet Russia, he looked

upon her with suspicion and discrimination. He was unwilling to allow her

to participate in the politics of Europe, and was in great fear of the spread

of communism. Therefore, his policy was to exclude Soviet Russia from any

participation in European problems. The British Prime Minister's distrust

of Soviet Russia was so great that even after the British Foreign Office had

succeeded in securing an assurance from Soviet Russia to the effect that if

Great Britain and France decided to oppose Germany, Soviet Russia would also

join in the opposition, and even after the British Foreign Office gave

publicity to this fact in the hope of cautioning Germany, the British Prime

Minister went ahead and sought and obtained the consent of Mussolini to

undertake a kind of mediation by proposing the convening of a four-power

conference, with Germany and Italy on one side and Great Britain and France

on the other, thereby excluding Soviet Russia.

As regards his attitude and policy in the Far East, the British Prime
 282

\(L]
Minister's main purpose is not to offend Japan in the hope that if there

should be war in Europe, Japan would be willing to be neutral and would continue

to respect British rights and interests in the Far East, particularly British

colonies. In view of this intention, it is easy to understand why the Prime

Minister went out of his way to show sympathy and consideration for Japan

and to refuse to grant China the loans and credits that we urged upon Great

Britain.

Even when China proposed to discuss export credit alone, and offered

to send a high official or a prominent banker and specialist to England to

undertake the negotiations, Great Britain refused to agree on the ground that

it would attract too much attention from Japan. Even when we raised the

question of the use of poison gas by the Japanese armed forces and requested

the appointment of an international commission to inspect and investigate it,

Great Britain took the stand that our evidence was insufficient, and offered

to investigate the matter through the ordinary diplomatic channels. As

regards our protest aid our request for action to discourage and stop the bombing

by Japanese aircraft of the civilian population and undefended towns, by

refusing to supply oil and aircraft to Japan, the British representative opposed

our request strenuously and repeatedly stated he could not participate in

any discussion of it. Even when I, in my draft speech, stated that the League

member states had a right under Article 16 of the Covenant to apply sanctions

against the aggressor nation, the British representative opposed the use

of the word "right" vigorously and insisted upon our deletion of this

particular term.

4. Soviet Russia was greatly disappointed at the capitulation of Great Britain

and France to Germany and Italy, and especially critical of France for her

attitude of appeasement. Mr. Litvinov repeatedly stated in the Assembly that

Soviet Russia attached great importance to a pact of mutual assistance concluded

 283

with another j^ower and was prepared to carry out all her obligations. As

an illustration, he stated that the Soviet government had officially warned

Poland not to send any troops to the Czechoslovak border, in order to demonstrate

Moscow’s determination to carry out her obligations under the pact of mutual

assistance [with France.. Although Soviet Russia continue*/ to uphold

, , , i
the Covenant of the League of Nations, she pan not but recognize that, in

fact, the League could not be depended upon and that Moscow should not rely

upon it.

As regards Soviet policy toward the Far East, the Foreign Commissar

stated that his government was in favor of aiding China and recognized the

need of adopting joint action in the application of sanctions against Japan.

But in view of the situation in Europe and the fact that China is so far

sway, [he said] it would not be easy to apply joint sanctions as would

ordinarily be the case. It would be necessary, in the circumstances, to

secure the cooperation of the United States. As regards this point, Mr.

Litvinov's views agreed entirely with what the French representative had

told me.

In a word^henceforth the most important thing, as regards the Far

Eastern problem and situation, to enable Soviet Russia to continue to

extend and increase her aid to China. As regards economic and financial sanctions,

their application, even to a limited extent, would require, in the opinion

VrXj
of the friendly 'powers, the cooperation of the United States. This ts a

crucial point.

At the League of Nations a legal basis ha^ already been laid for the

application of Article 16. It would therefore be opportune to approach the

United States with a view to urging Washington to take the initiative in

applying economic sanctions in cooperation with Great Britain, France, Soviet

 284

Russia, the Netherlands and Belgium, as regards raw materials with which the

said nations were well supplied, so as to bring about concerted international

WZj
action to halt further supplies to Japan. Whether this measure i* to be
vVtO h-
applied secretly or publicly, such application irs ^ound to bring some results.

I said toward the end of the telegram that I had already telegraphed

to Ambassador Hu Shih in Washington, informing him of the situation canpletely

and explaining to him that, even outside of the matte? of applying sanctions,

any measure to help China would, in view of the pj.e&aet situation in

Europe, require the cooperation of the United States and its initiative.

Washington had to act as the center of gravity for any effective measure of

concerted action of the powers to help China.

The telegram to Dr. Hu Shih, [which I mentioned,] was sent out the

previous day, October 3. [Specifically,] it first informed Dr. Hu of the

gist of the Council’s resolution on the Chinese question, to the effect that

Article 16 was applicable individually by member States, but as to their

collective action, the necessary elements of cooperation were not yet assured.

I then told him that, in the discussions of the drafting committee, Britain,

France and Soviet Russia had all stressed the necessity of American cooperation.

In fact, I told him, the original formula of the drafting committee practically

put the blame for the Brussels Conference’s failure to do anything effective

and the responsibility for the future application of sanctions, on the United

States government. And it was, I added, only due to my insistance and amending

that the final wording adopted did not do so.

Toward the end of the telegram, I said that in view of the present

European situation, any initiative for any concerted action in the Far East

had to come from America. Then I queried: Could Washington propose an understanding

with Britain, France,Soviet Russia, Belgium, Holland and a few other countries

concerned for effecting an embargo against Japan on arms, war materials,

 285

airplanesj oil, credit and essential raw materials for Japanese industry.

On October 12 I sent another wire to Dr. Hu Shih, telling him, with

reference to my telegram of the 3rd, that I had just sounded out the Quai

d1 Orsay, "which still holds France is ready to follow America and Britain

in adopting sanctions under Article 16" and I asked wht the prospects were
A
of American initiative in this matter. I added that personally, I thought
?
even a tacit understanding among interested powers to enforce certain sanctions

by administrative or semi-official means would have salutory effects.

Two days later, on the 14th, I sent Hu Shih another cablegram. It

in£ormed him that Havas, the French news agency, reporting on the American

attitude in Washington, stated that Japan's extension of hostilities into

South China created a situation calling for common action by America, Britain

and France, and that the whole situation depended upon British firmness,

since the United States had never yielded to Japanese military injunctions.

The same report said that the State Department was contemplating to initiate

consultations after studying the latest Japanese note. I ended the telegram

by a question: "Does the above reflect American official views?"

[In the meantime, the Generalissimo had] replied to my cable on policy

of October 4. In his telegram, dated October 12, he said my suggestion to

ask the United States to initiate sanctions was an excellent and admirable

one. He said he had himself already telegraphed to Ambassador Hu Shih to

proceed with the matter, and he hoped that I would continue to exert myself

with a view to bringing this desirable result about.

Dr. Hu Shih's first reply was received on October 16. It informed me

that he had received the three telegrams on sanctions. [Then he went on to

review recent American policy decisions. He first recalled Secretary of State

Hull's press conference of June 11. He said Secretary Hull declared the

United States condemned bombing of civilian populations or its material

 286

encouragement, and further stated this public condemnation would discourage

the sale of air bombers to regions where they would be used for bombing civilian

populations. On July 1, Hu Shih continued, the Office of Arms and Munitions

Controls under the State Department issued a confidential letter. With reference

to the manufacturer or exporter of airplanes or airplane equipment, the letter

said the United States government was strongly opposed to the sale of

airplanes or aeronautical equipment th?t would materially aid or encourage the

bombing of civilians in any country. Therefore, the Department would,

with great regret, not issue any license authorizing the exportation, direct

or indirect, of any aircraft or armament engine parts, accessories, aerial bombs

or torpedos to countries the armed forces of which would make use of

airplanes for attacking civilian populations. The same letter suggested

that the manufacturer or exporter who was under previous contractual obligations

might inform the Department of the terms of contract before applying for a

license to export or before exporting under a license already issued. Then

Dr. Hu, who had actually quoted the letter, added, out of precaution:

"Kindly regard above letter as not to be quoted directly."

[My telegram to Hu Shih of the 14th had referred to the extention of

hostilities to South China. In fact it was a most serious matter. On

October 12 the Japanese had landed forces at Bias Bay in Kwangtung Province

near Hongkong, evidently intending to take advantage of the major powers

preoccupation with the crisis in Europe to push inland to capture Canton,

and presumably, if possible, cut the important supply route provided by the

Canton-Hankow Railway, and move onward to Hankow. ]

On October 17, the Generalissimo sent me a telegram from his military

headquarters, informing me of [the beginning of the southward push with] the

attack on Canton by the Japanese armed forces. He evidently was seriously

disturbed. In his telegram, he said that this attack on Canton v/as not

aimed at China alone. It really was an indication of the beginning of the

 287

so-called "southward expansion policy" of Japan and an attempt to find out the

real British policy and the reaction of the United States and Great Britain.

If Great Britain showed any sign of weakness and if France and the United States kept

quiet, letting Japan establish a bas^ of operations in South China, then,

the Generalissimo said, the colonial possessions of Great Britain, France,

the United States and the Netherlands, such as India, Burma, Indochina and the

Philippines, would all in turn come to be the targets of Japanese expansion.

Therefore, he said, it was absolutely necessary for France, England and the United

States to combine their efforts and present a united front in assisting China, so

t hat Japan would know that she would have to face the united opposition of the

three powers and would therefore withdraw from her present attack. He pointed out

that since the Japanese attack on Mukden, on September 18, 1931, the Japanese

ambition to dominate Asia by expelling white people had become crystal clear,

and that it was developing all because the powers were unable to cooperate with

one another in order to effectively stop the Japanese aggression.

The Generalissimo went on to say that China herself had been resisting

Japanese aggression for over a year and her strength was being rapidly consumed.

Although she still appeared to be continuing her resistance, she really was feeling

exhaused and tired at heart. According to the Generalissimo, China would

no longer be able to meet a big battle, if it should take place. (I understood

this to be an exageration on his part, designed as an argument to encourage

action and firmness by the powers.) He said previously a moderate show of

a stiff attitude by France and Soviet Russia, as in the Paracel Islands

and the Changkufeng affair, was sufficient to cause Japan to withdraw. These

were proofs of Japan's real intentions and attitude. Therefore, the Generalissimo

urged that the various fevers should not lose this opportunity of uniting

to put a stop to the Japanese aggression. He said he could predict that

if such combined strength were manifested, Japan would cower before it. He

asked me to convey this idea to the French government and also to join efforts
 288

with Ambassadors Hu in Washington and Quo in London to press the powers to

take action.

The Waichiaopu, clearly feeling anxious about the latest development

in the military situation and the intensified operations directed toward the

capture of Canton and Kwantung Province, telegraphed me on the 16th f'f) asking

that I make a trip to London for the purpose of discussing with Ambassador Quo

how to bring about joint or parallel representations by London, Paris and

Washington at Tokyo. X replied that it would not be advisable for me to

leave Paris at the time because I had several important engagements to carry

out in pursuing the same matter with the French government <ind with my

diplomatic colleagues in Paris. At any rate, I explained, my trip would not

be necessary because I was in constant communication with the Ambassador in

London by telephone.

In the late afternoon of the 17th, I sawM. Georges Bonnet at the Quai d'Orsay.

I explained at the outset that the purpose of my visit was to speak to him

about the new situation created by the Japanese offensive against South China

and the consequences that it might entail for France, Great Britain and the

United States, as well as for China. I told him that the object of this new

adventure on the part of Japan was not only to cut the communications between

Hongkong and Canton so as to bring pressure to bear upon the Chinese government,

but also to establish a base from which Japan might threaten the security

of the territorial possessions of the Western powers, like Hongkong, Indochina,

Singapore and the Philippines. I said that this new adventure was the outcome

of a struggle between the moderate and extreme elements in the Japanese government

The latter group was supported by the Japanese navy and a part of the .irmy.

Therefore, they were in close cooperation with the Rome-Berlin axis and

were against collaboration with Great Britain and France. The other group,

which till a few days ago had succeeded in holding the extreme elements in

check so as not to provoke complications with Western democracies, had been

 289

led by General Ugaki, the late Foreign Minister. But following the events

in Europe and the Munich Agreement, the extreme elements had gained the upper

hand, and General Ugaki's opposition was overcome as shown by his sudden

resignation from the government.

I told M. Bonnet that I was convinced that the new Japanese move against

South China, while aiming to cut off one of the channels of supply to the Chinese

government, was also intended to mark the beginning of the execution of the

policy of southward expansion. The acquisition of a base in South China

would enable Japan, when the next crisis in Europe should arise, to bring

pressure to bear upon Great Britain and France in the Far East, in collaboration

with Germany and Italy in Europe, for extorting further concessions from the

Anglo-French group. Unless steps were taken at once to check this new Japanese

move, it might prove too late to prevent Japan from extending her activities

against the territorial possessions of Great Britain and France, when the next

crisis in Europe should develop. On the other hand, I said, if Great Britain

and France decided to adopt a firm attitude at present, Japan might be persuaded

to refrain from carrying out further her new adventure. I reminded M. Bonnet

of the success of the French policy of firmness in the controversy relating

to the Paracel Islands. I added that similar firmness on the part of the

Soviet Union in the Changkufang incident had also obliged Japan to withdraw

from a strong stand.

I went on to say that now after 15 months of war with China, whose resistance

in terms of its duration and its strength had greatly surprised the Japanese,

Japan was feeling war weary and anxious to finish the whole business as soon as

possible. She was in no position to withstand the pressure of a determined

opposition by Great Britain and France. But if Great Britain and France took no

action in time, the consequences to their interests in the Far East would be

very great.
 290

According to reliable information, I continued, Japan had been trying

to negotiate a military alliance with Germany, which had already accepted the

proposal in principle. The replacement of a career diplomat as Japanese

Ambassador in Berlin by the promotion of the former Military Attachd, General Togo,

had been done in order to push the negotiations to an early conclusion.

Hitler's uncompromising attitude, as shown in his recent speech at Saarbrucken,

and Japan's launching of an attack on South China indicated that Germany, Italy

and Japan were working together in order to exploit the apparent weakness
Q
of the democratic powers.

Having presented a picutre of this situation as China viewed it, I then

suggested three measures France might and should take, not only with a view

to easing the Japanese pressure on China, but also with a view to safeguarding

the important interests of France, Great Britain and the United States themselves.

These measures were as follows;

First, France might suggest to Washington and London making a demarche in

Tokyo jointly or parallelly, asking Japan to refrain from carrying out her

campaign against South China. I said I believed such a suggestion would in

all probability be favorably received in Washington. I pointed to the recent

Havas despatch from the American capital, which indicated that American official

sentiment regarded the new Japanese attack on South China as calling for common

action on the part of Great Britain, France and the United States, and that

the American government viewed the situation with concern and was disposed

to consider any action that might be proposed by Great Britain, which, in the

American view, had greater interests in the Far East than the United States.

Secondly, I said the French government might assure China of the facilities

of transit through Indochina for all Chinese war materials, pending the

restoration of the communications between Hongkong and Canton. I told him that

in the interest of France, Great Britain and the United States, as well as in

that of China herself, it was essential that the Chinese resistance should
 291

continue and succeed in holding the Japanese aggression in check. So long

as China was able to resist the advance of the Japanese army in South as

well as in North and Central China, there could be no danger to the security

of the British, French and American colonies in the Far East. But that

resistence depended upon an uninterrupted flow of supplies from abroad. I

emphasized in this regard that several shiploads then en route to China — some

were of German and Soviet origin and others came from France and Belgium--were

urgently needed at the front. I said I would therefore urge M. Bonnet to

arrange that these goods, when arriving in Indochina, be allowed to pass through

Indochina without any obstruction. I said the Chinese government, on its

part, could assure the French government that all these transit would be

handled quietly and discreetly without causing any embarrassment to the Indochinese

government.

Thirdly, I said, in order to bring further pressure to bear upon Japan, the

French government might at once take steps to refrain from supplying her with

arms, munitions, airplanes, petroleum and other raw materials for her war industry.

I recalled to M. Bonnet the report recently adopted by the Council of the

League of Nations, declaring that Article 16 was now applicable. In conformity

with this report, I said, every member state had the right as well as the duty

to adopt such measures as I had just mentioned. I added that the United

States government in July 1938 had already advised the airplane manufacturers

to refrain from further supplying Japan with airplanes and aviation material.

I said that advice had been adhered to by the American manufacturers and the effect
A
on Japan had been not inconsiderable. I told M. Bonnet similar and more extended

action on the part of France would make a useful contribution. It did not

matter, in my view, whether the measures were called sanctions or not, nor

whether or not they were carried out openly. So long as Japan was denied

further supply of the articles mentioned, she would soon feel the effect of this
 292

policy.

The French Foreign Minister said he was of the same opinion as I regarding

the consequences and effect of the Japanese advance towards South China. He

felt too that some action should be taken. But in the circumstances, he felt

that whatever was done by the United States would carry far more weight than

what might be done by either Great Britain or France. He said he would therefore

at once made a demarche in Washington in the sense I had proposed. As regards

the second and third steps I had proposed, he said he would study them. He

asked me to count upon his support and he expressed the hope to have another

talk with me on the result of his d&narch in Washington. As regards the

question of withholding supplies from Japan, he added that he did not know

that France was supplying Japan with such things as oil at all. I remarked in

reply that while Japan was not obtaining petroleum from France, I understood

that certain kinds of arms were still going to Japan.

Later the same day, I sent telegrams to Ambassadors Hu Shih in Washington

and Quo Tai-chi in London, giving them an account of my conversation with

the French Foreign Minister, which had emphasized Japan's intention to carry

out her policy of southward expansion at the expense of Great Britain, France

and the United States and my three suggestions in the interest of bringing

about a joint or parallel representations to Tokyo, with a view to checking

further moves by Japan in South China. Toward the end of my telegram, I

told tthem that the French Foreign Minister had concurred in my analysis of

the ulterior purpose of Japan in intensifying its military operations in

South China, but that he had emphasized the necessity of United States

participation in the demarche which France was contemplating to make either

individually or jointly. I also expressed my desire to know wh't they respectively

 293

understood to be the British and American attitudes on these particular points.

[There was further communication between the three of us, when, on

October 19, I saw Mr. Edwin Wilson, the American Charge d'Affaires in Paris, about

the same matter. After I gave him a gist of my conversation with the French

Foreign Minister and handed him a telegram to be sent to United States

Ambassador Bullitt, who was absent on leave in the United States, I raised

several questions. Mr. Wilson commented in reply that it also seemed to him

that Japan's attack on South China, Germany's move against Czechoslovakia

and Mussolini's declaration were all synchronized to work for their respective

countries' advantage. Although he had no information as to the attitude of

his government vis-A-vis the Japanese thrust to South China, to judge from

the announcement of a heavy program of rearmament in Washington and Mr.

Pollock's speech calling for national preparedness, he felt the American

government must have had in view not merely the European situation but also

the Far Eastern development.

When he read closely the text of the telegram to be dispatched to Mr.

Bullitt, he said he took the phrase "other measures" did not imply military

action. I answered in the negative and said that what I had in mind was

such measures as the withholding of supplies from Japan like airplanes,

arms and raw materials for Japan's war industry. Mr. Wilson thought that,

in the circumstances, empty words would not produce any desired effect on

Japan, and that something more than empty words was necessary.

I then expressed the view that it would be desirable to obtain Soviet

cooperation. Soviet Russia with her military dispositions on the Manchurian

frontier was in a position to exert a great deal of pressure on Japan. I

asked Mr. Wilson whether Washington would have any difficulty in asking Moscow
 294

to join in the demarche the three powers might contemplate making in Tokyo.

The American Chargd d'Affaires replied he had no information from his government,

but personally he was inclinedto think that Washington might hesitate to do so,

lest it should appear that the four powers constituted an opposition bloc to

the anti-Comintern group.

As to the general attitude of Washington on the suggestion of a demarche

Vr^a^v
in Tokyo, Mr. Wilson told me he had heard nothing from his government, I

called his attention to the Havas despatch indicating that the sentiment in

Washington was in favor of common action by Great Britain, France and the

United States. Mr. Wilson told me that he had read part of it in Le Temps, namely

that about Great Britain having greater interest in the Far East than the

United States, but he did not remember the part about the advisability of taking

common action. I told him that I would send him a copy of the full text of the

despatch. I also informed him that the Chinese Ambassador in London had just

seen Lord Halifax on Monday, the 16th, and had been told that the British government

would get in touch with Paris and Washington about the South China situation.

I then told him that I had addressed the telegram to Mr. Bullitt personally

because Dr. Hu Shih in Washington had received similar instructions to mine

from the Chinese government, although I did not know whether he (Hu) had

already seen Secretary of State Hull about it. I added that if Mr, Wilson,

in connection with sending his report to the State Department on the Far

Eastern situation, should want to use any part of the telegram or any of the

information which I had just given him, he was entirely free to do so.

Mr. Wilson expressed his appreciation of my offer and for the information

I had given him about my talk with M. Bonnet. He asked to be informed of

M. Bonnet's reply, and promised to inform me as soon as he received a reply

from Mr. Bullitt.

The question of how best to secure more effective aid and cooperation

from the Western powers--and in my case, particularly from Great Britain,

 295

France, the United States and Soviet Russia--was a subject not only of interest

to me but also of common interest to the important Chinese political leaders

or statesmen,wtio came from China from time to time, bringing me data as to the

actual situation in China and news of the government, in addition to what

information I received from them by letter or telegram.

One of the gentlemen who discussed this question with me most often was

Li Yii-ying. On October 16 (17 ?) Mr. Li came to ask about my views on approaching

the French authorities officially for a formal agreement on the question of

transit facilities through Indochina. He told me that he had received cables

from the Generalissimo and Dr. T. V. Soong on the question, and he wanted to

urge me to seek a formal agreement from France so China could be assured of

the very much needed transit facilities. I felt that the suggestion was

not a feasible one in the circumstances. I told him that with the French

policy regarding transit as it was, and especially in view of the position

of the French cabinet of October 13, 1937, it would be impossible to obtain a

favorable result, if we pressed the French officially for a general agreement

on the matter. I said it would be better to ask the French to pass goods

through Indochina as they arrived. In other words, I felt it was necessary

to let the French make an appearance of observing neutrality, but with the

understanding that they would continue to give us help in this field undercover.

I told Li Yii-ying that if we pressed the French too hard, the French cabinet,

which was divided on the question anyway, might act openly against China by

confirming the decision of the year before.

Mr. Li Yii-ying was a gr^at friend of Dr. Rajchman of the League of Nations.

[On October 19 they called together] to have a discussion with me. Among

other things, he -(*) told me that people in Britain and France had begun to

realize the price paid for the Munich settlement was much too high. He

also said in this connection that Chamberlain's position was even more
 296

■/jpA £
fhrea^eyi^p than that of Daladier in France. He said Chamberlain wanted

to come to terms with Germany and had already taken steps to study how to

satisfy Germany's colonial claims. His plan was based on giving up to

Germany part of British West Africa together with the Belgian Congo and part

of the Portuguese colonies, while France was to compensate Belgium by giving

her part of the French Congo.

The following day, I sought and obtained an interview with M. Georges

Mandel, the French Minister of Colonies, in order to have a free and full

exchange of views on the policy and attitude of the French government. I

began our conversation by saying that as one of the repercussions of the

events in Europe and particularly of the Munich Agreement, the Japanese had

now launched their attack on South China not only for the purpose of cutting

off the communications between Hongkong and Canton, thereby shutting off one

of the channels of supply for the Chinese troops at the front, but also for

the purpose of establishing a base from which Japan could later advance further

southward with a view to threatening Hongkong, Singapore, Indochina and the

Philippines, This, I emphasized, was the beginning of the carrying out of

Japan's Southward expansion policy, advocated consistently by the Japanese Navy.

I said that as M. Mandel knew, there were two groups in Japan--one in favor

of northward expansion and the other in favor of southward expansion. The

Japanese Navy had wanted to push southward but had been held in check by the

more moderate elements which wished to come to an understanding with Great Britain.

That group was represented by men like General Ugaki, the former foreign

Minister. But on the morrow of the Munich Agreement the advocates of the

southward expansion policy triumphed and forced the General out of the

government, with the result that the adventure against Canton had been put

into effect.

The attack on Canton, I told M. Mandel, would have far-reaching consequences.

 297

Unless action was taken to forestall further development, it might be too

late for France and England to take any action to prevent Japan from threatening

their Far Eastern colonies when a new crisis should arise in Europe, for their

hands would then again be tied. I went on to say that Hitler's Saarbriicken

speech, Mussolini's intrasigent attitude towards France, the troubles in Palestine

and the Japanese move against Canton were all indications of a conspiracy

on the part of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis to bring pressure to bear upon

France and Great Britain. The time to try to forestall it was the present

moment. If France, Great Britain and the United States could act in concert

and warn Tokyo against going ahead, such warning would have an immediate

effect. As I told M. Mandel, Japan, after 15 months of war with China, was in no

position to counter any opposition from the three powers. She had already

greatly diminished her war materials and her military resources.

M. Mandel added economic resources twell, and went on to say that he

saw the implications of the new Japanese move entirely in the same light

as I did. He told me he was ready to do what he could to help China.

When I said the new situation thus created by Japan really meant there was a

greater community of interest between China and France or Indochina, he

told me that three days ago he had already ordered the release of the airplanes

that had been detained in Indochina. They had been detained when the situation

in Europe indicated that war was imninent, he explained. In view of the Siamese

attitude and the measures that Siam had taken on the frontier with Indochina,

and especially as Foreign Minister Bonnet had declared that, in the event of

war in Europe, Japan was sure to intervene on the side of Germany, he, as

Minister of Colonies, had felt obliged to take immediate action to fortify the

defense of Indochina. But now the crisis was over, he had at once ordered

the planes released. The action of detaining the airplanes had really been

imposed upon him by the circumstances, he said, and he hoped that I understood it
 298

M. Mandel agreed with me that the new Japanese move was one of the

repercussions of the Munich Agreement, which he regarded as most unhappy.

He told me that he himself was so dissatisfied with the policy pursued by

the French Foreign Minister that he had at one time sent in his resignation

from the cabinet. The policy pursued by Bonnet, he told me, did not represent

that of the government as a body. Mandel maintained that Germany was not

prepared to make war and it was all really a bluff on Hitler’s part. Although

German aviation had a margin of superiority over that of France as regards

technical quality, the French air force had a personnel of 18,000 trained

officers, whereas Germany had a shortage of pilots. After a first few

weeks, France could expedite the production of airplanes. As regards the army,

France had a reserve of 5,000,000 men, while Germany needed at least another

two or three years to catch up with France.

When I commented that Great Britain like France felt it was not yet

in a position to engage in a way;M. Mandel said he believed that the combined

strength of France, Great Britain, Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia would

be a formidable force for Germany to face. But by surrendering to Germany,

France had lost a strong friend in Czechoslovakia, which had now been brought

within the orbit of Germany. He added that Rumania had also begun to waver.

Then he told me that his views were not only shared by Daladier, the

French Premier, but were supported by a majority of the Cabinet. But

the Foreign Minister had committed the government to such an extent that, when the

invitation came from Hitler, Daladier had no alternative but to accept it.

When I asked whether important decision on the question of foreign affairs

were not taken by the cabinet as a whi^le, Mandel replied, "not always," and

added that since M. Bonnet was directly responsible for the conduct of foreign

affairs, he always considered himself as having the prerogative of using his

discretion and exercising his power. He explained that M. Bonnet’s argument

was that the country was not prepared to accept war with Germany, and that it was
 299

better to save the peace now than to saddle the future generations with a

tremendous casualty list and material losses. But he, Mandel, did not believe

that Hitler would make war. At least, if France had stood firm, there would

be no war.

I remarked that Great Britain seemed to have been rather weak in the

situation. M. Mandel said Great Britain did not have any treaty obligations

to discharge, whereas France was definitely bound to Czechoslovakia. A country

would not keep its friends abroad if it did not respect its own treaty

obligations. Now after the first flush of relief had disappeared, France had

begun to take stock of the situation and the price which she had paid for peace.

Information received from the provinces indicated clearly that public sentiment

against the policy pursued by the government at Munich was now developing.

He felt that policy was most unfortunate. He himself, he said, had always

urged Daladier and Bonnet to take a firm stand. On the very eve of their

departure for London after Godesberg, it was his memorandum, submitted to

the Cabinet which was supported as a basis of the Cabinet decision regarding

the policy to be pursued in London. But the Foreign Minister, M. Bonnet,

pursued a different line altogether.

I told him of my conversation with Bonnet and asked the Minister of

Colonies to help, adding that General Chiang Kai-shek had charged me to make

a personal appeal to him, Mandel, in order to obtain an assurance for tranist

facilities through Indochina. In view of the fact that the communications between

Hongkong and Canton had been cut off and pending the opening of the new

route between Burma and Yunnan, which would be ready, I understood, on November 1

on the British side, it was ab&Qlutely essential that the transit route via

Indochina be assured to China. M. Mandel said he fully saw the importance of this

route to China and would do his best, but as I knew-he did not need to

mention any names--there had always been opposition from the Quai d'Orsay.

The cabinet decision of October 1937 made it difficult for him to force
 300

the matter in the Cabinet. I told him I knew of the unsympathetic attitude of

the Quai d'Orsay, and I suggested, therefore, that he might arrange to accord

transit facilities without going through the French Foreign Office. I quickly

added that, at present, there were two shiploads of German and Russian war materials

on the way. On account of the hostilities in the vicinity of Hongkong and

Canton, they had been detoured to Indochina, and it was particularly urgent

that they should reach China as early as possible.

M. Mandel said he could not cable to the Governor-General, but he

might send a man out by air. He was afraid, however, that the man would not

get there before the ships arrived. I quickly responded by saying that I

believed if he decided to send a man, I could arrange to have the boats slow

down their voyage so as to time their arrival at Haiphong at the right moment.

When he asked when the boats would arrive, I replied probably in eight days .

Thereupon, M. Mandel sent for the Director of the department concerned in

Vc
the Ministry to join in the discussion of the ways and means whereby the

cargo on these ships could be sent through Indochina without embarrassing the

Governor-General with regard to any possible protest from Japan.

The matter proved to be somewhat complicated. The Director came in and,

after being told of the quantity of the goods, the tonnage of the vessels

and the approximate date of their arrival in Indochina, he said if they

arrived at Haiphong, they would have to be unloaded quickly and sent through

the frontier, otherwise they might attract too much attention. He thought, if

there were heavy armaments like tanks, these should be unloaded along the

coast, outside the limits of any port, such as [Mong^ai ?r} near the

Chinese frontier.

I remarked that that could be done only with the understanding of the

*
The orginal notes of the conversation simply say that Mandel "sent for B”.
"B" is never mentioned in the notes themselves as the Director, but sometimes
as "General B".
 301

Governor-General^ otherwise there might be complications. The Minister said^however

that the Governor-General did not need to know. The Director said that

that would be impossible because the Customs were bound to report to the Governor-

General. However, it was pointed out that if the goods were unloaded at M^ncay,

they would be in the nature of contraband, which was not uncommon in that part

of the world. When I urged that it would be wise to have an understaning with the

Governor-General in order to prevent any complications, the Minister explained

his idea. The Governor-Genera 1 should be told of how the thing was to be

done, but it must nonetheless be done in..such a way that the latter could

disclaim any knowledge of it in answer to any possible protest from the Japanese.

He asked whether it would not be possible to mark these goods as destined

for use in Indochina. The Director replied that would be a good way. In fact,

he said, he had suggested, as regards airplanes, that they should be unloaded

right at the military airfield in Indochina, then, in a few days, reassembled

and allowed to fly to China. In the present case, he thought the material

should be sent to the government arsenal in Indochina and from there shipped

over the frontier.

At that point M. Mandel said the best way would be for him to report

to Daladier, and obtain his approval. I expressed my agreement with the

Minister. But I told him that I myself had already spoken officially to Bonnet

about it and thought it desirable not to discuss the matter again with the

Quai d’Orsay, which would in all probability, again raise objections. Thereupon

the Minister of Colonies promised he would speak to the Premier without delay,

and asked for 48 hours to give me a reply. At my request, he fixed our next

appointment for 12 noon, October 22.

[In preparing my record of our interview, I added a postscript, which

indicates the political situation in which M. Mandel found himself. He had

 302

told me that, in the first flush of rejoicing over the saving of the peace,

he himself was alleged to have advocated war. But, he said, he sincerely

believed there would be no war. He told me that, in 1936, at the time of the

German occupation of the Rhineland, he had advocated a strong policy of retaliation.

He was then also criticized for being bellicose. But when the storm had

blown over and the French people had settled down to look things calmly in

the face, they realized what a humiliating retreat it was for France to have

allowed the occupation of the Rhineland without any energetic reaction. Those

of his friends who had criticized him for being bellicose at the time,

thereupon, charged him again, but this time for not having been energetic

enough in insisting upon the adoption of his (Handel's) point of view. It

only showed how difficult it was for a political figure to behave so as to

satisfy the changing moods of the people.

[After seeing M. Mandel, I went to the Soviet Embassy for a talk with

Soviet Ambassador Souritz.] M. Souritz began the conversation by asking me

what I thought of the political situation in France as affected by the Munich

Agreement. I told him that after the first flush of relief from the threat of

war people in France seemed to have begun to realize the tremendous price

France had paid for saving the peace. It also appeared to me that Daladier

was now playing for time, before deciding upon the course to follow.

The Soviet Ambassador then said the public had begun to be alarmed

over the extent to which the government had conceded to Germany and to feel

uneasy about the future. Even in the cinemas, he said, he saw audiences

yelling surprise and dissatisfaction when they saw how Germans took over the

conceded territory, which included the Czechoslovak fortifications, equivalent

to the Maginot line in France. In Mr. Souritz's view there were three

alternatives open to Daladier. The first was the dissolution of the Chamber

of Deputies and the call of a general election. But in view of the present
 303

drift in public opinion, Daladier apparently hesitated to adopt this course,

as he was not certain that the results of a general election would be

favorable to his government. The second alternative, said Souritz, was to

carry on the present government and wait for further developments, trying

to regain the support of public opinion in pushing forward a program of

rearmament. The third alternative was the formation of a national [coalition]

government from the Communists to Marin. As the Communists would not participate

in Daladier's government, it would amount to a national government from Blum

to Marin, that is to say, from the Socialists on the Left to the Royalists on the

Right. The trouble was, M. Souritz continued, that French politics lacked

strong leadership. Daladier was always carried away by the advice of the person

who last saw him. Xt was true, as X had said, that Daladier saw the situation

clearly and understood its meaning, but, according to Mr. Souritz, he was

not firm enough to stick to his views. He was carried away at the last moment

by Bonnet and his clique.

I said that Mandel was a strong personality and seemed to be farsighted.

I said he saw all the implications of the surrender at Munich. M. Souritz

agreed with this view and said Mandel was a Jew and originally belonged to

the Right. He added that, politically, Mandel had made many enemies and had

few friends. According to M. Souritz, he did not appear to have the qualities

and influence that would enable him to form a government. (That was a very

shrewd analysis of the Minister of Colonies.) Speaking of the majority of the

French cabinet supporting Mandel, the Soviet Ambassador told me that he knew

such ministers as Chappedelaine, Ramadier and Julien were all against the policy

pursued by George Bonnet, but most of them were members of the Radical Party

and, as such, were not in a position to openly oppose the government. However,

as M. Mandel himself was in a different position, Mr. Souritz thought, he

should have resigned as a protest to the Munich Agreement and made his position
 304

clear, as Duff-Cooper had done in England. Mr. Souritz thought such a move

would have served to call the attention of the country to the real situation.

Instead, Mandel had carried on in an optimistic way, without giving an opportunity

to the French people to appraise the seriousness of the situation in the full light.

As to Georges Bonnet, Mr. Souritz said that at one time he thought the

French Foreign Minister would adopt a firm policy vis-S-vis Germany and would

back up Czechoslovakia. But M. Litvinov was right in always saying that France

would never march in defense of Czechoslovakia and that what Bonnet was trying

consistently to do was to rid France of her obligations under the treaty. Mr.

Souritz said that he himself had expected that Bonnet would do his best

to bring pressure to bear upon Czechoslovakia to make concessions, but he had not

expected Bonnet to go so far as to surrender entirely to Germany as he had done.

He continued by saying that M. Bonnet and M. Chautemps were presently in favor

of dissolving the Chamber for a new election, and that, in foreign policy, they

stood for an understanding with Germany and Italy. He also said that before Munich

Daladier even had the idea of dispensing with Bonnet's service altogether, but

the temporary popular approval given Daladier's action in Munich on his return made

Daladier change his mind. The trouble in France was the mixing up of internal

politics with foreign policy. (A factor from which I think M. Souritz' own country

was fortunately free under its system of government .)

M. Souritz told me that men like Flandin argued that the surrender at

Munich was a far better course than waging a war, because they reasoned that

France, in the event of war, would lose in any case, whether she actually

won the war or lost it. If France lost the war, she (according to Flandin's

reasoning), being the weakest in the Anglo-French-Soviet coalition, would be made

to foot the bill. If she won, the victory would bring credit to a government

based upon the popular front, which would mean the defeat of the conservative

elements and the placing of France under the influence of the Conmunist Soviet Union
 305

For them,said Souritz, such a France would be intolerable.

M. Souritz asked what could be done with men of this mentality. He

said the French government placed the question before the country as an issue

of peace or war, and the people naturally chose the course of peace. But

that was only for the time being. They had now begun to realize the irretrievable

loss to France in prestige, honor and friendships. The hegemony of Germany in

Central Europe had been achieved and her influence in South-eastern Europe

had also become irresistable. The Daladier-Bonnet government had really saved

Hitler and German dictatorship, and not the peace. If France had only chosen

to stand firm after having mobilized, Hitler would have found it impossible

either to advance or to retreat. If he retreated, he would have sacrificed

his prestige as dictator. If he had advanced, he would have had to face alone the

strongest combination, consisting of England, France, Soviet Russia and

Czechoslovakia, since Italy was then wavering, as it was known that the

Italian King was against mobilization. The Czechoslovak army would have been

able to keep a million Germany soldiers engaged. But France had not stood

firm and now she had lost Czechoslovakia and her influence in south-eastern Europe.

Some of the French people, M. Souritz continued, asid that Soviet Russia

had all along adopted a vague, uncertain attitude in the crisis. That, he said,

was entirely untrue. M. Litvinov had always cbclared that the Soviet Union was

ready to join in any action on the part of France and Great Britain. The Soviet

Union had no idea of hiding itself behind the League. The only reference his

country had made to the League of Nations had been in connection with the right

of passage for troops. In that case, namely the sending of troops across Rumania

into Czechoslovak territory, it was necessary, said Mr. Souritz, to get a

mandate from the League of Nations.

I then pointed out that one of the repercussions of the Munich Agreement

was the Japanese offensive against South China. I gave Mr. Souritz a gist

of my conversation with Bonnet, particularly my suggestion that Washington

 306

and London be consulted in the interest of making a demarche in Tokyo, warning

against the Japanese adventure in South China. I also told Mr. Souritz that

Bonnet had said he would at once take up the idea and approach Washington.

The Ambassador told me, however, that Bonnet was not really interested in

the Far East. He said both physically and morally Bonnet was lacking In courage,

and his mentality seemed entirely on the reactionary side. In fact, Ambassador

Souritz said France had, in Geneva, not only failed to support any suggestion to

take effective action in the Far East against Japan, but had tried to obstruct

any initiative taken by others in that direction. France had attempted to persuade

England not to interest herself in the Far East, lest the forces in Europe might

be weakened. If France had let down Czechoslovakia in Europe as badly as

she had, Mr. Souritz felt there was little hope of getting any active support

from her for China. He added that Boncour, the previous Foreign Minister,

was a different case. He said Boncour belonged to the Left in French politics

and could not be said to represent the French point of view altogether .

I told M. Souritz that contrary to his expectations, this time my idea

seemed to have impressed M. Bonnet, and I hoped something would come out of my

suggestion. At the same time, I said, I would like to consult him (Souritz)

about the idea of having the Soviet Union participate in the proposed demarche

in Tokyo. I said that since the Soviet Union was more interested fin the Far East ]

than the other three powers, her participation would add a great deal of

weight to their joint efforts.

The Soviet Ambassador replied that, as I knew, there could be no

question as regards the principle of the Soviet Union s help for China,

that was the settled policy of the Soviet government. Only the form and

procedure for the proposed action by Moscow need be considered. The three
 307

powers would naturally base their warning on the fact that the Japanese attack

against South China involved their respective interests there. As the Soviet

Union had little interests in that region, her participation in a joint

demarche would not appear justified. Moreover, sane of the three powers might

think that Soviet participation would, on ideological grounds, be a disadvantage

rather than an advantage.

I said that the form and manner in which the warning was to be given,

whether jointly or separately, was left to the decision of the powers themselves.

I had indicated to M. Bonnet that the Chinese government had no particular

preference on this point. It was indeed likely that Washington, following its

traditional policy of parallel action, would prefer that the proposed demarche

be carried out not collectively but individually, although a previous understanding

would have to be reached as to its substance. The Soviet Union, I added, might

rightly base her action on the Sino-Japanese conflict as affecting the Far Eastern

situation.

The proposed participation, I continued, had two possibilities. The

first was that the Soviet demarche would add a great deal of weight to that

of the three powers. The second was that it might prove to be the beginning

of the formation of a united front of the four powers vis-A-vis the Far East.

(This was a policy that I and my colleague in London had always advocated

and recommended to our government, although the opinion within the government

had been divided on this point, especially in the year preceding, and even

for a time after, the Lukouchiao Incident broke out.) M. Souritz agreed with

my view and said he would at once telegraph to M. Litvinov, reporting to him

what I had proposed and reasons for it. When he asked whether the Chinese

Ambassador in Moscow had alraady spoken to M. Litvinov, I said I had myself cabled
 308

to my government suggesting that the Ambassador in Moscow be instructed to

make a similar request. M. Souritz assured me that he would let me know as

soon as he received a reply from Moscow.

Canton fell, and on the 21st of October a report reached me that the

Japanese had entered the city. I felt depressed as well as surprised at the

rapidity of the Japanese advance and the ineffectiveness of the Chinese

resistance. At the time I harbored a suspicion that General Yu Han-mou really

had no stomach to put up a fight.

On October 22, M. Mandel and I met as arranged previously. At the very

start he told me that he had seen Premier Daladier and that his conversation

had borne fruit. The goods in transit should be routed to Saigon, where they

would be received by the local authorities and sent immediately to the government

arsenals to be kept there as if they belonged to the local government. Then

within a week to ten days they could be retransportednorthward into China. He,

Mandel, would send a special representative by air, leaving the next Wednesday

[October 26] and arriving in five days, in order to inform the local authorities

personally and make the necessary arrangements. He wanted me to see to it

that the shipments under discussion did not arrive at Saigon before November 1 .

After expressing my appreciationcf the Minister's efforts, I assured him that I

would certainly arrange for the boat to arrive after November 1, around the 6th.

M. Mandel cautioned me that it was necessary to say nothing at the

Quai d'Orsay. As for the Ministry of National Defense, he asid it would

pretend to know nothing about it. I said it was an excellent arrangement in

which everybody would be covered. He said if any inquiry or protest should be

made, it could then be explained that the Chinese government had re-sold the

goods to Indochina, since it was found impossible to unload them at Hongkong,

and that the Indochinese government refused to let them pass through Indochina.

He added that the Indochineee government was in a position to buy because a loan

had recently been raised for the strengthening of the Colony. He said it was
 309

necessary, however, for China to see to it that the section of the Yiinnan-

Indochinese railway lying in Chinese territory was adequately defended against

bombardment from the air. That section lying in Indochina would be looked

after by the French side.

I would like to add a comment. I have now mentioned the devious ways by

which the Minister of Colonies and I were trying to get the goods through

Indochina. But I should have it recorded that for China that was war, and

for France it was practically on the eve of war with Japan in Indochina, because

it was entirely up to the Japanese to decide when to launch an attack against

Indochina. So it was perfectly justified, not only for China but for France too

to safeguard vital interests. And since that was war, no measures which could

serve the main purpose of checking the enemy could not be justified. Just

as in boxing, there is a popular saying, "No punches should be pulled," so in

war, I think, no scruples should be too carfully observed, especially when

the enemy was so ruthless and even brutal in trying to achieve its objective.

[As M. Mandel had mentioned the necessity for China to see to the defenses

against air attack of the Yiinnan-Indochina Railway in her territory, ] I quickly

assured him that I would certainly call the attention of my government to the
•k

importance of the defense measures. General B, who was also present with

M. Mandel, then pointed out that the danger to the Railway was not so much

from the air as from destruction by dynamiting on land. He said the experience

of the Canton-Kowloon Railway had proved that it was extremely difficult to destroy

the railway or its bridges by air bombing. But both the railway in Yunnan and*

*8^
Editor's Note; The notes of the coversation simply say: "General B". Dr. Koo
thought this must be the department head in the Ministry. Most likely, it
is the General Buhrer referred to on several previous occasions.
 310

its bridges were susceptible to destruction by dynamiting. Moreover, the

line was an expensive one because it went through mountainous regions, requiring

a large number of costly bridges. He also pointed out that use should be made

of the motor-road via Lan$a»g to Nanning in Kwangsi, and that the Kwangsi section

of it should be improved to serve as a regular channel of transport. I assured

him that I would call attention to this point in my report to the government.

In answer to a question^ I said that the motor-road from Burma to Yifnnan

would be open on November 1, as the British had said that on that date the

section lying in Burma would be completed. I added that it was the desire and

intention of the Chinese authorities to make as much use of this road as

possible, although it would take some time before the 500 motor lorries

ordered in England for use on this road would be ready for delivery.

[At that point, our conversation shifted to another topic. But] M. Mandel

again brought up the question of security as we came to the end of our conversation

I had to assure him that I would impress upon my government the necessity of

observing the strictest secrecy and of instructing the Chinese representatives in

Indochina charged with the matter of transport and transit to the same effect.

On October 24, I received a disturbing report that George Bonnet had

just written to the Minister of Colonies, warning him to be careful vis-a-vis

Japan. I invited Li Yii-ying to see me. I wanted him to sound out the reaction

of M. Mandel [his personal friend] to the warning given by the Quai d'Orsay. At

the same time, I received a report from Mr. Yu Ming, Dr. Sun Fo's adviser, that

General Yang Chieh, [the Chinese Ambassador] in Moscow, negotiating with

the Soviet government for effective aid, would not [yet] be able to come to

Paris to discuss the question of aid from Russia because he was still waiting

for instructions from the Generalissimo. Mr. Yu added that, according to General

Yang, the Soviet Union did not wish to give planes to France r(a request which

France had asked China to make of the Soviet Union on behalf of the French
 311

government,) ] because Moscow understood that France was quite capable of

manufacturing airplanes herself.

The following day was another depressing day for me, because the news of

the evacuation and abandonment of Hankow was confirmed. I could not understand

why Hankow could not be defended and I cabled to the Vice-Minister of Foreign

Affairs for clarification. Feeling very heavy at heart over the news, I later

telephoned to Ambassador Quo in London to see whether he had received any

further information. Mr. Quo explained to me that Wang Ching-wei had cabled

him two days earlier about the government's intention not to defend Hankow.

As regards British financial aid, he said that T. V. Soong had cabled to

London, asking him to arrange for a three million pound loan to support

foreign exchange in China, but the British banks were skeptical about the

usefulness of such a loan. Moreover, in Mr. Quo's opinion there was not much

hope of obtaining it.

Thus all the news that day was of a discouraging character. But on the

following day, the 26th, Mr. Li Yii-ying came to report on his talk with M. Mandel.

According to Mr. Li, M. Mandel had said that the Quai d'Orsay people were defeatists

and that he, Mandel, was against them as much as he was opposed to the Japanese

and to the Germans. I felt somewhat relieved because, from Mr. Li's point,

Mandel evidently had not changed his mind about the arrangements he and I had made

for transit.

Referring to my recommendation to the government to seek effective cooperation

and, if possible, encourage a joint or parallel representation(s) by the

friendly powers in Tokyo, with a view to checking ttaJapanese move in South

China, a recommendation which was strongly approved by the Generalissimo,

I telegraphed three times to Dr. Hu Shih in Washington, not only to keep him
 312

informed, but also to urge him to take the matter up with the United States

government with the same object in view. Following his reply giving me certain

information concerning the attitude of the American government, particularly

its confidential communication to the aircraft manufacturers not to accept orders

from Japan or supply airplanes to her, he telegraphed to me further on October 21,

acknowledging my telegrams of the 18th and 19th of October saying that,

because his letter of credentials had not yet arrived, he could only make

unofficial representations. Besides,he said, the American President was

resting at his home. I suppose he meant Roosevelt's New York residence.

He said, however, that he had already asked Mr. Bullitt, American Ambassador

in Paris on home leave, to convey China's desire for the need of cooperation

between Great Britain and the United States to the proper authorities. Moreover

on the 19th he saw the Secretary of State and informed him of the three points

that I had stated in my telegram to him.

He added that K. P. Chen's negotiations in Washington were making substantial

progress and concrete results could be expected for China in that area. But as

regards the attitude of the United States government, he believed that, as

the Congressional by-elections were soon to take place, there could be no

prospect of any effective move by the State Department, and it would be necessary

to wait for further development in the Sino-Japanese situation. He said

recently the military situation in South China had reached such a point of

deterioration, it would be necessary to rely upon Great Britain and France to

take a front line diplomatic action. He, on his side, would continue to pay

attention, and if any opportunity should present itself, he certainly would

not let it pass.

[The following day, October 22, at my meeting with the Minister of Colonies,

I asked whether the question was brought up for discussion in the cabinet. M.

Mandel replied that that] morning, at the meeting of the Council of Ministers,
 313

M. Bonnet had referred to his conversation with me. Bonnet had said he had

proposed to Washington and London to make a demarche at Tokyo, but the

attitude of the American and British government was found to be very reserved,

indicating that neither of these two government was disposed to take any

action in the circumstances, with regard to the situation in South China. Mandel

added it did not mean their attitude would always remain so. It was possible,

after the situation developed further, that the two governments might modify

their views.

[The situation as of October 26th was] summarized very well by a telegram

from the Waichiaopu. It stated that, according to a telegram from Ambassador Yang

Chieh in Moscow, the Soviet government sincerely stated it was always willing

to aid China by joining in any collective demarche in Japan. If Great Britain,

France and the United States would make a proposal, the Soviet government

would gladly join it. But, the Waichiaopu telegram continued, a telegram from

Ambassador Quo said the British government still appeared to be unwilling to

take the initiative. As regards the United State§ although it continued to

express its sympathy, it was occupied with the Congressional elections about

to take place and could not be expected to be willing to take the initiative in

the matter. It would seem "more natural to ask the French government to initiate

the step." I was asked therefore to consult with the French government and try to

ascertain its views. But, as a matter of fact, I had been keeping in close

contact with the French government, particularly the Quai d'Orsay and the

Ministry of Colonies, [but I had not, of course, received any kind of committment

from France on the proposed demarche at Tokyo. ]

[That same day,] October 26, at 5 p.ra. I had a conversation with the

Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry. I began by telling him that

since our last conversation, important developments had taken place. After

taking Canton, the Japanese had occupied Hankow. The evacuation of the

latter city had, I said, been carried out in accordance with a preconceived
 314

plan by the Chinese military authorities and in a very orderly manner.

There was no confusion and no great loss of war material. I assued him that

for China the loss of Canton and Hankow did not mean the end of resistance.

As General Chiang Kai-shek had declared in a statement to the correspondent

of the Paris Soir, China was determined to continue to resist Japanese invasion.

I went on to say that the establishment of a Japanese base in South

China was as much a menace to the colonies and commercial interests of

France, Great Britain and the United States as a direct threat to China.

I had seen M. Bonnet, the Foreign Minister, a week ago and told him that unless

some action was taken immediately to prevent Japan from going too far in South

China, she was sure to bring pressure to bear upon the three powers during

the next crisis in Europe. I told him that the attack on Canton was the

beginning of the carrying out of the Japanese policy of southward expansion

so long advocated by the Japanese Navy, and I continued along this line of

argument, telling L6ger finally of my suggestion to Bonnet for a demarche in

Tokyo and of Bonnet's promise to contact London and Washington. I asked L6ger

what result had obtained.

A
The Secretary-General said that although M. Bonnet had not spoken to him

about it, he knew, according to a dispatch which came yesterday from Washington,

the attitude of the American government was far from encouraging. It did not

wish to take any action at present, even in regard to the possibility of a

joint mediation, unless both sides had expressly declared their willingness to

accept it. He said he did not know London's view as yet. But, in his opinion,

the warning would serve no great purpose. A demarche had been made at the time

of the Japanese attack on Peiping and Tientsin, and another was made when Shanghai

and Nanking were being attacked by the Japanese, but all without avUl . /nother

demarche, unsupported by any plan of action, would bring no better result.

On the contrary, L6ger said, it would merely enable the Japanese extremists

to furtheThumiliate these three powers for being unable to do anything to back

 315

I said, however, that the situation in South China was different. As

it affected the interests of the three powers far more seriously, silence at

this moment would surely be interpreted as a sign of weakness and helplessness

on their part, and would encourage the Japanese extremists to do whatever they liked

M. L6ger, while agreeing that the situation was full of possible consequences,

remarked that the American attitude was very reserved, whereas Great Britain and

France had their hands tied in Europe, and their armaments, moreover, were far

from adequate to cope with the situation in the Far East.

I suggested that the cooperation of the Soviet Union might be sought.

I said, with her large armed forces in Siberia, the Soviet Union was in a good

position to bring pressure to bear upon Japan. Soviet collaboration would

therefore help to make the intervention of the three powers in Tokyo more

effective. M. L£ger countered by asking what good Soviet cooperation would

do, since the Soviet Union had no idea of provoking a war and was not willing

to engage in a war, and Japan knew it. Besides, he said, both London and

Washington did not like the idea of having the Soviet Union participate in any

joint demarche. The experience at the time of the Brussels Conference and

on other occasions had made this evident.

I said the demarche need not be a joint one, if it was not agreeable

to all, it would be made parallelly, as was generally preferred in Washington.

In any case, I emphasizied there could be no doubt that the association of the

Soviet Union with the three powers in any demarche would be a very desirable

thing. If London and Washington did not wish to approach Moscow, I suggested

that France, by virtue of her close relations with Moscow and her lack of

ideological prejudice, was the logical one of the three powers to approach

Moscow for the purpose.

M. L6ger observed that France, in fact, had decided ideological views

against the Japanese policy of aggression and against Fascism and Nazism in Europe.
 316

At that point, seeing that M. L6ger might have misunderstood me, I explained

that what I had in mind was the political structure and philosophy of the Soviet

Union, which was looked upon with suspicion by Great Britain and the United

States, but which was viewed with broad comprehension and liberal understanding

by the French. But M. L6ger, still perhaps thinking I had meant a Franco-Soviet

demarche [or perhaps thinking that would be the net result if my suggestion were

followed,] suggested, in turn, that the first step would be to bring about an

understanding with Washington and London before approaching the Soviet Union,

because a Franco-Soviet demarche would serve no purpose at all. He said he would

consider the matter carefully and ascertain the views of Washington and London

again.

Then the conversation shifted to other subjects, [such as] the engagement of

French officers to assist, train and advise the Chinese army. [But at one point

we reverted to the question of the proposed demarche at Tokyo.] M. Ldger said

France and Great Britain were not strong enough to take any action in the Far East .

He asked what could therefore be done if Japan ignored the porposed demarche,

unless they were nonetheless ready to resort to positive action to back it up,

which would mean war. I countered this objection by saying the situation did

not appear to me in such a hopeless light . Japan, with her preoccupations in

China, was anxious for the goodwill of Great Britain and France and fearful of their

reaction. They could make it clear to Tokyo that if Japan did not refrain

from further extending her military operations, they could not remain indifferent

but would feel obliged to take necessary measures to counteract the Japanese menace.

I said that a mere intimation of their reaction and possible reta1iantion--not

necessarily immediately, but in six montte or a year hence--would make the Japanese

think twice before ignoring any proposed demarche. For one thing, I said, Japan

might be made to understand that measures of a sanctionist nature, such as the

withholding Of arms and raw materials for her war industry, would be immediately
 317

adopted. Such a declaration would not fail to produce its effect.

M, L6ger said, as regards the withholding of supplies from Japan, not one

thing useful to Japan had been supplied in France. No arms, munitions nor

even spare parts had been allowed to be exported to Japan. He added that even

minerals from Indochina useful for Japan's war industry were withheld under an

embargo. I commented that I understood that, although a decree had been proclaimed

forbidding the export of these minerals from Indochina, it had not been put into

effect. M. Ldger thought that it had. I expressed the hope that, in any case,

the French government would maintain this decree, thereby indicating some intention

to take action with reference to Japanese aggression.

On October 27, I had an interview with the Minister of Colonies at his request.

At the very outset, M. Mandel showed me a letter, dated October 26, from the Quai

d'Orsay. I glanced over tne communication, which said that a Chinese personality,

accurately informed on the subject, had expressed his appreciation at the

Quai d'Orsay for the efforts which the authorities of Indochina had made to enable

Chinese war material to be transported through Indochina into China, and which

greatly benefitted China. In the letter, the Quai attributed to this personality

a statement to the effect that the methods employed by the local authorities in

Indochina were: to have tne police seize openly a small part of the Chinese

consignment of arms and war material, and to arrange secretly for the transport

and transit of the remaining portion.

The letter warned the Minister of Colonies of the dangerous consequences

which might arise, especially in view of the present situation in the Far East.

It also explained that the Quai, in its letter of October 22 to M. Mandel, had

proposed positive measures for more effective control of the question of transit

for Chinese war material, and pointed out that such arrangement as had been

stated by the Chinese personality in question was in contradiction to the promise

 318

which the Quai had made to Japan.

After reading the letter, I said the matter was of great interest to me,

particularly as regards the identity of the Chinese personality referred to.

I said I could not believe that any Chinese could have been so stupid as to have

told the Quai what had been done. There were only three or four persons in Paris

who were in the habit of visiting the Quai from time to time. I said it appeared

from the letter that the information might have been obtained from one of the

services of information in Indochina controlled by the Quai, or possibly from

the French Consul in Yunnan.

General B, who was present at our interview, remarked that he had studied

the letter closely and had the same impression that the information referred to

might have been obtained from Indochina. I pointed out that the letter,

following the first one of October 22, was evidently intended to bring further

pressure to bear upon the Ministry of Colonies.

M. Mandel said the first letter was a long document of eight pages, giving

a full account of the question of transit and the decision of the Committee on

National Defense of October, 1937 and proposing the institution of a mixed committee

between the Quai and the Ministry of Colonies for the purpose of deciding jointly

all applications of the Chinese authorities for transit of war material through

Indochina. Mandel thought it was apparent that the document had been intended as a

historical record, which could be cited in justification of the attitude of

the Quai and its refusal to accept any responsibility in case Japan should

make a move against Indochina. (Evidently, behind this matter lay political

considerations about the question of responsibility by the government, in the event

a crisis should develop over the issue vis-d-vis Japan.) Mandel said he was

not interested in what the people might t ink of his action in history, hewas

more concerned with the policy of the present.

M. Mandel could not and did not approve of the idea of a mixed committee
 319

because the Quai in proposing it had obviously desired to determine and control

policy for his Ministry. Therefore, he said, he did not even reply to the first

letter. I then remarked that in view of what he had just said, the second letter

seemed intended to bring further pressure to bear upon him to take action on the

proposal in the first letter. I also pointed out that the second letter itself did

not indicate clearly that the secret arrangement referred to had been revealed

by the Chinese personality in question. I thought that the reference to this

person's visit, whoever he was, was evidently made a pretext for writing the

second letter. The Minister of Colonies then said he would call up L6ger ^ the

Quai and ask for particulars. (This is what I had really desired, although I had

refrained from saying so.) So I naturally agreed with him, and said that

would also be useful to me in my investigation.

Over the telephone Mandel and L6ger had a long discussion. It appeared

that Mandel was rather annoyed. He spoke sharply to L6ger who, on the other hand,

tried to explain the matter away, because I heard the Minister say to Ldger that

he was not interested in the history of the question, he merely wanted to know

particulars. He also said he had never cabled any instructions to the Governor-

General in Indochina contrary to the decision of the Committee on National Defense

of October 1937. In each case, he had consulted the Quai and had cabled only

what had been agreed upon. If any contraband had been carried on by the local

authorities in Indochina, it was against his orders, and he would like to take the

necessary steps to punish those who disobeyed his orders. He did not know the

Governor-General personally, but knew he could trust him to carry out his instruc­

tions. He again asked for particulars, L6ger, on the other hand mentioned

that the information was given by the Chinese personality in question to M.

Hoppenot and not directly to him (Lfiger), and that he would ask Hoppenot for

further clarification. (M. Hoppenot was head of the Asiatic Department at

the Quai [or rather--and perhaps this was why his name was used--he was in

the process of being transferred to the European Department and his successor on
 320

the Asian desk had just been named.]

After the telephone conversation M. Mandel told me that the second letter

made it clearer than ever that the Quai wanted to determine the policy for

his Ministry. He, as a minister, could not tolerate a civil offical attempting

to control his policy. Nonetheless, he said, as regards the arrangement which had

been made with me, it was evident it could not be carried out at present . He

would ask for a certain number of weeks and wait for an opportunity to do so.

Thus, this quarrel or scheme on the part of the Quai d'Orsay to influence and

control the policy of the Ministry of Colonies, in turn, had produced a dire

effect upon the question of transit .

I expressed my regret and said I understood his anxiety. I stilt wondered

who the personality could be, and began to run through various circumstances and

possibilities in order to pin down who might be involved. I told M. Mandel

I myself had seen Ldger at five o'clock on the 26th (the day before) and

had made no reference whatever to the whole question of transit . The Minister

pointed out the second letter must have been written before Ldger saw me. Then

since it was M. Hoppenot who was said to have received the information, I recal led

that the Counsellor of my Embassy had seen Hoppenot ten days before, when

he went to the Quai to express his appreciation for the release of 11 airplanes.

I said that was a matter about about which I had spoken to the Foreign Minister

and M. Ldger, the Secretary-General. The Quai, in turn, had written more than

once to the Ministry of Air and the Ministry of Colonies to have these planes

released. I said I had always pressed the Quai for facilities regarding

aeronautical material because L6ger had always assured me that while the French

government could not accord transit facilities for arms and munitions, they

could do their best to arrange for the transit of airplanes and aeronautical

material. I said the Counsellor, however, was a very careful, discreet person.
 321

He would not visit the Quai except on my orders and would not say a word more

than what I asked him to say. I said I was confident that the Counsellor could

not have committed such imprudence. I said possibly Mr. Li Yu-ying might have

seen Hoppenot) but Mr. Li, too, was a very discreet man.

The Minister said the only thing for him to do now was to wait for particulars

from L6ger. Meanwhile I would understand, he said, that he could not proceed

with the arrangement he had agreed to, although his representative had

already left for Indochina by air on the 26th. I said I was sorry such a

hitch had occurred, and asked whether the war material now en route could be taken

into the local arsenals in Indochina.

The Minister at once said he could not do that in view of the dispute

with the Quai. Thereupon I said I would report to my government and try to

have the shipment stopped at Singapore first, while waiting for another arrangement

later .

The next morning M. Mandel telephoned and said he had received particulars

from the Quai and would send Commander Jozam to see me on his behalf, although

the particulars were not of the nature he had expected. This Commander called

at 11:30 a.m. and told me that the Chinese personality who saw Hoppenot was Mr.

Li Yu-ying, the Chinese representative on intellectual cooperation. According

to Hoppenot, Mr. Li expressed his appreciation of the efforts made by the local

authorities in Indochina to facilitate the transit of Chinese war material.

When I questioned the Commander, he said he understood that the revelation

of the particular method of transit was not, however, attributed to Mr. Li.

I said possibly the explanation was that, as a matter of Chinese courtesy, Mr. Li

would always start any conversation by thanking the French for what they had done

generally without reference to any particular subject matter. (That is

typically Chinese.)
 322

The Commander said he understood the expression of thanks to be quite

definitely for assistance rendered in connection with transit, but he added

that the information contained no such details as the Minister had expected.

In order to clear up the doubt and suspicion as to exactly what Mr. Li had

said, I asked him to see me. He came to the Embassy on October 29. I told

him first of my conversation with M. Mandel and of receiving Commander jozam,

the Minister's representative, as well as of my impression that the information

from the Quai was not of the character insinuated in its letter of October

25 to the Minister of Colonies. Mr. Li told me that he had called on Hoppenot

about ten days before in connection with the Sino-French University in Peiping

and other Sino-French cultural work, and that Hoppenot htd been very helpful

in this area. He, Li Yii-ying, had expressed his appreciation of the efforts

Hoppenot had made and the assistance he had rendered in connection with this

cultural work, as well as in connection with economic cooperation between China

and France, especially as regards Hoppenot's efforts to get together and obtain

the collaboration of the French banking group. Mr. Li said he had made no

mention of the subject of transit and had had no occasion to thank Hoppenot

in regard to it. If he had desired to express his appreciation, it would

have been more appropriate for him to have done so to Lfiger. He said further

that the particular arrangement with reference to the alleged connivance of

the Indochinese police in the clandestine transportation of Chinese war material

was not a matter of recent origin. He recalled to me that a year ago when Moutet

(Mandel's predecessor) had threatened to resign from the Chautemps cabinet

because the decision taken against the grant of transit facilities to China

through Indochina had been adopted without his knowledge, Chautemps urged

Moutet to abstain from resigning by saying that while it would be inadvisable

to alter the decision, he (Moutet) could in fact grant such transit facilities

in aid to China by indirect and secret means. (That was said by Chautemps,

the Premier, President of the Cabinet at the time.)

 323

Moutet had spoken of this plan to him, Li Yii-ying, at the time. Mr. Li

recalled, there was a conversation at Herriot's place, which Moutet, Li himself,

Paul Boncour and Herriot had attended. Moutet had explained the method whereby

transit was accorded to Chinese war material. Herriot had agreed that that

was a good way of doing it without appearing to take the side of China. Herriot,

Li said, also thought that the French government should not be satisfied with

such indirect and secret aid, that rather the object should be to bring about

the realization of the policy of open assistance to China. As for Paul

Boncour, then Foreign Minister, Mr. Li said, he had been ignorant of the

arrangement.

Mr. Li also pointed out that even at the Quai both Hoppenot and L6ger

had spoken of another way of helping China by consigning war material to the

authorities of the provinces bordering on Indochina, ostensibly to meet local

needs for the maintenance of order and security on the frontier. I remarked that,

in connection with the transit of airplanes, the Quai itself was party to the

arrangements for it.

Mr. Li thought as I did that the reference to the Chinese personality in

the second letter of the Quai was really an attempt to seize some pretext for

pressing Mandel to accept the Quai's own policy in the matter of transit. Mr. Li

understood that during the past few days a great deal of pressure had been brought

to bear upon the Quai by the Japanese. He said, that L6ger, not wishing to tell

the real reason for action and prudence, had deliberately made use of his (Li's)

visit to Hoppenot as a pretext for writing the second letter to Mandel.

I suggested that Li might see Mandel and explain to him the various facts

he had just mentioned, in order to show that the so-called indiscretion of

the Chinese personality was really not the real reason [for the letter]. The

truth seemed to be that L6ger wanted to force Mandel to accept his point of view

as regards the whole question of transit for Chinese war material. Mr. Li

offered to see L6ger himself, but I thought that would not be advisable, as it
 324

might appear to betray the confidence of Mandel, who had spoken to me regarding

the relations between the Quai and his Ministry. I *oid it would nonetheless be

desirable for Li to see Mandel and explain to him the whole situation and the

facts of which he might still be ignorant.

Li Yii-ying and I then spoke of M. Lager’s attitude toward China. Mr. Li told

me that at first both L6ger and Hoppenot were rather sympathetic to our cause. In

fact, he recalled that on one occasion Hoppenot informed him that Ldger had told

me that the only course for China was to continue the policy of resistance, but

that continued resistance required a continuous supply of arms and ammunition

from abroad. In recent months, however, Mr. Li found L6ger becoming less

sympathetic and less favorable to the Chinese cause. He said it was the same

with Bonnet, the Foreign Minister. (I had also found this to be the case.)

[Mr. Li proceeded to illustrate what he meant.] He said that some months before

in Geneva, when Dr. Rajchman spoke to M. Bonnet about Sino-French political and

economic cooperation, the latter was altogether sympathetic and ready to help

China, to the extent that he (Bonnet) went so far as to say that their conversation

should be kept secret and that he should not let L6ger (his own Secretary-General)

know anything about it. But when Rajchman called on the Foreign Minister again

in company with Grumbach of the Chamber of Deputies, to discuss the subject

further, Rajchman was surprised that Bonnet sent for L6ger to join in the

discussion. As the conversation proceeded, L6ger parried every statement

Rajchman made in favor Of closer collaboration between China and France. He

also parried each of Rajchman's statements refuting such pretexts as Bonnet

had advanced as reasons for his Ministry's refusal to consider extending transit

facilities to China.

Mr. Li also recalled that M. Hoppenot at one time had even suggested that

a treaty between China and France might be provided to include a plan of political

collaboration between the two countries. Mr. Li said that at that time
 325

Hoppenot's attitude was so favorable he even intimated that the best way to

formulate a sheme of mutual assistance between China and France would be to discuss

and work together with the new Ambassador to China, Na^piar. But, Mr. Li

continued, on his recent visit to China, he had seen Naggiar in the company

of T. V. Soong, and had entered into a discussion of the subject at some

length. Naggiar made it plain that the question of concluding an agreement of

mutual assistance between the two countries was one of policy for which only

the Quai d'Orsay could assume the responsibility. What he, Naggiar, and the

Governor-General in Indochina could do something about were particular questions,

such as the question of transit of Chinese war materials. For a general agreement,

Naggiar had suggested it was important to cultivate the friendship of L6ger, who

in his present position really held the key to the situation in his hand. Mr. Li

added that, since his return rrom China, he had not seen either L6ger or Hoppenot

until very recently, as both of them had been ill.

The third matter we took up was that of a French military mission and

French military supplies to China. He reported that while he was in Hongkong,

T. V. Soong had written to him, saying that a telegram from Sun Fo suggested that,

through the intermediary of the Russia War Office in Moscow, it was intimated

that there was a possibility of obtaining certain French war material by some

arrangement made with Russia help. Li said the question of having a French

military mission was also discussed in China, [while he was there]. The general

idea was that the three questions, namely, a French military mission, the supply

of French war material, and transit through Indochina for Chinese war material,
and transit through Indochina for Chinese war material should be taken up together
A
in a proposed general agreement of Sino-French collaboration.

Mr. Li went on to say that after his return from China, he telegraphed

to General Chiang Kai-shek for concrete proposals to serve as the basis of a

 326

political agreement between China and France. General Chiang replied by

referring to his telegram of reply to Sun Fo. When asked. Sun Fo revealed

that the Generalissimo's telegram merely stated that the three things should

be taken up at the same time. However, Mr. Li said, he had meanwhile found out,

through conversation with Mandel and General B, that, as regards the question of

supplies, there were no heavy war materials available. It was possible that

some light arms could be obtained, but even that was uncertain. With thi::

that was-Timrertam. With this

knowledge of the situation, Mr. Li said, he thought it would be useless to

take up all three points simultaneously.

He consulted with Sun Fo about the matter and both agreed; Sun Fo

accepted the responsibility for deviating from the terms of General Chiang's reply,

Sun Fo also suggested that a reply should be sent to Mandel, accepting the conditions

of employment, which Mandel had proposed for the French military mission. Mandel’s

idea was that he should designate a suitable French general ot serve as the head

of the mission, and leave the question of choosing assistants to this general

himself, in consultation with the Chinese side. As to the terms of employment

relating to salaries and treatment, they were found entirely acceptable both to

him, Li, and Sun Fo. Afterwards the Generalissimo approved their acceptance

of the terms.

According to Li Yii-ying, Sun Fo had also seen Daladier and given the latter a

memorandum outlining China's military needs and the military supplies she desired to

obtain from France. The amount asked for was very great. A copy of it was also

given to Mandel. Mr. Li said at the time Mandel had asked Sun Fo and Li, himself,

not to say anything to the Embassy, because it would be better to continue to treat

the matter confidentially until a more suitable moment arose. Last week, Mr. Li

said, he had spoken to Mandel again and understood from the Minister that there

was no longer any necessity of keeping it secret from the Embassy. That was why

he then reported it to me.

 327

Of course Mr. Li, Sun Fo and later even General Yang Chieh and I discussed

the best way of obtaining and assuring French collaboration. It was a dire

necessity in view of the fact that China was really fighting Japan single-handedly

and was working under so many handicaps. She lacked adequate supplies of war

materials, and any substantial and concrete help from abroad in fighting the

invaders. But despite confidences, they did not go so far as to tell me what

had passed between the Generalissimo and Dr. Sun Fo in regard to their suggestion

to approach France for the conclusion of a military pact. I understood in

a general way that they had been seeing the French authorities at times when

they felt it was not necessary for me to go with them, although I always paved

the way for them.

China was fighting for her existence and it was important and sometimes

necessary that China's western friends should be approached in a way that

would be most convenient to them. This was especially true in France, where

the cabinet was divided on the question of foreign policy. The Foreign

Ministry, especially M. George Bonnet and M. L6ger, considered the European

situation of primary and preeminent importance, and therefore all considerations

for the Far East were subjected to this primary objective at the Quai d'Orsay.

In their hearts, I think they were more inclined to agree with Chamberlain's

view of buying off Germany at the expense of some small powers in Europe,

and of providing certain inducements, such as the giving up of part of the

British and French colonies to Germany, to satisfy her desire for sufficient

living space.

It was therefore preferable, as I understood it, to keep certain matters

of aid and collaboration with China as secret as possible from the Foreign

Ministry and I was not anxious to know everything that was going on. There

was enough to do as it was. Moreover I was the one that had to face M.

George Bonnet and often seek him out as well^s M. L6ger officially. Therefore,
 328

it was an advisable course for me not to know everything about the negotiations

that were going on, and which should by all means be kept secret from the

Quai d'Orsay.

The fourth question Mr. Li reported to me on was General Yang Chieh's visit

to Paris. Mr. Li said that General Yang was leaving Moscow on October 30,

according to a telegram just received, and was coming to Paris under instructions

from General Chiang Kai-shek to discuss with the French the question of military

cooperation and military supplies to China. In fact, Li said, the Generalissimo

had wanted this visit to take place a few months ago, and he, Li, had been

informed of it by Dr. Soong in China. Li added, as I knew, that General Yang

had been the Generalissimo's Chief of Staff for many years and he knew the

Generalissimo's views and China's military plans. I told him it was an excellent

idea to have General Yang arrange these military questions with which the civil

officials were so unfamiliar.

I asked with what responsible French representatives General Yang should deal

after he came here. Mr. Li replied that M. Mandel had said he would hold himself
%
%

responsible for taking care of the military mission to China and had instructed

General B to look for a suitable general to head the mission. But a few days ago

when he, Li, had spoken to Mandel again, General B had not yet found such a man.

(Thus on the French side it was evident that Mandel took the matter into his own

hands and kept away from the Quai d'Orsay, on the strength of his having obtained

the approval of Daladier, the Premier.)

I told Li the idea was excellent, but the present moment was not very

favorable to^the discussion of these question;: I said the military reverses

in China and the loss of Canton aid Hankow must have made the French more careful

and hesitant. The effect of the reaction to the Munich Agreement upon French

foreign policy served to diminish the prospect of a successful outcome of the

 329

proposed negotiations. I told him my impression was that M. Mandel was friendly

and willing to help China, but how secure he was in his present position remained

a question. I said M. Mandel had no political backing and did not belong to any

important political party. M. Mandel relied mainly on his own dynamic, personality.

(This was what had attracted M. Daladier and inspired the Premier's confidence.)

I told Li Yii-ying that with the opposition of Bonnet and the Quai, M. Mandel's

principal support was Daladier. However, the degree to which M. Daladier could and

would follow Mandel's views in regard to French policy towards China over aid against

those of the Quai had recently become more of a question. Daladier's clear

tendency to lean on the Center and the Right, as revealed in his own almost violent

attack against the Communist Party, served to show that the future foreign policy of

Daladier's Ministry would entail restricting French engagements abroad, while

concentrating on the internal reconstruction of France. Mr. Li agreed with this

analysis and remarked that the tendency of Daladier's actions seemed to indicate

that he was ready to yield to Germany and Italy, follow a weak foreign policy and

adopt a firm internal policy.

Mr. Li further suggested that, after General Yang's arrival, the first step

would be to have a consultation in the Embassy between General Yang, myself,

himself and General Tang, my military attachd in order to determine how to proceed

with the matter. According to Mr. Li, General Yang had written that he was

unfamiliar with conditions in France and did not know what could be done with the

French. I told Mr. Li I would be ready to join such a consultation. But I

expressed the hope that Mr. Li had already made arrangements with the French to

receive General Yang and start conversations with him along the lines of

cooperation between the two countries which he had just outlined.

[My apprehensions as to the limited possibilities for successful negotiations

at that time were confirmed by] a conversation with M. Archimbaud, [leader of the
 330

Sino-French group] in the Chamber of Deputies. He called on November 2, after

meeting with M. Mandel. After I had given him a brief resume of my own recent

conversations with Mandel, I asked what impression he had of his own meeting

with M. Mandel in the morning. M. Archimbaud replied that he had found M. Mandel

personally still very sympathetic and favorable to the Chinese cause, but that,

owing to increasing pressure brought to bear upon the Quai d'Orsay by the Japanese,

it was necessary to be very careful and prudent. Mandel would do his best, and

he had already sent a man to Indochina with whom he could ccxnmunicate by code

without going through the Governor-General. Being sure of Daladier's support, Mandel

was going to continue to do all he could to help. But it was essential not to say

anything outside, nor to let the Quai d'Orsay know it.

I remarked that that was a much better course to follow because, without

knowing the situation, the Quai d'Orsay could honestly deny any assistance

rendered to China as regards transit. Archimbaud then said that Daladier

was a great asset to China, because he really understood the far-reaching

consequences of the Japanese policy of aggression. He was therefore in favor of

helping China as much as possible. M. Archimbaud stated that Daladier's state of

mind was more against the Japanese than in favor of China, and he would help

anybody who was a victim of Japanese aggression.

In the meantime, the Consul-General in Hanoi h'~d cabled me for instructions

as to what to do in the face of the adamant refusal of the Governor-Genera 1 of

Indochina to let anything pass through Indochina to China, and particularly as

regards jeeps, and the trucks, a big assignment of which had already arrived in

Indochina. There was also a shipment of guns, which I knew had been held up in

Indochina. I was therefore anxious to see the French Foreign Minister with regard

to this and other questions] and I made arrangements to do so on November 4.

 331

I began the conversation by referring to the talk I had had with him about

two weeks earlier and to the conversation I had had with M. L6ger concerning the

views of the French government on the three suggestions I had made to facilitate

French assistance to China. The first, I recalled, concerned approaching

Washington in the interests of a joint demarche in Tokyo. I asked the Foreign

Minister whether there had been consultation with London and Washington. He

appeared to be uncertain, and said he had spoken to the British Ambassador about it,

but, in the hurry of going to Marseilles, he had not been able to speak to

M. Ldger about it.

I said that since that time the American note of October 26th addressed to

Tokyo had been published. I said the note contained a vigorous protest to Japan

against violations of the Open Door policy in China, and was couched in rather

strong terms. Not having received a reply from Japan, the State Department had

caused it to be published a few days ago. The American press comment was to the

effect that never in the history of American diplomacy had such strong language

been used. The note, in fact, concluded by saying that the failure of Japan to

give satisfaction to the American request was bound to affect the relations between

the two countries. The strong attitude taken in the American note, I told Bonnet,

indicated that the American government was deeply interested in the Far

Eastern situation and had no intention of abandoning its interests in that region.

Continuing, I said that France too had large interests in the Far East, and

that I was charged by my government to ask the French government to be good

enough to address a similar note to Japan. I added that the Chinese Ambassador

in London had already approached Lord Halifax and had already been informed that

the British government would also make a similar demarche. (I knew the French

Foreign Ministry always hesitated to do anything without first consulting London

and, if possible, first obtaining support from Washington. I therefore started

out my conversation with an account of what the American government had done and
 332

what the British had said.) I told the Foreign Minister that in my opinion a

similar demarche by the French government would help to call Japan's attention to
G

the dissatisfaction of the foreign powers, and at the same time would add support

to the American note.

Besides, I told M. Bonnet, this would be a very propitious psychological

moment to make a strong move. The Japanese had counted upon the capture of

Canton and Hankow to pave the way for ther termination of hostilities. Seeing

that China was as determined as ever to continue resistance, the Japanese were

beginning to show hesitations and doubts as to the future policy for Japan to

pursue. The apparent spirit of conciliation in Prince Konoye's declaration of the

previous day was evidence of this attitude of hesitation. A manifestation of

firmness and energetic representations to Tokyo at this time would therefore

have a greater opportunity of bringing the Japanese to realize the seriousness of

the situation facing Japan and to modify their policy vis-&-vis China.

M. Bonnet said he had not seen the American note. He wrote down the date

and the general purport of the American document as I had described it. He said

he agreed with my view and would make a similar move that very day. He would

ask M. Ldger to prepare a note forthwith, after looking up the contents of the

American communication. I was delighted with his prompt decision to act along the

line I had suggested.

I then brought up the question of transit through Indochina. I said the

occupation of Canton by the Japanese meant the loss of the channel of supply via

Hongkong. It was even more necessary than before to the success of Chinese

resistance that full transit facilities should be assured to China through

Indochina. (Up to the time Canton was lost, a very substantial amount of imports

had gone through Hongkong, although, this depended upon whether the goods were

needed in Central China or in the provinces along the Eastern coast, or in West

and Southwest China for use in the fight against the Japanese. Moreover, for the
 333

obvious reason of security, the route through Indochina had also always been

preferred for shipments of heavy armaments, like trucks and guns, because Hongkong

was less sheltered and it was far easier for the Japanese to observe what was

being done there.) I told M. Bonnet it was true there were two additional routes

in Northwest China to the Soviet Union through Sinkiang, to Yunnanfu from Burma, but

they were motor roads which could not take care of heavy material. The Chinese

morale was excellent, I continued, but success depended in great measure upon

supplies from abroad. The Indochinese route was of vital importance from the

point of view of supplies. — '

I then told the Foreign Minister that I could well understand French

preoccupations vis-ct-vis Japan on this question. I said too that it might be

advisable to maintain officially an attitude of neutrality, but that I earnestly

hoped that the French government would in fact enable China to make the fullest

use of Indochina for transit. The Chinese on their side would, of course, observe

the greatest prudence in utilizing such facilities. M. Bonnet said he

realized the importance of transit facilities to the cause of Chinese resistance.

But at the same time, he would like to have a talk with the President of the

Council, M. Daladier, before giving me a reply, which he hoped to be able to do

some time the following week. As regards the demarche to be made in Tokyo, he

assured me that he would take it up at once.

M. Bonnet asked, however, why Canton was lost so quickly and why the

Chinese forces were not able to resist, especially as he understood the Japanese

forces used in the attack on Canton were not very numerous. Was it because the

Chines forces were very weak? (That was a question which I had anticipated.)

I replied that the evacuation of Canton was effected very much in the same way

as that of Hankow. The Chinese strategy consisted in avoiding a frontal battle

with the Japanese armed forces. The Japanese troops which landed in the vicinity

of Canton were heavily mechanized, while the Chinese forces were inferior to them

in that respect. As it was the constant object of the Japanese army to try to
 334

destroy the main forces of the Chinese army, it was China's strategy to avoid

engaging the enemy in a pitched battle. The Chinese forces had now withdrawn

to the north of Canton, where they had established a new line of defense against

the advance of the Japanese forces. M. Bonnet appeared to be visibly satisfied

with these explanations.

General Yang Chieh had at last arrived in Paris on November 2, and I was glad

to see him because there was so much to discuss. In the evening, as was the custom

I gave a dinner in his honor, and then after it was over we entered into discussion.

First of all, I wanted to know what he understood to be the real attitude and the

policy of Soviet Russia on the Sino-Japanese affair and also on China's repeated

appeal for Soviet aid and assistance.

His response was quite revealing. He said Koscow's attitude, as regards

China's appeal for increased aid and cooperation from Moscow, could be summarized

as follows: The Soviet government felt convinced that, if it should aid China

to an extent which would provoke a war between Japan and Soviet Russia, it was

certain the other powers would then stand on the sidelines in the hope that both

Soviet Russia and Japan would be greatly weakened. If by chance, Soviet Russia

should come out the victor, then, Moscow felt, the other powers would join hands

with Japan to try to check the Soviet influence.

Moscow's view of the international situation, was rather pessimistic and

cynical although I must say the democratic powers in the West, especially London

and Washington had so far done nothing to help dispel Moscow's deep-rooted

suspicion. Basing my view on my conversations with the leaders of the British

government, and even a section of the French government, I was inclined to think

then that, if anything, the suspicions of Moscow were not altogether unfounded,

although Moscow's analysis may have been exaggerated. As for the analysis

made by London and Washington, while I would think the Russians would be able

to greatly augment their influence if and when Japan should be defeated oy them,
 335

the effect would not be as devastating or so far-reaching as either London or

Washington feared.

From another point of view, Soviet hesitation and suspicion of the real

motives or disposition of the Western democracies, particularly Great Britain

and the United States, was not altogether unfounded. In my conversations with

their representatives, especially in connection with the question of making a

collective representation at Tokyo, warning Japan against pushing forward her

southward expansionist policy, it was made clear to me that Soviet participation

would be unwelcome to them. Even the French were not eager for Soviet participation

because, as tb y put it, it might make it appear too clearly to the Central Powers

that they were uniting to oppose the anti-communist bloc in Central Europe.

Three days later, on November 5, I had another discussion with Yang

Chieh, this time joined by Li Yii-ying. The subject of our discussion was

again the Soviet attitude toward the question of aid to China. General Yang

siad the French desire for 300 planes from Soviet Russia to strengthen the

French air force had in fact been politely put off by China. To explain,

Dr. Sun Fo had previously suggested that China could indirectly convey to Soviet

Russia France's request for 300 planes to strengthen her defense, but the

Generalissimo had disapproved. The Generalissimo's interest centered upon and was

confined to an assurance from the French government for certainty of transit

facilities for Chinese war goods through Indochina. In fact General Yang

Chieh, [our Ambassador to Soviet Russia,] was authorized by the Generalissimo to

get into contact with the French military authorities in regard to a pact of

mutual assistance and cooperation in the military field.

General Yang also said it was not true, although Dr. Sun Fo had said it,

that Soviet Russia could speak to France on our behalf for aid to China. He said

Moscow always thought and believed it would be better for China herself to speak

to France. According to General Yang, the Wang Ching-wei group in the government

was working for peace with Japan. And he, General Yang, believed that the
 336

fall of Canton was due partly to Wang's influence. (I suppose on the ground that

General Yu Han-mou, military Governor of Kwantung Province at the time, was

a prot^gd of Wang Ching-wei.)

The attitude of the French government as a whole was so unfavorable to

China, because of the tense situation in Europe, that Professor Escarra, adviser

of the Chinese government, [whom I saw at that time,] thought that, in view of

the French, British and American apathy toward the Chinese cause, China might

very well join hands with Japan one day when the war was over and peace terms

were found to be acceptable. He thought that nothing could stop the Sino-

Japanese group from dominating Eastern Asia. His idea was that China should

cooperate with the Japanese moderates in Japan.

[M. Bonnet had assured me that he would immediately pursue the matter

of a demarche at Tokyo. Therefore, in order to get his reply, I called on him

again on November 10. He told me that since our last conversation, he had

ascertained through the French Ambassador at Washington that the American government

approved the idea of making a common demarche at Tokyo. That morning he also

had had a long talk with Mr. Wilson, the American Charge d'Affaires in Paris,

concerning the text of the note which the French government was sending to Tokyo.

I expressed satisfaction that the demarche would be made in concert with

London and Washington. I said I believed such a manifestation of common interest

by the three powers having great interests in the Far East would impress Tokyo.

This was all the more important, I said, in view of the declaration which the

Japanese government had recently made, accompanied by a broadcast of the Japanese

Premier, Prince Konoye. It was evident, I said, that Japan was now attempting to

carry out the policy of political and economic domination of China to include

the elimination of the interests that the western powers possessed there at

present.

The public statements to which I referred were a government declaration of

 337

November 3 and Prince Konoye's radio address of the same date, which together

announced the establishment of Japan's "New Order in East Asia." The former

reads as follows:

By the august virtue of His Majesty, our naval and military forces have
captured Canton and the three cities of Wuhan; and all the vital areas
of China have thus fallen into our hands. The Kuomintang Government exists
no longer except as a mere local regime. However, so long as it persists
in its anti-Japanese and pro-communist policy our country will not lay down
its arms--never until that regime is crushed.

What Japan seeks is the establishment of a new order which will

insure the permanent stability of East Asia. In this lies the ultimate
purpose of our present military campaign.

This new order has for its foundation a tripartite relationship of

mutual aid and co-ordination between Japan, Manchoukuo and China in political,
economic, cultural and other fields. Its object is to secure international
justice, to perfect the joint defense against Communism, and to create a new
culture and realize a close economic cohesion throughout East Asia. This
indeed is the way to contribute toward the stabilization of East Asia and
the progress of the world.

What Japan desires of China is that that country will share in the task
of bringing about this new order in East Asia. She confidently expects that
the people of China will fully comprehend her true intentions and that they
will respond to the call of Japan for their co-operation. Even the partici­
pation of the Kuomintang Government would not be rejected, if, repudiating
the policy which has guided it in the past and remolding its personnel, so as
to translate its re-birth into fact, it were to come forward to join in the
establishment of the new order.

Japan is confident that other Powers will on their part correctly

appreciate her aims and policy and adapt their attitude to the new conditions
prevailing in East Asia. For the cordiality hitherto manifested by the nations
which are in sympathy with us, Japan wishes to express her profound gratitude.

The establishment of a new order in East Asia is in complete conformity

with the very spirit in which the Empire was founded; to achieve such a task
is the exalted responsibility with which our present generation is
entrusted. It is, therefore, imperative to carry out all necessary internal
reforms, and with a full development of the aggregate national strength,
material as well as moral, fulfil at all costs this duty incumbent upon our
nations.

Such the Government declare to be the immutable policy and determination

of Japan.*

*
Contemporary Japan, p. 584. For the text of Prince Konoye's broadcast
of November 3, see the Appendix to this section.
 338

[In ray conversation with M. Bonnet, I next said that both the American

and British governments appeared to have objected to the Japanese position and,

in my view, rightly objected to the claims made in the Japanese declaration. On

the morrow of the said declaration, Mr. Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of

State, had made it clear that the American government could not accept any

alteration of the situation created by the Treaty of Washington and contrary to

international law. Mr. Butler, the British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs, had also declared, in the name of the British government in the House of

Commons, that the British position was the same as that of America. Its policy

was based upon the Nine-power Treaty and other international conventions, and it

could not approve any change in the situation contrary to those agreements.

I added that I had been charged by my government to ascertain what the

French attitude was, and would like to know what I could report to my government

in reply. M„ Bonnet said that the attitude of the French government was entirely

the same as that of the American and British governments, and that I could

report the same to the Chinese government.

M. Bonnet and I then took up the question of transit through Indochina.

M. Bonnet said he had discussed the matter with the President of the Council,

and was sorry to state that he found the French government could not modify

its decision adopted in October 1937. I expressed regret and asked whether

this meant that Indochina was to be closed entirely to the transit of the

Chinese war material. M. Bonnet said it was possible that the question might

be reexamined later.

I said this would greatly disappoint the Chinese government, and added

that since the fall of Canton and the severance of the communications between

Canton and Hongkong, the Indochinese route of transport was all the more essentia]

to China in carrying on her resistance to Japanese aggression. Moreover, I said,

the security of the immense interests of France, Great Britain and the United
 339

States, especially Indochina, Hongkong and the Philippines, seemed to

depend upon the success of Chinese arms. This in turn relied upon supplies from

abroad, and these could be sent to China mainly by sea and now through Indochina.

It was therefore a fact that, in resisting Japanese aggression, China was not only

defending her own territory and independence as a nation, but also the territorial

and other interests of these western powers in the Far East. If China should fail

in her resistance and Japan should successfully install herself in South China, I

told him, the territorial possessions of France in the East, just as those of

Great Britain and the United States, would at once be menaced, and France would be

obliged to take up their defense herself at a much greater cost and sacrifice.

(This turned out to be true in the end. In the early forties, Japan not only

captured Hongkong and the Philippines, but also Indochina.) I said that, the

way to parry the menace now was to support China in her resistance to Japanese

invasion. As a French proverb said: "Mieux vaut prdvenir que gudrir." (It

is better to prevent than to cure.)

M. Bonnet said he appreciated the situation and was inclined to agree with

my view. He hoped circumstances would enable the French government to reexamine

the question. I pointed out that Indochina was so firmly closed at present that

even transit of non-military material was held up--a situation which I could not

understand. Thus, for example, a shipment of motor trucks was held up in

Haiphong and refused transit, although they were used for non-military purposes,

such as transport of salt. I said a part of this shipment had been ordered

by the Salt Gabelle for one of the Chinese fiscal services. I said, too, that

he would recall that the order for these 1,000 trucks had been placed only after

having received an assurance from the authorities in Indochina that transit

would be accorded. I said it was surprising because I understood that the

decision of the cabinet in 1937 was applicable only to war material and that any

other material was not subjected to prohibition. Besides, an exception was

also made at that time in favor of airplanes and aeronautical material. But the
 340

actual situation in Indochina seemed to indicate that the French government

wanted to close Indochina to all kinds of material. I expressed the hope

that this could not be the intention of the French government. (I found it

necessary to speak out very plainly and firmly about my reaction to his reply

on French policy.) M. Bonnet asked whether I would like him to make a demarche

I-q the Ministry concerned. I said I would appreciate such a ddm<<rche on his part .

Then I brought up the question of the 19 guns for the 19 Devoitine planes.

I recalled to M. Bonnet that I had had a conversation with him early in

August and that he (M. Bonnet) had been good enough to say that he would at once

write to the Air Ministry. I reminded him that these 19 cannons were urgently

required in order that the 19 airplanes which had already been delivered could be

used. I said the refusal to give permission to export these guns was all the more

inexplicable because the permit for their fabrication had already been granted. I

added that I understood all the other ministries concerned had approved the release

of these guns, and M. Guy La Chambre, the Minister of Air, was the only one

who held up the shipment for export. M. Bonnet appeared to be surprised that the

cannons had not been released, and said that he would speak to M. Guy La Chambre

about it.

Again reverting to the general question of transit, I emphasized its great

importance to the cause of Chinese resistance. It was so important that I said I

would like to ask the French government to reconsider it, and would suggest

that the French government bring the question up for discussion when the British

Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary arrived in Paris for a conference on the policy

of general appeasement in Europe. If a common policy was established to facilitate

transit, I said, the French government might find it easier to accord transit

through Indochina, since such a policy of solidarity on this question with Great

Britain would relieve the French government of its apprehensions. The Foreign

Minister said he would bring the matter up before the Council of Ministers, but

naturally he would like to consult M. Daladier first.

 341

On November 15, I visited Mr. Hugh Wilson, American Chargd d'Affaires,

for an exchange of views and information relating to the Far Eastern situation.

I first recalled to him what I had told him on Armistice Day at the Arc de

Triomphe, when we were both attending the ceremony, namely, that I understood the

French Foreign Minister had had a long conversation with him (Wilson) about the

text of a note to be sent by the French government to Tokyo, relating to the

situation in the Far East, and similar to those already sent out by Washington and

London.

Mr. Wilson said what had happened was this. He had seen M. Hoppenot under

instructions from Washington and told him that the American government was sending

a note to the Japanese government asking for the opening up of the Yangtze River to

general navigation. The line of the American argument was that, before the

fall of Hankow, the Japanese had claimed that military operations prevented

the opening of this river to general navigation. Now that Hankow had fallen,

the time had arrived for the Japanese to act upon their promise. He had also

told M. Hoppenot that the American government had instructed him to inform the

French government of it, so that if the latter should want to send a similar note,

it would already be au courant with what the American government had done.

(That was a very discreet or diplomatic way of hinting that the French government

might do the same thing.)

Mr. Wilson understood the French and British notes were sent about the

same time, probably one or two days after the American note. The French government,

Mr. Wilson told me, was pleased with his demarche (i.e., at the Quai d'Orsay) just

as the British were with a similar demarche by the American Embassy in London.

(Paris and London always hesitated to do anything about the Far East diplomatically,

unless Washington would take similar steps. In this case the American government

had taken a definite step, and, of course, they were quite ready to follow suit,

since their own interests were directly involved also.)

 342

The subject matter was the question of navigation in the Yangtze River.

He understood that it did not deal with the general situation in the Far East.

I told Mr. Wilson what I had asked of M. Bonnet on November 2, relating

to the American note to Tokyo of October 6 on the maintenance of the Open

Door policy, Mr. Hull’s statement at the press meeting on the morrow of the

declaration of the Japanese government, the broadcast statement of Prince

Konoye of November 3, and Mr. Butler's statement in the House of Commons, which

not only supported the American standpoint, but also used practically the same

language as the American Secretary of State in emphasizing the British attitude

of upholding the Treaty of Washington as the basis of their policy towards

the Far Eastern situation. I added that the only difference between the British

and American statements was that whereas Mr. Hull declared that the American

government could not accept any change in the situation created by the I realy of

Washington and international law, the British spokesman in the House of Commons

stated that the British attitude was based upon the Treaty of Washington and other

international agreements. X also said that when X saw M. Bonnet on November 2,

the French Foreign Minister did not seem to be aware of the American note of

October 6.

Mr. Wilson said he had given a copy of the text of the note to M. Hoppenot

before that date. (I think that was not anything exceptional with the Quai

d'Orsay and M. George Bonnet as Foreign Minister, because the Foreign Minister,

particularly, and the Quai d'Orsay, generally speaking, always considered the Far

Eastern situation as of secondary importance and concentrated their attention upon

Europe. Therefore, it was net surprising to me that M. George Bonnet was not

au courant with a note Mr. Wilson had given to M. Hoppenot and that M. Hoppenot

had not had an opportunity to acquaint the Foreign Minister with the dgrn,.,rciie.
 343

or with the contents of the American note.) Mr. Wilson also said he would be glad

to send me a copy of the note for reference at my request. He added that he did

not know whether a reply had been given by Japan to the three notes on the Yangtze

navigation.

Mr. Wilson then asked about the question of transit facilities through

Indochina. I told him that Indochina was now practically closed to all Chinese

shipments for transit, although one of the objectsof my visit to the Quai the

week before was to try to persuade M. Bonnet to reopen Indochina for Chinese

shipments^ especially as the communications between Hongkong and Canton had been

cut. I said I had pointed out the the French Foreign Minister that the success

of China’s resistance depended upon supplies from abroad and would be in the

interest of Indochina as much as in the interest of China.

Mr. Wilson remarked that he had often inquired about the situation of transit

in Indochina, and understood it had now been closed. I said that that was

exactly what M. Bonnet had told me last Thursday (November 10). It appeared

that the French were afraid of Japanese complications. But as a matter of fact,

I said, I had pointed out to M. Bonnet that Japan was in no position to make

difficulties for any other power since she had her hands full in China. I also

said the French would be ready to accord all transit facilities, if they could be

assured of British and American solidarity. I pointed out that this was the

position taken by them at the Brussels Conference, and that although I had

tried to convince the French that such an assurance on the part of the American

government would be contrary to its traditional policy of keeping away from

entanglements and commitments, the French, in the absence of any assurance

of joint support, were reluctant to face the possibility of the Japanese

threat alone. Mr. Wilson said that was what he, too, had found out from the

Quai d’Orsay. They were afraid of the Yunnan railway being bombed and of

Hainan Island being occupied by the Japanese. But, Mr. Wilson added, it was quite
 344

impossible for the American government to promise any joint action to France.

Thereupon^ I expressed the hope that when Mr. Wilson next saw the French, he

would manifest some strong interest in keeping open transit facilities in Indochina

in the interest of France, as well as in that of China. The American Chargd d'Affaires

said all he could do was ask what the situation was in Indochina; he could not do

more. Any definite step to ask the French to throw open Indochina for Chinese

shipments could only be taken in Washington.

I asked whether Mr. Wilson had noted an article in L1 Oeuvre by Madame

Tabouis, stating that the Anglo-American trade agreement was about to be signed

and that one of its annexes provided that Great Britain would support the

American policy in the Far East. Mr. Wilson said that he had learned from one of

the members of the American Embassyin London in charge of negotiations information

to the effect that the trade agreement would be signed before the end of the month,

but he did not know of any annexes such as I had referred to. In view of the

traditional American policy, he did not think personally that the report could be

true. The negotiations concerning the commercial treaty had been complicated

enough, and they were confined to commercial and trade matters. He did not think

it likely that any question of a political character would be injected into it.

He said indirectly, of course, the successful conclusion of such a commercial

treaty was of great importance to the commerce and industry of both countries,

and would produce, politically, a favorable impression as regards possibilities

of Anglo-American collaboration.

I told Mr. Wilson that I had suggested to M. Bonnet that he might bring

up the question of transit for discussion with the British, when they came to

Paris towards the end of the month. I said an understanding of solidarity in

action between the French and the British would make the former feel more disposed

to reopen Indochina, as it was in the interest of the French as well as of the

British that China's resistance should continue and succeed in the end. The

British themselves, I added, were favorably disposed, according to information

from my colleague in London, to help with regard to transit facilities, and

 345

they had been doing their best as regards accommodating Chinese shipments in

Singapore and Rangoon. I also told Mr. Wilson that M. Bonnet had said that,

subject to M. Daladier's approval, he would bring the matter up before the

British. Before separating, we agreed to keep each other informed if either

of us learned of anything of interest .

The previous day, Yochow, [the gateway to Hunan Province from the Wuhan area,]

had fallen. The military situation in China seemed to be developing even more

unfavorably than during previous weeks. In other words, the Japanese forces

had been able to penetrate as far south as Hunan, evidently attempting to form

a pincer movement, one army approaching upward from the south and the other

pressing southward from Hankow and the Yangtze River, with a view to turning

west and approaching Szechwan Province and eventually Chungking. Therefore, I

was anxious to press the French further as regards the restoration of transit

facilities through Indochina.

On November 17, I saw M. Alexis r, Secretary-General of the French

Foreign Ministry, who was, from a practical point of view, really the central

figure at the Quai d'Orsay. [Aside from the question of transit,] I was

particularly anxious to ascertain the precise pl^uport of the French note

addressed to the Japanese government in Tokyo. I referred first to my conversation

'bo U
with the Foreign Minister the week before, in which the latter told me that the
K
American government approved in principle the idea of making a common demarche at

Tokyo and that a French note was being despatched. I asked M. L£ger whether

the said note referred to the situation in the Far East as a whole or to any

particular phase of it. I said it appeared from the press reports that the three

notes sent the week before referred only to the question of navigation on the

Yangtze River,and that the reply had already been sent by Tokyo.

M. L6ger explained what the situation was with reference to these notes.

He said that since our last conversation, the French government had made two
 346

demarches at Washington with a view to concerting action in Tokyo. The French

government explained to the American government that, in view of the developments

in the military situation in South China, it had been asked by the Chinese government

to consider the possibility of making a demarche at Tokyo. It had further

explained that while it was entirely willing to do so, it could not do it alone,

as the position of France, on account of Indochina, was more exposed than that of

either America or Great Britain in the Far East, and that with the occupation of

Canton by the Japanese, Indochina was even more exposed than before. It could

not run the risk of a coup de force or complications from the Japanese. Any action

of the kind requested by China, so far as France was concerned, had to be done

only in concert with Great Britain and the United States .

The answer of the American government, continued M. Ldger, was that the

Chinese Ambassador in Washington had not made a similar request to the American

government. Secondly, Washington recognized the justice of the French viewpoint.

Thirdly, it agreed in principle to the idea of making a common demarche relating

to the Far East. However, as the American note of October 6, 1938 on the

question of the Open Door policy remained unanswered, it would be desirable first

to take up a particular subject for a joint demarche as a trial. Iherefore, the

question of the restoration of free navigation on the Yangtze River was decided

upon., M. L6ger added that it was pointed out to the Americans in Washington that

the French had understood that the Chinese Ambassador in London made a similar

request to the British government and that the French could not understand why

the Chinese Embassy in Washington had not made a similar proposal. The Americans

replied that possibly it was due to the fact that in the conversations between the

Waichiaopu and the American representative in Chungking, the subject had

already been alluded to.

[I would like to pause in my account of this interview with M. L£ger to

 347

comment on the American reply to the French and on the possible reasons why the

Chinese Ambassador in Washington^ Dr. Hu Shih did not make a request in Washington

for the said demarche.] I think there was probably more than one reason why

Hu Shih did not take up the matter immediately in Washington.

First of all, in important matters of this kind, Dr. Hu Shih would have

had to see either the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, or the President himself.

Perhaps, Hu Shih did not find it very useful to see the Secretary of State at

all times, because the latter would, I imagine, have hesitated to give him an

outright answer without consulting the President first. As to seeing the President,

I understood that President Roosevelt was not always in Washington. Either he

travelled to make speeches or went South for medical attention, etc. Hu Shih himself

indicated in his earlier telegram to me that he had not yet brought the matter up

to Mr. Hull or Roosevelt for technical reasons.

Secondly, President Roosevelt, even with Mr. Hull as Secretary of State, was

in the habit of conducting important foreign policy himself. This was confirmed

to me later in 1941 by Mr. Quo Tai-chi. Quo, on his way to Chungking to take

up the foreign portfolio, called on the Secretary of State as a matter of courtesy

as well as to have an exchange ov views. Mr. Hull took the opportunity to say

very firmly and to express the hope that after Mr. Quo had taken up the foreign

portfolio in Chungking, foreign relations with the United States would be conducted

through the regular channels. He said, on his side, he was prepared and strongly

hoped to do the same thing on the Washington end.

This evidently implied that the Secretary of State was not quite pleased with

the way in which foreign relations, in this case, of course, between China and

the United States, bypassed the State Department and the Waichiaopu. It was a

fact that the Generalissimo and President Roosevelt had been in communication

on important questions practically all the time. Perhaps the question of the
 348

common demarche at Tokyo had been taken up between them personally. This would

explain why Dr. Hu was not asked by the Waichiaopu to see the Secretary of State

or to take up the matter personally.

Thirdly, it may have been a question of individual initiative. One may have

noticed by this time that most of the steps I took in Paris to bring questions up

to the Quai d'Orsay or to the Minister of Colonies or even to members of Parliament,

were taken on my own initiative. As a result, I reported to the Waichiaopu the date

and content of the relevant conversations, and I suggested what line should be

taken. I took it upon myself to so act, without any thought of the relative

position of the embassies abroad. Acting simply in the interest of China's cause,

I telephoned or wired my colleagues in London, in Washington, in Berlin, in Moscow,

telling them what the French government's view was, what I was doing, and asking

them to take matters up with their respective governments, and so forth. It was

perhaps because of my eagerness to serve China that I did not think very much of

the relative position of Paris and London^ of Moscow and Washington, or of the

position of the government, [hierarchically speaking. Under different circumstances

I naturally would have expected the government to take the lead. But knowing the

situation in China and knowing that the personalities in China were often more

immediately concerned with the situation at home, I felt it was my duty to do

what I thought was the best thing to do, and then to report back to the government

and suggest what the next step should be.

I suppose I did this also because I had been dealing with foreign affairs in

China much longer than anyone then in Chungking or in the foreign capitals.

(I had been Foreign Minister seven times in Peking and then Foreign Minister in

Nanking). That may unconciously have fortified my determination to go out and

do the things which I thought were best and which I felt the Foreign Minister in

Chungking or the other ambassadors would have done if I had suggested it .

Now in the case of Dr. Hu Shih, he had littled. experience as a public

 349

official. He was a scholar who had been unanxious to take up the post of

ambassador in the first place. At the time, he took up the ambassadorship--

and this probably accounted most for Dr. Hu's apparent hesitancy in Washington--

he even issued a public statement, which was rather sort of a surprise not only

to me, but I think also to the whole group of Chinese diplomats. His statement

said that there were three things he would not do as ambassador: 1) He would

not carry out any propaganda; 2) He would not be mixed up with the purchase of

arms and ammunitions and 3) He would not take any part in soliciting loans and

credits, that is, he would not negotiate for these. Those were the three things

he would not do, which was a surprise to the Chinese government, for they were

the three most important things. But that was Dr. Hu Shih's conviction, and

[also reflected the history of his appointment to the post.]

When Wang Ching-wei insisted that Alfred Sze be removed from the Washington
♦
post, C. T. Wang's name was suggested and accepted. But in Washington C. T. Wang,

as I understood for example, from Mr. Morgenthau, did not handle matters

appropriately. What finally led to his recall was his report in 1937, after

Lukouch'iao. He reported to the Generalissimo that the United States would declare

war on Japan and would join China in resisting Japan before the end of the year.

At the time, I could not understand how he could possibly have come to that

conclusion. He said that he had had a conversation with President Roosevelt

in which Roosevelt had confided this said attitude and policy to him. The

Generalissimo could only ask, doubtfully, was it really so. He had Madame

Chiang cable to Mrs. Roosevelt to find out what the President uad said. The

President, he was informed, had said nothing of the kind. In fact, it was asked,

how could he have even hinted at such a thing, it being impossible under the

American system of government. That was probably what clinched the decision to

remove Wang from Washington.

I recall] Mr. Bullitt remarking [to me], "How could your Ambassador have

gotten that impression. He said he had every copy of the irt ervises in Washington,
 350

and asked if I wanted to see them. He said that there was not a word indicating

that Roosevelt had so committed himself, that it was impossible from any point of

view.

On top of this specific case, there was the manner in which C. T. Wang had

been arranging the matter of loans. It was reported that he had some group

soliciting loans for China and charging enormous fees. These Chinese agents,

it was said included a businessman who was his personal friend not in the

Chinese government service and who was in and out of the Treasury building,

soliciting loans and charging something like a quarter of a million dollars in

fees without achieving any results. The American reaction to these proceedings

was indicated clearly in Morgenthau’s conversation with me, although he did not

mention C. T. Wang's name. But he certainly said the Chinese were proceeding

in the wrong way and would not get a penny.

Dr. H. H. Kung, although desirous of supporting Wang, whose intentions were

good, nonetheless realized that C. T. Wang would have to be replaced, [if

his, Kung's, efforts in the financial-economic sphere were to have any chance for

success.] Again the Chinese government had to choose a new representative to

Washington. I always said that in the case of America, our government must

send a man not just for taking up matters with the government in Washington,

as in the American case the ambassadorship was only half accredited to the

government. The other half was accredited to the American public. Therefore,

someone must be sent who was known to the public who could speak to the public,

because there, in the United States, public opinion was a real force. Dr.

Hu Shih's name came up. He was a popular figure in the United States, well-

known as a non-partisan. In fact, at that time he was already in the United

States publicizing China's cause to the American public, with the support of the

Chinese government. In the end, it was decided to appoint him and he, as I said,

accepted, but only on certain conditions.

 351

[To resume my account of my interview with M. L6ger, I next asked him]

whether the question of the Yangtze navigation had been chosen and the note

sent as a result of French initiative. M. L6ger said it could not be so said.

The subject was brought up and the note was agreed upon more by coincidence

and as a result of the interests of both sides rather than as a result of the

French initiative. Asked what the nature of the Tokyo reply wa§ M. L6ger remarked

it was an absolutely complete refusal, giving as reasons: (1) that there were no

Japanese commercial ships navigating on the Yangtze (implying therefore

that there should be no other foreign vessels either,) (2) that the safety of

navigation on the said river could not be assured on account of mines, etc.,

dangerous to shipping. M. Leger added that a subsequent telegram from Tokyo

explained that another reason was the feeling of the Japanese government that if

navigation on the Yangtze was opened to commercial shipping now, it would give rise

to contraband trade in arms for the Chinese forces.

I observed that following this refusal by Japan there should be some

consultation as to the next step to be taken. I expressed the hope that the

French government would again get in touch with Washington and London. (I had to

make all these suggestions because they were not thinking hard about it. I had to

put myself in their position to see what could be done in the situation.) M L6ger

pointed out that so far the American government had not made known its reaction.

But, he said, of course contact would be resumed.

I remarked that, as I had already told M. Bonnet, the American reaction

to the declaration of the Japanese government of November 3 and the broadcast

statement of Prince Konoye of the same date was very prompt. Mr. Hull stated

at a press conference that the American policy vis-3-vis the Far Eastern situation

was guided by the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington and international law. Moreover,

two or three days later, Mr. Butler, the British Under-Secretary for Foreign

Affairs, stated in the House of Commons, much in the same terms as Mr. Hull, that
 352

the British position relating to the situation in the Far East was based upon

the situation created by the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington and other international

conventions. In other words, I said, the British attitude was almost identical

with the American and the British desired to demonstrate that they were supporting

the American policy. I asked whether the French government could not make a

similar statement, especially as I had understood from M. Bonnet that the attitude

of the French government was similar to that of the British and American

governments.

The Secretary-General replied that the French attitude was absolutely the

same as that of the British and American governments. But the position of

France in the Far East being more exposed than the other two, the manner of

realizing that attitude was necessarily different. Besides, the French Parliament

was not in session and, therefore, the Foreign Minister had not a suitable

opportunity of making a statement in it. At any rate, the position of Indochina

was much more vulnerable than that of either Hongkong or the Philippines. Any

day the Japanese might deliver a coup de force, and France, in her present position,

did not have the means to act against such a Japanese move.

I pointed out that that was all the more reason that China should be

supported in her resistance. If she were not, the successful installation of

the Japanese in South China would further threaten the security of Indochina.

M. L6ger said he was not thinking particularly of a coup de force directly against

Indochina. He was thinking more of the Japanese occupation of Hainan Island,

or any of the other islands like SpotSpratly ^ near the coast of Indochina

or of the Chinese provinces adjoining Indochina, and also of the possible

destruction by air raids of the Yunnan railway. He said that any such act would

certainly create a dangerous situation for Indochina, and that was the reason

the French had asked the British and the Americans at the Brussels Conference

to agree to a policy of solidarity. But like the Americans, the British

 353

declined. French policy had not changed since then.

I told him that, in this connection I wished to raise again the question

of transit through Indochina for Chinese war material. I said the Foreign

Minister had told me, to my disappointment and that of the Chinese government,

that the French government in the circumstances could not modify the cabinet

decision of October 1937 to prohibit transit for Chinese war material. But I

had understood, however, from many conversations with him, the Secretary-General,

that that decision was applicable strictly to war material for use by the

Chinese armed forces and that many things were excepted from the scope of the

said decision, such as airplanes and aeronautical material, as well as arms

and munitions for local use in the provinces adjoining the Indochinese frontier.

I said undoubtedly material of a character not altogether military was an

entirely different matter, but actually motor trucks--some for the use of the

Salt Gabelle to transport salt and other items for use by the Red Cross

Society in China--had been held up. I said I could not understand the refusal

to accord transit facilities to these trucks, and I asked M. L6ger to clarify

the situation for me.

He agreed with my view of the decision of October 1937, but remarked

that there was some misunderstanding on the part of the Colonial Ministry in

interpreting the scope of the decision. As regards the motor trucks, he said

he had sent a letter to the Colonial Ministry requesting it to release them.

He added that, of course, trucks in the service of the Chinese array going from

one province through Indochina to another for military purpose would be

considered as having a military character, but that new trucks for the

purposes I mentioned should not be refused transit.

The question of transit also involved a consignment of silver from the

Central Bank of China in Kwangsi Province, which had been refused transit

through Indochina by the local authorities on the ground that a proclamation

prohibiting the export of silver from Indochina was in force. I explained to

 354

M. L6ger that this proclamation must, however, have referred to silver and silver

coins originating in Indochina. In the present case, the consignment of silver

was in no sense an export from Indochina; it was merely to be sent through

Indochina. He agreed with my view and asked where the consignment was to be sent.

I answered, "probably Hongkong." I asked what I should report to my government

in regard to the denial of transit by the local authorities in Indochina.

M. L6ger promised to take the matter up with the Ministry concerned and give me

an answer in two or three days.

I referred to my conversation with M. Bonnet about the possibility of

Japanese retaliation for according transit facilities through Indochina, a

possibility which seemed to have been greatly worrying the French. My suggestion

to Bonnet was, I said, that the French government might propose a discussion with

the British, when they came to Paris for a conference the following week, with

a view to arriving at a common policy and solidarity of action. The Secretary-

General said the French government could do so and he would speak to the Minister

about it. But he felt sure that the result would be nil. He added that every

time he had had an opportunity to speak to the British about the Far Eastern

situation himself, he found the British attitude always the same, namely,

the situation in Europe vis-a-vis Germany and the Mediterranean must be cleared

up before anything could be done as regards the Far East. He added that the

Far Eastern situation was considered by the British to be entirely of secondary

importance, and their attitude had not changed since the Brussels Conference.

Thereupon, I referred to Mr. Butler’s declaration in the House of Commons

relating to Anglo-French solidarity in the event of the Japanese occupation of

Hainan Island and his recent statement in the House of Commons relating to the

British attitude towards the Far East. I said both these statements, In my

view, indicated that the British realized British interests were at stake and

the importance of the Far Eastern situation.

Lfiger shook his head and said what the July declaration meant was not
 355

solidarity of action. It merely indicated that the British would associate

themselves with the French in dealing with Japan, in the event of the Japanese

occupation of Hainan Island. He said the British had been asked whether they

would act in solidarity with the French, in the event of the Japanese inflicting

a coup de force in South China, such as the occupation of Hainan Island or

any other island. In other words, they were asked whether they would use forcible

action in cooperation with the French. The answer, said M. L6ger had always been

in the negative. He said he knew that, before the communications between

Hongkong and Canton were cut by the Japanese, the British had been keeping

Hongkong open for the transit of Chinese war material. However, as the British

were anxious to avoid any commitment vis-S-vis France as to action in solidarity,

they had been doing that without any understanding with the French. He added that

the truth was that the British had no intention of defending Hongkong, if it were

attacked .

He went on to say now that Canton had fallen and the British had fallen

back on Singapore as their base of defense, the position of Indochina was more

exposed to Japanese aggression than ever. In the actual circumstances, France

was in no position to take any action in the Far East in the event of a Japanese

coup de force. The British, given the present state of Europe, would not do

anything or adopt any positive policy vis-S-vis the Far East unless and until

the United States was ready to take the initiative. The United States as

regards the Far East was free from any preoccupation and was in the best position

to act.

I said it was also my view that the United States, compared with Great

Britain and France, was certainly in a favorable position. I explained that

was the reason I had always insisted upon the enlistment of American collaboration.

In view, however, of the more active interest taken by the Americans in recent

weeks, followed by the British approval, I told him I was of the opinion that the
 356

British might be more disposed to consider an active policy vis-h-vis the Far

East, if the question were raised by the French. I told him the Chinese

Ambassador in London would likewise speak to the British and try to provoke a more

active interest with the request that they would discuss the Far Eastern situation

with the French during their coming visit. If a consultation took place during

the British visit and contact were continually kept with Washington in order

to work out a more active policy, I thought some conclusion might be arrived at

and some result obtained.

Finally M. Ldger assured me that he would not only speak to the Minister about

it, that, even though the present French position was more exposed than ever

owing to the fall of Canton, the French government was still fully prepared to join

in any action that might be proposed by the British and the Americans.
IV part 4
Preliminary Draft

Appendix I

The Text of Prince Konoye^ Radio Address of November 3, 1938. According to

an Unoffical Translation Appearing in a Then Current Issue of Contemporary Japan

I have the honor to state the views of the Japanese Government concerning

the establishment of a lasting peace in East Asia--a task that has been handed

down to us by the Emperor Meiji whose illustrious virtues we are commemorating

today.

Following upon the capture of Canton, Hankow, the heart of China, was also

taken, so that the so-called "Middle Plain," with its seven great cities, which

virtually sustain the life of modern China, has now fallen into our hands.

There is an old Chinese saying to the effect that "He who controls the Middle

Plain controls the whole land." Thus the Chaing Kai-shek government is no longer

anything but a local regime. Japan has achieved these results without

overstraining her fighting power, which has always been kept at a level sufficient

to ward off any intervention from the outside. We are moved, as never before, by

the consciousness that this has been made possible by the august virtue of His

Majesty, the Emperor, and the heroic efforts of His valiant officers and men.

In thinking of the glorious victories, our deepest gratitude goes out

first to the tens of tousands of those who have been killed and wounded. Their

noble sacrifices impose upon us, I feel, a two-fold obligation; first, to follow

in the footsteps of those willing martyrs, and to achieve at all costs the ends

for which they have fought, and secondly, to repay their services by doing all in

our power for their families.

The key to China's fate is indeed in our hands. What then do we want? We

want not the destruction of China but her prosperity and progress; not the conquest

of China but co-operation with her. Working hand in hand with the Chinese people

awakened to a new consciousness of themselves as a nation of the Orient, we

want to build up an East Asia which is truly peaceful and settled. Let me

say, no country is better aware than Japan of the ardent national aspirations of
 ii
356 ^

of the Chinese, nor feels more keenly the need that China shall vindicate her

position as a completely independent state.

It is a historical necessity that the three great neighbor nations--China,

Manchoukuo and Japan--while fully retaining their sovereign independence should

stand closely united in their common duty of safeguarding East Asia. It is deeply

to be deplored not only for the sake of Japan but for that of all Asia that the

attainment of this goal has been thwarted through the mistaken policy of the

Kuomintang government. The policy of the Kuomintang government was borrowed

from a transient fashion of the period that followed the Great War. It did not

originate in the native intelligence and good sense of the Chinese people.

In particular, the conduct of that government, which in its efforts to stay

in power cared not whether the nation was left a prey to Communism or relagated

to a minor colonial status, cannot but be regarded as treason toward those

many patriotic Chinese who had risked their lives in order to erect a new China.

It was in those circumstances that Japan, reluctant as she was to be involved

in the tragedy of two great kindred nations fighting against each other, was

compelled to take up arms against the Chiang Kai-shek regime.

Japan fervently desires the awakening of China. Let me hope that wise

and foreseeing Chinese will be swift to assume leadership and to guide their nation

back to the right path, and lead the rejuvenated state forward in the fulfilment

of our common mission in East Asia. Already in Peking and Nanking signs of

rebirth have appeared. And in the wide plains to the north and west, a new

Mongolia is springing to life. Let the wonderful Chinese people, who in the

past 5,000 years of their history have again and again illumined the annals

of civilization, prove once more their greatmess by sharing in the stupendous

task of creating a new Asia, participation even by the Nationalist Government

need not be rejected, if, returning to the true spirit China, it should repudiate
 Ill
38to*c

its past policy, remould its personnel and offer to join in the work as a

thoroughly regenerated regime.

The nations of the world must surely be able to have a clear comprehension

of these new developments in East Asia. It is undisputed history that China

heretofore has been a victim of the rivalry between the powers whose imperialistic

ambitions have constantly imperilled her tranquillity and independence. Japan

realizes the need of fundamentally rectifying such a state of affairs and she

is eager to see a new order established in East Asia--a new structure of peace based

on true justice.

Japan is in no way opposed to collaboration with foreign p'owers, nor

does she desire to impair their legitimate rights and interests. If the powers,

understanding her true motives, will formulate policies suited to the new

conditions, Japan will be glad to co-operate with them. Japan's zeal for

combatting Communism is certainly well known by this time. The aim of the

Comintern is to sovietize the Orient and to overturn the world. Japan is firmly

determined to eradicate the communistic influence which is behind the so-called

"long term resistance" of the Chiang regime. Germany and Italy, our allies

against Communism, have manifested their sympathies with Japan's aims in

East Asia and we are profoundly grateful for the great encouragement that their

moral support has given our nation during this crisis. In the present emergency,

it is necessary for Japan not only to strengthen still further her ties with

those countries, but also to collaborate with them in a common world outlook

towards the reconstruction of international order.

What the world needs today is a lasting peace based upon a foundation

of justice and fair dealing. It cannot be denied that the principles

governing international relations in the recent past have in practice tended

only to preserve and perpetuate with cast-iron rigidity an inequitable state of

affairs. In this irrational arrangement lies the fundamental cause of the

 iv
356* d

collapse of the Covenant of the League of Nations along with many other pacts

and treaties. We should not allow international justice to remain merely a

beautiful phrase, but we should strive to create a new framework of peace, in

accordance with a comprehensive view of all human activities--commerce, emigration,

national resource^ culture, etc.--and in keeping with the actual conditions and

the progress of events. I firmly believe that this is the only way to overcome

the universal crisis which confronts us today.

Placing absolute trust in the men at the front, the Japanese at home

are silently engaged in speeding wartime production and in making preparation for

protracted hostilities. Her^we have a modern reflection of the old Japanese

f\

spirit. History shows that our national fortunes waxed or waned in proportion

to the degree in which the whole people were consciously aware of Japan's

national polity. Knowing that a lasting peace in the Orient has always been

the aim of our Sovereign, we cannot but be deeply conscious of our moral

obligations as His subjects. It is high time that all of us should face

squarely those responsibilities--namely, the mission to construct a new order

on a moral basis--a free union of all the nations of East Asia, in mutual

reliance and complete self-determination. What does this mean? What sacrifices

does this call for? What preparations are required? These are matters of

which we must obtain a clear understanding and concerning which we cannot

afford to make any mistake. If there is anyone who believes that the fall of

Canton and Hankow marks a turning point and that an immediate return to normal

conditions is soon to arrive, he simply has not grasped the significance of

the present Affair. There could be nothing more dangerous than that. Japan's

undertaking to erect a new East Asia implies that she has entered upon a long

period of creative work in all the activities of her national life. In that

sense the real war has just begun. If we hre to make of ourselves a truly

great nation, we must stand united as one man and pursue with firm conviction
and adamant resolve the task of consolidation and construction overseas

as well as at home.
 FILMED
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5. The possibilities of Joint Action by the Western

powers in the Far East in Light of the European
Situation:
Mid-November 1938-Early-February 1939
 357
5. THE POSSIBILITIES OF JOINT ACTION BY THE WESTERN POWERS IN THE
FAR EAST IN LIGHT OF THE EUROPEAN SITUATION

It has been my purpose to continuously press the French government for

some positive action to assure transit to China, and also for a statement to

the Japanese that the French were determined to aid China in the actual situation

in the Far East. [Since the French were hesitant to act alone and always

wanted to act in conjunction with London and Washington, ] I was therefore

also always ready to suggest, and did suggest to them time and again, ways and

means of approaching both Washington and Great Britain with due regard to their

respective positions and states of mind, owing to their domestic and international

situations. I perservered believing it was not entirely a hopeless situation.

While the interests of the United States in China were not as great as

those of Great Britain and France, it was in a better position to do something

to aid China, and also felt itself more confident and desirous of doing something.

In fact, the American attitude, from the early summer of 1938 onward, was growing

more positive as evidenced, for example, by the friendly attitude and the

willingness evinced by Henry Morgenthau, the Secretary of the Treasury, in our

conversation, when I urged financial assistance for China from the United States.

It was also evident from the movement in the United States for a revision of

the Neutrality Act as regards the Chinese situation, and from the latest notes

which the United States sent to Japan, for example, in regard to the closing

of the navigation of the Yangtze River to American ships. Although Japan

did not respond favorably, and in fact for a long time kept silent, giving no

definite reply to Washington, the American attitude continued to harden and

develop in the direction of taking on a more positive character. And once

the United States committed itself to action, I felt France would be more likely

to act.

I had no doubt of the French preoccupation that, if they should do anything

singlehandedly, they would not be in a position to withstand any positive reaction

from Japan. However, they time and again assured me that in conjunction with
\ kC,
London and Washington, particularly with Washington, were perfectly disposed
 358

to join any act of collaboration to any degree and extent, fa to act parallely

with the other powers. This referred to all aspects of assistance to China, from

a protest to be registered to Tokyo to various forms of direct economic assistance

to China, such as loans or credits.]

Ever since the outbreak of the Lukouchiao Incident in July 1937, the

Chinese government was confronted with the difficulty of financing China s

struggle against Japanese aggression, aside from actually fighting the Japanese

invaders with the limited supply of arms nnd amunition at its disposal. The

foreign policy finally approved and pursued by the Chinese government--as had been

suggested repeatedly by me in conjunction with my colleague in London--was to

continue to arouse the sympathy of world opinion through the League of Nations,

and to promote the idea of "ABC" cooperation, including of course France and

Soviet Russia. In other words, it was my conviction and that of a number of other

Chinese political leaders and diplomats individually that the above policy was

preferable to seeking a compromise settlement with Japan directly through

negotiations, a policy which had been, and to some extent was still being, favored

by a group of Chinese leaders both within the government and outside. The

development of the situation and the unfolding of Japan’s mood and policy toward
77? u
China which was one of domination if not of complete conquest, wirt+r the views
' A
favored by the advocates of collaboration with and aid from the Western powers

more acceptable, and at the end it was definitely approved by the Generalissimo.

The problem of implementing this policy was rather complicated because

of the conflicting personalities within the ranks of the government and the

Kuomintang. The outcome was that each prominent leader in the government sent

his own personal representative abroad to confer with the official Chinese national

representations^ to contact the different quarters in the Westland to report back

to him directly.
 359

Paris was known as the center, and at one time or another they all came to

me and discussed not only the foreign policy itself, but also the ways and means

of carrying it out. [The proliferation of personalities of varying allegiances]

was rather confusing and perplexing at the beginning, but in the end I found

it interesting and enlightening. Confidential exchanges of views with representa­

tives of the different government and party leaders not only gave me a more complete

picture [of the international situation but also a picture] of the political

situation in China--a knowledge which was essential for me to take into account in

my recommendations to the government to carry out any one particular line of policy.

I also found it gratifying for the reason that these personal representatives,

although directly responsible to different Chinese leaders, all seemed to have

confidence in my neutrality, so to speak, vis-&-vis the different groups. They

also knew I enjoyed the confidence of their respective bosses.

Thus, the Generalissimo, who was directly responsible for the military

question, had sent his former Chief of Staff, General Yang Chieh first to

Moscow [as Ambassador] and then to Paris on a special mission, in connection with

the securing of aid from Soviet Russia and the negotiation of a military alliance

between China and France. Dr. Sun Fo, the president of the Legislative Yuan, who

was also President of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in China, was a great

believer in Sino-Soviet collaboration, and felt confident that Moscow would be

disposed to give much more aid and support to China, if Moscow were properly

approached. He undertook this mission himself with the approval of the Generalissimi

and travelled to Moscow several times. While Sun was in direct communication with

the Generalissimo, reporting to him and taking instructions from him, he also kept

me fully informed, and from time to time discussed with me his particular mission.

[When he was not in France himself, his representative, Yu Ming, kept me informed].
 Dr. H. H. Kung, the Minister of Finance and successor to Dr. T. V. Soong

in the Ministry, was naturally directly responsible for the financial and

economic policy of China, and particularly anxious to raise as many financial

loans and credits abroad as possible, not only for the purchase of arms and

munitions and for the development of war industries, such as the manufacture of

war planes and the assembling of trucks and other vehicles, in China, but also

because he was directly responsible for the maintenance of the value of the

Chinese currency, which task was becoming increasingly difficult owing to the

inflation that had been [exacerbated] by the war. Dr. P. W. Kuo was stationed in

Britain as his personal representative to negotiate such loans and credit with

the British particularly, but also with the French. The purchasing agent on the

other hand was a Frenchman, M. Audinet, in close touch both with French industries,

particularly the munitions industries, and the French domestic banking world.

Both M. Audinet and Dr. Kuo kept in close touch with the Embassy and reported their

activities to me as well as directly to Dr. Kung.

Dr. T. V. Soong, who was then Chairman of the Board of Directors of the

Bank of China and [lAanrafarnlly iti11 in charge of Chinese technical

cooperation with the League of Nations along with Dr. Rajchman, [at one time]

the League's representative, had a number of personal representatives abroad,

including Dr. Rajchman. [The latter had] worked closely with Dr. Soong, not only

in connection with League activities, but also more or less as a personal adviser

on situations abroad and conditions in Europe. Dr. Rajchman was a Socialist,

if not communist-oriented, that is to say he was a Socialist to the Left. He

was in close touch with the leaders of the Socialist parties of different countries

and also to some extent with Communist leaders in different European countries.

For example, he was in close touch with the leaders of the SpaniJ^y Republic. But
ry til /■ «<

he was not the only representative of Dr. Soong abroad. There was also the faaous
 361

Jean Monnet, who was not officially but in fact the representative of the

International Finance Corporation^ founded by Dr. T. V. Soong and his brothers

to promote economic development in China, particularly the opening up of

mines and the building of railways, with the help of foreign capital. Then Dr.

T. V. Soong also enjoyed the cooperation of Mr. Li Yii-ying, who was, as I said

before, one of the elder statesmen of the Kuomintang party. He was mostly

interested in developing intellectual cooperation in China and never accepted any

office in the government. He was in close touch with French leaders, particularly

those of the French Socialist Ptfrty, and with the leaders of the Second Internationa

in general. There was also Liott-Fu*fthang-^.Liu Fu ch'en a French-educated

Chinese, who had been associated with banking circles and had served as the

representative of the Chinese Government on the Banque Franco-Chinoise du Commerce

wtL4 ex A tj: £ eH ovt« \ ,
et Industrie, a bank which the Chinese government owned hflLfLjaf-
/
These then were the principal representatives of different leaders of the

Kuomintang and Chinese government abroad. There were in addition representatives

in France of the different. Ministries, such as the Ministry of Economic Affairs,

the Ministry of Communications and the Ministry of National Defense, but their

interests and scope were rather limited and more or less of a technical character.

They too, of course, were under instructions to report to me, and consult me in

connection with their activities in France. Usually, they came with introductions

from their Ministers at home, asking me to extend them as much assistance, in the

way of putting them in contact with the proper French authorities to carry out

their respective missions, as possible.

[One of] the more important questions at the time was, as I indicated, how

to obtain loans and credit from abroad. This was the main occupation of the

Minister of Finance, Dr. Kung. Earlier, on August 30, 1938, he had sent me

a telegram in which he outlined his policy and his objectives as Minister of

Finance. The telegram was sent at the time the League of Nations Assembly was
 362

about to meet and it will be recalled that when it did meet, one of my objectives

in conversations [particularly] with Mr. Butler, British Under-Secretary for

Foreign Affairs, and with members of the French delegation in Geneva was to bring

about financial aid from the League of Nationsf along the lines of League loans

made theretofore by the League of Nations to several European members of the

League, such as Austria.

In his telegram, Dr. Kung, outlining the main objectives of his Ministry,

said the most important objective of the Chinese government was to promote

economic aid from the members of the League of Nations, an objective which had

already formed the subject matter of more than one League resolution. He said

that the center of gravity, as he viewed it, rested really with the big powers,

such as Great Britain and France. He considered it unnecessary to push the

smaller nations too far, for their ability to aid China must be limited. He

agreed with me in saying that to secure financial aid and credit through the

instrumentality of the League of Nations would make it easier for the different

countries to aid us. He said, on the British side, he understood there was a

willingness to make a loan to China, but because of the international situation,

other countries were unwilling to associate with Great Britain [in this

undertaking.] Therefore, discussions [with the British] had been channeled to

the problem of obtaining credit for the purchase of materials and goods in Great

Britain.

Then he outlined the essence of his policy. He said the most important

[financial] measures for the government at present were the stabilization of

the economic situation in China and the consolidation of the currency. In order

to carry out these two objectives, it was absolutely necessary to secure loans

from abroad in the form of cash payments. He said there had been discussions of

getting a 20 million pound loan from Great Britain, which he hoped could be

realized. As to the American side, he said my conversations with the Secretary

 363

of the Treasury, Mr Morgenthau, had opened up a channel which he was counting

upon to a great extent. In fact, he had already arranged for the visit of

Mr. K. P. Chen to the United States to undertake the negotiations.

(Shortly thereafter Mr. Ohen arrived in the United States and, it will be

recalled, that Dr. Hu Shih, reporting to me toward the end of October, told

me Chen's negotiations in Washington were making substantial progress and

concrete results could be expected for China in that area.)'

Dr. Kung again urged that, in his view, obtaining economic aid was a matter

of vital importance to China in her policy of resistance to the Japanese

aggression. He therefore asked me to exert my utmost towards its realization and

to contact British, French, Soviet and Belgian representatives in Geneva to urge

them to support us.

This was one of the main objectives then which occupied the Chinese

delegation in Geneva, headed by me, as it pursued conversations with the heads

of the principal powers attending the League Assembly, this was an objective I

thereafter pursued in Paris in cooperation with other Chinese representatives].

In connection with the question of seeking loans and credits from abroad, it

will be recalled that the discussions in London at one time centered on what

China could offer as security and the amount of area which China could put up for

sale in the London market as a means of refunding the creditors in London. I was

therefore glad to receive Dr. •£■ Y ■ Waag^Wang Ch'ung-yii ^ a well-known metallur­

gist and Ph .D. from Columbia University [on November 23, 1938] and to discuss

with him the possiblities of the world market for China's antimony and tungsten.

According to Mr. Wang, China's production of these two minerals was very

substantial, China's tungsten constituting about 45 percent of the world's

production, and her antimony some 60 percent of it. He said he was sent abroad

for the purpose of arranging with the producers outside China how to stabilize the

princes of these two ores. He said China's production of tungsten and antimony
 364

was about 1,000 tons a month, the price for tungsten being about 180 pounds a ton

and the latest price for antimony being about 50 pounds a ton.

On November 26, I had a personal and confidential conversation with George

Mandel, the Minister of Colonies, just to impress him with the possibility of

securing British cooperation in regard to aid and support to the Chinese cause.

The Minister of Colonies said it was Chamberlain with whom he had talked. He

found him opposed to the Japanese aggression and desirous of seeing China hold

herself up against the Japanese.

I told him that the British had been doing a great deal recently to

facilitate the transfer of Chinese war material in Rangoon, even to the extent

of finishing a motor road to the Chinese border. Now the Burmese government,

under the influence of London, was willing to consider the construction of a

railway to the Chinese frontier. The French government, on the contrary, had

been closing Indochina to Chinese transit more firmly than ever, and I said

I found it difficult to explain the matter to the satisfaction of my government.

I said the leaders of the Chinese government were very much disappointed with the

French attitude. They felt that the interests of Indochina and China were common

and that French cooperation in Indochina should really come as a matter of

A X v •
course, especially in view of what China had done during the first world war. I

told him that was an qjenly“declared war and the duties of China s neutrality

were very strict in light of international law. Yet China had rendered France

a good deal of assistance, even apart from the despatch of Chinese laborers.

The Minister of Colonies said he knew all that and this his spirit of

sympathy and friendliness to the Chinese cause was known to me. He himself

had also received a report concerning the British attitude in favor of extending

facilities for transit in Rangoon and of making concessions in the Burmese

customs tariff [in conjunction with the use of new road]. I told him that the

concession wa$ in the form of a drawback to the extent of 15/16ths r?] of

the duty on import levied. I told him that the British attitude was the more
 365

appreciable because there was no treaty imposing any obligation on the British such

as that between China and France relating to Indochina.

I referred to the recent incident in which the French Consulate in Berlin had

refused to grant visas to 11 Chinese students in Germany, who had been obliged

to discontinue their studies on account of the war in the Far East and return to

China via Indochina. The Minister said that was a question for the Quai d'Orsay

and that he could not understand why they should have been refused permission to

cross Indochina. He said it must have been due to some misunderstanding.

As regards the question of transit in general, M. Mandel remarked that

the difficulties in France were peculiar. What he said next was rather significant.

He told me the Foreign Minister was determined to pursue a policy of his own,

namely, that of rapproachment with Italy and Germany. And since Japan was one of

the parties to the anti-Comintern pact, naturally, he, Bonnet, did not wish

to deal with her in a way that might cause incidents or irritation and thus dispel

the atmosphere he wished to create in order to carry out his policy.

When asked whether the announced visit of Ribbentrop, the German Foreign

Minister, to Paris in order to sign a French-German declaration would really

take place, M. Mandel said he thought Ribbentrop would come. He said whether

the visit would be postponed for two or three days due to the threat of a

general strike in France was immaterial. The important thing was that he

would come and the declaration would be signed. Thisdeclaration, Mandel added,

was not viewed with a great deal of sympathy or enthusiasm in the country. It

only tended to stir up more opposition on the Left and would not really help to

solve the European situation. But Bonnet hoped that it would mean a personal

success and strengthen the hands of the government. However, he (Mandel) did

not think that the proposed declaration was opportune and he had made his views

known the previous Wednesday, [November 23] at the cabinet meeting. M. Mandel

then went on to state that the fact that he was opposed to many aspects of the
 366

foreign policy that Bonnet was pursuing trade it the more necessary for him to be

careful about the grant of transit through Indochina. For the time being he

said, he was entirely following the instructions of the Quai d'Orsay.

In reply to another question, M. Mandel said the President of the Council

was rather sympathetic towards China, but could not openly oppose the policy of

the Foreign Minister. In France, he said, public interest in foreign affairs was

very limited, and still more limited was public understanding. The only way

whereby foreign policy could be influenced was through the use of some internal

question of public interest. In other words, he said, the question of foreign

policy could not be made a political issue directly and thereby bring about a

change in the political situation. One had to find some convenient political

question that could be made an issue for upsetting or modifying the composition

of the existing government. He said the Socialists under M. Blum for example,

were opposing very strongly the decree laws, but he, Mandel, was certain that

was only a pretext. They were really opposed to the Foreign policy of the

government and its intention to modify the electoral laws, neither of which

could be made a direct issue.

When I asked about the situation of the present government, he replied

that, in his view, it could hold on till the end of this year, and that a good

deal depended upon what would develop in the next few days in connection

with the threat of a general strike of French labor. He agreed with me that

the Socialists position was rather illogical. On the one hand, they

preached pacifism, conciliation and disarmament and, on the other, they

favored the adoption of a strong foreign policy. At the same time, they

were not prepared to engage in war if necessary. Mandel thought the Socialists

would this time vote together with the Communists against the government, as

they were not in a position to act independently of the Communists, especially

after the declaration of the Radical party leader at Marseilles.

Speaking of M. Bonnet's German policy and the inoportuneness of making a

 367

joint French-German declaration at the time, I said that M. Mandel had the

opinion in London and Washington behind him. He said, however, that while

Washington did not view it favorably, he thought Chamberlain, loyal to his Munich

policy, was not displeased with the proposed declaration. Although Chamberlain’s

sentiment about the Far East was different from that of the French Foreign Minister,

Chamberlain was desirous that France, like Great Britain, leave Central Europe

alone to Germany and not interfere in the situation there.

M. Mandel recalled that Clemenceau changed 20 cabinets by making an issue

of some internal political question in order to bring about a change in the

foreign policy. In reply to another question from me, he said the Foreign Minister

had not yet reported to the cabinet on the Anglo-French discussions, and he

thought that the next cabinet meeting would be devoted to the question of a

general strike and would not take up any foreign question. He thought it would

probably be two or three weeks before Bonnet would take occasion to inform the

cabinet of the discussions.

Our discussion then turned on the impending general strike, M. Mandel

thought it was very well to take strong measures and suppress it for a time.

But such a firm policy might also be employed by the people of the Right and

might add to their personal feurels. Furthermore, there would be reaction. In

the first place, what was aimed at was not so much a firm attitude in itself, but

increased production. It was all right to clear out the strikers from the plants

and factories, but what mattered was that they should be made to work. When

reaction set in and confidence was shaken and production was not increasing , the

situation would be more difficult for the government to deal with.

I then referred to my letter to him, asking for exemption from transit tax

for the shipments of electric metallurgical material. The Minister informed

me that he had already signed a letter in reply, saying that authorization had

been given to the Governor-General to let the material pass. He was good enough
 368

to show me a copy of the telegraphic instructions. I found the Minister

had merely said he, "in agreement with diplomacy, authorize you to accord

transit to the 3,000 tons of electric metallurgical material." When I asked

whether this expression covered the point of exemption from transit tax, which

was the subject of my personal letter to the Minister, the Minister, scrutinizing

the wording, showed himself to be somewhat taken aback and then said of course

it was covered. He assured me that, at any rate, the material would be allowed

to pass freely.

As regards the shipment of silver from the Central Bank for transit through

Indochina, he said he had received a communication from the Quai d'Orsay and had

given authorization to let it pass. Then I asked what distinctions the Quai

d'Orsay made as regards the trucks that would be allowed to pass and those that

would not. Mandel replied the distinction was this: Whatever was for commercial,

non-military use, or for charitable organizations would be allowed to pass.

When I again referred to the general question of transit through Indochina,

the Minister said it was really based upon the cabinet decision of 1937, which

allowed passage for arms and munitions ordered before the opening of hostilities

and which prohibited the transit of war material ordered afterwards. But he

assured me that he had the matter in mind all the time. He said he would ask for

a little more time to work his way out, and as soon as circumstances became

favorable he would again do his best to accord facilities for all materials.

The Minister of Colonies had just told me that the French Cabinet was

concerned about the impending general strike and that the Foreign Minister

would probably take two or three weeks before he would report to the government on

his discussions with Mr. Chamberlain in Paris. In this connection, I think

it is interesting to refer to a lunch party given by the Soviet Ambassador and

his wife, Madame Souritz [on November 29]. It was not a very large dinner party

but it was attended by a number of prominent European political leaders like

 369

Niti, the Former Italian Premier, Moutet, the Former Minister of Colonies,

and Vincent Auriol, who later became President of France. It was also a

gathering of leaders of the Socialist Party with M. Pascua y Martinez, the

Spanish Ambassador, representing the Republic of Spain, of course.

The conversation centered on the impending strike declared by the c. G. t,

the Confederation G^ndral du Travail. It was general opinion that a compromise

would be reached with the government, although the labor union objected very

strongly to Daladier’s intransigence. It was generally felt that the strike

would be a failure, which meant that the Daladier government would be able to

continue.

The following day the general strike took place, but there was little

evidence of it. There were fewer people and fewer cars on the road, and a

little less traffic in the streets, [but that was all.] It was evidently

a fiasco. However, there were no regular newspapers, though three or four,

such as Le Jour, Le Matin and Le Figaro appeared as loose sheets.

On November 29, I had a conversation with M. L6ger, which turned out to be

rather animated on his part. I opened the conversation by saying that I had

been overwhelmed with telegrams during the last few days from Dr. Kung, the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the other members of the Chinese government on

the subject of transit for Chinese material through Indochina. There was a

general feeling of deep disappointment at the French attitude of prohibition and

restrictions for transit in Indochina. They believed that China was entitled

to such transit both by virtue of treaties between China and France relating to

Indochina and also by virtue of the resolutions of the League of Nations, and

they could not understand why the French government should be so unsympathetic

in this respect. I told him the Chinese government felt that the prohibition

of transit of Chinese war material and restrictions on all Chinese shipments

for transit amounted, in fact, to measures of sanction against China and the
 370

grant of full liberty to Japan to purchase coal, iron and other raw material

essential to her war industries was euqivalent to extending indirect aid to

Japan. The British, I said, were very much in the same situation as the French,

but they had not been so anxious about the possiblity of Japanese complications

and, in contrast to the French, had been according full transit facilities

formerly in Honkong and now in Burma.

M. L£ger interrupted me by asking how it could be said that the French

government had been unsympathetic. He said ever since the opening of hostilities

between China and Japan the French government had been doing its utmost to

facilitate the passage of Chinese materials through Indochina. Until a little

while ago, he had been able to obtain the release of the cannons for the airplanes,

and I already knew that the trucks had been allowed to pass through Indochina. The

French government had gone out of its way even at the expense of its national

defense to help as much as possible. He said that I knew also that a new consignment

of arms and munitions had been released in France and allowed to go through

Indochina. Meanwhile, the Japanese had been making protest after protest, and the

French government had been trying its best to explain things away by saying that the

material supplied in France related to orders placed long before the outbreak

of the Sino-Japanese hostilities and that, in order to carry out the contracts,

it could not refuse the delivery.

M. L6ger also said that Japan had been applying for permission to purchase

arms, munitions and other war material in France, and had often offered to place

orders worth millions of francs. But in every instance the French government had

refused permission to authorize their acceptance. The French government, he said,

had not only been sympahtetic to China, but entirely partial to the Chinese cause,

and he was greatly surprised to hear that the Chinese government now considered

the French government partial to Japan against China. He wanted to know, if the

Chinese goverament was not satisfied with the present situation, would it prefer
 371

to have France not giving favorable treatment to China, as she had been doing, but

according equal treatment to both China and Japan by throwing open the market in

France for Japanese purchases. He felt certain that the Chinese government would be

far more dissatisfied and would complain more strongly against it.

He said he knew the British had formerly allied a great deal of Chinese

material to pass through Hongkong, but he held that the British position, with

Hongkong in the Far East, was not so exposed as the French position. Not only was

the long coast of Indochina exposed, but so were the Yiinnan-Indochinese railway

and the islands in the South China Sea belonging to China. He said the occupation

of these islands by the Japanese would endanger the safety of Indochina and

further complicate the situation.

He said he had explained to me 20 times that, while it was necessary to

manage Japan and be really tactful in dealing with her, it was an open secret

that Japan had been continually protesting and had formally threatened to adopt

a hostile policy towards France, who had already been made the main object of

attack in the Japanese press because of her partiality to China. The dissatisfaction

of Japan towards France had been very great, and it was not unlikely that

Japan might carry out her threats against Indochina. In the present situation

of Europe, France was not in a position to deal confidently with any complications

from the Japanese side.

In the case of Great Britain, M. L6ger added, Japan wanting to make trouble

for her, would have to send the Japanese navy to Singapore and Rangoon, nearly

3,000 miles away from Hongkong. But even then the British, while allowing

Chinese material to pass through Hongkong, always refused to allow the Chinese

airplanes to fly from Hongkong to China. They had even refused permission to

the Chinese to establish an aerodrome for that purpose. The French, on the other

tend, had let Chinese war planes go through Indochina, as I knew.

I told him that I understood the French position and I had never failed to
 372

report to my government the substance of our conversations on this subject . But

in the view of the Chinese government, the French anxiety was not really warranted

by the actual circumstances. Japan, with her hands full in China, was not in a

position to cause trouble to any country-neither to Great Britain nor to France.

In the interest of her continued war of resistance to Japanese aggression, China

rightly considered the problem of supplies as being of the utmost importance. The

Burma route, to which the French refusal of transit in Indochina had obliged

the Chinese government to resort for the transport of supplies, was both expensive

and causing delay and loss of time, because the transportation facilities and the

route were not nearly as developed as those in Indochina. When M. L6ger observed

that he understood the route would not be ready for full use until the end of 1938,

I told him it was possible to use it already, but it was doubtful whether serious

transportation could go over it.

Then I said that, personally, I understood the French government was not

unwilling to help China as regards transit, but it would like to do so in

solidarity with Great Britain and the United States. M. L6ger said that was all

that France asked of Great Britain and the United States. But the American

position had not changed since the Brussels Conference and the British, as recently

as during the Anglo-French conversations of the previous week, were not prepared

to assure France of their solidarity in action vis-9-vis Japan, if action

should be necessary, because the British government considered the situation in

Europe was still such as not to permit freedom of action to the British navy in the

in the Far East. But in spite of the want of assurance of solidarity in action

from the British and the Americans, M. L€ger said, the French government had

still been doing a great deal for China.

I said in reply that the Chinese government attached more importance not only

to the Sino-French treaty relating to Indochina but also to the resolutions of the

League of Nations asking the member states not to increase China's difficulties
 373

in her resistance, and that the refusal to accord full transit facilities

through Indochina undoubtedly added to China's difficulties. He said that

France was not the only member of the League of Nations, and such assistance

must be rendered not only by France alone but by other countries as well. If the

Chinese government felt dissatisfied because it considered that France had not

done enough for China, it might be understood; but if China should say that the

French government had not been sympathetic towards her cause, that was really

unjust.

I then told him that I was preparing a memorandum on instructions from my

government, asking the French government to reconsider the whole question of

transit. I expressed the hope that M. L6ger would use his influence to give

some satisfaction to the Chinese government. I said it was anxious to receive

an assurance in order to fix its program of supplies from abroad and their

transport for the coming year. M. L6ger then said he would be glad to receive

the memorandum. While the cabinet decision of October 1937 could not be cancelled,

he wanted to assure me that each case asking for transit through Indochina would be

sympathetically considered.

I said it was not the intention of my government to utilize the Indochinese

route as the only one, but it would like to have Indochina share part of the

responsibility for transit with Burma, for example. As regards the military
*
character of any consignment, I said that could be kept secret. Its transportation

would be so handled that any knowledge of its nature would be kept from outside

people, including the Japanese, so as not to embarrass the French authorities in

Indochina or the French government in Paris. He then promised to reexamine the

situation after receiving my memorandum. But he added that was not to say

the cabinet decision would be abandoned.

Continuing my conversation with the Secretary-General, I asked him how he

found the British attitude toward the Far Eastern situation at the recent

conversations in Paris. He said there had been a discussion of a general character

 374

but no concrete results. When I asked him whether the British and the French

would arrive at a common policy to be pursued in the Far East in the light

of the actual situation there, he replied that both sides were agreed that

China should be supported so that her resistance might no crumble. Moreover,

it was necessary that Japan be further exhausted before she would be disposed

to entertain any proposition with a view to the termination of the hostilities.

There was, he added, some discussion of extending financial aid to China for the

purpose of stabilizing the Chinese currency.

1 said the Chinese Ambassador in London, by order of the Chinese government,

had asked the British to propose a loan for the purpose of stabilizing the

Chinese currency and financing a scheme of industrial relief for the Chinese war

refugees. (Refugees, numbering literally in the millions, had fled from

various provinces in the eastern part of China, in the face of the advancing

Japanese army.) I explained the idea was that the funds raised should be utilized

to create industries, which would provide employment to the refugees. Ihus the

money would be productive and the funds assigned for this purpose would be a

revolving fund able to take care of the refugees indefinitely. (To be more

explicit, the idea was to organize various handicraft and small industries

in order to give work to the refugees. Thus they could be converted into a

productive force, not only to help the government take care of their livelihood,

but also to augment the supply of goods necessary for the market and even, in

some respects, for the armed forces.)

[As I told M. Ldger,] Lord Halifax was favorably impressed with the scheme

and expressed himself as being disposed to consider and propose a British

suggestion to France and the United States geared to realizing this scheme through

international cooperation. I expressed my hope that the French government would

likewise view the proposition sympathetically. M. L6ger promised to study it,

when the British took it up with the French.

Next X brought up the question of the reported intention in London to

 375

propose mediation between China and Japan for the settlement of the Sino-

Japanese conflict. I asked him whether the British had raised this question

with the French in Paris. He answered in the nagative. Then I told him that,

according to confidential reports from Tokyo, I understood that the German Embassy

there had already intimated to the British that Germany would be prepared to

persuade Japan to enter into peaceful negotiations with China, provided that

Great Britain would assume the responsibility of persuading China for the same

purpose. It being understood that Great Britain had for some time been sounding

the Japanese out with a view to the cessation of the hostilities, while the

Japanese had all along refrained from giving a reply. I expressed my view that

the demarche of the German Embassy in Tokyo to the British there might have been

intended as an indirect reply from the Japanese to the British. (In other words,

my impression was that the Japanese did not wish to engage any suggestion from the

g^it^ish as regards the prospect of mediation until she could be sure that Great

Britain would be able to persuade China to accept such mediation.) I asked whether

the Quai d’Orsay had received similar information about it. In answer to my

question, M. Ldger said that not a word had been received from the British and

that he knew nothing about it.

Thereupon, I told him that the attitude of China had of course been made

clear. General Chiang Kai-shek had recently declared again that he was determined

to continue resisting until Japan modified her policy. The Secretary-General

then told me that the British and the French were agreed in saying that the

Japanese militarists were still feeling elated and would not be disposed to

consider any proposition for peace until Japan got deeper in her difficulties

and her strength was further reduced. He said they agreed that any effort to

mediate now would not succeed because Japan would insist upon conditions that

would be unacceptable to China.

In an effort to further sound out the French intentions, I remarked

that if and when Great Britain and Germany should make an attempt at mediation,
 376

I assuemd France and America would also join the effort. M. Ldger assured

me that France would certainly want to participate in order to help that

effort along. I said that, as the Far Eastern situation was regulated by

the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington, I wondered whether the time had come for

holding another nine-power conference, as the interests of the other signatory

powers in that region were also affected by the present conflict. M. L6ger said

the time had not arrived for any attempt to be made in that direction. (My

purpose in pressing him for an expression of his views was to keep myself in

touch with not only what they had said and done, but with what they had in mind

and were contemplating to do, so as to be in a position to keep my government

altogether au courant so it could adjust or formulate its policy on more

solid ground, rather than on wishful thinking.)

I said to M. L6ger that the British Ambassador, during his recent visit to

Chungking, had been asked to place four suggestions before the British government

for consideration: (1) for financial aid in the form of a loan; (2) for an open and

clear declaration of the British attitude in the light of the Nine-Power Treaty,

to be based, at least, on the American attitude as revealed in the American note

of October 6, 1938, addressed to Tokyo; (3) for the adoption of some concrete

measures in the form of retaliation against the Japanese refusal to agree to the

reopening of the Yangtze to international navigation; and (4) to carry out the

resolutions of the League. To make sure M. L6ger understood me, I told him that I

had no doubt the British government, after considering the four points, would want

to consult Paris and Washington, and that I hoped that France would support them

(i.e., the four items I just enumerated.) He noted down the four points and,

being very careful, asked whether the Chinese government would want to inform the

French government officially of what it had proposed to Great Britain.

I answered in the affirmative, adding that the American government was

also being informed through the Chinese Embassy in Washington. Thereupon, he

said he would study them carefully.

 377

I then asked M. Ldger whether any consultation had taken place about

action to be taken vis-S-vis the unfavorable reply of Japan to the American,

French and British notes on the Yangtze navigation. He said there had been no

consultation. Paris was still waiting to hear from Washington, but it did not

seem that the American government was anxious to take any concrete step. The

British were likewise not in a position to take any initiative and therefore

the British, too, he understood, were waiting upon the Americans.

I told him the Chinese Ambassador in London had been charged by the

Chinese government to suggest to the British government the adoption of some

positive measures, such as having naval convoys for foreign merchant vessels

sailing on the Yangtze River and refusing to allow Japanese commercial ships

to enter American and British ports. I said such positive measures might

have some effect upon the Japanese. M. L6ger said any measure approved by the

Americans and the British would be favorably viewed by the French, who were

asking for no more than solidarity of action with the other two governments.

(So it went. It was always China--and it was natural that China should be

the one--doing all the thinking, not only for herself but also for Washington,

Paris and London in each situation pertaining to the Far East as it developed.)

Two weeks later, I saw M. Ldger again. At the outset, I referred to the

previous conversations I had had with him on the question of the Anglo-American-

French common demarche at Tokyo with regard to the Far Eastern situation, and

particularly with regard to the question of free navigation on the Yangtze River.

I mentioned the reports in the French press relating to the French Foreign

Minister's statement before the Commission of Foreign Affairs in the Chamber of

Deputies about consultations with London and Washington on the subject. M®re

particularly, I asked him what further action was being contemplated or proposed
 378

and whether any measures of retaliation were under consideration. The

Secretary-General told me in reply that the previous demarche at Tokyo had

brought no result whatever. It was suggested to Washington that further common

action might be considered^ but the American government, in view of the

fruitlessness of the previous notes, did not deem it advisable to send more notes.

I then recalled to M. L6ger the declaration made by Lord Plymouth, the

British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the House of Lords a

week before. He had said in effect that all possible measures to counteract the

Japanese attempt to monopolize trade in China would be considered, and that since

the adoption of such measures would necessarily require the cooperation of other

countries, the British government would first consult them. I asked whether the

British government had approached the French government on this subject. M. L6ger

replied that neither the British nor the Americans, so far as he knew, showed any

disposition to take any concrete action. But I told him I understood the

American attitude had been improving, as evidenced by her more active interest in

the Far Eastern situation. To give an illustration, I said I understood the

American Neutrality Law would soon be revised in order to enable the American

government to better face the situation.

The Secretary-General said this had been talked about for the last two years

and so far no action had been taken to modify the Neutrality Act. The fact,

in his view, was that no representations and no notes could have any effect on

Japan in the present situation. He said only positive action would impress

Tokyo. But Great Britain, with the European situation as it was, was unable to

send her fleet to the Far East. She had even felt her naval, forces inadequate

at the time of the September crisis and (the Munich Incident^ and had asked for

certain facilities and help from France. Still less was France able to sparely

part of her forces for use in the Far East. The United States was the only

power free from any preoccupations and possessing sufficient armed forces to

take the initiative. If it did, France and Great Britain, even though preoccupied
 379

with the European situation, would be willing to contribute a complementary force

to work together with the Americans.

I raised the question of the Open Door policy, asking M. Ldger whether the

French government had made known to Tokyo its attitude regarding the necessity

of maintaining integrally the Nine Power Treaty and the Open Door policy, as

had been done by the American and British government. M. Ldger replied, implying

the purposelessness of such a move. Japan, he said, knew perfectly well that

nothing happened to Germany when the latter violated the Locarno Treaty and

absorbed Austria. I remarked that the position of Japan was different from that

of Germany. She was not as strong as her European associate, especially as she

had her hands full already in China.

I referred to the press report that M. Bonnet had declared before the

Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber of Deputies that in the Chinese

territories occupied by the Japanese troops there was a strong movement of

xenophobia against all Europeans and Americans without discrimination and that,

in his (Bonnet’s) opinion, the situation called for concerted action on the part

of the other powers. I asked whether any demarche, with this in view, was

contemplated. M. L6ger answered in the negative. I then called his attention to

the situat?*.on in the French Concession at Hankow, where the Japanese were attempting

to interfere. Again he minimized the situation, saying it was not serious and

there was nothing in the French Concession's relations with the Japanese that

caused France any special anxiety at the moment.

Then once more I raised the question of transit through Indochina and

referred to the memorandum, which I had sent to the French Foreign Office

and in which, as in my previous conversations with M. L6ger and the Foreign Minister,

I had urged the French government to reconsider the cabinet decision of October

1937, restricting transit for Chinese shipments through Indochina. M. L6ger said
 380

he had read the memorandum only two days ago, but he could tell me that, as he

had previously said, in the present situation the French government could not

modify its policy of restriction. (In short, that was another refusal to

reconsider its earlier decision.) I told him the Chinese government attached

great importance to this question and that I had been receiving telegrams from

General Chiang, Dr. Kung, the Waichiaopu, and also from the Chinese representatives

in Indochina. I said I would like to ask him to see to it that a written reply be

given to my memorandum, stating the French position and clarifying the actual

situation as to what material could be allowed to pass and what would be stopped,

in order to give some guidance to the Chinese government in its arrangements for

the transportation of supplies. M. L6ger said he would and, taking up the

telephone, asked the head of the Asiatic desk to prepare a written reply.

I next took up the question of transit through Kwangchow-wan, on the

southern coast of China southwest of Canton, a territory which was leased to

France under Treaty with China. I told him that lately the French authorities

there had refused transit to Chinese shipments although, in the view of the

Chinese government, the status of Kwangchow-wan was different from that of

Indochina. I asked whether the cabinet decision of last October also applied to

Kwangchow-wan.

The Secretary-General said that it did and should be applicable with all

the more reason, because Kwangchow-wan was a much smaller place and anything

taking place there easily attracted attention. Although it was a leased

territory, the local French authorities, in the eyes of the Japanese, were

responsible for anything happening there. The Japanese had been expressing great

dissatisfaction to the French on the ground that the latter had been partial to

China in the matter of transit.

Two days ago, he continued, the Japanese occupied Sprat ley Island, which

six or seven years earlier had already been recognized by Great Britain, the United
 381

States and other countries as belonging to France, unlike the Paracels, the

sovereignty of which still remained an outstanding question between China and

France. If the Japanese found the authorities in Kwangchow-wan allowing Chinese

supplies to pass, they might really occupy it, he said, and they could do so

with greater facility than they could occupy Indochina. Indochina, he said,

was a French colony and therefore French territory, and the Japanese might

hesitate to attack it outright. But Kwangchow-wan was Chinese territory and close

to the arena of hostilities in South China. Besides, while there were some men

and cannons in Indochina to defend it against invasion, there was hardly anything

of the sort in Kwangchow-wan for its defense. The Japanese occupation of

CLH-
Spratley by landing marines of the Japanese navy was in indication of the

Japanese disposition towards France. They claimed they were obliged to do so

because France refused to modify her policy favorable to China.

I told him that was merely a Japanese pretext. In any case, I presumed

it would not be difficult for France to take steps to drive out the Japanese

marines from the islands. He then asked me how this could be done. He thought

it would be useless to take any forcible action, because there were plenty of

Japanese warships in the South China seas. For every ship France could send

Japan could send three. France, he stated, was in no position to take any

effective action, unless she could send her entire fleet to the Far East, and

that was an impossibility in the present situation of Europe. Therefore, I asked

what was contemplated and whether France was thinking of negotiating a settlement.

M. L6ger replied that the only possible thing to do now was to protest, but the

Japanese were not likely to leave the island.

At that point I expressed my appreciation of M. Lager’s efforts in securing

transit through Indochina for the trucks ordered by different services of the
 382

Chinese government, such as the Salt Gabelle and the Red Cross. [The Indochinese

authorities had finally allowed them passage.] However, I told him I had just

received a report that the authorities in Indochina had given orders to let only

100 trucks pass every month. I explained that since the number of trucks

having already arrived there was in the neighborhood of 1,400, the limitations

meant it would take 14 months to pass them. As this would undoubtedly add

to the difficulties of China, I asked him to have the limitations lifted, arguing

that since they were entitled to transit, there should be no restriction as to

their number. He promised to look into the matter.

Almost every turn in the European situation affected the situation in

the Far East and the conflict between China and Japan. As I have already

indicated, Germany, being the focal point of the anti-Comintern Axis, was watching

the Far Eastern situation closely, and to a lesser but still substantial degree,

Italy was also watching the Far Eastern situation, both countries realizing

it had a direct bearing upon their policies in Europe. The policies of the

Axis Powers in turn, of course were watched very closely by Moscow, because

Soviet Russia rightly considered that whatever happened in Europe would have a

great effect on Soviet Russia, principally by influencing Japanese policy and

the Japanese attitude toward the Soviet Union. In other words, the relations of

these countries were not only all interrelated fbut also interrelated as to their

effect on the Far Eastern situation.]

Therefore, in my conversation with the Secretary-General of the French

Foreign Ministry, I also turned to von Ribbentrop's conversations in Paris

[and to the European situation in general], I told M. L€ger that, according

to information I had received from Germany and the Far East, it was clear that

Germany was desirous of seeing the Sino-Japanese conflict brought to an end as

early as possible. I said I understood further that Germany had been advising

Japan in this sense. I asked whether, in the recent conversations between

M. Bonnet, the French Foreign Minister, and Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister,
 383

in Paris the Far Eastern situation was discussed in any of its aspects. I was

informed by M. L6ger that not a word was said about the Far East.

Then I referred to the rumors of another crisis in Europe, saying that both in

and outside the press there had recently been reports about the imminence of

another crisis in Europe, with the next Spring set as the time of its outbreak.

I recalled to him that a year ago he had given me a clear and farsighted analysis

of the European situation and said that 1938 would be a critical year for Europe.

I therefore asked what he thought of 1939 and what importance should be attached

to the said reports. Thereupon, he gave me another analysis, which I found to be

very enlightening.

He said, as regards the situation in Europe, there were the aspirations of

Germany in Central and Eastern Europe to be considered. But for the more immediate

future the urgent question was that of the Mediterranean. Italy considered France

ready, as a result of the Munich Agreement, to further pursue the policy of

concessions. Italy reasoned that, internally, France would be divided by political

strife, and that, externally, her policy of compromise and conciliation as

evidenced in Munich would have to continue. Italy was therefore making impossible

claims on France. She had enunciated them just on the eve of the threatened

general strike of November 30. But Italy was wrong, he stated. If she counted

upon French internal disunity and external weakness, she would soon discover her

error at her own cost.

He recalled that in 1935 France made concessions to Italy in the hope of

regaining Italian friendship. He himself was assisting M. Laval (at that

time the French Premier) in the negotiations with Mussolini. France gave up an

island on the coast of Africa and surrendered some territory in order to facilitate

the Italian plan of development in Italy's African colonies. France also offered

favorable status to the Italians in Tunis. He said all these concessions were made
 384

in consideration of Italy's promise of friendship. However, Italy had benefitted

by those French concessions and had not given any sign of friendship; so

France would be entitled to cancel the Agreement of 1935 and could do so with

justification. If today Mussolini considered the 1935 Agreement as no longer

binding, so much the better for France. But if Italy expected France to yield

again to Italian claims, she would soon find out her error. It was possible, he

said, paraphrasing a French proverb, that Mussolini had asked for a "boeuf" in

order to get an "oeuf," but this time he would not even get crumbR.

As regards Tunis, M. L6ger said there were 90,000 Italians against 130,000

French in Tunis. Those Italians were given the privilege of becoming French

citizens in the course of a fixed period, so as to enjoy all the rights of

French citizens. Such a measure was generous beyond measure. In other countries

the restrictions of immigration were heavy and the rights of foreign residents

were meagre, but such was not the case in Tunis. Then Tunis, added M. Ldger,

was not merely a French colony but a protectorate. There were 1.5 million

Tunisians. France could not barter them away or give up any of the Tunisian

territory. As regards Djibouti and the railway to Addis Ababa, he said, France

in 1935, as another friendly act, had given Italy a participating interest.

Those facilities had been of great value to Italy in her campaign in Ethiopia.

As to the question of the Suez Canal, M. L6ger did not see any reason why

Italy should raise it. The dues charged had already been reduced and every

country's ships, including those of France, had been paying without complaint.

The reason Italy raised the question was her financial inability to take care of

the payment of dues, since the amount of the Italian tonnage passing through

the Canal was considerable and therefore the amount of dues was also great.

He was certain that Italy was trying to get such control of the Suez Canal

as would release Italian government shipments from paying any dues, the more so

because her co-called conquest of Abyssinia was only true in name. In fact,

he said, the Italian situation in Abyssinia was desperate. Her garrisons there
 385

either revolted or disappeared. Food-stuffs and other things needed by the

Italian soldiers and the Italian colony had been sent from Italy.

The danger of the situation, in M. Lager's view, lay in the fact that

Mussolini felt that his cooperation with Hitler had brought Italy nothing. It

was Germany that benefitted each time by the so-called Berlin-Rome axis. As a

result, Italy saw her position in Central Europe lost and weakened. In

Southeastern Europe she found that Germany had installed herself in Austria and

Czechoslovakia and reached out her hand across Rumania, Yugoslavia and Hungary,

which [latter country Italy had] always considered to be her friend. She became

anxious and tried to get her share of the bargain with Hitler. She considered the

time had arrived because France was not in a position to resist. But France,

M. L6ger stated, would not yield this time as she had at the time of the

Czechoslovak crisis. As M. Bo met had declared in Parliament, France would not

yield an inch of territory. If Mussolini insisted, France was ready to go to

any length to support her refusal.

From the military point of view, said M. L6ger, France had nothing to

fear of Italy. The Italian army did not count and its condition was poor.

It lacked arms and, particularly, tanks. Its military stores were practically

empty, it having wasted them on Spain. The recently announced offensive on the

part of Franco to force a decision against Republican Spain meant further

serious drains on Italy's military stores. Count Ciano's declaration in the

Italian Parliament that at the time of the Czechoslovak crisis Italy had

mobilized 300,000 troops was ridiculous. Ciano made it only for the purpose

of misleading the Italian people and impressing the French.

[As an illustration of the French attitude, M. L6ger said at the time

France had informed the German Military Attach^ each time she took a counter­

measure against the German military preparations. On the other hand, on the

Italian frontier, France had sent no troops and had notified the Italian

Military Attachd accordingly, giving two reasons, first to show that France
 386

entertained no suspicion against Italy and, second, to convey the impression

that if Italy sent troops to the French frontier, France would not be worried,

but would be confident of her ability to face them. On theeve of the Munich

Agreement, a number of French troops were sent to the Italian frontier and

the Italian Military Attach^ was duly informed. The move was made not so much

for fear of an Italian invasion as for precaution against the possibility of

German troops attacking France through Italy. It also served as a preparation

for French forces to attack Germany through Italy, if a general war should

occur. M. L6ger further explained that the reason for this step was that

the Maginot line would make it impossible for the Germans to invade France,

and therefore they would [have to] be allowed to march through Italy in order

to attack France. It was the same with the French troops, he added.

It would not be possible for them to march through the Siegfried line in

order to attack Germany and they would also find it easier to go through Italy.

M. L6ger said that France was preparing for the worst, although still hoping

the situation would improve. How serious the situation would be would depend

upon Mussolini. However, as far as France was concerned, she would not yield

a single thing. If Mussolini, seeing the inevitability of a conflict, recoiled

and withdrew--in other words, if he decided in favor of peace--he would get

nothing. On the other hand, if he should force the hand of the French and

bring on war, it was certain that Italy would be defeated.

I then asked him what the German attitude was likely to be in such a

crisis. M. L6ger said Germany still had a program of expansion in Lastern

and Central Europe to carry out and she still needed the cooperation of Italy

to counteract the influence of France and Great Britain in the Mediterranean.

Therefore, Hitler would support Italy, not only for Germany's own purposes, but

also to give Mussolini the impression that he was backing him now in return

for Mussolini's collaboration in Central Europe. I remarked, [to further sound

 387

him out,] that Mussolini, being less obstinate and more supple than Hitler,

would probably see the hopelessness of the situation for Italy and withdraw in

time graciously. But M. L6ger thought not. It was just the contrary, he said.

Hitler was a man with a practical sense of ^the realities. He had the instinct

of knowing just how far to go. When he found that his game of bluff would

not succeed, he would withdraw in time. For example, he said, Germany was

heavily engaged in Spain at one time, but seeing the futility of the game.

Hitler withdrew, leaving only about 5,000 technicians on the French side. But

these 5,000 men were exercising much greater influence than the thousands of the

so-called Italian volunteers. Although Mussolini had sent enormous forces to

Spain and wasted Italy's resources there, the Spaniards disliked the Italians

and would only be too glad to see the latter leave Spain.

[As another illustration of his point] M. L6ger said, at the time of the

September crisis. Hitler knew that to withdraw was not to force the situation.

Mussolini, on the other hand, was vain and illogical. For reasons of internal

politics, he could not easily withdraw. Even [when] he realized he had made

mistakes, he would stick to the determined line of action to its end. And in

the course of the last few years, he had made many mistakes. Spain was one

and his cooperation with Germany was another.

M. Ldger recalled that in 1935, when he (Ldger) accompanied M. Laval to

Rome, it was plainly put to Mussolini to choose between France and Germany,

and France gave him all the inducements as witnessed in the 1935 Agreement.

But Mussolini chose Germany and he knew now that he had chosen wrongly, but

he would not change. The Berlin-Rome axis had brought Italy no benefit.

At the time of the Czechoslovak crisis, Mussolini did everything possible to

avoid a general conflagration, because he said it would bring Italy no benefits

but only more sacrifices.

M. L6ger thought that Mussolini would soon find that he had gone too far to
 388

withdraw. He thought that, with the continued backing of Hitlea; Mussolini would

soon find himself on the edge of an abyss, where he would meet his eventual

downfall. He said the Italian people knew that Mussolini's policy of cooperation

with Germany had brought Germany [to the dge of] the Italian frontiers. They

knew that eventually it would make Germany so strong that Italy would not be

able to stop her advance towards the Adriatic. But a dictator like Mussolini

had to hold up his prestige at all costs. So, said Ldger, a critical situation

was likely to occur the next Spring.

[I had earlier sought out the Italian view of the European situation and

Franco-Italian relations as seen by the Italian Ambassador in Paris. The

opportunity for doing so was provided by the courtesy visit of the new Italian

diplomatic representative, Sr. Guariglia, on December 6, 1938. On that

occasion,] Sr. Guariglia referred to the outburst of criticism in the French

press and government circles against the spontaneous demonstration of two

or three members of the Fascist Parliament in Rome, clamoring for certain French

colonies. The Ambassador said that he could not understand the French mentality.

In his opinion, the demonstration in the Fascist Parliament by a few individual

members was of no greater importance than similar manifestations in the French

Chamber of Deputies.

When I expressed my hope that the disturbing factor in Franco-Italian

relations would be of a transitory character, the Ambassador said he did not

think so. There were certain questions between the two countries that called for

a settlement and could not be set aside. He said the question of Tunis, for

example, was a very real.one. He added that, since the Laval Agreement, the

situation had been altered by the conquest of Ethiopia. The Laval Agreement

was made before the Ethiopian conquest, and the application of sanctions

greatly embittered the Italian people, who to this day still entertained

a rancor against that unfriendly act toward Italy. France, he stated, must
 389

take a realistic view of the situation and meet Italy's wishes accordingly.

I asked whether the question of Djibouti was not of greater immediate

importance to Italy. [(Djibouti was the major port of French Somaliland, on

the Gulf of Eden, connected by railway to the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa.)]

He answered in the affirmative, saying that Djibouti, leading to the interior of

Ethiopia, was naturally of greater importance to Italy and now of little value

to France herself.

The new Italian Ambassador did not see the relations between France and

Italy as being promising of improvement, unless certain outstanding questions

between them were satisfactorily arranged. The difficulty with France, in his

opinion, was that the government was always confronted with the internal political

situation, which to French statesmen was of far more pressing importance than

questions of foreign policy. Often, he said, French statesmen would view

the question of foreign policy in the light of internal politics. He said

that was the reason why France often found it difficult to adopt a firm policy.

In the present case, he thought that Foreign Minister Bonnet was pursuing a

sound policy of conciliation and appeasement, but that Bonnet's hand was not

free and that he was constantly afraid of opposition in Parliament and from

French political parties. He wondered whether M. Bonnet would be able to carry

out his policy successfully.

The conversation I had with Sr. Guariglia about ten days later on

December 17 when I made my return call was even more interesting in the sense

of sheding light on the Italian viewpoint and especially the Italian policy

toward France. Sr. Guariglia said the different questions outstanding between

the two countries should and could be settled one by one, if the French viewed

the situation calmly and took into consideration the changes that had been

brought about in North Africa as a result of the Ethiopian conquest. He said

the question of Djibouti, for example, could be easily settled. Djibouti,

with its limited territory, could not be considered a French colony. It was useful
 390

only as a port of entry and exit to Addis Ababa and the Ethiopian interior.

Though it was of little use to France she claimed it to be an important step

on the road to the East.

On account of the French attitude, M. Guariglia continued, Italy had

not been ^ing Djibouti and the railway for the transportation of men and

materials to Ethiopia. Instead she had been using the motor road leading

to Eritrea (from the Sudan £-?} ] to reach Addis Ababa and other parts of

inland Ethiopia, thus making a long detour at greatcost. A ton of coal, for

instance, could be sent to Ethiopia via Djibouti and the railway for 900 francs,

whereas it cost Italy 4,000 francs over the motor road. Thus far, he said, Italy

had been using the motor road at great sacrifice but this sort of situation

should not and could not last long. It should be readjusted.

He told me, that the same was true as regards the question of the Suez

Canal. Italian shipping had been paying an enormous dues to the Suez Company,

and Italian tonnage going through the canal as a result of the new situation in

North Africa had been increasing steadily. The pilotage, for example, was

excessive, since each ship passing through the canal had three pilots.

France should view the situation sympathetically and be able to reach a

settlement without difficulty. How could France, he asked, expressing the

Italian point of view, hope to restore the friendship between the two countries

by deliberately adopting an uncompromising and alarmist attitude towards these

questions?

I then asked him what he thought of the situation on the Continent. The new

Ambassador replied that, in Central and Eastern Europe, the question of the

Ukraine, which was the subject of much agitation in the French press, was

not a problem of immediate importance. Many leaders of the independence movement

in the Ukraine had been killed by the Soviet authorities and it would take time to

train new ones. He did not think Germany wanted, as the French said, to make

the Ukraine a German colony. The spirit of nationalism had always been strong
 391

among the Ukraine people, and it was a natural movement for self-government.

In his view, an independent, new Ukraine would be a contribution to the peace of

Europe.

I remarked that the Ukraine could not hope to have an independent existence,

unless its economic welfare was assured by an extension of its territory to the

shores of the Black Sea. M. Guariglia said the new boundaries would certainly

include the area bordering on the Black Sea, since that area was the richest in

natural and agricultural resources ,

I raised the question of Anglo-Italian relations, desiring to find out what

the Ambassador's views were. He said the British position in the Mediterranean was

an important one. Italy considered that it was as necessary and as important to

come to an agreement with Great Britain, in order to stabilize the situation

in the Mediterranean, as to reach an understanding with Germany for cooperation in

Central and Southeastern Europe. He thought Italian relations with France were

really of secondary importance.

I asked him whether the impending visit of Prime Minister Chamberlain and

Lord Halifax to Rome the following month would result in a satisfactory arrangement

between Italy and Great Britain in the Mediterranean.

He replied that it was difficult to say as yet. It would depend upon the

questions discussed. He thought Mussolini might indicate the questions to be

discussed in a speech, unless it was true, as lately reported, that he would

postpone the statement until after the visit.

My conversation with the Rumanian Minister on December 20 was also interesting

because it threw some light on the international situation in Europe from t-he

Rumanian point of view. The Minister came to inform me of his recall by the King

of Rumania to serve at home and the appointment of the former Prime Minister, M.

Tataresco, as the first Rumanian Ambassador to France.

 392

Speaking of Rumania’s foreign policy aid foreign relations with her neighbors,

the Minister saw the danger of German influence spreading rapidly in Rumania,

on account of the persistent inroad of German industry and business into Southeaster

Europe. He told me that Rumania's wheat, cereals, wood, meat and oil were articles

very much needed by Germany. He thought there was also the danger of Germany

wishing to penetrate into Lithuania through Rumania. But Rumania did not wish

to have her economy dominated by German influence, he said.

He told me that he himself had been urging the French to make an effort to

win the Rumanian market for French industry and manufacture. When I remarked

that the French impressed me as always being slow to move, the Minister said it

was worse than that. For one reason or another, the French dd not seem to be

able to exert themselves to conquer the Rumanian market. He feared that unless

the French redoubled their efforts to rehabilitate their country, they might find

themselves facing a great danger from the totalitarian powers.

[A conversation I had earlier, on December 12, with the new Mexican Minister,

on the occasion of his courtesy visit to me was not so much enlightening as

regards the European situation, as] illustrative of the complexity and the inter­

relationships and intertwining of the different countries internationally.

After congratulating the Minister on his appointment and thanking him for

his courtesy call, I asked whether there was any truth in the Deport that, as a

result of the Mexican government's appropriation of the properties of the foreign

oil companies in Mexico, it was contemplated to sell part of the oil to Japan.

He replied that there was some talk about it, but the Mexican government, being

against the Japanese policy of aggression in China, would not like to sei1 the

oil to her. The present Mexican government, especially the President, relied for

its support upon the political parties of the businessmen, the laborers and the

Mexican army. All these political parties were against international aggression
 393

and advocated a policy of international cooperation and peace. He said another

reason for not selling oil to Japan was that such an act might irritate the

American government in Washington^ which was known to be opposed to Japan's

policy of invasion and entirely sympathetic towards China.

But he continued, the Mexican government needed revenue and must sell the oil

somewhere. On account of the British government's influence with the American and

French governments and representations to them against buying the appropriated oil

from the Mexican government, Mexico could not sell such oil in those countries and

it was therefore possible that she would sell oil to Germany and Italy, although

politically the Mexican government did not approve of their ideologies.

I told the Minister that I understood that France normally would be prepared

to buy the Mexican oil, as she wanted to build up her oil reserves. Both in

Geneva and in Brussels, when the question of placing an oil embargo against Japan

in order to stop her aggression in China was raised, France had indicated, as an

inducement to the American and British oil producers, her willingness to take up

part of the oil that would otherwise be sold to Japan. The Minister said he was

going to make arrangements with private French oil companies for purchasing part

of the Mexical oil. He was also hopeful that eventually the American government

would be persuaded to waive her objections and allow the American oil companies

to buy some of it.

He explained that the appropriation of the foreign companies' properties in

Mexico involved two aspects: (1) compensation for the land and (2) compensation

for the oil. He said an understanding had already been reached with the American

government concerning the compensation for the land taken from the American oil

companies. He felt certain that once a satisfactory agreement was reached with

the American government concerning the oil and the land, the British government

could also be persuaded to settle the question with the Mexican government by
 394

negotiation. He also explained to me that the Mexican government recently had

taken action to appropriate the foreign oil companies because they exercised too

much influence in Mexico. He said the companies considered themselves so strong

as to defy even the decision of the Mexican Supreme Court in Mexico, and they

placed themselves outside the control of Mexican law.

The Minister himself had been a leader and active organizer of the labor

movement in his own country and a prominent representative of Mexican labor

organizations in Republican Spain. He said that the Mexican government needed

increased revenue in order to carry out social reforms. He said twenty years before
a*
on 20 percent of the Mexican people were able to read and write, but at present
<f-v

illiteracy had been reduced to 50 percent. However the work of social reform

was easier in the cities and among the working people concentrated in towns and

cities. It was more difficult among the farmers in the country, who were scattered

and only a beginning had been made to organize them. Nonetheless, they constituted

more than 75 percent of the total Mexican population. The Indian population in

Mexico, which constituted nearly 45 to 50 percent of the total Mexican population,

was another problem, he said, and the Mexican government was trying to liberate

them. As an example, he mentioned that one of the principal platforms of the

Mexican Socialist Party was the distribution of land to the farmers, by confiscating

land belonging to the capitalists and the bourgeoisie. He added that Mexico

was now experimenting with the system of collective ownership of land by farmers

themselves, wherein each farmer was given 20 hectres of land, which he could not sell

He said each farmer cultivated his own part of the land and was entitled to the

entire yield of his labor. As he could not sell any part of the land, this

prevented the return of the former system, under which the capitalists were

able to deprive the farmers of their land and reap big profits at the expense of

the farmers.

Mr. Souritz, the Soviet Ambassador, called on me for a conversation on

December 29. Although, as he told me, the purpose of his visit was to inquire
 395

of me what China proposed to do at the next Council meeting of the League of

Nations, a subject I will take up later, we also took the occasion to have an

exchange of views on the European situation. In reply to my question about the

Franco-Italian situation Mr. Souritz said that he had the impression that

Daladier and Bonnet would yield to Italy in the end. At present they were more

afraid of Chamberlain's visit to Rome than of the real Italian attitude. He

understood that Bonnet had informed London that the French government considered

the question of French-Italian relations as one for France herself to decide

and that she would not welcome British mediation. He further understood that

Bonnet conveyed the same point to the German government in a statement made

during Ribbentrop's visit to Paris. But he thought that Bonnet was not sincere

when he said France would not yield an inch of French territory. He though^y

in the end, France would give up Djibouti and the railway. In other words

said Souritz, the present French government was determined to continue the post-

Munich policy of compromise with the dictators, although their feeling was

naturally different when the dictators began to ask territorial concessions

from France herself. It was easy to bargain away, for fear of war, Czechoslovak

territory. But when it came to the question of ceding French territory

Mr. Souritz said the problem was not so easy for the French.

I asked him then about the present position of the Franco-Soviet Pact.

The Ambassador said officially Daladier and Bonnet still considered it to be in

existence, but their intentions were clear. In pursuance of the policy of the

Munich Agreement, they were anxious to leave Eastern Europe to Germany, and they

could not be expected to take seriously the obligations of the pact. The Soviet

Union knew it and therefore attached more importance to the French intentions

than to the terms of the pact itself. (That was a very realistic view to

take of the situation.) However, Mr. Souritz said, by holding to their present

attitude of discouraging all French alliances and pacts, the French leaders were

playing right into the hands of Germany, which had been seeking all along to
 396

destroy the French system of alliances and pacts of mutual assistance (the

formation of which had been a deliberate policy pursued by France after World

War 1). This, said Mr. Souritz, was also the motive, that underlay the German

propaganda to stir up the Ukranian porblem. There was nothing intrinsic in

the actual situation there to cause anxiety as to the possibility of a conflict.

Germany knew that Russia was well prepared and, therefore, would not dare to

attempt an invasion. Her purpose was merely to create a sense of terror and fear

in the minds of the French. Though^ the Franco-Soviet Pact might involve France

in war, there was in fact no danger of a war being started by Germany against

Soviet Russia on account of the Ukraine.

As to Polish-Soviet relations, (a subject which I raised in another question,

the Soviet Ambassador said that they had improved. He said at last Poland

had come to realize that her interests lay more with the Soviet Union than with

Germany. The impending visit of Colonel Beck, the polish Foreign Minister, to

Paris in January 1939 would not, in his opinion, accomplish anything, as the

French had lost all confidence in him.

Speaking of Soviet-Italian relations, Mr. Souritz said he could not think

of any improvement. The conclusion of commercial agreements did not mean any /

improvement in their political relations. Such improvement was impossible so long

as Italy remained attached to the Berlin-Rome axis.

When I asked him of the Soviet-Japanese relations, M. Souritz said the

negotiations relating to the fisheries question remained deadlocked. But Japan

would eventually give in as Mr. Litvinov was holding to the original Soviet

attitude. There were three points in this Soviet attitude, he explained, namely;

1) the fishery right of the Japanese was not automatic but subject to periodic

renewal; 2) the Soviet government had the right to withdraw any part of the

fisheries previously granted to Japanese fishermen; and 3) those which were

withdrawn were subject to the Soviet government’s assigning them to Soviet citizens
 397

The Japanese took the position that fishery rights were accorded to them under

the Portsmouth Treaty, and insisted upon enjoying those rights that had previously

been assigned to them. But Mr. Souritz thought the Japanese might eventually

meet the Soviet opposition by reducing the number of fisheries^ as Mr.

Litvinov had already reduced from 40 to 30 the number of fisheries to be

withdrawn from the grant. Mr. Souritz added that the Japanese position

had been greatly weakened through her invasion of China, and that he had received

reports indicating that, in the Changkufeng incident, Japan had sustained very

heavy losses and that it was a lesson to the Japanese.

/
[I next discussed the international situation in Europe with Mr. Souritz on

January 11, 1939, when we had an interview at his Embassy.] As I was always eager

to know his view of it, I questioned him and he, with his usual candidness, said

the European situation continued to be uncertain and, if anything, worse than it

was before the Munich settlement. For example, he said, as regards Franco-Italian

relations, he had thought that Mussolini, through the Italian press and Fascist

Council, had made some extreme demands, such as for Tunis and Corsica, in the hope

of obtaining something concrete, though much less, in fact, from France. In other

words, he had thought that Mussolini would be satisfied with French concessions

as regards questions of a political and administrative character, such as the

improvement of the status of Italians in Tunis, participation in the administration

of the Suez Canal and the grant of special privileges in the port of Djibouti.

He did not think that Mussolini would insist upon territorial demands. But he

learned from his colleague in Rome, Mr. Stein, the Soviet Ambassador there, recently

that Italy was very serious as regards her demands, including those of a territorial

character. He said Mr. Stein took a rather pessimistic view of the situation.

Speaking of the French side, Mr. Souritz agreed with me that France would be
 398

disposed in the end to yield on questions other than territorial demands. Any

territorial concession would be difficult for any government to make, he said.

He was of the opinion that although M. Bonnet had made it clear to London that

British mediation would not be acceptable and although Chamberlain would not be

careless enough to force mediation upon the French, yet the question of Franco-

Italian relations would be discussed in Rome by Mr. Chamberlain during his visit

to the Italian capital. Mr. Souritz thought it would be difficult to discuss the

general European situation and the Mediterranean question without touching

upon Italy's demands upon France, though the particular question did not appear

on the agenda of the Anglo-Italian conference at Rome. He felt certain that

Chamberlain would try to sound out Mussolini's minimum demands, and that Bonnet

himself would be glad to know what those were from Chamberlain, although publicly

and officially the French government had disapproved any idea of British mediation.

As regards Central Europe, the Soviet Ambassador remarked that the so-called

Ukranian question had been deliberately put forward by Germany in order to mask

Hitler's real intentions in Europe. He said he did not know as yet the nature

and the result of the interview between the Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel

Beck, and Hitler at Berchtesgaden, but whatever it was, the Soviet Union was not

worried. As he himself had explained to Bonnet, the status of the people cf

Ukrania was that of [members] of an independent, autonomous state and different

from [that of] the Ukranian minority in Poland, who were subject to real

disadvantages. There could be no question of the emancipation of the Ukranian

people living in that part [of the Ukraine] lying in Soviet territory.

It was probable, he continued, that Colonel Beck, with his pro-German

background, had come to some understanding with Hitler regarding an attack on

Ukranian territory in the Soviet Union. He added that so long as Beck remained

at the head of the Polish Foreign Ministry, the Soviet Union could not have

full confidence in Polish foreign policy. It was true that Beck's effort to
 399

approach Moscow after the Munich settlement was welcome, since it was believed

that Beck, seeing the nature of the Munich settlement for Czechoslovakia, had

become anxious about the security of Poland vis-a-vis Germany and therefore

desirous of finding some check or balance against the growth of German influence

and power. But Poland was never fully trusted by Moscow. In so far as the

Soviet Union was concerned, it did not consider the Ukranian problem as a cause

for anxiety, because after all it was a question of force. Germany could not hope

to settle the Ukranian problem in her own way without going to war, and the

Soviet Union was fully prepared and felt herself strong.

Mr. Souritz told me that he had warned Bonnet of the probability that

Germany had been stirring up the Ukranian problem in order to cover her intentions

and preparations against Western Europe. But Bonnet’s real policy, according to

the Soviet Ambassador, was to disinterest France in Central Europe and to concentrat

French energy and effort on the development of the so-called French colonial

empire. Souritz said Bonnet based his policy upon the belief that France was weak,

and that if she should be forced into a war and lost it, she would be made to pay

as the weakest partner in the democratic coalition. The Soviet Ambassador himself

believed that it was absolutely essential to form a united front of the peace-

loving, democratic powers in order to deal with the dictatorships. But Bonnet

thought differently, he said. While Bonnet was Foreign Minister in a cabinet

based upon the support of the Radical-Socialists and the Left, his sympathies

were really ont the side of the Right, being in agreement with such men like

Flandin (a point to which I have referred previously). According to Flandin,

said Souritz, France should be afraid not only of losing a war but even of

winning a war. If she lost a war, it was certain that she would be made to

pay the most for it, and if she won, it would mean the rise into power of the

proletariat class. In other words, Bonnet like Flandin was really thinking
 400

as much of class interests as of anything else.

As regards Bonnet's personal position in the cabinet, Mr. Souritz told

me he very much had his way as regards the direction of foreign policy. Time

and again he committed the government to an extent which Daladier could not

agree to but from which Daladier had no way of withdrawing his government .

Immediately after the Berchtesgaden meeting [between Chamberlain and Hitler],

Daladier was very much dissatisfied with Bonnet and rather in agreement with the

views of Paul Reynaud and George Mandel. There was much talk of changing

the Foreign Minister. But after the Munich agreement, said Souritz, Daladier

was looked upon by the French people as the saviour of peace and burdened with

laurels of popular praise. Therefore, he thought Bonnet's present policy

might probably be carrying more weight with Daladier.

I then asked him about the Franco-Soviet and Franco-polish Pacts of Mutual

Assistance. The Soviet Ambassador said officially and ostensibly Bonnet took the

position that France would always honor her obligations flowing from those pacts.

Bonnet had also told him that, during the conversations he had had with Ribbentrop,

he had made it clear to the German Foreign Minister that the French-German joint

declaration did not mean that France would henceforth disinterest herself in

Eastern Europe. But Souritz said there was a reservation in the declaration

which he believed Bonnet had made, following his conviction of the weakness

of French armed forces and his policy to leave Germany to busy herself with

Eastern Europe and thereby turn the direction of German expansion from the West

to the East. [He thought Bonnet] would not hesitate, if necessary, to sacrifice

the Franco-Soviet and Franco-polish pacts in return for some assurance or*

*
Editor's Note: The declaration referred to must be that accompanying the
signature, on December 6, 1938, of a Franco-German non-aggression pact, during
Herr Ribbentrop's visit to Paris. The pact guaranteed the existing frontier
between the two countries and provided for consultation in the interest of
settling any disputes pacifically.
 401

undertaking from Germany to leave France alone. Mr Souritz said that Poland

felt very much the same way, and he thought that Beck, in his talks at

Berchtesgaden a few days earlier, had not counted upon the French-Polish Pact

as of any great value to Poland.

Coming back to the question of Franco-Italian relations, M. Souritz said

he believed that Germany would fully support the Italian demands on France.

In fact, he said, Ribbentrop had made it clear during his visit to Paris that

the Rome-Berlin axis remained the basis of German foreign policy. Mr. Souritz

agreed therefore with me in the conclusion that the European situation was

far from reassuring and that the future would depend upon how far Mussolini

was prepared, with the support of Germany, to insist upon his demands on France.

[That same day, Mr. Chamberlain arrived in Rome accompanied by Lord

Halifax for a four-day visit. This prompted me, when calling on French Foreign

Minister Bonnet the following day, to discuss the question of transit, to take

the opportunity to sound him out on the European situation. When I asked him]

whether he thought there was a ddtente, particularly in the Mediterranean, the

Foreign Minister replied that although the situation was causing less anxiety

than during the previous September, it was still rather complicated. He thought

that Chamberlain, during his journey to Rome, might be able to find out

Mussolini's real intentions.

[When I called on the Secretary-General of the Foreign Office, M. L6ger,

on January 27,] I asked him his view of the immediate future of the European

situation and whether he was as anxious as some people outside the Foreign

Ministry [about it]. His reply was rather enlightening.

M. L6ger replied that it all depended upon what attitude Hitler would

adopt toward France. He himself thought Germany and Italy would again try to

bluff, thinking that the democracies would once more be cowed into submission

as they had been in the case of the Munich settlement. But the situation was
 402

different now. In the case of the Czechoslovak question, neither the people in

England nor those in France were willing to go to war to compel the Sudetens to

remain under the rule of Czechoslovakia. Although at the time the order of

mobilization had been given the French people responded magnificently, they

could not bring themselves to see the necessity of going to war just because

of Czechoslovakia. Even if a war had taken place and Great Britain and France

had won it, he said, it would still have been impossible to force the Sudetens

to remain under Czechoslovakian rule. Moreover, juridically, the obligations of

France had not been brought into play, because Germany had already agreed to

setding the question by peaceful means and had refrained from attacking Czechoslo­

vakia. Without a direct attack on Czechoslovakia, the pact of mutual assistance

between Czechoslovakia and France did not come into play. So juridically,

morally and in fact, said Ldger, France had no more duty than England to

go to war with Germany in the Czechoslovak crisis.

In the present case, however, said M. Ldger, the question was that of

French rights and French territory, and the French people, even the French

farmers in the provinces^ could understand and would be determined to defend

France against any attack. He felt the unanimous vote of confidence in the

government just passed by the Chamber of Deputies was an eloquent proof of this

widespread sentiment. He said France was not only prepared to resist any

aggression by Italy, but in the actual circumstances would not even agree to

negotiate on the claims of Italy.

In reply to my question, M. Ldger said the Italians had been mobilizing

and only the day before had mobilized another 60,000 men. In Lybia, Italy had been

concentrating her troops, and it was possible that she might attack Djibouti.

Therefore, I asked whether, in that case, France would retaliate. I said I

understood that France had taken the necessary precautions. M. L6ger said the

steps that had been taken for defense did not amount to very much in and around
 403

Djibouti. Only one cruiser, two submarines and 3,000 troops had been sent. He

added that France would certainly defend Djibouti, but, in view of the great

odds, it was not likely that defense would be successful as Djibouti was surrounded

by Ethiopia and the latter was full of Italian troops. However, France could

respond much more effectively in Europe and there was no reason the defense

against Italian attack should be confined to North Africa.

In his view Germany was bound to support Italy in case of war, although,

in that case, Germany would have to bear 65 percent of the burden of war and

Italy only 35 percent. There were no indications as yet of what Hitler was going

to say on January 30, but he thought it was still a question whether Germany would

be disposed to provoke a war. France was not only supported by Great Britain, he

said; the growing firmness in the American attitude was a fact clear to the

Rome-Berlin axis.

After our discussion, M. L6ger mentioned a recent visit he received from

Spender, whom he described as the future premier of Australia. (Presumably,

he referred to Sir Percy Spender, who in the 1960s was my colleague on the

World Court and President of the Court. Sir Percy, who in 1939 was Secretary

to the Australian Cabinet, came to hold many important posts in his government

in later years). He told me that during his passage through Paris, Spender had

called on him. M. L6ger had availed himself of the opportunity to arouse Spender's

interest on behalf of China by urging Australia to support Great Britain in Europe

against Germany, so Japan in the Far East would be weakened by virtue of the

accruing diminution of Germany's support and Great Britain would be enabled

to take a firmer stand vis-H-vis Japan. Despite the circuitousness of M. Ldger's

approach, I tried to encourage him by saying that was a very useful effort

on his part, as from all the information I had received, Japan, Italy and

Germany were working closely together. Mussolini, in particular, I told him, had

been pleading the cause of Japan before Hitler. As recently as two months

ago, Mussolini had appealed to Hitler to aid Japan. As a result Germany had
 404

granted 1.5 billion marks worth of credits to Japan for making purchases in Germany.

Hitler himself had spoken twice to the Chinese Ambassador in Berlin on the Sino-

Japanese conflict, I added, expressing his regret that China did not accept his

good offices at the time of the Brussels Conference for the termination of

hostilities and urging China again to make an effort to wind up the conflict.

I referred to M. Daladier*s statement in the Chamber [of the previous

day], and asked whether there was any possibility of the convocation of a four-

power conference (meaning a conference of France, Great Britain, Germany and

Italy). M. L6ger replied that it was not a four-power conference of which M.

Daladier had spoken, but a general world conference for peace and disarmament.

Besides it was not a proposal onM. Daladier's part, he said. The Socialists

had urged two proposals; the opening of the Spanish frontier [for the transport

of munitions on a large scale to the Republican forces] and the calling of a

world conference to assure peace, and it was by way of replying to the Socialists'
•k

propositions that M. Daladier had spoken. M. L6ger said that Daladier made it

clear, however, that, in his view, the project of a conference was unrealizable

in the present circumstances.

When I pointed it out, M. L6ger agreed with me in saying that M.

Daladier's statement was very much of the same character as the declaration of

President Roosevelt regarding the possibility of a world conference for which

he (Roosevelt) said the time had not yet arrived. M. L6ger stated that whatever

was in store for the future, France was prepared to go to any limit to face the

situation. He still believed it was a gigantic bluff on the part of Germany and

*
Editor's note; Barcelona, the center of Republican resistance, fell on January
26, 1939. But even before Barcelon surrendered, the chances of continued effective
resistance to Franco's forces had clearly dwindled, and France and Britain were
reported to be considering methods of a settlement. M. Daladier made such
suggestions for a settlement in his speech in the Chamber on the 26th and also
raised the subject of a general conference, leaving some doubt as to what he
intended by bringing up the latter.]
 405

Italy to force the democracies to make new concessions as they had so successfully

done at the time of the Munich crisis. But this time, he added, the Rome-Berlin

axis would find France and Great Britain in an entirely different mood. I told

him that I also understood the attitude of Italy and Germany to be one of

bluffing to gain concessions and that, in the interests of peace, it was

necessary to call the bluff once and for all. I said if this were not done, the

the cause of peace could never be assured and, on the contrary, would always be

threatened by renewed attempts to blackmail the peace-loving democracies.

M. L6ger told me that this was precisely what France and Great Britain were

going to do this time.

A week later I had a conversation with Mr. Tatarescu, [a former Prime

Minister and the] first Rumanian Ambassador in Paris, at the Embassy. I

want to refer to it because, while the main topic of our conversation related

to the desire of Rumania to conclude a commercial treaty with China, the

conversation touched upon certain apsects of the European situation and

Rumania's relations with Germany.

He told me that, personally, he had always been in favor of opening direct

commercial relations with China. He explained that thitherto Rumanian products

had found their way into China through the hands of intermediaries, mostly

Germans and Czechs. This indirect commercial intercourse not only added to

the price charged to the purchase, but also took something away from the seller.

He thought it would be very desirable to arrange for direct commercial relations,

which would be to the mutual advantage of both countries. He said he would

therefore bring the matter before his government again on his return to

Bucharest within the next ten days, and would bring back a reply to me.

I would like to add here that, among the duties and functions of the Embassy

in Paris, and I suppose of other missions in other capitals, there was always the
 406

work of negotiating and concluding treaties, not necessarily with the government

to which [I or] the particular mission was accredited, but with other countries.

Therefore, from time to time I was charged with the negotiation of treaties with

countries which had no existing relations with China. The established

policy of widening the sphere of international relations for China,

particularly when China had been fighting Japanese aggression and had moved

her capital to the interior, was one I fully endorsed. It was very important

for China to maintain international realtions with as many countries in the

outside world as possible.

It was for the above reason that I strongly reconmended to my government

to agree to the proposals of Liberia, Rumania and Yugoslavia for the conclusion

of commercial treaties with China. However, China of course found it difficult

to make commercial treaties because a great part of the country was already

under Japanese military occupation. Therefore, the policy that the government

proposed with some insistence, in pursuance of its general policy of widening

China's international relations, was the conclusion of treaties of amity and

friendship first, and the avoidance of attempts to widen the scope of such

treaties to inclucfe commercial intercourse for the time being. In implementing

this policy of my government, I had already negotiated and concluded a treaty

of amity with Liberia, of which the exchange of ratifications took place on

June 8, 1938- In 1939, I pursued negotiations of similar treaties with Rumania

and Yugoslavia.

[Once having discussed the subject of a commercial treaty with Mr. Tatarescu,

our conversation turned to the European situation. He told me that he had

made studies in France and lived there for many years. This time he found

France reasserting her strength in a way that was unprecedented. Instead of

showing disunity and weakness, as was evident at the time of the Munich settlement,

France under Daladier had regained her authority and prestige, and the firm policy
 407

which the present government was pursuing internally as well as externally

was bound, he thought, to react favorably upon the general situation in

Europe. He told me he understood from M. Bonnet that the French government

would not only refuse to make further concessions, but that, in the present

circumstances, it would not even consent to undertake negotiations with Italy.

This firmness, he felt, was bound to exercise a salutary influence on the other

side of the Alpes.

Then followed a brief analysis by the Ambassador of Rumania's geographical

position and the necessity for her to pursue a special foreign policy that

would enable her to develop her country u'nd work out its destiny in peace.

He explained to me that while her economic interests were all with Germany,

which took 40 percent of her wheat and 60 percent of her petrol., her political

sympathies were altogether with France and Great Britain, the two countries

whose policies were based upon respect for law and order and the maintenance

of the status quo. He said Rumania had for many years sided with France, hoping

that the Versailles Treaty, which was the basis of French foreign policy,

would serve as a guarantee for the security of Rumania through the League of

Nations. But the lack of foresighted leadership in the principal countries in

Europe and the mistakes French statesmen had made in the two decades that had

elapsed since the time of the Versailles Treaty had brought about a situation in

Europe that was far from satisfactory and reassuring. However, the firm

policy of the present French government and the results it had already obtained

were once more inspiring confidence in Rumania, and, he said, he was coming to

work for closer relations between the two countries.

I asked the Ambassador about Rumanian relations with the Soviet Union.

He said they were excellent. He added that this did not mean that the

Rumanian people sympathized with the internal regime of Soviet Russia. To

the contrary, he said, 85 percent of the Rumanian people were farmers, attached

to the soil, and the idea of communism was repugnant to them. He said this
 408

was a fact which was now well understood by the Soviet Union.

I observed that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was definitely

pacific in its sprit and that that must be a great help in promoting close

cooperation between Rumania and the Soviet Union. The Ambassador agreed and

added that there were other considerations besides. He said that Rumania for

six centuries was under the rule of Turkey, and Russia had always acted

sea kind of defender and protector of Rumanim interests during all those centuries.

The question of Bessarabia had, of course, always remained a thorn in the side.

For one reason or another, the Soviet Union had never recognized Rumanian

sovereignty over Bessarabia. He himself had pointed out to Russian statesmen

during his visit to Moscow that the want of understanding on the Bessarabian
4, '/
question was like a spike in Rumania's show, because while she was anxious

to run to the arms of the Soviet Union, the spike in the shoe stopped her

progress. Outside of this question, the relations between the two countries

were very friendly, he said, and particularly so since Stalin's rise to power

and his abandonment of the policy of provoking a world revolution. M.

Tatarescu's view was that Stalin, contrary to the policy of Lenin in the earlier

years of the Soviet Union, was moving in the direction of stabilization and

was abandoning even the policy of openly attacking capitalism.

As regards the internal situation of Rumania, the Ambassador said,

because of the diversity of the political parties and the intense rivalry

amongst them and especially between the Communist Party on one side and the

Fascist Party on the other, King Carol had found it necessary to bring about a

spirit of national unity by setting up a national government composed of

people irrespective of political parties. The Jewish problem was also a

difficult one for Rumania, he said, as 60 percent of its population consisted

of Jews, most of whom immigrated into Rumania after the Great War. On

the other hand, he said, there were Fascists in his country influenced by

the developments in Germany and Italy. The push of Germany into Rumania was
 409

was strong and the situation was uncertain. But Rumania was determined to dQ

everything possible to preserve her independence and sovereignty.

REMINISCENCES of WELLINGTON KOO

VOLUME IV MISSION TO FRANCE

(PRELIMINARY DRAFT FORM)

6. The Vagaries of Joint Action in the Far East

by the Western Democracies as Japan Attempts
Strengthen her political Hold on
China and to Expand Militarily in the pacific
Ocean Area:
Late December 1938-February 1939
6. the vagaries of joint action in the far east by the western 410
democracies as japan attempts to strengthen her political
HOLD ON CHINA AND TO EXPAND MILITARILY IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN AREA

In China, the question of the long term attitude toward Japan and the

short term policy relating to the settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict,

which was never entirely agreed upon, flared up as a subject of controversy

among leaders of the government late in 1939. The immediate cause was Prince

Konoye's statement of December 22, 1939.

Once more Japan, through her Premier, Prince Konoye, ostensibly made a

gesture for a settlement of the conflict with China. However, the proposals

Prince Konoye put forward as the basis of a settlement were such as to arouse only

violent opposition in China, [with one serious exception]. The Japanese statement

became a subject of controversy between the Generalissimo, [representing the

majority view,] and Mr. Wang Ching-wei.

The relations between the two leaders had not always been good. On the

contrary, arguments and disputes had arisen relating to various aspects of the

government's policy, and more particularly, with reference to the policy of

resistance to the Japanese aggression. Wang Ching-wei, who not unnaturally

aspired to be the leader of the government owing to his seniority in the Kuomintang

ranks and the great part he had played as Sun Yat-sen's collaborator in the

revolution and in the organization of the first revolutionary government at

Nanking, because [of his aspirations] and also because of his acquaintance

with the international situation, as he viewed it from his past experience and

observation, seemed to be first disposed to and later bent upon reaching an

agreement with Japan. The statement of the Japanese Premier on December 22

offered another occasion for him to assert his views. His stand was, however,

strongly opposed by the Generalissimo.

There was speculation as to what Wang Ching-wei really had in mind, but

judging from his subsequent actions in joining the Japanese in setting up what
 411

y/G/
known as the puppet government in Nanking with the support of the Japanese,

it was evident that in his controversy with the Generalissimo he was not

free from ulterior motives.

In any event, the immediate outcome of this controversy was Wang Ching-

wei's sudden departure from Chungking [first to Hongkong, thence] to Hanoi in

Indochina, to the great surprise of the Generalissimo and the other leaders of

the government. He took with him,among others, Mr. Tseng Chung-ming, his

confidential secretary and long-time collaborator.

Shortly after his departure, he and his party were able to reach Hanoi.

It was there, [on March 21, 1939], that an attempted assassination resulted in

the death of Tseng Chung-ming. It was reported at the time that the object

of the attempt was really Mr. Wang Ching-wei himself; but either by accident
or desire, the room that had been assigned to Wang was not like*by Wang, and

so he exchanged bedrooms with Tseng Chung-ming. It was there, in the middle

of the night, that an assassin sneaked in and killed Mr. Tseng and wounded his

wife .

Whatever the immediate cause of this sinister attempt, its effect was

certainly to strengthen Wang Ching-wei's purpose. More than ever, he desired to

blaze a new path away from Chungking in Western China, and cooperate with the

Japanese in the part of China dominated and controlled by the Japanese armed

forces, a part which was far richer than Western China, more populous and

always regarded as far more important by the powers, both of Europe and America.

Mr. Wang Ching-wei's sudden departure from Chunking in December 1938]

/
was of course a subject of much speculation both in China and abroad. But

in reply to my inquiry, the Waichiaopu simply said, in a telegram I received

on the 24th, that Mr. Wang had left Chungking to get medical attention and

was entrusted with no mission whatever by the government.

The Waichiaopu also sent me a telegram which gave me a resume of the

 412

Generalissimo's comments on Prince Konoye's statement of December 22. According

to the telegram, dated December 27 (28 ?), the Generalissimo had said [in a

speech in Chungking on the 26th] that Konoye's statement was a stark exposure of

Japanese intrigues aiming at the political dismantlement of China. The latest

official statement from Tokyo, according to the emphatic declaration of the

Generalissimo, gave the Chinese people a deeper understanding of the Japanese

designs, and served only to further solidify China's determination to fight on

without surrender or compromise.

Referring to Mr. Wang Ching-wei's departure from Chungking, the Generalissimo

said that Mr. Wang Ching-wei went to Hanoi for medical treatment, and that

rumors abroad alleging that Wang Ching-wei had made the trip on behalf of the

National Military Council to discuss peace terms with Japan were without a

thread of justification. In fact, he stated, Wang Ching-wei's journey had not the

slightest connection with the Military Council, nor with the Central Kuomintang

nor with the National government. (Initially Wang and his circle, for propaganda

value, had accounted for the sudden departure by implying that he had been

entrusted with a mission by Chungking. There was also speculation abroad that Wang

had bee., sent by the government to undertake negotiations with Japan. This is why

the Generalissimo and the Waichiaopu were anxious to explain away any such idea

and thus avoid unnecessary speculation.

The Generalissimo further stated, according to the telegram, that Japan's

establishment of the "Asia Developments Bureau," with the announced purpose

of bringing about an East Asian bloc and establishing a new order in East

Asia, revealed to the minutest detail the Japanese design to conquer the whole

of China. He concluded by saying that no Chinese people, knowing the

important issues at stake, cherished any idea of compromise with Japan.

Hence, the vicious rumors which Japan, the enemy, had spread (I suppose about

the conjecture that Wang had officially been sent abroad to negotiate peace with

japan) were unworthy of attention.

 413

Reading between the lines of this telegram, it was apparent that my

assumption, indicated earlier, namely, that the design and purpose of Wang

Ching-wei's sudden departure from Chungking was connected with his desire to

reach a settlement with Japan and to establish a new regime under the protection of

the Japanese, with himself as the head, was not altogether unfounded.

Japan, on her part, through the machinations and information of her secret

agents, was evidently counting upon the cooperation of Wang Ching-wei and his

followers in setting up a [more ambitious] puppet regime in eastern China,

all of which had by this time come under the domination and control of Japanese

armed forces. The circumstances surrounding Wang Ching-wei's flight from

Chungking and subsequent activities certainly indicated there was some previous

secret understanding between Wang and Prince Konoye. [Telegrams from Nanking

conveyed the same idea.]

On December 28, Mr. Yu Ming brought me a special telegram sent by Dr. Sun Fo,

through Yu Ming, his counselor, for my information. The telegram said that Wang

Ching-wei had left Chungking secretly, without informing anybody. It added that

it was found on evidence that Wang had been carrying on secret negotiations with

the Japanese, with the enemy. It also said that despite Wang's move, the

government remained unmoved and its policy of continued resistance unaffected.

Thus it became more apparent as time went on that Wang Ching-wei left on

the 23rd, knowing that the Generalissimo and his supporters had definitely

decided to oppose the proposals made by Konoye in his statement to China, and

also knowing that the Generalissimo was going to make his views public following

the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. But Chungking was

unaware of Wang's plans and, therefore, Wang's secret departure evidently came
•k
as_quite_a_surpri.se and shock to_Chungking_. _ [Lateri on_December 29L Wang_Ching-wei
^Editor's Note; Actually’wang Ching-wei left Chungking on December 18, 1938, before
the Konoye statement was delivered. However, the proposals in the statement and
the Generalissimo's feelings about the proposals were already known to Wang by ail
accounts.
 414

issued a statement frown Hongkong in which he publicly urged a peace settlement

based on the acceptance of Prince Konoye’s proposals. Chungking then acted

quickly. On January 1^ 1939 Wang was expelled permanently from the party and

dismissed from all his public posts.]

A telegram dated January 3, 1939 to me stated that the Central Executive

Committee of the Kuomintang had met in an extraordinary session the day before to

consider the question of Wang Ching-wei's breach of faith in promising to

observe the rules of the arty, and his treacherous act against the Partyand

the nation. It was decided that Wang Ching-wei should be dismissed from the Party

forever and removed from all the posts and offices that he was holding. It said

a resolution to this effect was passed by the Central Executive Committee, and the

Central Supervisory Committee of the Party also met in an extraordinary session and

passed a similar resolution.

A subsequent telegram from the Waichiaopu bearing the same date gave the

text of the resolution adopted by the Central Executive Committee. It said that

Wang had secretly left his post, and was hiding in a foreign country and announcing

a policy contrary to the national policy. A telegram from Wang, it went on,

had even advocated acceptance of the enemy's proposals, which were inspired

by a determination to destroy China as a nation, and urged the government to

appeal for peace from Japan. Wang's telegram even went so far as to make all

sorts of excuses to justify Japan's terms, thereby ignoring the rights and wrongs

of the Sino-Japanese conflict. In short, the resolution said, his telegram was

clear evidence of his deliberate intention toi^treacherously collaborate with the

enemy in order to surrender t& him, to the detriment of China as an independent

nation. Such an attitude and a policy was detested by the whole Chinese people,

and contrary to the best interests of the Party and the Nation. It meant a

complete surrender to the secret and dangerous design of Japan to break up

China and bring about her fall. For these reasons, the resolution said, he

had been dismissed from the Party and from all the posts and functions with
 415

which he had theretofore been charged. The resolution further called upon the

nation to continue to rally to the support of the government and uphold the

united will to continue resistance, so as to achieve final victory by following

and supporting the policy announced by the Generalissimo, as head of the Party,

at the memorial service on Monday. (This referred to the Generalissimo's

statement of December 26, 1938.)

[Long before that I was given an inkling of the way the wind was blowing

from Ch'en Kung-po. It will be recalled that] Ch'en Kung-po had come to Europe
*7
[in the fall of 1937, ] on an official mission to visit particularly Ciano and

Mussolini, with a view to enlisting the support of Italy on the side of China.

He had been sent abroad for that purpose because he had been a great friend of

Ciano's when Ciano was Consul-General in Shanghai. After returning from Rome,

he came to see me and inform me of the outcome of his conversations. I got the

impression that he was not happy over his visit because it was not very satisfactory

It was Italy's persistent advice that China come to terms with Japan, without any

indication being given at the same time of Italian support for China.

Then one day during his stay in Paris, he came to tell me that he had just

gotten a telegram from Mr. Wang Ching-wei asking him to go back at once. This

was already after Wang Ching-wei had left Chungking, and I think the telegram

was from Hongkong.^ Ch'en, of course, had been in close touch with Wang Ching-wei

all along. In fact, he was one of Wang's closest advisers and collaborators,

■k
Editor's Note; This part of Dr. Koo's recollection is clearly at odds
with the facts since Ch'en was in Europe in the fall of 1937 and Wang left £
Chungking in December 1938, when Ch^en was in Chengtu, Szechwan as Director *
of Kuomintang Provincial Headquarters.) If the conversation did take place in
1937, how much could Ch'en have known? perhaps Ch'en spoke to Koo about Wang's
M ^41

delTireand efforts to reach a settlement with the Japanese, perhaps Dr. Koo was
partly recollecting the fact that some of Ch'en's friends tried to dissuade
him from joining Wang, while Ch'en was staying in Hongkong in 1939 and trying
to reach a decision.
 416

especially in political matters. He knew what Wang Ching-wei was working for,

namely, to come to a settlment with Japan and set up a separate regime in

Occupied China with the support of the Japanese.

[If I remember correctly], Ch'en Kung-po intimated he was afraid Wang

Ching-wei would set up an entirely new regime in competition with Chungking

and pursue a policy of direct settlement with Japan. He said he did not like it

himself, personally, and we urged that he should have nothing to do with it.

He agreed, but said finally with a long sigh, "What could I do?" Being a

very close personal friend of Wang Ching-wei, he could not let his friend down,

although he was himself against Wang's policy in this respect, and against

Wang's contemplated move. He said that all along he had been [in the uncomfortable

position of] wearing a wet shirt in Wang Ching-wei's wing, and how could he
A . fV,
throw it off now. I have to keep on wearing it, he said.

I tried to make clear to him that personal friendship and political convictions

should not be mixed up. One concerned only one personal matter, the friendship

of one person; while the other concerned the whole country. He said he knew

all that, but of course in China friendship counted much more than elsewhere.

Having worked so closely with Wang for so many years and in consideration of their

close relationship, he could not at heart personally refuse to go back. So he

went back and joined Wang.

Later, when Wang Ching-wei became head of the puppet regime in Nanking,

Ch'en Kung-po was made [President of its Legislative Yuan and the ranking

member of the puppet government next to Wang.] When Wang became ill and

went to Japan for medical treatment [in March 1944,] Ch'en did another foolish

thing. At Wang Ching-wei's insistence, he took up Wang's post and acted for

him. So he became the acting head of the puppet regime [and when Wang died in

japan, he assumed the full leadership.] And, of course, when V-J Day arrived, he
 417

knew what his fate would be. He went to Japan but wrote to the Generalissimo
that he would come back to China any time he was wanted back, lie did when General
Ho Ving-Chin wrote him about the Generalissimo's desire for his return. He was
arrested and, within a short time, was tried along with the other members of the
Nanking puppet regime, and he was shot. But before, even in his cell, he wrote
a long personal letter to the Generalissimo, not so much to ask for pardon,
which he knew was out of the question, but to set the record right. He wanted to
and did state that all along he had been a supporter of the Generalissimo's policy
even though he had been obligated to join Wang Ching-wei's regime. But, he knew,
of course, all that served no purpose as far as his life was concerned. The
government had to act and he calmly accepted his fate.

It was rather a tragedy, because Ch'en Kung-po himself as a person was very

likeable and a gentleman, and he was always generous, not only toward his friends

but also fair and generous toward his enemies. That also explains in a way

his great attachment to Wang Ching-wei, even at the sacrifice of his good

name, his reputation and his political convictions. It was a tragic case

wherein he subordinated his own political convictions to his sentimental

friendship and personal obligation to Wang Ching-wei.

At the year's end, December 31, 1938. I summed up the old year in my

diary. Referring to my entries for the year, I first said:

This record is more a chronicle than a diary. But due to heaviness

of work, it was not always possible to write in this book every evening.
Sometimes a lapse of a week or ten days took place before I could resume
my recording. This explains the omission of many important events, and
my reactions at the time.

[The entry continues:]

The year closed on a pessimistic and depressing not of dissension

in Chungking, due to a difference ofopinion towards Konoye's offer of
peace terms. The press comments emphasized the discord, but it does not
appear really important to me, since Wang's influence and his following
seems to be rather limited in the Chinese capital .

It has been a strenuous and anxious year, with heavy work, irregular
hours and no rest, aggravated by the depressing news of the loss of
Suchow [Hsiichow], Kiukiang, Hankow, Yuchow and Canton. The loss of the
last-mentioned city, practically without fighting, was most astonishing
and discouraging to me. Fortunately, after a period of confusion and'
 418

uncertainty, the situation again became stabilized and public opinion

abroad began to take stock again of China’s determination to continue
resisting.

The most cheering news frc*n abroad during the year was the announcement
of the loan to China by the United States government and of the grant of
a credit of 1=500,000 by the British government immediately following the
American announcement, for the purchase of trucks for the Burma-Yunnan Road.
The development of Anglo-American cooperation in the Far East seemed to have
followed rapidly the conclusion of the Anglo-American Trade Agreement. The
striking reception accorded by the people of the United States to Sir Anthony
Eden, British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, on his vis,;, in December, all
showed which way the wind was blowing as regards closer Anglo-French
collaboration which marked the visit of the King and Queen of Great Britain
to Paris in July, or the Ribbentrop-Bonnet joint declaration in December.

In fact, the final success in securing concrete financial aid from the

United States, followed by a grant of credit by the British government, was really

gratifying, and it was very much appreciated and welcomed in Chunking. A telegram

of December 26, 1938, from H. H. Kung had confirmed my impression. In the

telegram, addressed to me, Dr. Kung said the success of the American loan was due

to my past efforts to promote the cause of American financial aid to China. He

said he wanted to cable me his appreciation and gratitude for my efforts in

regard to this matter. I was personally very happy about it. (It will be

recalled that the matter of getting concrete American financial aid met with a
A

good deal of difficulties in Washington. The turning point it seems was my

conversation with Mr. Henry Morgenthau, on visit to Paris, with the presence

of the American Ambassador Mr. Bullittt and our very frank exchange of views.

Following my exposition, the American Secretary of the Treasury was very quick to

realize the serious nature of the situation in China and the urgent necessity

of getting aid and support.from abroad. He, being at heart very friendly aid

sympathetic toward Chinafe cause, not only promised to do his best, but suggested

ways and means of securing effective financial assistance from the United States.

He even suggested that I ask Chungking to send Mr. K. P. Chen, which I did.

Subsequently, on my suggestion Mr. Chen was sent to Washington by Dr. Kung.

and through direct negotiations with the Treasury Department he succeeded in his
 419

mission.

[When I spoke with Soviet Ambassador Souritz on December 29,] he told me

the reason for his visit was Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov's telegram, asking

him to inquire what China proposed to do at the coming meeting of the Council of

the League of Nations regarding the Sino-Japanese conflict, in order that he,

M. Litvinov, might make the necessary preparations. I said I was still waiting for
g
instructions from my government, but personally had been thinking that the Council

might be asked not merely to repeat its former resolutions, but to take some

concrete action vis-^-vis Japan. I said I thought the practice of indiscriminate

bombing of civilian population in China, as in Spain, had aroused universal

condemnation and therefore it should be easier to insist on action by the League

in the form of an embargo, for example, on the supply of airplanes and

aeronautical material to Japan.

Mr. Souritz observed such a measure would save [have to take (?)]

the form of sanctions, [but] I knew, many member states were afraid of having

anything to do with them. I said the Council could very well take a decision on

the matter on humanitarian grounds, and not necessarily treat it as a measure of

sanctions. On the other hand, I said, I was contemplating to ask the Council to

aid China by supplying her with material for air defense. I added that I was

also considering the presentation of a request for definite financial aid to

China to strengthen the Chinese currency and for the extention of credits for the

purchase of supplies abroad. I said the recent grant of a loan to China by the

United States and the extension of the Sino-American Monetary Agreement were

followed by the announcement from London of the grant of half a million pound

export credit to China. These acts of assistance on the part of America and

Great Britain indicated that they had begun to realize the necessity and the

wisdom of aiding the Chinese caus . In view of these developments, I said it

might be easier now to have a general decision £rc*n the Council recommending
 420

financial assistance to China.

Mr. Souritz thought this had already been covered by the previous resolutions

of the League. I said it was necessary to apply them in a concrete way. Mr.

Souritz asked whether the League could be persuaded to adopt such concrete and

particular measures as [easily as] it could [be persuaded] regarding principles of

a general character. I said I thought a general formula could be found which

would cover a particular instance like the one cited. In reality, I said, such

measures would and could only be applied by a few member states. I further

explained that the purpose of such a proposition would be to promote the constitutior

of a united front of the four powers principally interested in the Far East, namely,

the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union.

Mr. Souritz said the financial assistance recently given by America and

Great Britain was a good sign, indicating that they were at last disposed to take

action instead of confining their sympathies to mere words. I told him I thought

the time had arrived when concerted action with a view to aiding China might be

brought about through the Council, as there had been a change for the better in

the American and British attitudes. And while the Soviet Union had already been

helping China a great deal, France would probably now follow the American and

British lead.

Mr. Souritz said he understood that up to the present France had done nothing

to aid China. From what he knew of her attitude, she had even been inclined to

persuade Britain not to take too much interest in the Far East, lest she would be

obliged to divide her forces and weakne her position in the Mediterranean, which

would naturally be felt by France.

I thought that, as a result of the improvement in the American and British

attitudes, France might be persuaded to accord transit facilities through

Indochina. Mr. Souritz remarked that he had recently had a talk with Mandel

about certain shipments of minerals froia China. He had been informed that they
 421

were refused transit through Indochina, though he. understood from Mandel that

there was no prohibition for such transit.

I cited a similar instance, saying that the shipment of a quantity of

metallic silver by the Central Bank in Kwangsi for exportation abroad through

Indochina had also encountered difficulties at first . But after I took the

matter up with the Quai d’Orsay, the Colonial Ministry had said there was no

prohibition and had sent instructions to let the shipment pass. The actual

situation, I told him, was that it was necessary to take up each shipment with

the authorities in Paris. I added that this accounted for a great deal of trouble

and difficulties, and that this had been made necessary by the over-cautiousness

of the local authorities in Incohina, who were inclined to report all shipments,

except on the express orders from Paris. M. Souritz said he could not understand

such an unsympathetic attitude on the part of the French. He took it as being

based entirely upon fear of Japan, which fear, in his opinion, was entirely

unjustified by the actual facts.

On New Year's Day of 1939, as usual, I had a reception to which all the

Embassy and Consulate personnel were invited. In conformity with past practice I

addressed a few remarks to them, and I would like to point out the emphasis that

I placed upon three or four points in my brief address.

I told them that while the new year had begun, we should gratefully remember

the officers and commanders of the Chinese armed forces who sacrificed their lives

in the national struggle against Japanese invaders. We should remember also the

lower ranks of the Chinese fighting forces who had sacrificed their lives or who

had suffered serious injury to their bodies. We should remember the widows and

orphans left by them, and also remember the people who had been expelled by the

enemy and those who had fled to other regions to become desperate refugees. We

should, I said, finally also remember all the hard work being done by the

government, under the direction of the Generalissimo, to lead the nation in its
 422

resistance to Japan. I urged all those present to continue their efforts so

that the day of final success in our resistance might come as soon as possible.

Three days later, a cheering and inspiring news item came, over the

radio reporting President Roosevelt's majestic indictment of the dictatorships

and aggressor states, and his call for action. I recorded in my diary of

that day the essence of a sentence from the broadcast: "Words are futile, but

action does not necessarily mean war." [(He had actually said: "Words may be

futile, but war is not the only means of commanding a decent respect for the

opinions of mankind. There are many methods sort of war, but stronger and

more effective than mere words.")] One suitable action he proposed was

revision of the Neutrality Law in order to distinguish between an aggressor nation

and its victim.

This statement clearly indicated that the United States had at last come to

realize the importance of its attitude and policy in relation to the great

question of preserving the peace of the world, if [the latter were] possible.

[It was] a change of attitude and policy that China had been hoping for and urging

upon Washington ever since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict. It was

also an attitude and policy that the democratic powers in Europe, particularly

France and Great Britain, had been hoping for, in view of the ever-growing tension

in the European situation due to the aggressive intentions of the leaders of the

Axis Powers in the West .

[In the meantime, news from the Far East indicated that ] Wang Ching-wei’s

pretended peace movement [was faring poorly. As] it was evident not only
hi, ?
to Wang, bu'. to Janan, that that movement must succeed if they were to carry out
' -jC ,, / ,<

their sinister design, Tokyo did not hesitate to carry out propaganda with a view
A
to impressing the outside world that this peace movement, headed by Wang,

reflected the real sentiment of the Chinese government and people, including

the Chinese diplomats abroad.

For this reason, it was not surprising to me when my counselor, Mr. Kuo,
 42 3

reported to me on January 5, 1939, the contents of a telephone message

from the editor of Le Temps, the principal newspaper in Paris. The message

stated that a Havas dispatch from Shanghai reported that Japanese airplanes were

distributing leaflets in Occupied China. The leaflets said that Ambassador Quo

in London, Ambassador Hu of Washington and Ambassador Koo of Paris had all

cabled to General Chiang Kai-shek, supporting the peace offer made by Prince

Konoye. I was so taken aback by this bare-faced fabrication that I at once issued

a denial and had it sent out by Havas and published in Le Temps.

[As time went on, it therefore became more apparent that,] in fact, it

was vaulting ambition which led Wang Ching-wei astray in respect to China's

resistance to Japan. He must have felt that in his new policy of reaching a

settlement with Japan by accepting the latter's peace terms, he could count

upon the support of at least part of the nation. He or his supporters went
'\as3JL'
so far as to enJJtet the names of several ambassadors abroad, including my own,

as being one of the supporters of his new policy. It was a fantastic fabrication,

not only in my own case, but in the case of the other names mentioned, such as my

colleague in London and Dr. Hu Shih in Washington. But probably the idea was first

conceived by the Japanese propagandists, [both to deceive the people in China and]

to throw dust in the eyes of Europe and America so as to further Japan's own design

of undermining the Chinese government at Chungking and setting up a puppet regime

to facilitate the attainment of Japanese objectives in China and East Asia.

A telegram from the Waichiaopu of March 10, 1939, stated that a broadcast

from Tokyo claimed that I had written to Wang Ching-wei at Hanoi to say I was of

the same opinion as he was in his promotion of a peace settlement with Japan,

and that my letter had provoked a great deal of attention. The Waichiaopu

telegram stated this was evidently a pure fabrication and the Generalissimo had

asked the Waichiaopu to telegraph to me at once so I could issue an immediate

 424

correction. Of course I did, without hesitation. It only showed to what

lengths Wang and his group went, perhaps even somewhat blindly, falling

into the arms of Japan in the process of carrying out their own political scheme.

This reminds me of the incident of the desertion of two of Wang Ching-wei's

close collaborators, after the puppet regime was actually set up in Nanking.

One of them was Wang’s confidential Secretary, Kao Tsung-wu, who was trained in

Japan and spoke Japanese very well. The other was T'ao Hsi-sheng. When

they translated from Japanese into Chinese the text of a proposed treaty

be be signed between Japan and the puppet regime,[thereby becoming aware of the

contents,] they felt the terms were so injurious to China that their consciences

told them they should not stay further in Nanking. They left secretly with

a copy of the text of the treaty for transmission to Chungking. The information was

brought to Chungking, and held out for a rather exorbitant price. But the Chungking

government felt no hesitation at all in accepting it, and paid the requested price.

[Of course, there are always two sides to any story. With reference to

Wang Ching-wei's sudden and secret flight from Chungking toward the end of 1938,

there was another reason, in addition to his secret contact with the Japanese

for the purpose of affecting a settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict and

thereby restoring peace in China, behind Wang's action. This additional reason

was both important and interesting for the light it threw on the relations between

the leaders of the Kuomintang and the National government in Chungking.

On March 31, 1939, I received a report fron the retiring Chinese Consul-General

in Paris. On his way to Chungking, he stopped in Marseilles to board a

steamer. On the same steamer was Mr. Wu Sung-kao a member of the Chinese

Codification Commission and a professor of law, who had just come from

Chungking and who reported [to the Consul-General] for my information on

conditions in China.

Ore of the points Wu Sung-kao made was that the general feeling among
 425

government officials in Chungking was somewhat pessimistic and depressing,

because of their personal suffering from lack of the essentials of life and

from generally poor living conditions. Their attitude was in contrast

with the optimism of all Chinese abroad as to the final outcome of the struggle

with Japan. Another point was that the work of intelligence in Chungking was too

poor, and this applied not only to the intelligence service of the military, but

also to the Political Department [of the Kuomintang government]. For example,

the sudden loss of Canton to the Japanese was partly due to the lack of

accurate information on the enemy's movement. When 80,000 Japanese were being

transported southward in the direction of Canton, the British authorities in

Hongkong passed this information on to the Chinese government, indicating that

such a large movement of Japanese troops southward meant they would undertake an

important military move in South China. But this information was not given

much attention or credence by the intelligence services of the government, which

stated, on the contrary, that, according to their information, the reported large

number of troops were Japanese wounded on their way to Formosa for hospitalization

and treatment, and that clearly it could give no cause for worry.

Another point [noted by Mr. Wu] was that an increasing number of people in

Chungking, including those who earlier had been strong advocates of the war

against Japan, had begun to hope that China would reach an honorable peace with

Japan, rather than continue this apparently hard and hopeless struggle.

There was very little freedom of speech or opinion tolerated in Chungking,

and only some members of the people's Political Consultative Council had the

courage to criticize what they considered to be undesirable or unsound in

the attitude of the government.

-t&XK'- tlr 'ff 1
[Wu had—said (?)..] these were evxdeft£dy among the reasons which led to

Wang Ching-wei's flight. One of the immediate and important causes of his

flight, however, was his quarrel with Dr. H. H. Kung, President of the Executive

Yuan. The quarrel was exacerbated when more than 40 members of the people's
 426

Political Consultative Council brought up a proposal to impeach Dr. Kung.

Wang Ching-wei, the presiding officer of the Council, as well as Vice-

Chairman of the Supremem National Defense Council, presented a copy of this

proposal to the Generalissimo. This action aroused the Generalissimo's anger

and led him to make a strong denunciation of the members of the people's

Political Consultative Council, at the following Extended Memorial Service of

the government. Dr. Kung, on his part, considered Wang's act most unfriendly

and the relations between the two leaders of the Kuomintang became worse

than ever so it became difficult for Wang to remain long in the government.

(This of course was purely a matter of the personal relationship between the

two leaders. But in China, perhaps more than in other countries, such personal

disagreements often had far-reaching consequences, because politics was so closely

interwoven with personal relationships.)

|It was nearly two months before I received this report that I had] a

conversation with the Dutch Minister in Paris, Mr. Loudon. He came to call

on me on January 5, 1939, for information,particularly in regard to the Sino-

Japanese conflict; the outcome of which was evidently bound to affect Dutch

interests in Asia. [To begin with, he wanted to know especially what one was

to look forward to in the future asai outcome of the whole situation. He asked

how far Chin 's unity had progressed and what could China anticipate in continuing

her resistance. I gave him a summary of the situation without hesitation.

I told him that China's unity remained very strong, and the recent difference

of opinion revealed by Mr. Wang Ching-wei's sudden departure from Chungking

should not have any serious effect upon it. As regards the military situation,

I said the evacuation of such places as Shanghai, Hankow, Canton and Nanking

had all been foreseen. The strategy adopted by the Chinese high military command

consisted in avoiding frontal attacks from the Japanese in places where they

could benefit seriously from their mechanized forces. The present military
 427

position rendered Japan no longer able to concentrate her attacks on any one

point, there being no principal objectives to be sought after. In other words,

I said, Japan could no longer bring pressure to bear upon China in order to force

her to accept Japan's terms. On the other hand, the Chinese felt that

henceforth they could begin to take the initiative in their own hands.

Continuing, I said that Japan, on her part, had hoped and expected the

so-called China incident to be finished first in three monghs, later in six

months, and still later in a year. But the war continued and the Japanese people

became more discouraged than ever and sceptical of the promises of the militarists.

In short, I said, the war was unpopular in Japan and the militarists as well as

the civilian elements in the government were at a loss to know what to do

to bring it to a conclusion. Financially and economically, Japan was feeling more

rfvL
and more exhausted. hardening of the attitude of the United States and Great

Britain as time went on further troubled the Japanese statesmen. The continued

weakening of the so-called terms of peace proposed by Japan was, I stated,

evidence of Japan's strong desire to finish with the China affair. But the

latest terms proposed by Prince Konoye were still not acceptable to China, who

was determined to continue her resistance until a peace on honorable terms could

be brought about.

The Dutch Minister appeared to be impressed, but puzzled. So he asked how

could China hope that Japan would withdraw all her troops from the occupied

territories in China. I replied that if China's resistance continued, Japan

would be obliged to withdraw them in the end, unless ^ie was willing to sink

herself deeper and deeper in a hopeless situation. The latest offer of Prince

Konoye to station Japanese garrisons only in North China and Inner Mongolia

further indicated that Japan could be made to withdraw all her troops from

Chinese territory, when she found her position further weakened by continued

war with China .

 428

I told him further that one of the things the new Japanese cabinet might do,

in order to arouse the enthusiasm of the Japanese people for the military party,

was to make war on Soviet Russia. I said this had always been the desire and aim

of the Japanese Army. I explained that so long as the Chinese war continued,

there was no possibility for Japan to carry out her plan vis-a-vis the Soviet

Union, since there was not only a rapid depletion of her financial and economic

resources, but also an increasing shortage of manpower. Japanese troops in

Manchuria were moved whenever there was a slackening of the tension in Soviet-

Japanese relations, and they were eient into China proper, where and when she

wanted to launch an offensive.

I told him there was, however, a rivalry between the Japanese army and navy

and that it was possible, in my opinion, that the navy might be able to make its

views prevail and attack such places as Hongkong, Hainan and the Dutch Indies.

I explained that, for over a year, the Japanese navy had been restrained by the

combined opposition of the Japanese army and politicians, but that on the morrow

of the Munich crisis and its settlement, it took the matter into its own

hands and attacked Canton without any serious reaction from the British. I said

this evidently was seized upon as a justification of the navy's viewpoint that

southward expansion would court no danger of serious retaliation or opposition,

while attacking the Soviet Union might mean a long-drawn out war, which would

further exhaust Japan's resources and strength and endanger her international

position.

Mr. Loudon said the defenses of Java and the Dutch Indies were far from

adequate, but sufficient measures had been taken in recent years so it would

be very difficult for any attacking forces to succeed--at least not for a long

time. (Evidently this was an optimistic expectation, which was not confirmed

when the Japanese did attack. For the Dutch resistance was very sparse, and
 429

proved to be entirely ineffective.) Mr. Loudon based his view on the fact that

the Singapore base had practically been completed and had become, he said, an

impregnable stronghold. Mr. Loudon did not think Japan would rashly attack the

Dutch Indies, although he knew if an opportunity actually presented itself, Japan

would not hesitate to seize it in order to take hold of the oil mines.

The next day, January 6, Mr. Souritz called by appointment for another

conversation. He first asked the sibnificance of Prince Konoye's resignation

and the reorganization of the Japanese cabinet headed by Mr. Hiranuma. [(The

new cabinet had just been formed by Hiranuma on the 5th.)] I told him that, in

my opinion, there were three reasons for the change. First, the Japanese

militarists insisted on carrying out further the so-called law of mobilization of

national resources, which Prince Konoye did not approve for fear of opposition

from the conmercial, industrial and financial world in Japan. Second, Prince

Konoye had counted upon success in his effort to conclude a peace with China

through cooperation with Wang Ching-wei and he had failed. Third, knowing Japan's

desire, shared by the militarists, to come to terms with China, he did not

wish to embarrass the government by remaining at the head of the cabinet, since

he had declared as recently as November 16, 1938 that the Japanese government

would not negotiate with General Chiang Kai-shek for peace, whereas, in reality,

no useful negotiations could be carried out successfully, except with the

Chinese government under the direction of General Chiang.

As to Mr. Hiranuma, the new Premier, I explained that although he was

president of the first Fascist Party in Japan and had always been acceptable to

the militarists, his association with the Court and public life in recent

years had led him greatly to modify his views. He was chosen rtiore as a figure­

head, and, from the point of view of the political parties, he was a moderate.

While internally the new government was expected to carry further the execution

of the law of national mobilization, in foreign policy it would, I said, follow

 430

very much the policy of Prince Konoye. I said this last point seemed to be

further confirmed by the fact that all the important portfolios in the cabinet

remained unchanged.

In reply to Mr.Souritz's question, I said I had not yet received instruc.tions

from my government concerning the proposals to be made at the coming Council

meeting in Geneva. Mr. Souritz then brought up another subject, observing that

the latest American note to Tokyo seemed to indicate the hardening of the

American attitude. The speech made by President Roosevelt at the opening of

Congress a few days earlier went so far, he thought, as to suggest a revision

of the Neutrality Law and also advocated the adoption of measures against

aggressor states and the extension of aid to the victims of aggression. He

thought it might be desirable to propose an invitation to the United States to

send an observer to the Council since most of the member states in the League

were not sufficiently interested in the Far East and any concrete action to be

taken by the Council could be adopted only with the cooperation of the United

States .

I told the Ambassador I shared his views, but I pointed out it might not be

easy for the American government to send an observer to attend the Council meeting.

I said that I myself had suggested to my government the convocation of the

Advisory Committee of Twenty-three or the resumption of the Brussels Conference

to consider the adoption of concrete measures in restraint of Japanese

aggression and in aid to China. Mr. Souritz thought either course would be

desirable and held out more hope of success than the Council meeting without

American participation.

[On January 11, I called on Mr. Souritz at the Soviet Embassy to inform him

of the program my delegation would pursue at Geneva and to enlist his support.

I said, generally speaking, the Chinese delegation's program consisted of three

points: 1) financial and economic aid to China; 2) reaffirmation of the Assembly

 431

resolution of October 1937, particularly as regards abstention from placing

difficulties in the way of China's effective resistance to Japanese aggression

and making it clear that China should be assured of the facilities of transit

for war material destined to the Chinese government; and 3) the undertaking by

the Council to coordinate the measures taken or to be taken by the member states

under Article 16, which had already been declared applicable by the Assembly in

September 1938. If there were difficulties in the way of obtaining a general

approval, I said, the Council should at least constitute a committee of those

member states chiefly interested in the Far East, or invite them for form such a

committee in order to bring about coordination and cooperation amongst themselves.

Mr.Souritz inquired whether an embargo against Japan was to be askedof the

Council. I replied that that was another point on the program and the Chinese

government desired an embargo, particularly on petroleum and iron to be imposed

against Japan. Mr. Souritz thought that embargoes of any kind would be rather

difficult to put through. He said Mr. Litvinov, his Foreign Minister had decided

not to come to Geneva this time, on account of the pressure of work, and had

instructed him to attend in his place. In Mr. Litvinov's opinion, the meeting

was not likely to be very important, and probably could accomplish no more than

a repetition of what had been done before.

Mr. Souritz said he himself was not keen on going as he was not fully

in touch with the question. But he asked me to send him a memorandum of the

proposals which the Chinese delegation would bring up before the Council,

indicating if possible the maximum and the minimum desiderata of the Chinese

government. He said he would like to have it in order that he might be

prepared to render as much support as possible. He added that there might be

occasions when the Chinese representative might find it difficult to modify

his own proposal, and on such occasions, it might be advisable for a third party

like him to propose a compromise.

I said I would be glad to send him an aide-memoire indicating the points

 432

the Chinese representative would bring up before the Council, leaving the matter

of possible concessions and minimum desiderata to a second memorandum, which I

could draw up after getting in touch with the representatives of the principal

powers in Geneva.

[While pursuing the question of enlisting cooperative international aid

and support to China, with an eye on recent British-American collaboration and

the January '39 meeting of the League of Nations Council, I continued to press

the French government individually for aid, particularly in the form of transit

facilities through Indochina. In this regard, I had an interesting] interview

with M. A. Baffeleuf, when he called on me at the Embassy on January 3. M.

Baffeleuf was President of the Chamber of Commerce at Haiphong, a member of

the Board of Control of the port of Haiphong and the Managing-Drrector of the

Soci^td de Transport Maritime et Fluvial in Indochina.

M. Baffeleuf brought me a comprehensive picture of the situation regarding

the transit through Indochina of supplies from abroad for China. He explained

that he had come from Indochina specially to interview the authorities in Paris

with a view to an improvement of the policy of restraining the transit facilities

for Chinese material through Indochina. He told me he was going to approach

the Ministry of Colonies and the Quai d'Orsay from the point of view of French

interests. He was of the opinion that, politically as well as economically,

France should extend all possible aid to China in the way of facilitating the

transit of Chinese shipments through Indochina. He said the diversion of much

of the trade to Rangoon, Burma was detrimental to the future development of

Indochina.

He then gave me an account of the attitude of French officials in Indochina.

He said in essence the Governor-General and other French authorities in

Indochina, being officials, were not disposed to assume responsibility. Therefore,

in all matters relating to the transit of Chinese shipments, they expected and
 433

asked for explicit and detailed instructions. He further understood that, while

the Ministry of Colonies was sympathetic and willing to help, the attitude of the

Quai d'Orsay had caused most of the difficulties.

I pointed out that the French government was evidently faced with the

necessity of carrying out its policy in view of the whole Internationa 1 situation,

and that, in order to be able to defend its attitude vis-^-vis the protests of

Japan, they did not feel in a position to issue explicit instructions. I said that

was the reason that instructions of a general character, couched in vague language

were often given in order that the local authorities might have full liberty of

action. Therefore, I emphasized, if the local authorities were not too

punctilious, they could have passed many of the shipments without requesting

further instructions. But, as M. Baffeleuf commented at that point, that

was just the thing they did not wish to take the responsibility for.

Then I told him that the latest reply of the Quai d'Orsay to the communication

from the Embassy made it clear that only arms and munitions'were prohibited

from transit. M. Baffeleuf, however, remarked that the question of material for

manufacturing plants was left in an equivocal position, there being a great deal

of material for use of factories which uould be passed either for arms and munitions

or for ordinary commercial merchandise. I suggested that the local authorities

should accept the declaration of the Chinese that such and such material was

intended for non-military purposes, and should not point out to Paris that such

material was susceptible to use for both military and non-military purposes

and then ask for specific instructions. It was evident that aach a request would

often put Paris in an embarrassing position. The President of the Chamber of

Commerce at Haiphong told me that the local authorities were reluctant to take any

chance, fearing that they would assume too much responsibility. (That was really

typical of bureaucracy.) Thereupon, I suggested that the Governor-General, being

the head of the administration in Indochina, might safely let things pass so
 434

long as they fejel within the terms of the general orders. I asked him what was

the real situation regarding the reported lack of adequate port facilities for

discharging^ storage and transshipment to China. M. Baffeleuf replied that the

port facilities were inadequate for the great quantity of goods to be discharged

since recent months. But the difficulties were not insurmoutable. The same was

true as regards depots and warehouses, he said, and the Chinese agents had made

a plan to purchase land for building temporary storage places.

As regards the transshipment and evacuation of the goods, he added that

besides the railway there were waterways which could be used. If necessary, the

goods could be sent up to Mong Cai near the border of Yunnan, whence they could be

carried by caravans. He said they were the channel of shipment and transport

extensively used before the construction of the Yunnan railway. In fact all the

material for the construction of the railway was shipped on this river. There

was, he continued, also a river leading to the frontier of Langun [Lang

Son], whence goods can be transported by the new railway from Lanchow to Nanning,

which was about to be finished or one could use the motor road from Haiphong or

Hanoi to the Kwangsi border.

I asked him about the situation regarding the furnishing to the Japanese of

all sorts of supplies like iron ore, coal, cement, sand, etc., from Indochina.

He told me that there was no prohibition whatever on the freedom of the Japanese

to obtain these things. He said that he had to be a little discreet regarding

this point, as he was a Frenchman and not in a position to disclose information

that might be used against his own government. I told him I understood his

attitude. I remarked that the information I already had was sufficient to enable

me to make a report to the Quai d’Orsay. In fact, I said, it had already formed

the subject of a memorandum, which I had sent to the French Foreign Office, and I

merely wished to have it confirmed again.

M. Baffeleuf then said the freedom with which the Japanese could obtain

these supplies should really be contrasted with the restrictions placed upon
 435

transit of Chinese material. That was also one of the points he wanted to

emphasize in his coming interviews with the French authorities in Paris, he said.

(That confirmed our suspicion all along that while all sorts of restrictions

were placed upon the transit of Chinese supplies, with a few concessions from

time to time, the Japanese were not restricted at all in the procurement in

Indochina of material needed by their industries.) He added that ordinarily he

would visit Paris once a year, but that this time he had come specially to

try to persuade the ministries concerned to define their attitude regarding

transit and to facilitate an understanding between the local authorities and the

Metropolitan government on the subject. When I asked him about the reasons the

Messageries Maritimes Office in London (this being a French company altogether)

could not accept a Chinese shipment of railway material for Indochina from

London, M. Baffeleuf promised to inquire into it and report to me later. He was

very helpful.

A week later I called at the Quai d’Orsay to pursue the question of aid with

Foreign Minister Bonnet. I referred at the outset to the hardening of the

American government's attitude toward Japan and to the American note to Tokyo

of December 31. I said, as M. Bonnet probably knew, the document flatly rejected

the Japanese claim that a "new order" had arisen in the Far East which justified

any unilateral revision of conditions there. It also reaffirmed the determination

of the American government to uphold the principle of the "open door" in China.

I also mentioned that President Roosevelt, in his Message to Congress on January 4,

reiterated the willingness of the United States to help the cause of peace and to

consult with other nations about checking international aggression. I added that

Senator Pittman, Chairman of the American Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had

also recently urged his government to take immediate economic reprisals against

japan by imposing an embargo on all Japanese imports and stopping the export of
 436

raw materials to Japan.

I asked whether there had been any consultation between America, Great

Britain and France about adopting sanctions against Japan and boycotting Japanese

goods. M. Bonnet said he was not quite aware of the contents of the American note

and of President Roosevelt's declaration to which I referred and that so far no

consultation had taken place between the three governments about putting economic

pressure on Japan.

I told him that it was gratifying to me to find that America and Britain

were pursuing a similar policy in the Far East, so that every time the American

government made a statement upholding the sanctity of treaties and denouncing

Japanese aggression, the British government invariably tried to take some action

to support the American view, thus showing the solidarity of the two countries. I

said that since I knew France was bound by ties of close relationship to Great

Britain, I wondered whether, in order to manifest her readiness to collaborate,

France was also contemplating a declaration on lines similar to those of the

British and American governments. I said that, in view of general misgivings

concerning the French reticence, any statement would not only be welcomed by

China but also appreciated by the United States and Great Britain.

Moreover, I told M. Bonnet that if France wished to enlist American

collaboration in Europe, the best way, in my opinion, would be to effectively

cooperate with America and Great Britain in the Far East. I said a united front

by the three democratic powers, with the assistance of the Soviet Union, would

be able to restore law and order in the Orient and discourage violence and

aggression elsewhere, besides preserving their respective legitimate rights and

interests in that region.

The French Foreign Minister agreed with my views entirely, but pointed

out that, although France had hitherto made no definite declaration, she had

urged the American government on several occasions to define its attitude

 437

concerning the transit of arms. He told me that he would, however, take the

first opportunity to make a statement in the Chamber of Deputies to support the

American stand.

Once having referred to the need of a concerted general policy with the

United States and Great Britain, I turned to concrete instances of financial aid

[from those two powers].I mentioned the grant of a credit of $23 million by

America to China and the extension of the Sino-American Monetary Agreement with

a view to supporting the Chinese currency, and also the grant of a credit of

t 500,000 by Great Britain as the first installment of British financial assistance.

I expressed the hope that France would follow suit by extending financial aid to

China, even though French policy regarding transit matters was most unsatisfactory.

M. Bonnet said, in reply, that as a general principle the French government

would join in any scheme proposed by America and Great Britain for aiding China

in her present crisis. Thereupon, I told the Foreign Minister that at the

coming Council meeting China would again urge the League to take effective action

in order to restrain Japanese aggression. I said she would ask for the adoption

of some financial and economic measures of retaliation, such as a boycott of

Japanese goods and an embargo on supplies to Japan, particularly airplanes and

petroleum. The Chinese government would also request the Council to invite the

member states to carry out the past resolutions of the assembly and the Council,

particularly that of the Assembly of October 6, 1937, by extending financial and

economic assistance to China and facilities of transit and transport for her war

material. Moreover, I said, China would ask the Council to set up a Committee

of Coordination, or at least a limited committee composed of the representatives

of the governments particularly interested in the Far East. I told him th-t I

had been instructed by my government to solicit the support of the French government
 438

for these proposals, and I expressed the hope that M. Bonnet would do his best to

help. The Foreign Minister said he had great sympathy with the cause of China

and that he would talk over the matter with Lord Halifax, when he reached Geneva

on Sunday, [the 15th, for the League Council meeting.]

Then I referred to that morning!s press report that negotiations were

taking place in Tokyo between France and Japan for concluding a commercial

treaty, and that a representative of "Manchukuo" had made a demarche to the

Japanese Foreign Office, with a view to participating in the discussions. I

asked whether the information was correct. I said, at any rate I hoped that,

in view of the League resolutions regarding the puppet regime in Manchuria ,

France would stick to her policy of non-recognition and refuse to deal, with it.

M. Bonnet replied that he was not "au courant" with the matter, but could

assure me that the French government had not the least intention of modifying

its policy and would always be ready to cooperate with America and Great Britain.

[A few hours earlier I had had an interview with M. Cosme, the former head

of the Asiatic department at the Foreign Office, who was soon to leave for China

to take up his new post as French Ambassador to China.] M. Cosme told me that he

had decided to sail for China from Marseilles on February 3. He would first go

to Chungking and then return to Shanghai to rejoin Madame Cosme. He recalled

that he had left China in 1930 and for the last seven years had been in charge

of the Asiatic Department at the Quai d'Orsay. He was therefore in touch

with developments in the Far East, and said that he was particularly interested

in promoting Sino-French cooperation and had helped forward the projects for

financing several Chinese railways with French capital.

As the new Ambassador to China, he had earlier paid me a visit and I

had spoken to him about the transit problem. This time he said he had reported

to the Quai d'Orsay the gist of our previous conversation concerning the transit

of Chinese material through Indochina. He added that, personally, he sympathized

 439

with China’s viewpoint and realized the urgency of the situation, but France's

preoccupations in Europe and the constant Japanese threat to Indochina, which

was infested by hordes of Japanese spies, rendered it imperative for her to

pursue a prudent policy. The circumstances had not improved since the decision

of October 1937 was taken, and she could not see her way through to modifying

it. He said the position of Hongkong and Burma, in the view of the French

government, was different from that of Indochina, which was more exposed ard did

not possess sufficient means of self-defense. I countered by stating that the

improved attitude of the United States and Great Britain vis-a-vis the Sino-

Japanese conflict and their recent extension of export credits to China should

make it easier for France to also adopt a firmer policy toward Japan.

The new Ambassador remarked that America had certainly shown a more positive

attitude. He understood that an exchange of views was then going on between the

three governments of America, Great Britain and France regarding the preservation

of their interests in China and the maintenance of the Nine-Power Treaty. Thereupon

I remarked that the active cooperation of the three great democratic powers in the

Far East, with the assistance of the Soviet Union, would not only restore law and

order in that region but would exercise such a salutary influence upon the rest

of the world, particular^ in Europe, as to discourage aggression and preserve

peace.

M. Cosme, however, said--and this was rather significant--that in

order to bring about an effective and equitable settlement of the present conflict,

it would be necessary to enlist the help of both Germany and Italy as well as the

collaboration of the powers principally interested in the Far East. He thought

the time seemed to be approaching and he hoped that the friendly powers would

exert themselves to secure an early termination of the war. The Chinese government,

he believed, would prehaps not be unwilling to grant reasonable economic concessions

to Japan.
 440

In all that he said, it was clear to me that M. Cosme was reflecting

the attitude and the policy of the Foreign Minister, which was either influenced

or greatly supported by M. L6ger, the Secretary-General or permanent head of the

Quai d’Orsay. In other words, all three represented the views of the Right, had

grave doubts about the policy of the French political leaders on the Left and were

of the conviction that France's ultimate interests lay on the side of collaboration

with Germany and Italy, rather than with Great Britain, or still less with the

Soviet Union.

M. Cosme also stated that the League of Nations was a non-political body

whose impotency in dealing with major international conflicts was patent. Of

the past experience taught one anything, he said, it was that one should not

expect the Geneva institution to achieve what was apparently beyond its ability to

perform. He said China would therefore be well advised if she refrained from

placing too much confidence in it as a powerful political machine capable of

imposing its judgment on all member states whose interests were varied and often

contradictory.

Here was, I must say, a balanced view of the potency or ability of the

League of Nations, a view which I shared and which I had in fact explained to the

government on more than one occasion. But for China the League of Nations

[continued to be] practically the sole instrumentality through which she could

bring her problems and Japan's aggressive policy before the world and arouse public

opinion. That was the purpose of bringing the question to the League of Nations

and urging it to act, not so much with the hope of securing concrete results as

to continue to keep alive the issue before the world, because China, and I/

particularly, felt that the public opinion in the world, desiring peace and

detesting aggression, would undoubtedly sympathize with China's c@use and. if

possible, urge their own governments to pursue a sympathetic policy toward China.
 441

I pointed out to M. Cosme that the war was imposed upon China by militarist

Japan, that China had been resisting the unprovoked aggression with all the

resources at her command and was determined to continue to resist to the bitter end.

She would, however, be prepared to consider terms of peace based upon justice. But

she would have to demand 'the withdrawal of all Japanese troops from her territory.
'\
Since after 18 months of war Japan was now feeling exhausted, if the powers

presented a strong united front, she m;Lght, I said, be persuaded to withdraw her

troops. The Ambassador doubted whether, in view of the considerable strength of

the Japanese troops in China, the powers could make Japan listen to their appeal

and withdraw her troops. Still he shared my belief that if Washington, London

and Paris jointly brought pressure to bear upon her, she might come to terms.

M. Cosme added that Japan wasnow attempting to establish a puppet central

government in the occupied areas. If Japan succeeded, he said, shewould split

China in two, creating an unfortunate situation like that in Spain. He thought

the fact that the vested interests of the foreign powers all lay in the areas

under the Japanese military control would make the situation all the worse.

I told him that, according to my information, Germany and Italy would

proceed to recognize the puppet central government, should Japan be able to form one,

for that would strengthen the so-called Rome-Berlin-Tokyo triangle. The

new Ambassador agreed that was a danger which should not be overlooked. I pointed

out, however, that although Japan had left no stone unturned to find a suitable

personage to head the proposed puppet central government, their efforts had so

far failed dismally, because no one of honor and prestige like Marshal Wu pei-fu

(who the Japanese were reported to have approached) would bevilling to play the
A
catspaw. The Ambassador thought this was a remarkable patriotic sign, which

had not existed before. He found a real spiritual awakening among the Chinese

people, which augered well for China’s bright future.

Although this conversation did not touch upon the movements of Wang

Ching-wei and his secret departure from Chungking and his covert activities
 442

with the Japanese, I had already been aware of the design of Japan in trying

to set up a puppet regime, not only in competition with the Chinese government in

Chungking, but to overshadow it, in the hope of bringing about the national

government’s downfall. Th£n and all along it was the line of Japanese policy to

quickly settle the conflict with China, as Rome and Berlin continued to press her

to do so, in the interest of furthering the carrying out their more important and

ambitious policy--the domination of Europe by the Central powers and the domination

of Asia by Japan.

In this connection I would like to refer to an entry which I made on

January 10 in my diary. M. Andr6 Duboscq of Le Temps came to tell me that

M. L6ger, the Secretary-General, whom he had just seen, had told him: "Nous

ferrons ce que font les Anglais en ce qui concerne I'Extr^me Orient." "We

will do what the British do as regards the Far East." M. Duboscq also told

me that he believed that the time was approaching when European and American powers

would at last play their part to end the Sino-Japanese conflict. He added that

Great Britain, particularly, would now talk business and induce Japan to come to

terms for a settlement, and that Japan was feeling the same way.

[In other words, what M. Duboscq told me was indicative both of the

increasing possibilities of joint action by the pfowers in the Far East and the

desire of Japan to reach a settlement. It leads me] to refer to another diary

entry, which I made on January 24, when Archbishop Yu Pin called and brought me

some interesting and significant information. He had just come from Chungking.

He said in Occupied China, Doihara, the notorious Japanese agent who spoke

Chinese just like the Chinese people, had told the Japanese journalists that Japan

needed peace and had made a mistake in plunging into the situation in China. At

the same time he asked the Japanese journalists not to encourage the Chinese, so

as not to make them ask for everything back, including Manchuria. (In other words,

judging from what Doihara had confidentially told the Japanese journalists, Japan
was really very anxious to settle the conflict with China for the sake of

carrying out national policy of greater significance, such as the southward

expansion in Asia.

Doihara was in a position to know the facts. For years he had been serving

as secret agent in China of Japanese military headquarters in Tokyo, and

actually was a leader in China of the so-called lang-jen or underworld characters

in the service of Japanese intelligence. The lang-jen were a group of strong-

arm Japanese, who did whatever was necessary when Japanese diplomacy in China

was unable to achieve its goals.

Yu Pin also told me of the inside story of Wang Ching-wei's attempt to

promote peace negotiations with Japan. He said General Chiang Kai-shek was

against it all the time, which I had divined earlier, when first learning

of the secret flight of Wang with his supporters from Chungking.

[Earlier, on January 15, I had arrived in Geneva for the League Council

meeting, which lasted only briefly. As far as China was concerned, the

immediate result of my efforts at the Council was the adoption, on January 20,

of a resolution recalling the resolutions of October 1937 and February 1938, and

requesting member states to hold consultations for taking effective measures to

assist China. It was at least a move in the direction of joint effort. On

January 21, after] signing and sending a protest to the League against Hungary's

de facto recognition of Manchukuo, I left Geneva to return to Paris.

I would like to refer to two events which took place in the course of the

work at the meeting of the Council (the 104th Session). The delegation had already

prepared a draft resolution to be proposed to the Council, and as usual I was

contacting the representatives of the various member states on the Council, in

order to prepare the way for its speedy adoption, rif possible.] At the same time,

it was in line with the practice of the Council to first hold secret meetings

to discuss the matter, that is to say, the Chinese draft resolution, prior to an

open meeting for speeches and voting.] [At such a secret meeting,made a
 444

Mr. Butler, the British representative, spoke immediately after me. He

paid a tribute to my speech, but opposed the Chinese draft resolution. The

outcome was a proposal for and the appointment of a drafting committee to go over

the Chinese draft in greater detail. The committee consisted of the representatives

of China, Great Britain, France, Soviet Russia, Latvia and Yugoslavia. There was

a tough debate, especially over the first part of the resolution, relating to the

need of the proposed coordinating committee to take effective measures, which was

one of the essential points in my draft. There was so much opposition to the

paragraph, both open and veiled, that finally Ambassador Souritzy proposed what he

described as a compromise draft. Actually this draft had also been prepared by

the Chinese delegation, but was given to him previously at his suggestion, [as

one will recall] so that he could propose it as a compromise from a third party.

It was readily accepted with slight modifications, particularly by the British.

I mention this incident in order to show that at that time the Soviet Union

cooperated readily and publicly with China at the League of Nations.

[There was another particular point of debate.] In the Chinese draft

resolution, which I presented, there was a paragraph endorsing the declarations

made in the British and American notes of January 14, 1939 and December 31, 1938,

respectively, relating to Japan's implicit interference with equal economic

opportunity in China as indicated by the Japanese statements of November 3 and

December 22, 1938. Mr. Butler strongly opposed my proposal for the Council to

endorse these declarations. The resulting debate between us was so animated that

it turned into a deadlock. Finally, I said I had to ask for a suspension of the

meeting in order to enable me to ask for instructions from Chungking. My suggestion

appeared to have at once half-amazed and half-scared Mr. Butler, for he immediately

asked what the usual League procedure was, in a case like this, to break the

deadlock, meaning evidently whether it would be possible to take a vote and decide

by majority. Finding that that was impossible under the rules of procedure of the
 445

Council, where such a matter would require unanimity, he said that he did not

wish to give the impression that Great Britain was not helping China, when

actually she really wanted to help her. [At that point,] As Mr. Butler

seemed to be softening his opposition, at least in his language, I saved the

situation by drafting a compromise formula, and passed it on to Mr. Souritz to

propose it as such. He did so at once.

At a public meeting which followed, I spoke in support of a Spanish request

for action against indiscriminate air bombing. At a later meeting, Mr.

Jordon of New Zealand spoke sharply against the French attempt to amend

my proposal supporting the Spanish request and suggesting a formula for it.

Mr. Jordon pointed out that they could not put words into my mouth which I did

not say. The situation again became somewhat strained. In order to ease the

situation, the President of the Council, Mr. Munters, suggested that the text

of the draft resolution would be polished by the Secretariat. I at once asked

then whether the word "polish” was really meant to be "polish" and not "polish

off." Later, in regard to the translation into French of the word "claim" upon

which I laid great emphasis in the text of my formula, I finally, although

reluctantly, accepted a translation of the word "claim" which I had used as

"qu'aurait"'tohat would have to be." I accepted it by saying that in the

matter of the fine points of the French language, I certainly was willing

to yield to M. Charverait's authority, he being French. If he thought he

must use three words of French to translate only one of English, I would have

to content myself with it.

In connection with the conduct of diplomacy, and also in pursuance of

my standing policy of keeping in close touch with my colleagues, with a view

to the coordination of our efforts for the attainment of China's objectives

in the international field, I was [as I have said, ] in constant touch with my

colleagues in different important capitals, and particularly with those in London,

 446

Washington, Berlin and Rome. But sometimes I found myself in a quandry. One

instance was on receiving Dr. Hu Shih's telegram of January 13, 1939 which

was a puzzle to me but which dealt with a subject I had very much at heart,

[especially at that moment, that is to say, to press for the adoption of a

resolution by the then impending meeting of the Council of the League [in the sense

indicated . ]

Dr. Hu's telegram, which he sent me on his own initiative for my information,

said that on January 8 he had received a telegram from the Waichiaopu. He went

on to quote his reply to the Waichiaopu. His reply stated that he had no

way of finding out the answers to all the questions and points in the Ministry's

telegram and wanted to express his deep regret for this. He said the positive

attitude of the leaders of the American government was already clear to the

whole world. However, as to the steps it would take to implement such an

attitude and the timetable for their implementation, the United States government

had special difficulties under the American system and, therefore, could

not but observe a hundred-percent secrecy. For example, he said, when President

Roosevelt's Chicago speech was published in the newspapers of October 5, [1937]

there was wide speculation that it was intended to be an act in concert with the

views expressed in the Assembly of the League of Nations at the same time. He

said he himself had also believed that that was the intention. But in fact not

only did no one in the League Assembly at the time know anything about it, even

the State Department had not known that such a speech would be made. This was a

very important point, he said, and he had asked the Waichiaopu to lay it before

the Generalissimo and Dr. Kung.

I have said thisvas a conundrum to me, because I could not quite make out

just why he had sent me the telegram, nor I suppose was the content of his

reply evident to the Waichiaopu. Nonetheless, Hu Shih sent the telegram on his

own initiative, and at the end asked me to be so kind as to forward it also to

Mr. Quo Tai-chi in London, Ambassador Tsien Tai in Brussels, Minister King in the
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Hague and Victory Hoo in Berner He must have had a good reason for it. The

telegram indicated very clearly that he either did not wish to, or did not think

it wise to, take any steps to ascertain the views of the United States State

Department on the questions listed by the Waichiaiopu. It would seem that it

was this he wanted to communicate to me and my colleagues in Europe. The

implication might be that it would be useless for him to try to find out

any information from the State Department, because even in the case of President

Roosevelt's famous Chicago speech, the State Department had known nothing about

it beforehand, and that we in Europe should take that into consideration.

In that case he was being over cautious.

A week after returning to Paris from Geneva, on January 27, 1939, I called

on M. Ldger, the Secretary-General of the French Foreign Office. At the very

beginning of our conversation, I referred to the French note recently addressed

to Tokyo upholding the Nine-power Treaty in conformity with the attitude taken

in the British and American Notes. I asked whether any information had been

received regarding the reaction of the Japanese government to the French note.

The Secretary-General answered in the negative. I asked whether, in the meantime,

any consultation was taking place between Washington, London and Paris. M. Ldger

again said, "No." But he did say that the French note had been sent by agreement

with Washington and London.

[Turning to the question of transit, I then told M. Ldger that I had lost

no time in transmitting [to my government] the contents of the memorandum of the

French Foreign Ministry on the subject of transit, dated December 24, 1938. I

told him although, the explanations given there heopled to clarify the situation,

I regretted to say they did not help to dissipate the feeling of dissatisfaction

prevailing in Chungking and in China in general concerning the French attitude.

I said the Chinese government had cabled me certain comments on the French

memorandum, which I would take the first opportunity to communicate to the

 448

Quai d'Orsay in the form of a new memorandum.

M. L6ger said he would be ready to examine those comments and remarked

that it was natural that Chungking was not satisfied with the last French

memorandum. He said that, in view of the situation, he could well understand

the Chinese point of view.

Thereupon I asked M. L6ger to help, in the meantime, by persuading the

French government to authorize the transit of certain materials of war ordered

in France before the outbreak of the hostilities. I told him I had always

understood that the transit of any war material for which orders had been placed

before the commencement of the Sino-Japanese conflict would be treated as an

exception, and that I was taking it for granted that, as regards this point, there

ted been no change in the policy of the French government. I told him I therefore

intended to present a list of such material for which I would ask him to be good

enough to arrange for transit through Indochina. M. L6ger was not able to give

an answer, and dodged one by saying he did not know what the opinion of the

Ministry of Colonies would be on this point. I reminded him that I had always

understood the difficulties as regards the transit of Chinese war material

to have come rather from the Quai d'Orsay than from the Ministry of Colonies.

M. L6ger recalled that in regard to certain aeronautical material,

the Ministry of Colonies, at the time of the Munich crisis, did give an order

for its detention in Indochina. I emphasized that it was done in July on the

eve of the Munich crisis. In any case, I said, the material in question fell

under the exception and I would, therefore, urge him to do his best to help.

He was good enough to assure me that he would examine this question favorably.

In order to facilitate his task, I told him I would send in a list of such

material in order that he might verify the fact that it had all been ordered

prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict.

[On January 29, just before leaving Paris for a brief vacation on the
 449

Riviera, I gave a luncheon in honor of Naggiar, who had been French Ambassador

in China prior to M. Cosme's appointment and who was about to start for Moscow

as French Ambassador in the Soviet capital. In a brief conversation, he confirmed

the timidity of the French Governor-General in Indochina, M. Brevie, concerning

the matter of transit of Chinese war materials. He said that Brevie, being a

civil service functionary, seemed little disposed to assume any responsibility

more than was aboslutely necessary, and always preferred to refer questions

relating to transit to Paris for instructions, a practice which often unnecessarily

embarrassed the French government, particularly the Ministry of Colonies, which

was well-disposed toward helping China as much as possible in this matter.

s
At this conversation, M. Naggiar also advised that China should hold out in

spite of the difficulties, until the European war broke out--and he was

certain that it would break out--for then China's cause would be settled in a

general settlement. His view was entirely in agreement with my own, and with

that of the Generalissimo.

[The Generalissimo was determined to continue resistance.] Earlier, on

January 24, the opening day of the Fifth plenary Session of the Kuomintang,

the Generalissimo had delivered a 5,000-word inaugural address, in which he

reiterated China's unflinching determination to resist Japanese military

aggression. Two days later, the address was communicated to the Embassy, and

I would like to incorporate the gist of it here.

Declaring his implicit^- faith in final victory for China, the Generalissimo

first gave the following reasons why Japan was bound to be defeated in the end;

1. In launching upon a campaign of aggression against the whole of China, before

she had consolidated her gains in Manchuria and Mongolia, Japan had upset her

original military program.

2. Japanese attempts to bring China to submission without resort to war as well

as her attempts to score a quick and decisive military victory had met with failure.
 450

3. Japanese military strategy had failed miserably, because Japan had

overestimated her own strength and underestimated the Chinese power of resistance.

In desperation, she had penetrated too deeply into Chinese territory, making it

difficult for her to pull herself out of the mire.

4. Japanese policitcal stretegy had also failed. In China, the setting up of

puppets and the utilization of Chinese social outcasts served to corrupt the
a11
Japanese military/the more rapidly, while diplomatically, Japanese foreign policy

was full of pitfalls and contradictions which resulted in furthering her diplomatic

isolation.

On the other side, the Generalissimo cited Chinese history to show that

from a political, geographical, cultural, spiritual or economic standpoint,

China could never be conquered. Declaring that China would never compromise or

surrender, the Generalissimo urged the Chinese people to reinforce their

spiritual strength, to continue to prosecute the war of resistance and to marshal

their entire forces for the decisive engagement.

Turning to the international situation, the Generalissimo said that

developments on the international front would unquestionably move in the direction

of the maintenance of international faith and world peace and the democratic powers

would undoubtedly augment their determination and readiness to check aggressors.

That was all the more reason why China should follow a path of justice and

righteousness, and carry out to the end her national policy of "resistance

to the last

He also said China's counter-policy [to Japanese aggression] should

thenceforth be executed along the following lines: 1) replying to the enemy's

arrogance and lawlessness with national unity and solidarity; 2) making the best

use of China's strong points as an agricultural country, by sustaining the war

of resistance with valor and fortitude, so that China might be able to outlast

the enemy, an industrial country which as such had inherent weaknesses; and
 451

3) utilizing to the best of our ability China's natural resources and intensifying

wartime reconstruction in order to hasten the enemy's social collapse. In

conclusion, he urged the Kuomintang members to live up to their pledge to

work swiftly, unbendingly, diligently and energetically until final victory was

achieved and the momentous task of the revolution consummated.

Shortly thereafter I receved a telegram from the Generalissimo dated

January 31. This personal telegram was interesting to me, because after

informing me of the closing on January 31 of the plenary session, which had

lasted eight days altogether, the Generalissimo told me of the spirit of unity

that had prevailed at the session and of the determination that was also

manifested to resist Japanese aggression. In fact he said that the demonstration

of the spirit of unity had been so extensive that he considered it unprecedented.

The main purpose of the telegram, however, was to convey a sense of

appreciation to me and my colleagues abroad for our activities in the interests

of our country. He said, in the telegram, that in the course of the session the

international situation and the progressively positive attitude of Great Britain,

the United States, and France in regard to the Far Eastern situation were

discussed, and all the members found the latest developments encouraging and

inspiring. Then he said at the end that all these developments had been due

to the exertions and skillful actions on my part and on the part of my

colleagues. The members of the session themselves were deeply gratified and

wanted to express their admiration. Therefore, he said, he was sending a special

cable to me to convey this message, and he hoped that we [abroad] would continue

our exertions in order to achieve final victory in the end.

[On February 6, 1939 (?) I had the Embassy deliver to the French Foreign

Office the second Chinese memorandum on transit, objecting to the increasingly

 452

restrictive interpretation J^Pjpris of the French Cabinet decision of October 1937.]

On February 1, the Waichiaopu sent me a telegram conveying instructions, which

evidently had been fully discussed and approved by the government after thorough

consideration. It showed not only the importance the government attached to

transit facilities^ but also the feeling of dissatisfaction that prevailed in

the government at Chungking, as the telegram was couched in fairly strong

language at times.

The telegram first stated that the French memorandum [of December 24, 1938]

had been studied, and as a result the government wanted to state that the

matter had a great bearing upon the future of China's resistance to aggression.

While it was true that the route between Yunnan and Burma had been completed and

traffic had started, this Burma route was still beset by many difficulties,

notwithstanding the exertions and full effort of the British to cooperate with

China in this enterprise, and could not serve to afford all the necessary

transit facilities, nor replace those provided by the railway between Yunnan and

Indochina.

The telegram stated that the government looked upon the firm French refusal

to accord transit facilities to munitions of war for the use of the Chinese armed

forces as a great disappointment, and that the public reaction in China to this

attitude was becoming more and more accentuated. Recently, it said, in view of

the obstructive attitude and policy of the French government toward China's

resistance to international aggression, suggestions had been made to compile all

the facts relating to the French attitude in violation of its treaties and

the repeated resolutions of the League of Nations, and then to publish these facts,

giving them the widest publicity, in order to appeal to the understanding and

sympathy of the world at large. The government, however, did not wish to go so

far in dealing with France. It felt still that it should continue to undertake

negotiations with the French authorities in the hope that France would voluntarily
 453

and on her own initiative bring about an improvement in the situation.

[The telegram continues:]

The present French policy and attitude was not only greatly
unsatisfactory to China, but even Great Britain and the United States
felt surprised and intimated earnestly and sincerely that they would be
glad to speak to the French authorities on our behalf. For example, the
latest report from Washington is that the United States government has
already ordered the American Ambassador in Paris to approach the French
government with a view to according full transit facilities through
Indochina and that because France, pleading what amounted to pretexts,
was not according full transit facilities to China, the United States
government felt very much dissatisfied. In connection with the French
request to purchase more rolling stock and automobiles in the United
States for the use of the French army, the American government insisted
that transit facilities should be accorded to the Chinese goods as a
condition for its approval of such [French] purchases in the United States.

Therefore, the telegram went on to ask me to press the French government further,

in the hope of modifying its attitude. It said that perhaps, in the circumstances,

the French government would be well-prepared to come around and modify its

restrictive attitude, and revise its previous regulations in this respect .

[The French memorandum had made a pretext of Article 7 of the Sino-French

convention regarding Indochina.] As regards this Article 7, which related to

national defense, the telegram said the Chinese government contested the

interpretation of the French based upon the alleged urgency of France's own

national defense. It said it was the government's view that according transit to

Chinese munitions and implements of war for China's own use could have no bearing

upon France's own national defense and that, therefore, legally speaking, the

French pretext based upon the Treaty provisions between them, was not sustainable.

It said, with regard to the actual facts, the Japanese threat to France was not

something that should be feared by France. On the basis of all sources of

information, the Chinese government did not believe that Japan intended to apply

military coercion against Indochina. It said before the loss of Canton, Hongkong

was actually a very important base for the transport of munitions and war materials

for the Chinese armed forces, and more recently large quantities of military goods

passed through Burma. Yet no word had been heard about British anxiety on this
 454

score. On the other hand, it said, Japan would feel encouraged by the French

obstruction of transit of Chinese military supplies and consequent obstruction

of China's policy of effective resistance to Japanese aggression. This would

lead her to resort to military measures against Indochina, whereupon the security

of Indochina would be threatened.

I was asked to call the attention of the French government to all these points

and to ask it to modify its attitude by cancelling its orders to restrict and, in

fact, practically stop the transit of Chinese military supplies. I was also asked

in presenting a memorandum based on these points, if I would also, verbally, use

stronger language to voice our dissatisfaction in order to persuade the French

government to reconsider the whole question of restrictions and to annul its

previous decision. The telegram added that the Waichiaopu had also sent

instructions to Ambassadors Quo and Hu, in London and Washington respectively, to

take the matter up and to consult the British and American government with the same

end in view.

On the vital question of transit facilities through Indochina for

[materials needed in] China's struggle against Japan, and also in regard to

the Chinese situation and the international situation as affecting the Chineee

cause, I had an interesting and important conversation with Mr. William C. Bullitt,

American Ambassador, on February 16, 1939. He had recently come back from a rest

in the United States on leave.

When I said I was glad to see him looking so well, he remarked that

he really had felt broken in pieces after the September (Munich) crisis, when

he had had to work day and night, not only in connection with the crisis, but

also on such matters as the reconciliation between George Bonnet, the French

Foreign Minister, and Lukasiewicz, the polish Ambassador. The two had quarreled

and refused to see each other, but both of them had approached him with the

request to bring them together again. (I include this as a sidelight on the

complexity of diplomatic alliances.)

 455

Mr. Bullitt was particularly interested in the situation in China, and

asked whether Wang Ching-wei's attempt to negotiate peace with Japan had been

made with the knowledge of General Chiang Kai-shek. He said while in Washington,

Mr. Johnson, the American Ambassador in China, had told him that General Chiang was

fully determined to continue resistance to Japanese aggression, that the morale of

the Chinese troops was good and that the prospect, as regards the outcome of the

war, was favorable. Here in Paris, on the other hand, he understood that Wang

Ching-wei had really been acting for General Chiang and that his efforts were in

in the nature of a ballon d'essai. Mr. Bullitt wanted to know particularly

whether General Chiang was the center of the policy of resistance and the people

rallied round him in consequence or whether General Chiang, seeing the spirit of the

people was for resistance, was keeping up the fight in obedience to the popular

sentiment. (As I said before, the Japanese had been intimating to France and

to the western powers as a whole that the Generalissimo was behind the move for

peace.)

I told Mr. Bullitt that there was no doubt that General Chiang was the spirit

and inspiration of the policy of resistance. Time and again Wang Ching-wei had

spoken to the General of the desirability of coming to terms with Japan, but each

time General Chiang held out strongly against any such attempt, believing that

Japan was not sincere in her pretended desire for peace. Even in the morning of

the day Wang Ching-wei suddenly left Chungking for Indochina, I said, he had

approached General Chiang again on the same subject and, finding the General as

determinedly as ever against any premature negotiations, concluded there was no

hope of persuading him to accept his point of view. I added that what Mr. Bullitt

had heard in Paris must have come from the French sources that surmised that

Wang Ching-wei had been acting for General Chiang, which,however, was not the case.

I told him that the joint telegram of 27 Chinese commanders in the field

supporting General Chiang's policy of resistance clearly indicated the spirit

 456

of the Chinese army. I said the morale of the people continued to be good; in

fact, it was better than had been expected. While certain sections of the

educated classes wavered from time to time in their faith in the policy of

continued resistance, the masses, particularly the peasants in all parts of

China and especially in the areas invaded by the Japanese, were all for continuing

resistance. They saw that everything they had had been destroyed by the

Japanese, and their only hope of returning to their homes and fields lay in

chasing the Japanese out of the country. I said this explained why the people,

even in the occupied areas, heartily and willingly cooperated with the guerrilla

forces in attacking the Japanese.

As an illustration of their spirit, I mentioned the repeated instances

of Chinese farmers removing the rails from the railways in the occupied areas

in order to obstruct Japanese troop trains. At first the Japanese tried to

avenge themselves by exterminating whole villages, but, finding such ruthlessness

merely provoked stronger reactions on the part of the Chinese, they resorted to

the practice of offering rewards for the los? pf rails. Thereupon the chineee

farmers would bring the rails back to the Japanese, usually for five dollars a

piece. Then they contrived to remove them again at night to be presented

back to the Japanese again for new awards. Mr. Bullitt was very much impressed

and amused by such native cleverness.

Mr. Bullitt inquired about the precise situation of transit through

Indochina for Chinese shipments. I gave him a brief account and referred

to the situation as defined by the note of the Quai d'Orsay of December 24,

1938. I also handed to him for his confidential information copies of the

two memoranda of the Chinese Embassy addressed to the Quai d'Orsay, namely,

those of December 21, 1938, and February 6', 1939, as well as a copy of the note

of the Quai d'Orsay of December 24, 1938.

 457

Mr. Bullitt then said that President Roosevelt had instructed him to take

the matter up with the French government in order to help China. He had already

seen Daladier, Mandel, Bonnet and L4ger. He found Daladier very sympathetic

towards China and disposed to help, but he thought Daladier was not fully informed

by the Quai d'Orsay. He found that Mandel, the Minister of Colonies, was also

sympathetic, but that Bonnet did not seem to take much interest in the question

altogether and appeared to have left the matter entirely to L6ger who, in Mr.

Bullitt's opinion, was the real center of opposition to according transit to

China. He had spoken to L6ger of the desire of the American government to see the

trucks ordered by China carried by the Yunnan railway, and had urged that it

would be useless to arrange for the purchase, if the French could not allow China

to use the Yunnan railway to bring them into China. He was told, however, that the

Chinese had decided to send those trucks, not by the railway, but by road. He,

Bullitt, wanted to know the real situation.

I told him that as far as China was concerned, the quicker they could be

shipped into China the better. As there was an accumulation of material in

Indochina waiting for transportation, all transport facilities would really have

to be utilized for the purpose. The railway facilities being limited, part of

the material would have to be carried over the road. Mr. Bullitt appeared to be

very much dissatisfied with the French attitude, and said he could not

understand why the French should have so much difficulty in helping China merely

with according transit facilities.

Mr. Bullitt then said that in connection with the European situation,

France had asked for assistance from the United States in the supply of war material,

and the American government had done a great deal to help her. More was being

asked of the United States still. He thought that if the French would not give

satisfaction on the question of transit through indochina, the American government

might also refused to help France anymore. I remarked that would perhaps be the
 458

only way of making the French see the necessity of assisting China. I urged

that Japan’s continued aggression in China and the Far East in general was

not unconnected with the policy of the Rome-Berlin axis in Europe. I said that

Japan's recent occupation of the island of Hainan was a move designed as much to

bring pressure to bear upon France and England in Europe as to carry forward

another step in her own program of expansion in Asia.

Mr. Bullitt said that, as he saw the situation, it was clear that, of the

three Axis powers, Italy and Germany had been practically checked in their

aggressive designs by the solidarity of Anglo-French cooperation supported by the

United States, confronted with this tremendous combination of powers and resources
/V
neither Italy nor Germany, in his opinion, da^ed to move forward to threaten war

again. (I*-~was interesting to see how each sort of magnified the significance

of-his country’s actions.) So, he stated, the danger of war in the spring could

be said to have already been dissipated. It might arise again in six months^ time,

but certainly not in the immediate future. As regards the danger of war in

Eastern Europe and Germany's ambitions in the Ukraine, he thought that the

condition precedent to such a war was an understanding between Germany, on the one

hand, and Hungary, Poland and Rumania, on the other, and that to bring this

about would require at least six months or a year. So there was no immediate

danger in Eastern Europe either.

The situation, he continued, was like that on a chessboard. The only J-^s,

toajle that was free to move about in this case was Japan, which remained unchecked

in the Far East. There the danger really existed. Unless Japan was effectively

checked, Bullitt thought she would go on with her aggression, pushing into the

South Seas and even to Australia. It would therefore be in the interest of

general peace for all democracies to work together to check Japan. If Japan, in

the absence of effective restraint, attacked Australia,for example, the United

States would be obliged to go to war against her. In that case, she would have to
 459

bring all her strength to bear in the Far East and could not at the same time

help France and Great Britain in Europe. With the United States engaged in the

Far East, Germany and Italy wouldsurely move on France and Great Britain, hut .

the United States could not carry on two wars simultaneously. In a word, he said,

with the United States occupied in the Far East against Japan, American assistance

to Europe would collapse, and France and Great Britain would have to fight

Germany and Italy without American help. That could not be desired by France.

According to him, China was really the only country now holding Japan in check

and keeping her occupied, and it would therefore be to France's interest to help

China as much as possible.

I observed that I understood Great Britain at last appeared to be cooperating

with the United States wholeheartedly in the Far East, and that it was a short­

sighted policy on the part of France not to see the relationship of the problem of

the Far East with that of Europe. Irecalled further what Mr. Bullitt had told me

in the summer, namely, that it would be useless to approach the British for help

before America had acted. I added that this had proved to be the case and that

now that the United States had come out to help China financially, the British

had followed.

Mr. Bullitt said the British liked to create the impression that they

were working closely with the United States, but in fact they were more interested

in the European situation than in the Far East. I remarked I understood that

the French had not only been reluctant to help China themselves, but had been

urging Great Britain not to get entangled in the Far East on account of the

European situation. Mr. Bullitt said the French reasoning was this; If Great

Britain should have to fight Japan, for example, in case the Dutch Indies were

attacked by the Japanese, she would have to send her whole fleet to the Far East.

In that emergency, Great Britain would naturally wish to come to terms with

Germany and would be willing to accept any concessions to have a free hand in

the Far East. When it came to the question of making concessions, it would not
 460

be unnatural for Great Britain to make France sacrifice the most . It was

certainly far easier to give away other people's goods. France knew that in

that case she would be isolated and obliged to make the greatest sacrifices.

Therefore, she was anxious to avoid such a situation.

I said the French had always been afraid of the Japanese either attacking

Indochina or destroying the Yiinnan-Indochinese Railway, and that the primary

reason they gave for refusing transit to Chinese war material through Indochina

was that Japan would at once occupy Hainan Island. (Hainan was, of course, a

gateway to Indochina. The country which controlled it would be practically able

to control the entrance to the very important Indochinese port of Haiphong.)

Now that Japan had occupied Hainan, I said, the consideration which kept the

French back had disappeared. But as a matter of fact I knew the Japanese

occupation had made the French even more timorous. Whenever they were pressed to

grant transit facilities for Chinese war material, they would always ask for a

guarantee of cooperation from the United States, in case France were attacked in

Indochina by Japan.

Mr. Bullitt said the answer of the United States would be a decided "No".

There was no reason why America should help France defend Indochina, which was a

French colony, and assist her to old down another people. It was France s

business, if she wanted to keep Indochina, to defend it. But the question of

transit of Chinese war material was of great interest ot President Roosevelt and

Mr. Morgenthau, the Secretary of the Treasury, both of whom were waiting to know

what the French would do to help China. He believed that if President Roosevelt,

on his return [to Washington] in the early part of March, still found the

question unsolved, he would send for the French Ambassador and speak to him in

person of his desire to see France help China on this matter. Mr. Bullitt asked

me therefore to give him a statement of the precise situation in Indochina in

order that he could take it up again with the French. He said he would of course

not mention that it came from me, unless I saw no objection to it. He added
 461

|vr »v(A

that he was on good terms with the members of the French government and do

his utmost to get this question solved.

Then Mr. Bullitt inquired about the Burma-Yunnan and the Sinkiang routes

for transit of materials into China. I replied that both were in operation but

that only light material could travel over them. I said the heavy stuff had

still to be sent to China by sea through Indochina.

The occupation of Hainan Island, south of Canton,by the Japanese--which

the French had feared and which I had repeatedly forecast--actua1ly took place

in February 1939. I had first learned of it on February 10. The report I

received said that there was practically little or no resistance by the Chinese

garrisons to the Japanese invaders. I was then [still] taking a rest on the

Riviera on the advice of my doctor, but this news deprived me by one stroke,

as it were, of all pleasure and of the possibility of resting in the South of

France. The news came from my counselor who telephoned from Paris.

I had all along been urging the French to adopt a liberal policy as regards

transit for China, in the interest of France herself, with due regard to the

close relationship that existed between Developments 1 9 the Far Eastern situation

and the European situation. The French, however, preferred the argument that

should they antagonize the Japanese by extending transit facilities to China,

the Japanese would, among other moves, carry out their threat to occupy Hainan

Island .

My own view, which also represented the view of my government, was that the

Japanese would occupy Hainan, when they felt the proper moment had arrived,

irrespective of what France was or was not doing about transit . That was a minor

question from the Japanese point of view in terms of the national policy they

were pursuing. And whether they would or would not act would finally depend on

many other factors. In any case, the Japanese would not have the temerity to

occupy Hainan, until they found the circumstances were favorable. They would be
 462

influenced greatly by the evolution of the international situation in Europe,

and particularly by the development of the policies of the Axis powers with

which Japan was already closely associated. Therefore, I had all along wanted

to impress the French with the idea that although the threat to Hainan was real,

the relationship that they tried to establish between the French policy on

granting transit facilities through Indochina to China and the danger of

Japanese occupation of Hainan was very limited. On the other hand, I wanted the

French to take a broader comprehensive view of the significance of Japanese action

in Asia, as having a serious if not direct bearing upon the European situation.

[The occupation of Hainan Island having actually and finally taken place,

I was anxious to get the French to see the relationship between this latest

Japanese act of aggression and the development of the situation in Europe, in

which France always felt more directly interested, and which (the European

situation) the French authorities had always emphasized to me in order to account

for the French attitude and policy of caution. [(The Japanese landing on Hainan

had, for example, occurred less than two weeks after the fall of Barcelona, which

marked the imminent success of Franco's forces in Spain, and coincided with the

height of German-Italian pressure in the Mediterranean area.)] Therefore, on

February 16 I called on M. Chauval, the new Assistant-Director of Asian Affairs

at the Quai d'Orsay, [and on February 20 I called on M. Bonnet, the Foreign

Minister with this stated purpose in mind.]

[Before giving an account of those conversations] I would like to refer

to the views the Generalissimo expressed to foreign correspondents at a

press conference on February 12, 1939, in Chungking. The transcript of the

questions and answers was communicated to me by the Waichiaopu on that day.

The first question the Generalissimo was asked was: "What is the Japanese intention

in effecting the landing in Hainan?" He answered:

In order to appreciate the significance of the Japanese landing on

Hainan Island and its repercussions, we should consider the pacific question
as a whole. Hainan is an important strategic focal point between the Pacific
 463

and the Indian Oceans. Should the enemy occupy the island—[at that time,
the Japanese forces had landed and occupied Haikou,the northern port on
the island but had not ,yet advanced, ]-not only would communications between
Hongkong and Singapore,' a^_Mei4--as between Singapore and Australia^ be
interrupted, but the security of the Philippines and Indochina would also be
threatened. This would be the beginning of Japanese naval dominance in the
Pacific Ocean. When the whole island came under Japanese control, the
Japanese navy would be able to make its influence felt in the Mediterranean,
and also cut the connection between the American and British naval bases in
Singapore and Hawaii. Therefore, the present Japanese movement relating
to Hainan is in the nature of a reply to the American warships' visit to
Singapore last year.

A correspondent next asked why the Japanese landing at Hainan was considered

a prelude to the Japanese attempt to control the pacific? The Generalissimo

answered:

We all know Japan has in mind three important strategic points in the
Pacific: Sakhalin in the north, Hainan in the west, and Guam in the east.
With a view to the complete naval domination of the pacific, Japan has been
keeping a covetous eye on all these three places. Should all three fall
into Japanese hands, both Hawaii and the Philippines would be as good as
Japanese-occupied territory. Having gotten possession of one half of
Sakhalin, Japan is now trying to occupy Hainan in the hope of frustrating
any possible concerted action that might be taken by Anglo-American naval
forces in the pacific. If such a scheme goes unchecked, Japan will make
an attempt next to place herself in a position to control Guam, so as to
be able eventually not only to hamper the westward movement of the American
fleet, but also to cut the line of communications with the Philippines.

To further the promotion of a southward expansion and to bring about

her dominance in the pacific, Japan, for the past 30 years, has been
scheming to build a strategic triangle out of three islands. In 1936,
when she provoked the Pakhoi [Pei-hai] Incident, her intention was to use
this as a pretext to establish her position with reference to the occupation
and control of Hainan. For fear of international complications, she did
not dare go much further.

Now Japan, regardless of consequences, has invaded Hainan. This

move represents the last desperate attempt at the conquest of China
[and is] not for the purpose of inciting a world war. After several
decades' hesitation, what Japan is now doing is ramong] the 'most ]
important events since the commencement of Sino-Japanese hostilities.
It is also a turning point in the history of the pacific. For Japan
has thus revealed her inordinate ambition to expand and control the
pacific. I do not see how countries having vital interests in the Far
East can watch with unconcern this dangerous development. To the Japanese
navy, Hainan is the first line of advance toward the Western pacific,
as Guam is in [toward l] the Eastern pacific.

Then someone at the press conference asked him this question: "Where

then is the second line of advance?" Smiling, the Generalissimo was reported

to have said: "people with a European outlook would be able to answer this
 464

question, and Americans particularly knew the answer well." Then he went on to

explain that the Japanese attempt, in occupying Hainan might be considered as a

counterpart of the Japanese occupation of Mukden on September 18, 1931. He said:

By attacking Hainan, Japan has created another Mukden outrage in

the pacific. The effect of this move is the same, irrespective of the
fact of whether it is committed on the land or on the sea. Thus, should
Japan be permitted to hold Hainan following the present invasion, I
believe in a short time a foundation for her planned new air and naval
base will be laid. As a consequence, the international situation in the
Pacific will undergo a great change. Even if France should then wish to
establish a naval base in Indochina, and the United States desired to
defend Guam, I fear they would not have much time for so doing. In making
the present southward move, Japan does not intend to use it for the
termination of Sino-Japanese hostilities but obviously [for other purposes, ]
because she has made up her mind to run the risk of sowing the seeds for war
in the pacific.

Then the Generalissimo was asked what defensive measures the Chinese

government had taken in Hainan? The Generalissimo answered: that China

had not given much consideration to coastal defense, because of the lack of

naval forces, but her land forces having made sufficient preparations, she

would do her utmost to prevent the enemy from occupying the whole island. He

said we had taken the necessary precautions against an attack on Pakhoi, and

were ready to offer strong resistance.

The final questions was: What is the effect of the Japanese landing at

Hainan on the Sino-Japanese hostilities? The Generalissimo answered that it

had little effect on China's war of resistance, that the issue would be fought

out on land, and the occupation of the island was really inconsequential from

the Chinese point of view.

My call on M. Chauvel took place in the late afternoon. It was a return call,

he having only recently assumed office. I opened the conversation by inquiring

into the situation as regards the representations made in Tokyo on the Japanese

occupation of Hainan. He said that the French Ambassador to Japan, M. Charles

Arsfene Henry, had reported, and the substance of the Japanese reply corresponded

to what the Japanese had given to the press, namely, that the occupation had
 465

been made on the ground of military necessity, that it was temporary and that

Japan had no territorial ambitions concerning the island. He added that the

British had made a similar demarche at the request of the French, and the

Japanese reply to the British was very much the same.

I told him I understood that the French demarche was not a protest, and

asked whether a formal protest would be sent to the Japanese government.

The Assistant-Director replied that the first demarche was in the nature

of a request for explanations regarding the assurances Japn had repeatedly given

to the French government that she had no intention of occupying the island. It

also expressed surprise that Japan had not previously consulted the French

government in view of those assurances, but had, on the other hand, notified

Germany and Italy. He said the next step to be taken was still under consideration

But he was of the opinion that a formal protest would require a stronger

juridical basis. He explained that, as the matter stood, the exchange of

notes between China and France of 1897 merely committed China not to cede the

territory in question to a third power. But the present action did not, of

course, originate from China. As regards the Treaty of 1907 between France and

Japan, there was no specific provision that could be quoted. In order to make

a formal protest^ a more specific basis seemed to be necessary. For that reason,

he stated, the demarche already made had emphasized the voluntary assurances

given by the Japanese government to the French Ambassador and the French government

This argument appeared to me, at the time and even now, as sort of

hairspliting by the French in order to excuse themselves for not taking stronger

action in Tokyo. [At the time] I observed [to M. Chauvel] that this was a

breach of undertaking by Japan in view of her former assurances to France,

and that that should be sufficient basis for a protest.

M. Chauvel explained the assurances were nd' in the nature of a formal

undertaking, but consisted merely of a statement that Japan had no intention

 466

for the present of occupying the island. He said the British, however, in taking

up the matter the previous summer with the Japanese government, had gone deeper

into it. When told by the Japanese that Japan would not occupy the island

unless compelled by military necessity, the British asked what would be, in

that case, the character and the duration of the occupation. The Japanese

had replied that such occupation, if it took place, would last so long as military

necessity remained, but that Japan had not territorial design on the island.

M. Chauvel added that the British demarche was also in the nature of a request

for explanations and elucidations as to Japan's real intention relating to the

island. (It was evident that the British took a much more serious view of the

act of occupation and also took a stronger stand. In the first place, Hainan

is much nearer to Hongkong than to Indochina. In the second place, Great Britain

saw more clearly than France that Japanese occupation of Hainan Island would be

a first step in the Japanese program of expansion further southward, which would

unavoidably include the occupation of Hongkong itself, and threaten the vast

British colonial possessions in Eastern Asia and South Asia.)

I asked what impression the French government had obtained in Washington

as regards the American government's attitude toward the occupation of the

island. M. Chauvel replied that the American attitude was rather reserved. It

appeared that the State Department regarded the act merely as one designed to

prevent the flow of supplies on the mainland, and did not fully realize its

bearing upon the strategic position of France, Great Britain or the United

States in the Far East . He thought that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington,

being a clever man, must have succeeded in influencing the State Department as

to the pretended purpose of Japan in occupying the island. M. Chauvel himself

entirely agreed with General Chiang's statement that Japan's purpose in occupying

Hainan was really to bring pressure to bear upon France and Great Britain in

Europe and to control the strategic position of the French, British and American
 467

possessions in the Far East. If Japan had wanted to cut the communications

and the channel of supplies, he said, she would have contented herself with

the occupation of the port of Haikou on the northern end of Hainan. But

her action in occupying the whole island and landing strong forces at Yulin

on the southern end of the island clearly indicated that her purpose was of a

general political character. (M. Chauvel, having served for many years in

the Far East, particularly in China, had acquired a knowledge of the relative

strategic position of the islands in the south of China, (of their strategic

value to Japan in her southward expansionist policy, and also of Japan's ultimate

ambitions in Asia.)

He told me that, in the morning, he had received Mr. Edwin Wilson,

Counselor of the American Embassy, and told him his views, emphasizing the

political significance of the Japanese occupation. He had also telegraphed

the same thing to the French Ambassador in Washington. He thought for the time

being it would be difficult to move the American government to take a step

similar to the French and British action, however desirable it would be in the

solidarity of the democratic (powers. M.Chauvel added that the American government

was always slow to move, and so it was necessary to keep up the current by

continuously keeping before the American government the political bearing of the

Japanese action. He expressed the hope that the Chinese would do likewise, so

that eventually the United States might be persuaded to take action, for without

American cooperation the other powers, in the present situation of Europe, could

do very little in the Far East.

[I was rather pleased to find that M. Chauvel] saw the situation clearly,

particularly with reference to its bearing upon the situation in Europe, and upon

the French and British positions in that situation. I told M. Chauvel that

[the view he had just expressed] was precisely the view which General Chiang had

expressed and which the Chinese government had been pointing out to the American

government. I said the reserved attitude that the American government showed at
 468

present was probably due to the friction between Congress and President Roosevelt
*
over the question of foreign policy, particularly American help to France and

Great Britain in Europe. As the Hainan incident had created a great deal of

feeling in the American political world, it was not unnatural that the Administratioi

would like, for the time being, to hold itself aloof from the question of Hainan,

lest it pour oil on the fire by giving a new pretext to the opponents of the

Administration. (At the time there were still many pacifists, and American public

opinion was still largely favorable to a policy of neutrality supported by the

isolationist sentiment among the American people.) I told M. Chauvel I felt

confident, however, that the bearing of the Japanese move must be clear to the

American government, and that when the present storm blew over, the American

government might still act. As a matter of fact, I told him, the American

government had already sent a destroyer to Hainan to investigate.

M. Chauvel said the American Department of the Navy had despatched a ship

without informing the French or the British governments, although France and

Great Britain would have been glad to cooperate and to concert action with

the United States so as to present a united front before Japan. But that was

not the way approved by the United States. Similarly, he recalled, the American

note of December 31, 1938, protesting against the Japanese acts of discrimination

against foreign interests in China, had been sent without previously consulting

or informing the French and British governments. (That was the way the American

government preferred to act at the time, in light of the then current state of

public opinion, particularly opinion in Congress.) I remarked that probably

the American government was also waiting for a first-hand report from its own

sources, and when the report arrived, it might take some appropriate step in Tokyo.

(As a matter of fact, it soon did.)

I urged that the Japanese occupation of Hainan had been effected not only

to carry out further her program of southward expansion, but also in response
 469

to the demand of Rome and Berlin to bring pressure to bear upon the democratic

countries in Europe. I said that Japan, in acting thus, was really working

closely with Italy and Germany to further the policy of the last two mentioned

powers in Europe. I told him that because of the existing state of Franco-

Italian relations, Japan had chosen the present moment to occupy Hainan in order

to test the extent of the reaction from France. In my view, I said, it was

necessary for France to react vigorously this time. Any inactivity, I urged,

would be taken as a sign of weakness, and would perhaps aggravate the situation

in Europe and particularly that in the Mediterranean. (That was how I viewed

this act of occupation of Hainan Island by Japan, and it turned out to be

precisely what the Japanese had in mind.)

One of the easiest acts of retaliation, I said, would be the cancellation

of all restrictions on transit of Chinese war material through Indochina.

Heretofore, I said, the French government had hesitated to accord full transit

in consideration of the Japanese assurance that Japan would not occupy Hainan

Island. Now that this consideration had been entirely destroyed by the

Japanese action, I told him France would be expected to retaliate in order to

prevent any misreading of her intentions.

M. Chauvel said he was also of this opinion, and therefore, as regards

the according of transit facilities, was in favor of adopting a more liberal

interpretation and allowing more material to go through. He intimated to

me that such articles as motors and war material ordered in France before the

outbreak of hostilities would probably be allowed to pass. As regards the

raising of the embargo on transit of war material entirely, that was a politic^1

question, and he presumed that I had already seen the Minister. 1 told him I had

already asked for an interview with M. Bonnet and expected to see him very soon.

The Assistant-Director then told me that, because of the possible consequences

of raising the embargo, given the present state of the defenses of Indochina,
 470

he very much doubted the French government would feel justified in removing the

interdictions altogether. However, he thought the adoption of a more liberal

interpretation, so as to allow more things to go through, would also have an

effect on Japan. He felt sure that if 40 pieces of machinery in Haiphong were

accorded transit, the Japanese Charge d'Affaires would call the next day and

complain against it. He would, however, tell the latter that since the Japanese

occupation of Hainan had brought about a change in the situation, the French were

no longer bound to refuse transit to China. (Here he let the cat out of the

bag. It became clear as daylight that the French had been withholding transit

facilities from China from time to time and had in fact adopted a policy decision

to stop transit all out of consideration for Japan's sensibilities and Japan's

objections.) Thus, he continued, the effect on the attitude of France, Great

Britain and the United States, in the end, would make Japan realize that she

had taken an ill-advised step which turned like a boomerang against herself.

On February 20 I called on French Foreign Minister Bonnet. At the outset

I tolj him that I wished to see him in connection with the Japanese occupation

of Hainan Island and its bearing and significance. It was certain, I said, that

the action had been taken in pursuance of the Japanese program of southward

expansion always advocated by the Japanese Navy for the purpose of dominating

the South Seas and the possessions of the Western powers in that region. But

I emphasized to M. Bonnet, the action had also been taken under the influence

and with the approval of Germany and Italy in order to bring pressure to bear

upon Great Britain and France in Europe. It was a fact, I said, that the

Japanese had been seeking aid from Italy and Germany for some time. From Berlin

Japan had now obtained a credit of 1.5 billion marks for the purpose of procuring

war planes and other armaments in Germany. 1,350 planes were ordered as a result.

Before granting this credit, Germany had insisted that Japan should furnish a

quid pro quo and asked that the Japanese Navy should cooperate in the interest
of the Rome-Berlin axis in Europe. Italy had likewise made a similar demand on

Japan. Therefore, I told M. Bonnet the Japanese occupation of Hainan had a

political significance far beyond the question of cutting the channels of supply

for China.

I went on to say that I had always emphasized that the Far Eastern question

should not be viewed as something separate and unconnected with the European

situation, and that the Japanese act of occupation at the moment served to

confirm this fact in my mind. It obviously was intended to bring pressure to

bear upon the Anglo-French group, I said, and to persuade it to go further in

the policy of conciliation and concession. At the same time, it was intended

to test the degree of reaction from France and England to such an important

act of aggression on the part of Japan.

I told M. Bonnet that I had been instructed by my government to point out

the significance of the Japanese action and to emphasize the necessity for

France to take some positive action in retaliation. If the French and the

British government should again content themselves with merely registering

diplomatic protests in Tokyo and show themselves unprepared to adopt any

energetic action, then Japan and her partners would consider the absence

of energetic action as proof of weakness and would feel disposed to go even

further^ both in the Far East and in Europe. The manner in which France and

Great Britain reacted to the Japanese action as regards Hainan was, I asserted,

bound to have an important effect on the European situation.

I told him I had been glad to note that the United States government

had now made a demarche in Tokyo similar to that which had been made by the

French and the British governments concerning the Japanese occupation of Hainan.

I said this American action served to show the solidarity of the policy of

the three democratic pbwers and the willingness of the United States to work with

Great Britain and France in regard to the Far East. If the present opportunity
 472

could be seized to develop this solidarity and cooperation among the three

democratic powers in the Far East, it would pave the way for a similar cooperation

as regards Europe. Therefore, I said, I would propose that the Minister consider

the adoption of some concrete measures of retaliation against Japan for her

arbitrary occupation of Hainan Island. Of course, in view of the situation in

Europe, it was no time to think of military action, as such action might be

provocative and aggravate the situation. But outside of measures of a military

character, I told him, there were other measures of a commercial and economic

nature that could be safely adopted as means of retaliation, without provoking

the danger of an armed conflict.

I went on to say that, in the first place, I would urge the French government

to stop at once the supply to Japan of such raw materials fron Indochina

as were indispensable for her war industries. Such as iron ore, coal and cement.

Secondly, I would propose that the French government immediately approach

Washington and London with a view to adopting common restrictions concerning the

importation of Japanese goods into the respective countries. I pointed out that

such a measure would strike at the root of the weakness in the Japanese economy

and make its effect quickly felt. The Japanese national debt had doubled

after 20 months of war against China, and yet the Japanese government was

contemplating the imposition of new taxes of all sorts, in spite of the

opposition of the people. Thirdly, I said I would urge the French government to

annul its previous decision to prohibit the transit of Chinese war material through

Indochina. I understood that the consideration that led the French government to

deny the China such transit facilities was Japan's repeated assurances not to

occupy the Island of Hainan. Now that she had occupied the island, notwithstanding

her pledged word, the reasons for the French prohibition disappeared. Not only

should the French government consider itself free to act as it saw fit, I said.
 473

but in order to avoid any false impression of weakness on the part of France,

it would be imperative to adopt some measure of retaliation.

Besides, I continued, it would be in the interest of France also to aid

China as much as possible. I said I myself had always hoped that the European

situation would not become aggravated, but if unfortunately a conflict should

arise, it would be more necessary than ever that China should continue to keep

Japan occupied on Chinese territory, and thereby act as the first line of

defense of territorial possessions not only of France, but also of Great Britain

in Hongkong and Singapore, of the United States in the Philippines, and of

Holland in the Dutch Indies.

Knowing that Paris always had an eye on Washington, I specifically pointed out

too that the United States had been aiding China to a considerable extent not

only by furnishing her with loans and credits but also in the supply of war material,

such as airplanes and trucks. I told M. Bonnet that the American government had

asked the Chinese government about the certainty of transit for such American

materials through Indochina, and what relevant assurances the French government

had given to the Chinese government. I said China had been unable to give a

satisfactory answer to the American government.

Then I referred to the attitude of Great Britain in the matter of transit

through Burma. I said it must be well known to M. Bonnet that the British

authorities were facilitating the transit at Rangoon as openly and publicly

as they had done at Hongkong, without any fear of reprisals from Japan. I told

him that France, with her vital interests in the Far East, should, in the view

of the Chinese government, accord st least full freedom of transit for all

kinds of material as an aid to China and that such assistance to the cause of

resistance would be as much in the interest of France as in that of China .

After hearing my rather lengthy statement, the French Foreign Minister

replied that he considered my statement of great interest. As regards the

first two suggestions, he told me he would not fail to take them up and study
 474

them with the Ministries concerned. He thought that measures of retaliation

of a commercial character could be envisaged. Regarding the question of transit,

he said the government was going to allow certain war material to pass for which

transit had thitherto been prohibited. He said this was intended to demonstrate

to Japan France's willingness to retaliate.

M. Bonnet also told me that Mr. Bullitt, the American Ambassador, had

seen him a few days earlier concerning the transit of a certain number of

American trucks for China, and that he (M. Bonnet) the French Minister

had assured him that instructions would be given to allow them to pass through

Indochina. As regards the abrogation of the previous cabinet decision inter­

dicting the transit of war material, M. Bonnet told me he would take up the

matter with his colleagues in the government. I again urged that those

measures of commercial retaliation should be studied as soon as possible.

The Foreign Minister said he would do so, adding that he found these

suggestions exceedingly interesting.

As the Foreign Minister's telegram to me, dated March 4, 1939, indicated

the Japanese occupation of Hainan marked the completion of the first phase

of Japanese conquest and the beginning of the second phase. As the Foreign

Minister explained, the first phase of Japan's military operations had not

ended with complete success for Japan. Japan had expected that, by rapid

military action in China, she would be able to bring about a quick settlement

of the so-called China incident. But no settlement had been reached and Japan

was presently obliged to face an entirely different military situation, which

marked a second phase on her timetable. Thenceforward her armed forces had to

penetrate westward to try to destroy the Chinese armed forces. This meant

all the fighting would have to be done in very mountainous regions of most
 475

inconvenient and even difficult terrain. Whereas communications in the eastern

part of China were easy (there were roads, there were railways and even

canals through which the Japanese could move about with relative ease) in the

west they would have to fight on unfamiliar terrain, lacking roads and railways.

In addition, the telegram pointed out that at this time the internal

political conditions in Japan were confused and the lack of unity among the

leaders of the Japanese government had become more prominent. The Japanese

economy had become more and more strained, while diplomatically Japan was

becoming more isolated. At the same time, the oppositon of the people in

general to the continuance of the war was growing more marked. The telegram

therefore said that, in carrying on the publicity work abroad, I should emphasize

the approach of the date of Japan's total failure in China.

It was to forestall this development, the Foreign Minister said, that Japan

had been boliged to attempt to bring about a quick settlement of the whole conflict

with China, and to propose as a bait the setting up of what Japan called "the

New Order in East Asia." The purpose of this move, evidently, was to seek control

of China's political, economic, military and cultural policies and to try

simultaneously to eliminate the interests of Europe and America in the Far East.

It was announced in Tokyo, the telegram said, that a whole week from

March 3 to 9 would be devoted to the propagation of the so-called New Order in

East Asia. In order to counteract this move, our own government had decided

that we should lay emphasis in our publicity policy upon the following two

principles. The first was to refute the statements made by Prince Konoye that

announced the setting up of a New Order in East Asia. The second was to

use the statement of the Generalissimo [replying to Konoye's broadcast],

and his inaugural address at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Committee

of the Kuomintang as the basis to further intensify our emphasis upon our

determination to uphold the Nine Power Treaty and Article 16 of the Covenant
 476

of the league of Nations, in order to further press Britain, France, the United

States and Soviet Russia to adopt more positive action toward Japan.

The Foreign Minister’s telegram of March 4 pointed to Japan’s growing

difficulties and her desire to bring about a settlement in China in order

to forestall total failure. The same theme had been alluded to by the

Generalissimo in his statement before the Kuomintang Plenary Session earlier,

HA-
[and I have mentioned some reports I had in January to this same effect.]
A
As another illustration that the Japanese also had their troublesf^m# even in

maintaining the loyalty of their own forces in China--I would like to refer to

a report from Hongkong. The report stated that anti-war sentiment was growing

among the Japanese troops in China. A detachment of about 1,000 Japanese

troops at Liukiamiao [/l] near Hankow had mutineed on February 13, and

serious fighting followed between the mutineers and the loyalists resulting

in about 700 casualties on both sides. The report added that the disaffected

troops were finally surrounded and disarmed only after 24 hours of fighting.

This illustrates very well the restlessness of the Japanese troops.

[As to the Japanese desire to reach a settlement,] a Waichiaopu telegram

of February 20, 1939, sent me through our Embassy in London, [trgyJ suggested that

plans were actually afoot for bringing a settlement about.] The telegram stated

that the Waichiaopu had received information that Japan would hold an international

conference in Tokyo at the beginning of March 1939, and was sending instructions

out to the Japanese diplomatic missions abroad, particularly those accredited to

Europe and America, to exert themselves with a view to persuading the Western

powers to act as mediators to bring about a settlement of the Sino-Japanese

conflict, to revise the Nine power Treaty and to redelin^ate the spheres of

influence of the different powers in China.

At the same time, the telegram said, the Japanese government would send a

delegation of five members to be headed by Mr. Koyama, a member of the Japanese Diet
 477

to visit different countries in Europe and America. Germany and Italy,

according to the same report, had already promised to give their support to

the Japanese program. The purpose of this telegram was to ask me to look out

for the activities of this Japanese mission and at the same time to sound out

the reaction and views of the European powers .

On March 3 I called on Secretary-General L6ger, partly to see what the

Quai d'Orsay might know about the reported Koyama mission. My main purpose, however,

was to see if the French government had taken any action on the three suggestions

I had made to Foreign Minister Bonnet on February 20. Therefore, after giving
iIyj
M. L6ger a resume of the three suggestions, I told him Uwe Foreign Minister had

promised to consult the other ministries concerned and I asked him what action

had been taken as a result.

M. L6ger said the matter had been studied. As regards the proposed

restriction of the importation of Japanese merchandise, the French government was

in consultation with London and Washington. He did not believe, however, that

much would come of it. He said that right after the Japanese occupation of

Hainan, the French government had approached the British and American governments,

suggesting that they make a joint demarche to Tokyo protesting against it. But

the Americans did not appear to be very mcuh interested and considered there was

no political significance in the Japanese action. So they declined to make a

demarche. When I reminded him that, according to the press reports, the

American Ambassador in Tokyo, two or three days after the French and British had

acted, had made representations to the Tokyo government, M. L6ger said the

American action was in the nature of an inquiry and did not even raise any objection

to the Japanese occupation. As to the British, he said they reluctantly made a

demarche as suggested by the French, but it was a rather mild one.

Speaking of the French government, M. L6ger said that when told by the

Japanese that the occupation would last only so long as military necessities
 478

required it, it considered the reply satisfactory and was not inclined to take

further action. When I remarked that the Japanese action was such as to really

threaten the security of French Indochina and that it therefore called for some

positive measures on the part of France, M. Ldger said that, so far as the French

government was concerned, it was prepared to adopt any measures, if it could be

assured of British and American cooperation. Its attitude remained the same as

that at the time of the Brussels Conference. France was prepared to apply economic

sanctions or even a naval blockade, if the United States and Great Britain would

cooperate with her. The French government had decided to send a warship to

Haiiiow-rHaikou] and proposed to London and Washington each to send a similar vessel

there in order to demonstrate the solidarity of the three powers. But the British

government did not approve the suggestion and the American government refused to

do it .

I said that, according to the press reports, the American Navy Department had

sent a destroyer to Hainan. But he said it was not true. He went on to say the

French government had decided to send a ship in any case, but, after notifying the

Japanese authorities, it was told that they could not guarantee the safety of any

war vessel sent to Hainan. He said this meant that the French vessel would run the

risk of striking a mine and being blown up. He added that the Japanese declaration

created a difficult situation for the French government, and the question of

despatching a warship was being taken up for consideration by the French Ministry

of the Navy.

M. L6ger thought that, practically speaking/the presence of a warship would

not be able to do much good, but morally it would at least assure respect for the

French flag. But to adopt effective action, he said, the solidarity of Great

Britain and the United States with France was indispensable. France herself had

only two warships in the Far East, and therefore she could do nothing without the

help of the other two pbwers. The United States was free from all complications
 479

elsewhere and could take effective action if it was willing, while the British

fleet was far stronger than that of the French. Alone France could not hope

to do anything effective in the present circumstances of Europe. M. Ldger

added that he had talked the matter over with Mr. Bullitt, the American Ambassador,

who gave him to understand definitely that the United States government was not

going to do anything beyond giving financial assistance to China, and that the

question of Hainan did not interest the United States.

I pointed out the Japanese would certainly not be desirous of provoking

complications with France, and the occupation of Hainan was intended also to

sound out the reaction from France and Great Britain. I said the anxiety

mainifested by the Japanese in reaching a settlement of the Hongkong bombardment

incident confirmed my view. M. Ldger agreed, but again emphasized the necessity

of obtaining Anglo-American cooperation.

As regards the suggestion of stopping the supply of minerals and raw materials

from Indochina to Japan, M. L^ger said that a decision had been taken by the

government and that the Quai d’Orsay had written to the Ministry of Colonies about

it. The supply would be discontinued, but not openly as a measure of retaliation

against Japan. It would be on the ground of a decree which had already been

issued forbidding the export of certain minerals and raw materials. The permission

given to the Japanese to export from Indochina in recent months had been taken

merely as a detraction from the decree, and the decision of the French government

now was to enforce the decree and stop making any further exceptions. Accordingly,

he explained, the Japanese would not be notified of this decision. If they made

further applications for permission to export these articles in question, no

action would be taken on them. But if they pressed the matter further, they

would be told in the sense indicated. This procedure would avoid having the

action considered by Japan as an act of offense, but the result would be the same.

Although the French authorities and merchants in Indochina opposed the measure
 480

very much because Japan was really the best customer of these products and

the adoption of the proposed measure would mean a great loss of revenue and

income, still the government for political considerations had decided to put

it into effect.

M. L6ger went on to say that the third suggestion^ namely, the restoration

of free transit for Chinese war material through Indochina, had also been

considered by the French government. While it was found impossible to annul

organically the whole decision of the cabinet taken in October 1937 relating to

the matter, the French government had decided, however, to substitute a new basis

for its application and interpretation, namely, the list of arms and munitions

contained in chapter one of the 1925 Geneva Convention relating to the control of

international traffic in arms, munitions and war materials. He pointed out that

this Convention was signed by the delegates of both Japan and France, and that the

list therein contained was far less comprehensive than that of the annex to the

decree of September 1935 issued by the French government concerning the embargo

on the export of arms, munitions and war materials (the old basis) . This new

basis, M. L6ger added, would enable the French government to authorize the transit

through Indochina of many articles and materials theretofore included within the

prohibition. Already the automobiles and trucks had been allowed to pass, and all

restrictions on the number of vehicles for transit had been abandoned.

I said the new basis would probably give some satisfaction to the Chinese

government and might serve to remove to some degree its great disappointment

over the French attitude. But I wanted to make clear, I said, that arms and

munitions for which orders had been placed in France before the outbreak of

hostilities should still be accorded full transit, and I wished to have that

understanding confirmed by M. L6ger, who had always assured me that the cabinet

decision of October 1937 did not in any way apply to such orders. I reminded

M. L6ger of the list of such orders I had sent to him on January 30, 1939.
 481

M. L6ger said instructions had already been given to the services concerned

in the Ministry to authorize the transit of these materials, and there would be

no difficulty about it. Although the question of Hainan and that of the transit

of Chinese war material were two separate questions, which, he said,the French

government had never considered as being interdependent, still the Japanese had

repeatedly given assurances of not occupying the island. So her occupation, in

contravention of her pledged word, gave the French reason for acting with

greater freedom as regards the matter of transit for Chinese war material .

I asked what was the situation as regards the French Concession in Tientsin,

in view of the press reports that Japan had taken measures to encircle and

isolate the French and British Concessions there, and what was the real object

of the Japanese action as M. L6ger understood it. The latter replied that it

was evidently intended to bring pressure to bear upon France and Great Britain.

When asked whether, in his view, the Japanese intended to seize the Concessions

by force, he said not immediately, but if war should break out in Europe in one

or two months, then the danger of these Concessions being seized would become a

real one.

I told him of the information the Chinese government had receive reporting

that Japan was contemplating to convoke an international conference in Tokyo for

the purpose of modifying or even destroying the Nine power Treaty and that Japan

had sent a secret mission headed by Koyama to work for the cooperation of

Italy and Germany to this end, and to influence France and Great Britain to

accept the idea. I asked M. L6ger wherie'Ke had received any information on the

subject. He said, no, he had heard nothing about it. Then as M. Ldger had to

attend a luncheon at the President’s office given in honor of the Danish King,

he asked to be excused, but assured me he would be glad to renew the conversation

at any time I was free.

I went inmediately to call on M. Chauvel . I told him the gist of the

 482

conversation I had just had with M. Ldger in which the latter had referred to the

Geneva Convention on the control of international traffic in arms, munitions

and war material and to its use in the application and interpretation of the French

decision relating to transit of war material through Indochina. I said that as

M. L6ger had had to hurry away to the Elysee Palace, I wished to continue with

M. Chauvel the conversation on that subject and some other matters which I had

intended to bring to M. Lager's attention. I asked what was the precise difference

between the new basis and the old.

M. Chauvel showed me the text of the Geneva Convention and pointed out that

chapter one of the Convention contained a list of arms and munitions which was

very much more restricted than that which was contained in the French decree of

1935. In other words, the list in the Convention contained only arms, such as

guns, rifles, machine guns, revolvers and pistols, and munitions such as powder

and explosives. Raw materials useful for war industries and war material in

general were not included in this list. So things such as machinery for the

manufacture of arms and munitions or raw materials for similar manufacture would

not be subject to prohibition for transit.

As regards airplanes and aeronautical material, M. Chauvel said the Ministry

had asked the Ministry of Colonies not to include in the prohibition airplanes

and aeronautical material destined for commercial aviation in China, such as those

needed by the Eurasia and other aviation companies. He added that this new basis

would enable China to ship through Indochina many things which were hitherto

prohibited for transit, especially such heavy material as machinery, which he

understood could not be easily transported by the Rangoon-Yiinnan route. As regards

arms and munitions, they were, as a rule, light and could be sent easily to China

from Rangoon. He thought this division and coordination of the two routes should

give China all the facilitiesshe needed to ship all material for military use.

I reminded him of the assurance as regards the arms and munitions for
 483

which orders had been placed in France before the outbreak of hostilities, and

said that those articles should in any case be allowed transit through Indochina.

M. Chauvel said he had already studied the list from the Embassy, and that transit

for such material would be accorded without difficulty, if the French merchants

could prove to the satisfaction of the Ministry that orders had in fact been

placed before the adoption of the cabinet decision on the matter of transit in

1937. He added that this was done again to give satisfaction to the Chinese

government, because theretofore the list which had served as the basis for the

action of the Ministry contained only a limited number of orders. But that

old list was now discarded, and the Embassy list would be taken as the basis

subject only to the confirmation of the order in each case.

I told M* Chauvel of the information about the dispatch of a secret mission

by Japan headed by Koyama for the purpose of persuading Italy and Germany to help

Japan in pushing the idea of an international conference in Tokyo to bring

about the termination of the Sino-Japanese hostilities and to revise the Nine

power Treaty. I added that, according to the information, the Japanese intention

appeared to be to persuade all the small signatory powers of the Nine Power Treaty

into accepting the Japanese point of view and to thereby isolate and reduce to a

minority the principal signatory powers, such as France, Great Britain and the

United States. As regards Germany and Italy, I said they had already manifested

on more than one occasion their intention to side with Japan.

In this connection I drew M. Chauvel's attention to the recent Havas report

from Tokyo, saying that the Portuguese Inspector of Police at Macao had

negotiated in Tokyo an agreement with the Japanese government whereby Portugal

would recognize "Manchukuo" and accord, among other things, full facilities to

the Japanese army in Macao, including those of the Portuguese Customs. I told

him that this report, if true, was important because Macao, being situated in
 484

South China, could be made into an important base for Japanese operations.

From the larger point of view, I said, it also signified that Portugal,

following the example of Hungary, was about to join the anti-Comintern group of

powers. If this were so, Macao would become a dangerous center for Japanese

activities against the interests of France and Great Britain in that part of Asia.

M. Chauvel said he had heard nothing about the report, but it was of interest

to him. He recalled that both the American and British Notes addressed to Tokyo

recently on the Far Eastern situation concluded by suggesting that if Japan

desired to propose the revision of the Nine power Treaty, they were prepared to

join in an international conference for such a purpose. When the British

consulted the Quai d'Orsay on their draft note, he had pointed out to them that

the moment was still premature to suggest any international conference for the

revision of the Nine Power Treaty. While, as a result, tie British softened the

language of the concluding paragraph, they, however, still left the idea in it.

But the French, on their part, refrained from making any suggestion about calling

an international conference for the purpose. He thought it was possible that

Japan now wished to make use of the Anglo-American suggestion and turn it to her

own advantage. He offered to give to me any information that he might receive

on this subject.

Referring once again to the new decision of the French

government concerning the matter of transit through Indochina, I asked whether

the Quai d'Orsay could send a statement to the Embassy. M. Chauvel then said

it was still under consideration whether to notify the Embassy of the new

decision in the form of a reply to the Embassy's memorandum of February 6, 1939.

The inclination was not to give any written notification, because if it were

sent to China, a similar notification to Japan would be necessary too. Accordingly,

the Quai d'Orsay had instructed the French Charge d'Affaires at Chungking to

inform the Chinese Foreign Minister verbally instead of sending any written
 485

communication. He added that if I wanted a statement, it could take the form

of either a formal reply to the Chinese memorandum or of a written statement

on a loose sheet, which would not have the character of an official communication.

I said It was inmaterial to me what form it took. What I desired was to

understand precisely the character, scope and bearing of the new decision in

order to guide the Chinese government in its arrangements for supplies. If there

were objections to sending an official communication on the subject, I would be

satisfied with a written statement on a loose sheet. M. Chauvel said he would

talk the matter over with M. L6ger and try to give me a statement in writing--

probably on a loose sheet.

In relation to the Koyama mission, which appeared to have very important

objectives to pursue for Japan, I would like to refer to the conversation

I had with American Ambassador Bullitt, on March 6, in order to find out his

interpretation of this new Japanese move and what he thought likely to be the

intentions of Japan as regards the terms for settlement of the Sino-Japanese

conflict.

I told the American Ambassador at the outset of the report I received from

Chungking that Japan had sent a secret mission headed by Koyama, a member of the

Diet, to seek the cooperation of Italy and Germany for promoting an Internationa I

conference in Tokyo', with a view to bringing about an early termination of the

Sino-Japanese war and the revision of the Nine Power Treaty of Washington, and

to influence London and Paris in support of the idea. Information I had received

from another source in Europe, I told him, indicated that Japan, in pursuance

of her idea for a revision of the Nine Power Treaty, was also working to detach

the small signatory powers of that treaty, such as Portugal, Holland and Belgium,

from the conference, so that when it met, France, Great Britain and the United

States would find themselves isolated and in the minority.

 486

Incidentally} I mentioned to Mr. Bullitt the Havas report from Tokyocf

an agreement having recently been concluded by the Chief of Police of Macao and

the Japanese government, pledging Portugal to recognize "Manchukuo" and extend

all facilities to the Japanese army at Macao, I said, if true, it was particularly

significant for this Portuguese action would seem to indicate that there was more

behind it than the desiie to safeguard Macao from Japanese occupation. I said

it looked as if Portugal was disposed to follow the example of Hungary, by

joining the Anti-Comintern Pact and thereby becoming definitely a member of the

Axis powers.

Mr. Bullitt said he had received a report from Moscow to the effect that

Japan had sent a mission to Europe composed of the Abbfy of the Japanese army,

Admiral Katsuma of the Navy and Mr. Ito of the Foreign Office. That mission left

Japan on February 2, and the report added that its object was to sign a military

alliance at Berlin with Germany and Italy about the middle of March. He

wondered if the two reports referred to the same thing. I told him that they

were two different matters.

Mr. Bullitt said his report, having come from a Soviet source, should not be

accepted without confirmation from other sources. As regards the reported

Portuguese-Japanese agreement in Tokyo, he said he himself could not believe it

to be true. His argument was this. The relations between England and Portugal

were so close, amounting almost to a British protectorate over Portugal, that

such an important move by the Portuguese could not have been undertaken without

the previous approval of London. In that case, the report, if true, would

indicate an important change in the British policy vis-a-vis the Far East.

He could not believe that such a change had taken place. However, he

promised to try to ascertain the true situation. (He then called Mr. Wilson

on the telephone, asking him to ask the Quai d'Orsay by telephone whether

they had any information on the subject. After a few minutes Mr. Wilson called
 487

back to report that the Asiatic Section of the Quai d'Orsay, after having

heard my account of the same, had telegraphed to Tokyo and London,but so far they

had not yet received any confirmation.)

Then Mr. Bullitt told me that the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Souritz, had

invited him to a luncheon on Monday, but his private secretary had declined

for him. Mr. Souritz then invited him to tiffin on Tuesday, and the invitation

was again declined on the ground that he was already engaged. Then Mr. Souritz

offered to give him a luncheon on any day that might be convenient for him.

The American Ambassador asked me therefore what could possibly be the reason for

such a persistent invitation on the part of Mr. Souritz, whom he had not seen

for the last two years. I told him I had not seen the Soviet Ambassador for

nearly six weeks, but I imagined that Mr. Souritz had asked to see him (Bullitt)

on instructions from Moscow. Mr. Bullitt also thought this was true.

I then said that the efforts Mr. Bullitt contributed to the appeasement of

Europe had borne fruit. The support given by the United States to France and

Great Britain, for example, in the supply of airplanes, and President Roosevelt’s

declarations in support of the principles of democracy had certainly made Germany

and Italy hesitate to provoke another international crisis. I reminded-trim

thAt>-4^--had beBa- plavtng'a" leading rale- international crisis. [I reminded him

that J he had {personallyj'been playing a leading role in this work of appeasement

and {that} the attitude of {his country, 1 the United States, had become a

determining factor for the outlook of Europe. As regards the Far East, I said

the influence of the United States would be even more decisive. The Soviet

Union, which was vitally interested on both fronts, namely, in Europe and in

Asia, naturally would be anxious to cultivate closer relations with the United

States .

There would seem to be another reason, I continued. I understood that

Naggiar, the new French Ambassador at Moscow, had been instructed to work for an
 488

improvement in the relations between Paris and Moscow, and for the resuscitation

of the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance. In other words, I said, there

was a change of attitude on the part of the French in recent months. Immediately

after Munich relations between Paris and Moscow had cooled down, and the press

understood from the Quai d'Orsay that the Franco-Soviet Pact was practically an

obsolete instrument. But the policy of the Soviet Union appeared to be always

to work together with the democratic countries in Western Europe. As the latter

made it a cardinal point in their policy to cultivate friendly relations and

promote cooperation with the United States, it would be quite understandable if

Moscow should be more than anxious now to approach the United States with a

view to understanding American policy.

Mr. Bullitt said the trouble with the Soviet Union was that one could

never have any faith in its promises or assurances. As an illustration, he

mentioned the conversation the former American Ambassador, Mr. Davis, had with
A

Stalin on the eve of his departure from Moscow. Mr. Davis had understood that

Stalin was anxious to cultivate friendly relations with Washington and offered

to make a settlement of the Russian debts to the United States and American

citizens. But when Davis later spoke to Molotov, the Soviet Premier, about it,

the latter denied any such thing on behalf of Stalin, and said there must

have been a misunderstanding on Mr. Davis' part.

Mr. Bullitt went on to say he had worked hard to help in the appeasement

of Europe, and one might say it had been a success. At any rate, there would

be no war in Europe this spring. He said when he was in the States last summer,

he saw that the Czech crisis was impending, and although President Roosevelt

asked him to stay a little longer, he insisted on returning to Europe at once

in order to be on the spot at the time of the crisis. That crisis arose,but

it was already too late to do anything effective to prevent it. At present, he

said, his efforts had boi e more fruit, and there was evident hesitation
 489

on the part of the totalitarian powers, which had accounted for the diminution

of the tension in the situation in Europe. Now, he said, he had been thinking

a great deal about the Far Eastern situation and would like to render similar

help. He felt idiotic at being unable to conceive of some plan whereby the Sino-

Japanese war could be settled. He asked me how he could help and what kind of

settlement would satisfy the parties to the war.

I said that Prince Konoye's last statement indicated the basis on which

Japan would be willing to accept a settlement with China. In brief, there were

to be a political understanding, which meant the recognition of "Manchukuo;" the

detachment of Inner Mongolia as a special anti-communist district; economic

cooperation making China, Japan and so-called ’Manchukuo" a great economic

combination; and cultural cooperation, which meant that China should join in the

Anti-Comintern Pact and collaborate with Japan against the spread of communism.

Those terms, I said, were not, however, acceptable to China because their

acceptance would practically mean the enslavement of China by Japan. The

Ambassador shared my view, and observed that what Japan conceived to he

cooperation was no cooperation at all.

I said China had no objection to economic cooperation with Japan in its true

sense, just as she was anxious to cooperate with Europe and America. But such

cooperation must be made to benefit all parties to it and not Japan alone. In

other words, I said, China desired an economic cooperation on the basis of the

Open Door principle. In order to bring about a settlement which would he

reasonable to China as well as to Japan, I thought it would be necessary, first

of all, to adopt certain measures with a view to bringing pressure to bear upon

japan. [I pointed out that] the militarists in Japan, with their double object

of expansion abroad and political control at home, felt they had clear sailing

and were flushed with success. They pointed out to their people that there was

no danger of opposition to their policy from any quarter and that this was the
 490

moment to carry their policy to its logical conclusion. X said that until and

unless France, Great Britain and the United States, with the cooperation of

the Soviet Union, gave proof of their intention not to allow the Japanese to have

it all their way, the civilian elements in Japan could have no hope of bringing

their influence to bear upon the militarists, although they fully comprehended

the possible danger of international complications arising from the militarists'

policy of headlong aggression.

I told Mr. Bullitt that of course I realized that any measure that might
or
involve these powers in serious complications/might involve the danger of war with

Japan, would be out of the question. But there were measures, I told him, short

of war, such as economic ones, which could be adopted and the effect of which

would be immediately felt in Japan, without giving rise to a grave crisis vis-S-vis

Japan. Then I told him what I had suggested to M. Bonnet at our last interview,

outlining to him the nature of the three suggestions. I emphasized particularly

the idea of a boycott of Japanese goods and urged that it be seriously considered.

I also told Mr. Bullitt the impression I had from the French seemed to be that

they were rather disappointed at the American reaction to the Japanese occupation

of Hainan Island. I said I also understood from the French that Washington was not

willing to make a similar demarche in Tokyo, and when the American Ambassador at

Tokyo finally made some demarche a few days later, it was merely in the nature

of an inquiry. The French were not very much pleased with the British either,

I said, because the latter did not adopt a very firm attitude towards Tokyo

on the subject, although the British had made a demarche objecting to the
/
occupation qiftd considered the Japanese reply satisfactory.

I told Mr. Bullitt also that M. Bonnet had promised to consider the three

suggestions I made to him, and I gave him (Bullitt) an account of the French
 491

attitude towards them. I said that, particularly as regards the idea of a

boycott, the French had taken it up with London and Washington, but they gave

me to understand that there was not much prospect of a favorable response

from either quarter.

The American Ambassador said, however, that as regards the Far East, the

important factor was the attitude of the Soviet Union. He said Russia had

vital interests at stake in the Sino-Japanese war and should be the first to

help China. But her real intentions were a puzzle and her words could never be

trusted. France and England had their preoccupations in Europe and were not

able to take any strong action in the Far East. As to the United States, its

interests were relatively small as compared with those of the other powers.

The American people as a whole had a very vague idea about China. The

distance separating the two countries was such as to give the American people

only a remote interest in what was happening in that part of the world. But

the Soviet Union was right on the spot, and yet, he said, its policy was an

enigma.

I pointed out to Mr. Bullitt that the Soviet Union had been rendering a

great deal of help to China and its attitude vis-a-vis Japan, as I understood it,

was always to join in anything undertaken by the United States, Great Britain and

France. I said was ready even to participate in military action. I then referred

to the Chinese proposals at the Brussels Conference for a demonstration by the

Soviet Union with her army in the north and by the three powers with their navy

in the south. I reminded him that it was not approved by the American Delegation

and that later, in Geneva and in London, China tried to arrange a meeting for

consultation of representatives of the four powers and China, but it was again

turned down.

Mr. Bullitt said it was natural that the idea was not favorably received

because one could not rely upon what the Soviet Union might have said. I urged,
 492

however, that it was time to adopt some measures with a view to pressing Japan

to modify her policy. I said the restriction or prohibition of Japanese imports

would be an indication to Japan of the intentions of the Western powers with its

implication that other measures might follow. Such a step would help to

soften the Japanese militarists and strengthen the influence of civilian elements

in favor of an early settlement on a reasonable basis.

Mr. Bullitt said that, so far as the United States was concerned, a boycott

had in fact been enforced. In other words, various steps had been taken to

discourage and reduce the purchase of Japanese goods in the United States.

Thereupon I remarked that I understood the opposition to a boycott was strongest

in the South, amongst the American cotton growers. Mr. Bullitt said, "quite

so," because American cotton--which the Japanese bought heavily-was paid for

not in cash but with Japanese silk, But, he continued, there was always a

feeling that pife Soviet Union would like to push the capitalist countries

into war between themselves while she, by remaining aloof herself, could reap

the benefits from it. He thought that the one country that should help China

most was Soviet Russia, and if the latter actually engaged in military operations

against Japan, that would help to prove to the other powers what her real policy

was. Then there would be no question of their cooperating more decisively in

dealing with Japan, he said.

When I asked whether the opposition in Congress to the proposed

fortification of Guam had any significance for the foreign policy of the

United States, Mr. Bullittt replied that it did not mean very much. It had

never been put forward as a proposal of the Administration. It had simply been

suggested in a plan proposed by the army, and, as there was opposition to it,

President Roosevelt dropped it in order not to hinder the progress of

deliberations in Congress.
This memoir was made possible by grants
from the Ford Foundation and the National
Endowment for the Humanities to Columbia
University for the Fast Asian Institute,

Copyright C 1076. The Trustees of Columbia

University in the City of New York. All
rights reserved. This work may be cited
and brief passages may be quoted as with
any scholarly work, but the memoir may not
be published, nor sold, nor otherwise re­
produced in any form without written ner-
mission from the Fast Asian Institute of
Columbia University, New York, New York 10027.
REMINISCENCES OF WELLINGTON KOO

VOLUME IV MISSION TO FRANCE

(PRELIMINARY DRAFT FORM)

7. The Effect of the Blatant Actions of the Axis

Powers in Europe and the Far East on East-West
Efforts at Cooperation:
Late February-Early April 1939
 493

7. THE EFFECT OF THE BLATANT ACTIONS OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE

AND THE FAR EAST ON EAST-WEST EFFORTS AT COOPERATION

[Following General Franco's defeat of the Republican forces at Barcelona

in late January 1939, the Republican resistance in Spain had quickly lost

its remaining momentum. Then, on February 27, France as well as England recognized

the Franco regime, without any conditions.]

On February 28, at 6 p.m., an incident took place just outside of my Embassy

in Paris [concerning the recent French recognition of Franco's government.]

On February 28, at 6 p.m., I heard cheering outside my office, and soon found out

it was for Franco's representative, appointed to take over the Spanish Embassy

from the representative of the Quai d'Orsay, to whom Pascua y Martinez, Ambassador

of the Spanish Republic, had handed it over at 1:30 p.m. that same day.

The French action showed the direction in which the wind was blowing as

regards the French official attitude toward the Axis powers and the real policy

which France was pursuing in response to the demands of Germany and Italy in

Europe as a whole. It was not so much that the loudly cheering demonstrators

were French as well as Spanish that impressed me, but that the French government

had accorded recognition to the Franco regime [before Madrid of Valencia had

actually surrendered.]

How this act of recognition was viewed by the Americans was clearly indicated

to me by Mr. William Bullitt, the American Ambassador, at a lunch party on March 6.

At this party, Spain was the main topic of conversation, and Mr. Bullitt, who was

also the guest of honor, complained of the embarrassment to the United States

resulting from the French recognition of Franco.

At this same time, when my attention was absorbed by what was taking place

in Europe, in general, and in France in particular, as regards the increasingly

evident orientation of French foreign policy [and its inevitable effect on China's

situation, ] I received a cablegram from the Waichiaopu, which was rather embarrassin

to me. It asked me to go to the Vatican to attend the cornoation of Pope Pius XII

on March 12. The telegram was received on March 9, thereby putting me in

 494

difficulty as regards my work in Paris. The President of the French Republic

had already accepted my invitation to attend and see the exposition of Chinese

paintings by a well-known Chinese painter. Besides the American Ambassador had

asked me to dine with him on the 14th. Therefore, some rapid arrangements were

necessary. I at once called on the Papal Nuncio, and asked him to inform the

Vatican of my going. I also consulted the Political Protocol Department of

the Quai d’Orsay and settled the point concerning the reception of the President

arranging for my Counselor, Mr. Kuo, a Belgium-educated returned student who

spoke French very fluently, to act in my place. I was glad to still have time,

however, to attend what the French called the vernissage or private view of

the painting exhibition in the same afternoon at 5 o'clock. There were journalists

whom I had invited in my name, and therefore I found it necessary to be present.

On the 10th, the following day, I attended the formal vernissage opening

at the Jeu de paume with M. Jean Zay, Minister of Public Education. About 300

guests were present, including, besides the prominent people of the artistic and

intellecuual world, a number of socially and diplomatically prominent people, such

as the Nuncio, the former Minister of Colonies M. Moutet and Mme. Claudel, the

wife of the French Ambassador in Switzerland.

The very same day, at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, I left for Rome by train.

I arrived in Rome the following day and was met by the Chinese Charge d'Affaires

and the whole staff of the Chinese Embassy, as well as by Marquis Vitutti,

the Vatican's official representative to greet me on behalf of the Holy See.

The Chinese Charge d'Affaires in Rome seemed to hold a view of the situation

in Europe that was evidently influenced by Italian propaganda. He told me he

did not think Italy was prepared to make war, or otherwise there would have

been more signs of activity [in preparation] for such an event visible to him.

He also told me that he had learned from Mr. William Phillips, the American

Ambassador in Rome, that in a conversation with Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister
 495

the latter had said that he could guarantee there was no truth in the press

reports that an Italo-German-Japanese military pact was about to be signed, and

that, in any case, Italy would not join it. It seemed to me, however, that

what the Italian Foreign Minister said was more in the nature of throwing dist

in the eyes of third parties to conceal the real situation.

On the morning of the 12th, I was escorted to the Vatican by Marquis

Vitutti along with my suite. The Coronation ceremony was impressive. It began

at 8:30, first on the balcony, then inside St. Peter's Cathedral, where the pope

received the obedience of the Cardinals, and then conducted the Mass. After the

ceremony, from the balcony, the new Pope gave his benediction to a huge crowd

assembled in the square, below. The whole ceremony was not over until 1:30 p.m.

On the same afternoon there was a reception given by Prince Colons,

and a dinner was given in the evening by the Chinese Charge d'Affaires. The

next day there was a reception by the students of the Sacred University in my

honor. I went, as advised, in my official uniform in the company of the Chargd

d'Affaires and my suite, again escorted by the Marquis vitutti. After a

photograph was taken, we were conducted into the great reception hall and one of

the students made an eloquent and complimentary speech, to which I replied in

Chinese and in English.

At noon on the 13th I was received by the new Pope and had a good conversation

with him. His warm heart, evident spiritual force and simple charm impressed me.

The conversation I recorded later in a note I would like to refer to now.

According to my note, I first said it was a great honor for me to have

had the opportunity of representing my country at the coronation ceremony,

and I informed His Holiness that H. E. the President of the Chinese Republic

had charged me to congratulate him personally and to wish him good health and

the prosperity of his high mission in the world. The Pope said he was very

grateful to H. E. the President of China for sending a special mission to

 496

attend his coronation, and he appreciated the fact that China had sent such a

well-known personality. He was also delighted that I with my important work

in Paris, was able to come to Rome.

I said I wished to take the opportunity to express to his Holiness my

appreciation and the gratitude of the Chinese government and people for the

excellent work of relief which the Catholic missions in China had been doing for

the Chinese refugees and the wounded civilians. The Pope remarked that he

was glad to know that the work of the Catholic missions in China had been helpful

and satisfactory. However, he said, they merely fulfilled a duty which charitable

and humanitarian considerations imposed upon them. He expressed the hope that

the sufferings China was now undergoing would soon come to an end, and that she

would be able once more to devote her whole time and energy to the work of

culture and civilization which was admired all over the world.

I said I felt confident that the high influence of his Holiness would be

brought to bear upon the cause of peace and that of justice in the world. His

Holiness said he hated to see that violence rage and that he would certainly do

his best to spread moral and spiritual influence in order that the real superiority

of mankind, as expressed in its culture and civilization, could be emphasized

once more. I observed that the triumph of force would only be temporary and

would never last. As Chinese sages had taught, it was the conquest of the heart

that would count most in the long run. The high standard of culture and

civilization had been built up not by force of arms, but by the cultivation

of the spirit and the development of the intellect, which distinguish the

human race from the lower hordes of the animal kingdom.

His Holiness said the happiness of mankind depended upon the supremacy of

the moral force over violence and disorder. Then seeing me rise to take leave,

he said: "God protect you." When I rose, the pope rang the bell, the door

opened, and the Embassy's staff was introduced to him by Marquis Vitutti.
 497

Immediately afterward, I called on Cardinal Maglione, the new Papal Secretary

of State. I knew him fairly well because he had been my colleague in Paris

as the Papal Nuncio. We had a friendly talk. He expressed great pleasure in

receiving me, already an old colleague of Paris days, as the Chinese Ambassador

on a special mission. He inquired into the situation in China, and said he

was very much interested in it. I told him of the resumption of fighting on

three fronts in China, and that the Chinese were holding their positions well.

In the face of continued aggression, the excellence of the morale of the

Chinese armed forces and people was remarkable, I said, and I was afraid that

the war would be a long one.

The Cardinal expressed the hope that the sufferings to which China was now

subjected would soon end. Then he inquired about the situation in France. I

said that since the end of last September there had been a rapid recovery of

confidence on the part of the nation. The Daladier ministry had been able to

consolidate public opinion and it had made progress in the work of reconstruction

and preparation to meet the disturbing situation in Europe. The Secretary

of State said that he had heard of the possibility that Daladier might be

elected to the presidency in succession to Lebrun, but that he thought that

would deprive France of a very able President of Council.

I said Daladier had done so well that he would surely be elected, if he

was ready to be candidate. But many of his friends were urging him to remain

at the head of the government for the time being at any rate, because if he

were elected to the presidency of the Republic, it would be difficult to find

a successor to him with equal firmness and energy to meet the present situation.

The Secretary of State said he was of the same opinion. He was glad to have

had the opportunity of receiving me and assured me that China would always

find in the Vatican a loyal and true friend, ready to help at any time. I

thanked him [and took my leave].

Earlier in the day I had paid a visit to Mr. William Phillips, the American
 498

Ambassador to Rome. It was 20 years since I had seen him last in Washington. At

that time lie had been Assistant-Secretary of State and we had maintained close

relations, because as Chinese Minister to Washington I saw him frequently

perhaps more often than any other member of the State Department. In

our conversation, Mr. Phillips gave me a very interesting and clear picture

of the international situation in Europe as he saw it at the time.

Referring to the Mediterranean situation, Mr. Phillips said he did not

believe that It ily was prepared for war with France. At present, he said, French

and Italian troops had been massed in Tunis and Lybia and were facing each

other on that frontier. The situation was tense, and any foolish incident

might provoke a conflict. So far as he could see, however, there were no

indications of Italy's plunging into war. He said the Italian people did not

want war and the country was poor. Although petroleum [holdings] had been

built up recently, there was still a lack of such important raw materials

as iron, cotton and copper, which Italy had to import from abroad. With

scarities in these essential raw materials, he felt it was obvious that Italy

could not conduct a war for long.

I asked him about the report that England was playing the role of a mediator

and what his information was. Mr. Phillips said it was not exactly mediation

that Mr. Chamberlain was undertaking. The British Prime Minister was trying

to ease the situation in North Africa by persuading both sides to withdraw part
rPf&'7 situation could be easier and the
of their troops from the frontier soothe

atmosphere better prepared for the opening of negotiations between Italy and

France. He understood that no claims had yet been advanced by Italy. He said the

questions concerning the port of Djibouti, the railway to Addis Ababa and the

Suez Canal could all be easily arranged. The crux of the situation was a

possible Italian claim for free immigration into Tunis. That problem would

meet with opposition from France, because it would mean that in a generation or lM)
 499

Italian subjects would flood the place and outnumber the French population.

(Thus, in a few words, he gave me a very clear picture of the situation as

regards relations between Italy and France in North Africa.)

I told him of the hardening of the French attitude towards Italy, and

Mr. Phillips commented that the Italian attitude towards France was really a

blessing in disguise for the French people. He explained that it served to

strengthen the hands of Daladier and unify the whole nation behind him. He

thought that the pistol pointed at France was what had brought about the

solidarity of the French national spirit, and that, with a reunited front,

France could hope to negotiate with Italy successfully. But so long as that

pistol remained pointed at France, she could not initiate negotiations. Therefore,

the problem at present to try to induce Mussolini to turn that pistol away from

France, and that, he said, was what Chamberlain was attempting to do.

Here in Italy, he continued, the situation was peculiar. It was a one-man

show. France, Great Britain and the United States, in dealing with Italy,

were really dealing with one man. Being a human being, Mussolini was uncertain

and had his moods. Lately he had become sultry and irritated. The situation in

Spain had not developed to his liking. Italy had over 10,000 men killed and

woulded in Spain, and yet had obtained nothing from it. According to Mr.

Phillips, Mussolini was practically surrounded by a clique of four men, namely,

Count Ciano, the Foreign Minister, Alfieri, the Minister for Popular Culture,

Starace, the Secretary-General of the Fascist Party, and Farinacci, the former

Secretary-General of the Party. All the information Mussolini had concerning

the international situation came from these men whose pro-German sympathies

--and this included Count Ciano--made them give him such information as suited

their own purpose. The Italian people were opposed to war and were getting

tired of this clique around Mussolini. For the Duce they still had a great

deal of admiration and liking, but they were dissatisfied with the way the
 500

country’s affairs were controlled by this small group. It was possible,

therefore, that Mussolini might one day suddenly decide to provoke a conflict

with France. Said Mr. Phillips, it all depended upon his mood. (All this

impressed me as a very shrewd analysis of the situation in Rome.)

I asked Mr. Phillips about the relations between Italy and Germany. He

replied that he did not believe that Germany would fight for Italy. Hitler's

whole policy had been to obtain what he wanted by threat of war but not by

actually making war. If Hitler avoided war in the fulfilment of German

ambitions, he certainly was not going to risk war in order that Italy might

benefit by it.

According to Mr. Phillips, relations between Italy and the United States

were not very good. Mussolini was very much irritated over the persistent

attacks in the American press against him personally. Mr. Phillips explained

that in America, Mussolini and Hitler were synonymous, and the people could

not criticise the regime without criticizing the man who represented it. But

Mussolini could not understand it and did not like it. Therefore he was

furious about the United States. In answer to my question about Italian relations

with Moscow. Mr. Phillips said that very recently a trade agreement had been

concluded between the two countries. There was really no direct cause of conflict

between the two.

From the American Embassy I went to see Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister.

I had known him fairly well in China, and found him a considerably stouter man

than before. We had fully an hour's talk that was frank and friendly, although

the views he expressed clearly indicated to me that he was sympathetic to or

favored the Japanese side, while he claimed all the time to be a friend of

China and sympathetic with the Chinese cause. Probably it was true, as he

claimed, that personally and at heart he was more sympathetic with the Chinese,

because he and his wife, the Countess Ciano, had spent so many years in China
 501

in the Italian diplomatic service. A rather unusual fact was that they, of

the whole diplomatic corps in China, knew more Chinese friends and had

established more friendly relations with Chinese of the official as well as of

the social world.

After exchanging amenities and news concerning mutual friends in china

with the Count, I said although I was making a very brief visit to Ron*} I did

not wish to leave the Italian capital, especially on my first visit, without

seeing him and having a chat. I said that I still remembered him as one who,

for many years, had worked hard to promote Sino-Italian relations, and that it

was a regrettable fact that since our last meeting in China many changes had

taken place and the results of his work seemed to have faded away. It waa all

the more regrettable, I said, because these changes had occurred since he

had become the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (This was an indirect

way of telling him that he was partly responsible for the deterioration of

relations between our two countries.)

I told him that if Italy found it necessary to cultivate Japan's friendship

in order to facilitate her policy in Europe, that was of course Italy’s own business

and I did not wish to comment on it. But Italy in justice to China should

not make the desire to cooperate with Japan a reason for antagonizing China .

From time to time, I said, I had noticed statements by Italian political leaders

and articles in the Italian press openly ..ishing Japan would win the war against

China and claiming that China's fate was doomed. I told him all this hurt the

feelings of the feelings of the Chinese people, who still remembered Italy's

friendship and the Count’s own friendliness for China in the past. (I was making

these preliminary remarks in order to lead on to a point where he would have

to unbosom himself, so to sepak, to me as to his real intentions and Italy's rea^^

policy.)

Count Ciano then said that Italy's rapproachement with Japan was entirely for
 502

facilitating the Italian policy in Europe, and that Italy did not wish to oppose^^

China. He said that he considered himself as still a friend of China, and

that, in fact, he had spent several of his most pleasant years in China, which

he considered as his second country. Two of his children were born in China

and he had many good Chinese friends. He had worked hard to promote the friendship

between the two countries, he added, but he wanted to say frankly that China had

been pursuing a mistaken policy vis-S-vis Italy in the matter of sanctions and on

other occasions. (It was natural that he should, first of all, think of Italy,

his own country, and her interests.)

I said, in reply, that China's policy in connection with sanctions implied

no unfriendly feeling towards Italy. She had acted merely to protect her (China's)

own interests in regard to the question of Manchuria and Japanese action in China

in general. Any other country in her place would have done the same thing and

she could not be expected to pursue a different policy tantamount to an abandonment

of her position before the world.

The Count then remarked that this was of course a matter of the past, and he

did not wish to dwell on it. As a good friend of China, however, he would, he said,

urge the Chinese government to ccme to terms with Japan as soon as possible. Japan

was strong and it was futile for China to continue to resist her. He knew that

certain powers had been advising China to go on resisting just as they had so

advised Abyssinia. But they themselves were not really helping China in her

resistance, and only wished to see China make further sacrifices. (These were

remarks which impressed me as reflecting his honest opinion; it was not a sort

of excuse. It was natural for him to harbor these views, since he was an

Italian above all.) He asked: Where was the Negus (Emperor of Abyssinia) now.

The longer China resisted, he said, the worse would be her fate. The only polijj^

for China to follow was cooperation with Japan. When China decided to work together

with Japan, Italy would always be ready to help her; but while she continued her
 503

resistance, Italy was unable to render her any help. That was a very frank

expression of views, and I wanted to reply in kind. I pointed out to him

that the present Sino-Japanese war had been forced upon China. Japan had been the

invader and China, in order to defend her territory and independence, had to

resist. Any other- country in China's place would have done the same thing.

So as a matter of fact, no country had been urging China to go on resisting.

It was her duty and determination to defend herself against Japanese invasion.

The Chinese government and people were ready to talk peace with Japan at any time,

if Japan proposed a reasonable settlement honorable to both parties. But so long

as Japan insisted on dominating China, so long would China continue to resist .

The present Japanese invasion aimed at strangling the life of China, I told him,

and it was perfectly natural for the victim to make a desperate struggle to free

herself .
The Count then said he did not know what Japan's terms would be as he coult^^

not very well ask her about them, but he would like to know what terms would be

found acceptable to China. I said that I could not speak on behalf of my

government, but personally I was certain that the only principle upon which peace

could be discussed was that of respect for China's independence and sovereignty.

Cooperation with Japan must be on an equal footing and for mutual benefit. If

by cooperation Japan meant domination and dictation, China of course could not

accept it. In order to make possible real cooperation, it would be necessary,

I said, for Japan to withdraw all her troops from China.

Count Ciano immediately said he knew that Japan would not withdraw her

troops. That was something she could not do. I said that so long as Japan

was unable to accept that condition, the war would go on. The Count then asked

about Manchuria. I said in reply that it could be discussed, just as Inner

Mongolia could be discussed (in other words, as part of Chinese territory.) He^^

asked then about Peking. I said that the Japanese would have to hand it back to
 504

China. It was one of the centers the restoration of which the Chinese would

continue to fight for.

I went on to say that if Italy, on account of her European policy, desired

to see the Sino-Japanese conflict terminated as soon as possible in order that

Japan might conserve her strength and resorces for other eventualities, then

Italy should not encourage Japan by siding with her against China. I said, as

far as I could see, Italy’s purpose in cultivating Japan's friendship was to

have Japan twist the tail of the lion and keep France in Indochina, in order to

bring pressure to bear on England and France in Europe. If that were so, I told

him, it was not necessary for Italy to encourage Japanese aggression in China.

There were other ways for Japan to exercise her influence upon these two powers

in the Far East.

However, I expressed the belief that any such action on the part of Japan

in the Far East would not have any decisive effect on Europe, that is, the

Powers whose interests might be endangered by Japanese action and Japanese

pressure threatening their colonial possessions in that region would not bother

to divide their forces in order to deal with Japan, if there should be war in

Europe at the same time. The ultimate fate of the British and French interests
(W
yy *
from that part of the world. If Japan, thanks to her solidarity with Italy and

Germany, succeeded in getting hold of the possessions and interests of the

Western democratic powers in the Far East, certainly she was not going to share

them with Italy or Germany.

Fundamentally, I said, there was no basis for mutual beneficial cooperation

between Italy and Japan. Economically, both countries were highly industrialized

and depended upon their exploitation of foreign markets for their manufactured

goods. What Italy needed, Japan could not give. Italian cooperation with Japan

could work only to the benefit of Japan and bring no material help to Italy herself. ».
 505

So Italian-Japanese collaboration was really a [matter of] one-way traffic

favor of Japan.

I went on to say that I understood that the three powers of the anti-

Comintern Pact were about to convert that pact into a military alliance. I

told him that, in view of what I had just said, I did not see how such an

alliance could be of help to either Italy or Germany.

Count Ciano’s reply was rather significant as well as interesting. He

said it was quite true that Japan could not help Italy in Europe, and it was not

expected of her. But in the Far East, what she could do was something more

than twisiting the tail of the lion, or France's feet. Japan was strong,

with her army and navy, and if there should be conflict in Europe, her help

would not be confined to Europe, but could be extended even to Africa.

With Germany and Italy in Europe, Japan would not be attacked in the Far East

by any power, and she would have full freedom of action.

As regards the question of a military alliance, the Count remarked that it

was still premature to speak about it. They might be discussing it in Berlin now

But so far as Italy was concerned, he understood that no alliance had been

concluded. This did not mean that it would be out of the question for the future.

The anti-Comintern axis, with Italy, Germany, Japan, Manchukuo and Hungary as

members, consituted a very powerful group, which no other group could oppose

successfully. He therefore urged China to join it, and asked (rather cynically)

what sort of China would be left after the war to cooperate with Italy.

I told him that China, with her 450 million people, could not be absorbed

by japan. She was continuing her resistance. But Japan, on her part, had already

shown signs.of fatigue. As she found her strength and resources getting exhausted,

the day was bound to come when she would have to call a halt.
 506

The Count said he did not believe that Japan would be exhausted in her ™

war with China. No country, he said, was ever stopped from making war because

of its economic deficiencies. The longer China resisted, the worse would be her

fate, and in the end she would be another Abyssinia.

I told him that China was not Abyssinia, nor was Japan Italy, whose unity

of purpose in the Abyssinian adventure and whose cultural influence were great

assets to her. Japan, on the other hand, was very much divided in her present

policy towards China. The army was divided against itself and could not agree

with the Marines. There was also a difference of opinion between the militarists

and the civilians, the politicians and the diplomats.

The Count said diplomats in Japan counted for nothing. It was the army

which determined policy, and it was resolved to continue the war until China came

to terms with Japan. He agreed that China could not be absorbed, being so much ^

bigger and more populous than Abyssinia. But if after 20 months of war China

had lost all the big cities and ports, including Shanghai, Nanking, Tientsin,

Peking, Hankow and Canton, and her government had removed to Chungking, which

was cut off from the rest of the world and where the people were poor and

the resources limited, then it would only be a question of time for Japan

to clean up the disturbing elements in the rear and reestablish order. He said he

had also heard that General Chiang Kai-shek was no longer able to make his orders

obeyed, that the generals were divided, and that China could get no more supplies

of arms from abroad, being cut off from all communications. Japan, on the other

hand, was already making some places pay part of her expenses, and Manchuria was

growing richer and more prosperous.

I pointed out that the Count's information seemed to have all come from the

Japanese sources, and that what he had just described as the situation in China ^

was contrary to what the facts were. I said that, far from exhausted and

desperate, China was determined to go on with her resistance to Japan, and the
 507

morale of the army and of the population as a whole was excellent. Even while

the war had been going on at the front, economic reconstruction and the development

of means of communication, such as the building of railways and motor roads, had

been proceeding at the same time, (which was perfectly true.) The spirit of

unity had never been so developed, General Chiang, far from being opposed by

any Chinese generals was recognized, worshipped and obeyed as the national

leader. Generals who used to oppose him, such as Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi, Li

Tseng-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi in Kwangsi, had all been col'aborating loyally with

the Generalissimo during these months.

I told him also that I did not know of any place [in occupied China)

where prosperity had returned and which was able to bear part of the expenses ol

the Japanese forces. On the contrary, I said, the Japanese army found it

necessary to bring everything from Japan and Manchuria, including even foodstuf^^

for the Japanese soldiers, because the scorched-earth policy of the Chinese

deprived them of anything that they might have found on the spot. (This was also

true. It was a deliberate policy ordered by the government and welcomed by the

people who had to flee from their native homes in the villages and towns occupied

by the Japanese. Before they left, they were so angry at the invaders that they

destroyed everything so that the enemy could not make use of it.) As to

Manchuria, I told him that only about two months ago there was fighting twenty

kilometers outside of Mukden. The latest spirit of opposition of the Chinese

was stronger than ever.

The inaccuracy of the Count’s information concerning the Far East led me,

toward the end of our talk to refer to the fact that the new Italian Ambassador

in China was loitering in Shanghai and to urge the Count to instruct him to

i nriiBiiiH liinr T~ proceed to Chungking and take up his duties there so he could

inform the Italian government fully and accurately on the situation in China.

I told him that nearly all the great powers of Europe and America had their
 508

Ambassadors in Chungking. It was not conducive, in my opinion, either to the

personal prestige of the Italian Ambassador or to that of Italy as a great power

to have no representative near the Chinese government. The Count said, by

way of rebuttal, that there was an Italian Consulate at Chungking and it could

not be said, therefore, that Italy was not represented. Thereupon, I remarked that

that was not the same thing as having an Ambassador in direct touch with the

Chinese government. I told him I did not see any reason why the new Ambassador

should be allowed to linger in Shanghai and participate in enormous social

functions, instead of carrying out serious duties near the Chinese government,

unless it was done to please the Japanese government.

The Count was visibly moved and, meditated for a moment and said that

China had not recognized the Italian Empire. The Soviet Union and China were

the two countries in the world that had not yet accorded such recognition, he
said, adding that he was not asking for recognition by China and the Soviet Unio^^

because the Italian government no longer attached much importance to that question.

I then told him that the non-recognition, so far as China was concerned, implied

no intention to be unfriendly towards Italy. The question was left outstanding

merely because China had a special position to safeguard vis-3-vis Japan and the

rest of the world. But I told him I felt certain that some satisfactory formula

could be worked out to surmount this difficulty, (without saying what it was).

Then I asked how the Count viewed the immediate future in Europe. Count

Ciano said he was not pessimistic and believed that Italian policy would be

realized. At any rate, he thought the next fewweeks would show more clearly

how the situation in Europe was going to develop. He said the Western democracies

loved to think that Italy was weak, but Italy herself was fully confident of

her own strength. When I referred to the serious development in Slovakia and

the reported mobilization by Hungary of a part of her forces on the Slovakian

frontier, Count Ciano said that Italy had no particular interest in the situation.
 509

and he did not think that it would develop into any grave issue as Germany ^

was not opposed to it.

In order to show that this very frank and unreserved exchange of views

on the part of both of us was not in any way a strained interview, but merely a

free exchange of views between two friends, I should add that, on my taking leave,

the Count assured me that, if his services were needed, he hoped I would not

hesitate to call upon him. He expressed his regret that I was leaving Rome the

same day for France. He assured me that when I visited Rome next time, he

would like to arrange to have me received officially.

[In retrospect, I think] the conversation shows my own view of Japanese and

Chinese capabilities at that time. Count Ciano brought up the point that Japan

was strong, that he had the impression that Japan was having her way in China

and that her economic and military position had improved. I brought up a

number of facts in response, which, I remember, seemed to impress him very much.

I did not feel that the Chinese view or summation of the Japanese position,

as expressed to me, for example, in incoming telegrams from the Chinese Foreign

Minister (though some were for publicity purposes) were strictly propaganda.

The Chinese government was actually well-informed about Japanese capabilities

and developments. We had pipelines from Japan and occupied China and several

government and Party departments concerned with intelligence. There was a

department in the Waichiaopu, under the control of the Director of the division of

information, and also a special bureau in the Generalissimo’s headquarters, headed

by a Chinese who was trained in Japan, had served in the diplomatic service in

Tokyo and who spoke Japanese just like a Japanese. He knew personally many of

the leaders in both the Japanese political world and the military circles. He

was able to establish useful channels of information. And I understood that

he had even several Japanese working for him, under disguise of course.
Vv'-'j rtrrr>*^
I remember that, when I was in Chunking, this man used to stop in^two or
 510

* three times a day to compare notes and discuss the significance of the

information which he had received, so as to get another point of view. He

was more familiavr with Japan and the Far East than X was, and he wanted to

know how such information appeared from the point of view of European and

American people, with which I was more familiar.

Just to illustrate how effectively he was working, we obtained definite

information that the Japanese navy was going to attack Pearl Harbor. We were

also able to inform Washington of the day on which the Japanese navy set out with

secret instructions, although at first Washington did not quite believe it.

It was communicated to Washington about the middle of November.

In the afternoon of the 13th, after my call on Cardinal Maglione, I attended

a reception by the Papal Secretary of State at the beautiful summer residence of

the Pope, about 25 miles from Rome. In the evening, while attending a dinner

given by the Chinese Chargd d'Affaires in my honor, I was handed a cable gram

from Dr. H. H. Rung, asking me to see Mussolini about ordering the new Italian

Ambassador to proceed to Chungking. [Of course, I telegraphed back to say that

I had already raised the subject emphatically, with Count Ciano, the Foreign

Minister. ]

On my return journey to Paris by train the following day, Von Wiegen,

[Karl von Weigand, correspondent for the Rearst newspapers C?], whom I had known

in Paris for some time, came into my compartment. We engaged in a frank personal
V

chat. What he told me appeared very interestj&d. He said Hitler was a mystic,

and always said he would not live to be an old man. He said the talk about

his distraction for women was all rot. Hitler, he said, studied the Hsiin-tzu

ping-fa, the Military Strategy of Hsun-tz^(a Chinese book claimed to have

been writtaiin the third century, B.C.) Hitler had told him (Von Wiegen ) on

one occasion that in diplomacy one should try to surprise one's opponents as

one should in war, and that the best policy was to win without war. (In
Vw f >
other words, pu-chang erh sheng, which is one of the famous precepts of Hsun-tze).
 511

Vcn Wiegen also told me that Germany’s army was still a solid unit, and

its feeling was not at all cordial toward Hitler because of his low birth, poor

education and unconventional methods. He said that st: the time of the Munich

episode, six generals called to urge him to desist, but they were told they

must have formed a defeatist club, by Hitler who, after saying that, left

the room abruptly.

I arrived at Gare de Lyons, the railway station in Paris, at 9:25 in the

morning of the 15th, and saw in the French newspapers proclamations of

independence by Slovakia, supported by Hitler. At 12 noon my counselor and my

secretary both reported to me that the United Press correspondent had just

telephoned--the Germans and entered and occupied Prague.

At 1 p.m. the same day I attended a luncheon by the Academy of Diplomacy.

The conversation at the table centered around the situation in central Europe,

and the fate of the French cabinet. The hostess, Madame Frangulis, wife of the

Secretary-General of the Academy, told me that only four days before Stephan

Osusky, the Czechoslovakian Minister in Paris, has asked her husband to arrange

a seat near the German Ambassador at the next Academy luncheon. This indicated

clearly that the Czechoslovak Minister had known nothing of the impending

development in Prague.

Mr. Osusky was a very talented man. He and I used to exchange views on the

international situation in Europe, particularly on the relations between France

<C*VV

and Czechoslovakia, and Czechoslovakia and Germany. His sympathies were

clearly on the side of the democratic powers and very suspicious of the policy of

Germany toward Czechoslovakia. He and Benes had been ery intimate friends and

collaborators in Czechoslovakia, but later fell out because of a difference of

view. He always felt that Benes was not firm enough in his political views and

was truly disposed to compromise on issues of principle, although I suppose he

hardly suspected that Benes would finally meet such a fate as he actually

sustained as a result of Germany's occupation of Czechoslovakia.

 512

The following morning, on March 16, all the newspapers carried big headlines

announcing the death of Czechoslovakia. Bohemia and Moravia [(the two

provinces remaining to Czechoslovakia after Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine

(Ruthenia) declared their "independence^")] became two provinces of the Great

Germany. Hitler had entered Prague, and was staying in the historic Chateau

that only the day before had been the official residence of the President of

the Czechoslovakian Republic.

The same evening I attended a dinner by Mme. Georges Kohn, the sister

of Henri Rothschild, at her beautiful Paris residence. We chatted; she considered

Hitler a frightful madman. Vacarescu, a Roumanian, said to me that General

Gamelin, the Commander-in-Chief of French forces, was worried most about the

German disarming of the Czechoslovakian army, since France had assured Czechoslovakia

of her security. Gamelin felt that Germany must have already found out all the

French military secrets from the Czechoslovakian military files. He thought this

incident was likely to produce a French Cabinet crisis, but that Daladier

would stick it out, perhaps with Georges Bonnet as Foreign Minister.

Every Frenchman I spoke to at the party said that this German coup at

Prague would either make France more alert and vigilant or further strengthen

Anglo-American-French solidarity. But none of them suggested any positive

action. They all took it for granted that Munich had already sealed the fate of

Czechoslovakia. If France were to react or act now, then the question would

arise: Why Munich? Such was the French attitude of inaction at the time of

Germany's absorption of Czechoslovakia.

Some of the French leaders, particularly those of the Right, felt very mucn

concerned as to French weakness and lack of preparedness to face any sudden war.

As for the people on the Left, they were not so conscious of this. As one of my

French friends told me, the position of the Left was rather illogical. On one

hand, they were opposing the adoption and carrying out of the program of military
 513

preparation for eventualities and were objecting to a large military budget;

on the other hand, they were pressing the government to adopt a strong foreign

policy vis-a-vis the Axis powers.

To put the whole situation in a nutshell, I think the lack of internal unity

in France was, of course, one of the basic factors which led f first to her

inaction and then] to her downfall, when the war did break out. There were people

in important government posts who saw the storm gathering, such as Georges yjandel,

Minister of Colonies, and to some extent even Daladier. However, Daladier

vacillated, at one time leaning toward one viewpoint, and another time turning

around to lean toward the other. During the Munich sett 1ement,for example, lie

went along with Georges Bonnet, although he initally felt Bonnet went too

far in yielding, and did not quite approve it. He was afraid of the reaction at

home and became very nervous when, on his return trip by airplane, he saw a huge

crowd massed at the airfield. He thought he was going to be mobbed. But actually

they were there to extend him a warm welcome for his achievement. This served

to change his mind and his convictions. In other words, there was a lackof strong

leadership in France, which probably explained, in the last analysis, the

debacle which took place after the outbreak of the war. ^Prior to that it

was evidenced in France's foreign policy, which was vacillating and hesitant. j

It was evident for a period of time that France tried very hard to enlist

the support of Italy by making reasonable concessions to her, as regards her

ambitions in the Mediterranean. But France did not go far enough in the eyes of

Italy, and when Italy did press forward her policy of expansion in the Mediterranean

and North Africa, France failed to react strongly.

As regards the question of military preparedness, it was true that France

was ill-prepared in 1936, when German troops marched into the Rhineland, and it

was still true in 1937. But by the middle of 1938, her military preparedness

improved a great deal and that, if Germany should still try to coerce France,
 514

France would react, and this time would not simply bow to Berlin. But again the

hands of the government were tied, not only by lack of unity within the cabinet,

but also, of course, by the lack of political unity in the French Parliament.

The Leftists were raising all sorts of objections to the department of Daladier.

In short, the whole history of France at that period was really depressing

to outside observers and, I suppose, it accounted in the end for her failure to

play an important role in opposing the aggression of the Axis powers.

In the first place, at the time of Munich, when the French used various

agreements and gave various assurances to Czechoslovakia to persuade the latter

to accept loss of face, territory and population, it was merely to get Czecho­

slovakia's consent to the Munich agreement. They never meant seriously that if

later Germany should again whet her appetite and make more claims, that France

(or Britain) would come actually to her support. Even if the French had said

so at the time, they were no longer very particular about honoring their pledges.

The French attitude in March 1939, as expressed in the question: Then why

Munich?, appeared to be very cynical, but it was an objective and rational

attitude, because all along it had been as clear as daylight that once one

gave it to Germany on the Sudetan problem, Germany would not stop there, but

would go a step further and finally swallow up the whole of Czechoslovakia. I

am sure the French statesmen at the time were not ostriches who had buried

their heads in the sand so deeply as not to see that. But Georges Bonnet, ^

the French Foreign Minister, in particular, was very suspicious of Moscow and

Soviet Russia, and very strongly anti-communist. Georges Bonnet always felt

that France's real interests lay in working together, not only with Italy, but

also with Germany in the end for the sake of Europe and to maintain Europe's

position as a great power. It must also be considered that France then was

greatly influenced by the policy of appeasement of Chamberlain. The French were

 515

only too glad to follow the British lead because France was thinking that,in

case the European dreaded crisis should flare up, only Franco-British collaboration

could stop it. France was willing to pay any price almost to secure Great Britain's

cooperation and support on the French side. That was probably another reason

Georges Bonnet had in mind in readily yielding to the German demands at Munich.

As regards France's suspicion of the policy of the Soviet Union and the

latent innate dislike of communism on the part of France, that was entirely in

harmony with the attitude and the policy of Mr. Chamberlain in London. The

British Prime Minister likewise was opposed, at heart, to any kind of collaboration

with the Soviet Union. He did not trust Moscow, and in fact did not wish to enter

into any kind of collaboration with Moscow, because he felt he could not trust

the words of the Soviet leaders.

[Toward the last week of March, Germany, not content with her recent

absorption of whole Czechoslovakia, proceeded to annex the Lithuanian territory

of Memel, as a result of pressure brought to bear on Lithuania. At the same time

Hitler presented stiff demands to Warsaw regarding Danzig and the polish corridor.

By this time, however, the British had begun to balk. Even Mr. Chamberlain

had appeared genuinely indignant about the German seizure of Prague. But of

course it was much too late to give effect to the guarantee of Czechoslovakia's

integrity. The British turned their attention instead to the Polish-flerman problem.

[Before discussing what transpired in Europe as a result of British efforts,

I would like to turn to certain economic-financial developments within China, and

to China's attempts to seek financial aid and support abroad, particularly from

the Western democracies.]

China's economic, financial and fiscal difficulties kept on growing as a

result of Japan's deep penetration into China from the coast. In addition to the

great loss of revenue entailed in the loss of coastal China, where economk:
 516

development had proceeded more rapidly than elsewhere and which contained

the centers of China's international trade, new problems arose because of the

steps taken by the Japanese invaders to control currency and markets in the

provinces Japan was already dominating.

It was evident that Japan was trying, in addition to her military operations

to destroy China's armed forces, to systematically bring economic pressure

on China in order to disrupt her economic and financial systems. Of course

Japan had a double object. Bringing economic and financial pressure to bear upon

China so as to force her to sue for peace was onfiaspect and making as much use as im­

possible of the financial resources she could lay her hands on in the occupied

territories, so as to lighten her own financial burden and help meet part of the

cost of Her military adventure in China, was another. [Then, of course, she

simultaneously desired to eliminate the interests of other foreign countries in

China.

With these objects in view, Japan proceeded in two directions. In the

first place, after setting up puppet regimes both in Nanking and in Peiping,

she adopted a series of decrees with the object of taking control of the revenues

collected by the Maritime Customs. In the second place, she took steps to outlaw

the use of the Chinese national currency in the occupied areas, and to set up

what the Japanese called the Federal Reserve Bank and issued puppet note's to

replace the Chinese national currency. The two directions of attack were

closely related because the new Japanese currency was tied to the Customs revenue,

which had previously secured the foreign debt service.

In order to meet the Japanese measures detrimental to [the utilization

and flow of] China's financial and economic resources, China was obliged to

take counter measures. With reference to the indemnity and foreign debt

service, [the government had to reconsider its policy of maintaining payment.]

The suspension of foreign debt payment was a complicated question. China had

done her best to maintain the debt service, ever since the outbreak of the
 517

Lukouchiao Incident and the commencement of the Sino-Japanese conflict. In spite

of the severe strain on her economy and finances caused by the necessity of

resisting Japanese aggression, China had thus far been able, with great difficulty

of course, to keep up that debt service, which included not only payment of the

coupons and the amortization of the principals of foreign dap«rs, contracted, but

also the Boxer indemnity payments. But the Japanese had invaded and occupied

practically all the provinces along the coast of China and it was upon the

collection of customs duties in these provinces that China had depended most

for revenue to enable her to take care of her foreign debt obligations. The

Japanese, in addition, had closed the normal revenue-producing agencies and

rfu. t<
detained the revenue, and in the case of the collections by Am&Eaba&n customs,

had adopted special measures to appropriate the funds thus collected. [Moreover,

Japanese occupation of the major ports along the coast and interruption of the

flow of Chinese exports curtailed China's ability to earn foreign exchange for

debt payments in foreign currencies. The dwindling reserves of foreign exchange

were badly needed elsewhere: to support the Chinese currency and to purchase war

materials . ]

The government was finally obliged to declare a partial moratorium.

The nature and purpose of this measure was explained in a telegram from Dr.

H. H. Kung, Minister of Finance, dated January 15, 1939. It contained a

statement released simultaneously in Chungking:

For Over a year the Japanese authorities, despite their assurances,

have been detaining all the revenues pledged for debt service that have
been collected in the areas under their military occupation, except for a
single remittance from the Shanghai Customs last June. In order to make
up the amount that should have been remitted from those areas, the Chinese
Government has advanced about $175 million. The Central Bank of China,
moreover, has provided all the foreign exchange required, although the
Japanese have been interfering with the Chinese currency and forcing the
acceptance of several forms of yen, military and puppet notes, a measure
which had reduced collections in legally valid currency on which the
obligations of the government are secured.

Notwithstanding all difficulties the Chinese Government has provided

for the service of China's debt, thereby demonstrating the utmost consideration
 518

for the holders of its obligations.

Under existing conditions the Chinese Government very reluctantly has

been forced to the conclusion that this situation has become too anomalous
to be continued. The Government therefore has been obliged to reject the
Inspector-General of Customs’ request for a further advance. As from this
date, however, the Government is prepared to set aside in special accounts
in the Central Bank of China a share of long term debt service, proportionate
to the collections in the areas not subject to Japanese interference,
the revenues pledged to all such debts outstanding before the hostilities.
It is hoped that remittance of the share attributable to the pledged
revenues from the areas under Japanese military occupation may similarly
be forthcoming, and that interference with Chinese currency will cease so
that service of these debts may be duly effected. This measure is a temporary
arrangement in view of present abnormal conditions.

The following day I received a telegram from the Waichiaopu, informing

that the Ministry had dispatche$/,a note on January 15^ to the British, ^
me
/
American and French Embassies, etc., together with the said announcement on the

service of Chinese government debts. In that note, the Chinese government regretted

that the action taken was found necessary, but expressed its belief that the

governments concerned could appreciate that it had been caused by events for

which China was not responsible. The Chinese government also expressed its

appreciation of the sympathetic interest shown during the present difficult period,

and its hope that the governments concerned would continue their efforts to

rectify the situation on a basis consistent with existing treaties and agreements

and with the mutual interests of China and friendly nations.

As to the Japanese effort to drive out the Chinese national currency notes

from the occupied areas, the Japanese authorities adopted a plan which, according

to a telegram from Dr. Kung of February 2, briefly consisted of the following

measures: The Japanese proposed to establish a new bank, a central bank

with a capital of $100 million to be directed by a Japanese called Kodama,

and to issue currency notes and fix the exchange rate at eight pence for one

dollar. [(This was the Federal Reserve Bank| its currency was Federal Reserve

Notes.)] The Japanese would support these notes by using exchange acquired from
the market, amounting perhaps to 3 million pounds, and from Customs collections,

in the hope that the new notes would drive out the Chinese currency effectively.

The new curirency would not be tied to the Japanese yen, because the initial goal

was to try to promote public confidence in the new note.

Dr. Kung's telegram went on to say that Japanese control of financial

transactions in the occupied territories would result in closing their door to

trade and commerce, to the great detriment of the foreign interests. He

therefore asked the embassies abroad, including the one in France, to urge the

foreign government concerned to do their utmost to prevent the carrying out of

such measures. More specifically he asked that the friendly governments oppose

the proposed scheme, and in particular, that the foreign banks and businessmen

be urged by their governments to refuse to accept such currency. In addition,

Dr. Kung had received information to the effect that the foreign banks in
<* t'
Tient-sin had already indicated their willingness to accept the Federal Reserve
A
currency in place of the Chinese national currency. Therefore, he asked me to

ask the other ambassadors to approach the respective governments concerned

to do everything possible to prevent such action and to help maintain the position

of the legal Chinese currency.

[After receiving this telegram,] I sent my counselor, Mr. Kuo, to see

M. Chauvel, the Assistant-Director for Asia at the Quai d'Orsay. On February 16,

when I called on M. Chauvel myself in regard to the Japanese occupation of

Hainan, I referred to his talk with Mr. Kuo relating to the decree of the

Japanese-sponsored regime in Peiping prohibiting the use of the Chinese

national currency and replacing it with the notes of the so-called federal

Reserve Bank.

M. Chauvel told me that the French government had already taken the matter

up with the British government in London, but had not yet received a reply. He

felt the matter was a rather difficult one. The foreign interests could uphold
 520

the Chinese national currency in the foreign concessions in Tientsin and in the

Legation Quarter, but such areas were very limited. He pointed out these places

were surrounded by areas under the Japanese control, and their foodstuffs had

to be bought outside, where the Chinese national currency would be refused. I

observed, however, that if the foreign banks all agreed to refuse to accept the

new notes, their joint attitude might have a deterrent effect on the Peiping

regime in carrying out the promulgation decree.

M. Chauvel told me that he had already consulted the Bank de I'Indo-Chine

and been told that the difficulties in the way were so many that it would be

practically impossible to hold out very long against the new notes. Besides, the

British banks in Tientsin had already started accepting the new notes. If the

Chinese government had some concrete plan to prevent the carrying out of the decree

in North China, he would be glad to cooperate, he said. But he had received, in

* ' » ('rU-it *(ft

the morning, a report to the effect that the Peiping regime had issued another
A
decree ordering that all new commercial contracts should be made in the new

currency and that all old contracts signed before February 10 should be converted

into the new currency. If the foreign banks, for example, refused to obey the

new decrees, the matter would be referred to the local courts which would have

to uphold the decrees. This, he said, illustrated further the difficulties in

the way of preventing the execution of the new decrees. (It was certainly a

very complicated situation and it also showed how determined and thorough the

Japanese were in strengthening their hold upon North China.)

[The next time I saw M. Chauvel, at the beginning of March, I happened to ask

him about the situation in Tientsin concerning the French and British Concessions.

He replied that the object of the Japanese action was to force the Concession

authorities to accept the use of the new Federal Reserve money ordered by

the Peiping regime. He added that, as he had told me on my previous visit, the

question of resisting the circulation of the money would be rather difficult

 521

because the necessity of purchasing foodstuffs, for example, in the areas outside

the Concessions would force the people living in the Concessions to use the

new money for such purposes in any way. He said he had recently inquired of

London as to the British attitude on the question, and he was not able to obtain

a reply, indicating perhaps that the British were not very much enthusiastic

about doing anything to stop the circulation of the new money. He again assured

me however that on his part he would be glad to study any concrete measures to

prevent the circulation of the new money, if the Chinese government had any

suggestion to make, and that, meanwhile, he would again try to obtain the views

of the British government.

A telegram from the Chinese Embassy in London, dated February 24, contained

a Reuters report of February 23 from Peiping. Reuters stated that according to the

Japanese, firstly, the North China Customs authorities would refuse export permits

from March 10 onwards, unless exporters produced certificates showing [that foreign
( Cl M < r t: . I ' ^3
exchange [to cover the] export had already been sold to the Federal Reserve Bank.

Secondly, a decree would be issued shortly calling for all foreign currency collecte

by the customs authorities to be deposited in the Yokohama Species Bank. It also

stated that the Japanese adviser to the Federal Reserve Bank had announced that

although the said bank had already accumulated considerable reserves and was

accumulating more, further measures would definitely be needed to balance foreign

exchange transactions, and that, therefore, the bank would buy and sell exchange

at one shilling-two pence in due course. And since foreign exchange requirements

for economic development in the occupied areas would be considerable, the credit

obtained from imports would have to be further restricted.

[A telegram from] Dr. Kung therefore asked the Embassy to make representations

to the appropriate government department in Paris, and to point out that such

reports indicated clearly the Japanese intension to impose foreign exchange control,

to make the customs a party to the Japanese scheme to undermine the Chinese
 522

financial structure and to exclude other than Japanese interests from economic

activities in China. The Embassy was asked to urge the French government as

well as other governments to resist the suspensions whichvould be highly injurious

to foreign interests.

Dr. Wang Ch'ung-hui, the Chinese Foreign Minister, in his broadcast speech

made on March 8, stated, among other things, that the Japanese exponents of the

"new order" had made clear their utter disrespect for human intelligence and

presumed that Japan would win in the end, whereas the actual facts pointed to

the impossibility of Japan’s winning her war of aggression against China.

He went on to clarify the implications of the recent Japanese economic

measures on foreign interests in China. In the hope of achieving her objectives,

he said, Japan had announced the setting up of a new order in Asia. Among other

things, the new order required a puppet regime to rule China, which puppet regime

would surrender all resources to the Japanese, in order to: a) facilitate their

war for the further expansion of the Japanese empire; b) to bring about recognition

by third powers of Japan's supremacy in Asia; c) to bring about acceptance of the

principle of the Closed Door, instead of the Open Door, through which foreign

trade could filter into China only with Tokyo's permission.

As regards the effects of the new Japanese currency regulations in North

China on foreign trade in particular, the head of the Shanghai General Chamber

of Commerce stated them clearly in his annual report, which dealt especially

with Japanese discrimination against the interests of the foreign powers. The

report, contained in a telegram from Chungking of March 23, said that large

quantities of Japanese merchandise imported into North and South China had given

rise to many complaints from a number of third party powers. Many restrictions

were imposed upon trade and other spheres of commercial and financial activity

that were entirely unnecessary and could retard iramesurably rehabilitation

work and resumption of normal conditions in the areas where actual hostilities
 523

had ceased. The same [things] were taking place in provinces remote from the

majority of the treaty ports.

It also said that the restrictions enforced by the Japanese authorities had

resulted in the stagnation of all forms of trade as far as third party pWers

were concerned, and if this were true of Shanghai and districts south of the

Yangtze Valley, where no currency controls had as yet been exercised by the

Japanese authorities, it required little imagination to understand the position

of Tsingtao and other ports in North China, where trade was subjected to the
ft I- 1 <-•' fu f
control of the Federal Reserve Bank.
\
The report went on to say that Hankow had been completely isolated and

that, unless the Yangtze River was reopened to trade, the trade of Shanghai must

continue to be negligible. It also referred to the discriminations against

foreign shipping, and the deteriorating position of the foreign-financed railway,

such as the Shanghai-Nanking and the Tientsin-Pukow Railways, financed with foreign

capital. Certain of the railways, with the help of Japanese equipment, were

doing satisfactory business, it said, but these railways had already been built

by third party powers and financed by foreign loans, which still remained

outstanding. Yet they were being operated by the Japanese without any payment

whatsoever to the shareholders to take care of the bond service.

On March 24, the Minister of Finance, Dr. Kung, addressed a telegram to the

embassies of the countries affected by China's partial moratorium, outlining the

moratorium scheme and, in an introduction, explaining the attitude and intentions

of the Chinese government [in view of developments since its announcement of

January 15 on the same subject. ]

The Chinese government had been much concerned to continue the debt service,

it stated, despite unprecedented difficulties, and it was only with the greatest

reluctance that it announced on January 15 that it could no longer provide ful1

service to take care of the obligations based upon the customs revenue. Now, in
 524

view of the Japanese interference with the salt revenue, the government was

obliged to apply similar measures with respect to the debts secured on the

salt revenue. The Salt Administration had been provisionally instructed to this

effect and asked to set aside, in special accounts in the Central Bank, an

appropriate share for the services of salt loans. This measure would be formally

announced shortly.

The introduction went on to say that the Chinese government did not wish

the situation resulting from these measures to continue without effort being

expended to arrive at a reasonable arrangement to maintain the debt service

so far as practicable. Having regard for the abnormal conditions obtaining in

the country and to the vital necessity of prosecuting the war and preserving

financial and economic stability, the Chinese government, therefore, had initiated

negotiations with the representatives of the creditors in respect of the customs

and salt-secured loans.

The statement, which followed, then explained that the present debt

situation was due solely to the war. It said that, prior to 1937, China was

making great financial and economic progress. Adequate revenues were being

developed, financial administration was being improved and the currency stabilized.

The old debts had mostly been settled and the balancing of the national budget

was within reach. Railways, roads and air communications were being improved

and extended, and new industries were being developed. But the Japanese aggression

had destroyed overnight the promise of a new era of economic progress and

development. Not withstanding the disparity of the resources and equipment

available to her as compared to her enemy, China had waged a one-sided war much

longer than expected, and until recently had been left to fight almost unaided,

an exception being the valuable aid resulting from the American purchase of

Chinese silver. China had no heavy industry and her export trade had been
 525

crippled. Hence, most essential imports had been paid for by cash. The Japanese

war of invasion had gravely disrupted China^ economy, and it was a matter for

wonder that during recent months financial organizations had not broken down.

The statement said that despite all this, the government had made every

effort to maintain the value of her currency and her credit abroad. Her obligations

abroad in foreign currencies had been maintained for fully 18 months after the

outbreak of the war. Now the government had reluctantly decided to seek the

cooperation of the foreign bondholders. Therefore, it proposed that it has

decided for the next 12 months in respect of the customs and salt-secured loans

held by the public, to pay one coupon on loans receiving full interest and to pay

half annual interest on loans under settlements providing for less than full

interest.

The statement pointed out that the foreign bondholders, as a matter of fact,

had received more than would normally be expected under the circumstances of the

past twenty months of war. The present proposal would only be a temporary

arrangement, and it was intended to resume full service at the earliest possible

moment. It said that similar proposals were being made to the appropriate

creditors’ representatives in the other countries . It also said that, to

avoid delay, the government was putting forward at the outset the maximum of

what it could do to continue taking care of China's foreign obligations, and

that it was not putting it forward for bargaining purposes. It stated that half

of the annual interest on these loans was about U.S.$ 4,700,000 and roughly

equivalent to the secured revenue in the unoccupied area, which, namely, would

amount toU.S.$ 5,100,000. This amount represented about 20 percent of the

total customs collection and about 35 percent of the salt revenue, a collection

which was still available. It added that the Chinese government did not wish to

relate this proposal to the share of the salt revenue collected, because it was

unwilling to imply any possible derrogation of her sovereign rights in the

 526

occupied areas .

I was asked by Dr. Kung to take the matter up with the French government,

as my colleagues in London and elsewhere were being requested to do with the

governments to which they were accredited. [Accordingly, when I called on the

Secretary-General of the Foreign Office, M. L6ger, on March 29. I raised the

matter with him personally.

First I referred to the suspension in January of the debt service guaranteed

by the Customs, and said that the Chinese government was now obliged to also take

some action as regards foreign debts secured on the Salt Gabelle. Then I empha­

sized the earnest efforts and the success attending the government's efforts

to maintain these two services in the past 20 months of war. If the services

were now suspended, I explained, the suspension was really due to the strenuous

circumstances caused by the war. It was, however, intended to be a temporary

measure.

At the same time, I said, my government was prepared to do its utmost to

maintain a partial service for these debts in order to prove her absolute good

faith vis-a-vis the holders of the Chinese bonds abroad, and it therefore wished

to make an offer in that sense. I expressed the hope that the French government

would view it favorably, especially in the light of China's efforts and

successes in maintaining fully the debt services up till the present. Then, as

I had already prepared a memorandum based upon the instructions I had received,

I handed it over to M. L6ger and asked him to consider it in the spirit in which

the offer was made. M. Ldger glanced over the memorandum and said that the

French government had already shown on several economic and military questions

its sympathy and friendly desire to help. He assured me that it would consider

the present question in the same spirit.

Then, on April 1, another telegram from Dr. Kung asked me to make further

representations to the following effect: Tha^ the Chinese government particularly

regretted that circumstances forced it to apply the measure announced on January

 527

15 with reference to the payment of the indemnity of 1901 and with reference

to foreign loans. Thistelegram of April 1 also asked me to request the foreign

government concerned to agree to a temporary deferrment of the indemnity payments

during hostilities, excepting payments that might be made on the 1928 loan, floated

in Belgium, under such arrangements as might be concluded in respect thereof. The

telegram stated that the American, Belgian, British and Netherlands governments

were likewise being approached concerning the deferrment of the indemnity payments

and that in London a committee of creditors and bondholders was formed to represent

British interests in the matter.

A telegram dated April 21 from Dr. Kung contained explanations as to how the

partial moratorium was to be carried into effect and to what extent the existing

loan and debt obligations would be taken care of. After reiterating that the

government was determined to meet unpaid service as soon as conditions would

permit, it explained that for the present the Japanese were detaining and

interfering with pledged customs and slat revenue in occupied areas, which

together with interference with the national currency, was responsible for the

suspension of loan payments and the temporary inability to pay more than 50 percent

of the interest. It said the Chinese government therefore hoped that the friendly

foreign governments could prevail upon the Japanese to allow utilization oj debt

service on pledged revenues collected in the occupied area. The telegram continues;

The Chinese government proposes the following temporary plan in respect

of the unpaid service;(a) The Chinese government is to issue non-interest
bearing treasury bills for the total amount of unpaid service on loans
covered by the proposal. The treasury bills are to be considered as interim
payment and not as creating obligations with regard to additional coupons
unpaid, (b) The treasury bills are to be replaced by cash in proportion to
the difference, if any, between payments in foreign exchange to bondholders
and the share from areas not subject to Japanese interference. (c) The
treasury bills are also to be replaced by cash derived from the occupied
areas. It would be understood that creditor governments, in pressing the
Japanese to allow utilization for loan service or revenue derived from
occupied areas, would avoid any action, such as acceptance of puppet ^
treasury bills, that might imply any question as to the maintance of China s
sovereign right or the recognition of bogus regimes. (d) The treasury hills
and cash, if any, could be entrusted to the Inspector-General of Customs
 528

and the Associate Director-General of Salt as joint trustees and would be

locked up in vaults under their joint controls. (e) No payment of foreign
exchange could be made directly or indirectly from the trust fund without
the consent of the Chinese government. (f) The treasury bills and cash
would be paid on the basis of the open market rate of exchange, and adjusted
from time to time.

The Chinese government earnestly hopes that an early agreement on the

basis of the previous proposal with the above explanations.

In other words, China had until then remained faithful to her obligations,

contracted either under the protocol of 1901 or under the various agreements

with foreign banks and other foreign creditors, and the Chinese government had

exerted itself to maintain the full debt service, even after the outbreak of the

Lukouchiao Incident in September, 1937. Now it felt itself unable to do so

because of continuing Japanese interference with the collection of customs revenue,

the Japanese order that such revenue be deposited in a Japanese Yokohama Species

Bank, the setting up of the so-called Federal Reserve Bank in North China to

issue puppet notes to replace the Chinese national currency notes. Finally the

Japanese had also been detaining the salt revenue collected in the occupied area,

which like the customs had been pledged as security for a number of foreign loans.

With a temporary loss of these revenues, due to the interference of the Japanese

military authorities, China's ability to maintain fully her indemnity and loan

service, naturally, had been seriously affected. Therefore she proposed a

temporary arrangement to take care of her obligations, partially based upon the

amount of revenue which she continue to collect outside the occupied areas, with

the promise that as and when the revenue that was seized by the Japanese in the

occupied area was released, it would, in the same proportion, increase its cash

payment on the indemnity and loan services due the foreign creditors. As were my

colleagues in London and elsewhere, I was asked by my government to take the

matter up with the government to which I was assigned.

[In the meantime, the Chinese government had met with a certain amount of

success in its search for financial assistance from the West. During the previous
 529

year,] Dr. Kung's representative and my financial counselor, Dr. P. W. Kuo,

had been negotiating, under the immediate direction of Mr. Quo Tai-chi in London,

with the Board of Trade of the British Treasury for British financial assistance,

and for the implementation of a scheme of assistance through the agency of a

newly-formed company named the Industrial Facilities, Ltd. Actually, it was

a French idea that any substantial financial aid to China should take the form of

a corporate enterprise between French and British financial quarters. But the

negotiations were largely carried on in London with the British, with French

participation. The original idea was that the company would buy raw materials

abroad and furnish machinery and parts to China to build such things as lorries,

trucks, jeeps and other industrial products. Much progress was made, especially

since the fall of 1938.

[More recently] negotiations had taken place in Chungking between Chang Kia-

ngau, Minister of Communications, and the French and British groups as represented

in Chungking [concerning a railway project to be undertaken by the newly-formed

corporation. (The proposed railway was to connect Chengtu in Szechuan with

Yunnan and with the principle north (northeast-south)rai1 line of Burma.) On

February 17, 1939, I received M. Andre Bussy, Director of the Bank Franco-

Chinoise. His purpose was to report to me on these negotiations in China. His

resum6 of three meetings, which had taken place between January 13 and January

17, 1939 corresponded generally to the report contained in Chang Kia-ngau's

letter tome. Essentially, the questions discussed concerned the financial needs,

the total amount required, the nature of the securities offered and demanded,

and so on.

M. Bussy said the total sum of 9 million pounds demanded by the Chinese

Ministry of Coirmunications could serve as a basis for consideration. He said,

generally speaking, the French and the British were to take up the enterprise on a
 530

50-50 basis, but the actual allocation between the French and the British and the

percentages of what needed to be spent in China and abroad would depend upon

several factors. In some parts of Yunnan and Szechwan Provinces, it would be

cheaper to engage Chinese engineers, who would be quite capable of doing the

necessary work. In other parts, requiring a great deal of tunneling and bridging

and therefore the hiring of highly-specialized experts, it would be necessary to

engage European engineers, who naturally required bigger salaries.

As regards material to be furnished, M. Bussy said that France was usually

recognized as the most experienced in bridge engineering and so bridge material

had best be procured in France, as well as bridge building engineers. He added

that Messrs. Francois and Davidson (the two gentlemen who had represented their

respective groups in Chungking) were about to send their reports to Paris aid

London. Upon receiving a report, the French would go over to London and study

the matter jointly with the British, and work out a program based upon the

technical report of the work and material required.

As regards financing, M. Bussy said the Ministry of Finance in Paris had

been approached, but no reply had yet been received. (Here I must explain that

the financial credit to be furnished by the French financial institution would be

given only on the guarantee of the French government. That was why the question

of the guarantee of the French Ministry of Finance was brought in and the

Ministry was approached.] M. Bussy aid that the Ministry of Finance had given his

representative to understand that the French government was already heavily

engaged vis-S-vis China, and that there had been some default in respect to the

Chinese Treasury promissory notes. Thereupon, I told M. Bussy that as far as

I knew, there had really been no default in payment of the Treasury notes. In one

or two cases, while the money had already arrived, it had been held up by the

French agents of the factories in France, pending the issuance of a permit to

export the material ordered.

M. Bussy said he did not look upon the present attitude of the Ministry of
 531

Finance as hopeless. In the past, they had encountered greater difficulties

and in the end overcome them all. Confidentially, he said that the representative

sent to the Ministry of Finance was of the view that it would be desirable not to

ask the Ministry of Finance for the whole amount of guarantee, but, as a

beginning, for only a small part of it. Bussy added that, as a matter of fact, it

was not necessary to obtain a guarantee for the whole amount at first . He

explained that as the work of construction proceeded, the larger parts of the

line could be open to traffic as they were completed, and they would begin to

bring in revenue. Moreover, as the construction progressed, new areas could be

opened up and material otherwise inaccessible could be obtained locally. All this,

he said, would help to lighten the burden of financing the enterprise.

Besides, continued M. Bussy, it would be easier to arrange with the Ministry

of Finance [for payment] by installments rather than by a global sum at the start,

as the recently declared moratorium on the foreign debt service had already

produced an unfortunate impression at the French Ministry of Finance. But, as a

matter of fact, the Ministry of Finance had already been told that the 1898 loan

had already been taken care of and that the next coupon had already been provided

for. As regards the 1925 Gold Loan, Bussy stated that the next coupon would not

fall due until July 1. He expressed the hope that negotiations which were then

taking place in London would result in an arrangement being made before that date.

I told him that it was also my opinion that the negotiations going on in London

would certainly result in some settlement to the satisfaction of the parties

concerned.

Early the following month, the British publically announced that they would

cooperate with the Chinese government in establishing a stabilization fund for

the Chinese currency. After more than a year's negotiation and appeal and the

submission of a series of proposals, the British government had finally decided

to lend China financial support to the extent of 5 million pounds for the express
 532

purpose of stabilizing the Chinese currency. The stabilization scheme itself

was to be undertaken with the cooperation of the British. As a result, a commission

had been formed in Chungking with a British representative on it; and later, when

the United States government likewise agreed to extend financial credit to China

for this purpose, the Commission was joined by an American representative. This

was conveyed to me in a Waichiaopu telegram of March 9, 1939, which also informed

that the decision of the British government would be announced by the Prime Minister

in London the same day. It also asked me to approach the French government with a

view to getting similar French assistance.

That concrete act of financial support from Great Britain was more than

welcome to the Chinese government. Dr. Kung, the Minister of Finance, on March 10,

held a press conference, in which he expressed great gratification at the credit

extended by the British government to the scheme for stabilization of the Chinese

currency, as announced in London the day before. Dr. Kung said that this credit

was a helpful addition to the facilities China had provided for continued

maintenance of the stability of the Chinese currency. He regarded this act of

British assistance as further evidence of Great Britain's interest in China's

financial and economic situation, and as an act of farsighted statesmanship, which

was clearly in the mutual interest of both countries. He said that it was deeply

appreciated by the Chinese government and people.

In the same telegram to the Embassy reporting the press conference, the China

Times was quoted as saying that the British loan was further evidence of the fact

that the third powers now considered the time had definitely passed for empty

protests to Japan, and that their legitimate interests in China could only be

protected by means of active support to China. The Times pointed out further that

the British decision was finally arrived at after prolonged and mature consideration,

and that it showed that Great Britain finally realized the impossibility of

reasoning with Japan except in terms of firm action. The paper therefore
 533

expressed its hope that democratic states would enter into effective cooperation

to check the Japanese aggression.

The same telegram, I might add, also indicated how Japanese military action

in China was extending further westward from Hankow in the Han River Valley. It

said that I-chang on the Yangtze River, practically on the border of Szechwan

Province, had been completely reduced to ruins as a result of four Japanese air

raids in the last three days. It stated that the civilian casualties were

exceedingly heavy, estimated to be about 3,000 and that American Church Mission,

the Scottish Missionary School and a number of foreign residences were also hit

and damaged.

[In accordance with] the desire of the Chinese government that France should

also participate in the currency stabilization scheme, the French government was

duly approached, but first in a semi-official way. This was to avoid embarassment,

lest the French government might find it necessary to turn down the Chinese proposal

from the very outset.

M. Denys, representative of the China Finance Corporation, accompanied

by Mr. Li Yii-ying, came to report to me on April 1, 1939, what their semi-official

discussions with the French authorities had so far achieved. The two gentlemen

had already called on M. Chauvel, the Director of the Asiatic Department of the

Quai d'Orsay, with a view to sounding out the attitude of the French Foreign

Ministry on the question of French participation in the proposed currency

stabilization loan. M. Chauvel, they reported, first expressed dissatisfaction

at the fact that the matter had not been brought to the attention of the Quai

d'Orsay earlier, because he had learned that the French Ministry of Finance had

already been approached by the Chinese side. As regards the question of French

participation, M. Chauvel said that was a question of arrangement with the French

banks. With regard to the technical administration of the fund, so far as he

himself was concerned, he was in favor of it in principle. But he pointed out

 534

that the question also involved considerations of a political character, which

could be decided only by the Foreign Minister and the French government. M. Denys

said that he had explained to M. Chauvel why the Quai d'Orsay had not been

approached. When M. Chauvel understood the point, he remarked that in that case

it would be more advisable for the Chinese Embassy to postpone making an official

demarche at the Quai d'Orsay until the French government was in a position to give

a favorable reply. He agreed that it would be rather awkward for the Chinese

Ambassador to make a request now and receive a negative answer.

Continuing to report M. Denys said that Mr. Rogers from London, representing

the English banks, had seen M. Paul Reynaud, the French Minister of Finance, and

sounded him out on the possibility of French participation in a Chinese currency

stabilization loan. At the time of their conversation, the British government

had not yet taken a final decision on the question and, therefore, Mr. Rogers'

talk was couched in more hypothetical terms. On the question of the control and

operation of the loan, however, Mr. Rogers had given M. Reynaud to understand that

it would be preferable for the French not to participate in it, but only to

contribute to the fund. When M. Li called on M. Reynaud later, after receiving

a telegram from Mr. T. V. Soong, he found M. Reynaud under the impression that the

British did not desire any French participation in the fund. That was a mistaken

impression and M. Li pointed out to the French Finance Minister that the British

definitely desired French contribution to the fund, but emphasized the desirability

of having as few people involved and as simple a method as possible in cperating

the fund.

According to M. Denys, the French banks were dissatisfied because they had

had not been previously consulted by the Chinese, nor had he himself spoken to

them. M. Denys explained that Mr. Rogers had asked him not to speak to the

French banks at that time (all this was very delicate,) probably because he (Rogers)
 535

wanted to first come to an understanding with the French government on the

question of control. But it turned out to be impossible to keep the French banks

in the dark. When the Quai d'Orsay received a letter from the Finance Ministry

suggesting participation in the proposed Chinese currency stabilization loan,

the former (i.e. the Quai d'Orsay) at once convoked the bankers and asked for

their opinion. M. Denys said at that point he went to the Quai d'Orsay for a

discussion with the bankers since they knew about it anyway.

As regards the sum of French contribution, I told the two visitors that I

had intimated that it ought to be around one million pounds. M. Li, however,

had asked two million pounds for China, and urged M. Denys on his part not to

suggest any reduction. But M. Denys thought that one million pounds would

probably be the best the French could do, in view of the financial stresses

and urgent calls on the French Treasury as a result of the European situation,

the necessity of partial mobilization and the bills for the purchase of armaments

and raw materials. M. Denys had, in fact, understood from Mr. Rogers that what

Rogers desired most was not so much a large amount, but a symbol of French

solidarity with the British in aiding China.

Two things were clearly involved, one, contribution to the fund, and two,

participation in its control. I, therefore, asked whether the present difficulty

was not that of French participation in the control of the fund. I explained to

my visitors that I had been asked by our Ambassador in London, Quo Tai-chi, to

approach the Quai d'Orsay, because the British had just suggested to him (Quo)

that the time was now ripe for official representation in Paris. In other words,

the British thought that the Chinese Embassy in Paris should now approach the

French government officially, asking for French participation in the fund. At

the same time, I said, I had also received a telegram from the Waichiaopu asking

me to do the same thing. However, as I also told them, before I had the

opportunity to call on the Quai d'Orsay, Ambassador Quo in London sent me another
 536

letter suggesting that I put off this demarche until the British had had an

opportunity to come to an understanding with the French. Since there were a

number of conflicting suggestions^ I wanted to know what M. Denys understood

the situation to be.

M. Denys said that Mr. Quo, in writing to me the second time, must have been

inspired by Mr. Rogers, who had been waiting to hear from the French. M. Denys

thought that, in so far as the question of principle was concerned, there was

every liklihood of the French agreeing to join in the fund (i.e. to make a

contribution) . But on the question of participation in the control and administrati*

of It, he could understand why Mr. Rogers should be jealous of it. Technically,

he said, such control required absolute secrecy, and the fewer the people taking

part in, the easier it would be to carry out the scheme. Rogers himself had been

operating in the area of control of the exchange market for the banks in the past

years and practically had full power in controlling the exchange. It was therefore

understandable that Mr. Rogers would not like to now share this control with others.

Moreover, M. Denys explained, Mr. Roger's position as man in control of the

exchange had no juridical basis. It had been built up more through his connection

with important personalities in the Chinese government and in the British financial

world, like Sir Norman Anguil of the Bank of England and Sir F. Leith-Ross of the

British Treasury. In the present case, M. Denys said, Rogers could not claim

to be officially representing the Chinese government in France, nor was he

representing the French government.

M. Denys thought, however, that the French banks might not insist upon

sharing the control of the fund. Anyhow, he thought a formula could be worked out

(to get around French opposition for not being allowed to participate in control of

the fund). In such a formula, he said, Mr. Rogers would be designated by the

French as their representative, in as much as he was the representative of the

 537

British banks, and he would therefore report to the French as he would report

to the British. In any case, M. Denys said, the question of control had better

be left out until the question of principle had been settled. If the question

of control was raised before the principle was agreed to by the French, then it

would be difficult for the latter to approve it altogether, (which was a perfectly

sound observation) .

M. Denys said he had accordingly reported to Mr. Rogers and told him that it

would be impossible to have the French agree to contribute to the fund and at

the same time renounce participation in its operations, and that it was therefore

better to leave out the question of operation and control until the principle

of contribution had been agreed to. In that case, M. Denys added, a practical

arrangement could be negotiated between the French banks and Mr. Rogers on

behalf of the British banks. Mr. Rogers, according to M. Denys, had accepted

his suggestion.

I told him that I had heard indirectly that the French were under the

impression that the British, in granting a five million pound currency stabilization

loan to China, had received certain special considerations of an economic character.

This, however, I said, was not true, M. Denys said the French must have been

referring to an agency to sell wolfram for China abroad. The questions were not

tied to each other, but there was some connection. Thereupon, Li Yii-ying explained

that at the time the question of financing the proposed Chengtu-Yiinnan-Burma

railway was raised, the French had asked for a grant of mineral rights along the

railway and also for the right to represent the Chinese government in the sale of

wolfram abroad. M. Gustave Moutet had been asked by the French banks to go to

China to negotiate for an agency to sell wolfram, and he had even gone so far as

to have bought his passage to China. But when M. Georges Bonnet vetoed the idea

of having France finance the railway, the French banks asked M. Moutet to cancel

his trip, indicating perfectly clearly that France had refused to finance the