Document Numbers

Document dates

January 1-29: The Continuing Search for Peace and Preparations for
the Enemy's Winter-Spring Offensive
1 through 31

Jan 1-29, 1968

January 30-February 8: The Tet Offensive

32 through 49

Jan 30-Feb 3, 1968

50 through 62

Feb 3-8, 1968

February 9-28: Westmoreland's Augmentation

63 through 70

Feb 9-12, 1968

71 through 85

Feb 12-24, 1968

86 through 94

Feb 26-29, 1968

March 1-15: Policy Reassessment and the "A to Z" Review

95 through 107

Mar 1-6, 1968

108 through 131

Mar 6-15, 1968

March 16-31: De-esclation and the March 31 Speech

132 through 148

Mar 16-21, 1968

149 through 169

Mar 22-31, 1968

April 1-May 3: Discussions on the Site for Talks

170 through 193

Apr 1-11, 1968

194 through 221

Apr 13-May 3, 1968

May 4-31: Opening of the Peace Negotiations and the May Offensive
222 through 239

May 4-21, 1968

240 through 257

May 20-31, 1968

June 1-July 15: Soviet Involvement and Possible North Vietnamese

Restraint
258 through 277

Jun 3-20, 1968

278 through 298

Jun21-Jul 15, 1968

July 16-August 31: The Lull in Fighting, the U.S.-South Vietnamese

Conference at Honolulu, and the Third Enemy Offensive
299 through 318

July 16-31, 1968

319 through 345

Aug 1-31, 1968

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968

Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 1-31

January 1-29: The Continuing Search for Peace and Preparations for the
Enemy's Winter-Spring Offensive
1. Editorial Note
On January 1, 1968, Radio Hanoi broadcast an official North Vietnamese statement made by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy
Trinh during a reception for a visiting delegation from Mongolia on December 29, 1967, in Hanoi. Trinh's remarks seemed
to refine earlier official remarks and categorically affirmed the single condition under which his government would enter into
discussions on peace in Vietnam. The key part of Trinh's statement reads:
"If the American government really wants conversations, as clearly stated in our declaration of January 28, 1967, it must
first unconditionally cease bombing and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. After the
cessation of bombing and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the DRV will start
conversations with the United States on relevant problems."
For the full text of the statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pages 1055-1057. The
operative term used in Trinh's statement was that talks "will" follow a halt rather than "could," as mentioned in previous
proclamations. On January 3 Mai Van Bo, the North Vietnamese representative in Paris, told French Foreign Minister
Etienne Manac'h that the statement was the "direct answer to President Johnson." In addition, he elaborated that "we will
guarantee that the conversations will be explicit (claires) and serious." (Telegram 8741 from Paris, January 7; National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/RAMS)
The statement was perceived by the United States, however, as neither innovative nor radically different from past
intransigence on Hanoi's part. In a news conference on January 4, Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated that the "use of
the word 'will' instead of 'could' or 'would' seems to be a new formulation of that particular point, but that leaves a great
many questions still open." He suspected the sincerity of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in light of the fact that the
North Vietnamese ordered an offensive for the winter season and already violated the holiday truces. For Rusk's remarks,
see Department of State Bulletin, January 22, 1968, pages 116-124.
South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu stated that he "saw no real change" in the North Vietnamese Foreign
Minister's formulation for peace. (Telegram 14927 from Saigon, January 3; National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-VIET S) The Consulate in Hong Kong, the primary U.S. post for "China-watching,"
described the Trinh statement as "a flat contradiction" of China's position on Vietnam and thus a reflection of the policy
differences between the North Vietnamese and the Chinese. (Telegram 3774 from Hong Kong, January 3; ibid., POL 27
VIET S) According to an Intelligence Note from Thomas Hughes, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to
Secretary of State Rusk, January 12, Hanoi responded harshly to the tepid U.S. response; the North Vietnamese accused
the United States of distorting Trinh's statement, putting forward "arrogant" and "insolent" conditions for a halt, and
continuing the escalation of the war. (Ibid.)

2. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, January 3, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis.
Drafted by Goldberg and approved in S/S on January 6.
SUBJECT
Viet-Nam and the Security Council--Part 6 of 7
PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Goldberg and Ambassador Dobrynin
In mid-December Ambassador Dobrynin approached me at a large social function and indicated a strong desire for a

private meeting with me at an early date. After checking with the Secretary and with his concurrence, I arranged a
luncheon in the Secretary's private dining room for the Ambassador and myself on January 3, 1968. My talk with
Ambassador Dobrynin covered a wide variety of topics, and our discussion of two and one-half hours is briefly summarized
as follows:
We then talked briefly about Viet Nam and the Security Council./2/ I told him that our final decision had not been made but
then asked whether in light of the recent statements out of Hanoi the Soviet position about UN involvement had changed in
any way. Dobrynin replied that insofar as he was aware their position remained the same against UN involvement and then
frankly in response to a question from me stated that their position would, as in the past, be determined by Hanoi's attitude.
He added that it had been their view for some time that the NLF position was not necessarily the same as Hanoi's and
expressed the private opinion that it would be highly useful to explore possibilities through the NLF. I then asked for his
reaction to the recent statement of Foreign Minister Trinh of North Vietnam./3/ He disclaimed any official information about
the statement but added that it was not surprising since Hanoi had stated the same position to Kosygin last February. He
added that Kosygin had communicated this to us at the time./4/ I inquired whether in light of Trinh's statement, the Soviets
as a co-chairman of the Geneva Conference would feel at great liberty to join with the British in reconvening the
conference. He replied that the bombing still stood in the way. He then asked as to the meaning of the President's San
Antonio statement/5/ and I replied that I thought the statement spoke for itself and that I had tried at the UN to express the
same concept when I said that negotiations or discussions could only take place under circumstances which would not
disadvantage either side. He then asked whether the words meaningful or fruitful negotiations were not conditions and I
said rather than being conditions they were a simple statement that negotiations would have to be good faith negotiations.
/2/For the debate over whether to introduce the issue of Vietnam in the UN Security Council, see Foreign Relations, 19641968, vol. V, Documents 421 ff.
/3/See Document 1.
/4/Reference is to talks Kosygin held with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson in February 1967; see Foreign Relations,
1964-1968, vol. V, Documents 39 ff.
/5/The President's San Antonio address of September 26, 1967, established a formula for a bombing halt, provided the halt
was followed by "prompt and productive" discussions with the North Vietnamese who would not take advantage militarily of
the cessation. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 995-999. See also Foreign Relations,
1964-1968, vol. V, Document 340.

3. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

Washington, January 3, 1968, 2:55 p.m..
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and
McNamara, January 3, 1968, 2:55 p.m., Tape F68.01, Side A, PNO 2. No classification marking. This transcript was
prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. Johnson called McNamara from his ranch in Texas,
where he remained until January 13. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
President: Bob?
McNamara: Yes, Mr. President?
President: Dean just called me and says that he thinks there's some re-strikes scheduled that could be misinterpreted
because of Sihanouk and because of the Romanians./2/ It looks like every time we get to where we can get in with the
weather, why something happens, and I guess the weather is not too good anyway, but-/2/See Document 5 and footnote 4, Document 14.
McNamara: Mr. President, I can't quite hear you.
President: I say, Dean just called me and said that there were some re-strikes scheduled in the Hanoi area and because of
the Sihanouk thing and because of the Romanian thing that he questioned the wisdom of our going in. I asked Buzz
[Wheeler] what was scheduled. He said that there was nothing important except the two bridges and they didn't need to be

hit for the next day or two. I wanted to get your judgment on what you thought about it. Dean Rusk suggested I call you./3/
/3/Rusk called the President at 2:38 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of this conversation has
been found. Johnson then called Wheeler at 2:47 p.m. He informed Wheeler that Rusk told him that strikes, including the
re-strikes, which he believed did not involve any especially significant targets, should be prohibited in the area around
Hanoi for a few days due to the situation in Cambodia and the involvement of the Romanians in the peace process.
Wheeler replied that the re-strikes on two bridges in Hanoi were important and that McNamara had told him that he was
not keen on Rusk's proposal. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson
and Wheeler, Tape F68.01, Side A, PNO 1)
McNamara: There are a total of 11 targets authorized for re-strike in the 5-mile area, and 3 other targets that have not yet
been struck but are authorized for strike, and therefore 14 targets authorized on which action would be deferred by Dean's
proposal. I talked to Buzz about it. It was my view, and I think he shared it as he evidently expressed to you, that deferral
of strikes in that 5-mile circle for a period of days would not be serious. The weather's been bad, we haven't been hitting
them regularly anyhow, so I would support Dean's view, although I must also say that I don't think the political gain of these
deferrals is very great either.
President: I don't think we get any gain but we might get some damage just from propaganda-wise, and they always like to
use this as a standard operating excuse.
McNamara: Well, you probably know that two Los Angeles Times reporters are writing a book on this theme and that
sways my judgment as much as anything, the exact point that you just made. And their book could be very damaging and
it would be worse if we went in there in a slam-bang strike when the weather was good and gave any basis for Hanoi or
Cambodia or the Romanians for criticizing us. So I supported Dean's view and I told him to tell that to you.
President: Well, then, let's just tell them, and you tell him that I've talked to you, I wanted to get all the information before I
did, and you tell him and tell Buzz for me, let's hold it off for 2 or 3 days and we'll talk about it a couple of days from now.
McNamara: It might be helpful, in the orders that go out to the field, if we could put a date on it, subject of course to later
change.
President: I'd tell them 2 or 3 days.
McNamara: Just 2 or 3--it would probably be better if I gave them a date, such as today, the 3d. Would the 6th be
appropriate?
President: Yeah, that's all right.
McNamara: Tentatively the 3d through the 6th.
President: That's all right. Of course, if Sihanouk told us to go to hell in the morning, and the Romanians, whatever came of
that, but I guess that's all right.
McNamara: All right, we'll bring it up to you again.
President: Why don't you just--yeah. That's all right. Or why don't you just tell them not to strike until further notice and that
you expect that there will be at least a 72-hour deferral.
McNamara: That's better.
President: We anticipate a 72-hour deferral. Do not strike within 5 miles of Hanoi until further word.
McNamara: That's good.
President: And then we can give them notice and do it and it doesn't look too bad for the record with other folks.
McNamara: Yes, very good. I'll do that, Mr. President.

President: Any other news?

McNamara: No, sir. I talked to Charlie Schultze/4/ today about the problem of a no tax bill and the expenditure reductions,
and you had talked to him after you had talked to me, and he and I discussed how we'd go about it on the Defense and
non-Defense side and he and I are in accord that we're going to try to get $3 billion of expenditure reduction out of Defense
and $3 billion out of non-Defense. I've being working with my comptroller here, I haven't told anyone else in the
Department, but I would hope by Saturday to have a list of the kinds of actions we'd have to take to get that $3 billion
expenditure reduction.
/4/Director of the Office of Management and Budget Charles L. Schultze.
President: Good. Well, let me know when you're done. I'll be seeing you. You call me now.
McNamara: I'll do it right away.

4. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, January 4, 1968, 0510Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 3J-Bombing Mistakes. Secret; Sensitive; Literally
Eyes Only. This telegram was received at the LBJ Ranch Communications Center at 1:05 a.m. on January 4. The notation
"ps" on the telegram indicates that the President saw it. The President stayed at the Ranch from December 26, 1967,
through January 13, 1968.
CAP 80092. 1. Jim Jones has asked me for comment on the Westinghouse interview with Bo in Paris./2/ It must, of course,
be combined with the Trinh formula presented at the Outer Mongolian banquet/3/ and combined with other evidence as
well.
/2/In a January 3 interview with Bernard Redmont, a correspondent for the Westinghouse Broadcasting Corporation, Bo
reportedly had "confirmed more clearly than ever that Hanoi is willing to open peace talks at once if the bombing and all
other acts of war against North Vietnam are halted." See The New York Times, January 4, 1968.
/3/See Document 1.
2. I shall, therefore, divide this report into three parts:
--analysis of Bo and Trinh statements;
--other evidence and analysis of it;
--conclusions and recommendations.
I. Trinh and Bo
3. On the face of it the Trinh and Bo statements meet all but one of the criteria--more or less--built into the San Antonio
formula:
--"prompt". The Westinghouse broadcast, for the first time, says "Hanoi is willing to open peace talks at once if the
bombing etc., are halted."
--"productive". In both the Westinghouse and the Trinh statements Hanoi paraphrases productive as "conversations on
problems interesting the two parties." In line with the Buttercup formula,/4/ the Westinghouse interview sharply
distinguishes those problems between the U.S. and the North (U.S. operations against North Vietnam plus anything
reciprocal they would do with the South) from those matters appropriate to the NLF and Saigon in the South.
/4/See Document 6.

--"assuming". There is no word in public at all, in either the Trinh or the Westinghouse statements, responding to your
"assumption" that Hanoi would not "take advantage" of a bombing pause.
4. This is clearly the greatest gap between Hanoi's apparent present position and San Antonio formula; that is they do not
address themselves at all to the DMZ problem.
5. Now look at these formulae from Hanoi's previous point of view:
--They have dropped "could" for "will"; they have dropped "permanently," leaving only "unconditionally" which could be as
much to our advantage as theirs, because it leaves us freedom of action to resume bombing if in our judgement they do
not meet our "assumption."
6. In short, Hanoi, so far as the public record is concerned, has left us in the position of having some kind of response to all
the elements in the San Antonio formula except reciprocal restraint at the DMZ; since we can continue to bomb in Laos
along the Ho Chi Minh Trail even during a pause.
II. Other Evidence
7. It is certain that these moves by Hanoi are, at least part--and perhaps wholly--an effort to exert increased political and
psychological pressure on you to stop bombing the North. I say this for two reasons:
--We know for certain that various Eastern European friends of Hanoi have been urging them for some time to present a
better face to the world by being "more flexible."
--If they were one hundred percent serious about ending the war they would have used a secret channel to us, not the
public prints, to shift their position and find accommodation with the San Antonio formula.
8. Having said this, I must also say that I think we must keep our minds open to the possibility that they have decided it is
more in their interest to end the war before the November 1968 election than after the election.
9. For at least a year we have known the object of their military operations was not victory in the field in Vietnam but
political victory in the United States. We have generally believed they're holding out until November 1968 in the hope that
American political life would produce a Mendes-France who would accept defeat as the French did in 1954. But they may
have decided now that a pre-election Johnson will give them a better deal than a post-election Johnson or a NixonRockefeller-Reagan with four years to go.
10. Whether this transition in their thoughts has--or has not--taken place, the following are facts with which we must
reckon:
--They have told the Viet Cong cadres all over South Vietnam that the purpose of the winter-spring offensive is to yield as
soon as a coalition government which the NLF will dominate: they are now promising their long suffering cadres peace;
and this is an important hostage to fortune.
--The new NLF program shifts the NLF from being "the sole legitimate representative of the South Vietnamese people" to
being a participant in a coalition government.
--There is Buttercup, the most persuasive of all the approaches we have thus far had.
--In at least one South Vietnamese province (Long An) the Viet Cong province leader is promising peace by Tet to his
people.
--The Russians have been denouncing Mao as having turned Asia over to the United States to organize by frightening the
peoples of Southeast Asia with "Hitlerite" domination (Soviet speeches on this theme sound very much like our own
speeches about the emergence of the new Asia).
--Hanoi has begun to spread the concept of a neutralized Southeast Asia--not dominated by any other major power; and
Hanoi is also beginning to establish ties to France, Singapore, and elsewhere looking, apparently, to its postwar
development.

--A Rumanian envoy is coming here on January 5th with a message from Hanoi;/5/ and we are returning Buttercup/2 to
meet Buttercup/1 the same day.
/5/See Document 5.
III. Conclusions and Recommendations
11. Keep our powder dry: unless proved to the contrary we must plow ahead with our present plans in both South Vietnam
and with respect to the bombing of the North. We are engaged in a test of nerve and will in which we are being measured
every day. We should not draw back from our present dispositions and operations unless we have reasons of substance to
do so.
12. We must accept that we are being subjected, at the minimum, to a major Hanoi psychological warfare offensive to get
us to stop bombing in order to permit them more cheaply to prolong the war in the South.
13. We should make no move on the Trinh-Westinghouse formula until we hear out the Rumanian envoy on January 5th6th. Then we must make clear to the envoy and to Hanoi that the San Antonio formula is rock-bottom. You meant every
word that you said about the San Antonio formula in your TV interview.
14. But if the Rumanian message is reasonably forthcoming, we will face a very tough problem:
--should you have a bombing pause and talks "at once" even if you do not have prior assurance on the "assumption" of "no
taking advantage";
--or, should you first negotiate and insist on the assumption of reciprocal action from either side.
15. This is a matter of which, of course, you must judge in the light of all the evidence at the time. We have not heard the
Rumanian yet. I would, however, make this observation: if there is any chance for peace, it is because they want it before
1968. Therefore, we should, if we get a reasonably forthcoming response from the Rumanians, take it slowly and carefully
despite the pressures that are already building at home and abroad. To make it precise, I think we should send the
Rumanians back to check out the "assumption" before we actually stop bombing--assuming that they confirm at a formal
diplomatic level the Trinh and Westinghouse statements.
16. Finally, we must watch sensitively the Buttercup channel and other indicators of the possibility of a Southern
negotiation. Both the Westinghouse broadcast and Buttercup have, as I noted initially, made the same sharp distinction:
--between a Southern negotiation to settle the political shape of South Vietnam;
--and a U.S.-Hanoi negotiation to stop the bombing (with NVN reciprocal action) and thus set the stage for the
reinstallation of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962--to which the Westinghouse interview refers explicitly.
17. In short, Mr. President, I am beginning to believe my judgement at the time of Ho's letter to you a year ago/6/ could be
wrong. I then said that peace was beyond our grasp until after the November 1968 election. I am now beginning to open
my mind to the possibility that Hanoi may have decided that time is no longer its friend--either on the battle fields of
Vietnam or the battle fields of U.S. politics. But, I repeat, a part of what we see is certainly not diplomacy but political
pressure against us.
/6/For Ho Chi Minh's February 1967 letter to President Johnson, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Document 82.
18. On both counts, therefore, we must be prepared to respond actively to what we hear from the Rumanians on January
5-6 and to what emerges from Buttercup. At a certain point you may wish to cease the initiative. Instead of
counterpunching you may wish to hold their feet to the fire on both the San Antonio formula and your five points on TV. If
you wish this scenario pursued I can continue; but that's enough for tonight.

5. Record of Meeting/1/
Washington, January 5, 1968.

/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson,
Subject Files, M-Man. Secret; Nodis; Packers. Typed at the top of the page is the notation: "Dean--At Walt's request I
prepared this memo to go to the Ranch. It's inadequate but best I could do briefly on four hours talk. Ben has sent it over to
Walt. Averell." In telegram CAP 80115 to the President, January 5, Rostow suggested Vance, Clifford, Bundy, Taylor, or
Lodge as the negotiator if Packers was successful in producing a halt and subsequent talks. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Vietnam, PACKERS (II) continued)
Following are the highlights of this morning's meeting between Governor Harriman and the Romanian First Deputy Foreign
Minister, Macovescu, lasting over two hours followed by lunch:
1. As a result of their conversations with Governor Harriman in Bucharest,/2/ President Ceausescu and Prime Minister
Maurer sent Macovescu to Hanoi. Macovescu was in Hanoi for four days in mid-December and had a number of meetings
with Vietnamese officials, including one long one with Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and two with Foreign Minister Trinh.
/2/For an account of the meetings of November 28-29, 1967, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Document 411. In
a January 2, 1968, meeting, Bogdan told Bundy and Davidson that Macovescu and his staff would arrive on January 5 and
would be prepared to stay "as many days as necessary to have all contacts and to fulfill his mission." Bogdan added that
he thought Macovescu "had something" of importance as a result of his meetings in Hanoi. (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/PACKERS)
2. After extended discussion, Macovescu was told in writing with verbal explanations that:
(a) Hanoi will undertake talks with U.S. at any mutually agreeable place, after bombardment of North Vietnam has
unconditionally ceased. However, no interval of time before the meeting was specified. Demand for permanent cessation
of bombardment was definitely dropped.
(b) At the talks Hanoi would put forward its four points and the NLF program as basis for settlement. However, Hanoi
understands the United States to have a different position and is prepared to engage in serious discussions.
(c) There was no mention of the NLF being present at the talks, nor limitation of subjects to be covered.
In addition, Macovescu explained in detail to North Vietnamese the meaning of the assumption of "no advantage" to be
taken of the cessation of bombardment--namely, no increase in the flow of men and supplies to the South or attack across
the DMZ. However, Hanoi characterized the "no advantage" formula as a condition and maintained an unwillingness to
indicate its position. Macovescu clearly understands the adverse effect of a breakdown in negotiations if Hanoi were to
take advantage of the cessation of bombardment and is certain he explained it fully to North Vietnamese.
Macovescu stopped in Peking on his return and reported to Chinese Foreign Office official Romanian and U.S. positions
but not Hanoi's. At first, Chinese appeared to oppose negotiations but at end stated it was a question for Hanoi to decide.
Macovescu is under instructions for Ceausescu and Maurer to see the President before his return.
Harriman was impressed by Macovescu's meticulous care in clarity of his statements and answers to his questions in order
to avoid any possible misunderstanding on our part of Hanoi's position. It seems clear that Trinh's statement of December
28 resulted from Macovescu's visit.
A fuller memcon/3/ is being prepared which the Secretary of State will bring with him on Sunday./4/ In the meantime, he is
seeing Macovescu at 11:00 Saturday morning./5/
/3/Dated January 5. (Ibid.)
/4/January 7.
/5/In the meeting the next day, Macovescu told Rusk and Harriman: "The leaders of my government, President Ceausescu
and Prime Minister Maurer, believe that at present there is a minimal set of conditions required to start conversations with
the government in Hanoi. We believe that it is in your interest (and here I emphasize that we have no intention of
interfering in your internal affairs), the interest of Hanoi and the interest of world peace that a gesture be made towards
peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam." (Memorandum of conversation, January 6; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/PACKERS)

6. Editorial Note
The contacts between the United States and the National Liberation Front (NLF) known as Buttercup began in the fall of
1967 and continued through early 1968. The immediate objective of the Buttercup operation was to secure the exchange
of prisoners; both parties also viewed it as a possible means for generating a dialogue on political issues. For
documentation on the operation in 1967, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume V, Documents 341 ff. On January 5,
1968, the intermediary Truong Binh Tong and Mai Thi Vang, the wife of NLF Central Committee member Tran Bach Dang,
were released from South Vietnamese custody in order to return to the headquarters of the NLF, the Central Office for
South Vietnam (COSVN). Arriving at COSVN on January 10, Tong met with Dang's secretary, Anh Ba, who, in addition to
questioning him about the American reaction to the original letter Tong had transmitted, which called for an exchange of
political views in addition to a prisoner release, directed him to return with a new offer. (Telegram CAS 6841 from Saigon,
January 10; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-7 VIET
S/BUTTERCUP)
Ten days later, Tong arrived in Saigon with a message proposing that the GVN release four prisoners named on a list
passed to the United States the previous October in exchange for the release of two American and two South Vietnamese
prisoners. (Telegram CAS 7321 from Saigon, January 23; ibid.) This proposal followed a January 8 release by the NLF in
Binh Thuan of 14 South Vietnamese officers, 2 of whom were on the exchange list, a move that Secretary of State Rusk
termed "somewhat implausible in terms of the promptness of the action and the belatedness of the word to us establishing
the connection." (CAS telegram from Rusk to Bunker, February 3; Central Intelligence Agency, DO/EA Files: Job 7800058R, C/VNO File, BUTTERCUP, Vol. III-1 February 1968) On January 23 the NLF did release the two American
enlisted men in Quang Tin Province and two additional South Vietnamese soldiers in Can Tho Province.
Carrying a reply from the United States, on January 26 Tong left for Viet Cong headquarters in the NLF Military Region IV
in order to make contact with COSVN by radio. The points listed in the reply sent with Tong included: "(a) clarification of
proposed prisoner release by NLF; (b) more formalized and efficient prisoner exchange arrangements in the future; (c)
NLF agreement to using the radio channel or alternatively face to face meetings by representatives from both sides
designated to discuss prisoner exchange matters; and (d) selection of different, more efficient and less dangerous routes
for travel" by Tong on future trips. (Telegrams CAS 297 and 298 from Saigon, January 26; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-7 VIET S/BUTTERCUP)
On January 27 North Vietnam announced that it would release three American pilots; they returned to the United States on
February 17. In light of this development, the administration became very eager to move forward on Buttercup, and
suggested that the Embassy engineer a reciprocal release of GVN-held Viet Cong prisoners even without waiting for
Tong's return. (Telegram CAS 70173 to Saigon, January 27; ibid.)
Tong arrived back in Saigon on January 29. The message he carried from Dang was disappointing, since it did not
address the points made by the United States in its message sent through Tong and instead called for a continuation of
the same procedures for the second part of the exchange. (Telegram CAS 353 from Saigon, January 29; ibid.) Difficulties
were encountered in persuading the GVN to agree to the release of NLF prisoners, two of whom were killed during Tet.
Working through Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, however, the Embassy convinced the GVN to agree to the release of
three of the VC prisoners, only one of whom had been on Tong's January list. (Telegram CAS 591 from Saigon, February
12; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Buttercup Vol. II, and telegrams from Bunker to Rostow,
Rusk, Helms, and McNamara; CAS 730, February 20; and CAS 768, February 22; Central Intelligence Agency, DO/EA
Files: Job 78-00058R, C/VNO File, Buttercup, Vol. III-1 February 1968)
On February 22 Tong returned to COSVN with the Viet Cong prisoners released by the GVN as well as with instructions to
inform Dang that political discussions were still under consideration by the United States. Despite initial U.S. optimism
relating to this channel, no further response was received from Tong, and both sides began to back away from this contact.
(Telegram CAS 896 from Bunker to Rostow, Rusk, McNamara, and Helms, February 27; telegrams from Bunker to
Rostow, Rusk, Clifford, and Helms; CAS 148, April 24; and CAS 654, September 11; ibid.) In a memorandum to Deputy
Executive Secretary John Walsh, May 26, Fred Greene, Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and
the Pacific in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, observed: "It does not seem likely, therefore, that the Front was
prepared, had covert political contacts eventuated, to give very much on its own position; rather such contacts might have
seemed worthwhile in and of themselves as advancing the Front's claim to formal status as the negotiating partner with the
U.S. with regard to ending the war in the South." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1967-69, POL 27-7 VIET S/BUTTERCUP)
The channel remained moribund until January 16, 1969, when an NLF operative identifying herself as "Madame Jeanne"
telephoned the Embassy in Saigon on the same extension given to Tong and identified herself as his associate. The GVN,
however, immediately raised considerable resistance to pursuing this channel. (Memorandum from Helms to Secretary of

State William P. Rogers, January 27, 1969; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI (Helms)
Chrono, Jan.-Jun. 1969)

7. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Leonhart) to the President's Special Assistant
(Rostow)/1/
Washington, January 6, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 6G(1)a 12/67-1/68, Talks with Hanoi. Secret. A
notation on the memorandum indicates that Rostow saw it.
1. Herewith rough cuts at:
Stabilizing GVN/RVNAF
Political/Psychological Actions Against the VC
2. My main search has been for measures which will (a) increase GVN willingness to move in phase with us and (b)
minimize our dependence on their assumption of new administrative burdens. Locke's talk with Thieu yesterday
abundantly illustrates the point./2/
/2/As reported in telegram 15140 from Saigon, January 5. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1967-69, POL US-VIET S) A follow-up conversation with Thieu was reported by Locke in telegram 15269 from
Saigon, January 7. (Ibid.)
3. On scenario reflections, the problem of the number of governments with which we may wish to be in early touch will
deserve very careful treatment. "Effective international guarantors", a revised supervisory commission, or new international
inspection force may all be involved. And in addition to whatever claims the 1954 Geneva Nine or the 1962 Geneva
Fourteen may have--there are at least the special situations of Japan and Indonesia.
Bill

Attachment 1
STABILIZING THE GVN AND RVNAF FOR AND
DURING NEGOTIATIONS
1. Political. The prime question is agreement on the nature and composition of the political system we seek in Vietnam.
This issue cuts across the negotiations process, SVN cooperation, the requirements of US public opinion. We must be
clear about the design we have in mind and get it right. From it, we can work back to initial negotiating positions--fallbacks-irreducibles--troop dispositions--interim security arrangements--aid strategy--regional development plans.
a. The non-negotiable negatives: No coalition in advance of elections; no partition of SVN; no freeze-in-place during
negotiations.
b. The basics: constitutional order; one-man/one-vote elections; GVN freedom of movement in SVN; "open skies" over
NVN; undiminished GVN control of the armed forces and security establishment.
c. Maneuver areas: (1) present GVN Constitution with representatives in an expanded Assembly elected from where
balloting has not yet taken place--(2) new National Elections under the present Constitution and a revised election law
(primaries and a runoff)--(3) revised Constitution by a new Constituent Assembly followed by new national elections. Each
has advantages--the third would provide the longest stretch out for strengthening the GVN and deferring US troop
withdrawals.

2. Bilateral Arrangements. Once agreement is reached with the GVN "inner group" on the political framework, we will need
general understandings on post-settlement bilateral arrangements. These should include:
--post-settlement MAP and military support costs
--US adviser forces (engineers, technical service elements, instructors, etc.)
--transfer and stand-by maintenance of military installations
--national and regional economic development plans.
3. "Effective International Guarantees"--as stipulated at Manila./3/ We will need to define at an early stage with the GVN
who will be the guarantors and what the case of intervention.
/3/Regarding the discussion of Vietnam at the Manila conference of October 1966, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol.
IV, Document 284.
4. Negotiating Process. Invite and assure GVN participation from the beginning. Consider Military Advisers Group (in
Saigon) from Troop Contributor Countries.
5. Specific Actions
a. Intensify Pacification--deploying a substantial share of US forces against provincial guerrillas; expanding combined
operations; moving at least one US division to the Delta; increasing air reconnaissance and Market Time operations.
b. Accelerate Anti-Infrastructure Campaign--expanding detention programs and facilities, and emphasizing PRU operations
(increased pressure against the infrastructure is probably indispensable to greater effectiveness of Chieu Hoi and National
Reconciliation appeals).
c. Shift AID Program Emphasis to support of elected village institutions--accelerating movement of civilian supplies to the
countryside, expediting indemnity payments for war damage, energizing land reform, improved rice cultivation, local
education and health programs.
d. Grant Wage and Pay Increases--for GVN and RVNAF, justified in any event (real wages having declined in the
government sector 50 percent since 1964).
e. Organize Civil Constabulary--activate program for combining elements of RF/PF/CIDG/PRU/PFF into a single rural
constabulary under civil auspices and not subject to demobilization arrangements.
f. Assist GVN Information Services--expanding radio and TV operations and rural programs.
g. Increase Support to National Political Building Blocks--labor unions, veterans, farmers associations, sectarian groups.
h. Accelerate and Publicize Post-war Economic Plans--based on Lilienthal-Thuc reports,/4/ and including regional
cooperation programs.
/4/See ibid., vol. V, Document 430.
6. Contingency Plans
a. (US/GVN) Reach general understanding on military consequences of a failure of negotiations.
b. (US Only) Develop a series of leverage actions and contingency measures for any GVN attempt to thwart or sabotage
negotiations--once they appear reasonably productive. These measures should be scaled from reduced US support
through coup frustration to regime succession.

Attachment 2
POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIONS AGAINST THE NLF
1. High-level Defector Program could have the greatest pay-off. It should be re-examined at highest levels and pressed to
the maximum.
2. Chieu Hoi--Seek further program improvements in security of camps, living conditions, employment opportunities,
exploitation of individual returnees in VC areas, and information on good treatment by GVN.
3. National Reconciliation--try to persuade GVN to reactivate, offering full amnesties, job opportunities, and political rights.
4. Designate "No Fire" Areas in each district in SVN where individuals can turn in--with bounties for arms--and supervised
by US civil affairs teams.
5. Establish Substantial Reward System for province or district chiefs who arrange unit defections.
6. Expand Use of Hoi Chanh in Military Operations--increase use of Kit Carson scouts; experiment with Chieu Hoi
Battalions; publicize in VC areas their successes against the VC.
7. Psy Ops Appeals--Convene psyops working groups in Washington and Saigon to review both procedures and content.
Possible new themes:
"Join Winning Side--While You Can"
"Hanoi is Sacrificing the South for Immunity in the North"
"Hanoi is Conspiring with the Chinese to Weaken the VC for an NVN Takeover"
"New GVN Constitution Guarantees Free Elections--It's Better to Vote than to Die"

8. Telegram From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson
in Texas/1/
Washington, January 11, 1968, 0227Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, PACKERS (II) Continued. Top Secret; Nodis;
Packers. Received at 0408Z at the LBJ Ranch.
CAP 80264. Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara recommend that you now arrange to see the Romanian
representative in order to deliver to him the written and oral messages below. These messages have the full concurrence
of Walt Rostow, Nick Katzenbach, and myself, and were drafted in extensive consultation with Governor Harriman.
If you approve these texts, the Secretaries recommend that you select a member of your staff to work out with Walt or me
an absolutely secure means of flying the representative to the Ranch and return, for an appointment at a time designated
by you. The representative must have his interpreter and his personal aide and note-taker as well; these two persons are
important to enable him to give us and Hanoi what have seemed to us all extremely clear, full, and accurate accounts of
what is said. It is also recommended that Governor Harriman act as escort with his aide, Daniel Davidson, who has taken
all the notes on our side. We believe it essential that a full record of the conversation be made.
Governor Harriman and Davidson could see you before the actual meeting to give you any further background you may
desire. However, we believe the proposed texts speak for themselves.
In our meeting tonight, it was the feeling that Bunker should be given a summary of the Romanian messages and these
texts, for his own personal information and not for revealing to Thieu./2/ We expect to send another message to Bunker on
what he can say to Thieu to ease the tense atmosphere in Saigon, and also a very short statement to the Manila allies--to

the effect that, as Secretary Rusk said in his press conference, we are exploring the meaning of the Trinh statement and
how it relates to your San Antonio formula, we have no information as yet, but will be in touch with them when and if there
is any useful light.
/2/Bunker was authorized to do so in telegram 98130 to Saigon, January 12. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/PACKERS)
The Romanians should communicate the following written message (in English and French texts) to the DRV:
1. The DRV has communicated to the USG this statement of DRV position:
"If the USG really wants discussions with the Government of the DRV it should first unconditionally cease bombing and
any other acts of war against the DRV. After the unconditional cessation of all bombing and of any other US act of war
against the DRV and at the end of an appropriate period of time the Government of the DRV will enter into serious
discussions with the USG."
The USG welcomes this statement.
2. We understand that Foreign Minister Trinh has stated that "as soon as" all bombing ceases, the DRV "shall be prepared
to receive" a U.S. representative. The USG will be prepared to have its representative have contacts with a representative
of the DRV as soon as all bombing ceases. (The USG believes that the first contacts should take place almost
immediately, perhaps one or two days after the cessation of bombing.) The purpose of these "contacts," which might be in
Vientiane, Rangoon, Bucharest, or some other suitable third-country location, would be to fix the time and place of serious
discussions referred to by the DRV. Arrangement of the necessary modalities for the serious discussions should take no
more than a few days./3/
/3/In a January 8 memorandum to Rusk, Harriman described a meeting that day among himself, Bundy, Davidson, and the
Romanians exploring what they had been told on the issue of talks following a halt: "Macovescu explained that it was his
impression there could be preliminary contacts through diplomatic representatives to exchange points of view and then
after an appropriate period of time official meetings to prepare for negotiations. In other words, he visualized the possibility
of three stages: contacts, official talks and then negotiations." (Ibid.) A full report on this conversation is in a memorandum
of conversation, January 8. (Ibid.) In a January 9 memorandum to Katzenbach, Harriman wrote: "I've been surprised that a
number of people have assumed that Hanoi would insist on having the talks Secret. For my part, I don't see how it would
be possible to keep any talks 'secret' after bombing has stopped. It seems to me the sensible thing to do is to pick a place
such as Rangoon or Bucharest, where the presence of international press is limited. Should there be contacts prior to the
talks, the possibility of which was suggested by Mr. M.[acovescu], I assume these would be secret." (Ibid.)
3. The USG takes note of the fact that a cessation of aerial and naval bombardment is easily verifiable. In fact, the act of
cessation would be observed immediately internationally and become a matter of public knowledge and speculation. In
these circumstances, the USG believes that the "serious discussions" referred to by the DRV should commence
immediately on the conclusion of the arrangements through the contacts.
4. Obviously it will be important at an appropriate time, in connection with the serious discussions, to accommodate the
interests of all parties directly concerned with the peace of Southeast Asia. One such means is that the DRV and the USG
might suggest to the two co-chairmen, and possibly to the three ICC members, that they be available at the site chosen for
the serious discussions in order to talk to all parties interested in the peace of Southeast Asia. This procedure could avoid
the problems of a formal conference.
5. The USG understands through representatives of the Romanian Government that the serious discussions contemplated
by the DRV would be without limitation as to the matters to be raised by either side. The attitude of the USG toward peace
in Southeast Asia continues to be reflected in the 14 Points and in the Manila Communiqu.
6. The USG draws attention to the statement of President Johnson in San Antonio on September 29 in which he said:
"The United States is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Viet-Nam when this will lead promptly to
productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Viet-Nam would not take advantage
of the bombing cessation or limitation."
The Aide-Mmoire handed to the Romanian Government in November, 1967, which we understand was communicated to
the DRV in mid-December, explained this statement in the following language:

"The President, in making his assumption that the North Vietnamese would not take advantage of the bombing cessation
or limitation while discussions proceed, was not assuming North Viet-Nam would cut off entirely its support of its forces in
the South while the armed struggle was continuing; at the same time the USG would feel if NVN sought to take advantage
of the bombing cessation or limitation to increase its support of its forces in the South, to attack our forces from North of
the DMZ or to mount large-scale visible resupply efforts, now impossible, it would not be acting in good faith."
The USG wishes to confirm to the DRV that this statement remains the position of the USG.
7. The USG would inform the DRV in advance of the exact date of the cessation of aerial and naval bombardment in order
to enable the DRV to have its representative prepared to meet the representative of the USG.
End of Written Message
ORAL POINTS
The following points would be made orally to the Romanian representative:
(A) The Romanian representative should be thanked for his efforts and told that we are confident that he has fully and
faithfully reported the positions of both sides in these matters. We are grateful for this action and have confidence that he
will continue to do so.
(B) He should understand that the first sentence of paragraph 4 in the written message is intended to refer to the
importance of the South Vietnamese Government and other interested parties being present at the site of the discussions
in order to play an appropriate role.
(C) The USG wishes to avoid any misunderstanding also with respect to any allegations which may be made concerning
specific military actions by the USG against the DRV prior to cessation. In deference to the serious intent and sincere
objectives of the mission of the Romanian Government, the USG will refrain for a limited period of time from bombing
within 5 miles of the center of Hanoi or of Haiphong. This information is for the Romanian Government only. The USG
states this as a fact and not as a commitment as to the future, but the USG would not wish the DRV to be informed of this
fact for fear that, as in the past, it could be misinterpreted by them.
(D) The USG awaits with interest the report of the Romanians, after consulting Hanoi, on the foregoing written and oral
points.

9. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, January 11, 1968, 12:45 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/PACKERS.
Secret; Nodis; Packers. Drafted by Davidson and initialed by Harriman. The meeting was held in Rusk's office.
SUBJECT
Vietnam Peace Talks
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large
Daniel I. Davidson, Special Assistant to Gov. Harriman
Romania
First Deputy Foreign Minister George Macovescu
Corneliu Bogdan, Ambassador
Marin Iliescu, First Secretary of Embassy
Sergiu Celac, Third Secretary of Embassy

Rusk: I talked to the President. He regretted that it is not feasible for you to come to the ranch. He had hoped to come to
Washington but there have been problems of scheduling discussions and of other types.
He did ask me to thank you for your visits to Hanoi and Peking.
He asked me to give you a communication. It is in two parts--one oral and one written, and we ask you to convey the
written to Hanoi.
Maybe you want to read it over with your colleagues to see if there is any inaccuracy in our understanding of what you told
us.
Our President will be writing to your President to thank him and to give our views. The President told me this morning that
he would be in immediate touch with your President on this matter.
(The Secretary distributed the written message.)/2/
/2/See Document 8.
This, of course, is a highly confidential communication.
Macovescu: Oh yes.
Rusk: We might go over it paragraph by paragraph to check the accuracy of our understanding of what was said.
Paragraph one is from the public statement, so we assume there is no problem.
Harriman: No, it is not the public statement, but the statement conveyed through the Romanians.
Rusk: I understand.
(About five minutes passed while the group reads the document.)
I don't want to press you. I will be leaving in a few minutes for California. You might discuss further with Ambassador
Harriman the accuracy. The policy matters are between us and Hanoi, but you may wish to talk with the Governor about
detail and accuracy.
Harriman: I would like to bring in Assistant Secretary Bundy.
Rusk: There are also certain oral points I am to make but perhaps the simplest thing is to give them to you in writing with
the understanding that it is to be considered oral.
Macovescu: Understood.
Harriman: You'll note that the first paragraph is our thanks to you.
Rusk: Yes, perhaps I should read that paragraph aloud.
You notice we are telling you that we won't bomb you if you return to Hanoi.
Harriman: Perhaps they won't feel that we were welcoming them as we did last time.
Rusk: In terms of talks, we are making suggestions. If there are other suggestions, they can be considered.
There are two problems. First is the contacts to make arrangements which we refer to as "contacts". Then there are the
more serious discussions. It is difficult to conduct them in secrecy. The bombing will have stopped and the world will have
noted it. If the discussions are in public there are a good many governments and parties who will suggest that they are
entitled to participate. We could lose months, so we proposed--let's see how we put it. In paragraph four, the second
sentence, we say, "one such means". In other words, this suggests that the two Co-chairmen and the three ICC members

send representatives to the location. Anyone else could be in the city available to discuss this with the two or the five or
with each other.
Rusk (cont.): I do not know Peking' s attitude. They may not want to come to a conference but might want to have a man
present at the location. On our side some will want to be present. This is one suggestion that could avoid the problem of a
formal conference. We are willing to hear your suggestions or Hanoi's. It's a problem of modalities--to avoid a formal
conference, but to make all views available. I don't anticipate a big meeting with eight or twelve or fifteen present, but the
two Co-chairmen or the three ICC members might be a communications center talking to the parties and putting their two
or five heads together on the possibilities of agreement.
Macovescu: I have a first question Mr. Secretary. Suppose that after the first contacts the two parties desired to meet
according to certain formulae--one of which you have just presented. This is just for me to see what is the issue and not a
final suggestion on my part. Would you accept to have further negotiations with the Vietnamese alone, without the
presence of any other party there? I repeat, this is not a formal suggestion, but to make me clear in my mind, and if you
don't wish me to discuss this aspect with the Vietnamese, I will not.
Rusk: If the fact of talks becomes public, and I think it will, both sides will have serious problems. In our reply to Secretary
General U Thant in March, we made it clear that other parties must be associated with talks./3/ This does not mean that
there cannot still be bilaterals, but we cannot have a situation where everyone else is excluded. The Government of
Saigon and others present problems. I wouldn't make that suggestion to Hanoi. If they come back with it, we will look at it
but it will be difficult.
/3/On March 15, 1967, the United States delivered a reply of support for U Thant's March 14 call for a standstill cease-fire
in Vietnam. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Documents 107 and 108.
Macovescu: It is not my suggestion and I won't raise it. I just meant to bring more clarity so that we might better know your
position. If the Vietnamese side raises this problem we shall communicate with you on it.
Rusk: You have a mission in Hanoi?
Macovescu: We just sent a new Ambassador.
Rusk: You have private communications.
Macovescu: Yes.
Rusk: While you are in Hanoi, you may have problems you wish to discuss with us. Ambassador Davis/4/ is a good friend
and very discreet. You may wish to communicate through him.
/4/Richard H. Davis, Ambassador to Romania.
The President did tell me that he probably will be in Washington and that he wishes to see you if you come back.
I was in Texas and could land but not take off. I had to travel over miles of icy roads. The President's schedule has been
completely disrupted.
Harriman: And the security problem is impossible.
Rusk: And we didn't want to delay.
Harriman: I'd like to ask a frank question. I have told the Secretary that the President should address his letter to
Ceausescu and not to Maurer, which is his natural instinct since he met him.
Macovescu: Ceausescu.
Rusk: I'll be leaving for California in a few moments. But Mr. Harriman, our youngest elder statesman, will be available this
afternoon.

Harriman: Any time.

Macovescu: I thank you. Of course I will be needing certain clarifications but as you told me that I may have these through
Governor Harriman--for that reason I won't detain you. I know you are very busy.
I hope that I am not going home empty handed and that we shall be in a position to continue this dialogue between Hanoi
and Washington.
Rusk: Mr. Minister, Governor Harriman and I have been involved in many crises. Don't be discouraged too soon with your
difficulties. We are interested in peace, not in something less. The two sides are still divided by very difficult and complex
problems. The question is peace but on what basis so a certain amount of persistence on your side is required.
Macovescu: We understand the situation as well as you do. We also understand that it is not only complex but also
complicated. We can assure you that we do not discourage easily.
Harriman: They have negotiated with the Russians.
Rusk: If you succeed, you will get the Nobel and Lenin Peace Prizes. If you fail, you will have the satisfaction of having
tried.
Bogdan: Perhaps a Pulitzer Prize for writing a book?
Harriman: We can't give you a Lenin Prize, or recommend you for it, but we can recommend you for a Nobel Prize.
Macovescu: We don't desire a prize, but peace, which will satisfy us sufficiently.
Harriman: I'll see you anytime you wish./5/
/5/Harriman, Bundy, and Davidson met with the Romanian delegation later that evening to clarify the message for the
North Vietnamese. Harriman underscored that the primary concern was to have clarified fully the U.S. position and to
obtain the North Vietnamese reaction to it. "The maximum you can get is that they will meet us in two days or in five days
for serious talks after cessation in Rangoon or Vientiane or elsewhere--the more you can get of this the better but we are
not asking for those precise answers," he told Macovescu. (Memorandum of conversation, January 11, 5:15 p.m.; National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/PACKERS)
Rusk: I am going off to make a speech in California tonight. After the speech I will be asked questions. Do not pay too
much attention to what I say. The document that I have given you is the important thing.

10. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, January 12, 1968, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential;
Exdis. Drafted by Toon and approved in U on January 15.
SUBJECT
Soviet Note on "Pereyaslavl-Zalesskiy" Incident
PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Yuri N. Chernyakov, Soviet Charg, a.i.
Mr. Nicholas deB Katzenbach, Acting Secretary
Mr. Malcolm Toon, Country Director, Soviet Union Affairs

Chernyakov requested and was given an appointment with the Acting Secretary in order to deliver a note from his
Government in reply to the United States Government note of January 5 with regard to the bombing of the Soviet ship
"Pereyaslavl-Zalesskiy" in the harbor of Haiphong on January 4./2/ A translation of the note is attached./3/
/2/In its January 5 note, the United States apologized for the incident but "neither substantiated nor ruled out" the claim
that the damage was caused by U.S. aircraft. (Ibid.)
/3/Not printed. In its January 12 note, the Soviet Government replied that it could not "acknowledge the reply of the USA
Government to be convincing, since it not only does not contain a clear recognition of the guilt of the American armed
forces in the perpetration of the marauding attack upon a Soviet merchant vessel in violation of all norms of international
law and freedom of navigation, but actually admits the possibility of the repetition of such aggressive acts by the American
air forces." Since Rusk had informed Dobrynin on January 9 of the accidental dropping of 17 undetonated bombs near
Haiphong, the Department was surprised that the Soviet reaction was so muted. (Telegram 96905 to Moscow, January 10,
and telegram 98440 to Moscow, January 13; both ibid.)
Mr. Katzenbach pointed out that the Soviet Government must recognize that ships operating in an area of active hostilities
run certain risks and it was impossible to guarantee that accidents would not happen. As had been made clear in the
United States Government note of January 5, all that could be done was to offer assurances that careful precautions would
be taken to avoid damage to non-hostile shipping in and around North Vietnam. The United States Government regretted
the damage caused to the Soviet ship in the port of Haiphong and hoped that such incidents could be avoided in the
future. It was for this reason that additional information, of which the Charg was undoubtedly aware, had been passed to
Ambassador Dobrynin by the Secretary of State earlier this week. Mr. Katzenbach pointed out that there could be no real
guarantee against damage to Soviet shipping so long as Soviet ships operated in the North Vietnamese waters.
Chernyakov said his instructions did not go beyond the delivery of the note itself, but he would point out on a personal
basis that attacks on Soviet shipping were in contravention of international law and violation of the principle of freedom of
navigation. In Chernyakov's view the best way to avoid further incidents would be to stop the bombing.
Mr. Katzenbach replied that the bombing could stop tomorrow if the North Vietnamese would comply with the Geneva
accords and withdraw their forces from South Vietnam. If this should be done, then difficulties stemming from such
developments as the January 4 incident involving the "Pereyaslavl-Zalesskiy" would not arise between our two countries.
Chernyakov referred to Trinh's statement of December 30/4/ and said that it was clear that talks would take place if the
bombing were stopped.
/4/See Document 1.
Mr. Katzenbach said that the United States Government's position on cessation of bombing was clearly set forth by the
President in his San Antonio speech in which the President said that he would be prepared to stop the bombing if it was
clear that such action would lead to productive talks. Was it Chernyakov's view that Trinh's offer was a serious one?
Chernyakov said that his Government certainly regarded Trinh's offer as a serious one and the only way to ascertain if
talks could be productive would be to stop the bombing in order to permit them to take place. He did not wish to criticize
the statements by President Johnson, but he would point out that whereas in the past the President had said that the
United States Government attached no preconditions to talks, the San Antonio formula seemed to impose the condition
that talks must be productive.
Mr. Katzenbach felt that it was wrong to regard the San Antonio formula as imposing conditions on talks. Obviously, if the
North Vietnamese should insist that the agenda for talks be limited to Hanoi's four points, then there would be no purpose
in talks since obviously they could not be productive. This was the meaning of the San Antonio formula in Mr.
Katzenbach's view.
Chernyakov said that he would only point out that in his December 30 statement Trinh made no mention of the four points.
Chernyakov was asked if his Government planned to publicize the note which he had handed Mr. Katzenbach.
Chernyakov had said his instructions did not refer to publicity and he would point out on a personal basis that his
Government's note of January 4/5/ was made public.
/5/The January 4 Soviet note demanded punishment of those responsible for the incident and called for U.S. assurances
that it would not happen again. (Telegram 94518 to Moscow, January 6; National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)

11. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, January 13, 1968, 1055Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret;
Immediate; Nodis. This telegram is printed in full in Douglas Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers: Reports to the President from
Vietnam, 1967-1973, Vol. 1 (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies), pp. 284-294.
15899. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my thirty-fourth weekly message.
A. General
1. In the present message, I am attempting to give an objective evaluation of the efforts and achievements which, in
common with our Vietnamese and other Free World allies, we have recorded during 1967. This represents not only my
own views but also those of the major elements of the Mission so that in effect it represents a Mission consensus. In the
next message, I hope to outline the major problem areas we foresee and to summarize the actions we plan to take to deal
with them in the year ahead.
2. The past year has been one of sustained and unremitting effort and I believe has seen enough achievements to give us
every encouragement to continue along the present lines. We can have confidence that the successful defense of the
Republic of Viet-Nam against Communist aggression and subversion is assured. Our efforts have been magnificently
supported by you and by the American people, who have contributed in men and money to a degree unparalleled in our
own history, to the defense of a people far from our shores. But as you have often said, the cost in men and money, heavy
as it has been, cannot be compared to what the cost would ultimately be if we allowed Communist aggression and
subversion to succeed in Viet-Nam. All of us working in the Mission here are convinced that what we do will affect not only
the future of Viet-Nam but all of the countries in this part of the world who wish to be free and so has a direct bearing on
our own vital national interests.
3. The achievements of the past year, I believe, fall into three main categories. In the field of military operations the
bringing into proper balance of the ratio of combat to support troops in the U.S. forces and the steady improvement of the
Vietnamese armed forces, together with the contributions of our Free World allies, resulted in increasingly effective actions
against the enemy. He has been thwarted in his attempts at penetration south of the DMZ, his bases increasingly
neutralized, and he has been steadily pushed back toward the Laotian and Cambodian borders. Viet Cong recruitment and
morale have declined. Lines of communication have been steadily opened up, commerce and trade thus permitted to
develop.
4. Slow but steady progress in pacification combined with military successes have brought a steadily increasing proportion
of the population under government control, now about 67 percent, with a corresponding decrease under Viet Cong
control, approximately 17 percent, the balance being in contested areas.
5. Progress in these two categories were essential elements in the progress achieved in the third, that of constitutional
development. Perhaps the major achievement of the year has been stabilization of the government and the opening and
democratization of the political system. People have been able to vote for local, village, and hamlet officials thus marking
the beginning of the reinstitution of local self-government. The promulgation of the Constitution opened the way for the
election of a President, Vice President, and a National Assembly. The inauguration of the new government marked a
beginning of fully constitutional processes and the change-over to civilian rule. The immediate problem now facing us is to
encourage, prod, persuade, and draw our Vietnamese allies to use their new political and governmental structure to face
up to and resolve more effectively the problems of defense and growth that have beset them for many years.
6. I think these achievements reflect favorably on the Vietnamese people. For them the struggle against the Communists
has been going on for more than twenty years, and their losses have been heavy. But we can now see growth of a
conviction among them that they can and will see the struggle through to a successful conclusion. Their concerns now turn
more directly on the nature and form of a final settlement and the position it would leave them in, located immediately next
to an unremittingly hostile neighbor. Their concern is with the consequences of success rather than with the results of
failure.
7. Our defects in the field of public affairs, both here as well as in Washington, have required imagination and energy. We
have sought to present the true dimensions of the conflict in Viet-Nam to American and world public opinion as objectively
and fairly as we can, but we have had to do this through a press which, it seems to me, has been unusually skeptical and

cynical. One experienced journalist gave an explanation for this which may have validity, i.e., that there is a generation gap
here in that many of the young reporters have never seen nor experienced war before and consequently suffer from an
emotional trauma which results in subjective reporting. However that may be, the result of all this is that there tend to be
two separate and only partially connected realities: the view of Viet-Nam as we see it here in Viet-Nam and the view that is
being presented to American and world public opinion. This problem has engaged major attention during the past year and
will continue to have our attention in the future. I think we have made some, though limited, progress in dealing with it.
[Omitted here is discussion of progress during 1967 on political, military, pacification, and economic matters.]
Bunker

12. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
CM-2908-68
Washington, January 13, 1968.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, 1968 Files,
VIET 385. Top Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that McNamara saw it on January 15. According
to a January 8 memorandum from Carver to Helms, entitled "The Enemy Threat to Khe Sanh, A Speculative Appraisal,"
intelligence reports indicated that elements from four NVA divisions had been moved into the area around Khe Sanh in
preparation for an attack. The memorandum concluded that the enemy's objectives were, at a minimum, to force
abandonment of the base and, at a maximum, "to draw substantial U.S. reinforcements from other areas in South Vietnam
and tie them down in the Khe Sanh area." (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80R01284A, DCI/ER Files, ER Files-Special Material 01 Jan-28 Feb 1968)
SUBJECT
Khe Sanh (U)
Recently, two differing views of the situation in the Khe Sanh area came to my attention. Briefly, these are: (1) preempting
an enemy assault in the Khe Sanh area by an offensive into Laos; (2) a complete withdrawal from Khe Sanh. I do not
personally subscribe to either of these views, both of which overlook important factors. However, since these two
propositions have reportedly been given prominent attention at high non-military levels, I considered that it would be useful
to have General Westmoreland's comments on them and on the Khe Sanh situation in general./2/ I have now received his
comments and I provide them to you, in the succeeding paragraphs, for your information.
/2/In telegram JCS 343, January 11, Wheeler requested Westmoreland's views on each option. The first was phrased as
"the possibility of turning an attack against the Khe Sanh to our advantage, that is, Dien Bien Phu in reverse. This view
argues the possibility of capitalizing on an attack against Khe Sanh by striking the enemy from the rear in Laos and
proceeding to attack enemy bases in the area, perhaps as far west as Tchepone, in a relatively short campaign." The
second was phrased as "withdrawal from Khe Sanh because the enemy is building toward a Dien Bien Phu. This argument
is based upon the following premises: A. The Road to Khe Sanh has been cut. B. We do not control the commanding hills.
C. The enemy is bringing up artillery which will be able to control the airfield. D. A withdrawal now could be done without
much public notice. E. There is an awkward relationship between COMUSMACV and the Marine commander which makes
the Marines reluctant to withdraw and COMUSMACV reluctant to direct them to do so." (Johnson Library, William C.
Westmoreland Papers, Eyes Only Message File, 1 Jan.-31 Jan. 1968)
"1. I have just returned from a visit with General Cushman during which we discussed contingency plans for reinforcing
Khe Sanh and the I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). General Cushman has two USMC battalions in Khe Sanh now and
contingency plans for augmenting this force with an additional USMC battalion on eight hour notice, followed by a second
battalion on twelve hour notice, and by SLF forces. Additionally, and as a result of the above discussion, I have directed
him as a matter of first priority to alert a brigade of the Americal Division to move into the Hue/Phu Bai area. This can be
done quickly with fixed wing or rotary wing aircraft.
"2. As a second priority we are prepared to reinforce I CTZ in the Hue/Phu Bai, Danang, or Chu Lai areas in that priority
with another brigade, either from the 101st Airborne Division or from the 1st Cavalry Division.
"3. Additional actions underway include the following:

"a. As the ROK Marine Brigade moves into the Danang tactical area of responsibility (TAOR), elements of the 1st Marine
Division are being released for deployment north of Ai-Van pass. This in turn is releasing elements of the 3d Marine
Division for movement into Quang Tri province. Two battalions of the ROK Marine Brigade have completed their
movement and four battalions of the 1st Marine Division are now north of Ai-Van pass. This move will be completed by 31
January with four ROK battalions in the Danang TAOR and five 1st Marine Division battalions north of the pass.
"b. The JGS has agreed to deploy a task force of two airborne battalions to I CTZ on or about 15 January 1968, bringing to
four the number of ARVN airborne battalions in I CTZ.
"c. We are developing priority targets in Operation Niagara/3/ for a sustained Arc Light campaign, augmented by tactical
air, beginning not later than 18 January. We plan to concentrate on targets in RVN prior to Tet with approximately 75
percent or more of our total effort. During and following the Tet cease fire, we will strike targets in Laos. This operation also
includes a slam type operation in the Khe Sanh area by 7th Air Force. In conjunction with our sustained Arc Light
campaign, I am requesting (by separate communication) a further step up in the B-52 accelerated program now scheduled
to begin 20 January.
/3/A clearing operation involving bombing and artillery shelling of enemy positions around Khe Sanh.
"d. We are also requesting that a carrier be alerted to be brought in to augment tactical air, and the prompt return of the
SLF for commitment to either the 3d or 1st Marine Division areas.
"e. Maximum number of NGF support ships will be concentrated in the I CTZ.
"4. Regarding view (1), above, my concept for operations in Laos is outlined in Operation El Paso, proposed for October
1968. Preempting a Khe Sanh area assault by an offensive into Laos is neither logistically nor tactically feasible at this
time. Significant considerations include the following:
"a. To be effective, a Laotian assault should be launched in the near future.
"b. With the NE monsoon upon us, launching and supporting the magnitude of force envisioned is not within our current
capability. An air LOC is essential and flying weather is marginal. Additionally, our airlift capabilities are inadequate to
support both this concept and an acceptable tactical posture in other RVN threat areas at this time.
"c. We estimate sizable enemy forces to be in the Tchepone area and to the north thereof; thus a brief successful
campaign there may not be possible.
"5. Regarding a withdrawal from Khe Sanh, I consider this area critical to us from a tactical standpoint as a launch base for
Special Operations Group (SOG) teams and as flank security for the strong point obstacle system; it is even more critical
from a psychological viewpoint. To relinquish this area would be a major propaganda victory for the enemy. Its loss would
seriously affect Vietnamese and US morale. In short, withdrawal would be a tremendous step backwards.
"6. Although there are some in non-military circles who favor the concept of retreating into enclaves, I must reiterate that
such a strategy merely returns the center of violence to the midst of the RVN people in the populated centers. On the other
hand, a massive assault into Laos is not feasible in the near time frame.
"7. In view of the enemy capability to initiate a major offensive in Quang Tri province before Tet, I would prefer to defend
with force deployment and combat support as indicated above. I will submit additional support requirements separately for
Arc Light, Carrier and NGF support."
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

13. Editorial Note

On January 17, 1968, President Lyndon Johnson delivered his annual message to Congress on the State of the Union. In
the speech, the President discussed the prospects for peace in Vietnam:

"Right now we are exploring the meaning of Hanoi's recent statement. There is no mystery about the questions which must
be answered before the bombing is stopped. We believe that any talks should follow the San Antonio formula that I stated
last September, which said:
"--The bombing would stop immediately if talks would take place promptly and with reasonable hopes that they would be
productive.
"--And the other side must not take advantage of our restraint as they have in the past.
"This Nation simply cannot accept anything less without jeopardizing the lives of our men and of our allies. If a basis for
peace talks can be established on the San Antonio foundations--and it is my hope and my prayer that they can--we would
consult with our allies and with the other side to see if a complete cessation of hostilities--a really true cease-fire--could be
made the first order of business. I will report at the earliest possible moment the results of these explorations to the
American people."
For full text of the speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I,
pages 25-33.

14. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, January 17, 1968, 1115Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret;
Immediate; Nodis. Received at 8:01 a.m. and passed to the White House. This telegram is printed in full in Pike, ed., The
Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 295-301.
16225. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my thirty-fifth weekly message:
A. General
1. I indicated in my last weekly message/2/ that I would be sending my assessment of problems and prospects for 1968 in
my next message. I have now deferred this for a week in order to assure that a more careful and comprehensive analysis
can be prepared. The following report therefore covers normal developments of the past ten days.
/2/Document 11.
2. Viet-Nam is now entering its annual pre-Tet lull when most activities are either slowed or halted altogether in favor of
preparations for the great annual Tet holiday, which is a celebration which resembles our Christmas, New Years, and
Thanksgiving all rolled into one.
3. Indeed approaching Tet season is the official explanation of the reason given for calling a halt to the conflict between the
government and the CVT labor union which arose because of the demands of the employees of the former French owned
power company for pay increases. The strike had already spread to other segments of the work force. Although there were
other compelling reasons for calling a halt to the conflict between the government and the CVT labor union, following a
meeting of labor leaders and government officials which lasted until 3 in the morning, the CVT yesterday issued a
communiqu stopping all strikes in the interest of not inconveniencing the people before the Tet holiday.
4. If the Tet spirit helped to smooth over the clash between the CVT and the government, it has not yet allayed the
widespread concern about the possibility that the U.S. will make a deal with Hanoi or the NLF which will ultimately result in
a Communist takeover of South Viet-Nam. The Trinh statement on negotiations set off a wave of speculation that
continues to touch all facets of Vietnamese political life. The Senate discussed the question of the GVN position with
regard to the NLF on January 3, and most speakers stressed their belief that coalition government is a Communist tactic
aimed at accomplishing by political means what they have failed to do by military action. The chairman of the Senate as
well as a number of other Senators and lower house Deputies have expressed their deep concern to us privately. Some
military leaders have gone so far as to talk privately of a coup if a coalition government seems imminent. Even militant
Buddhist leaders and "Struggle" elements have expressed such fears and counseled against any dealings with the NLF
which will give the Front any status other than that of Hanoi's instrument. These fears have been echoed and agitated by
the press. For six weeks editorial comment has been dominated by such things as the possibility of U.S. recognition of the

NLF and the bogey of coalition government.

5. President Thieu has responded to these anxieties by a series of statements designed to show that he is determined to
oppose and prevent any policy moves from any quarter which will result in a Communist takeover here. On January 5 he
told journalists that he will crush all peace moves which favor the formation of coalition government. He made several
similar statements in the following days, and on January 15 he made a major speech in which he set out the government
position on the peace issue. He warned against a bombing pause without any reciprocal action by the Communists, and he
said that the Communists are trying to get the allies to negotiate with the NLF in order to "obtain acceptance of a 'coalition
government' in which the Communist elements, as Trojan horses, will gradually take over the whole of South Viet-Nam."
6. I think that Thieu's remarks reflect his own general thinking, though he is personally more flexible than the
uncompromising tone of his speech might seem to indicate. For example, he repeated to me recently what he had said as
long ago as last August that he could and was not unwilling to probe the NLF but that this must be done secretly and that
he could do nothing unless and until public speculation and talk subsided. But whatever his personal view of these matters,
the speech certainly reflects his reading of Vietnamese political realities. Thieu clearly does not think that he can take any
other position publicly without risking loss of support from both military and civilian leaders.
7. I expect that the Secretary's very good statement of January 15/3/ will help to reduce the fears that we are going to sell
out South Viet-Nam, and in turn that should make such reactions as Thieu's January speech less necessary. In fact, Thieu
yesterday told me that the agitation and the fears which had been sweeping the country were like a wave. The crest had
been reached and it was not subsiding. The problem of handling Vietnamese opinion will continue to be with us, however,
all the more so if Hanoi in fact proves to have any sincere intention of seeking an acceptable solution to this conflict.
/3/Rusk assured the GVN that "it goes without saying that the future of South Vietnam could not be decided without full
participation of the legal and constitutional government of South Vietnam." See The New York Times, January 16, 1968.
8. Concentrating as they are on the possibilities of negotiations with Hanoi and the NLF, most Vietnamese leaders have
had little to say about the Bowles mission to Cambodia and the resulting communiqu./4/ Comment has been mildly
favorable for the most part, though I think no one really expects much in the way of concrete results. In his January 15
speech, Thieu restated the government's position on the Cambodian border question in rather harsh terms. The tone of his
remarks unfortunately reflects the continuing [garble--antipathy?] which most Vietnamese leaders feel for Sihanouk
personally as well as Thieu's understandable anger over the great assistance which Cambodian policies have given to the
enemies of a free South Viet-Nam. I tried to get Thieu to eliminate one paragraph referring to Sihanouk personally but he
reacted rather strongly and said that while obviously Sihanouk did not have to talk to the Vietnamese, the least he could do
was to be correct. Thieu and Ky, however, in private conversations with Phil Habib and me have agreed that the Bowles
mission was a useful exercise and that Sihanouk's intentions should now be tested more concretely.
/4/In a January 4 press conference, Rusk announced that Ambassador to India Chester Bowles would travel to Cambodia
to discuss with Sihanouk measures to restrict the presence of NVA/VC forces in Cambodia. See Department of State
Bulletin, January 22, 1968, pp. 116-124. In a January 12 joint communiqu resulting from Bowles' trip, Sihanouk renewed
his pledge to strengthen the ICC's role in ensuring Cambodian territorial integrity, especially through the policing of border
areas. They did not, however, reach accord on "hot pursuit" of Communist forces into Cambodian territory. See ibid.,
January 29, 1968, pp. 133-134. See also Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXVII, Documents 105 ff.
[Omitted here are sections on Priority Programs, Other Reports on Efforts to Improve Civil Administration, and sections on
Political, Pacification, Economic Issues, Chieu Hoi, and Americans and Vietnamese Killed.]
Bunker

15. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Henry Kissinger and the Executive Secretary of the Department of
State (Read)/1/
Washington, January 17, 1968, 7:30 a.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14
VIET/PENNSYLVANIA. Secret; Nodis; Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania peace effort involved the efforts of Kissinger to
conduct direct talks with Bo through two French intermediaries, Raymond Aubrac and Herbert Marcovich. For additional
documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Documents 306 ff.

1. At 9:00 p.m. Paris time January 16, Bo called Marcovich and asked him if he could stop by to see Bo at an early time. M
went over to see him immediately and had a two hour conversation, which he reported to Kissinger at 5:30 a.m. EST this
morning.
2. Bo opened by saying that the breakoff in conversations with M & A last October was occasioned by general conditions
and the DRV still held both of them in high personal esteem.
3. Bo called attention to the interview he had given to the French radio and television network earlier in the evening (see
page 1 NYT story today by Henry Tanner),/2/ and read him the Q and A about Hanoi's commitment to talk an appropriate
time after cessation of the bombing.
/2/In the interview conducted on January 16, Bo confirmed that the Trinh formula was "perfectly clear," stating notably that
"all political observers have underlined the changes for the conditional to the future in the remarks of December 29." See
The New York Times, January 17, 1968.
4. M asked what the DRV meant by "an appropriate time", and Bo replied that conversations would begin "just as soon as
it will be established that the cessation is effective."
5. M asked whether it would now be possible for Bo to receive Kissinger, and Bo replied that under existing circumstances
any such request would be taken into consideration./3/
/3/Later that day, Kissinger informed Read that he had given the following message to Marcovich for Bo: "a. Thanks for
your message. b. If you (B) wish to see me directly, I will make an effort to come although my schedule is
full." (Memorandum of telephone conversation between Kissinger and Read, January 17, 6 p.m.; National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/PENNSYLVANIA) According to a memorandum of
a telephone conversation, January 18, 9 a.m., in which Kissinger reported to Read that Marcovich had delivered the
message to Bo, Kissinger told Read that "Bo thanked M and opened the envelope in his presence but did not discuss it
with M. Bo said that he hoped 'things were going somewhere this time'. M reports the atmosphere was cordial." (Ibid.)

16. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, January 17, 1968.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, VIET 092. Top
Secret; Sensitive. An attached note from Wheeler to Nitze, January 18, reads: "Paul--Herewith a copy of a Memo for
Record by Bill DePuy concerning situation in SVN. I propose to give a copy to each member of the No-Name Committee at
our meeting this afternoon. You will note he reports Komer et al. at some variance with the CIA report on the same subject
& Amb. Bunker's 35th Weekly Report. Bus."
SUBJECT
Conversations with Ambassador Komer and Major General Forsythe--COORDS, MACV
1. Both Ambassador Komer and General Forsythe are extremely disquieted by the situation in the GVN at this time. The
basis for their unhappiness and concern goes something like this:
a. The GVN is simply not functioning at this time. The various ministries have not organized themselves nor have they
launched into the new programs mentioned by Thieu in his inaugural statement.
b. The reorganization of the RVNAF which was worked out on a combined basis with MACV and which would reduce the
power of the Corp Commanders and the Division Commanders in respect to their relationship with the provinces as well as
the regional and popular forces has been frustrated by a series of crippling stipulations. For example, it is not to go into
effect until:
(1) The military situation is propitious.
(2) The provincial staffs are beefed up.

(3) The provincial staffs have reached an unstated higher level of training and quality.
c. Corrupt Province Chiefs have not been removed.
d. Province Chief designees have not been sent to the Vung Tau School and now will receive a watered down course in
Saigon instead, but this has not yet started.
e. The Vice Chief of the JGS (until recently General Thang) has not been given authority for Provincial affairs. This simply
means that the Corps Commanders continue to exercise their "war lord" authorities without regard to Saigon and the
particularly unresponsive Corps Commanders in the 2nd and 4th Corps have not been removed./2/
/2/According to a January 20 discussion with Forsythe reported in telegram 16712 from Saigon, January 23, Thieu noted
that the reorganization of the RVNAF that began on January 2 ultimately would result in the termination of all but a
supporting role in pacification by the division and corps commanders, thereby removing them from the "political arena" in
order to concentrate on the "military arena." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69,
POL US-VIET S)
2. At the moment the Thang case is center of stage. Thang demanded increased authority along the lines of the
reorganization plan and demanded the relief of Vinh Loc and Manh in 2nd and 4th Corps respectively. He stated that there
was no point in going through the pacification planning cycle while these two Corps Commanders continued to ignore
Saigon authority. Thieu refused to let Thang resign but said he could not move that rapidly. Thang is cooling his heels at
home./3/ Thieu continues to refer to the post Tet period when he claims all these problems will be solved. There is only a
little confidence in Saigon that this will be the case. What worries Bunker, Westmoreland and Komer and Company at the
moment is that the press which had called a moratorium of four months on criticism of the Government is now on to the
fact that Thang has been sidetracked. General Sidle is of the opinion that this will blow the thing wide open and the press
will take off after the inactivity--in fact the back sliding--of the Government. The Thang case, of course, is only symptomatic
and the last thing he wants is a lot of American help at this time. He believes that if he is reinstated under American
pressure that Thieu will only go through the motions and give him no real authority./4/
/3/In a January 17 memorandum to Rusk, McNamara, Wheeler, and Rostow, Helms noted the Saigon CIA Station's
opinion that Thang's resignation was "a serious threat to the GVN pacification effort" because he had "provided a quality of
leadership and courage in his relationships with other senior military leaders that, one can safely predict, will not be
replaced." The Station suggested that the situation be kept "in a state of suspense" so that Thang's role in pacification
might somehow be saved. (Department of Defense, Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 970/305 (29 Sep 67), IR
2554, Sea Cabin)
/4/Forsythe and Komer met with Thang and his designated replacement, General Nguyen Van La, on January 24. Thang
listed the most important objectives of the GVN pacification effort, especially focusing on means to improve the RF/PF in
terms of morale, manpower, and its contribution to RD. In addition, means for more effectively training province and district
level officials had to be ensured. (Memorandum for the Record, January 24; U.S. Army Center of Military History,
DepCORDS/MACV Papers, 103. RD Liaison: 1968)
3. Thieu thinks he is faced with conflicts between three major constituencies:
a. The electorate and the new lower and upper houses.
b. The senior generals who placed him at the head of the ticket in lieu of Ky.
c. The Americans.
4. Thieu, in long conversations with General Forsythe, who has a special relationship with him, seems to understand the
problem only too well--in fact exaggerates the danger of a coup. His approach apparently is to move toward reorganization
very slowly and thus gradually to diminish the powers of his military constituency. Whether he will do this is by no means
certain. That he will proceed with great caution and slow speed is highly likely. In the meantime, the RD Cadre and the
Province RD Chiefs are having a morale crisis. The Junior Officers of the Army are increasingly restive in that nothing has
been done about corruption in the Armed Forces. The Government ministers and ministries feel that they have no authority
to move out on new programs nor are they getting any support from Thieu. The Prime Minister, Loc, is involved in some
kind of a balancing act between Thieu and Ky.
5. This all adds up to an absence of forward motion and an apparent inability to make the basic organizational and
personality decisions which would put the Government on the road. Komer considers this to be intolerable, given the

weight of U.S. investment in blood, dollars and effort. He feels the crunch is coming and that we are very close to the time
when the U.S. must somehow force the GVN to make decisions and move out. All this of course, is a perfect example of
the so-called theory of leverage. There is simply no possibility of applying effective leverage anywhere below the top level
in Saigon with any success unless and until the Bunker/Westmoreland/Komer level has applied adequate leverage at their
level. This view, by the way, is very wide-spread amongst the successively lower echelons in the American military and
civil structure.
6. Given the GVN sensitivity to U.S. activities related to possible negotiations, this may well be as difficult a time as any to
put the heat on the GVN. This does not change the fact that we are close to a time when this nettle must be grasped. It
would be far better to do it now before the press mounts an attack against the GVN for inactivity. There is a current
preoccupation with the likelihood of a major NVA effort in the Northern provinces (probably Khe Sanh) which can probably
be handled from a military standpoint after a number of bloody fights. But in the long run, the immobility of the GVN is the
more serious and most difficult problem. It may be necessary for the U.S. high command in Saigon, not only to make
certain demands to the GVN for specific actions, such as reorganization, but also to involve itself in whatever scenarios
may be necessary to remove the power of the Corps Commanders. Of all the things regarding SVN that should be
worrying Washington now, it is my opinion that this subject should be number one./5/
/5/In a memorandum to the Senior Advisers for each CTZ, January 18, Komer outlined final COMUSMACV-approved
guidelines for the 1968 pacification effort. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 472, MACV Headquarters,
CORDS Office Files, 1966-1969, 1601-04--CORDS Correspondence and Unidentified Files (Folder 2 of 2))
W.E. DePuy
Major General, USA

17. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Roche) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 18, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 6 G (1)a, 12/67-1/68, Talks with Hanoi. Eyes
Only. Received at 3:55 p.m. An attached note from Johnson to Rostow, January 18, 6 p.m., reads: "Raise the question
with the proper people." A handwritten notation reads: "done 1/19/68."
I recognize (and respect up to a point) the attitude that Secretary Rusk, Bill Bundy and others have about "gimmicks" or
"grandstand plays."/2/
/2/On January 4 Roche sent a memorandum to Rostow which reads: "Why not try a little dirty pool and see what happens?
1. We announce that our negotiating team will be in Geneva tomorrow. 2. We announce that there will be an 'unconditional'
bombing pause. 3. We announce that if there is a DRV negotiating team there and that 'productive discussions' are
initiated, and no military advantage is taken of the pause, the 'unconditional' pause will be extended. I don't have much use
for gimmicks, by and large, but this puts the ball in their court." (Ibid., 6 G (1)b, 12/67-1/68, Talks with Hanoi)
Of course, there is a difference between your position and theirs: nobody to my knowledge has ever been elected
Secretary of State.
We are getting butchered in the press for "over-caution" vis--vis negotiations. I have never doubted that the Communists
would throw negotiations into the pot this year as a technique of political warfare (see my attached memo of last March
27)./3/
/3/In the memorandum to the President, March 26, 1967, Roche wrote: "On the basis of various statements that have been
emerging from Hanoi over the past six months, as well as articles in Hoc Tap and other Communist organs in Hanoi, I am
convinced that Ho knows that the road to victory in South Vietnam by overt aggression is closed. He is therefore willing to
shift from overt war to negotiations, with the latter in no way compromising his determination to some day 'unify' Vietnam.
Negotiations are a weapons system at which Ho is an expert (see his performance between the French and the Chinats
from 1946-49 or his 1949-53 moves with the French)." Roche concluded that Ho would initiate negotiations "at the worst
possible time in terms of American internal unity--say on September 1, 1968." (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive
Registry Subject Files, Job 80-R01580R, 273--Vietnam Task Force)
But why can't we play too? Why can't you announce that on January 30 our representatives will be in Djakarta, Rangoon,
Geneva or wherever, that the bombing of North Vietnam will stop (it's Tet anyhow), and that if productive discussions occur

it will not be resumed, etc.

This would put the ball in Hanoi's court--and we could still bomb hell out of the Laotian trails without violating the pledge.
Let "world opinion" focus on Hanoi for a while.
John

18. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, January 18, 1968, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/PACKERS.
Secret; Nodis; Packers. The meeting was held in Harriman's office.
SUBJECT
Vietnam Peace Talks
PARTICIPANTS
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large
Daniel I. Davidson, Special Assistant, S/AH
Corneliu Bogdan, Romanian Ambassador
Ambassador Bogdan told the Governor that Mr. Macovescu today left for Hanoi and that weather permitting he will arrive in
Hanoi on January 22. Bogdan presumed this was Hanoi time. On Tuesday January 23, the Soviet government will be
informed by an authorized representative of the Washington talks and of Macovescu's new mission to Hanoi. Ambassador
Bogdan did not know who the authorized representative would be but thought it would be "probably at the highest level".
When asked what the Russians would be told Bogdan said that he had not been informed exactly but he recalled
Macovescu saying they would be given the gist or a summary of the talks.
Governor Harriman asked if the Ambassador had seen the State of the Union address/2/ which the Governor
characterized as confirming the San Antonio formula. Bogdan replied that he had and saw nothing new in it. The Governor
said that he mentioned the speech because some newspaper commentators said that the U.S. had hardened its stand and
that he wanted the Romanians to know that the U.S. government had not changed its position. Ambassador Bogdan
recalled that Secretary Rusk had said that what he told the Romanians is what counts and not what was said publicly.
Bogdan said the Romanians understand that no advantage is not a condition but a warning.
/2/See Document 13.
The Governor stated that he was authorized to inform the Romanians that there had been no change in the San Antonio
formula. As the Romanians had been frankly told a bombing pause could not continue if Hanoi took advantage of it but the
U.S. was not requiring Hanoi to agree to any conditions in advance.
The Governor referred to the statements by Bo in Paris./3/ Bogdan said that they did not contain anything new and if
anything confirmed what the Romanians had told us. Governor Harriman said that we did not want to get it confused with
the Romanian message.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 4.
Ambassador Bogdan said that yesterday evening after the State of the Union address Murrey Marder of the Washington
Post had called him at home and asked if a high Romanian official was in Washington. Bogdan had said that no such high
official was now here but that the First Deputy Foreign Minister had inspected the Embassy at the beginning of the year.
The Ambassador had asked Marder what made him inquire and Marder had replied that there was an item on this in a
Washington news letter./4/
/4/Telegram 98490 to Bucharest, January 14, instructed DCM Neubert to deliver a message to Ceausescu from Johnson

thanking him for his government's efforts "to bring about an honorable and peaceful solution." (Ibid.) On January 15
Neuber gave the note to Macovescu and informed him that information on the latter's visit to Hanoi the previous December
apparently had leaked out. In response, Macovescu replied that such an occurrence was "understandable" since both the
Soviet and Chinese Governments had been informed of his visit to the DRV. He hoped that the secrecy of his visit to
Washington would be maintained until after his planned trip to Hanoi later in January. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/PACKERS) Despite Macovescu's hopes, the Romanian
Government itself did not maintain secrecy. A January 26 note given to the Department of State by the Apostolic Delegate
Luis Raimondi, reads: "In a special audience with His Holiness, Pope Paul VI, on January 24, 1968, the Prime Minister of
Rumania repeatedly stated that he has reason to believe that if the United States stops bombing North Vietnam, the Hanoi
Government will not take advantage of the situation to reinforce its military power. This information, received by the
Cardinal Secretary of State, is conveyed for whatever interest it may have." (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)

19. Memorandum From the Board of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency, to Director of Central
Intelligence Helms/1/
Washington, January 18, 1968.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80-R01580R, Peace Talks. Secret. An
attached note from Helms to Rostow, January 22, reads: "Here are three copies of an effort on our part to fulfill your
request for an examination of certain hypotheses in connection with Hanoi's intentions. I have sent copies to no one else. If
you want further distribution, please advise me." A second attached note from Smith to Helms, January 18, reads: "This
has been revised after consultation with George Carver, Dean Moor, and DD/I. I believe they are now satisfied with it."
SUBJECT
Alternative Interpretations of Hanoi's Intentions
Introduction
1. There are several hypotheses concerning the progress of the war in coming months and the intentions of the
Communists. Most of them can be argued plausibly, for and against, and can be supported by some evidence. None is
capable of conclusive proof or disproof, mainly because the evidence is either insufficient or can be interpreted in various
and often diametrically opposed ways.
2. For example, there is the question of whether the North Vietnamese are willing to "negotiate." Hanoi has declared that it
"will" talk if the bombing of North Vietnam is stopped. It is idle to say that this represents no change of attitude whatsoever;
it is equally idle to assume that of itself it indicates an early end to the fighting. One may argue, quite plausibly, that Hanoi
has finally comprehended that war against the power of the US can have but one ultimate conclusion, and is now probing
to find out what US terms are. But one may also regard this latest statement simply as another political and psychological
move to encourage dissent in the US and inflame world opinion against Washington.
3. In present circumstances it is true that any of a multitude of things could happen, at almost any time. Hanoi could quit
tomorrow, or at any time thereafter; the Chinese could enter the conflict with their own armed forces in great number;
China could collapse in total chaos; the Soviets could take a far more active role, either in support of Hanoi to continue the
war or in withdrawing such support; the South Vietnamese government and polity could disintegrate; the Sino-Soviet
controversy could become far more or far less acute than it is, and thus change the context of the Vietnam struggle; the
policy of the US government could change in any of a number of ways, and so on.
4. A balanced estimate of the situation cannot rule these and other possibilities wholly out of consideration. The best it can
do is to decide, on the basis of evidence and careful argument, that many of them are so unlikely as to be irrelevant, at
least until more evidence appears, and that others should be held as possible qualifications and correctives in a net
judgment. In the paragraphs that follow we attempt to show how the evidence and arguments may fit or not fit into
alternative estimates of the prospects in Vietnam.
5. There are three hypotheses under which the situation in Vietnam may be considered and to which most of the evidence
may be related: (1) Hanoi has decided that it must terminate the fighting in the course of this year; (2) Hanoi still feels a
good measure of confidence in its prospects and firmly intends to fight on until it perceives a break in its favor in US policy;
(3) Hanoi is less certain of its prospects and is keeping several options open. It intends to continue hard fighting in the
months ahead, but recognizes it may be advisable to seek a compromise solution within the next year, according to the
way things develop.

I. Pessimism in Hanoi
6. The more solid evidence supporting the proposition that Hanoi intends to quit at an early date comes from an analysis of
Communist prospects in South Vietnam. According to our view of the data, the leaders in Hanoi could conclude that their
prospects in South Vietnam are steadily and surely diminishing. The toll on their forces is increasingly heavy; their losses
cannot be reduced without undermining the effectiveness of their military and political operations; recruitment in South
Vietnam is becoming more and more difficult, control over the population is diminishing, and morale is becoming more of a
problem as the war continues without conclusive results. Even though such problems may not yet be critical, the overall
effect is that the Communist position will be weaker at the end of 1968 than it is now. Military action can arrest the decline
but cannot change it fundamentally.
7. Proceeding from this analysis, Hanoi's current efforts on the military and political fronts can be seen as one last push to
gain the best possible terms in an early settlement. For example, it can be argued that Hanoi would not intentionally seek
the bloody and costly battles that it has, unless it knew that the fighting would end fairly soon and replacements would not
be a problem. Hanoi would not, under this hypothesis, commit part of its strategic reserve, unless it believed there would
be no real threat of an invasion from the US. Nor would the North Vietnamese claim that 1968 would be "decisive" and
lead to the formation of a "coalition" government unless they actually anticipated an early political settlement.
8. There are, of course, various other considerations or factors which could cause Hanoi to seek an early end to the
fighting; some of these have some evidential base. Perhaps the burden of the war on North Vietnam is in itself a decisive
factor. The leadership may find that the annual loss of young men, added to the sum of economic and material damage, is
unacceptable in its implications for the future vigor and productivity of the nation. Our own view, however, based on a
variety of sources and buttressed by the recent testimony of the Spanish repatriates, is that the strains of the war on North
Vietnam are still well within manageable limits.
9. There are other possibilities which are no better than sheer conjecture, but which cannot be entirely excluded. For
example, it could be that Moscow, concerned over a decline in Communist strength in Vietnam, a possible US invasion of
the north, and greater Chinese involvement and influence in North Vietnam, is exerting pressure on Hanoi to end the war.
Such pressure could have taken the form of a threat to terminate major military aid after the completion of the deliveries
negotiated this past fall along with a promise to provide substantial aid for economic development once the fighting stops.
10. Pressures from Peking could also be responsible for a decision to end the fighting. The Chinese, for example, might
have made their continued aid conditional on Hanoi's acceptance of Chinese advice on both military and political strategy.
11. Neither of these conjectures can be supported by any available evidence. Indeed, Peking and especially Moscow have
appeared reluctant in the past to apply direct and heavy pressures on Hanoi; neither wants to force Hanoi into the embrace
of the other. While Moscow, unlike Peking, is not committed to prolongation of the war, it has always seen some
advantages in the fighting and has demonstrated no willingness to intervene with Hanoi in favor of early negotiations.
12. Alternatively, Hanoi may have concluded that the Sino-Soviet dispute will undermine effective aid. The USSR may be
refusing to ship certain weapons through China, or to risk delivery by sea. Hanoi may anticipate that one of the Communist
giants will insist that it take a clear cut stand in the dispute; this would place Hanoi in the position of alienating at least one
side.
13. Another possibility is that the North Vietnamese leaders may have concluded that turmoil and disruption in China make
it a poor prospect as a "reliable rear area." Hanoi may fear that China's antics are encouraging the US to escalate the war
without fear of Chinese reactions. And Hanoi might even fear that the time will come when the Chinese will insist that North
Vietnam begin its own "cultural revolution."
14. There is, of course, evidence of Hanoi's concern over the Sino-Soviet dispute and over China's internal policy. Last
year the North Vietnamese Politburo and Central Committee apparently passed a resolution affirming Hanoi's neutrality in
the dispute. Missions were sent to both Moscow and Peking to explain this position, which has been continually reemphasized. At one point last year, Hanoi apparently had to become directly involved in ensuring that Soviet supplies
transited more expeditiously through China. Hanoi also reacted to Mao's cultural revolution by issuing a fairly pointed
criticism of Chinese behavior and the cult of Mao. Added to these concerns is the fairly open record of Chinese opposition
to any hint of talks between Hanoi and the United States.
15. What is lacking, however, is any evidence that the tensions with China or the concern over Soviet support have
reached the level where Hanoi would fear Soviet or Chinese disengagement. The physical evidence suggests that both
Peking and Moscow are in fact increasing their aid.

16. If for any of the reasons discussed under this hypothesis Hanoi should decide to end the fighting, it would have at least
two alternatives. It could simply decide to allow the conflict to die down, without seeking a political resolution. Or it could
attempt to obtain the best possible terms for a settlement under the existing circumstances. In this latter case, the recent
Trinh statement on talks with the US could be read as the first step in the gradual development of a negotiating position.
The North Vietnamese, of course, would still bargain for favorable terms, but they would also recognize the need to be
more forthcoming and to reduce their demands for a settlement. It would also make sense under this interpretation for
Hanoi to get negotiations underway before rather than after the American elections, reasoning that during an election
campaign it would have more room for maneuvering against the US. Hanoi's handling of the follow up to the Trinh
interview will be a test for this hypothesis; if it is correct confirmatory evidence should become available before long.
II. Confidence in Hanoi
17. The North Vietnamese may be more impressed with their achievements in the past two years than with the problems
they have encountered. They have withstood the massive American intervention in the South and the heavy bombing of
the North. Despite the bombing, they now fight with more and better arms and ammunition, and their supply lines are more
elaborately developed. The political infrastructure in the South has been maintained, even if in somewhat weakened
condition. Their military effort, based on the increasing threat from the border areas, not only presents a new challenge to
the US on the ground but also introduces new political complications for the Americans. Finally, of course, because of their
experience with the ebb and flow of the French war, the natural inclination of the political leaders would be to exaggerate
their own strength and expect the US to concede defeat rather than face the prospect of a protracted war.
18. Hanoi's determination to keep fighting could also be explained by what it believes are fundamental weaknesses in the
American and South Vietnamese position. The Communists may be convinced that the Saigon regime has little chance of
becoming an effective government, generally accepted by the people. Moreover, Hanoi may be persuaded that the South
Vietnamese army will never develop into a fighting force which is effective enough to assume part of the US burden. Thus,
even if the US military effort is highly successful, in the end the US will find it has no political base in South Vietnam and
will be forced to conclude a political settlement with the Front.
19. Even if Hanoi does not read the situation in South Vietnam in this way, it may be relying on assurances of substantial
external support which will enable the Communists to fight on effectively. The Chinese may have promised more logistical
and air defense troops and even some combat units in order to meet any manpower needs in North Vietnam. The Soviets
may have promised new weapons to cope with superior American fire power and the air and naval attacks on the North.
20. Perhaps the best evidence in support of this general interpretation of Hanoi's outlook is the record of the past two
years. At each phase of the US buildup Hanoi has been willing to respond by committing additional resources to the
struggle in the South. A high level of infiltration has been maintained; the most recent deployments near the western end of
the DMZ may express a determination not only to persist in the war, but to try for a decisive defeat of the US in some local
battle. Hanoi's leaders have not taken advantage of several opportunities for negotiations; this could mean that they
believe nothing can be gained at the bargaining table unless it has already been won on the battlefield. Finally, a
commitment to fight a protracted war was the main decision of the North Vietnamese Central Committee resolution of late
1965, was reaffirmed by the Central Committee in early 1967, and continues to be cited as basic policy.
21. As to evidence of external support, Hanoi has recently concluded a series of new agreements with its Communist
allies. Moscow has openly promised a variety of weapons; Soviet coastal defense missiles could be the first of several new
items on the list. New Chinese weapons have shown up in the Delta for the first time in the war. We know of no increases
in Chinese troop strength in North Vietnam in recent months. Recent high level reaffirmations of pledges to support Hanoi,
however, could be read as a willingness to increase Chinese commitments. And air defense cooperation between Hanoi
and Peking has grown markedly in recent months.
22. We know of no evidence that is totally inconsistent with an intention to continue the war for some considerable period
of time. Nevertheless, it can be argued that Hanoi would never draw down its home army and weaken the defense of North
Vietnam if it looked forward to a long war, particularly in light of continuing concern over an American invasion. And it could
be further argued that Hanoi would not tell the troops in the South that this would be a "decisive" year, if in fact it believed
the war was likely to continue well beyond 1968. Finally, why Hanoi would want to keep alive hopes for negotiations,
aggravating the Chinese in the process, if it had no intention of reaching a political settlement in the near future?
23. If Hanoi's mood and outlook is roughly as assumed under this hypothesis then its attitude toward peace talks is likely to
be intransigent. Upon exploration, moves like the recent Trinh statement will come to nothing. Hanoi, of course, would
welcome an end to the bombing, but will adamantly refuse to pay any price for it. Negotiations would be mainly to register
the defeat of the US and the end of the Saigon regime.
24. Finally, one may conjecture that Hanoi's postulated confidence rests on some factor or event which is not yet apparent

to the US, such as a major escalation by the Communists. This might take the form of a military offensive in Laos which
would threaten to expand the area of conflict and further strain US resources in Southeast Asia. Or escalation might take
the form of Chinese moves in Vietnam or elsewhere around its periphery. Or again, the North Vietnamese could be relying
on the USSR to create a diversionary crisis, say in Berlin.
25. Such possibilities have been carefully considered almost since the beginning of the US intervention in Vietnam. Thus
far, there is no persuasive evidence that Hanoi, Peking or Moscow intends to enlarge the war beyond Vietnam or take
major action elsewhere against the US.
III. Suspended Judgment in Hanoi
26. The third hypothesis assumes that Hanoi's estimate of the situation is based on a mixture of increased pessimism and
continuing confidence, which are compounded by other factors, particularly the American elections. Under this hypothesis
Hanoi is keeping several options open and will continue to do so at least until late spring or summer, when it should be in a
better position to judge the effect of the American primaries and conventions and the results of its own military offensive. At
that time Hanoi will also be better able to judge the effectiveness and durability of the Saigon government.
27. If this is so, Hanoi's winter-spring offensive is designed not only for its immediate military objectives but for its overall
impact on the US. Hanoi would recognize that its chances for a military victory have evaporated, but it would still hope, by
sustaining high levels of combat in the months ahead, to create the impression of a stalemate. It would not expect the US
to capitulate, but it would see increased chances for a compromise on terms that would protect the Viet Cong infrastructure
and provide the basis for a new political phase in the revolutionary struggle. Hanoi could not be confident of what the
outcome of its own efforts will be. But it would recognize that the next twelve months provide an unusual opportunity
because of the American elections.
28. Even if political overtures combined with military pressures do not bear fruit, Hanoi could reason that by agitating the
question of a coalition government and contacts with the Front, the strains between Washington and Saigon will grow and
the US will come under increasing international pressures to modify its own terms. In short, Hanoi would do what it could to
maintain its military pressures, but would at the same time become more flexible in its diplomacy, waiting for some months
more to decide whether to make the best deal possible, continue the war more or less along present lines, or even to
adopt a radically different way of fighting, i.e., guerrilla warfare.
29. This hypothesis rests on a different reading of much of the same evidence already cited. Hanoi has made military
decisions which strike some observers as inexplicable given the nature of their problems. Hanoi cannot possibly hope to
drive the US into the sea and probably cannot expect another Dien Bien Phu. Thus, it would seem better advised to
conserve its forces for a protracted war in which it would hope to sap the will of the US. Instead, the North Vietnamese
commit more troops and seek costly battles. Moreover, since last July they do seem to have indicated more interest in
maintaining private contacts with the US and, in some cases, actually inviting US negotiating probes--moves which their
rather rigid public position would not justify.
30. This hypothesis is supported by some negative evidence. For example, why should China be so cool to the new
program of the NLF unless Peking senses that the revision of the program was a step toward a negotiating situation? Why
did the Front try to send representatives to New York, if as Hanoi claims the UN has absolutely no business in the Vietnam
question? And, above all, why do the captured documents contain intriguing tidbits suggesting that the war may not go
beyond 1968? These contradictions or inconsistencies could be reconciled within the framework of this third hypothesis.
31. Uncertainty could also grow out of the state of relations with China and the USSR. In actual fact we know little of
Hanoi's relations with its allies. What we do know is based on glimmerings from captured documents, deductions from
overt statements and an occasional hint from Soviet sources. In any case, Hanoi cannot be very confident that Moscow
and Peking will not fall into an even more bitter conflict, or that the situation inside China will not deteriorate further.
Indeed, Hanoi could conclude that it would be better to explore US terms for a political settlement while China is still in
some disarray rather than later, when the Chinese leadership might be reunified and tempted to interfere more directly in
Hanoi's affairs.
32. Indications of uncertainty could also be reconciled with an even more extreme variant of this hypothesis, namely, that
the North Vietnamese Politburo is badly divided and is pursuing an indecisive and at times contradictory policy. Perhaps,
as Ho Chi Minh's health has declined, factionalism has reared its ugly head and led to a fairly even split between hawks
and doves. Both factions could seek comfort and support from abroad, the hawks from Peking and the doves from
Moscow. The hawks may insist on the need for further intensive military effort while the doves could be arguing for a shift
to political tactics.
33. Though there is some evidence that the North Vietnamese leaders have engaged in debates over policy, mainly on the

proper military tactics, there has never been sufficient evidence to conclude that the leadership is divided on basic policies
of whether to fight or quit. A power struggle in Hanoi, of course, is a possibility after Ho and could be developing now. But
the evidence is lacking, and this explanation of Hanoi's behavior seems highly unlikely.
34. Even less likely but still within the reach of the imaginable is a split between the Viet Cong and Hanoi. As Hanoi has
assumed more of the burden and direction of the war, it may have alienated a faction within COSVN. The Viet Cong could
argue, with support from certain figures in the Hanoi leadership, that all talk of negotiations is defeatism. Hanoi may
suspect a Chinese bent in the Viet Cong., etc., etc. There may be actual divergencies between Hanoi and some of the Viet
Cong leaders, but a real split should be excluded as unlikely.
35. As noted at the outset of this discussion we cannot rule out any of these three hypothetical explanations for Hanoi's
behavior. It would certainly not be surprising if the North Vietnamese continued the war through next year and for some
time afterward. It would be more surprising if they decided to end it soon. We believe there is much to recommend the third
case: in the months ahead Hanoi will continue its military effort but will probe more intently to discover what the shape of a
political settlement might be.
For the Board of National Estimates:
Abbot Smith
Chairman

20. Memorandum for Record/1/

Palm Desert, California, January 18, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, President Eisenhower [1965-1968] [1 of 2]. Secret.
Prepared by General Goodpaster on January 22.
SUBJECT
Meeting with General Eisenhower, Palm Desert, 18 January
I met with General Eisenhower for two hours at his office and his home at Palm Desert on 18 January.
I began with a report on the progress of the war. In recent weeks, the VC and NVA have been making an unusual military
effort, and taking very heavy losses--3,000 and 2,200 in the last two weeks. Documents have been captured which call for
an immediate or "final" effort by all units. The general pattern continues to show Communist losses more than 5 times as
great as the losses to U.S., Allied and ARVN forces combined.
Next I gave a rsum in some detail of the principal US/ARVN operational efforts now going on and envisaged for the near
future, including ground/air operations in SVN (by Corps area), ground activities relating to Laos and Cambodia, naval
operations in the Vietnam area, B-52 operations, Air operations against NVN, Air operations in Laos, the anti-infiltration
system, and revolutionary development operations in SVN.
Next I covered a few points of special note. There is an enemy concentration which may total 3 NVA divisions in the Khe
Sanh area which is being closely watched. Also there is enemy preparation for possible renewed action in the Dak To
area. Next, I reported recently obtained VC reports that in Quang Tri and Quang Nam, the Communist organization is
being "stunted" by US/SVN military operations, and that in areas of Phu Yen, cadre and infrastructure are disintegrating;
also an NVN report indicates that North Vietnam is hurting from the bombing attacks and suffering losses, some of which
are irreplaceable.
I then passed on a report that the NVN had conducted a remarkably well coordinated supply operation during Christmas
week. Trucks observed in Route Package 1, other than Christmas Day, ranged from 3 to 95 (averaging 44) and
waterborne logistic craft from 0 to 43 (averaging 17); on Christmas Day 547 trucks and 325 waterborne logistic craft were
sighted. On the same day between Thanh Hoa and Dong Hoi 900 trucks were sighted, 888 moving south (carrying an
estimated 4,000 tons). General Eisenhower thought these were significant figures and asked why these figures are not
better known. I told him that figures like these had been made public, and there had been some press coverage, although
not with the emphasis he had in mind. (I indicated that I could not speak about TV coverage.) He said he thought that
photographs should be taken and publicized in case of any future suspension. I told him this has been done in the past,
and that in the discussions I have heard concerning possible future bombing halts there was strong insistence on the need
to provide photo reconnaissance.

I next reported on Chieu Hoi returnees in 1967. The number--some 27,000--was less than had been estimated when the
year began, but was 34% over 1966. Of the 27,000, some 17,000 were military, the equivalent of 2 Communist divisions or
about one-fifth of the total VC/NVA killed or captured in 1967 (91,000). Political returnees numbered nearly 8,000 of whom
4,700 were infrastructure or party organizers. General Eisenhower asked whether some of these may be VC agents. I told
him that they are screened, and that in fact some of the returnees are used with patrols that seek out, propagandize, and
call in air and artillery strikes on the units from which they came.
General Eisenhower commented that the TV coverage of our bases that are hit by mortar fire is damaging to our people's
understanding of the war. The presentations are highly dramatic and shocking in their effect. I told him that a great deal of
patrolling, which is often successful, goes into protecting our bases against mortar fire, and that some attacking groups
have been detected and attacked by air and artillery. This, of course, cannot be shown as graphically on TV and in the
press as the attacks on our bases.
I next reported upon the widespread SVN concern over "coalition", as the background for General Thieu's recent
statement. Ambassador Bunker had reported rising concern in SVN that the U.S. might be shifting to favor coalition, and
had suggested that this should be scotched. Also, Mr. Rostow told me that there was a great deal of talk and worry about
this in SVN, much of which seemed to be starting with the VC. The latter, according to captured documents, is pushing the
coalition issue in its propaganda (and linking the U.S. to the idea) while calling for a special round of combat effort. I said
Mr. Rostow had told me that our government does not favor coalition; this is simply VC propaganda. General Eisenhower
said that a coalition would be undesirable and dangerous and we should oppose it. I also mentioned that Mr. Rostow
believes there is some evidence of a shift in the view the Communists have held that time is on their side. General
Eisenhower thought such a shift would be highly significant.
Next I took up the status of the possible NVN "peace feeler" involved in the shift from "could" to "will", covering points
provided to me by General Wheeler. We do not know what the NVN objective may be--whether they are serious, want a
respite, seek a psychological coup, etc., or whether their shift on "permanent" cessation is somehow an indirect assurance
they will not take advantage of a bombing halt.
During discussion, General Eisenhower cited his experience first with the Italian surrender and later with the German
surrender. He advised not to rely on "iffy" favorable interpretations, but to insist upon more frank and clear-cut statements
(which may, of course, be made privately). Even then, he said, we must not put ourselves in the position of depending
upon belief in what a Communist says. Whatever is worked out must be self-enforcing. I told him that these questions, and
others like them, are being very carefully studied within the government, and that a great deal of thought is being given to
them. There seems to be considerable recognition that the key issue is whether the NVN is ready, or can be led, to give up
its efforts at take-over of SVN by force. Also, that if bombing is stopped, it could prove very difficult to start up again. This
underlies the cautious and careful approach that is being made.
Next he said that if the NVN is in fact weakening its position, now is the time to hit them harder. He mentioned B-52 attacks
on enemy forces and bases in SVN, and I told him that an expansion of effort is envisaged currently. Also, he thought we
should hit the enemy with our ground forces, and should encourage the SVN to go after him with special aggressiveness at
this time. The enemy might, as suggested, be making a great military effort in order to impose losses on us, and advance
his advantages in going into negotiations. We should do much the same.
He said he hoped that we could get an effective armistice. To that end, now may be the time to increase our combat effort.
He commented that this will be a partisan and political year, but that there is nothing partisan in his views when the lives of
U.S. military men are involved. He said he wants to see the President win the war.
G.
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

21. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
CM-2927-68
Washington, January 20, 1968.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, VIET 092.2.
Top Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: "Sec Def has seen."

SUBJECT
Tet Stand down
1. This responds to a request from Mr. Walt W. Rostow for General Westmoreland's rationale behind his recommendation
for a 36-hour Tet stand down. In requesting General Westmoreland's views, I provided to him a summary of the rationale
which the Joint Staff prepared for me on this question./2/ This was provided to Mr. Steadman, OSD (ISA) and Department
of State on 18 January. General Westmoreland agreed with that rationale and the logistical data therein. His comments are
reflected below:
/2/Attached to a January 18 memorandum from Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense William Lang to McNamara was a
draft Presidential memorandum recommending only a 36-hour Tet holiday truce, a paper arguing the military advantages
of reducing the stand-down, and an undated estimate from the DIA which suggested that the North Vietnamese could
infiltrate as much as an additional 10,000 tons of material southward during the 12-hour difference. (Ibid., OSD Files: FRC
330 72 A 1499, Vietnam 381, Jan-April 1968) In a memorandum for the record, January 16, Westmoreland discussed a
conversation he had with Thieu the previous day in which they decided upon a 36-hour truce for the RVNAF (from 1800 on
January 29 to 0600 on January 31). However, all U.S. troops would be on alert, as would 50 percent of the ARVN.
(Johnson Library, William C. Westmoreland Papers, #28 History File) The truce was shortened the next day; 8 days later,
the truce was canceled for CTZ I.
a. Holiday ceasefires have been unilaterally established, together with rules of conduct, by both the enemy and ourselves.
However, our respective objectives are unrelated. The record is replete with documented evidence that the enemy's intent
and actions have been consistently contrary to any peaceful objectives. Hanoi has directed the truce periods be fully
exploited for improving the communist military posture.
b. Free World casualties sustained during truce periods are but slightly less than during non-truce conflict. Hence, there
can be no sense of security or safety for the people of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) for the enjoyment of holidays,
whether ceasefire periods are established or not. On the other hand, the aggressor in this conflict and his people suffer no
similar limitations while pursuing their mockery of our concessions.
c. For so long as Hanoi persists in its direction and support of the war in RVN, our air interdiction efforts in North Vietnam
(NVN) are indispensable to both the defense of RVN and the achievement of an early and acceptable negotiations
posture. The expense in men and planes has fallen very heavily on the United States. Bombing pauses, however brief, are
capitalized on fully to rebuild the essential elements of the NVN logistics system which we have so painstakingly disrupted.
It would be unfortunate if our costly, necessary, and yet restrained air interdiction program were nullified by the concession
of unilateral privileges which can be accurately forecast as being unproductive.
d. The enemy is presently developing a threatening posture in several areas in order to seek victories essential to
achieving prestige and bargaining power. He may exercise his initiatives prior to, during or after Tet. It is altogether
possible that he has planned to complete his offensive preparations during the Free World ceasefire. He has used past
truce periods for this purpose and can be expected to do so again. We shall do all possible to restrict the movement of
men and materials by the enemy in RVN during the ceasefire through advance positioning of our forces.
e. President Thieu and General Vien do not question the advisability of keeping ceasefires to the shortest possible time
periods, and they recognize the wholly unilateral aspect of the holiday truces. They do, nevertheless, feel bound to at least
a token observance of this most important of Vietnam holidays. However, they do not propose standing down the war for
the full run of the traditional Tet celebration; this out of frank recognition of the severe penalties of imposing unwarranted
trust in an enemy whose duplicity in such actions is so well established.
f. In summary, the longer the truce the greater the cost to us and to our Allies in lives, material and probably the duration of
the war. It has been conclusively demonstrated that holiday truces of whatever length will not have any mollifying effect
upon the enemy. The additional 12 hours (to 48 hours) will offer the Vietnamese people nothing in the form of safety or
respite from the communists. It would seem that the additional 12 hours will serve only the purpose of the enemy, with no
reciprocal benefits to us.
2. Admiral Sharp, in response to my request for his views on this matter, strongly recommended that the Tet ceasefire
period be of the shortest possible duration, no more than 36 hours, to permit the enemy the shortest possible period to
refurbish and reposition his forces. The additional 12 hours permitted by a 48 hour stand down would allow a very
considerable increase in supply movement south and can only result in additional casualties to friendly forces.
3. Copies of this memorandum are being provided to Deputy Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Mr. Walt W.
Rostow, and OSD (ISA).

Earle G. Wheeler

22. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, January 23, 1968, 8:30-9:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Confidential. The meeting was held in the White House.
Those present at the meeting were the President; Vice President Humphrey; Senators Mansfield, Russell Long, Robert
Byrd, McCormack, and Albert; Representative Hale Boggs; and several White House officials. (Ibid., President's Daily
Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH
THE DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP
The President said U.S. forces are moving in reinforcements to prepare for a major concentrated attack around Khesanh.
The President said that the Communists are making a major build up in this area./2/
/2/The NVA siege of Khe Sanh began on January 22. In a telephone conversation with the President at 8:27 a.m. that
morning, McNamara reported: "You undoubtedly know that we think the long-expected attack on Khe Sanh in South
Vietnam has been initiated. Substantial artillery and mortar fire and ground action is taking place there. General
Westmoreland believes he is fully prepared to meet it." (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone
Conversation Between Johnson and McNamara, January 22, 8:27 a.m., Tape F68.01, Side A, PNO 5)
The President described the capture this morning of a U.S. communication ship off the coast of North Korea. He said
confidentially that early reports indicated that several U.S. Navy personnel had been wounded as a result of the incident.
There may have been shots fired. The ship was surrounded by North Korean boats and forced to port. He said this could
develop into a major international problem./3/
/3/Reference is to the North Korean seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo.
The President said the U.S. Government and the South Vietnamese government are doing all they can to get Hanoi to
discuss peace. "Hanoi changed from would and could to will talk, but they will not say when. They will not discuss anything
but North Vietnam. They will not talk unless we cease all military activities. We must know what ceasing all military
activities really means."
The President said the U.S. Government thinks it has caught the Soviets paying off some of the anti-war people in this
country.
The President said U.S. troops crossed into Cambodia yesterday trying to protect themselves. There was no way to avoid
this in effort to save their own lives. The Vice President said he was sorry that Secretary Rusk had to apologize for the
incident. The President said it is really a question that we cannot violate even one inch of territorial integrity./4/
/4/In a February 1 memorandum to Calhoun, General Phillip Davidson, head of MACV intelligence, submitted the final
report of his investigation on the border episode. The report was transmitted to the Department in airgram A-406 from
Saigon, February 8. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S) On
January 22 Rusk expressed regret over the crossing into Cambodian territory by allied forces during a clash with the
enemy. See The New York Times, January 23, 1968. For background, see footnote 4, Document 14.
The President said there could be a major upsurge in infiltration in the next quarter. The increased intensity of enemy
activity indicates a major effort. Intelligence reports show a great similarity between what is happening at Khesanh and
what happened at Dien Bien Phu. The President said there is no firm indication that North Vietnam will back down on any
of its conditions.
The President said that there is a rapid deterioration of the strength of the Viet Cong. They are having to replace their
manpower with North Vietnamese. The current campaign is a short-term surge effort designed to gain political advantages.

The President reviewed the last 48 hours. Reports show that a full scale attack on Khesanh is imminent. There also is a
strong possibility of attack on Camp Carroll and multi-battalion attacks on Danang. In addition, country-wide terrorism is
expected with attack on Pleiku and enemy violence in and around Saigon.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]

23. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, January 23, 1968, 12:58-2:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. Those attending the meeting were the
President, Rusk, McNamara, Clifford, Rostow, Helms, Wheeler, Christian, and Tom Johnson. (Ibid., President's Daily
Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S TUESDAY
NATIONAL SECURITY LUNCH
[Omitted here is discussion of the Pueblo crisis, printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXIX, Part 1, Document
213.]
The President said he thinks that this incident is related to the whole picture. He said he would not be surprised if
something happened in Berlin to coincide with what is going on in Vietnam and in Korea.
The President asked if we were confident of our situation around Khesanh.
The President asked General Wheeler if we had given General Westmoreland everything he needed.
General Westmoreland said, yes, sir.
General Wheeler said Westmoreland is confident of being able to handle the problem in Khesanh. He said that reenforcements have been sent into the area and the weather is not continuously bad. Even in the event of bad weather
there is sufficient artillery. In addition, the ARVN have sent a Ranger Battalion to the area to make this a joint effort.
The President pointed out that we have had a very good press from Saigon in the last two or three weeks.
Rostow said General Sidle is an excellent man who is moving the ARVN out front in the press. General Wheeler said Sidle
has a good program and also is making Westmoreland more prominent in the news.
The President asked if anybody had heard from Senator Ted Kennedy on the refugee study./2/ Walt Rostow said he had
not.
/2/Kennedy visited Vietnam to investigate refugee and medical care programs. Johnson saw Kennedy at a meeting for
Democratic members of the Congressional labor committees on the morning of January 23, and asked to meet him the
next day. In an off-the-record session on January 24, 11:35 a.m.-12:35 p.m., the President met with Kennedy, his
administrative assistant David Burke, and Leonhart to discuss the Vietnam visit. (Ibid.) Notes of the meeting have not been
found. Kennedy discussed his visit in a January 25 speech delivered at the World Affairs Council in Boston. In the speech,
Kennedy suggested that many leaders in the U.S. military in Vietnam would support the enactment of a defensive enclavelike strategy that emphasized holding onto the heavily populated areas. See The New York Times, January 26, 1968.
Secretary McNamara said he saw a preliminary report from the field. Based on the questions asked, it appears the report
will emphasize excessive fire from allied weapons is resulting in civilian casualties and refugees.
Walt Rostow asked should the incident be referred to the United Nations, involving the ship.
The President said this would be protective and would show a lack of malice on our part.

Secretary Rusk said we might like to take this to the Security Council. First, we should see what comes from the Mixed
Armistice Commission./3/
/3/Reference is to the armistice commission deliberating on the Pueblo.
Director Helms said the Soviets have their own ships of this kind including two ships off the Korean coast to keep an eye
on the Red Chinese. In addition, they have one ship off Guam.
With reference to the expected enemy offensive near Khesanh, General Wheeler said General Momyer is coordinating all
air support.
Secretary McNamara said that the anti-personnel barrier has been defended for use around Khesanh.
General Wheeler said that "gravel" (ammunition used to blow up personnel) will be placed in the area tomorrow.
The President read portions of General Westmoreland's cable outlining developments in the area and the potential
terrorism which is expected in Saigon./4/
/4/Reference is to telegram MAC 01049 to Wheeler, January 22, in which Westmoreland concluded: "The bulk of our
evidence suggests that the enemy is conducting a short-term surge effort, possibly designed to improve his chances of
gaining his ends through political means, perhaps through negotiations leading to some form of coalition
government." (U.S. Army Center for Military History, William C. Westmoreland Papers, #29 History File)
[Omitted here is discussion of the Military Assistance Program and the provision of arms to Jordan.]

24. Telegram From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson/1/

Washington, January 24, 1968, 0530Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, United Kingdom, Vol. 7. Secret.
CAP 80370. We have given a careful reading to your record of the current discussion and much appreciate your letting us
see it./2/
/2/In telegram T.33/68, January 24, Wilson described his efforts to devise a communiqu with Kosygin, part of which
related to Vietnam. Despite having been briefed by Bundy about the existence of a "channel of communication" with Hanoi
(although the fact that it was through the Romanians was not disclosed), the Prime Minister complained that his being in
the dark had made his task more difficult. In addition, Wilson noted Kosygin's desire for him to make contact with the DRV
Embassy in Moscow. (Ibid.) Bundy's report on his briefing of Wilson is in telegrams 5726 and 5728 from London, both
January 20. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET) A
backgrounder on Bundy's mission is in telegram 101274 to Saigon, January 19. (Ibid.)
We are a bit puzzled about just what Kosygin has in mind. Over a year ago Secretary Rusk asked Gromyko for advice
about which of the capitals in reasonably friendly relations with Moscow would be the most appropriate and reliable contact
with Hanoi. Gromyko quite categorically stated "Moscow. The others are of no value." In the most recent period, however,
it has been our very strong impression that Moscow was not interested in working seriously in Hanoi for a peaceful
settlement. If that was their view, we thought we ought to accommodate them.
One can never be sure about contacts involving third parties. In this instance, however, we have every reason to believe
that we are in such contact with Pham Van Dong and Trinh, the Foreign Minister. This derives both from internal evidence
in what has allegedly been said and from external evidence in the consistency between what has been said privately, what
has been said publicly by Hanoi and by reasonable interpretations of a great deal of diplomatic gossip in a number of
capitals involving Hanoi's representatives.
It is probable that Moscow knows the channel and does not particularly like it. After all, Moscow's own prestige could be
involved. It may be that Hanoi is somewhat evasive with Moscow because of Hanoi's problem with Peking. There is always
the possibility, whatever the intermediary might be, that we are being hoodwinked. But we are protecting ourselves against

being hoodwinked. For example, the bombing has not been stopped.
It is curious that Kosygin seems to feel strongly about the channel but has nothing to say on the substance. We have had
nothing from your talks with him or with Brezhnev indicating what Moscow is prepared to do on the assumption that we are
prepared to stop the bombing within the framework of the San Antonio formula.
We have followed our own contact closely, know where he is and when he will get back. We expect to see him or hear
from him again before the end of the month. We have even done one or two little things as a contribution to his safety and
comfort while on his mission.
If Kosygin, unexpectedly, wishes to talk about the issues in substance we would be glad to know what he has in mind. He
knows our own view, he knows our address and we have had nothing from him.
We concur in your judgment that perhaps you yourself should not see the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Moscow but
we have no particular problem about your Ambassador, or indeed our Ambassador, seeing this individual to listen although
we would not ourselves wish to direct any message through that channel at the present time. We say this because we
have tried on other occasions and have gotten nothing but bruises for our efforts.
Trying to answer your specific questions, we don't know who is taking whom for a ride except that we don't intend to be the
victim. It is possible that Hanoi is dealing somewhat at arm's length with Moscow because of the Peking problem. It is
entirely possible that Kosygin is trying to sell you something and it would be habitual for him to try to persuade you that we
are trying to sell you something. In this case, I have no doubt that he would like to get a tender morsel on Viet-Nam in the
communiqu. What is perhaps more ominous is that Moscow may be playing a spoiling game in Hanoi because of their
irritations with the present procedure.
Our inclination would be to play our hand out on the present line to see where we get. If that gets nowhere and Moscow is
ready to play the next chapter, we won't object if they smirk a bit and say "we told you so." I do hope that you can keep
your position as co-chairman intact when it comes to the communiqu because there will be a lot of people engaged in
defending South Viet-Nam who need to have confidence that at least one of the co-chairmen is playing it straight./3/
/3/In an unnumbered personal telegram for the President, January 24, Wilson expressed thanks for Johnson's message,
which "arrived just in time to arm me for what proved a classic Kremlin battle over the passage on Vietnam in the
communiqu." He reported that the Soviets had unsuccessfully "fought with total intransigence for a formula which would
have had us denounce outside (i.e. American) interference and declare that any settlement should be based on the right of
local peoples to solve their internal affairs without it." In addition, while Wilson could not get the communiqu tied to the
San Antonio and Trinh formulas, he did manage to have the Geneva agreements referenced. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Head of State Correspondence, United Kingdom, Vol. 7) In a further report on his discussions in Moscow, in
an unnumbered personal telegram to the President, January 29, Wilson elaborated on his impressions of the Soviet mood:
"I cannot help feeling that their real dilemma is how to strike a satisfactory balance in their own minds between, on the one
hand, the requirements of their global relationship with yourselves and their determination not to get involved in a conflict
with you; and, on the other hand, a blend of gut-reaction against (as they would see it) any attempt by the capitalist world
to eliminate a socialist state and of plain fear that any open let up on their part will weaken their effort to retain leadership
of the world communist movement." (Ibid.) For the official British record of Wilson's meetings at the Kremlin, see Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series III, Vol. I: Britain and the Soviet Union, 1968-72,
pp. 14-22.

25. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, January 24, 1968, 1215Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret;
Immediate; Nodis. Received at 9:10 a.m. The telegram is printed in full in Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 302315.
16850. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my thirty-sixth weekly message.
A. General

1. In this message, I should like to give a general assessment of some of the problems we shall be facing in 1968 and how
we propose to cope with them. We will, of course, be dealing with them and reporting on them in a more specific manner
as time goes on, but I thought it would be useful to give a rather general view of the situation ahead as we see it now.
2. I think one general observation is in order. As a result of a number of elections held since September 1966, and with our
encouragement, the Vietnamese have adopted a democratic, constitutional form of government with the institutions which
normally pertain to it, executive, legislative, and judicial. It marks the transition from a recent military form, and historically
an authoritarian form of government to democratic institutions. It is a form of government with which the Vietnamese have
had virtually no experience. A senator said to me last week: "We must make our new government work, but it will be
difficult because while we have a history of 4,000 years, we have no tradition of democracy." The fact that the basic
structures have been built and representative institutions constructed out of near chaos and are beginning to function is in
itself quite a remarkable achievement. But the question we have to look to in the coming year is how well and how rapidly
they can be made to operate.
3. I believe we shall have to face the fact that in many instances action will be less rapid than under the previous
government which could rule by decree. The views of the Assembly, which is beginning to assert its prerogatives, will have
to be considered by the executive. Even in cases where regulations might be promulgated by the executive as, for
example, in the raising of certain taxes, it may be reluctant to take the political risks involved without consulting the
Assembly. The decree law on partial mobilization and the Assembly reaction to it is an example of what may occur.
Consequently unless the Assembly is willing to relinquish some of its authority and grant to the executive fairly broad
wartime powers, I believe we shall have to expect some disappointment in the rapidity with which actions are taken.
4. Another factor which will make for caution is the necessary process of the transformation of the character of the
government from an essentially military one to a civilian regime. This will require some deft handling, especially on Thieu's
part. Some resistance by the military to give up prerogatives which they have long enjoyed can be expected. At the same
time, the civilian elements of the government have to gain experience and get accustomed to their jobs. Thieu recognizes
this problem and, being essentially cautious, will move, I believe progressively step by step rather than abruptly to bring
about the change. I believe he is wise in this, for too precipitate actions might cause strains which would be difficult for the
present governmental structure to sustain. A corollary to this is the Thieu-Ky relationship, which needs to be nurtured and
cultivated on both sides. I think there are encouraging signs that this is developing satisfactorily and that their present
relationships are now better than they have been for some time in the past. Both have very recently expressed a desire to
work closely together.
5. Another thing we shall have to live with is sensitivity to US pressures, at least with a more articulate expression of it. A
massive American presence is apt to stimulate a latent xenophobia and with a free press and open debate in the
Assembly, I believe we can expect a certain amount of criticism of our actions here. If kept within reasonable bounds, I do
not think we need to be apprehensive about this, for it represents a healthy spirit of developing nationalism and
independence.
6. Another general problem is that of political organization, the creation of broadly representative national political parties.
This is something which will take time. As both Thieu and Ky have said, the process must develop from a sound base. The
effort to force the development too rapidly will result in artificiality and instability. On the other hand, it is something which
we must steadily and progressively encourage and help to push, for the development of political organization on national
lines is, I believe, the ultimate defense against the Viet Cong and perhaps the only permanent defense. The formation of
groupings, or blocs as they call them, in the Assembly and the institution of local government at the village and hamlet
level, which is proceeding steadily, may form the nuclei for the development which we seek. This is something which we
shall want to keep steadily pushing./2/
/2/Preliminary discussion of Vietnamese plans to form a political party are reviewed in telegram 17282 from Saigon,
January 30. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 12 VIET S)
7. The question of peace, a political settlement and negotiations are matters which will be constantly before us here as well
as at home. It is my view, shared by members of the Mission Council, that were we to enter into negotiations now, we
would be faced with a most difficult situation. I do not believe that the present government has acquired sufficient strength,
either militarily or politically, to be assured of survival on its own. Six months from now it should be in a somewhat stronger
position, but Hanoi may be aware of this and consequently press for negotiations. It seems to me that if I were in their
place, this is what I would be doing. I realize their estimate of the situation may be quite different, but I believe that we
should be prepared for such an eventuality; and that therefore we ought to try to spell out in as precise terms as possible
what would be acceptable terms of settlement to us. Since what may be acceptable to us may not be fully so to the GVN or
some of our other allies, we may need to engage in some educational effort and I believe we ought to be in a position to
begin this before too long.
[Omitted here is discussion of politics, pacification and development, economics, military actions, and public affairs.]

Bunker

26. Notes of Meeting of the National Security Council/1/

Washington, January 24, 1968, 1-2:06 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of
the White House. In addition to those who spoke, those present at the meeting included Humphrey, Rusk, Battle, Sisco,
Nitze, Helms, Marks, Vance, Katzenbach, Rostow, Christian, Saunders, Davis, Smith, and Tom Johnson. (Ibid.,
President's Daily Diary)
[Omitted here is discussion of the Pueblo and Cyprus crises. The discussion relating to the Pueblo is printed in Foreign
Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXIX, Part 1, Document 218.]
The President: I spent some of this morning with Senator Ted Kennedy discussing his trip to Vietnam and the report he
plans to submit./2/ There are two points he made:
/2/See footnote 2, Document 23.
1. He is distressed about the degree of corruption in the South Vietnamese government. He thinks this may be ascending
rather than descending.
2. He said there is substantial division among our generals about tactics and strategy we are following. He said many of
them think we are investing more than we are getting in return.
I would suggest Secretary McNamara call the Senator and tell him I am very concerned about his report and that we are
taking steps to head this off.
Secretary McNamara: We looked into the harassment and interdiction fire tactics. General Wheeler asked General
Westmoreland to make very clear the rules of engagement and make sure they are well understood.
The President: General Wheeler, are you as confident today as you were yesterday that we can handle the situation at
Khesanh?
General Wheeler: I do not think the enemy is capable of doing what they have set out to do. General Westmoreland has
strengthened his position. He has contingency plans and can meet any contingency. There is nothing he has asked for that
he has not been given. Khesanh is important to us militarily and psychologically. It is the anchor of our defensive situation
along the DMZ.
The President: General Wheeler, are you sure that you have everything that is needed to take care of the situation in
Khesanh?
General Wheeler: Yes, we are. General Westmoreland has been given everything he has requested.
The President: Have you done all we can back here?
General Wheeler: Yes Sir.
The President: We have been getting unusually good press from South Vietnam recently and I think that Secretary
McNamara and General Wheeler should pass that along to the people who are handling our press relations out there.
Secretary McNamara: We have a good new military press man and I will be happy to pass along the President's views.
The President: I will now ask Secretary Fowler to give us a summary of his situation concerning the budget and the
possible deficit.

Secretary Fowler: It is no longer a question of debate on whether or not a tax increase is a good thing. I think our case has
been presented quite clearly. We may get $6 billion, 2.9 from excise taxes and 3.0 from corporate taxes. So it becomes a
question of getting 6 this way or 12 if we get the surtax.
Looking back over the last six months, the economy has risen $32 billion in this half versus $13 billion increase in the first
half. We have a 4% price increase. Last year we said the balance of payments problem was becoming serious. It did. The
committee said they wanted budget expenditures reduced by $5 billion. We reduced them by $4-1/2 billion.
The committee asked us not to request a rate of increase to exceed that of last year. We did that. We restricted new
programs. We cut back on old programs.
I reminded the committee that time is running out if we are to do anything meaningful about this deficit.

27. Editorial Note

In confirmation hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee during January 1968, Secretary of Defensedesignate Clark M. Clifford answered questions on the Vietnam war. In testimony on January 25, Clifford opposed a halt to
the bombing under the current circumstances, citing the need for reciprocal actions on the part of the North Vietnamese. In
response to a question on whether the North Vietnamese had to end all military activity as a condition of a cessation,
Clifford responded that under the San Antonio formula, postulated by President Johnson the previous September, the only
conditions were that the North Vietnamese engage in negotiations promptly following a halt and not take advantage of it
militarily. "Their military activity will continue in South Vietnam, I assume, until there is a cease-fire agreed upon. I assume
that they will continue to transport the normal amount of goods, munitions, and men to South Vietnam. I assume that we
will continue to maintain our forces and support our forces during that period. So what I am suggesting is, in the language
of the President, that he would insist that they not take advantage of the suspension of the bombing." Clifford's testimony
was reported in The New York Times, January 26, 1968. The Senate unanimously confirmed Clifford's nomination on
January 30.

28. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, January 25, 1968, 1228Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis.
Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
16919. During a talk with President Thieu morning January 25 I told him about the latest information we had had from
General Westmoreland on developments in the Khe Sanh area and asked him how he felt about this offensive. Thieu said
he thought that the result might give us some real estimate of the will of the North Vietnamese, as they were clearly
embarked on an all-out effort along the DMZ. He was also inclined to think that General Giap was actually leading the
attack. Thieu said that we would also soon see if this was an NVN effort to support proposals for talks, on the theory that
the U.S. was under pressure to talk. Thieu said that he was going to visit the area tomorrow and noted that Generals
Westmoreland and Vien were up there today. He observed in conclusion that at least two divisions were needed for a
dynamic defense, or possibly a dynamic offensive, if it developed that way.
Bunker

29. Editorial Note

From 1:25 to 3:45 p.m. on January 27, 1968, President Johnson met with a group of leaders representing the National
Alliance of Businessmen. The principal subjects of discussion were the Pueblo crisis, economic indicators, and the budget.
According to Tom Johnson's notes of the meeting, the President also spoke to the group about Vietnam as follows: "This
has been an involved week. We have a very great concentration of power against us. There has been a great deal of
political pressure placed on us in this country concerning Vietnam. We have 700,000 people tied down by our bombing in
Vietnam. We believe the Hanoi government and the Viet Cong are hurting." The President also read a quote from John

Stuart Mills on war: "War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest thing: the decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic
feeling which he thinks nothing worth a war is worse. A man who has nothing which he cares about more than his personal
safety is a miserable creature who has no chance of being free, unless made and kept so by the exertions of better men
than himself."
In concluding remarks, the President noted: "We know what would happen if we did not stand firm in Vietnam. We have
told Hanoi we will stop the bombing immediately if they will talk promptly and will not take advantage of the talks. In Korea,
they killed more of our men after the talks started than before. I do not want that to happen again. We are seeking any way
we can for an honorable peace. So, this has been a bad week. We had an intrusion into Cambodia. We had a bomber go
down with nuclear weapons aboard. We had a major offensive planned against us in Vietnam. The North Koreans tried to
assassinate President Pak and then the North Koreans took the Pueblo." (Notes of the President's Meeting with the
National Alliance of Businessmen, January 27; Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings)

30. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to President Johnson/1/

JCSM-63-68
Washington, January 29, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of Defense, Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 911/301 (29 Jan 68), IR 4542. Top Secret.
An attached note reads: "At the special meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at 1100 hours Monday, 29 January 1968, the
Chairman tabled the subject paper as a proposed CM. After making one minor amendment the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed
that the memorandum should be a JCSM and approved it for signature by the Chairman and transmittal to the President."
SUBJECT
The Situation at Khe Sanh
1. You will recall that on 12 January 1968 General Westmoreland informed me that the Khe Sanh position is important to
us for the following reasons: (a) it is the western anchor of our defense of the DMZ area against enemy incursions into the
northern portion of South Vietnam; (b) its abandonment would bring enemy forces into areas contiguous to the heavily
populated and important coastal area; and (c) its abandonment would constitute a major propaganda victory for the enemy
which would seriously affect Vietnamese and US morale. In summary, General Westmoreland declared that withdrawal
from Khe Sanh would be a tremendous step backwards./2/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 12.
2. At 0910 hours this morning I discussed the Khe Sanh situation by telephone with General Westmoreland. He had just
returned from a visit to northern I Corps Area during which he conferred with senior commanders, personally surveyed the
situation, and finalized contingency plans. General Westmoreland made the following points:
a. The Khe Sanh garrison now consists of 5,000 US and ARVN troops. They have more than a battalion of US artillery
supporting them, and 16 175 MM guns which can fire from easterly positions in support of the Khe Sanh force.
b. Among other reinforcing actions, he has moved a full US Army Division into northern I Corps. Within a few days the
equivalent of an ARVN airborne division will also reinforce this area.
c. He has established a Field Army Headquarters in the Hue/Phu Bai area to control all forces, both US and ARVN, in
northern I Corps. This headquarters is commanded by General Abrams.
d. General Momyer, Commander 7th Air Force, is coordinating all supporting air strikes in the Niagra area which
constitutes the locale of enemy buildup around Khe Sanh.
e. Air action since 17 January has been remunerative. About 40 B-52 sorties per day and some 500 tactical air sorties per
day are being conducted in the Niagra area There have been numerous secondary explosions. It appears that air strikes
and our artillery fire have disrupted the enemy's logistic buildup and troop concentration.
3. General Westmoreland stated to me that, in his judgment, we can hold Khe Sanh and we should hold Khe Sanh. He

reports that everyone is confident. He believes that this is an opportunity to inflict a severe defeat upon the enemy. Further,
General Westmoreland considers that all preparatory and precautionary measures have been taken, both in South
Vietnam and here, to conduct a successful defense in the Khe Sanh area.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the situation at Khe Sanh and concur with General Westmoreland's assessment
of the situation. They recommend that we maintain our position at Khe Sanh.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

31. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, January 29, 1968, 1:04-1:40 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.
Those in attendance were the President, McNamara, Wheeler, Nitze, Moorer and his assistant, Commander Daniel K.
Pope, Harold Johnson, Chapman, McConnell, Rostow, Christian, and Tom Johnson. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S
MEETING WITH
THE
CHIEFS OF STAFF
The President asked the Joint Chiefs if they were completely in agreement that everything has been done to assure that
General Westmoreland can take care of the expected enemy offensive against Khesanh.
General Wheeler and all the Joint Chiefs agreed that everything which had been asked for had been granted and that they
were confident that General Westmoreland and the troops there were prepared to cope with any contingency./2/
/2/See Document 30.
General Chapman told Walt Rostow that the special ammunition was in the hands of the troops and fully ready to be used
if necessary.
General Wheeler: There have been enemy casualties in the Khesanh area.
The President: Are these figures reasonably accurate?
General Wheeler: We count only the ones we find on the battlefield. There is only a 10 percent margin of error in this
count. You must remember that a lot of bodies are lost in swamps and waterways and many of them are hauled off by the
enemy.
The President: What are you doing with the other aircraft which are not hitting Hanoi and Haiphong?
General Wheeler: They are striking at the Khesanh area, in Laos and in the other parts of South Vietnam.
The President: If you had your way would you also hit Hanoi and Haiphong?
General Wheeler: Yes, sir.
General Johnson: Yes, we would also like to hit Hanoi and Haiphong, Mr. President. We have the capability of doing that.
General Wheeler: In Vietnam we have the capability of flying 1,000 sorties a day. We're using only 500.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Pueblo crisis; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXIX, Part 1,
Document 243.]
The President: A senator (Senator Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts) told me he was very worried about our situation in
Vietnam. He said that some of our top generals have serious questions about our military strategy in Vietnam. I thought the
Westmoreland-Bunker reply was a very good one. Bob (Secretary McNamara), I would go to the Senator and tell him you
want to see what the various generals said to determine whether or not they were wrong--or if what we are doing is wrong.
General Wheeler: I told General Westmoreland of this charge plus the one of corruption. I have not seen his response. I
have been out there 14 times. General Johnson has been out there several times. General Chapman has been out there
several times. General McConnell has been out there several times. Between us, I think we have talked to every general
officer in Vietnam. I have not heard one word of criticism about General Westmoreland's strategy.
The President: Each one of you should write me a memo on the facts and what you have heard. The Senator says the
generals think the Bermuda strategy is the one they want. Take this matter up with General Westmoreland, with the Joint
Chiefs, and with Senator Russell. Let's get the right answers./3/
/3/Chapman reported his opinion in a February 2 memorandum to the President. (U.S. Army Military History Institute,
Harold K. Johnson Papers, Memorandum of L.F. Chapman to President, Feb. 2, 1968) In a February 1 memorandum to
the President, General Johnson commented on Kennedy's ideas and the strategy pursued in Vietnam. (Johnson Library,
Papers of Clark M. Clifford, 2nd Set [Memos on Vietnam Feb. 1968])
General Johnson: There is some corruption. But there is no disagreement over strategy among our generals.
The President: We cannot have perfection. We have corruption here. General Westmoreland and Ambassador Bunker and
all of you are against corruption. You should point out how much corruption and crime we have in places like Houston,
Washington, New York City, and Boston.
[Omitted here is additional discussion of the Pueblo crisis, also printed in volume XXIX, Part 1.]

34. Telegram From the Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the
Commander in Chief, Pacific Forces (Sharp) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Saigon, January 30, 1968, 1255Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs A-Z and AA-AA.
Secret; Eyes Only. Notations on the telegram indicate that Wheeler forwarded it to Rusk, Helms, and McCafferty of the
White House staff.
MAC 01438. The events of the past 18 hours have been replete with enemy attacks against certain of our key installations
in the I and II CTZs. The heaviest attacks were launched against Danang, Kontum, Pleiku, Nha Trang, Ban Me Thuot, and
Tan Canh in the Dak To area. Lesser attacks were made on Qui Nhon and Tuy Hoa. Although enemy activity in III and IV
CTZs was comparatively light during this period, we are alert to attempts by the enemy to attack significant targets in these
areas. Repeated attempts can also be expected in the I and II CTZs. While our operations reports to your headquarters
have covered these attacks in some detail, I felt it would be helpful to give you a wrap-up on the situation as it stands now.
It is significant that in I CTZ none of these attacks were directed against our installations north of the Ai Van Pass, perhaps
because of the thickening of US forces in that area. Danang was the prime target and was attacked beginning at 20
minutes past midnight. The facilities at Marble Mountain and the Danang air base were mortared and rocketed with a
number of aircraft receiving damage, to include five jet aircraft destroyed. The rocket site was immediately located and
brought under fire with unknown results at this time. Simultaneously, the ARVN Corps Headquarters came under enemy
mortar and ground attack by an estimated reinforced enemy company. An attempt was made against the Danang bridge
by underwater swimmers. It was thwarted with three enemy KIA and one captured. Timely warning of the attacks plus
rapid reaction by US/ARVN/ROK forces has brought the situation in the Danang area under control at this time. Casualties
so far list 89 enemy KIA and 7 friendly KIA. Noteworthy among the counteractions launched in the early morning hours
was that of the ROK Marines, who, in response to an enemy ground attack in the Hoi An area, inserted a force by
helicopter, engaged the enemy, killing 21 with no friendly casualties.
The II CTZ received the bulk and intensity of the enemy attacks. In the Kontum area, in excess of 500 enemy attacked
from the north in the vicinity of the airfield, and were engaged by elements of the 4th U.S. Division and assorted
Vietnamese units. The area is now under control with artillery and air strikes being employed against an estimated two
enemy battalions. Seven U.S. were killed in this action, with 165 NVA KIA. Vietnamese casualties are unknown. In Tan
Canh of Kontum Province, contact is sporadic with elements of the 3/42 ARVN regiment opposing an unknown size enemy
force. Four friendly have been killed and five NVA. In Pleiku, contact continues with an enemy of unknown size in the city,
with friendly forces attempting to cut off the enemy forces trying to escape. The 4th Inf Div captured 220 enemy in the
vicinity of Pleiku. Of these, 20 had North Vietnamese money on their person. The vast majority are Montagnards believed
to be pressed into service. Average age appears to be 18 to 30. 58 claim to be Hoi Chanhs. ARVN forces are in the city
(Pleiku). Seven friendly have been killed as against 103 enemy. In Nha Trang, sporadic fighting continues in the city.
Friendly lost 21 KIA; enemy 60 KIA. Fighting continues against the enemy attempting to withdraw. City fighting continues in
Ban Me Thuot with enemy still in the vicinity. Casualties are reported to be 7 friendly KIA and 131 enemy KIA. In addition,
36 enemy have been killed in the Tuy Hoa area and 11 NVA KIA in the Ninh Hoa area. In Qui Nhon, the enemy holds the
radio station and the maintenance area but has lost 50 KIA. The ROKs have the radio station surrounded but have not
attacked, since the enemy is holding three hostages.
In III CTZ in Binh Dinh Duong Province, southwest of Ben Cat, units of the 25th U.S. Division made a significant contact
with an enemy force, resulting in 66 enemy killed, with eight friendly killed and 14 wounded. IV CTZ had one significant
encounter in the Vinh Long area, where gunships and tactical support aircraft engaged a cleared target of sampans in a
canal area, killing 80 enemy, destroying 124 sampans, with three secondary explosions.
During the course of the day we had a maximum air effort, which was reported to be extremely effective.
The current outlook depicts a situation similar to my foregoing account.
In summary, the enemy has displayed what appears to be desperation tactics, using NVA troops to terrorize populated
areas. He attempted to achieve surprise by attacking during the truce period. The reaction of Vietnamese, US and free
world forces to the situation has been generally good. Since the enemy has exposed himself, he has suffered many
casualties. As of now, they add up to almost 700. When the dust settles, there will probably be more. All my subordinate
commanders report the situation well in hand.

35. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, January 30, 1968, 8:30-10:06 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House.
Those attending the meeting were the President, the Vice President, McCormack, Albert, Boggs, Mansfield, Long,
Fulbright, Sparkman, Byrd, Representative Thomas Morgan, Rusk, McNamara, Wheeler, Secretary of the Air Force Harold
Brown, O'Brien, Rostow, Sanders, Califano, Manatos, and Tom Johnson. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH THE
DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP
[Omitted here is discussion of the Pueblo crisis.]
Senator Byrd: Thank you very much for the briefing. I think the actions which have been taken are prudent and wise. On
another matter, I am very concerned about the build up at Khesanh. I have been told that we have 5,000 troops there
compared with 40,000 enemy troops. Are we prepared for this attack?
The President: This has been a matter of great concern to me. I met with the Joint Chiefs yesterday. I went around the
table and got their answers to these questions. In addition, I have it in writing that they are prepared.
I asked, "Have we done all we should do?" They said yes. I asked, "Are we convinced our forces are adequate?" They
said yes.
I asked should we withdraw from Korea. They said no, that Khesanh is important to us militarily and psychologically.
[Omitted here is discussion relating to Korea.]
The President: Russell, if you will just listen a minute you will see that we are taking the action we believe to be right.
There are 700 enemy dead now as a result of our actions in Vietnam. That is not soft.
Walt Rostow: During the first day of Tet the enemy attacked in 10 places in Vietnam. Six were substantial attacks.
At 6:00 a.m. today General Westmoreland said the enemy suffered the highest killed in one day of the war. They counted
700 enemy dead. The ratio of enemy killed to U.S. killed runs about 5 to 1.
The enemy is trying to terrorize the people. Reports said the ARVN performed very well. Khesanh's air field is open.
General Wheeler: On the matter of your question, Senator Byrd, about 5,000 U.S. troops versus 40,000 enemy troops.
Khesanh is in very rugged areas. There are 5,900 U.S. troops in the Khesanh Garrison. These are support troops including
26th Marines and a battalion of the ARVN. In support of this there are 105 millimeter, 155 millimeter and 8 inch guns.
There are 175 millimeter guns operating from the nearby "rockpile." There are 14 more 175 millimeter guns 14 miles east.
Off the coast, there is a force of cruisers and destroyers which can target on the enemy.
There are 4 North Vietnam divisions at Khesanh. We have available the 1st U.S. Infantry Division. We have one additional
ARVN Division available with units which can be dispatched quickly. There are 39,968 friendly forces versus 38,590
enemy forces. Roughly, there are 40,000 allied troops to match the 40,000 enemy. We think we are ready to take on any
contingency.
In addition, there are 40 B-52 sorties and 500 tactical air sorties in the area Niagara each day hitting the enemy.
I talked with General Westmoreland yesterday. He had been in the area and conferred with senior field commanders. He
placed the entire field operation under his deputy General Abrams. He has as his air deputy General Momyer.
General Westmoreland is confident he can hold the position. To abandon it would be to step backward. The Joint Chiefs

agree with General Westmoreland. The Joint Chiefs believe that he can hold and that he should hold.
General Westmoreland considers it an opportunity to inflict heavy casualties on North Vietnam. We have 6,000 men there,
and 34,000 available. It is 40,000 versus 40,000.
[Omitted here is Part II, discussion of unrelated Congressional legislation.]

36. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, January 30, 1968, 1:08-2:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret.
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Clark Clifford
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
[Omitted here is discussion of the Pueblo crisis, printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXIX, Part 1, Document
248.]
The President: What about Buttercup?/2/
/2/See Document 6.
Secretary Rusk: The last Buttercup messenger turned around because of particularly heavy activity around Hanoi. On his
last report the message was not very clear. Ambassador Bunker wants it authenticated. Their people think we should
release four additional prisoners. I think we should leave the details of this with Ambassador Bunker to work out with
Thieu.
The President: What about Packers?/3/
/3/See Document 18.
Secretary Rusk: Our man is expected in Bucharest on February 1. I think Hanoi is waiting to see how they come out in this
offensive.
The President: General Wheeler, will you give us the most up to date information about Khesanh.
General Wheeler: First reports indicate 700 enemy killed. U.S. and Vietnamese casualties are light. There have been
rockets and mortars to hit Da Nang. The city of Da Nang was also attacked. Pleiku was attacked by a couple of hundred
men. They terrorized the city and struck at the Pleiku air base. There have been at least two other acts, one against the
4th Infantry and one at Nha Trong and Kontum.
At Khesanh the situation is quiet and the weather is good. At 9:00 a. m. today EST General Westmoreland said that he
had talked with his Commander at Khesanh and the situation is well in hand. At Tet it is customary for many people from
the countryside to come into town. It is easy for the Viet Cong to infiltrate these groups. They can bring in a mortar and a
rocket easily. They assemble it at a prearranged time and attack these installations. We caught four trying to blow up a
bridge. The enemy has lost quite heavily. The 4th Infantry captured 200 Viet Cong, most of whom were Montagnard
Tribesmen. Twenty of them had North Vietnamese money.
Secretary McNamara: There are three military actions we would like to bring up at this time. Two of them will require the
President's approval, and one is for the President's information.

General Wheeler: We would like approval of the Talos anti-aircraft missile for use south of the 20 degree south latitude.
We have noticed recently that the MIG's are carrying wing tanks which give them greater range. They will be going after
the B-52's in South Vietnam. They have been trying to shoot down a B-52 for psychological purposes for some time. (The
President approved this action upon the recommendation of General Wheeler, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara.)
The second item on which the President's approval is requested is the use of patrols in the DMZ. These patrols would be
used to check on the disposition of supplies, troops and other developments inside the DMZ. Intelligence indicates a
thickening of forces around Khesanh with a thinning in the Eastern end of the DMZ. As an alternative to use of U.S.
patrols, we would suggest use of ARVN patrols with U.S. advisers.
Secretary Rusk: We will lose some men this way, but there is no political problem.
Secretary McNamara: I have no problem because of the Khesanh build-up. It is natural that we will want to know what is
going on in the DMZ, particularly with Khesanh shaping up the way it is.
Secretary McNamara: The third action we proposed is to organize and mount a feint of a full scale landing above the DMZ.
This would involve mounting naval gun fire, making air strikes along the coast and moving amphibious shipping north into
the area.
The President: Is this about the same as the proposal I have heard once before?
General Wheeler: Yes, sir. There are some disadvantages. If we made such a feint, North Vietnam would claim a victory,
but we request the President's approval to go ahead and prepare a plan. This plan would be submitted to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and to the President for approval. We would pretend we were going to make a landing and we would let it leak to
the South Vietnamese to make sure that the North Vietnamese would learn of it. We would use naval gunfire and marshal
the shipping as though we were going to load troops. The objective of this would be to make them believe that we were
about to have a major landing. This would, if its purpose is realized, get them to move troops and lessen the pressure in
the Khesanh area.
One advantage of this is that if it does break publicly, we have never made such a move.
Secretary McNamara: We would plan this on the basis that it would be brought to the attention of the North Vietnamese
and not to the American public.
CIA Director Helms: It is a great thing if you can keep it out of the hands of the press.
Secretary McNamara: I agree.
Walt Rostow: I would not leak it to the ARVN. Once you do it will become known to the press. I would make the cover
through the use of the most sophisticated electronic equipment we have.
Clark Clifford: Here is my uninformed reaction. If we go ahead and plan on this and it should become known, people would
say we used this as an excuse for the real thing.
The President: Go ahead and plan it. I want to give weight to the Field Commanders recommendation in this case.
[Omitted here is continuing discussion of the Pueblo crisis.]
Walt Rostow: What are we going to do about Ted Kennedy's report?
Secretary Rusk: He has used figures we cannot legitimately attack. Corruption is a tough one to deal with.
Secretary McNamara: There is no excuse for the Vietnamese not lowering their draft age to below 20.
The President: We should sit down with these people who have been to Vietnam and talk to them before they are turned
loose on an unsuspecting public.
(At 2:35 Walt Rostow returned from a call he had taken from Bromley Smith. He reported to the meeting that "we have just

been informed we are being heavily mortared in Saigon. The Presidential Palace, our BOQ's, the Embassy and the city
itself have been hit. This flash was just received from the NMCC.)/4/
/4/During a meeting with Dirksen and Ford later that day, the President discussed the attack on the Embassy compound
and other areas. The record of the meeting, "Notes of the President's Meeting with Senator Dirksen and Congressman
Ford," January 30, is in the Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meeting.
The President: This could be very bad.
Secretary Rusk: Yes, I hope it is not Ambassador Bunker's residence.
The President: What can we do to shake them from this?
This looks like where we came in. Remember it was at Pleiku that they hit our barracks and that we began to strike them in
the north.
What comes to mind in the way of retaliation?
General Wheeler: It was the same type of thing before. You will remember that during the inauguration that the MACV
headquarters was hit. In a city like Saigon people can infiltrate easily. They carry in rounds of ammunition and mortars.
They fire and run.
It is impossible to stop this in its entirety. This is about as tough to stop as it is to protect against an individual mugging in
Washington, D.C.
We have got to pacify all of this area and get rid of the Viet Cong infrastructure.
They are making a major effort to mount a series of these actions to make a big splurge at Tet.
Secretary McNamara: I have two recommendations. This is a public relations problem not a military one. We need to keep
General Loan in charge of the Saigon police. He should not be removed as some of our people in the State Department
are suggesting. At least not until we find somebody better.
CIA Director Helms: I agree completely.
Secretary McNamara: He is the best security chief since Diem's time. He has cleaned up Saigon well.
Secretary Rusk: He is a good police chief, but he has been rather uncooperative with some of our people.
Secretary McNamara: The answer to the mortar attacks is success at Khesanh. We must get our story across. Phil
Goulding called General Sidle this morning in Saigon. We are inflicting very heavy casualties on the enemy and we are not
unprepared for the encounter.
[Omitted here is discussion of clearing the Suez Canal.]

37. Editorial Note

Beginning at 7:24 a.m. on January 31, 1968, President Johnson conferred by telephone with Secretary of Defense
McNamara. Among the topics of conversation was the Tet offensive in Vietnam. In response to the President's request that
McNamara evaluate the situation in Vietnam, the following exchange occurred:
McNamara: Well, I think it shows two things, Mr. President. First, that they have more power than some credit them with. I
don't think it's a last gasp action. I do think that it represents a maximum effort in the sense that they've poured out all of
their assets and my guess is that we will inflict very heavy losses on them both in terms of personnel and matriel and this
will set them back some, but that after they absorb the losses, they will remain a substantial force. I don't anticipate that we
will hit them so hard that they'll be knocked out for an extended period or forced to drop way back in level of effort against

us. I do think that it is such a well-coordinated, such an obviously advance-planned operation that it probably relates to
negotiations in some way. I would expect that were they successful here, they would then move forward more forcefully on
the negotiation front, thinking that they have a stronger position from which to bargain. I don't believe they're going to be
successful. I think that in the case we're going to have the real military engagement, I believe we'll deal them a heavy
defeat. I think in the other areas it's largely a propaganda effort and publicity effort and I think they'll gain that way. I
imagine our people across the country this morning will feel that they're much stronger than they had previously anticipated
they were, and in that sense I think they gain.
The question in my mind is how to respond to this. Is there anything we could be doing that we're not doing? I've talked to
the Chiefs about some kind of reciprocal action in retaliation for their attack on our Embassy or in retaliation for their attack
across the country. There just isn't anything they've come up with that is worth a damn. They talk about an area bombing
attack over Hanoi. The weather is terrible--you can't get in there with pinpoint targeting. The only way you could bomb it at
all at the present time is area bombing, and I wouldn't recommend that to you under any circumstances. They just haven't
been able to think of retaliation that means anything. My own feeling is that we ought to depend upon our ability to inflict
very heavy casualties on them as our proper response and as the message we give to our people.
President: I think that one thing we ought to do is try to keep Westmoreland in the news out there, twice a day-McNamara: Yes, I quite agree. I asked Phil [Goulding] to talk yesterday to our people there and have Westy make--I said
once a day, but I'll make it twice a day. You're quite right.
President: I think you ought to too. I don't think they get enough information. I think you've become sensitive and we all
pulled in. I meet with them once every 2 or 3 months--you meet with them once a month if there's something big. But if
you'll remember, you used to see them almost daily, and I think it shows the difference, and I think in this campaign year,
the other crowd has got two or three committees grinding out things. Their only interest is to find something wrong. People
look for something wrong unless you've got so much choking them that is happening. (Johnson Library, Recordings and
Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and McNamara, January 31, 1968, 7:53 a.m., Tape
F68.02, PNO 1; transcript prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume)

38. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific Forces (Sharp) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Wheeler)/1/
Honolulu, January 31, 1968, 0707Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs A-Z and AA-ZZ.
Top Secret; Eyes Only. Wheeler forwarded the telegram to the other JCS members and to Rusk, Helms, and Rostow at
1253Z. It was received in the White House at 2:02 p.m.
1. I have just talked with Westy by telephone. He provided me an assessment of the situation as of now by secure
telephone and filled in the complete details which follow.
2. The situation is still confused but it is apparent that the enemy has taken advantage of the general state of relaxation
existing during Tet. His forces infiltrated into Saigon in civilian clothes. They are moving throughout the city against
government buildings and in a general campaign to terrorize and kill civilians. Their campaign has been well planned and
obviously formed over a long period of time.
3. The expected attack against Khe Sanh or across the DMZ has not materialized, but it could come momentarily and we
must be ready for it. It is possible that the massive air attacks conducted in I CTZ and along the DMZ may have thrown him
off his time table but the threat of his attack still remains.
4. In the Capital District one of the most dramatic attacks took place against the U.S. Embassy. The enemy blew a hole in
the wall and attempted to enter across the compound. A detachment of the 101st Airborne landed on the roof and joined
Marine guards and MPs in repelling the attack. Westy had just returned from the Embassy where he viewed 19 VC bodies
on the ground outside the Embassy building. Westy states that no VC actually entered the building. This changes many
conflicting reports which we had received earlier in the day indicating that enemy troops were actually inside the Embassy.
One Marine was KIA, and 4-5 Army MPs were killed at the Embassy. The building was partially defaced but there is no
structural damage. There is minor damage in the lobby downstairs but nothing that cannot be repaired.
5. The enemy has been unsuccessful in getting into Tan Son Nhut and a friendly battalion is now sweeping the field. Two

troops of cavalry have arrived at TSN and one company is engaging the enemy in the race track area. There is a big fight
now in process there. Rockets from U.S. gun ships could be heard overhead while General Westmoreland made this
report. He advised that the impact was approximately 1000 yards away.
6. An ordnance depot in Gia Dinh Province has been penetrated by the VC and they are now being engaged by ARVN
Rangers. A VC captain has been captured and claims that 30 VC battalions are in the environs of Saigon. Another POW
states that 21 battalions have infiltrated the city. Both reports are unconfirmed but it is obvious that infiltration is
widespread, that the enemy can be expected in any kind of uniform, and that he is well equipped and armed with
automatic weapons. Attacks have taken place against the palace, several of our BOQs and generally throughout the city.
7. Bien Hoa is closed to jets but the VNAF is taking off on an open runway. There is rocket fire now taking place there, with
a battalion sweeping the area. The enemy has attacked the POW camp at Hien Hoa but has not penetrated. II Field Force
headquarters has been infiltrated and mortared with one friendly KIA. 199th Brigade has been in an intense fire fight with
the enemy in a village northeast of Bien Hoa. First reports indicate that upwards of 500 enemy KIA might be anticipated,
but Westy does not attach too much reliability to this first report. Our casualties have been light in the 199th.
8. Note: Deliver during duty hours.

39. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, January 31, 1968, 8:40-10:15 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House.
Those attending the meeting were the President, Rusk, McNamara, Clifford, Helms, Wheeler, Taylor, Rostow, Christian,
Tom Johnson, Senators John Stennis, Margaret Chase Smith, Carl Hayden, and Milton Young, and Representatives
George Mahon, Frank Bow, and William Bates. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S
BREAKFAST MEETING
WITH
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS
AND
POLICY ADVISORS
The President: I appreciate your coming here. I hope Senator Russell can be out of the hospital as quickly as possible.
Our people have talked with General Eisenhower. In addition, we have talked with Senator Russell, McGeorge Bundy,
George Ball, Henry Cabot Lodge and General Taylor. I have discussed this matter with my senior foreign policy advisors
and with many of the men I have mentioned who are outside of government. I intend to ask General Ridgway to come in to
discuss this with me.
I want to review the problems of the Nation with you. There is not [now?] a war spirit in the country, but we do have more
sympathizers and "agents of the enemy" in this country working against us.
I have always felt that man's judgment is no better than his information. We have spent a great deal of time on this
situation. I have received reports from 90 ambassadors. I asked Clark Clifford, George Ball, Henry Cabot Lodge, and
General Taylor to come in Sunday and go over this. We are calling on men like Mark Clark and Admiral McDonald to look
at it. We have talked to Senator Smith, Senator Stennis and Senator Russell.
A desperate attack is being launched against us in Vietnam. At the same time the number of incidents has changed from
57 to more than 570 during the past year in and around the DMZ in Korea. This Pueblo seizure was well planned.
The JCS reviewed the military plans and have told me they have done everything we can for Westmoreland. Everything he
has requested we have granted. All of them believe he is prepared to handle the situation in Vietnam.
General Wheeler: I will read to you excerpts received at 4:18 this morning from General Westmoreland./2/

/2/See Document 38.

In it he reports on the country-wide attacks throughout South Vietnam. There were heavy attacks in Saigon. The DMZ and
Khesanh are quiet.
We have inflicted very heavy losses on the enemy. At Kontum 300 enemy were killed.
We estimate the enemy has lost 3,000 men killed in action in the last two days. This compares with about 300 allied
losses, including 100 U.S. We know they are prepared for a major offensive at Khesanh.
The President: We still face a big challenge at Khesanh. At home many people want to destroy confidence in your leaders
and in the South Vietnamese government. I ask you to measure your statements before you make them. The greatest
source of Communist propaganda statements is our own statements.
We are going to stand up out there. We are not about to return to the enclave theories.
President Eisenhower said, what I want most for the President is for him to win the war.
(A copy of the telephone conversation with General Eisenhower is attached as Appendix A.)/3/
/3/No record of this conversation has been found.
The enemy has about 40,000 men around Khesanh. You won't hear much in the press about how bad the enemy's
bombing in Saigon was last night. You won't hear many speeches about the North Koreans' attempt to cut off President
Park's head and to kill the American Ambassador. All we hear about is how bad our bombing is.
We see both of these actions in Vietnam and in Korea as a coordinated challenge.
[Omitted here are a briefing by Wheeler on the Pueblo crisis and subsequent discussion by Congressional leaders and
Johnson administration officials.]
[CIA Director Helms:] There is not much doubt that there is a connection between the incursion along the DMZ and the
seizure of the Pueblo. The reasons for these actions are to divert attention from the attacks in Vietnam and to keep South
Korea from sending more troops to South Vietnam.
There has been no movement of Chinese.
General Wheeler: After going over all the evidence for several days I have nothing really useful to suggest that has not
been mentioned.
The mission of the ship was essential. We could not prevent the capture of it under the circumstances.
The time and space factor would not permit it. It is undesirable for these ships to have escorts. If they did, they would not
be able to get the information.
We cannot afford a military diversion. We cannot have a split with South Korea. They are our strongest allies.
And we cannot let the Pueblo be a dividing factor with us.
The President then read a cable from Ambassador Bunker which ended with a quote by Thomas Paine beginning, "These
are the times that try men's souls."
The text of that cable is attached as Appendix C./4/
/4/Not found.
These have been trying times. We have had the incident along the Cambodian border. The B-52 craft with A bombs

aboard. There was increased infiltration and the assassination attempt in South Korea. The Pueblo was seized. We are
being attacked heavily in Saigon and in South Vietnam. We are going to get our most experienced men and get their
advice. We will be talking with you more. Meanwhile the Joint Chiefs will get us any information you need.
I want you to provide leadership. Senator Stennis did an excellent job in speaking on this matter on TV Sunday.
If somebody launches a tirade against our people I hope you will tell them to be responsible. We may have to extend
enlistments. We may have to have 100 million dollars for Korea. We may need further call-ups.
But if you have further ideas, I hope you come and talk to me.

40. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency (Carver) to the
President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, January 31, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 58. Secret; Sensitive.
Copies were sent to Rusk, McNamara, and Wheeler. In an attached covering note to the President, January 31, 4:45 p.m.,
Rostow wrote: "I have marked the key passages in this interesting report from the CIA Station in Saigon. It indicates clearly
the task ahead for Thieu and Bunker in regaining confidence after the shock of these attacks."
SUBJECT
31 January Telephone Conversation with Saigon Station
1. At 31/0433Z I was in telephonic communication with our Saigon Station. The circuit was bad: I could hear Saigon but
they could not understand me. The Station reported that the situation was generally stabilizing and the press greatly
exaggerating the seriousness of the penetration of the Embassy. The Chancery was not actually penetrated, though Viet
Cong did get into the compound. There were no U.S. civilian casualties in Saigon known as of that time.
2. After the phone conversation I transmitted the following specific questions to Mr. Lapham through the open teletype link,
explaining that these were the points I had hoped to raise over the phone.
a. What does the countrywide situation look like?
b. What do regional officers report?
c. Was attempt made against Thieu, Ky or other senior GVN officials?
d. Did Saigon attack seem primarily aimed at American targets?
e. Was there any local intelligence or other warning of these attacks (in Saigon or elsewhere)?
f. What do you expect in Saigon and countrywide within next 24-48 hours?
g. Any indication of effect attacks had on mood or attitudes of Vietnamese population?
h. Your general preliminary comments on meaning and import current countrywide spate of VC activity.
i. How is VC surge likely to affect GVN standing and stability?
3. At 31/0710Z, Mr. Lapham replied. The text of his reply is given below. I am passing it to the recipients of this
memorandum in the belief that you may find it useful. You will understand, of course, that these are Mr. Lapham's initial
reactions in a very fluid situation, the full dimensions and details of which were not known to him at that time.
For Mr. Carver From Mr. Lapham:

1. Appreciate your need for rapid coverage of events and assure you we are doing everything possible to comply. It has
been extremely difficult during the morning hours to obtain any hard information on the events of the night since police are
fully occupied in mopping up operations in various sectors of the city. For example, the VC continued to be holed up in a
house across from the Palace and apparently in houses in the area of Tan Son Nhut. Contrary to earlier reports, Embassy
employees have been instructed not to report to work this afternoon.
2. You will shortly receive dissem concerning police report we have received re enemy plans for this evening.
3. Mr. Carver's telecon just received. As you can see from above, announcement premature that situation was calm
enough to permit return of personnel to work. At this moment, it is impossible to estimate how long it will take to mop up
VC who are holed up around town. If intelligence referred to above is accurate, we may have a busy night again this
evening.
4. Will be filing report shortly on countrywide situation (TDCS 314/01647-68). Regional officers are preparing sitreps for
direct transmission. An FVS has been filed re Loan's comments./2/ President Thieu was in My Tho yesterday and
requested MACV assistance in returning to Saigon this morning. Although American facilities received their share of
attention, other targets were Korean and Philippine Embassies, Palace and Saigon radio station. During the last few days,
Station has diligently pursued all available sources for intelligence that might have given us warning of these attacks. The
police had a few spotty reports but nothing which appeared to be very hard. They were unquestionably not prepared for
this attack on the opening day of Tet, when large numbers of them were celebrating with their families. At this point, we
anticipate that countrywide attacks will continue tonight. However, we lacking intelligence from the regions which would
give us an accurate read-out. Your telecon questions, para 2g, h, and i will be dealt with separately.
/2/Not found.
5. COS and EXO will spend night in Station, with a backup commo command post in another area of the city. We are
establishing additional commo links with various police posts. Every possible precaution being taken to assure security of
personnel and classified facilities.
6. Re your telecon questions g, h and i:
a. You will appreciate the difficulty we have in even beginning an answer to these questions which will be of great
importance when the security situation settles down.
b. We are not today in contact with many elements in the Vietnamese population to discern their attitudes and moods. A
circling airplane with loudspeakers told the people to stay off the streets and in their homes. VC have reportedly made
specific threats to persons living in certain areas to vacate homes at risk of death. Most Saigonese have indeed stayed at
home and we assume that they will follow VC orders as well. The mood is very tense.
c. The meaning and import of current activity can be extracted from VC stated intentions regarding the winter-spring
campaign, their calls for general uprising, and their obvious drive toward a major victory for propaganda and morale
purposes. While we may be undergoing a major multiple harassment without lasting military significance, the ultimate
import will depend on their degree of success on the ground and the impact on American and South Vietnamese
willingness to rebound. The boost to VC/NVA morale is in any case certain to be substantial.
d. Regardless of what happens tonight or during the next few days, the degree of success already achieved in Saigon and
around the country will adversely affect the image of the GVN (and its powerful American allies as well) in the eyes of the
people. All Vietnamese, both those who are sympathetic and those who are critical, hope and expect for protection from
their government and the relative lack of VC activity in Saigon during recent months created a presumption of GVN and
police strength in this area at any rate. Those who believe that security situation (not the political) is paramount will deduce
that only a tough, efficient, no-nonsense government run by the military can meet the sheer physical thrust of the Viet
Cong. Those who cannot stomach such a government will be moved further toward the temptation of negotiations and
coalition government.
e. We would hope to be permitted to delay additional analysis and prediction until we have provided for the necessary
security of our installations and personnel and can begin to move about the city to communicate with sources able to
provide authoritative reactions and ideas. In meantime, hope above will be helpful.
George A. Carver, Jr.

41. Intelligence Memorandum/1/

SC No. 01909/68
Washington, January 31, 1968.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DO Files, IMSC 01909/68. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. A note on the
first page reads: "This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and
coordinated with the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs."
THE COMMUNIST TET OFFENSIVE
Summary
The current series of coordinated enemy attacks in South Vietnam appears designed for maximum psychological impact
and to demonstrate the Communists' continued power despite the presence of strong US forces. The Communists clearly
have made careful preparations for the offensive. These preparations point to a major assault in the Khe Sanh area
possibly in conjunction with a drive throughout the northern I Corps area, and widespread attacks against US installations
may be preparatory to or in support of such action. The enemy probably hopes to score some major battlefield successes
during their campaign. Their military actions appear related to Hanoi's recent offer to open talks, but it is questionable that
the Communists are making a final desperate bid before suing for peace.
1. The current coordinated series of enemy attacks in South Vietnam, so far targeted primarily against population centers
and US installations from I Corps to the delta, appears primarily designed for maximum psychological impact. The
Communists appear to be trying to demonstrate to the South Vietnamese, to US and world opinion and probably to their
own forces that, almost three years after the intervention of US forces, they can still enter major towns and bases, threaten
the US Embassy itself, and seriously disrupt the country, if only temporarily.
2. Extensive harassment of US airfields, logistical centers, and command and communications centers appears--in
addition to its shock effect--partly designed to inhibit immediate allied reaction and retaliation. It may be preparatory to or
intended to support further impending enemy actions in the Khe Sanh/DMZ/northern Quang Tri area. So far this area has
been relatively quiet during the latest round of attacks, but the enemy concentration in this area remains the most ominous
in the country.
3. Evidence has been building up for the past several weeks that the Communists intended a major nationwide offensive in
connection with the Tet season. Enemy propaganda, however, had stressed an intention to honor a seven-day cease-fire
regardless of the period of the allied standdown. This line may have been intended to enhance the surprise factor of
attacks on the day of Tet itself. It may also be that the Communist timetable--in past years calling for stepped up action just
prior to and immediately following the Tet truce--was sufficiently flexible to call for action during the Tet if the allies could be
put in the position of apparently bearing the onus. In any event, Communist propagandists were clearly ready with the line
that the enemy attacks were "punishment" for allied violations.
4. It is clear that the Communists made careful and, most recently, urgent preparations for the current offensive. These
preparations seem to point, in coming days or weeks, to a major assault around Khe Sanh, possibly in conjunction with a
campaign throughout the northern I Corps area. The Communists probably hope, in addition to psychological gains, to
score some dramatic battlefield successes, ideally (from their standpoint) the overrunning of Khe Sanh or a US withdrawal
from this or some other key garrison. In launching a series of bold actions, they incur the risk of serious defeats or
retaliation, with possible repercussions on their own forces. Nonetheless, they probably hope to gain the strategic initiative
and to pin down substantial numbers of allied troops over wide areas in which the Communists hold some military
advantages. A major objective of the entire Communist "winter-spring" campaign since autumn appears to be to draw off
US forces while the VC attempt to erode the pacification effort through guerrilla-type actions. Furthermore, the
Communists certainly hope to make political mileage out of heightened US casualty rates and a demonstration of
continued VC strength./2/
/2/In Intelligence Note No. 84 to Rusk, January 31, Hughes wrote: "Unusual and unanticipated as the urban attacks are,
we do not believe that the Communists have chosen to mount them as a substitute for a major military thrust from one or
more of the areas in which they have been massing. Rather, we regard these urban forays (which must have required
considerable advance planning) as complementary to their main force attacks. That they were mounted in advance of the
main force attacks--preparations for which they must have known could not go undetected--suggests that the Communists
hope, by opening their campaign with a series of surprise, low-cost spectaculars, to lessen the subsequent impact of the
heavy casualties and inconclusive military results that mark major engagements with U. S. forces." (National Archives and

Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)

5. There seems to be little question that the present Communist offensive activity bears a relation to Hanoi's recent offer to
open talks. Foremost, the Communists probably hope to improve their political and military image in the event that any
negotiations are initiated in coming months. Prior to the initiation of the "winter-spring" campaign, Communist forces
throughout the country were intensively indoctrinated on the importance of the campaign. At least in some areas, the
campaign itself was linked, directly or by implication, to the possibility of a political settlement. Some of this indoctrination
may have been propaganda intended to instill a victory psychology among troops possibly discouraged by hardships and
talk of "protracted war." Although the current surge of Communist activity involves both a military and political gamble, it is
highly questionable that the Communists are making a final desperate effort for a show of strength prior to suing for peace.
Despite evident problems of manpower and supply, enemy forces continued to display improved fire-power, flexibility of
tactics, and a considerable degree of resiliency. Their current offensive is probably intended to convey the impression that
despite VC problems and despite half a million US troops, the Communists are still powerful and capable of waging war./3/
/3/A memorandum entitled "The Current VC Campaign," February 10, which was prepared by the staff of the SAVA office
and sent by Allen to Helms, noted: "The Tet Offensive represents the beginning of the spring phase--which our adversaries
have described as the decisive phase of the war. There is abundant evidence to demonstrate that this phase aims at a
'general offensive' combined with a 'general uprising.' The VC hope that this offensive will inflict major defeats on U.S.
forces, disintegrate the Vietnamese forces, and collapse the GVN. The Communists evidently believe that major
successes along these lines will create irresistible international and domestic pressures on the U.S. to open negotiations
on Communist terms." (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80-R01284A, I-ER Files-Special Material 01 Jan-28 Feb 1968)

42. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, January 31, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 7, Meeting Notes.
Confidential.
Herewith a rough working outline of the headings for the Presidential speech about which we talked.
1. The Setting. A widespread, desperate and dangerous Communist effort along the whole front in Asia to divert us from
Viet Nam, upset the progress made in Viet Nam, and discourage and split the American people.
2. Elements in Communist thrust:
--the Pueblo: why we were there; what we propose to do about it.
--mounting attacks across the 38th parallel, including the attack directed against President Park;
--the extension of the war in Laos and Cambodia;
--the VC raids throughout South Viet Nam during Tet; the build-up at Khe Sanh and the DMZ.
3. Peace proposals.
--The San Antonio formula--as far as any American President can go: rock bottom./2/
/2/In a January 27 memorandum to the President, McPherson suggested eliminating the use of the term "San Antonio
Formula." He argued that "it might be hard for us if we had to accept a 'Haiphong Formula' or a 'Vinh Formula.'" The
President noted on the memorandum: "Harry, That's fine. Bear that in mind in writing." (Ibid., Office Files of Harry
McPherson, Memoranda for the President (1968) [3 of 3])
--a serious intermediary has been trying to find out if the other side is prepared to accept it. I must conclude that they have
not. Let us stop talking about a bombing cessation and keep clearly in our minds the bombings in Saigon, Danang, and all
over South Viet Nam. When they are ready to talk about peace, they know where to get us. We shall be ready.

4. What are we seeking in Asia?/3/

/3/A marginal note in an unknown hand referring to the next three paragraphs reads: "This is WWR not LBJ."
We seek an end to a double standard:
--where we obey the laws of the sea, and the other side feels free to behave as pirates;
--where we defend the 38th parallel, and the other side feels free to attack;
--where we keep our ground forces out of North Viet Nam, and they feel free to send them across in defiance of the 1954
parallel;
--where we honor the Geneva Accords of 1962, and they feel free to violate them and to violate Cambodia as well;
--where they ask us to stop our bombing for the privilege of talking to them, while continuing to bomb throughout South
Viet Nam.
5. We want an Asia in which both sides obey the law, both sides honor international agreements, and the nations in the
area turn to their development in cooperation.
6. Actions.
In order to meet the pressures against us, and demonstrate the unity and will of the American people at this critical time, I
am asking the Congress to do the following:
--help protect the dollar by passing a tax bill immediately;
--lift the gold cover immediately;
--allocate funds for the Price Stabilization Board and, through voluntary means, make sure wages are properly related to
productivity and prices are kept as low as possible;
--freeing of the exchange stabilization fund to defend the dollar;
--give the President the right to extend tours of duty and call up individuals with special technical qualifications;
--add an extra $200 million to our funds for military aid, most of which would go to support Korea.
7. Call for unity and responsibility in the face of this Communist challenge despite an election year.
W

43. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Saigon, February 1, 1968, 0132Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, William C. Westmoreland Papers, #29 History File, 1-29 Feb 68 [1]. Secret; Eyes Only.
Repeated to Admiral Sharp and Ambassador Bunker.
MAC 01464. At 0545 hours, General Wheeler called me on the secure telephone and directed that I call Mr. Rostow at the
White House and provide answers on behalf of Ambassador Bunker and myself to six questions. At 0650 hours, I
contacted on the secure telephone General Binsberg. The following is a transcript of my oral report.

This is General Westmoreland speaking.

I was instructed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to call the White House and ask for Mr. Rostow.
Six questions have been posed. I will read these as I interpret them and will give you our answers. I am speaking for
Ambassador Bunker and myself--I have covered with Ambassador Bunker all these matters on the telephone.
Question number 1: Our estimate of friendly and enemy casualties.
Answer: From the beginning of the truce period--1800 hours, 29 January--the following casualties have been suffered by
us or inflicted on the enemy in accordance with our best estimates. KIA, friendly, 421, which includes 189 US, 3 Free
World, and remainder--229--Vietnamese. Enemy 4320 KIA, 1181 detainees, a number of whom are prisoners of war.
Question number 2: How long do we estimate the present campaign will continue?
Answer: We see this as a three-phase campaign. The first involved preparation, build-up, sporadic attacks, and a wellorchestrated psy war program. We are now in the second phase, which is an all-out military effort in South Vietnam,
excepting the two northern provinces. The enemy has achieved some local successes, but there is evidence that the
initiative is turning against him. However, we feel he has the capability of continuing this phase for perhaps several more
days, at great risk to himself. The third phase involves a massive attack in Quang Tri and Thien Provinces. The enemy is
now poised for this phase, which he considers his decisive campaign. Our air strikes may have blunted this attack, but we
still give him the capability to strike at any time with large forces supported by an abundance of artillery and rockets.
Question number 3: Do we believe there is a relationship between activities in South Vietnam and those in Korea?
Answer: It would seem to us that there is a relationship.
Question number 4: The French press allege that there is an impasse in South Vietnam. What is our comment?
Answer: We do not consider the situation an impasse, since the initiative is turning in the favor of the government and her
allies and the enemy is suffering unprecedented casualties.
Question 5: Is the enemy holding any towns in South Vietnam?
Answer: The enemy does not control any single town in South Vietnam. However, he has some degree of control in
several towns. Specifically, he has forces in Quang Tri, Hue, Duyxuan, Kontum City, Chau Phu and Ben Tre, he has
scattered elements in Saigon. Repeat, he does not control any single town. In those towns he has troops, they are
confronted by Vietnamese troops and fighting is continuous.
Question number 6: What political problems do we anticipate as a result of this enemy activity? Will it have a psychological
impact on the people and affect the stability of government?
Answer: It seems to us that initially there will be some psychological impact on the people and the government. However, if
the government handles the matter carefully, they can seize an opportunity to strengthen their position with the people.
President Thieu has the opportunity to exercise real leadership. The National Assembly has the opportunity to be more
constructive. The President has declared martial law, but this will have to be approved by the Assembly after 12 days, in
accordance with the Constitution. The situation should not slow down (for a prolonged period) major programs. It may well
harden the government's position on negotiations with the Front. It may tend to set back civilianization of the government.
Military successes should give the ARVN and its leadership self-confidence and encourage the acceleration of their
improvement.
End of statement./2/
/2/In his History Notes for the month of February, Westmoreland wrote: "On Thursday, February 1, there was great
consternation in Washington. Frequent messages and telephone calls assisted in bringing balance to the real situation.
However, this was more than off-set by the alarming headlines and the gloom-and-doom type editorials that proceeded to
propagandize the limited successes by the VC. One received the impression that the press were gleeful that the VC had
finally accomplished something significant and the U.S. and South Vietnamese were in an awkward position. In order to
make known my assessment of the situation and try to bring about a certain balance in attitude and perspective, I held, at

the suggestion of Washington, an on-the-record press conference at 1645 in the JUSPAO auditorium. I outlined the
general situation, my assessment of the enemy's strategy, and pointed out that this was a major, go-for-broke offensive but
that I anticipated that the enemy would shortly run out of steam. I was asked if I thought that the offensive had anything to
do with negotiations, to which I made a noncommittal reply. I was, however, decidedly under the private and personal
impression at the time that there was definitely such an association in the mind of the enemy. I had made this view
privately but was in no position to do so publicly." (Ibid.) A copy of Westmoreland's remarks and his responses to press
queries is ibid.

44. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/

Washington, February 2, 1968.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80-M01044A, 282. SHOCK. Secret. In the February 2
covering memorandum transmitting this memorandum to Katzenbach, Nitze, Wheeler, and Rostow, Helms wrote: "A
number of officers of this Agency who have been concerned over the years with Vietnam have put together the attached
memorandum suggesting a possible course of action for the United States at this time. I pass it to you for your
consideration in light of some other factors bearing on the problem."
SUBJECT
Vietnam--Operation Shock
1. The Viet Cong Tet offensive is a clear indication of continued Viet Cong power which calls for a new look in our
approach to the Vietnam war and to the Government of Vietnam. Over the years the current leaders of Vietnam have
developed a complacent assurance that American support is immutable. Consequently, they have felt free to approach the
war in terms of gradualism, favoritism among the limited circle of personalities at the top and only a casual attention to
mobilizing popular support and engaging the population actively in the war. This gentle treatment of the members of the
Establishment has worked to exclude from positions of responsibility younger, more dynamic and modern-minded leaders.
The Tet offensive can be utilized in a frontal attack on these attitudes and habits, since it has forcefully demonstrated that
the present GVN lacks some of the principal attributes of sovereignty. It cannot defend its frontiers without a half million
U.S. troops and cannot even enable the American Ambassador to utilize his Embassy. In this frontal attack, the United
States must insist on standards of performance and American participation in decision making during an emergency effort.
While this would temporarily suspend the long-standing policy that the Vietnamese be encouraged and allowed to carry an
increasing load of initiative and decision, the objective would be to remake the power structure to permit the emergence of
new and more dynamic leadership to whom this role could be passed. This frontal attack would be thoroughly consistent
with our long-standing public position that the U.S. effort in Vietnam is only to help the Vietnamese help themselves, not to
carry the fight for them. These points should be expressed in an early urgent interview between Ambassador Bunker,
accompanied by General Westmoreland, and President Thieu and Vice President Ky.
2. In specific terms, the United States should review for President Thieu the serious situation revealed by the Viet Cong
offensive in terms of the weakness of Vietnamese security and the lack of popular resolution to contribute to the fight
against the Viet Cong, with the implication that the prospects of success along current lines and current programs are
insufficient. The point should be made that gradualism can no longer be accepted as an approach on our side of the war
and it should be stated forcefully that henceforth the GVN must follow U. S. direction in an urgent program to redress the
state of the war.
3. As the first point in this program, we should insist that General Nuyen Duc Thang be named Minister of Interior and of
Defense, with "full powers" over the military, the police and the administrative structure. He should be assigned the
immediate urgent mission of providing for the security of the nation. He should be given full authority over all Vietnamese
forces in order to accomplish this and he should be directed to concentrate his efforts on strengthening and purging secure
areas outward into less secure areas. He should be advised that Free World forces will be employed against Viet Cong
and DRV main force units, through spoiling actions, etc., and in re-enforcement of the Vietnamese forces when needed,
and that Vietnamese forces must be 100% committed to an aggressive pacification role. General Cao Van Vien of the Joint
General Staff should be specifically instructed that all Vietnamese forces will henceforth be used in direct support of the
pacification program commanded by General Thang through such subordinate commanders as Thang may select,
including province chiefs. In the course of re-orienting the RVNAF, General Thang should be given full authority to
reorganize its command structure and remove officers as necessary to carry out this new mission. Similarly, the Director
General of Police, the Minister of Revolutionary Development and all other elements of the GVN which can contribute to
pacification should be given the primary mission of direct support to General Thang's pacification program.
4. President Thieu should also be directed to appoint Vice President Ky as his Chief of Staff and Director of Operations. Ky

should be given two major missions. The first would be to organize an individual review of the personal files and
performance of all Vietnamese military and civilian officers and officials, with immediate purging of all found involved in
corruption or other abuses of authority. Upon removal, immediate replacements should be appointed from subordinate
levels or from other services. Vice President Ky's second major mission should be to organize a national political vehicle or
front outside the government structure, including all non-Communist political elements, to share a massive rallying of the
entire population in support of this new program to develop the country and free it of Viet Cong terror.
5. In order to focus the entire nation and government on this program, and still respect the provisions of the Constitution,
President Thieu should seek the approval of the National Assembly on an urgent basis of the establishment of a War and
Reconstruction Council. The War and Reconstruction Council should consist of President Thieu as Chairman, Vice
President Ky as Vice Chairman and Director of Operations, General Thang as Deputy Director of Operations, and
appropriate representatives of the Ministries and the Armed Forces as well as the Senate and the Lower House. The War
and Reconstruction Council should have counterpart War and Reconstruction Councils at the province and district levels,
with similar participation not only of representatives of the Administration but also of provincial and district councils. The
function of the Councils would be to review the degree to which the normal operations of government are concentrated in
support of this special program and to provide a means for ensuring the participation of all elements of the population in
the national effort. These Councils should also be charged with ensuring that the programs initiated in this emergency be
developed for the long term benefit of Vietnamese citizens through normal governmental and political structures. The
proposal to establish these Councils should be announced to the nation in a Presidential speech within the next ten days,
to be given maximum dissemination by all possible media. The National Assembly should be required to accept or reject
the proposal within a matter of days in order to avoid legislative wrangling over details and permit full focus on this urgent
problem while the implications of the Tet offensive are still fresh.
6. President Thieu should be advised that the United States and all its agencies will support this program to the fullest and
will utilize all its officers actively to assist, monitor and participate in the effort at all levels. Should additional financial,
logistical, etc. support be necessary, it will be immediately supplied outside normal channels if necessary,
7. President Thieu should be advised that we consider that this program must show obviously positive results within 100
days of Tet (i.e., by early May). If this does not occur or if President Thieu refuses this proposal, he should be advised that
the United States will reserve its position with respect to the GVN. In this event, he should be left in some doubt as to
whether this implies that the United States might seek an alternate GVN through other leadership or whether it might begin
the process of working out some accommodation with the NLF and the DRV at the expense of the GVN. He could be
assured that this 100 day showing is essential to the American nation, as if it does not occur there will only be a matter of
weeks thereafter before the American nation begins to make its basic political decisions for the next four years. If the GVN
is not able to show the kind of progress which makes further U.S. support justifiable, the United States might then have to
examine alternative courses of action.
8. The United States options at the end of the 100 days would deliberately be left undefined for President Thieu and Vice
President Ky. We might, of course, find that sufficient forward momentum has been achieved to warrant continued U.S.
support. Should this not occur, the United States might take one of the following courses of action:
a. Insistence that President Thieu or other GVN leaders resign in favor of individuals who might have proven themselves
during the 100 days, who could be duly elected according to Constitutional processes at the election three months after the
President resigns.
b. Suspension of the bombing of North Vietnam and the initiation of talks with the DRV. This action could be justified as the
result of the GVN's inability to respond to the challenge and consequently an American decision to adjust to this situation.
Alternatively it could be utilized as a further stimulus to Vietnamese leadership to take more vigorous action.
c. Development of a dialogue between the United States and the NLF suggesting the possibility of some move toward a
coalition government. In this situation, United States assistance could still be provided to some non-Communist
Vietnamese elements, continuing our policy of helping resolute Vietnamese fight and help themselves.

45. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 2, 1968, 1125Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret;
Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.

17480. 1. After a meeting of the Mission Council this morning, Feb 2, I took up the urgent question of what was needed in
the way of action, primarily by the GVN but also by US, to overcome the psychological gains obviously made by the Viet
Cong through their terrorist attacks on the population centers. We agreed that the primary thing needed was visible and
effective leadership by the GVN, in order to restore confidence and deal with the urgent problems created by the recent
events. We agreed that it would be useful to propose to President Thieu that a joint task force be formed, headed on the
GVN side by Prime Minister Loc and on the US side by Ambassador Komer. This task force could address itself to the
problems across the board, including not only the Saigon area but also the principal provincial centers affected by VC
attacks./2/
/2/On February 3 Komer became the designated adviser to Ky for Project Recovery, the name given to the GVN's program
to repair the losses suffered during Tet. For additional information, see the Project Recovery action memorandums in the
U.S. Army Center for Military History, DepCORDS/MACV Files, Tet/Recovery: Project Recovery.
2. General Westmoreland and I met with President Thieu this afternoon just before he was to record his speech to the
nation, which will be televised and broadcast this evening. Thieu reported that he had convened a sort of National Security
Council this morning and had included the Presidents of the two houses of the Assembly. The demands of the immediate
situation were discussed in some detail. Thieu said that the meeting agreed that it was necessary to maintain the martial
law and the curfew for the present, at least until the most urgent security and other problems had been brought under
control./3/ Thieu went on to say that in order to assure that this state of martial law was kept within the Constitution, it was
agreed that there should be a special joint session of the two houses at which these special measures could be endorsed.
He thought this would take place as soon as the two houses could be reconvened. Thieu said he recognized that it was
important to avoid the impression that a military regime was being reimposed, and this was why he had invited the
Presidents of the two houses to be at the meeting and had asked them, in accordance with the Constitution, to call a
special joint session. I agreed with Thieu that it was important that all of these measures be done within a constitutional
framework and that there be no impression given that military rule was being reimposed.
/3/Thieu declared martial law on January 31.
3. I then told the President that we recognized that the events of the last few days, while representing a major military
defeat for the VC, also brought with them a major psychological gain for the enemy. I said that we must deal with the
immediate psychological problem in such a way as to avoid a pyrrhic victory and that I wished to offer whatever support
and assistance we could give him and his government for these purposes. I added that if this matter were handled well, it
could turn into a psychological victory for the GVN and its allies which could rally popular support and restore confidence. I
concluded that the first and most important objective should be to get back to the pre-Tet situation so that the government
and the population could resume work and security could be reestablished, with police and other security forces publicly
evident. I added that rooting out the VC infrastructure in Saigon and the cities was an urgent part of this program and that
mobilizing the population for all of these purposes was essential.
4. Following these comments I said that we had discussed these matters on our side and wanted to suggest for the
President's consideration the establishment of a joint US-GVN task force which could plan and order the execution of the
necessary measures to get the situation back to normal as quickly as possible. I said that rapid and effective action,
supported [possible omission] that the government was on top of the situation. I mentioned a number of urgent objectives
which should be met, in addition to restoring security in the cities, such as opening roads and airports, and getting the
economic life of the country underway speedily. I added that an active and imaginative psychological warfare campaign
was a vital element in this process. I concluded by saying that we wished to assist in any way we could and offered to put
the resources we had at the disposal of the government for these purposes. I then asked Westmoreland to outline more
specifically some of the needs as he saw them.
5. Westmoreland pointed out that there was much destruction, not only in Saigon, but also in many provincial cities. He
said the problems in these areas were serious but manageable and added that they were not very widespread in Saigon.
Among the urgent needs are the restoration of proper health and sanitation services, caring for refugees, and the
rebuilding of houses, schools, etc. Westmoreland recommended that a top-management group be set up, headed by the
Prime Minister and Komer, and reporting to the President. He suggested that the President might want to consider
delegating supervision to Vice President Ky. Westmoreland said that on the GVN side, the appropriate Ministries could be
instructed by the Prime Minister and on the military side he and General Vien could work closely with Loc and Komer in
providing what would be needed. He stressed that this would not be a new organization and would use existing individuals
and organizations, but with an effective method for assigning specific tasks promptly from the top and keeping the
President informed. Westmoreland concluded that we needed to put the best talents we have to work on both sides in
order together to overcome the effects of the VC attacks. He added that there probably should be a separate Saigon task
force under the over-all supervision of the Prime Minister and Komer.
6. Thieu said that he recognized there were many and varied problems to be solved, including the opening of main roads,
cleaning out the VC, and restoring sanitation and other services. He agreed coordination was desirable and that this effort

should be extended to the provinces as well. He suggested a joint meeting on February 3 to discuss these problems and to
be briefed by the US side regarding their organizational and other suggestions./4/ He thought that the proposed task force
could then work out the necessary programs.
/4/Telegram 17607 from Saigon, February 3, reported on the joint U.S.-GVN task force, during which GVN officials
stressed the necessity for a rapid restoration of order in Saigon. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
7. Comment: Although it is apparent that the GVN intends to continue the current state of martial law for a further period of
time, I am encouraged to see that the President is very conscious of the need for doing this in a constitutional way and has
included the principal representatives of the National Assembly in his deliberations. He also seemed generally responsive
to our suggestions for dealing urgently and effectively with the vital problems to be met. We will make every effort to keep
up this momentum and to overcome the many wild rumors and reports that are circulating, by restoring confidence in the
government and demonstrating that we are working closely with them.
Bunker

46. Letter From President Johnson to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker)/1/

Washington, February 2, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 1 E (2), 1/68-2/68, Post-Inaugural Political
Activity. No classification marking. The President underlined the words in the letter printed in italics and wrote at the top of
the page: "Personal Attention Please." In an attached memorandum to the President, February 1, Charles Zwick, Director
of the Bureau of the Budget, advised sending the letter but withholding its public release; the President indicated his
concurrence on the memorandum. (Ibid.)
Dear Ellsworth:
I recently directed the Secretary of State and the Budget Director to undertake a program to reduce United States
personnel overseas./2/ Because of the special problems you face, Viet Nam was specifically excluded from this program.
/2/In memorandums to the heads of the Executive branch departments and to Rusk and Zwick, both released publicly on
January 18, the President directed the reduction of the number of U.S. employees overseas and curtailment of official
travel abroad. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp.
34-35. In a November 6 memorandum to Johnson, Zwick reported on the measures taken along these lines. See Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 4, p. 1579. In a January 31 memorandum to Rusk, McNamara, and Zwick, the
President despaired over the international situation: "In general, it appears to be the judgment of our enemies that we are
sufficiently weak and uncertain at home, sufficiently stretched in our military dispositions abroad, and sufficiently anxious to
end the war in Viet Nam so that we are likely to accept, if not defeat, at least a degree of humiliation," to which he
attributed events in Korea and the Tet offensive in Vietnam. Thus he recommended that they consider extending tours of
duty, a selective call-up of reservists, additional military aid to South Korea and Thailand, and various financial measures
including a tax bill and currency exchange stabilization. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 US/JOHNSON)
I believe very strongly that you and General Westmoreland should have the resources necessary for the difficult tasks
before you. But I also believe we must accomplish these tasks with the minimum number of Americans in Viet Nam.
To this end, I want you to develop with General Westmoreland ways to reduce American and other U.S.-financed
personnel in Viet Nam, other than those directly associated with combat activities. This will not be an easy job. But it is
highly important to the effectiveness of our efforts in Viet Nam.
I am purposely setting no target figure for the civil or military aspects of this exercise. I expect you to take a hard and
careful look at what can be done. I want you to report your findings and recommendations to me by June 1. Your efforts
will have my complete support.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson

47. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, February 2, 1968, 4:30-6:02 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Confidential. The meeting was held at the White House.
According to a covering memorandum from Johnson to the President, February 3, the attending correspondents and the
press organizations which they represented were: Max Frankel, The New York Times; Charles Bailey, Cowles
Publications; Richard Saltonstall, Time Magazine; Chalmers Roberts, Newsweek; Frank Reynolds, ABC; Dan Rather,
CBS; Ray Scherer, Washington Star; Sid David, Westinghouse Broadcasting; Jack Sutherland, U.S. News and World
Report; and Forrest Boyd, Mutual Broadcasting. Rusk, Clifford, Taylor, Rostow, and Tom Johnson also joined the meeting.
(Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S
DISCUSSION
WITH CORRESPONDENTS
Chuck Bailey: How did your discussion go with General Ridgway?/2/
/2/The President met with General Ridgway, the former commander of U.S. forces during the Korean war, at a luncheon
lasting from 2:15 to 4 p.m. and attended by Humphrey, Clifford, Rostow, Christian, Tom Johnson, McConnell, Moorer,
Harold Johnson, Chapman, and Helms. Among the topics discussed were the war in Vietnam, Kennedy's recent
statements, and the Pueblo. (Ibid.) Notes of the meeting have not been found.
The President: We talked about the Pueblo incident and the increase in the number of incidents along the demilitarized
zone in Korea. I asked for his advice as I have asked for the advice of many others who have experience in the military
and diplomatic field.
Frank Reynolds: What are the North Koreans up to?
The President: It appears to have been an irrational act on their part, perhaps to help their brothers in North Vietnam.
Max Frankel: What is General Giap doing?
The President: I always over-estimate Giap. You see what he did to the French. He is extremely able. I don't know what
will happen.
I asked the JCS to give me a letter saying that they were ready for this offensive at Khesanh. They have 40,000 men to our
6,700. We have 40,000 men within 40 miles and we do have air mobility. There are 1,200 B-52 sorties per month going
into Vietnam.
Max Frankel: What do you believe Ho is thinking?
The President: I do not know. I felt by February 3 we could have expected the major offensive to begin. What Ho thinks I
do not know. I believe he thought that the people would rally with them. They did not. There have been much sporadic
activities. The ferocity was not anticipated.
They did not get into the Chancery of the embassy. They sent 19 men. All 19 were killed.
[Omitted here is discussion of the Pueblo crisis.]
Chuck Roberts: In light of the advance intelligence, were we in a state of sufficient readiness in Vietnam?
The President: Yes, anybody who could count can see that we were.
Chuck Bailey: Were the South Vietnamese prepared and how did they conduct themselves during this?

The President: Yes, the South Vietnamese were ready. I have heard nothing that would indicate any cowardice or lack of
responsibility on their part.
The President then read to the group the Thomas Paine quote:
"These are the times that try men's souls. The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the
service of his country; but he that stands it now, deserves the love and thanks of man and woman. Tyranny, like hell, is not
easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph. What we
obtain too cheap, we esteem too lightly; 'tis dearness only that gives everything its value. Heaven knows how to put a
proper price upon its goods; and it would be strange indeed, if so celestial an article as freedom should not be highly
rated."
Chuck Roberts asked if there had been any change since the San Antonio formula was given.
The President: We put many long hours and days into the text of the San Antonio speech. We said then and we still believe
that that is as far as we can go with honor. We stressed prompt, productive, and "it is assumed."
We do not want another Panmunjon. Sure, there will be some regular resupply. We undoubtedly will send in more planes
and food and supplies for our troops. We expect them to do something along the same lines. We haven't hit Hanoi or
Haiphong in a couple of days. There is good reason to what we are doing. Clark Clifford said what I stated in San Antonio
and said it better./3/ But it all means the same thing.
/3/See Document 27.
The formula still stands, although you will notice I almost withdrew it yesterday at the Medal of Honor ceremony./4/
Anybody who sees what they are doing out there now knows they do not appear very interested in peace talks.
/4/In the ceremony presenting the Medal of Honor to Major Merlyn Dthlefsen, USAF, the President stated: "Until we have
some better signs than what we have had these last few days--that I hope any American can see and read loud and clear-that he [the NVA/VC enemy] will not step up his terrorism; and unless we have some sign that he will not accelerate his
aggression if we halt bombing, then we shall continue to give our American men the protection America ought to give them,
and that is the best America affords." For the full text of the President's remarks, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 145-147. Earlier that day, the President conferred with the press,
noting that U.S. forces in Vietnam were aware of the enemy's offensive in advance. For the text of the President's
statement at this conference, see ibid., pp. 155-163.
Jack Horner: Do we have any information that North Korea is planning a massive raid across the DMZ?
The President: We have no information of that type. They are not on an aggressive alert with any evil intentions as far as I
know. It just looked like they had a chance to make a contribution that then cost them militarily.
Sid Davis: What is your own gut feeling about Ho? Does he really want to talk this year before the elections?
The President: No, I don't think he wants to talk, but he may have to. I would think he would be better off before the election
than after.
[Omitted here is further discussion of the Pueblo crisis.]
Ray Scherer: Do you think there will be a partisan issue made of this by Nixon, Percy and others?
The President: I do not know. I know of a lot of people being worried. I do not say this is the last gasp by the North
Vietnamese. It is a kamikaze type thing. They are not getting a good return on their investment.
Ray Scherer: What are the Russians doing?
The President: I think they want to live in this world with us. I do not think they are anxious to have any major confrontation
over this.
They won't be too enthusiastic about getting into a war with us.

48. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State
Rusk/1/
No. 97
Washington, February 3, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; No
Foreign Dissem.
SUBJECT
Vietnam: Estimated Communist Strategy in the Coming Months
The events of the last several days suggest that the Communists are well-embarked upon a carefully planned campaign of
mutually-supporting military, political, and diplomatic efforts directed toward a massive deterioration in the GVN position
and an erosion of the political basis for a US presence in Vietnam. If this were to develop, negotiations could become the
seal of success rather than the path to a situation in which, in due course, success could be attained. Meanwhile, they will
continue to hold open the possibility of talks.
Intent on Creating Revolutionary Situation. Hanoi's primary intent appears to be to create the revolutionary situation, in
towns and countryside alike, which doctrinally must precede final victory in the South. The accelerated effort, dramatically
emphasized by recent events, to destroy the authority of the GVN and the credibility of the US/South Vietnamese alliance
could be intended to reach the point where war-weariness and defeatism throughout the country become overwhelmingly
strong and where non-Communist South Vietnamese political elements might be prepared to join with the Front in the
establishment of coalitions at the center and at lower administrative levels. The resulting organization could claim to have
supplanted the authority of the GVN and to have assumed the mantle of the "coalition government." If it could be attained,
this "coalition government" would become the condition precedent to or simultaneous with negotiations rather than the goal
to which negotiations might lead.
Flexing and Applying Military Muscle. To reinforce the political/military effort to destroy the authority of the GVN, Hanoi also
appears intent on using the threat of major military victories to manipulate the deployment and redeployment of the allied
forces./2/ This effort, by establishing a capacity for set-piece victories in remote locations of the country, appears designed
to whipsaw allied forces and to place a heavy strain on allied capabilities to engage in "conventional" war against the main
enemy force or to support GVN military efforts against Communist guerrilla and political forces in the countryside. Hanoi
may, if the proper opportunity presents itself, also use these build-ups to inflict heavy casualties on US forces and, if
possible or appropriate, to attempt to gain spectacular victories. But the main force military threat will be maintained and
employed primarily for its political impact and for its diversion and dispersion of allied resources rather than for the
attainment of military victories per se.
/2/Hughes reported in Intelligence Note No. 117 to Rusk, February 8, that Hanoi had begun to invoke the memory of Dien
Bien Phu for the first time since the Tet offensive began. (Ibid.)
Communists Assess their Position as Strong but Risky. The Communists probably believe that they are operating in the
South from a position of considerable strength. They have already demonstrated a three-fold capability--to deploy large
forces at various remote points; to carry on simultaneously with these deployments an intensified campaign of harassment
in the countryside; and to augment their political effort in the urban areas with an unprecedented wave of coordinated
attacks throughout the country without apparently drawing very significantly from their major troop concentrations. They
probably recognize also that they have embarked upon a high-risk course. They are clearly exposing themselves to very
heavy casualties. By enlarging their campaign, broadening the impact of their attacks, and imposing additional resource
requirements on themselves, they risk not only intolerable strains on their own structure but also stronger reactions against
them. By moving so rapidly and with so much propaganda and indoctrinational stress on "decisive victories" and the
opening of the "revolutionary phase", they risk the creation among the cadres of high expectations of quick results which, if
disappointed, could severely affect morale.
They probably expect, however, that they can make tactical adjustments which will compensate for difficulties
encountered, a capability they have especially demonstrated during the past two years. They could be counting on going a
long way in keeping up morale and willingness to persist by contending that their spectaculars--such as those of recent
days--even though they cannot be of long duration or of frequent occurrence, are in themselves "decisive victories" that
have moved the war into a new and close to ultimate phase. Heavy as their losses may be as the result of such actions,

they may believe that they can recover from them more rapidly than the GVN can recover from the administrative
disruption, necessity for redeployment, and loss of confidence and momentum which it has undergone.
The Communists would accept the heavy casualties that result from their major actions believing that the cost of such
actions are more than compensated for by heavy strains imposed on the allied side, which, on balance, facilitate the
persistent campaign of local harassment, small-scale action, and political organization. It is through these actions that the
Communists have long sought to destroy the GVN socio-political framework in the countryside; and they will increasingly
seek to do the same in urban areas. They would anticipate also increasing friction within the GVN and between the GVN
and the United States which will work to their advantage. While they will undoubtedly attempt to create the impression that
they are being increasingly supported by the enthusiastic revolutionary masses, their genuine interest will lie not so much
in winning major accretions of mass support as in inducing a widespread conviction that the Communist drive cannot be
stopped and must be accommodated to./3/
/3/In Intelligence Note No. 121 to Rusk, February 8, Hughes commented: "Despite heavy casualties, Communist forces
retain the capability to launch new attacks against urban centers while the bulk of the North Vietnamese Army main force,
still uncommitted, poses the threat of larger-scale assaults in the remote or outlying areas." (Ibid.)
The Talks/Negotiations Posture
While we believe that the Communists have adopted a strategy in the South which they will not quickly alter (that is, within
the next month or two), even in the face of particular failures or set-backs, we anticipate that they will continue to hold open
the prospect of talks. Though they may not expect to get a bombing pause, they would hope thereby to deter the United
States from harsher measures against the North, the resources of which must continue to flow to the South in support of
the accelerated campaign there. Anxious as they are for a bombing pause, their campaign in the South will assume
precedence in their thinking for the time being. Accordingly, we do not anticipate that Hanoi will be prepared in the near
future to promise that it will not "take advantage," though there is a chance that it may haggle on the subject if it believes
that some degree of compromise (as a hypothetical example, an understanding not to use the DMZ but no restriction on
infiltration rates) can gain a bombing halt.

49. Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special
Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, February 3, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 1 EE (1), 2/2-20/68, Post-Tet Political Activity.
Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Rostow saw it.
SUBJECT
Situation in Viet-Nam
This memo contains some reflections on recent events in Viet-Nam and some thoughts on what should be done.
First, it is my opinion that the series of well-coordinated NVA/VC attacks in all parts of the country represents a distinct
setback to the Government in Saigon and to us. But it may also offer some opportunities that should not be lost.
I regard these events as a setback because:
--among other things, they reflect probably the worst intelligence failure of the war. If the VC and North Vietnamese can
move probably 30,000 men into place for attacks in all parts of the country without detection, something is wrong with the
GVN's intelligence network. It would have taken weeks to stockpile the weapons and ammunition used in these attacks.
Thousands of Vietnamese must have been used in this process. Many thousands of others must have been aware of
movements through or near their villages, and of unusual activity in their neighborhoods in the cities. Yet I have seen no
clear evidence that any of these movements were reported or their significance correctly understood. We didn't have one
single attack thoroughly anticipated, of the many that occurred. Something is rotten in the Vietnamese CIO, the Military
Security Service and the National Police. And what about our intelligence work in the provinces?
--by these attacks, the NVA/VC have demonstrated an ability to hit any urban center they choose, and to carry out a level
of coordination in their attacks heretofore unknown in Viet-Nam.

--I believe that the effectiveness of these assaults, despite their short duration in most cases, have severely shaken
confidence in the Government's ability to provide security for its people. It is a virtual certainty that thousands of
Vietnamese who have felt secure in the urban centers are now telling themselves: if the VC can hit like this once, they can
do it again; I better be more careful of what I say and do.
--these events cast serious doubt on any future statements that people in Viet-Nam's urban centers are "under
Government control" or "free from VC threat." They clearly are not, if the VC are prepared to pay the price to hit them.
--finally it is clear from intelligence reporting of the last day or two that many Vietnamese are prepared to believe and to
spread the wildest rumors about the Americans--that we helped the VC enter Saigon, that we are working with the VC to
set up a coalition government, that we are looking for a chance to get out, etc., etc. This means to me that VC propaganda
has been exceedingly effective and that our and that of the GVN leaves a hell of a lot to be desired.
I recognize, of course, that the North Vietnamese and VC paid a heavy price for this adventure. Even if the reported losses
are inflated--as they may be to some extent--they have sacrificed a lot of people, probably including some of their best
sabotage and terror personnel. The effects of these losses should be felt for some time. But I doubt that either the VC or
the general Vietnamese population are as impressed as we are by these losses. If the level of VC activity drops
dramatically in the weeks ahead, it will indicate how badly they have been hurt.
In any case, it is my deep conviction that the Vietnamese people and the Government itself have been more seriously
shaken by the events of this week than we now realize or than they are willing to admit.
This is not without potential benefit. It may cause people in the Government to take a more serious view of their situation
and to pull up their socks--in strengthening their military forces and going after the VC with new vigor, in pushing forward
programs of reform, in giving the people more protection and a higher stake in the future, in pushing personal rivalries and
jealousies into the background.
But I am utterly convinced it will not have this effect unless we provide some strong pushing in the right directions.
I said at the outset that this week offers opportunities. But I would urge that we strike while the iron is hot. The moment can
easily be lost.
I would recommend:
--that Bunker have a real heart-to-heart talk with Thieu. It should be private. He should tell Thieu that, in our judgment, the
coordinated VC attacks and their extensive propaganda campaign have had a strongly negative effect on both Vietnamese
and American opinion. It is of the highest urgency that the GVN act now and act decisively to meet the problem. The time
for caution and for slow steps forward is past. We recognize that strong measures will entail mistakes. We can live with
those and will not be throwing brickbats. But what we cannot live with is a "business as usual" approach to a grave crisis.
Thieu can count on our support. We will help him in every way possible. But we cannot support inaction and halfmeasures. We strongly believe that he, Vice President Ky and Prime Minister Loc should be a closely-knit team; that they
should be working together and cooperating; that each should have his own clearly defined responsibilities and that each
of them can move, knowing he has the support of the others and of the Americans.
We believe that it is urgent that he push ahead rapidly on:
--strengthening the ARVN and getting the most able officers in command positions, eliminating or shelving officers who are
up to their necks in corruption;
--shaking up and getting more teamwork in his intelligence serv-ices. It is a disgrace that the VC can mount 30 or 40
simultaneous attacks all over the country and his Government doesn't know a damn thing about it in advance;
--improving the quality and honesty of his provincial and district leaders; the GVN's well-conceived reform program in this
area should be pushed with maximum energy;
--a large-scale and effective drive on corruption. The Vietnamese people are sick and tired of sending their sons into the
Army to receive $30 a month while they face death, when Vietnamese "operators" and blackmarketeers are making
millions a year on shady deals. It may be that the only approach to this knotty problem (given the involvements in deals of
so many army officers, their wives, and other officials) is to declare an amnesty for all past dishonesty. But to make it clear

that a new deal is now in effect, and the first officer or official who violates the new rules is going to get rapid and strong
justice.
It may be the only way to get someone like General Vien (who is himself clean but whose wife has been busy in the
marketplace) to take a strong supporting stand. Men like Vien are very worried about the effect of past activities of their
friends and families. If they have a clean slate to start from, they can crack down.
Finally, they need to get cracking fast on national political organization to compete with the VC and the Front. My own
personal belief here is that Senator Don and his Soldier-Farmer-Worker bloc has the best potential for something useful
and we should be thinking about the most effective way of supporting it. They have no solid financial base. They need
some kind of revenue-producing establishment whose profits can be fed into their organization. This is a better approach
than a "black bag." I wouldn't talk to Thieu about the Don situation, but I would urge him to get together with Ky and begin
real organizational work on a pro-government party, broadly based and national in scope. Every day that is lost is a day
the VC use to their own advantage.
In sum, I think the time is ripe for a new approach in Viet-Nam. The Vietnamese deeply want a better shake. They do not
want to be taken over by the Communists. They want a Government that they think is honest and effective. They want
action. And they want it now. I think we should, too.
Otherwise, we are in for a year of trouble and heartbreak.
Bill

50. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in
Chief, Pacific Forces (Sharp)/1/
Saigon, February 3, 1968, 1512Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis;
Eyes Only. Repeated to Wheeler and Bunker. At 1810Z Wheeler forwarded the telegram to the JCS as well as to Rusk,
Rostow, and Helms.
MAC 01592. 1. The following is my assessment of the situation as it has developed.
2. The enemy's Tet offensive peaked on 30-31 January and has been ebbing over the past two days. Current actions
result primarily from the mopping up of pockets of enemy forces in and around the urban areas of the country. The enemy
has caused heavy damage to sections of Saigon, My Tho, and other cities and towns in his rampage of destruction, but he
has failed to gain the objectives he sought. The cost to him in losses of manpower have been enormous. It is too early to
accept any figure of enemy killed [garble--as legitimate], but I have no doubt that the enemy lost more men in the 72 hours
beginning 1800 29 Jan than he has in any single month of the war.
3. The objectives, strategy and tactics of this enemy offensive are becoming clearer. Beginning on 31 January, the VC
propaganda organs announced the existence of a new "revolutionary armed forces" responsive to a new political entity
called "the Alliance of National and Peace Forces". This organization was touted as a collection of intellectuals, merchants,
industrial, political and religious notables. The "revolutionary armed forces" are alleged to contain many elements including
defected GVN troops. It is apparent that the enemy attempted to create the impression of spontaneous political and
military uprising against the GVN and to suppress the role of the NLF and the VC/NVA military forces.
4. The ruse is transparent, but the goals and strategy of this Tet offensive are indicated in it. The enemy apparently hoped
to seize a number of population centers or parts of them and set up an ostensibly non-VC political apparatus in the
ensuing chaos. The initial assaults, where possible, were conducted by VC main and local forces and guerrillas infiltrated
into populous areas under cover of the Tet celebrations. These were apparently to paralyze GVN control and generate a
popular uprising within 48 hours. Then the remaining VC main forces and the NVA would reinforce to exploit the situation.
This general pattern of the enemy plan has been substantiated by numerous POW interrogations and by the actual
movement and commitment of forces. There were, of course, modifications in various areas for local reasons.
5. The NVA divisions in northern I CTZ were not committed during the Tet offensive. There were some contacts near Cam
Lo, but these were due to U.S. Marine initiatives. Elements of the 812th Regiment and one battalion each of the 803rd
(both from the 324B Division) and 270th Independent Regiments were committed to the attack on Quang Tri City.
6. In the Tri-Thien MR the enemy committed 80 percent of his locally available forces in attacks on Quang Tri City, Hue
and Phu Bai. Only the 9th NVA Regiment and possibly some elements of the 4th and 5th NVA Regiments were held back.
In southern I CTZ practically all of the VC units were committed, but the 2nd NVA Division and the newly infiltrated 31st
NVA Regiment have not been to date.
7. In the western Highlands, every VC unit was committed along with elements of the 24th and 95B NVA Regiments. The
1st NVA Division retained an offensive posture, but did not attack. Along the coasts of II CTZ, the paucity of VC troops and
guerrillas was reflected in the relative inactivity of the enemy. The exceptions were the attacks at Nha Trang by the 18B
NVA Regiment and at Phan Thiet by VC units. The remainder of the 5th NVA Division and all of the 3rd NVA Division
remained inactive.
8. In III CTZ, it now appears that almost every VC unit was committed with the 7th NVA Division plus the 88th NVA
Regiment withheld. A possible important exception is the 9th VC Division. It is possible that at least two regiments of the
9th are in the Saigon-Bien Hoa area, but we are not sure whether they have been committed.
9. In IV CTZ virtually every VC battalion which we know to exist was committed to attacks throughout the CTZ.
10. Thus it appears that the enemy has generally followed his plan to commit VC forces and retain NVA forces for follow
up attacks. He has achieved little success to exploit with follow up attacks, but his capability to recycle his offensive
remains, and another round of attacks could occur in I, II and III CTZ's at any time. In IV CTZ it appears that there are no
large reserves for renewed attacks in the near future.
11. I expect enemy initiation of large scale offensive action in the Khe Sanh-DMZ area in the near future despite the failure
of the Tet offensive to achieve its objectives. He has been hurt to some extent by friendly firepower and his losses around

Cam Lo, but it is unlikely he would abandon his heavy investment in offensive preparation in that area. It is likely that the
uncommitted NVA forces elsewhere in the country will conduct complementing offensive operations. If the enemy conducts
these attacks he will no longer enjoy the cover of the Tet holidays, and he will lack the assistance of destroyed VC units.
This presents us with an opportunity to inflict the same disastrous defeats on his NVA troops as we have on his VC forces.

51. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to President Johnson/1/
CM-2944-68
Washington, February 3, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 2 A (2), I Corps and DMZ, 2/68 [2 of 2]. Top
Secret.
SUBJECT
Khe Sanh
In response to your telephone call to me last evening, I asked General Westmoreland to provide me his views as soon as
possible on our reinforcement capability in the Khe Sanh area. His reply to me is presented in the following paragraphs for
your information./2/
/2/Westmoreland's message was transmitted to Wheeler as telegram MAC 1586, February 3. (Ibid.)
"1. I agree with (General Wheeler's) response on the question of our Khe Sanh reinforcement capability/3/ and would add
the following amplification.
/3/In telegram JCS 1147 to Westmoreland, February 1, Wheeler referred the President's question on how to reinforce Khe
Sanh if bad weather set in and offered the following response: "You have sizable helicopter assets at your disposal plus
tank units and artillery closer to Khe Sanh area than the French had forces to Dien Bien Phu. You do not have to depend
on fixed wing aircraft for moving troops and supplies but can use choppers which do not need a runway. Moreover,
although it would be costly, in the ultimate you would be able to reopen Route 9." (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 407, Litigation Collection, Westmoreland v. CBS, MACV Backchannel Messages to Westmoreland, 120 February)
"2. Our situation at Khe Sanh as compared with the French at Dien Bien Phu is different in three significant respects. We
have supporting air (tactical air and B-52's) for all-weather attack of enemy forces by orders of magnitude over that at Dien
Bien Phu. We have reinforcing heavy artillery within range of the Khe Sanh area from USMC positions east of the
mountains. We have multiple and vastly improved techniques for aerial supply and we are within helicopter support range
for troop reinforcement, logistic support, medical evacuation and other requirements./4/
/4/General W.E. DePuy prepared a definitive refutation of the analogy between Khe Sanh and the Viet Minh siege of the
French garrison at Dien Bien Phu in an undated memorandum to Goodpaster, which Rostow sent to the President
attached to a February 21 memorandum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Khe Sanh-Dien
Bien Phu Comparison by Gen. DePuy)
"3. We now have four Marine Corps battalions and one ARVN ranger battalion with combat and combat service support in
the Khe Sanh area. We currently have two brigades of the 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile), plus one brigade of the
101st Airborne Division, with appropriate light and medium artillery support, located north of the Hai Van Pass, within
prompt reinforcing distance of Khe Sanh. We have plans to further reinforce this area on short notice if required.
"4. We have a significant capability to reinforce Khe Sanh by fire in all weather conditions by artillery, tactical air, and B52's. There are 18 105MM howitzers and 6 155MM howitzers within the Khe Sanh defensive system. Additionally, 16
175MM guns are with the 3d Marine Division forces east of Khe Sanh positioned at the Rock Pile and at Camp Carroll.
These guns are within range of Khe Sanh and their fires can be massed as required through the use of the centralized fire
direction facility at Dong Ha. In addition to this heavy artillery support, and in contrast to the French situation at Dien Bien
Phu, we have a highly effective tactical air and B-52 capability. Radar or "Sky Spot" technique allows us direct tactical air
strikes either at night or in zero visibility conditions throughout the Khe Sanh area. In addition to tactical air, our B-52
strikes are also weather independent. During adverse weather in the Khe Sanh area there are frequent breaks of three or

four hours, in which we could intensify the air strikes, and insert helicopter gun ships into the area for additional fires as
required. If the enemy masses to attack, he will be extremely vulnerable to the massed B-52's against his supporting
forces and destructive power of tactical air, gunships and artillery against his infantry. This capability of reinforcement by
fire alone could have changed the course of battle at Dien Bien Phu.
"5. Although logistical support will present a major problem, I am satisfied we can resolve it by our multiple means of
resupply. Enemy interdiction of the airfield at Khe Sanh will not deny our reinforcement and support capability by
helicopters. As pointed out in (General Wheeler's) response to the President, we could also re-open Route 9 for a land line
of communication. This would take 22 company days of engineer effort, but with considerable cost in security.
"6. Although not ideal, the tactical situation at Khe Sanh as well as our improved combat techniques and capabilities are
considerably different from those at Dien Bien Phu.
"7. Addressing the President's query on additional help required, with the current level of activity we need an additional
squadron of
C-130 aircraft, complete with ground handling and maintenance crews, for immediate usage. In addition, I recommend a
second squadron of C-130's be alerted for immediate movement if unforeseen contingencies arise. Admiral Sharp may
wish to addresf C-130's be alerted for immediate movement if unforeseen contingencies arise. Admiral Sharp may wish to
address these requirements from the standpoint of assets available elsewhere in the theater. Additionally, it would be
prudent to have heavy air drop equipment in reserve which can be called forward if we need it. We currently have a
capability of delivering 600 tons per day for 14 days with no recovery. I would like at least an equal quantity ready for
immediate air shipment forward if required. These requirements are also being submitted separately. Acceleration of the
issue of M-16 rifles, M-60 machine guns and M-29 mortars to South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) units would improve our
posture in economy of force areas. The importance of helicopter assets in the pending battle cannot be overstated. To
achieve the necessary helicopter lift for forces deployed to Northern Corps Tactical Zone, I plan drawing on Rosson's
(Commander I Field Force) and Weyand's (Commander II Field Force) assets to a major degree. Expediting the rate of
delivery of replacement helicopters for assault helicopter companies and assault support helicopter companies would aid
in maintaining our situation in the south during the battle in the north. We are also experiencing high loss rates of 0-1
observation aircraft and replacements are urgently needed to maintain our observation and surveillance capability over our
newly opened LOC, new areas under pacification, enemy routes of infiltration and enemy base areas. The northern I Corps
Tactical Zone has greatly increased our engineering requirements. Construction of a logistical base, the maintenance of
Route I in that area, construction of Dye Marker obstacle/strong point system, plus the need of opening Route 9 to Khe
Sanh will tax severely our construction capability. Providing the Naval Mobile Construction Battalion yet to be furnished as
part of Program 5 would significantly improve our buildup in the north. With regard to Republic of Korea forces, action
should be taken to oppose any thought of withdrawing elements of Republic of Korea forces in Vietnam and returning them
to Korea. In addition, every effort should be made to re-open negotiations regarding the proposed ROK light division
deployment as soon as the situation in Korea will allow. Expedited deployment of the Thai light division, within practical
limitation, is most desirable and would permit greater flexibility in the employment of our ready reaction forces in RVN.ty to
use COFRAM. However, should the situation in the DMZ area change dramatically, we should be prepared to introduce
weapons of greater effectiveness against massed forces. Under such circumstances I visualize that either tactical nuclear
weapons or chemical agents would be active candidates for employment."/5/
/5/In telegram JCS 1154 to CINCPAC and COMUSMACV, February 1, Wheeler had requested Westmoreland's views on
the feasibility of nuclear strikes at Khe Sanh. (Ibid., NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs A-Z and AA-ZZ) In
telegram JCS 1272 to COMUSMACV, February 3, Wheeler informed Westmoreland that the President did not want to be
placed in a situation in which he would be required to decide on the employment of nuclear weapons. (Ibid.) On February
11 the President ordered the termination of contingency planning for the use of nuclear weapons at Khe Sanh. (Telegram
JCS 1690 to CINCPAC, February 11; ibid.) At a news conference on February 16, the President stated categorically that
Rusk, McNamara, and the JCS had "at no time ever considered or made a recommendation in any respect to the
deployment of nuclear weapons." See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69,
Book I, pp. 230-238.
Earle G. Wheeler

52. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, February 4, 1968, 0144Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15 VIET S. Secret;

Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by John Burke (EA/VN), cleared by Lannon Walker (S/S) and Katzenbach, and approved by
Habib.
109831. 1. We recognize here that situation continues to remain fluid in Saigon and throughout the country. We fully
endorse the moves you have begun with the GVN in an effort to recover from the physical and psychological blow against
the Allied effort. We feel particularly that joint GVN and US task force is good first step and we would hope that it will prove
to be the vehicle by which Thieu and the members of his government can be urged not only to take the emergency
measures that are necessary to recover from recent events but also to move ahead with the programs outlined in his
Inaugural address and his January 25 State of Nation speech./2/
/2/See Document 53.
2. In the aftermath of their urban offensive, the VC seem to have achieved a short term advantage, in political if not in
military terms. Assuming that the remaining NVA/VC forces can now be rapidly driven from positions they still occupy in
cities and towns and the GVN can get on with the business of picking up the pieces, the advantage could be swung to our
side.
3. There are some indications which incline one toward the judgment that VC have put significant portion of their resources
on this "throw of the dice." Interrogation reports and other intelligence sources support the thesis that they expected and
hoped to find a significant percentage of the urban populace ready to join their cause in response to direct exhortations
following their show of force in the cities and towns. However, as you have pointed out their expectations do not appear to
have materialized.
4. Another interesting indication tending to support the "all or nothing" thesis is the announcement by Liberation Radio of
the creation of the "Front of National Democracy and Peace Alliance."/3/ In unveiling what purports to be a wholly new
organization, with its sweeping revolutionary call to arms, the NLF has tacitly conceded that its own capacity to stir up and
mobilize broader segments of population has remained limited, notwithstanding its claim to be sole representative and
spokesman for the SVN people. If this ploy does not produce significant defections from the government side, the NLF
may subsequently find itself at a disadvantage in its efforts to represent itself before the world as the one valid organization
representing the majority of the people. This suggests the importance of vigorous psywar effort to expose it as just another
phony Communist front.
/3/As broadcast on January 30.
5. Thieu and the GVN on the other hand have been dealt a significant blow and Thieu must move energetically if GVN is to
recover from it. Even assuming that the GVN can regain firm control of the situation in the cities, and the VC forces are
forced to withdraw, Thieu may encounter important criticism in the press, the National Assembly, and in the Council of
Generals, all of whom may seek to blame him for letting the enemy forces strike such a blow. It is important that we do
what we can to spur him and to assist him in taking the kinds of measures which will neutralize this criticism and channel it
in a constructive direction. But in doing so we would want at all costs to insure that the constitutional fabric so carefully
woven over the last 2-1/2 years should not be torn at this time.
6. With this preamble we would like to lay out for your consideration certain of our own thoughts as to what steps we
believe might be considered at this time. Essentially these are our first thoughts following the events of this week but they
derive from the experience of the past few months. As we see it, the immediate tasks of the government include the
following:
a. An energetic and well-coordinated effort to mobilize all elements of the government, particularly the leadership of the
National Assembly, in a rededication to the struggle against the enemy.
b. A carefully thought out program of contacting important nongovernmental elements within the body politic and enlisting
their support for the government. This would include obviously labor, the religious sects (including even the militant
Buddhists if it can be determined that they did not conspire or collaborate with the VC/NVA forces), the intellectuals, and
the press.
c. A sweeping re-appraisal of the bureaucracy in an effort to evaluate performance of key officials during the crisis. We
would hope and expect that officials on the national, provincial, district levels who performed well during the recent crisis
would have their performance acknowledged in some suitable way. By the same token we would expect the GVN to
dismiss those who had failed to measure up. (If GVN can be persuaded to conduct such a review, this might provide
opportunity we have long sought to get rid of inefficient elements, both military and civilian.) The GVN should get on with
the task of clearing house.

d. A useful by-product of recent developments might be a modification in Thieu's sense of timing and priorities. As a result
of the crisis he might shift from his cautious, methodical approach to problems and programs to a more dramatic energetic
one--or at least give freer rein to those who naturally take a more activist posture. We might come, hopefully, to find him
more receptive to our advice in future and more willing to act quickly on it. Crisis might also convince him of necessity of
collaborating more closely with Ky and delegating him more authority. Note that Ky appears to have been taking de facto
control of task force on GVN side presumably with Thieu's blessing. This would now provide opportunity to discuss and
clear projects and programs directly with him without undue risk of damaging Thieu's sensibilities. Thieu might, indeed, be
willing to assign him action role and withdraw himself into position of presiding officer.
e. Finally, in addition to our suggestions above and those actions being considered by the joint GVN-US task force, we
would like to see an energetic hard-hitting psywar effort organized immediately. This would have three basic purposes: (1)
to reassure the populace that the GVN authority is still intact and will be rapidly reasserted; (2) to reaffirm the US
commitment; and (3) to exploit what we hope will be a significant disarray and confusion in VC ranks if their offensive fails
completely. All the mass media facilities available to the Mission and the GVN should be organized in an effort to achieve
those three goals.
7. As stated above this represents only our preliminary comments on a still fluid, fast moving situation. The steps you have
taken so far, including your excellent backgrounder, and the apparently helpful first meeting with Thieu-Ky of the joint
GVN/US task force seem to us eminently correct. We are very aware of the difficult situation facing you and we intend to
be as helpful as possible while at the same time trying to avoid adding to your already enormous tasks.
Rusk

53. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 4, 1968, 1100Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret;
Immediate; Nodis. Received at 9:02 a.m. This telegram is printed in full in Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 316326.
17920. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my thirty-seventh weekly message:
A. General
1. Because of the emergency caused by the widespread enemy attacks which began in the early hours of January 31, I
have regretfully had to delay this week's message. It thus covers a period of ten days from January 25.
2. The early days of the period, although witnessing a continuation of the massive build-up of enemy strength along the
DMZ and the northern part of I Corps, with anticipatory preparations for the Tet holidays underway, began in an
atmosphere of relative calm. It began, however, with what to me was an occasion of great significance, an occasion largely
overlooked as so many important developments here tend to be because of the concentration on the military situation.
Appearing as the nation's freely elected President before the freely elected legislative branch, President Thieu delivered
his first state of the union message./2/ It was a sober, positive, and constructive speech, wide-ranging and comprehensive
in scope, outlining plans to benefit the Vietnamese people. He began by a reference to the constitutional framework now in
place and expressed the hope that the executive and legislative branches can work effectively together to serve the nation.
He indicated his plans to move quickly in establishing the other institutions called for in the Constitution, notably the
judiciary, the inspectorate, and the advisory councils. But he noted that the democratic system cannot exist only through
an external form; that it demands fundamental changes in organizations and laws as well as in political structures and
habits; and he noted the importance of the development of political parties.
/2/This speech before the RVN House and Senate occurred on January 25. See The New York Times, January 26, 1968.
3. While he mentioned some of the substantial achievements which had already been accomplished, the main thrust of his
speech looked to the future. Here he covered both plans for the longer term and short range priority programs on which the
government proposed to concentrate in the next six to seven months. These included judicial and administrative reform,
expansion of educational opportunities; the development of industry and agriculture; the stimulation of land reform, in the
social field, vigorous measures to improve the refugee situation; to expand public health measures; to improve the
condition of labor and measures and incentives to bring the youth into the service of the nation. To carry out these

programs, he presented a budget of 95 billion piasters which the Assembly is scheduled to take up as the first order of
business when it resumes its session February 6. It is almost certain, however, that by mid-year the government will have
to submit a supplementary budget since the amounts provided in its present submission for the military effort are
inadequate.
4. In dealing with the government's position on the question of peace and negotiations, Thieu stressed the fact that the
GVN is merely acting to defend itself against aggression and re-affirmed the government's adherence to the principles
established by the Manila summit conference. Implicit in this program is the desire and intention of the GVN to strengthen
its position before any negotiations open. The contrast between Hanoi's methods and that of President Thieu's government
is very great and, I hope, instructive to the critics of this regime and our effort in support of it.
5. The massive, countrywide terrorist attacks on centers of population which began in the early morning hours of January
31 have been fully reported. I will not attempt to duplicate this reporting here. It is obvious that they were premeditated and
planned well in advance. It is equally clear that they were coordinated and correlated with the massive and open invasion
in northern I Corps by North Vietnamese forces.
6. It is evident too that the initial success of the attacks was due in part to the element of surprise and to the fact that they
were made in flagrant violation of the Tet truce period which Hanoi as well as the GVN had proclaimed. I think it's fair to
say also that there was some failure of intelligence on our side, for a sizable number of GVN troops and many GVN
officials were on leave.
7. That these widespread, concerted attacks will result in a massive military defeat for the enemy is evident in the casualty
figures reported Saturday morning. From 6:00 PM January 29 the beginning of Tet truce period, to midnight, February 2,
according to our figures, 12,704 of the enemy were killed, and 3,576, many of whom will become prisoners of war, were
detained; 1,814 individual and 545 crew served weapons were captured. Allied losses were 983 killed of which 318 were
US, 661 ARVN, and 4 other Free World; the number of allied wounded was 3,483. Enemy casualties for these few days
are considerably larger than for any previous month of the war. Based on the enemy casualties, I asked General
Westmoreland for an estimate of the total number of enemy committed and he said he thought that this was probably in
the neighborhood of 36,000.
8. Enemy military operations have been well orchestrated with their psychological warfare. As you know, for a considerable
period, both Hanoi and the NLF have spread rumors that negotiations and a resulting coalition government were imminent
after Tet. The inference, of course, was clear: if peace is so near, why go on fighting and getting killed? When the attacks
came, the Liberation Radio called for everybody to rally to the revolution, alleged that many ARVN troops had defected,
and of course claimed great victories, that the "US bandits and their lackeys had never before been dealt such stinging
blows." Liberation Radio also spread the rumor that US forces were cooperating with Viet Cong attacks in order to put
greater pressure on the GVN to agree to a coalition of government; and Hanoi Radio announced the formation of a "front
of national, democratic and peace alliance" in Saigon and Hue.
9. Given the fact that the enemy has suffered massive military defeat, the question arises whether he has secured in spite
of it a psychological victory; whether peoples' trust in the invincibility of the allied forces has been shattered; whether their
confidence in the ability of the GVN to provide security has been shaken; or whether on the other hand Viet Cong perfidy in
flagrant violation of the truce during the traditional Tet holiday, their use of pagodas, hospitals and residential areas as
sanctuaries and their terrorist tactics have aroused peoples' indignation and resentment. While our information at this point
on the reaction of the Vietnamese, especially in the provinces, is sketchy it seems apparent that both reactions have
occurred. But it also seemed to all of us here that if the GVN would take prompt action, if Thieu would give evidence of
strong leadership, would call in all elements in support of the government, that what might have turned out to be a Pyrrhic
victory for the GVN and its allies could be turned into a psychological victory as well.
10. It is for this reason, as I have reported, that I saw Thieu Thursday/3/ morning and told him that I thought this was the
psychological moment for him to demonstrate his leadership and to galvanize the nation by a statement which would
constitute a declaration of national unity. I said it would not only reassure the civil population, especially in the provincial
centers, but could also be a positive declaration to give life and meaning to the main programs and priorities he had
spelled out in his state of the union message. I suggested that he might want to meet with leaders of both houses of the
Assembly and perhaps have them associate themselves with his declaration and intentions. I think Thieu was impressed
with the arguments for taking advantage of the present situation to mobilize greater popular support. The next morning, he
held a meeting of the National Security Council and included the presidents of both houses of the Assembly to lay out an
action plan of relief and recovery for the civil population. In the afternoon, he recorded a speech to the nation which was
delivered on TV and radio that same evening.
/3/February 1.

[Omitted here is discussion of the U.S.-GVN Joint Task Force on post-Tet reconstruction.]
13. One naturally considers what the motives and purposes of Hanoi and the Front have been in staging these massive
attacks and apparently preparing momentarily to launch extremely heavy ones in northern I Corps. Were they prepared to
suffer these tremendous casualties in order to gain a psychological and propaganda victory? There are some evidences
that they might actually have had some expectations of popular uprisings, and in any case they are publicly claiming that
these have occurred. The British Ambassador, who has had much Asian experience, remarked that the VC, having made
these claims, will suffer, in Asian eyes, a very serious defeat if they prove to be not true. Had they planned these offenses
hoping to put themselves in a strong position to enter negotiations, hoping to force a coalition government by
demonstrating that the NLF commands the loyalty of the South Vietnamese people and must have a major voice in any
peace settlement; conversely hoping to demonstrate that the GVN is a weak puppet government and can be ignored? Or
is this part of a long winter-spring offensive which would endeavor to exert pressure to the extent to the enemy's
capabilities at least until our elections, hoping if possible to score some major victory, but in any case to inflict heavy
casualties on our troops in the expectation that they might create adverse psychological reactions in the United States and
thus a change in policy?
14. I am inclined to the former theory. It seems to me that the primary purpose of this particular operation was probably
psychological rather than military, that it was designed to put Hanoi and the Front in a strong position for negotiations by
demonstrating the strength of the Viet Cong while shaking the faith of the people in South Viet-Nam in the ability of their
own government and the US to protect them. This would be consistent with the determination on their part to press
towards peace talks.
[Omitted here is additional discussion of the Joint Task Force, politics, economics, Chieu Hoi, and casualties.]
Bunker

54. Memorandum From Robert N. Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special
Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, February 4, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 2 A (2), I Corps and DMZ, 2/68 [2 of 2]. Secret.
I would speculate that there are two possible reasons why the attack on Khe Sanh has not yet materialized:
--Our B-52 and tactical air attacks may have upset their timing--especially if the air bombardment actually put their
headquarters out of operation for a day or so.
--They may have planned the attack on Khe Sanh to coincide with a second round of attacks on the cities. Initial attacks on
the cities would be designed to force General Westmoreland to commit his reserves. The second round would keep them
committed while they launched a major assault on Khe Sanh.
Since the first attacks did not achieve their objectives, it is conceivable that the attack might not take place.
More likely, the enemy would try to carry out its original plan. If so, we might expect the battle for Khe Sanh to start within
the next three days. Various intelligence reports indicate; for example:
--Attack as early as possible before 5 February./2/
/2/Late on the night of February 4-5 enemy shelling and minor ground assaults on Khe Sanh began but were quickly
beaten back.
--General Loan, police director, believes another attack on Saigon is scheduled for 4 or 5 February.
--Enemy troop movements in Pleiku area indicate possibility of attack the night of 4 February (today our time).
--A second attack is scheduled for Nha Trang ten days after the first attack (6 or 7 February).

--Special communications plans for enemy units the night of 4-5 February.
G

55. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 5, 1968, 9 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech. No classification marking. The
notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
Responding to a question from Elspeth/2/ last night, I explained events in Vietnam as follows.
/2/Rostow's wife.
The war had been proceeding in 1967 on an attritional basis with our side gradually improving its position, the Communists
gradually running down: like this
[Omitted here is Rostow's hand-drawn graph with a line labeled "Allies" rising and a line labeled "Communists" falling.]
Behind these curves were pools of military forces and fire power which represented the working capital available to the two
sides.
As the documents forecast, the Communists decided to take a large part of their capital and put it into:
--an attack on the cities;
--a frontier attack at Khe Sanh and elsewhere.
In the one case their objective was the believed vulnerability of the GVN and the believed latent popular support for the
Viet Cong.
In the other case, the believed vulnerability of the U.S. public opinion to discouragement about the war.
So the curves actually moved like this:
[Omitted here is Rostow's hand-drawn graph with the top line, the right half of which is dotted, rising gradually and the
bottom line falling slightly, rising sharply, then falling sharply to well below the beginning point, after which it rises again. At
the point where the line falls, it is dotted, coinciding with the dotted line above it.]
The dotted portions indicate the potentiality if:
--the cities are cleared up and held against possible follow-on attacks;
--the GVN demonstrate effective political and relief capacity;
--we hold Khe Sanh;
--we keep U.S. opinion steady on course.
In short, if all on our side do their job well, the net effect could be a shortening of the war.

Walt

56. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State
Rusk/1/
No. 101
Washington, February 5, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; No
Foreign Dissem.
SUBJECT
The GVN in the Wake of the Communist Urban Offensive
Since the Communists launched their unprecedented military offensive against South Vietnamese urban centers, the GVN
has of necessity concentrated on the security problem it faces throughout the country. As South Vietnamese and Allied
military forces continue to cope with North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong troops in Saigon itself and at many other
points, the GVN has declared martial law, banned all public meetings and demonstrations, and placed under the threat of
severe punishment "all activities causing disturbance to public security and order, that is all political movements lending a
hand to Communism under a label of peace and coalition government." In the meantime, it is attempting to restore normal
administrative operations in the cities and towns and to provide immediate relief services to the thousands of displaced
persons.
Beyond these immediate tasks, however, the GVN will have the problem of countering the adverse psychological impact of
the enemy actions. Although information on public reactions is still very sketchy, available reports support the assumption
that the Communist effort has convinced many Vietnamese that enemy capabilities are far greater than they had been led
to believe and that no area, however "secure", is really immune from attack./2/ In addition to diminished confidence among
the urban public, the GVN may well have to contend with lowered morale in its regular and irregular armed forces and in
the civil bureaucracy. There may be increased attentisme among some political elements and possibly a greater tendency
to support an accommodation with the Communists. In the countryside, the Communist offensive may have already dealt
the pacification, Chieu Hoi, and other government programs serious setbacks. Headquarters and support facilities have
been disrupted or destroyed in a number of towns, and many pacification and Chieu Hoi cadre presumably are without any
guidance and/or in a highly demoralized state. More importantly, however, the Communist attacks have almost certainly
raised further doubts among the rural populace as to the ability of the government to protect the countryside when it cannot
protect secure urban areas./3/
/2/In Intelligence Note No. 128 to Rusk, February 9, Hughes noted a curious reaction to the timing of the Tet offensive by
the South Vietnamese, since "by violating the sanctity of Tet, the Vietnamese Communists have incurred a degree of
enmity among the urban population that will not soon subside, above and beyond the fact that the war has now directly
affected many people whose own lives and property had heretofore gone untouched." (Ibid.)
/3/In Intelligence Note No. 161 to Rusk, February 29, Hughes noted that, in addition to the loss of confidence in the GVN,
the withdrawal of the ARVN from rural areas into the cities to counteract the urban attacks left a power vacuum in the
countryside which VC guerrillas were filling, and the departure of RD teams caused pacification to become
"inoperative." (Ibid.) In a February 7 memorandum to Rostow, DePuy described the short-range impact of Tet upon
pacification as "very bad" and the long-term impact as unclear until the GVN could reverse the political and psychological
gains of the VC. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 1 C (3), Revolutionary Development
Support)
Thus far, the GVN seems to be attempting to capitalize on popular revulsion against the carnage and the violation of the
Tet holiday by the Communists, appeal for national unity, and rally support to the government. President Thieu may even
try to assume wider powers beyond those in the martial law decree for a protracted period and perhaps declare a state of
"general mobilization," or ask the Assembly to do so. Many Vietnamese in and out of the Assembly undoubtedly have been
shocked by the excesses attending the Communist offensive and may be more receptive to GVN appeals for unity and
support than has been the case in the past. When the initial shock passes, however, members of the Assembly and other
politically-important groups will probably tend to revert to the normal suspicion of the government leadership and to their
acute concern with their own prerogatives. At this point, the ability of the GVN itself to remain united and prove by
performance that it can respond more than it has in the past to public needs will become an important factor in determining

the acceptability of emergency measures. In the final analysis, moreover, much of the GVN's ability to control the political
situation will hinge on its ability to improve the military situation. Government statements pointing to the high Communist
casualty toll or announcing that the current Communist offensive has been stopped are not likely to be very convincing as
long as Communist harassment in and around the towns and cities continues, and as long as the main body of NVA and
Viet Cong regular forces continues to pose a serious threat of larger scale actions in outlying areas./4/
/4/In a February 10 memorandum entitled "RVNAF Performance During the Tet Offensive," CIA analysts concluded: "It
does appear that most ARVN units--and National Police and other paramilitary units--reacted reasonably well to the initial
attacks. Subsequently, there seems generally to have been a lack of aggressiveness and some breakdowns in discipline
have been reported. It seems likely that morale and confidence have been shaken to some degree, but morale does not
appear to have collapsed. It would also seem likely that most units are at least temporarily well below normal strength.
Because of the disruption of communications, RVNAF units may not be well-informed of the situation, and thus susceptible
to the same rumors that seem to be upsetting the civil populace. Their vulnerability to Viet Cong propaganda is thus also
probably greater than usual. On balance, some ARVN elements would seem to be ill-prepared for sustained or renewed
pressure without a respite of several weeks. While many units can still be expected to perform well and give good account
of themselves, some of those in isolated areas and operating without close U.S. support might disintegrate. We would
expect RF and PF elements to be generally more shaky than ARVN, particularly those in relatively isolated rural
areas." (Central Intelligence Agency, O/DDI Files, Job 78-T02095R, I-South Vietnam Branch (I/SV))

57. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 6, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Tabs A-Z and AA-ZZ. No
classification marking.
We have gone through the accumulated materials resulting from interrogation of prisoners and documents captured last
week, and sought the answers to three questions:
1. Did the VC/NVA troops expect the Vietnamese populace to rise up and support them in their attacks?
2. Did the VC/NVA have any known plans for retreat or withdrawal?
3. What is the VC/NVA evaluation as to success or failure of the campaign?
In general, the answers are as follows:
1. Yes, they did expect assistance and uprising as evidenced by the following responses to interrogation.
A prisoner captured on January 31 in Chau Doc City stated that the attack was to create conditions which would bring the
U.S. Government to negotiate in order to proceed with peace. The time was ripe for an uprising. He said that the VC
realized that they were committing everything and every person they had in this assault. It was obvious to all that the
assault was a "go for broke" matter. He believes that few of the participants expected success, although most of them
hoped that they would succeed.
Prisoners captured in Nha Trang (II Corps) state that they were told they could take Nha Trang because of the VC
organization in the city. The NVA officers did not believe this but went on with the attack in order to support the nation-wide
effort and make success possible elsewhere.
According to one of these who was captured on the morning of February 4, "The current general insurrection campaign will
extend for the duration of the Winter-Spring Campaign. Many attacks will continue because the order has been given and
cannot be countermanded." He stated that "when the VC/NVA attacked Nha Trang, they expected to be defeated;
however, they believed in the general insurrection campaign of South Vietnam."
The Executive Officer of the VC Zone Committee II, Gai Lai (Pleiku), who was captured on January 30, stated that the aim
of the present action is to achieve the goals set forth in Resolution 13 of the Lao Dong Party, that is, guide people to strike
and demonstrate and to liberate all areas. He also advised that the present offensive was scheduled to last seven days
and would end on February 5, 1968.

Three prisoners captured in the Bien Hoa area stated that they had believed that the population would assist in an uprising
against the GVN and U.S. forces and in their opinion the anticipated support from the population has not been forthcoming.
2. All evidence points to the conclusion that orders were received to "hold at all costs." Prisoners captured on January 30
in the attack on Pleiku revealed that they had orders to "take Pleiku City or not return." Three prisoners captured in the
Bien Hoa area apparently were not provided with withdrawal plans since there was no question about achievement of
victory. The prisoners said their orders were to continue fighting until the victory. (Lack of a withdrawal plan and
unfamiliarity with the local terrain may account in part for the large enemy losses.)/2/
/2/On this point, the Embassy offered the following assessment: "The virtually total absence of the usually elaborate VC
withdrawal plans as well as the 'no-retreat' instruction given to the units concerned strongly suggest that it was believed
that all they would have to do was to seize their objective and hold it for a brief period of time while the masses of the
people and the defecting ARVN could be mobilized for their support." (Telegram 18399 from Saigon, February 7; National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
Four prisoners captured in the attack on Saigon provided the following: Casualties were to be left behind. After Saigon had
been occupied, there would be a special detachment to take care of wounded. The Battalion was not to retreat. The
objective was to be held indefinitely. Supplies would be brought in later. Troops were ordered to fight until Saigon was
taken. A prisoner who died of wounds on February 1 revealed before his death that the major objectives in the attack on
Saigon were the Presidential Palace, the radio station, and the Tan Son Nhut Airbase, with orders to hold at all costs, with
no thought of retreat.
Another prisoner (believed to be a VC General and currently undergoing more intensive interrogation) revealed that the VC
planned to take over Chau Doc Province at any cost. If this failed, then taking over the Province was to be completed
before the end of the "Spring Phase," that is, before the end of March 1968. This all came about because of an order from
COSVN to use the Tet period as a "unique opportunity to make sacrifices of their lives for the survival of the fatherland."
There was no plan of retreat or withdrawal as the VC were convinced of success. This was part of a general uprising
throughout South Vietnam, which would reduce the number of U.S. or GVN troops which could be sent in as
reinforcements. Thus, if their first attack on Chau Doc City failed, they planned to keep attacking until they achieved
success.
Approximately 100 VC prisoners captured in the attack on the city of Rach Gia, Kien Giang Province, with an average age
being between 15 and 18 years, revealed during interrogation that the soldiers were given no contingency plan and were
directed simply to take the town and hold it until a coalition government could be formed.
3. There is little hard evidence in the form of response to interrogation or captured documents which gives feel for their
assessment of success or failure. However, the following does show that plans did not progress as anticipated.
A prisoner captured in Chau Doc City indicated that his troops had been told that the conditions were now right for an
uprising of the population and that an aggressive and rapid assault would bring the people to the side of the VC and make
untenable the positions of the GVN and American defenders. The uprising in fact did not take place during the attack and
the prisoner said that it is likely that this lack of all-out popular commitment to the campaign is having a bad effect on the
morale of the VC attackers.
A prisoner captured during the attack on Nha Trang stated that there would be a second attack of the city and that the
Special Forces Headquarters, the 62nd Aerial Squadron, and the airfield would be shelled. Shelling had been intended
during the first attack but the element in charge of transporting ammunition did not arrive on time./3/
/3/In a February 13 memorandum to the President, Rostow described another VC document captured at Danang which
showed that the NLF recognized the failure of Tet was a result of the inability to gain popular support, to cause ARVN units
to defect, and to coordinate attacks. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol.
3, Tabs A-Z and AA-QQ)
W.W. Rostow/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

58. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, February 6, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting ran from 10:31 to 11:55 a.m.
(Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SENIOR
FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS
THOSE ATTENDING WERE
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
General Wheeler
Clark Clifford
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
There was a general discussion of the proposed speech to be given by the President on the Pueblo and Vietnam
developments.
Secretary Rusk: Some parts of the speech are unnecessary. I do not think it should be given at this time. Extending tours
of duty in Vietnam could have a serious effect on the morale of the men.
General Wheeler: I agree with the consensus here. I think this speech should be made when events are clearer in Vietnam
and Korea. I would counsel against public announcement of a decision to extend tours of duty in Vietnam. It would alarm
the American people rather than reassure them.
The President: We must lay out this situation in a clear logical explanation of what happened. I do accept your advice that
it would be ill advised for the President to do this now.
The President then asked Tom Johnson to read the four points of criticism by Senator Robert Byrd (West Virginia)./2/ The
four items follow:
/2/Byrd made his statement at the President's breakfast for the Congressional leadership that morning. In response to
Byrd's statement, the President replied: "I don't agree with any of that. We knew that they planned a general uprising
around Tet. Our intelligence showed there was a winter-spring offensive planned. We did not know the precise places that
were going to be hit. General Abrams said the Vietnamese are doing their best. There was no military victory for the
Communists. Just look at the casualties and the killed in action." (Ibid., Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings)
1. Poor intelligence.
2. Poor preparations for these recent attacks.
3. Underestimated Viet Cong morale and vitality.
4. Overestimated support of South Vietnamese people and army.
The President said he was alarmed at this and that the attitude expressed by Senator Byrd seemed to be reflected by
much of the comment heard in Washington not only by politicians but by the press.
George Christian: The story circulating now is that we must have a confrontation with the South Vietnamese government to
get them to do more.
Walt Rostow: We have more evidence now than ever before about South Vietnam's role in this recent series of attacks.
The government was cool. It never broke down. The Vietnamese military took the brunt of the attacks. General Abrams
gives them very high marks.
The President: We should get to the Members of Congress information about all of this so that when they return to their
homes they know what line to follow.

I want to send South Korea what they need. I am afraid that many people now are working towards the objective of
undermining support and destroying our relationship with the South Vietnamese and with the South Koreans, and with
many people in this country. There seems to be a great effort to discredit this government and its military establishment.
Only yesterday I told Mr. Henry Brandon of the London Daily Telegram that I fully support General Westmoreland and that
any talk of his removal is absolutely untrue./3/ I took a bit of the steam out of him by showing him an "Eyes Only" cable to
General Westmoreland expressing my full support for him and his actions./4/
/3/On the afternoon of February 5, the President met with Brandon in an off-the-record session to discuss the Pueblo,
Vietnam, and the domestic political situation. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
/4/Telegram CAP 80390 from the President to Westmoreland, February 5, reads: "There is some irresponsible talk in the
newspapers abroad and here today that we have lost confidence in you. I wish to tell you in the bluntest and most direct
way I can that I have never dealt with a man in whom I had more confidence. You and your Vietnamese colleagues have,
in my judgment, dealt with the attack on the cities well. It is my judgment that your leadership and Ellsworth's will bring us
much further ahead a month from now than we otherwise would have been. Let us make that happen. I believe that
everything you have asked for has been supplied. As you go into this battle, you have my fullest possible confidence and
support." (Ibid., National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech) In telegram MAC 1719 to the President,
February 7, Westmoreland replied: "Am grateful to you for your message of yesterday, wherein you expressed your
confidence in this command. Be assured we are doing all possible to deal the Communist aggressor a severe blow. There
are difficult days ahead, but we are fully confident in our ability to prevail over the enemy. Faithfully yours." (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 407, Litigation Collection, Westmoreland v. CBS, MACV Backchannel Messages
from Westmoreland, 1-12 Feb 1968 [Folder I])
General Wheeler: I talked with General Westmoreland this morning and he said he was deeply appreciative of the
message from the President. He said that General Abrams would appear before the Press Corps to outline how pleased
he has been with the performance of the South Vietnamese Army.
[Omitted here is a brief discussion of the Pueblo crisis.]
Secretary McNamara: I am very disturbed about what the President said about the leadership, particularly Senator Byrd.
He treated Buzz rather badly in testimony this week.
The President: This is all part of a political offensive. They say we had the people believing we were doing very well in
Vietnam when we actually were not.
General Wheeler: This reminds me of the time of the Battle of the Bulge. The Germans did achieve tactical surprise both in
method and in their timing. They stretched the Seventh Army out like an accordion. The Germans did much like the Viet
Cong and the North Vietnamese, even to wearing United States uniforms. I never heard at that time anybody who wanted
to fire General Eisenhower because of bad intelligence. It was a severe defeat for at least one unit--the Army 99th Infantry
Division. Having been there, I do know that we lost some of our heavy artillery--15 of our 18 guns. We have had nothing
like that during this current battle.
General Westmoreland was aware and concerned about these attacks. He had the highest possible state of alert. Had he
not done this, the situation would have been much worse.
We cannot have the precise plans of the enemy without some amazing stroke of luck.
Frankly Senator Byrd surprises me on Khe Sanh, I gave him the best response I could. I tried to put the military victory in
context.
The President: I told him he should be defending us rather than attacking us. I disagreed with all points that were made. I
say this to let you know what is going on.
Walt Rostow: If the war goes well, the American people are with us. If the war goes badly they are against us. The only
way for us to answer this is for the military situation out there to come out alright. I think the men in uniform now have the
burden in determining how much support or lack of support we get.

59. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, February 6, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting lasted from 1:14 to 2:55 p.m.
(Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S TUESDAY LUNCHEON MEETING
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Clark Clifford
General Wheeler
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
[Omitted here is a brief discussion of the Pueblo crisis.]
(The President then left the room to talk to Senator Byrd who had called the President. The President returned to say that
the Senator had called to apologize for his criticism at the morning leadership meeting.)/2/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 58.
Secretary McNamara: The Joint Chiefs of Staff want to remove the restrictions around Hanoi and Haiphong, reducing the
circles to three miles around Hanoi and one and one-half miles around Haiphong./3/
/3/In a memorandum to McNamara, JCSM-78-68, February 3, Wheeler presented his argument for the reduction of the
control areas for limiting targets around Hanoi and Haiphong. (Washington National Records Center, Department of
Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, 1968 Secretary of Defense Files (Jan.-May)) In a memorandum to McNamara, I35128/68, February 5, Warnke advised accepting the JCS proposal only if "the new circles be treated as containing areas
where no strikes are to be made without individual authorization." (Ibid.)
The President: What is the reason for this?
General Wheeler: Currently there is a five mile absolute limit around both cities. We would like to reduce this to three and
one and a-half with Washington approval required inside of those circles.
Secretary McNamara: This was upon land, water and power facilities to route reconnaissance.
Secretary Rusk: This action also opens up the possibility of large civilian casualties and leads to extensive devastation of
the area. From what we have seen in other areas this leads to almost total devastation. What to hit is up to the pilot.
General Wheeler: We do not advocate attacking the population centers. We never have before, and we don't ask for that
now. I admit there will be more civilian destruction, but we will be going after trucks and water craft. They are secure now,
but represent very genuine military targets.
Secretary McNamara: Any attack of this type is very expensive both in the number of U.S. aircraft lost and in civilian
destruction. I do not recommend this. The military effect is small and our night time attack capability is small. Civilian
casualties will be high. In my judgment, the price is high and the gain is low. The military commanders will dispute all the
points I have made except aircraft loss.
General Wheeler: I do not think the effects on the civilian population will be that high. As you know, they have an excellent
warning system and most of them go to shelters and tunnels. From that standpoint, civilian loss could be lower than it is in
other areas. We have had nothing like the civilian destruction that took place in World War II and Korea. But the targets
which are there are military targets of military value. Frankly, this (civilian casualties which might result) does not bother
me when I compare it with the organized death and butchery by the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong during the last
two weeks in South Vietnam. All of this relates to the matter of pressure.

The President: How are our aircraft losses running?

General Wheeler: We are losing more aircraft because the enemy is extending its air defense southward.
Secretary McNamara: We are losing about 40 fixed wing aircraft every month. Our helicopter losses are going up. We had
27 helicopters destroyed and 137 damaged during the past two weeks. During the war we have lost 1700 aircraft. There
have been 2025 put in. That is a net gain of 375 wings.
Clark Clifford: The situation is so fluid in Vietnam and Korea now I don't feel it advisable for the President to have any
public comment. Any statement now will just augment public concern.
The President: I believe somebody in government should say something. I do not share the view that many people have
that we took a great defeat. Our version is not being put to the American people properly.
[Omitted here is a brief discussion of Korea and arms sales to Jordan.]
[The President:] What are we going to do now on these bombing targets?
Clark Clifford: I am inclined to move in the direction that their action over the past two weeks shows a dramatic answer to
the San Antonio Formula and to the request for talks. I am inclined to resume the bombing in North Vietnam and go ahead
with the suggested three mile and one and a-half mile limits.
As long as the enemy has demonstrated that they are not going to respond positively we should go ahead with this.
The President: Bob McNamara says the loss is not worth the gain.
Secretary Rusk: I would recommend hitting the 14 targets designated inside the restricted areas without authorizing total
route reconnaissance.
Secretary McNamara: There are 14 authorized and unstruck targets inside of that area.
General Wheeler: We can go first for the authorized targets although the Joint Chiefs does recommend the removal of the
limitation.
Secretary Rusk: Major destruction is involved.
The pilots select the targets. I do not know how much intensive bombing we want to permit in this area.
General Wheeler: I am fed up to the teeth with the activities of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. We apply rigid
restrictions to ourselves and try to operate in a humanitarian manner with concern for civilians at all times. They apply a
double standard. Look at what they did in South Vietnam last week. In addition, they place their munitions inside of
populated areas because they think they are safe there. In fact they place their SAM's in civilian buildings to fire at our
aircraft.
We showed during the good weather period that our campaign of bombing cut off Hanoi and Haiphong from each other
and from the rest of the country. Photo reconnaissance showed that their air supplies were stacked all over and their turn
around time for ships was very lengthy. That turn around time has now been reduced and the ships are able to unload
much more quickly.
(The President approved the removal of the five-mile limit, agreed to strike the fourteen authorized targets. After these
targets are hit the question of granting permission of armed reconnaissance will be raised again.)
[Omitted here is a brief discussion of carrier escorts and Korea.]

60. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, February 7, 1968, 12:29-1:55 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the
Cabinet Room. Those attending were the President, the Vice President, Rusk, Katzenbach, McNamara, Fowler, Helms,
Wheeler, Marks, Gaud, Office of Emergency Planning Director Price Daniel, Nitze, Clifford, Rostow, Christian, Tom
Johnson, Bromley Smith, and Edward Hamilton. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Summary notes of this meeting by Smith
are ibid., National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 5, Tab 63.
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
General Wheeler: There is continued fighting in the Cholon section of Saigon. We have intelligence indicating there are
two enemy divisions in the Saigon area. At Hue and Danang the situation is most serious. The enemy remains in Hue and
the strength of the ARVN battalions is down. Early reports say the ARVN battalions are "running out of gas."
Bad weather on the coast has affected air activities, including some resupply. A new attack on Danang is expected.
General Westmoreland said he plans to reopen Highway One so he can take supplies in by road rather than by air.
In the Khesanh vicinity there was a heavy attack on a special forces camp 4 miles from Khesanh. For the first time, the
attack was supported by 9 Soviet-supplied tanks. Some of the tanks were damaged or destroyed. The camp held out until
daylight, but we have just learned that it was necessary to evacuate Lang Vei./2/
/2/The combined armored/infantry assault by the NVA on Lang Vei, 5 miles southwest of Khe Sanh, began at 0042Z on
February 7.
Khesanh was shelled again last night and there was a probing attack against Hill 861.
U.S. casualties so far are: 670 U.S. dead; 3,565 wounded. There have been 1,294 South Vietnamese KIA and 4,448
South Vietnamese wounded. Enemy dead now stands at 24,199 with 5,007 detainees. We have captured 6,216 enemy
weapons./3/
/3/These are total casualties as a result of the Tet offensive up to this point. In telegram MAC 1614 to Wheeler, February 4,
Westmoreland estimated the KIAs alone to have been 15,595. (Johnson Library, William C. Westmoreland Papers, #29
History File, l-29 Feb 68 [1]) In telegram MAC 1754 to Wheeler, February 7, Westmoreland wrote: "I too had some doubts
about them at first, but as the facts of the general situation and individual actions come in, the KIA figures look reasonable.
The enemy committed virtually every VC unit in the country regardless of combat effectiveness and regardless of normal
area of operations. They were committed with do-or-die orders, forbidden to retreat, and with no withdrawal or rallying
plans. The enemy attacks might be described as a country-wide series of 'Loc Ninhs.' The very high casualties are not
strange in this light." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 407, Litigation Collection, Westmoreland v. CBS,
MACV Backchannel Messages from Westmoreland, 1-12 February 1968 [Folder I])
General Westmoreland has established a field headquarters in Danang. It will be entitled "MACV Forward." General
Abrams will command it for the moment./4/ General Westmoreland and the Senior South Vietnamese Chief of Staff may
move to this headquarters to coordinate the heavy activity in the neutral sections of I Corps.
/4/Abrams officially took over as Commander of MACV Forward on February 13.
There are some conclusions:
--The attacks have caused fear and confusion in South Vietnam.
--The attacks have aroused anger among the South Vietnamese people. The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong had no
regard for life and property in these raids. They also violated the Tet holiday.
--There is some loss of confidence, because of these attacks, in the government of South Vietnam and in the U.S.
General Loan said that his headquarters was getting many phone calls from private individuals in Saigon giving away
locations of the Viet Cong. This is encouraging.

We are concerned about stepped up MIG activity. They have been conducting bombing practices. MIGs may be used for
the first time in support of ground action or in an effort to shoot down our B-52's. They may also attempt to attack an air
base, like the one at Danang. I sent a message to all field commanders alerting them to these possibilities.
Secretary Rusk: What about the possibility of the MIG's attacking a carrier?
General Wheeler: No, I do not think this likely. The carriers do have air caps and are distant from the MIG bases.
The President: Go in and get those MIGs at Phuc Yen.
General Wheeler: We will as soon as the weather permits.
Secretary McNamara: The MIG's would have negligible military effects but they would have spectacular psychological
impact.
We do get the feeling that something big is ahead. We do not exactly know what it is, but our commanders are on alert.
The President: I want all of you to make whatever preparations are necessary. Let's know where we can get more people if
we need to move additional ones in.
General Wheeler: I have a preliminary list on my desk. I am not satisfied with it.
Secretary McNamara: This would include Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine units.
The President: What about the allies?
General Wheeler: The Australians are incapable of providing more troops. The problems in Korea are such that it will be
hard to get the South Koreans to even send the light division they had promised. The Thai troops are in training and to
move them in now would be more detrimental than helpful.
The President: So it would be only Americans? Well, I want you to know exactly where you could get them, where they are
located now and what we need to do. Get whatever emergency actions ready that will be necessary.
Secretary McNamara: All we would recommend at this time are the three items we had discussed earlier.
There may be some increase in draft calls but this would have no immediate effect.
The President: Do we have adequate hospitals and medical personnel?
General Wheeler: We have ample space, ample supplies, and enough doctors for the present.
Secretary McNamara: There are 6,400 military beds. Of that, 2900 are occupied by U.S. troops and 1100 by Vietnamese
civilians. So we have an additional capacity of about 2400.
The President: Look at this situation carefully. If we have another week like this one, you may need more.
Secretary Rusk: How do you interpret their use of tanks?
General Wheeler: They had to bring them all the way from Hanoi. This shows that this plan has been in staging since
September. It represents a real logistic feat. They want to create maximum disruption.
Director Marks: Could they do anything at Cam Ranh Bay?
General Wheeler: They could. On this last attack, we caught frogmen in there. They could put rockets in the hills and fire
on to the base.

The President: How many of the 25,000 killed were North Vietnamese Regulars?
General Wheeler: Approximately 18,000 were of a mixed variety of South Vietnamese enemy. Approximately 6,000 to
7,000 were North Vietnamese.
The President: How do things look at Khesanh? Would you expect to have to move out of Lang Vei?
General Wheeler: It was not planned that we would hold some of these outposts. We may have to move back that
company on Hill 861.
The President: Bob, are you worried?
Secretary McNamara: I am not worried about a true military defeat.
General Wheeler: Mr. President, this is not a situation to take lightly. This is of great military concern to us. I do think that
Khesanh is an important position which can and should be defended. It is important to us tactically and it is very important
to us psychologically. But the fighting will be very heavy, and the losses may be high.
General Westmoreland will set up the forward field headquarters as quickly as possible. He told me this morning that he
has his cables and his communications gear in. He is sending a list of his needs, including light aircraft. We are responding
to this request.
The President: Let's get everybody involved on this as quickly as possible. Everything he wants, let's get it to him.
[Omitted here is discussion of the Pueblo crisis.]
Mr. Rostow: The New York Times said today that enemy KIAs were more like the number of weapons captured than like
the figures which we are reporting.
General Wheeler: That is not true. We have captured many crew-served weapons. In fact we have captured 900 crewserved weapons on which 4 to 5 men operated. Many of these suicide crews have used only grenades and satchel
charges. They have been so heavily loaded that they do not carry hand weapons. Experience has shown that the ratios of
weapons to men runs 3 to 4 to 1. This ratio confirms our battle figure counts of enemy KIAs.
[Omitted here is additional discussion of the Pueblo.]
Then I went through the whole summary on Vietnam, similar to what General Wheeler gave here today. Most of them are
concerned about the political significance of the offensive.
I pointed out that the Government of South Vietnam had not waived or collapsed. There had been no reports of South
Vietnamese defections. There have been no reports of a popular uprising. Not a single one of the provinces or district
capitals is held by the Viet Cong.
I told them General Westmoreland made it clear that we can expect further attacks.
[Omitted here is discussion of military assistance programs.]

61. Letter From the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (Walt) to the President's Special Assistant
(Rostow)/1/
Washington, February 8, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 2 A (2) [2 of 2], I Cor and DMZ, 2/68. Secret.
Dear Mr. Rostow:

Last evening at the McNamaras you asked if I would give you my personal opinion as to the situation at Khe Sanh, and
also the defensibility of the Khe Sanh area./2/
/2/In the immediate area of Khe Sanh, 5,700 Marines and 500 ARVN Rangers faced an opposing force of 25,000.
First, let me say that I left South Vietnam on 1 June 1967 and have not returned since. I knew the ground defenses at Khe
Sanh as they were at that time but since then many changes have been made. We have three times as many Marines
there now and I cannot speak as to the details of their fortifications or the disposition of the troops.
I did feel then, and I do now, that the combat base is of extreme importance to us, both from the psychological and military
points of view. I believe the psychological is obvious because of the nature of the war. Militarily, Khe Sanh is the northwest
anchor for the entire Quang Tri-Thua Thien defense sector. Its loss would allow the enemy to close in on the Camp CarrollDong Ha-Quang Tri City areas to our serious discomfort. To the enemy, Khe Sanh lies at the junction of several natural
routes of infiltration into South Vietnam from Laos to the West and North Vietnam itself. Our location denies him easy
access to these routes, and forces him to take the long way around. Lastly, Khe Sanh, as you know, serves as a base for
certain of our specialized operations in the general area. The maps which we have provided your office portray rather
vividly the terrain implications in the area.
In short, Khe Sanh is tactically vital to us, in addition to the psychological factors which would beset us were we to
evacuate it.
I am sure that the Lang Vei evacuation assumes significant importance to you./3/ A couple of points are significant here.
First, Lang Vei, like all the Special Forces camps, has a mission to provide security in the local area, to conduct
reconnaissance, and to train and employ indigenous para-military people who are locally recruited. It did not have the
mission to serve as a conventional outpost for the defense of Khe Sanh against large organized enemy formations.
Significant also may be the perhaps forgotten concept of Special Forces camps--they were initially conceived as a
mechanism which would recruit and employ persons who might otherwise be recruited by the other side. Only after we had
had them on the payroll for a period of time did their other missions evolve.
/3/Ten Americans and 200 civilian irregulars were evacuated by helicopter later that day.
Returning to Khe Sanh proper, all indications point to an attack on Khe Sanh in force, and soon. We can expect
simultaneous efforts against Camp Carroll, Con Thien, Dong Ha, and Gio Linh, by fire at least and potentially by ground
troops as well. Additionally, we can expect rocket/mortar attacks against Danang, Phu Bai and Chu Lai. The form of the
attack against Khe Sanh itself will most probably come from the north, with probable diversionary effort from the west
along Route 9. I base this probability on the nature of the terrain north of the base which provides the enemy more cover,
which in turn permits him to move his supplies closer to the base and which subjects his troops to our supporting fires for a
shorter time and over shorter distances.
I hope the foregoing may prove helpful. Rest assured that I share the assurance which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others
have expressed in our capability to retain our hold in the Khe Sanh area. Our 6,000 Marines there will insure this.
Sincerely,
LW Walt

62. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 8, 1968, 1115Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret;
Immediate; Nodis. Received at 8:35 a.m. This telegram is printed in full in Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 327333. On February 6 Bunker, Westmoreland, and Thieu had preliminary discussions on ways to galvanize the GVN and
also on Loan's February 1 public execution of a VC suspect. (Telegram 18269 from Saigon, February 6; National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S) Additional information on Loan's action during
the height of Tet is in telegram 109066 from Saigon, February 2, and memorandum from Meeker to Rusk, February 3.
(Both ibid.)

18582. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my thirty-eighth weekly message.
A. General
1. Because of the emergency situation caused by the Viet Cong Tet attacks, my last report was sent to you on February 4,
just four days ago./2/ Nevertheless, I think enough has happened in the meantime to justify a short report at this time. As
more facts concerning the massive Tet offensive of the enemy comes to light and the story unfolds, a number of things
become evident. Information is being steadily accumulated as reports come in from the country and Saigon. Consequently,
what were somewhat tentative assumptions a few days ago begin to take more definite shape.
/2/Document 53.
2. It seems fairly clear now that:
A) Plans for the offensive were worked out long in advance and with meticulous care. Instances have come to light in
which enemy units were infiltrated disguised as civilians to reconnoiter targets, withdrawn, and re-infiltrated again as
civilians immediately before the attack.
B) Commitment of enemy troops was considerably larger than the estimate I reported in my last message. Estimates now
are that 52,000 enemy troops, plus another possible 10,000 guerrillas, for a total of approximately 62,000 enemy forces,
were committed to these widespread attacks.
C) The enemy believed that there would be uprisings in their support and that they would be able to take over many of the
cities. This is supported by captured documents and prisoner interrogations which indicated that enemy troops were told
they would find popular support, that there would be defections from the ARVN troops, and that reinforcements would
follow. Unlike previous heavy attacks, they had no orders covering possible withdrawal. The tenacity with which the
VC/NVA have held on to some of the areas they have captured (as in Hue and parts of Saigon) also suggests that the
leaders envisaged a seize-and-hold and not a hit-and-run operation. Given the forces available to the VC/NVA, this would
not be possible without massive popular and ARVN support. The enemy radio constantly pounded on the theme that the
masses were rising to help the Viet Cong, and the government forces were defecting to join with the Communist troops.
A particularly interesting captured document is the Order of the Day from the headquarters of the South Viet-Nam
Liberation Army to all military forces in South Viet-Nam. The document has a tone of urgency and calls all enemy troops
"to liberate the 14 million people of South Viet-Nam" and "fulfill our revolutionary task." It refers to the attacks as the
greatest battle in Vietnamese history and states that the assaults "will decide the fate and survival of the fatherland." It
exhorts the enemy forces "to achieve the final victory at all costs."
D) No popular uprisings took place in any city, nor did the security forces defect to the enemy. Initially, many Vietnamese
were frightened and impressed by the enemy's ability to attack on such a wide scale, and their confidence in the ability of
their government and the United States to provide security was shaken. Now they have observed that the enemy was not
able to stand in the face of our forces but has instead fallen back and has been able to remain in none of the cities he has
tried to seize. The reaction consequently has changed from one of apprehension and doubt to anger, indignation, and
resentment at the treachery of the enemy's attack during the Tet holidays, at the widespread destruction he has caused,
and the terrorist tactics he has employed.
E) The enemy has suffered a major military defeat. He has suffered losses on an unprecedented scale. From the early
morning hours of January 31 until midnight of February 7, the enemy lost nearly 25,000 KIA, nearly 5,000 detainees, more
than 5,500 individual and nearly 900 crew-served weapons. These losses are two and one-half times that of any previous
month. Although these losses seem extraordinarily high, they are substantiated to a considerable degree by the number of
detainees and weapons captured. Friendly losses have been 2,043 killed (703 US, 1,303 ARVN, and 37 FW), less than
one-twelfth of the enemy's. Gen. Westmoreland tells me that this estimate of enemy KIA is computed on a very
conservative basis, since neither enemy killed by airstrikes nor artillery have been included. This has been a heavy blow
for the enemy, particularly as many of the men killed were among the best they had, carefully trained regulars and
commandos, many of them from North Viet-Nam. From a military point of view, he had gained little in return for his heavy
expenditure of men and equipment.
F) In inflicting this severe military defeat on the enemy, our forces everywhere turned in a superior performance. A highly
encouraging development also was the very commendable performance of ARVN forces. General Westmoreland reports
that all the ARVN division commanders were on their toes and performed well, as did the corps commanders. General
Abrams has been visiting the ARVN divisions. He returned yesterday from II Corps with glowing reports of the performance
of the ARVN 22nd and 23rd Divisions. The Commander of the 23rd Division, with headquarters at Ban Me Thout, allowed

no Tet leave and, anticipating an attack, had deployed his troops outside the city; had he not done this, destruction would
have been much greater.
G) Although the enemy has suffered a heavy setback, he still retains the capability of launching a second wave attack in
Saigon and in the III Corps area. Elements of three enemy divisions, the 5th, 7th and 9th, are in the III Corps area. In
northern I Corps, in the DMZ, and the Khe Sanh area, he still has four divisions and farther south is threatening to exert
pressure on Danang. As I have previously reported, it is Thieu's opinion that the enemy will endeavor to keep up pressure
throughout the summer in I Corps and the central Highlands. In my talk with him yesterday, he added the view that in
addition to this pressure, he believed the enemy would continue efforts at harassment and infiltration against the cities in
order to pin down friendly troops in defense of the populated areas and would also endeavor to recover territory in the
countryside, in what he called a "counter-pacification effort."/3/
/3/This meeting was reported in telegram 18561 from Saigon, February 8. (National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
H) Enemy attacks have resulted in heavy damage in many cities and towns. We do not yet have an accurate count of the
number of houses destroyed or refugees created, but we do have enough information to know that there has been very
considerable property damage. As of this morning, the refugee count in the Saigon metropolitan area was 93,000 and for
the country as a whole about 190,000. Thus far, with 31 provinces out of 50 reporting, even though sketchily, we estimate
the number of evacuees (many of whom will return home as soon as fighting subsides) may reach between 250,000 and
300,000. About 15,000 homes are reported destroyed though this figure will undoubtedly increase. Civilian casualties
compiled from preliminary figures total almost 800 dead and 7,500 injured, though this also is probably much under the
actual total. Some important installations, such as hospitals, radio stations, and power plants, have also been damaged.
The GVN, however, has taken prompt measures to deal with all these problems through the Joint Task Force, which I
mentioned in my last message and to which I shall refer in more detail later in this report.
3. It may be argued that the enemy objective was not primarily military, that his military defeat is more than compensated
by his political and psychological gains. But I believe clear evidence is emerging that Hanoi expected to take and hold a
number of cities. Enemy documents and interrogations clearly suggest that at least middle and lower level cadre and
officers thought this was to be the final push to victory. The Order of the Day of the South Viet-Nam Liberation Army would
lend credence to this view. Some Vietnamese leaders who know the Communists well tell us that they think the
Communists expected to take the cities and so end the war. This, in fact, seems to be a fairly general interpretation among
our contacts.
4. As I mentioned in my last message, however, Thieu leans to the theory that the Tet attacks represent an effort to get
into a more favorable position for negotiations. He believes that the enemy realizes his strength is ebbing and so took a
desperate gamble so they could at least give the impression abroad of great and growing Communist power in South VietNam.
5. I think the two interpretations are not mutually exclusive. It seems possible that Hanoi would actually expect that the
Vietnamese people would in many cases side with the invading forces, either out of fear or because of grievances against
their own government. The experience of the Buddhist "Struggle" movement in I Corps in 1966, when military and police
units sometimes sided with the anti-government forces, may have encouraged Hanoi to believe that it was possible to
trigger defections from the GVN security forces./4/ Thus their maximum objective may have been the occupation of some
major urban centers and the collapse of the GVN.
/4/For documentation of the Struggle movement, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume IV.
6. But the primary objective of winning the war in one great series of attacks on the cities does not preclude a lesser
objective. Hanoi may well have reasoned that in the event that the Tet attacks did not bring the outright victory they hoped
for, they could still hope for political and psychological gains of such dimensions that they could come to the negotiating
table with a greatly strengthened hand. They may well have estimated that the impact of the Tet attacks would at the very
least greatly discourage the United States and cause other countries to put more pressure on us to negotiate on Hanoi's
terms.
7. But I am convinced that there is now a great opportunity not only to frustrate Hanoi's expectations, but to compound the
enemy's military defeat by also turning it to political and psychological advantage for the GVN. Much depends on the
promptness and effectiveness with which the GVN acts to return the situation to normal, to set about the task of
reconstruction and to care for the victims of the fighting. I have urged on Thieu that this is the psychological moment to
assert aggressive, dynamic leadership, to mobilize and energize elements of the government and to let the people know
that he proposes to push ahead with the programs he outlined in his state of the nation message. I have stressed the
importance of capitalizing speedily on the mood of anger and resentment at the Viet Cong treachery at Tet which is

sweeping the nation. And I have urged on him the importance of keeping the people informed about the GVN's programs
to help them; that through frequent brief appearances on radio and TV he should tell the people what is going on and seek
their support.
8. I have also suggested to Thieu that other Cabinet members supervising emergency activities should speak to the people
about their programs and that notables in Vietnamese life should be involved in all these activities and should be
encouraged to stimulate efforts by the population. I offered our assistance and participation on these information activities
in any way that he thought useful, and left with him a memorandum of specific suggestions./5/
/5/In telegram CAP 80391 to Bunker, February 6, the President suggested that the Ambassador get Thieu to "move rapidly
on the deeper problems facing the Vietnamese government" such as shoring up the ARVN, improving the performance of
the intelligence services, and rooting out corruption. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt
Rostow, Vol. 59 [1 of 2]) In telegram 112634 to Saigon, February 9, the Department also provided a list of necessary steps
for the GVN to take, including mobilizing the people in the rebuilding effort, making radical personnel changes, undertaking
a more aggressive pacification campaign, and seizing momentum through "a sense of theater and drama to get its
message to the people and guide their emotions as they emerge from their state of shock." (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
9. I also suggested to Thieu yesterday he might want to consider broadening the base of his government by associating
with it in some way prominent and influential civilians such as Nguyen Luu Vien, Tran Van Huong, Mai Tho Truyen, Vo
Long Trieu, Ha Thuc Ky, Tran Van Tuyen, Phan Quang Dan, Tran Van An, and others, Thieu said that perhaps such
individuals could be asked to serve as an advisory council to the government and that he was considering convening a
Congress of Notables, something along the lines of the congress which had been convened in 1966 to promote the
movement for elections for a Constituent Assembly to draft the Constitution./6/ He also noted that Ky had gone on
television on February 5 to inform the people of the GVN's relief and recovery effort and that he himself will address a joint
session of both houses of the Assembly on the morning of February 9./7/
/6/In a February 9 memorandum to Rusk, Harriman noted in relation to these comments by Thieu: "Whichever means is
used, I strongly endorse the idea of broadening the political base of the Saigon government. It is not today representative
of the people and does not have the ability to rally the loyalty which is essential for a strong national government. I hope
that Bunker will be encouraged to follow up on this conversation and that some steps are taken along the lines to which
both men appear to agree." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service,
Kennedy-Johnson, Chronological File, February 1968)
/7/In the speech, Thieu asked the National Assembly for its support to speed up mobilization plans. (Telegram 18892 from
Saigon, February 10; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
10. Our pacification organization has turned itself into a relief operation for the time being. Bob Komer is managing US
support of the GVN's relief and recovery effort under Vice President Ky and has established a command post in the palace
with Ky. A small group of bottleneck-breakers and problem solvers are working there to pull together civil-military
operations on both GVN and American sides.
[Omitted here is continuing discussion of reconstruction measures and the economic situation.]
Bunker

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968

Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 63-70

February 9-28: Westmoreland's Augmentation Request

63. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) and the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/
Saigon, February 9, 1968, 1633Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, William C. Westmoreland Papers, #29 History File, 1-29 Feb 68 [II]. Top Secret. In telegram
JCS 1529 to Westmoreland, February 7, Wheeler cautioned that the motive behind the enemy's strategy for the build-up in
I Corps and especially around Khe Sanh was to compel Westmoreland to commit his troops to the area, thereby exposing
the South Vietnamese Army in Saigon and other parts of the country to attack. To counter this strategy, Wheeler
suggested that the 82d Airborne and one-half of a Marine division (the 6/9 Marine Division available in the Pacific
Command) could be sent to Vietnam. In conclusion, Wheeler noted: "The United States is not prepared to accept a defeat
in South Vietnam. In summary, if you need more troops, ask for them." (U.S. Army Center for Military History, William C.
Westmoreland Papers, Eyes Only Message File, 1 Feb.-29 Feb. 1968)
MAC 01858. References: A. JCS 01590, DTG 090021Z;/2/ B. CINCPAC DTG 090359Z;/3/ C. MAC 01810, DTG
081440Z./4/
/2/In telegram JCS 1590 to Westmoreland, February 9, Wheeler suggested that Westmoreland issue a request signaling a
greater urgency. "Please understand that I am not trying to sell you on the deployment of additional forces which in any
event I cannot guarantee," Wheeler argued. "However, my sensing is that the critical phase of the war is upon us, and I do
not believe that you should refrain from asking for what you believe is required under the circumstances." (Johnson
Library, William C. Westmoreland Papers, #29 History File, 1-29 Feb 68 [II])
/3/In this unnumbered telegram to Westmoreland, February 9, Sharp accepted the possibility that "the Khe Sanh buildup
might be a threat to syphon off troops from the south in order to weaken U.S. and ARVN as much as possible to facilitate
attack on Saigon" and requested Westmoreland's analysis of whether the enemy might also be able to infiltrate troops
inside Saigon while it simultaneously attacked the city from without. (Ibid.)
/4/In telegram MAC 1810 to Wheeler, February 8, Westmoreland, concerned about the degree to which his forces were
stretched and citing the possibility that Khe Sanh could be lost, formally requested the dispatch by April to Vietnam of the
troops to which Wheeler had referred. (Ibid.) Westmoreland also attempted to obtain supplemental forces to fulfill longrange requirements. In telegram MAC 1812 to Wheeler, February 8, Westmoreland detailed the areas in which an
additional number of troops above the previously established ceiling of 525,000 would be utilized. (Ibid.) In replying in
telegram JCS 1589 to Westmoreland, February 9, Wheeler offered the following caution against such expansion: "I believe
it imperative that you hold up the front channel submission of your supplemental requirements for the coming year until at
least the early part of March. I fear that, until we have fully sorted out and acted upon your immediate requirements
stemming from the present situation in Vietnam, the fulfilling of those requirements could very well be jeopardized by
adding your longer range requirements at this particular time." (Ibid.)
1. (U) Since references A and B concern the same general subject, I will answer them collectively.
2. (S) To put the situation in context, it might be desirable to give you my views of the enemy's strategy and the plans that
he developed in Hanoi during early fall. It would seem that the enemy concluded that a protracted war was not in his longrange interest in view of the success of our ground and air actions against his forces, supplies, and facilities. He therefore
decided to adopt an alternate strategy to bring the war to an early conclusion. Stemming from this strategy, there evolved a
plan that I reconstruct in three phases. Phase I, which started at the end of October and was scheduled to go until the first
of the year, had as its objective the seizure of selected areas in remote provinces along the Lao and Cambodian borders
and consolidation of these areas pending further operations to expand his area of control. Also during this phase, he
proceeded to concentrate on district towns to disrupt the political and military control structure outside the cities. During
this phase, we saw the major attack on Dak To; attacks by fire on Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban Me Thuot; and major ground
attacks against Loc Ninh, Bu Dop, and Song Be; and attacks against innumerable district towns and outposts. As you
know, this phase achieved very limited success, resulted in large casualties to the enemy, and a failure to physically
control more territory in South Vietnam. An enclave strategy would have played into his hands. The second phase, which
we saw start at Tet, involved infiltration of cities to destroy the political and military control apparatus and to bring about a
public uprising. In the border areas, this phase was designed to support his plan to seize control of Pleiku and Darlac

Provinces which would give him de facto control of the eastern portion of the country from the Ashau Valley in western
Thua Thien all the way down through War Zone C in northern Tay Ninh. The third phase, which is yet to begin, would
involve consolidation of his position and strong attacks across the DMZ and against Khe Sanh with the objective of
establishing military control over the two northern provinces, thereby bringing about a de facto partition of the country from
wherein he would control Quang Tri and Thua Thien, western Quang Nam, western Quang Tin, and the Provinces of
Kontum, Pleiku, Darlac, Quang Duc, and at least the northern portions of Phuoc Long, Bien Long, and Tay Ninh. Under the
circumstances, he would have created a situation similar to that which now prevails in Laos and would therefore be in a
strong negotiating position, particularly if he were successful in his design to assume control of the cities and bring about a
public uprising.
3. As to the present situation, an enemy threat of major proportions is still posed north of the DMZ and around Khe Sanh.
In addition, the enemy is applying considerable pressure to the Hue area and to Highway 1 north of Danang. Furthermore,
he has a number of battalions directly south of Danang which pose a threat to the air field and the city. The 3d Mar Div is in
good posture at Khe Sanh and south of the DMZ. The 1st Cav Div is in Quang Tri Province with two battalions in blocking
positions north of Hue. A Marine regiment is securing Hue/Phu Bai and assisting in the clearing of Hue City. The Marines
have made excellent progress, but the going by the ARVN in the citadel has been slow and they will probably be with it for
several more days. The road over Ai Van Pass is cut, with little prospect of being opened until additional troops and
engineers can be provided. Because of this situation, I am deploying by air tomorrow a battalion of the 101st Abn Div to
Hue/Phu Bai to assist in the security of that important area and will be moving out by LST a second battalion of the 101st
to Danang on the 12th with the mission of providing security for Highway 1 over Ai Van Pass. Also I am sending by sea an
army combat engineer battalion to work on Highway 1. The controlling factor in Quang Tri and Thua Thien is logistics, now
marginal at best. It is essential that we open up Highway 1 and the Marines cannot spare the forces to do the job. The
situation in Hue should improve because a task force of three Vietnamese Marine battalions that are in good strength will
be replacing the three understrength abn bns now fighting in the city along with elements of the ARVN 1st Div.
4. The situation in II Corps is generally favorable but there is some fighting with enemy elements in Dalat and a sizeable
threat exists at Dak To. I believe we have enough forces in Dak To, but Rosson is prepared to reinforce with elements of
the 173d.
5. In III Corps, fighting continues in Saigon, but this situation should be cleared up shortly, despite the fact that I expect the
enemy to increase his effort there in the next several days. Today I deployed a US battalion in the area in order to energize
the ARVN and to permit them to redeploy a battalion to another part of the city. North and east of Saigon there are
elements of the 9th and 5th VC Divisions and further north we have the 7th NVA Div. The 5th and 9th Divisions have been
hurt by recent actions and their capability is considered limited. On the other hand, the 7th Div is in fair shape, but we have
been putting the pressure on them through ground raids, artillery, and air strikes during the last week, which has probably
degraded their capability. Weyand has so disposed his forces that the enemy will have difficulty getting an attack off the
ground and could only do so at great risk. During the last several days, Saigon has been reinforced by two Marine
battalions which were deployed from the II Corps. I am planning to move the mobile riverine force into Long An on the 12th
and if necessary can reinforce with troops now in the IV Corps on short notice. Finally, there is an airborne battalion at
Phan Thiet which I can use to further reinforce if required. In summary, despite the deployment of two airborne battalions
to I Corps, I feel that our posture in III Corps is adequate to cope with the situation.
In IV Corps, I now have five battalions of the 9th Div, to include the mobile riverine force. They have done an excellent job
and in my opinion have saved the situation in My Tho and Ben Tre. Yesterday I planned to move the mobile riverine force
to Long An on the 10th, but because of continued activity near My Tho I have decided to leave them in that area until the
12th.
6. The only really serious threat that faces me now is in the I Corps area, where we are limited by logistics, weather, the
closure of Highway 1 and enemy initiatives. It is important that I reinforce soonest with a minimum of two battalions.
7. One of the problems that concerns me is the shortage of strength in the ARVN units. The situation was brought about by
high casualties during the past week and absentees from the units because of Tet. Most of these absentees were
authorized in that leaves were permitted and the troops have not been able to get back to their units. On the other hand, I
think we must realistically expect desertions to be high. It is going to take some time to build the ARVN back up to
strength. I have emphasized this to Pres. Thieu and urged that he proceed immediately to draft 19-year-olds, to be
followed as needed by the drafting of youths of 18. Furthermore, we plan to increase the Vietnamese Armed Forces by
65,000, and Thieu has recently asked if we can support an even greater build-up. In my opinion, we will have no difficulty
supporting any build-up that they can accomplish. After filling their depleted ranks, I doubt their ability to recruit and train
units beyond the planned strength increase of 65,000.
8. I have now deployed to I Corps the 1st Cav Div less a brigade, plus a brigade of the 101st Abn Div. I will be deploying
shortly two additional battalions of the 101st and will be prepared to deploy a third battalion with a brigade headquarters at
a later time. In my opinion, this is the minimum force that I will need to insure stability of the situation in the two northern

provinces, but even this may not be enough. I may have to employ the entire 101st Div and am prepared to do so,
depending upon enemy actions. However, logistics is the key and this means opening Highway 1. During the next several
months, I would move into the Ashau Valley and clean it out and to open up the road to Khe Sanh. On the other hand, I will
have to give priority to moving against the enemy once he has committed himself. I am not happy about thinning out III
Corps, but the departure of the 101st will not present an unacceptable risk; it will slow down progress that could otherwise
be made in defeating main force units in the area and in supporting pacification.
9. Needless to say, I would welcome reinforcements at any time they can be made available:
A. To put me in a stronger posture to contain the enemy's major campaign in the DMZ-Quang Tri-Thua Thien area and to
go on the offensive as soon as his attack is spent.
B. To permit me to carry out my campaign plans despite the enemy's reinforcements from North Vietnam which have
influenced my deployments and plans.
C. To off-set the weakened Vietnamese forces resulting from casualties and Tet desertions. Realistically, we must assume
that it will take them at least six months to regain the military posture of several weeks ago. I should point out in this
connection that when one considers the casualties inflicted on the enemy, this is not an expected [unexpected?] price to
pay.
D. To take advantage of the enemy's weakened position by going on the offensive against him.
10. If the one-half Marine division were made available now, I would of course assign it to III MAF, for either north of
Danang or in Quang Tin Province thereby releasing elements of the Americal Division for deployment further south. If the
82d Abn Div were available now, I would want it to arrive at Danang and be deployed north in the Ai Van Pass and thence
to the Hue-Phu Bai area for possible operations in Base Area 117 and later perhaps in Base Area 101. This division would
operate in conjunction with the 1st Cav Div. Subsequently, along with the 1st Cav Div, and elements of the III MAF, it could
effect a land link-up with Khe Sanh and thence move into the Ashau Valley and clean it out. (York II) The sequence of
objectives would be determined after considering the factors at the time. I envision the 82d would move by foot and road to
the extent possible so as to economize on the use of helicopters. Such deployment would permit me to relieve elements, if
not all, of the 101st Abn Div to return to the III Corps to assist in operations there. If the units arrive later, reference C
pertains. When weather permits, it will be desirable, if not essential to establish a beach support area south of Quang Tri
as outlined in reference C. This is the most effective and economical way of providing logistical support to the area. It will
be feasible to support the 82d initially from Danang along Highway 1, provided necessary troops are committed to keep the
road open. With the commitment of such troops, it might also be practical to put the railroad in operation and this would
further increase the tonnage. However, I do not yet have a survey as to the costs and time involved in opening railroad, but
I do not believe it would be a major task.
11. In summary, I would much prefer a bird in the hand than two in the bush, but would like the birds to be deployed to the
I Corps area and not in the II Corps or III Corps. Elements that I have had to deploy from III Corps could perhaps be
returned and therefore expand our operations in that area. It is conceivable that a six-month loan of these units would turn
the tide to the point where the enemy might see the light or be so weakened that we could return them, particularly if the
ARVN can rebuild itself following its recent battles and improves its fighting quality by virtue of the modern weapons it is
scheduled to receive.

64. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, February 9, 1968, 11:02 a.m.-12:43 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of
the White House. Those attending the meeting were the President, Rostow, Rusk, McNamara, Clifford, Wheeler, Harold
Johnson, Chapman, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff General Bruce K. Holloway, Moorer, Nitze, Christian, and Tom Johnson.
(Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
The President: I asked you to come here on the basis that we would hope for the best and expect the worst. I want to see
what we should do in Vietnam.

We ought to look at everything that we should be doing. Get the requirements ready to do what needs to be done. Let's be
fully prepared to move in the event we are required to do so.
We want to ask questions so that you can inform us of what the current situation is and so that we can determine what
things we need to work on now in the event we get a call for additional help.
I want a military review of the problems confronting us if the enemy continues more of the same activities as during the
past two weeks. I think we should anticipate all the surprises and determine what is going to confront us if the Viet Cong
attack the cities, attack Khesanh, and pull off a few surprises elsewhere.
Two questions we will have to answer:
1. Will we have to put in more men?
2. Can we do it with the Vietnamese as they are now?
General Wheeler: During the past few days I have talked with General Westmoreland over the phone and received a
number of cables from him.
Westmoreland reported the following:
--The enemy apparently will start new attacks on the 10th. That is tonight our time. This is based on communications
intelligence and prisoners of war.
--The ARVN fought well. There has not been any defections that we know of.
--There is a question whether the ARVN can stand up after 12 days of heavy fighting if another series of heavy attacks
occur.
--The enemy's objective may be fragmentation of the ARVN and the Government of South Vietnam. This fragmentation
would be accomplished by attacks against our air bases with an effort to keep U.S. men concentrated in the north.
Intelligence communications recognize this as one objective.
--The enemy may not be ready yet to attack Khesanh, General Chapman can elaborate on that.
--Westmoreland has moved the 1st Calvary Division and elements of the 101st Airborne Division. These are his two
strategic reserve elements which have been moved up North.
Those units are there to take care of contingency operations in the area.
--Westmoreland has had to use other reserve elements to deal with the fighting around Quang Tri and north of Hue.
--He is now moving by LST an airborne battalion to the Hue area. The major problem is a logistical one.
Westmoreland said he must have the use of Highway One in order to move supplies from Danang from the North and
support Khesanh logistically.
--He has moved an army engineer combat battalion to clear the road area.
--He will move another battalion of the 101st to open "MACV Forward," his front headquarters. This will be done tonight our
time.
--Yesterday was fairly quiet although Lang Vei was over-run and 27 U.S. men were killed. They killed 100 enemy.
--There was also an ambush on a truck convoy. It is obvious the enemy is trying to disrupt logistics.

--We are using water board craft to move supplies. The enemy is trying to disrupt this with frogmen.
The President: Are we doing all we can? Could we use civilians protected by military to help open that road? (The
President also referred to civilian contractors who have been involved in construction projects.)
Secretary McNamara: I am sure that these units are being employed and I will check on this.
General Wheeler: Westmoreland needs reinforcements for several reasons. The reinforcements he has in mind are the
82nd Airborne Division and the Sixth-Ninth of a Marine division. This would total 15 battalions.
He needs these reinforcements for two reasons:
1. To prevent the ARVN from falling apart.
2. To give himself a reserve to use as quick response units to any initiatives by the enemy in Vietnam.
He said he would put the 82nd Airborne in Danang and north of Danang. That would permit him to move the 101st south
and to keep Highway One open.
The Marines would give two capabilities:
1. Reinforcement in I Corps permitting amphibious forces to be available at all times.
2. Make available troops for an amphibious landing north of the DMZ if that action is decided upon.
The 82nd Airborne and the Sixth-Ninth of Marine division can only be deployed if we eliminate the restrictions on frequency
of tours and length of tours in Vietnam.
Secretary McNamara: We should give some very serious thought to the proposal of scrapping the 12-month tour. It might
have a very bad effect on morale.
Secretary McNamara: General Westmoreland said he needs the 82nd Division and two-thirds of a marine division. That
would be 15 battalions.
In order to do that, it would be required to call up some Army divisions and the 4th Marine division.
General Wheeler: We would propose to move the 4th Marine Division to Okinawa and Hawaii for ready deployment.
The 2 Army divisions should be in the U.S. to be ready to meet any contingencies.
The JCS will address themselves to this matter this afternoon.
There are four options:
Option 1--Slow Movement--This would involve 265 aircraft and no draw down on airlift capacity in Southeast Asia.
This would put the 12,500 men in Vietnam in 15 days. The cargo would arrive in 29 days under this option. (There are
11,600 tons of cargo.) Under this option, the 5 Marine battalions would reach Vietnam in 8 days. Their cargo would get
there in 17 days.
Option 2--This would involve 334 aircraft and a 70% draw down in cargo airlifts to Southeast Asia. This would put the 82nd
Airborne Division in Vietnam in 6 days. The cargo would arrive in 17 days. The Marine battalions would reach Vietnam in 3
days, and its cargo in 10 days. Option 2 cuts by one-half the time as required under Option 1.
Option 3--This would involve 670 aircraft and the call up of the Air National Guard and other air squadrons. This would
place the 82nd Airborne in Vietnam in 5 days (its cargo in 14 days). This option would put the Marines in Vietnam in 3 days
and the cargo in 9 days.

Option 4--This would use civilian aircraft and would involve the cut down on airlift capacity to South Vietnam by 40% rather
than 70%. General Holloway says the call up of Stage III craft would have no effect.
There would be considerable lost motion in refitting these civilian aircraft for military use.
General Holloway said that by leasing aircraft we could cut down on time required.
I would add a K factor to the times specified in order to alert the men and to assemble the airlift. This K factor would be
plus 2 days to all times given.
If this program is followed, it will be necessary for the President to get authority to extend terms of service (to call up
individual reservists) and to extend existing authority to call up reserve units past the 1968 deadline.
Based on my conversations with General Westmoreland, I believe General Westmoreland is now dictating a message to
ask for early deployment of the units I have now mentioned.
The President: How many men does this represent?
General Wheeler: 25,000 men in these units plus support personnel.
Secretary McNamara: The total would run about 40,000.
Normally, each battalion has 5,000 men. If one multiplies that times the 15 battalions, the total level would be 75,000 men.
The difference between the 40,000 and the 75,000 is made up by the use of overhead manpower already in Vietnam
which could be placed in these 15 battalions to raise them to full strength.
The President: How many men do we have there now?
General Wheeler: 500,000.
The President: Can we speed up the other infantry battalions we have already promised?
General Johnson: We have already curtailed training to the minimum. We must give these units proper training time. They
are already squeezed. One battalion is scheduled to go the last week in March. Three battalions are scheduled to go the
last week in April.
Secretary McNamara: If General Johnson says that is the case then I will accept it. I would like to look more at this.
Perhaps these units could be sent on short training into rear areas.
General Johnson: Mr. Secretary, there are no rear areas in Vietnam anymore.
Secretary McNamara: What we are considering is a massive force structure. I think it would be unwise to leave these
forces out there if the contingencies we have discussed do not develop.
Apart from the immediate contingency I do not think we will need them. We do need to extend the tours, but this should be
only temporary.
To call up the forces we are talking about would involve a total of about 120 men.
General Wheeler: This emergency is not going to go away in a few days or a few weeks. In 3 months we may still be in an
emergency situation.
The enemy is not in a position to really assault Khesanh. He is going to take his time and move when he has things under
control as he would like them.
The reserve divisions we are sending must have a period of training and shake down before they can perform well. I would
estimate this to take about 8 to 12 weeks.

I want to point out, Mr. President, that if you do make a decision to deploy the 82nd Airborne, you will have no readily
deployable strategic reserves. I know this will be a serious problem for you politically.
In all prudence, I do not think we should deploy these troops without reconstituting our strategic reserves in the United
States.
The President: All last week I asked two questions. The first was "Did Westmoreland have what he needed?" (You
answered yes.) The second question was, "Can Westmoreland take care of the situation with what he has there now?"
The answer was yes.
Tell me what has happened to change the situation between then and now.
General Wheeler: I have a chart which was completed today based on a very complete intelligence analysis. It relates to
all of South Vietnam, Laos and the area around the DMZ. It shows the following:
--Since December the North Vietnamese infantry has increased from 78 battalions to 105 battalions. Estimating there are
600 men per battalion that is approximately 15,000 men.
--We have been able to get this information by 3 means:
1. Contact with the actual units
2. Communications intelligence
3. Captured documents and POWs.
--This represents a substantial change in the combat ratios of U.S. troops to enemy troops.
--This ratio was 1.7 to 1 in December. It is 1.4 to 1 today.
--In the DMZ and I Corps area, there is a 1 to 1 ratio. There are 79 enemy battalions in the 1st Corps area (60 North
Vietnamese and 19 Viet Cong).
In the same area there are 82 Free World battalions (42 U.S.; 4 Free World; and 36 ARVN).
This is about 1 to 1.
The President: What you are saying is this. Since last week we have information we did not know about earlier. This is the
addition of 15,000 North Vietnamese in the northern part of the country. Because of that, do we need 15 U.S. battalions?
General Wheeler: General Westmoreland told me what he was going to put in tonight's telegram. This is the first time he
has addressed the matter of additional troops.
Paul Nitze: I was not aware of this new intelligence.
General Wheeler: The last report was that there was approximately 15,000 enemy near and around Khesanh.
As of today, our estimates range between 16,000 and 25,000. Their infantry has been built up.
In addition, Westmoreland is now faced with the problem of the impact of these recent heavy attacks on the ARVN.
We do not know what is going to happen to the ARVN after this second round of attacks. All ARVN units are on maximum
alert.
But in Hue, the ARVN airborne units are down to 160 men per battalion. Their strength is far below that required.

The President: We have to get the Government of South Vietnam to increase its efforts. Why can't we get them to do as
we do, call up 18 year olds and give the American people the impression that they are doing as much as we.
Secretary McNamara: When I was in Vietnam I talked with Thieu and Ky. They told me then they intended to call up 18
and 19 year olds.
The President: I saw where Senator Kennedy pointed out that the South Vietnamese voted not to call up 18 year olds.
General Wheeler: I met last night with this unnamed group chaired by Nick Katzenbach and Paul Nitze. We are pressing
for the South Vietnamese to lower the age limit at least to 19 and Bunker is pushing this hard.
Secretary Rusk: We must keep in mind that they consider a child 1 year old when he is born, so, their 19 year olds are our
18 year olds.
The President: Has either House voted not to draft these men?
Paul Nitze: I am unaware of any vote on it.
Secretary McNamara: I will look into this and follow through.
The President: Are there some things that we can get the South Koreans and the South Vietnamese to do to match all of
these things we are planning to do?
Walt Rostow: The men at Hue have been drawn down by the very intensive action there. What is the state of strength of
the ARVN units?
General Wheeler: I do not have the answers precisely. They have been mauled. As of 11:00 p.m. our time last night, 1,698
ARVN were killed; 6,633 were wounded seriously. This totals about 10,000 ARVN lost.
Mr. Rostow: Has the enemy switched from a slow attrition strategy to a "go for broke" strategy? Would an extension of
tours in Vietnam be understood as far as morale is concerned?
General Wheeler: For a temporary period we can sustain an extension of tours without losing morale. For any long period
of time, however, you would face a loss of morale. We now have a rule that we will not send a man back without 25
months between tours in Vietnam.
General Johnson: We send men back now with special skills in less than 25 months.
As I see it there are two basic problems. The first is at Khesanh. The second is in the cities. What are they trying to do?
There are two postulates:
1. The enemy believed that the people would rise up. There were no withdrawal plans by the enemy.
2. The enemy suffered erosion over the last few months. They have seen a decoupling of its forces in hamlets and
villages. U.S. troops have cleaned out the Viet Cong from many of the villages. So, he has concluded he must go for a
psychological victory prior to negotiations.
We are in a critical stage. We expect new attacks will begin on the 10th. There are two essential questions facing us:
1. What strength does the enemy have to renew the attacks with?
2. What strength does the ARVN possess to resist these attacks?
The President: What is the ARVN strength?
General Wheeler: Approximately 360,000 men now. Total forces about 600,000.

Secretary Rusk: I have been asking for several days if there was a new order of battle. This is the first time that I have
heard of this.
The President: Because of their increase of 15,000 troops, is it true that we now need 15 battalions or 45,000 men? What
mobile reserve forces does Westmoreland have between now and the time he gets more men?
General Wheeler: He has the bulk of the 1st Cavalry and one brigade of the 101st Airborne. Other than that, all of his
forces are dispersed to meet the enemy. We are not getting much mileage out of the Australian or South Korean troops.
They must go back to their home country for their orders.
The President: Do you mean that the Australian and Korean commanders have to go back to their capital before they can
be deployed?
General Wheeler: Yes sir, they remain under the operational control of their government.
Secretary McNamara: I am under the very clear impression that they have been told by their home governments to do
everything possible to hold down their own casualties.
Our losses are running six times the level of Korean losses on a percentage basis.
The President: We ought to try to bring all the allied forces under Westmoreland's command.
General Wheeler: In all fairness, the allies have operated well in areas where they have been located.
The President: Does Westmoreland have enough airpower to support his troops?
General Wheeler: Yes sir, we are moving in 2 more C-130 units.
The President: How is the supply problem at Khesanh? Will artillery and rockets knock this out? Can we rely on roads?
Secretary McNamara: There is no road available up there.
General Wheeler: We moved in 214 tons of supplies yesterday with helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. As long as we use
B-52's and tactical air, we will be able to keep our resupply up. They are keeping about 10 to 12 days supplies in storage.
The President: Wouldn't we have one big problem if the airfield at Khe Sanh was out?
General Wheeler: Yes, we would have to link up by road some way. Of course we can use air drops and helicopters. The
air strip will be used from time to time.
The President: If you lost the air strip, would you evacuate Khesanh?
General Wheeler: That depends on the course of the fighting and their ability to resupply.
Secretary Rusk: When does the weather improve?
General Johnson: It is now beginning to improve. I have some concern about the loss of the air strip, because fixed wing
aircraft carry so much more than helicopters.
Nobody can give a categorical answer. We think we have a 50-50 chance of sustaining our actions out there.
The men have 12 days of rations and 11 days of ammunition. Almost no cofram has been used.
Being cut off would hurt in the evacuation of wounded, but we can evacuate at night if necessary. This is one of the
hazards you have to accept.

The President: How is the weather likely to affect actions along the border?
General Wheeler: The better the weather, the more it favors us.
The President: Have you anticipated air support from any of the communists?
General Wheeler: There is no evidence of any movement except the training flights and the Soviet bombers which were
seen at Khesanh.
The President: What is his air capability if he uses it?
General Wheeler: His capability in using air is a nuisance and has propaganda value rather than any great military threat.
He has 8 IL 28's.
The President: What use does he have of these?
General Wheeler: I do not know.
The President: How many MIGs does he have?
General Wheeler: We know of 23 MIG 21's. There are other MIG 15's and 17's.
Most of these MIGs are in China.
The President: Keep the MIGs in sight at all times.
General Wheeler: We are doing the best we can. Admiral Sharp is moving a guided missile ship to the Gulf of Tonkin. It
carries the Talos Missile. We are also sending in ships with the Terrier Missile.
The President: Get the JCS to work up all the options and let's review them together.
I want you to hope for the best and plan for the worst. Let's consider the extensions, call ups, and use of specialists.
Dean, should we have more than the Tonkin Gulf resolution in going into this? Should we ask for a declaration of war?
Secretary Rusk: Congressional action on individual items would avoid the problems inherent in a generalized declaration. I
do not recommend a declaration of war. I will see what items we might ask the Congress to look at.
The President: Where are the problems in the cities?
General Wheeler: In Hue, we have one Marine battalion operating on the south side of the river. The ARVN units at Hue
have been shot down to 160 men per battalion. In Cholon there are enemy forces being met by 3 Vietnamese. There is
one U.S. battalion in the race track area.
The President: What would be the impact internationally to a declaration of war?
Secretary Rusk: It might be a direct challenge to Moscow and Peking, in a way we have never challenged them before.
There would be very severe international effects.
Secretary Rusk: How can we get as many Vietnamese as possible returned to duty?
General Wheeler: The men are coming back. We do not know what numbers.
Secretary Rusk: I have skeptics [am skeptical?] of the enemy's ability to hit us again. Some of them have been very badly
mauled.

Secretary McNamara: There is no question that they have been hurt, but I believe they have the ability to restrike.
Clark Clifford: There is a very strange contradiction in what we are saying and doing.
On one hand, we are saying that we have known of this build up. We now know the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
launched this type of effort in the cities. We have publicly told the American people that the communist offensive was: (a)
not a victory, (b) produced no uprising among the Vietnamese in support of the enemy, and (c) cost the enemy between
20,000 and 25,000 of his combat troops.
Now our reaction to all of that is to say that the situation is more dangerous today than it was before all of this. We are
saying that we need more troops, that we need more ammunition and that we need to call up the reserves.
I think we should give some very serious thought to how we explain saying on one hand the enemy did not take a victory
and yet we are in need of many more troops and possibly an emergency call up.
The President: The only explanation I can see is that the enemy has changed its tactics. They are putting all of their stack
in now. We have to be prepared for all that we might face.
Our front structure is based on estimates of their front structure. Our intelligence shows that they have changed and added
about 15,000 men. In response to that, we must do likewise. That is the only explanation I see.
General Wheeler: The enemy has changed the pattern of the war. In the past, there have been instances of terrorism, but
this is the first time they have mounted coordinated attacks throughout the country.
Secretary Rusk: I have a question. In the past, we have said the problem really was finding the enemy. Now the enemy
has come to us. I am sure many will ask why aren't we doing better under these circumstances, now that we know where
they are.
The President: Is there anything new on the Pueblo?
General Wheeler: No, except the North Korean Prime Minister says that North Korea is ready for another war.

65. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, February 10, 1968, 3:17-5:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House.
Those attending were Rusk, McNamara, Clifford, Rostow, Tom Johnson, and Christian. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE
SENIOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISORY COUNCIL
Secretary Rusk: The Korean Desk at State does not want Vance to go to Vietnam. They think it would dilute his mission to
South Korea to go elsewhere.
The President: Is it true there are no nuclear weapons in Vietnam?
Secretary McNamara: It is true there are none there.
The President: Do you expect any more trouble on the nuclear matter?
George Christian: No, I think it will die down.
The President: How do you feel about Khesanh?

Secretary McNamara: There seems to be no alternative except to hold it, and put in reinforcements. I would not send the
82nd Airborne out there.
The President: Where is all this criticism of Westmoreland coming from?
Secretary McNamara: Not out of the Defense Department.
Secretary Rusk: I have heard no criticism of Westmoreland in the State Department.
Secretary McNamara: There is some difference between Westmoreland and Ambassador Lodge on search and destroy
versus search and harass. Lodge feels that what we are doing is too costly and involves too many U.S. troops.
The President: What's causing the enemy to delay its attack against Khesanh?
Secretary McNamara: The bombing affected their schedule./2/
/2/The NVA did not launch any large-scale attacks against Khe Sanh for the next 2 weeks.
The President: What about the cities?
Secretary McNamara: A number of them are threatened by small guerrilla bands.
Secretary Rusk: I doubt if a second wave of attacks will be as great as the first.
The President: Should we just sit and wait?
Secretary McNamara: I think so.
Secretary Rusk: Westmoreland wants them to commit themselves before hitting them with our reinforcements. In that
sense, Khesanh is bait.
The President: Does the use of tanks affect Westmoreland's defensive capability?
Secretary McNamara: No, Westmoreland did not expect the strength of attacks throughout the cities.
Because of it, he had to spread his deployment differently.
The President: What would Westmoreland want if he could have it?
Secretary McNamara: The 82nd and the Six-Ninths of a Marine Division.
The President: Don't you think it would be good to get these men on out there or nearby on Okinawa? Frankly, I am afraid
to move the 82nd because of the possibility of civil disturbances here in the U.S.
Secretary McNamara: I do not think we should send the 82nd Airborne. I fear we are further involving the U.S. as a
substitute for Vietnamese troops.
Secretary Rusk: I am worried about the ARVN taking six months to get back into shape.
The President: That worries me too.
Secretary McNamara: I believe it unwise for Paul Nitze to go to Vietnam. If he went, he would be called before the
Congressional committee and would face press questioning. If Cy Vance goes to Vietnam, he doesn't have to say
anything.
The President: Cy is the best equipped for this. He is precise, firm and positive.

Secretary McNamara: Cy would take a hardheaded view. He is a good reporter. He would bring back the views of our top
people there and his own intelligent assessment.
The President: Should we increase the production of helicopters?
Secretary McNamara: Yes, we will increase the number.
I think we may want to move those 5 U.S. battalions out of the Delta. I was disappointed at the uses that we had to put
U.S. troops to in Saigon. The ARVN should have been able to handle Saigon. We do not correct a situation by putting
more U.S. troops in.
I think we should do 4 things:
1. Get the 50% back who were on Tet leave.
2. Try to get the ARVN to perform better.
3. Get the Vietnamese to follow their decree and draft 19 year olds as we do here.
4. See where we can relieve men for duties more essential than those they are now performing (as in the Delta).
President: What other recommendations do you have?
Secretary McNamara: The Chiefs are meeting Sunday/3/ and will be ready for their recommendations on Monday. I also
have a group working on troop deployment. You will have a Wheeler plan and a McNamara plan.
/3/February 11.
Secretary Rusk: I can't find out where they say those 15,000 extra enemy troops came from. They say that these battalions
came in between December and January.
The President: The Chiefs see a basic change in the strategy of the war.
They say the enemy has escalated from guerrilla tactics to more conventional warfare.
I asked the Generals last week about the necessity of defending Khe-sanh. They said it was necessary. I asked them
about the security of Khesanh. They said they could defend it.
General Wheeler and all of them said it was necessary to defend it and it could be defended.
There seems to have been some movement in their position.
All I am asking is that we make sure that everything has been done. I do not want my advisors to shift from a position of
sureness to a position of uncertainty. I don't want them to ask for something, not get it, and then have all of this placed on
me.
I would supply Westmoreland with all he needs. Let's get him the 25,000. Senator Russell told me last night that the 82nd
is all we have here./4/ But he said he would not have Westmoreland asking for the 82nd and not supplying them.
/4/The President spoke by telephone with Russell at 5:15 p.m. the previous evening. (Johnson Library, President's Daily
Diary) No record of the conversation has been found, but it is summarized briefly below.
Secretary McNamara: I am trying to devise a plan which will get you the men without the disastrous consequences of the
action recommended by the JCS (call up and dispatch of the 82nd Airborne Division and the Sixth-Ninth of a Marine
division).
The President: Senator Russell said we do not have anybody in the U.S. Army who compares with General Giap in

guerrilla warfare.
The President: That may be true.
Clark Clifford: I hope we do not have to ask for a completely new program. This is a bad time to do it. On one hand the
military has said we had quite a victory out there last week. On the other hand, they now say that it was such a big victory
that we need 120,000 more men (call-up of reserves).
I would much prefer that Khesanh get real rough and then provide more men than to put them out there now after all that
had been told the American people.
The President: I think it would strike morale a death blow if we extended tours in Vietnam permanently. But we may want
to let Congress know that all of the things the Viet Cong have done will cost a great deal more money.
Clark Clifford: All we have heard is about the preparation the North Vietnamese have made for the attack at Khesanh. I
have a feeling that the North Vietnamese are going to do something different. I believe our people were surprised by the
24 attacks on the cities last week. God knows the South Vietnamese were surprised with half of their men on holiday.
There may be a feint and a surprise coming up for us.
Secretary Rusk: One regiment of enemy troops was seen moving east of Khesanh this morning. This unit may hit
somewhere other than Khesanh.
The President: But I have been told that both communications intelligence and captured documents show Khesanh as their
target.
It may be that Giap knows we know this and then will hit us elsewhere.
Secretary McNamara: If I were Giap I would hit Kontum or Pleiku. This would be less costly in men for him.
I do not know the precise relative strength in the area, but I do know that we will pay a heavy price. We have lost 900 men
in 10 days already.
Clark Clifford: With all the attention on Khesanh, with the population in disarray, Giap may want to keep Westmoreland and
20,000 troops tied down up north. This is a very difficult time and we must watch every possibility. I do not think we really
know where the blows are going to come.
In addition, I am getting a few pains in my tail about the South Koreans. They should remember that we have kept 60,000
men and lost many thousands of American lives in defense of South Korea.
It just seems to me that South Korea should know that we are over there to help them. Somehow, it seems to them that
they are helping us.
We must say, wait just a minute, we are there to help you and we have been helping you for over a decade.
The President: I told Cy Vance last night that Park must understand our problems. Cy must make it clear to him that this
talk of pulling out of Vietnam would cause us to pull men out of South Korea.
Secretary Rusk: When Walt was at the Policy Planning Council at State, I asked them then how does a great power like
the U.S. avoid becoming a satellite of a small allied power, such as Korea.
The President: Senator Russell said we should not have Senator Fulbright and the Military Foreign Relations Committee
down here. He also said we could not testify on television during war time. He said there is a big difference between
Secretary Rusk's answering questions put to him by newsmen and answering questions on television asked by the
members of Congress. It makes us look as though one branch of government is opposed to what the other is doing.
Clark Clifford: I do not like the idea of the President having to write Senator Fulbright a letter.
I think a dinner is better than a formal letter./5/

/5/The previous morning, the President, Rusk, McNamara, Clifford, McPherson, Rostow, Christian, and Tom Johnson had
met to discuss Fulbright's request that Rusk appear before televised hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Clifford advised: "The times are too serious and the public too concerned for a public feud between the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and the Secretary of State. I think the people are hopeful that we would be working together at times
like these. I think it unwise to write a formal letter turning this down. A public session would be a disservice to the country.
We should quiet the whole matter down. The Committee wants either a Roman Holiday with Dean Rusk or a confrontation
with the President." (Notes of the President's Meeting with Senior Foreign Policy Advisers, February 9; ibid.)

66. Editorial Note

The North Vietnamese continued to signal an interest in negotiations with the United States through numerous channels,
including one code-named Ohio. Ohio had originated in 1967 and involved contacts in Peking between the North
Vietnamese Ambassador, Ngo Minh Loan, and the Norwegian Ambassador, Ole Algard. In telegram 1406 from Oslo,
February 10, 1968, Ambassador to Norway Margaret Joy Tibbetts reported that Loan had told Algard the previous day that
the North Vietnamese Government "presupposed" that military operations would not take place while any potential
negotiations with the United States were in progress. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/OHIO) This statement appeared to represent an answer to a long-standing requirement of the
Johnson administration that the North Vietnamese engage in military restraint if and when peace talks began. Loan had
also invited further exchange with the Norwegian Government. In a February 10 covering memorandum transmitting this
telegram to President Johnson, Walt Rostow, in commenting on this latest expression of policy from Hanoi, observed:
"They may well think that, having failed to knock off the government and the ARVN, the best thing they could do would be
have a cease-fire on a what-we-have-we-hold basis." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President,
Walt Rostow, Vol. 61)
In response, the Department of State authorized Tibbetts to give to the Norwegian Government a statement to use in its
discussions with the North Vietnamese. It laid out the San Antonio formula of "prompt discussions" and not taking military
advantage of negotiations, as well as the corollary put forward by Secretary of Defense-designate Clark Clifford accepting
"normal" levels of southward infiltration. The conclusion of the statement read: "The U.S. evaluation of Hanoi's current
position takes into account Hanoi's actions as well as its words. The unprecedented offensive against most of South VietNam's urban centers, which Hanoi treacherously launched in the midst of the traditional Tet holidays, causing widespread
civilian casualties and suffering, was made notwithstanding the fact that we were still exploring with Hanoi its position
through diplomatic channels, and that we had exercised restraint in bombing targets in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi and
Haiphong. In this context, we cannot but weigh Hanoi's words with great skepticism and caution. These actions carry a
harsh political message. The U.S. favors every effort to obtain clarification of Hanoi's position. We shall continue to
evaluate all information and to pursue every possible avenue which promises to bring us closer to the resolution of this
conflict through serious negotiations." (Telegram 118092 to Oslo, February 20; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/OHIO)
Algard visited Hanoi March 3-10 at the invitation of the North Vietnamese Government. He found "little new" outside of
references to the formula put forth by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh the previous December. Trinh also told him that
"it was now up to the Americans to take the next step" although it appeared that the United States "was not interested in
negotiations." The Foreign Minister also said that the San Antonio formula could not be accepted, even in the "somewhat
diluted form" rendered by Clifford. Algard concluded: "It was very difficult on the basis of these conversations to get any
impression of how much Hanoi wanted a peaceful solution of the conflict and on which points they would think of
concessions to make possible such a solution. They are clearly realistic enough to understand that a peace excluding
Hanoi's conditions cannot come under discussion and that also from the Vietnamese side a will to compromise must be
shown. At the same time I had the impression that the military advances in the south had created a certain hardening in
these positions. It was clear that Hanoi because of the military advances in the south now felt that politically their position
had been strengthened." (Telegram 4120 from Oslo, April 5; ibid.)
Another part of North Vietnam's "diplomatic offensive" was the resumption of the channel through Sweden known as
Aspen. In response to a scheduled visit to Stockholm by the North Vietnamese Ambassador to Moscow, Nguyen Tho
Chan, the United States transmitted to Sweden the same statement given to the Norwegians for use in the ensuing
discussions. Prior to the arrival of Chan's mission, both First Secretary of Sweden's Foreign Ministry J.C.S. Oberg and
Ambassador Lennart Petri, Swedish representative in Peking, planned to visit Hanoi. The visit, however, was postponed at
U.S. request. (Telegrams 877 from Stockholm, February 16; 883 from Stockholm, February 20; 896 from Stockholm,
February 23; 901 from Stockholm, February 214; and 117383 to Stockholm, February 17; all ibid., POL 27-14
VIET/ASPEN) Additional documentation on Aspen is ibid., S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 461, Aspen.

67. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, February 11, 1968, 4:25-6:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. Those attending the meeting were the
President, Rusk, McNamara, Wheeler, Taylor, Clifford, Helms, Rostow, and Tom Johnson. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
[Omitted here is discussion of the Pueblo crisis.]
The President: Reviewed General Westmoreland's wire of February 9. (Attachment B)./2/
/2/Not attached, but printed as Document 63.
Secretary McNamara: General Wheeler will discuss Westmoreland's wire and the current situation in Vietnam.
General Wheeler:
--Very little went on yesterday in Vietnam.
--There were some small actions around Khe Sanh.
--More people were evacuated from Khe Sanh.
--A defector was picked up. He said the plan of attack was first to hit Long Vie; then to hit Con Thien; then to hit Khe Sanh
at a later time.
--We had a report of Frog Missiles being mounted on the front of enemy tanks. These missiles are similar to our Honest
John. They carry an 800 pound warhead. These could pose problems.
--In Hue there is still fighting in the Citadel area. We hope to clean this up within a couple of days. The outskirts of the city
are clear.
--In Da Nang, there has been a hell of a scrap. Units of the NVA are leaving.
--At Dalat there is continued sniping. The situation is in hand.
--Saigon fighting continues in Cholon. There was an attempted attack on Tan Son Nhut airport last night. Over 170
weapons were captured and 100 enemy left dead.
--In IV Corps there is some skirmishing around the towns.
The Joint Chiefs are looking at the entire situation. On Friday/3/ we had not seen the Westmoreland cable. His cable put a
different light on the situation we discussed at the Friday morning meeting with the President. As you will recall, on
Thursday I sent Westmoreland a cable that we had discussed additional matriel but he had said nothing about additional
troops. The next day Westmoreland said that he could find use for additional troops like the 82nd and some Marine units. I
talked to him again on Friday morning. He said he was then dictating a cable on the current situation. This cable came in
Friday afternoon. I had DePuy go over the cable thoroughly to see what it means. The key paragraph says "needless to
say I would welcome reinforcements if they became available." He said he would use these reinforcements to do three
things:
/3/February 9.
1. To contain the enemy offensive in the two northern provinces of I Corps.
2. To carry out his 1968 campaign plan.
3. To offset a weakened Vietnam armed forces.

The Joint Chiefs feel that we have taken several hard knocks. The situation can get worse. We do not know the ability of
the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong to recycle and come back to attack. We know that the enemy committed virtually
all of its Viet Cong units to these most recent actions. There have been heavy casualties inflicted.
We do not know what the ability of the ARVN is to withstand recycled attacks.
Secretary McNamara: I have doubts about the ARVN strength but many of them have returned after the Tet Holidays to
bring the units back up in capability.
The President: What I am interested in is that line in the Westmoreland cable "shortage of strength in the ARVN units."
General Wheeler: The ARVN are getting the men back to their units.
Walt Rostow: What about the RF and PF units.
General Wheeler: We do not know what the situation is on these units.
The President: As I see it, you have concluded that neither Bob's plan or the JCS plan is workable now, and that we should
look at this whole situation tomorrow.
General Wheeler: That is correct.
Secretary McNamara: Yes, we will talk about this tomorrow.
The President: What about the supply situation and the need for more helicopters?
Secretary McNamara: We are examining the helicopter production schedules. We are in good shape with fixed wing
aircraft.
The President: What about Khe Sanh?
General Wheeler: The supplies at Khe Sanh are very adequate. There is plenty of anti-tank ammo and they have used
Coraform only once. We may move more C-130's in temporarily.
General Wheeler: The President may want to consider sending a small JCS staff group of intelligence, operations, and
logistical advisers either with me to come back with a first-hand report of the situation. I have never found any substitute for
getting first hand information.
The President: First let's see what we can do with Cy Vance. If Westmoreland really does not need additional troops, let's
don't plan any troops on the basis of what we have.
General Wheeler: The situation could deteriorate. The Joint Chiefs today do not feel the President should undertake the
emergency actions we proposed on Friday. Of course this situation could change.
The President: Let's meet tomorrow and see what happens.
Secretary Rusk: Should we plan on Cy Vance going on to Vietnam?
The President: Yes.
Does it concern anybody about those two divisions outside of Saigon?
General Wheeler: General Westmoreland thinks the situation is in hand./4/
/4/In telegram MAC 1901 to Wheeler, February 10, Westmoreland minimized the danger posed to Saigon by infiltration
and main force attacks. Instead, he described Khe Sanh as the area where the NVA posed the major threat, since the
enemy had "put too much effort into this buildup to support the diversion theory." (U.S. Army Center of Military History,

William C. Westmoreland Papers, Eyes Only Message File, 1 Feb.-29 Feb. 1968)
Secretary McNamara: It is not the two divisions that I am worried about. They may be recycling to undertake a second
wave. The Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese may have the ability for a strong second attack.
The President: How many enemy do you estimate are available for new attacks.
Secretary McNamara: At least 60,000.
The President: Do you think they will bomb Khe Sanh?
General Wheeler: They may do one of three things:
1. Surprise us with the Frog Missiles.
2. Use MIG's and SA-2's to come south of the DMZ and try to shoot down the B-52's.
3. Use the IL-28 bombers to attack us in the South.
The President: I want to be completely clear in my mind. Is it true that General Westmoreland is not recommending or
requesting additional troops now?
General Wheeler: That is true.
Secretary McNamara: That is my reading of it.
The President: Is it your judgment not to send additional troops today?
General Wheeler: Yes sir.
Secretary McNamara: Yes, that is my judgment.
Clark Clifford: How prepared are we for the second wave of attacks?
General Wheeler: The question is this. Is the government strong enough to withstand another wave of attacks? That I
cannot say. Physically we are better prepared. The element of surprise is removed.
The President: What about the extent of desertions and the men on leave?
General Wheeler: We have nothing firm on desertions and on the number of men who have returned from leave.
The President: So you really don't know the state of readiness.
General Wheeler: The only ARVN reported as non-effective are the 5 airborne battalions which were shot down in the
heavy fighting around Hue.
Walt Rostow: I think we should be giving considerable attention to what is happening in the countryside. The RD Cadres
moved to the cities as did the Viet Cong.
If the Viet Cong go back into the countryside they may be able to make very quick recruitment drives.
If we have a diplomatic offensive, it would be very bad for the Viet Cong to control more of the countryside than they did
before this offensive. It would be good to find out what the RF and the PF are doing. We also need to determine how
quickly the ARVN can get back into the countryside to take over that which was previously held. I expect a diplomatic push
to pressure us to negotiate.

General Taylor: I am out of tune with this meeting. I read General Westmoreland's cable differently from you.
As I read it, Westmoreland's forces are tied down. He has no reserves except some units of the 101st. The offensive in the
north is against him. The enemy has 35,000 men already in the area. Westmoreland does not say anything about how he
would get reserves if he were to be met with a massive engagement there. It looks to me as if he is operating on a
shoestring. I still feel we do not need to do anything today. But I strongly recommend sending General Wheeler out there
to get information first hand.
Clark Clifford: Would it be unusual for General Wheeler to go out there? Have you been before recently on a mission of
this type?
General Wheeler: I have been out there fourteen times.
General Taylor: It is a natural military mission.
Secretary Rusk: I do not think it unwise for Wheeler to go. I must say if General Westmoreland is requesting troops in this
cable he has a poor Colonel doing the drafting for him.
General Wheeler: We are not without reserves, General Taylor. He does have the First Cavalry Division up there. There
are ARVN forces not committed. There are some Marines not committed.
General Taylor: What about the logistics of the situation?
General Wheeler: Westmoreland told me that he must get that road up. In bad weather he would have need of secure land
LOC. Water LOC is not good this time of year.
The President: From my station, it looks as though we felt content with what was happening until the fire crackers started
popping. We talked to General Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs on Friday and they felt we should send the 82nd
Division and 6/9 of a Marine division.
Bob McNamara countered by saying we could pick up 12 battalions without using the 82nd by putting 4 battalions in South
Vietnam and the others off the coast in LST's and in Okinawa.
Westmoreland's wire came in. I interpret it as a man who wanted 600,000 troops last year and was talked down to
525,000. Now he is saying he could use the 82nd and the portion of a Marine division because of all of the uncertainties
which face him. He is concerned about the effective fighting capabilities of the ARVN.
I think we should send anything available to get the number up to the 525,000 limit. We should live up to our commitment.
"Just before the battle Mother" the JCS is now recommending against deploying emergency troop units.
General Wheeler: At this time, yes sir.
The President: If the Joint Chiefs feel secure, if Secretary McNamara feels secure and if General Westmoreland doesn't
ask for them, I don't feel so worried.
Secretary McNamara: I do not feel secure. But I do think it is not a shortage of U.S. battalions at issue. It is the stability of
the political structure in Vietnam and a lack of motivation by the ARVN and the PF and RF.
The President: But when they are unable to do the job and when we are in a fight to the finish, then don't you think we
should give the troops as they are necessary?
Secretary McNamara: Emergency augmentation is not required. We could redeploy forces already in Vietnam such as
those that are operating in the Delta.
The President: If Westmoreland asks for the 82nd Division would you give them?
Secretary McNamara: No, I would not. I read this as a permanent augmentation to forces. We are carrying too much of the
war there now. All this would do is to shift more of the burden on us. There is no reason to have those battalions in the

Delta.
Secretary Rusk: I do not believe that the deployment of additional forces would have the same effect on deployment as
would the placement of 525,000 fresh forces. There may be reasons to redeploy some of the U.S. forces there.
There are no current responsibilities between ourselves and the Vietnamese. We are spread out all over the country.
There are none of the advantages of a concentration of forces. I do not think we are really getting the full benefit of our
500,000 U.S. troops there now.
General Taylor: We may want to provide General Westmoreland with new strategic guidance. Let us not fight this war on
the enemy's terms. We need to do what we should to get reserves and wait for favorable weather./5/
/5/In a memorandum to the President, and in a paper entitled "Enemy Scenario of the Future?", both February 10, Taylor
suggested that Westmoreland concentrate on the security of the urban areas, avoid major combat actions under
disadvantageous conditions that might give the enemy an opportunity for "victory," build up reserves for a counteroffensive beginning in March, and maintain Rolling Thunder operations at maximum levels. Johnson read the
memorandum and asked Rostow to give copies to Clifford, Rusk, and McNamara for "their eyes only." (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 8I, 1/67-12/68, Taylor Memos-General)
The President: Who deployed the U.S. troops in the Delta?
General Wheeler: This was part of General Westmoreland's battle plans submitted last year.
General Taylor: I think that it may be necessary now to outline our objectives. We should ask General Westmoreland to get
set for a major offensive in a particular area when the weather breaks.
The President: I would be glad to get from you any suggestions on redeployment or any other strategic advice.
Secretary Rusk: I tend to expect Westmoreland and our troops to do everything all at once. I think we need to get clearly in
mind what our priorities are.
General Taylor: I think our objective should be to clear the cities first and to recruit forces there to put in reserve.
Clark Clifford: How many men of the 525,000 do we have out there now?
Secretary McNamara: 500,000.
The President: What about a reordering of our priorities at this time?
Secretary McNamara: Not now while we are in the middle of this.
Secretary Rusk: No I would not recommend it while we are in this situation.
The President: It seems that Westmoreland has inherited this thing by stages. Let's re-evaluate the overall strategy after
this is over. The Joint Chiefs and you do not feel that you should recommend deployment of more men at this time? Is that
correct?
Secretary McNamara: This is correct.
The President: What about the re-evaluation of supplies.
General Wheeler: The men are satisfied.
The President: Well, it looks like we are generally content with the situation today.
Secretary Rusk: We will meet tomorrow and see how this thing shapes up.

Secretary McNamara: Westmoreland has not asked for troops to avoid defeat. If he does, I recommend deployment of
those there.
General Taylor: The function of an overall headquarters is to give strategic guidance. I think we need to give thought to
what that new guidance should be.
The President: I am inclined to leave the situation as it is based on your judgments. I think we should tell Westmoreland
that if he really isn't asking for more troops and find out if that interpretation is correct. In my mind I think he really wants
more troops. I would favor Cy Vance going out there and taking a hard look at all of this.
Secretary McNamara: I would also send Cy there. I think we could send General Wheeler out there if it weren't for this
being splattered all over the front page.
General Taylor: I will make one more plea. I think it is important to get a first hand report from General Wheeler after he
gets first hand military judgment from his military commanders out there. There is no substitute for that.
Secretary Rusk: I received excellent response last night to a speech I made to a group of Secondary School Principals./6/
/6/The previous evening Rusk spoke at the 52d Annual Convention of the National Association of Secondary School
Principals in Atlantic City, New Jersey. For text of the speech, which included comments on the Tet offensive, see
Department of State Bulletin, March 4, 1968, pp. 301-304.
Director Helms: I am not satisfied on our intelligence on RF, PF and ARVN units. I disagree with Bob McNamara about
U.S. units being placed with ARVN units. My information is that ARVN fights better with U.S. units around them. The U.S.
forces provide the ARVN with the courage they need.
The President: What is the real difference? What makes the North Vietnamese fight so well, with so much more
determination than the South Vietnamese?
Director Helms: I think it is a combination of good training and good brain washing. There is a certain heroism about dying
for this cause. The North Vietnamese have been damn good fighters for fifteen years. They are well trained, well equipped
and well disciplined. Their system eliminates all doubt from their mind.
The President: For a moment let us assume that the ARVN are not doing their part. What is the alternative?
Secretary McNamara: We should not do their job for them. Let them fight it out for themselves.
Secretary Rusk: I think you get better performance when the U.S. troops and the ARVN are billeted together.
The President: Buzz, what is the evaluation of the military effect of this wave?
General Wheeler: There are always pluses and minuses in anything like this. The ARVN has performed and behaved well.
No unit defected. They took heavy casualties. Their morale seemed to improve because of the casualties. Destruction has
been very bad. Many towns are in shambles and there was one completely flattened.
The President: Are you concerned about the refugees?
General Wheeler: Bob Komer has turned his entire effort into refugee care. Our people are working with the ARVN,
sharing food with the Vietnamese and doing all they can.
I think the civilian populace of Vietnam was appalled by the destruction and the cruel, cruel atrocities caused by the Viet
Cong and the North Vietnamese. But we are not better off than we were on January 15.
Secretary McNamara: We need to get the Vietnamese to do more by insisting that they do what they should do. We should
refuse to do what they must do. Their Congress has yet to pass a single bill.
The President: Get working on a combined authority by which General Westmoreland would take over responsibility for all
allied units and then let's address ourselves to the problem of the Vietnamese. Let's go to work on them. I want them to

live up to that decree of drafting 19 year olds.

The President: Should we still not say anything publicly (in the form of a Presidential speech)?
General Taylor: We do need to say that there has been a change of strategy on the part of the enemy brought about by
losses inflicted on him by the old strategy.
(The issue of the Presidential message was left for consideration at a later time.)

68. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in
Chief, Pacific Command (Sharp) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Saigon, February 12, 1968, 0612Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs a-z. Top Secret;
Eyes Only; Limited Distribution. In the attached covering memorandum transmitting a copy of the telegram to the
President, February 12, 9:35 a.m., Rostow wrote: "Herewith Westy's message loud and clear and, in my judgment,
correct."
MAC 01975. Subject: Assessment of situation and requirements.
1. Since last October, the enemy has launched a major campaign signaling a change of strategy from one of protracted
war to one of quick military/political victory during the American election year. His first phase, designed to secure the
border areas, has failed. The second phase, launched on the occasion of Tet and designed to initiate public uprising, to
disrupt the machinery of government and command and control of the Vietnamese forces, and to isolate the cities, has
also failed. Nevertheless, the enemy's third phase, which is designed to seize Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces has
just begun. This will be a maximum effort by the enemy, capitalizing on his short lines of communication, the poor weather
prevailing in the area for the next two months, and his ability to bring artillery and rocket fire to bear on installations from
positions in the DMZ and north and from Laos to the west. Furthermore, he can bring armor to bear on the battlefield. It is
clear that the enemy has decided he cannot "strike out" in this phase as a matter of face. We can therefore expect him to
exert on the battlefield the maximum military power available to him. In addition, we must expect him to try to regain the
initiative in all other areas.
2. If the enemy has changed his strategy, we must change ours. On the assumption that it is our national policy to prohibit
the enemy from seizing and permanently occupying the two northern provinces, I intend to hold them at all cost. However,
to do so I must reinforce from other areas and accept a major risk, unless I can get reinforcements, which I desperately
need.
3. To bring the maximum military power to bear on the enemy in Quang Tri and Thua Thien and to prevent the gradual
erosion of these two provinces, I must open up Highway 1 from Danang and Highway 9 to Khe Sanh. These two tasks are
not unreasonable, provided that I can divert the troops to provide security and commit the engineers to the task. I therefore
must make a down payment in troops in order to provide the logistics to support in fully adequate fashion troops now
deployed and reinforcements that will be required. First, it will require a Marine regiment or an Army brigade to secure the
Ai Van Pass from Quang Tri to Hue/Phu Bai. Another regiment or brigade will be required between Hue and Quang Tri.
Finally, a third regiment or brigade will be required to secure Highway 9 to the Khe Sanh area. I cannot afford to divert
troops now deployed in that area for the purpose and am therefore forced to deploy the 101st Abn Div from the III Corps;
this is now in the process and will be done as fast as transportation can be made available. Even the commitment of the
101st will put me in no better than a marginal posture to cope with the situation at hand.
4. This has been a limited war with limited objectives, fought with limited means and programmed for the utilization of
limited resources. This was a feasible proposition on the assumption that the enemy was to fight a protracted war. We are
now in a new ball game where we face a determined, highly disciplined enemy, fully mobilized to achieve a quick victory.
He is in the process of throwing in all his "military chips to go for broke." He realizes and I realize that his greatest
opportunity to do this is in Quang Tri-Thua Thien. We cannot permit this. On the other hand, we must seize the opportunity
to crush him. At the same time, we cannot permit him to make gains in the other Corps areas, and I am obligated to
maintain the minimum essential troops in these areas to insure stability of the situation and to regain the initiative. Equal in
priority to the enemy is the Saigon area and a high risk in this area is unacceptable. I now have approximately 500,000 US
troops and 60,981 Free World military assistance troops. Further contributions from the Thais and Koreans are months
away. I have been promised 525,000 troops, which according to present programs will not materialize until 1969. I need

these 525,000 troops now. It should be noted that this ceiling assumed the substantial replacement of military by civilians,
which now appears impractical. I need reinforcements in terms of combat elements. I therefore urge that there be deployed
immediately a Marine regiment package and a brigade package of the 82d Abn Div and that the remaining elements of
those two divisions be prepared to follow at a later time. Time is of the essence./2/
/2/In telegram MAC 1924 to Wheeler, February 11, Westmoreland wrote: "Additional forces from CONUS would be most
helpful in permitting us to rapidly stabilize the current situation. Their deployment would underscore our determination and
will certainly speed the completion of our mission." He noted that the forces would be deployed initially in the northern part
of the country and only later to the southern part of South Vietnam. (Ibid., William C. Westmoreland Papers, #29 History
File, 1-29 Feb 68 [II])
5. I must stress equally that we face a situation of great opportunity as well as heightened risk. However, time is of the
essence here, too. I do not see how the enemy can long sustain the heavy losses which his new strategy is enabling us to
inflict on him. Therefore, adequate reinforcements should permit me not only to contain his I Corps offensive but also to
capitalize on his losses by seizing the initiative in other areas. Exploiting this opportunity could materially shorten the war.
6. If CINCPAC concurs, request that the Secretary of Defense and Commander in Chief be informed of my position./3/
/3/In an unnumbered telegram to Westmoreland, February 12, Sharp stated his concurrence in the deployment of
additional forces to the I Corps area. "If enemy actions reflect his desperation, these additive forces can assist in delivery
of a decisive blow," he added. "If his strength and determination have been underestimated we will need them even
more." (Ibid., National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs a-z) In a February 12
memorandum to the President, Rostow discussed the means of countering the continuing enemy assault in northern South
Vietnam: "So far as U.S. and world opinion are concerned, there is only one satisfactory answer: a clear defeat of the
enemy in I Corps, while rallying the South Vietnamese to get back on their feet elsewhere. Moreover, I Corps is--or should
be--our kind of battle. It has guerrilla elements, but is much more nearly conventional war. It should be our kind of war if
Westy is not strapped for men, aircraft, and supplies. Only such a demonstration is likely to permit us to end the war on
honorable terms. Therefore, I am for a very strong response to Westy's cable. Only you can make the political assessment
of what it would cost to call up the reserves; but that would be the most impressive demonstration to Hanoi and its
friends." (Ibid.)
7. I have discussed this message in detail with Amb Bunker and he concurs./4/
/4/In concluding his assessment of Westmoreland's request in memorandum CM-3003-68 to the President, February 12,
Wheeler noted: "While the decisions and requests made in his message of today are his, he has consulted closely with
Ambassador Bunker, General Abrams and Mr. Komer who all agree as to the validity of his assessments and request for
additional troop strength." (Ibid.)

69. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, February 12, 1968, 8:29 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and
McNamara, February 12, 1968, 8:29 a.m., Tape F68.02, Side A, PNO 4. No classification marking. Prepared in the Office
of the Historian specifically for this volume.
McNamara: We've just had a message from Westmoreland/2/ that's quite different from the interpretation we were placing
on the message last night./3/ He states categorically he wants six battalions immediately. I just wanted you to know this.
The Chiefs are meeting now. We'll of course be back sometime later today. My view hasn't changed a bit from what it was
last night. I think it'd be a mistake to call up the reserves and plan on permanent augmentation of our forces out there
above the planned 525. I do think, given this kind of a message, we ought to place six battalions either out in Vietnam or
along the shores, in a sense, as an emergency supplement to meet a contingency and do it damn fast. But I think to go to
the Congress for legislation to call up the reserves to plan on permanent augmentation to take over further the job of the
South Vietnamese would be in error. In any event, that isn't the reason for my call. The reason for my call is simply to alert
you that we had this message that just came in.
/2/Document 68.
/3/See Document 67.

President: Yeah, Bob. I didn't quite understand. I felt like I was in the ring yesterday with a boxer and I didn't know who I
was boxing. I was--I was about to agree with the thought that you had expressed. That is what I was trying to adjust to
yesterday and the day before.
McNamara: Yes.
President: And then it seemed like we moved from our position--I mean, you did. I never have felt that we ought to go with
this whole thing that you outlined at this stage. We might be called to even do that and more if the situation required it.
McNamara: That's right, that's right.
President: But I thought that if we would in effect--if you could do with him what you had done on the 525, where you've got
a greater proportion of combat troops than supply troops and where you reduce the total numbers a good deal, and where
you didn't have to bust up the 82d [Airborne Division] and send it out, that that was an alternative that we ought to try to
find. Now I gather that when you all re-interpreted the message that you didn't think that was justified. That's still the
viewpoint I have. Between the Chiefs of Staff, I did not share the approach that Buzz had the day before. I did more or less
look favorably, although I hadn't hardened, and concluded--as you could see last night, I went along. But on the alternative
that you were attempting to evolve--now, that's where I would like to come out if we could. So, A--I don't have a position of
deserting my commander in time of war. B--I don't have a position of deserting my home folks and acting imprudently or
getting involved where I can't pull out. I did like the LST idea for several reasons. I didn't have the feeling, they may be
right, but I did like the Okinawa idea. I thought that you wouldn't have all the uproar if they were in Okinawa even for a
short time and they'd be close in an emergency, but it ought to be treated more or less as an emergency instead of a
regular permanent operation.
McNamara: Well, Mr. President, I think that's the plan that we ought to try to push through. I'm going to have great difficulty
on it because the Chiefs and the Marines don't want to send these Marine battalions. They're--in my opinion, they're
available for an emergency assignment. I actually had with me last night, and I didn't want to bring it up because there was
so much opposition among the Chiefs to it. I have a full paper on this, as I told you I would have, and I strongly believe it
can be done. In any event, the purpose of the morning call is to tell you that Westy's come in for an immediate requirement
for six. We'll get to work on it. I'll try and work it out the way on Friday/4/ I told you the way I thought it should be worked
out.
/4/February 9.
President: Does he give any more justification? Does he have any alarming-McNamara: Yeah, yeah. Well, I wouldn't say alarming, but I'll read you a couple of lines here. [McNamara read portions of
telegram MAC 1975.] So, that's the essence of it. Now, on this question of replacing military with civilians, you asked me
on Friday or Saturday to look into that civilian contractor situation--Saturday, I guess you asked about it./5/ I did. I cleared
with Buzz Wheeler this morning and I sent to Westmoreland a cable suggesting to him that he replace certain of his
construction battalions outside of the I Corps area with civilians. I said I've got $50 million in a contingency allowance that
I'm making available to him for this purpose and encouraged him to use as many civilians under those civilian contractors
as he wants. We can replace one construction battalion--one military construction battalion--a month with a thousand
civilians at a cost of $750,000 a month. So I urged him to go as far as he wanted to in that way. We went down from
50,000 construction civilians to about 17,000, just about what you told me on Saturday. So I think we can do more than we
have in that area. But based on what he says here, and I've only read you a portion of the cable, Mr. President, I'm inclined
to believe that as Commander in Chief you can't very well deny him these six battalions at this time. But neither do I think
that we ought to obtain them by calling up the reserves and going to Congress for legislation. So I'll try to work something
out on that basis. I'm sure the Chiefs will not immediately accept that kind of alternative.
/5/See Document 65.
President: Well, we'll meet on it, I guess, this afternoon./6/ You'll meet this morning, won't you?
/6/See Document 70.
McNamara: That's right, we will, Mr. President.
President: Okay. Bye.

70. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, February 12, 1968, 1:45-3:08 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. Those attending the meeting were the
President, Helms, Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, Wheeler, Clifford, Christian, and Tom Johnson. The first part of the meeting
was a luncheon held in the Family Dining Room until 3:20 p.m.; from then until 3:50 p.m., the participants met in the Oval
Office. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
SENIOR FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS
The President: Just now I said in a speech that we should keep in mind that President Lincoln lost 600,000 men and faced
all of the division and adversity in this country that is imaginable. He said then "we have got to stick it out." I said today, "so
will we."/2/ One man told me this morning that it doesn't look like the same person wrote the Westmoreland wire today and
the one Friday./3/ What reaction do you have to it?
/2/Earlier in the day, the President attended a ceremony at the Lincoln Memorial in honor of President Lincoln's birthday.
(Ibid.) In remarks at the ceremony, Johnson stated: "Sad, but steady--always convinced of his cause--Lincoln stuck it out.
Sad, but steady, so will we." For full text of the President's remarks, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 218-219.
/3/Taylor made this comment in a February 12 memorandum to the President, noting that "this new one is clear, crisp and
sounds an unambiguous call for additional help in minimum time." Taylor concurred in Westmoreland's desire to create
reserves for use in I Corps and recommended that the President approve "the dispatch without delay of the additional
forces which General Westmoreland requests." (National Defense University, Maxwell Taylor Papers, Clifford Study
Group-Tet 1968)
Secretary Rusk: It looks to me like Westmoreland wants to take advantage of an opportunity to exploit the situation. I do
not read it as a desperate need. He wants to shorten the war with it, and that has a certain attractiveness to all of us. It
bothers me that we do not know what is happening to the South Vietnamese and their determination.
I don't appreciate Thieu saying he needed more American troops. I would think he would be looking for more ways to get
more of his own men.
But if six battalions will help him exploit this opportunity, I am for sending them without a permanent commitment.
Secretary McNamara: I read the Westmoreland cable differently from Dean. I read that he needs these six battalions in
order to avoid defeat at Khe Sanh.
If he only wanted them to take advantage of the opportunity to do more, I would also send them.
I recommend today the following:
1. Send him the units he has requested.
2. Send the troops for the period of the emergency only, not a permanent augmentation./4/
/4/In JCSM 91-68 to McNamara, February 12, the JCS examined plans for the emergency augmentation of MACV but
recommended that the deployment of reinforcements be deferred until measures were undertaken to reconstitute the
strategic force posture through reserve call-ups. However, the 82d Airborne and the 6/9 Marines would begin preparations
for possible deployment. See The Pentagon Papers: The Senator Gravel Edition, pp. 539-542.
3. Send General Wheeler out to meet with Ambassador Bunker, General Westmoreland and Cy Vance.
The President: Where will these units come from?

Secretary McNamara: It will include a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division and Marine units.
The President: Do these units have Vietnam veterans in them?
Secretary McNamara: We will screen out the Vietnam veterans, those we can.
The President: How long will this take?
Secretary McNamara: 14 days.
General Wheeler: 14 days is correct.
The President: Are there any U.S. troops in the area we can use?
General Wheeler: No, sir.
Secretary McNamara: There is one battalion on the way.
General Wheeler: General Chapman wants to return that battalion to Hawaii because it includes some 17-year olds and it
was operating in the area on an exercise only.
The units will be sent from the following locations:
One battalion from Camp Pendleton.
Units from Camp Lejeune.
The 82nd Airborne from Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
Possibly some army from Fort Benning.
The President: How many men does that total?
General Wheeler: 3800 from the 82nd and 6500 from the Marines, for a total of 10,300.
The President: Does that give Westmoreland what he needs?
General Wheeler: Yes, sir.
Secretary McNamara: The loss of one brigade of the 82nd will not affect our ability to handle severe disturbances.
Clark Clifford: I would like to get some answers to several questions. In General Westmoreland's cable he says, "If the
enemy has changed his strategy, we must change ours." What change in strategy has the enemy made?
General Wheeler: The enemy has been on a protracted fighting basis. Now he seeks to "grab" for immediate success. I
think the enemy overestimates the degree of support in the Vietnamese populace and underestimates our strength.
General Wheeler: He is taking both actions concurrently. He is attacking the cities and also launching conventional attacks
for the first time.
Clark Clifford: In his cable, General Westmoreland also points out that it is national policy to keep the enemy from seizing
and holding the two northern provinces. Hasn't that been the situation all along?
General Wheeler: General Westmoreland believes that it would cost more to withdraw and go back later than to stand and
fight now. But he does know we can trade space for time and troops if necessary.

Clark Clifford: General Westmoreland says in his cable that he cannot hold without reinforcements. What change has
taken place to keep him from holding?
General Wheeler: There have been wide-spread attacks in the South. General Westmoreland is unsure of the ARVN
strength as a result of these attacks. He must also hold open Highway 1 and Highway 9. He has more troops committed
around Saigon than he has in the past. He says that he cannot take more forces from the South without risk.
Secretary Rusk: Couldn't he take more out of the Delta?
General Wheeler: He does have contingency plans, both for taking units from the Delta and for, if necessary, withdrawal
from Khesanh. But these are contingency plans only.
Clark Clifford: General Westmoreland also says that we are now in a new ballgame with the enemy mobilized to achieve
quick victory. Is that something new?
General Wheeler: This thing has been building up for some time. There has been the greater build-up around the DMZ.
There is a new determination for major attacks coupled with the Tet actions. Prior to now, the enemy has fought a piecemeal war.
Clark Clifford: General Westmoreland's telegram has a much greater sense of urgency in it. Why is that?
General Wheeler: General Westmoreland realized that his earlier low-key approach was not proper based on a full
assessment of the situation.
Clark Clifford: General Westmoreland makes it clear that he cannot permit the enemy to make gains in other areas. He
does not want to permit a reduction in strength elsewhere.
But he has now sent what is clearly an urgent message.
General Wheeler: General Westmoreland has been conservative in his troop requests in the past. Now he finds that his
campaign plan has been pre-empted by enemy action.
Secretary Rusk: Can it only be done by additional U.S. forces? Can't we press them to brigade U.S. troops with
Vietnamese?
General Wheeler: Before I answer that I need to know what you mean by brigading.
Secretary Rusk: By putting one battalion of U.S. troops with one battalion of ARVN.
Clark Clifford: General Westmoreland said it was time to open up key roads, Route 9 and Route 1. Can we use civilians
under military protection to do some of this work?
Secretary McNamara: I authorized General Westmoreland to use whatever civilians he wished to use. I do not think he
would want to use civilians in I Corps.
The President: I want a cable sent to Cy Vance to tell him to examine this./5/ We should put civilian road and construction
experts to work and replace military construction personnel so they may be sent up north.
/5/Vance was going to South Korea, and the possible visit to South Vietnam was a suggested side trip. In a February 12
memorandum to McNamara and Rusk, Rostow outlined the issues Vance should raise in Seoul and Saigon. In Saigon
Vance would explore with the GVN its mobilization plans for the ARVN, the use of civilian contractors to release military
engineering units, a new combined command structure, strategic guidance to Westmoreland, and Buttercup. (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S) In a February 12 memorandum to
Rusk, Bundy sent a more detailed draft of instructions for Vance's possible visit to Saigon. (Ibid.)
General Wheeler: Westmoreland wants combat troops in construction brigades. Frankly I think he has underestimated
what is needed to open and hold those two roads.

The President: Let's try to use what is out there if possible. I wanted Cy Vance to talk with him about it.
I am worried about the North Vietnamese Air Force and the possibility that many of our choppers will be destroyed.
Clark Clifford: I learned with great surprise that General Westmoreland does not have authority to control Korean and
Australian forces. If he is short of men, can't Cy Vance get an understanding with President Park for greater utilization of
the Korean troops in Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk: I think we should strongly consider a combined Allied Command with President Thieu as Commander in
Chief and General Westmoreland as Chief of Staff.
Secretary McNamara: There are benefits to this with the Vietnamese. We have not moved in this direction because of the
political problems.
General Wheeler: We have a similar thing to that in Thailand. On this, I think we need to get the advice of Ambassador
Bunker.
The President: I would sure try to do this for maximum control of the South Koreans, the Australians and the South
Vietnamese.
Clark Clifford: Are there any U.S. troops in the area of Japan, Hawaii or Okinawa we could use?
General Wheeler: Zero.
Clark Clifford: From a psychological standpoint, this would be a good time to get more Thais and South Koreans.
The President: Get Cy Vance to tell the South Vietnamese that we are accelerating our program and they need to
accelerate theirs. In addition ask Cy to see what he can do about getting that extra division moving from Korea to Vietnam.
What is the hold-up?
Secretary McNamara: They say equipment, but the equipment is on the way. The Thais cannot possibly be ready before
July 1.
General Wheeler: All of our military people in Thailand say July 1 is the earliest time.
Secretary McNamara: The Koreans would send a division if they wanted to.
The President: What actions are the South Vietnamese taking on getting those extra 65,000 men?
Walt Rostow: The Cabinet on Sunday/6/ voted to do two things. The first is to call back veterans. The second is that they
moved the date to begin the drafting of 18 and 19 year olds. They moved back from April 1 to March 1 the drafting of 19
year olds. They moved back the drafting of 18 year olds from July 1 to May 1.
/6/February 11.
The President: What is our average draft age?
Secretary McNamara: It's either 20.2 or 20.4 years.
The President: Get me the exact answers on that, Buzz.
What is our situation with equipment? I hear we lost quite a bit out there lately.
Secretary McNamara: That was a misleading report that you received today. We have had 57 choppers destroyed and 48
choppers which will require replacement. There will be between 97 and 137 to be replaced this month. We are shipping
this month 246.

The President: How about observation planes?

Secretary McNamara: We are fine on those.
The President: I want to ask all the questions that I possibly can now so that we get answers to them before a situation
develops and we didn't have them. I hope all of you see what has happened during the last two weeks. Westy said he
could use troops one day last week. Today he comes in with an urgent request for them.
I want to look at all of these things now. I want to anticipate that more will happen to us than we had planned. I have very
serious concerns about our equipment.
Frankly, I am scared about Khesanh.
I worry about that runway going out or those C-130s being knocked down. I think if the weather gets bad and if the runway
gets knocked out we are going to have a hell of a problem on resupply. Then I guess we will have to use helicopters. I am
afraid they will pick off the helicopters. So I want you to check the number of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft.
If we lose this big build-up we can't endure many losses. And we can look if we are out of ammunition, or out of fuel or
didn't have medicine. I would feel better to get the answers here now. I have a mighty big stake in this. I am more unsure
every day.
Secretary Rusk: Is General Westmoreland aware that he can choose his own place to fight?
The President: I want a crash program to get these men out there just as fast as they can. Dick, how do you feel about all
of this?
Dick Helms: I have been meeting this morning with twelve of my top CIA people who have been in Vietnam. They believe
the war is in a critical phase. They think Westmoreland should get the troops if he needs them. We cannot even find some
of the forces. I am a believer in the old axiom "A stitch in time saves nine."
General Taylor: In my view, this is an urgent situation. The element of time bothers me. General Westmoreland seems to
believe that he has time to open the roads. He seems to believe he has time to do all of the other things that are
necessary. And I get the feeling that many of us here today feel the same way. I do not. This offensive could open up
today. We should assume in our planning that it will open up tonight. I think Westmoreland's request is reasonable and we
should act quickly to meet it.
The President: Do all of you feel that we should send troops?
Secretary McNamara: Yes.
Secretary Rusk: Yes.
Director Helms: Yes.
General Wheeler: Yes.
General Taylor: Yes.
Mr. Rostow: Yes./7/
/7/In a memorandum to the President at 11:45 a.m. that day, Rostow urged "a very strong response" to Westmoreland's
request, a response that included calling up the reserves, since such an action "would be the most impressive
demonstration to Hanoi and its friends." (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech,
Vol. 2, Tabs a-z)
The President: Is there any objection?
(There was no objection.)

General Wheeler: We will close these forces in Vietnam in 14 days.

The President: Is that the minimum time?
General Wheeler: Yes, it is.
The President: There is no schedule you can improve upon?
General Wheeler: We will move as quickly as possible.
We should maintain our current level of resupply to Southeast Asia. The Joint Chiefs will use these 62 aircraft which are
normally withheld for emergencies. This is an emergency.
MAC and TAC will operate in war-time rates. We are utilizing voluntary civilian air lift.
We propose to call up the Air Force National Guard and Reserve C-124 squadrons. This will be augmented by 112 reserve
aircraft and 48 Air National Guard aircraft. This would total about 10 squadrons.
The President: How many men?
Secretary McNamara: 2,000 to 3,000 men.
The President: Well, let's do it. Could you tell the Air Transport Association we will need to call up civilian aircraft?
General Wheeler: The Joint Chiefs feel that if you deploy these men there should be a call-up of the reserves.
If we send a brigade of the 82nd Airborne, we should call up two brigades from the Army National Guard. This would total
about 30,000 men.
General Chapman feels that if we deploy this Marine unit, we should call up the Fourth Marine Division, one RLT now and
the rest of the Fourth Division subject to call at any time.
The Marine reserves will be ready to go within two months.
The President: I want you and Bob McNamara to get together and come in with an agreed recommendation as to whom to
call-up. Let's not decide on that today. Go back and agree on what to call.
We must move as soon as we can. I was ready Friday. The clock is ticking. We may waste valuable time and money, but it
is better to have them there when they are needed than to need them there and not have them.
General Wheeler: I will call now and get my men drafting the order.
(General Wheeler left the room.)
The President: What is the status of Buttercup?/8/ I see where Ky agreed on the release of prisoners. Get Vance to follow
through.
/8/See Document 6.
Walt Rostow: President Thieu also has agreed to this.
Secretary McNamara: My position on Vietnam is very clear. I do not think it wise to go to the Congress asking for
additional legislation. I do not think the call-up is necessary.
The President: Well, if you can not agree with the Joint Chiefs on what is needed, then submit to me a minority viewpoint
and your separate recommendations.

Secretary McNamara: Do you want General Wheeler to go to Vietnam?

The President: No, I want him here. I don't want anybody substituting for him at a time like this. I feel better with him here.
My feeling is that if the Vietnamese aren't able to carry the load alone we will have to do it rather than let them all get
defeated. I think Westmoreland is confronted with a defeat or a victory.
[Omitted here is discussion of Korea.]
The President, Dick Helms, George Christian, General Wheeler and Tom Johnson then went to the office where the
President showed charts reflecting the ratio of enemy KIA to friendly KIA.
The President said that General Ridgway had told him that we are not prepared for another major problem elsewhere in
the world. He said our preparedness is not that adequate.
The President said he would rather have more than is needed in Vietnam than to need something and not have it
available./9/
/9/In telegram JCS 1695 to Westmoreland, February 12, Wheeler described this meeting and noted the sense of the
participants about Westmoreland's position: "A. You could use additional U.S. troop units, but you are not expressing a
firm demand for them; in sum you do not fear defeat if you are not reinforced. B. You are concerned as to the possible
status of the ARVN as a result of recent combat actions. C. You are concerned about the reliability of your logistic system
into northern I Corps Tactical Zone and believe that you must control and use Highway 1 through the Ai Van Pass. D.
Additional forces would give you increased capability to regain the initiative and go on the offensive at an appropriate
time." (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs a-z) In his reply,
telegram MAC 2018 to Wheeler, February 12, Westmoreland wrote: "I am expressing a firm request for additional troops,
not because I fear defeat if I am not reinforced, but because I do not feel that I can fully grasp the initiative from the
recently reinforced enemy without them. On the other hand a set back is fully possible if I am not reinforced and it is likely
that we will lose ground in other areas if I am required to make substantial reinforcement of I Corps." (Ibid.)

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968

Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 71-85

71. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, February 12, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson,
General-February 1968. Secret; Nodis/Personal; Packers. Drafted by Harriman. This memorandum of conversation was
transmitted to the Embassy in Romania in telegram 117922 to Bucharest, February 20. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/PACKERS)
PARTICIPANTS
Secretary of State Dean Rusk
Governor Harriman
When I telephoned the Secretary to tell him of the unsatisfactory reply we had from Macovescu's visit to Hanoi, he asked
me to stop in. I showed him the specific message and told him that in addition, Macovescu had reported verbally that the
Hanoi officials had stated that our point of view was unacceptable as it made the stopping of bombing conditional./2/ This
confirmed the rejection of the San Antonio formula. I explained that the only glimmer of light was Macovescu's statement
that the Romanian Government was prepared to pass any further messages to Hanoi. The Secretary said he thought we
should close out this channel, thanking the Government, and specifically for Macovescu's personal efforts. I agreed, with
the comment that Hanoi seems to be trying several channels in addition to the Romanians. I pointed to the strange one
through Rome and the new one through Algard, the Norwegian Ambassador in Peking./3/ This indicated, I said, that Hanoi
was trying out several channels as negotiation feelers--perhaps substantiating one guess that Hanoi had expected general
disarray in the United States as well as in the South Vietnam Government, which would lead to negotiations at any price.
/2/In a conversation with Harriman and Davidson, February 12, Bogdan discussed Macovescu's meetings in Hanoi with
Dong and Trinh during the period January 22-28. As a result of these contacts, Bogdan noted, his government put forth a
new interpretation of a formula for peace involving "new conditions" created for a "new step towards a solution through
negotiations." These "Romanian considerations" consisted of an unconditional cessation of bombing by the United States,
followed, after "a convenient period of time" for the United States to "prove" that it had in fact terminated hostilities, by talks
"on questions of interest to the two parties." According to the memorandum of conversation, "the Governor stated his
unofficial reaction is that Hanoi does not wish talks and he commented that Hanoi had paid no attention to cigars." (Ibid.)
Macovescu later expanded on the particulars of his visit to Hanoi in conversations with Harriman on March 2 and with
Rusk on March 4. (Memoranda of conversation, March 2 and March 4; ibid.)
/3/See Document 66.
Dean asked whether we had answered the Rome feelers. I said I didn't recall that we had but would see that some answer
was prepared. We discussed the reply that had gone to Oslo and he agreed that we should await developments there.
I asked him if he had read Senator Mansfield's inexcusable speech in Maine, and since he hadn't and his New York Times
was in front of him, I suggested he look at it mentioning that it was on page 8. He read about half of it and said, "well, if
we're all wrong we'll be spending the rest of our time in Hobe Sound or otherwise these men will have to eat their
words"./4/
/4/In a speech at the University of Maine on February 11, Mansfield described the South Vietnamese political structure as
insecure and unstable and declared his opposition to any effort by the United States to "insure that any political structure
shall be enshrined over the smoldering ruins of a devastated Vietnam." See The New York Times, February 12, 1968.
He said that the gloom in World War II was much worse than now. I replied that in London in January 1942 there was
gossip of Churchill's Government collapsing; Beaverbrook really believed that he was going to be called by the King to take
the Prime Ministership. Dean said he didn't see why we should be so distressed. I said that I thought there should be a
review of the military program. That Westmoreland had been consistently proven wrong in his military judgment. I wasn't at
all sure that his military plans were right; that I could not sit in Washington and suggest a military program, but I felt the
program should be reviewed. I hoped that the President would not commit himself to Westmoreland. Our pacification
program had received a major blow. As far as I was concerned I did not know what our military plan should be but I was
not at all sure Westmoreland was on the right track. To this he made no reply. I mentioned my memorandum (of February
9)/5/ in which I pointed out my opinion that we must have a broadly based government--perhaps this was the time to get rid

of Loc, the Prime Minister, who reports indicated was no good. I suggested Huang, or some other political leader, or else
Thieu's idea of a broadly based advisory committee which would have real functions not just scenery.
/5/See footnote 6, Document 62.
He again repeated that he didn't see why we should be discouraged; that perhaps he was wrong. He referred to the
depression in World War II. I said that that was quite different. Then I was not depressed because I was convinced of our
own capacity. The problem today is not our capacity but the capacity of the South Vietnamese to develop a government
with the will and spirit; we had to work through them; we could not do the job ourselves. I pointed to the encouragement of
the better fighting of the ARVN and other South Vietnamese units without any unit defection but we had no information on
individual dissenters. He agreed we should find out how rapidly and how many of the Tet vacationers returned to their
units. He also agreed that the clearance of Saigon and other cities had been done largely by Vietnamese troops and
should be given credit. However, he spoke about the continued great losses of the Viet Cong. I said that I didn't know yet
whether the VC had expected to take such losses and thought them worthwhile. I could not agree with Westmoreland's
optimism about attrition. There was some evidence that the Vietnamese Communists were quite ready to accept the ratio
of loss as being favorable to their side (I was referring not to this last period but to the previous period). On the whole, I got
the impression that, although he admitted that he might be wrong, he did not indicate there should be any change in plans,
programs, etc.

72. Vietnam Situation Report/1/

No. 7/68
Saigon, February 12, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 2 C (5), 2/6-12/68, General Military Activity.
Secret. The report, disseminated as TDCS DB-315/00518-68, covered the period January 28-February 10. In a covering
memorandum to Rostow, February 12, Helms wrote: "This is the cable I mentioned to you on the 'phone a little while ago. I
am sending it to you in this form, because I wanted you to have it promptly." (Ibid.) In his covering memorandum
transmitting a copy of the report to the President, February 12, 4:50 p.m., Rostow wrote: "This is an extremely well
balanced CIA assessment from Saigon of what the Communists have gained and lost; and what our problems are. We are
unlikely to have anything better right away." (Ibid.) The notation "ps" on this covering memorandum indicates that the
President saw it.
THE TET OFFENSIVE--A PLUS OR A MINUS?
The Year of the Monkey had an inauspicious beginning for the people of South Vietnam as the VC/NVA forces violated the
sacred Tet holidays and launched virtually simultaneous attacks against 36 province capitals, five of the six autonomous
cities, and numerous other population centers throughout the country. Their objectives have been clearly spelled out in
captured documents--to destroy or subvert the GVN/allied forces, eliminate the GVN governmental structure, create a
general uprising among the people, and establish a revolutionary government dominated by the National Liberation Front.
In what appears to be an almost incredible miscalculation of their own military capabilities and the degree of support they
could command from the people, the Communists failed to achieve these stated objectives. It has cost them dearly in
manpower--in 12 days some 31,000 killed, 5,700 detained, probably another 10,000 dead from wounds, and unknown
number dead from air and artillery strikes--a total probably amounting to more than half of the forces used in this attack.
Nevertheless, the enemy's well-planned, coordinated series of attacks was an impressive display of strength which has
given him a major psychological victory abroad, dealt a serious blow to the pacification program, and created problems
that will tax the energies and resources of the government for many months to come.
The enemy's military strategy consisted of a two-phase offensive. Wherever possible, the first phase assaults were
conducted by VC local forces. Psychologically, this was more appropriate than using NVA units, given the enemy's
objective of winning the support of the people. NVA forces were used in I and II Corps where VC forces were inadequate,
but throughout the country most VC/NVA main forces were withheld for the second phase when they would move in to
capitalize on the expected chaos and general uprising.
The passive reaction of the population, the fierceness of Free World and ARVN counteroffensives after the initial surprise
and confusion, and the effectiveness of massive air and artillery fire obviously forced cancellation of the commitment of
VC/NVA main forces. It is estimated that slightly less than half of the enemy's main force maneuver units outside of those
in the DMZ, but well over half of his local force units, participated in the attacks. Thus, he still has substantial uncommitted

forces available for a new "second phase" attack.

In spite of the enemy's heavy losses, he apparently still plans a resumption of the offensive on a large scale in the near
future. The failure of committed forces to withdraw completely to safehavens and current disposition of previously
uncommitted units lend credence to prisoners' statements that the second phase offensive will soon be initiated. Although
the VC/NVA main forces would supposedly be better equipped, trained, and disciplined than the primarily low-level troops
(cannon fodder) which launched the first offensive, the enemy has lost the element of surprise, does not have the cover of
a Tet truce, and has already expended a great deal in the way of men and matriel. The consequence of a second "all-out"
series of attacks would probably be as disastrous militarily as the first phase. If, indeed, the enemy is preparing for largescale attacks at Khe Sanh, Quang Tri, Hue, Danang, Dak To, Phu My, Tuy Hoa, Saigon, Can Tho, and My Tho, then he
must strike quickly. Though stretched thin, allied forces have consolidated their gains, regrouped, and initiated offensive
operations against the enemy's massed main forces with notable success. As time passed, his position is becoming more
tenuous and there will be less and less opportunity to achieve his immediate objectives.
Although the enemy has been seriously weakened, he is not on the verge of desperation. He has over half of his main
forces basically intact with more men and matriel enroute or available from NVN. He has taken substantial losses in the
past and shown an amazing degree of resiliency. On the other hand, his logistics and recruitment problems will be greatly
increased with such heavy losses from the local and guerrilla forces who provide manpower for support and combat.
As an alternative to a second assault against the cities, the enemy could elect to cut his losses by reverting to more
traditional harassing attacks while attempting to improve his position in the countryside. The recent well-coordinated
attacks over widespread areas proved the enemy's capability to utilize this tactic. Such attacks on a smaller scale would
still gain headlines and have considerable psychological appeal and value to the enemy as they re-raise questions in SVN
and the world as to the ability of the allies to provide security to the people. However, after such extensive indoctrination of
the inevitability of imminent victory, a reversion to essentially guerrilla warfare would probably cause severe problems of
morale among the cadres and a loss of impetus for the revolutionary effort.
It is not yet possible to make a firm assessment of the damage which has been caused to the pacification program, but it
probably has been extensive. The pacified areas did not at least initially appear to have been a priority target, probably
because most of the VC guerrillas were drawn into local force units for the city battles or were engaged in interdicting
LOC's. However, GVN forces providing security for the pacified areas and the RD teams were in many cases withdrawn to
assist in the defense of urban areas, leaving the VC free to penetrate previously secured hamlets and conduct
propaganda, recruit, acquire food, eliminate the GVN administration, and occasionally terrorize the population. The impact
of the VC presence was especially severe in the
larger hamlets which generally are located close to the population centers and were on the VC route of entry. This activity
was responsible for part of the large refugee flow into the cities.
With many of the cities in shambles and requiring priority reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts, the development aspects
of the program almost inevitably will suffer. In any event, it will be many months before the confidence of the people in the
previously secured hamlets can be restored, some of whom felt the VC presence for the first time. One possibly hopeful
sign is that many of the VC expressed surprise at the relative prosperity of the people in the GVN areas, contrary to what
they had been led to believe. This, together with the military defeat and heavy losses, should contribute to some future
defections.
There has naturally been a mixed reaction from the people to the Communist onslaught--initially, it was one of shock at the
strength of the attack, and anger at its perfidy. However, even those skeptics who would not previously acknowledge that
the large electoral turnouts, the inability of the VC to get a response to calls for a general strike, and the almost totally
conscript nature of the VC forces were proof that the VC lacked popular support, can hardly deny it now. Despite the
creation of a revolutionary administration, supposedly untainted by association with the NLF, no significant element of the
population or of the armed forces defected. The refusal of the people to respond to the VC call for an uprising, and in fact
often to render assistance to the government forces, was the key to the failure of the VC plan, and is one of most
encouraging aspects of the whole affair.
There are negative factors, of course--the people now have a greater respect for the capabilities of the VC, and this will
probably result in some cases in a more cautious attitude toward open support for the government. There is criticism over
the government's lack of preparedness, charges of excessive property damage and civilian casualties, and looting by the
counterreaction forces, and a persistent belief that somehow the U.S. was in collusion with the VC. However, the
population is universally angry at the VC for violating both a sacred holiday and their own truce, and the blame for all of the
ills is generally placed on the VC. There was left no doubt in the minds of the people as to the superiority of the
government forces and as to who won this engagement. On balance, we feel that in the contest for the hearts and minds of
the people, the VC have so far suffered a severe loss. In common danger, there was a tendency to unite behind the
government. With a residue of ill will toward the VC which will not be easily erased, the task of nation-building, at least in

those areas still under government control, should become a little easier. Much will depend, how-ever, on the skill and
alacrity with which the government handles the severe social and economic problems it faces.
The days ahead constitute a severe test for the GVN. There is no question but that the government suffered a serious loss
of prestige by its inability to defend its cities. Notwithstanding, there has been at least a temporary tendency on the part of
nationalist elements to set aside their parochial interests and rally behind the leadership. This is by no means universal-the militant Buddhists, the Dai Viets, and some others still have refused either publicly to condemn the VC or to support the
government actively. Although it was an American idea, clearly the most effective action by the government so far was the
creation of the joint Vietnamese/American task force under Vice President Ky to handle the immediate problems of
rehabilitation. Whatever closing of ranks behind the government that has accrued can be credited largely to Ky, who has
emerged as the "man of the hour." Despite aggravating and bureaucratic problems, some forward movement has been
made in reestablishing essential facilities and services. Ky may well have saved the GVN from projecting its usual image of
inactivity.
We are not sanguine about future political problems. The schisms which divide this society are deeply rooted, and will
inevitably arise again as the first flush of unity begins to fade. Demands will be made for the removal of officials, both
national and local, who proved unequal to the task in a crisis, and this will be certain to restore the endemic factional
infighting. The military, some of the Catholics, and those favoring a rough, directed system will fault the government for not
being tough enough, while others will be concerned over even the temporary sacrifice of democratic processes and the
continued preeminent role of the military. The crisis has ignited a spark of unity, but to sustain it will require a successful
relief and recovery operation, and a sublimation of personal and partisan political interests which this society has never
before demonstrated.
The Communists can be credited with having maintained excellent security for such a comprehensive plan, but they are
guilty of a massive intelligence failure. Documents captured over the past four months and interrogations of the prisoners
involved in the recent attacks indicate quite clearly that the VC did intend to take and hold the cities, did expect a general
uprising, and did plan to install a revolutionary government, as evidenced by the presence of a standby VC administrative
structure in the major cities. It may seem incredible that VC expectations should have been so divorced from reality, but
there are three factors which probably explain this. First, the Communists are and always have been victims of their
doctrine, and in the present case the articles of faith were: "The longer we fight, the stronger we become;" and, "The more
viciously the enemy fights, the closer he is to collapse;" and "The people support us and when the urban people have the
chance to rise up, our victory will be assured." Second, the leaders have been consistently and greatly misinformed by
lower cadres. Given the doctrinal bias alluded to above and the Oriental penchant for telling people what they want to hear,
the reports going upward have so misinterpreted the facts that the leaders could not base their decisions on reality. Third,
the need for a significant victory after two years of drought may have introduced a lack of prudence. By any rational
standard, North Vietnam has been losing too much in order to gain too little. For too long, VC strength and support has
been dwindling. The entire nature of the war, the entire environment of the struggle, changed with the massive U.S.
involvement. The Tet assault must have been part of an expected VC plan to inflict heavy physical and psychological
damage in hope of gaining, if not all their objectives, something which could be construed as a victory.
We are very much aware that we have probably seen only the first of a two-act drama. If the second act repeats the
scenario, we will seriously question the ability of Hanoi to continue to carry on this kind of conventional warfare for a
protracted period. Whatever else may follow, the Tet offensive in South Vietnam, contrary to much foreign opinion, is not
popularly regarded here either as a VC victory or even as an indication of their eventual success. There is a sobering
thought for the future, however--if it were not for the presence of U.S. forces, the VC flag would be flying over much of
South Vietnam today.

73. Intelligence Memorandum/1/

ER IM 68-23
Washington, February 13, 1968.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, O/DDI Files, Job 78-T02095R, SNIE 14.3-1-67, Viet Cong Recruitment and Morale
Problems. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A notation on the first page reads: "This memorandum was produced by CIA. It was
prepared by the Office of Economic Research with assistance of the Vietnamese Affairs Staff and coordinated with the
Office of Current Intelligence. It analyzes developments reported through 13 February 1968."
COMMUNIST UNITS PARTICIPATING IN ATTACKS
DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE

30 JANUARY THROUGH 13 FEBRUARY 1968

Summary
A review of field reporting since the start of the current Communist offensive indicates that approximately 58,000
Communist main and local forces were committed in attacks on urban areas and military installations through 13 February.
(For detailed data on forces available and engaged in the Tet offensive, see Appendixes A and B.)/2/ Of this total, about 37
percent were North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops and another 29 percent were Viet Cong (VC) main force troops. The
remaining 34 percent consisted of VC local forces which had been reinforced for the attacks by the upgrading of local
guerrillas. On the basis of MACV's latest order of battle of 115,000 men, the Communists would appear to have committed
about 50 percent of their regular forces to the attacks.
/2/Neither printed.
If the reported losses of 32,500 killed in action and 5,500 detained applied solely to the VC/NVA regular forces, the
Communists would have lost more than 65 percent of the forces committed to the Tet offensive. This would have been a
devastating blow. However, there are a number of pieces of evidence which suggest that such an interpretation would
overstate the Communist manpower drain.
First of all, VC/NVA forces participating in the offensive were augmented by numbers of guerrillas operating in independent
units or integrated into local force units. Second, there was extensive VC activity to raise new recruits. Third, casualties
included laborers conscripted to move VC supplies, as well as a number of civilians in densely populated areas taken
under attack. Almost certainly the rate of casualties among new and relatively untrained forces was higher than among
hard-core troops.
In summary, a number of factors suggest that the VC/NVA losses, although high, are not as serious as first believed. Most
recently, the enemy has been taking advantage of his greater control of the countryside to accelerate recruiting among the
rural population. All of these developments make it difficult to assess the current enemy manpower situation with any
accuracy./3/
/3/In a CIA memorandum entitled "The Communists' Ability To Recoup Their Tet Military Losses," March 1, the Office of
Current Intelligence and the Office of Economic Research speculated that it would take the NVA/VC 6 months to recover
from their Tet losses, but added the following caveat: "It is entirely possible, however, that they might be able to
accomplish full recovery in a much shorter time and that within six months their troop strength would be substantially
greater than it was prior to Tet. Everything hinges on the real extent of their Tet losses and on their ability to recruit and
impress personnel in the countryside." (Ibid.)
[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

74. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, February 13, 1968, 1:12-2:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House.
McNamara, Rostow, Taylor, Clifford, Helms, and Wheeler left at 2:25 p.m.; Rusk left at 2:32 p.m.; Christian and Tom
Johnson left at 2:40 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S
LUNCHEON MEETING
WITH
SECRETARY RUSK
SECRETARY MCNAMARA
CIA DIRECTOR HELMS
CLARK CLIFFORD
WALT ROSTOW
GEORGE CHRISTIAN
TOM JOHNSON

[Omitted here is a brief discussion of Korea.]

The President: Anything new on Vietnam?
General Wheeler: There is continued resistance in Saigon, but it is fragmented. Dalat is clear. The enemy is still holding
the citadel in Hue.
There is shooting but nothing important around Khesanh and the DMZ.
The President: What is your evaluation of the light activity around Khesanh?
General Wheeler: They had the hell knocked out of them. They are trying to reconstitute their forces. Their first wave was
very savagely handled.
General Westmoreland indicated to me this morning that "things are looking better all over."
The enemy has a new flag with blue, red and yellow. The red represents blood; the blue represents the land; and the
yellow represents the revolutionary spirit.
The President: What is the nature of the enemy forces in Saigon?
General Wheeler: The forces in the Saigon area are decreasing. There is still the build-up and the threat across the
Cambodian border.
At Khesanh we got that C-130 out. He took off in 0-0 visibility. It was a very gallant action.
The President: How are the C-130s coming?
Secretary McNamara: Westmoreland asked for two squadrons of C-130s. They were sent on February 9.
The President: Is there no problem with the C-130? Do they have enough?
Secretary McNamara: There is no problem at present.
General Wheeler: We do not have with us now a recommendation on reserve call-up. The Joint Chiefs are working on that
today./2/
/2/On February 13 McNamara ordered the deployment of one brigade of the 82d Airborne and one Marine regiment to
South Vietnam. In JCSM 96-68 sent to McNamara that day, the JCS indicated that 46,000 reservists would have to be
called up to active duty to meet immediate requirements and 137,000 more needed to be readied for possible call-up. The
text of this memorandum is in The Pentagon Papers: The Senator Gravel Edition, pp. 542-546.
The first troops will begin moving out of U.S. facilities tomorrow night 6 p.m. (These are the first units of the 10,500
authorized and approved for immediate shipment in response to General Westmoreland's request. The Bunker
announcement and press guidance are attached as Appendices A and B.)/3/
/3/Attached but not printed.
The Chiefs are preparing a paper, one proposal based on the minimum call-up necessary to support these troops and the
second based on the desirable level in case we have to deploy the rest of the 82nd Division and more Marines.
The President: I sure want you and Bob McNamara to get together on one program. Let's agree on these things before you
get here.
There are a number of questions which I want you to consider and get answers to me. Those questions are:
1. Why is it necessary to call up reserve units at this time?

a. To be ready for further reinforcement of Vietnam?

b. To be ready for other contingencies outside Vietnam?
c. To reassure allies such as NATO to whom we have military commitments?
d. To contribute to our overall deterrent posture by adding to our visible strength in being?
2. How large should the call-up be to satisfy the foregoing requirements? Can the call-up be diminished by such devices as
a reduction in our overseas garrisons in Europe or Korea?
3. Why is it necessary to call up individual reservists at this time? Can't it be avoided or postponed? If not, how many must
be called? When? From what sources?
4. What will happen to the reserve units and individuals called up? Where will they go? How long will they serve? Are the
necessary housing, equipment, and training facilities ready for them?
5. What are the budgetary implications of these actions?
6. What must be requested from the Congress? What can be avoided or delayed?
7. What will be the manpower requirements for maintaining these increased forces? What will the effect be on draft calls?
8. What will be the domestic and international reactions to these decisions?
9. How should our decision be explained to the domestic and international public? What should be the timing of our
statement?/4/
/4/The President had these questions typed and submitted to Rostow on February 15. (Johnson Library, National Security
File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs aa-vv)
The next thing I want to discuss with you is the telegram I received from Cy Vance./5/ I will read it:
/5/Telegram 4180 from Seoul, February 12. (Ibid., Korea-Pueblo Incident, Seoul Cables, Vol. II)
There could only be one answer if the President really wants me to go. I have serious reservations, however, about going
on to Saigon from here. I fear that decision to this effect could jeopardize any benefit which may come out of our mission.
These people are ultra sensitive and in a hurt mood. There is a good chance they would feel they are being downgraded
by being made a part of a two purpose mission and by lack of urgency in my reporting to the President on their problems.
Secretary Rusk: Bunker said we should not let the Vance mission be interpreted that the South Vietnamese Government
has the same problem with the U.S. Government as does the South Korean Government.
The President: Would you send him?
Secretary Rusk: I want you to get the best information and advice you need.
Secretary McNamara: I think it would be helpful to get a first-hand report from Vance.
Secretary Rusk: Somebody should go.
The President: It looks like it is a question of personalities then.
I think Cy has a point that Pak wants me to get the message from him as quickly as possible.
Secretary Rusk: Also we should not underestimate the trouble with South Korea Vance is handling.

General Wheeler: Admiral Sharp asked me whether we should move the cruiser Canberra from the Sea of Japan back to
Vietnam in light of the political problems this might cause with South Korea.
[Omitted here is a brief discussion of the Pueblo crisis.]
Secretary McNamara: There are four near-term action programs which are proposed.
Those are as follows:
1. Defer additional reinforcements of U.S. forces in South Vietnam until requested by Westmoreland. Defer "call-up" of
reserve units to replace the 6 battalions now being deployed until further information is available as to Westmoreland's
additional troop requirements, the extent of defections in the ranks of the ARVN, RF/PF and South Vietnamese security
forces and the success of the GVN in restoring
services, coping with the refugee problem, etc. Defer request for new legislative authority.
2. Call up now a relatively small number of the Ready Reserves, approximately 40,000, recognizing that additional call-ups
may be required later. This can be done without additional legislative authority. This call-up could be accompanied by a
Presidential speech noting that a further call-up may become necessary depending upon developments in Southeast Asia,
but that for the time being no legislative action is being requested on either personnel or financial matters.
3. Call up either a small (40,000) or large (130,000) number of Reserves and concurrently request Congress to authorize
additional personnel actions to strengthen the Armed forces./6/ Defer request for supplemental financial authorizations and
appropriations, but indicate these will be required.
/6/By Joint Resolution of Congress, the following authorities could be granted: (a) Authorize the extension of all
enlistments, appointments, periods of active duty, and other periods of obligated service of Regular and Reserve members
of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force. (b) Authorize activation of all needed individual Ready Reservists and
extend beyond June 30, 1968 the authority to call both units and individuals of the Ready Reserve. (c) Authorize re-call of
retired Reserve personnel. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. Call up either a small (40,000) or large (130,000) number of Reserves and concurrently request from Congress both the
authority to take the needed personnel actions and the supplemental financial authorizations and appropriations
required./7/
/7/The possible increase in our effort in Southeast Asia may require, for Fiscal 1968, additional new Obligational Authority
of $1 billion, with additional expenditures of $500 million, and for Fiscal 1969, additional new Obligational Authority of from
$2 to $3 billion, with an increase of expenditures amounting to $2 billion $500 million. [Footnote in the source text.]
General Wheeler: Senator Russell said it would be necessary to have a substantial reserve call-up before Congress would
approve extension of enlistments.
The President: What would you get with an extension of enlistments?
Senator McNamara: You would get 17,000 extra men per week by extending enlistments. It would raise the readiness of
our strategic reserves.
The President: How long would you extend tours?
Secretary McNamara: It would depend on how many men are called up. We would ask for authority to extend one year.
We would apply that authority if needed. For example, we need helicopter pilots extended.
General Wheeler: Yes, it would help with helicopter pilots.
The President: What do we do with the Rumanian?/8/
/8/See Document 71.

Secretary Rusk: I think we should just thank him for his help. He brought back nothing.
The President: What about any targets in the Hanoi area?
Secretary McNamara: There are 13 authorized but not hit.
Secretary Rusk: In light of these recent attacks and the negative response to our visitor to Hanoi, I am ready to hit almost
anything.
General Wheeler: The Joint Chiefs propose again limiting the circle around Hanoi to three miles and 1-1/2 miles around
Haiphong. This would open everything else up to Route reconnaissance.
But these targets do not have to be brought up today, since the weather is bad and there are authorized targets which
have not been struck.
The President: How do you feel about this, Bob?
Secretary McNamara: As I have said before, the military value is small. The risk is very high. The chance for civilian
casualties is very high.
Secretary Rusk: We can consider this at a later time.
Clark Clifford: To get the reply you did do what I consider a very just and fair suggestion. It seems very reasonable and, in
fact, well justified to increase the level of pressure in North Vietnam. I would favor a step up in the military pressure./9/
/9/In a February 13 letter to Clifford, Under Secretary of the Air Force Townsend Hoopes argued that, although the
bombing program had caused heavy damage to the DRV, it had not impaired the North Vietnamese ability to infiltrate men
and matriel southward in order to continue the fighting on an indefinite basis. He recommended a bombing cutback and
curtailment of ground actions in order to reduce casualties. (Johnson Library, Clark M. Clifford Papers, Memos on Vietnam,
February-March 1968)

75. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts/1/

Washington, February 14, 1968, 1733Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority;
Limdis. Drafted by John Burke of the Vietnam Working Group, cleared by Habib and EA Public Affairs Adviser Oscar
Armstrong, and approved by Bundy. Sent to all European posts, all East Asian and Pacific posts, Hong Kong, Mexico,
Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan, Ceylon, Tunisia, Iran, India, Morocco, and USUN, and pouched to all other posts.
115081. Subject: Initial Appraisal Viet Cong Tet Offensive.
1. Note: Over the last several days Sitreps have been provided to keep you abreast of the developing situation in South
Viet-Nam in the wake of the communists' Tet offensive. The following represents a preliminary appraisal of the current
situation, which you may draw upon on background as appropriate in your conversations with senior officials of the
government to which you are accredited as well as colleagues within the diplomatic corps. It may also be used with
reputable correspondents.
2. North Vietnamese and VC forces have succeeded in dealing a major blow against the urban population of South VietNam in the offensive launched Jan 30. Though there is some intelligence which indicates that this initial strike will be
followed up by one or more additional concerted efforts, this phase of the offensive seems to be drawing to a close. There
is still fighting going on in the suburbs of Saigon, in a section of Hue, and in Dalat, but aside from these areas the attacking
forces have been driven from the towns and the Government of Viet-Nam is proceeding to restore order and re-establish
security and services in the urban centers. The enemy has also massed regular North Vietnamese divisions near the DMZ
and the Khe Sanh campaign is expected soon in that area.
3. The Tet offensive was ordered by Hanoi and the operation was in the planning stage for weeks and probably months

before the initial attack. Our forces have captured a copy of the general order for the offensive which begins with the
words: "The Tet greeting of Chairman Ho is actually a combat order for our entire army and population." In the midst of
their announced holiday truce they mounted an attack on province capitals and district towns throughout the length and
breadth of South Viet-Nam. Thirty-eight of the forty-four province capitals were attacked either by artillery or ground troops
in force. About sixty district towns were also struck. It now appears that Hanoi committed a tremendous proportion of its
resources in the south and took very heavy casualties. Our estimates are that more than 60,000 NVA/VC troops, mostly
main and local force, were utilized. A great many of the attacks were suicidal in character. However, on the basis of
preliminary interrogation reports of those captured, many of the cadre involved were apparently led to believe that their
efforts would be followed up by subsequent VC attacks. Many of those captured have stated that they were not provided
with withdrawal plans (in past communist operations withdrawal plans have been an essential feature). In their briefings,
communist cadre were also led to believe that the people would respond to their calls for anti-GVN uprisings and would
welcome them as liberators. Such a reaction was not forthcoming and in the testimony of POWs, this was apparently a
source of surprise and disappointment.
4. We know from captured documents and interrogations, as well as from Hanoi and Liberation Radio broadcasts, that the
communists expected to achieve the following goals:
a. Full control of many of the cities. (Instead they retain only a small portion of Hue, part of Dalat, and a few hundred are
still holding out in the Chinese suburbs of Saigon.)
b. They expected major defections from ARVN and they have even claimed that entire units had defected. Conclusive
reports from our advisers make clear that there were no significant defections and it has been clearly established that one
of the units identified by Hanoi as defecting, the ARVN 45th regiment, fought very well against the communists and
remains firmly on the side of the GVN.
c. They expected the elected, newly installed GVN to collapse in the face of their offensive. In contrast its executive branch
has moved quickly to establish a Recovery Task Force which is mobilizing the Government's resources to provide relief for
the many refugees created by these attacks, re-establish services, and organize the task of rebuilding the destroyed areas.
5. There are a number of hopeful and potentially favorable elements in the present situation:
a. Despite the fact that it was caught by surprise and several effectives were on holiday leave, the ARVN performed
commendably and indeed bore the brunt of the attack. (As of Feb 12 over 2,100 ARVN troops had been killed and almost
8,000 had been wounded. This contrasts with American dead of approximately 1,000 with an additional 5,000 wounded.)
ARVN performance has been attested to by newsmen on the scene. (E.g., CBS broadcast of February 9 from Saigon:
"Now that more and more reports are in, the record would seem to show that face to face against the Viet Cong in the
battle for the cities the South Vietnamese armed forces performed almost universally well, and this could be the most
significant development of this phase of the war. The South Vietnamese armed forces have long been a question mark.
There was a period in this war about three years ago when entire battalions would disappear in the face of attack. Nothing
like this happened in the past week and a half.")
b. Key groups and leaders, including those within the National Assembly and in opposition political circles, have issued
statements denouncing the Viet Cong for their deceitful attack and urging the people to rally in opposition to the VC. Such
statements have come from intellectuals (a group of university professors, journalists and writers issued a strong
statement on February 11), labor groups (the president of the largest trade union federation in SVN), a former chief of state
and unsuccessful presidential candidate, religious leaders (the Director of the Institute for the Propagation of the Buddhist
Faith). In addition to these public statements, there have been numerous private assurances of support for the GVN in
present emergency from many other political figures including declared oppositionists.
c. Reports almost universally testify to a widespread sense of outrage over the VC violation of Tet. (N.B. Tet is the most
important and most sacred of Vietnamese holidays and normally runs for four days. It is a time when families are reunited,
usually in the home village or hamlet, gifts are exchanged and religious ceremonies are held in honor of ancestors. Weeks
before Tet, the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong had publicly declared that they intended to observe a seven-day truce
in connection with this holiday. The GVN and allied forces had, on their part, announced a thirty-six-hour truce, but there
was no indication that the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong intended to shorten their truce as a consequence. Up to
the time the attacks took place, Hanoi and Liberation Radio had still not indicated any intention to depart from their sevenday truce.) This sense of outrage at the violation of Tet and the many atrocities committed by the communists during their
attacks--e.g., the systematic massacre of entire families could now result in a galvanizing of popular will.
6. There are also less hopeful elements:
a. The initial success of the attacks on the urban centers could well produce a loss of confidence in the ability of the GVN,

the ARVN, and the allied forces to protect the people from the VC.
b. The urban population has been exposed for the first time to heavy property destruction and loss of life. Latest figures as
of February 12 indicate that refugee count may exceed 500,000, including 217,000 in Saigon and environs. Civilian
casualties have been estimated by Chief of State Thieu as being in the neighborhood of 3,000 killed.
c. The pacification program, to which so much importance has been attached, has been temporarily disrupted. To get it
back on the track both the GVN and U.S. forces must act quickly and effectively.
7. Over the next few months the true impact of the Tet offensive can be calculated. The initial advantage must be
conceded to the NVA/VC forces. They have succeeded in invading the previously-inviolable cities and exposing the urban
population to the brutal facts of war for the first time. They have created havoc and suffering and have imposed a heavy
new burden on the already overstrained manpower and material resources of the GVN. Obviously, the ultimate success or
failure of their urban effort will depend on how well the GVN addresses itself to these new problems. So far it has reacted
well. President Thieu and other key members of his administration have shown leadership and a willingness to come to
grips with the situation. This effort must, however, be sustained. The populace undoubtedly will be watching GVN
leadership.
8. The other side of the coin is just how much the NVA/VC forces spent on the urban offensive. They sustained heavy
casualties: over 30,000 dead and almost 6,000 taken prisoner. (Because of their magnitude Vietnamese and American
officials in Saigon have checked their figures carefully against such other factors as captured weapons, and are convinced
of their essential accuracy.) From interrogations and from their propaganda broadcasts it seems clear that they expected
to realize much from this offensive. The fact that they failed to take control of any major town, except for brief periods of
time, and their inability to generate any popular support for their effort may prove to be of prime significance. It should be
noted that they were willing to announce the formation of an "Alliance of National and Peace Forces" as a propaganda
weapon coincident with this offensive. This paper organization was meant to attract intellectuals, merchants, industrialists
and politicians and its creation carried with it the tacit admission that the NLF was not the single voice of the South
Vietnamese people. This obviously important concession would seem a heavy propaganda price in view of the fact that
there was no significant popular rising in response to the urban offensive.
9. The Tet offensive was deliberately ordered by Hanoi at a time when they knew we were actively taking soundings to
determine whether the Trinh statement of December 28/2/ represented a sincere intention on their part to enter into
meaningful talks and had, in connection with these soundings, imposed restrictions on air activity in the vicinity of Hanoi or
Haiphong. Thus, the Tet offensive, taken in conjunction with the communist buildup at Khe Sanh and the harsh
denunciation of the San Antonio formula by radio Hanoi, and by Trinh himself on Feb 8, does not augur well for the early
commencement of meaningful peace talks. This does not however mean that Hanoi and the supporters of the DRV will not
attempt to mount an increasingly shrill propaganda concerto in favor of early negotiations on their terms. Our position on
talks remains clear: the San Antonio formula.
/2/See Document 1.
Rusk

76. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 15, 1968, 1100Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret;
Immediate; Nodis. This telegram is printed in full in Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 334-341.
19428. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my thirty-ninth weekly message:
A. General
1. As the massive Viet Cong Tet offensive subsides, it becomes increasingly possible to draw certain conclusions. What
was blurred a week ago begins to become more clearly into focus. Although it will be several days before we have a fairly
accurate country-wide assessment of the physical and material damages certain things are now fairly evident:

A) The enemy has suffered a heavy military setback with nearly 33,000 killed, over 5,600 detained, and the loss of more
than 8,000 individual and 1,250 crew-served weapons. A large part of the force he had committed, estimated at about
60,000, has been put out of action. A second wave of attacks against Saigon and some other major cities, which it was
feared for some time might take place, has not materialized and there is increasing evidence, for the present at least, that
it may not.
B) That Hanoi and the Viet Cong made a major miscalculation in expecting uprisings among the people and defections
among the Vietnamese forces. While the GVN may not enjoy great popularity among the people in general, there is strong
evidence that in the city and countryside alike the Viet Cong attacks during the last two weeks have caused widespread
resentment and bitterness toward the VC.
C) That it seems apparent that Hanoi's maximum objective was to take and hold many of the cities, thereby creating a
political situation which would compel the GVN and the US to virtual surrender. The second and fallback objective (and this
is Thieu's opinion also) was probably to put themselves in a strong position for negotiations, one in which they could insist
as a minimum on a coalition government.
D) That despite the heavy military defeat suffered by the enemy, much damage has resulted throughout the country. The
number of evacuees which had climbed to 485,000 yesterday showed a decline of 457,000 today, probably an indication
that people are beginning to return to their homes. The number of houses destroyed has now been reported at 48,000
although on the basis of our observations, we believe the figure may be exaggerated. The figures on civilian deaths
increased to almost 3,800, and the wounded to nearly 21,000. In addition, there has been substantial damage to industry
and to lines of communication. Commercial activity has been slowed, at least temporarily, and will take some time to
recover.
E) The economic situation in Saigon and in most of the country is improving. Food prices, which rose rapidly in the first
days of the attack, are coming down. Lines of communication are beginning to be opened up. In looking beyond the
immediate crisis, economic prospects are less bright than they appeared a few weeks ago. It will take time to restore the
damage to industry and the loss of confidence in the business community which the attacks have caused. The Vietnamese
economy, however, has demonstrated powers of recuperation in the past and hopefully these negative factors may prove
short lived.
F) That the predominant reaction of the people is that of anger, indignation, and a sense of outrage at the VC, especially
its treachery in attacking during the Tet holidays, although there is a lot of apprehension and fear of the possibility of future
attacks. There is too surprise that the enemy was capable of attacking on such a wide scale in such force and criticism of
GVN intelligence capabilities. But there is also a feeling of pride in the performance of the Vietnamese forces, a new
confidence in the GVN, and a welling up of the support for it from many quarters. I think it is fair to say, therefore, that the
GVN is facing a crisis of confidence. If it reacts quickly and effectively, moves ahead with reconstruction and other
constructive programs the resentment of people at the losses they have suffered will be replaced by confidence and
gratitude; if not, the GVN can be seriously weakened./2/
/2/In a February 13 memorandum to the President, Lodge noted that the "plus side" of the aftermath of Tet was that in
South Vietnam the growth of "a dividend from all the work we have done to bring about constitutional government and a
sense of civic consciousness," which he labeled "political energy," was occurring. In addition, the RVNAF had fought well
and there was a "remarkable" degree of unity among the GVN leadership. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC
History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs aa-vv)
[Omitted here is extensive discussion of measures undertaken by South Vietnam to rebuild in the aftermath of the Tet
offensive.]
Bunker

77. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 19, 1968, 1050Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret;
Immediate; Nodis.
19824. Ref: State 114390./2/ Subj: Command Relationships.

/2/Telegram 114390 to Saigon, a joint State/Defense message to Bunker, Sharp, and Westmoreland, February 13,
requested an assessment of the "feasibility and desirability" of developing a command structure that would give
COMUSMACV more direct authority over South Vietnamese and allied nation forces. One such plan involved designating
Thieu the overall force commander and Westmoreland the field force commander. (Ibid.)
1. I have given careful consideration to the suggestion that a new command arrangement be developed here to increase
the authority of COMUSMACV over RVNAF and third country forces. While I agree that we want to consider measures to
make our prosecution of the war more effective, I think we must avoid adopting solutions which may in themselves create
more problems than they solve. This sums up my reaction to the idea proposed. In saying this, I recognize that the main
reasons for such a change in command arrangements are military and I am not in the best position to judge the merits of
this proposal from this viewpoint. I have, of course, talked with General Westmoreland who is developing his own thoughts
on reftel, and will address this particular aspect of the question in his reply. Our replies will naturally be closely coordinated
but I would like to address myself primarily to the obviously sensitive political factors which would be involved in any such
proposal.
2. As we have emphasized in numerous messages over the past few months, Vietnamese sensitivities about real or
imagined encroachments on their sovereignty and allegations of US domination of their governmental activities have
increased slightly. The lifting of censorship of the press last summer, the election campaigns, and the establishment of the
National Assembly have all afforded wider means voicing these views. They have often taken the form of highly critical and
even vitriolic comment on our massive presence here and its overwhelming effect on Vietnamese society and political life.
No matter how we might seek to disguise such a command arrangement, I have no doubt that the Vietnamese will see it
for exactly what it is intended to be, and this will only add to the hue and cry.
3. In addition to this internal political factor, such a change in command arrangements would lend itself readily to
propaganda exploitation by Hanoi and the NLF, and indeed all critics of the pres-ent Vietnamese Government and of our
efforts here. Hanoi's constant reiteration of the phrase "puppets" and the "Thieu-Ky-US clique" would be given added force
and indeed substance. Two of our basic and urgent objectives here are to build up constitutional processes and to
increase confidence and competence among the leaders of the new Vietnamese Government. In my opinion such a
change would tend to undermine both of these objectives. If there were some international umbrella, such as the United
Nations afforded for the Korean war command structure, this might make the proposal more digestible, but I do not believe
that either the facade of a Vietnamese overall commander for the seven nations grouping would be adequate to this
purpose. Moreover, the Koreans themselves would want high-level positions in the command structure and this would only
complicate present relationships, which are satisfactory.
4. An added point related to the naming of President Thieu as overall force commander would be that such a move runs in
the face of our effort to emphasize his civilian Presidential role under the Constitution. I recognize that he is also
Commander-in-Chief of Vietnamese Forces, but the public impression that he is first and foremost a General would be
strengthened. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine naming someone with lesser stature to this position.
5. A further consideration of the political side is the likelihood that a fundamental revision of command relationships will
stimulate already expressed GVN desires for a more formal status of forces agreement between our two governments.
This opens a can of worms which we all want to avoid.
6. In sum, I can see no political advantages from such a revision in command arrangements, and very considerable
disadvantages. Subject to more expert views on the military purposes which would be served by this change, would urge
that it not be considered at the present time, or in the foreseeable future.
7. General Westmoreland has seen this message and concurs with it.
Bunker

78. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, February 20, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson,
Chronological File, February 1968. Secret; For Personal Files Only; Absolutely No Distribution. Drafted by Harriman. The
meeting began at 12:37 p.m. and lasted until 1 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT

I talked with the President at noon today alone. [Omitted here is brief discussion of domestic issues.]
He then said, "Now what will I say to U Thant?"/2/ I said I had prepared a memorandum as he had asked me to, which he
read over and said gave him a good review./3/ I said on the basis of this record he has every right to tell U Thant that there
has been no indication from Hanoi yet that they seriously want negotiations. They want the U.S. surrender.
/2/The President met with Thant the next day; see Document 80.
/3/Harriman brought to the meeting a memorandum entitled "Our Efforts To Seek a Peaceful Settlement of the Vietnam
Conflict," which detailed the numerous efforts since 1964 of the Johnson administration to seek a peaceful resolution of the
war. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson,
Chronological File, February 1968) In a February 19 memorandum to Warnke, Under Secretary of the Air Force Townsend
Hoopes decried the administration's dour predictions of the prospects for peace talks following Tet, noting that "only in
circumstances under which Hanoi can demonstrate a degree of military muscle [and] can make clear that NVN has
remaining strengths and alternatives, will it be willing to accept the risk of serious bargaining from which it knows there will
emerge a compromise solution--i.e., something less than its stated war objectives." (Johnson Library, Alain Enthoven
Papers, Alternative Strategies 1968)
I said I was still hopeful, however, that they were moving in that direction and that I hoped that we could get talks started
before the autumn. He said that would be most desirable. I said they should understand the chance they are running in the
election for a tougher U.S. position. He said, "I'm afraid they don't understand that."
I said I was afraid our military did not recognize that it wasn't just the North Vietnamese we were fighting. We were fighting
North Vietnam with the full, determined support of the Soviet Union and Red China; that I thought Westmoreland's attrition
rate was acceptable to the North since the manpower situation in Asia was unlimited. Also, Kosygin had told me that the
Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe had offered volunteers, and this offer was open. I am not sure that he
liked that comment, but I went on to refer to the recent meetings of the Non-Communist Front. He readily agreed that this
was the most important thing that had happened, and did not dispute my statement that this Front would be strong enough
to deal with the VC or elements of the NLF, which is not true of the Saigon Government. He did not appear to disagree
also with the statement that I felt the eventual solution lay in South Vietnam, even though talks between us and Hanoi
might have to come first.
As I left he thanked me for my support and I commented that I thought I should continue to be very blunt off the record and
rather careful on the record, as I was still his representative in peace negotiations which should be non-political. This
position I would change when the elections grew nearer. I feel sure he fully agrees.
W. Averell Harriman/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

79. Editorial Note

On February 20, 1968, Secretary of Defense McNamara testified in closed session before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on the Tonkin Gulf attack of August 2, 1964, and the supposed attack 2 days later on August 4. The hearings,
continuing through February 26, served to cast aspersions on the credibility of the Johnson administration. McNamara,
without the Committee's approval, released a statement on his testimony on February 21; see The New York Times,
February 21, 1968. The Committee never published a final report on the hearings and accompanying investigation,
although McNamara's testimony was made public on February 24. See U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Hearings: The Gulf of Tonkin, The 1964 Incident, 90th Congress, 2d Session, 20 February 1968.
The President and McNamara had earlier, on February 19, discussed on the telephone the August 1964 Tonkin Gulf affair
and the upcoming Senate deliberations. In response to the President's query about the basis of the criticism by Senator
Gore of the administration's role in the episode, McNamara said: "He's just intemperate and I think his real objective is to
disassociate himself from any responsibility for anything that's followed, which of course is Fulbright's as well. They want to
prove that they were misled, and had they known at the time the facts of the Tonkin Gulf situation they never would have
supported the resolution and hence would not in any way be responsible for the escalation in military operations out there
that has occurred since then. And if he can't hang it on one thing and you destroy the case on that he pops up two or three

places elsewhere with different arguments." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone
Conversation Between Johnson and McNamara, February 21, 1968, 8:29 a.m. and 8:52 a.m., Tape F68.03, PNO 4 and
PNO 5; transcript prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume)

80. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, February 20, 1968, 1:05-2:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. Those present at the meeting were the
President, Rusk, McNamara, Clifford, Helms, Wheeler, Rostow, Christian, and Tom Johnson. The meeting was held in the
White House. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) On February 18 the enemy launched a series of "second wave" attacks in
three of the Corps Tactical Zones.
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S LUNCHEON MEETING
WITH
FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS
Secretary McNamara discussed his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Tonkin Gulf
incident./2/ "So far it's a draw."
/2/See Document 79.
Clark Clifford: [blank in the source text]
Secretary McNamara: Yes. This is highly classified.
Secretary Rusk: Why has Fulbright not let your statement out?
Secretary McNamara: It is obvious he wanted to get out his side first.
Secretary Rusk: If he does, will you go with your release?
Secretary McNamara: Yes. It is a can of worms. They will try to cloud the issue.
The President: Who took the lead in opposing and defending you?
Secretary McNamara: Senator Lausche was on our side. Senator Morse was doing the most damage, trying to prove we
provoked the incident. Senator McCarthy was nasty personally. Senator Cooper was decent. Senator Mundt did not find
the opening he wanted. Sparkman was marginally helpful. So was Senator Mansfield and Senator Hickenlooper on one
occasion./3/
/3/Senators Frank Lausche, Wayne Morse, Sherman Cooper, Karl Mundt, John Sparkman, and Bourke Hickenlooper,
respectively.
The President: How long do you expect it to go on?
Secretary McNamara: All day. Senator Morse said it may go on through tomorrow, but I am going to try to cut it off today.
The President: I suppose you have a better case on the fact the attack occurred than on the charge that we did provoke
the attack.
Secretary McNamara: I have a good case that there was an attack. They think we responded too soon.
(At 12:23, Secretary McNamara received a call from Phil Goulding. Goulding said Senator McCarthy had already made a
statement about Secretary McNamara's testimony before the committee. In light of this, Secretary McNamara said to go

ahead and issue his statement.)/4/

/4/McNamara's statement reiterated the administration's contention that intelligence reports had indicated that there was a
second attack. See The New York Times, February 21, 1968.
Secretary McNamara said McCarthy went out and told the press that one of the U.S. vessels penetrated North Vietnamese
waters. "He just did not listen. That is exactly what I thought would happen."
Clark Clifford: Would the President like to report on his visit with President Eisenhower?
The President: I enjoyed the trip very much. I intend to get away from here Wednesday afternoon and spend the weekend
in Texas./5/
/5/During the weekend of February 17-18, President Johnson toured several military installations. On February 21 he left
for his Texas ranch and remained there through February 28. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
We first went to Fort Bragg with General Johnson and General Walt. I made a brief speech and stood at an aircraft while
the men loaded aboard.
I told them that there were 500,000 of their buddies in Vietnam and that General Westmoreland had asked for their help. I
said if they had been out there and needed help, I know they would have wanted us to respond when we were asked.
Those boys expressed no sentiment, but it was obvious to me that none of them was happy to be going. It was a very
serious moment to be going. The whole trip was great. Everybody knew what to do. There were no complaints.
General Seitz, Commander of the 82nd Airborne said to me, "This is the proudest moment of my entire life."
About 50% of the men down there were Negroes. I understand they volunteered because of the high morale in the
Airborne and the extra pay./6/
/6/The President's first stop during his weekend visit to bases was at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in the late afternoon of
February 17. In remarks to 2,500 members of the Army's 82d Airborne Division who were leaving for Vietnam, he said:
"We long to see this bloodshed come to an end. Month after month we sought to find an honorable solution to the struggle
that has torn Vietnam for 20 years. The enemy's answer was clear. It is written in the towns and the cities he struck 3
weeks ago--in the homeless thousands who fled the scenes of battle--in the army that he has massed in the North near the
DMZ. And our answer--your answer--must be just as clear: unswerving resolution to resist these ruthless attacks, as we
have resisted every other." For full text of these remarks, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon
B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 238-239.
From there we went to El Toro and spoke to the men inside the hangar. After a three-minute talk I walked down rows of
men. I told myself--I am at heart a sentimental guy at times like those--that I sure regret having to send those men. One
soldier really melted me and brought me to my knees. I asked a boy from Ohio if he had been to Vietnam before. He said
yes, he had been there four times. I asked him if he had a family. He said yes, sir, he had a little baby boy born yesterday.
There wasn't a tear in his eye. No bitterness showed in his face. But I can assure you I sure stopped asking any men
questions for awhile. I saw them load the plane. The people moved with precision. I went inside the plane. There were 94
men in there, all in place. I talked to them a few minutes and then saw the plane take off. That's a rather rough feeling./7/
/7/At El Toro Marine Corps Base in California, the President spoke to Marine formations and an assembled civilian crowd.
Noting that "freedom's defense could not be in better hands," Johnson praised the men and underscored the importance of
their mission in support of the defenders of Khe Sanh. At the conclusion of his speech, Johnson, as he had at Fort Bragg,
came out to the tarmac to talk or shake hands with the Marines as they boarded their transport plane. For full text of the
President's remarks, see ibid., pp. 240-241.
From there I went to see men on the Carrier. They are going back to Yankee Station. I met many of the men on the ship.
Ninety-five percent of them think we should be doing more in Vietnam. They said they would not mind giving their lives but
they were a little more war-like and kept saying, "It's not cost effective to fight the war like this."
I had 25 men in for breakfast. All they knew was that they had a job and they wanted to do it well. They wanted to keep the
pilots and the equipment in the air and in good shape. They lost one plane with a flame out and each of them felt a very
personal loss of the three men. I would be glad to have any of them looking after my plane. They made a good impression.

I remember one thing about the trip in particular. When I was speaking to the 82nd Airborne I came to a line in my speech
when I said, "You are the Airborne." A roar came up from the crowd unlike anything I have ever heard before with "All the
way, sir." They like the prestige of the Airborne.
I almost froze in my Captain's quarters aboard the Constellation. I turned the electric blanket up to 9. About 3 o'clock, and
every hour after, I went to the door and saw this big hulk of a Marine. I kept telling him, "I am freezing." He kept saying,
"yes, sir." But he never moved./8/
/8/At a breakfast with 20 of the Constellation's crew, a sailor questioned why his fellow servicemen had to go to war while
"peace-niks got away from the draft by rebelling and having demonstrations." The President replied that "in every war there
are always dissenters and this is not something that has happened just in the Viet Nam war and this is not something that
happens just about wars. There are always people who are against what is going on in the world. Take, for example, how
people are against short skirts." Johnson also told the sailors that he was proud of them, adding "that it is boys like you
that make America a free country." (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) According to notes taken by Tom Johnson, a
further exchange occurred: "He asked one boy 'If you were President what would you do to change things?' Boy asked
'What things sir?' The President said 'Anything. What goes on that could be corrected?' Sailor said 'I would hit them more.'
President explained they would come back at us and there were many more of them than us. Then he was asked about
hitting their supply ships. Rostow said they could get their supplies other ways. 'It is hard to keep the roads and railroad
closed. In good weather we do a lot of damage. Then they have the ports of Southern China to use. We could make it
more difficult to get supplies, but you would run into trouble with Russia and others by closing the ports. You would make
Hanoi more dependent on the Chinese than ever.' President: 'We are trying to keep them (meaning Chinese and
Russians) actively out of it. If you hit two or three ships in the harbor--it is like slapping me and I would slap back. We don't
want a wider war. They have a signed agreement that if they get into a war, the Russians and the Chinese will come to
their aid. They have two big brothers that have more weight and people than I have. They are very dangerous. If the whole
family jumps upon me--I have all I can say grace over now--that is the reason the Secretaries of Defense and State have
to see that what damage we will do them will be in the end not so dangerous. We will do better tomorrow than yesterday,
but if we provoke both of them and get them on us, if we have all three actively fighting us--we are trying not to make this a
wider war.'" (Ibid., Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings) The full text of the speech given by the President while on the
Constellation is in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 241-243.
General Wheeler: I'll bet he had orders not to move and nobody telling him to move, even including you, was going to
affect his orders.
The President: Well, I quit trying at 6 o'clock. I said, go get Rostow. We had breakfast and then met with all of the men. I
can say to you Secretaries and Generals, that even Senator Fulbright couldn't find anything wrong with those men and that
operation. It makes me feel sorry that we worry about creature comforts with these men who go back three and four times
and who fly 25 hours straight into combat.
The crew was the proudest. They have the major responsibility for getting the men safely to Vietnam.
After the Constellation, we returned to see President Eisenhower and to get his judgment./9/ I think he has been
mistreated by history and by misinterpretation.
/9/Johnson flew by helicopter to the home of former President Dwight Eisenhower at Palm Springs. Following a briefing,
lunch, and a game of golf with Eisenhower, the President returned to Washington. (Johnson Library, President's Daily
Diary) The President's telephone discussion with Eisenhower the next day is ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording
of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Eisenhower, February 19, 1968, 12:17 p.m., Tape F68.03, Side A, PNO
2-3. In a discussion with Secretary Rusk on February 19, the President noted: "I spent a long time with Eisenhower. He
says, 'I don't think you all--one criticism I've got of this administration is I think you're right, I think you're doing what you
ought to do, I think you got to be there, but I don't think you understand that the longer the war, the more costly it is.' He
said, 'I'd rather lose 25,000 a day for a few days and get it over with than lose 2,500 a month ad infinitum.' And I said, 'Any
general would do that,' and he said, 'The man that's got the greatest responsibility on his shoulders of any general in the
history of this country is Westmoreland.' But he said, 'Westmoreland ought to be asking for more men and ought to be
doing more than he is. And anybody can look at it and see,' and he said, 'I'm afraid that that's your mistake.' So I would
gather that's the Republican line." (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rusk, February 19,
1968, 11 a.m., Tape F68.03, Side A, PNO 1; transcript prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume)
He said that he did not intend to play politics with Rusk and McNamara. He said it is a mistake to second guess the people
who know the information. He spoke glowingly of General Wheeler and General Westmoreland and General Goodpaster.
He said he saw no justification for the criticism of General Westmoreland. He said he remembered in another war when
people sat on the sidelines and said there was a better way, but he preferred to leave that to the judgment of the men who
had the better information.

He said there were two people he had most respect for. Who would you think they are?
Secretary Rusk: General Marshall?
General Wheeler: Churchill?
Director Helms: General MacArthur?
The President: It was Marshall and Churchill. He told me some stories about General Marshall. He said that Marshall was
an impersonal man. He brought Ike up from Fort Sam to handle operations. He ordered General Eisenhower to draft the
invasion order and plan. Ike said he guesses he was a little vain and a little cocky and he went to General Marshall and
said, "I hope the General knows that I have spent many hours on this plan and that it is O.K." General Marshall told him
"Eisenhower, I hope it is too. You may be the one called upon to execute it."
In addition, Eisenhower said that Churchill wanted to go into battle. Eisenhower told Churchill he did not think it was wise
to go into battle because of the additional security that must be provided. When Churchill told the King, the King also said
he wanted to go. As far as Churchill was concerned, that ended it. He didn't go.
General Eisenhower said that Westmoreland carries more responsibility than any General in the history of this country. He
said we should give him everything he needs and then let him fight the war.
I asked him how many allies he had under his command during World War II. He said, including U.S. and allied troops, he
had about five million.
I told him General Westmoreland had 500,000 men, so how could he say that Westmoreland had the greatest
responsibility of any American general?
He said it was a different kind of war and General Westmoreland doesn't know who the enemy is and there is not any
clearly defined front.
Ike said, I am a mean Republican, but I am not going to be partisan on the war.
Then General Eisenhower was asked how he got legislation passed when he was President. He said he told the visitor
that he had a Speaker from Texas and a Majority Leader from Texas, both Democrats. He said his leader was Knowland
of California./10/
/10/Senator William Knowland, Senate majority and minority leader during the 1950s.
He said he could call in Mr. Sam/11/ and me and say why a certain piece of legislation was best for the country and that
the two of us would do it if it were in the best interest of the country. He said this was often not the case with his own party.
/11/Representative Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House of Representatives, 1940-1961, and Johnson's mentor.
General Eisenhower said that we had always done what we thought was best for the country, particularly when he called
on us. He intended to do the same thing now.
He called me and told me of a rough wire he received from three scientists who told him I planned to drop the nuclear
bomb. I told him I had talked to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and that no one had recommended
nuclear weapons in the last four years.
Now, what do we do with this trip of General Wheeler's?
Secretary Rusk: Can we keep this trip very quiet until Buzz gets there? I am worried about what they might do to the
airport if they knew he were coming.
The President: We talk too much anyway. Ike said it is criminal to announce the location of men or units or headquarters.
He said the press can talk about the way in which the war is being directed but that it is wrong to say anything about when
or where or how it is being fought.

Ike said we should get the other government to restrict coverage and that he never would have said that we were sending
10,500 men. He said he would think General Giap would just love to have that information.
General Wheeler: I will leave tomorrow night and return on Tuesday the 27th.
The President: What should we do while Buzz is out there?
Secretary McNamara: There is nothing we need to do that we haven't done. We should wait until Buzz comes back.
General Wheeler: General Westmoreland said that the intelligence indicated there might be a major attack tonight on
Saigon. As of this morning, nothing of a sizeable nature had happened.
Walt Rostow: It has been quiet up until the time of the meeting.
The President: What about targets? Should we retaliate for these strikes?
General Wheeler: The weather is terrible except for an occasional day. We can make systems runs on certain targets. I
don't want to sound like a broken record, but I still feel the best thing is to squeeze down the circle and then authorize
armed reconnaissance.
Secretary McNamara: May I leave? (The Secretary had to return to the Hill where he was testifying before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.)
General Wheeler showed maps of the Haiphong-Hanoi area. The General pointed to high value targets and said that
systems runs on these targets should be considered. He recommended reducing the circles around Hanoi and Haiphong
to three miles and 1-1/2 miles and permitting armed reconnaissance.
The General pointed out the northeast arm of the railroad and Highway 1-A. In addition, he pointed out the inland port of
Hanoi. He said it was an inland port used for barges to bring in supplies.
Secretary Rusk: I would not object to systems runs. There would be a limitation of 15 miles along the China border. I would
hit the highway and the railroad.
Walt Rostow: How about a systems run on Hanoi radio headquarters?
General Wheeler: We could hit it. It is part of the Air Defense System in the area.
The President: Go get it. It has been previously authorized anyway.
General Wheeler: May we reduce the circles to 1-1/2 and 3 miles?
The President: Do you have any trouble with that, Dean?
Secretary Rusk: It will get a lot of civilians but I feel less strong about the matter now. Let me look at this and get back to
you later.
The President: Take the 15 mile limit.
General Wheeler: How about a systems run on the Hanoi port?
The President: How do you feel about that?
Secretary Rusk: O.K.
Clark Clifford: O.K.

The President: What is a systems run?

Secretary Rusk: It is bad weather bombing.
General Wheeler: It is not as good as visional bombing.
Clark Clifford: Is it safer with a systems run?
General Wheeler: It is somewhat more safe. Planes can go in at night and also in bad weather.
The President: Do you want to send anybody with Wheeler?
Secretary Rusk: I want to send Habib with Wheeler.
General Wheeler: We have made space for him on the plane.
The President: O.K. What is the enemy up to, Dick?
Director Helms: It is clear the enemy had a poor assessment of what would happen. They thought a political uprising would
take place. They did not get it.
Based on the documents, they are now re-evaluating and are much more flexible in their attitude. They are now attacking
some cities with mortars and some with troops. Meanwhile, they are not coming out with any real forces for ground attacks.
They are busy in the countryside. They have a manpower pool out there to draw on.
What they do in the future depends on what we do.
The President: How did they get the countryside?
Director Helms: All of the ARVN and U.S. forces have come in to protect the cities.
General Wheeler: Not all.
Director Helms: Most. In addition, it appears that the North Vietnamese may not attack Khesanh now. They may wait and
try to hold us down and move their troops in along the coast. We have a rough problem at Quang Tri.
General Wheeler: General Westmoreland said the ARVN troops are tired and some have taken rather heavy casualties.
[Omitted here is discussion of the Pueblo crisis.]

81. Record of Meeting/1/

Washington, February 21, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room, 2/21/68. No classification marking. The meeting
lasted from 11:08 a.m. to 12:15 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
MEETING BETWEEN U THANT AND THE PRESIDENT
U Thant reported to the President that he had met with the French Ambassador in New York, Mr. Berard./2/ He told U
Thant the French Delegation had reported to Paris. U Thant asked for a statement in writing confirming this. The note
received reported the French Delegation reports that North Vietnam considers "The appropriate time after the cessation of
the bombing as meaning a time necessary to demonstrate that the cessation is effective."

/2/Armand Brard, French Representative to the United Nations.

U Thant added that if the Republic of North Vietnam were to be officially notified of such a cessation of hostilities from the
United States, then the talks could start immediately. U Thant reported that the impression he got in his talks in New Delhi
and Paris are: They want to talk./3/
/3/French Foreign Ministry officials informed Bohlen that on January 30 the DRV had authorized its representatives in New
Delhi to discuss with U Thant the issue of Vietnam. (Telegram 9857 from Paris, February 2; National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/RAMS) On February 16 the President discussed
this upcoming meeting at a news conference, noting that "I have received a good many reports from folks who have visited
other capitals." See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 235236. One such source was the Indian Government, representatives of which had met with their North Vietnamese
counterparts both in Hanoi and in New Delhi. The Indian Government also concluded that North Vietnam was prepared to
negotiate. (Telegram 115569 to New Delhi, February 15, and telegram 117317 to USUN, February 17; both National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S; and memorandum from Rostow to
the President, February 29, 12:15 p.m.; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, March 19, 1970
Memorandum to the President--Decision to Halt the Bombing, 1968, III) The British Government also had transmitted to
Washington word of U Thant's message from Hanoi. (Message from British Ambassador Patrick Dean to Rusk, February
13, in telegram 115376 to London and Moscow, February 14; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET)
U Thant met with the Hanoi representative on the 7th, Hanoi-Peking attacked him on the Peking radio on the 11th--calling
him messenger boy of Washington, etc. Hanoi replied to him on the 13th. His interpretation was--in spite of Peking's attack
on him, Hanoi disregarded this and sent a reply. U Thant said the point he wanted to make was in spite of Peking's attack
on him, Hanoi always made it a point to answer his questions. He reported Hanoi has been saying if there is an
unconditional cessation of bombing and other things, they will talk, "but, of course, they can't be trusted. Peking we never
have trusted. Peking Radio has been broadcasting for about three years that we will solve the problem. That is Peking's
position. So in spite of Peking's position, Hanoi has come up with this formulation. So this is another instance of Hanoi's
independence of Peking. My conclusion is: Hanoi wants to be independent of Peking. Told Ambassador Stevenson also,
long ago, my impression is Hanoi is more independent of Peking than either was ever independent of Moscow."
U Thant expressed opinion we could get Hanoi on our side. Thought Hanoi could be weaned away from Peking, but would
have been much easier two years ago. He expressed view that if bombing was stopped, Hanoi would talk. In the case of
stopping the bombing, he did not consider the DMZ part of North Vietnam and it might be necessary to bomb to stop
infiltration of troops. Suggested a message be sent to Hanoi that the President would test their sincerity by stopping the
bombing an x number of days. Thought that would make them decide to talk. Test their sincerity, whether to discuss
cease-fire, or de-escalation in the South, maintenance of proposed San Antonio Formula--although they don't accept the
San Antonio Formula, at least up to now.
President asked how U Thant's suggestions differ in substance from the San Antonio Formula./4/ President said: "I
imagine what it would be, the discussions that the bombing would stop, that's one part of it. The discussions would start in
a couple of days, that would be two. Three, they could be productive in that they would be on substantive matters and not
vituperation and just harassment but they would involve the four points and our points."
/4/In a telephone conversation with Clifford on February 14, the President made the following comment on U Thant's latest
peace initiative: "Now U Thant is screwing the thing up and just as much as he can. And he's their agent almost. And he's
gone to Moscow and he didn't see anybody but some clerk. Then he dashed over and tried to put it to Wilson, and Wilson's
no good, but he did at least tell us what's happening. Now he's going to run over and try to see DeGaulle. Then they're
going to come in and demand that we stop bombing tomorrow." He later added: "He's meeting in Paris today and he's got
a new message now from North Vietnam--they've sent for him, and they're going to put the propaganda to us again. And
it's going to be one of these 'will' is changed to 'should' and 'should' is changed to 'would' and they will meet now and not in
6 months but in 10 days. And they'll do nothing. But if we stop that bombing we've just sacrificed all of our men." (Johnson
Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Clifford, February 14,
1968, 9:16 a.m., Tape F68.02, Side B, PNO 1-2; transcript prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this
volume)
U Thant said yes. The President continued by saying:
"And finally, we would assume that they would want us to stay at the table and discuss these things in an atmosphere that
would be productive so they wouldn't have a crash program or take advantage while we were talking to try to overrun us at
the DMZ, or something like that."

The President reported that he did not see much difference in what U Thant was saying and what was contained in the
San Antonio Formula.
President: "The San Antonio Formula says there will be talks--and they will speak productively on the subjects and they
don't have to agree to anything else. We assumed, we thought that if you take advantage of this, if you continue to infiltrate
and you continue to supply to your troops and you continue to wage war, we understand that. We will continue to supply
our troops. We expect that you will do that. But if you take advantage over and above by trying to have a crash program to
overrun us, while we are trying to talk to you, if you're going to take our wives and our children out there and try to burn the
house down while we are sitting here in the Cabinet Room talks, then we'll have to go out and turn the water on to keep
the house from burning. The purpose of the talks is to get somewhere and we are not wanting to take advantage by
bombing Hanoi and Haiphong and we don't want you to take advantage by increasing, etc. We can't expect you to let your
men starve or run out of ammunition or not get food or something. But we do expect you to not line your trucks up bumperto-bumper and 30,000 extra men to try to shove over while we are sitting down.
"Now it seems from what you say that there are three elements of our San Antonio Formula: One is we stop the bombing
of North Vietnam. Okay. We could do that. Second, that the talks could start promptly--that's today. Three, they could be
productive, fruitful, substantive talks. That's all that means, that they're expected to be settled. Then we say, we don't make
a condition and we don't exact a promise from you. We warn you, or we notify you, or we think frankly, candidly that if while
we were talking, a fire is started with our wife and children--. They say 'We won't take any of it--the San Antonio Formula is
out', and they hit 44 cities."
U Thant reported he felt they had changed their attitude. He reiterated he would try to test their sincerity by stopping the
bombing.
President. "My experience has always been that these other pauses--that once we pause and they use them as they did
for 37 days,/5/ then it takes days and days to get out of the pause and the folks really don't understand and then the good
sincere people want to blame us for resuming and so forth, and our men out there feel like we had been duped and we've
let them down by tying their hands while these folks come at them, hitting 44 cities at once and all that stuff."
/5/Reference is to a temporary bombing halt that lasted from December 1965 to January 1966.
U Thant reported that was a factor for the President to decide but his feeling was it was worth testing.
President reported: "Now, we yearn for peace. We want self-determination in that area. We have no desire to stay there as
a colonizer and occupier. We want to take the resources that we're spending in the war, as I said in Johns Hopkins, and
spend in economic development and that not only includes South Vietnam. It includes that area in North Vietnam, just as
we have in other areas where we have struggled to protect freedom in Europe, in Asia before, and we want to do that and
anything that gives us any hope of the sincerity of the other side in permitting the people themselves to determine what
kind of government they want, and for that reason, after Mr. Gromyko indicated to us, that if we could be specific on
leaving there--we went to Manila and pointed out that if the infiltration would cease and violence would subside, then we
could divert our attention to economic building of the area instead of destroying the area. We still feel that way, very
strongly.
"So last week the message that we got from the leader of another country who had communicated our explanations in
some detail of what we meant by 'prompt', what we meant by 'productive', what we meant by 'taking advantage of', we had
done that before last summer--in August and September--and when we announced the San Antonio Formula. Then we
repeated it again through another government and their answer there was the original position--they wouldn't accept the
San Antonio Formula just as they didn't last summer and we felt they had not budged very much, if any, from the position
they took all along, mainly, their four points./6/ But we are anxious to have peace. We do want to go halfway to meet them.
We are desirous of taking the resources we have to stop using them for destruction and try to use them for constructive
purposes."
/6/The basic DRV position for the peaceful resolution of the conflict, known as the Four Points, was stated by Dong on
April 8, 1965; see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 853-854.
The President told U Thant he welcomed and applauded his consistent attempts to try to bring us together./7/
/7/Rusk, Goldberg, Clifford, Katzenbach, Harriman, Bundy, and Sisco met with Thant and Ralphe Bunche, UN Under
Secretary-General, at 1 p.m. that day. (Memorandum of conversation, February 21; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET) U Thant's report on his contacts with the North
Vietnamese was disseminated in telegram 119559 to London, Saigon, Paris, and USUN, February 22. (Ibid.)

82. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 22, 1968, 1200Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret;
Immediate; Nodis. Received at 9:08 a.m. and passed to the White House. This telegram is printed in full in Pike, ed., The
Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 342-350.
20175. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my fortieth weekly message.
I. General
1. Since my last weekly message, there have been a number of significant developments in the situation, some favorable,
others less so. I shall try to summarize these briefly at the beginning and will endeavor to enlarge on them later in the
report:
A) The GVN has continued to press the recovery program with commendable energy. Despite frustrations, substantial
progress has been made. In the Saigon area, public services have been maintained, distribution of food has been
expanded, prices have come down (now about 20 percent higher that pre-Tet), and the problem of evacuees has been
handled effectively. The curfew has been relaxed and people are getting back to their normal occupations. In the cities and
towns throughout the country, recovery work is underway, food supplies are adequate, and efforts are being made to open
lines of communication as rapidly as possible. The counterparts of the Central Recovery Committee at corps and province
level are for the most part working effectively. Perhaps a major by-product of the effort has been that of getting Ministries
to work together, horizontally instead of vertically.
B) We have as yet no comprehensive inventory of destruction throughout the country but this is now underway. It is
obvious from preliminary reports, however, that destruction has been heavy. Evacuees will probably number from 400,000
to 450,000, of which perhaps 30-40 percent having left their homes for security reasons will be returning. Most of the
remaining will be refugees in the true sense in that their homes have been destroyed. We have no accurate count of the
number of houses destroyed nor an inventory of the damage to industry. Our latest count showed 61,000 houses
destroyed, a figure considerably higher than that of the GVN. As reported in my last week's message,/2/ industrial plants
have suffered extensive damage. It is apparent, therefore, that the repair of physical destruction caused by the Tet
offensive will involve an extensive and time consuming effort, and a substantial allocation of resources.
/2/Document 76.
C) Further elements in the enemy's strategy developed with renewed attacks on a number of cities during the night of
February 18-19 in what appears to be the second phase of the Tet offensive. These for the most part were rocket and
mortar attacks directed principally at airfields and bases. Exceptions were the cities of Phan Thiet and Song Be which the
enemy entered and from which he was thrown out with heavy losses. But what is evident is that the enemy in effect is
attempting an investment of some of the major cities. For example, troops are being moved closer to Saigon and to Can
Tho in the Delta. He is making intensive efforts to disrupt lines of communication, cutting Highway 4 from the Delta every
night. His present moves seem to confirm Thieu's view that he will continue to attempt to harass, isolate, and choke off the
cities. He remarked to me yesterday that the countryside has always been of prime importance to the VC for this reason.
D) The enemy is bringing in heavy reinforcements to the Saigon area and severe fighting has been taking place in Gia
Dinh. These reinforcements evidently have been coming from replacement camps in Cambodia. Heavy truck traffic has
been noted on the Cambodian side proceeding up to the border and heavy sampan traffic observed from the border inland
to Viet-Nam. This raises the question as to how long we can afford to permit the enemy to make use of the Laos and
Cambodian sanctuaries as freely and effectively as he has been doing for the infiltration of men and material. I recognize
that this is an extremely difficult problem having many complex and sensitive political aspects, and will therefore want to
make it the subject of another message.
E) The enemy's present moves, it seems to me, lend credence to General Westmoreland's views and those of President
Thieu on the probable future course of his strategy. As I reported last week, General Westmoreland believes that the
enemy may be preparing for a major offensive in the northern provinces, perhaps supported also in the Central Highlands,
and that he has the capability to mount such an offensive. Thieu's view, which he confirmed again in my talk with him
yesterday, is that the present offensive will be followed by a second one which may come some months from now, perhaps
around May to July: that in this he will try to pin down our troops in the North, in the Central Highlands, and in defense of

the cities; to continue mortar and rocket attacks on airfields in an effort to reduce our air potential; to continue harassment
and infiltration of the cities to carry on political "spoiling" and attempt to paralyze the government through terror attacks;
and to attempt to regain and hold as much of the countryside as possible. Thieu believes that the main enemy objective is
still the countryside, and that his purpose in its control is twofold: to choke off the flow of food and other supplies to the
cities, and to be able to demonstrate that he controls a large part of Vietnamese territory before going to negotiations.
Thieu believes, therefore, that the enemy's ultimate objective is a political settlement, and his view of timing looks toward
the end of 1968 or early 1969.
F) If these views are correct, and they seem to me quite logical, then it appears they will involve a major effort on the part
of the enemy. How long he can sustain such an intensive effort, given the losses which he has already taken and which
such an effort will inevitably entail, is problematical, especially if we have the men and material to meet and frustrate him at
every turn; I think there is no question about the will.
G) It is apparent that the pacification program has suffered a setback, though to what extent it has not been possible to
determine. Eighteen of the fifty-four ARVN battalions assigned to pacification were withdrawn for defense of the cities; so
apparently were a considerable number of the Regional and Popular Forces and some of the RD teams, though the exact
numbers are not known. The consequent impairment of security which has resulted has raised doubts in people's minds
concerning the capability of the government to provide adequate security in the countryside. On the positive side, however,
is the fact that substantial numbers of the Viet Cong forces were withdrawn from rural areas for the attacks on the cities
and that for the first time a large part of the infrastructure has surfaced and been identified. This should make possible a
more effective rooting out process.
First priorities, already underway, are to get supplies to the provinces; to get refugees into permanent camps; and to get
inspection teams out. The next priorities are to get the forces back into the countryside as soon as possible; to re-establish
security; to revive the economy; through psyops to capitalize on the Tet failure; and to attack the exposed infrastructure.
H) Popular reactions have continued to surface. Confidence in the government was at first badly shaken; but at the same
time popular opinion hardened against the VC. While the enemy instilled new fear in the city dwellers, he learned that the
masses will not voluntarily support him. In the view of many experienced observers, the crisis has generated a greater
feeling of unity and more willingness to contribute to the common cause than has ever been witnessed in this country.
There are anxieties about the "second wave" attacks, but there is also among many Vietnamese a new esprit; they feel
they have met and defeated the best the enemy had, they are proud of their army for the first time in many months, and as
Phan Quang Dan puts it, they believe that their government and their system has proved it is "viable" in the toughest kind
of situation.
2. Military situation. Since General Westmoreland has reported daily, comprehensively and in detail, developments in the
military situation, I shall only give a brief summary of the present outlook. The "second wave" of the Tet offensive is
apparently underway. It began with a coordinated series of rocket and mortar attacks throughout II, III, and IV Corps in the
early morning hours of February 18. Since then, many cities and airfields, including Saigon and Tan Son Nhut, have
suffered harassing mortar and rocket fire. Enemy forces at considerable strength are close to Saigon with the obvious
purpose of investing the city. The apparent intention of these attacks throughout the country is to tie down defense forces
and prevent them from moving back to the countryside, while at the same time continuing to maintain tension among the
urban population and impress them with VC power. The prime enemy objective, I believe, is III Corps and Saigon, although
he also poses a threat to Can Tho in the Delta, and a continuing and very serious threat in the northern part of I Corps with
four divisions in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.
3. Although we have by no means necessarily seen the whole of the enemy intention or capability for "second wave"
attacks, I am inclined to be encouraged by the slowness and apparent relative weakness of his follow-up attacks.
Obviously, it was essential from his point of view to hit the cities and the GVN again as quickly as possible. Enemy radio
broadcasts made the point that we must not be allowed to get back on our feet. In fact, it appears to me that the GVN, with
our help and prodding, has reacted to the new situation, both military and political, faster and better than has the enemy.
4. On the political-economic side, we have reported daily the government effort over the past three weeks to provide
immediate relief to the victims of the fighting, show vigorous leadership and inspire confidence by public appearances and
statements, and rally all nationalist groups to the support of the government in this crisis.
[Omitted here is discussion of additional measures undertaken by the GVN to rebuild in the aftermath of Tet.]
Bunker

83. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, February 22, 1968, 1850Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 64. Top Secret; Sensitive.
The President stayed at the LBJ Ranch February 21-28.
CAP 80484. February 22, 1968. Herewith a summary of a CIA assessment of future Communist military strategy in South
Vietnam. I will forward the full text in the next pouch./2/
/2/Not found.
Developments during the past three weeks have made it clear that the Communists now plan to put extensive and
sustained military pressure on the urban areas of South Vietnam. At a maximum, they hope to move in and control some
of the major cities; failing this, they hope to bring about a deterioration of the governmental authority in urban areas, as
well as in the countryside, that eventually would be severe enough to force a political accommodation in the war on
Communist terms.
During the last few weeks there have also been a number of indications, apart from the attacks on the cities, that additional
shifts in Communist war strategy are in process. Among these has been evidence of plans to use the limited North
Vietnamese air arm in a logistic or attack role in South Vietnam. New Communist weapons including tanks and possibly
better artillery rockets have appeared in the DMZ area. Signs pointing to heavy new troop infiltration to the south have
been noted, while the flow of supplies to the DMZ and down the Lao corridor has continued at a stepped-up pace.
Additional enemy road building has also been under way which will improve the Communists' ability to support the military
units in both the DMZ and the coastal area of the two northern provinces in South Vietnam.
The developments suggest that the enemy is trying to get in a position throughout this area which will permit him to
conduct sustained offensive operations, probably along more conventional military lines than ever before in the war.
Recently the bulk of one division of Communist troops from the DMZ area has slipped south into the coastal plains of
Quang Tri and, along with NVA elements already in the sector, will probably attempt a sustained campaign to erode and
destroy friendly control over the rural population and the cities in the area. It now appears that the Communists are going
to make a major effort to hold their positions in the city of Hue, invest or capture Quang Tri, and, if possible, gain de facto
administrative control over Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces.
Continued pressure on the allied bastion at Khe Sanh is likely in the course of the Communist effort in the North, with the
enemy seeking to tie down a substantial allied reaction force. Whether Hanoi will make an all-out effort to overrun the base
remains to be seen; there is some evidence in the shift of Communist troops to the eastward in recent days that the enemy
may be reducing his forces in the general vicinity of Khe Sanh. It is possible that he plans at present only to mount a longterm siege operation against the base.
We believe the most likely course of over-all enemy action in Vietnam during the near term will revolve around a major
effort in the north combined with selective pressure against the urban areas farther south. The pressure against the cities
will include both limited ground probes and coordinated attacks by fire. We think it likely the enemy will make a special
effort, both for political and psychological reasons, to harass and disrupt the city of Saigon.
The Communists will also be heavily engaged in trying to consolidate the gains they have made throughout the rural areas
of the country since the government's retreat to defend the cities. In particular, the Communists will attempt to revise much
that has been achieved in the pacification/RD program, and will utilize renewed access to the rural population to intensify
recruitment efforts and the collection of taxes and other forms of logistic support.

84. Editorial Note

A comprehensive analysis of the Tet offensive by the intelligence community began in February 1968. Director of Central
Intelligence Richard Helms met with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) on February 16. Helms
noted that pre-Tet intelligence was deficient in terms of predicting "the precise time of the urban attacks, their widespread
scale, and their intensity" because of the lack of penetration of the Viet Cong, inadequate dissemination and analysis
procedures, and poor performance by the South Vietnamese intelligence service. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS
Files, Job 79-207A, US-8 President Files, US-8 January 1968 to December 1968) In a February 23 letter to Helms,
Maxwell D. Taylor, PFIAB Chairman, requested that he cooperate in a study to determine "to what extent, if any, our

intelligence services and those of our allies were at fault in failing to alert our military and political leaders of the impending
large-scale attack on the cities and towns of South Vietnam." Taylor posed two questions: "Did our intelligence collection
agencies obtain all or most of the pertinent intelligence which was available in the circumstances?" and "Was the
evaluation of the available intelligence sound and did that evaluation reach the decision-makers in time to assist them in
taking appropriate action?" He requested a response by April 1. (Ibid., Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80-R01580R,
PFIAB Subject File, 285. Tet Offensive)
In a letter to Taylor on April 1, Helms noted that the U.S. intelligence agencies in Washington, the Joint Staff, the staff of
the Commander in Chief, Pacific, and the agencies in Saigon had begun the study. The report had not been completed,
however, due to "the complexity of the task, the vast amount of material to examine, the necessity to interview
commanders and intelligence officers in the field, and our desire to minimize the additional load placed on these officers."
Helms did transmit to Taylor an interim report entitled "Intelligence Warning of the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam."
Principal among the findings of the interim report was the fact that advance warnings of some of the attacks had been
given to senior officials and "as a result, a series of actions were taken in Vietnam which reduced the impact of the enemy
offensive." However, other factors to a great extent mitigated this achievement. Numerous reports described attacks on
other dates in other areas. In addition, there was a lack of awareness of the full scope of the offensive since the enemy, in
emphasizing security even over coordination, had "compartmented" his plans for attack. Despite the abundance of
intercepted messages and reports, the exact timing and the scale of the offensive had not been determined beforehand.
Not surprisingly, most of those who knew about the coming enemy attack "did not visualize the enemy as capable of
accomplishing his stated goals as they appeared in propaganda and in captured documents." Finally, the "urgency" of the
attacks felt by those on the ground in Vietnam was not immediately grasped in Washington. (Ibid.)
The final report to PFIAB evaluating the quality of U.S. intelligence before and during Tet, completed on June 7, was
received by President Johnson on June 11. The conclusions of the report were:
"a. that the intelligence at hand contributed to the decision on January 25 to cancel the Tet truce in I Corps and to General
Westmoreland's action on January 30 putting U.S. commanders on full alert throughout all of South Vietnam just prior to
the main attacks;
"b. that intelligence contributed substantially to the result that the attacks on the cities were beaten off and that no
permanent lodgements were achieved;
"c. that the intelligence bearing on the Tet offensive proved adequate in that it alerted U.S. commanders in time to permit
them to carry out their missions successfully and, therefore, there are no grounds to support the charge of a major
intelligence failure;
"d. that the finished intelligence assessments and reporting at the Washington level did not convey the same sense of
urgency of the developing military situation as those reaching decision-makers in Saigon and often arrived too late to
satisfy the demands of senior officials for prompt information."
PFIAB recommended that the "normal intelligence process" be examined for ways in which its defects could be overcome.
(Memorandum from Taylor to the President, June 7; Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, PFIAB, Vol.
2)

85. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, February 24, 1968, 1546Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 3, Tabs A-Z and AA-QQ.
Top Secret; Sensitive. Received at the LBJ Ranch on February 23 at 11:17 a.m.
CAP 80542. Herewith Bus and Westy respond to our query of yesterday/2/ with their picture of the situation.
/2/In telegram OSD 2175 to Wheeler and Westmoreland, February 23, Rostow wrote: "Roughly speaking, our appreciation
of the situation, as seen from here, runs about as follows: The enemy is preparing to strike in the Western Highlands
(Pleiku, Kontum, Dak To). He is apparently bringing major units in towards Saigon. He is, of course, positioned to attack at
both Khe Sanh and Quang Tri. He has forces around Hue and Danang; degree of readiness less certain, although major
contact northwest of Hue is reported. In the Delta, especially, but elsewhere as well, he is moving rapidly to exploit the
relative vacuum in the countryside to recruit in an effort to make up recent losses, to expand rural control, and exert

pressure on towns. The effort to close off Route 4 to deny food supplies to Saigon continues, as well as the effort to keep
Route 1 closed between Danang and Hue to limit military supplies to I Corps. Diplomatically, the enemy is establishing a
whole range of diplomatic contacts 'to explain his victories' and to keep lines open for a later negotiating offensive. We now
estimate that more than 60,000 were used in the first wave of attacks at Tet made up as follows: 37 percent North
Vietnamese units; 29 percent VC main forces; 34 percent VC local forces. CIA estimates that main force units (North
Vietnamese and VC), estimated by MACV at 115,000 in December, were higher than that at Tet. 'Over half' of main forces
are available for follow-on major attacks. There is the suggestion in intelligence that additional North Vietnamese regulars
are being brought south--perhaps two additional divisions. It may well be that the enemy is about to make a virtually total
effort with the capital he has in hand. He may then try to lock us into a negotiation at his peak position before we can
counterattack. In particular, he may try to dissipate Westy's reserves by simultaneous attacks at a number of places and
take Khe Sanh, if possible. In what way would your appreciation on the spot conform or differ from this thumb-nail
sketch?" (Ibid.)
From here the enemy situation looks like this:
I Corps--The enemy attacked Khe Sanh yesterday with a heavy attack by fire and continues to adjust his fire to increase
the effectiveness of his artillery. The threat to Quang Tri has been reduced somewhat and now consists of the 803rd
Regiment attempting to interdict the Cua Viet River, north of Quang Tri City, and the 812th Regiment attempting to cut
Route 1 south of Quang Tri City. There are at least eight equivalent combat effective battalions threatening Hoi An and
Danang. The battle at Hue involves about eight combat effective battalion equivalents and the fighting is heavy as the
enemy attempts to hang on in the city. There is extensive supply activity in A-Shau Valley, and the enemy is building a
road from the valley to join Highway 547 which runs to Hue. We have no information on what troop units are located in
A-Shau.
II Corps--The enemy is tactically deployed to conduct offensive operations in the Dak To area. He is capable of conducting
ground attacks with seven battalions of the 1st NVA Division supported by elements of the 40th Artillery Regiment.
Available evidence indicates that these attacks can be initiated at any time. In Kontum City, the relocation of major units
coupled with evidence of detailed planning indicates an offensive action against the city with as much as three infantry and
two sapper battalions at any time. In Pleiku City, the enemy does not pose an immediate major threat at this time. He is
however, capable of attacks by fire and harassment type activity.
III Corps--The three regiments of the 9th VC Division remain in the northern and western Gia Dinh Province. Elements of
the 101st NVA Division have been identified north of Saigon, and a PW from the 141st NVA Regiment, captured in
southern Binh Duong stated his battalion was following two others to Gia Dinh. Airborne direction finding located a terminal
serving the 2nd Battalion, 274th VC Regiment on 23 February in eastern Gia Dinh. Thus, elements of three divisions
threaten Saigon, although some of them have been hit hard in the past weeks.
IV Corps--The enemy is currently attempting to capitalize on the fact that ARVN forces in the Delta have been forced to
concentrate upon the defense of urban centers throughout the area. While keeping his maneuver units within striking
distance of the major cities and lines of communication, his efforts in the rural areas have centered around recruitment and
anti-GVN/US propaganda. It is not clear, however, that he is moving rapidly to exploit the situation in the countryside
throughout the corps. During recent weeks the enemy has been able to successfully interdict Highway 4 throughout the
Delta. Road blocks, cratering, and harassing attacks have been used to bring traffic on this major thoroughfare to a near
standstill. We doubt the enemy believes that this will cut off food supply to Saigon.
Strength--About 60,000 enemy combat and combat support troops were committed in the first two days of the Tet
offensive. Up to 25 percent more were committed from the guerrillas, administrative services and political infrastructure. Of
the total, about 30 percent were NVA troops. In the three weeks since that time the enemy has committed additional forces
(five to seven battalions in I Corps, four battalions in II Corps, five to nine battalions in III Corps, and none in IV Corps).
Main force strength at the beginning of the offensive was about 133,000 due to the arrival of the 304th and 320th Divisions.
About half of enemy's main force strength probably remains uncommitted, the most significant intact elements being those
at Khe Sanh, the DMZ, the Highlands, and four NVA regiments (2nd Division and 31st Regiment) in the Danang-Hoi An
area.
Reinforcement--Although a few PW's have stated that the 308th and 30th Divisions are in the DMZ, there is no credible
intelligence held by MACV indicating that additional divisions are in or near South Vietnam or enroute thereto. The NVA
divisions located in NVN have not exhibited any unusual communications patterns which would indicate southward
deployment, although the 308th Division is not currently isolated in SIGINT.
Summary--We agree with you that the enemy can conduct simultaneous large scale attacks against Khe Sanh, Hue,
Danang, Dak To, and Saigon. He will no doubt attack other towns and cities at the same time. With due consideration for

the location and strength of the enemy threat COMUSMACV has deployed his forces to be in the best posture to counter
these simultaneous attacks throughout the country.
While we are prepared to defend against multiple attacks, there is some evidence that the enemy may delay for weeks,
even months before initiating his next offensive. In the interim he will attempt to invest the cities and towns, attriting the Air
Force of the Republic of Vietnam and weakening the will of the civilians and their loyalty to the GVN. To capitalize on any
such delay, together with RVNAF we are proceeding with operations designed to destroy the enemy or to push him away
from the towns, while moving to reopen lines of communication and reassert friendly presence in the countryside.

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968

Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 86-94

86. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Board of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency (Smith) to
Director of Central Intelligence Helms/1/
Washington, February 26, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 3, Tabs RR-ZZ and a-d.
Secret. Prepared by the CIA's Office of National Estimates. In an attached covering memorandum transmitting a copy of
this CIA memorandum to the President, February 27, Rostow wrote: "I have marked the key passages in this CIA
document on the outlook in Vietnam. So far as the decisions before you are concerned, paragraphs 11 and 13, sidelined in
red (pp. 5-6), are critical. Whether 'the U.S. and ARVN regain the initiative' is really what your decision in the days ahead is
about." This memorandum was part of the backup material considered by the Clifford Task Force. See Document 100.
SUBJECT
The Outlook in Vietnam
1. This Memorandum does not seek to explore all aspects of the situation in Vietnam, or its probable development over a
long term. It is addressed only to the specific question put to us, i.e., whether developments in Vietnam are apt to involve a
continuation of combat into the indefinite future at a level comparable or higher than current levels, or whether it is more
probable that either the VC or the GVN will be unable to sustain such a level beyond a few months.
2. The current phase of combat will have a critical bearing on the further course of the war and may even prove to be
decisive. We cannot be sure how long this phase will last, but it seems likely that by early summer the immediate results
and the longer term implications will be fairly clear to Hanoi, Saigon, and Washington. At present, the key questions
concern: (1) the capabilities of the Communist forces to sustain their current challenge, and whether they can continue the
fighting thereafter, and (2) the capabilities of the South Vietnamese political and military establishment to cope with the
tasks imposed by the present Communist offensive.
Communist Plans and Prospects
3. Hanoi's aims in the present offensive phase are: to register significant military successes against US and especially
ARVN forces, and to inflict such heavy losses, physical destruction and disorganization on the GVN as to produce a total
situation favorable to a negotiated settlement on Communist terms. The Communists are not likely to have a rigid
timetable, but they probably hope to achieve decisive results during the course of the summer. The high importance which
Hanoi now attaches to forcing the issue is evident from the risks and costs of the enterprise.
4. The toll on Communist forces has been considerable, even if reported casualties are greatly inflated by inclusion of low
level recruits and impressed civilians. To some extent these losses have been offset by measures already taken. Heavy
infiltration of both new units and replacements from the North is continuing. A strenuous, last minute recruitment effort was
made prior to the Tet attacks. A significant part of the guerrilla and main forces could still be committed. And, at present,
the Communists enjoy fuller access to the rural areas, where they are recruiting heavily. They will probably be able to
recoup their recent losses, though at some sacrifice in quality.
5. In any case, the Communists probably will maintain their offensive for the next several months and be prepared to
accept the high losses this entails. They cannot accept such losses indefinitely, however, and they probably will not be
capable again of launching repeated mass attacks of the magnitude and widespread scale of 30-31 January. But they are
almost certainly capable of sustaining a high level of combat, including major battles with US forces, assaults on selected
cities, and rocket and mortar attacks on urban areas and military installations.
6. It is possible that the Communists regard the present campaign as so critical to the outcome of the war that they will
commit their full resources to a maximum effort in the near term. On balance, however, we think it likely that even if their
present push falls short they will wish to be able to sustain a protracted struggle. Hence they will probably not exercise
their capabilities in such a profligate manner as to deny themselves the possibility of continuing the struggle should the
present phase fail to produce a decisive result./2/
/2/In a February 27 memorandum entitled "Hanoi's Appraisal of Its Strategic Position Prior to the Current Offensive," the
CIA used a captured North Vietnamese assessment of September 1, 1967, to show the rationale behind the DRV's belief
that it was favored increasingly in the strategic balance while the U.S.-GVN's military position was always in decline. As a

result, the memorandum concluded that the North Vietnamese would continue to press the offensive begun at Tet "even at
the cost of serious setbacks." (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80-R01580R, 285. Tet
Offensive)
GVN/ARVN Prospects
7. The will and capability of the GVN and its armed forces remain the keys to the eventual outcome.
8. In the main, the ARVN has acquitted itself fairly well since 30 January, though the record is uneven. Morale has held up
on the whole, and we know of no unit defections. However, the ARVN is showing signs of fatigue and in many areas it has
now lapsed into a static defensive posture. Security in the countryside has been sharply reduced. A long and costly effort
would have to be undertaken to regain the pre-Tet position. It is highly unlikely that the ARVN will be inspired enough or
strong enough to make such an effort--certainly not in the near future.
9. The GVN also performed adequately in the immediate emergency, particularly in the Saigon area. There now appears to
be a greater recognition of the need to push forward with additional measures, but the Communist challenge has not yet
proved a catalyst in stimulating an urgent sense of national unity and purpose.
10. The overall position of the government has been weakened. Its prestige has suffered from the shock of the Tet
offensive; its control over the countryside has been greatly reduced. Popular attitudes are confused and contradictory; the
Viet Cong received virtually no popular support, but neither was there a rallying to the government side. Passivity is likely
to continue as the dominant attitude in most of the population, but further military defeats could cause a sudden swing
away from the government. While the central authority in Saigon is unlikely to collapse, its ability to provide energetic
leadership throughout the country and all levels is in serious doubt. It is possible that over the next few months certain
provinces, especially in I and IV Corps, will be lost to Saigon's effective authority.
11. The psychological factor is now critical for South Vietnam's whole political-military apparatus. The widespread rumors
that the US conspired with the Communists are symptomatic of popular anxieties over the future course of the war and US
attitudes toward a political settlement. As yet, however, there are no signs of a crisis of confidence within the government.
12. If major military reverses occur, the political and military apparatus could degenerate into general ineffectualness. If, on
the other hand, US and ARVN regain the initiative and inflict some conspicuous setbacks on the Communists and the
general offensive appears to be contained, then the GVN might manifest new energy and confidence and draw new
support to itself. On balance, we judge that the chances are no better than even that the GVN/ARVN will emerge from the
present phase without being still further weakened.
Alternative Outcomes of Present Phase
13. We believe that the Communists will sustain a high level of military activity for at least the next two or three months. It
is difficult to forecast the situation which will then obtain, given the number of unknowable factors which will figure. Our
best estimate is as follows:
a. The least likely outcome of the present phase is that the Communist side will expend its resources to such an extent as
to be incapable thereafter of preventing steady advances by the US/GVN.
b. Also unlikely, though considerably less so, is that the GVN/ARVN will be so critically weakened that it can play no further
significant part in the military and political prosecution of the struggle.
c. More likely than either of the above is that the present push will be generally contained, but with severe losses to both
the GVN and Communist forces, and that a period will set in during which neither will be capable of registering decisive
gains.
For the Board of National Estimates:
Abbot Smith
Chairman

87. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy/1/

Washington, February 27, 1968, 0332Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/KILLY. Secret;
Nodis; Killy. Drafted by Harriman and Heywood Isham (EA/VN); cleared by Bundy, Katzenbach, and George Kelly (S/S);
and approved by Rusk and Harriman. Repeated to the White House. Beginning in January 1967, Italian Ambassador to
South Vietnam Giovanni D'Orlandi and North Vietnamese Ambassador to Czechoslovakia Phan Van Su met intermittently
at Prague. Following these exchanges, which lasted through January 1968, Su came to Rome and met with Italian Foreign
Minister Amintore Fanfani on February 5 and 6. According to Fanfani, Su suggested the possibility of the DRV opening
contacts after a cessation of bombing. Su rejected reciprocity but noted that his government might take certain "favorable
meas-ures" as talks progressed. On February 7 Italian Ambassador to the United States Egidio Ortona read to Rusk a
telegram from his government summarizing the contacts and emphasizing the step forward made by Hanoi. A story about
these contacts appeared in the Italian press on February 12. (Memorandum from Bundy to Rusk, February 12, and
attached translated note from Ortona to Rusk, February 7; ibid., EA Files: Lot 71 D 461, Killy--DD's Background, and
memorandum of conversation between Fanfani and Su, February 5; ibid., Killy (extra copies and drafts))
120937. Ref: Rome 4418, 4419, 4422, 4429, 4440, 4441./2/ From Harriman for Davidson.
/2/In telegrams 4418, 4419, and 4422 from Rome, all February 23, and 4440 from Rome, February 26, Davidson reported
on his February 22 discussion with Fanfani and D'Orlandi concerning statements made by Su during his meetings with
Fanfani. A summary of the Killy contacts appears in telegram 4429 from Rome, February 24. In telegram 4441 from Rome,
February 26, Davidson recommended in favor of a trip to Prague by D'Orlandi, during which D'Orlandi could "try to obtain
an agreement on requirements of no advantage" and to get a firm statement from Su on the number of days between a
bombing halt to the opening of negotiations. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69,
POL 27-14 VIET/KILLY)
1. The full reports of your conversations with Fanfani and d'Orlandi have been most useful in evaluating this North
Vietnamese approach. On the basis of what the Italians have told you about the substance and background of these
conversations, and particularly in the light of the serious attitude the Italians have taken, we agree that we should give a
constructive response to the proposal that d'Orlandi make another visit to Prague as suggested by Ambassador Su. We
certainly do not wish to give the Italians the impression we are being negative on following up any possible opening; and,
in any event, it would be useful to obtain further insight on just how seriously the North Vietnamese really do view the
Italian channel (we have doubts on this score).
2. However, under existing circumstances it would be unwise to suggest any new formulations (as you propose para 4
Rome 4419)/3/ which might give Hanoi the idea that we were weakening on the San Antonio position.
/3/In this paragraph, Davidson reported that he had suggested to Fanfani and D'Orlandi that the DRV could get around the
problem of openly accepting the San Antonio formula "if Hanoi stated that it recognized that during a period when the U.S.
was not bombing and while talks were continuing that such acts as attacks on U.S. positions in the area of the DMZ,
massive terror against the cities such as the Tet campaign or increased infiltration, would show bad faith on its part and
that it, of course, would never do anything that smacked of bad faith."
3. In view of the above, it would seem well to keep the Italian channel open for possible future use rather than to pursue it
actively at the present time.
4. You should therefore convey the following to Fanfani and d'Orlandi:
(a) Express our great appreciation for their (particularly Fanfani's) efforts and attention they have given to these problems,
as well as for the information and background that Fanfani's conversations with North Vietnamese representatives have
developed. Secretary Rusk is personally most grateful for Fanfani's interest and effort in this matter.
(b) You should explain to Fanfani that Hanoi has made a number of different approaches to other interested governments
since the Tet offensive although they are of more recent date and none of these has been as skillfully and knowledgeably
handled as that made through Fanfani. However, it appears to us that Hanoi is undertaking a combined diplomatic and
propaganda offensive rather than showing a serious intention to negotiate in good faith at the moment. It would be useful
for the Italians to try to discover whether the North Vietnamese look upon contacts with the Italians as expressing a serious
negotiating position or as part of a rather widespread exercise to impress a variety of governments.
(c) As you suggest in Reftel 4441, it appears useful for d'Orlandi to visit Prague in order to tell Su:

1) His statements have been communicated to the US and after careful analysis did not seem to US Government to be any
more forthcoming than public statements of Hanoi. If Hanoi has any intention of conveying anything new, Su should be
requested to point it out.
2) D'Orlandi might on his own responsibility explore with Su anything that Su could suggest which would be more definite
on timing and particularly any statements Hanoi would be willing to make as to their intentions relating to the military
problem of "no advantage." D'Orlandi may draw on explanations you have provided him as to meaning of San Antonio
formula./4/ FYI We have been informed by French and through U Thant on information he received from French that
negotiations would start immediately if we announced publicly unconditional cessation of bombing and other acts of war
against NVN./5/ Therefore there is no value in making an issue of this point through Su. End FYI.
/4/Telegram 4590 from Rome, March 4, reported on D'Orlandi's March 1 meeting in Prague with Su. According to
D'Orlandi, Su came close to confirming the San Antonio formula by reportedly implying that the North Vietnamese would
not launch or continue offensive operations in South Vietnam if the bombing had ceased and talks had begun. (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/KILLY) Lodge reported that he was
told by D'Orlandi that the North Vietnamese were prepared to agree that "they would not take advantage of a U.S.
bombing pause to improve their military position." (Telegram 134985 to Rome, March 22; ibid.) An analysis of Killy is in a
memorandum from Hughes to Rusk, March 22. (Ibid.)
/5/Goldberg reported this information received from U Thant in telegram 3886 from USUN, February 22. (Ibid.)
3) In addition, d'Orlandi might wish to point out to Su that since Hanoi had rejected San Antonio formula, Americans had
asked number of questions. For example, does this mean that Hanoi feels free to move men and supplies to the South as
they did during the Tet truce last year? Would Hanoi feel free to move troops to the DMZ area in positions to attack US
forces south of the DMZ? Would Hanoi consider it has the right to intensify artillery and other fire across the DMZ into US
positions in South Viet-Nam?
5. If the Italians express disappointment at the lack of detail in this message, please tell them that we are understandably
cautious because of the major military operations now in progress or being planned by North Viet-Nam in the DMZ and the
Laos Panhandle. We cannot ignore Hanoi's actions on the ground in interpreting what Hanoi's intentions may be.
6. We agree Davidson should remain in Rome to debrief d'Orlandi immediately following his return (Rome 4421)./6/
/6/Dated February 23. (Ibid.)
Rusk

88. Memorandum From the Ambassador's Special Assistant (Lansdale) to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker)/1/
Saigon, February 27, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 8 E (1), 7/67-3/68, Lansdale Memos to Rostow.
Secret. In an attached covering memorandum transmitting this memorandum to Rostow, February 29, Lansdale wrote:
"Ellsworth Bunker asked each of us in the Mission Council to assess the period of the Tet offensive for him. Since he
undoubtedly will want to compile a balanced account, based on the wide variety of assessments he gets, I don't want to
prejudice his report in Washington. Thus, I enclose my personal assessment on an 'eyes only' basis to give you a personal
insight into how this all looked to my little group, with the reminder that others will be broadening the view." A MACV
analysis of the Tet offensive and recommendations for action are in an untitled report dated March 15. (Ibid., William C.
Westmoreland Papers, #30 History File, 1-31 Mar 68 [1])
SUBJECT
Evaluation of Tet Offensive
As desired by you, the Senior Liaison Office submits herein its spot evaluation of the enemy's Tet offensive. It contains
both my personal opinion and also the opinions of the members of my staff (David Hudson, Calvin Mehlert and Charles
Sweet). It's our first total attempt at sorting out and considering the lump sum of what we've seen in the Saigon-Cholon
area, what we've read in reports, and what we've heard from a wide variety of Vietnamese and other contacts. Here, then,
is our evaluation:

In Brief
The enemy adopted the meanest attribute of the "Year of the Monkey," that of vicious trickery, to change the nature of the
war in Viet Nam at the start of the lunar year. It will mark how the war is waged from now on. The high cost of the enemy
was not vital to him. It could be made vital, if there were retribution from an aroused Vietnamese population who were led
with more spark and spunk than the present Neville Chamberlain style of Vietnamese leadership. As it is, the enemy has
the initiative in this war a month after Tet. Today, too many Vietnamese civilians and soldiers have a sinking feeling in their
guts that the enemy is going to outwit us with this initiative. It will take some tough political and psychological judo on top of
military muscle to throw down the enemy. There are initial thoughts about this at the end of the paper.
Pre-Tet
As a starting point, it would be useful to keep in mind the look of things in the enemy's "target area" before the attack. The
enemy's immediate target was urban/suburban South Viet Nam, where the bulk of the people supporting the GVN live. On
the eve of Tet, this target area presented a picture with many encouraging overtones. Although it also had less pleasing
undertones, such as the threat of a full-scale invasion from the North and the debilitating effect of official GVN corruption,
these had been identified as problems and pertinent solutions were being tackled.
There was a fledgling Constitutional Government, elected by the people, learning to behave as an administrativeexecutive-legislative team; it had plans for progress and reform after Tet. There were more than a million and a quarter
men under arms, including some 700,000 Vietnamese backed up by U.S. and Allied forces; RVNAF in many places had
pushed out actively into the countryside after the smaller enemy, killing him at a high ratio, fighting him further and further
away from cities and towns. There was an energetic, nation-wide "pacification" campaign to win back the countryside, with
a heavy infusion of U.S. managerial techniques and with Americans to oversee the use of these techniques at every
Vietnamese echelon. There was a stirring among the Vietnamese political elements towards the broadening of alliances,
towards getting better roots among the people, as moves towards the founding of new political parties. The people of the
population centers had a new feeling of more security; there was more safety from the terror of the enemy and there was
more money to buy food and gifts for the family celebrations of Tet.
At Tet
The enemy moved into this target area at Tet, with effective new military weapons, with a hard core of dedicated fighting
men who evidently had top generals and political cadre amongst them to share in the dangers, and with a beguiling
exposition of political aims. The symbols of moral and political/administrative strength on our side were singled out for
denigration or destruction. Thus, the U.S. Embassy, the Presidential Palace, the JGS compound, the Hue Citadel, most
provincial headquarters, and police stations were attacked with great vigor; churches, temples, and pagodas were
occupied; leaders among the people were sought out for quick murder or kidnapping. Enemy troops fought hard, notably
so. Enemy troops behaved as good comrades towards the people, again notably so. Their new weapons were effective
against our armor, once again notably so. With all of this, there was attractive political talk of the war soon ending, of the
Americans making a deal and leaving Viet Nam to the Vietnamese, of the forming of a new government by the people.
The enemy who came into the cities and fought openly has been crushed militarily, with great loss of life to him, to our
military, and to civilians, along with much destruction of public and private property. The physical wounds of the enemy's
Tet offensive are being healed through a relief and recovery program which could ease the memory of them to a large
extent within this year. The psychological wounds of the enemy's Tet offensive are different, deeper, more dangerous. If
too little is done too late, the psychological wounds can fester and be fatal for us. The Tet offensive demonstrated that the
enemy is still waging "people's war." He got in among the majority of the people on our side this time. Although he failed in
his proclaimed objective of getting the people to rise up against the GVN and the Americans, the enemy has shaken the
faith of the people in the ultimate success of our side. An enemy as skilled as this one in the manipulation of mass opinions
can be expected to keep up the attack at a point he can recognize as being vulnerable.
One psychological fuse was lit during Tet that might bring a delayed explosion. It deserves attention. Both Vietnamese and
American combat forces fought the enemy right out in plain view of hundreds of thousands of articulate city dwellers, the
"home folks," instead of far off in the remote countryside or jungle. The Vietnamese home folks not only saw the brutal face
of war up close, they also saw RVNAF in a harsh comparison with both Americans and the enemy. The comparison could
become invidious, since RVNAF did not always show up well. From some of the emotional outbursts of civilian and military
"young Turks" since then, it can be deduced that there is some feeling of shame among them. If reaction to this shame or
"loss of face" is improperly channeled, it could turn into a virulent type of anti-Americanism as people acknowledge the
obvious fact that the country would have been lost to the enemy if it weren't for American actions. The "young Turks" must
be given a good way of "gaining face" again, fast.
Enemy Objectives

When attempting to assess results of the enemy Tet offensive, we should ask what objectives the Communist leaders
sought to attain. They told their combatants that people in urban areas would rise up against the government, that ARVN
units would defect, and that "revolutionary" committees would be able to take over the administration in many cities. They
also told their shock forces that reinforcements would arrive after the first period of battle.
The people and ARVN failed to respond to the Communist appeal, reinforcements failed to appear, and the cities remain
under GVN control. Furthermore, the enemy took serious losses. On the surface, it would appear the Communists failed
and that, on balance, their offensive resulted in a stronger position for the GVN.
However, it is likely that the Communists, while hoping to attain the larger goals, knew that the chance for success was
uncertain, and had other, longer-range, goals in mind, such as:
--striking fear into the hearts of the urban population by demonstrating the inability of the government to provide adequate
security.
--terrorizing and demoralizing government civil and military personnel, and their families, the bulk of whom live in urban
areas.
--exacerbating existing tensions among top GVN leaders by confronting them with a major crisis, which caused them to
view one another in frustration, anxiety, and fear.
--straining American/Vietnamese relations for the same reasons as above, and for others, i.e., seeking to portray the
images that U.S. firepower destroyed the Vietnamese cities; that Americans in Viet Nam still live affluently while their
Vietnamese allies are without homes, food, etc.
--increasing pressure on the U.S. at home and abroad to withdraw, by seeking to demonstrate the hopelessness of victory
and the immorality of our cause (for example, the image of U.S. firepower destroying friendly Vietnamese cities).
--forcing the government to abandon its efforts to expand its areas of authority in the countryside (i.e., the RD program) by
compelling it to concentrate on urban defense and recovery; or, alternatively, forcing the government to spread its
resources so thinly that it is unable to do anything effective anywhere.
Enemy Gains
The urban population, at least in Saigon-Cholon, is still somewhat fearful, unsure of the ability of the GVN to face repeated
armed challenges in the cities. (For example, on the night of February 24, more than three weeks after the opening of the
Tet offensive, VC were reported calling at the homes of people on Ly Nam De Street, District 5, asking for food. The
people had no alternative but to provide food since there was no police protection on the streets after dark. Many people in
Cholon believe stories that the VC have been cutting off the hands of persons who work for Americans.)
The excessive burden of the demands created by the offensive has further weakened the GVN executive branch which
was already plagued by diffusion of power and internal political conflicts. The full powers required for handling the
emergency were not invested in the Central Relief Committee nor were they effectively assumed by the President, causing
considerable tension within the GVN as a result of its inability to act decisively in a critical period.
Destruction resulting from U.S./GVN bombing and artillery firepower has created some deep resentment against the U.S.
and Vietnamese governments, particularly in the refugee camps where Viet Cong agitators are at work. Viet Cong
atrocities have created mostly fear but not wide-spread antagonism, except in families which suffered personal losses. Viet
Cong propaganda still seems to have more credibility with the people, on this point, than does the information campaign on
our side. This can still be reversed, but time is running out.
The Viet Cong have sown the seeds of suspicion and distrust. The rumor of U.S./Viet Cong collusion in the attack is still
alive, still talked about among the people. The allegations of Communist infiltration into private organizations, and
collaboration by certain individuals with the Viet Cong, have also generated suspicions and have led the government to be
overly cautious and at times suppressive in their dealings with private individuals and associations. (The arrest of CVT
labor leaders at the moment they were generating an anti-Communist drive hurt our side, helped the enemy cause.)
Public criticism of U.S. policy in Viet Nam has intensified in the U.S. and elsewhere abroad.
GVN resources have necessarily been spread more thinly. In many areas of the countryside, RD teams and RVNAF units

have been drawn back into more urban locations, inviting VC takeover of areas formerly under GVN control.
GVN Response
The government's response, beyond defending and restoring security in the urban areas, centered on the formation of the
People's Relief Committee headed by Vice President Ky. This Committee performed commendably in coordinating and
expediting the emergency welfare relief measures of the involved GVN and U.S. agencies, including such action as:
a. the re-supplying of Saigon and the shipping of emergency relief goods to the provinces;
b. the distribution of rice and food to the refugees and public and the re-opening of rice retail shops with strict government
price controls;
c. the protection and repair of public utilities, allowing services to continue throughout the emergency;
d. the resettling and registering of the 150,000 Saigon refugees;
e. the intensification of the government's psychological operation by giving each refugee camp a radio and television,
improving the news coverage on radio, and assisting 15 daily newspapers to begin publication;
f. the soliciting of funds, supplies, blood and labor from Vietnamese private organizations and individuals and third
countries;
g. the gradual lifting of restrictions and extension of the blue (secure) areas in Saigon;
h. the collection and burning of garbage; and
i. the deployment of inspection teams to the provinces and establishment of a system for culling all pertinent data for
Saigon and provinces.
Additionally, the imaginative action of assigning 2,500 RD cadre from Vung Tau to work in Saigon, the noteworthy
performances of the Ministry of Health and the City Sanitation and Fire Departments throughout the entire emergency; and
the visits of GVN officials to stricken areas brought definite political/psychological gains to the government.
Both Houses in the National Assembly became actively engaged in the relief effort. Initially, each House sent
representatives to attend the meetings of the Central Relief Committee. Senators and Lower House Deputies also
inspected refugee camps and damaged areas in Saigon and the provinces; Lower House Deputies unable to return to
Saigon assisted the provincial officials in the initial relief efforts. Both Houses have issued communiques supporting the
government's emergency relief efforts and have requested assistance for the victims from national legislatures of other
countries.
Despite these positive actions, the GVN so far has been unable to capitalize on the opportunity the Tet offensive presented
and emerge in a stronger position. Perhaps the principal reason for this is the excessive diffusion of executive and political
power which is largely the result of the continuing rivalry between the Thieu and Ky camps. As a result, there has been no
clear central point of executive and political leadership during the emergency. Because of this key executive decisions
have been delayed or not made, particularly those involving joint civil/military considerations (for example, the curfew), and
a trend has developed toward creation of two rival political Fronts.
Popular Response
The enemy's biggest "calculated risk" in the Tet offensive was on how the people in the GVN centers would respond to
him. True, the enemy asked for public uprising against the GVN and the Americans, which he failed to create. This was a
tactical loss to him. The enemy's strategy still will aim for creating an eventual surge of popular support for his cause
against ours in the urban/suburban population centers of Viet Nam. The enemy undoubtedly has this aspect of his Tet
offensive under intense study right now.
The Communists must make sure that the people's reactions to their Tet violence do not crystallize into a purposeful
hatred directed in an effective way against them. The enemy made this mistake against the Catholics and the Hoa Hao
years ago. He risked doing it again with other large groups of Vietnamese, by his Tet attack. However, he seems to be

getting away with it, although the final psychological effects are still not firm. The emotional flag-raising at the recaptured
Citadel in Hue, witnessed by so many thousands of teary-eyed residents, may well spark the nation-wide tide against him
that the enemy fears. However, there was no similar polarizing event in which the people could participate in Saigon or
other centers. The Hue ceremony could remain an isolated incident instead of becoming the focal rallying point (such as
"Remember the Alamo," "Remember the Maine," "Remember Pearl Harbor").
The initial response of the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh population to the Tet offensive was disbelief--some even thought a
coup was in process. As the critical nature of the situation became clear, concern for personal safety prevailed. The people
soon started to wonder why their government could not protect them; stories of American and Viet Cong collusion in the
offensive were widely spread and believed. As fear grew, there was a reluctance on the part of refugees and even
volunteers from private associations to become too closely associated with the government although this feeling has now
been reduced. On balance, although the people have appreciated the government's efforts to help them, there has also
been a tendency out of fear for the urban population to assume a more moral neutral stance.
Political personalities, ARVN officers, civil servants, Northern Catholics, and other strongly anti-Communist groups also
reacted initially with fear, for they would lose the most in a Viet Cong takeover; also, for the first time, the war was brought
to their doorsteps. As the shock wore off, however, many of the elements came to believe that this may be the last
opportunity for "all nationalists to unite and save the nation."
At the moment, many of the people in the capital--and possibly the same is true elsewhere--feel isolated into just their own
family groups. Each family is an "island," separated apart from neighbors, the community, the government. In case of
another enemy attack, individuals will feel highly vulnerable, their main recourse to comfort or safety being only within the
immediate family. Much of this has been caused by the attitude and behavior of the police. Although the securing of
Saigon-Cholon owes a big debt to the energy and resourcefulness of General Loan, he also portrayed the image of an
emotionally unstable, suspicious, vindictive, and willful person. This image has rubbed off on the forces he commands,
further tarnishing their reputation for corrupt venality and saving their own hides in time of trouble. Unless this image is
changed, unless there is created some bond of trust and understanding between police and people, we will be leaving a
grievous chink in our armor for the enemy to exploit.
Challenge--Our Thoughts
The enemy's Tet offensive demonstrated once again the ability of Communist leaders to make a hard strategic decision,
marshal their resources in an extremely disciplined way, and deal us a hard blow. At present our strategy is less clear and
our resources are not being used in as concerted and disciplined a fashion as the enemy's at least in the political sphere.
If we are to achieve our goal of having a strong, popularly-supported constitutional government and armed forces in South
Viet Nam, we must make some hard political decisions now and carry them out with teamwork, skill and discipline of our
own.
Specifically, I believe we must do the following:
(1) Help Nguyen van Thieu rapidly become a strong President, under the Constitution. This action has two closely-related
facets: helping him develop his own capabilities as the elected leader of his country; and helping him acquire full powers
delegated to the President under the Constitution. At present, he has far too little authority over the key elements of the
executive branch, i.e., the cabinet, province chiefs, the police and the armed forces. Rapid emergence of Thieu as a strong
President with full authority is the first, and absolutely essential step, toward creation of a GVN that works, that can really
get things done, which is not the case today. Under a strong President, firm chains of command could be established in
both the civil service and armed forces. Until this is achieved, however, the GVN can only muddle along in seeking to carry
out critical programs, since the governmental mechanism for effective execution does not exist. We can no longer tolerate
a two-headed, Siamese-twin central government with four separate "governments" between it and the people. Thieu and
Ky, and their entourages, for many reasons, can never really work together to the extent required, and we should not
delude ourselves that they can.
(2) To assist Thieu, as discussed above, far more concerted U.S. political action is needed. As an immediate step, a small
political working group should be established under your personal direction, composed of Arch Calhoun, Lew Lapham, a
personal representative of General Westmoreland (such as Colonel John Hayes), General Forsythe and myself.
(3) While helping Thieu consolidate presidential power under the Constitution, other critical actions should be taken to
create a political base which would complement and reinforce establishment of a strong executive/administrative base.
Immediate actions to create a political base include:

a. Real enforcement of the order recently issued by General Cao van Vien that looting by RVNAF personnel will result in
summary court-martial, and execution, if warranted. This order should include, if it does not already, squarely placing
responsibility for troop conduct on unit commanders. Another general order should be issued, and backed up, stating that
every officer and soldier has two duties of equal importance--to destroy the enemy, and to defend and help the people-and that any misconduct toward the people will result in severe punishment. (This is a critical political action because the
armed forces, along with the police and RD cadre, remain the principal link between the government and the people.)
b. Acts of political leadership, starting with Thieu, but also by all nationalist leaders, within and without the government,
which will create out of the emotions aroused by the Tet offensive, a new spirit of unity, sacrifice, pride and hope among
Vietnamese nationalists. Full support by Thieu for the "People's Congress," as a single, united popular Front for
emergency purposes, is one such leadership act critically needed now.
c. Create psychological polarity to focus the people's emotions against the enemy as a beast who must be stopped. This
can be done through a concerted campaign built around the battle-cry of "Remember Hue!". This requires a continuing
revelation of information about what the enemy did to unarmed civilians and to cherished national heritages in Hue,
through media that will spread these stories to the widest extent possible, over and over again. One such medium is the
Vietnamese ballad; a song is needed, to be sung throughout the country, carried there by VIS, RD cadre, and student
choral groups. "Remember Hue!" can be the theme of an address to the nation by President Thieu, of manifestos and
speeches by patriots in the new "Fronts." "Remember Hue!" can be included in general orders of RVNAF, used by troops
in counter-offensive operations. "Remember Hue!" can be imprinted with postal cancellation marks on all mail in Viet Nam.
We must beat the Communists to the punch, before they use "Remember Hue!" first.
d. Help put a stop to indiscriminate expressions of Sinophobia among the Vietnamese in urban centers, particularly
Saigon-Cholon. You and the rest of us in the U.S. Mission can make a point of this when talking with Vietnamese leaders.
President Thieu can be urged to meet with responsible and respected leaders of the Chinese-ancestry "congregations" in
Cholon, to learn what has happened to them and what they have contributed to our common cause, to get a fix on enemy
activities among those of Chinese blood, and to exchange pledges of mutual teamwork in the face of national peril. Viet
Nam Press can do a feature news item on the favorable actions by the Sino-Vietnamese of Cholon; there have been
heroic acts, heavy donations of money, goods, and services in this crisis. We in the U.S. Mission could see that this item is
picked up by the world press, that it becomes known to police and other GVN officials where we have an advisory effort.
This would give fresh heart to those in Viet Nam's most crucial commercial circles, to get the nation's economy moving
again.
e. Devise a feasible means of mobilizing the entire Vietnamese people into the war effort, in an organized way that will
make good sense to them and gain their willing support. While this is especially needed by "young Turk" civilians and
soldiers to channelize their energies and emotions into constructive channels, many others in the population are in need of
having a practical, known way in which they can help against the enemy. The mobilization means and the duties assigned
(which include self-defense) have a highly political import. GVN organizations, such as the Ministries of Interior, Youth, and
RD, and the newly-formed "Fronts" have concepts on mobilizing the people against the enemy. The U.S. Mission needs to
crystallize its own policy on this matter, to gain maximum effect of U.S. support. It is urged that this subject be given early
study by the small, political working group described above.

89. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, February 27, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, March 19, 1970 memo to the President on the
Decision to Halt the Bombing, 1967, 1968 [I]. No classification marking. The notes are handwritten by McPherson.
[PARTICIPANTS]
Rusk, McNamara, Clifford, Katzenbach, Bundy, Rostow, Califano and McPherson
McN: Westmoreland wants
105,000 by 1 May
100,000 in two increments: part by 1 Sept, part by 31 Dec
Total: 205,000 men, all but 25,000 (air) in Army and Marines.

This will require a sizeable reserve call-up (minimum 150,000) as well as increased draft. In total, an increase in uniformed
strength of 400,000.
In expenditures, at least $10 billion extra in FY 1964. With auto-matic $5 billion in FY 1970, this will put FY 1970 DOD
budget at $15 billion above current FY 1969 figure.
Alternatives for President's speech and program:
1) Go with full 205,000. Ask for present surtax request plus additional taxes. Announce economic program (possibly
controls on interest, production controls, etc.).
2) Go with full 205,000, economic program, and announce new peace offensive.
Rusk: Basis for peace in Southeast Asia: ending of Communist assaults in Laos, Thailand; we will stop bombing North of
20th parallel if NVN withdraws from Quang Tri province; or stop altogether in that event; or other specific proposal.
McPherson: This is unbelievable and futile.
3) Status quo on forces, with a change in strategy. End US commitment to defend every province and district capital.
Protect essential areas. Fight enemy wherever he fights; end search and destroy.
4) (Clifford) Another possibility that should be considered--and I am not pushing it--is announcement that we intend to put
in 500,000 to million men.
McN: That has virtue of clarity. Obviously we would have decided to put in enough men to accomplish the job. That and
status quo both have the virtue of clarity. I do not understand what the strategy is in putting in 205,000 men. It is neither
enough to do the job, nor an indication that our role must change.
5) (Bundy) We must also prepare for the worst. SVN is very weak. Our position may be truly untenable. Contingency
planning should proceed toward possibility that we will withdraw with best possible face and defend rest of Asia. We can
say truthfully that Asia is stronger because of what we have done in past few years.
Katzenbach took call from Habib in Hawaii. Reports Habib is "less optimistic" about political situation in Saigon than he
was when he went out. Reports that there is serious disagreement in American circles in Saigon over 205,000 request.
Bunker has doubts about this.
Rusk: If we have to call up reserves, we should take some of our troops out of Europe. Europeans will have to put some
more in for their defense.
McN: Agree, if we call 400,000.
State of military situation:
Rusk, Rostow think enemy took beating in Tet offensive. Rostow says captured documents show enemy was
disappointed, may be unable to mount heavy coordinated attack on cities. Rusk reminds that enemy took 40,000
casualties. No US units out of operation. Rostow says if we can re-inforce Westm. now, he should be able to handle
situation until good weather comes to I Corps and NVN.
McN: What then? Let's not delude ourselves into thinking he cannot maintain pressure after good weather comes. (Rostow
apparently had air attacks in mind.)
McN: We are dropping ordnance at a higher rate than in last year of WWII in Europe. It has not stopped him.
Bundy: SVN forces uncertain, but almost certainly not as strong as were before. Assessment due from MACV on Feb 29.
Clifford: Look at situation from point of view of American public and Vietnamese. Despite optimistic reports, our people
(and world opinion) believe we have suffered a major setback. Problem is, how do we gain support for major program,
defense and economic, if we have told people things are going well? How do we avoid creating feeling that we are

pounding troops down rathole? What is our purpose? What is achievable? Before any decision is made, we must reevaluate our entire posture in SVN. Unfortunately Pres. has been at ranch with hawks.
McN: Agreed. Decision must not be hasty. Will take a week at least to work out defense and economic measures, if we go
big. Wheeler, Habib will meet with Secretaries Wednesday morning/2/ at breakfast with President. Decision should
certainly not be announced that night.
/2/February 28.
General impression: prevailing uncertainty. Radically different proposals were offered and debated, none rejected out of
hand. We are at a point of crisis. McNamara expressed grave doubts over military, economic, political, diplomatic and
moral consequences of a larger force buildup in SVN.
Q[uestion] is whether these profound doubts will be presented to President./3/
/3/In telegram CAP 80610 to the President at the LBJ Ranch, February 27, which notified him of this meeting, Rostow
wrote: "A wide range of views were stated and explored. The only firm agreement among Secretaries Rusk and
McNamara, Katzenbach, and Clifford was this: The troop issue raises many questions to which you ought to have clear
answers before making a final decision. Therefore, it is recommended that you not make a final decision at breakfast
tomorrow but, after listening to General Wheeler, order a team to go to work full-time to staff out the alternatives and their
implications (perhaps Clark Clifford could chair this intensive working group). They ought to report in a few days." (Johnson
Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 3, Tabs A-Z and AA-OQ)

90. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 27, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 3, Tabs A-Z and AA-QQ.
Top Secret. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
SUBJECT
Military Situation and Requirements in South Vietnam
1. I spent the better part of three days conferring with General Westmoreland, General Abrams, General Momyer and the
Senior American Commanders in each of the four Corps areas. With Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland, I
called on President Thieu and Vice President Ky and, with General Westmoreland, saw General Vien.
2. I have prepared a more detailed report/2/ which you may wish to see later, but the major points are outlined in this
memorandum.
/2/"Report of the Chairman, JCS on Situation in Vietnam and MACV Force Requirements," February 27. (Ibid., Tabs RRZZ and a-z) In telegram CAP 80566 to the President, February 25, Rostow reported Wheeler's tentative conclusions based
upon a report of telephone conversations between Wheeler and Westmoreland and Wheeler and Harold Johnson on
February 24. (Ibid., Tabs A-Z and AA-QQ) A summary of Wheeler's trip and Enthoven's draft comments on it, dated
February 29, are ibid., Alain Enthoven Papers, Alternative Strategies 1968.
3. There is no doubt that the enemy launched a major powerful nation-wide assault against the Government of South
Vietnam and its Armed Forces. This offensive has by no means run its course. In fact, we must accept the possibility that
he has already deployed additional elements of his home army without our having detected such a move. We must be
prepared to encounter enemy use of longer range missiles or rockets (Frog) and limited use of enemy tactical air. All
commanders on the scene agree that his initial attack nearly succeeded in a dozen places and the margin of victory--in
some places survival--was very very small indeed. Whether he intends to expend himself fully at the current level of
intensity or hold out enough to fight next year is not known. However, the scope and severity of his attacks and the extent
of his reinforcement are presenting us with serious and immediate problems.
4. The South Vietnamese Armed Forces performed remarkably well in most places, most elements were not hurt too
seriously, and are on the road to recovering their fighting strength, but they are not yet out of the woods. On 20 February
RVNAF forces had 97 effective and 58 ineffective battalions. The ineffective battalions seemed to be recovering fairly

rapidly. The Regional and Popular Force situation is not yet clear. There is some question as to whether the South
Vietnamese Armed Forces have the stamina to withstand the pressure of a prolonged enemy offensive. General
Westmoreland has already been forced to move to their assistance in a number of important areas. Commanders are
unanimous in the view that the VC would have achieved a number of significant local successes at the outset, except for
timely reinforcement by US forces. At the moment there are ten US battalions operating in the outskirts of Saigon against a
number of enemy regiments which have encircled the city. US forces are carrying the brunt of the action at Hue and are
preparing for large scale actions in the northern two provinces, in the Highlands, and around Saigon. With respect to
northern I Corps the major engagements may be at Hue and Quang Tri instead of Khe Sanh.
5. The enemy has undoubtedly been hurt, but he seems determined to pursue his offensive--apparently he has the
capability to do so. There has been a substantial withdrawal of ARVN forces from the countryside in order to protect the
cities and towns. Therefore, unless ARVN forces reenter the countryside quickly it may go by default. In my meetings with
President Thieu, Vice President Ky and General Vien, I emphasized the need for ARVN units to move out of the cities and
towns into the countryside and operate against the enemy infesting the environs. All three agreed, but they commented
upon the serious effect on the urban population of a recurrence of the Tet operations. General Westmoreland is working
with General Vien to implement a program whereby urban security would be turned over in a major way to Police Forces
supported by small mobile military forces held in reserve to reinforce the police when they encounter enemy forces with
which they can not cope. Most commanders believe that ARVN will need, or--just as importantly--think it needs, assistance
from US forces for this purpose. Thus, at the very time General Westmoreland is redeploying and otherwise preparing to
meet major thrusts by large NVA forces, he is forced to pick up part of the tab from ARVN. This is especially true in and
around Hue, Saigon and the II and IV Corps.
6. It is the consensus of responsible commanders that 1968 will be the pivotal year. The war may go on beyond 1968 but it
is unlikely that the situation will return to the pre-Tet condition. The forces committed and the tactics involved are such that
the advantage will probably swing one way or the other, during the current year.
7. US forces are in good combat shape. Air support has not been significantly degraded. Increased requirements for rapid
reaction by US forces has placed a premium on helicopter availability in the face of increasing battlefield losses. In-country
airlift is increasingly critical. Logistical support is marginal in the northern I Corps but will improve with the opening of Hwy
1 and with temporary facilities now being built for over-the-shore supply. Equipment loss rates are up and we must review
the adequacy of replacements and spare parts programs.
8. In many areas the pacification program has been brought to a halt. The VC are prowling the countryside, and it is now a
question of which side moves fastest to gain control. The outcome is not at all clear. I visualize much heavy fighting ahead.
Casualties will probably remain high. Equipment losses will continue at a high level. ARVN may prove to be a bit shaky
under sustained pressure. The government will have enormous problems with refugees, civilian casualties, morale and
recovery.
9. If the enemy synchronizes his expected major attacks with increased pressure throughout the country, General
Westmoreland's margin will be paper thin. He does not have a theatre reserve. We can expect some cliff-hangers, and
with bad luck on weather or some local RVNAF failures he may suffer some reverses. For these reasons he is asking for
additional forces as soon as possible during this calendar year.
10. General Westmoreland wants, as a matter of urgency, a mechanized brigade consisting of one tank battalion and one
mechanized battalion and one infantry battalion from the 5th Mechanized Division. He also wants an armored cavalry
regiment and the remainder of the 5th Marine Division/Wing, and the acceleration of the deployment of certain supporting
units now programmed for deployment under Program 5.
11. These immediately required forces, which he hopes to receive before the first of May, will permit him to deploy
additional armored elements to reinforce along the DMZ and will include a capability to cope with a potential enemy
armored threat. He hopes that this will permit him to disengage at least some elements of the lst Air Cavalry Division or the
101st Airborne Division for the beginnings of a theatre reserve. The additional requirement, which he considers necessary
as soon as possible, but not later than 1 September 1968, includes the ROK Light Div, the remainder of the 5th
Mechanized Division and associated elements. The armored elements of this force could be deployed in a mobile defense
of the DMZ thus releasing the remainder of the airborne infantry or air cavalry forces for employment elsewhere as a
substantial theatre reserve. This would also permit the repatriation of the brigade of the 82d Airborne Div.
12. As a matter of prudence, particularly in light of the protracted NVA buildup, General Westmoreland states a
requirement during the calendar year for an additional infantry division to anticipate possible deterioration of some ARVN
units, and to provide a reasonably available two-division theatre reserve at all times of the year.
13. It is my judgment that General Westmoreland requires a theatre reserve of about two divisions. The deployment of the

5th Mechanized Division, the armored cavalry regiment, and additional Marines would permit him to shake loose either the
air cavalry or the airborne division as a theatre reserve. Additionally, at the onset of the good weather season in the DMZ
area (from May to November), he could probably extract the other Army division to constitute an adequate reserve. If
Hanoi deploys additional elements of the home army, this reserve might also be committed and additional force
requirements would be generated.
14. The rough estimate of added strength required for the three force increments is:
Army

Navy

USMC

USAF

TOTAL

a. Immediate Increment,
Priority One

54,000

8,060

37,132

8,791

107,983

b. Immediate Increment,
Priority Two

31,000

4,446

--

5,750

41,796

c. Follow-on Increment

46,700

138

2,004

6,558

55,400

TOTAL

132,300

12,644

39,136

21,099

205,179

15. The spread sheet attached sets forth the major units included in the above strength figures./3/
/3/Attached but not printed.
Earle G. Wheeler

91. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, February 28, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting lasted from 8:35 to 11:15 a.m.
and was held in the White House. The Vice President joined the meeting at 8:50 a.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING TO DISCUSS
GENERAL WHEELER'S TRIP TO VIETNAM
ATTENDING THE MEETING
The President
The Vice President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Clark Clifford
General Taylor
Under Secretary Paul Nitze
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
General Wheeler: This is a summary report. By later today the full report should be ready./2/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 90.
The ARVN were not as seriously hurt as some reports indicated. The ARVN were not fragmented although units fighting in
Hue in some cases are down to 25% strength.

The ARVN are held up in the cities and fear a recurrence of attacks similar to the ones on the cities during Tet. They seem
to be looking back over their shoulders.
General Taylor: What about communications into the hinterlands?
General Wheeler: The communications are there, particularly to the district towns. What happened in the areas outside the
towns is the difficult thing. There is a lack of knowledge about some outposts.
Secretary Rusk: What's the mood of General Westmoreland and Ambassador Bunker?
General Wheeler: Both are concerned. Westmoreland is concerned about the military situation. Bunker is pushing the
government to get on with the job.
The President: Buzz, we are very thankful that you are back and appreciative of what you are doing.
I want Dick Helms to give us a summary of the situation as he sees it today.
Director Helms: It is difficult to give a summary of the situation since we are in the middle of the battle. The Communists
are in high gear. This military activity may continue 3 to 4 months. Their objective is to wreck the Government of South
Vietnam and its military structure. If, in the process, they can hit the U.S. units, that is okay. But their principal objective is
against the ARVN.
The allies are on the defensive. The enemy does have the initiative. The enemy still has 50% of its main forces units intact
and they are now in a position to get manpower additions from the countryside.
The ARVN fought well but they have had a hard time. The net of this is that the ARVN is in worse shape today than before
Tet. I am concerned about defections since the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese have treated the people in the
countryside rather decently. We may have to confront the possibility of desertion.
The Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese may ruin themselves if they go "flat out." I doubt that the Government of South
Vietnam will collapse. It looks like there will continue to be more fighting and stand-off. I don't think it will be a decisive
period for or against either side. The longer this thing is drawn out, the less likely I think negotiations are.
General Wheeler: I talked to General Westmoreland and all of the senior U.S. commanders. I also talked with Ambassador
Bunker, President Thieu and Vice President Ky. There were a number of factors which surprised me. I certainly learned
things I did not know before:
--The Tet attack was very powerful and nationwide.
--The enemy's prime objective was against the ARVN and the Government of Vietnam.
--The enemy also wanted to destroy our logistic base and our command and control system. They were also after our air
power.
--The enemy planned on a major uprising and many defections. Our press had led the North Vietnamese to think the
ARVN army was a pushover. That proved to be untrue.
--The enemy has laid land lines down the Laotian panhandle. This will permit them to operate on radio silence and give
their orders through land lines. This will make it much more difficult to monitor their intelligence.
--The margin of victory was very thin in a number of battles.
--What the future intensity of the conflict will be is an unknown.
--We do know that more Tet-type attacks are planned.
--The enemy is still hanging in around the cities. They are still trying to infiltrate into Saigon.

--The ARVN performed well. There were no defections. There has been some underpar performance due to poor
leadership.
--The RF and the PF carried the brunt of the fighting. Many elements of the ARVN were shot down.
--I think it will take a minimum of 3 to 4 months before the ARVN returns to its previous strength. There are 58 ineffective
battalions and 97 effective battalions as of the time I left. The RF and PF situation is not entirely clear.
--The regular troops did take more casualties than the RF and PF forces.
--We believe about 40,000 enemy were killed. We cannot count the number wounded and missing.
--On the Vietnamese side, there were approximately 12,000 KIA's and wounded.
The President: What you are saying is that the ARVN has been seriously hurt?
General Wheeler: Out of 140-150 battalions, 58 are ineffective due to losses of one type or another.
General Taylor: Are all back from Tet?
General Wheeler: A number are back but we still do not know.
Paul Nitze: When ARVN units fall below 60% of full strength, they then call them ineffective. This suggests that a lot of
men disappeared who are neither missing, or wounded, or killed in action.
General Wheeler: I have here a paper which was written on 31 January by the Military Affairs Committee and the Current
Affairs Committee of the Liberation Army./3/ We believe this document to be authentic.
/3/Not found, but summarized below.
In it the Viet Cong say their principal objectives were: a general offensive to destroy the ARVN, an effort to neutralize
military and political support and to generate a general uprising.
They failed to get an uprising. There was no ARVN desertions. They did not capture the military targets they set out to
capture. In many cases their attacks were ill-timed and ill-coordinated.
The document continues to say that they have problems with morale, with personnel, and need to continue the general
offensive. They recommend pressing on with actions. They want to concentrate on our forces and take the "must win"
areas like Saigon and Hue.
They told the units to avoid attacks on U.S. forces because of the heavy casualties that would result. They postponed their
"victory day" 3 to 4 months. They told their forces to continue to attack their bases and harbors and to destroy the
Vietnamese units and do everything they could to cause defections.
There is a major problem with the ARVN withdrawing to the cities and towns. They are worried about the security in the
urban areas. I pointed this out to Thieu and Ky and told them that they are letting the countryside go by default.
Thieu and Ky recognized the danger in this and both of them said "we are faced with a dilemma." They said that they
cannot afford to have another Tet offensive in Saigon and in other towns.
The government is most worried about maintaining the support of the people.
There are these other observations:
--Pacification is at a halt.
--The Viet Cong cannot roam at will in the countryside.

--The worse situation on pacification is in I Corps north. The next worse is in I Corps south. The best pacification now is in
II Corps.
--None of the pacification programs is satisfactory to us. Bob Komer said the situation was not satisfactory anywhere.
--As to our own forces, they are in good shape. The Air Force was not significantly degraded by the attacks. There has
been an increase in helicopter losses, but there are more helicopters in Vietnam today than there were before Tet.
The equipment loss rate is up in all categories.
--Westmoreland is working to open Highway 1 in I Corps.
The President: Did we ever do anything about getting civilian contractors into these areas to build some of these bridges
and other projects?
Secretary McNamara: We are going to increase the work being done by these contractors.
General Wheeler: I asked about this. General Westmoreland said they can employ productively about 25,000 civilians.
The President: Use them to the maximum. This might save us from sending more troops from here.
General Wheeler: The construction engineers told me they have plenty of activities to keep the contractors busy.
The President: Be sure it is done.
General Wheeler: 1968 will be a critical year in the war. There is heavy fighting ahead. The losses will be high in men. The
losses will be high in equipment.
The question is, can the ARVN withstand another wave of attacks. The government has many problems, among them are
the refugees, many civilian casualties and the continuing problem of morale.
The military situation is this: General Westmoreland must have a sufficient force in I Corps to hold securely those two
northern provinces.
The enemy still has several courses of action open. They could attack Khesanh. They could leave a holding force around
Khesanh and move south to attack Quang Tri and Hue. They could attack Danang. He does have the tactical flexibility. We
know he is building a road in northern provinces to use for tanks and artillery. In short, General Westmoreland has no
theater reserves. He has been stripped of his reserves.
He needs reserve forces for three reasons:
1. To repulse any enemy invasion.
2. To destroy the enemy forces and their bases.
3. To exploit enemy defeats.
It is my judgment, and the judgment of General Westmoreland, that we must move into the Delta to catalyze the ARVN into
action. The margin of victory was very thin in many of the battles over the Tet. The margin between defeat and victory in
many areas was surprisingly narrow. In the Delta three battalions of U.S. troops were sent to help the ARVN. If it had not
been for these battalions, several key province towns could have been overrun.
The second surprise I had was that we came very close to losing Tan Son Nhut Air Base. It was touch and go there. This
attack was blocked by battalions coming in and hitting the enemy from the rear. It was close. Around Danang, we had
another close call. We had to put people down by chopper and then move them to catch the enemy second North Vietnam
Division. It was close there too.

In my opinion, and in the opinion of General Westmoreland, he needs a theater reserve of two divisions.
General Westmoreland said he was thankful for the troops which had been sent. He said they had a good effect on the
ARVN and on the people.
The President: Are all of them there now?
General Wheeler: All are due there today.
The President: How long will it be before they are ready?
General Wheeler: The 82nd should be ready now. The Marine units should be ready in a few days.
Westmoreland handled this bad situation well because of three things:
1. Mobility
2. Fire power
3. Flexibility in command.
As you can see from the attached table (see attachment)/4/ General Westmoreland has asked for three packages.
/4/See footnote 3, Document 90.
By 1 May he wants a brigade of the 5th mechanized division; 1 armed cavalry regiment; 3 artillery battalions; 4 engineer
battalions; other elements of the 5th Marine division; a Marine air wing and other units.
General Westmoreland wants more armor for where there is a threat the armored cavalry regiment is good for opening and
securing roads.
If the President approves this, we propose a Four Structured Planning Meeting at Honolulu with representatives of the
Joint Chiefs, General Westmoreland and the service secretaries to go over these requests and get the exact details ironed
out.
This total request comes to 205,000 men.
The President: What are the alternatives?
General Wheeler: The only alternative to this, in our judgment, is a decision to be prepared to give up areas in lieu of more
troops. Without the reserve, we should be prepared to give up the 2 northern provinces of South Vietnam. This, of course,
would be a political hazard. It also would give the North Vietnamese a strong position for negotiating. It would, I believe,
cause the collapse of the ARVN.
The President: What about those 65,000 troops the ARVN was supposed to provide?
General Wheeler: You will get them. They have begun steps to draft 18 and 19 year olds. They are recalling men to active
duty who haven't served 5 years. President Thieu assured me we would get more than 65,000 if they could be absorbed
and supported by the U.S. Government.
General Westmoreland thinks they can go above 65,000 this year. General Westmoreland wants them to concentrate on
mobilizing their army, since the ARVN are frequently outgunned by the enemy. This is one reason why they are reluctant in
some cases to fight.
The President: How is the recruitment of enemy coming?
General Wheeler: This is a matter of conjecture. We do know that they have brought their forces up by at least 3,000 men.

Prior to Tet they had approximately 225,000 troops of all types. By infiltration, recruitment and other steps, they were able
to get this number up to 240,000 by the time of Tet. We estimate they lost 40,000 killed; 5,000 disabled; and 3,000
prisoners of war who are military types. This totals about 48,000 enemy out of action. We now estimate that they have
approximately 200,000 effective fighting units.
(At 9:35 the meeting moved to the Sitting Room.)
General Wheeler: There were several North Vietnamese divisions which were relatively untouched including the 9th and
the 5th. On the border, the first NVA division was relatively untouched. They back-stopped main force VC units. I think the
two divisions around Khesanh have taken a good shellacking.
Director Helms: I worry about those figures on casualties and enemy strength being used. I am not sure how accurate they
are.
General Wheeler: They are the best we have.
Secretary Rusk: What is General Westmoreland's strategy? What are his priorities? Is he tied to the towns?
General Wheeler: He feels he must have sufficient forces to hold.
General Taylor: Can he do it with these reserves (referring to the 200,000 requested).
General Wheeler: Yes, I believe so unless the enemy ups the ante.
The President: Are we adequately prepared for Khesanh?
General Wheeler: Yes, sir.
The President: Do you think that it will be there (Khesanh) or elsewhere?
General Wheeler: We do not know. We know that we have about 5900 men at Khesanh with a Vietnamese ranger
battalion. These units are heavily supported by air and artillery. We are pouring in air.
The price the enemy would have to pay would be a very high one if they were to try to take Khesanh. General
Westmoreland does not believe they can take it.
We have been bombing the enemy very heavily outside of Khesanh. They are being pushed severely. Just this week we
hit an ammo dump and set off 4-1/2 hours of secondary explosions.
Westmoreland thinks the enemy can attack Khesanh or move south toward Hue and Quang Tri.
The President: How far is that?
General Wheeler: About 60 miles. The enemy could leave a holding force in the area.
The President: As I understand it, they have 40,000 to 50,000 men in a 40 mile area. We have 5000 men in Khesanh. We
would bring in by plane or by road the necessary reinforcements if this position were attacked. Is it possible that the enemy
has moved in more troops?
General Wheeler: Yes, Sir, it is possible that he could have moved in more troops. We ran into 3 tanks and we know that
the enemy has a brigade of paratroopers. While we are on that we need CIA to give us some good photo reconnaissance
of downtown Hanoi and the production centers. In addition, one prisoner of war said he saw 20 tracked vehicles with what
appeared to be Frog missiles on them. In short, the enemy could show up with more forces in the south than they have
shown before.
The President: What about our taking the initiative ourselves? Is there anything we can do other than just sitting and
waiting for them to attack?

General Wheeler: As far as new bombing efforts there is nothing new in the cards. We could plan an amphibious operation
in the north, but we do not have the capacity to do it at this time.
Secretary Rusk: I think the President is talking about new initiatives in I Corps moving our units to attack rather than being
on the defensive.
General Wheeler: Well, the 1st Cavalry Division is engaged in offensive actions against the enemy.
The President: It seems to me for months we have been waiting for them to move. They may be recouping and replacing
their losses during this time. Does he plan any surprise moves of his own?
General Wheeler: He plans to move along the road and clear it. In addition, he is sending out patrols on foot to locate the
enemy and get prisoners and move against them when possible.
The President: So he really has no initiative of his own other than to interrupt their road building and to patrol.
General Wheeler: No, except the 1st Division is engaged against the enemy at Hue.
The President: We may get some dazzling and shocking surprises. Perhaps we have overbuilt Khesanh. It looks like the
enemy can pick and choose his own time and place. Does Westmoreland have any plans to attack them? I am not
questioning his strategy. I am just trying to find out what the situation really is. As I understand it, he is prepared to move
with other forces to attack the enemy if they attack Khesanh. Also he is prepared to move against anything coming down
into the south. If they move across the DMZ, he will counter-attack.
How many men are programmed for him?
General Wheeler: 517,000 in the next 90 days. These are part of the Program 5 package.
The President: What do you have available to send to him in the next 60 days?
General Wheeler: We have not had a chance to go over this thoroughly.
Secretary McNamara: General Westmoreland has asked for 105,000 additional men by May 1. He has asked us to do it in
60 days, but I don't think we can do it in less than 90 to 120 days.
The President: Where will these troops come from?
Secretary McNamara: They will come in two increments resulting from a call up in reserve forces. There would be two call
ups in the Army, the first for 90,000 and the second for 70,000. There would be about 50 to 60 thousand Marines called
and about 20,000 Navy and Air Force. This would total about 250,000 in reserve call up. In addition, we would need to
extend tours up to 6 months and increase the draft call in May.
The President: Then we would call up the reserves and extend enlistments up to 6 months.
Secretary McNamara: Yes, we would ask for an extension of enlistments for 6 months for a period of authority extending
for 8 months from now. No single man would stay in longer than 6 months, but the need for this authority may extend for
the next 8 months.
As I see this total program, it would add 2-1/2 billion dollars to the 1968 budget. It would increase the 1969 budget by $10
billion. It would increase the 1970 budget by about $15 billion.
Of course, we would have to expand production of helicopters, ordnance, air power, and ground support equipment.
The President: How is the M-16 production coming? Colt is working 3 shifts now on a 5 day a week basis. There will be a
second source coming in. We get production of about 29,000 rifles now and expect this to be up to 40,000 by the end of
the year. A total of 683,000 M-16's have been produced so far.
In addition, we would open several new camps. There would be a need to open Camp Chaffee in Arkansas and Pickett Hill

in Virginia. In addition, we would open Camp Roberts in California and Indiantown Gap in Pennsylvania.
The President: Could you handle all of the equipment and supplies for all of these bases?
Secretary McNamara: Yes, the Marine units could be ready in 8 weeks. The Army units could be ready in 12 to 16 weeks.
We would immediately call 57,000 Marines and 90,000 Army. At the time of the announcement we would also say that this
would be followed by an additional 70,000.
The President: What type of men are these that would be called?
Secretary McNamara: They are of three types:
1. World War II and Korean veterans.
2. Men who have already fulfilled two years of active service and are now in the active reserves.
3. Men who have 6 months training and have had less active service.
There will be lots of griping but I don't think the problem will be serious.
The President: What problems are there now?/5/
/5/No additional pages of these notes have been found.

92. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 28, 1968, 6:55 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 3, Tabs RR-ZZ and a-d.
Top Secret; Sensitive. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it and the attachment.
Mr. President:
I sent the attached draft memorandum to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Mr. Clifford.
At the end of a quite fruitful discussion of more than 3 hours,/2/ Sec. McNamara recommended (and Mr. Clifford
concurred) holding this directive until the first draft reports are available on Saturday./3/ We would then, when the materials
were in, present a directive to you.
/2/The so-called "Clifford Task Force" had its first meeting that day. Notes of the meeting have not been found but it is
summarized in this memorandum. The members of the group included Clifford, Rusk, McNamara, Katzenbach, Bundy,
Nitze, Warnke, Taylor, Helms, Wheeler, and Fowler. Rusk and McNamara did not attend after the initial sessions.
According to an undated memorandum, at this first meeting the subjects to be reviewed were divided as follows:
alternative U.S. courses of action--Defense, Taylor, State; alternative enemy courses of action--Defense and CIA;
implications of the augmentation request: military-JCS, political-State, economic-Treasury, Congressional-Defense, public
opinion-State; and negotiation alternatives-State. The final section of the memorandum reads: "Papers will be prepared for
distribution among Clifford group to meet Saturday 10:00 a.m. at DOD. Group will then come up with recommended course
of action and possible alternatives for Presidential consideration Monday. Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State will
meanwhile consider the draft directive received from the White House. Directive will be redrafted before Saturday meeting
to fit the approach being followed by the Task Force." (Ibid., Vol. 4, Tabs C-M)
/3/March 2.
On the other hand, if you wish to have a directive like the attached completed earlier, this could be arranged.

I will not attempt to summarize the discussion which involved many points of view and touched on a wide range of issues.
Aside from differences on the troop issue, with which you are familiar, these were some of the points that seemed to be
agreed:
--From our point of view--and the Communist point of view--1968 is the "year of decision" in Vietnam. Not that the war will
necessarily end this year, but its outcome will be foreshadowed by the events of this year.
--Whatever we do about troops, a maximum effort must be made to get the best conceivable performance from the GVN
and the ARVN. In this connection, we may wish to nail down and include in any budgetary proposals a mobilization effort in
Vietnam going beyond the 65,000.
--We must come to grips in our own mind with the terms of an acceptable negotiation and begin to talk in a mature way
with the GVN about what we would regard as an acceptable outcome.
--Whatever the decision on troops, we may wish to give Westy a new, more precise and updated directive, stating the
objectives which we aim to achieve.
--Joe Fowler made the following points:
--What is required on both the military and financial side is an Act of National Will.
--He would regard the increase in the military budget as a "not unmixed evil" since he believes a tax bill will then move,
although probably at the expense of further reductions in civilian expenditures.
--Our presentation should not merely include Vietnam but the need to make our military credibility more clear in Korea,
Middle East, and elsewhere, since he believes that the Communists, together or separately, are probing at us in a number
of directions.
--At the end Clark Clifford gave assignments under each of the headings in this draft directive, which are to be completed
by Saturday. The committee that met this afternoon will then work over the week end on a statement of alternatives and on
its recommendations.
--We underlined, at the close of the meeting, once again the extreme requirement for security.
Walt

Attachment
Draft Memorandum From President Johnson to Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara/4/
Washington, February 28, 1968.
/4/Top Secret; Sensitive.
As I indicated at breakfast this morning,/5/ I wish you to develop by Monday morning, March 4, recommendations in
response to the situation presented to us by General Wheeler and his preliminary proposals.
/5/See Document 91.
I wish alternatives examined and, if possible, agreed recommendations to emerge which reconcile the military, diplomatic,
economic, Congressional, and public opinion problems involved.
In particular, I wish you to consider, among others, the following specific issues:
--What military and other objectives in Viet Nam are additional U.S. forces designed to advance?

--What specific dangers is their dispatch designed to avoid, and what specific goals would the increment of force, if
recommended by you, aim to achieve: in the next six months; over the next year?
--What problems would we confront with respect to appropriations and the budget; and what measures would you propose
to deal with those problems?
--What problems would we confront with respect to balance of payments; and what measures would you propose to deal
with those problems?
--Should we go forward with an increment of U.S. forces; what negotiated posture should we strike, in general; and what
modifications, if any, would you recommend with respect to the San Antonio formula?
--Aside from the question of negotiations, what other diplomatic problems would we confront, and how should they be dealt
with?
--What special effort can we and should we take at this time with respect to improving the political and military performance
of the South Vietnamese?
--How should we frame our proposals for the Congress with respect to: objectives; legislation required (e.g., selective callup); appropriations?
--What major Congressional problems can be anticipated, and how should they be met?
--Aside from your recommendations on the dispatch of forces and reconstitution of reserves, what steps are required to
build up a production base for our over-all military effort?
--What problems can we anticipate in U.S. public opinion, and how should they be dealt with?
You should feel free in making this report to call on the best minds in the Government to work on specific aspects of the
problem; but you should assure the highest possible degree of security up to the moment when the President's decision on
these matters is announced.

93. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, February 29, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 7, Meeting Notes. Top
Secret. Prepared by Walt Rostow. At the top of the page, he wrote: "ARVN & Thieu will take more risk in getting out of the
cities if US strikes new stance."
1. I believe the Wheeler recommendation should be accepted for four reasons:
--In view of the enemy's new strategy of intensive engagement,/2/ the forces are required in Viet Nam if we are to avoid
excessive military and political risk.
/2/Rostow added this clause by hand.
--The further U.S. commitment in Viet Nam and the build-up of reserves are required to deflate the widespread view that
we are too thin and that pressure or aggression might be successful in the Middle East, elsewhere in Asia, and perhaps,
even, in Europe.
--This is a Presidential election year and a classic period for Communist adventure: we should not go into this period overextended--either in Viet Nam or in general.
--Our two most responsible men in the field have asked for additional forces: Westmoreland and Bunker.

2. Specifically in Viet Nam:

--The Communists are acting on the assumption that 1968 is the year of decision: we must accept that and make the
decision turn the right way.
--The Communists are engaging their forces at more than twice the average rate of 1967--quite aside from the Tet peak.
Westy is, therefore, thin on the ground in terms of his minimum requirements. The pressure may ease in May; but we
cannot be sure; and post-May he will need more forces to retrieve losses suffered in the winter-spring offensive and to
have bargaining weight should negotiations emerge.
--These forces are needed in part to give the ARVN both the assurance about the security of the cities and to make
possible joint U.S.-ARVN operations in the Delta and elsewhere in the countryside. We could face a disastrous political
situation if the enemy consolidated the countryside and then called for negotiations with the majority of the people in his
hands.
--The present situation--for us and the enemy--is one of both losses and opportunities, since the Tet offensive began. The
outcome (say) two months from now of the whole battle since Tet depends on what happens between now and then. If we
send some forces now--and Westy knows others are on the way--he will be able to do much more than if he has to work
off thin margins.
--Right now the enemy may be introducing an additional two divisions from the North. The intelligence is uncertain, but
somewhat firmer than a few days ago.
3. If we accept the Wheeler recommendation we face, of course, many problems.
--We must develop a precise list of concrete things we want the GVN and ARVN to do, and use maximum leverage to get
the South Vietnamese to do them on schedule. (Incidentally, I regard the GVN performance since Tet as B+, in fact
remarkable for a developing nation confronting a desperate attack of this kind. We cannot set impossible standards. We
can set precise, maximum realistic goals and hold feet to the fire. Perhaps a Guam meeting with Thieu and Ky might be in
order--or even a troop contributors' meeting.)/3/ Tab A is a possible list of legitimate U.S. requirements.
/3/Rostow wrote the marginal comment: "or Thieu in Wash."
--Since negotiations may be thrust upon us--and we certainly want them if they promise an honorable peace--we must face
up to what we think and begin consultations with Thieu. We do not intend to sell them down the river; but we cannot
postpone peace--if it is reachable--until every VC is killed or until in some psychological sense the GVN is ''ready."
4. The dispatch of additional forces could be the occasion for a new directive to Westy setting the limits of his mission in
terms of concrete U.S. political objectives in SVN and Southeast Asia./4/
/4/Rostow wrote below this paragraph: "But I am not sure another strategy is viable--frontiers/rural/urban."
5. There may be strong political forces generated in directions we do not wish to go:
--Invade Laos, Cambodia, North Viet Nam. We may wish to mount such operations at some time. We should not rule them
out. But as I read Westy's situation, he has his hands full for the next months inside South Viet Nam. I see no reason that,
if we recover equilibrium in the late spring, the President should be forced to move where he does not believe it wise to go.
--Bombing Haiphong. We may (or may not) wish to hit Haiphong and Hanoi harder; but for coming months the weather is
bad; we need our air in ground support; the arguments about not engaging the USSR and making Communist China the
primary route for supply are still relevant. If the President makes his decisions now, I do not think he can be realistically
forced into a policy which cannot now be executed. Several months from now I believe he will still command the capacity
to maintain his freedom of decision.
--Mining Haiphong: Fresh look!/5/
/5/Rostow added this point by hand.
--Pull troops out of Europe. This must be met by making our case not merely in terms of Viet Nam but thickening up our

total deterrent position. We don't want a Berlin or NATO crisis. But we have a right to demand of NATO Europe--and
Germany in particular--the fullest possible financial and balance of payments cooperation.
6. Taxes.
From my limited knowledge, Joe Fowler's assessment--that these moves could break the tax stalemate--makes sense.
But, as he has suggested, the whole enterprise--Viet Nam forces, global reserves, taxes--must be put as an Act of National
Will, in terms which transcend Viet Nam and, even, Southeast Asia.
7. Public opinion.
I am no expert; but I sense three things:
--frustration at our defensive posture, and real fear;
--a hawkish balance in the country;
--a desire to do something about the situation./6/
/6/Rostow wrote in the margin: "[illegible] 'long war'."
With appropriate prior consultation with leading citizens--as well as Congressional leaders--I believe the package is viable.
W

94. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 29, 1968, 0940Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret;
Immediate; Nodis. This telegram is printed in full in Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 351-361.
20798. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my forty-first weekly message.
A. General
1. It is now four weeks since the enemy launched his Tet offensive. Many factors are still only partly known in this new
situation, but I thought it would be worthwhile to try to make a preliminary assessment of where we stand. This will have to
be a rather rough approximation since it will be some time before the returns of the comprehensive and detailed
examinations now underway will be in. Nevertheless, I believe the following general points can be made:
A) It is evident that the enemy made a heavy commitment of his forces to the Tet offensive, some 62,000 plus guerrilla and
other elements in supporting roles; that more than half of the forces committed have been destroyed and more than 10,000
weapons captured, a figure which tends to substantiate the reported personnel losses. These heavy losses would appear
to have a number of consequences: many enemy units are expected to be ineffective for a considerable period; a heavy
replacement flow will be required from North Viet-Nam which is likely to result in a significant increase in the proportion of
NVA troops in South Viet-Nam; and there is a possibility that he may be forced to reassess his strategy, for example the
all-out offensive versus the "conservation of forces" policy, the attack on urban areas versus his "frontier" strategy, or the
desirability of going into a primarily guerrilla war posture.
B) This reassessment of strategy by the enemy may be influenced by the psychological effect on him of the heavy losses
and defeats he has suffered. He mounted an intense propaganda effort prior to the attacks, thoroughly indoctrinated his
troops with the idea the winter-spring campaign would be the decisive and concluding period of the war, that a coalition
government would be formed, and their hardships would cease. Now the enemy propaganda is talking about a long war,
and there are no further references to "victory this spring." It would seem logical that this pre-Tet psychological buildup
would be followed by a letdown as the enemy troops come to realize that they have not won the final victory, but on the

contrary have taken very heavy losses only to be thrown out of all the cities they attempted to seize. Probably the letdown
will be most rapid and severe among VC provincial and regional forces, guerrillas, and infrastructure. If this should take
place, it may well result in an upturn in Chieu Hoi rates.
C) It is clear also that the enemy made a major miscalculation in believing that the people would rise to support his forces.
A recently captured document makes this even clearer than before. COSVN order dated February 1, a critique of the first
phase of the Tet offensive, points to the lack of popular uprising and ARVN defections as key failures. But, as I have noted
before, failure of the masses to actively support the enemy does not necessarily mean there is solid popular support for
this government; and among many elements of the population, there is widespread apprehension and fear of further
attacks by the enemy. Nevertheless, opinion has hardened against the enemy, and GVN efforts to assist the victims of the
fighting have probably improved the government's image in certain quarters. In some areas, popular indignation against
the enemy is running very high. The post-attack feeling of national unity and willingness to cooperate with the authorities
remains strong. Granted there is still a considerable distance to go to create a solid, enduring climate of opinion which can
be described as strong, positive support for the government as against the present essentially anti-VC feeling!
Nevertheless these are positive elements in the present military picture.
D) There are factors on the other side of the ledger. The enemy has shown a capacity for continued heavy infiltration from
the North. Indeed it seems apparent that this was substantially stepped up in the months immediately preceding the Tet
offensive, a fact which raises acutely the question of what measures should be taken to reduce substantially infiltration
through Laos and Cambodia. The enemy has also been able to equip his troops with increasingly sophisticated weapons;
they are in general better equipped than the ARVN forces, a fact which has an adverse bearing on ARVN morale. And the
enemy has demonstrated flexibility, skill, resourcefulness, discipline, and determination. That he suffered such a severe
setback has been due to the skill, tenacity, and bravery of our commanders and troops and those of the ARVN, to our
mobility, and to our superiority in artillery and air power.
E) It seems apparent also that a number of options are open to the enemy. If instead of reverting to a policy of a prolonged
war, or a guerrilla posture, he decides, as Thieu believes he will, to go "fast" in the months ahead with the objective of
putting himself in a strong posture for negotiation, we may be approaching a decisive period in the war should this be his
decision, and provided we act quickly and decisively to meet the threat! If we take positive action now, and this, of course,
involves getting the GVN to take a whole range of decisions and actions, I am confident in our ability to meet the threat
successfully. It is possible indeed that this could shorten the conflict and bring us more quickly to a decision. Thieu sees
this in a time frame encompassing late 1968-early 1969.
F) The physical destruction caused by the Tet offensive has been heavy and widespread. One-hundred two cities and
district towns were attacked, creating at present count some 550,000 evacuees, of which it is expected some 30-40
percent will return to their homes when security is restored. The number of houses destroyed now stands at 66,400, but
this does not yet take into account figures for the heavy destruction at Hue. The present count of civilians killed stands at
4,700 with another 19,500 injured, but again this does not include figures for Hue. These figures give some idea both of
the magnitude of the problem and of the time and resources that will have to go into the recovery effort. But assisted,
prodded, and supported by our people, the government reacted well at the outset and is now showing more drive and
effectiveness than at any time since my arrival in this country. While its performance is not beyond criticism, it is better
than many of us expected, and far better than press reports indicate. We have to bear in mind the limitations of the human
resources available here in drawing a fair judgment. Most important, I believe, is the fact that the government has
recovered faster and is moving more swiftly than the enemy. Both sides are tired and disorganized in the wake of the near
Armageddon, which the enemy provided, but our side is reviving more rapidly.
G) The relief and recovery program is moving ahead with no apparent loss of momentum since Ky turned over the
direction of the Central Recovery Committee to Prime Minister Loc. This in part is the result of a more active participation
on the part of President Thieu who chaired the Feb 24 and 28 meetings and has exhibited both comprehension and
decisiveness in his interventions. He has told me he plans to chair the task force twice a week in the future. It is also due in
part to the surprisingly effective performance of Minister Doan Ba Cang who has turned out to be a more hardnosed and
efficient coordinator than Gen Thang. It is also due to the very effective efforts of Bob Komer, Gen Forsythe, and our staff.
At this writing Saigon is approaching normal in many ways: prices are down to 15 percent above the pre-Tet level, rice
distribution is back in the retailers' hands and no longer poses a problem, public utilities are functioning, there is a uniform
1900 to 0700 curfew throughout the city. One-hundred-sixty-nine thousand evacuees are being cared for, the work of
clearing away the rubble is well underway, and the long task of rebuilding has begun. While moving more slowly in the
provinces in many cases, relief and recovery is also going forward there in a satisfactory manner.
H) Having failed to hold the cities, the enemy is now keeping up harassment of the urban population and attempting to
dominate the countryside. The second wave of the offensive, as I mentioned last week, is in many ways becoming a race
to re-establish control in the rural areas. Both enemy and friendly forces were withdrawn from the countryside to take part
in the fight for the cities. That phase seemed to end Feb 25 when President Thieu attended an emotion-filled ceremony at
which the Vietnamese flag was again raised over what remains of the ancient and sacred city of Hue./2/ If Thieu is correct
in his analysis of the enemy strategy, the present enemy concentrations near the cities and harassment by mortaring and

rocketing of the urban populations is intended to tie us down to urban defense while he attempts to take over and hold as
much of the countryside as possible. Interrogation of an enemy officer in I Corps supports this view of the enemy
intentions. Thieu is fully aware of this, so are General Westmoreland and Gen Vien, and our troops are beginning to move
back into the rural areas.
/2/In telegram 20585 from Saigon, February 27, Bunker reported Thieu's discussion of his trip to Hue and his assessment
of the enemy's next moves. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET
S)
I) Pacification has been set back but contrary to some press reports certainly is not dead. While it is imperative that we
move fast, we have by no means lost the race. About one-half of the RD cadre have remained in their assigned hamlets
with the other half working in the urban areas. Some provinces were relatively untouched, and in at least 16 provinces it
should be possible to get the program back on the rails rather quickly. Thirteen provinces were hardhit and we estimate
that it will take a minimum of six months to get the program there back to the pre-Tet level. By corps areas, we can say the
situation in I Corps is bad, with the program suffering most severely in the northernmost provinces; in II Corps it is in
relatively good shape; III Corps is in worse condition, though we view the situation there as very serious in only three
provinces, but those three include two provinces which are neighbors of Saigon, Gia Dinh and Bien Hoa. IV Corps is
perhaps the most serious problem with something approaching areawide paralysis prevailing in that key region.
J) It is clear that we must move rapidly. Given a free hand, the enemy will use the people in the countryside, step up
recruitment, replenish food stocks, and erode previous GVN pacification gains. Instructions have gone out to Vietnamese
forces and US advisers to seize the initiative and to go on the offensive, roads and waterways are being re-opened and
commercial traffic is beginning to move north of the Mekong. The next step is to break the RF/PF out of their defensive
shells, and to get all RD teams back to their hamlets. While some risks are involved, it seems to me important that we do
not over-commit ourselves in defense of the cities. Our ability to take the offensive, especially in the countryside, will be
psychologically important both in restoring the morale of the South Vietnamese population and in persuading the enemy
that he cannot possibly win militarily./3/
/3/In a discussion with Bunker and Westmoreland on February 24, Thieu described the dilemma he faced in having to keep
some troops on the periphery of the cities in order to prevent infiltration while at the same time needing the ARVN out in
the countryside in the pacification program. (Telegram 20584 from Saigon, February 27; ibid.)
2. The effects of the Tet offensive on the Vietnamese economy must be rated as adverse and seriously damaging, without
significant positive offsets. Estimates of the physical damage have been reported elsewhere. It is doubtful that the extent of
this widespread damage will ever be estimated accurately in money terms, but for a country whose capital wealth is low, it
is a severe blow. If peace and security were now restored, one could imagine a rapid recovery of the sort that often takes
place after localized natural disasters. But the continuation of fighting and insecurity will make the recovery longer and
more difficult for Viet-Nam. Reconstruction will inevitably divert resources from the war and the pacification effort. In the
meantime, the effect, both monetary and psychological, on people who have lost their homes, seen factories and places of
business destroyed, and communications interrupted will be hard to sustain.
3. Another result of the damage inflicted during the past month and the consequent reconstruction effort will be a buildup of
inflationary pressures. It seems certain that GVN expenditures will increase by at least 10 billion piasters. At the same
time, disruption of economic life will inevitably lead to reduction of tax revenues, probably by the same order of magnitude.
Our preliminary estimates show more than a doubling of the increase in money supply, from 19 billion piasters to more
than 50.
[Omitted here is discussion of the impact of Tet on the business community, the GVN's overall performance during and
after the attacks, reconstruction and mobilization efforts, pacification, and the political response to Tet.]
Bunker

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968

Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 95-107

March 1-15: Policy Reassessment and the "A to Z" Review

95. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
Washington, March 1, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 3, Tabs RR-ZZ and a-d.
Secret. The memorandum is initialed by Rostow, indicating that he saw it. It was attached to the backup material
considered by the Clifford Task Force; see Document 100.
SUBJECT
Questions Concerning the Situation in Vietnam
I. The Communist Position
How does Hanoi view the present phase of the war; for example, has Hanoi concluded that a protracted conflict is
impossible and that it must gain victory this year or collapse?
1. Hanoi's strategy of revolutionary warfare in South Vietnam has always embraced two propositions: to prepare for a
protracted struggle and to seek victory in the shortest possible time. From the introduction of large US forces in 1965,
through the summer of 1967 the emphasis was on the probability of a prolonged war of attrition. Some backing away from
the protracted war theme became evident in captured documents and Hanoi's propaganda later in 1967. In our view the
intensity of the Tet offensive and the exertions being made to sustain pressures confirms that Hanoi is now engaged in a
major effort to achieve early and decisive results. Yet the Communists probably have no rigid time-table. They apparently
have high hopes of achieving their objectives this year, but they will preserve considerable tactical flexibility.
2. It is still not altogether clear why the Vietnamese Communists chose this course of action at this time. They certainly
were not desperate or fearful of early collapse. A reconsideration of their capabilities to succeed in a long war may have
been a contributing factor. And they probably regarded the balance of forces as sufficiently favorable to warrant a major
and widespread offensive. The fact of Presidential elections in the US may have influenced their decision, and, of course,
the tactical advantage of the Tet truce played a role in the immediate timing. In any case, it does not appear that they
undertook the present offensive because they had concluded that protracted conflict was no longer feasible for them.
What are the capabilities of the NVA/VC forces to sustain their present offensive, and, if they choose to, continue a
prolonged war thereafter?
3. There is no doubt that the Communists have already paid a high price in the present offensive phase. They have not
only lost manpower, but also quality resources such as the special units employed in the Tet attacks. Nevertheless, prior to
Tet there was apparently a strenuous drive to bring units up to strength with new recruits and upgraded guerrillas.
Complete guerrilla units also were merged with local forces to form larger elements. Infiltration of replacements and units
from the North has probably been heavier than previously believed. A part of the Main Forces has been withheld from
major combat. Finally, an intensive effort to raise new levies is underway in the rural areas, where the Communists now
enjoy fuller access. Thus, it is conceivable that the enemy's gross strength is not significantly lower now than it was in the
latter part of 1967.
4. The Communist supply position might be a factor limiting combat capabilities in the next few months. Many forces are
now deployed away from their bases at the end of longer lines of supply. Expenditures of ammunition and losses of
equipment have been relatively high. These factors will be offset in some degree by the extraordinary stockpiling that
evidently took place before Tet and by the increased availability of manpower in the countryside which will permit the
continued portering of military supplies and food to VC/NVA forces.
5. While not strictly a matter of physical capability, the Communist position is much enhanced, for the time being at least,
by their possession of the strategic initiative. Within limits this permits them to choose the time and place of combat and to
keep US/ARVN forces pinned down and dispersed in static defense of many potential targets.
6. Accordingly, we believe that the NVA/VC forces have the capability to sustain a relatively high level of combat and

occasionally to intensify it over the next several months, including rocket and mortar attacks on urban areas and military
installations, major battles with US forces and assaults on selected cities. At the same time, the Communists will have
resources to consolidate their hold on formerly pacified and contested areas.
7. It is conceivable that the Communists regard the present campaign as so critical to the ultimate outcome of the war that
they will commit their full resources to a maximum effort in the near term, even at risk of very high losses. But it is far more
likely that they probably will not use their resources in such a reckless manner as to deny themselves the possibility of
continuing the struggle well beyond the next several months.
What is the Communist attitude toward negotiations: in particular how would Hanoi deal with an unconditional cessation of
US bombing of NVN and what would be its terms for a settlement?
8. The Communists probably still expect the war to end eventually in some form of negotiations. Since they hope the
present military effort will be decisive in destroying the GVN and ARVN, they are not likely to give any serious
consideration to negotiations until this campaign has progressed far enough for its results to be fairly clear.
9. If, however, the US ceased the bombing of North Vietnam in the near future, Hanoi would probably respond more or
less as indicated in its most recent statements. It would begin talks fairly soon, would accept a fairly wide ranging
exploration of issues, but would not moderate its terms for a final settlement or stop fighting in the South.
10. In any talks, Communist terms would involve the establishment of a new "coalition" government, which would in fact if
not in appearance be under the domination of the Communists. Secondly, they would insist on a guaranteed withdrawal of
US forces within some precisely defined period. Their attitude toward other issues would be dictated by the degree of
progress in achieving these two primary objectives, and the military-political situation then obtaining in South Vietnam.
11. Cessation of bombing and opening of negotiations without significant Communist concessions would be deeply
disturbing to the Saigon government. There would be a real risk that the Thieu-Ky regime would collapse, and this would in
fact be part of Hanoi's calculation in accepting negotiations.
The Outlook
What is the likely course of events in South Vietnam over the next 10 months, assuming no change in US policy or force
levels?
12. In the assumed circumstances a total military victory by the Allies or the Communists is highly unlikely in the next 10
months. It is manifestly impossible for the Communists to drive US forces out of the country. It is equally out of the
question for US/GVN forces to clear South Vietnam of Communist forces. It is possible, however, that the overall situation
in this period will take a decisive turn.
13. We think it unlikely that this turn could be in the US/GVN favor. To be sure, Communist forces are now exposed to
aggressive counteraction, their supply lines are extended, and some base areas may be vulnerable. Morale may be poor
in some of the units which have suffered heavy losses. But we see no evidence yet that the GVN/ARVN will be inspired to
seize the initiative, go over to the attack, exploit the Communist vulnerabilities, and quickly regain the rural areas. We
doubt they have the will and capability to make the effort.
14. Far more likely is an erosion of the ARVN's morale and effectiveness. We do not believe that the GVN will collapse, or
that the ARVN will totally disintegrate. But there is a fairly good chance that Communist pressures will result in a serious
weakening of the GVN/ARVN apparatus and an end to its effective functioning in parts of the country. In these
circumstances, virtually the entire burden of the war would fall on US forces.
15. The Communists too will be weakened by further offensive efforts. Losses will be heavy, combat effectiveness will be
lowered, and morale will be damaged by the failure to achieve a complete victory. Even though their situation vis-a-vis the
ARVN will be strong, their forces will probably not be in a position to register decisive advances unless they radically
escalate the war by an all-out invasion.
16. In sum, there is a high risk that both the ARVN and GVN will be seriously weakened in the next months, and perhaps
decisively so. Our best estimate is that in the assumed circumstances the overall situation 10 months hence will be no
better than a standoff.
Reactions to US Courses of Action

What is the likely NVA/VC strategy over the next 10 months if US forces are increased by 50,000, by 100,000, or by
200,000?
17. We would expect the Communists to continue the war. They still have resources available in North Vietnam and within
South Vietnam to increase their troop strength. Their strong logistical effort and their ability to organize and exploit the
people under their control in the South enable them to counter US increases by smaller increases of their own. Over a tenmonth period the Communists would probably be able to introduce sufficient new units into the South to offset the US
maneuver battalion increments of the various force levels given above.
18. We cannot foresee the outcome of future combat resulting from the increase in US forces. The Communists would
probably have to modify their current tactics, especially if the US increments were large enough to permit the formation of
a strategic reserve as well as providing for the partial relief of the ARVN. In some places, they would retreat from the urban
areas, trying to hold as much as possible of the countryside.
19. The prospect of heavy US reinforcements might persuade Hanoi to gamble on an all-out invasion from the North to
seize Northern I Corps before reinforcements could be committed. It is also possible that the Communists would greatly
expand their military pressures in Laos. The purpose of such a move would be to draw off US forces from South Vietnam,
and to indicate that, unless the war was ended, the US faced a continued expansion of its commitment.
20. We would not expect the addition of any given number of US troops to change the policy or attitude of the USSR or
China. Both would be willing to increase assistance in weaponry and Peking would offer more manpower for North
Vietnam. Both would be concerned that the US would still be frustrated and would eventually be led to invade North
Vietnam. But neither China nor the USSR would be likely to enter the war in response to a US buildup, and neither would
be likely to take drastic diversionary moves outside of Vietnam.
21. The general international climate would certainly worsen for the US. There would be greater apprehension that the war
in Vietnam would inevitably expand to the point of a US conflict with China, and perhaps even with the USSR. Many
countries would blame the US for not trying to negotiate with Hanoi. International pressures for an end to the fighting would
increase. At the same time, some US allies in Asia would be relieved that the US chose to reinforce rather than accept an
unfavorable political settlement.
What is the likely Communist reaction to a change in US strategy toward greater control over population centers, with or
without increased forces?
22. In general the Communists would view this move as a success for their strategy. Their tactical response in such
circumstances would depend mainly on the nature of US enclaves. If these were fairly large and embraced much of the
outlying countryside, the Communists would believe them to be porous enough to infiltrate and harass, much as they are
doing now. If the defensive perimeters were fairly solid, however, the Communists would not try to overrun them in frontal
assaults. Instead, they would concentrate for a time on consolidating the countryside and isolating the various defended
enclaves, in particular interdicting supply lines and forcing the US to undertake expensive supply movements from out of
country. A Communist-controlled regime with a "coalition" facade would be set up in "liberated" areas and attempts at
terrorist activity inside the enclaves would be undertaken. Hanoi would hope that a combination of military and political
pressure, together with the dim prospect for achievement of the original US aims in the Vietnam struggle, would eventually
persuade the US to extricate itself through negotiations.

96. Report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff/1/

Washington, March 1, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Vietnam War-Courses of Action-Post Paris Peace
Talks, 1967-1968. Top Secret; Sensitive. The attached foreword reads: "At the direction of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and under the supervision of the Director, Joint Staff, the Short Range Branch, Plans and Policy Directorate, Joint
Staff, was directed to analyze the military implications of several military courses of action proposed to defeat the enemy
offensive and regain the initiative in Vietnam. Representatives of each of the Services, other organizations of the OJCS,
and other Joint Staff Directorates were made available and provided inputs to the study. This study has not been
addressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or by any of the Military Services individually."
ANALYSIS OF COMUSMACV FORCE REQUIREMENTS
AND ALTERNATIVES

Section I--Purpose
A. The Problem. To provide military advice on the military implications of several courses of action to defeat the enemy
offensive and to regain the initiative in Vietnam.
B. Study Objectives. The study examines five alternative military courses of action. Each is examined as to its ability to
attain the following military objectives:
1. First, to counter the enemy offensive and to destroy or neutralize the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) invasion force in
the north.
2. Second, to restore security in the cities and towns.
3. Third, to restore security in the heavily populated area of the countryside.
4. Fourth, to regain the initiative through offensive operations.
C. Examination of the Options. The following questions are posed which bring out the significance of each of the options
examined:
5. What military objectives are advanced by the option (in six months; 12 months)?
6. What specific dangers is the option designed to avoid (in six months; 12 months)?
7. What specific goals does the option achieve (in six months; 12 months)?
8. Does it achieve the objectives? If not, where does it fall short? What modifications of strategy and/or objectives are
indicated?
9. What personnel and procurement actions are required to support the option?
10. What specific units will be deployed and what time schedule?
11. How are these forces generated, and what combat forces remain in the CONUS?
12. What are the estimated dollar costs?
D. Conclusion. After this examination (of the pros and cons), the options are compared in order to provide a conclusion as
to which of the options is the most advantageous from the military viewpoint.
Section II
Summary
1. The enemy, since November, has increased his forces in South Vietnam by at least 41 maneuver battalions, some
armored elements, a large number of rockets, and additional artillery. There are indications he is preparing for the use of
limited air support, including logistical air drops and bombing missions.
2. In the MACV proposal (options 1 and 1A), the number of maneuver battalions provided roughly offsets the increase in
enemy forces. In the lesser options, the enemy buildup is not matched. Furthermore, there are indications now that
additional enemy forces are on the move to RVN.
3. The basic strategy which must be followed by MACV in any circumstance is to defeat the current enemy offensive both
in Northern I Corps Tactical Zone where it is the most formidable, in the Highlands where it is highly dangerous, and
throughout South Vietnam in defense of the government and the cities and towns. In many places, allied forces have lost
the initiative to the enemy. They are meeting the threat in the I Corps Tactical Zone, are in a marginal position in II CTZ,
and elsewhere are committing the bulk of the South Vietnamese forces to the defense of cities and towns. Allied forces are

not conducting offensive operations of any great magnitude or frequency and therefore they are not wresting control of the
countryside from the enemy.
4. Under the smaller options, that is the current force plus 6 battalions already deployed (Option 2), or Option 3 which
provides an additional 6 battalions within the 50,000 strength add on, the capability to meet the enemy offensive is
definitely increased; however, this added capability may well be required in the II Corps Tactical Zone alone. It may permit
MACV to break loose a small airborne or air cavalry reserve to conduct reaction or limited offensive operations. The
intermediate Option 4 of 100,000 additional troops should permit the constitution of about a one-division reserve which
could reinforce in any threatened area such as Khe Sanh or the Highlands or could undertake slightly expanded offensive
operations. As long as the enemy employs the forces now available to him in synchronized attacks, it is not realistic to
believe that this size force can guarantee security throughout South Vietnam's rural areas. However, the accomplishment
of this mission of providing security in the populated countryside also depends very heavily on the speed with which
Vietnamese forces recover and the effectiveness with which they are able to operate.
5. If the enemy offensive can be broken with sustained heavy casualties, then, and only then, will the cities be secure and
the countryside reentered. Even with the largest force contemplated (Option 1) it will not be possible to perform adequately
all of the tasks unless the current enemy offensive is decisively defeated. This, therefore, is the first and most important
task upon which all else depends. If the offensive can be broken, then all of the other tasks become possible with the
forces in Option 1.
6. It is not possible to predict whether the forces now available in Vietnam will be able to break the offensive without
additional help, considering the magnitude of the enemy buildup and his clear willingness to expend forces with small
regard for casualties. Military prudence requires that we react and respond to his escalation and initiative. The larger and
faster our response the better. It is not possible to draw clear and compelling distinctions between the effects to be
expected from the incremental differences in the various options.
7. If the forces now in Vietnam or the forces under any of the options prove to be inadequate to break the enemy offensive,
or if, conversely, the enemy sustained offensive breaks the Vietnamese armed forces (even short of destroying the GVN),
then our objectives in South Vietnam and the tasks associated with them will be unobtainable. Specifically, we would be
unable to regain the initiative, that is, we would not be able to conduct offensive operations at the scope and pace required
either to prevent further enemy buildup or to reenter the countryside. This would force US and allied forces into a defensive
posture around the major population centers.
8. The major risks involved in such circumstances are:
a. Enemy forces would retain the initiative and could move a number of divisions now tied down along the borders and
around the Khe Sanh against the populated areas where their attacks by fire would be demoralizing.
b. By holding the countryside, enemy (particularly VC) strength would increase.
c. The enemy could consolidate both geographic areas and segments of the population and probably could establish a
credible Revolutionary Government which, as a minimum, would be a strong position for a negotiated settlement, but more
importantly might bring about the collapse of the GVN and the removal of any reason for US troops to remain in South
Vietnam.
9. Therefore, immediate action to break the enemy's current offensive is not only the first but the decisive requirement.
10. In each of the options discussed in the following sections, sizeable support forces are included which will provide
support not only for the additional combat troops but also for those of the recent (Feb '68) emergency deployments and the
additional light ROK division soon to be deployed.
(Note: The analysis of each of the options assumed the approval, by separate action, of deferral of the civilianization
program as prescribed in Program 5. This provided an authorized base-point strength level of 537,500. (525,000 Program
5 troop level PLUS an additional 12,500 spaces provided by deferral of the civilianization program. Each of the force levels
examined are additive to the amended Program 5 force level of 537,500.)
SUMMARY OF PROPOSED OPTIONS
Action

Program

Strength

Maneuver

Tactical

Option

Battalions
Old Total

Add-On

Fighter Sqdn

New
Total

AddOn

New
Total

Add
On

New
Total

525,000

--

106

--

32

1. None

Program
5

525,000

2. Approve deferral
of civilization
program
amend Program 5
authorized levels.

Revised
Program
5

525,000

12,500

537,500

3. Emergency
Deployment
authorized on 12
Feb 68.
Approve deployment
of residual nondeployed Program 5
TFS.

Option 2

537,500

10,700

548,200

112

35

4. Deploy an
additional 50,000
personnel above
Option 2.

Option 3

548,200

50,000

598,200

118

38

5. Deploy an
additional 100,000
personnel above
Option 2.

Option 4

548,200

100,000

648,200

12

124

43

6. Deploy an
additional194,200
personnel above
revised Program 5
(2 above).

Option 1

537,500

194,200

731,700

27

133

15

47

[Omitted here is another table, entitled "Spreadsheet Summary of Options--Effect of MACV Objectives," in which the
options were assessed in greater detail.]
Section III--Conclusions and Recommendations
A. It is concluded that:
1. Additional deployments to Southeast Asia should commence as soon as possible in order to defeat the present enemy
offensive, improve the security of allied forces in South Vietnam, and regain the initiative.
2. The larger forces of Option I and IA will greatly reduce risks to Free World forces in SVN and will accomplish US
objectives more rapidly than the forces of the other options.
3. Restrictions on military operations in Southeast Asia have prevented the most effective application of allied military
power.
4. The current capability to respond appropriately to additional force requirements is extremely limited.
5. Deficiencies in personnel, equipment, and facilities cannot be overcome in time under present policies and procedures,
and requires extraordinary measures to accelerate procurement and production.

B. It is recommended that:
1. Immediate actions be taken to provide forces of Option 1; specifically:
a. Extension beyond 30 June 1968 of the authority to order to active duty units of the Ready Reserve for a period not to
exceed 24 months;
b. Authority to order to active duty individual members of the Ready Reserve for a period not to exceed 24 months;
c. Authority to extend for a period not to exceed 12 months: enlistments, appointments, periods of active duty, periods of
active duty for training, periods of obligated service, or other military status, in any component of the Armed Forces of the
United States;
d. Obtain selective industrial mobilization as required to accomplish production of material necessary to equip and sustain
forces for the prosecution of the war;
e. Immediately accelerate procurement, to include delegation of authority to the Services to negotiate non-competitive cost
reimbursable contracts.
2. Restraints on military operations in Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam be removed.
[Omitted here are Sections IV-IX, in which the options are separately explored, and Appendix A, "Detailed Threat
Assessment."]

97. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, March 1, 1968, 1130Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Nodis.
Received at 8:44 a.m.
20928. For Secretary Rusk from Bunker. Pass OSD for Secretary Clifford.
1. You have noted in a recent public statement that we may be entering a climactic stage in Viet-Nam./2/ I believe that
indications here tend to support this view. There are many factors which may have convinced Hanoi that it should gamble
on a broad and carefully phased all-out effort. These include our steady grinding down of their forces, the effects of the
bombing in the North, the successful constitutional process in South Viet-Nam, the beginnings of results on pacification,
and possibly other factors which are difficult to judge, such as a revised Hanoi estimate of the trend in American public
opinion. We are not yet clear on Hanoi's aims, but an attempt to engage us in negotiations in 1968 after such a military
effort, combined with its current diplomatic and propaganda offensive, is one possibility.
/2/See footnote 6, Document 67.
2. I think it would be useful at this point to review Thieu's current analysis of Hanoi's three-phase strategy (Saigon 18561
and 19925)./3/ The first phase involved military efforts to seize terrain, to create as much destruction as possible, to build
up heavy casualties, and to pin down GVN and allied troops in the northern I Corps and central Highland areas. Second, to
continue to harass the cities, intensify infiltration, increase popular tension, and build up the guerrilla forces and
infrastructure. This would include interrupting supplies from the countryside to the cities, pinning down troops in urban
areas, and facilitating political spoilage in these areas through propaganda and agitation. Third, to undermine the
pacification program by extending VC control in the countryside through a counter-pacification program. Thieu thought that
following these three efforts, Hanoi would decide whether to negotiate, if her position remains strong enough, or to fade
away. Thieu believes that Hanoi and the NLF will be able to maintain this pace until the end of the year or early 1969,
before moving clearly in one of the two indicated directions. I am inclined to agree that even with higher losses they have
the capacity to continue at least through the summer and into the fall at this general level of activity, unless we and the
GVN are able to pose new problems for them by going on the offensive on both the military and political fronts.
/3/In these telegrams, Bunker reported on meetings with Thieu during which Thieu discussed the enemy's strategy. For

telegram 18561 to Saigon, February 8, see footnote 3, Document 62. Telegram 19925 to Saigon, February 20, is in
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 VIET S.
3. Hanoi's presumed change in strategy presents both a heightened risk and an important opportunity for us. We must at
any reasonable cost eliminate enemy chances of major gains, especially in the two northern provinces, lest this undermine
already shaken South Vietnamese morale. We should, however, be quick to exploit the opportunity created by the enemy's
heavy losses in the Tet offensive, and possibly in a subsequent Thua Thien-Quang Tri action. If the GVN can, as we hope,
recover quickly enough from the Tet onslaught and take advantage of the opportunities offered by the new situation and
we can initiate counter-offensives in certain areas while containing the NVA in northern I Corps, the combined effect may
be to put Hanoi under sufficient pressure to shorten its planned time frame.
4. We are pushing the GVN leadership as hard as we can to get forces out into the countryside and to counter-attack
where feasible, to accelerate civil recovery, and to rally the people in a policy of national unity. We believe that we are
getting some results from the GVN in what are admittedly difficult circumstances for them, but as I have said before it is
essential to bear in mind what human resources we have to work with here in assessing the possibilities for a more
effective leadership and more rapid progress.
5. There are a number of complementary measures which only Washington can take, however. They involve factors which
we cannot fully judge from here, but which we believe could powerfully reinforce the GVN effort and perhaps ultimately
contribute to shortening the war.
A) First, while we recognize the many problems involved in the early despatch of a limited number of added combat troops
to Viet-Nam, we believe that they would reinforce our ability to exploit the enemy's heavy losses and perhaps to make new
moves to deal with infiltration through Laos, as indicated below.
B) Second, accelerated modernization of the South Vietnamese forces is of military and moral importance. The
introduction of Russian-designed assault rifles, light and heavy machine guns, anti-tank rockets and artillery rockets into
Viet Cong military units has increased the enemy's combat power to a major degree and has adversely affected morale of
the Vietnamese armed forces, since they are now out-gunned at battalion level and below. This subject has been
addressed by General Westmoreland through military channels.
C) Third, the enemy's Tet offensive has given us an opportunity to underline the importance of the San Antonio formula as
a prerequisite to any cessation of the bombing in the North and to talks with Hanoi. Both the President and you have
recently reaffirmed this position and this has reassured the GVN leadership. I should point out here that the Tet offensive
has clearly had an effect here of hardening the GVN's public and private position on negotiations and related questions
such as the status of the NLF and overt contacts with it. In fact, with the present state of Vietnamese morale, following the
shock of the Tet attacks and their aftermath, I believe that an early move by us to engage in bilateral talks with Hanoi
would have a most damaging political effect here. Continuing close consultation with the GVN on these matters and the
latter's inclusion at an early stage in any negotiations with Hanoi assume even greater importance now.
D) In assessing our bombing policy in the North, we can see some advantage in increasing the pressure on Hanoi by
adding certain military targets, provided they are of military value and do not increase substantially the likelihood of greater
civilian deaths and casualties. Certain decisions have already been taken in this sense and perhaps there is nothing more
that should be done in this direction. There is some evidence that Hanoi expected retaliation for the Tet attacks, however.
We have been forebearing in recent weeks and months in our effort to indicate to Hanoi that we were ready to talk, but
their response has been the series of vicious attacks in South Viet-Nam over the Tet holidays and their diplomatic
offensive designed to put pressure on us.
E) I urge prompt completion of contingency planning and appropriate responses should Hanoi introduce spectacular new
weaponry or other major new military moves. Examples of this are possible enemy bombing south of the DMZ, attacks on
our carriers, use of the Soviet Frog missile, or extensive use of armor in SVN. Such intensifications of the NVN military
effort would inevitably further affect South Vietnamese morale by emphasizing their relative inferiority in terms of weapons
and equipment.
F) Areas of continuing special concern to me are Laos and Cambodia. As I have pointed out earlier (Saigon 28293 of June
17, 1967)/4/ and repeated several times since, I consider it essential to develop some effective way of greatly reducing the
major infiltration through Laos, which should make the situation here much more manageable. There has also been
increasing circumstantial evidence of enemy supplies, including weapons and ammunition, coming through Cambodia.
Since the effort to strengthen the effectiveness of the ICC there does not seem to be prospering, I believe that early
consideration should be given to other measures which will deter the growing NVA/VC use of Cambodia and the apparent
resupply from this quarter. Our measures should be applied in such a way as to bring pressure on Sihanouk to deal more
forthrightly and concretely with the problem. They should combine political, psychological and any required military actions.

With these twin problems of Laos and Cambodia in mind, I have convened a SEACOORD meeting on March 7, at which
Ambassadors Unger and Sullivan, Admiral Sharp, General Westmoreland and I will review the situation in those two
countries and recommend courses of action to deal with them./5/
/4/Not printed. (Ibid.)
/5/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXVIII, Document 345.
6. I recognize that some of the steps suggested above will be regarded in certain circles as degrees of escalation, and to
be frank about them, they are. What I believe should be weighed against this factor, however, is the apparent all-out nature
of the present enemy strategy which suggests that he is playing all his military cards short of inviting some kind of open
Chinese or Soviet participation beyond the reportedly growing use of Chinese labor to replace North Vietnamese
manpower. In deciding on our actions, we of course wish to avoid steps which might make such external military
involvement more likely for reasons of face or desperation. Our objective should be to take measures which will encourage
the North Vietnamese leadership to seek negotiations on an acceptable basis, in recognition of our determination to
continue on our present course until they do.
7. I hope that these suggestions will receive prompt high-level consideration so that we can capitalize on the enemy's
exposed position at a time when it may count the most.
Bunker

98. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, March 1, 1968, 1515Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret;
Priority; Nodis. Received at 2:11 p.m.
2983. Literally eyes only for Under Secretary from Ambassador. Ref: State 122443./2/
/2/In telegram 122443 to Moscow, February 29, Katzenbach requested that Thompson assess the Soviet reaction to more
aggressive U.S. actions in Vietnam and whether any action could be taken to "offset or lessen" an adverse Soviet reaction.
(Ibid.)
1. Before addressing specific action alternatives I submit following general observations applicable to all. Much would
depend upon general setting in which given action took place. If any of them come out of the blue or in situation which
appeared to reflect U.S. decision to achieve clear military victory, Soviet reaction would be far stronger than if it appeared
to be effort to offset military reserves. Important also would be current weight of opinion in Politburo between hawks and
doves of which we know little. However Soviet frustrations at Budapest Conference, probable effect on Soviet leadership of
their own propaganda which has been increasing in stridency recently and which has tended to strengthen Soviet
commitment not only to NVN but also to NLF, and effect on leadership of other problems such as Middle East and Korea,
all, it seems to me, have operated to make Soviet reactions more likely to be vigorous than was the case a year ago.
2. It should also be noted that the Soviet reactions would not necessarily be confined to Vietnam. They could increase
tension in Germany, particularly in Berlin, in Korea and Middle East. They could revert to all-out cold war and in any event
would step up diplomatic and propaganda activity.
3. In all of alternatives mentioned I would expect increased Soviet military aid which in some cases might go as far as use
of volunteers if North Vietnam would accept them, although most likely in anti-aircraft and other defensive roles. In some
cases they might ask for use of Chinese airfields. I should think supply of medium range rockets or other sophisticated
equipment a real possibility.
4. Following are comments on specific cases although I must admit my crystal ball is very cloudy:
A. Mining of Haiphong Harbor would certainly provoke strong Soviet reaction. As a minimum would expect them to provide
minesweepers, possibly with Soviet naval crews. Because of increased dependence of NVN on China for supplies as a

result of such action, Soviets would read into this wider implications related to the Sino-Soviet quarrel.
B. Intensified bombing of Hanoi-Haiphong area might cause Soviets to arm their merchant ships or possibly even escort
them if one were sunk. If heavy civilian casualties resulted they might persuade NVN to agree to bring matter to the UN
and would at least organize worldwide propaganda campaign and possibly push for international boycott.
C. An Inchon-type landing would probably cause extremely grave reaction. Nature Soviet action would be affected by what
Chinese Communists did. Soviets would not wish to be in a position of doing less. They would probably consider landing
as prelude to full scale invasion and destruction NVN government regardless of how we described the operation.
D. I doubt that our activity in northern portion of DMZ would be regarded as very serious but raids beyond that would cause
stronger reaction depending somewhat upon how it was reported in world press. They would be concerned that we might
be launching trial balloon and that their failure to react strongly might invite actual invasion.
E. I am inclined to believe they would take US/GVN ground action in Laos less seriously than similar action in Cambodia,
particularly if this followed further successful Pathet Lao/NVN offensives.
F. I think there would be very little Soviet reaction to increased U.S. deployments in SVN although there would probably be
some increase in quantity and quality of military equipment supplied by Soviets. The same would be true of request for
massive budget increase.
5. In sum, any serious escalation except in South Vietnam would trigger strong Soviet response although I believe they will
endeavor to avoid direct confrontation with us in that area. A prior bombing pause would mitigate their reaction to
alternatives discussed even though we might have to resume after short period because of increasing infiltration or clearly
unacceptable demands put forward by NVN at start of negotiations. Anything we can do that would diminish picture
Soviets have built up in their own minds of U.S. pursuit of worldwide offensive policy, as for example progress toward
Middle East settlement, would probably make them more tolerant of our actions in Vietnam.
Thompson

99. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Saigon, March 2, 1968, 0947Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs C-M. Top Secret;
Noforn; Limdis; Eyes Only. Repeated to Admiral Sharp.
MAC 2951. In order to quickly furnish information required by your JCS 02430,/2/ I am replying to your questions
piecemeal. This relates to the purely military area referred to in para two of your message.
/2/In addition to questions A and B as quoted in this telegram, in telegram JCS 2430 to Westmoreland, February 29,
Wheeler asked about the necessity to alter political objectives, the possibility of rapid expansion of the ARVN, success in
getting the ARVN back into the countryside, plans to attack enemy units around Saigon, alternative strategies to defend
the South Vietnamese population using only the Program 5 forces plus the six battalions already deployed, whether
evacuating Khe Sanh would improve the military situation, and the feasibility of allowing the ARVN to operate in the Delta
on its own. (Ibid.)
Question A: What military and other objectives are additional forces designed to advance?
Answer: (1) Defeat and evict from SVN the new NVA units now present in western Quang Tri and central Thua Thien
Provinces, to include the Ashau Valley and base areas 101 and 114.
(2) Maintain positive governmental and military control over Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces, particularly the populous
areas of the coastal lowlands and the DMZ area. Be prepared to block or interdict the infiltration/invasion routes from NVN
through Laos.

(3) Destroy VC/NVA main force units and base areas in the remainder of I Corps and in the northeastern coastal and
northwestern Laos border areas of II Corps.
(4) Reduce the "calculated risk" currently entailed in our economy of force posture in II and III Corps by providing the
added flexibility and "punch" of an armored cavalry regiment.
(5) Conduct aggressive and continuing offensive campaigns throughout the coastal areas of II Corps and into traditional
enemy base areas and sanctuaries in III Corps along the Cambodian border; especially in war zones "C" and "D". Restore
the offensive combat and pacification momentum lost in III Corps as a result of the enemy's Tet offensive and the
requirement to transfer the 101st Airborne Division (-) to I Corps to stem the NVA incursion into Quang Tri.
(6) Be prepared for contingency operations if required.
Question B: What specific dangers are their dispatch to SVN designed to avoid, and what specific goals would the
increment of force, if recommended by you (the committee), aim to achieve--in the next 6 months?
over the next year?
Answer: (1) (Predicated on the scheduled delivery of forces indicated during your Feb 68 visit.) Additive forces would serve
to forestall the danger of local defeats due to the tactical degeneration or temporary disorganization of some ARVN units in
the event of another general enemy offensive coupled with a massive invasion across the DMZ. The need to be prepared
to support or reinforce ARVN units that are surprised by the nature and intensity of VC/NVA attacks became manifest
during the enemy's Tet drive and must be recognized in US troop requirement and deployment plans for the foreseeable
future. By providing a two division mobile "swing force" which could be positioned and employed as required, the need to
draw down on forces directly engaged in territorial security tasks probably would be reduced. Thus the danger of losing
popular confidence in and support for GVN/US capabilities, policies and aspirations as a result of temporary military or
psychological setbacks would also be diminished.
(2) Provision of the immediately required additional forces also would make it possible to apply continuous pressure to
some degree in all corps areas and thus reduce the danger of allowing the enemy the opportunity to solicit support from
the population and to reorganize, refit and recoup so that he could soon field rejuvenated units, despite heavy losses
suffered during the Tet offensive. This is particularly important in view of the enemy capability to move additional divisions
south through the Panhandle or DMZ without any clear intelligence indicators of such action. (This matter is of particular
concern to me.) These forces will also make it possible to retain that degree of flexibility and rapid responsiveness
necessary to cope with an apparent new enemy tactic of searching for thin spots in our force structure or deployment in
order to launch his concentrated mass attacks.
(3) In the next six months the presence of the Armored Calvary Regiment in II or III Corps would reduce the degree of
calculated risk inherent in the economy of force posture in those areas, provide added territorial security and further the
goal of providing added combat flexibility. Addition of another Marine regiment and its division headquarters in I Corps
would thicken troop density in critical I CTZ, add to combat flexibility and improve command and control capabilities in that
critical area.
(4) Over the next year the increment of force would make it possible to:
A. Move progressively from North to South with a continuing series of hard hitting offensive campaigns to invade base
areas, interdict and disrupt infiltration routes, and eliminate or evict VC/NVA forces from SVN.
B. At the same time, the highly mobile exploitation force (two divisions) would be available to splinter enemy aggression or
to exploit opportunities for tactical success anywhere in SVN without reducing the minimal essential force necessary to
guarantee maintenance of security in those areas where successful military campaigns have already been waged.
C. Addition of the new division in III Corps during this time frame would re-establish the capability for conducting constant
operations in and around war zones "C" and "D" and make possible the constant use of a division size force in the IV CTZ
which capability was removed with transfer of the 101st Airborne Division (-) to I Corps. In addition, combat operations
conducted by this division would provide added security for LOC and the vital seat of government and economic center of
Saigon.
D. With the total additive combat forces requested it will be possible to deal with the invader from the North, and to face
with a greater degree of confidence the potential tank, rocket and tactical air threat as well as the ever present possibility
that he may reinforce with additional elements of his home army.

Other data and answers will follow./3/

/3/Westmoreland replied to the other questions in telegrams MAC 2952-2956, all March 2. (Ibid.) In telegram MAC 3092 to
Sharp, March 4, Westmoreland noted his desire to submit a request to lift the 525,000 ceiling restriction. (National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 407, Litigation Collection, Westmoreland v. CBS, MACV Backchannel from
Westmoreland, 1-31 March 1968 (Folder 1))
Warm regards.

100. Editorial Note

On March 2, 1968, the Clifford Task Force began its comprehensive reassessment of Vietnam policy by considering a
preliminary draft of a memorandum to the President. This memorandum and its accompanying backup materials were
prepared in the Department of Defense by a staff under the direction of Leslie Gelb of the Office of International Security
Affairs (ISA) and was reviewed by the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs Paul Warnke, Deputy Assistant
Secretaries Morton Halperin and Richard Steadman, and Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis Alain Enthoven. The
staff compilers suggested that an increased level of forces alone would not lead to the achievement of the U.S. political or
military objectives in South Vietnam. The enemy would match any augmentation, the additional troops would be
inadequate to drive the Communist forces out of South Vietnam, having 700,000 troops would lead to a "total
Americanization of the war" which would serve to undermine the effectiveness of and confidence in the South Vietnamese
Government (GVN), and the call-up and consequent expenditures would lead to severe domestic problems within the
United States. The only way to achieve eventual success was for the GVN to provide effective military and political
leadership for its people. Thus, the preliminary memorandum concluded, U.S. troops should no longer engage in attriting
the enemy through search and destroy operations. Instead, U.S. combat units should confine their operations to providing
security for the populace and to supporting operations undertaken by the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN). For text of this
memorandum, see The Pentagon Papers: The Senator Gravel Edition, pages 561-568. The interagency memoranda and
reports comprising the backup material numbered over 40 attachments and are in the Johnson Library, Alain Enthoven
Papers, Draft Presidential Memorandum on Vietnam 1968.
Notes of the meetings of the Clifford group have not been found. However, the meetings are described in Townsend
Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention (New York: David McKay, 1969), pages 171-181; Larry Berman, Lyndon Johnson's War
(New York: Norton, 1989), pages 176-180; Herbert Schandler, Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam: The Unmaking of a
President (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pages 143-156; and Clark Clifford, Counsel to the President,
pages 492-496.
In an article he wrote in 1969, Clifford noted the general tenor of the answers to the questions he sought to address during
his review. Clifford received no assurances that the additional 200,000 men would turn the tide; instead there was "no way
of knowing" how many more soldiers might be needed. He further found that the augmentation would require a reserve
call-up of approximately 280,000, an increased draft call, and an extension of tours of duty. Clifford also was told that the
enemy could match the build-up, that the costs of the build-up would be $12 billion by 1969, that bombing would not stop
the war or decrease U.S. casualties, that U.S. troops would continue to carry the load since the ARVN "were not yet ready
to replace our troops," that there was "no plan for victory in the historic American sense," and that there was "no
agreement on an answer" as to how long it would take to win the war of attrition. See Clark Clifford, "A Viet Nam
Reappraisal: The Personal History of One Man's View and How It Evolved," Foreign Affairs 47:4 (July 1969), pages 601622.
According to The Pentagon Papers, the group did not reach a consensus on a new strategy but requested that Warnke
and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Philip Goulding draft a new and "less controversial" paper than the
preliminary memorandum. The new Draft Presidential Memorandum was discussed by the Clifford group on March 3. It
recommended:
"1. Meeting General Westmoreland's request by deploying as close to May 1 as practical 20,000 additional troops
(approximately 1/2 of which would be combat).
"2. Approval of a Reserve call-up and an increased end strength adequate to meet the balance of the request and to
restore a strategic reserve in the United States, adequate for possible contingencies.
"3. Reservation of the decision to deploy the balance of General Westmoreland's new request. While we would be in a
position to make these additional deployments, the future decision to do so would be contingent upon:

"a. Continuous reexamination of the desirability of further deployments on a week-by-week basis as the situation develops;
"b. Improved political performance by the GVN and increased contributions in effective military action by the ARVN;
"c. The results of a study in depth, to be initiated immediately, of a possible new strategic guidance for the conduct of U.S.
military operations in South Vietnam." (The Pentagon Papers: The Senator Gravel Edition, page 573)
The final version of the Draft Presidential Memorandum is printed as Document 103.

101. Telegram From the White House Situation Room to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 3, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs C-M. Top Secret.
The notation "ps" on the telegram indicates that the President saw it.
CAP 80644. Following is General Westmoreland's report on offensive operations in Vietnam:/2/
/2/Westmoreland's report was sent as telegram MAC 2984 to Wheeler, February 3, 0238Z. Wheeler transmitted it to
Rostow and Rusk at 2004Z.
Although there have been no highly publicized major operations launched against the NVA, there has been a general
resumption of aggressive offensive operations throughout the country.
Yesterday, Gen Vien and I visited Gen Thang, the new IV Corps Commander, at Can Tho. Gens Eckhardt, Weyand and
Ewell/3/ were present. This was the initial meeting of our forthcoming offensive. My philosophy was expressed as fot thirty
days the enemy tried to effect a coup. His plans were based on the twin assumptions that the people would rise up and
join his forces and that the fighting spirit of the RVNAF was low. The record of the past thirty days has proved that the
people are sound, they will fight for their freedom. The armed forces have proved that they do have fighting spirit. There
were no traitors; nearly all units fought well. The enemy was misled by his own propaganda.y his own propaganda.
/3/Generals George Eckhardt, senior military adviser in IV Corps; Frederick Weyand, Commander of the II Field Force; and
Julian Ewell, Commander of the 9th Infantry Division.
The question is often heard, "When are the VC going to attack again?" This type of thinking is unacceptable. The VC are
tired, they have suffered heavy casualties, they are staying in their positions attempting to pose as a threat, but, at the
same time, hoping that we will remain defensively oriented around the cities and not attack them.
We must stop thinking about the next VC attack and start thinking, all of us, of continuing to carry the attack to the enemy.
We are fully capable of doing it. It is true that our forces have been operating at a fast pace for thirty days and we have
suffered heavy casualties. Some may be tired. However, the main thing now is our state of mind. It will be the side that
perseveres and carries the fight to the enemy that wins. And we are going to do it.
Throughout the country we are moving to a general offensive.
In IV Corps Gen Thang has just taken command and he is working on plans to launch a major offensive in Dinh Tuong
Province, commencing on 6 or 7 March. It will involve a major portion of the 7th ARVN Division and about two thirds of the
9th U.S. Division under Gen Ewell. Gen Weyand will provide helo support, an air cavalry troop and additional artillery. The
objectives of the operation will be to defeat the four main force battalions in Dinh Tuong, restore the security around My
Tho, secure and repave Highway 4, reestablish--and relocate as necessary--the Regional Forces/Popular Forces outposts,
and further the regional development program. This operation will be the first event of a major corps wide offensive which
Gen Thang will initiate. It will have one name (Vietnamese) and will be properly publicized so as to make the broadest
possible impact.
In III Corps, a similar plan is being worked out by Gens Weyand and Khang. It will embrace the five provinces around
Saigon--and will be a one named joint U.S./VN operation. It will also be one of the largest ever conducted in III Corps and
will continue until the enemy is defeated or driven out of the area. It will commence nearly simultaneously with the IV Corps

offensive and will be properly reported so as to have maximum impact.

At the same time, in northern I Corps, we will move into high gear in the next few days. With over 20 percent of all
U.S./ARVN maneuver battalions in this area, and with the logistic situation improving daily, we are in an excellent posture
as to commence a broad offensive.
The operations in I & III Corps will be supported by the maximum use of tactical air and B-52 strikes. For the time being, I
must keep priority of air at Khe Sanh but I am prepared to make massive shifts, particularly of B-52s, to Ashau Valley or to
III Corps, when the weather permits tactical air to provide visual attack support for Khe Sanh.
In II Corps, we are not planning on one major offensive. However, the ROKs are on the move along the coast in a multibattalion operation. Gen Peers/4/ is prepared to wage a major battle against the enemy forces in Kontum or Darlac
Provinces. His spirit is aggressive and he has the exact frame of mind required to conduct the economy of force operations
which his situation requires. Peers has a new counterpart, Maj Gen Lu Lan, who at the outset has displayed an aggressive
spirit.
/4/Lieutenant General William R. Peers, Commander of the 4th Infantry Division.
On Monday Gen Vien and I are meeting with Gens Weyand and Khang and their division commanders to discuss their
plans for the immediate implementation of this offensive strategy.
Tomorrow afternoon Vien has invited at my suggestion the Free World commanders to his headquarters to give them the
benefit of his offensive attitude. Since it is not within Vien's character to use forceful language I will provide the necessary
emphasis in a follow-up.
Today I will visit Gens Abrams, Cushman and Rosson/5/ to review their plans.
/5/Lieutenant General William B. Rosson, Commander of the Provisional Corps.
I hope that the impact of these simultaneous major operations will convince the people in SVN and Washington that we are
not waiting for either the VC to resume the initiative, or for someone to help us. The time is ripe to move out and we will do
so.
We will emphasize the offensive nature of the current operations in future reports, without distorting the perspective.

102. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 4, 1968, 1:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 7, Meeting with President
and Draft Memo. Top Secret; Sensitive.
Mr. President:
SUBJECT
The Clifford Committee
1. After much debate, there should be before you at 5:30 this afternoon an agreed paper./2/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 103.
2. The essence of the agreement is:
--We should send to Westy in, say, the next three months, whatever we can send him that would be helpful in the tense
battle he may face before the weather changes; but the condition of our Reserves does not permit us to get much to him in
this time interval (perhaps 30,000)./3/

/3/Rostow added the parenthetical note by hand.

--We should call up Reserves sufficient to meet the rest of his requirements if it is later judged that the rest of his request
must and should be met;
--These two actions require that we reconstitute the U.S. strategic Reserve. The exact scale of this reconstitution has not
been agreed in the group nor the exact recommended combination of increased draft call and Reserve call-up. All hands
agree, however, that our basic national security position requires the reconstitution of our Reserve position if we are not to
tempt aggressors in various parts of the world.
3. It was agreed that we should make a maximum effort to encourage and induce improved Vietnamese military and
political perform-ance. The particular headings for discussion with and pressure of the GVN are pretty well worked out.
As part of this effort there should be a program for improving the equipment of the ARVN; and a rough package has been
worked out for that purpose of, say, $400 million.
4. It was agreed that there should be a fresh review of our strategy in Viet Nam; that this should be urgently conducted and
completed before you are asked to make a commitment to send Westy forces beyond the tranche recommended for the
next three months.
5. On the economic side, Joe Fowler would propose that the increased budgetary outlay for Fiscal 68-69 be offset dollar
for dollar mainly by a tax increase, but he believes a program reduction of civilian outlays in Fiscal 69 will be required in the
$2-$3 billion range. He has further recommendations in the field of manpower policy and administration and wage/price
policy, but does not recommend formal wage and price controls. Since the recommended package is only now beginning
to take shape, Secretary Fowler has not discussed it with Okun, Zwick,/4/ or Califano.
/4/Arthur Okun, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and Charles Zwick, Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
Discussion
You should know that the discussion we have had in these days has been colored by one major uncertainty and a widely
shared reservation. The uncertainty is: what are enemy capabilities, and what are U.S. and ARVN capabilities in the days,
weeks, and several months ahead?
We all have the feeling that the battle is likely to be pretty close. If the enemy brings in additional North Vietnamese forces,
it could become dangerous for our side; and it will go badly for our side unless we can induce the ARVN to go out and fight
in the countryside. On the other hand, if we and the ARVN prove capable of taking the offensive along the lines in Westy's
latest cable, we could make 1968 the year of decision. Thus, the performance of the Vietnamese and the ARVN is critical
and the exact state of the enemy which we won't know until we engage him or he engages us. Therefore, in looking ahead
over the next months and considering Westy's request, we don't know whether we are being asked to send forces to
prevent a radical deterioration in our side's position, or to permit him to conduct in the second half of the year a vigorous
offensive.
The reservation, which goes deep in State and Defense, is that the additional forces would constitute a gross overcommitment of U.S. military resources to Viet Nam without bringing us closer to a resolution of the problem. Behind that
judgment, in turn, is a feeling that we can only attain our objectives in Viet Nam by a negotiation which brings the Viet
Cong into the political process, and this negotiation, in turn, may not be much advanced by putting additional U.S. forces
into the country. Secretary Rusk, for example, is thinking in terms of setting an absolute limit on U.S. forces and then
leaving the rest of the job up to the South Vietnamese.
The group did not address itself to an extremely important question, which is precisely how this package would be
presented to the Congress and the country.
I have some ideas about this; and I am sure others do also.
As for the Congress, there was a general feeling that this will be a difficult matter; probably possible; but we might confront
some extremely ugly and determined opposition from Fulbright, Gore, etc.--perhaps including a filibuster.
The differences of view about bombing and mining Haiphong were so profound within the group, and other issues so
urgently required resolution, that the bombing question was put to one side for separate and later treatment.

Walt

103. Draft Memorandum for President Johnson/1/

Washington, March 4, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Draft Memorandum for the President [3/14/68 re
VN]. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by the Clifford Task Force. Portions of this memorandum and the attached tabs are
printed in The Pentagon Papers: The Senator Gravel Edition, pp. 575-584.
General Westmoreland has requested an additional 205,000 troops (beyond the 525,000 personnel now authorized). He
asks for the deployment in three packages, by May 1, September 1 and December 31.
General Wheeler believes we should prepare ourselves to meet the request for an additional 205,000 personnel and
should act to increase and improve our strategic reserve in the United States. An initial staff examination of requirements
indicates that to achieve both will require:
a. A call-up of reserve units and individuals totaling approximately 262,000 (194,000 in units, 68,000 as individuals).
b. Increased draft calls.
c. Extension of terms of service. These actions would produce a total increase in end strength in the Armed Forces of
approximately 511,000 by June 30, 1969. (The staff examination referred to above included spaces to add 31,500 troops
in South Korea and a US naval proposal to add two cruisers and fifteen destroyers to the naval forces in Southeast Asia. If
these proposals are disapproved in their entirety, the figures above will be decreased to approximately 242,000 and
454,000 respectively.)
A build-up of roughly these dimensions would enable us to meet the Westmoreland request and, in any event, would
reconstitute the strategic reserve in the United States.
We recommend:
1. An immediate decision to deploy to Vietnam an estimated total of 22,000 additional personnel (approximately 60% of
which would be combat). An immediate decision to deploy the three tactical fighter squadrons deferred from Program 5
(about 1,000 men). This would be over and above the four battalions (about 3,700 men) already planned for deployment in
April which in themselves would bring us slightly above the 525,000 authorized level. The argument for this immediate
action, and detailed schedules of availability is contained in Tab A./2/
/2/None of the tabs is printed. In the paper attached at Tab A, the group noted that an immediate injection of forces would
influence variables, such as the degree to which the Communist forces kept pressing their attacks, the ability of the VC to
extend its control in the countryside, and the ability of the GVN to improve its performance and win popular support.
2. Either through Ambassador Bunker or through an early visit by Secretary Clifford, a highly forceful approach to the GVN
(Thieu and Ky) to get certain key commitments for improvement, tied to our own increased effort and to increased US
support for the ARVN. Details are in Tab B./3/
/3/In Tab B the group noted that such an effort would demonstrate U.S. commitment to the GVN, although it was possible
that the South Vietnamese might "relax behind the refuge of American power." The specific actions required of the GVN
included stepped-up mobilization, greater unity among its top leadership, getting back into the countryside, attacking the
VC infrastructure, creation of some arrangement approaching a joint command, reform of the GVN, replacement of the
current Prime Minister, formation of a united front group of anti-Communist organizations, steps to prevent inflation and
counteract the balance-of-payments deficit faced by the United States as a result of having more troops in South Vietnam,
and efficient resource allocation.
3. Early approval of a Reserve call-up and an increased end strength adequate to meet the balance of the Westmoreland
request and to restore a strategic reserve in the United States, adequate for possible contingencies world-wide. Supporting
discussion and details are in Tab C./4/

/4/The paper at Tab C argued that even if all the additional forces were not deployed to Vietnam, these measures would
still be warranted due to the depletion of the strategic reserve.
4. Reservation of the decision to meet the Westmoreland request in full. While we would be putting ourselves in a position
to make these additional deployments, the future decision to do so would be contingent upon:
a. Reexamination on a week-by-week basis of the desirability of further deployments as the situation develops;
b. Improved political performance by the GVN and increased contribution in effective military action by the ARVN;
c. The results of a study in depth, to be initiated immediately, of possible new political and strategic guidance for the
conduct of US operations in South Vietnam, and of our Vietnamese policy in the context of our world-wide politico-military
strategy. Supporting discussion is in Tab D./5/
/5/As expressed in Tab D, the view of the Clifford group was that "there can be no assurance that this very substantial
additional deployment would leave us a year from today in any more favorable military position." Since the war posed a
danger to U.S. interests and commitments worldwide, and since the enemy's recent tactics had proven that "there can be
no prospect of a quick military solution," a major interagency study on strategic guidance involving Westmoreland and
Bunker had to be undertaken in the near future. Nitze wrote two memoranda on strategic guidance, both dated March 3,
which dealt separately with short-term recovery and longer-range strategy. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze
Papers, Vietnam War-Miscellaneous Materials, 1968)
5. No new peace initiative on Vietnam. Re-statement of our terms for peace and certain limited diplomatic actions to
dramatize Laos and to focus attention on the total threat to Southeast Asia. Details in Tab E./6/
/6/Tab E contained the text of a February 29 memorandum prepared by Bundy which listed three negotiating alternatives:
"stand pat on the San Antonio formula," undertake a new initiative modifying the San Antonio formula (which the paper
concluded would be "unwise" since the San Antonio formula was "rock bottom"), or "pitching" for negotiations following a
countering of the enemy offensive.
6. A general decision on bombing policy, not excluding future change, but adequate to form a basis for discussion with the
Congress on this key aspect. Here your advisers are divided:
a. General Wheeler and others would advocate a substantial extension of targets and authority in and near Hanoi and
Haiphong, mining of Haiphong, and naval gunfire up to a Chinese Buffer Zone;
b. Others would advocate a seasonal step-up through the spring, but without these added elements.
The opposing arguments are in Tab F./7/
/7/The paper at Tab F detailed further discussion of how to intensify the bombing of North Vietnam.
In proposing this course of action, we recognize that there are certain difficulties and negative factors, outlined in Tab G.
Additional problems we can anticipate in US public opinion are at Tab H./8/ Nevertheless, we believe that this course of
action, in its essential outline at least, is urgently required to meet the immediate situation in Vietnam as well as wider
possible contingencies there and elsewhere.
/8/The papers at Tabs G and H emphasized the domestic difficulties faced by the President in increasing the troop
commitment to Vietnam and in calling up the reserves.

104. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, March 4, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting lasted from 5:33 to 7:20 p.m. and
took place in the Cabinet Room. Those attending were the President, the Vice President, Clifford, Rusk, Wheeler, Helms,
Taylor, Rostow, Christian, Presidential aide Marvin Watson, and Tom Johnson. Immediately preceding and following this

meeting, the President met privately with Clifford. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) No record of these meetings has been
found.
The President: As I told you last week, I wanted you to return today with your recommendations in response to General
Westmoreland's request. Among the things I asked you to study were the following questions:
1. What particular forces are you recommending that we dispatch immediately? How do we get these forces?
2. How soon could we formulate what we want from the South Vietnamese?
3. What difficulties do you foresee with your recommendations, both with the Congress and financially?
(There was an Agenda for the meeting prepared by Walt Rostow. That agenda is attached as Appendix A.)/2/
/2/Memorandum from Rostow to the President, March 4. (Ibid., Declassified and Sanitized Documents from Unprocessed
Files, Vietnam)
As I understand it, Clark Clifford, Secretary Rusk, and Rostow and others have been meeting on these questions in
conjunction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Walt Rostow: That is correct.
Clark Clifford: Paul Nitze and I started to work on this Friday night./3/ As you could understand, with the time pressure we
placed upon ourselves there still may need to be refinements and adjustments to the program I will discuss.
/3/March 1.
We have tried to make this document clear and understandable. (Undersecretary Nitze passed out prior to the meeting
copies of a "Draft Memorandum for the President." A copy of that document is attached.)/4/
/4/Document 103.
The subject is a very profound one, and I consider it advisable to outline the difficulty we face and the central problem
which your advisers see you facing.
As you know, from time to time, the military leaders in the field ask for additional forces. We have, in the past, met these
requests until we are now at the point where we have agreed to supply up to 525,000 men to General Westmoreland.
He now has asked for 205,000 additional troops. There are three questions:
1. Should the President send 205,000?
2. Should the President not send any more?
3. Should the President approve a figure somewhere in between and send an alternative number?
Your senior advisers have conferred on this matter at very great length. There is a deep-seated concern by your advisers.
There is a concern that if we say, yes, and step up with the addition of 205,000 more men that we might continue down the
road as we have been without accomplishing our purpose--which is for a viable South Vietnam which can live in peace.
We are not convinced that our present policy will bring us to that objective.
As I said before, we spent hours discussing this matter. For a while, we thought and had the feeling that we understood the
strength of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. You will remember the rather optimistic reports of General
Westmoreland and Ambassador Bunker last year.
Frankly, it came as a shock that the Vietcong-North Vietnamese had the strength of force and skill to mount the Tet

offensive--as they did. They struck 34 cities, made strong inroads in Saigon and in Hue. There have been very definite
effects felt in the countryside.
At this stage, it is clear that this new request by General Westmoreland brings the President to a clearly defined
watershed:
1. Do you continue to go down that same road of "more troops, more guns, more planes, more ships?"
2. Do you go on killing more Viet Cong and more North Vietnamese and killing more Vietcong and more North
Vietnamese?
There are grave doubts that we have made the type of progress we had hoped to have made by this time. As we build up
our forces, they build up theirs. We continue to fight at a higher level of intensity.
Even were we to meet this full request of 205,000 men, and the pattern continues as it has, it is likely that by March he
(General Westmoreland) may want another 200,000 to 300,000 men with no end in sight.
The country we are trying to save is being subjected to enormous damage. Perhaps the country we are trying to save is
relying on the United States too much. When we look ahead, we may find that we may actually be denigrating their ability
to take over their own country rather than contributing to their ability to do it.
We recommend in this paper that you meet the requirement for only those forces that may be needed to deal with any
exigencies of the next 3-4 months. March-April-May could be an important period.
We recommend an immediate decision to deploy to Vietnam an estimated total of 22,000 additional personnel. We would
agree to get them to General Westmoreland right away. It would be valuable for the general to know they are coming so he
can make plans accordingly.
This is as far as we are willing to go. We would go ahead, however, and call up a sufficient number of men. If later the
President decides Westmoreland needs additional reinforcements, you will have men to meet that contingency.
The President: Westmoreland is asking for 200,000 men, and you are recommending 20,000 or so?
Clark Clifford: The strategic reserves in the United States are deeply depleted. They must be built up. Senator Russell has
said this. We do not know what might happen anywhere around the world, but to face any emergency we will need to
strengthen the reserve.
Out of this buildup you can meet additional requests from Westmoreland in the event you decide he needs more than the
22,000 later. The first increment will meet his needs for the next three to four months.
Westmoreland must not have realized it, but it would have taken much longer than he had anticipated to provide the men
and units he originally requested anyway. We could not meet that schedule.
We suggest that you go ahead and get the manpower ready. If they are not really necessary for Vietnam, they can be
added to the Strategic Reserve to strengthen it.
We also feel strongly that there should be a comprehensive study of the strategic guidance to be given General
Westmoreland in the future.
We are not sure the present strategy is the right strategy--that of being spread out all over the country with a seek and
destroy policy.
We are not convinced that this is the right way, that it is the right long-term course to take. We are not sure under the
circumstances which exist that a conventional military victory, as commonly defined, can be had.
After this study is made--if there is no clear resolution in the actions of the next 3-4 months except long drawn-out
procedure--we may want to change the strategic guidance given Westmoreland. Perhaps we should not be trying to
protect all of the countryside, and instead concentrate on the cities and important areas in the country.

There will be considerably higher casualties if we follow the Westmoreland plan. It just follows that if we increase our troop
commitment by 200,000 men, there will be significantly higher casualties.
We may want to consider using our men as a "shield" behind which the government of South Vietnam could strengthen
itself and permit the ARVN to be strengthened.
Under the present situation, there is a good deal of talk about what the Arvn "will do" but when the crunch is on, when the
crunch comes, they look to us for more. When they got into the Tet offensive, Thieu's statement wasn't what more they
could do but that "it is time for more U.S. troops." There is no easy answer to this.
If we continue with our present policy of adding more troops and increasing our commitment, this policy may lead us into
Laos and Cambodia.
The reserve forces in North Vietnam are a cause for concern as well. They have a very substantial population from which
to draw. They have no trouble whatever organizing, equipping, and training their forces.
We seem to have a sinkhole. We put in more--they match it. We put in more--they match it.
The South Vietnamese are not doing all they should do.
The Soviets and the Chinese have agreed to keep the North Vietnamese well armed and well supplied.
The Vietcong are now better armed than the ARVN. They have:
--better rifles
--better training
--more sophisticated weapons (mortars, artillery, rockets).
I see more and more fighting with more and more casualties on the U.S. side and no end in sight to the action.
I want to give a whole new look at the whole situation. There is strong unanimity on this. If it were possible, we would want
to look at the situation without sending more troops to him. But we should send the 22,000--that is, until a new policy
decision is reached. And that 22,000--that will be it until that decision is made.
We can no longer rely just on the field commander. He can want troops and want troops and want troops. We must look at
the overall impact on us, including the situation here in the United States. We must look at our economic stability, our other
problems in the world, our other problems at home; we must consider whether or not this thing is tieing us down so that we
cannot do some of the other things we should be doing; and finally, we must consider the effects of our actions on the rest
of the world--are we setting an example in Vietnam through which other nations would rather not go if they are faced with a
similar threat?
It is out of caution and for protection that we recommend these additional forces.
Now the time has come to decide where do we go from here.
I can assure the President that we can reexamine this situation with complete protection to our present position.
We do recommend the following actions:
1. A callup of reserve units and individuals totaling approximately 262,000 (194,000 in units; 68,000 as individuals).
2. An increase in the draft calls.
3. Extension of terms of service.

These actions would produce a total increase in strength in the Armed Forces of approximately 511,000 by June 30, 1969.
This proposal includes 31,600 troops for deployment to South Korea. I would oppose that. It also includes a U.S. navy unit.
If the troops for South Korea and the naval units are disapproved, the figures would be decreased to approximately
242,000 reservists called up and 454,000 total increase in troop strength.
If you do wish to meet the additional troop request, or further demands of Westmoreland you can do it out of this pool of
242,000.
If you did not, the Strategic Reserve would be strengthened by their addition. This would, in the opinion of the JCS, put the
Strategic Reserve "just about right."
You need to have that type of reserve in times such as these.
As part and parcel of policy decisions, it is important to have a very clear understanding with the government of South
Vietnam. They should know that your eventual decision about more troops and more use of U.S. support depends to a
large part on their attitude.
We should tell the South Vietnamese that the General has asked for 200,000 more troops, but we are giving only 25,000.
We should let them know that you are delaying your decision until you know what the GVN will do about:
--removal of the poor unit commanders
--meaningful steps to eliminate corruption
--meeting their own leadership responsibilities
--not only saying they will do something, but meaning it as well.
If they are not, we should know it now.
I suggest you allow yourself greater degree of latitude and flexibility. There possibly is another plan which can be utilized.
There may be another way to avoid more bloodshed to us, possibly by letting go some areas.
We should consider changing our concept from one of protecting real estate to protecting people. We need to see if these
people are really going to take care of themselves eventually. I am not sure we can ever find our way out if we continue to
shovel men into Vietnam.
We have looked at all your questions. The answers to each of them are included in the context of the document before you
tonight.
We say, for example, that this is not the time to negotiate.
We have spent the last three days trying to reach a consensus. As we sat together and cross-fertilized, we have reached a
general consensus on this.
Of course, if we had to vote on sending the straight 200,000 men or no men, we would come out all over the lot . . . we
would be split all over the place.
But we wonder if we are really making progress toward our goal under the plan we have been following.
This is the overall approach we would recommend.
The President: Does this change the tour of duty?
General Wheeler: The tour of duty in Vietnam is not changed. We feel this is an essential reason for the high morale. It is

the total length of service which will be lengthened.

The President: Does it affect the man with 4 years service the same as the draftee?
General Wheeler: Yes, sir. It would apply to all types. Of course, there are some men we would not want to extend.
The President: Have we done this before (extend tours)?
Undersecretary Nitze: Yes, sir. At least twice. At one time, the Secretary of the Navy had the authority to do this. I did it for
a period during Vietnam. The Congress took this authority away last year to put it on an equal basis with the other
services.
General Wheeler: We did it at the same time of the Berlin airlift. Also during the Cuban missile crisis, I believe.
Secretary Rusk: Mr. President, without a doubt, this will be one of the most serious decisions you will have made since
becoming President. This has implications for all of our society.
First, on the review of strategic guidance: we want the Vietnamese to do their full share and be able to survive when we
leave. This was one of the things that saved us in Korea. The question is whether substantial additional troops would
eventually increase or decrease South Vietnamese strength.
We may very well find that there are equipment factors that would create competition among our new U.S. forces being
sent out to Vietnam and the South Vietnamese. Many of us would like to see the ARVN equipped better and supplied with
the M-16 rifles.
We must also consider what would happen to our NATO troop policies. To reduce NATO troops is a serious matter indeed.
We have also got to think of what this troop increase would mean in terms of increased taxes, the balance of payments
picture, inflation, gold, and the general economic picture.
We should study moving away from the geographic approach of Vietnam strategy to a demographic approach.
On the negotiation front, I wish we had a formula to bring about a peaceful settlement soon. We do not. The North
Vietnamese are pressing against Laos and Thailand. The Chinese are leaning against Burma and Cambodia.
During the day we had two additional comebacks on two probes which we made. The Shah of Iran saw Hanoi's
representative. The Hanoi representative pressed the Shah to get us to accept some of their conditions--those Hanoi had
laid down. He said he wanted to see the Shah again./5/
/5/As reported in telegram 121108 to Bern and Rome, February 27, and in additional documentation in National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/FLEMING. In a memorandum to Rusk,
Harriman speculated that Mai Van Bo had spoken with the Shah. (Ibid., S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 461, Fleming)
The Rumanian was in again. I asked him if after the winter-spring offensive the Hanoi government would take a different
position. He said he thought they were giving some thought to it./6/
/6/See Document 71.
But the negotiation track is quite bleak at the current time.
I think we should make public some of our peace efforts. Clark Clifford has outlined well the problems. Appendix G and
H/7/ will show the divisive element we must face if we move forward with this decision.
/7/See footnote 8, Document 103.
The President: Why not an extension of enlistments at the same time of the callup of reserves? Why can't we have the
callup now, with the extension of enlistments later if needed?

General Wheeler: The extension is the best way to quickly build up the Strategic Reserve. We need men with leadership
and experience to train new men and to expand and improve our replacements.
Nitze: We could say that no man would be extended for more than a certain period of time.
Wheeler: On that point (whether Congress will go for an extension of enlistments) you have a better feel than I.
President: Russell says you must call up reserves before extending enlistments.
Wheeler: The callup must be phased anyway. When you announce callup, you should announce the dates of the callup of
the units.
I talked to the JCS today. General Chapman says he needs a certain number of Marine Reserves to fill out the 4th Marine
Wing.
Clifford: I suggest a package approach including:
--the callup of reserves
--extension of enlistments
--callup of individuals.
By the time Congress took action on the extension, we would be calling men up anyway. If we did not get extensions we
would be along with the regular unit callup anyway.
President: I don't question the need for a callup. How many men can you get by voluntary extensions?
Nitze: Very few. We got only 900 last time.
President: What about incentives?
Wheeler: We have some very good incentives.
President: How much of an increase in draft calls?
Nitze: About an increase of 150,000 men in 6 months. The draft call is up to 48,000. They have been running 30,000. The
increase would have them running about 45,000.
President: How about men who haven't served?
Wheeler: They are not as well trained. We need men with experience.
In FY 68, 341,000 men are to be inducted. Need an additional 100,000 this year.
Rusk: What is annual increment of inductees?
Wheeler: We have enormous pool of men available.
President: How many in Project 100,000?/8/
/8/Project 100,000 was a program initiated in 1966 to increase inductions into the military services by waiving requirements
on mathematical and verbal tests for prospective draftees and recruits.
Nitze: 60,000 approximately. In Phase I, quota was 40,000. There were 49,000 volunteered. In Phase II, there is a quota of
100,000. In first three months, 31,000 have volunteered. That is far above quota for that period.

Fowler: We would need an entirely new fiscal program to offset expenditures dollar for dollar. I would forecast an increase
in expenditures of $2.5 billion in fiscal 68 and $10 billion in fiscal 69. There would be an adverse balance of payments
impact of $500 million.
The adoption of this program would require a new fiscal program. These things are necessary:
--a new fiscal package
--a new mutual security package (separating all project assistance for South Vietnam, Thailand, and Korea from the
current foreign aid arrangement)
--agreement on reserve management
--increase in the tax proposal so that we could offset expenditures
--cut low priority civilian programs (a $2-$3 billion cut in program outlays would be required).
An increase in the force level by 500,000 men would put pressure on manpower and employment. The cream of the labor
force, men twenty years of age or older, already is way down low in unemployment.
We will have some area and skill shortages. This will have its pluses and its minuses. We could then begin to focus our
training and manpower development programs on a specific area or specific skill. We could, by this, minimize the
manpower shortages.
We would have to have additional procurement. There would need to be an assessment of materiel and supply program.
Also judgments must be made on our economic and stabilization policies. I would ask Okum, Martin, Zwick and I to
determine if---standby credit controls should be used
--we should have authority to deal with flareups in the wage-price field.
Dick Helms: I feel that the study of the last 3-4 days has shown that we must replenish our Strategic Reserve. If you look at
conditions throughout the world, you can easily see that we need it.
Rusk: I would go to Congress for specific actions not for a statement of policy such as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. We do
not want a general declaration.
President: In the Senate we face a real problem. Anything that requires any authority may result in a filibuster.
Wheeler: If we could provide Westy with the troops he wants I would recommend they be sent. They cannot be provided.
This (the 22,000) is what we can do by 15 June.
I find nothing wrong with going along with this track. I recommend these additional forces: 4 battalions of infantry; 3 tactical
fighter squadrons; an additional 6 tactical fighter squadrons (2 by 1 April; 3 by 1 May; 1 by 1 June); 1 Marine RLT of the
4th Marine Division; and 1 Battalion of Seabees (700 men).
This is all we can do by 15 June.
With the callup of the reserves, you still can meet Westmoreland's request by 1 September and 1 December--but not by
May 1.
President: Why Seabees?
Wheeler: We need to expand that unit of personnel.
Walt Rostow: There are two matters that need to be looked into in this study:

1. The question of North Vietnamese Reserves. There are two schools of thought on this. Some believe they can put
additional men into battle easily, and match our forces. Some think they are limited.
2. I think we should cast aside the generalities about military solution vs. diplomatic solution; or population strategy vs. real
estate protection.
I agree we must build up the ARVN and the GVN. They are the reason we are there. Ought to bring them along on the
Southern solution. That is, we need to talk candidly with them and develop a frank dialogue about the matters between us.
We need to look for a fresh summary of the reasons for mining Haiphong. There may be additional military steps to resolve
the matter sooner.
The Russians really have not had difficult choices. We should look at a course of harder as well as softer policy.
Nitze: I differ with Walt on that. We need to build up the Arvn and the government. The real impact depends on whether
the ARVN can pick themselves up. We must use the ARVN more effectively.
It is clear that our strategic reserves are inadequate. We must rebuild them.
Wheeler: Prior to Vietnam, the Strategic Reserves had 12 divisions (9 Army and 3 Marines).
Now they have 4-2/3 Army (none of which are deployable) and 1-1/9 Marines (not deployable).
Nitze: We must get into negotiations some time soon. These fellows are not necessarily the key (the contacts such as the
Rumanian or the Shah).
We must make up our own minds when we want to cease the bombings and see what happens.
We have to look at what we can do to get into negotiations. We must choose our own time. We should do this no later than
May or June.
Rusk: We could stop the bombing during the rainy period in the North.
President: Really "get on your horses" on that.
Vice President: I have no comment on anything. I really just have been learning tonight.
General Taylor: We are all for this recommendation tonight--but all for different reasons. I frankly was startled to learn that
we can't send more than 22,000 men.
I also want to know if this is a year of despair or a year of opportunity. I think it is the latter.
Westy may get into trouble between now and June. He could lose a lot of politically valuable terrain.
We should bear this in mind. The first three pages of the document. I agree with that.
The tab on new Strategic Guidance./9/ I agree we should review this, but we may not be able to reduce the blood
requirement, the troop requirement, and the other necessities.
/9/Tab D of the draft memorandum; see footnote 5, Document 103.
Let's not delude ourselves about the ARVN. They will try--they will give us the right answers--but don't count on them to do
too much in a short period of time.
President: Have you told Westmoreland you would only send this number and we could give no more by June 1?

Wheeler: No, I will tell him after this meeting.

President: Tell him to forget the 100,000. Tell him 22,000 is all we can give at the moment./10/
/10/Wheeler reported on the meeting and the President's reactions to the Clifford Group's recommendations in telegram
JCS 2590 to Westmoreland, March 5, specifically noting that "the requirements you have expressed for additional forces
can be met only by taking far-reaching actions including a call-up of reserves, extension of terms of serv-ice, and a request
for an increase in the defense budget for 1969," and thus a decision on fully meeting Westmoreland's request would be
reserved for the time being. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 407, Litigation Collection, Westmoreland
v. CBS, MACV Backchannel Messages to Westmoreland, 1-31 March 1968 (Folder 1))
Rusk: I see new fighting has begun.
Wheeler: They are planning to crank up a new offensive. I told Westy that combined operations would draw the ARVN out.
President: If the ARVN are not equipped as well as the Vietcong, isn't that a sad commentary on us?
Nitze: It may be possible to supply all ARVN with M-16s, and grenade launchers and machine guns. We have armed
personnel carriers on the way out to Westmoreland now.
Wheeler: We are also shipping tanks and choppers.
President: Have we gotten through the engine bottleneck on the choppers?
Nitze: No
President: Let's do everything we can on choppers. Otherwise, I am going to bring that over here to handle. Get them
working six day weeks, if necessary.

105. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, March 5, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, March 19, 1970 Memo to the President on
Decision to Halt the Bombing, 1967, 1968 [I]. Top Secret. Drafted by Tom Johnson. The meeting lasted from 1:14 to 3 p.m.
Those attending were the President, Rusk, Clifford, Wheeler, Helms, Taylor, Rostow, Christian, and Tom Johnson. (Ibid.,
President's Daily Diary) The notation "ps" on the March 6 covering memorandum transmitting a copy of the notes from
Tom Johnson to the President indicates that the President saw the notes.
The President: I will be meeting with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow evening. Senators
Fulbright, Sparkman, Aiken, and Hickenlooper./2/
/2/See Document 109.
Secretary Rusk: You should remind them that we were not bombing Hanoi and Haiphong about six months of last year. He
(Senator Fulbright) doesn't seem to give us credit for that.
The President: Well, Nixon has taken note of it. He has accused us of gradualism and stated that we would have ended
the war sooner had it not been for this policy of gradualism./3/
/3/In a speech at Hampton, New Hampshire, March 5, Nixon contended that new leadership could win the war by applying
greater pressure. See The New York Times, March 6, 1968.
Secretary Rusk: There may be a point to that. If back under President Kennedy we had recommended and approved
putting in 100,000 men it might have saved things.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Pueblo crisis.]

The President: O.K. on that. What about the suggestions of last night?
Secretary Rusk: There is one idea which would throw additional responsibility on Hanoi. (Secretary Rusk read a statement
about cessation of bombing.)/4/
/4/The statement drafted by Rusk read: "After consultation with our allies, I have directed that U.S. bombing attacks on
North Viet-Nam be limited to those areas which are integrally related to the battlefield. No reasonable person could expect
us to fail to provide maximum support to our men in combat. Whether this step I have taken can be a step toward peace is
for Hanoi to determine. We shall watch the situation carefully." In a March 6 memorandum to Nitze, Warnke argued that
the North Vietnamese would not be able to accept this statement as indicative of a true bombing cessation. "Consideration
should therefore be given to making the announcement, as worded, but accompanying it with a complete cessation of
bombing in North Vietnam north of the DMZ," he noted. "The indications are that, whatever its legal status, the North
Vietnamese would not regard bombings in the DMZ as inconsistent with a bombing halt." (Washington National Records
Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, 1968 Secretary of Defense Files, VIET 092.2)
My guess is that it would last about three days. It would not hold up if they attacked Khesanh or the cities. By the time the
bad weather had ended, if there is no response by Hanoi, we could resume it.
General Wheeler has some targets with him today. They consider the possibility of bombing inside Haiphong itself. This is
not a recommendation yet. We will see what develops.
General Wheeler: I sent General Westmoreland the message you asked me to give him last night. I told him of the report
of your committee and that we did not have the capability to send more than 22,000 men to him at this time. But I
emphasized that no decision has yet been made on this.
The general said he is going to publicize the offensive U.S. troops are about to undertake.
Clark Clifford: I feel not. If the offensive does not come off as well as planned, we would have an added burden.
Secretary Rusk: Let's emphasize what we have done after it is over--not our expectations or what we will do.
The President: Let's don't get these people to expect more than we can deliver.
Rusk: It's fatal to promise more than we can get. Also, it is wrong to expect more of the ARVN than we can deliver.
The President: It looks like we should have two or three suppliers of choppers and weapons.
Also, it appears we are about to make a rather basic change in the strategy of this war, if:
--we tell the ARVN to do more fighting.
--we tell them we will give 20,000 men; no more.
--we tell them we will do no more until they do more.
--we tell them we will be prepared to make additional troop contributions but not unless they "get with it."
I frankly doubt you will get much out of them unless they have a good coach, the right plays, and the best equipment.
Secretary Rusk: Let's put on a massive helicopter program. We always can use them. There is substantial demand for
their use as civilian evacuation. They will be put to good use, no matter what the number.
The President: Let's get that firm on a 7-day week, three shifts. I see that Paul Nitze was wrong. They are not on it now.
The engines are the limiting factor. Let's do something to clear that up. Let's get that M-16 production up too--right away.

Rusk: What about the possibility of getting foreign production of choppers.

General Wheeler: I think the President is aware of the feeling in the Congress about "buying at home."
Clifford: The chopper firm can go to 3 shifts, six days a week. They need the 7th day for maintenance. It is interesting that
the firm is opening a new plant in Charleston, S.C. This will get production up from 200 to 300/month.
The President: Do we want to talk over this strategy change with Congress?
Clifford: That depends on the President's attitude toward the recommendations.
The President: I am ready to sign on except for how we handle the announcement--what we say and the timing of it.
I would be guided by Senators Russell, Mansfield, Rivers and Dirksen on what to say--as well as talks with the other
leaders. I think we should announce the reserve call-up with a full explanation.
I think we should say at the same time that we may ask for specialists and the extension of tours of duty.
Let's make it clear that we are not going to lengthen the tours in Vietnam. The tour there will still be 12 months.
Buzz, you and Clark go this afternoon and talk with Russell. Tell him you are about to recommend this to the President.
See if he can swallow:
--a call-up of reserves
--authority to call specialists
--extension of enlistments.
If he can, let's see if he can "march it through" the Senate and the Congress.
Clark Clifford: The first thing Russell will want to know is what Westmoreland has asked for.
On these figures, I want to know if they should include the 31,000 for Korea and the naval cruisers and destroyers.
511,000 total strength sounds large; 454,000 sounds better.
I think the lower figure (without the 31,000 for Korea and the naval vessels) is easier to sell.
General Wheeler: I think we should work on three solutions, and the JCS is doing that:
Solution One: The full package of 511,000. This includes the troops for South Korea and the naval vessels.
Solution Two: This includes 8,500 men for Korea for the security of the air bases. It would drop out the two cruisers and
the 15 destroyers.
Solution Three: No cruisers. No destroyers. No troops for South Korea. On this, I suggest we talk in terms of a call-up of
240,000 with an end strength of 450,000.
General Taylor: Have we promised the Koreans anything?
The President: No.
Secretary Rusk: In Korea, they have a population which is entirely with its forces. We do not want a conventional war. And
we do not see any evidence of any offensive intervention by North Korea into the South.
The President: Let's get Colt working around the clock on those

M-16s. Also let's consider opening two additional sources of supply. Waive that contract with Colt, if necessary before
June. Let's get on with this. Don't wait until June either.
General Taylor: Is that the fully modified version of the M-16?
General Wheeler: Yes.
General Taylor: Is the powder any problem?
The President: Is that the ammo?
General Wheeler: There is no problem on that. They have worked this out./5/
/5/By the end of 1967 all M-16 rifles had been overhauled to prevent jamming and other malfunctions primarily attributable
to the type of firing powder used.
The President: I agree with General Johnson on this proposal to hurry-up the dispatch to Vietnam of 3 maneuver
battalions. Their current ETA is March 28, April 6, and April 15.
What about the 2,250 B-52 capability?
General Wheeler: We can give him surge capability, but not a sustained level.
Clark Clifford: Are you (The President) authorizing me to take whatever steps that are necessary to increase chopper and
M-16 production?
The President: Yes. Let's also give the South Vietnamese the best equipment we can.
Get the engine company high behind. Let's see if somebody else can't make that engine.
Secretary Rusk: I think we should investigate the possibility of foreign production.
The President: Let's also look at the fixed wing plane proposal. That proposal will run $2.29 billion.
[Omitted here is a brief discussion of Berlin.]
The President: I will talk with Russell about the Gulf of Tonkin. He may have put Hollings up to proposing that the
resolution be withdrawn, and then vote against his own motion to get people to take sides.
The hawks want the others to put up or shut up.
[Omitted here is a brief discussion of the retrieval of a Soviet missile.]

106. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Lodge) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, March 5, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Lodge, Henry Cabot. Top Secret; Nodis. The next
day Rusk transmitted this memorandum to the President under cover of a note which read: "I think you will be interested in
reading the attached memorandum from Cabot Lodge." In his own covering memorandum to the President, March 6,
Rostow wrote: "Herewith Cabot Lodge makes his case for a modification in military policy which would permit us protracted
operations in Vietnam at low casualty levels." The President wrote on this covering memorandum: "Ask Taylor & Clifford &
Bunker each for separate comments." (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
Herewith what I tried to convey to you on Sunday/2/
/2/March 3.
American public opinion can stand a long drawn out military campaign with few casualties or a relatively short campaign
with high casualties (such as World War II which from the American standpoint began with heavy combat operations in
December 1942 and ended in April 1945, i.e., two and one-half years). But American public opinion cannot stand a long
drawn out war with high casualties. As far as the overwhelming mass of public opinion is concerned, the big thing is U.S.
casualties. If they go down, none of the other things matter very much. And Vietnamese civilian casualties would go down
too.
It would be most imprudent to expect quick results in Viet-Nam. The central purpose, after all, is to build a nation and this
involves psychological changes which usually come gradually. As realists we should assume a protracted effort--hopefully
with low casualties. If things should go quicker than we expect, so much the better.
"Search and Destroy"
The policy of the U.S. military in Viet-Nam has consistently--and rightly--been to conduct what is called "offensive
operations." But these are defined as "search and destroy"--and this raises serious questions.
Such a definition clearly implies a belief that an exclusively military victory is conceivable and that if we just get out and
destroy enough Viet Cong the war will come to an end. This is the so-called "war of attrition."
Such a war was sound doctrine in World War II, but it is not realistic in the Viet-Nam war. It is not possible to win the war
by killing the enemy by military means on the ground in South Viet-Nam. The hard core terrorist guerrilla certainly cannot
be reached that way. He will only be reached when the people give enough information about the terrorists so that they
can be rooted out by police-type methods. This is what is meant by "pacification" which, in turn, is the first step in "nationbuilding." And the North Vietnamese soldier can be better reached by bombing North Viet-Nam and by being apprehended
when he reaches his so-called "safe haven" in South Viet-Nam.
The following questions, therefore, arise:
a) has there not been unnecessary killing of people on our side because of the policy of "search and destroy," in particular
by the devastating effect of our artillery and airpower on Vietnamese civilians and buildings?
b) has not this tactic failed to do the job?
c) has it not also created an undue number of refugees?
d) has it not made heavy demands on precious intellectual and physical energies which might otherwise have been aimed
at nation-building, which is the most promising way to achieve a durable result?
Might we not, therefore, do much better if we defined the phrase "offensive operations" as meaning "split up the enemy
and keep him off balance"? In accordance with this definition the U.S. military would be playing its own utterly
indispensable part: acting as a shield behind which the Vietnamese nation-building and pacification operations can take
place.
Someone who enjoys the President's confidence and has a good grounding in military and political matters, but who is not
in the regular military hierarchy, should see whether a policy of "split up and keep off balance" would not result in fewer
U.S. casualties, fewer refugees and at the same time actually expedite the pacification program, by releasing energies now
inevitably absorbed by the great demands of the present policy of "seek out and destroy."
The question of how we use our armed forces is a matter of the greatest political importance, even though its execution is
military. It should be viewed from the viewpoint of the highest possible overall civilian strategy.
More Troops?
More troops, therefore, should, in accordance with this reasoning, be sent in numbers sufficient only to enable us to keep

faith with our troops in exposed positions, as in the northern end of South Viet-Nam--and not to continue the past
emphasis on "search and destroy."
The new emphasis should be on the creation of durable local political institutions under which police-type programs--for
"territorial security"--can operate. Such an emphasis would be on protection of heavily populated areas, which would, of
course, require operations outside of these areas. It would deny safe haven to the infiltrators from the North. It should
organize South Vietnamese society as efficiently as North Vietnamese society is organized. There should thus be intensive
and repeated scourings--i.e., "comb-outs"--precinct by precinct, block by block, house by house, and farm by farm. It
should be as hard to move from one precinct to another or from one village to another in South Viet-Nam as it is today in
North Viet-Nam. All this should mean fewer U.S. casualties and fewer Vietnamese refugees. And it should hasten the end
of the war.
Our present practice of having virtually everything available to the press is also a loser. The enemy would never do such a
thing. We should institute censorship just as we did in World War II and on the very simple grounds that we are risking
American lives if we don't./3/
/3/In commenting on Lodge's points in two separate memoranda to Clifford, March 8, both Goulding and Warnke opposed
the idea of censoring information from Vietnam as ineffective and likely to produce even greater opposition. (Washington
National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, 1968 Secretary of Defense Files, VIET
381)
A New Turn
Thus it would be clear that we are not going to abandon Viet-Nam; but that we are going to run the war with a somewhat
different emphasis in the light of our experience at the time of the Tet raids, which has created a new situation.
There were those who, in the late forties and early fifties, believed that the so-called "cold war" with the Soviet Union must
come to a head. Some were making plans accordingly--to "end the cold war by winning it." Then General Eisenhower
explained to the American people that we must learn to live with the cold war. Everyone now sees that this was good
advice.
We can learn to live with this Vietnamese situation and, if we do not watch the clock, we will find that time will be working
for us. We have had soldiers in Germany and in Korea since 1945. Similarly, we can have soldiers in Viet-Nam providing
protection for the nation-building program against external aggression. But South Viet-Nam must become competitive with
Communism--not just on the conventional battlefield but in every single aspect of life, notably in the organization of their
society. We must build a solid foundation before we start putting on the penthouse.

107. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, March 6, 1968, 1200Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret;
Immediate; Nodis. Received at 8:52 a.m. The telegram is printed in full in Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 362371.
21321. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my forty-second weekly message.
A. General
1. In my last week's message,/2/ I attempted to give an interim evaluation of the effects of the Tet offensive pending more
detailed reporting from the provinces. I think it is important also to try to make some evaluation of what motivated an
obvious change of tactics on Hanoi's part and what the implications are of their failure to achieve their immediate
objectives in order to plan for the period ahead. I should also like to mention some of the things to which I think we should
be giving top priority.
/2/Document 94.

2. This change of tactics represented a radical departure from the theory of a prolonged war. It may be that the most likely
reason for the change, a view shared by Thieu, was a growing awareness on Hanoi's part that the war was not going well;
that with the great increase in American power, the progress toward a representative, nationalist government in South Viet
Nam and the spreading of pacification through the countryside, the gradual approach did not seem capable of coping with
it. Hanoi also undoubtedly calculated that it had assets it could use in South Viet Nam in the anticipated wide popular
support and defections from ARVN. Their widespread propaganda to this effect would indicate that this was an essential
part of their plan.
3. The Communists seemed to have hoped that the result of the initial offensive would leave them in control of a number of
cities and perhaps portions of others, including Hue and Saigon; that the countryside would have come into their hands
automatically through victory in the cities; that there would be enough popular response to enable them to form coalitions
between the NLF, newly formed front groups like the Alliance of Democratic and Peaceful Forces, and independent
"progressive" groups to govern on the local and ultimately perhaps on the national level. Not only was the GVN not
envisioned as part of the coalition, but on the contrary the Communists expected that it would have been discredited, its
army weakened by the defection of large numbers of troops, the U.S. humiliated by the occupation of its Embassy and
attacks on other installations, and disillusioned with the showing of its Vietnamese allies against whom the brunt of the
attack was directed.
4. In such a situation, Hanoi would be in the posture of strength from which they would like to negotiate hoping thus to
achieve a cease-fire and provisions for eventual American withdrawal; and perhaps under such conditions quite willing to
accept a coalition between the NLF, the newly created non-Communist fronts, and independent "progressive" groups.
5. It is clear that the Communists have not achieved anything like these expectations, but it is undoubtedly true also, as
Thieu has said, that they have had a fall-back position. It would appear now that while they have kept up some harassment
of the cities, they are in the process of making an assessment of the present situation and there have come hints of a new
course of action. In recent propaganda there is renewed emphasis on the countryside, the "destruction" of the pacification
campaign as a major achievement of the offensive. This suggest arise [sic] they may now try to move to exploit their
current gains against our rural programs.
6. Another current theme is the "collapse" of the GVN administration. We may expect that the GVN at all levels may be a
continuing target in the period ahead through what Thieu referred to as "political spoiling tactics," propaganda,
assassinations, and terrorism. A third element in the Communist propaganda is the frustration of the U.S. "search and
destroy" programs. They claim that they are tying down our troops in a defensive role. And the importance of Saigon and
Hue in current Communist propaganda would indicate that these may be, as Thieu has said, two principal targets of future
Communist military action.
7. As I have previously mentioned, there are options open to Hanoi and their choice of options will probably depend on
their assessment of the developing situation in the urban and rural areas of Viet Nam and the outcome of new military
engagements. But it may be significant that Communist propaganda is now speaking of the long war, of the need for each
victory to be the basis for another, and of the stubbornness of the Americans. They are not promising easier, quick
solutions. This may well indicate that the strategy outlined by Thieu in his recent conversations with me, which I have
previously reported, i.e., pressure in I Corps and the Central Highlands to tie down our troops, harassment of the cities,
and an attempt to take over the rural areas, may well be the course they will follow. This could involve a prolonged effort
through the spring and summer (Thieu sees a critical period as probably May-October) in the hope of attaining their
political objective of achieving a strong posture for negotiations.
8. But while, because of the nature of the war, the enemy may have options, we have opportunities which through prompt
and decisive action can be turned to our advantage; action as prompt and decisive as lies within Vietnamese capabilities,
channeled by our advice and guidance, and stimulated to the maximum extent possible by our persuasion, prodding,
urging, and leverage. [Omitted here is Bunker's list of items to which the Embassy would give top priority: the recovery
program, the resumption of "aggressive offensive operations," increasing the size of the RVNAF, shuffling the top echelons
of the RVNAF to reward those who had been effective, an expansion of the Phoenix program, reforming the bureaucracy,
financial measures, the development of a new spirit of commitment and unity, and the restoration of people's confidence in
the GVN. In the remainder of the telegram, Bunker elaborated upon additional recovery and political matters.]
Bunker

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968

Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 108-131

108. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 6, 1968, 10:15 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 65. Secret; Sensitive;
Literally Eyes Only. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
Herewith some personal thoughts on the war.
Objective: The art of the next two or three months would be to produce a situation in which Hanoi decided to end the war.
If that is impossible, the objective is to produce a situation in the second half of the year in which our side is clearly moving
forward.
Present Situation: We are clearly in the midst of an unresolved critical battle. The enemy is committed--having taken stock
of his immediate post-Tet situation--to continue to throw forces into the battle at a rate almost four times his average for
1967: he is losing about 1,000 KIA per day as opposed to 241 per day in 1967. He did increase his order of battle in the
days before Tet--with several additional North Vietnamese divisions, North Vietnamese fillers for VC main force units, plus
hasty recruiting for VC units. But there is no evidence he can sustain present rates for more than a matter of a few months.
At the moment the enemy appears to be trying to pin Delta and Saigon allied forces close to the cities; draw Westy's
reserves to the Western frontiers (Kontum-Pleiku); and strike a decisive blow in I Corps. The threat forming up around Hue
is major (perhaps 5-6000 enemy troops). Westy is trying to put his Delta and Saigon forces on to the offensive; deal with
the Western highlands economically; fight a decisive battle in I Corps.
To maximize the chance that we achieve our objective, these things should happen:
--the ARVN and the GVN should put on a performance which convinces Hanoi, the U.S., and Moscow that they are viable
and must be considered a major factor in a settlement;
--above all, Westy must win as decisive a victory at Hue--and in I Corps--as he can;
--the U.S. must behave in the days ahead in a way to make clear we have the will and staying power to carry on;
--the supply prospects for North Viet Nam over the coming months and year must be worsened;
--the GVN--from a position of strength--must put forward a powerful new appeal and proposal for peace in the South.
The proper timing of this sequence is critical.
A Proposal for Consideration:
The best trigger point would be:
--a major battle around Hue, initiated either by the enemy or by Westy going out to get these forces before they are set;
--plus some success in the battles Westy tells us are about to begin as Thang moves to the offensive in the Delta and our
forces move out simultaneously against the enemy's Saigon divisions. This should happen in the next few days.
When the battle is joined we do two things:
--go for the Clifford package, beginning with a reserve call-up;/2/

/2/The Reserve call-up may not be able to wait until the battle is joined; but the best time to mine the ports--should you
decide to do so--would be at the height of battle. [Footnote in the source text.]
--mine the North Vietnamese ports with delayed-action mines, telling international shipping to get out of North Vietnamese
territorial waters.
At Tab A is a fresh analysis of the mining problem done by Bob Ginsburgh at my request./3/ Mining by itself would not be
decisive; but it will be costly to the enemy. The maximum predicted Soviet reaction would be to bring in mine-sweepers
and shoot their way through. (This is what the Czech general, recently defected, has said; but since we're not blockading,
there is nothing to shoot except mines.)
/3/Not printed.
Against this background--and assuming some tactical success in the forthcoming battles--we persuade Thieu to take the
offensive for peace:
--appealing to all Vietnamese to stop the bloodshed;
--offering to talk to any Southerners on the basis of converting the war into politics under a constitutional one-man-onevote system.
We could accompany the offer with a temporary stoppage of bombing.
The whole sequence hinges, of course, on some tactical success on the ground in coming days and, especially, one clearcut victory--hopefully at Hue. Thieu must feel he is operating from some strength.
Not since the Civil War has quite so much hinged for our country on immediate battlefield events.
As for Hanoi and the Russians: I do not believe a Communist takeover of South Viet Nam is regarded as a vital Soviet
interest. The Chinese will oppose, but are not likely to occupy North Viet Nam. Hanoi may have entered the winter-spring
offensive with the same judgment at high levels that they have conveyed to low levels; namely, 1968 must be the Year of
Decision.
What happens if we fail in I Corps? I doubt that the North Vietnamese can drive Westy from I Corps; but a setback would
not be a good occasion for a peace initiative. But we should proceed to lay the extra burden on the North Vietnamese
supply system via mining.
This is a line of thought--not a firm recommendation. I believe it deserves some examination.
Walt

109. Editorial Note

From 6:47 p.m. to 9:22 p.m. on March 6, 1968, President Johnson discussed Vietnam with Senators J. William Fulbright,
Mike Mansfield, John Sparkman, George Aiken, and Bourke Hickenlooper. The group discussed Secretary of State Rusk's
forthcoming appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to testify on the war as well as the ongoing
Senate debate over the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. In response to comments by Fulbright that the resolution was null and
void due to the possible decision being made to send over 200,000 troops to Vietnam, the President endeavored to explain
why he had introduced such a resolution to Congress in 1964 and how it related to his current policy decision:
"I sent up the resolution on Southeast Asia because I told the Security Council members that I was not going to commit
troops or get into any compromising position with these folks unless I had the approval of Congress. I had a thorough
study and review of the law and precedent in this area. My legal advisors told me how many times we had gone into an
area without the consent of Congress and without a declaration of war. I told them that I did not want to follow that
procedure. Then I had a resolution drafted copying as nearly as possible President Eisenhower's Formosa resolution and
Middle East resolution. This draft resolution was taken to the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Armed Services
Committee. I also reviewed it with Congressional leadership.

"I don't care about resolutions but this is the only way I know how to try to get a formal expression from Congress of their
views. It was not designed to bind them because I don't consider the Tonkin Gulf resolution binding on any man up there. If
any man doesn't think what we are doing is right, he has an obligation to say so. And there's not a man in the Senate who
is unwilling to dissent.
"The question is how we can minimize our problems and make this job easier and mine easier. Also how can we make
them more effective. I know full well that all of you are my friends and all of you want to help the President. I also know that
you do have differences. Your intentions and your good judgment and your experience are well known to me. I have never
doubted them. I know that each of you would be there if I were in deep trouble. I have always sought the advice and
counsel of Congress. I have never taken any position on foreign policy in the Senate that I didn't talk to Mansfield and
Fulbright. We have to work together without leaking our meetings and conversations to the newspapers.
"We have no commitments on extra troops. We have 500,000 odd out there. They want extra troops now. But we are
looking at the entire picture. We are looking at our situation with regard to men and equipment. The South Vietnamese are
drafting their 19-year-olds now and they have given us assurance they will draft 18-year-olds. They are cleaning up their
Army and improving it. We must avoid being dangerously weak here at home. We have 6 divisions in reserve. The Joint
Chiefs have wanted to call up the Reserves for some time. I have tried to avoid going on a war and war-controls basis.
Calling the Reserves is the first step that reaches into every home. In addition, the Reserves have their problems. They do
not have the best equipment. However, if we need to call up large numbers, we are going to have to call in some
Reserves. We are exploring every avenue open.
"Fulbright was right when he said Vietnam has poisoned the whole world. Everything goes back to it. But the bombings
make it more difficult for North Vietnam and help us to protect the DMZ."
During the course of the meeting, Fulbright responded:
"I do not want to give a false impression. I don't have the slightest idea how to run the war and I have never given you
advice on it. The war has a psychological impact as well as a financial impact. What I am trying to do is create a climate
which I think would make it much easier for you to stop the war short of victory. I may be making a mistake but I cannot
see the future of this war. It is not worthwhile, what we are paying for it. I do not think there is a good way to stop it. I don't
want to argue the details. I am trying to make my own position clear. I hope to create a sense that reconciles this country
as best I can to settlement here that may not be palatable under other circumstances. I can't see anything that can be
accomplished by military means that will cost lives and dollars and disrupt our political relations with Russia and other
countries. I do not think it is going to be a victory like we had in World Wars I and II. I don't want to run the war. I just want
to state my position."
Fulbright later added:
"I just think this war is a disaster. I think that we are going down the drain if we continue with it. This is their country. They
live there. They are poor and don't have much to lose. We have a lot to lose. I think that this was originally a miscalculation
and we have to admit that it was. That country has no industry, has no obligation, has no balance of payments, has no
gold, and none of these problems. We are involved in a little country that isn't worried. We are beating ourselves for
nothing. In my opinion we are playing the Communist game. We just ought to get out of that country any way we can."
The full record of the meeting is in the Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room, March 6, 1968, 6:47
p.m. to 9:22 p.m.

110. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 7, 1968, 3:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs N-Z and AA-KK.
Secret.
Mr. President:
Clark Clifford and Bus Wheeler are against your sending a message to Gen. Westmoreland at this time along the lines of
the draft which I forwarded to them./2/

/2/An attached telegram from the President to Westmoreland drafted on March 6 reads: "As you know, we are considering
most seriously the suggestions Gen. Wheeler brought back from his trip to Vietnam. In the meanwhile, I wish to tell you
how much comfort and inspiration your message to General Wheeler of March 4 brought to me. I was raised by Mr.
Rayburn to believe that West Point produced better professional military officers than the halls of Congress. My feeling at
this distance is that the enemy has been hurt by the first five weeks of his winter-spring offensive more than our side. Like
all great battles, this may be close. But my instinct tells me you are right: every South Vietnamese, U.S. and allied unit-every cook and bottle washer--ought to be inspired in the days ahead with an offensive spirit. Within the limits of what you
regard as prudent, I believe it is now time for our side to go all out. In any case, as you enter this crucial counteroffensive,
you should know you have my confidence and my prayers." (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, 2 C (8) 3/68, General Military
Activity)
There are two major reasons:
--Clark believes very strongly that we should not now take an optimistic view of the war, but let the facts speak for
themselves and hope that in 4 or 5 months things will obviously be better.
--He also believes we should not influence Westy in what tactical course of action he should pursue: perhaps pursuing the
enemy all out is right; perhaps not. He does not believe the President should get into this.
Quite aside from the message--and addressed more specifically to the report of the backgrounder in Vietnam yesterday-Clark would like to speak with you about our general public stance towards the war, in Presidential and other public
statements. He would like to urge great caution about optimism.
Hold message/3/
Arrange appointment for Clifford
/3/The President checked this option.
Walt

111. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell/1/
Washington, March 7, 1968, 4:10 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and
Russell, March 7, 1968, 4:10 p.m., Tape F6802.04, PNO 13-14. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared
specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
President: Scoop Jackson called down and talked to my man Califano and said he had been talking to you and he was
very worried about something Fulbright was doing and he thought that I ought to see a group headed by you and him and
a couple of other fellows, Symington, I think, and Stennis. I called Jackson back./2/ I was at lunch. He called Mansfield. I
spent 3 hours with Fulbright last night--with Fulbright and Mansfield and Bourke Hickenlooper and George Aiken and John
Sparkman./3/
/2/The President called Jackson at 3:44 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) No record of the conversation has been found.
/3/See Document 109.
Russell: Well, you didn't do much of a Johnson sales job on him evidently.
President: No, he's got problems, Dick, that man has. He has got problems. And I listened to everything they had to say
from 6:30 to 9:25 and just nobody present except those five and me.
Russell: Mansfield?
President: Mansfield and Fulbright and Sparkman, Hickenlooper and Aiken.

Russell: Well, they all are of a different mind about this thing.
President: They're all of the same mind except Fulbright and he didn't show much. I was real worried about Fulbright. I
said, "Senator, now let's play President awhile. What would you do if you were President? What would you like to do?"
Well, he said, "I would like to negotiate." I said, "Well, I would too." He said, "Why don't you negotiate?" I said, "Because
they won't negotiate." He said, "Well, there must be some way to make them negotiate." I said, "Well, you tell me--you
write me and you tell me how to do it. I don't know how to do it." Well, he said, "It just goes to show." He said, "By God, I
never did want to be in this." I said, "I didn't want to be in it." He said, "Well, I didn't say you got in it. I know they were there
when you came in, but--." And it was that way for 2 or 3 hours. And we got to Sparkman and Sparkman said, "I don't like it.
I don't want it. I wish we didn't have it. But I don't know what I can recommend that we do, Mr. President." I got to
Hickenlooper, and Hickenlooper said, "Well, I will just say this. I don't want this to be a committee to conduct the war" and
said, "I don't know what we can get by Morse and Fulbright debating back at Rusk on televisions all over the world in the
middle of a critical period." He said, "I don't want this to be a Civil War committee. We can't conduct the war." Fulbright
said, "Now, look here, Bourke, I don't want it to be a Civil War committee either." They got into a little argument and I just
sat there and listened to it. Mansfield said, "Well, I wanted to confer with you and now we announce this." I said, "No. I
want to meet with some of the House people and I'm meeting with all of the House chairmen this afternoon and then I want
to meet with some of the Armed Services people and Appropriations people and there is not anything I know to announce.
If I say I saw two or three Senators, well, the other twenty that I didn't see object. So unless we want a lot of publicity, let's
try to talk this thing out. I will take any suggestions you want to make and say we will consider them. Mr. Mansfield, any
time you want to bring any groups of Senators to me, you can see me the day that you call. You just call and I will make
the plans." Fulbright said, "Well, we think that you are the complete captive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," and said that I was
saying to Dick Russell--he implied as he went everything he said you agreed with. He never did say that, but that was the
implication.
Russell: Well, did he call my name?
President: Oh, yes, two or three times. He would say, "Now, Dick Russell and I see alike on this" and then he wound up by
saying-Russell: It must have been some very minor thing.
President: It was--just enough like an old cow, if you ever milked in the country days, you've been too long away from the
milk pail, but just as you get the bucket full, she dragged her tail through the top of it and leaves a little streak. That is the
way he dragged your name through it.
Russell: And usually she would slap hell out of you with the tail too.
President: That's right. That's exactly right. Hit you right in the face with it. But anyway--he has no plan or program. I said,
"What do you want to do?" He said, "I want to run us out of this war. You are a complete captive of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. That is what they say." And I said, "Well now, Senator, that is a little bit unfair. I am not a captive of anybody. I am
listening to you Senators. I have talked to more Senators today than I have generals and I have to listen to the best advice
that is available to me and consider it."
Russell: My complaint is the other side. You haven't paid enough attention to them.
President: Well-Russell: He's made a hell of a mean speech and Bobby Kennedy made a meaner one and Nelson/4/ has been raising hell
for about 10 minutes. And John Tower made a very strong statement on the other side. He started off with the assumption
that you were getting ready to call up 200,000 men to send out there. Of course, I hadn't heard anything about that. I know
that you ought to call up some and you need some reserves mighty bad because we haven't got anything left in this
country at all except two brigades of the 82d [Airborne Division]. But he had you sending 200,000 more out there. He said
he had rumors and reports that that is what you were getting ready to do--send 200,000 out there.
/4/Senator Gaylord Nelson.
President: It's very much rumors like this nuclear attack the other day. We haven't made a decision. We don't really know
what we're going to do. We do know that, as I asked General Wheeler to go out and brief you when you were at the
hospital, I have asked him to get everybody's opinions on what we ought to have and most of the Armed Services people
have thought for some time we ought to replenish our strategic reserve. It is getting pretty low and you have thought so
more than anybody else and they have had the feeling--pretty generally agreed by Secretary of State and Secretary of

Defense and the Joint Chiefs--that we ought to call up some reserves and perhaps, as I told you when I went home the
other day before I went down to Georgia and that trip, that we ought to call up these units and ask for permission to call up
selected specialists and the authority we need and probably extend the terms of enlistment--authority to do that and you
said, "Well, we can't do that, unless you call up the reserves."
Russell: I am not in favor of that, Mr. President, I want to make it perfectly clear, until we get up some of these fellows that
haven't served at all.
President: I understand that and I don't plan to put the first first but that those are the things that are being considered.
Now, how much of that would ever go to South Vietnam, if any, has not been determined. We do not know. Clifford is of
the impression and feeling that we oughtn't to decide at this moment, that we ought to go ahead and make our decision on
filling out the strategic reserve--we had twelve divisions, I believe, and it is now down to about six now--and that he thinks
that is an invitation to weakness to the rest of the world and that we ought to call up these folks, but we ought to be sure
that we are prepared for them and have something for them to do and know exactly what we are doing and we are
studying all of those things now. They even suggested that he might want to go out and have some conversations with the
allied leaders, particularly with the Vietnamese, to see how they are coming with their 19-year old drafts, and the 18-Russell: Well, that has been brought up a half dozen times on the floor--calling up our boys at 18 and not calling up theirs
until they are 20 or 21.
President: Well, that is not true. The average of ours is 20.4 and it was 20.9 last year. They are calling their 19s now and
they will call their 18s in June. And if we called up the same proportion of our population, we would have between 9 and 10
million instead of the 3, so that is not a very-Russell: Well, I don't hardly know how to reply to all of this because it is so damn general and deals with suppositions of
which I have no knowledge at all. I want to say something but damn if I can see any place to put my teeth into other than to
build up a straw man. Then you go calling up reserves--that would make me look silly.
President: Well, I think you ought to say that first the Committee of the Congress and the reservists themselves have been
urging that they be called up because we have a strategic reserve--twelve divisions when we got into this thing and it is
down to six and they ought to be called up. Now, the President has had the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to talk to you
about it, the President has talked to the other chairmen [sic] about it, you believe the President has talked to a good many
Senators, and if any Senator wants to talk to the President about it you are sure the President will be glad to hear his
views. There has been no President that has ever consulted so much with the Senate as the present President. Now, so
far as the Senate running the war, this is something else.
Russell: No, of course, the Senate cannot do that.
President: That's what Hickenlooper said last night and made a very effective statement and it had an effect on both
Fulbright and Mansfield. In fact, Fulbright got a little irritated by it. Now, I asked them not to say that they met with me, and
I just--but I think it is very improper to indicate that nobody has consulted when he came down and spent 3 hours.
Russell: He indicates that the Congress has been kept in damn complete ignorance and he went on and said that the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense just lied to him on this Tonkin Gulf Resolution when they testified./5/
/5/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 280.
President: Yes, he says that all the time. He interprets when McNamara said they were not in territorial waters. At the
same time McNamara said that, they claimed-Russell: Well, this letter the crew wrote, you know. But I didn't see anything so damn bad about that. If I were out there I
would want out too.
President: Well, Fulbright is just trying to justify his position of not wanting to be for the war and being an ass in voting for
Tonkin Gulf. That's all--that's what he's trying to do. But I think you all ought to say--you and Jackson and the rest of you-that the President has talked to you--talked to you more than he ought to sometimes. He had the Joint Chairman and the
Joint Chiefs come to see you last week before last and called you last week himself and he has asked for your advice on
the reserves from time to time and the Congress has been urging, and the reserve organizations too, that they be called up
for a long, long time. We did have twelve divisions and now we are down to four and a half and one and a half--about a
total of six.

Russell: We haven't got six on active duty, have we, Mr. President?
President: They told me they had about six available in the strategic reserve--four and a half plus one and a half.
Russell: Well, these boys that are selling flour and silk today and going to call them up tomorrow--I just can't believe they
are as good as they think they are.
President: I didn't say they're good at all. I just said that they said we ought to have twelve and we did have twelve and
we'd worn it down to six.
Russell: They're all reserves. We just have about one and a half that are regulars.
President: That's right, that's right.
Russell: Well, I'll go back in there and make up my mind on it, but I just hate to get up there and go floundering around
when I don't know what the hell I'm getting at. Fulbright doesn't know what he is talking about and I hate to do the same
thing just because he is.
President: I think I would just take the position that any Senator that wants to talk to the President, the President will be
glad to talk with him.
Russell: He hasn't raised the point that you wouldn't see anybody.
President: Mansfield said-Russell: He hasn't said that. He just said he thought we ought to be apprised before you do anything else. That's what he
said.
President: Congress ought to be consulted and hadn't been.
Russell: I don't know. I didn't get the part that they ought to be consulted and hadn't been.
President: Well, that is what Jackson said.
Russell: Well, he sort of leaves that inference, but he didn't say that. I was sitting there listening to him myself. He just
probably left that inference with those who heard it.
President: Well, now, if you think any of them ought to come down here--I had thought-Russell: I don't think any of them want to come. I think if you kept Fulbright right at your elbow all working hours for the
next 6 days he would be of the same thing as he is right now and I don't think you would change him one iota. So I am not
urging you to see anybody. All I could say was that Tydings/6/ came over and asked me if I knew how many reserves were
going to be called up and I told him, "No, I didn't know." That was all I could tell him.
/6/Senator Joseph Tydings.
President: Well, I don't know either. Tell him the President-Russell: I told him that.
President: Well, you can just tell him now. The President doesn't know himself how many he's going to call.
Russell: I told him that I did not know how many were going to be called up. He's gone dovish. He got up and said he
thought me and Stennis and Symington ought to be apprised and ought to keep being advised about it. But hell, we have
already given these people the war plans in advance, which has cost us a whole lot. This has been the most openly fought
war that ever has been fought.

President: Say that. Please say that, and say what Eisenhower said to me the other day--that I would have given any
amount of money to have known about the enemy what they know about us.
Russell: Of course. We tell them in advance what is going on.
President: And I see now from the intelligence this morning that they are asking for the copies of the film of Rusk and
Fulbright debating. They'd like to have it at night for all of the European capitals. This is one that is coming up next week.
Russell: They put them on television?
President: They want to, and Rusk has got to go up on foreign aid. Well, I have asked them not to and now he's got to go
up on foreign aid.
Russell: Well, he doesn't have to go on television.
President: Well-Russell: I'll be damned if I would do it. Just surrendering to them after he has held out and everybody has been
sympathizing with him.
President: Well, you see, the Committee voted overwhelmingly eleven to four, but this fellow Mundt/7/ got in and played a
little politics to order him up.
/7/Senator Karl Mundt.
Russell: That is just a little politics, of course. Mundt is a hawk as far as the war is concerned. Well, I'll go out here and see
what the situation is--if they are still talking about it.
President: Thank you, Dick.
Russell: Bye.
President: Bye./8/
/8/In a telephone conversation with Rusk the following day, the President discussed the meeting with the Senators and the
issues raised in his telephone conversation with Russell. A statement calling for a more intensive effort to secure
negotiations by the administration had been issued by 18 Congressional representatives on March 4. Regarding action to
counter this and other Congressional criticism, the President stated: "Now I think we have to try first to see if there are any
initiatives--political or diplomatic--that we can get in the mill that will cover that front a little bit for us where we are just not
static and doing nothing. We ought to see if there is anything possible there. I think the second thing we ought to see is
what would be the best legislative approach to this thing before we act on additional troops. We're going to have to act-we're going to have to call them up and we don't want to assume the burden of having an affirmative resolution because
they can filibuster it and we can't get it passed and then that would be a failure and that would fold. So I think we ought to
see what we can do. My judgment would be, just guessing, that to get Russell to move to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin with the
understanding that if they did repeal it that we would pull in our horns or something and then a motion to table that would
lie and then after 4 or 5 days you would cut off debate on that." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording
of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rusk, March 8, 1968, 10:35 a.m., Tape F6802.04, PNO 15; transcript
prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume)

112. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) and the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/
Washington, March 8, 1968, 0048Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, William C. Westmoreland Papers, #30 History File, 1-31 March 68 [1]. Secret; Eyes Only;
Immediate. Received at 0314Z.

JCS 2721. 1. I had a most interesting and informative conversation today with our new Secretary of Defense, Mr. Clifford.
He is a very astute, intelligent and able man who is closely in touch with Congressional leaders, the business community,
and the heads of the news media agencies. As you no doubt know, he has been the trusted advisor to four Presidents. In
my judgment, apart from his important official position, he is a man of stature and achievement, one whose views must be
accorded weight.
2. The main points he made with me this morning were the following:
A. The Tet offensive mounted by the enemy came as a great shock to the American public. He believes that this shock
was the greater because of the euphoria engendered by optimistic statements in past days by various spokesmen
supporting administration policy in South Vietnam.
B. He is concerned at the lessening support for the war effort; he cited satiric articles by Art Buchwald as reflecting the
beliefs of many people that actualities in South Vietnam and what is said are poles apart.
C. He thinks that the American public cannot stand another shock such as that administered by the Tet offensive. He
believes that we have laid ourselves open to the possibility of an additional setback with the American public by playing
down the effects of the Tet offensive on the GVN, the RVNAF, and on the South Vietnamese public. One government
spokesman (who shall be nameless) was ridiculed a couple of weeks ago for what the press considered to be wild
overstatements in minimizing the strength and cunning of the enemy and the impact on the GVN.
D. He considers that additional substantial attacks over a fairly wide area of South Vietnam could create a credibility gap
with the American public and the news media which would be virtually unbridgeable.
3. I must admit that Secretary Clifford's assessment is shared by me although, not having the contacts he enjoys, I cannot
document the feelings in the business community and among the news media as can he. Nevertheless, I have been upset
by views expounded in the news media, in the Congress, and in letters from the public to me that we are fighting a war
which cannot be won; that unending hordes of North Vietnamese are surging against South Vietnam; that the GVN is
corrupt and inept; that the South Vietnamese people are either solely interested in making money, largely by stealing from
American sources, or are completely apathetic as to the outcome of the war, that the senior GVN military are war lords
vying for power and are unconcerned about saving their country.
4. During our conversation Mr. Clifford called my attention to a key article by Gene Roberts on the front page of The New
York Times of 7 March. The article is datelined Saigon 6 March, and puts in quotes a number of expressions of opinion
attributed to "a senior military spokesman."/2/ Among these which aroused the Secretary's concern are these:
/2/In telegram MAC 3280 to Wheeler, March 8, Westmoreland replied that he was the "senior military spokesman" referred
to in the March 7 story in The New York Times. "My comments were based on my best estimate of the current situation,
and I chose the opportunity to make them known because of my concern for the local attitude, particularly that of the
Vietnamese, since there is constant talk of a second wave attack," Westmoreland explained. "You know of my efforts to
attempt to reverse this defensive attitude and get on the offensive, which action is necessary if we are to take advantage of
the opportunity presented by the enemy and to reverse the adverse trend now apparent in the countryside in a number of
areas." He pledged to conform to Clifford's guidance. (Ibid.)
A. A general statement that the military command is less worried now than at any other time during the last five weeks
about a general second wave of attacks against Saigon and other population centers. This is followed by "I don't believe
the enemy has any great capability to assume any general offensive in the near future. He has been hurt and hurt badly.
He is tired. His logistic efforts have been adequate to support his campaign thus far, but there is evidence of developing
logistic problems."
B. "But I do give him a capability in I Corps north where he has large forces near Hue. In my opinion, Hue is the next
objective."
C. A general statement to the effect that supply and transportation problems and a steady pounding by American bombs
have weakened the enemy's position around Khe Sanh and have decreased the possibilities of immediate attack. Apropos
of the foregoing, Mr. Clifford remarked that of course he does not know whether the quotes attributed to the spokesmen
are correct. In this connection, he asked that I obtain the tapes of the press interview or stenographic notes if there are no
tapes.
4. The Secretary continued that he believes our best course of action is to be conservative in assessments of the situation
and enemy capabilities. Otherwise, we could have the American public subjected to the second shock. In particular, he

expressed the following views:

A. Do not denigrate the enemy.
B. Do not indulge in forecasting enemy plans or our plans.
C. Do not make predictions of victory.
D. Do express the view that there is tough fighting and that the enemy has residual capabilities not yet committed.
E. This conservative approach, he feels, would put us in a strong public information position. If we suffer some reverses,
the public will not be shocked. If we achieve some successes, we can modestly and without overplaying the situation claim
and receive some kudos.
5. The Secretary particularly stressed the impact of statements such as that appearing in the Times article on public
opinion and in Congress in connection with your request for additional forces. He pointed out that your programs will
require the call-up of on the order of 240,000 reservists, extension of terms of service, and authority to call to active duty
individuals in the reserve pool. End strength of the armed forces will increase by 450,000 or more by end FY 69. In his
view, these requests will be made much harder perhaps impossible to sell if we do not adopt a sober and conservative
attitude as to the military, political, economic, and psychological situation in South Vietnam.
6. I pointed out to Secretary Clifford that you have a difficult problem facing you. No commander can afford to be
pessimistic and apprehensive in dealing with his troops because such an attitude in the commander engenders poor
morale and defeatism in his forces. The Secretary replied that he fully recognized the dilemma facing field commanders in
this regard. Nevertheless, he feels that a conservative public stance will be in the over-all benefit to our public image and
to the support we will receive for administration policies in pursuing the war to a successful conclusion. He considers that
you can tell your senior commanders you are deliberately adopting this attitude for the purposes extensively discussed
above and, at the same time, encourage them to approach the job with optimism and an [3 illegible words].
7. I believe this guidance from the Secretary of Defense is so critical to our military effort in Southeast Asia that you should
devise some way of passing it on without attribution as command guidance to your commands and public information
staffs. Needless to say, if you have comments, I will be pleased to have them. Warm regards./3/
/3/In an unnumbered telegram to Wheeler, March 10, Sharp replied: "The guidance from Secretary Clifford is appreciated
and is being acted upon. Intend continuing efforts to insure credibility in all public statements, and am advising all
subordinate commands of the necessity for conservative expressions of opinion on both good and bad aspects of the
war." (Ibid.)

113. Editorial Note

From 2:24 to 4:13 p.m. on March 8, 1968, President Johnson met with a group of his senior foreign policy advisers that
included Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Earle Wheeler, Special Consultant
Maxwell Taylor, Special Assistant Walt Rostow, Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms, Secretary of State
Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs William Bundy, and Presidential aides George
Christian and Tom Johnson. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) Although no notes of the meeting have been found,
Clifford wrote notes of telephone calls he made that morning in preparation for the afternoon meeting. The first set of notes
marked 10:30 a.m. concerning his conversation with Rostow reads:
"Rostow
"1.) 2:00 p.m. luncheon.
"2.) Bring Buzz Wheeler.
"3.) Would like to add the 20,000 & keep it within the 525,000-"A.) by not replacing certain of the non-combat troops.

"B.) Any other ideas to accomplish the Pres' purpose.

"4.) Should Clifford go to Vietnam or Taylor or Vance.
"5.) Leans toward resolution repealing the Tonkin Gulf."
The second set of notes marked 11:00 a.m. was from a telephone conversation Clifford had with the President at 11:09
a.m. and reads:
"The President
"1.) Review record of yesterday in Senate.
"2.) Wheeler and I see Russell-Stennis-Symington-Scoop Jackson.
"3.) We have 525,000 planned. Have more going.
"4.) Can replace rotation of one returning.
"a.) Might have to go over ceiling.
"5.) May have to break ceiling.
"6.) Reserves were 12 now only 6.
"7.) Have message set forth plan.
"8.) Hatfield Resolution--not good.
"9.) Russell could present motion to repeal Tonkin resolution.
"10.) Look at supplies-"a.) M-16--Helicopters--Planes.
"b.) How can we get air and combat people out too.
"c.) How do we get Congressional determination.
"d.) Pres' plan:
"1.) Call up reserves.
"2.) Armed services & Appropriations. Wheeler and I should appear.
"a.) Russell says no reserves--no extensions.
"3.) [blank]
"e.) Proper way to present plan.
"1.) In one package.
"2.) Or piecemeal--callup first & then Congressional help." (Ibid., Clark Clifford Papers, Notes Taken at Meetings [2])

114. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/
CM-3098-68
Washington, March 8, 1968.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, 1968 Files,
VIET 370. Top Secret; Sensitive. Received in the Office of the Secretary of Defense at 11:29 a.m. on March 9. A notation
indicates that Clifford saw the memorandum.
SUBJECT
COMUSMACV Force Requirements
1. Subsequent to our meeting with the President last Monday evening,/2/ at his request I passed on the recommendations
of the Special Committee to General Westmoreland for his comments. Specifically, I informed him of the substance of the
Committee's recommendations to:
/2/See Document 104.
a. Authorize immediately the deployment of the three tactical fighter squadrons (two Air Force and one Marine) deferred
from Program 5.
b. Authorize at once the deployments to Vietnam of approximately 22,000 additional personnel, this force to be comprised
of (1) six tactical fighter squadrons, (2) one Naval Construction Battalion, and (3) the 4th Marine Expeditionary Force (-).
c. Initiate Reserve call-up and take other necessary actions to improve our strategic posture in the U.S.
2. General Westmoreland's partial comments have been received. He states that the immediate deployment of the three
tactical fighter squadrons would greatly enhance the tactical air support available to ground units. He points out, however,
that construction at Nam Phong must begin immediately if the two F-4D squadrons scheduled in May are to be
accommodated. Units can be deployed as soon as an austere capability has been developed. Moreover, the operation at
Nam Phong is dependent upon the necessary transportation for POL, munitions, supply, etc. If Nam Phong is not ready on
1 May, the two F-4D squadrons scheduled into that base could be temporarily located, one at Udorn and one at Ubon for a
period not to exceed 30 days. He further points out that the six tactical fighter squadrons shown in paragraph 1b(1) above
are over and above the F-4D squadron now in Korea which he assumes will remain in Korea, and they do not include the
F-100 squadron now on temporary duty at Phu Cat. He recommends that this squadron be converted to PCS and remain
in place. Finally, in regard to air deployments, he recommends that the Marine Expeditionary Force be deployed with three
rather than four squadrons. Four squadrons in addition to the one deferred from Program 5 cannot be accommodated at
Chu Lai.
3. General Westmoreland states that although immediate authorization for deployment of 22,000 additional personnel
would provide much needed combat and combat support forces, the combat service support forces now in Vietnam are
insufficient to support our present force structure. This is especially critical in view of the recent deployment of the 3rd
Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division and RLT 27 to the I Corps tactical zone without the appropriate slice of combat
support. He emphasizes the absolute requirement to provide the support forces identified with the increased deployments
prior to or at the same time the tactical forces are deployed. In this regard, General Westmoreland has this date forwarded
his specific strength recommendations for the immediate essential combat service support forces to provide adequate
support for combat units in I CTZ, including the 3rd Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division, RLT 27 and Army units which
have been redeployed to Northern I Corps tactical zone. This request has not yet been validated by CINCPAC, but is
currently under consideration here by the Joint Staff in anticipation of early action by Admiral Sharp's headquarters.
4. Finally, General Westmoreland recognizes that the forces which were contained in the Committee's recommendations
were apparently based upon the capabilities of the Services to produce troops for deployment. He states that there has
been no change in his appraisal of the situation since my visit to Vietnam and thus there has been no change in his
requirements as originally proposed.
Earle G. Wheeler

115. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/
Washington, March 9, 1968, 0130Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, William C. Westmoreland Papers, Eyes Only Message File, 1 Mar-31 Mar 1968. Top Secret.
Repeated to Sharp.
JCS 2767. Ref: JCS 2766./2/
/2/In this telegram sent to Westmoreland on March 9, Wheeler noted that since the decision on future deployments had
been reserved, "for the purpose of your developing the 30,000 man package you should not count on approval of any
future deployments." (Ibid.)
1. By now you will have received the above message asking your desires concerning the composition of the 30,000-man
package, over the above the Program 5 ceiling, to be deployed by 15 June 1968. The reasons that I am querying you
rather than relying upon your earlier requests are these:
A. Your recently forwarded a request for 3,316 personnel to support forces already deployed.
B. I wish to emphasize to you the decision has not yet been taken to deploy the 30,000-man package; however, there
appears to be substantial agreement that this is the proper course. Furthermore, I wish to emphasize that no decision has
been taken to provide you forces over and above the 30,000-man package.
C. You will need to make a choice of units from those which we will have available following the reserve call-up. A listing of
forces available for deployment by 15 June is contained in the reference.
D. I am concerned that, if we worked up a 30,000-man package here based upon your earlier requests, you would end up
with an unbalanced force in South Vietnam, perhaps one which you could not support; therefore, we need your views as to
what is needed to give you a balanced force./3/
/3/In telegram MAC 3385 to Wheeler, March 11, Westmoreland proposed two alternative add-on packages. The first
included only those forces available by June 15 and thus consisted of a much greater Marine Corps contribution. The
second package included forces available after June 15, a "better" mix of forces, and was Westmoreland's preferred
alternative. (Ibid.)
2. As I informed you in my earlier message it is agreed that the 12,545 civilianization program will be canceled. This action
raises the Program 5 ceiling to 537,545. The staff assures me that the subject 12,545 personnel are now in-country and
that no civilianization of these military spaces has taken place. If this is not the case please advise me.
3. I do not wish to shunt my troubles on to you; however, to guide you in your thinking and planning, I feel I must tell you
frankly that there is strong resistance from all quarters to putting more ground force units in South Vietnam. The call-up of
reserves and the concomitant actions that must be taken will raise unshirted hell in many influential quarters, and I find that
there is substantial sentiment that the 30,000 increment should not be deployed. I tell you this because I feel you must
know that, while a reserve call-up will improve markedly the CONUS strategic reserve and put us in a position to honor
further requests from you, you should not count upon an affirmative decision for such additional forces. With this cheerless
counsel I will sign off. Warm regards.

116. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 10, 1968, 11:20 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 7 D (2), 12/67-3/68, News Media Coverage of
Viet Nam. Confidential. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

Mr. President:
Herewith my judgment on today's New York Times article on troops./2/
/2/The continuing debate within the administration over further troop deployments became public on March 10 when
reporters Neil Sheehan and Hedrick Smith published an article in The New York Times that extensively revealed details of
the policy assessment. For full text of the article and discussion on it, see The Pentagon Papers: The Senator Gravel
Edition, pp. 584-589.
1. The materials were mainly gathered from medium-level officials in both State and Defense, who oppose the sending of
more troops to Vietnam.
2. These officials either made available, read, or summarized--probably the latter--from one of the working papers
prepared for the Clifford Committee, which made the argument against more troops.
3. I find no evidence that officials who worked directly on the Clifford Committee spoke to the writers of the article; and
some indication that they did not. I regard the article as the product of dangerous insubordination which can only be met by
an early decision by the President and a full account of where we stand in the winter-spring enemy offensive and what we
intend to do./3/
/3/There was some indication that these reporters were on the trail of the story 2 days earlier. Smith told his friend Richard
Ullman, who worked in Warnke's office, that "a comprehensive account of what had been happening within the U.S.
Government since the Tet Offensive" would soon be published. (Memorandum from Ullman to Warnke, March 8; Johnson
Library, Clark Clifford Papers, Vietnam (1 Feb 68-15 Mar 68) [1]) In a note to Clifford, March 8, Goulding wrote: "Nick
Katzenbach called me this afternoon to say that Neil Sheehan--who covers the Pentagon for the Times--had been calling
various State people with the 206,000 figure, but without the detail that Smith apparently has. That indicates how they are
operating--the State men for the Times are working this building and the Pentagon men working the State Department.
Paul, Nick and I are all surprised that it has taken this long for something to surface. I see nothing constructive we can do
about it." (Ibid.)
Incidentally, my impression of the Westmoreland counteroffensive, described in a dispatch, March 3, to General
Wheeler,/4/ is that it is going quite well in I Corps and around Danang. Thang has taken hold in the Delta. He deserves all
the support we can give him. In III Corps we have not yet engaged the divisions near Saigon; but I presume this is
imminent.
/4/See Document 101.
Walt

117. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, March 11, 1968, 1142Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret;
Immediate; Nodis. Received at 10:48 a.m.
21733. Ref: State 124584./2/
/2/In telegram 124584 to Saigon, March 5, the Department transmitted the text of the paper attached as Tab B to
Document 103. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
1. I agree that the question of additional US troops for Vietnam raises fundamental questions regarding our policy here. As
the paper contained in reftel indicates, the positive and negative effects of an increase on the Vietnamese Government
and people involve difficult judgments affecting both our long-range and short-term objectives here.
2. A critical element in judging the effects of an increase in US forces is obviously the size of that increase. General
Westmoreland, based on his understanding of the capabilities of the military services to deploy trained units, has

recommended that the first increment should amount to an additional seven combat maneuver battalions plus an MP
battalion. These forces are needed to partially offset troops which have already been dispatched to northern I Corps. If
Pres Thieu's analysis of enemy strategy and capability is correct, NVA/VC forces can be expected to mount another major
offensive in the late spring or summer. This offensive must be decisively defeated. Even though Vietnamese forces will be
building up during the time between now and summer, we can not expect them to be fully trained, equipped and in place
before this phase occurs. I would therefore favor earliest deployment of the first increment recommended by General
Westmoreland. The question of the dispatch of forces beyond this increment should be reexamined at a later date in the
light of the situation during the summer months. The comments that follow relate to the general problems I forsee resulting
from additional US forces, although I believe these problems will be manageable if the increase is limited to the numbers
proposed under General Westmoreland's recommendation for a first increment. I am not attempting to address in this
message the effects of the proposed deployment of additional US forces in terms of measures required in the US to back
up this action and give us the required reserve forces, since these are matters which have to be determined in
Washington.
3. I agree that the deployment of additional US troops would probably stiffen the GVN's will at a critical time and would be
a further affirmation of our commitment and of our capability to meet it. The countervailing factor that it could tend to further
Americanize the war and give the Vietnamese an escape route from their responsibility is an important consideration,
however. The Tet attacks have given the anti-Communist elements here both a shock and a shot in the arm, as reftel
indicates. The question now is how to take advantage of this without imposing impossible demands on the government,
which will tend to make it throw up its hands and slip away from its responsibility, leaving us to carry the main burden. I
think the answer to this will turn both on the size and deployment of additional US forces and on the availability of
equipment and other support needed to allow the GVN to increase its military effort promptly. In other words, we need to
maintain a careful balance between modernization of RVNAF and the build-up of our own forces. One of the clear lessons
of the past few weeks has been that the Communists have given all out support in terms of military equipment and
supplies for the NVA/VC and they have been able to outgun those RVNAF forces that are still equipped with our older
weapons. Our modernization program for RVNAF is just beginning to make progress. We cannot afford to let this program
slip and must examine each major item carefully to insure that RVNAF gets a fair share and that the momentum and
confidence inspired by issue of the new items is not lost. The number of additional US troops contemplated for deployment
should not have any appreciable effect upon the modernization and improvement of RVNAF. In fact, these two matters
should go hand in hand to increase the momentum of the overall build-up of strength and capability in country to
progressively destroy the enemy. I consider it most urgent that we get the weapons RVNAF needs over here as
expeditiously as possible, in order to maintain the momentum of the GVN's present mobilization plans. I view this matter as
both a short and long term objective, while in contrast the provision of additional US forces is a necessary but a short term
goal.
4. I am concerned about sizable additional US forces because of the effects of our overwhelming presence here and the
possibility that the destructive effect of our type of warfare will nullify some of our basic purpose. By this I mean that we will
increasingly come to play the role of a colonial power, whether intentionally or not. For this reason, I think we must
maintain a very careful balance between what we undertake to do ourselves and what we can achieve through pressure
on the GVN, always bearing in mind what the GVN is capable of in terms of its own human resources. However, bringing
in the additional US forces presently contemplated should not add seriously to the problem of an overwhelming US
presence at this time, since these forces will be deployed in the hinterlands fighting VC and NVA units, where destruction
and visibility should be minimal. Additional forces when added to the proposed RVNAF build-up, should permit us to regain
our momentum and accelerate it beyond that of 1967. The foregoing general observations underlie some of the specific
comments which follow in the numbered paragraphs of the paper quoted in reftel.
5. I agree with para 3 that the GVN has the capacity to improve the security and political climate, and thus its image in the
US, but the definition of this capacity must be a realizable one. Therefore, the range of decisions and actions to be
required of the government must be keyed to a realistic assessment of what they can do, rather than an ideal related
primarily to what we or American public opinion would like to see. No matter how much we achieve here, the American
press and probably certain of our own Congress will never regard it as sufficient, given their tendency sometimes to
demand standards of perfection which even we have not attained. I am confident that we and the GVN can do what is
necessary, but in deciding what this is, we must take sufficiently into account the fact that this is an underdeveloped Asian
nation torn by decades of war and with limited human resources, endeavoring to function under a new and unaccustomed
form of government in which it has had little practice and less tradition.
6. Re para 5 I agree that a high-level mission to Saigon can play a helpful psychological role in this situation and Sec
Clifford would be the ideal person to head it. I would be inclined, however, to recommend that the mission come at a
somewhat later date, perhaps in April, to evaluate what is being done and to give an added push to our effort, I could then
continue with the task of laying before the government what we expect of it and of getting this effort under way. I should
note at this point that most of the decisions and actions listed are ones on which we have already been pushing the
government and on which they have already begun to take encouraging action. This does not mean they cannot do more,
but merely underlines the fact that we in the Mission, as well as the GVN, are basically on the same wave-length with
Washington in terms of our objectives, and of the time-frame within which we are working.

7. Re para 6--mobilization, I have already reported on Pres Thieu's decision to accelerate the mobilization process and his
desire to provide between 100,000 and 125,000 additional men for the armed forces during the next six months. In this
regard Pres Thieu envisages the extensive use of units on Fairfax type operations to protect the cities, their environs, and
the LOCs. We are working with the GVN to maintain key civilians in their government functions where they cannot be
spared or replaced. Gen Westmoreland informs me that FY 68 program for the expansion of the Vietnamese armed forces
involves an increase of 64,000 men. Only approximately 25,000 of this force increase has been realized. The current
approved program is therefore short approximately 40,000 men, for which equipment has been programmed. In
accordance with this program, these 40,000 men were to be used to fill existing units and to activate the following major
elements: approximately 80 RF companies and 250 PF platoons, 1 artillery battalion, 1 engineer battalion, 1 separate
infantry regiment, and 2 infantry battalions to flesh out existing regiments. If additional men are mobilized, RF/PF units
could be organized and equipped with WW II-type weapons available by virtue of receipt of more modern weapons by
ARVN. Gen Westmoreland's proposed FY 69 program involves an increase of 93,000. A formal request for approval has
been submitted through his channel. Therefore it is Gen Westmoreland's opinion that the number of men Thieu plans to
mobilize can be conscripted, trained and equipped. Assuming that 125,000 men are mobilized during the next six months,
this will result in a net increase of approximately 60,000 men in RVNAF over current strength in consideration of estimated
losses of approximately 10,000 per month through casualties and desertions. There will be shortages of some equipment
until FY 68 programmed quantities are delivered and until FY 69 items are programmed and available from production.
Individual weapons will again be of the WW II type and vehicle shortages will have some effect on mobility. However,
these problems are believed to be manageable. The major problem is one of leadership, where it is estimated that officer
and NCO requirements may be difficult to fill. We feel that we should encourage Thieu and the Joint General Staff to
proceed soonest with their mobilization, not only to form additional units that are sorely needed and to fill up their ranks,
but to deny this manpower to the Viet Cong, who are, themselves, in desperate need of manpower.
8. Re para 7--Thieu/Ky relationship, this has been one of many main preoccupations since my arrival almost a year ago.
This relationship continues to have its peaks and valleys, and it is now in one of its valleys, but I shall continue to devote
my fullest energies to maintaining it and to encouraging a greater unity of leadership on all sides. The objectives outlined in
paras 7 and 8 are those which have guided me in the past and I will continue to pursue them vigorously.
9. Re para 9 and 10--getting the GVN back into the countryside, this is a point on which Gen Westmoreland and I have
been pressing the top leadership continuously for the past few weeks, and as I have reported, Thieu and Ky are fully in
accord with it. While there have been circles in the military leadership who have been too conservative and reluctant to
move out into the countryside, we believe that some success has already been achieved, and in most areas this effort is
already well underway. We will continue to press vigorously in this direction and to furnish the necessary support to make it
possible for the government to take the initiative without fear. Westmoreland and I agree regarding the vital role of the
province chiefs and their staff and the sense of mission of the ARVN units and we intend to pursue the evaluation process
at all levels.
10. Re para 11--drive on the VC infrastructure, I agree that the pres-ent situation offers an opportunity which must be
exploited promptly and vigorously and we are already engaged with the GVN in this process. It will be pushed with even
greater vigor.
11. Re para 12--government reform and anti-corruption campaign, Pres Thieu is as you recognize, already moving in the
desired directions and we will keep up the pressures on him to accelerate the reform and to assure that it achieves the
desired purposes. I agree that incompetent military commanders, province chiefs and civilian officials must be removed
and that we should make our own views on such persons known. The way in which this is done, however, is something on
which the judgment should be left to those of us here on the spot. We understand the objective and agree with it. The only
point I would like to make at this stage is to emphasize that these changes involve very complicated relationships among
the leaders here, especially in the military, and that we must not allow our eagerness for change to outweigh the overall
objectives of maintaining unity of leadership. I recognize that Thieu is overly cautious and reluctant to move in such
matters, and I will continue to press him as needed, but we must accept the fact that the definition of what is possible must
in the last analysis remain his, since he is the President.
12. Re para 13--the united front. I agree that in order to take fullest advantage of the nationalist spirit of cooperation, we
must prevent personal rivalries and differences from undermining this effort. The Thieu/Ky relationship, the relations
between the executive and legislative branches, and the inter-play of political groups and leaders all bear on this picture.
One cautioning note which I would like to sound here is that when we choose to stimulate Vietnamese initiatives for
national unity, they should be related to the actual political situation here and should have lasting meaning in Asian terms,
not just American ideas of what we think they should develop. The skepticism with which the National Salvation Front is
viewed by many Vietnamese as evidence that the introspective Vietnamese often finds a hidden meaning and purpose in
what to us seems logical and reasonable. We will continue to press for meaningful efforts to unity the nationalist elements
here and to create the basis for longer-term political activity.
13. Re paras 14-16, we will be formulating further proposals on economic measures along the lines suggested in these
paragraphs.

14. I believe that the factors discussed in paras 17-19--US actions and leverage, have already been addressed at the
beginning of this message. I would merely reiterate here my general feeling that the emphasis should remain on enlarging
and modernizing RVNAF and that US force increase should be limited to what we consider essential to maintain the
offensive and to overcome certain geographic advantages which the enemy has, without unduly widening the war or overAmericanizing it. I know that this definition requires careful spelling out but I would hope that this could be our basic
guideline in doing so.
Bunker

118. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 11, 1968, 4:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 66. Literally Eyes Only.
Mr. President:
The Apostolic Delegate, the Most Reverend Luigi Raimondi, asked to see me this afternoon. He carried a memorandum
which proposed that, without the prior knowledge of Hanoi or Washington, a legitimate neutral source invited the following
to appear at a conference at a certain time and place: U.S., GVN, Hanoi, and NLF. The three members of the International
Control Commission (India, Canada, and Poland) would also be invited. The inviting neutral country would also ask both
sides to de-escalate the violence, including a cessation of bombing of North Vietnam.
The Holy See, after examining the project, said that it was impossible to back it without both sides, at least, being
informed. Therefore, Rev. Raimondi was willing to have me read the memo; make any remarks I cared to make; but not
keep and circulate the memo.
I read it and told him that he should ask for a session with Secretary Rusk; let him read and return the memo; and get his
observations. My own observations were these:
--The memo is based on the assumption that both sides wish to negotiate, but cannot find a way to do so without believed
disadvantage. It was unlikely that this was the case; but no idea or hypothesis that might bring peace should be excluded.
--The proposal called for a "gradual reduction" in the violence; but called for a flat "cessation of bombing of North Vietnam.
" Whatever proposals were made should be well balanced and symmetrical, in my judgment.
--The memo suggested Sweden as an ideal authentic neutral--I noted that out of its own political life, Sweden had gotten
itself into a somewhat awkward relation to Vietnam. He immediately said that Switzerland would certainly be better.
--I concluded by repeating that he should regard my remarks as personal; and should seek out Secretary Rusk./2/ I told
him that anything coming from the Holy See or from himself personally would always be taken most seriously by this
government.
/2/See Document 139.
I told him that I would, of course, inform the President; but I would not circulate a piece of paper about this project within
the government beyond that.
He asked me to convey his respects and best wishes to the President.
Walt

119. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to President Johnson/1/

CM-3102-68
Washington, March 11, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of Defense, Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 911 (5 Mar 68) IR 3134. Top Secret;
Sensitive; Nodis. Copies were sent to Clifford, Nitze, and Warnke.
SUBJECT
Ambassador Lodge's Memorandum
1. Ambassador Lodge in his memorandum dated 5 March 1968, addresses himself to two major problems and then
touches on a number of related matters./2/ The first of these has to do with the level of military forces in Vietnam and their
employment. The second has to do with the importance of strengthening the police structure within the cities and towns in
order to comb out the Communist organization, so that local political institutions and agencies can operate.
/2/Document 106.
2. Taking this last point first, I am in complete agreement with the Ambassador's very perceptive analysis. In fact, now that
the enemy is involved in large-scale infiltration of the cities and towns, the effectiveness of police and security forces has
become as important as any other measure. If the towns are lost from within, this would be just as fateful as if they were
seized from without. I do have the impression that Ambassador Bunker and the entire mission in Vietnam also agree on
the importance of this matter. Current plans to expand the police are consistent with this view and the very elaborate
organization under Ambassador Komer, including the special organization for the attack on the infrastructure, are all
moving in this direction with all of the imagination and energy at their disposal.
3. With respect to the level of forces and their employment, I believe that there is a widespread misunderstanding about
the purpose and the nature of the so-called "search and destroy operations" conducted by U.S. forces in Vietnam. It may
be that the term itself is misleading. I define "search and destroy" as offensive operations designed to destroy enemy units,
bases and supplies.
4. General Westmoreland has been pursuing three military objectives in South Vietnam, which require that he find and
destroy enemy forces:
a. Destroy, neutralize or eject the North Vietnamese Army;
b. Destroy, neutralize or induce the defection of the Viet Cong military and political apparatus; and
c. Extend the control of the Government over all of the people of South Vietnam and all of its territory.
5. In my view, which is shared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it will be necessary, for a number of reasons, to continue to
conduct offensive operations in Vietnam. Among the more prominent reasons are these:
a. Even if the missions assigned to the commander were to be wholly defensive in nature--that is, to defend the
government in Saigon, in the provinces and districts and to defend and secure the major population concentrations--it
would be necessary to conduct offensive operations against the enemy forces which threaten the government, cities and
towns, and the people.
b. The geographic configuration of Vietnam is such that the population frontier is long and indefensible by any system of
static defense.
c. If our forces were to fall back along the population frontier, the enemy could mass large forces anywhere in the mountain
and jungle hinterland and strike deeply, with force and surprise, into the population areas. Such strong enemy attacks
would have excellent prospects for initial success. Then, in order to eject him, it would be necessary to mass large allied
forces and subject populated areas to the effects of the heavy firepower which would be required to destroy or eject him.
This would lead to the kind of destruction we have seen in Saigon, Hue, and many other cities and towns. Civilian
casualties would skyrocket, new refugees would be created, and over a period of time almost total destruction would
ensue throughout South Vietnam.
d. Even though it is sometimes more difficult to fight in the deep jungle and mountains, as at Khe Sanh, Dak To and Plei

Me, the interests of both the United States and the Vietnamese people are better served by fighting outside the populated
areas. Put another way, it is better to have the two divisions which surround Khe Sanh back in the mountains than in the
city of Hue--and it is better to fight the 1st NVA Division at Dak To, for example than in Kontum City or Pleiku.
e. In order to defend the population, it is necessary to patrol in strength in the interior to find large formations and then to
strike at them with strength. It is exactly operations of this type which best succeed in keeping the enemy "split up and off
balance" so that he can attack less frequently and less effectively against the primary population targets in South Vietnam.
These are the operations which now fall into the reporting category of "search and destroy".
6. Concerning two other points made by Ambassador Lodge:
a. I can find no basis for correlating the length of wars with casualty rates and degree of public support. In this connection,
you will find the enclosed statistical comparison (Tab A)/3/ of interest.
/3/The attached Tab A, a chart comparing various wars in terms of length, battle deaths, and deaths per month, noted that
World War II had the highest casualties per month but "was fully supported by the American public" while "the war in
Vietnam (measured from the introduction of U.S. ground combat units) has been shorter than the Korean War and the
death rate has been less than one-third."
b. When Ambassador Lodge speaks of censorship, he has put his finger on a problem which has been plaguing General
Westmoreland. It seems perfectly clear that we are channeling to the enemy, through the press, information which is
extremely helpful to him. This is a real handicap to the Allied forces in Vietnam and certainly one which complicates the
successful prosecution of operations.
7. Ambassador Lodge expresses thoughts about the requirement for additional forces beyond those "to enable us to keep
faith with the troops in exposed positions". Our forces in Vietnam today, as during the past three years, have been
employed primarily to hold off the main forces of the enemy--increasingly North Vietnamese--so that the very process
described by the Ambassador could go forward behind their protective screen. By reinforcing from North Vietnam with well
over three divisions in two months, General Giap has simply rendered our shield less effective. If I understand General
Westmoreland's basic requirement for additional forces, it is simply to prevent the relative balance of force from going
badly against him. If the balance of force improves in favor of the enemy, as it has in recent months, the enemy
automatically increases his ability to mount attacks, or to threaten attacks, in an increasing number of places. In his current
offensive, he has posed threats in precisely those areas which Ambassador Lodge correctly identifies as being the most
critical--the cities, the towns and the concentrations of heavy population.
8. With respect to over-all strategy in Vietnam, I would make this observation. We are now engaged in the most crucial
phase of the war. The events of the next three or four months could fundamentally alter the nature of this war. In my view,
it is not timely to consider fundamental changes in strategy when we are fully committed in what could be the decisive
battles of the war.
Earle G. Wheeler

120. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, March 11, 1968, 6:57-8:18 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.
Those attending were the President, Rusk, Clifford, Nitze, Wheeler, Taylor, Helms, Rostow, Christian, and Tom Johnson.
(Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS
The President: Dean, we are very proud of you up there today (testifying before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on
Vietnam and Foreign Aid)./2/
/2/On March 11-12 Rusk appeared in a public hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for the first time in
over 2 years. Except for a brief statement on foreign aid the first day, Rusk responded to the Committee's questions on

Vietnam and specifically on the impending troop augmentation decision and the 1964 Tonkin Gulf incidents. Rusk also
described the reassessment then being undertaken by the administration on Vietnam, an exercise that he referred to as an
"A to Z review." In addition to putting Rusk on the defensive by criticizing Johnson's Vietnam policy, Fulbright and the other
Senators unsuccessfully pressed for a pledge that the administration would consult with the Committee prior to reaching
any final decision. See The New York Times, March 11-13, 1968. In a telegram to Bunker assessing his appearance at
Fulbright's hearings, Rusk noted: "As I assess the internal mood of the country here, I am deeply convinced that (a) the
performance of the South Vietnamese and (b) some clear news of important military successes would help most of all in
morale on the home front." (Telegram 129797 to Saigon, March 14; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
Secretary Rusk: As you all know, I testify again tomorrow at 9:30 a.m. I do not want to be caught off guard up there
tomorrow by anything which you may be discussing here today. Should I leave or stay?
The President: You have had a rough day. Why don't you go on and get rested for tomorrow. You and Clark can get
together later to go over what we have discussed.
(The President and the group then reviewed at length the recommendations and answers to questions which are
attached.)/3/
/3/Not attached. In this March 11 memorandum to the President, Clifford listed seven questions and appended responses.
These questions concerned Westmoreland's add-on package request, the Marine Corps figures, the status of the troops
"in the pipeline," additional tactical aircraft, reserve call-up, Program 5 deployment, and equipment for allied forces.
(Johnson Library, Clark M. Clifford Papers, Vietnam (1 Feb 68-15 Mar 68) [1])
The President: I see that Westmoreland prefers Alternative Two. (The President then read: "I prefer the second alternative.
By providing seven additional maneuver battalions as compared to three in the first alternative, it maximizes my combat
firepower . . ."--from General Westmoreland's cable to General Wheeler 11 March 1968)./4/
/4/See footnote 3, Document 115. In a memorandum to the President prior to receipt of this telegram, March 11, 9:50 a.m.,
Rostow noted: "As instructed, I have spoken with General Wheeler as well as Clark Clifford. The questions were put to
Westmoreland. There is as yet no reply. The reply may come in today. General Wheeler says that he hopes there will be a
little time to 'scrub down' Westmoreland's recommendations before they come to you. Therefore, he is inclined to think that
it would be better to make the critical decision tomorrow rather than today; but he and Clifford will be in touch with me
later." (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs N-Z and AA-KK)
This would be roughly 30,000 men?
General Wheeler: Yes, sir.
The President: Was Westmoreland limited in this?
General Wheeler: Yes, we told him this was all that we had the capability of providing in this time period. I recommend that
we send him these men as soon as we can. Of course, it will be necessary to call up the reserves to do this.
The President: Can we relate this 30,000 to a specific request from General Westmoreland?
General Wheeler: The first increment he asked for out of the 206,000 was 90,000. But as I said this is all we can provide in
this period. But this does not relate to a specific request from him.
Secretary Clifford: In this cable, he says that the second alternative is better than the first.
There then was a general discussion of force levels. General Wheeler said that if the President approves the
recommendations the total troop level would be brought up to 578,000 including Program 5 (525,000) completion, the
elements of the 82nd airborne and Marine RLT already sent, along with the new troops.
The President: I do not want to be having a seminar on strategy back here while our house is on fire. I want to get
Westmoreland what he needs to get him through this emergency period. Let's get those civilian contractors working
wherever possible and get some strong, tough strawbosses running things out there.

(About a twenty minute discussion followed on the specifics of the attachments.)

121. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, March 12, 1968, 1:29-2:32 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House.
Those attending were the President, Clifford, Helms, Wheeler, Rostow, Christian, and Tom Johnson. (Ibid., President's
Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH HIS
FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS
AT THE
TUESDAY LUNCH
The President watched portions of the Senate Foreign Relations hearings on television. He saw questions and answers
given to Senator Dodd, Senator Pell, Senator Gore, and Senator Fulbright.
General Wheeler gave to the President two cables which he had drafted to be sent to General Westmoreland. Those
cables are attached as appendixes A and B./2/
/2/Not attached. One telegram is printed as Document 122, and the other is cited in footnote 2 thereto.
General Wheeler said that the weather was so bad that there was no need to consider targeting.
The President asked the group to look at the financing of the troop build-up very carefully. "We must have $1.8 billion
without the build-up. With it we will need more than that--you have to have about $4 billion. Look into that."
All of you should also consider whether the President should make a statement. Give some thought on what we should say
on the matter.
I want Clark and General Wheeler to talk to Congressman Rivers and Senator Russell as well as Congressman Mahon as
soon as he returns from Texas. Have Russell get any of the people from the Appropriations Committee for this meeting.
All of you moderated my judgment in that Monday meeting after I returned from Puerto Rico./3/ I was ready then to say
that we should call up the reserves to strengthen the strategic reserves; to ask Congress for authority to call up selected
reservists; to use this as a basis for a new position on the tax bill; and to ask for authority to extend enlistments. That
Monday session did moderate my judgment some. I do think we should evaluate our strategy. It is a good idea from time to
time to have a good, sound review. I only hope we don't get over-run in the meantime.
/3/See Document 105.
I want to get the judgment of Senator Russell and Congressmen Rivers and Mahon and others about how we deal with
Fulbright on this.
Since Secretary Rusk undoubtedly would like a little rest after that hearing, I don't think we really have much more we need
to cover here. There is nothing we can do on anything else, is there?
Walt Rostow: No sir, not that I know of.

122. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/

Washington, March 12, 1968, 2014Z.

/1/Source: U.S. Army Center of Military History, William C. Westmoreland Papers, Eyes Only Message File, 1 Mar-31 Mar
1968. Secret; Eyes Only; Immediate. Repeated to Sharp.
JCS 2848. Deliver during waking hours. Ref: JCS 02847./2/
/2/Telegram JCS 2847 from Wheeler to Westmoreland, March 12. (Ibid.)
1. By referenced message I have informed you of upcoming actions to meet alternative two of the force requirements
expressed by you in MAC 3385./3/ This message will provide you further background as to the situation here and its
impact on force deployments to SEA. The following factors are important:
/3/See footnote 3, Document 115.
a. Leaks to the press have resulted in a rash of stories, reflected in debate in the Congress, that you have asked for an
additional 206,000 troop augmentation.
b. There is substantial opposition in the Congress to any further deployment of forces to South Vietnam. Moreover,
prominent Senators are demanding that the President seek Congressional approval before undertaking further
deployments of U.S. troops.
c. A great many knowledgeable Congressmen and news media personnel know full well that the CONUS reserve cannot
support any substantial additional deployment without a call-up of reserves.
d. It is anticipated that Members of Congress and the news media will criticize the Administration regardless of what is
done; i.e., some will criticize because further deployments are made while others will criticize on the basis that more was
not sent.
2. At a meeting at the White House last night/4/ to discuss the augmentation you requested in MAC 3385, the highest
authority stated that, in response to questions and criticism, he proposes to say in effect: Westmoreland asked for these
forces (30,000) as soon as possible; they were all we could realistically get to him to bolster his combat strength during the
next three to four months. We intend to build up the CONUS strategic reserve in order to improve over-all capabilities. We
will look at other requirements if and when the situation necessitates.
/4/See Document 120.
3. Furthermore, I was directed to keep you informed of the status of our forces in the United States so that you will not in
future be placed in the position of asking for something that does not exist or is not available.
4. I will appreciate as always any comments you may care to offer. Warm regards.

123. Editorial Note

The impact of the war in Vietnam in domestic politics became a significant factor during mid-March 1968. On March 12
Senator Eugene McCarthy made a surprisingly strong showing in the balloting for the New Hampshire Democratic
Presidential primary by winning all but 4 of the 24 delegate votes. His tally represented a significant repudiation of the
administration's policies. McCarthy's relative success encouraged Senator Robert Kennedy to enter the Presidential
nomination race on March 16. Five days prior to this announcement, Kennedy adviser Theodore Sorensen met with the
President at the White House to present Kennedy's position on Vietnam. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
Although notes of this meeting have not been found, Johnson did discuss the meeting in three telephone conversations
with Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago, Illinois, on March 13 and another on March 15. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts,
Recordings of Telephone Conversations Between Johnson and Daley, March 13, 1968, 5 p.m., 10:49 p.m., and 11:22
p.m., Tape F68.05, PNO 1-5, and March 15, 1968, Tape F68.05, PNO 6)
Both Sorensen and Kennedy met with Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford at 11 a.m. on March 14. In this meeting,
Sorensen and Kennedy suggested that the Senator would not declare his candidacy for the Democratic nomination for

President if Johnson agreed to appoint a commission to re-evaluate U.S. policy in Vietnam. Kennedy suggested that he
and nine others would direct the commission toward changing the course of the war. That same day Clifford discussed the
proposal with the President in a meeting at the White House. The President concluded that he could not accept the
proposal since it would "appear to be a political deal." Clifford then reported the rejection of the idea to Sorensen and
Kennedy. (Ibid., National Security File, White House Famous Names, Robert Kennedy) According to transcripts of a
telephone conversation at 6:15 p.m. that evening, Presidential aide DeVier Pierson further explained to Sorensen why the
President had rejected the idea of establishing the commission: "He feels that public announcement of such a group would
be interpreted in Hanoi as a weakening of our position and would have an adverse effect on our own people--particularly in
State and Defense Departments--and appear to undercut their efforts." (Ibid.)

124. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, March 14, 1968, 1030Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret;
Immediate; Nodis. Received at 7:30 a.m. The telegram is printed in full in Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 372379.
22088. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my forty-third weekly message.
A. General
1. In my last two messages,/2/ I reported on our preliminary readings on the effect of the Tet attacks on the situation
countrywide, and their meaning in terms of enemy strategy. It is clear that we must push ahead not only with the recovery
program to get things back to the pre-Tet normal situation, but also move ahead as rapidly as possible toward
achievement of our longer range priority objectives, i.e., mobilization, reorganization of the armed forces and civil
administration, pacification, the attack on corruption, and economic measures. These latter will first have to be concerned
with a restoration of the badly damaged economy, and in restoring confidence in the business and farming communities
before any real advances can be envisaged. Taxes will have to be increased to close the inflationary gap and a vigilant
watch kept on the upward pressure on prices. In surveying the situation this week, I can report progress on both the
recovery effort and on some of our longer range objectives. At the same time, there are areas where we face continuing
difficulties.
/2/See Documents 94 and 107.
2. Progress is evident in the following areas:
A) President Thieu is continuing to take an increasingly active and decisive role in the government, providing more
effective and more visible leadership than at any time in the past. Because of his temperament, he does not give the
picture of the dynamic, charismatic leader that we might think of as ideal. But he has shown increasingly a desire to take
hold of the reins and I think he is doing better in both American and Vietnamese eyes. He has continued to chair meetings
of the Central Recovery Committee where he has made quick, sound decisions, pushed his Ministers to rapid action, and
in general imparted more of a sense of urgency and confidence in the Vietnamese bureaucracy. He has moved to speed
up mobilization, has taken steps on administrative reform, outlined his tax proposals, and enforces austerity measures,
including the closing of bars and nightclubs, and imposed a ban on luxury building.
B) In pushing the relief and reconstruction effort, Thieu made a second personal inspection in Hue March 9, where he gave
further impetus to the relief effort by making on-the-spot decisions and a display of interest and concern. While in Hue he
made a point of contacting ordinary people and touring the entire city to see and hear their problems first hand. General
Forsythe, who accompanied Thieu, tells me that the gratitude and warmth of the people toward him was obvious.
Remembering the attitude of the Hue population toward the central government in the "Struggle" and even in the recent
past, this response to Thieu is doubly significant. On March 11, Thieu also made a brief radio and TV appearance, as I
have been urging him to do, in which he launched the official campaign for voluntary contributions to a national fund for the
Tet victims.
C) The relief and reconstruction effort is continuing to move forward with good results. Universities and some other schools
have reopened, relief convoys are moving to Hue and the Delta, distribution of relief supplies continues, and reconstruction
is underway. Some 81 million piasters have been hand carried in cash to the provinces to speed the relief effort. In Saigon,
the curfew has been cut by two hours, resulting in improved morale, and the port is functioning much better, the discharge

rate now having reached 8,000 tons per day. Prices continue to move downward. Nationwide, the number of refugees now
stands at about 500,000 and will probably continue to decline as people whose homes have not been destroyed move
back as security is established. Other statistics, though not final, also testify to the magnitude of the problem. The number
of houses destroyed is now estimated at 74,000 and civilian casualties at 9,100 killed and 21,200 wounded.
D) The movement back into the countryside has begun. At least 321 of the 555 RD teams are in the hamlets; 93 out of 109
Truong Son (Montagnard) teams are also in place. The President has also issued instructions that all RD cadre would be
sent back to normal RD duties effective immediately, and that they therefore would no longer be supervising refugee
camps, manning command posts, guarding cities and towns as they have been doing in some instances. Both General
Cao Van Vien and RD Minister Tri have been making personal inspections, urging on rural officials an aggressive return to
the pacification effort. The RD Ministry also has 12 teams in the countryside to develop the necessary program changes to
adapt RD plans to the present situation.
E) On the military side, an encouraging development was the fact that both volunteer enlistments and draftees jumped
dramatically in February. There were 10,084 volunteers in February compared with 6,059 in January and 3,924 in
February of last year. Over 10,600 draftees also reported for induction in February, as compared with 3,766 in January and
4,006 in February of last year. It is worth noting that despite personnel losses in the recent heavy fighting, RVNAF unit
strength is generally satisfactory and GVN forces are maintaining a high level of combat effectiveness. Of the 155 RVNAF
maneuver battalions, 98 were combat effective as of February 19, but this had jumped to 118 by March 1. Average
countrywide present-for-duty-strength of RF companies is 99 (full strength, 123) and for PF platoons is 29 (full strength,
35).
F) A Civil Defense Directorate was established in the Ministry of Interior March 7. The organization of local units is going
forward throughout the country, and at latest reading there were nearly 19,000 volunteers in 20 provinces.
G) The Prime Minister has signed a decree on the organization and functions of the new Directorate General of the Civil
Service which should provide a sound institutional base from which to launch an effective reform program within the civil
service.
H) Tran Van Don successfully held his national congress to form a broad, nationwide anti-Communist front on March 10.
While there were some conspicuous absences among the invited notables, attendance was impressive in terms of the
wide span of political elements represented. Also noteworthy on the political scene this week was the passage by the
lower house of the national budget, with no significant changes from the administration draft. The budget now goes to the
Senate.
3. Among the difficulties still confronting us are the following:
A) Perhaps the most negative development this week has been an obvious tendency on the part of some Vietnamese
leaders to return to politics as usual. While the success of the Tran Van Don congress testifies to the continuing strength of
the feeling of national unity which emerged from the Tet offensive, there have also been disturbing signs that characteristic
Vietnamese factionalism is again emerging. Most troublesome in this category have been reports of intention by Ky,
particularly spread by his supporters, to force a change in the power structure which would give Ky more authority. Some
reports even went so far as to suggest a forcible change in government leadership might be in the offing. I took up this
matter specifically with Ky yesterday morning and will report on it in more detail in the political section.
B) Related to the Thieu/Ky problem in the continued activity by Tran Van An and Nguyen Van Huong to form political
organizations which are generally viewed to be in competition with Don's front.
C) Another matter is the effort by some lower house Deputies to place on the house agenda a motion of no confidence in
the government, although at last report it appears that this may not materialize.
D) The enemy continues to pose a formidable military threat in several areas. He is apparently having considerable
success in recruiting to make up for losses as well as continuing to reinforce his shattered units by infiltration. The situation
seems to be most serious in the Delta. Ky told me this morning that General Thang had reported to him last Saturday that
367 outposts had either been overrun or their complements withdrawn to defend the [garble] and that some 2,000 men,
with as many weapons, are unaccounted for; whether they were killed or deserted is not known. There are reports that Viet
Cong recruitment starts at age 14 for guerrilla forces and even as low as age 10 for hamlet defense units. Harassment by
mortar and rocket fire, sometimes accompanied by ground assaults or the planting of rumors of pending offensives, have
created fear and uncertainty among some urban dwellers as well as a lack of confidence in the ability of the GVN to
provide security. But with the U.S. and ARVN troops beginning to go over to the offensive, the initiative appears to be
shifting to the allies. Communist documents have emphasized the need for "continuous and fierce attacks" to prevent the
allies from going on the offensive. The enemy's fears may be justified, for last week a majority of the ground contacts were

allied-initiated, with the enemy generally attempting to disperse into small units to avoid combat. The low level of enemy
activity and the unusual risk in attempting to bring in supplies by sea suggests that he is having logistic difficulties, or that
he is trying to conserve his strength for another big effort. I Corps is an exception to this general statement where the
enemy seems to be preparing for large scale conventional warfare.
[Omitted here is discussion of the situation in the countryside, political activities, and economic matters.]
Bunker

125. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, March 14, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs N-Z and AA-KK.
Confidential. In an attached covering note transmitting the memorandum to the President, March 14, 7:50 p.m., Rostow
wrote: "Here is how I summarized Dean Acheson's proposal, after his exposition at lunch today." The notation "ps" on the
covering note indicates that the President saw the memorandum; the President also wrote: "Walt--Call me--L."
SUBJECT
Summary of Dean Acheson's Proposal/2/
/2/The President lunched with Acheson that day from 2:04 to 3:09 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) They discussed the
results of Acheson's inquiry on Vietnam, for which the President had granted Acheson, despite his unofficial status,
government-wide access. The former Secretary of State concluded that the public would never support the large
augmentation as requested, and thus the war had to be brought to a conclusion as soon as feasible. He suggested that the
President organize a group to assess Vietnam policy. In response to Johnson's comment that the military remained
optimistic, Acheson replied, "Mr. President, you are being led down the garden path." See Douglas Brinkley, Dean
Acheson: The Cold War Years, 1953-1971 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 256-259.
1. We should make available such forces as we can muster and are needed in the next emergency months.
2. We should immediately set about a study in which the brightest and ablest civilians and military in the Government take
part.
3. This study should consist of:
--An examination of what has happened over the last year in Vietnam, including, of course, the Tet offensive and its
aftermath. This should be a careful, factual effort.
--We should then examine, looking ahead over the future, what we can expect from the government of Vietnam and its
military forces in undertaking its share of the allied studies: staying together; improving its quality and energy of
government; improving its military importance.
--We should then analyze how we can deal with North Vietnam and its military forces. We should look backward at what
we have done, our successes and failures. What could we do?
--On the basis of an assessment of the past, the GVN possibilities and the possibilities of coping with the North
Vietnamese, we should then launch ourselves on a path looking towards progressive disengagement over whatever period
of time we judge appropriate.
WR

126. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Air Force (Hoopes) to Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/

Washington, March 14, 1968.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1250, VIET 381,
1968. Secret.
SUBJECT
The Infeasibility of Military Victory in Vietnam
As a contribution to current deliberations and to your own ongoing review of the situation, this memorandum argues the
case that the idea of military victory in Vietnam is a dangerous illusion, at any price that would be compatible with US
interests, the interests of the people of South Vietnam, or the cause of world peace. Secretary Brown agrees that it should
be forwarded for your consideration.
Military victory--that is, the destruction or ejection of NVN forces and reduction of VC guerrilla forces to impotence or at
least to a level that is manageable by ARVN alone--has been the implicit (though not always clearly recognized) goal of US
policy at least since the decision to build up American manpower in 1965. It continues to be the unexamined assumption of
General Westmoreland's strategy, of his request for additional forces, of the JCS support for his strategy and his requests,
and of all other proposals for intensifying or enlarging our war effort in Vietnam.
Moreover, military victory (as defined above) appears to be a necessary precondition for the realization of a US political
objective which defines "free choice" for the people of SVN as a process necessarily excluding NLF/VC from participation
in either elections or government. Whether or not this definition reflects the true US intent, it is clearly the position of the
GVN and has not been rejected by the USG. As is known, even non-communist politicians are now being jailed by the
GVN out of fear that they will open a dialogue with the NLF. These facts suggest that if military victory is not feasible, the
US political objective must be redefined.
One's assumption about the necessity or feasibility of military victory is therefore a critical fork in the road. Reaffirmation
will lead in the direction of a larger and wider war effort aimed at destroying the NVN/VC forces. Refutation will lead to
adoption of a far less ambitious strategy, aimed at protecting the people of South Vietnam, permitting a stabilization of the
US resource commitment at tolerable levels, and followed by a prompt, utterly serious effort to achieve a compromise
settlement of the war that reflects the enduring political and military realities in Vietnam. It is imperative, at this watershed
in our Vietnam experience, to subject the assumption to the most searching re-examination. Our future ability to formulate
rational policies for VN depends on this.
The history of our involvement in Vietnam, particularly since 1965, has been marked by repeated miscalculations as to the
force and time required to "defeat the aggression," pacify the countryside, and make the GVN and ARVN viable without
massive US support. Each fresh increment of American power has been justified as the last one needed to do the job.
Responsible political and military officials have consistently underestimated NVN/VC strength and tenacity, have promoted
uncritical notions of what US military power can accomplish in the political and geographical environment of SEA, and
have indulged in persistently wishful thinking as regards the present capacity and real potential of the GVN and the ARVN.
It is important that these misjudgments be kept in mind as we weigh the alternatives that now lie before us.
The following points contain some material that may already have come to your attention. The purpose here is to combine
all of the relevant arguments and bring them to focus on the root question of whether military victory is feasible.
[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum, in which Hoopes discussed several factors that mitigated against continued
escalation in Vietnam. Military action had not increased popular support for the GVN, which was compounded by its
inability to control its own territory. Significantly, the bombing campaign had failed to deter the enemy because of support
provided the DRV by the Soviets and Chinese. In addition, the air war's impact on manpower was minimal. As a
consequence, Hoopes argued, "on balance, NVN is a stronger military power today than before the bombing." The
introduction of the troops Westmoreland wanted would cause a number of difficulties and likely would not make much
difference in terms of proportional strength. The DRV could "neutralize" the proposed augmentation of 206,000 U.S. troops
by deploying only 50,000 new troops of its own. With so many troops in South Vietnam, the casualty rates would rise with
resultant political costs to the administration but without altering the fundamental conditions of stalemate in Vietnam. In
addition, the impact of the force augmentation would be detrimental to efforts to reform and invigorate the GVN, would
have a deleterious impact on the U.S. economy, and could significantly undermine the domestic political order. An
alternative means of attacking the enemy by intensive bombing that included crop destruction could be more effective in
terms of sapping enemy will but would prove too costly to implement.]
Townsend Hoopes

127. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Wheeler)/1/
Washington, March 14, 1968.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, 1968 Secretary
of Defense Files, VIET 370. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Southeast Asia Deployments
The President would like us to meet General Westmoreland's latest request for an additional 30,000 troops. Therefore, I
plan to issue a new Southeast Asia deployment plan, Program #6, with a total military personnel strength of 565,500. This
number includes the 525,000 in Program #5, the 10,500 emergency reinforcement on loan to MACV, and the new request
for 30,000. The Deputy Secretary of Defense will reply separately to your request for cancellation of the civilianization
program.
I would like us to comply substantially with General Westmoreland's preferred alternative. However, I would prefer to
substitute Army and Air Force units of similar types for the Marine Corps units on his list. Because of the high fraction of
the Marine Corps already deployed, the Marines would find it very difficult, perhaps impossible, to sustain the additional
deployment under current personnel tour policies. Moreover, substitution of Army and Air Force units would permit us to
use the Marines in missions closer to those for which they are designed.
Therefore, I would like to propose the following approximation to General Westmoreland's preferred alternative.
Strength

Deployment Date

Infantry Bde (3 Inf Bns)

4500

15-30 June

Mech Bde (1 Inf Bn, 1 Inf Bn (Mech), 1 Tk Bn)

5041

12 July

Avn Co, Sep Bde

238

15 July

Armd Cav Sqdn

1030

15-30 June

MP Bn

955

15-30 June

Cbt Svc Spt

3316

Cbt and Cbt Svc Spt

9120

Subtotal

24200

A. U.S. Army

B. 7th AF
4 TFS

2164

15 April

FAC/TACP

191

1 June

Airlift

741

1 June

Support

929

Subtotal

4025

C. USN
NSA DaNang Support

1775

D. Total MACV

30000

The Secretary of the Army proposes to meet the request for a mechanized brigade by deploying a brigade from the 5th
Mechanized Division. He now believes it cannot be ready to deploy before 12 July.
Moreover, for the reasons noted earlier, I would like to substitute an Army infantry brigade and support personnel for the
27th Regimental Landing Team and support personnel that deployed in February. Therefore, I would propose to substitute
7,363 Army personnel for Marines in the first half of July. The Army can provide the personnel; the Secretary of the Navy
now believes the 27th RLT can be sustained until then./2/
/2/In a March 14 memorandum to Nitze, Resor noted that the replacement would require an additional call-up of units with
13,500 personnel and a corresponding increase in the MACV ceiling. (Ibid.)
Would you please inform General Westmoreland of these proposals, and of my preference for them, and ask him whether
he considers the substitutions satisfactory./3/
/3/In a March 14 memorandum to Nitze, Wheeler noted that he would inform Westmoreland of the substitute package. In
addition, he inquired whether his understanding that reserve units and individual reservists would be called-up but terms of
service would not be extended was correct. Nitze indicated "no" on the memorandum and wrote: "Would like to know what
we are going to do, of course." (Ibid.)
Paul H. Nitze

128. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 15, 1968, 3:25 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 7, Meeting Notes. Top
Secret.
Mr. President:
Herewith the proposals for the 5 p.m. meeting./2/ I have ascertained from Paul Nitze that:
/2/See Document 130.
--this is a consensus agreed upon completely within the Pentagon; that is, all the members of the JCS and the service
Secretaries, as well as Clifford and Nitze;
--the Strategic Reserve call-up (para 3) would be announced at the same time as the call-up to support the thirty thousand
deployment, but it would take place later: beginning approximately April 15;
--the cost of this package would be for FY 1968 $2 billion extra. To this must be added the $3.4 billion extra to which we
are already committed by actions taken. The extra cost for FY 1969 is "much less" than the $10 billion we had earlier
envisaged. Nitze will have an approximate calculation in time for the 5 P.M. meeting.
I will organize some questions for you promptly, but I wanted you to have this right away./3/

/3/In a memorandum to the President that day, 4:20 p.m., Rostow listed 10 questions that the President could ask during
the 5 p.m. meeting. In addition, Rostow suggested that the President discuss the suggested timing of the announcement,
ARVN expansion, a general Vietnam policy review, arrangements for Congressional consultation, and guidance to Clifford
and Rusk on the announcement speech. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech,
Vol. 7, Meeting Notes)
Walt

129. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Clifford to President Johnson/1/

Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 7, Meeting Notes. Top
Secret.
SUBJECT
SEA Deployments, the Strategic Reserve, and Related Actions (U)
1. What should be the composition of the forces totaling 30,000 men to be sent to General Westmoreland?
We have agreed on a package including 24,200 Army, 4,025 Air Force, and 1,775 Navy personnel. We have also agreed
we should bring back the 27th Regimental Landing Team and support units, totaling 7,363 Marines in July, and replace
them with Army. This would bring the approved South Vietnam deployment to 565,500 U.S. military personnel, including
the 10,500 deployed in February. These deployments can be sustained with current personnel policies, without new
legislation. For details see Tab A./2/
/2/Tabs A-C are attached but not printed. Tab A listed Army, Air Force, and Navy units by strength and deployment date.
2. What callup of reserves do we recommend to support that deployment?
We recommend a callup of 36,621 Reserve and National Guard personnel, including 31,600 Army, 3,497 Air Force, and
1,524 Navy. This is within the scope of existing law. For details see Tab B./3/
/3/Tab B listed the reserve military units that would be requested in an immediate recall to active duty.
3. What additional callup of reserves do we recommend to reconstitute the strategic reserve?
We recommend a follow-on callup of 48,393 Reserve and National Guard personnel: 45,300 Army to bring our active
strategic reserve to 7 divisions (5-1/3 Army, 1-2/3 Marines); and 3,093 Air Force. For details see Tab C./4/
/4/Tab C listed the Army and Air Force units that could be recalled to build up the strategic reserve.
Alternative Executive Orders to implement this are at Tab D./5/
/5/Not printed.
Clark M. Clifford

130. Editorial Note

On March 15, 1968, the President met with his advisers from 5:15 to 7:10 p.m. to discuss the call-up of reserves and the
Program 6 deployment to Vietnam. Those present at the meeting included Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, Secretary
of State Dean Rusk, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle Wheeler, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze,

Justice Abe Fortas, General Maxwell Taylor, Special Assistant Walt Rostow, and Presidential aides George Christian and
Tom Johnson. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) Clifford began the meeting by stressing the need for two call-ups,
one of 50,000 and the other of 48,000 men, and whether they would necessarily be sent to Vietnam:
"Clifford: As far as the numbers are concerned about this first call-up, this 50,000 call--that number comes out, because
everybody knows about it and all you have to do is begin to figure out who has been called and it doesn't take anybody
very long to put those numbers together. Now, as far as the deployment of the men is concerned, and no decision has
been made on that, that I know of, insofar as the announcement is to be made, that is open. That is the 30,000 plus the
13,000 [Westmoreland] says he needs as support troops, so there is 43,000 that we presently plan on sending to South
Vietnam in addition. Now . . .
"President: What does this bring your ceiling up to? Your strength . . .
"Clifford: It's going to bring it up to, I'd say, 579 [thousand]. The original figure of 525 [thousand], then you must send that
emergency shipment of 10.5 [thousand], I believe we call it. I believe with the 82d Airborne and 27th Marine [Divisions],
that really became 11 [thousand]. I think . . .
"President: You add that on to 525 [thousand] or 510 [thousand]? I didn't think we had reached the ceiling on them.
"Clifford: Oh, but we had. They had fellows in the pipe line to bring it up to the ceiling. That was definitely in addition to the
525 [thousand]. You got 525 [thousand], then the 11 [thousand with] the 82d Airborne and 27th Marines, your new group of
30,000 which you are sending over, and this support group of 13,000, and you have a total, when they all get there, of
579,000.
"President: So it's 10-525-10.5 sent in emergency the other day and 43 are going?
"Clifford: That's right.
"President: That makes 579.
"Clifford: 579 is right.
"Christian: Don't put in that 12.5 [thousand].
"Clifford: On that civilianization program, we had left that out because there is still a possibility that Westmoreland may be
able to find 12.5 [thousand] civilians and fill those slots. If he doesn't--if he can't find 5 or 6 thousand or so, that would bring
the total up a few thousand or more depending on how many slots are unfilled when he tries to fill them with civilians and
he can't."
Following a further discussion of civilian personnel and the possibility of Australian augmentation, the conversation turned
to the public announcement of the move:
"President: Now what would we do--we would say that roughly half of those people would be in strategic reserve, the other
half over a period of from now until August would be available for Vietnam. We would not announce when they went to
Vietnam until after they had arrived. Is that a fair statement?
"Rusk: Well, you would want to say that in advance or would you say that you are calling up 90,000, in the course of the
next 30 days, or whatever the period is to get these two groups, to strengthen the strategic reserve forces in the United
States. We anticipate that some of those may be available and may have to be used to strengthen General
Westmoreland's forces and that others simply will be used to strengthen the strategic reserve.
"President: It's going to leak out, just what you do, and the first man you consult.
"Christian: Let me put this out. The Washington Post already has the 98,000 figure. They've got it [wrong]. I got an inquiry
just before we came in here--couldn't understand what he's talking about. He said the Pentagon reporter has said 98,000
men had been told they are being sent to Vietnam. He's got the figure though.
"President: That's before I got it.

"Clifford: We just got the 98,000 figure--as Paul and Buzz and I worked the figures over at luncheon today. Now, there had
to be a meeting this morning of a number of military personnel and civilians to work out this whole package, but we finally
worked out these numbers here, then we came around to this figure of 98,000 at luncheon today."
The group then discussed the desirability of announcing two smaller augmentations. Both Rusk and Clifford noted that the
difficulty with this approach lay in attempting to communicate to the public what percentage of those being called up would
go to the strategic reserve and how many might be deployed for service in Vietnam. Clifford stated: "There is always the
present intention that exists, it seems to me--I think the President takes quite a burden right now if the story gets out--that
there are 98,000 men being called up and the administration is rather hazy about it--so the supposition is that they are all
going to go to Vietnam. So the headline is '100,000 more men to go to Vietnam.'" In response, the President later
interjected: "I think it goes back to what I said originally. We are going to call up 98,000 and half of them will be scheduled
for the strategic reserve and the other half will be deployed in Vietnam between now and August. Now that's the facts and I
don't know how you do it. We've been doing it that way all along up to 525 [thousand] and try to change it now."
The issue of broaching the augmentation to Congress received considerable attention:
"Christian: Mr. President, I think we might consider, in view of what you have just said, as to whether or not this might be
the appropriate time to expand on what Secretary Rusk told me the [Senate Foreign Relations] Committee about studying
from 'A to Z' and maybe use that in connection with the announcement on the call-up of reserves--sort of a double-barrel
formalization of something--just for talking purposes here as to whether this might help offset all the hollering we are going
to get tomorrow and over the weekend and make it appear, and truthfully so, that we are taking a good hard look at the
Vietnam situation in conjunction with . . .
"President: I had interpreted the Secretary's statement a little differently on 'A to Zs'--that each day we study what
everybody ought to be trying to do and what we are doing and we're flexible and we're hoping for suggestions. But that
does not mean that we are considering a policy and trying to form a new one and that the one we've had is a mistake.
"Christian: I think it is dangerous to do that whether we are--if we could do it in such a way to show that we want to expand
on what he said--not go beyond . . .
"Rusk: I don't see how we'll get out of that without a lot of speculation without substance."
The President recognized, and Rusk underscored, the importance of informing the Congress of any public announcements
that the administration would make beforehand. The following discussion ensued:
"Fortas: I wonder whether it is necessary to say that you are going to do step one and step two about the reserves all at
the same time. Listening to what you say, it seems to me that this could be cut up into two parts. I'm not talking about the
conversations of disclosure with the Congressmen, but in terms of what the official statement will be. If you say we are
calling up 98,000 people, no matter what you say after that the public impression is going to be that 98,000 will be going to
Vietnam. If you could break that up with an interval of time between the two and still handle it so that there is no--that you
don't mislead anybody which I suspect would be quite possible because there are two separate and discreet actions--I
think it would avoid getting a wrong impression to the public. For example, if in your first statement that is made, it is that
we are going to call up 48,000 for the reserve and they will be available to go to Vietnam and we are surveying what the
need will be for an additional call-up for our ready reserve within the United States. And don't let anybody push you into a
figure on that. I mean in terms of public--and do that later because I--it seems to me that if you say you are calling up
98,000 people and no matter what you say after that, it's going to be 98,000 people to Vietnam.
"President: I think it could be justified too, if you could figure out those that are sent out--Airborne and those that are sent
out, Marine--I think there would be much merit in our saying if we--General Westmoreland--must have 30,000 people now
and for that reason in addition to what he has and we have to support him. And so we've got 48,000 [sic]--that's what is
going out now. And then when we make the other announcement two weeks later we could say that we have sent from this
country recently up to 50,000--we're going to have to replace those--we'll call-up some to take a position in this country for
those that have gone out of country--if that is an accurate statement.
"Clifford: I have had the same feeling that Abe has had from the very beginning, that as soon--and I think he made a brief
reference to it earlier--as soon as you pick out some 98,000--some odd [number] that immediately becomes 100,000 and
the headline is 'one hundred thousand more troops to go to South Vietnam' and there is nothing that you can say to them
that is going to persuade them any to do different. I think we are much better off if we can separate them and there is no
real problem in that regard."
The President reached a decision near the end of the discussion:

"President: Well, let's move our people then. Let's decide that one. Let's brief our people on the fact that we have gone
over with Westmoreland and there have been a lot of figures published and some said 200 [thousand] and some said 100
[thousand] and some said 90 [thousand] and we have it down now to where we are ready to recommend or considering
suggesting to the President after consultation with you, approximately 50,000 that will go out there, which will give us
30,000 fighting men plus the supporting units and so forth.
"Clifford: All right.
"President: Now, we are undertaking a study to see how we call-up our strategic reserve and we'll probably have a figure-we would hope not any bigger than that, but just to give them an idea that [it] won't be too large; we're studying that and we
don't want to get accurate, but just give them an idea that won't be too large--we're studying another figure and we'll come
up with that when we get it.
"Clifford: Because that's going to be the first question that Senator Russell will ask. He will say, 'Well, okay, if Westy thinks
he needs them, all right, but now what are you going to do about the reserve?' We've been talking to him--well, then, it
brings very much into focus, and we're studying it.
"President: Well, I wouldn't get definite on it but I would say we are hopeful that we can get that figure where it won't be
any more than the other one, maybe a little less--fill out these units specifically.
"Clifford: I think there's . . .
"President: 48,000, you see . . .
"Clifford: I think there is real value in the public [announcement].
"President: You can say it will be a little less. I think that will keep them from announcing a figure because they won't know,
you see, and it will actually be, if we go through with it, if we decide that it would be. So watch that we don't make either
decision, but for consultation purposes you will say to them that you'll send--this is the figure you've got--and say, 'Now we
will study in the next weeks ahead. We'll be back in touch with you with that, but we think now just from the glance that we
have made at it--and not being firm--that it will be probably less than this figure.' All right, Abe, go ahead. Is that
satisfactory, Buzz?
"Wheeler: Yes, sir. If we can do this a week or ten days afterwards, then we can cut it."
The discussion then focused on the necessity to cut back on troop deployments elsewhere in the world and what Fortas
termed "the impact of it in terms of expense and particularly in terms of public attitudes." The meeting concluded with
additional discussion on budgetary constraints arising from the augmentations. (Ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the
Cabinet Room)

131. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/
New York, March 15, 1968, 2307Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET. Top Secret;
Nodis. Received at 7:36 p.m. In telegram CAP 80671 to the President, March 16, Rostow transmitted the text of this
telegram with the following introductory paragraph: "Herewith Goldberg proposes we go for a bombing cessation and a
negotiation promptly. In my judgment, the right time will be a few months from now--assuming Westy and the GVN weather
the winter-spring offensive in tolerably good shape." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 6 C,
1961-1968, Peace Initiatives: General International Initiatives (Retrospective Accounts)) The notation "ps" on Rostow's
telegram indicates that the President saw it. The President was at the Ranch March 16-18.
4152. Eyes only for Secretaries of State and Defense. Please pass White House for the President--Eyes Only. From
Goldberg.
Secretary Rusk has made it clear in his statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the entire situation with
regard to Vietnam is under review from A to Z./2/ It is my understanding this review encompasses not only military aspects

but also possible moves toward a political solution. It is on the latter question that I should like to advance the following
thoughts for the consideration of those engaged in this policy review.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 120.
Recent developments in our country have demonstrated that there is grave concern among the American public whether
the course we have set in our Vietnam policy is right or holds promise of results commensurate with the cost--concern
which has been deepened by the reverses we and the South Vietnamese suffered during the Tet offensive, by the
apparent lack of energy, effectiveness and appeal of the South Vietnamese Government, by the mounting rate of
American casualties, by the extent of the destruction of life and property in Vietnam, and by reports that requests have
been made of the President for substantial troop reinforcements in South Vietnam. This concern reflects a growing public
belief that the war in South Vietnam is increasingly an American war, not a South Vietnamese war which the US is
supporting, and, further, that the war cannot be won on this basis without ever-mounting commitments not worth the cost.
As I see it, under our democratic processes, if public support is permanently and substantially eroded, we will not be able
to maintain let alone intensify the level of our military efforts in Vietnam. This is not to say that decisions on this matter
should be controlled by the normal fluctuations of public opinion concerning the progress of the war. Major presidential
decisions cannot and should not be made on the basis of a day-by-day reading of the public's temperature. It is my
considered opinion that the very best way to prevent further erosion of public support from taking place is to make a new
and fresh move toward a political solution at this time. Moreover, and independently of this, I believe on the merits that a
fresh move toward a political solution should be made now.
The question which then arises is: what new and fresh effort should be made? In my view, there is only one feasible step
at this time which offers any possibility of making progress toward a political settlement and, at the same time, of being
received by the American public as a good-faith move toward such a settlement. Stated simply, that step would be to put
into effect the San Antonio formula by assuming Hanoi would not take advantage of the bombing cessation and without
seeking prior assurance from Hanoi on this point. There are obvious risks in this course of action. Nevertheless, I believe it
must and should be taken.
It is pertinent to recall what the President said at San Antonio:
"As we have told Hanoi time and time and time again, the heart of the matter really is this: the United States is willing to
stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive discussion. We, of
course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or
limitation."/3/
/3/See footnote 5, Document 2.
Taken at its face value, this formula does not call for any prior assurance that North Vietnam would not take advantage of
a cessation of the bombing. Rather, it foresees that we will act on the "assumption" that North Vietnam would not take
such advantage. Therefore, the step I propose would not involve a departure from the policy enunciated by the President.
Since the San Antonio formula was enunciated, we have had explicit public and private statements from North Vietnam
that: A) talks between the US and Hanoi would follow relatively soon after an end to the bombing and other hostile acts
against the North; and B) no subject matter would be excluded from the talks. This leaves the way open for us to insist in
such talks that the first order of business would be appropriate arrangements to ensure that Hanoi does not use the
bombing cessation to obtain a military advantage.
In specific terms then, my suggestion, based on the San Antonio formula, means that--without announcing any conditions
or time limit--we would "stop" the aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam, for the limited time necessary to
determine whether Hanoi will negotiate in good faith; in my view this can best be determined by what actually happens
during the talks rather than any advance verbal commitments of the kind we have been seeking.
There are, however, many things which my suggestion does not mean:
A) It does not mean we would refrain from bombing the main infiltration routes through Laos or within South Vietnam;
B) It does not mean we would cease or refrain from intensifying our bombing in the Khe Sanh area, the northernmost
provinces of South Vietnam, and any other point in the South where VC/NVN troops are concentrated;

C) It does not mean we would discontinue naval bombardment south of the 17th parallel of Hanoi's supply and infiltration
operations by sea;
D) It does not mean we would be inhibited from rotation or normal augmentation of our own forces in the South during the
bombing cessation or the subsequent talks--unless, of course, those talks resulted in an agreement concerning nonaugmentation of forces;
E) It does not mean, finally, that we would be precluded from resuming the bombing if, in fact, North Vietnam were in bad
faith to take military advantage of the bombing cessation.
In addition to and concurrently with the bombing cessation, I would urge that we pursue the following courses:
1. Go privately to the Soviets and the Bloc countries to enlist their strong support toward ensuring that, on the one hand,
Hanoi does not take military advantage of the bombing cessation and, on the other, that Hanoi will promptly begin
negotiations which will be fruitful. We would also be in a strong position, having followed Soviet and bloc advice on
stopping the bombing, to urge that they use their supply leverage in support of a political settlement;
2. Enlist the support of others (e.g., France, India and other non-aligned countries) toward the same end;
3. Enlist similar support from the Pope and the Secretary General;
4. Attempt to obtain, at an appropriate time, the support of the Security Council for our diplomatic effort prior to any
resumption of the bombing. Resort to the Council, timed so as not to undermine our other political initiatives, will
additionally serve to satisfy Congressional and public opinion in favor of involving the United Nations and to minimize the
difficulties which would be involved at any time bombing is resumed.
I realize fully the course I am proposing would have repercussions and implications for the government in Saigon,
particularly at this time. But a growing erosion of support by the American people for our present policies would have far
greater repercussions and implications for that government.
In the Vietnam situation, like almost all potential negotiating situations, there can never be an ideal time for negotiations. If
things are going well militarily, the natural inclination is to look upon negotiations as unnecessary. If, conversely, things are
going badly militarily, the disposition is to look upon negotiations as disadvantageous. In light of our past experience in
Vietnam, there will not be, in the foreseeable future, an ideal time for negotiations. Were we to decide upon a substantial
military build-up, I see no reason to believe that our adversaries are incapable, given the support they are receiving, of
stepping up their military response, rather than being forced within practical time limits into negotiations under
circumstances more advantageous to us than the present.
My strong conviction about the need for a move toward negotiations now is based upon the considerations. No forseeable
time will be better for negotiations than the present, and never has a serious move toward a political settlement been more
necessary.
Goldberg

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968

Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 132-148

March 16-31: De-escalation and the March 31 Speech

132. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, March 16, 1968, 0050Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret;
Immediate. Drafted and approved by Rusk.
131330. Nodis outside the Department. Literally eyes only for the Ambassador from the Secretary. The President is facing
some decisions which may well require him to make a major speech to the nation around the middle of next week involving
troops and the call-up of certain reserves. There could be important advantages in a "mobilization" type of speech by
President Thieu beforehand to which reference could be made. Please give me your quick reactions to the feasibility of
some such speech and the major elements which Thieu might be able to include, including possible reference to an
additional 100,000 men, the steps taken in the draft in the recall of veterans, and any more steps on civilian programs. A
strong assertion by Thieu that the South Vietnamese accept their full responsibility for the struggle and are going all out to
meet it is the sort of thing we are looking for. I would discuss this only with Westmoreland for purposes of the present
turnaround. What we need is your judgment as to what you think will be possible.
Rusk

133. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 16, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Vietnam War-Miscellaneous Materials 1968. No
classification marking.
Dear Mr. President:
Yesterday you suggested that I should testify next week before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and I replied that
I thought Clark Clifford should testify. The reason for my reply was that I have not been, and possibly should not be, privy
to the reasons for limiting consideration to Option A in the chain from A to Z. As a result, I do not feel myself to be in a
position properly to defend the Executive Branch in a debate before the Foreign Relations Committee which would
undoubtedly spread from MAP to the major policy issues before the country.
It has been and is my view that other options should be considered before deciding to adopt Program 6. I discussed with
Bob McNamara before he left, and subsequently with Clark Clifford, a proposal for an alternate course of action to the one
we have been following. Basically it couples a negotiating position similar to that proposed today by Ambassador Goldberg
with a strengthening of our strategic reserve. A copy of the proposal is attached./2/ Since it was prepared, the gathering
financial crisis adds weight to options which could achieve a wider base of Congressional, domestic and international
support than Option A.
/2/Attached but not printed is Nitze's February 27 proposal.
I fully realize the tremendous burdens which you, as President, are called upon to bear. I send this now only because I
believe the issue to be of profound importance.
Sincerely yours,/3/
/3/Printed from an unsigned copy.

134. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, March 16, 1968, 1140Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate;
Nodis. Received at 7:28 a.m.
22276. Literally eyes only for the Secretary from Bunker. No distribution outside the Department. Ref: State 131330./2/
/2/Document 132.
1. I am reasonably confident that I could convince Thieu to make a speech of the sort you have in mind before the middle
of next week.
2. He has told me that he is eager to do whatever he can to help us in the present situation and I know that he appreciates
the problems which the President faces in making decisions for the future relating to our effort in Viet-Nam. I have
discussed this matter with General Westmoreland who agrees that there are quite a number of useful points which can be
made regarding the new initiatives on the GVN side relating to the military situation, mobilization, and getting back into the
countryside for resumption of the pacification effort.
3. As to the content of the speech, one of the major emphases would certainly be the foregoing complex of efforts to beef
up their military capacity. Within this I believe quite a number of points can be covered regarding their intentions with
respect to manpower mobilization and training, and the time frame which Thieu is considering. In terms of civilian
programs, I think there are several useful points which can be made regarding reorganization of the civilian administration,
replacement of province chiefs and their new channel of authority to the central government, and the plans for training new
and qualified personnel for key positions in the future. The renewed efforts against corruption, outlined in detail in the
Prime Minister's March 14 speech,/3/ would be another useful point to meet criticism in the U.S. A section of the speech
could be devoted to the very praiseworthy GVN efforts to move rapidly for the relief of more than 500,000 refugees, as well
as the plans for housing reconstruction, which has already been started here and will soon be moving in Hue and other
hard-hit areas in the provinces. I would also hope that he might describe some of the effort to unify the nation politically,
including his relations with the assembly and perhaps some kind words about efforts to draw various groups and interests
together in a national front.
/3/In this speech, Loc described punitive anti-corruption measures undertaken against 74 government officials and military
officers. See The New York Times, March 15, 1968.
4. In brief, I think there are enough positive elements which could go into speech to make it worthwhile, even though many
of them have already been covered in public statements and speeches. One of the problems of course is the
deliberateness with which Thieu approaches such matters as major speeches and this difficulty in preparing a text rapidly.
Perhaps we can help him in this respect. If you conclude that such a speech is desired, please let me know promptly so
that I can try to get to him on Monday to discuss the matter and give him some ideas./4/
/4/In telegram 131731 to Saigon, March 16, the Department stressed that Thieu should avoid any reference to additional
allied assistance since "the important thing is to present a picture of South Vietnamese determination to do everything
possible to help themselves with the greatest energy and dedication." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S) The Department also wanted Thieu to emphasize the steps already taken on
corruption and mobilization. (Telegram 131765 to Saigon, March 18; ibid.) In addition, he could mention the ARVN's need
for equipment but should not use lack of equipment as an excuse to avoid rapid military expansion. (Telegram 131744 to
Saigon, March 17; ibid.) Thieu agreed to make the speech along the lines suggested to him by Bunker. (Telegram CAP
80693 from Rostow to the President, March 17; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 1 EE (3),
3/16-31/68, Post-Tet Political Activity) In the March 21 speech, which Bunker described as "the best and briefest he has
made since taking office," Thieu announced plans to increase the RVNAF by 135,000 men through an expanded draft,
extensive recalls to active service, and other measures to rally and invigorate the Vietnamese people. (Telegram 23308
from Saigon, March 28; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
Bunker

135. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, March 16, 1968, 1709Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs N-Z and AA-KK.
Top Secret. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
CAP 80675. For the President. So that you can stare at it, I have translated the Acheson idea into the following draft
directive for the team leader.
A key question is: who should head the group?
Perhaps the best choice would be Cy Vance. But his being about Washington would lead to leaks. His quality is such that
it might well be worth taking that risk or even letting it be known that he is doing a Vietnam review job.
Other possible candidates: Max Taylor, Dean Acheson.
Draft Instruction
I wish you to direct a study which will look back to the past and forward to the future with respect to our Vietnam policy.
The study should be completed by May 15, 1968.
These are the questions which I should like answered from all the data we now have available and can promptly generate:
1. What progress did we make--and fail to make--in the period between mid-1965 and Tet 1968?
2. What elements of fear and hope, weakness and strength, led Hanoi to mount the winter-spring offensive?
3. Where does Hanoi stand with respect to its objectives, as of the time this study is completed? What are its options as
you think Hanoi sees them? To what extent are they dependent on what the United States does? What do you believe
Hanoi will choose?
4. What can we expect from the Government of Vietnam and its armed forces with respect to: unity; executive and
administrative energy; scale; modernization and effectiveness in combat during the balance of calendar year 1968? 1969?
5. What increments of military force can we expect--or, realistically, induce--from our present fighting allies? Could the
circle be widened?
6. What are the prospects for inhibiting or blocking the flow of North Vietnamese forces to the South in the light of our
experience with bombing North Vietnam; with the technology of the so-called barrier; and with the use of air and ground
forces against North Vietnamese forces?
7. What is the state of the North Vietnamese armed forces? What regular reserves are available for dispatch to the South?
What is their demonstrated and potential capacity to provide replacements in both quantity and quality?
8. What is the present state of the control over the population of South Vietnam, particularly in rural areas? What are the
prospects for the balance of 1968? 1969?
9. In the light of your analysis and judgment, can we envisage as realistic a policy of gradual reduction of U.S. forces in
Vietnam: in the balance of 1968; 1969; 1970?
10. At what moment--if any--could you envisage as potentially effective a U.S. or GVN negotiating initiative? What should
be the character of that initiative?
You should feel free to pose and answer other questions you judge relevant to past or future policy in Vietnam.
In developing your report, you should assemble a team of the most knowledgeable and able Vietnam experts in the

government; for example, George Carver, William DePuy, Philip Habib, William Jorden, Roy Wehrle. (A DOD
representative is needed. The obvious choice is Richard Steadman. He feels strongly that Vietnam is hopeless. But, more
important, I cannot recommend him until it is firmly established that he was not involved in The New York Times leak.)
They should, if necessary, work virtually full-time on the project.
You should feel free, of course, to consult with other officials in the government and, on a discreet basis, with outside
experts as well.

136. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/
Washington, March 16, 1968, 2045Z.
/1/Source: U.S. Army Center of Military History, William C. Westmoreland Papers, Eyes Only Message Files, 1 Mar-31 Mar
1968. Secret. Repeated to Admiral Sharp and General Johnson. In JCSM-159-68 to Clifford, March 15, Wheeler
recommended obtaining authority to call up individual reservists, the retention of personnel currently on duty, and
increases in end-strength. (Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 72 A 1499,
320.2 Vietnam, 121-370.5 1968)
JCS 3024. Ref: MAC 03651./2/
/2/In telegram MAC 3651 to Johnson, March 16, Westmoreland continued to insist upon the deployment of the full
divisional structure and promised to send a troop list for the entire force package. (U.S. Army Center for Military History,
William C. Westmoreland Papers, Eyes Only Message Files, 1 Mar-31 Mar 1968)
1. In the light of referenced message and earlier messages on the same subject, I wish to inform you of where we stand
with regard to MACV force augmentation. As preliminaries there are four things you should know:
A. Due to leaks here in Washington and in Saigon, there has been created an extremely difficult political and public
atmosphere regarding the deployment of any augmentation to SEA.
B. You are very busy and, therefore, perhaps do not realize the monetary crisis through which we are going at this very
moment. This subject has many ramifications which I will not detail, but the situation is serious to the point that it impinges
directly and heavily upon Congressional and public attitudes toward further sizable expenditures of money in FY 68
supplemental and in FY 69 for the purpose of reserve call-ups and further deployments to you.
C. It is fair to state that the combination of further troop deployments and the critical fiscal situation has placed the
government in as difficult a situation as I have seen in the past five years.
D. All of these things have, I judge, together with the gloom and doom generated by the Tet offensive, affected heavily
public support for our war effort. The latest polls show that 69 per cent of those interviewed favored a phased withdrawal of
our forces from SEA. To put it succinctly and frankly, I am concerned by these developments, and I believe that you should
be aware of them. However, I caution that you do not reveal to anyone that this is the situation as I see it and is as serious
as I believe it is.
2. With the foregoing in mind, I have three bits of information which I believe you will welcome:
A. The 30,000-man package will very probably be approved along the lines of my message to you which proposed deletion
of the Marine element and substitution of an Army infantry brigade therefor.
B. I think that there will be acceptance of your retaining the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, and being provided an Army
brigade to replace the 27th Marine RLT.
C. In line with B. above, I think that you will be provided the 13,400 support package for the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne
Division, and the 27th Marine RLT (or its replacement).
3. Now as to the referenced message: I suggest that you not forward a proposal to change the composition of the 30,000-

man force at this time. We are far enough down the road that such a proposal on your part might well cause the whole
package to come unglued. Moreover, there is a political problem involved. Much of the force you will be getting is drawn
from the reserve; i.e., from Army and Air Force National Guard and reserve sources. The Army has had some difficult days
in an attempt to restructure reserve units better to serve the needs of the Army as a whole. This has caused much bad
feeling and much contention in the Congress and in reserve circles. I am sure that they are waiting to see if the Army calls
up their separate brigades and immediately slaps a Regular Army division commander and staff on top of them to build
them into a division. With all else that is going on, we don't need that. Of course, at some later time you might be able, just
as you did in the case of the Americal Division, to scrape up some spaces and parts within your forces and with a small
augmentation from the CONUS (which is not in the cards today) form another division, if that is your goal.
Warm regards.

137. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, March 16, 1968, 2210Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret;
Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Bundy and approved by Rusk.
131732. No distribution outside Department. Literally eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary.
1. In connection with our possible decisions as foreshadowed in State 131330,/2/ we have a number of staff proposals
concerning our negotiating posture as we announce our actions. One would be simply to reiterate the San Antonio formula
and take the same line that we have done in recent statements. However, two other possibilities have been raised on
which we need your judgment as to the South Vietnamese reaction.
/2/Document 132.
2. The first of these would be to treat the various Hanoi statements reported to us in recent weeks as indicating that Hanoi
at least clearly understands our "no advantage" assumption, and hence to go ahead with stopping the bombing in the near
future. We would of course need to consult with the GVN before taking such action, but now need your judgment as to the
GVN reaction and the broad effect in South Vietnam of carrying out such a proposal. We would of course insist on prompt
talks and on observance of the "no advantage" assumption if we did in fact stop.
3. The second proposal that has been put forward at staff level is more modest. Its essence would be for us to restrict our
bombing actions against North Vietnam roughly to the area south of Vinh, accompanying this by the simplest and most
open-ended announcement possible, along the following lines: "After consultation with our allies, the President has
directed that US bombing attacks on North Vietnam be limited to those areas which are integrally related to the battlefield.
No reasonable person could expect us to fail to provide maximum support to our men in combat. Whether this step can be
a step toward peace is for Hanoi to determine. We shall watch the situation carefully."
4. The timing of such an action/announcement could be prior to, concurrent with, or after the presentation of force increase
proposals to the Congress. Among the considerations that we have in mind are the following tentative judgments:
a. For the next month or so the weather in the Hanoi-Haiphong area would mean that the proposal would not make a major
difference from a military point of view.
b. Full bombing would be resumed if there were a major attack on Khe Sanh or a second round of attacks on the cities.
c. We would not send Ambassadors rushing all over the world to convert the bombing action into negotiations but would
simply sit back and wait for Hanoi to respond.
d. It would shift away from theological debates about words and put the problem on the de facto level of action. If Hanoi
took no corresponding military action, the bombing would be resumed.
e. It would be very important for us not to embroider the statement with all sorts of "conditions" or "assumptions." Just take
the action and see whether anybody is able to make anything out of it.

f. The "areas which are integrally related to the battlefield" would presumably be as far north as Vinh. Bombing below that
area should be intensive and without wraps.
5. As I said at the outset, there would obviously be other elements in any final judgment, notably whether the effect on the
Congress and the American public would be on balance favorable, and so on. We would also need the most thoughtful
assessment of how Hanoi would respond; it would be our best judgment that they would not take any real step toward
peace, but it is conceivable that they might hold their hand at Khe Sanh and against the cities for some time, and this
would require at some point a military judgment whether this situation would be to our net advantage.
6. What we most need from you, though, apart from any general thoughts you may have, is whether such a proposal could
be sold to Thieu (in conjunction with disclosure of plans for at least limited US force increases and also proposals for
improving ARVN equipment), and whether the initiation of this action might--even if Thieu had agreed--have serious
disturbing effects on South Vietnamese will and morale. We are of course well aware through your reporting of the deep
rejection of any new negotiating approach or peace initiative at the present time, and the equally deep sensitivity to any
implication that the US may be dealing separately. The question is whether this action would arouse these emotions and to
what degree. We would like your thoughts on what sort of timing it might take to obtain GVN concurrence if you think it
wise to see this.
7. May we have your judgment on the South Vietnamese aspects of these proposals at your earliest convenience, together
with any comment you wish to make on their general wisdom at this time? If it is your conclusion that any change in our
negotiating posture at the present moment would not be wise, we would like your general thoughts as to the possible
future timing of any similar actions./3/
/3/In telegram 22548 from Saigon, March 20, Bunker warned that many South Vietnamese were angered that a strong
reaction against the DRV was not undertaken immediately after Tet; as a result, a U.S. move toward negotiations could
cause a considerable anti-American outburst. Bunker advised delaying any peace initiative and consulting with Thieu and
Ky at every step. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
8. I want to emphasize that the foregoing are among alternatives being considered at the staff level only. They have not
been presented to higher authority for consideration. You may be sure that you will not be confronted with any sudden
decisions and that you will be afforded full opportunity for consultations.
Rusk

138. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, March 18, 1968, 1200Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret;
Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
22386. 1. I took Ambassador Komer to report privately to President Thieu on his Washington visit, as part of our current
effort to get the GVN moving faster. Thieu was very receptive, and we had a long, two-hour discussion.
2. I told Thieu that Bob Komer had given me such a disturbing appraisal of the great concern in Washington over the
current situation and GVN performance that I wanted President Thieu to get the same candid appraisal firsthand. We
carefully noted that this was not an official call on instructions, but rather an effort on my part and Komer's to make sure
that President Thieu understood the full magnitude of Washington concerns.
3. Komer dwelt heavily on the deep discouragement of the U.S. press and public, as well as the large segment of the U.S.
Congress, at the success of the VC Tet offensive and the slowness of the GVN's response. He pointed out that this had
greatly strengthened anti-war sentiment among much influential U.S. opinion and had re-enforced the growing criticism of
the administration for even considering further Viet-Nam force increases at a time when the GVN was not carrying its own
share of the burden. The GVN was regarded as moving too slowly in reforming its machinery, in recovering the
countryside, counter-attacking the enemy, and rebuilding the cities.
4. On the contrary, Komer stressed, he found the President and his chief advisors determined and unflappable. However,
Komer felt compelled to say in all candor that he found the highest levels in Washington also deeply disappointed and

concerned that the GVN was not moving faster on the civil and military fronts.
5. To re-enforce this point, Komer cited various criticisms which he found at high levels. He emphasized that the constant
reappearance of Thieu/Ky dissent gave an impression of divided and uncertain management at just the wrong time. It was
regarded as a critical impediment to dynamic and unified GVN leadership./2/ The press and critics were using this theme
to argue that even the top GVN leadership couldn't hang together. The proliferation of efforts to organize "national fronts"
was also cited as evidence of the inability of the Vietnamese to pull together.
/2/In telegram 22205 from Saigon, March 15, Bunker reported on his meeting that day with Thieu during which they
discussed his rivalry with Ky. Bunker described the conflict as "damaging to the image of the GVN both here and abroad"
and stressed to Thieu the need to resolve this problem. Thieu placed considerable blame for the impasse on Ky and
expressed anxiety about entrusting him with an important function such as the anti-corruption campaign, "since he was
surrounded by corrupt people." (Ibid.) In a meeting with Ky 5 days later, Komer warned against any "extra-constitutional
moves" as "there was no doubt in his mind that U.S. would do everything in its power to prevent any power
grab." (Telegram 22549 from Saigon, March 20; ibid.) A March 20 memorandum prepared by the CIA Station in Saigon
assessing the Thieu-Ky relationship concluded that "while Ky must be warned that coup talk is simply unacceptable and
contrary to both GVN and U.S. interests, it would be best if Thieu rather than Ky could be induced to play the major role in
the resolution of the 'Thieu-Ky problem' using Ky's announced dissatisfaction to our advantage in encouraging Thieu to be
more aggressive in this regard." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 1 EE (3), 3/16-31/68,
Post-Tet Political Activity)
6. Komer went on to say that he had been told repeatedly that the GVN did not seem to be moving fast enough in purging
its own ranks, despite the plus from removal of two corps commanders and several province chiefs. Since Washington
regarded the next few months as critical, it also had difficulty in understanding why ARVN could not conduct more of a fullscale counteroffensive to relieve the threat to the cities and recapture the countryside. Further, there was much criticism of
the lack of solid action to date against corruption, and even of the weakness of Prime Minister Loc.
7. Komer summed up by expressing his own personal view that it would be difficult for the U.S. to justify yet further support
for the GVN, or perhaps even sustain the present level of support, unless the GVN took more drastic steps to show it was
rising both to the enemy threat and to the great opportunities which Hanoi's all-out offensive was creating. He felt that the
U.S. position would be critically dependent on what the GVN itself did over the next few months to convince the U.S.
administration, Congress, and public that it merited such support. He apologized for having to present such a gloomy view,
but repeated that he and I felt we owed it to Thieu because in the last analysis only Thieu as president could galvanize the
GVN.
8. Thieu expressed appreciation, and recited some of his difficulties in getting the GVN to pull together. He mentioned
jocularly that he even had to deal with rumored possibilities of a coup. I seized the opening to remind him again that
Washington supported him and only him as the duly-elected President, and that a coup would most certainly risk
withdrawal of U.S. support to Viet-Nam. We doubted whether our Viet-Nam policy would survive another coup.
9. Thieu then asked candidly, "Should I have a change of government?" When I asked him what he meant, he asked
frankly whether he should change Loc and other Ministers. I replied that I recognized the difficulty of Loc's position. He also
struck me as a very intelligent man, but he did not seem to be a particularly good executive or manager who knew how to
use his power to make decisions. Komer added that in his and General Forsythe's almost daily meetings with the Central
Recovery Committee over the past six weeks, they had both been struck by how the President or Ky would take decisions
but how the CRC became more of a debating society when Loc was in the chair.
10. Thieu dissented from our view, saying that he thought Loc had the capability to make decisions but was caught in a
very difficult position in the middle (between Thieu and Ky). Though Loc had been proposed by Ky, he was being
hampered in taking many decisions because of fear of offending the Ky group. For example, Loc knew who was corrupt
(Thieu cited the Customs Director, the Port Director, and some others whose names we did not catch), but these were Ky
appointees whom Loc feared to remove. The President had told Loc that he would back Loc in any changes, but Loc was
concerned over "cutting off Ky's arms and legs." Loc meant well but was hamstrung by being in the middle.
11. Komer suggested giving Loc a specified period--say two months--in which to perform on pain of dismissal. Thieu
smiled but did not respond. Next Komer suggested strengthening the Prime Minister's office by making Doan Ba Cang
Deputy Prime Minister with power to pull the governmental machinery together on the recovery front. Cang was toughminded and was performing brilliantly; however, he lacked the authority to compel Ministers to respond.
[Omitted here is discussion relating to the pacification program.]
Bunker

139. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, March 18, 1968, 3:30 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 461, Lions. Secret; Nodis. Drafted
by Davidson. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. Raimondi also saw Harriman the previous week at the time
Rusk was testifying before Congress. (Memorandum from Harriman to Rusk, March 12; Library of Congress, Manuscript
Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, General-March 1968)
SUBJECT
Vietnam Peace Proposal
PARTICIPANTS
Archbishop Luigi Raimondi, Apostolic Delegate to the U.S.A.
The Secretary
Daniel I. Davidson, Special Assistant to Ambassador Harriman
Archbishop Raimondi told the Secretary that last February a person connected with the official and diplomatic sector, a
specialist in international law, presented a solution for breaking the impasse preventing the two parties to the Vietnamese
conflict from meeting. This idea was for a third party to issue an invitation to talk at a specific time and place. This would
get around the current situation where no one feels free to take the first step although both sides say that they are ready
for talks./2/ The Archbishop handed a memorandum, prepared by the person he had referred to above, to the Secretary./3/
/2/The source of the idea was Harvard University law professor Roger Fisher. According to Kissinger, Fisher said that he
had contacted officials of the Polish, Swedish, and Papal governments. Fisher was told by Polish UN delegate Bohdan
Tomorowicz that Hanoi would accept the essence of the San Antonio formula but not make direct assurances to the United
States. Only the Apostolic Delegation had agreed to act as an intermediary. (Memorandum of conversation between
Davidson and Kissinger, March 21; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 461,
Lions)
/3/Not found. Several detailed analyses of the memorandum are ibid.
After slowly reading the memorandum the Secretary said that it contained a very important idea that touches on many
things which have been done or attempted. The Secretary said he did not want to give an off-the-cuff reaction.
The Archbishop said that he had not expected an immediate reaction but did wish to inform the Secretary that he would
welcome suggestions the Secretary might have. For example the role given to Sweden could be given to Switzerland or to
any other country. Archbishop Raimondi emphasized the importance of the two parties technically remaining unaware of
the proposal and said that he was somewhat hesitant with leaving a copy with the Secretary but would trust his judgment.
The Secretary said that the U.S. had thought of trying variations of the plan at various times. We had been thinking of
suggesting that the two co-chairmen or the three ICC nations send representatives to a site such as Geneva who would be
present to talk to anybody who came to the site. This method could avoid procedural difficulties such as the role of the
NLF. As the various groups converse with the representatives it might lead to suggestions on how to move to peace.
One of the problems that requires close attention said the Secretary is the proposal for a reduce fire without a previous
understanding or arrangement. The Secretary pointed out that the GVN holds all provincial capitals, six autonomous cities
and all the district capitals and asked whether it could make use of the road network connecting these towns during a
reduce fire. The Secretary repeated that he was not in any way judging the proposal./4/
/4/In telegram 133723 to Saigon, March 21, the Department informed Bunker of the proposal but cautioned him not to
mention it to Thieu. (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/LIONS)
The Archbishop said that the Holy See would not go ahead unless exploration revealed the possibility of success since the
Holy See was not interested in academic exercises.

The Secretary told the Archbishop that the Holy See's interest is greatly appreciated and that the memorandum would get
immediate and careful study./5/
/5/Harriman suggested that Raimondi be told that a Polish commitment to attend the meeting was required before the
United States would proceed on the initiative. (Memorandum from Harriman to Rusk, March 27; Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, General-March 1968) According
to a March 28 memorandum of conversation, Harriman, with Rusk's concurrence, suggested that Raimondi sound out the
Poles on this matter. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 461, Lions)

140. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, March 18, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 1 EE (3), 3/16-31/68, Post-Tet Political Activity.
Secret; Nodis. Prepared by Jorden on March 19. Rostow supplied talking points for the meeting in a memorandum to the
President, March 18, 1:25 p.m. (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
Meeting Between the President and Ambassador Bui Diem
The President met late yesterday with Vietnamese Ambassador Bui Diem in the President's office. Purpose of the
Ambassador's call was to review the present situation in advance of Bui Diem's return to Saigon this week for consultation
with his Government. William J. Jorden of the NSC Staff was present. The meeting began at 6:30 p.m. and ended at 7:10
p.m.
The President welcomed the Ambassador and remarked on his early return to Saigon. The Ambassador said he planned
to underline three things in his talks with his own President and other Government officials:
(1) the mood in the United States and the rising tide of criticism against American involvement. He planned to stress the
extent to which the criticism is aimed at the Vietnamese themselves and their lack of vigorous action.
(2) the desperate need for improved performance by the Vietnamese--especially the Army and the Government. He would
stress the need for the GVN to attack such social evils as corruption.
(3) the need for President Thieu and Vice President Ky to work in harmony and to form an effective team.
The President indicated he thought these were all matters worth emphasizing. He said that criticism was indeed rising here
and that he was under heavy pressure.
He was firm in his conviction of the rightness of our course in Viet-Nam. And he planned to ask the Congress and the
American people for additional sacrifice and expenditures. But he said we could not do the job alone. The Vietnamese had
to bear a heavier load, too.
He noted how much of the criticism focused on Vietnamese actions or lack of action--the slowness in drafting Vietnamese
youth, the misuse of AID supplies, the buying of draft deferments, the corruption of officials and others.
The President noted that some officials had been removed but he thought indications were that more should be ousted. He
suggested that the Vietnamese ask MACV for a list of inefficient or corrupt commanders and then "get rid of them."
The Ambassador noted that present plans called for drafting 65,000 Vietnamese in the next few months. They were now
thinking of raising that to 100,000 or 125,000 and perhaps even 200,000 by the end of the year. He said this kind of
increase raised problems of equipment, training facilities and budget support. The President assured him of our help in
meeting equipment requirements.
The President asked Jorden to prepare a memo for the Ambassador listing the 8 or 10 things we think need most to be
done. The Ambassador assured the President he would use such a memo in his talks with his own officials./2/

/2/In a March 20 covering memorandum transmitting this memorandum to Rusk, March 20, Bundy wrote that it was "based
upon the recent exchange of messages with Ambassador Bunker on what needs to be done in Viet-Nam as a matter of
priority." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
As the Ambassador was about to leave, the President wished him success and asked him to tell President Thieu and Vice
President Ky to "work together and get moving."/3/
/3/In a meeting on March 20, Rusk told Diem to "emphasize that the problem of public opinion in the United States is
directly related to the feeling our people had as to the dedication and performance of the Vietnamese Government and
armed forces. It would be good news that would make an important difference in the attitude of the people of the United
States if it were clear that a maximum effort was being made by the people involved in Viet-Nam." (Telegram 134107 to
Saigon, March 21; ibid.) Diem also met with Clifford on March 20. Clifford told him that the United States and Vietnam had
to end the war before the American public's support for it ended, although "the results of this conclusion will not be very
satisfactory to the GVN or to us or to Hanoi or to the NLF" since "everybody is going to have to give up a lot." (Washington
National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1250, 1968 Files, VIET 091.112)
W.J. Jorden

141. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of
State Rusk/1/
Washington, March 19, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Nodis. A copy
was sent to Katzenbach.
SUBJECT
Checklist for Any Major Announcement--Luncheon Topic
As we consider a major announcement of forthcoming actions, I submit the following checklist:
1. How and when do we inform Saigon and our allies?
I believe this should be done at least a day or two in advance in Saigon, and at least a day in advance for the Manila allies.
A related question is whether we make any determined effort to get additional contributions. We probably can get a Korean
light division under negotiations already under way, and the Australians might go up just a little. However, I see no other
prospects, and would strongly recommend against any publicized push.
2. How do we depict the situation, both in Viet-Nam and in relation to our world-wide need for an adequate strategic
reserve?
On Viet-Nam alone, we need a careful and considered statement of the enemy's strategy and new capabilities, on which to
base the fundamental argument that we are acting to meet what they have done. On the world picture, there are delicate
problems in whether we point to any specific threat area as justification for bringing our strategic reserve up to an adequate
level.
3. Do we announce flatly an increase in our force ceiling in Viet-Nam, together with the timing of deployments?
On the one hand, to give a flat deployment schedule plays into Hanoi's hands. On the other hand, Congress and the
country may require a firm new "ceiling" to avoid the implication that we are committing ourselves to the full extent of the
total force increase. This is a dilemma in which the answer will require careful review of such a possible position as stating
that we now believe X thousand additional forces, over and above the 525,000, will be required and are earmarking in that
sense but without giving the dates.
4. What do we say about any revision of strategy?
We could use some such formula as that Westmoreland is being instructed to give primary emphasis to the protection of

populated areas, but this raises the question of whether we mean to abandon Khe Sanh and the highlands. On the other
hand, if we have no language suggesting any change of emphasis, we will be accused of simply going on with more of the
same. The underlying fact, as we believe the DOD studies will show, is that any change can only take place over a period
of time.
5. Do we mention bombing policy in the announcement? If not, what are we going to say about this to the key committees,
with a high likelihood that it will leak?
It still seems to me that we require a broad decision in principle by the President between a seasonal step-up within
current limitations, and serious consideration of the JCS expanded proposals, including the mining of Haiphong. Surely we
cannot avoid this issue in the Armed Services Committees, and whatever we say will come out.
6. What is our posture toward negotiations?
All of us have felt that we should not modify the San Antonio formula or take any dramatic new initiative. It may be that the
Papal proposal would be helpful outside the limits of any announcement./2/ However, we face a broad question of how the
announcement refers to our view toward possibilities of peace in the coming months.
/2/See Document 139.
7. What does the announcement say about tax proposals and budget cuts?
Whatever is being worked out with Congressional leaders may well have to be specified in the announcement to avoid
damaging psychological effects on the dollar. If domestic cuts are involved, these will need to be presented and sustained.
8. How fully do we argue the whole case for continuing in Viet-Nam?
It seems to many of us that the situation calls for an unusually sober and full statement of the reasons why we are going
on. A simple reiteration of the past rationale will not do. It would be my own feeling that we should lay stress not merely on
our commitments but on the continued importance of our stand in Viet-Nam for confidence in Southeast Asia--with full
treatment of the current threats there and also a good deal more than the President has ever said about the favorable
trends in Southeast Asia that our stand to date has made possible.
In short, the announcement may well need to be a very major state paper almost on the scale of a state of the union
message. If we fail to spell out real answers to these questions, we will leave the field wide open and have to tidy up in any
event during the hearings or through further public statements.
In the circumstances, I strongly urge that a task force be designated to work on the whole of this statement under
conditions of utmost secrecy, and that no timing for the announcement be set until we have reached virtually final
agreement on the terms of the announcement.

142. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, March 19, 1968, 1:01-2:55 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House.
Those attending were the President, Rusk, Clifford, Helms, Wheeler, Rostow, Fortas, Jones, Christian, and Tom Johnson;
the Vice President joined the meeting at 1:30 p.m. and McPherson at 2:30 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH HIS FOREIGN ADVISERS
AT THE
TUESDAY LUNCHEON
[Omitted here is a brief discussion of an unrelated matter.]
Secretary Rusk: We need some good news from Vietnam, Buzz.

General Wheeler: News is basically good. They are clearing out the enemy around Saigon.
There have been successful offensive operations in IV Corps. Nothing is happening in II Corps. News is good in I Corps.
We will see an effort to grab Hue. It could be a sizable operation.
Mr. Rostow: The Vietnamese seem more willing to contemplate offensive actions of their own. The enemy hasn't.
Secretary Clifford: The enemy may feel he is doing so well politically that he need not do anything militarily. They see:
--Debate in the Senate
--The New Hampshire primary
--Quarrels over the war in Congress
The President: Can we talk on the Goldberg-Bowles proposal?/2/
/2/See Document 131.
Secretary Rusk: I met with Ambassador Goldberg, Ambassador Harriman and Under Secretary Katzenbach. Goldberg
says to go ahead with the San Antonio formula even though there is no response from the other side. He thinks it would
unify the country. I don't think it will affect the doves.
I would be more inclined to have de facto bombing in the north halted and see if we get de facto response from Hanoi. I
think we should go over it with Ambassador Goldberg.
Secretary Clifford: I am not impressed by the merits of the Goldberg proposition. I think it would be fruitless.
You have your committee of senior advisers. They met prior to the Tet offensive. They were briefed--you met with them.
You had unanimous expression for carrying on as you were in Vietnam.
A lot has taken place. I wonder if it would be of value, if in the last three to four months--if you were to find that the same
men either affirmed their attitude or reached a change of attitude. It would be of considerable help to you.
The group of Dillon, Dean and the Republicans was a very good group. Bob Murphy and Cabot Lodge were also included
in it. We should get the benefit of their substantive opinion. Then we could say you were meeting again with the same
group.
Drew Pearson wrote around that time about the group.
The President then asked Tom Johnson to get these quotes.
The President: I would add General Ridgway. He was not a critic. The net of what he said was that he was concerned--that
we have these alliances and responsibilities in Europe, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Mideast. He thinks we do
not have enough strength to meet a new crisis. He thought we should have stronger strategic reserves.
He was not critical of any person. He had no magic formula.
They think a lot of Ridgway, as they do of Reischauer. It might be good to have them in.
The President read notes from the Dean Acheson meeting he had last week./3/ He said nothing much comes out of these
big meetings.
/3/See Document 135.

It would be a mistake to get a new super-Presidential board.

Mr. Rostow: November 2 was the date of that meeting.
The President read the notes of the November 2 meeting which had been written by McGeorge Bundy./4/
/4/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Document 377.
Secretary Clifford: The names of the group who have met with the President before are:
Dean Acheson
George Ball
McGeorge Bundy
Douglas Dillon
Arthur Dean
Abe Fortas
General Taylor
Omar Bradley

William B. Murphy
Henry Cabot Lodge
Nicholas Katzenbach
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Clark Clifford
Director Helms
George Christian

Of these, eleven were outside government:

Dean Acheson--hawk
George Ball--dove
McGeorge Bundy--for de-escalation
Douglas Dillon--dovish
Arthur Dean--hawkish
Abe Fortas
General Taylor
Omar Bradley
Robert Murphy--hawkish
Henry Cabot Lodge--hawkish
Clark Clifford
Secretary Rusk: Lodge thinks we should do less search and destroy and build up the South Vietnam forces.
The President: There are two or three dangers in this:
1) We comply with the Senator Kennedy demand.
2) We create doubt about the fact we are doubtful.
3) We were charged with handpicking.
4) It might harden public position against us.
Cyrus Vance should be in that group.
We will not change any dove anytime with anything.
Abe Fortas: There are three problems:
(1) The general public attitude
(2) The merits of the situation
(3) What we can do to get people behind your program.

Abe Fortas: Are we doing this as a defensive mechanism? If so, it is good. I think the committee would be a defensive
public relations move. As that, I would wait a little while. It is a negative defensive thing to blunt the other side.
In summary, it is a good thing to do. We need to keep it from being excessively hawkish. I support a firm policy. We should
get to work to mount public support for what we are doing.
The President: What is the Douglas committee doing?/5/
/5/Former Senator Paul Douglas headed an eight-member committee which publicly supported the President's insistence
upon reciprocal action prior to an extended bombing halt.
Walt Rostow: It's still here.
Abe Fortas: It should (1) Blunt the attack of the doves. It should have a new job. (2) Mobilize the people behind us. (3)
Maybe there are some fresh ideas it could give.
Secretary Rusk: There is safety in reconvening this group since you met before. It would be an advantage of getting their
views.
The President: What about Reischauer and Ridgway?
Secretary Clifford: We could get the same group to look at developments since they last met. It would be valuable to get
the judgment of the same group in light of the last four months.
Announcing it publicly would have two defects:
(1) Senator Kennedy would say he persuaded you to set it up
(2) The group is very hawkish.
I would use the group as a confidential advisory group.
If you did it from a public relations standpoint, I would start from scratch.
Walt Rostow: The timing should be related to:
(1) Whether or not South Vietnam goes ahead with 125,000 new troops
(2) How Westy's April offensive looks
(3) Logistical base for operations against Khesanh is reduced. The timing may matter.
General Wheeler: I would have the same group. I would get the views of the same men. A reappraisal might be important
indicators of public opinion. To establish a new and larger group will be counter-productive.
You will get no benefit out of it. The first group would benefit you. The second (new) group is a trap.
The President: Let's set it for this weekend. Let's try it Wednesday./6/
/6/March 26.
What about Ambassador Bowles?
Secretary Rusk: I will take care of him.
[Omitted here is a brief discussion relating to the Middle East, Rhodesia, and Panama.]

The President: What is the situation on troop deployments, Clark?

Secretary Clifford: Senator Russell will go along with a plan for 50,000 reserves--43,000 to Vietnam.
30,000 for Westmoreland
13,000 for support
43,000 deployed
Russell would also go along with calling up 48,000 more reserves to fill the places open in the strategic reserves of this
country. He is grateful of the build-up in strategic reserves.
This would build up to 7 deployable divisions versus 1-1/2 now.
I also met with Senator Stennis. He is for the call-up but not unless we broaden the scope of the war. He would like a plan
to expand the war.
We told him General Westmoreland wanted 43,000 troops to protect over what we already have. Senator Stennis said
O.K.
Senator Smith is strong for a call-up. She wants to call the U.S. people to arms to rally the people here.
Senator Scoop Jackson would go along with the plan.
Senator Milton Young gave general approval.
Senator Symington is opposed to the call-up. He thinks we should get out. He thinks the dollar will depreciate.
Congressmen Mendell Rivers and Bates would go along. Congressman Rivers wants a settlement on the nuclear frigate.
Representative Mahon will go along with it. He was shocked about the money it will cost.
The Defense Department will move when the President is ready to move.
We should give consultation and notice to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and also the House Foreign Relations
Committee. That should be done the same day the announcement is to be made.
Senator Russell is quite upset about the invasion of the defense field of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
We feel some prior notification should be given to the two Foreign Relations Committees.
Secretary Rusk: We should have an executive committee to notify our allies: Gorton, Thieu, Pak, and the Prime Minister of
Thailand.
I still am concerned about the details one puts out publicly. I don't want to give exact figures.
Secretary Clifford: We can separate it some. Out of the first 50,000 some will be deployed to South Vietnam. Out of the
second group they will fill our strategic reserves.
Senator Smith expressed hope that there would be a joint session of the Congress. We feel this would be too much since
nothing is asked of Congress at this time. We are not asking for extension of enlistments or a call-up of selected reservists.
We propose a speech to the nation on television by the President.
Secretary Rusk: I agree it should be on television.
Secretary Clifford: We should deal with the military situation, international situation, political situation, the situation with the
GVN and ARVN, the 120,000 call-up of 18 and 19 year olds.
It will look better if the GVN calls up 125,000 of their own men. We also would discuss what, if anything, the allies are

doing. The ARVN is being raised from 700,000 to 850,000 troops.

We must face up to the international monetary situation./7/ All of that should go together.
/7/Five days before, intensive speculation undermining world currencies had caused the London gold market to suspend
trading.
General Wheeler: Here is a statement on the deployment. This is being coordinated by General Westmoreland.
Secretary Rusk: Ambassador Bunker is working with Thieu to get him to make a speech by Wednesday.
The Vice President: What about weapons to South Vietnam, particularly the regional forces and popular forces?
General Wheeler: We are doing more. (He then gave a list of equipment the U.S. is providing.)
The President: Are we final on our costing?
Secretary Clifford: We are as close as we can get. I refer to the memo of March 16. We estimate $10 billion.
The President: Get Bill Jorden, yourself, Harry McPherson, Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford, Justice Fortas, along with
Budget, Treasury, Council of Economic Advisers to get a first draft of the speech by Thursday. I will be gone Friday and
Saturday.
(Harry McPherson entered the meeting at this point.)/8/
/8/The President called McPherson at 2:01 p.m. and requested that he join the meeting. McPherson arrived at 2:30 p.m.
(Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
I meet with the leadership at 6 p.m. today./9/
/9/The President met with the Congressional leadership from 6:16 to 7 p.m. (Ibid.) No record of the meeting has been
found.
George Christian: I don't expect you can talk about this with the leadership without it leaking.
The President: If we announce the call-up of 48,000 reserves--most of whom go to Vietnam--I have directed the Secretary
of Defense to have his department study the possibility of a call-up for strategic reserves here, to give us seven divisions of
the strategic reserves.
We do not have plans for their deployment to Vietnam.
Secretary Clifford: That would meet it very well.
Secretary Rusk: Many would say the seven divisions are about to go to Vietnam. They would say we are going to get our
strategic reserves in order.
Abe Fortas: You might talk about the first call-up for Vietnam and make sure our ready reserves are adequately
strengthened.
The President: I could say we are calling up 48,000 people, a substantial portion of whom will go to Vietnam, and with our
world responsibility I am directing the Department of Defense to look at the call-up for our strategic reserves.
General Wheeler: You could say on the second call-up, it is in order to replenish and build up our strategic reserves. The
number will approximate the first call-up.
The President: How do you cost it out?

Secretary Clifford: Let's see what our people feel on that.

The President: Let's check that out with Secretary Fowler.
Walt Rostow: (1) We need information on an increase in forces because of those brought in by North Vietnam from
information by the CIA. (2) We need information on the general North Vietnamization of the war--the proportion of the
North Vietnamese fighting in South Vietnam today.
Director Helms: I will look at it. It is in the range of 50,000.
General Wheeler: 30-35 battalions.
Director Helms: On the Neil Sheehan article,/10/ all copies were passed out in Clark Clifford's office on March 2. No other
copies were ever distributed.
/10/See footnote 2, Document 116.
The memorandum on Pacification was then passed out./11/
/11/Not found.

143. Memorandum for the 303 Committee/1/

Washington, March 20, 1968.
/1/Source: National Security Council, 303 Committee Files, Vietnam 1965-1968. Secret; Eyes Only. A handwritten note
reads: "303 Committee approved on 10 April 1968."
SUBJECT
Expansion of the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) Program
1. Summary
Originally called the Counter-Terror Team Program when it got underway in 1964 as part of the 12-point covert political
action program developed under NSAM 328,/2/ the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) Program has undergone an
almost complete transformation since early 1966. From a program geared primarily to harassment of the Viet Cong in their
own areas, it has been changed to one working almost exclusively on the collection of intelligence on, and capture of, key
members of the Viet Cong infrastructure in the countryside. Its effectiveness in this new role is amply attested to by the
amount of intelligence collected and Viet Cong captured and equally by the fact that the program is considered to be the
single most effective instrument in the Mission's joint attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure with the South Vietnamese. In
consequence of this [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Ambassador Komer to expand the program from a
present personnel strength of about 3,500 men to 6,000 by the end of FY-69. Ambassador Bunker and General
Westmoreland have endorsed this expansion, as has Asst. Secretary of State William Bundy. The total cost for the
Program for FY-68 and FY-69 will be $13.2 million.
/2/NSAM No. 328, April 6, 1965; see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 242.
2. Program
The PRU Program is the latest evolution in the continuing [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] effort in Vietnam
to exploit unconventional and paramilitary techniques in the war against the Viet Cong. The basic concept has always
been to employ covert tactics for executive action missions by small teams using ambush, disguise, night operations and
the whole gamut of classical techniques of this kind of warfare. In its earlier version this program was called the CounterTerror program and the objective was to administer to the Viet Cong the same kind of medicine that they had been serving
up to the Vietnamese Government and people. While the Counter-Terror Teams were effective in their role of harassing
the Viet Cong in their home territory, there were certain drawbacks in the management and problems in the
implementation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in 1966. These stemmed from the difficulty of keeping this

rather sensational program from public scrutiny and from difficulties in controlling the 40 or so province chiefs through
whom the program was implemented. In mid-1966, the name was changed to the PRU and the units retargeted to the
specific and limited task of collecting intelligence on the Viet Cong secret power structure in the countryside by capture of
members of this organization. In effect the mission became that of long range police patrol penetrating into areas from
which ordinary police are barred to apprehend identified subversives participating in the conspiracy against the GVN. An
indication of the effectiveness of this program is that, over the past year, 11,000 operations were conducted resulting in
over 5,000 intelligence reports disseminated and the capture of 2,500 Viet Cong, in addition to 3,300 killed and 1,200
wounded. The PRU were thus responsible in one year for capturing or otherwise eliminating Viet Cong equaling roughly
twice the number of men engaged in the program. Because of this record of effectiveness, Ambassador Komer has
requested [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] increase the size of the program from about 3,000 to 6,000 men
by the end of FY-69.
3. Factors Bearing on the Problem
a. Origin of the Requirement--This requirement results from the need to augment the Saigon Mission's capability to collect
intelligence on, and capture, members of the Viet Cong infrastructure and is in specific response to Ambassador Komer's
request that the PRU program be increased to 6,000 men by the end of FY-69.
b. Relationship to Previous 303 Committee Actions--On 26 July 1965, the Committee was given a briefing on [less than 1
line of source text not declassified] covert operations in Southeast Asia in which the Counter-Terror program was included
as part of the overall Political Action Team program. Policy approval was given at that time subject to further discussions
with the Bureau of the Budget concerning the supplemental appropriations for FY-66.
c. Operational Objective--[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] objective is to enhance the Saigon Mission's
capability for collecting intelligence on the Viet Cong infrastructure.
d. Proposal--[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] proposes to expand the existing PRU program from its
present personnel strength of about 3,500 to 6,000 by the end of FY-69. This entails substantial construction costs for
increasing the size of existing training facilities to accommodate this larger number of men, increased support costs for the
additional men on duty, and the cost of re-equipping existing units with M-16 rifles, to keep pace with the increased
firepower demonstrated by the Viet Cong during the Tet offensive.
e. Risks--There are essentially no security risks in this operation. The adverse U.S. publicity and Congressional interest
generated by the predecessor Counter-Terror program stemmed partly from the somewhat sinister ring of the name and
from the absence of an overt and legitimate sponsor. The redirection and renaming of the program, coupled with the
Vietnamese Joint General Staff directive which places the program logically within the Vietnamese military hierarchy, have
transformed the program from a colorful and somewhat conspicuous effort into a low profile activity which appears merely
to be another of the many American sponsored programs in Vietnam. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
sponsorship is known to some of the older newsmen in Saigon and anyone who is interested would have little difficulty in
ferreting out this fact, but the modest size of the program, even if expanded to 6,000 men, appears inconsequential against
the background of the massive American involvement in Vietnam.
f. Timing of the Operation--Preparations for the expansion have been completed and can be undertaken immediately upon
receipt of policy approval and the necessary supplemental funds.
4. Coordination
a. Department of State--This proposal has been approved by Assistant Secretary Bundy of the State Department.
b. U.S. Mission and MACV--This proposal has been approved by Ambassador Bunker and by General Westmoreland.
c. Host Country--This program has been coordinated with the Vietnamese Joint General Staff which has issued a directive
providing ostensible sponsorship for the program.
5. Recommendation
Because of the demonstrated effectiveness of the PRU program against the VC infrastructure and its importance to the
overall U.S. effort in Vietnam, it is recommended that the 303 Committee endorse the continuation and expansion of the
program as outlined above. It should be understood that the continuation and expansion of this program as recommended
will result in a total program cost for FY-68 and FY-69 of $13,227,000. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]/3/

/3/The minutes of the April 10 meeting of the 303 Committee, recorded in an April 11 memorandum for the record, read:
"The expansion of the PRU Program in Vietnam was approved by the principals. Mr. Bohlen asked a number of questions
concerning the extent of direct control [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Mr. Rostow was interested in the
coordination of PRU intelligence production with military interrogations." (National Security Council, 303 Committee Files,
Minutes, 1968)

144. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/
CM-3129-69
Washington, March 20, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Clark M. Clifford Papers, Memos on Vietnam: February-March 1968. Top Secret; Sensitive.
Received at OSD at 10:53 a.m. on March 21. There is a notation that Clifford saw the memorandum. That same day,
Clifford also received a memorandum from Enthoven in which the U.S. position vis-a-vis the air war was likened to the
NVA/VC position in the ground war; namely, that both sides could control the rate of losses in these respective arenas.
(Ibid., Alain Enthoven Papers, Strategy)
SUBJECT
Answers to Certain Questions
1. What would be the military effect of a cessation for a specific period of time of offensive air operations which include the
delivery of air munitions in (a) the Hanoi and Haiphong areas; (b) north of 20 North Latitude?
Answer: The weather begins to improve in the northern part of North Vietnam about 15 April; usually the change is
complete by about 1 May. Past experience indicates that we can expect about four days of weather suitable for visual air
attacks in the month of April. Militarily, our air operations north of 20 N. Latitude at this time of year are harassing in
nature, not destructive; i.e., the few radar controlled air strikes exert psychological pressure primarily on the people and the
Hanoi government, rather than destroying military supplies and facilities.
Conclusion: If a cessation of offensive air operations involving the delivery of air munitions north of 20 N. Latitude were
implemented during the period from now through 15 April 1968, we would be giving up relatively little military effect on the
enemy.
2. What quid pro quo could be asked in return for the cessation of bombing operations as specified above?
Comment: Any quid pro quo sought should be tangible and measurable. For those reasons, vague specifications such as
the reduction of infiltration of North Vietnamese troops into the south would be meaningless. Moreover, while a proposal
for cessation of VC/NVA rocket and mortar attacks against urban areas in South Vietnam might seem attractive, the fact
that we would propose to continue air and naval offensive operations south of 20 N. Latitude and in Laos would give the
opposition to U.S. policy an opportunity to demand as equitable the cessation of all offensive operations against all of
North Vietnam; i.e., the quid pro quo could be and would be characterized as insincere and deliberately unacceptable to
the Hanoi regime. In the same way, any proposal which would modify the San Antonio formula and link a limited cessation
of offensive air operations to prompt and productive talks would seem to be dangerous. In the first place, such a proposal
would be proclaimed by the opposition as a withdrawal from the San Antonio formula; in the second place, we are in our
poorest negotiating position since the summer of 1965. A formulation which meets the tests of tangibility and
measurement, but without the dangers involved in other proposals mentioned, would seem to be the following:
a. In reciprocation the North Vietnamese would be expected to cease the delivery of artillery, rocket and mortar fire from
positions in North Vietnam and within the DMZ against U.S., ARVN, and free-world military positions south of the DMZ;
and
b. Enemy forces would be withdrawn from the neutral DMZ established by the Geneva Accords of 1954.
Conclusion: Any quid pro quo sought should be tangible and measurable, and not susceptible to being twisted by the
opposition to our policies in Southeast Asia. Therefore, a suitable quid pro quo could be: a. a proposal that the North
Vietnamese cease artillery, rocket and mortar fire against Allied positions south of the DMZ from locations in North
Vietnam and within the DMZ; and b. enemy would be withdrawn from the neutral DMZ established by the Geneva Accords

of 1954.
3. What would be the military effect of proposing a cease fire if the proposal were accepted by the enemy?
Comment: The effect would be disastrous. As an example, there are now 53 enemy battalions located in the two northern
provinces of South Vietnam. Of these, 16 battalions are in the vicinity of Khe Sanh; 13 battalions are in the eastern portion
of the DMZ; 24 battalions are located in the Hue area, apparently positioning themselves for renewed attacks on that city.
This same situation is found in many other areas of South Vietnam. This means that there are at present substantial areas
of the country occupied by VC/NVA forces. If a cease fire were offered and accepted, these areas would remain under
control of the enemy. He could resupply these forces and augment them with impunity in order to expand his control over
the countryside and/or prepare for renewed offensive operations at a time and at places of his choosing. Moreover, in such
a situation, the South Vietnamese Armed Forces would probably lose all offensive spirit and could not be relied upon to
withstand renewed widespread attacks as they did during the Tet offensive. In sum, a cease fire, militarily, is simply a more
dangerous form of the enclave concept.
Conclusion: A proposal for a cease fire, if accepted by the enemy, would place Allied forces in a position of maximum
military disadvantage.
4. The foregoing comments in response to your questions address only the military factors involved. There are, of course,
many political factors, both foreign and domestic, which should be weighed. On balance, it would not seem that any
political factor would support a proposal for a cease fire.
5. I have not consulted with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the preparation of these answers.
Earle G. Wheeler

145. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, March 20, 1968, 0833Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret;
Priority; Nodis. Received at 7:32 a.m.
22548. No distribution outside the Department. Literally eyes only for the Secretary from Bunker. Reference: State
131732./2/
/2/Document 137.
1. I appreciate the opportunity to comment at an early stage on the very important questions raised in reftel since, as you
have indicated, actions on them clearly will have major effects here which should be taken into consideration before
decisions are made. I recognize that considerations relating to the situation in the US may be overriding, but I am setting
forth my very frank views on the problems which I believe may follow here if these courses of action are initiated in the
near future. I will make some general comments first and then discuss the specific courses of action in the light of these
more general comments.
2. As you indicate in para 6 of reftel, we have reported the general attitudes here towards early negotiations or peace
initiatives fully and they do not need to be repeated in detail. In addition to a continuing sense of uncertainty and some
residual fear of further enemy attacks on the cities, which underlie the GVN sensitivity on new negotiation initiatives, there
are one or two additional factors which lie under the surface. One is the latent feeling which I sense many Vietnamese
have that there should have been some form of immediate retaliation against NVN after the savage Tet attacks. This has
not been explicitly voiced by Vietnamese leaders but I suspect that it is there. The recent initiatives by Ky and Loan that
some of their followers are urging a "march to the North" and a declaration of war against North Viet-Nam probably
represent, inter alia, a reaction to this frustration.
3. This factor has a bearing on the general question of Thieu's position if he should agree to a proposal from us along the
lines indicated. Thieu, as you know, has shown himself to be very responsive to our wishes and needs, even if he has not
always moved with the speed and vigor we might hope. In doing so, he has made himself vulnerable to charges of being
unduly influenced by the Americans, and this may be one of the motives that lie behind these nationalistic initiatives by Ky

and others. Thieu could therefore find himself in a very delicate position if he should give his concurrence to our proposals
unless Ky is equally committed in whatever is done.
4. The timing of these moves will be critical to our success in getting GVN support, or at least understanding, for them, and
I regard full consultation with GVN leaders as essential. From the viewpoint of putting Hanoi on the spot, I can see that an
early initiative might have some advantage, but from a South Vietnamese viewpoint it could create problems that the GVN
may not be able to cope with. At the present moment the mood of the people, especially in the countryside, is still fluid and
a move by us to make a concession to Hanoi and the VC without a quid pro quo could be widely misinterpreted and could
feed the latent anti-Americanism which the VC have been cleverly exploiting in recent weeks. It could revive the earlier
rumor of US-VC collusion. It could also reverse the favorable trend of opinion in the urban areas where the new mood of
unity and anti-Communism is still quite strong, as shown for example by the large number of young men volunteering for
military service. We are also just at the point where the Vietnamese armed forces are taking the offensive against the
enemy and are moving back out into the countryside. We do not want to take any action which might discourage this trend
as we have been working hard to encourage it for the past few weeks. In short, a premature move towards negotiations
could unsettle the favorable trend of Vietnamese opinion and action at a critical moment, encourage the fence-sitters,
doubters and rumor mongers, and possibly discourage new ralliers from the other side.
5. On the other hand, a few more months might make all the difference in reestablishing Vietnamese confidence in
themselves (and in us) and in their ability to overcome the Tet attacks and to move ahead demonstrably on priority
objectives. It would also afford time to judge more accurately the effect of the Tet offensive on the enemy's capability and
to demonstrate our own intentions regarding further military and other support for the GVN, including equipment for
augmented Vietnamese forces. Time, in other words, should work to our advantage in terms of Vietnamese receptivity to
further negotiations initiatives, whereas too early a move might have an extremely negative effect and undo much that we
and the GVN have been trying to accomplish since the Tet attacks. As you know, Thieu, Ky, and Do have frequently said
to me that a political settlement is needed and desired by the Vietnamese people who have been at war off and on for
more than twenty years. They consider, however, that the timing of negotiations aimed at a settlement is critical and must
be related to the strength of the GVN's position. They all feel strongly that it is too early now to get engaged in such an
effort.
6. If I may look at this proposition also from Hanoi's viewpoint, I imagine that the leadership there might regard an early
move on our part without any reciprocity from their side as an indication of the success of their Tet offensive and of their
diplomatic and propaganda campaign around the world. They might well conclude that the situation in South Viet-Nam has
been shaken more than they probably now think and that in the US our resolve with respect to Viet-Nam has been
weakened. I am inclined to agree with you that Hanoi would not take any real step toward peace, but their leaders would
seek to give a world-wide impression that they were doing precisely this, and I believe we might find it difficult to resume
bombing in these circumstances. The holding of their hand at Khe Sanh, which may be their intention in any case, and
which we could never really be sure of, could leave us with the same major commitment of forces in northern I Corps that
we have now. Moreover, it would be a situation without any real military advantage since we would have to remain
prepared for any eventuality there. I also question whether the holding of their hand against further attacks on the cities
would have real significance in military terms, since it seems increasingly likely that they no longer have the capability to
undertake successfully wide-spread and destructive attacks on a scale comparable to Tet. Further harassment of the cities
and of lines of communication seems more likely. Our military posture will be further improved in the meantime if
Vietnamese forces are built up substantially and American forces are augmented to some degree. In sum, I find it difficult
to believe that Hanoi's response to these measures will bring us any advantage, either politically or militarily.
7. With respect to the two specific proposals you outline, the first alternative (para 2 of reftel) would create the greatest
difficulties for us here. I recommend strongly that we not pursue this course, since from a Vietnamese viewpoint it would
bring out all the disadvantages I have mentioned and it would also mean giving up our principal card without obtaining
anything in return.
8. If your second proposal were adopted, it would be easier to obtain GVN concurrence. I believe, nonetheless, that it
would still have most of the negative effects I have discussed above if initiated prematurely. The conditions spelled out in
para 4 would be helpful in presenting the matter to the GVN leadership, although I suspect that they will still see major
difficulties if this course is initiated in the near future and certainly if it is done before we have indicated publicly our
intention to increase our forces in Viet-Nam. Generals Westmoreland and Momyer are currently studying the probable
effects of confining the bombing of NVN to roughly the area you have in mind and it would be useful to have the results of
this study in hand in order to determine its military effect.
9. In conclusion, I should say that while I do not want to exaggerate the effects here of our initiating an action along the
lines indicated, I believe that if it is done prematurely, it runs the very real risk of undermining much that we have
accomplished here and of stimulating latent Vietnamese doubts about our intentions. As I have indicated, we must consult
Thieu and Ky and we must give them time to consider the effects of such action on their situation. This might mean a few
days or possibly a week. I expect, however, that it will disturb them deeply and that they will urge us to defer such actions
for at least several months when they expect to be in a stronger position to bring other elements of Vietnamese opinion,

military and civilian along with them in support of any new initiative by us.
Bunker

146. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/
Washington, March 20, 1968, 8:44 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and
Clifford, March 20, 1968, 8:44 a.m., Tape F6805.02, PNO 5. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared
specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
Clifford: One very quick item. I had a telephone call from Mac Bundy yesterday late in the afternoon. I thought he seemed
exceedingly friendly and cooperative. Had no sympathy whatsoever for Bobby's entry into the race./2/ We had a little talk
about the problems of Vietnam. He said he knew we were going through quite a difficult and critical period and made the
offer if he could be of any help at all, you only had to let him know and he would be glad to come down and help. Now, I
pass it on to you because I thought you might want to consider the advisability--if you thought well of it--of calling him and
perhaps asking him to come down. This is a very important speech that has to be written. I spent a couple of hours with
Harry McPherson yesterday afternoon and I had the feeling that maybe Mac could be quite useful during this particular
period.
/2/Reference is to Senator Robert Kennedy.
President: Yes, I think it would be very good. I think what we've got to do, too, is to get out of the posture of just being the
war candidate that McCarthy has put us in and Bobby is putting us in, the kids are putting us in and the papers are putting
us in. Lindsay/3/ is out advocating rebellions this morning and not responding to the draft and things of that kind. The
Mayor urges youth to aid war resistance, and they've got 4-column front-page pictures. Now when the head of the biggest
city goes to doing things of that kind, you've got to really look at the picture. And I think that if we could get your people,
your men like, I don't know who they are over there, I certainly don't want some of the civilians that are giving us trouble,
but if we could get, if we had any young men at all, I think Goodpaster is one we ought to look at, DePuy maybe, sit down
with some of Rusk's people, one or two there, maybe Habib and perhaps Bill Bundy, and see what it is that we could use
with our left hand. Our right hand is going after their jaw with an offense on the war front, but we ought to have a peace
front too simultaneously and use both fists--not just one, not fight with one hand behind us, so that we can say we are the
peace candidate--but we are the true peace candidate. We're not the Chamberlain peace--we're the Churchill peace. We
are not the guy that is going to throw in the towel and let them take Athens. We are the Truman who stands up and finally
saves Greece and Turkey from the Communists. And that, of course, there is a temporary peace, and if we surrendered,
you would have peace until they got their government installed and then by God you'd have a bigger war than ever. Now
we have got to develop that. But in order to do it, we have got to come up with something. Now Goldberg's plan is not
worth a damn, but if we could say that we are going to cut off Hanoi and Haiphong for a period, a specific period, now we
are not going to touch them, and if they will cut off on the DMZ or some other area, where it's real reciprocation, then we'll
respond and something of that type where it's really to our advantage, where the Russells just can't murder us./4/ We
ought to do that. We ought to have some kind of something on peace because they're concluding now that we are getting
in shape and getting into pretty quick with McNamara's peace talks, his "Harvard stuff," and all the stuff they are putting
out--you can see from Nitze's letter/5/--where we are just the Goldwater of '68 and we can't take that.
/3/Mayor John Lindsay of New York City.
/4/Reference is to Senator Richard Russell.
/5/Not further identified.
Clifford: That is right. That is right.
President: We can't take it and hold because people like Daley/6/ and them are not going to hold.
/6/Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago.
Clifford: They won't hold. Really right in there, what it is, we are out to win, but we are not out to win the war--we are out to

win the peace.

President: That is right.
Clifford: And that is what our slogan could very well be--win the peace with honor--and I think we have got to get that
thought over. Now I have been giving consideration to offers of de-escalation. I don't know whether they have anything, but
if we could begin to start a negotiation toward de-escalation, something to the effect that, now if we could have an
agreement with the North Vietnamese, that we would let Hanoi alone if they would let Saigon alone. I don't know that it is
very practical, but considering something of that kind, we can't stop, but if there is some program of a gradual deescalation that the parties could get into, we could then get in a better posture.
President: That is right. I don't think they can do it because their announced thing is to do this job this year and that is why
they are coming out of the woodworks and hitting us as they are--so they are not going to take anything off-limits. But if we
could take something off-limits for a period that didn't really hurt us, and it seems to me that the weather is not too good
anyway, and it seems to me that we could say that we're now going for several days without hitting Hanoi and Haiphong--it
seems we have gone 2 months without it--we ought to say that to the public though. And we go in with a sporadic raid, we
don't get any real benefit out of it but we say now we are going further, but if you want to respond you let us know and we
will go to a Geneva Conference or something. I think you and Rusk ought to try to explore something that we could offer in
that way. My own thought is that we ought to stress this peace thing and we ought to stress the permanence of it--and
anybody can get an umbrella and have a temporary one, but that just means more people get murdered later--but that we
are willing to have a Geneva Conference. We are willing to sit down and pull our troops out of there as soon as the
violence subsides. We're willing to take our treasure and go back and help rebuild it as we did under the Marshall Plan and
kind of add on to my Johns Hopkins speech a little, add on to Manila a little, but we've got to have something new and
fresh that goes in there, along with the statement that we are going to win.
Clifford: Right. But we have to be very careful of what it is we say that we are going to win.
President: That is right.
Clifford: I think we would frighten the people if we just said we are going to win. They would think, "Well, hell, that just
means we are going to keep pouring men in until we win militarily," and that isn't what we are after really.
President: Well, your President does and we don't want to appeal to them too much. We have got to appeal to them some
but we sure as hell don't want to frighten the people. That's the thing that gives you the most support that you've got and I
bet that if you pay a little attention to the 45 percent that want to do more instead of the 5 percent that want to pull out we
will have a different attitude. But I just can't ever get Fulbright, but I can't afford to lose Russell. Now, if I lose him, we've
got nothing. That's what we have got to remember. So we have got to get something that will not hurt our men materially,
like Hanoi and Haiphong for a period, for a month, for two weeks, for something that Buzz Wheeler can tell them we
wouldn't do anyway. Then we've got to make that public. We're not going to get these doves, but we can neutralize the
country to where it won't follow them if we can come up with something.
Clifford: Yes, that's right. I think you put your finger right on it. We have a posture now in which Kennedy and McCarthy are
the peace candidates and President Johnson is the war candidate. Now we must veer away from that and we can do it.
What we need is a policy now that is a consistent far-ranging policy, but which we don't have. I think we need a policy of
the kind that--say a five-step policy, Mr. President, that we will continue to exert the military pressure. That I know we have
to do. We'll never get anything from them if we don't do that. So, as you say, with our right hand we continue to exert the
military pressure, then I think we have to have a well thought-out program that we try with our left hand. Step number one.
Then that might be some kind of mutual de-escalation that really doesn't hurt us. If it isn't successful, we might move to
step number two. Now at some stage in this matter, if nothing else works, then I think we have to keep in mind that before
the [Democratic Party National] Convention, then if not before the Convention, before the election, I think we have to work
out some kind of arrangement where we start some kind of negotiation.
President; Well, you can't do that but one way, you know, and these folks are not wanting to do that. They want to get rid of
us.
Clifford: I know. Yes, that is right. But I still think there is a good chance to do that if it is prepared properly and if we work
up to it in this plan. All I am saying is we don't have such a plan. The major task now is to come up with it and I intend to
give a good part of my time and effort to see if we can't come up with such a plan. But what I think at the moment is, with
this important speech coming, I think it would be a good idea if you felt well of it to call Mac back and say come on down
and help us, Mac, and he offered to do it./7/

/7/The President called Bundy at 9 a.m., immediately following this conversation. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
No record of this conversation has been found.
President: Thank you.

147. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, March 20, 1968, 5:08-7:20 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. Transcribed by Jorden on
February 13, 1970, from Tom Johnson's handwritten notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. McPherson also
took notes of the meeting; his handwritten notes are mistakenly dated March 19. (Ibid., Meeting Notes File)
PRESENT
President, Vice President, Rusk, Clifford, Fortas, M. Bundy, B. Bundy, Bill Jorden, W. Rostow, G. Christian, H. McPherson,
Amb. Goldberg, Tom Johnson
President: I asked all of you here to help me prepare a well thought out, well-balanced statement. Let's explore ways to
strengthen our ways militarily and diplomatically; let's find new ways to strengthen our society and our nation. You are
people of good experience, imagination and initiative. Let's look at every suggestion.
Let's see what we could do we haven't done better.
Let's see how we can improve ourselves.
Let's do what we said we would do at Johns Hopkins./2/ If we are silent and nothing new is said, people really will think we
are stale. Harry has drafted a statement.
/2/Reference is to the President's speech at Johns Hopkins University on April 7, 1965; see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,
vol. II, Document 245.
Economic people believe we must have a tax bill if we are to have a dollar.
10-10-5 billion.
10 billion in taxes
10 billion in appropriation cuts
5 billion in expenditures
We know it is going to be tough. Last year we put in a 10-2 formula. We have a strain on the economy, not just by
Vietnam. We must add on $5 Bill. for Vietnam./3/
/3/Earlier that day the President and his chief economic advisers discussed the costs and impact of the new program for
Vietnam. The total package involved a $10 billion tax bill, a $10 billion reduction in obligations, and a $5 billion reduction in
expenses. At one point during the meeting, Fowler noted: "On the floor, a tax bill is related to the Vietnamese addition. I
see a sharp loss in the Democratic votes. The reason is the same as that given by Church or Proxmire--economically they
don't agree. They must have a national unity package. I would present this as a bipartisan bill to restore confidence in the
dollar." (Notes of the President's Meeting with his Fiscal Advisers, March 20; Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of
Meetings)
This speech ought to have in it for our needs to get:
--military strength

--economic strength
--diplomatic strength
--peace
I want war like I want polio. What you want and what your image is are two different things.
--let's meet emergency needs in strength
--a reasonable offer on peace
I want McGeorge Bundy and Arthur Goldberg and the Vice President and Rusk and Clifford and Fortas and B. Bundy
(what not to do).
Mac and Harry will have . . .
M. Bundy: Let's not worry over draft. Let's go around room.
--what troubles people most
--what can we do
--a lot of easy answers are being peddled on other side of street.
President: Any suggestions?
Rusk: Major peace proposals aren't promising unless there is a cessation of bombing. There are serious political and
military risks to bombing halt. We have been exploring bombing limitations in North, leaving open bombing above the DMZ.
It also would look bad to segments here at home to have bombing halt at same time as calling up reserves.
We are being divided by rejections by Hanoi.
(Rusk read statement he proposed that the President use.)/4/
/4/The statement read: "After consultation with our allies, I have directed that U.S. bombing attacks on North Viet-Nam be
limited to those areas which are directly related to the support of their forces invading South Viet-Nam. No reasonable
person could expect us to fail to provide maximum support to our men in combat. Whether this step I have taken can be a
step toward peace is for Hanoi to determine. We shall watch the situation carefully."
Unless we are prepared to do something on bombing, there is no real proposal for us to make.
We put two ideas to Bunker:
1) San Antonio formula without any indic. from other side
2) limited cessation in northern part of NVN
He was negative on both./5/
/5/See Documents 137 and 145.
You can't couple a reserve callup with a bombing cessation. Let's make a generalized speech without a major move.
Rostow: Criticism (should be Critics) of our position believe we're intent on creating a constitutional and democratic
government by pursuing last VC until he is dead.

They see capacity of VC to hit the cities.

I do not think we can move Thieu to a Greek solution--offer of VC coming into govt.
Part of peace thing:
--Communists have tried to overthrow GVN and ARVN. They failed.
We are seeking one-man, one-vote constitutional system.
We need to turn war to the ballot box.
Rusk: Public opinion has taken element of hope from so many people.
M. Bundy: I think the problem is to have to make a statement when weight of feeling is well, another . . .
--tax issue
--more troops
--more costs ($5 billion)
Is there a way of conveying an impression that we are more willing for peace. Or say "this is about it."
It will get better. Moral of Tet was GVN . . . (sic).
It would be irresponsible to say we could, but we want to.
Clifford: 3-4 important functions:
1) Need reiteration of importance of Vietnam. People are asking themselves that question again.
2) Danger that is inherent if we lose all SEAsia. Those who have the simple, easy solutions are not visible (viable?).
3) Why are we sending more troops.
Sen. Stennis said I am not in favor of sending more troops to VN unless we expand the war.
Stennis said he was against another buildup. Enemy has moved in more troops in northern I Corps.
There are indications that next 3-4 months could be critical period in the war.
1. Support Marine bases
2. Increase our effectiveness
3. Critical period
Must answer charge that this is becoming an American war.
People are very concerned about ARVN sitting back and letting us do the work.
Coupled with needs of military we do have [something] to offer?
We have made reasonable offer to Hanoi.

They have made no effort in that regard.

Offering a program of de-escalation of the war.
We could offer a beginning of gradual de-escalation.
We could . . . stop bombing 75 mi S of Hanoi-Haiphong (20th).
We would stop all bombing N. of 20th if enemy would stop artillery, mortars and rockets in DMZ area.
This would be acceptable trade for the military.
They would get some benefit out of it.
This could be considered reasonable.
Then we will have another.
This takes edge off "war candidate" vs. peace candidate.
Rusk: We would expect them to stop bombing in DMZ./6/
/6/According to a transcript of this meeting, the course of discussion at this point went: "President: Dean, do you want to
make any observations on that? Rusk: I think, that, if you--that would mean that we would expect them to stop shooting in
the vicinity of the DMZ while we continue to bomb heavily in there. I don't see how they can be expected to stop something
and then they would be subject to the most intensive bombing we could lay on them." (Johnson Library, Transcripts of
Meetings in the Cabinet Room)
M. Bundy: Suppose you turn it around.
Say you can't stop bombing without their doing something.
Idea of getting something started is good.
Clifford: Could say Hanoi would withdraw its men from DMZ.
M. Bundy: Aren't you better off if you do this privately?/7/
/7/The meeting's transcript reads as follows: "Rusk: Would you offer them the two northern provinces of South Vietnam?
Clifford: Well, what we would like to do would be, Dean, to make the proposition one that would be reasonable enough so
that there would be some chance I suppose. McGeorge Bundy: Aren't you better off without a definite proposal in the
speech? If you simply say that you're doing this and you've made communications to show why you're doing it you keep
the channel available to them. You look more open than if you offer a trade to which everyone will say it is unreasonable--if
he wants to. Clifford: I'm not sure just the words will do it. McGeorge Bundy: It's unilateral, if you do something, you've
really done something and I've never been a believer that the real pause of the kind that the Times wanted would get us
anywhere and I think it is militarily very dangerous. But I think this speech does need a left hook in it somewhere." (Ibid.)
Clifford: Value of it is psychological.
They are not likely to accept any proposition.
Kennedy and McCarthy aren't coming up with much.
"Let's try something like this."
M. Bundy: That's OK.

Rusk: Whether or not this is a step toward peace is up to Hanoi.

M. Bundy: President is not about to escalate like you say. But what do you lose.
Bombing that far north doesn't do that much good.
President: It brings fury and violence from abroad.
M. Bundy: Risk is that our campaign friends will say we have President running./8/
/8/Bundy's full response is transcribed as: "I think there is risk about it--that we ought to look at (it) which is our
campaigning friends will say, 'Well, that's half a loaf now we've got the President running--if he would only put the other
half on the table then I wouldn't have to run' or whatever they say to that. I don't think that is a very good argument, but I
think we ought to walk around it." (Ibid.)
Goldberg: Our problem is profoundly serious. I am going to talk frankly. I have a different approach. If a peace move is to
be made without hope . . . You have tried to use both hands. It has not been successful in convincing world opinion or
domestic opinion. Peace move must be realistic one. Say I cannot offer you the prospect of anything better. Let's don't go
with a proposition which will not be acceptable. Let's be realistic. Only thing Hanoi wants is suspension of bombing. Where
it will lead nobody knows. Hanoi sees it as a possibility for starting talks. I think we should do that.
M. Bundy: I agree with you on a full suspension.
Goldberg: I thought militarily we could do it.
Cessation doesn't mean . . . Khe Sanh would be unprotected. Reinforcements could continue. No departure from San
Antonio.
To move this way would be a meaningful thing.
You yourself have made this point. Hanoi said they wanted government in South to settle issue.
We could put on agenda
--Hanoi stop aggression against South
--U.S. stop bombing against North./9/
/9/Goldberg made an additional comment here: "What would be the logical subject for talks with Hanoi if the United States
and Hanoi entered into talks? The logical subject would be this. Say to Hanoi that you stop your war against the South.
The United States, you stop your war against the North. I do not believe, I haven't seen what Ellsworth said, that that type
of agenda should disturb the South. It eliminates the air war, the problem of a simple agenda, and it relates to stopping the
war in Hanoi against the South and the South against the North. And that is the subject particularly within the
accomplishment of the United States and Hanoi. We are bearing the brunt of the war against the North. And Hanoi is
carrying the war to the South so that the problems which really--we're not agreeing or promising to discontinue the war in
support of Saigon in the South. There is commitment on that, and no agreement. That may enter into discussions. And if it
does enter into discussions, then, of course, the discussions will have to be enlarged. But I have often wondered at this
stage of the game why it was that Hanoi has so pinpointed the discussions to be the United States and Hanoi--and has not
put up the barriers for those talks or anything of that sort." (Ibid.)
President: Would I combine with talk on reserves?/10/
/10/According to the transcript, several individuals interrupted Goldberg by voicing questions at this point. Goldberg's
response was: "I am asked two questions. Would I combine this proposition together with your talks about reserves and
what about the shelling?" (Ibid.)
Goldberg: I would not combine it with troop speech.

I would make peace proposal or a support of war speech.

I would not combine the two.
In UN Eastern Europeans are fed up with being taxed by this war (Czechs, Poland).
Do know it is costing USSR over $1 billion a year.
They may have their Bill Fulbrights too.
Clifford: If that was fruitless, would that interfere with an all-out effort later on?
Goldberg: It won't be seen in good faith if you couple it with troops.
Rostow: In world opinion, bombing of Hanoi-Haiphong has impact. One Soviet indication, he made distinction between
bombing battlefield and around H-H.
M. Bundy: Restraints have not been made clear.
B. Bundy: They were disclosed on background.
President: We paused 6-1/2 months around H and H.
[Unattributed comment]: Russell said he would support callup only if we take out Haiphong.
President: You won't change Bobby or McCarthy by this.
Goldberg: You have made many approaches.
President: 30 of them.
Clifford: Is it your feeling that the President could make this proposal of stopping the bombing . . .
Goldberg: Doesn't use "permanent".
Clifford: Is it your belief they would talk?
Goldberg: It is my hope. I think talks . . . should talk.
Rusk: Why shouldn't they talk. They get talks and put in men and a sanctuary.
[Unattributed comment]: I never said anything about Laos.
President: You have another Panmunjom.
Goldberg: On Panmunjom, commonly assumed we lost more men when talk started.
Suppose you had continued with no Panmunjom, how many men would we have lost?
We have lost handful of men since Panmunjom. We get more out of this.
President: Wouldn't you remove one of Marines, . . . one of their most protective elements?
Goldberg: I would double sorties around troops. Use more effective sorties in South.

Clifford: As of now, would not have an appreciable effect.

By mid-April weather will improve.
Would mean giving up more then than now.
President: Think bombing keeps lead out of our men's bodies.
Clifford: It is not a clear-cut case. Military thinks it adds to difficulty of NVN getting supplies to South. Airpower is not
proving to be very effective in this war.
M. Bundy: If we lost at Khe Sanh while stopping bombing we would be in a hell of a shape.
Rusk: Moscow cares more about what is happening in NVN than what is happening in South.
President: Bunker says you are trying to crawl. He says let's pour steel to him.
Fortas: 1) Speech should have limited objective
Reasons for callup
Economic impact
No architectural plans for conduct of war and search for peace.
2) This is time when we must be firm and courageous. It is possible to make some bad mistakes of timing. No time for a
major offer. It will be seen as sign of weakness.
3) National concern is a question as to whether SVN affairs are being maturely, competently handled. It is a feeling of
insecurity.
This is due to mixture in carb(uretor?). It is because of our own sensitivity to criticism, our own dislike of bloodshed.
In my opinion--on this speech--Clifford lined up points well to sending more troops. Must be in framework of strength and
resolution.
I can consider it most unfortunate to state offers now. Senators Kennedy and McCarthy will see it as empty gesture. Hanoi
will see it as an admission floundering around in an effort to get a bigger piece of candy.
On that point, problem of a cessation of hostilities . . . we can never handle except on the merits.
Time may come in June or July. Meanwhile, we must be firm in our hearts and in our resolution. We must avoid unilateral
proposals.
I weigh evidence.
Cessation of bombing. I don't see it.
That is a one horse-one rabbit deal. That is wrong time and wrong occasion for that.
Should stress what SVNese are doing.
Can we get SVN General placed on Joint Council.
Our people give SVN little credit for their victories.

Clifford: I feel a great sympathy for that approach.

We must talk about ultimately we will prevail. Conditions were susceptible. That did lead to ultimate victory.
Continued application of strength and power does not show us the road to ultimate success.
[Several unattributed comments]:
That disturbs me.
Mere application of physical force doesn't do it.
You must stop the supply lines.
You can't unless you go with force into Laos. Then Cambodia. Then Haiphong. What about docks harbor at Haiphong.
Doesn't stop. Would make it more difficult, but they could still bring them in.
Clifford: I don't believe any approach to Hanoi at this time will be accepted.
Fortas: Neither do I.
Time and sequence of events is not right. Very little is to be gained from unilateral moves at this moment.
The task is to give this country confidence in the competence of handling this war.
Need feeling of calmness and soundness of military side.
President: How can you give them confidence?
--more troops
--more taxes
--more reserves
Fortas: Let's don't show lack of confidence in our competence. People don't understand.
President: Bill, what is your . . .
B. Bundy: I see alternatives as Goldberg.
Hanoi is not ready to do anything.
Hanoi really doesn't want to talk.
I would defend the record.
We should explore 3rd party efforts.
Let's give SVN front and center and let them build themselves.
Stress somber picture,
I find it somber, indeed.

Enemy has more maneuver bns. than we in I Corps.

M. Bundy: Could you add in language of Thieu notion we are trying to get their proportion of the effort increased.
B. Bundy: [No remarks indicated]
Goldberg: Isn't real issue if we continue our effort with additions with SVN additions, can we do it without erosion of public
support be far more difficult? [sic]
Aren't we in a race for time if we continue as we have? Isn't continuing the effort and increasing it--the economy's involved-wage and price controls may be required. Can we do it?
I don't believe we can.
President: I visit with folks who have worked on this problem.
I will meet with group in coming days.
I agree with what Goldberg started out with. Real question is that we may be misleading them.
Let's separate peace things. Do it right. Take Italian proposal--Clark proposal--Let B. Bundy get all they have got.
Let's work up an agenda on possibilities. See which are worth pursuing.
Harry, you get with the 2 Bundys.
Get two proposals.
Rusk (?) Proposal.
Reasons
1) support our men
2) meet their new troops
3) different strategy
Let's look at this tomorrow.
President: Is there any advantage of having Souvanna Phouma here to discuss danger to his country?
There is nobody but us who will stand up.
British won't.
Theories of our treaties was that we would stop the Hitlers of tomorrow.
If they march, they will be met.
Let's get peace out of it except we're ready to talk.
Situation at moment is very serious one. We must support the men we have there./11/
/11/The President had made two hard-line speeches in the days prior to this meeting. On March 16 he spoke before a

meeting in Washington of the National Alliance of Businessmen. His speech was a rousing call to rally around his Vietnam
policy: "As your President, I want to say this to you today: We must meet our commitments in the world and in Vietnam,"
he proclaimed. "We shall and we are going to win." See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B.
Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 402-405. In remarks to the National Farmers Union Convention in Minneapolis on March 18,
the President stated: "We hope to achieve an honorable peace and a just peace at the negotiating table. But wanting
peace, praying for peace, and desiring peace, as Chamberlain found out, doesn't always give you peace. If the enemy
continues to insist, as he does now--when he refuses to sit down and accept the fair proposition we made, that we would
stop our bombing if he would sit down and talk promptly and productively--if he continues to insist, as he does now, that
the outcome must be determined on the battlefield, then we will win our peace on the battlefield by supporting our men
who are doing that job there now." See ibid., pp. 406-413.

148. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 21, 1968, 1:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, March 19, 1970, Memo to the President,
Decision to Halt the Bombing, 1967, 1968, [I]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only.
Mr. President:
I indicated briefly to you yesterday morning the sequence which I have come to believe we should follow in the months
ahead with respect to Vietnam policy./2/ I am putting it on paper so that you can consider it for what it may be worth.
/2/From 10:15 to 10:44 a.m. on March 20, Rostow and Jorden met with the President to discuss a proposed draft of the
President's speech on Vietnam. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
1. A firm Thieu commitment to an additional 135,000 South Vietnamese plus other Vietnamese action to assume a greater
proportionate responsibility in the war. His speech of today takes us some distance down that road, but of course it will
require follow-up day by day./3/
/3/See The New York Times, March 21, 1968.
2. U.S. military offensive actions. I attach, to refresh your memory, Westy's plan to go on the offensive in I Corps in April./4/
/4/Attached but not printed.
I believe he should be encouraged to move out, if anything, at an accelerated pace. You should be aware that at this
particular time, enemy units seem to be pulling back in a number of places, including Khe Sanh. We do not know what
their intention is:
--to regroup for later attacks?
--to avoid casualties which their forward positions have permitted us to impose upon them?
--to let McCarthy and Bobby Kennedy fight the war for them?
But the fact is there and, for the first time since the Tet offensive began, enemy casualties and ours are falling back toward
the average levels of 1967.
I do not believe we should wait to see what their next move is: I believe Westy should go out and face them. In any case, it
is important that over the next month or so the military news from Vietnam shows that we have the military initiative and
they are not simply hunkered up waiting for another enemy blow.
3. As this new military position becomes more clear to our people, we should then shoot for a major peace offensive
targeted for, say, May 1st. As you know, I believe that Thieu and the South Vietnamese should be the center of it; but we
should play our part and we should bring the Pope, the Roumanians, the Russians, etc., into the game to the maximum.

4. Meanwhile, we should be using the time to develop a strategy for the next year on the assumption that Hanoi will not
respond to the peace offensive of May. In particular, we should consider three strategies:
--a continuation of our strategy of 1966-67; that is, regaining our position in the countryside, extending pacification, and
grinding along on the basis of slowly reducing the VC manpower base in the South, which we are doing at the rate of about
one million per year through movement to the cities, plus refugees from VC areas, plus extended control in the
countryside.
--a so-called population control strategy in which we would keep U.S. as well as Vietnamese forces in a position to give
more regular and steady protection to the South Vietnamese population centers rather than grappling with the North
Vietnamese units at the frontiers. Westy would defend his policy of 1966-67 as a population protection strategy in the face
of North Vietnamese pressures across the frontiers. But it is conceivable that, after very careful analysis with Westy on the
scene, some practical difference could be identified between the policy that he has been following and a policy of so-called
population protection. As you know, I am skeptical of any abstract debate of this proposition until it is tested against actual
force distributions and utilization on the spot in detail.
--a policy of forcing a decision from Hanoi and its allies.
The latter strategy involves adopting one or more of the following three courses of action:
--mining the North Vietnamese harbors and trying to interdict the transport routes from China;
--invading the southern part of North Vietnam and blocking the transport routes from, say, Vinh, to both the Mugia pass
into Laos and the roads to the DMZ; or
--moving into Laos on Route 9 and blocking on the ground the Laos transport routes into South Vietnam just south of the
17th parallel.
In different ways, any one of these three actions could put a very tough set of decisions to Hanoi and to its allies. I happen
to believe that if the South Vietnamese government is on its feet and tolerably effective; we are moving forward militarily in
the south, even if slowly; our terms for a settlement remain modest and legitimate; that neither the Soviet Union nor
Communist China would escalate the war and that we would have a chance of bringing it more quickly to an end. I feel in
my bones that after the Tet offensive, things can never be quite the same, and that a simple return to the 1966-67 strategy
will not wash.
What I am recommending is simply that we carry out the most careful staff work on these alternatives from the present
forward, so that you can make a rational judgment as to which way we go if the May peace offensive envisaged here
should fail.
Walt

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968

Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 149-169

149. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, March 22, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. Top Secret. Drafted by Christian. This luncheon meeting lasted from 2:10
to 5:20 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
Secretary Fowler
Attorney General Clark
Justice Fortas
William Bundy
McGeorge Bundy
Walt Rostow
Harry McPherson
George Christian
The President opened the proceedings with the statement that Senator Hayden was not going to run for re-election. He
said that he was glad that he was not taking on Goldwater and that Hayden was one of the finest and best men he had
ever known. The President also said that he had talked to Governor Rockefeller and told him that the people close to him
had mixed reactions on the Governor's decision. "Those who want me to run were glad you stepped out, and those who do
not want me to run are sorry you are not going to be in the race."
The President referred to Secretary Freeman's confrontation with jeering students at the University of Wisconsin and said
he thought Freeman handled the matter very well.
Justice Fortas said that he had seen Leon Keyserling on television, and it was the meanest thing he had ever seen
directed against Bobby Kennedy.
The President said he feels there has been a dramatic shift in public opinion on the war, that a lot of people are really
ready to surrender without knowing they are following a party line.
Secretary Clifford said he thought Senator Kennedy was too "shrill" this early. He referred to Kennedy's comments holding
the President responsible for all the evils of society. Secretary Clifford said at this stage a moderate appeal would be better
for Kennedy.
The President asked Secretary Clifford to check and see if the National Guard and Reservists who have been called up
are doing anything. He said two of his best backers had told him that their sons did not have anything to do, and intimated
that Pat Nugent had told him the same thing. He suggested that Secretary Clifford might get Rivers to take somebody and
make a study of manpower in the services. He said he went through this during the Kennedy call-ups and hated to see it
happening again.
The group then began work on Harry McPherson's draft of a speech incorporating suggestions from McGeorge Bundy, Bill
Bundy and Walt Rostow.
Secretary Fowler said the speech did not have a "sense of crisis" on inflation. Fowler also contended that we continue to
play to people who are against the tax and budget cutting program. "If we pass this program, it will be the 268 conservative
votes. The liberals don't have the guts to vote for a tax bill. They don't want either taxes or a cut."
During the discussions on the speech, the President and Secretary Rusk left the room to talk on the telephone to Sergeant
Shriver in Madrid. During their absence, McGeorge Bundy said that extreme care had to be taken in the President's
statements. That a speech like the one last Saturday will cost the President the election. Secretary Clifford agreed, saying
that the President's Saturday speech to the National Alliance of Businessmen had caused concern among thoughtful

people because the President seemed to be saying that he was going to win the war no matter what the cost in American
lives./2/
/2/See footnote 11, Document 147.
When the President and Secretary Rusk returned, Secretary Clifford advised that Joe Fowler take the economic part of the
speech and he would take the call-up part and they would try to make these sections stronger and more palatable. He
wanted to tie in the American call-up with the additional Vietnamese soldiers.
The President suggested that his advisers should get together on their thinking. He said he felt that Congress was going to
interpret the speech as pressure on the tax payers and that others would say it was a speech for the campaign year if he
made the address before a Joint Session. He said he thought he should make the statement from his office on television,
talking about taxes, troops and reserves, negotiations and peace.
The President said it had been his feeling that when the weather is bad we should take advantage of possibilities for
changes in bombing. He said we might provide a circle around Hanoi and Haiphong again and wait two weeks on possible
developments.
Secretary Clifford said the major concern of the people is that they do not see victory ahead. He said the military has not
come up with a plan for victory. He thought the people were discouraged as more men go in and are chewed up in a
bottomless pit. Since the men Westmoreland wants won't get there until summer they really aren't going to be any use to
him in the emergency. Secretary Clifford suggested that possibly we should call up the reserves but not commit any troops
other than those we had promised Westmoreland. He said we could be training now and make the decision later. He said
he thought support troops only should be sent.
Secretary Clifford suggested that the President have General Wheeler meet General Westmoreland at Manila and discuss
it with him.
The President asked for opinions on how to proceed on more peace moves. Secretary Clifford suggested that deescalation be started by a limited cessation of bombing above the 20th parallel, with reciprocal action by the enemy by
stopping shelling from the DMZ or just north of the DMZ.
Secretary Rusk said this would be alright if there were no hard conditions on the enemy. He did not believe Hanoi would
reciprocate.
Bill Bundy said that in Bunker's judgment this would cause major difficulties in Saigon. He said he would be skeptical of the
idea but had no alternative.
Walt Rostow said Hanoi would know full well that we were taking advantage of the bad weather. He said it might have
some effect on doves and some effect in Europe, but would not succeed and would cause them problems. Secretary Rusk
said a critical time for a peace offensive is later after the winter fighting has subsided. He said that if we do this and the
enemy hit Saigon, we would have to be prepared to hit Hanoi very hard in retaliation.
Secretary Fowler said he did not think the speech needed to commit us to measured escalation.
Justice Fortas said the decision would be criticized as too little, too late and insincere. He said the speech lacks an
essential ingredient in that it does not explain why we are in Vietnam.
If we do not talk in terms of Communism, it is like a production of Hamlet without the prince. He said he would emphasize
the invasion of Laos by the North Vietnamese and the brutal murders of the civilians during the Tet truce. He said he did
not believe the people would give the President the support we need in the speech's present form.
Mac Bundy said he thought Secretary Clifford's proposal would have a short life diplomatically, but he was not against it.
He agreed with Rostow that if you wanted to do more later, it is smarter to do less now.
Justice Fortas suggested that we might get somebody else to sponsor the peace plan like the Pope or U Thant because it
is going to fail. Both Bill and McGeorge Bundy thought this was going to be a good idea.
George Christian

150. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell/1/
Washington, March 22, 1968, 4:49 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and
Russell, March 22, 1968, 4:49 p.m., Tape F6803.02, PNO 8. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared
specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
Russell: Hello?
President: Dick, I was giving some thought to some decisions here and I wanted to see if you thought they were all right.
Russell: Yes sir, Mr. President.
President: I understand--I think I talked to you about it, but I wasn't sure, I have had so much on my mind. McNamara on
the 18th of January recommended to me and said we should decide it in February--the continuance of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs. He recommended and Clifford recommends that I continue Wheeler for a year, or at least until my term
expires in January. What would be your reaction to that?
Russell: I think that is all right, Mr. President.
President: They tell me I'll have to have legislation.
Russell: Is that right?
President: Mmm-hmm.
Russell: Well, I wasn't sure of that. I think we can get it passed. I don't know. I don't know any reason why we shouldn't.
How long do you want it for?
President: Just a year.
Russell: Uh-huh, yes sir. I don't think there would be any trouble about that.
President: Now the next thing is-Russell: When does his term expire?
President: July. They wanted it announced in February. I haven't done it because they were trying to remove
Westmoreland and they were making an attack on him and they were hitting Abrams and the Commies were given a big
ride and I had intended to move Westmoreland out and Abrams in. Some of them had suggested I go down and get some
new fresh man--that was kind of the dovish group. But Wheeler thinks very strongly, as does Clifford--he is not very
experienced and his judgment is not as good as yours--as does McNamara, that Abrams would be the better man to
replace Westmoreland.
Russell: Well, I think so too.
President: That would be their recommendation.
Russell: Yes sir. I think he's the best man I can think of at the moment. I don't know a better man in the Army.
President: They said there would be two or three they would consider, but they would put him first call. Buzz does--he said
he would consider Abrams, he would consider Palmer, he would consider Goodpaster. Goodpaster has had a heart attack,
but we are thinking of making him Vice Chief to Westmoreland.

Russell: Well, I don't think I'd pull Abrams out of there without giving him a whack at it if I was going to bring Westmoreland
in.
President: Well, that is what I think we would do. The way it would go--would go--Wheeler would be continued for a year.
Westmoreland would come out. He would replace [General Harold] Johnson whose term expires and who wants to retire.
Goodpaster would step up to Vice Chief and we would have a new man for Honolulu, but the services would nominate him
and he wants to retire, and his term is up in April. But we thought we-Russell: Sharp?
President: Yes. His term is up in April and he wants to retire. He's got some business thing he wants to go with. We
thought we would try to ask him to stay on until this took place in July, if he would, and we would put either Ryan of the Air
Force or Admiral Clarey of the Navy./2/ They would be the service nominees for the post at Honolulu. We won't have to
decide that and that is the Secretary's decision, but I just wanted you to know our thinking.
/2/Pacific Air Force Commander General John D. Ryan and Admiral Bernard A. Clarey.
Russell: All right, sir. I appreciate it.
President: Do you think there would be any reaction that I was demoting Westmoreland and that he'd been a failure?
George Christian says he thinks there would; Abe Fortas said he doesn't think much, but Buzz says-Russell: There would be some among people that don't like Westmoreland undoubtedly, Mr. President.
President: Buzz thinks that it is such an honorary job to be Chief of Staff and Eisenhower and [former General of the Army
John] Pershing and all of them had it, and that it wouldn't bear much weight.
Russell: Nobody in the services would think so. There's a lot of people who don't think anything about it. If Steve Young
were to make a speech, well they would say they must have been right about it. But you are not going to please all of them
anyhow. I don't see anything wrong with it. It's a great distinction. I would think that Westmoreland would be glad to get out
and get to be a Chief of Staff.
President: He wants to very much. He thinks he has been there longer than he wanted to stay. His wife does and Buzz
thinks it is time.
Russell: Well, I don't see how anybody could be critical of that unless they just wanted to be anyhow.
President: Now Bobby [Kennedy] is storming these states and those governors and switching them and switching the
bosses all over the country and a pretty blitz ruthless operation and says if you don't do this I will defeat you and he is
doing it with the candidates for the Senate and things of that kind. Ribicoff kind of backed away from an endorsement
yesterday.
Russell: I was amazed. I saw it on television.
President: Well, they started this riot business two years ago on television saying if they didn't do something they were
going to take the cities and they were encouraging it and Bobby has been hiring Martin Luther King and raising money for
him for two years. We have been watching it. They are doing that a good deal. They are going to beat hell out of us in
Wisconsin, as you could imagine, from the type of votes you have there. They do the same thing in California.
Russell: Well, I am not as sure about California. I don't know anything about Wisconsin.
President: You know the LaFollettes, don't you?
Russell: Yes sir.
President: Well, it's still there. Pretty deep, they tell me--the boys we have had there. They're against any war--like Henry
Reuss, Gaylord Nelson, and stuff like that.

Russell: Well, Nelson has been mighty tender-footed here lately. He has quieted down a lot after he got to running.
President: Well, there's been a great shift of sentiment, unless I am misinformed from what I see in the wires and letters.
Just nearly everybody since he got in and started speaking to these student groups around the country just think we
played hell and that we ought to get out right quick. It is the worst thing I've ever seen.
Russell: Well, I don't think everybody does by a whole lot.
President: No, but I think there has been a good shift of sentiment is what I am saying.
Russell: Oh.
President: I think since the Tet offensive, then followed by McCarthy's New Hampshire victory, then followed by Bobby's
play, and then followed by their 18 speeches up there and our general re-survey trying to determine what to do and all the
leaks./3/ [Two lines excised from the tape by the Johnson Library under the donor's deed of gift.]
/3/Reference is to the 18 Congressmen who signed the March 4 statement calling for greater efforts by the administration
to secure negotiations.
Russell: Well, some of them, that little coterie that McNamara had in there.
President: Yes, they are.
Russell: They are a big minority.
President: Among the civilians though. The leading civilians that he had are practically--practically all want us to surrender.
Russell: There is no doubt about that. But there aren't more than 12 or 15 of them.
President: That is right. But they are running it.
Russell: Yes, that's right.
President: You take Nitze. Refused to testify on the MAP bill on the military assistance. Just said he didn't believe in the
policy. Did not think we ought to be in Vietnam. Just wouldn't do it. Just insubordinate. Wrote me a letter./4/
/4/The Senate Foreign Relations Committee at first had requested that Clifford testify on Vietnam, but he demurred due to
his short time in office. According to his autobiography, Nitze refused to testify in Clifford's place because he disagreed
with the Task Force's recommendations, and he even offered to resign instead of appearing before the Committee. Nitze
believed that his refusal was responsible for his exclusion thereafter from the remaining Tuesday Luncheons with the
President. See Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision, A Memoir (New York: Grove
Weidenfeld, 1989), pp. 277-279.
Russell: Well, I would have got him out of there the next day.
President: Well, I would, but Clifford said he just can't do it so quickly by himself. Enthoven is very much the same way.
Steadman is the same way. He doesn't really know about his Service Secretaries, but Warnke is the same way.
Russell: Well, Clifford ought to know some good men he could bring in there.
President: Well, there are, but it is a question of just how fast you disrupt them until he can kind of get his feet on the
ground and know who is who and what Department they are running. Do you have pretty good confidence in Ignatius and
in Resor and in Brown?
Russell: Well, I think those three are all right.
President: You think they would be loyal?

Russell: Yes, I do.

President: Do you think I ought to do any specific thing that you can think of in the Bobby picture that I'm not doing?
Russell: No sir, I don't know of anything. I don't think he is as bad as you apparently think it looks. He started up a big
hoorah. But you can go to a place like the University of Alabama or the University of Kansas where you've got six or eight
hundred people in the crowd [and] you can make it sound like the whole thing has gone crazy. But when a girl gets up and
apologizes like that girl did to Freeman up there and the crowd gives her a standing ovation, now nobody arranged that.
That is more a determination of how a crowd feels--all the heckling and booing that were posted over the building.
President: Thank you so much. When are you coming back?
Russell: I am coming back tomorrow.
President: I want to talk to you. As soon as you get in, I want you to rest a little bit and then come over here and have
dinner or something because I've to talk to you about these troops.
Russell: All right, sir. I will get in sometime tomorrow about noon.
President: Thank you. You try to have dinner with me sometime tomorrow evening.
Russell: I'll try to do that./5/
/5/The President did not dine with Russell the next day. He did receive a telephone call from Russell at 8:41 p.m. on March
24. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of the conversation has been found.

151. Editorial Note

In telegram WH 80711 to General Westmoreland, March 23, 1968, President Johnson informed him that he would be
relieved as the Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam and reassigned as Army Chief of Staff. The
President's message read:
"General William C. Westmoreland--Your appointment as Army Chief of Staff gives me great personal pleasure. I have
never had higher regard or greater respect for any military colleague. It will be a source of uncommon strength to have you
close beside me as we continue to press the struggle for peace and freedom in Vietnam. The prospect for success is so
much brighter because of all your leadership has achieved. In a period of rapid expansion of American forces, you have
lifted the quality of combat effectiveness and marshalled a unique system of logistics support. Our South Vietnamese and
Free World allies have shared in the benefits of your great abilities. For four years, you have thwarted the savage efforts of
aggression to cut a nation in half. You have carried the fight to the enemy, routing his forces at every turn and raising the
cost of his ambitions. For all these reasons, this nation will be proud to welcome you home as the hero you are. I will be
first in line to shake your hand and welcome you to new responsibilities. Lyndon Baines Johnson." (Johnson Library,
National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs LL-ZZ and a-k)
In a March 23 letter to Westmoreland, the President wrote: "I wish to give you directly the background to your appointment
as Chief of Staff of the Army. On January 19 this year Bob McNamara recommended to me that you be elevated to this
post. He felt, quite simply, that you were the best man to lead the Army and that, after your protracted period in field
command, you deserved a tour in Washington where you were at least equally needed. I did not wish to make the decision
until Clark Clifford was in his post and had a chance to make an independent assessment. Clark came to me with an
equally firm recommendation that you take command of the Army. I cannot find language strong enough to express the
confidence we feel in you; our gratitude for the unique service you have rendered your nation and the cause of freedom in
Vietnam; and our satisfaction that you will be joining the team in Washington, where you will be my strong right arm." (Ibid.,
William C. Westmoreland Papers, #30 History File, 1-31 Mar 68, [II]) That morning, the President discussed
Westmoreland's departure with JCS Chairman General Wheeler. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of
Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Wheeler, March 23, 1968, 10:01 a.m., Tape F6803.02, PNO 12)
In a reply transmitted in telegram MAC 4091 to the President, March 25, Westmoreland wrote: "Your message of 23 March
is deeply appreciated as is the nomination to serve you as army chief of staff. While confessing a soldier's reluctance to
leave the battlefield before the battle is over, I look forward to the challenges and responsibilities of this new assignment.

With highest respect, W. C. Westmoreland." (Ibid., National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 4,
Tabs LL-ZZ and a-k) In a March 27 letter to Westmoreland, former Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge
wrote: "To me your accomplishments are tremendous. The building of the huge base in Viet-Nam, the deployment of so
many U.S. troops and the good relations with the Vietnamese are solid achievements which have laid the foundations for
the success which will surely come if we are steadfast. They are unique accomplishments in the career of one man. What
you have wrought in a few years most men do not achieve in a lifetime. But to us, there is something more which tells us
not about your accomplishments, but about your behavior--about the kind of a man you are. I refer to your never-failing
courage and willingness to sacrifice yourself, your high sense of honor, your consideration of others, and your refusal ever
to stoop to the scheming so common today. I think also of your constancy in spite of prolonged and innumerable strains
and harassments. All these qualities of yours show true greatness of soul and explain why you have so many friends who
feel themselves so closely bound to you." (Ibid., William C. Westmoreland Papers, #30 History File, 1-31 Mar 68, [II])
Clifford also sent Westmoreland a congratulatory letter on March 29. (Ibid.)

152. Memorandum From the President's Counsel (McPherson) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, March 23, 1968, 12:20 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 6 G (2), 2/68-3/68, Talks with Hanoi. No
classification marking. A handwritten note on the memorandum by the President reads: "Walt--For Rostow, Rusk, Clifford,
comments at once."
For the President
I wonder whether some kind of sequence like this might be useful:
1. North Vietnam tells the Swiss they are seriously prepared to take part in negotiations after the unconditional halt of the
bombing.
2. You announce that you have instructed our air forces to halt the bombing north of the 20th parallel,
--and that you have sent representatives to Geneva and Rangoon to await the North Vietnamese.
3. They say that isn't enough; we've got to stop it altogether.
4. We say, we cannot stop it altogether so long as men and supplies are pouring down the Ho Chi Minh trail.
We show photographs of this and other evidence of the invasion over the past two months.
5. We say, "We'd like to stop the bombing altogether. If you will not mount an attack on our bases or on the cities in I
Corps, or upon Saigon, and if you will stop the shelling of South Vietnam from the DMZ and positions north of the DMZ, we
will stop it altogether during the period in which you refrain from such attacks. And we will send our man to Geneva or
Rangoon."
6. They say that's insulting; we must stop our bombing and all other acts of war, etc.
7. We say we regret they have responded in the same old way--"You disarm, while we pistol-whip you."
Purpose of the exercise: to show the American people that we are willing to do every reasonable thing to bring about talks.
Each step must be in the open--not reported after the fact. We are genuinely seeking peace, and we made several offers
and counter-offers.
Harry

153. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/

Washington, March 25, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs LL-ZZ and a-k.
Top Secret. In an attached covering note to the President transmitting Rusk's memorandum and attachments, March 25,
2:25 p.m., Rostow wrote: "As you can see, Sec. Rusk was already rolling when Harry McPherson's suggestion arrived. I
had earlier this morning transmitted your desire for a positive proposal. As background to this proposal, you should be
aware that the enemy forces are maneuvering into position for simultaneous attacks in the western highlands, Hue, Quang
Tri, as well as Khe Sanh. Moreover there is very heavy movement of men and materiel on the infiltration trails. If the offer
came before they had launched their attacks, you would, in effect, be giving them a chance to draw back. If, as we
suspect, they do not draw back, we would be in a position to fight the unfought battle against the major North Vietnamese
units, flat out. The next natural moment for initiative would come, as I have suggested, in May." The notation "ps" on the
covering memorandum indicates that the President saw it and the attachments.
My own mind is running very close to that of Harry McPherson about a possible peace move. The attached papers contain
the essence of the suggestion I wanted to discuss with the "wise men." In detail, I have the following observations on
Harry's very interesting suggestion:/2/
/2/See Document 152.
1. Rather than our sending representatives to Geneva and Rangoon, I would prefer putting the monkey on the back of the
two co-chairmen to get in touch with both sides to see what is possible.
2. A simple condition for stopping the bombing all together might be the withdrawal back into North Viet-Nam of all North
Vietnamese forces in the two northernmost provinces of South Viet-Nam and the demilitarization of the DMZ.
3. Otherwise, the McPherson suggestion is a very constructive one. It would require careful coordination with Bunker who
would need to get the South Vietnamese on board.
Dean Rusk/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Attachment
COMMENTS ON THE ATTACHED DRAFT/4/
/4/The attached statement, drafted by Rusk on March 25, reads: "After consultation with our allies, I have directed that U.S.
bombing attacks on North Viet-Nam be limited to those areas which are directly related to the support of their forces
invading South Viet-Nam. No reasonable person could expect us to fail to provide maximum support to our men in combat.
Whether this step I have taken can be a step toward peace is for Hanoi to determine. We shall watch the situation
carefully."
1. For the next month or so the weather in the Hanoi-Haiphong area would mean that the proposal would not make a major
difference from a military point of view.
2. Full bombing would be resumed if there were a major attack on Khe Sanh or a second round of attacks on the cities.
3. We would not send Ambassadors rushing all over the world to convert the bombing action into negotiations but would
simply sit back and wait for Hanoi to respond.
4. We should notify Prime Minister Wilson in advance in order that he can test the Soviet Union about the convening of the
two Co-Chairmen (and perhaps the three members of the ICC) to be available to talk to any interested parties about the
possibilities of a peaceful settlement.
5. It would shift away from theological debates about words and put the problem on the de facto level of action. If Hanoi

took no corresponding military action, the bombing would be resumed.

6. It would be very important for us not to embroider the statement with all sorts of "conditions" or "assumptions." Just take
the action and see whether anybody is able to make anything out of it.
7. The "areas which are integrally related to the battlefield" would presumably be at least as far north as Vinh. Bombing
below that area should be intensive and without wraps.

154. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 25, 1968, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, March 19, 1970, Memo to the President,
Decision to Halt the Bombing, 1967, 1968 [I]. Secret.
Mr. President:
You may wish to give some time today to consider the key questions you may well put to the Advisory Group tomorrow
morning./2/
/2/See Document 156.
Here are my tentative suggestions; although I shall file a second memo tomorrow morning in the light of this evening's
discussions./3/
/3/Not found; presumably the conclusion reached at the "Wise Men" group's meeting later that night made additional
questions extraneous. See Document 155. Rostow presented the State and Defense Department plans for structuring the
briefing of the "Wise Men" in a briefing book for the President, March 25. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC
History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 7, Meeting Notes)
I have tried to keep the questions as close to those of November 2/4/ as possible so that you will be able to gauge the
change of view between then and now; although, of course, new issues have arisen--notably, additional troops; and the
timing of our actions with respect to the ending of the winter-spring offensive (say, May 15).
/4/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Document 377.
Question 1. Should we send more troops to South Vietnam? Do you suggest any change of military strategy or tactics in
South Vietnam?
Question 2. With respect to the North, should we: Continue what we are doing? Mine the ports and plan to take down the
dikes when the water is high? Unilaterally reduce or eliminate bombing of North Vietnam?
Question 3. In the light of our experiences with negotiating probes over the past year, should we:
--remain passive, awaiting a signal from Hanoi?
--initiate negotiations?
--if so, what formula of initiation do you recommend?
--when should we take the initiative?
Question 4. Taking into account all that you know, do you believe we should, in one way or another, get out of Vietnam
and leave it to the Communists?

Question 5. If you believe we should stay the course in Vietnam, what measures would you suggest to rally and unite our
own people behind the effort in Vietnam?
W.W. Rostow/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

155. Editorial Note

On March 25, 1968, members of the group informally known as the "Wise Men" assembled at the Department of State for
a series of presentations on Vietnam. The following senior U.S. statesmen made up this body: former Secretary of State
Dean Acheson, the President's former Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, former Secretary of
the Treasury Douglas Dillon, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, Representative to the United Nations
Arthur Goldberg, former Under Secretary of State George Ball, retired Generals Matthew Ridgway and Omar Bradley,
Special Consultant to the President Maxwell Taylor, Justice Abe Fortas, former Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs Robert Murphy, Ambassador at Large Henry Cabot Lodge, former High Commissioner of Germany John McCloy,
and Arthur Dean, who had been involved in the Korean war peace negotiations.
The group dined at 7:30 p.m. with Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense Clifford, Ambassador at Large Harriman,
General John P. McConnell, Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, Under Secretary of State Nicholas
Katzenbach, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
William Bundy, and Special Assistant Walt Rostow. Over dinner, the Wise Men listened to Clifford's discussion of the
overall situation in Vietnam. Clifford outlined the three choices that the United States faced: an expansion of the war effort,
"muddling along" by continuing the current policy, or reducing the U.S. role by cutting back the bombing and curtailing
ground operations. Following dinner, the Wise Men went to the Operations Center, where they received three formal
briefings. (Johnson Library, Dean Rusk Appointment Books, 1968) A schedule for the Wise Men meetings is in the Library
of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Vietnam War--Courses of Action--Post Paris Talks, 1967-1968.
The first briefing was by Major General William DePuy, Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs for Counterinsurgency and
Special Activities, who described the post-Tet military outlook in encouraging terms but was assailed by Goldberg in the
following exchange, as later recalled by Clifford: "What, Goldberg asked, was the normal ratio of wounded to killed? A
three-to-one ratio among the Vietnamese would be a conservative estimate, DePuy answered. How many 'effectives'-regular soldiers--do you think they now have, Goldberg asked. Perhaps 230,000, maybe 240,000, said DePuy. Well, said
Goldberg, with 80,000 killed and a wounded ratio of three to one, that makes about 320,000 men killed or wounded. 'Who
the hell is there left for us to be fighting?' he asked." See Clifford, Counsel to the President, page 513.
The next briefer was less hopeful. George Carver, top adviser to Richard Helms on Vietnamese affairs, discussed
pacification and enemy strength, noting that the problems facing the civil side of the war effort would prove more difficult
than expected to overcome. The most pessimistic assessment came from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs Philip Habib. He portrayed the political situation in South Vietnam as extremely dire and military
victory as unachievable; he advocated negotiations preceded by a bombing halt.
By the time the meeting ended at 11 p.m., the majority of the Wise Men favored de-escalation of U.S. involvement in
Vietnam. No record of the meeting has been found, but it is described in detail in The Pentagon Papers: The Senator
Gravel Edition, pages 591-593; see also George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern (New York: Norton, 1982), pages
407-409; Walter Issacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), page 700; Herbet Y.
Schandler, Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam: The Unmaking of a President (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977),
pages 259-261; Maxwell Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: Norton, 1972), page 390; Larry Berman, Lyndon
Johnson's War (New York: Norton, 1989), pages 194-195; Douglas Brinkley, Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years, 19531971 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), page. 260; and Lloyd C. Gardner, Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson
and the Wars for Vietnam (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995), pages 451-453.

156. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, March 26, 1968, 10:30 a.m.-12:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the family dining

room of the White House. Tom Johnson joined the meeting at 10:45 a.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH
GENERAL EARLE WHEELER, JCS
AND
GENERAL CREIGHTON ABRAMS
General Wheeler: General Westmoreland told me today that with the forces he now has available he does not fear a
general defeat. However, the lack of adequate reserves could permit the enemy a tactical victory.
General Westmoreland says the enemy has the capability to reinforce over the next two months with two divisions.
The President: What does our intelligence, our best intelligence, tell us about the number of men the enemy has put into
the South?
General Wheeler: In the period from late December to late January, they moved in 30 battalions of North Vietnamese or
about 18,000 new combat troops not including support. The total with support would be about 30,000 to 35,000 not
including fillers.
The President: What would the complete total be including fillers?
General Wheeler: 50,000.
The President: Are they still moving in fast?
General Wheeler: There are 16 radio terminals coming down toward the DMZ. The best intelligence estimates these as
fillers, not troop units. One group is 600 strong--it could be a battalion or replacement group. The enemy needs
replacement because the casualties have been high.
The President: I believe that General Westmoreland asked for troops because:
(1) He doesn't have what he needs
(2) Substantial infiltration
(3) Continued infiltration from the north
General Abrams: It is clear to me that replacements are coming in for 70,000 lost since Tet began. There will be a total of
20 groups of men with 7,000 to 9,000 per group. The men in charge have reported how many there are in a group and
what types of men. In one message, they asked how to get uniforms for the civilians.
We have run into men for NVA who had no training per se except in the march down.
The President: Howard Tuckner of NBC says they have 250,000 troops in reserve. What are the facts?
General Abrams then showed the President a picture of two captured Viet Cong. One was 12 years old; the other was 14
years old. One carried a U.S. carbine and one carried an AK-47.
General Abrams: In the Viet Cong units, they are putting NVA replacements.
The President: What are the best figures we have on infiltrators from the North--civilian or military?
General Abrams: 60,000. We got two brigades--10,500 men total.
General Wheeler: The enemy has 200,000 men in the north to protect against amphibious attack. He also has anti-aircraft
and rocket units. His reserves are not unlimited.

General Westmoreland thinks they can put two divisions (25,000 men) in for reinforcements. It could give the enemy a
tactical victory.
He doesn't think it will be Khesanh. It will be Hue or Quang Tri or in the Central Highlands.
The President: Has Khesanh been busted up, or just used as a ploy?
General Wheeler: He got clobbered with air and artillery. He is now going after Hue and Saigon.
The President: Are we vulnerable at Hue?
General Wheeler: No.
General Abrams: No, absolutely not.
General Wheeler: General Abrams was in the Hue area.
General Abrams: We have planned on going out to Khesanh--to bring trucks in April and conduct operations around there.
April is a good time. There is more flyable weather.
Whether you hang on to Khesanh is a matter of flexibility. We don't have to have Khesanh as a price of geography.
The President: Except for our vetoing certain targets, how do we run the war out of here?
General Wheeler: Not at all. He's run in the field.
The President: Didn't we tell General Westmoreland we would let him do what he wants to do and we would support him?
General Wheeler: Yes.
General Abrams: Westy feels that way.
General Wheeler: General Westmoreland is there in South Vietnam. He has complete authority. He can't go across the
DMZ. There are limits on Laos and Cambodia.
The President: Whose strategy is used?
General Wheeler: It is completely from Westmoreland.
The President: Do we handicap him?
General Wheeler: No.
The President: I want you to have the flexibility you need, General Abrams. I told Westy if you want to see it through, you
move.
General Abrams: Westy decided to stay in Khesanh himself.
General Wheeler: He can move in or out.
The President: Did you (JCS) review this?
General Wheeler: Yes.
The President: With the exception of a few bombing targets, General Wheeler, General Westmoreland, Secretary
McNamara, Secretary Clifford and State are in general agreement about the conduct of the war?

General Wheeler: Yes. The ARVN are doing well, Westy said.
The President: I want you to meet with that group today. Stress that you have worked with the South Vietnamese closely.
Tell them, in candor, we want to talk to you about the South Vietnamese.
(The general impression was depressed, and the low morale in the briefing last night by the CIA.)/2/
/2/See Document 155.
Give them the factual, cold honest picture as you see it. We don't want an inspirational talk or a gloom talk. Nitze won't
even testify./3/ It is the civilians that are cutting our guts out.
/3/See footnote 4, Document 150.
The President: We weren't caught asleep during Tet. They lost 50,000. They are trying their damnedest to recover.
Give them your plan, hope and belief.
Carter and DePuy weren't up to par last night. I want both of you at lunch. I want General Abrams to give us the whole
picture--pros and cons.
The bitterness has built up here. We hope we aren't attacked while this is going on.
General Ridgway said the strategic reserves are down to nothing. He said he thinks we have more commitments than we
can handle.
Secretary Rusk: If we can't see some reasonable date, this country can't support a bottomless pit.
General Wheeler: The ARVN is doing well. The morale is good.
The President: Stress that, General Abrams.
General Wheeler: I asked General Abrams about no reporting of ARVN activities.
The President: Say you found C+ or B- or whatever you think should be said. Make a minimum effort to get SVN to do
what they can.
General Wheeler: Westy said he understands the situation in the U.S. He wants the Program Five forces to include three
tactical fighter squadrons. He would like to have the forces he now has in the country--the 27th RLT and the 82nd
Airborne. I told him we must replace the 27th RLT by an army unit because of the Marines training needs.
He will now move the 101st Airborne to the South-Central highlands for flexibility of action. He wants 13,500 support
troops, or might have to cancel the civilianization progress. Westy said he could make progress with the forces he has.
He said he should have a ready element in Hawaii in case something goes wrong. If he gets nothing, it will reduce his
flexibility to meet the enemy activity and would require certainly some military achievements. He said he did not want to
preempt the views of his successor. General Abrams and I have discussed the situation rather extensively. He has been
on the ground eleven months.
The President: Our fiscal situation is abominable. We have a deficit running over 20. We are not getting the tax bill. The
deficit could be over 30. If it does, the interest rate will raise. The British pound may fall. The Canadian pound [sic] may fall.
The dollar will be in danger. Unless we get a tax bill it will be unthinkable.
They say to get $10 in taxes we must get $10 in reductions of appropriations. We have to take one half from non-Vietnam
defense expenditures. That will cause hell with Russell. If we don't do that we will have hell. What happens when you cut
poverty, housing and education?

This is complicated by the fact it is an election year. I don't give a damn about the election. I will be happy just to keep
doing what is right and lose the election.
There has been a panic in the last three weeks. It was caused by Ted Kennedy's report on corruption and the ARVN and
the GVN being no good. And now a release that Westmoreland wants 206,000 men, and a call-up of 400,000. That would
cost $15 billion. That would hurt the dollar and gold.
The leaks to the New York Times hurt us. The country is demoralized. You must know about it. It's tough you can't have
communications. A worker writes a paper for Clifford group and it's all over Georgetown. The people are trying to save us
from ourselves. You must bear this in mind.
Bobby advocated: (1) Rusk resigning. (2) Placing the war in the hands of a Commission. I said no./4/
/4/See Document 123.
I will have overwhelming disapproval in the polls and elections. I will go down the drain. I don't want the whole alliance and
military pulled in with it.
Ambassador Goldberg wants us not to bomb North Vietnam for three weeks. Secretary Clifford has a plan to stop above
the 20th parallel, and his infiltration. We must have something.
I wouldn't be surprised if they repealed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Senator Russell wants us to go in and take out
Haiphong. Senator McCarthy and Senator Kennedy and the left wing have informers in the departments. The Times and
the Post are all against us. Most of the press is against us.
How can we get this job done? We need more money in an election year, more taxes in an election year, more troops in
an election year and more cuts in an election year.
As yet I cannot tell them what they expect to get in return. We have no support for the war. This is caused by the 206,000
troop request, leaks, Ted Kennedy and Bobby Kennedy.
I would give Westmoreland 206,000 men if he said he needed them and if we could get them.
General Wheeler: They will settle for the 13,500 plus the Air Force squadrons.
The President: The reports are depressing about the Reserves.
General Wheeler: A squadron of A-1s is going into Laos at the end of this month or early next month.
The President: Is there anything we should be doing that we aren't doing?
General Wheeler: Our basic strategy is sound. We can't fight a war on the defensive and win. Westmoreland has tried to
go on the tactical offense. In certain places he must defend--such as Cam Ranh Bay. Within our strategy there are tactical
variations.
General Abrams: I don't feel we need to change strategy. We need to be more flexible tactically inside South Vietnam.
Khesanh is an example. Khesanh hasn't turned out too bad. We have had 5,000 men and irregulars there, and 20,000
loads of bombs on their two divisions. Their losses have been tremendous.
It looked as though they were going to attack on the 23rd. We put B-52s and Tactical Air in. They did start shelling (1100
rounds). The battalions had trouble getting to jump-off places. Another never came. Khesanh hasn't turned out to be a bad
thing for us.
He has one division left--shifted one division. We think he has been persuaded not to attack Khesanh. He has lost
munitions and fuel.
Now we will open the road to relocate Khesanh so we can support it better and bring more power to bear.

I think three tactical fighter squadrons should go under Program 5.

The brigade of 82nd or equivalent should stay.
The President: Has there been any bitching from the men?
General Abrams: No. I saw a Negro First Sergeant in the 82nd Brigade. He has been back a year. He told me he had been
in Vietnam 18 months. He had been in the 1st Cavalry Division. Had been a Platoon leader. He has a wife and kids. He
was asked, what do you think about being here now? He said he believes we are doing the right thing and that we should
be there. The morale is tops. General Seitz/5/ has taken care of the wives and families at Fort Bragg. The men had to take
off and hadn't had their income tax for 1967 filled out. All of them are good soldiers. Eighty percent are Vietnam veterans.
/5/General Richard Seitz, Commander, 82d Airborne Division, U.S. Army.
The President: Do you have 100,000 fighting men out of 500,000, or how many?
General Abrams: About 38% or more.
General Wheeler: It is nearer 200,000.
General Abrams: Yes.
The President: Can you say the other 60%, if were extended, what would that do? Ask those not in combat to extend 60
days.
General Wheeler: One twelfth of the force comes out every month.
The President: 30,000. Would 60 days more cause any problem? We might make it 30-60-90 days. Limiting them to 12
months has given us good morale.
Take an extra 90 days for those who aren't in combat.
General Wheeler: There will be some problems. This is difficult to find men who haven't been fired on. I think it would shoot
morale to hell.
General Abrams: I would not do it.
The President: Can you do it by volunteers?
General Abrams: I would be hopeful you could have volunteer
drives on that. Out of the non-combat types you get high percentage of volunteers. My judgment is that we should call up a
small percentage of reserves.
I want you to tell them all the things that are true. Be sure it is factual. If you soldiers were as gloomy and doomy as the
civilians you would have surrendered.
Give thought to how we can maintain the best posture in the world with what we have out there.
I think a senior person who believes in what we are doing ought to meet the Korean President next Saturday/6/ in
Honolulu.
/6/March 30.
Nitze says he would resign if we sent extra troops. What we have been doing has got us in a mess.

General Abrams: There are a lot of good civilians.

The President: What can we do to hold South Vietnam and keep North Vietnam from taking it over? I want you to be able
to do in South Vietnam what needs to be done.
I like Westmoreland. He was one of four recommended to me. The other three were: General Abrams, General Palmer
and General Johnson. Westmoreland has played on the team to help me.
The Stennis hearings hurt us. The civilians in both departments hurt us. I started in 1966 trying to get a surtax. I've made
no progress on taxes. I've got a deficit of $30 billion.

157. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, March 26, 1968, 1:15-3:05 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House.
Those attending were the President, Clifford, Rusk, Taylor, Rostow, Goldberg, Bradley, Dillon, Lodge, Bundy, Acheson,
Vance, Ridgway, Ball, Dean, Murphy, Wheeler, Abrams, Harriman, Jones, Christian, and Tom Johnson. Fortas entered the
meeting at 2:50 p.m. and the Vice President at 3:07 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH HIS FOREIGN
POLICY ADVISERS
(On the table was a document on the growth of North Vietnam Army forces in South Vietnam.)/2/
/2/Attached but not printed; it is summarized below.
The President: Thank you for coming. I am sure Secretary Rusk and Secretary Clifford have followed this meeting closely.
I want to hear from people who are not regular advisers from time to time.
I asked General Abrams to come here today. General Wheeler has been conferring with General Westmoreland. I want to
hear your views and what you think will be helpful to me.
General Wheeler: In late February I visited South Vietnam./3/ At that time the situation was fluid. The South Vietnamese
were shook and had a variety of paralysis. Government and military were clustered in urban areas to protect against a
second wave of attacks. I told President Thieu that the South Vietnam forces had to go on the offensive. Thieu said South
Vietnam could not take another Tet offensive.
/3/Regarding Wheeler's report, see Document 160.
General Westmoreland has turned this around. They are now out in offensive activities.
General Westmoreland told me in Manila:
--Do not fear a general defeat with the forces we now have.
--There could be a tactical victory.
--The morale of the South Vietnamese is good.
--ARVN are now on the offensive.
The North Vietnamese army force in South Vietnam is now increased by 50,000-60,000 men. The enemy can reinforce
with two divisions in 30 days. It could give the enemy greater chance for a tactical victory.

General Westmoreland believes that replacement packages are coming down from the North. The enemy has suffered
great casualties.
Khesanh has served a useful purpose. It held two enemy divisions around it and one enemy division in support. The
enemy has been badly battered. He has withdrawn one unit to the south and one moved to the east. I do not think the
enemy has the intention of attacking Khesanh now.
We face additional hard fighting. He has sanctuaries. I see no reason for all the gloom and doom we see in the United
States press. There were setbacks during Tet--mostly psychological and two military. The most setback was here in the
United States, which was one of their objectives.
The President: When General Westmoreland was last here, we did not give him all the troops he asked for. We agreed to
make up the difference with a package of additional allied troops. We have sent all but three or four battalions promised./4/
/4/In telegram MAC 4192 to Wheeler and Sharp, March 27, Westmoreland outlined MACV's minimal requirements. He
noted that the package would require an adjustment of the force ceiling to 560,000, exclusive of spaces to be filled through
civilianization. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 407, Litigation Collection, Westmoreland v. CBS, MACV
Backchannel Messages from Westmoreland, 1-31 March 1968 (Folder II)) Wheeler responded in telegram JCS 3449 to
Westmoreland, March 28, by noting that the maximum ceiling would be 549,500 spaces consisting of the Program 5
deployments, retention and replacement forces, and reinforcements in support of deploying brigades, and requested
Westmoreland to specify the elements that would comprise the forces he wanted. (Ibid., MACV Backchannel Messages to
Westmoreland, 1-31 March 1968 (Folder II)) Westmoreland sent a "front channel" request for these forces in telegram
MAC 4242 to Wheeler and Sharp, March 28. (Ibid., MACV Backchannel Messages from Westmoreland, 1-31 March 1968
(Folder II))
General Wheeler: Three battalions will arrive by mid April.
The President: General Abrams has been working closely with South Vietnamese.
General Abrams: When I was assigned to Vietnam eleven months ago I was assigned to work with the South Vietnamese
troops. I worked with them six days a week. In the first few days of February, I visited all the Vietnamese commanders.
Then I went to northern I Corps to coordinate deployments in I Corps. In the last few days before I came back I spent time
visiting all four Corps.
First, the Vietnamese armed forces performed well during the Tet offensive. We would have been in a catastrophe had
they not fought well. The South Vietnamese were in bad posture when the attacks came. At that time, most South
Vietnamese troops had 50% of their units home on Tet leave. There were three commanders who decided not to let their
men off.
The Division commanders expected attacks in several areas, and canceled the leaves of the men. In some cases the
division commanders were not ready.
The South Vietnamese have 149 maneuver battalions--8 performed unsatisfactorily; 30 performed with distinction; the rest
performed satisfactorily.
The First South Vietnamese division cleaned out two thirds of the Citadel. They lost two thirds of their strength. They took
the palace.
The Airborne Division took 11% casualties.
The desertion rate in these divisions was slightly higher than in other divisions. The Second Ranger Group performed very
poorly. The trouble is with their leadership.
The 44th Regiment was a great disappointment. It is made up of integrated training and operations. We thought it was a
good thing, but in Tet they weren't worth a damn. The problem was with the regimental commander.
There are three divisions in III Corps around Saigon that are a problem. They did fight during the Tet. Desertions exceeded
casualties in February. They had more training and help in 1967 than any other. We may have helped them too much.

In the Delta, the divisions performed well. They had nasty and difficult fighting.
In February, there were 7,000 volunteers for service in the Vietnamese army versus 1500 in January.
There have been two replacements of division commanders which look helpful. I feel good about the Delta.
I visited all the outfits. They are out moving, even in 3rd Corps. The roads are open. Traffic is moving. Trucks are moving
over Route 4. ARVN is out operating from one end of the country to another.
They have shortened the recruit training period. They will add 135,000 more troops.
Some other commanders have been relieved. Some province chiefs have to go.
I feel good about the way the thing is going. The morale of the ARVN is high. Some have won battles, with the best of the
NVA. The ARVN are promoting from the ranks.
We are trying to improve weaponry. Some of this was done before Tet. M-16s have been distributed to two divisions in the
Delta. We are going to give them machine guns and mortars.
We need to give regional forces and popular forces better weapons. The regional forces and popular forces stuck and
fought too. Desertion rates did not increase in the regional forces and popular forces.
The President: Will you get 135,000?
General Abrams: Yes.
The President: Are they drafting 18 year olds?
General Abrams: Yes. Thieu and Ky are determined to do it.
The President: What percent of the ARVN are poor?
General Abrams: 8 of 149 battalions.
The President: How many U.S. battalions are there now?
General Abrams: 103 now. We will have 106.
The President: What are the capabilities for improvement?
General Abrams: They are better. Westy has worked on this for a long time. They have a fine Officer Candidate School
and Staff Colleges.
The President: How do the ARVN compare with the Koreans?
General Abrams: The Koreans had the same problem of building their army and fighting at the same time. I would say the
Vietnamese are doing as well if not better than the Koreans.
The President: What about the battles in I Corps against the North Vietnamese Army units?
General Abrams: In I Corps, his main objectives are the two northern provinces. In that, the principal objective is Hue.
He committed 14-16 battalions to take Hue and 14-16 battalions to take Saigon. Since then, he has moved back in on Hue.
I do not believe Hue is in danger.
He has 44% of his main units in I Corps, 22% in II Corps, 24% in III Corps, and 10% in the Delta. Of ours, 49% are in I

Corps.
The President: Do you think he will attack in Khesanh?
General Abrams: I would bet he is not. He started out to on the 23rd of the month. We put too much on him.
The President: How?
General Abrams: By bombing.
The President: What do you expect in April?
General Abrams: He will continue his pressure on Saigon. He will try to keep up the pressure. He may try at Hue. I don't
believe he has the strength to do that.
The President: What do you see this year?
General Abrams:
--Hard fighting
--Attrition of enemy forces
--Improvement in ARVN, RF and PF
--Enemy is making this year an all-out effort.
The President: Is it a change in his strategy?
General Abrams: Yes.
The President: What kind?
General Abrams: He was losing under the old strategy. He was losing control of people.
McGeorge Bundy: What is the relation of Regional Forces and Popular Forces and ARVN to the pacification in the future?
General Abrams: In many places the Popular Forces and the Regional Forces were pulled into towns. This took them
away from the influence and protection outside towns. Our biggest problem is in the 4th Corps.
In III Corps, the losses in men in the Regional Forces and Popular Forces have not been great. We only need to move
them out of the provinces.
I Corps and II Corps--it is pretty good.
McGeorge Bundy: Were they not as much affected by Tet?
General Abrams: Not as much affected, no.
Ambassador Goldberg: Can there be another series of Tet-like offensives?
General Abrams: No.
Douglas Dillon: When the buildup of the ARVN is completed, can they carry a larger part of the fighting?

General Abrams: Yes. I would have to quit if I didn't believe that. They can take on more fighting against the Viet Cong. I
feel quite certain of that.

158. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, March 26, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. Those attending the meeting,
which lasted from 3:15 to 4:32 p.m., were the President, the Vice President, Clifford, Rusk, Taylor, Rostow, Goldberg,
Bradley, Dillon, Lodge, Bundy, Acheson, Vance, Ridgway, Ball, Dean, Murphy, Fortas, Wheeler, Abrams, Harriman, Jones,
Christian, and Tom Johnson. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
SUMMARY OF NOTES
McGeorge Bundy: There is a very significant shift in our position. When we last met we saw reasons for hope./2/
/2/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Document 377.
We hoped then there would be slow but steady progress. Last night and today the picture is not so hopeful particularly in
the country side.
Dean Acheson summed up the majority feeling when he said that we can no longer do the job we set out to do in the time
we have left and we must begin to take steps to disengage.
That view was shared by:
George Ball
Arthur Dean
Cy Vance
Douglas Dillon
and myself (McGeorge Bundy)
We do think we should do everything possible to strengthen in a real and visible way the performance of the Government
of South Vietnam.
There were three of us who took a different position:
General Bradley
General Taylor
Bob Murphy
They all feel that we should not act to weaken our position and we should do what our military commanders suggest.
General Ridgway has a special point of view. He wanted to so strengthen the Army of South Vietnam that we could
complete the job in two years./3/
/3/Ridgway circulated a paper in which he called for the creation of a GVN "defense establishment capable of defending
that political independence." He added a final caveat: "Perhaps the serving of notice on the Vietnamese Government that

we will give it a maximum of two years to accomplish this, at the end of which time we begin a phase-down of our forces,
would serve as an adequate stimulus." ("Random Thoughts on Vietnam," March 26; Library of Congress, Manuscript
Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Vietnam, General, April-Dec. 1968)
On negotiations, Ball, Goldberg and Vance strongly urged a cessation of the bombing now. Others wanted a halt at some
point but not now while the situation is still unresolved in the I Corps area.
On troop reinforcements the dominant sentiment was that the burden of proof rests with those who are urging the increase.
Most of us think there should be a substantial escalation. We all felt there should not be an extension of the conflict. This
would be against our national interest.
The use of atomic weapons is unthinkable.
Summary:/4/
/4/In a March 27 memorandum for his personal files, Harriman recorded what Lodge had told him about the meeting: "Mac
Bundy gave a summary which Lodge thought was pretty fair. The President said, 'then all of you except Wheeler, Taylor,
Bradley, Murphy want to disengage.' Lodge said, 'No, I don't want to disengage--I want to use our power differently than
we have.' (I commented to Lodge that 'disengagement' is not the right word. Many of us want to start negotiations for a
peaceful settlement). Wheeler took the point of view this is the worst possible time that we have ever had to start
negotiations. Lodge said he whispered to Acheson, 'Yes, because we are in worse shape militarily than we ever have
been.' But the extraordinary thing is the President summed it up by saying, 'You have been hearing things I haven't. I want
to hear from the men you have.' " (Ibid., Chronological Files, March 1968)
Ridgway: I agree with the summary as presented by McGeorge Bundy.
Dean: I agree. All of us got the impression that there is no military conclusion in sight. We felt time is running out.
Dean Acheson: Agree with Bundy's presentation. Neither the effort of the Government of Vietnam or the effort of the U.S.
government can succeed in the time we have left. Time is limited by reactions in this country. We cannot build an
independent South Vietnam; therefore, we should do something by no later than late summer to establish something
different.
Henry Cabot Lodge: We should shift from search and destroy strategy to a strategy of using our military power as a shield
to permit the South Vietnamese society to develop as well as North Vietnamese society has been able to do. We need to
organize South Vietnam on a block-by-block, precinct-by-precinct basis./5/
/5/In a written statement of his proposal used at the March 26 meeting, Lodge wrote: "Less stress on 'search and destroy'
would mean fewer casualties (U.S. and Vietnamese), less destruction, fewer refugees, less ill will, and more public support
at home. More stress on organization of South Vietnamese society would make South Vietnamese truly competitive with
Communism--not just on the conventional battlefield, but in every aspect of life." He added: "If we had focused our past
effort on population organization rather than search and destroy, we would, I believe, undoubtedly have been less badly
hurt by the Tet raids." (Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304,
1968 Secretary of Defense Files) In a letter transmitting the statement to Clifford the next day, Lodge further noted: "It does
not mean that our troops would be placed in static positions for the physical defense of the cities. In fact, our base camps
would stay pretty much where they are now. It does mean that their mission would be the protection of Vietnamese efforts
to organize the population (and root out the hard-core terrorists) instead of their mission being the 'war of attrition.'" (Ibid.)
Douglas Dillon: We should change the emphasis. I agree with Acheson. The briefing last night led me to conclude we
cannot achieve a military victory. I would agree with Lodge that we should cease search-and-destroy tactics and head
toward an eventual disengagement. I would send only the troops necessary to support those there now.
George Ball: I share Acheson's view. I have felt that way since 1961--that our objectives are not attainable. In the U.S.
there is a sharp division of opinion. In the world, we look very badly because of the bombing. That is the central defect in
our position. The disadvantages of bombing outweigh the advantages. We need to stop the bombing in the next six weeks
to test the will of the North Vietnamese. As long as we continue to bomb, we alienate ourselves from the civilized world. I
would have the Pope or U Thant suggest the bombing halt. It cannot come from the President.
A bombing halt would quieten the situation here at home.

Cy Vance: McGeorge Bundy stated my views. I agree with George Ball.

Unless we do something quick, the mood in this country may lead us to withdrawal. On troops, we should send no more
than the 13,000 support troops.
General Bradley: People in the country are dissatisfied. We do need to stop the bombing if we can get the suggestion to
come from the Pope or U Thant, but let's not show them that we are in any way weakening. We should send only support
troops.
Bob Murphy: I am shaken by the position of my associates. The interpretation given this action by Saigon would be bad.
This is a "give-away" policy. I think it would weaken our position.
General Taylor: I am dismayed. The picture I get is a very different one from that you have. Let's not concede the home
front; let's do something about it./6/
/6/According to transcripts of the recording of this meeting, the conversation at this point went: "General Taylor: Well, I
have been somewhat amazed, Mr. President, by the views expressed here by some of my friends for whom I have the
greatest respect. I look back on the briefings last night because the picture these gentlemen have in their minds is not the
one I have developed over a period of time. President: I just want to observe--the first thing I am going to do when you all
leave here is to get those briefers last night. [Laughter followed.] I want to hear what they said because I want to see-because I want to evaluate it. I haven't heard of that kind of pictures. [sic] Go ahead. General Taylor: Mr. President, first as
Secretary Rusk pointed out, they had spoken in unison. I thought they bent over backwards to balance the good and bad.
But I suspect we are all the victims of our environment. I know that I am, and I think my friends are too. I think that if you
are accustomed to hearing the bad, the bad comes to view, and I listened to those same briefings and didn't come out any
more discouraged than I was when I went in. But behind all this is concern about the election front which I am sure racks
us all. But we didn't get around to discussing it. The last time, you will remember, that was the primary subject in
November. What could we do about the home front? Now there seems to be a vigorous misconception as to the fact that
this home front is going out this month or next. Well, that is not the impression I get when I go around the country. There is
indeed more discouragement this year than this time last year, but I still have huge confidence that the people in the
United States are willing to do those things that are necessary--and are demonstrated as being necessary. So I am not
ready to sell out on the home front yet, but I would like to hear, and perhaps you may wish to--let's do something about it
and see if we can't explain the need for doing these very tough things that are facing us in Southeast Asia. Now that's
about my only overall comment except I dispute in my own mind the reasoning we must stop the bombing because we
muffed the solution and then come to the table knowing that we are going to lose our shirt. I just don't see how success
goes down that road. President: I haven't heard the men that reviewed the events since Tet--from them directly. I want to
so I can evaluate it and may come to the very same conclusion that everybody else here has. I haven't heard some of
these theories. Maybe I haven't gotten the whole story. I gather that it is different from what I have been getting topside." (Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room)
Fortas: The U.S. has never had in mind winning a military victory out there; we always have wanted to reach an agreement
or settle for the status quo between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. I agree with General Taylor and Bob Murphy. This
is not the time for an overture on our part. I do not think a cessation of the bombing would do any good at this time. I do not
believe in drama for the sake of drama.
Acheson: The issue is not that stated by Fortas. The issue is can we do what we are trying to do in Vietnam. I do not think
we can. Fortas said we are not trying to win a military victory. The issue is can we by military means keep the North
Vietnamese off the South Vietnamese. I do not think we can. They can slip around and end-run them and crack them
up./7/
/7/Following additional remarks by Dillon, Wheeler, Dean, Murphy, and Ball, the President concluded: "What we want to do
is take what you have said and what we can produce here from the junior and senior people and what Congress may be
able to approve, [which is] what we may need to do, and try to make our course here as effective as possible. I want to
thank each of you for taking the time in giving it to me. I want to feel in reasonable limits I could call on you to give me your
frank and honest opinions at any time. I would hope that you would be available as occasions arise periodically in the next
few months--in the months to come and [thereafter], as you have on other occasions, particularly last November and now.
All I believe were here then except General Ridgway and Mr. Vance, and I had them individually on other occasions on the
same general subjects. I don't want to consider this a formal group. I don't want to consider it a restricted or restrained
group. I want you to feel perfectly free to say anything whether the Secretary of State is here or not--whether or not the
Secretary of Defense is here--because primarily I want to inform them myself. I didn't have the chance to spend last
evening with you and I wanted to talk with you personally without any other people being present. I would like to ask you to
keep your presence and the fact that you were at a meeting with a group like this to yourself and not discuss it. If it does go
the way of some of our intelligence documents and some of our reports that are filed with the Defense Department and
State Department do, they'll wind up in print. My general [explanation] will be that this represents a group that from time to

time I talk to individuals in whom I have confidence and associations with the general problems. I don't want to get in the
habit of making those public because I don't want--particularly in a political year--to have them appear or feel I am using
them one way or the other. The fact that they advise with me implies that they are part of my policy. And so I would like to
have each of you regard it as you have in the past and not let the public know about it. If they ask when I saw you last--I
have asked Mr. Christian to say the President from time to time calls upon men who have served in the government and
that's a manner calm and patient. Thank you." (Ibid.)

159. Editorial Note

On March 26, 1968, the President met in the Cabinet Room with the Vice President, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of
Defense Clifford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle Wheeler, General Creighton Abrams, Special
Assistant Walt Rostow, Special Counsel Harry McPherson, and Justice Abe Fortas in a meeting that lasted from 6 to 7:40
p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) The primary topic of conversation was the situation on the ground in
Vietnam, with Wheeler presenting General William Westmoreland's assessment of it. Wheeler noted that Westmoreland
had emphatically stressed that his troops were "doing well" and that their morale was "good." Westmoreland believed that
he could keep on the offensive if he could receive the balance of the Program 5 forces yet to be delivered and necessary
support elements for that deployment. He also recommended the stationing of a significant reserve force in Hawaii.
Westmoreland also had wanted to clarify that he never had asked for 206,000 men; it had been only one of several
packages discussed "in contingency thinking." Wheeler stated that, based on Westmoreland's requirements, the force
levels in Vietnam would consist of those already in the pipeline comprising the 525,000 ceiling, plus the 11,000 emergency
augmentation and the 13,500 support troops. However, if the civilianization program was canceled, the ceiling could
increase by an additional 12,500.
In light of this significant augmentation, Wheeler positively assessed the prospects facing Westmoreland in Vietnam: "My
feeling is that, with Westy's present force and when we include in these two brigades and Program V to continue with the
addition of these 13,500 support troops, that he was not going to suffer any defeat of any magnitude. Now this does not
mean that he may not find it necessary under certain conditions to give up some terrain, temporarily or perhaps even
permanently. I don't foresee that he will have to do that, but he might. We have a powerful force out there and if it is wellbalanced, and if he has adequate air and unless the enemy reinforces quite substantially--I would even say more than the
two divisions that we have been talking about--Westmoreland with the Army should be able to take care of the situation."
At the President's request, Abrams speculated on what would happen in the near future: "I would predict that they will
continue to send replacements down in order to maintain the structure that they've got in the next few months, in the next
two or three or four months, to try to keep the pressures off the urban and rural areas and with the structure they've got,
they may reinforce it by bringing some other units down." But he noted that the South Vietnamese military "was going to
get better and better and that we were going to stand up to them more and more." Abrams later offered a personal
comment: "One thing, Mr. President, I would like to tell you. I know there is a lot of dying men out there. But you should
know about me. I had made up my mind several years ago whether I would continue serving in the Army with all this
business and I decided there was something worse than being dead. I thought I would put up with it. I don't like it but it's
worth it." (Ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room)

160. Editorial Note

The 584th meeting of the National Security Council was held on March 27, 1968, from 1:20 to 2:19 p.m. Those attending
the meeting were the President, Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, Walt Rostow, Bromley Smith, Arthur
Goldberg, Secretary of Defense Clifford, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, Director of Central Intelligence Richard
Helms, General Earle Wheeler, Director of USIA Leonard Marks, General Creighton Abrams, AEC Chairman Glenn
Seaborg, Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness Price Daniel, ACDA Director William Foster and Deputy
Director Adrian Fisher, Director of the Office of Science and Technology Donald Hornig, NSC Staff member Spurgeon
Keeny, and George Christian. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Notes of the meeting appear in a memorandum for the record
by Keeny dated April 4. These notes in part read:
"The President stated that he had asked General Abrams to join the meeting so that he and General Wheeler could report
on the situation in Vietnam before the Council turned to the problem of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He asked General
Wheeler to summarize his report on his recent trip to Vietnam.
"General Wheeler stated that the situation in Vietnam was very difficult to assess. The Vietnamese government had not
been broken by the powerful VC/NVA attacks during the Tet offensive but had been 'frozen' in a defensive posture. The

reason for this was that the VC had established a stranglehold around the cities. General Westmoreland had told President
Thieu that one could not afford to defend a city from the inside and had to go out after the enemy. Thieu, however, was
hesitant to have his forces leave the cities since he felt the government simply could not afford another Tet offensive.
However, Thieu was now beginning to push out again from the cities. For example, the current offensive around Saigon
was not simply a US operation but was made up of 12 ARVN and 6 US battalions. Westmoreland told him that he believed
the ARVN had in general performed well, had maintained high morale, and was now regaining the initiative. While he
expected further hard fighting, Westmoreland had no fear of a general defeat. However, the enemy does have the
capability of further local victories which can be blown up for propaganda purposes. Westmoreland estimates that the NVA
can bring in two more divisions in the next 30 to 45 days and that there are now some 8,000 to 10,000 NVA troops coming
down from North Vietnam. Khe Sanh appears to have served the NVA's purpose. Earlier there were two NVA divisions
surrounding Khe Sanh with an additional division in reserve. Now one division has moved to the south and the reserve
division has moved east. The enemy seems primarily interested now in Hue and Saigon, and Westmoreland believes that
the enemy's near-term efforts will be to continue harassments and strangulation of these two cities. In conclusion, he
stated that General Westmoreland had no concern that we would suffer a major defeat in South Vietnam.
"The President introduced General Abrams to the group and stated that he had been working closely with the ARVN for
some time so that they will be in a better position to take care of themselves. He read excerpts from a memorandum from
General Taylor commending General Abrams' excellent record as both a battlefield and staff officer. He then asked
General Abrams to tell the group about the plans and problems of the ARVN, particularly with regard to the decision to
draft 19- and 18-year-olds.
"General Abrams stated that at General Westmoreland's request, he had been working for almost a year directly with the
ARVN forces and had gotten to know most of the officers above the level of regimental commander and some of the
regimental commanders as well. He felt that the ARVN, as well as the RF and PF, were continually gaining confidence in
themselves. Some deficiencies had been revealed during the Tet offensive, but the general performance of the ARVN had
been good--exceeding the expectations of most Americans. The performance of only eight out of the 149 battalions was
considered unsatisfactory. Thirty battalions distinguished themselves, and the remainder did very well. He noted that the
first ARVN division took 10% casualties--30% in the rifle battalion--but continued to fight. He recounted the story of an
ARVN lieutenant who received a field promotion to captain as a result of his aggressive leadership in the recapture of Hue.
An increase of 140,000 is now planned in the present ARVN force of around 600,000. They will now draft 19-year-olds and
in June will begin the draft of 18-year-olds. He noted that the training centers were all back in operation but that the training
job of this large increase is a major task which places a limit on how rapidly the forces can be expanded. He was confident,
however, that the ARVN can achieve this force level objective. He reported that they are now trying to obtain from 4,000 to
6,000 additional officers and that a major source will be the commissioning of noncoms who distinguished themselves
during the Tet offensive. With regard to new weapons, he noted that a major effort is being made to supply the ARVN with
the M-16 rifle as quickly as possible. This program has been completed in I Corps and they are now moving ahead rapidly,
particularly in the Highlands where the ARVN is fighting regular NVA units which have modern equipment. He noted the
program to upgrade ARVN units with M-60 machine guns and grenade launchers as well as a new mortar. There will be
new equipment available by the time the 140,000 new recruits are trained. He reported that an effort must be made to also
improve the RF and PF and that, pending availability of additional M-16 rifles, they would be supplied with M-2 automatic
carbines as they were replaced in the regular ARVN forces with M-16 rifles.
"The President asked how the Korean forces had operated during the Tet offensive.
"General Abrams replied that the Korean forces leave nothing to be desired. They have the finest officers in the junior
grades that he had ever seen. This particularly pleased him since they had been trained in the schools that we had set up
after the Korean War.
"The President asked whether the ARVN forces would ever be as good as the Koreans which, he observed, were not
considered very good at the beginning of the Korean War.
"General Abrams replied that he saw no reason why the ARVN could not be just as good as the Koreans.
"The President asked how the Australian troops have done.
"General Abrams replied that the Australians had performed very well and that now that they had an additional battalion
they had a large enough force to operate independently.
"The President asked what the results of the Tet offensive had really been and what we could look forward to.
"General Abrams stated that the Tet offensive had given a quantum jump to the improvement of the ARVN morale since
the ARVN had met and beaten the best of the NVA forces. He observed that nothing you can do does more for a soldier's

morale than to give them a victory. The morale of the ARVN is now at the highest point it has ever been. The morale of US
soldiers has been good and continues to be so. He told a story of the Marine group on Hill 821 at Khe Sanh that ran up the
flag every morning in a bugle ceremony in order to attract fire so that the enemy would use up its quota of shells against
them for the day all at once. For the future, he expected more fighting in April. The enemy will apply all the pressure that
he can.
"The President asked whether he had enough troops for adequate protection.
"General Abrams replied that, with the currently planned augmentation, he believed that the situation can be adequately
handled."
The full text of Keeny's memorandum is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 5, Tab 66.

161. Memorandum From the Postmaster General (O'Brien) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, March 27, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, O'Brien, Lawrence--Vietnam. Confidential. The
President wrote on the memorandum: "Rostow--ask Rusk to get Larry over here at once & explain."
Mr. President:
During the last several days, I have had contacts with a large number of Democratic officials, leaders and workers around
the country--both in person and by phone. Without exception, these people are your supporters and also without exception
they express serious concerns about our current posture in Vietnam, both in political and in general terms.
The political aspect came through clearly in the conversations I have had. These people--loyal Administration Democrats-are fearful of the end result in terms of both the Chicago convention and the November election, if our present Vietnam
posture is maintained.
I know that this is not news to you--that you have been getting the same reports--but it is apparent that these views are
becoming more widespread. I have continued to review the problem in my own mind since sending you my memo of
March 21, and now I would like to respectfully suggest some possibly dramatic moves that could allay the fears and buoy
the spirit of the nation.
As I suggested in my previous memo,/2/ I believe we should vigorously pursue the course of insisting upon greater
responsibility by the Vietnamese people and Government in fighting the War. At the same time, we should publicly express
our disappointment and unhappiness with the South Vietnamese failures, both in military terms and in terms of establishing
a truly democratic governmental process.
/2/In this March 21 memorandum to the President, O'Brien noted: "What I am suggesting is a phasing out of the
tremendous American responsibility for the conduct of the war and a phasing in of far greater responsibility by the South
Vietnamese themselves." (Ibid.)
The Government of South Vietnam could follow this up by making a tangible move toward a greater spirit of democracy:
the granting of a general amnesty for political prisoners.
The next step would be for President Thieu to express his strong desire for peace and his willingness to negotiate with the
enemy. President Thieu would specify that on a date certain the South Vietnamese Armed Forces and all allied troops
would begin a cease fire. Our Government would support this effort and would announce a bombing pause to begin on the
same date.
As a further effort to dramatize our sincerity, you would announce that you are sending a delegation of outstanding
Americans to Geneva who will be sitting at the peace table along with representatives of the South Vietnamese
Government--ready to negotiate with North Vietnam at the very hour that the cease fire and the bombing pause would be
scheduled to start.

I realize that if we took the above steps or similar steps, the chances for meaningful negotiations and lasting peace would
still be questionable. However, I think these moves would accomplish a great deal in making a large segment of the
American people understand our sincerity and in convincing them that this Administration will go to the greatest possible
lengths to achieve peace.
We all agree, Mr. President, that our problems in Vietnam transcend political considerations and our search for solutions
must not be politically motivated. Nevertheless, the widespread anxieties I have found among our political friends and
associates convince me that their fears reflect an ever deepening disenchantment among many segments of the
population which have heretofore supported our actions in Vietnam.

162. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, March 27, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. Those present at the meeting,
which lasted from 4:15 p.m. to 5:37 p.m., were the President, the Vice President, Helms, Carver, DePuy, his assistant
Lieutenant Colonel H.H. Perritt, McPherson, and Tom Johnson. An hour after the meeting began, Fowler and Zwick
entered and were seated at the back of the room. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) An attached cover sheet reads: "CIA-DOD
Briefing by General DePuy and George Carver." A transcript of a recording of the meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings
in the Cabinet Room.
DePuy:
--Build-up of NVA Battalions: Attack force was 85,000--of that, KIA was 42,000
--Areas hit.
Abrams: For every one man we count dead, he loses 1/3 to injury. Saigon wasn't taken. They did get near Tan Son Nhut.
DePuy:
--Losses: NVA-VC--500/day; weapons--16,000 enemy.
--Movements: Buildup near Saigon & Hue.
--Force level of SVN: March '68--647,000; June '68--685,000; June '69--779,154; June '70--801,215.
--Equipment modernization.
--Combat death.
P[resident]: Were 80,000 KIA?
H[elms]: What kind of soldiers were they?
A[brams]: Mixed group, but armed men.
D[ePuy]: Low estimate of enemy force under arms.
153,000--250/day = 98% KIA.
270,000--500/day = 85% KIA.
DePuy: At what point does attrition catch up w/infiltration? They don't.

P[resident]: If we knock off 80,000/yr., can they sustain it?

H[elms]: How many NVA were killed?
Wheeler: I am studying the matter now. Westmoreland believes they could bring in 2 divisions in next 30-60 days. For next
several months, he will take more & more chances because he is attacking Americans here at home.
President: Everybody is recommending surrender. What are estimates--input of VC; NVA held down in NVN; how many
are available from N.; how fast we can kill them?
Wheeler: Giap's theory is there (are) always going to be people dying.
Carver: Communists want to take South Vietnam. Keep VN state structure from developing.
Decision to put in line elements--late Spring 1964; Autumn 1964--moving in; showed up in early 1965.
Their escalation--March 1965--1st U.S. troops to Danang; Feb. 1965--bombing; May-June; July--Decision by LBJ--100,000
put in.
Are we relatively much stronger today than a year ago/2 years ago?
Abrams: Yes.
P[resident]: From July '65 to July '70. If you take 5-yr. period, are we as far along proportionally as we were in W.W.II?
W[heeler]: Yes. Better off.
P[resident]: How many (do) they have (actual count)?
W[heeler]: 100 (thousand).
P[resident]: How many (do) we have?
W[heeler]: 1,000 (thousand).
P[resident]: You seen any Chinese men?
W[heeler]: No.
P[resident]: Has M-16 problem subsided?
A[brams]: Yes.
Carver: Decisions made last summer in Hanoi. They think they can take us in guerrilla war & that we will not start
conventional war. They decided to exploit differences between (not SVN) & (SVN & people) & stop(ping) pacification.
Major trends going against them. Had to move off of protracted war status--collapse (of) GVN; destroy pol(itical) basis;
collapse our will to carry on struggle in election year. We know all our imperfections. Have an imperfect picture of their
losses. They wanted to create fear psychosis. They did take casualties. Controversy over how many.
Abrams: CIA says we lump cab drivers, messengers, couriers, together & call them VC-NVA.
[Omitted here is a list of those present.]
We can't afford to kid ourselves on figures. B-52s and Tac Air (tactical air support) isn't counted.
P[resident]: Any pressure from Washington on body count?

W[heeler]: No. They lost more in 3 months than we have in whole war.
Carver: GVN has been thrown back to district & province towns. Expect 2nd effort. Select individual units. Kontum & Ban
Me Thuot.
Abrams: Agree they could hit west of Kontum.
Carver: Still can play with negotiations. Always can make some gesture. Accept S(an) A(ntonio). Prediction--make 1968 a
decisive year. Next 2-4 months will be decisive. Political balance may tip. Our contribution must be one of attitude. In next
2-3 months will be decisive.

163. Editorial Note

In late March 1968 the speech for President Lyndon Johnson's television address on Vietnam, scheduled for March 31,
underwent significant revision. From 11:03 a.m. to 2:15 p.m. on March 28, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs William Bundy, Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, and Special
Counsel Harry McPherson met to discuss drafts of the speech on which McPherson had been working. When the meeting
began, Clifford noted his sense that the leaders of the American business and legal communities no longer supported the
war effort. "Whatever the specific reason, these men now feel that we are in a hopeless bog," he asserted. "The idea of
going deeper into the bog strikes them as mad. They want to see us get out of it." Clifford then proposed that the speech
introduce a new element, namely, a halt to the bombing north of the 20th parallel. Notes of the meeting have not been
found, but in his memoirs, McPherson described how Clifford's assertion was received:
"Amazingly, the conversation thereafter was concerned with the mechanics of informing our commanders and allies, and
with redrafting the speech--not with whether the country should instead be rallied to sustain the effort. No one argued for a
continuation of the bombing around Hanoi, or for committing large numbers of fresh troops. Here were five men, all
associated with the war; all of whom had either urged its prosecution, helped to form its strategies, argued its rationale, or
written its leader's speeches; and not one of them spoke out against 'winding it down'--which would mean, inevitably,
accepting a result that was less than satisfactory by the standards they had set for it." (Harry McPherson, A Political
Education (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1972), pages 443-436)
The hard-line speech on which McPherson had been working was set aside, and work began on a new alternate draft that
emphasized negotiations and de-escalation. In the end, the group decided to give both the hard-line and the de-escalatory
drafts to the President. In his memoirs, Clifford related how it was determined which speech the President favored:
"The next morning, shortly after ten o'clock, President Johnson called McPherson to discuss changes in the draft. As Harry
began looking through the old draft for places where the President wanted to make changes, he suddenly realized that the
President was working on the alternate draft! Suppressing his excitement, he took the President's changes down one by
one, but as soon as their conversation was over, Harry called me. 'We've won,' he shouted. 'The President is working from
our draft!'" (Clark Clifford, Counsel to the President: A Memoir, pages 519-521)
The original version began: "I speak to you tonight in a time of grave challenge to our country." The alternate draft read:
"Tonight I want to speak to you of the prospects for peace in Vietnam and Southeast Asia." The various drafts of the
speech are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, [March 19, 1970, Memo to the President,
"Decision to Halt the Bombing"] 1967, 1968, II. The President discussed his reasons for the decision he conveyed in the
speech in his memoir The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1971), pages 423-424.

164. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, March 29, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson,
Subject File, Vietnam--General, Jan.-Mar. 1968. Secret; Nodis.
Yesterday evening you asked whether I had any advice on future policy./2/ On thinking it over I suggest that an overall

decision be made to direct policy towards getting negotiations started under as favorable circumstances as possible. We
could move towards negotiations either through the papal or the Goldberg/U Thant routes and should aim at a full bombing
stoppage before the middle of May. A halfway stoppage is unlikely to be effective and could be counter-productive.
/2/Harriman met with Rusk between 5:58 and 6:15 p.m. on March 28. (Johnson Library, Dean Rusk Appointment Book,
1968) No other record of their meeting has been found.
I also believe it very important (for the reasons outlined in the attached paper)/3/ to talk to the Soviet leaders first and to
attempt, so far as practical, to enlist their cooperation.
/3/In the attached paper, entitled "Objectives of Talks With Soviet Leaders," March 28, Harriman argued that informing the
Soviets of the impending peace move "would have a beneficial effect on their future positions and actions" relating to
negotiations. "Considering the suspicions that exist between Hanoi and Washington," Harriman noted, "we need some
outside influence to assist in reaching a settlement, and there is no other that could be as effective as the Soviet
Union." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson,
Subject File, Vietnam--General, Jan.-Mar. 1968) Further elaboration of Harriman's argument in favor of involving the
Soviets and East Europeans in the peace process is in a March 25 memorandum entitled "General Principles," which
Harriman used during the Wise Men's meetings. (Ibid., Chronological File, March 1968)
In South Vietnam our first move should be to follow through on Thieu's suggestion that he state at a press conference that
there is no need for more American troops and that the Vietnamese will raise additional forces as required (Saigon
23309)./4/ (This does not mean that without publicity some additional support troops cannot be sent to balance out current
deployments.)
/4/Dated March 28. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
As far as feasible our military forces should adopt a policy emphasizing protection of the populated areas and reduction of
U.S. casualties. We might also subject our present operations to cost effectiveness analysis.
I developed some of these ideas in a paper (attached)/5/ which I prepared for possible use in discussions with the Senior
Advisory Group.
/5/In the attached paper, entitled "Proposed Vietnam Policy," March 25, which Harriman had transmitted previously to Ball
and Ridgway and discussed at the Wise Men's meetings, Harriman outlined measures to strengthen the ARVN and the
RF/PF, means to politically unite the South Vietnamese through a broadening of the governmental structures, an altered
U.S. policy that emphasized protection of the population centers, and ways to initiate talks. The latter included Harriman's
stated preference for "a neutral initiative which would gain support at home and abroad and ease Saigon's
apprehension." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, KennedyJohnson, Subject File, Vietnam--General, Jan.-Mar. 1968)
W. Averell Harriman/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

165. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, March 29, 1968, 0120Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret;
Nodis; Immediate. Drafted by Bundy, approved by Rusk, and cleared by Rostow and Walsh.
138438. No Distribution Outside Department. Literally Eyes Only for Ambassador from Secretary. Ref: State 131732:
Saigon 22548./2/
/2/See Document 137 and footnote 3 thereto.
1. We are now thinking in terms of early policy announcement that would have following major elements:

a. Major stress on importance of GVN and ARVN increased effectiveness, with our equipment and other support as first
priority in our own actions.
b. 13,500 support forces to be called up at once in order to round out the 10,500 combat units sent in February.
(Westmoreland has details.)
c. Replenishment of strategic reserve by calling up some 48,500 additional reserves, stating that these would be designed
for strategic reserve.
d. Related tax increases and budget cuts already largely needed for non-Vietnam reasons.
2. In order to obtain necessary Congressional and public support for this program, it is now the judgment of highest levels
that we must include at this time an announcement of an initiative along the lines of the lesser proposal described in State
131732. This would consist basically of announcing that bombing would be restricted to targets most directly engaged in
the battlefield area and that this meant that there would be no bombing roughly north of Vinh. Announcement would leave
open how Hanoi might respond, and would be open-ended as to time. However, it would indicate that Hanoi's response
could be helpful in determining whether we were justified in assumption that Hanoi would not take advantage if we
stopping bombing altogether. Thus, it would to this extent foreshadow possibility of full bombing stoppage at a later point.
3. We recognize necessity of full consultation with Thieu and (in accordance with your recommendation) Ky as well before
we announce such action. Time factors are such that we would like to move not later than Sunday night. Hence, you
should now act urgently to obtain their concurrence.
4. In so doing, you may make following points:
a. You should call attention to force increases that would be announced at the same time and would make clear our
continued resolve. Also our top priority to re-equipping ARVN forces.
b. You should make clear that Hanoi is most likely to denounce the project and thus free our hand after a short period.
Nonetheless, we might wish to continue the limitation even after a formal denunciation, in order to reinforce its sincerity
and put the monkey firmly on Hanoi's back for whatever follows.
c. With or without denunciation, Hanoi might well feel limited in conducting any major offensives at least in the northern
areas. If they did so, this could ease the pressure where it is most potentially serious. If they did not, then this would give
us a clear field for whatever actions were then required.
d. In view of weather limitations, bombing north of the 20th parallel will in any event be limited at least for the next four
weeks or so--which we tentatively envisage as a maximum testing period in any event. Hence, we are not giving up
anything really serious in this time frame. Of course, a major change in the military situation might require full scale
resumption at any time.
e. Insofar as our announcement foreshadows any possibility of a complete bombing stoppage, in the event Hanoi really
exercises reciprocal restraints, we regard this as unlikely. But in any case, the period of demonstrated restraint would
probably have to continue for a period of several weeks, and we would have time to appraise the situation and to consult
carefully with them before we undertook any such action.
5. In making these points, you may as you see fit use our judgment of the public situation here as another indication of the
vital necessity of early and demonstrated GVN improvements such as you have been urging. You may convey our
gratification at the actions Thieu has taken and announced, particularly his speech of last week (which we expect to refer
to extensively), but make equally clear that a great deal must be done and seen to be done if we are to get through the
present difficult period as we must. The joint Thieu-Ky press conference now suggested could be most useful as one
move.
Rusk

166. Memorandum for Record/1/

Washington, March 29, 1968, 11 a.m.

/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Vietnam War--Miscellaneous Materials, 1968. Top
Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Nitze.
SUBJECT
Meeting March 29, 11:00 AM
PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Clifford, Mr. Nitze and the JCS
Mr. Clifford reviewed the deliberations he and Mr. Rusk had had over the past days with the President concerning our
course of action with respect to Vietnam. He emphasized the point that unanimous advice from all sides was that the
American people and the Congress would no longer support a policy of merely more of the same. The President had
therefore resolved to go before the people with a speech in which, among other things, he would announce that he was
sending 13,500 men to Vietnam and calling up 62,000 Reserves. Included in the speech would be the announcement of a
pause in bombing north of the 20th Parallel which, if followed by reciprocal action on the other side, could lead to a
cessation of bombing of North Vietnam and negotiations.
Mr. Clifford emphasized that one could not estimate how long the pause in bombing would continue; that there were
estimated only to be four good bombing days in April; and that the sorties not flown north of the 20th Parallel would then be
available in southern North Vietnam and Laos closer to the battlefield. The principal object would be to broaden the base of
domestic support for our policy and to put the monkey on the back of the other side. He recognizes that there might be an
adverse effect on the morale of our troops but hoped that this would prove to be manageable. He said that it was Mr.
Rusk's view that this action could be explained to General Thieu and the GVN and that they would understand. He then
asked General Wheeler for his views.
General Wheeler said that from the military point of view there was no point in lessening pressure on the enemy if one was
winning, and he did not think that we were losing. He thought the effect on military capabilities would be negligible; that if
the GVN could be brought along, he thought the effect on the morale of our side would be manageable; if the pause were
not prolonged beyond an appropriate time, he was not bothered. What did bother him was the question of resumption after
a pause. From the information coming to him he thought the situation in the country with respect to support for our current
policy was perhaps even worse than Mr. Clifford had described.
General Johnson asked whether the effect on Korea and Thailand had been considered. Mr. Clifford said that it had and
that it was Mr. Rusk's view that this could be managed. General Johnson went on to say that he was not self-confident on
what the effect might be on the morale on our side. The question at issue was that of the commitment of the middle level in
South Vietnam; they were making up their minds as to which side to back in the long run. He also commented that in the
last three years when we had backed away from full pressure on the enemy, opposition to our policy had grown. He feared
that the announcement of the bombing pause would lead people to believe we had decided to leave the war. Mr. Clifford
said that in a certain sense the proposed announcement would not go as far as the San Antonio formula. General Johnson
thought there was less ambiguity in this announcement. Mr. Clifford did not agree with that appraisal.
Admiral Clarey said he agreed with General Wheeler that there was no purely military advantage in lessening pressure on
the enemy. In view of the fact that the President is resolved to take this action he would support the decision. He did,
however, think we should make up our minds what to do if the move fails to elicit a positive response from the other side;
to go back and merely do more of the same would seem to him not to be enough. Mr. Clifford said he thought it would be a
mistake to attempt to predict now a situation that might arise in the future. The important thing now is to strengthen the
base from which the President can then act. Admiral Clarey said he did not believe we had done enough in the diplomatic
field; enemy atrocities during the Tet offensive had not been sufficiently exploited in the press; and the restraint which we
had exercised in not bombing dikes, rice fields, etc. were not known to the public. He did not believe we had taken strong
enough action against our allies, particularly the British, with respect to shipping from Hong Kong. Mr. Clifford agreed that
we did have a serious problem with the press. Photographs and moving picture film of the atrocities during the Tet
offensive had been given to the press but had not been used.
General McConnell said that if the U.S. public had rallied to the cause, it was his belief that we should have gone harder
against the North. In view of the situation as it is, he supports the President's decision and will see to it that the Air Force
as a whole does. He pointed out, however, that if the enemy does not respond positively, we are left with only two
alternatives: either to go up in escalation or down. He thought it a fallacy to suppose that sorties not flown north of the 20th
Parallel would make any significant difference south of there. If the pause were prolonged, he thought it could lead to
tragedy.

General Chapman said he thought the military disadvantages might be real; particularly in their effect on the morale of the
Marines at the DMZ. He recognized that we faced a battle for resolve--the resolve of the GVN, the NVN and the American
people. He questioned whether the will of the Americans would be strengthened by a weaker position. His friends believe
that the American people would react better to an escalatory approach. General Chapman asked Mr. Clifford whether he
thought the diminution of U.S. support was temporary. Mr. Clifford said no, he thought it was solid; that it sprang from the
situation in our cities, price inflation, concern over our gold cover, and a general disorientation of values.
Mr. Clifford asked the Chiefs whether a distinction could be made between support for the decision and opposition thereto.
General Johnson said he would certainly support the decision. However, if asked in a Congressional hearing as to whether
he had proposed the action, he would reply in the negative, and if asked for his personal views, he would have to express
the doubts he had in his mind. All of the Chiefs agreed that they would support the President's decision. General Wheeler,
General McConnell and General Chapman felt that, in view of all the circumstances, the President's position was an
appropriate one.
It was agreed that Mr. Clifford would suggest to Mr. Rusk that he explain the reasons for the President's decision to
Admiral Sharp when he saw him at Wellington, New Zealand. General Wheeler said he would send a back-channel
message to General Ryan explaining the reasons for the decision.
Mr. Clifford asked whether any of the Chiefs felt that they desired to express their views directly to the President or
whether they would rely upon his, Mr. Clifford's, presentation of their views to the President. They all agreed that they saw
no necessity for their seeing the President.

167. Editorial Note

From 4:13 to 7:27 p.m. on March 30, 1968, the President met with his advisers at the White House. Those attending
included Secretary of Defense Clifford, General Wheeler, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Bundy, Walt Rostow, former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Harry McPherson, George Christian, and Tom
Johnson. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) On their advice, the President decided against announcing a call-up of
reservists either to fill units going to Vietnam or to replenish the strategic reserve (save for medical and other specialized
support units). The President conceded: "Okay, I am willing to do it any way that you all want to. I'm just worn down on it. I
don't want to leave the impression that they are going to be called up. When they are called up they will get the notice," he
stated. He later added: "Well, I am convinced we will have to call up 48,000 people within the next few months. Now the
question is whether you want to hit one belly-buster and put it in here or not. I would think that's ill-advised, but how to deal
with it I'm not sure." (Ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room)
The President was convinced of the necessity of minimizing the public reaction to the call-up as much as possible, as
Wheeler explained in telegram JCS 3564 to Westmoreland, March 31: "At a White House meeting this evening the
President cited the fact that we have been accused in the past of always accompanying peace initiatives with increased
military operations. He is aware, of course, of your operations leading to clearing Route 9 and eventually operating against
the enemy in the vicinity of Khe Sanh. The purpose of this message is not to have you stand down those operations.
However, it is desired that you, your subordinate commanders and your PA people play them in low key. By this I mean,
since the press is always with you, you and your people should take care to describe these operations as being merely in
the usual run of offensive operations against the enemy." (Ibid., William C. Westmoreland Papers, #30 History File, 1-31
Mar 68 [II])

168. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, March 31, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Rusk-Dobrynin. Secret; Sensitive.
Meeting of the President with Ambassador Anatoliy T. Dobrynin/2/
/2/The meeting lasted from 5:55 to 6:25 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) The Department of State transmitted a
summary of the conversation to Rusk, who was in New Zealand to attend a SEATO meeting, in telegram 139705 to
Wellington, April 1. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET)
Although the Daily Diary notes that Dobrynin met with the President, Rostow, and Harriman, the Soviet Ambassador

asserted in his memoirs that only he and the President were present. According to Dobrynin, as he left the Oval Office, the
President stopped him in the hallway and informed him of the surprise ending that he planned for his speech. (Anatoly
Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Times Books, 1995),
pp. 170-173) A March 30 memorandum from Rostow to the President suggesting issues to raise and a March 31 list of
talking points for the meeting are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech,
Vol. 4, Tabs LL-ZZ and a-k.
Also present: W. Averell Harriman and W.W. Rostow
(Note: Gov. Harriman and Mr. Rostow had gone over with Amb. Dobrynin the President's speech/3/ for about an hour
before joining the President in the Mansion.
/3/See Document 167.
The partial bombing cessation was explained as well as other statements bearing on our negotiating position.)
The President met Ambassador Dobrynin at about 6:05 p.m.
The President began by stating that he was going as far as he could in all conscience go, given the tactical position in the
field. He could not endanger lives of his men on the Vietnamese frontiers by having a total bombing cessation. It was up to
the Soviet Union as Geneva co-chairman and as a major arms supplier to Hanoi to bring its influence to bear for a
conference and the making of peace.
The President recalled that the Soviet Union had played an important role at Tashkent in settling the India-Pak war. He
believed, after his talks with Premier Kosygin at Glassboro, that Kosygin wished to be helpful; although nothing had come
of it. But the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had shown in many matters that we could work together for constructive results; for
example, in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
This was a time for everyone to bring to bear the greatest forbearance, restraint, and understanding. In South Vietnam
itself the contending parties must give up war and seek a one-man, one-vote solution.
The Ambassador should be aware, however, that the U.S. was not going to pull out of Vietnam. The proportion of
American voters who actually wanted to pull out was about 5%; another 15% wanted the President to do less militarily; but
there were 40% who wanted the U.S. to do more. That was the problem with which he had to deal.
The President had great concern about Southeast Asia as a whole, not only Vietnam. He feared a much wider war that
would be contrary to both our interests and the Soviet's interests. He thought perhaps the Chinese were getting "cocky"
and "chesty." Their aggressive ambitions should not be encouraged. It was up to the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to end the war
in Vietnam soon and prevent hostilities from spreading.
The President said he had gone 90% of the way; now it was up to the Co-Chairmen to make it possible to go the last 10%
and start negotiations for peace.
Ambassador Dobrynin asked the President to explain precisely why a 100% bombing pause was impossible. The
President did so, adding that if Dobrynin thought of what it would be like if there were Russian soldiers in the same position
as Americans and German forces were approaching, he would understand. Dobrynin said that the Soviet Union was lucky
enough not to be there. The President countered: "But you are helping them."
Ambassador Dobrynin asked about the area in which we would bomb. It was explained: below the 20th parallel.
He asked if there was a time limit on the cessation. The President said no firm limit--perhaps a few weeks. Dobrynin said
that was good. It is better not to have to hurry.
Dobrynin took full notes and a preliminary text of the speech, departing about 6:30 p.m.
W.W. Rostow/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

169. Editorial Note

President Johnson spoke to the nation on March 31, 1968, at 9 p.m. By 1 p.m. that day, Secretary of Defense Clifford had
transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff an order, effective at 7 p.m., to halt all strikes on North Vietnam north of 20 degrees
latitude. (Memorandum by Executive Secretary Benjamin Read, March 31; National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET) After Horace Busby, Johnson's former speechwriter, helped the President
finish up the surprise ending of his televised address on Vietnam, the President read it to his wife, daughters, and his
friends Arthur and Mrs. Krim, who listened without comment. Between 3:03 and 3:36 p.m., Johnson practiced the speech
in front of television cameras, after which he requested a copy of former President Harry Truman's withdrawal remarks
made in 1952. At 6:35 p.m., as Busby continued to revise the ending, the President told him: "Buzz, we're going down to
the line, it's time . . . let's see what you have." The final pages of the speech did not go to the teleprompters until 7:37 p.m.
Presidential aide Jim Jones took the final part of the speech to be encrypted to the teleprompters at 8:10 p.m.; this section
was placed into the President's speech book at 8:55 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
President Johnson began his address to the nation at 9:01 p.m. The speech marked the culmination of months of debate
within the administration over the course of policy in Vietnam. Describing the recent Tet offensive as a failure, the
President stated his intention to seek peace by repeating the offer made at San Antonio the previous fall to end the
bombing of North Vietnam when assured that prompt and productive talks would follow and that the North Vietnamese
would not take military advantage of the halt. The substantive part of his speech reads:
"We are prepared to move immediately toward peace through negotiations. So, tonight, in the hope that this action will lead
to early talks, I am taking the first step to de-escalate the conflict. We are reducing--substantially reducing--the present
level of hostilities. And we are doing so unilaterally, and at once. Tonight, I have ordered our aircraft and naval vessels to
make no attacks on North Vietnam, except in the area north of the demilitarized zone where the continuing enemy buildup
directly threatens allied forward positions and where the movements of their troops and supplies are clearly related to that
threat. The area in which we are stopping our attacks includes almost 90 percent of North Vietnam's population, and most
of its territory. Thus there will be no attacks around the principal populated areas, or in the food-producing areas of North
Vietnam. Even this very limited bombing of the North could come to an early end--if our restraint is matched by restraint in
Hanoi. But I cannot in good conscience stop all bombing so long as to do so would immediately and directly endanger the
lives of our men and allies. Whether a complete bombing halt becomes possible in the future will be determined by
events."
He also announced his designation of Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman as his personal representative to peace
talks. At the end of his speech, the President discussed a final decision:
"With America's sons in the fields far away, with America's future under challenge right here at home, with our hopes and
the world's hopes for peace in the balance every day, I do not believe that I should devote an hour or a day of my time to
any personal partisan causes or to any duties other than the awesome duties of this office--the Presidency of your country.
Accordingly, I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your President." For full
text of the speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pages
469-476.
After the speech, the President received a number of telephone calls from colleagues. The first that he took came at 9:46
p.m. from Chicago Mayor Richard Daley, who told him: "We're going to draft you. You dropped the biggest bombshell by
announcing that you will not be a candidate for nomination for another term as my President." This call was followed in
quick succession by calls from Vice President Humphrey (then in Mexico) and Texas Governor John Connally. Calls later
in the evening came from the wife of Senator Eugene McCarthy, former aide Bill Moyers, Governor Nelson Rockefeller,
and others.
The President then took questions during a press conference from 11 to 11:40 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily
Dairy) During the press conference, the President described his decision as "completely irrevocable." He noted that the
"turning point" in his decision came during the visit of General Westmoreland the previous November. He also pledged to
do as much as he could in terms of the peace process in the remaining months of his administration. For full text of his
remarks, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pages 476-482.
In remarks to Krim at 12:12 a.m., the President reflected, "I never was any surer of any decision I ever made in my life, and
I never made any more unselfish one. I have 525,000 men whose very lives depend on what I do, and I can't worry about
the primaries. Now I will be working full time for those men out there. I don't need to worry, and the only guys that won't be
back here by the time my term ends are the guys that left in the last day or two. I think the boys will be glad that I'm
working for them." (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968

Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 173-193

April 1-May 3: Discussions on the Site for Talks

170. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, April 1, 1968, 1110Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential;
Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
23612. 1. For obvious reasons, I asked to see Thieu, immediately after listening to President's speech,/2/ and saw him this
afternoon for three quarters of an hour.
/2/See Document 169. The Department transmitted general guidance for discussion of the President's decisions in circular
telegram 139524, April 1. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
2. I opened by saying I was as surprised as he must have been by the President's announcement with respect to his
candidacy.
3. Thieu immediately asked what significance was to be attached to it? Has the President really closed the door? Was
there no possibility of a draft at the convention?
4. I said I had no inkling whatsoever that this announcement was coming and I have so far had no instructions. I therefore
have no special information to provide him on this decision. I could only give him my personal view: The President, by
taking this step, has a free hand to pursue the new policies which he announced and which represent no departure from
his stand on Vietnam; and he has cut the ground from under the critics of his Vietnam policy. He has lifted Vietnam out of
domestic politics and is asking the country and his opposition to face up squarely to what must be done.
5. Thieu said he was making a speech tonight on the anniversary of the promulgation of the Constitution, and tomorrow at
1000 hours he will have his joint press conference with Ky./3/ He had obviously to deal with the President's speech and
would welcome any advice. The rumors in Saigon were that this represents a change in U.S. policy, that the President
abandoned his policy on Vietnam, that Kennedy will clearly win the nomination, and so on.
/3/During this press conference, Thieu asserted: "I have said many times that if the allies cannot continue their assistance,
we will fight on alone." Both he and Ky assured their people that they would work together. (Telegram 23956 from Saigon,
April 4; ibid.)
6. I suggested he ought probably avoid speculation and interpretation on these lines, and say these were domestic U.S.
questions on which he did not think it appropriate to comment. He nodded vigorously, saying that was what he intended to
do. As for the rest of the speech he found it unexceptional. It was flexible and very carefully constructed, and it would give
him no difficulties. "President Johnson in this speech," he said with a smile, "was more Asian than we Asians."
7. He said he was sorry the President did not indicate that he had consulted with the GVN leaders on the substance of the
speech, since he would be asked if this was the case. He intended to handle this by saying that contents of the speech,
except for the last part about the President's personal intentions, came as no surprise since it was discussed with him in
advance. He intends to stress the many favorable features of speech, and make reference to GVN's support for the need
to search for a peaceful solution.
8. Thieu asked how long the restriction on bombing would apply and what we regard as a "significant response" from
Hanoi. I said, as I told him at our previous meeting, we have no specific period in mind but thought it might run four weeks
or so, or longer, and that we thought Hanoi's reply would probably be negative.
9. Thieu said he thought Hanoi would deal with the new statement on two planes. Officially they would say it was not
responsive to their demand for a complete cessation of all bombing. Privately Hanoi would circulate rumors that the
speech shows that even President Johnson recognizes his hawkish policy has failed and that he has now abandoned it.

10. Comment: Thieu was unflappable during the conversation. He was constructive, did not appear to be alarmed by this
most unexpected turn of events, and was more puzzled than worried. I think in the back of his mind is the feeling that the
President has by a bold stroke removed Vietnam from domestic U.S. political controversy, confounded his critics, and won
the first round in the political campaign./4/
/4/Bunker also reported in his 46th weekly message to the President on the South Vietnamese reaction to the news of
Johnson's peace offer: "The general reaction to your speech was at first confused and fearful, but as the text became
widely available and was studied carefully, reactions were generally favorable. While there remains some fear, particularly
with the man on the street, that the decision to sharply reduce the bombing may be a sign of American wavering in the
face of the enemy, most opinion makers here now see it as a necessary gesture toward American and world
opinion." (Ibid.) This telegram is printed in full in Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 403-410.
Bunker

171. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator J. William Fulbright/1/
Washington, April 1, 1968, 4:03 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and
Fulbright, April 1, 1968, 4:03 p.m., Tape F6804.01, PNO 10. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared
specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
Fulbright: Hello?
President: Hello?
Fulbright: Mr. President, Bill Fulbright.
President: Yes, Bill. How are you?
Fulbright: Well, I just wanted to congratulate you on a very great and unselfish act of statesmanship.
President: Well, thank you, Bill. I'm mighty glad to hear it.
Fulbright: I heard it last night and, of course, it was a big surprise to me. It was a very unusual circumstance. I happened to
be out making a speech myself, and we suspended it and listened to yours. But you made a very fine impression, and if
they don't respond to it, well, I just can't understand it at all.
President: We called in--I wanted to talk to you but we didn't get to talk. They told me--Clark [Clifford] said he was going to
talk to you. He thought you'd be back--was it Saturday/2/ night? Did you come back?
/2/March 30.
Fulbright: Yes. Clark did call me right after I got back from Arkansas.
President: Well, we talked to Dobrynin yesterday/3/--I wanted to tell you. We don't want it out, but I asked him and told him
we'd sent for Tommy [Thompson], and that we wanted to go as far as we could in this country without having mutiny in our
own forces and that we were going to eliminate everything except that below the pass where they're directly hitting the
DMZ and Mu Gia Pass--that road that's bumper to bumper. We felt if we didn't protect that, well, we'd lose thousands of
casualties and it would be reprehensible, but that we would be glad if they saw fit not to shove their crash program up our
bottom there--to even pull out there if there's any chance of talking or anything. And we felt that he had a real responsibility
and we'd been doing pretty well with them. I knew that hadn't admitted it, but Thompson thought we had a good record and
we'd had lots of things--the consular treaty, and the exchange agreement, and now the non-proliferation. We had a lot of
other things we had to live with, and this is a chance for them to show some responsibility. And they were furnishing this
equipment, and we weren't hell-bent on furnishing it and we didn't want anything. We wanted to pull out. We never had
wanted to be there. I'd asked them not to go in there in '54, unless everybody go in with us. They were there when I came
in as President. I had to get out or do the best I could. I've done the best I could. I'm sure I've goofed and made a lot of

errors, but I've done the best I know how and I just wished that he'd get his people. Kosygin told me he thought I was--had
done about what he expected, and he thought he could market my product at Glassboro, and gave me to believe he
thought we were going pretty far. But I never did hear from him. I thought he ought to go all the way now. He [Dobrynin]
didn't say what he'd do--very courteous, very polite, seemed to be very pleased with what we were saying. I didn't go into
the last part of the speech. I thought, though, that it might have taken a little local play away from the proposal here at
home. On the other hand, I thought it relieved us of any political connotations or the fact that we're just trying to do what
somebody wanted us to do to get votes. And most people thought it had a better impression in other capitals because it
had that on it--that after all, nothing I want except peace. So, he went away, I think, impressed. And we are working very
hard. We sent word to the Pope at the same time. We gave U Thant advances through Goldberg. I had General Ridgway
and Mac Bundy and a large group of folks in here--about 15--last week, [including] George Ball, and we looked at
everything we could do. They spent two days on the briefings and analyzing it. And this seemed to be the thing--we had, I
need not tell you, strong divisions in our government on it. I'm going to try to go out and meet some of the military people in
a few days to try to hold everything--keep them aboard, certainly, while this is going on.
/3/See Document 168.
Fulbright: I think you took a very courageous stand. I don't know that I can do you a bit of good at all. I'd be willing to try, if
you want me, to talk to any of these people. I have been on reasonable relations with Dobrynin and the Polish
Ambassador, [and] the Yugoslavian Ambassador./4/ I don't know whether it'd do a damned bit of good, and I don't want to
do it unless you think it might. I just offer that. If there's anything else I can do to try to persuade them that there's an
opportunity for them, [that] they ought not to pass it up.
/4/Jerzy Michalowski and Veljko Micunovic, respectively.
President: Yes, I think that would be good, and-Fulbright: You want me to do that?
President: Yes. Yes, I think so. Let me see who we talk to and let me call you back or have Clark or Chip [Bohlen] call you.
Fulbright: The three that I know are the Russians, the Pole, and the Yugoslav. I don't know the-President: Well, I have the feeling that the Polish have been trying to help us and I believe the Yugoslavs too and I think it
would be good to talk to both of them. And I think I would--I would say that we in this country, certainly the President,
regardless of what we may differ on anything else, that we had rather find a way to stop the killing of our people, ours and
theirs, more than anything else in the world and we're trying to do it, and if this is not the way, and they've got a better one
that would endure, we'd like to have it, and that now is the time to let Tommy Thompson and Averell [Harriman] go over
there and start something.
Fulbright: Well, I think it is a good play. They really ought to respond. I think it may take them a few days because it
probably comes as a great surprise and they've been fighting so damned long. It takes a few days for them to kind of-President: Well, we're prepared to stay for several weeks. We don't want to do anything rushed. We talked about Rusk, we
talked about Bohlen, we talked about different ones, and they finally thought that Averell had been handling all the talks at
all the other countries. But we needed a professional, and so we decided--everybody thought Tommy Thompson was
respected and if we had to get the Soviets, he would be the best one with them to use. I hope you think that's all right.
Fulbright: Yes, he's a good man.
President: I haven't talked to him, but that's what the Departmental people and Clark thought he would be the best. Clark
suggested him to me and he's being of a good deal of help. And I wish you'd spend whatever time you can with him
because he respects you and likes you and I think that we can bring the government a little closer together in these days
ahead when we all need to be that way.
Fulbright: Yes, Thompson is a good fellow. I like him. That's fine. I'll do what I can.
President: Thank you, Bill.

172. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, April 2, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. Transcribed from a handwritten
text. The meeting, which took place at a luncheon in the Mansion of the White House, began at 1:01 p.m., but there is no
indication when it ended. The President returned to the Oval Office from the Mansion at 4:55 p.m. Those attending were
the President, Clifford, Katzenbach, Helms, Wheeler, Rostow, Christian, and Tom Johnson. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
Pres[ident]: I believe we should brief the House and Senate on the bombing restrictions. It may be we should brief the
press.
C[lifford]: I have been on the phone all morning about it.
K[atzenbach]: Mood on Hill is terrible./2/ I think you should say you are going up to the 20th parallel. We must do this-otherwise, we take Hanoi off the hook. 1st target selected was a bad one.
/2/That morning on the Senate floor, Fulbright led an attack on the bombing cutback, describing it as "not a significant
change at all" and a move that was unlikely to induce North Vietnam to enter into negotiations. Mansfield noted that the
President's "inexact language" left room for interpretation of the extent of the halt. See The New York Times, April 3, 1968.
P[resident]: I wouldn't amend the decision. I would clarify it. Tell them where the line is if necessary.
Pres.: We stopped hitting 90% of the population and we have nothing in return. Did you tell Fulbright it was 20th parallel?
C: It was Saturday evening./3/ I told him it was the 20th parallel.
/3/March 30.
Pres.: I want the 4 of you to meet with them on it. Show them the Tass comments./4/ Momyer scared me about the order
we already had issued. Said NVN trucks were running with lights on.
/4/On April 1 the Soviet news agency Tass described the offer by Johnson as not conforming to DRV demands to enter
into talks, as reported in The New York Times, April 3, 1968.
W[alt] R[ostow]: Trucks are now running with lights on at night. They are getting a lot of them through.
Pres.: I think they have 12 inches and they want 6.
C[lark] C[lifford]: Russell was concerned about us limiting ourselves at a time when men are coming through. He thought
pause was a mistake.
Pres.: What was the theory of taking out the 20th parallel?
K: Wanted to relate the pause functionally rather than geographically.
G[eorge] C[hristian]: The problem is that speech/5/ said we are stopping bombing in area of DMZ. This attack was 200
miles north of the DMZ.
/5/See Document 169.
C: If we limit ourselves below 20th they will take advantage of it. It would be grave mistake to go below 20th parallel. Odds
are 100 to 1 Hanoi will turn us down. Best thing we can do is to show a continuing effort. We have done that. We told
Dobrynin it was 20th parallel./6/
/6/See Document 168.

Pres.: Military can say they intend to bomb right up to 20th parallel.
Helms: Impression of speech was it was squeezed tight to DMZ.
Clifford: Might prepare clear statement of where we are--to give intent. Give statement to press and to Congress.
Pres.: Statement won't stop it. Have to have briefings on the Hill.
Clifford: I think everything we need to say can be put in a statement.
Katzenbach: Can't you say concentration will be so. [south] of Vien, with certain targets north.
Clifford: Nothing wrong with that.
Pres.: Read section of speech given Sunday night (insert). Does that trouble any of you?
Wheeler: Not I.
P: 1st call I got after speech was Mrs. McCarthy; Ted Kennedy; Ernest Gruening; George McGovern. I knew something
was wrong when all of them approved.
(Harry McPherson enters with text of remarks which was shown Fulbright and Mansfield.)/7/
/7/McPherson came in at 1:37 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
C: I do not think all of us should go up with a briefing, which . . .
R[ostow]: It is 180 degrees from DMZ to 20th parallel.
P: How far was this target from DMZ?
W[heeler]: 205 nautical miles.
C: 90% of our sorties have been along DMZ. Only 10% up in the northern [part]. The President's purpose was to take a
unilateral step to reduce significantly the level of violence. Consequently, attacks have halted in the area of North Vietnam
containing almost 90% of its population and three-fourths of its land. In the remaining quarter of NVN--from the 20th
parallel just north of Thanh Hoa south to the DMZ--where in the President's words "the movement of troops and supplies
are a threat to allied forward positions," attacks are continuing. This area--known as the Panhandle--is the funnel through
which troops & supplies must flow both directly south to the DMZ & west to the Ho Chi Minh trail directly to the battlefront.
P: Mansfield got impression it was "just" north of DMZ. This pause is only going to aggravate the hawks and won't please
the doves.
WR: I thought Dobrynin took it seriously and would report it so. We took cities and main population centers off./8/
/8/The next day the administration released a statement specifying the 20th parallel as the restriction line and explaining
that the President had left the reference vague so that the United States would not be committed to a fixed sanctuary. See
The New York Times, April 3, 1968.
[Omitted here is discussion of the situation in the Middle East and the Pueblo crisis. Additional unattributed remarks written
presumably by the President read: "1. Refer troop level to Pentagon. 2. No more troops levels until I approve. Where they
are used against our men. Over 90% of sorties were within 50 mi. of DMZ. In no event bombing will not be north of 20th
parallel."]

173. Telephone Conversation Among President Johnson, Senator Mike Mansfield, and Secretary of Defense

Clifford/1/
Washington, April 2, 1968, 2:10 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Among Johnson,
Mansfield, and Clifford, April 2, 1968, 2:10 p.m., Tape F6804.01, PNO 11. No classification marking. This transcript was
prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
Mansfield: Mr. President, a great deal of flap is going on up here among a good number of the Senators relative to this
bombing which took place some 200 miles north.
President: Wait a minute. Let me put Clark Clifford on here a second. Go ahead.
Mansfield: Are you on, Clark?
Clifford: I'm on, Mike.
Mansfield: There is a good deal of flap going on up here about this recent report, which I haven't seen, about the bombing
209 miles north of the DMZ. The general impression seems to have been that what the President said the other day was
the bombing would continue north of the 17th parallel and the general impression was that it would be confined, oh, I
would say no further than the Mu Gia Pass, which is about 80 miles north, to give the protection to our troops or to stop the
recent infiltration of men and materiel./2/
/2/On April 1 bombings occurred near Thanh Hoa, 205 miles north of the DMZ (and only 81 miles from Hanoi) but below
the 20th parallel. Goulding stated that the bombings were "within the framework" of the March 31 restriction; unnamed
officials described the exact area of the bombing cessation as "undefined." See The New York Times, April 2, 1968. In an
April 3 memorandum to the President, Rostow justified the attack on Thanh Hoa, specifically noting that it was a major
transit point for men and supplies going into South Vietnam and Laos and that it also contained an airfield that was
recently active. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 6 G (3), 4/1-10/68, Talks with Hanoi)
President: I think that is Marcy's impression. There's not anything in my comments that says that at all. The decision was
based, as you know, on the 20th parallel, and as Bill Fulbright knows because I read you the text that had "20th parallel"
on it and we briefed Russell and Fulbright and all of them on it. We didn't brief the god-damned mousy old women who
serve as staff members, so they've been going around very concerned. Now we have a concentration point up there-marshaling yards where they unload their trucks to send steel to put in the butts of your Montana boys and mine. They are
below the 20th parallel. We took the cities off and we took 90 percent of the population off and we took these power plants
and the POLs and the other things around these civilian populations. But we did not take anything off below the 20th
parallel. The 20th parallel was the line. Now the diplomats felt we ought to describe it in the language we did, that I have
ordered aircraft and vessels to make no attack on North Vietnam except in the area north of the DMZ where the continuing
enemy buildup--this is one of the big build-up points--directly threatens Allied forward positions, and where the movements
of their troops and supplies are clearly related to that threat.
Mansfield: Yes, sir.
President: Now, General Momyer was in last night./3/ They don't like our setting the 20th parallel, but that does give them
200 miles to stop these trucks in without going into a city and hitting an old woman or bothering any Communist or killing
any children or hitting any hospitals. It is just primarily area roads with 10 percent of the population. Now that's what we
said. We said it specifically until the diplomats thought it would be a little better to generalize it. But the text I read you was
the 20th parallel. The briefing we gave Fulbright was 20th parallel. The briefing we gave Russell was 20th parallel. But
instead of saying 20th parallel, the State Department people thought that instead of just drawing a hard line there and
saying that "Boys, you can marshal everything you want to right up on that line, we won't touch you." That is what is
happening in Haiphong. We have told them we have made concessions here not to bomb Haiphong, so they have got their
damn storage area there. Momyer said it just looks like one big truck yard full of supplies. Now when we tell them we're not
going to do something, they take advantage of it immediately. So, when they wrote this paragraph, they eliminated the
20th parallel, which is the decision we made, you and Fulbright and Clark briefed the Senators on, and said that we will
stop our bombing except in the area north where a continuing enemy build-up directly threatens. Now that is an area right
up to the 20th parallel and the place that they hit yesterday was probably a target that was selected a week ago. But it is a
marshaling yard where a bunch of trucks got supplies coming right into our boys. Of course, it is probably three hours
away from them at 60 miles an hour. By airline, it is 180 miles. By round circuitous road, it is 209 miles. So they hit that.
Now, most of the strikes are within, oh, 50 or 60 miles. Clark thinks that out of a hundred we hit yesterday, that probably 90
percent of them are within 50 or 60 miles. They've already come down. But it you can get up there where they are

breeding, if you can get them one month pregnant, we sure want to do it. We don't want--because we will have so damn
many of them bumper to bumper down on the DMZ, if we can stop when we do it. So, what we have done--Hanoi is really
turning down and Tass is turning it down, we think--we thought so all of the time, we did not want to express any doubt, but
we just hope the Senate doesn't turn it down for them. We told Marcy that this morning when he called and said he was
getting worried. Then he got Fulbright worried. Fulbright called me last night and he said it was the greatest move that was
ever made and he heard the speech and knew what I said./4/ But I would hope that without our . . ., I guess we will just
have to come and say the 20th parallel is what we've said to everybody and that's the order that went out and just say,
now then, that permits them to come right in, and on the one inch over the parallel they know they are immune, and that is
bad and our military people don't like that. But we can do that if it satisfies some folks like Marcy. He's upset. He has called
us early this morning and our people have been working on it.
/3/The President and Rostow met with General William Momyer, MACV Deputy Commander for Air Force and the
Commander of the 7th Air Force, Pacific Air Force, from 6:37 to 7:46 p.m. on April 1. (Johnson Library, President's Daily
Diary) No record of their discussion has been found.
/4/See Document 171.
Mansfield: Well, I haven't even seen Marcy, but several newsmen have asked me and called to my attention--what I'm
getting at is the impression was created by your speech was that it would be adjacent to the DMZ for the protection of our
troops and now it is 209 miles or so north and questions are being raised about it.
President: Well, the answer is that, I don't know, I can't control a man's impressions. That is a power I don't have. But I can
control my language, and my language says, "The area north of the demilitarized zone where the continuing enemy buildup directly threatens Allied forward positions and where the movement of their troops and supplies are clearly related to
that threat." Now that could be one mile out of Hanoi, Mike. It is not 200 miles, 190 or 180. I didn't want to say the number
of miles. I did say that I wouldn't hit Haiphong, which we didn't want to say because they have these supply centers,
because I had the impression that the doves were raising hell about our bombing the cities. I didn't know they did not want
us to bomb the trucks that were hitting our men.
Mansfield: No, no. No, no. But they had the idea, and I think it was the general impression among the whole population
that you would be hitting them just north of the DMZ for the primary purpose of protecting our men who are along that area.
And then the story comes out 209 miles north. Then they were wondering, "Well, gee, what does this mean? How far do
they have to go north to give protection to the DMZ?"
President: Well, I think to give real protection you have to go all the way, right in Hanoi and Haiphong. But to try to make
an earnest appeal, we say that 90 percent of your population and most of your area, about 75 percent of your area, is offlimits to our bombers. We have the air fields, we have the build-up yards, the concentration points, that aren't 220 miles or
215 miles by road, not airline, but by road. Every time we can hit one of them and catch them with a lot of supplies, why we
are going to do it, even if it offends Mr. Cooper--just got to protect our men. And that is what we said. We didn't say "just."
They have raised the question down here with us, I think Marcy or some of them, that we said "just north." Now, we didn't
say that.
Mansfield: No, no. "In the area north."
President: We say, "except in the area north where the continuing enemy build-up threatens allied positions." Now that is
not anything that says it will be 10 miles or 200.
Mansfield: No, no. Technically, what you said is correct, Mr. President. All I am conveying to you is the impression from
your speech that many of them thought this did not mean 200 miles north to get a marshaling yard but maybe as much as
40 or 50 miles north of the DMZ itself.
President: Well, it means that if you want to be real factual and they want to tie us and put us in a straitjacket, and that
means, I'd like for them to be with us a little bit, but if they want to tie us, you can say 20th parallel.
Mansfield: No, I don't want to use that name because-President: that's what I read to you. I just went over the text of the speech I read to you and it has in it the 20th parallel and
we just went over the briefing with Fulbright and it has the 20th parallel. And we just went over with Buzz Wheeler what we
told Russell and Rivers and that's 20th parallel. We were telling you all in confidence and we didn't necessarily want to tell
the North Vietnamese that you can stack up on the eight yard line and away from the 20th parallel. But I think it has got to
the point where that maybe you ought to say that the area north where they have the build-up extends as far up as the

20th parallel.
Mansfield: Up to.
President: Yes, sir. That involves 180 miles airline from the DMZ. Now that's about 3 or 4 hours drive by truck and we want
to stop those trucks. If they would quit, as I said in the speech, the next paragraph, if they would quit running down there,
we would stop it all. I said, "Even this bombing could come to an end if our restraint is matched by restraint." But I--now,
you know how it is being matched? General Momyer said it is being matched--for the first time they are turning their lights
on at night because they are in such short supply that they have to get supplies through there and they are taking the
losses they suffer when they run with their lights on and they are damn near bumper to bumper. We knocked out nearly, I
believe, 60 of these yesterday. So if we sit here on our fanny and let these marshaling yards, concentration points load up,
unload one truck and put it on another one and come down there, then we will not be able to stop what we have got to stop
in order to protect these men.
Mansfield: Well, I've got the arguments, Mr. President, and I will do my best.
President: I'll try to get Clark to send you a statement you can use with these sentences and I would remind both Fulbright
and Russell we have briefed them on the point parallel and if we have to say it then I just think we have to say it on
account of our own tenderfoots.
Mansfield: Well, we will try not to say it and I hope nothing comes up, but I wanted to be prepared if something did come
up.
President: Now, one other point here that you ought to know for our benefit. We will get you the exact number, but Clifford
has the impression--and this is his first initiative, I guess he, I don't know whether he is going to want to take many more or
not, this is, he is cutting his teeth on this one--but his impression is that of the first 100 sorties, 92 or 93 of them were within
the first 20 or 30 miles because that is where he has really got the last chance to stop them, but 6 or 7 of them are where
they've started. Do you see what I mean?
Mansfield: I see.
President: And the others are in-between. It is like a football game going from here to New York and you all go in the car.
You try to stop them when you get up to Brooklyn Bridge, but you may want to stop some of them out here when they go
across the Potomac.
Mansfield: That is right.
President: Here is Clark.
Clifford: Just one added comment, Mike, that is along the same line as the President but might put it in a little different
perspective. What the President had in mind and what he was saying at the time was if we are going to give our direct
attention to those areas where we see the actual troops and war materiel moving to the enemy that's going to be used
against our boys, and that's what he meant. He might well have said at the time that we are going to give our preferred
attention to the area north of the DMZ and up the line of supply, but in no event will we bomb north of the 20th parallel. He
might have said that. What we did was we sent our sorties over, we found massed trucks down in Route Package 1, which
is 40 or 50 miles north of the DMZ, and we sent most of our sorties in there. As we sent our reconnaissance planes up
north of there to see what else was going on, they found this situation existing up at Thanh Hoa, and that's maybe 12 to 15
miles south of the 20th parallel. Well, here is this massing taking place at this assembly point. That's all part of the same
pipeline. But our major emphasis, which is as the President said, I think the statistics will show, which we will put in a
statement, but I think 90 percent of our effort was directed close down toward the DMZ because that is where the biggest
build-up is.
Mansfield: Well, Clark, I have got to go in for a vote pretty soon. Send me down a memo/5/ as soon as you can, and if this
comes up, I will do the best I can with the information you and the President have given me.
/5/Not found.
Clifford: Good, Mike.

174. Notes of Telephone Conversation/1/

Washington, April 2, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson,
Chron./Sched.--April 1968. Secret; Personal; Nodis.
NOTES ON TELEPHONE CONVERSATION:
TO MR. KATZENBACH FROM GOV. HARRIMAN
Gov. Harriman called Mr. Katzenbach concerning the military reports on bombing deep in NVN; H said had talked to Clark
Clifford, but was sorry at that time did not know of "military spokesmen"./2/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 173.
K. said was having lunch today and discussing the subject.
H. said he is strongly recommending to the President that he make public statement for the press clarifying--said would
send K. a copy./3/ H. continued that Clifford had told him the JCS were reluctant approve 20th parallel; if the President
wants to overrule the Chiefs that's certainly within his power. K. said Clifford is sitting with a 3 to 2 vote on the 20th parallel.
H asked who, to which K replied apparently Navy and Air Force go along but not the Army and Marines; it was 2 to 2.
/3/Attached but not printed is an April 2 memorandum to the President from Harriman, in which Harriman called bombing
so far into North Vietnam a "disastrous trend," which he urged the President to reverse, and requested that the President
issue "an immediate clarification of the bombing restraints." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers,
Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Chron./Sched.--April 1968)
H. said he thought these fellows are trying to sabotage it and try to make a liar of the President; the President has to at
least answer with something very clearly and if later on gets specific information, agree. H. said had been talking to INR
and they told him details--if found traffic on Route 7 increased or if found accumulation of military units or material, or
supplies then revise the decision.
K. said he thought that made sense. H. added that he was using word "disastrous". That Clifford defends military because
they were told 20th parallel and he calls this "fuzzy" language. Unfortunately I didn't know what had gone. Perhaps it is
better for K. to give him (Clifford) what we have from Rome and Canada. Hanoi is going to be let off the hook completely
that H. impression was that 20th parallel was the maximum.
K. When they looked at the language of the speech the orders had not yet gone out. The President approved the orders
after approving the language; K supposed that that is essence of Clifford's argument.
H: But the Chiefs have a responsibility to the Commander and Chief--and they will make the President, our Commander
and Chief, a liar.
K: Give me a copy and I'll take it to lunch and give it to the President.

175. Editorial Note

The North Vietnamese response to President Johnson's offer of peace talks came on the morning of April 3, 1968.
Broadcast over Radio Hanoi, the message chided the Johnson administration for enacting the partial bombing halt and
labeled it a "defeat and at the same time a shrewd trick." While Hanoi recognized that the United States had not
unconditionally stopped the bombing of its territory, it was ready to make a move as well. At the end of the message was
the following declaration: "However, for its part, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declares its
readiness to appoint its representative to contact the U.S. representative with a view to determining with the American side
the unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
so that talks may start." Following an impromptu discussion of the message from North Vietnam with 40 European news
editors, the President read the statement to the press at 5:05 p.m. and pledged that on the basis of this response, the
United States would establish contact with North Vietnamese representatives. For text of the North Vietnamese response

and the President's remarks, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book
I, pages 492-493. The Department transmitted these statements to the Embassy in Saigon and to Secretary of State Rusk
in New Zealand in telegram 141172, April 3. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69,
POL 27 VIET S)
An April 3 memorandum on "Hanoi's Motives" by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency
summarized the conclusions of the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The memorandum noted the change in tactics that the North Vietnamese
response represented and suggested a number of motives for this shift. One reason may have been that Hanoi believed
that President Johnson would resume the bombing and other offensive operations on an even larger scale if the North
Vietnamese did not respond promptly. Second, North Vietnam might have already decided to respond to the partial halt in
order to force a complete cessation, to influence U.S. public opinion, to create divisions between Washington and Saigon,
and to undermine the South Vietnamese morale. Third, the North Vietnamese likely regarded the halt and offer to talk "as a
decisive change in U.S. policy--an admission of unwillingness to continue the war, and a first step towards accepting the
consequences." (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI (Helms) Chrono.,
Jan.-Jul. 1968)
A more detailed analysis of Hanoi's motives was circulated on April 8 to the President and his top foreign policy advisers.
This memorandum, from Abbot Smith, Chairman of the Board of National Estimates, to Director of Central Intelligence
Helms, suggested three possibilities. One was that the North Vietnamese leadership was "highly optimistic" in believing
that the tide of the war had turned in its favor and thus would "begin talking while still fighting." Another possibility was that
the North Vietnamese were "uncertain" and thus "the President's initiative offered an opportunity--though not an ideal one-to give greater emphasis to the political aspects of the struggle." Additionally, the North Vietnamese might have appraised
the situation as "pessimistic" due to the losses they suffered at Tet and therefore "the President's statement provided a
way out." Other contingencies explored in the memorandum included possible domestic turbulence inside North Vietnam
or struggle among the top leadership. In conclusion, the memorandum argued that "Hanoi considers that it can register
further military successes at costs it can afford to bear even if it would prefer not to, that it believes the will to persist is
beginning to crumble on the US/GVN side, and that hard bargaining combined with continued military pressure can bring a
favorable outcome." (Ibid.) A similar analysis by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research appeared in Intelligence Note No.
240 from Deputy Director George Denney to Acting Secretary Nicholas Katzenbach, April 4. (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)

176. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, April 3, 1968, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Kennedy, Robert F. Secret; Sensitive. The
meeting lasted until 11:41 a.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) The President discussed the meeting beforehand with
Chicago Mayor Richard Daley. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between
Johnson and Daley, April 3, 1968, 8:23 a.m., Tape 6804.01, PNO 13) Soon after the meeting began, the President
received a call from Clifford at which time they discussed what to say to Sorensen. (Ibid., Recording of Telephone
Conversation Between Johnson and Clifford, April 3, 1968, 10:30 a.m., Tape 6804.01, PNO 14)
Memorandum of Conversation: The President, Senator Robert F. Kennedy, Theodore Sorensen, Charles Murphy, and
W.W. Rostow, 10:00 a.m., April 3, 1968
The President opened the conversation by saying he had received Senator Kennedy's wire./2/ He was pleased at its spirit
and wished to explore whether they could find areas in which the Senator could be helpful to the nation at this critical time.
/2/Kennedy sent a telegram to the President on April 1 requesting the meeting. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
Senator Kennedy said he was glad to do so and wished to do so.
The President said that he found the situation confronted by the nation the most serious he had seen in the course of his
life. The nation was vulnerable abroad and at home. In Vietnam the situation in Saigon was quite troublesome. The Thieu
government left much to be desired; but if that government went--if there were a coup--we would probably not get a
government as good. This is about as good a government as we are likely to have. It is reasonably responsive to what we
have urged upon it. It is now doing some of the most important things. Thieu would wish personally to do more, but he
cannot get all he would like any more than the President can.

The nation needs a tax bill, or the dollar and the international trade and monetary system will be in mortal danger. It is a
question of weeks, not of months.
The Middle East situation is explosive. The Soviets are likely to take actions detrimental to the peace. The President faced
that problem in June when the Soviets were about to act. He turned the fleet around at that threat. But, essentially there
are forces in the Middle East which are beyond our control. Hussein cannot survive another set of raids on Jordan; but the
Israelis cannot have their buses blown up and children killed without taking action.
It has been very difficult for the President to cope with these problems while under attack every day from Nixon, Senator
Kennedy, Senator McCarthy, and the nation's enemies--as well as certain of our allies. For example, Senator Fulbright
made great difficulties yesterday, although he had been fully briefed by Secretary Clifford, as had the other appropriate
leaders in the Senate. We had briefed the U.K. and the Soviet Government on exactly what we intended to do in our
bombing limitation. The President had consulted a large group of outside experts, who had examined the whole question
of bombing pause and Vietnam policy in general.
There was also irresponsibility with respect to the question of our planning to use nuclear weapons. A rumor started
somewhere. Some woman may have telephoned a Senate committee. Instead of calling the Secretary of Defense, they
went directly to the press. Secretary McNamara had told him that, in his whole period as Secretary of Defense, the
question of nuclear weapons had never been raised with him, nor with the President. A group of scientists then got excited.
They wired General Eisenhower. When they were queried, they said they were not worried about President Johnson using
nuclear weapons but about General Eisenhower advocating their use. This kind of irresponsible behavior was unsettling.
The President said he had only one desire: to do the best he could for the country. He doubted that he and Senator
Kennedy would be far apart if they sat at the same table. He had taken himself out of the election to remove any possible
suspicion that what he was doing was self-interested. He would try to lead the country in the next nine months. He had
great faith and trust in the judgment of the people.
The President said that he would have his own judgments and would exercise them, but except for a few fund-raising
dinners, he planned to keep out of campaign politics.
Senator Kennedy said that he thought the President's speech was magnificent. He understood the difficulties and burdens
borne by the President. He regretted the lack of contact in recent times, and said that a lot of it "was my fault." He would
like to be of help to the President. He would try to help and make an effort. He understands the difficulties in the Middle
East. He had had different ideas about Vietnam and expressed them. But he understood that the President's speech had
been made in the interests of the nation. He had always understood that President Johnson had placed the national
interest as paramount. If there is anything he can do to help, he would like to.
The President responded that there was a great deal that he could do. If Senator Kennedy and the leaders in both parties
wished to act in that spirit they could make a great contribution to national unity. He said that he hoped Senator Kennedy
would keep in touch with Nick Katzenbach. When Nick had said that he had avoided contact with Senator Kennedy, the
President had replied, "that's too bad--he should make contact." The President trusted him fully. He feels the same way
about Senator Ted Kennedy, who has generally taken enlightened positions. Secretary Clifford would be glad to see
Senator Kennedy anytime. The President had instructed Clifford to keep in touch with Senator Fulbright, and hoped that a
new face in the Department of Defense would open up a new relationship.
The President himself would be available to Senator Kennedy or to his people. During this period the President would try
to keep in touch with the spokesmen for various political groups. If national unity and a common outlook could be
achieved, that would be good. But of course there would be no attempt to muzzle differing views.
The President then turned to the military situation in Vietnam and said that the enemy was bringing down men and
supplies in an effort to achieve a decisive military victory. General Momyer had told him that they were for the first time
running their trucks at night with their lights on. It was the President's duty to order a bombing policy that would hold back
from South Vietnam as much of the supplies as possible. On the other hand, the President's position was not inflexible.
Westmoreland had asked for five aircraft squadrons. We didn't have them immediately available and would have had to
call up National Guard units. The President decided to take aircraft away from bombing Hanoi and Haiphong and put them
into the area south of the 20th parallel. Senator Kennedy should be aware, however, that Hanoi and Haiphong are being
used as military storage areas. The streets of Haiphong are full of military supplies.
On Nick Katzenbach's advice, the President had drafted the speech in terms of the functional purpose of the bombing in
the panhandle of North Vietnam rather than in terms of a geographic area. Fulbright had been briefed, but didn't mention
this. Although Russell and Stennis and others had noted that they had been informed. Mansfield had heard the full text of
the speech at a time when the 20th parallel reference was still there./3/

/3/See footnote 2, Document 172.

Then a Hanoi newspaper said the President had said "just above the DMZ." This was backed up by a Tokyo newspaper,
and before we knew it, Members of Congress and newspapermen were stating that the President had misled them. The
President had to go back and have the tape replayed to prove that he had, in fact, followed his text exactly. One of our
serious problems is the willingness of some in this country to play the enemy's game.
It had not been easy with the JCS. They voted 3 to 2 in support of the limited bombing cessation, and would not have done
it without Bus Wheeler's leadership.
The President underlined that the purpose of his strategy was to underline that he was taking a first step and would be
prepared for other steps if there was a response.
The President then went through the attached memorandum and its two tabs with the Senator./4/ Mr. Rostow went over
the map with the Senator, pointing out precisely which routes and points south of the 20th parallel it was necessary to
cover in order to protect our forces.
/4/Not found.
The President then resumed by saying that he had shaved his position on Sunday/5/ night just as fine as he could. He had
to bear in mind not only making the most generous offer to Hanoi that was possible, but also the protection of his men and
the position of our allies. What he had done had been difficult for Thieu and Ky; for the Thais and Koreans. He will try to
move further if it is possible, but we must not be too confident that the Hanoi statement (which the President had made
available to Senator Kennedy) was an authentic peace offer.
/5/March 31.
Returning again to the map and to the language used in the speech, the President explained the danger of a line
permitting the enemy a sanctuary, as in the case of Korea, and explained how Nick Katzenbach's suggestion had been
negotiated between Katzenbach and Harry McPherson. He said, however, that the responsibility was only his own.
Senator Kennedy said he was glad to have this explanation. He had understood from the President's speech that he was
making a great effort. He had not understood the bombing limitation passage, but he had not criticized it. He was glad to
have the explanation now.
The President explained Clifford's conception of a step-by-step de-escalation. He said Tommy Thompson and Governor
Harriman were ready for negotiations if the other side were ready.
Mr. Sorensen interjected that he had found the language of the speech excellent. As a speech writer, he thought it
extremely well done. The whole manner of presenting the President's case was that of a man searching for peace and
prepared for peace. The President noted that the letters to Kosygin were better drafted at the time Sorensen was working
in the White House than now. He noted also that Harry McPherson was not a belligerent-minded fellow and had helped to
give this speech the right tone.
Mr. Sorensen said the briefing had been extremely informative. It was a helpful session. He said there was an inclination in
the press to divide us, but we don't wish to keep divided. It would be good for the country if we were closer together. The
President repeated that Nick Katzenbach would make available anything we had, as would Secretary Clifford. We would
brief Senator Kennedy and his people just as we brief General Eisenhower and Mr. Truman.
If they had any suggestions for policy we would be glad to receive them and discuss them. In this way we could avoid the
violent disagreements which are damaging both to the Democratic Party and to the nation. We must all pull together at this
time. The President said that he felt no bitterness and no vituperation against Senator Kennedy nor against Senator
McCarthy nor Nixon. He wanted to get peace above all. Some were urging him to stop all the bombing. But he had to take
into account that towards the end of last year and early this year the North Vietnamese had sent down into South Vietnam
large additional forces. Westmoreland, when he was here, had asked for a very substantial increase in the forces available
to him. Secretary McNamara had worked it out so that we increased his forces by 45,000--to 525,000--planning to get the
balance that Westmoreland wanted from the South Vietnamese (65,000) and extra divisions from the Thais and the South
Koreans. The President had insisted that we get as much of the forces promised Westmoreland out by the end of 1967. By
airlifting some, we had gotten out 102 of the 106 maneuver battalions promised Westmoreland by Christmas. Meanwhile,
the South Vietnamese had raised their target from 65,000 to 135,000. The South Vietnamese had fought very well during
the Tet offensive. Abrams tells us that of 149 maneuver battalions only 8 performed in an unsatisfactory way; 40 performed

with military distinction; the balance good or better. We are now rushing equipment to them to improve their fire power.
In addition we are sending 13,500 support forces for the 82nd Airborne and Marines that we had sent out by air at the
height of the crisis. This includes artillery, Marine communications, and other units necessary for sustained operations.
We shall call up some Reserves, but only when we are clear that they have a mission, equipment, and something useful to
do. The New York Times story about a request for 206,000 cost the nation a billion dollars in gold./6/ The President had
turned down all requests beyond these supporting forces; although he intended to build back the reserves to a position
where we had seven deployable divisions, as opposed to the 12 we had when we began to send forces to Vietnam.
/6/Reference is to the March 10 story that broke news of the troop augmentation request; see footnote 2, Document 116.
This could involve a callup of something like 30-50,000 men.
This is the President's present plan and he does not intend to do more than this, but situations could arise which would
require more. The Congressional committees had urged for a long time that the President call up the reserves even to the
level of 460,000. McNamara had resisted this for three reasons: it put the country on a war footing; it would cost a lot; and
it was not necessary. As Senator Kennedy will recall, we learned from previous callups that there is a danger that the men
will have nothing to do. The President was determined not to repeat that error and was insisting that the callups from now
on take place only when the mission was clear and all arrangements had been made. He had learned from his son-in-law,
Pat Nugent, what could happen: briefings on the weather which had already been on the radio earlier in the day, and
sitting around reading magazines.
Additional expenditures would be required for two additional M16 factories; to run the helicopter plants 7 days a week
rather than 5. We would get the Thai division beginning in the middle of the year. It looked for a time as though the
Koreans might wish to pull out their two divisions from South Vietnam, but we made it clear that if this happened, we would
have to send our troops now in Korea to South Vietnam. We still hope to get the Korean division. We also had the
expenses of the callup and movement of forces in connection with the Pueblo crisis.
We are encouraging the South Vietnamese to think about talking with the NLF. Thieu is amenable, but faces many
difficulties in South Vietnamese politics. Ultimately the President believes they will talk. Bunker works at it every day. He
now has Berger beside him. He believes it is better to move them step by step rather than to be excessively tough and
blow apart the frail political structure in Saigon. At our urging, Thieu has removed weak Corps commanders and installed
new and more capable province chiefs.
The President then turned to the Stockholm conference. He said that the results were good. The Germans had stood up
with us against the French. The British had accepted a very tough budget and the pound was steadier; but the whole
international monetary system would remain fragile until the Congress passed a tax bill. This was absolutely critical.
The U.S. experts had worked out a surcharge which exempted those under $5000 income. And this was fair. It may,
however, have been too complicated. It would have probably been easier to restore the old rates. That was Wilbur Mills'
view. If we had the old rates, our tax income would be $24 billion higher than it will be this year. The surcharge bill would
give us an extra $9 billion.
The President said that, in retrospect, he never should have repealed the tax bill. And his advice to his successor will be:
Never lower taxes.
The President then summarized his key concerns for the nation:
--Vietnam;
--the Middle East;
--the tax bill and the deficit; and
--the question of the cities and race tension.
With respect to the latter, he hopes to emerge with as much money as we had last year for the cities. If he got the tax bill,
he would be prepared to cut an extra $5 billion from expenditures, including about $2 billion from Defense. It would be

painful, but possible. He does not wish to go beyond a $5 billion expenditure cut. Under these circumstances, he feels that
he could bring the deficit down to the range of $8-$10 billion and that would be manageable and would stabilize the dollar
and the international monetary system.
He expected Congress to cut aid and space appropriation. And he expected cuts also in roads and agriculture. He hoped
that the poverty would have at least as much as last year. We might have to follow the procedure of awaiting the
completion of the 15 appropriation bills by June 30 and then taking something like 2% off payrolls and 5-10% off controls.
This would bring the budget from $186 to $181 billion, of which $2 to $2.5 billion would be non-Vietnam defense. The
President is intent on not abandoning his basic domestic programs.
The President then said the Senator might wish to know that he was going out to Honolulu this weekend to talk with
Westmoreland about his successor--and if it were Abrams--Abrams' successor.
The President explained Operation Pegasus and the opening up of the routes to Khe Sanh./7/ On the whole, he thought
the South Vietnamese had responded well to the Tet attacks; were coming back in pretty good spirit with an apparent
willingness to stand increasingly on their own.
/7/Operation Pegasus referred to operations involving the clearing of Route 9 to Khe Sanh which began on April 1.
Mr. Rostow then explained at somewhat greater length how the enemy's attack on Khe Sanh had proceeded; the role of air
power in the withdrawal of some units; and the objectives of Operation Pegasus.
The President then repeated that Senator Kennedy should feel free to talk with Katzenbach and Clifford and also in the
White House to Mr. Murphy, DeVier Pierson, and Walt Rostow at any time.
The President then said that he proposed that George Christian tell the press that the Senator had sent him a wire offering
his cooperation. The President had accepted the suggestion. The Senator had come in and they had generally discussed
the international situation: Vietnam and the whole picture. They might be meeting again from time to time. They did not go
into politics.
Senator Kennedy then said that he wished to ask a question about the President's political position. He had the highest
admiration for what the President had said in his speech, but he wished to know where he stood. Would the President
oppose Senator Kennedy's candidature? Would he mobilize political forces against him? The President replied that he
hadn't talked to any other candidate. Mrs. McCarthy had called him; but he had not gone beyond what he had said in his
speech.
He had told the Vice President last year that there was no certainty that he would run in 1968; in fact, he rather thought he
would not run. The President said he does not wish to forego his options. He does not wish to mislead Senator Kennedy or
anyone else. It is his hope that he would be able to stay as close as possible to the statement he had made on Sunday
night and keep the Presidency out of the political arena, if that can be avoided.
The President said that he was not pure or holier-than-thou; but he was simply scared about the position of the country. He
had asked the Vice President to meet him later during the day./8/ He would go over the same ground as he had with
Senator Kennedy. The Vice President had been an exceedingly good Vice President. He would not advise him whether or
not to run. The President's objective in the months ahead was to try to get as much done as he possibly could; to get as
nearly universal support for his actions as he could, Democratic and Republican. He would like his successor to take over
with as few problems as possible. If he thought he could do that job and engage in politics, he would have run. He
concluded that he could not do it. Speaking subjectively, the President said that he thought he had done more for the
young via education; for the Negro; and for the colleges--via the higher education bill--than any other President. But the
fact is they feel a detachment from the President. This has been heightened by what Senator Kennedy, Senator McCarthy,
and the Republicans have said. The President concluded that the country would not be served by having a controversial
President in the middle of a campaign at a time when the nation faced such grave issues.
/8/Immediately after the meeting with Kennedy, the President saw Humphrey. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
Notes of this meeting have not been found.
The President went on to say that in fact he had not wanted to be Vice President and had not wanted to be President. Two
men had persuaded him to run in 1960: Sam Rayburn and Phil Graham./9/ They had said that unless Johnson were on the
ticket, John Kennedy could not carry the South. Without the South, Nixon would win. He would have greatly preferred to
have continued to be the leader of the Senate.

/9/Former Senator Sam Rayburn and former publisher of the Washington Post Philip L. Graham.
The Vice Presidency is a job that no one likes. It is inherently demeaning; although no one ever treated a Vice President
better than President Kennedy had treated him.
The President said, "I found myself in this place and did the best I could." He had the feeling that perhaps Senator
Kennedy did not understand his feelings about President Kennedy. When he accepted the Vice Presidency, he felt he
went into a partnership with President Kennedy. They disagreed seldom, but they did disagree a few times. Once on civil
rights, for example, involving an Executive Order including the banks and savings institutions. A few times President
Kennedy was a little irritated with him and showed it; but no one ever knew; although on one occasion President Kennedy
had asked Robert Kennedy to talk to him about a matter of disagreement.
As President he had continued to look on his task as a partnership with President Kennedy. He felt he had a duty to look
after the family and the members of the firm which they had formed together. He had never asked a Kennedy appointee to
resign. He had never accepted the resignation of a Kennedy appointee without asking him to stay. As President, he had
felt President Kennedy was looking down on what he had done and would approve.
The President said he felt the press had greatly exaggerated the difficulties between Senator Kennedy and himself.
Summarizing his attitude towards the campaign, the President said he would vote; he would not forego the possibility of
stating publicly his views; but he planned to keep out of pre-convention politics and keep out of the convention. He recalled
President Truman's ineffective advocacy of Harriman at the Democratic convention. He doesn't plan to do that. On the
other hand, he is making no commitments and he may say whom he will vote for.
Mr. Sorensen then pressed the point by asking: Can Members of the Administration work for one or another Democratic
candidate? The President said he had no hard and fast rule; he would like to think about that. It is a decision he will make
perhaps sometime down the road. He wants no role as a king-maker; but he also wishes to keep his options open. When
he was in Chicago and saw Dick Daley he didn't talk about the nomination. He may at some future time but he has no
plans. As for members of the Administration becoming involved with one or another candidate, this is a matter he would
like to consider before making a decision.
The President said that he had told only Secretaries McNamara and Rusk what he planned to do before he did it. Shrewd
observers might have guessed something, however, through the decision of Governor Connally. Governor Connally had
said he was willing to run for Governor only if the President was going to seek another term. It might have been noted that
Governor Connally did not run.
The President is conscious of what the Senate did to President Wilson and President Truman. He simply did not command
the leadership to get the results the nation needed.
As for the candidates, he had not talked to them and they have not talked to the President. He wanted it understood that
he had a warm affection for the Vice President. No one has ever served a President better in that post. The Vice President
has not indicated whether or not he is going to run. The President simply doesn't know.
The President received more than 5000 telegrams in response to his speech, many asking to whom should they now turn.
The President had answered them politely but did not respond to that question.
Senator Kennedy then asked this question: If the President decides to take a position on a candidate, would he inform
Senator Kennedy before he does so? The President said: I will try to honor that request if I can be that cool--unless I lose
my head in response to a particular situation.
Senator Kennedy said, I merely ask that so that I can be clear in my own mind as to your position. The President then said
he would call Senator Kennedy if he decided to take a position in the campaign.
Senator Kennedy said he regarded the President as a brave and dedicated man.
The President then said that he would summarize his position and attitude as follows: He does not believe the country
understands the gravity of the international position. There are many points of trouble: Vietnam and the Middle East,
notably, but also Frei/10/ is in trouble; there is trouble in Brazil; Ayub/11/ is ill and no one knows who might succeed him;
the India/Pak tension is just beneath the surface; the whole South East Asian situation is fragile in Indonesia, Thailand,
and Laos.

/10/Eduardo Frei Montalva, President of Chile.

/11/Mohammed Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan.
In addition, there is the monetary situation, race problems, and the cities.
The President would do his very best to get peace. He was not optimistic, but he thought all would benefit.
He would do his best to have a good summer. In fact, there would be more jobs this year than last; there would be more
money for urban activities, although not as much as he wanted. The Ford group was getting well organized to provide jobs
in the private sector; there were more housing starts in the cities. On the other hand, there were all the disruptive liabilities
of an election year. He would do anything he could to maintain a stable country.
He would like to emphasize that things are more dangerous than people realize. He hopes that his successor can do
better.
Concluding, the President said that he had responded to Senator Kennedy's telegram because it was right for him to do
so. He would try to behave the way he would wish Senator Kennedy to behave if their positions were reversed. He had
already talked in this vein to Mrs. McCarthy. He would talk with the Vice President. The Senator should understand his
great affection for the Vice President. He feels towards him the way, perhaps, Ted Sorensen feels toward Senator Robert
Kennedy. But he intended not to involve his office in the campaign because:
--he would not be effective;
--it would not be consistent with what he wants to do with the Presidency; and
--if he were to get in campaign politics, he would have been involved on his own behalf.
He wishes to keep the freedom to do and say what he feels right later in the campaign, but he does not plan to enter it.
The President said that if there were any way in which he could have avoided being a Presidential candidate in 1964, he
would have not run then. He wants Senator Kennedy to know that he doesn't hate him, he doesn't dislike him, and that he
still regards himself as carrying out the Kennedy/Johnson partnership.
W.W. Rostow/12/
/12/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

177. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, April 3, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. Transcribed from Tom
Johnson's handwritten notes. Those attending the meeting, which lasted from 12:29 to 1:29 p.m., were the Vice President,
Katzenbach, Goldberg, Fowler, Clifford, Clark, O'Brien, Smith, General Taylor, Interior Secretary Stewart Udall, Commerce
Secretary Cyrus Smith, Under Secretary of Agriculture John Schnittker, Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz, Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare-designate Wilbur Cohen, Housing and Urban Development Secretary Robert Weaver,
Secretary of Transportation Alan Boyd, and Presidential aides John Macy, Leonard Marks, Barefoot Sanders, Mike
Manatos, Ernest Goldstein, John Roche, Ervin Duggan, Charles Maguire, and Tom Johnson. (Ibid., President's Daily
Diary) A full transcript of the recording of the meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
Pres[ident]: Appr[eciate] your dedication to country, loyalty to me, and your unselfishness. Many of you came here and
stayed on at my request, faithful, competent, and served country well. Doubt anybody has sacrificed more. Doubt there
has ever been a more dedicated Cabinet. All of you have been interested in bettering humanity. I will understand if any of
you have to stand aside. I would be happy for you to stay until the last day. I will talk to each of you.

We have some indication from Hanoi we are evaluating.

Sen. K[ennedy] came in this morning./2/ Spent an hour. Briefed him on international developments. He said he would try to
meet dangers that face country--tax, monetary, city, int'l problem. Told him Rusk-Clifford-Fowler and all would be available
to him and to all of candidates.
/2/See Document 176.
Told V.P. expect him to know anything. I want to stay as close to position I outlined as possible. I do not want to be a kingmaker. I was a trustee of the K[ennedy]-Johnson partnership. I looked on my work as if JFK was watching everything I did.
I think he would give us an A+. I explained that to Sen. K[ennedy]. I am free man--first American, public servant, [then]
Democrat. Said same thing to V.P. Told Kennedy that V.P. has been A triple plus V.P. (12:37--V.P. w/moist eyes). I figured
I was a B+ V.P. and HHH was an A+++ V.P.
I did what I did because thought I ought to do it. Country is in damn serious danger. Danger in Vietnam--danger in Middle
East. We have problem in L.A. Negroes are marching in cities. Needs of civil disorders. Demands of Senate to cut $6
billion. We must have a tax bill. Didn't see how I could do that running with my motives being questioned.
I am going to try to stay as close to statement as I can./3/ Told Bobby I could announce tomorrow but I don't intend to. I am
doing this because I want country to be better. Told K[ennedy] country be made better. Told him anything in State would
be told him by Katz[enbach] & Rusk to all.
/3/Reference is to the President's March 31 address; see Document 169.
[Udall]: Because I am senior,/4/ I speak sentiment[ally] that we regret what you said the other evening. But you put your
country, & unity of your country, before everything else. It has been a great honor to serve you. It will be a great
administration in history.
/4/According to the transcript of the recording of the meeting, Udall stated: "I am senior in age of those who originally
served with President Kennedy and then yourself." (Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room)
Katzenbach: Hanoi came out with statement this morning. In reality, we are not bombing above 20th. This is further than
Hanoi has ever gone. Treat it as a willingness to get together.
Clifford: The offer of Sunday night/5/ was a first step. It seems clear this is their first step. This appears to be a departure
from [their] previous position about unconditional cessation of bombing. I would recommend a reciprocal step from
Hanoi./6/
/5/March 31.
/6/According to the transcript of the recording, at this point, Clifford stated: "I think one significant comment of heretofore,
Hanoi has insisted that it will not have any talks with the U.S. unless the United States unconditionally stops the bombing.
Now this appears to be a departure from that previous position they have taken. Because they say, if our translation has its
merits, that 'the parties will get together to decide with the U.S. side the unconditional cessation of bombing and all other
acts of war by the United States so the talks could be begun.' Now it seems to me that we have the right, within the
framework of the President's offer of Sunday night, to construe this as a reciprocal gesture on the part of Hanoi, and I
would certainly, along with Nick, be ready to recommend--certainly should (it) also appear feasible--that we construe this
as a reciprocal step on the part of Hanoi and now proceed to the second part of the program that the President had in
mind."
Briefing made three main points:
1) Calling up add'l reserves for support of 11,000 emergency increment.
2) Effort to turn fighting over to SVN more.
3) Unilateral cessation of bombing above 20th parallel where 90% of people live and 75% of territory.
Sorensen said language in text was better than using 20th--less combative.

Sen. Fulbright-Russell-Stennis were told about it. Looks as though Fulbright wanted to reject it before Hanoi.
Katzenbach: Purpose of speech was to explain why bombing would continue in DMZ and area north of it where supplies
continued to flow. Foreign governments knew 20th parallel was line.
Pres[ident]: We would endanger our troops to cut out all bombing. It was a 90% stop in population and 75% stop in
territory./7/
/7/In a memorandum to the President, April 3, 2:45 p.m., Rostow noted the "potential" of U.S. military strength on the
ground in South Vietnam and advised that this position be improved as talks progressed. (Johnson Library, William C.
Westmoreland Papers, #31 History File, Apr 68 [II])
[Omitted here is a discussion of the Stockholm conference on the international monetary system and an assessment of an
upcoming march on Washington.]

178. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, April 3, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. Transcribed from Tom
Johnson's handwritten notes. Those attending the meeting, which lasted from 3:15 to 5:05 p.m., were the President,
Clifford, Wheeler, Katzenbach, Bundy, Helms, Rostow, Goldberg, Harriman, Thompson, Christian, and Tom Johnson.
(Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
W[alt] R[ostow]: 1st item is what should we say this afternoon.
Pres[ident]: I have said we are studying it.
WR: We should add, "we are consulting with our allies." That is a note we should strike.
Pres: I agree with Bill Bundy's points of this morning.
Katz[enbach]: There are 2 points--1) Must say consulting w/ allies; 2) You should make an affirmative response. We
should not create public appearance of hesitancy.
C[lark] C[lifford]: Showed Pres. the language of their translation.
Pres: O.K. Katzenbach, Clifford and Harriman go to treaty room and get Goldberg to go over it. We will issue it.
WR: Urgent cable to Saigon. We have a draft cable./2/
/2/Telegram 141172 to Saigon, April 3. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL
27 VIET S)
Helms: Effect of this on GVN will be terrific.
Pres: We must prevent everybody from getting hopes up. We must be aware of it.
Katz: Nobody disagrees with that.
WR: We can improve the pace of the negotiations by military means.
Pres: I would not change bombing order in north. If we have to go up to Route Package 4, let's look at it here first because
newspapers & critics will make it appear we are not of a peaceful mind. I don't believe any Pres. has followed his advisers
more closely or backed them more with his support. I have tried to be as restrained as I could.

CC: The debate in the Senate has been washed away by events. Hanoi responded in manner beyond (their) furthest
dreams.
Pres: It's easier to satisfy Ho Chi Minh than it is Fulbright.
CC: Let's keep mil. pressure on in SVN & along DMZ. Also call up reserves. That has a salutary effect on Hanoi.
Pres: Look at Wisconsin--most pacifist state in Union. Nixon vote & Johnson vote & Reagan vote show support for our
position vs. McCarthy./3/
/3/On April 2 McCarthy won the Democratic primary and Nixon won the Republican primary in Wisconsin. Small yet
significant primary ballots were also cast for Johnson, whose name remained on the ballot, and for Reagan, who was not
officially a candidate but represented the Republican conservative wing.
CC: Timing--when should it be released?
Taylor: We must get the GVN on board. Let's not rush into it.
Pres: We are not rushing. Ought to do 2 things: 1) ought to go out to Bunker; 2) get statement out.
Goldberg: I agree. We cannot hesitate. For first time they have been willing to meet to discuss circumstances for a
complete pause.
WR: Isn't it to go into diplomatic contact saying Averell and Tommy [Thompson] are heading for Geneva?
Katz: Statement today has to be affirmative in view of past statements.
(Katz, Clifford, Goldberg retired to work on statement.)
Bundy: [I] have consultative messages ready to go.
Rostow: After this, have balanced statement to people urging unity--say exploring . . .
Pres: I don't know. Let's be awfully careful. Westmoreland didn't want me to get into Tet. People who will violate that will
violate anything. Let's listen to old hands. That's why I have Tommy & Averell & Max Taylor. Let's look & think & get
collective wisdom. Let's look at it carefully. Time to keep your head is when everybody else loses theirs.
Thompson: What will objective of talks be?
Taylor: Should we push our agenda?
Bundy: Contacts are one thing. Substantive talks are another. Talks are whole different area of sensitivity.
Taylor: We can explore dimensions of problems.
Thompson: The first thing is the San Antonio formula. Soviets--they worry about "productive."
Harriman: That has been stretched out.
WR: Withdrawal of DRV from 2 northern provinces would be (in) return for stopping bombing in panhandle.
Wheeler: To stop bombing you want something tangible. You can measure withdrawal--also artillery & rocket attacks
against DMZ. I want to monitor what they are doing w/recon. planes along DMZ.
Harriman: We must get to see what they will do.

Taylor: Under S.A. formula, I don't see how you can.

Bundy: We said "attacks across the DMZ". Have not said any movement along DMZ would be violation.
Wheeler: They have no right in DMZ. Neither do we.
Taylor: Talks should be (on) mutual de-escalation.
Harriman: There must be no danger to our men. The Pres.' speech has supplanted S.A. speech.
Wheeler: I agree.
Taylor: S.A. formula has been mentioned in Pres.' Sunday night speech.
Bundy: There must be over-flights. No give on that.
WR: Critical element will be what fellows are doing on the ground. If we are chewing them up we are in much better
negotiation stance.
Harriman: If we can gradually reduce military action, that is good.
WR: Then get beefed up ICC into DMZ.
Thompson: What about our reinforcements?
Bundy: The gut issue is what is normal rate of infiltration.
Goldberg: I think you should give the statement personally.
[Unattributed remarks:] Changes--made a statement which includes the following paragraph with respect to peace in
Vietnam & Southeast Asia. Copy of President's statement inserted.
Bundy: We will have trouble from allies.
Harriman: You are only repeating what you have said all along. They will be just as angry if we . . .
Katzenbach: How about "as soon as we have consulted with govt. of SVN & other allies."
Taylor: I like Nick's formula.
CC: Let's make it a clean & complete acceptance.
Pres: How will we establish contact?
WR: Through Vientiane. One thing that can wreck this for us is for allies to collapse under us.

179. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, April 4, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 8 I, 1/67-12/68, Taylor Memos--General. Secret.
In an attached note transmitting the memorandum to the President, April 4, Rostow wrote: "Herewith, as usual, Gen. Taylor
produces a lucid and cogent memo on the first phase of the negotiations with Hanoi." The notation "ps" on the covering
memorandum indicates that the President saw Taylor's memorandum.

SUBJECT
The Coming Meeting with the Hanoi Representatives
At your luncheon yesterday,/2/ I was impressed by the need to reach a prompt decision among ourselves as to the
purpose and scope of the coming meeting with the Hanoi representatives. They are likely to arrive determined to limit the
discussion narrowly to agreement as to "the unconditional cessation of bombing and all other war acts by the U.S. against
the DRV." In my opinion, it should be our primary objective to verify the likelihood of "prompt" and "productive" negotiations
in any second round of substantive negotiations during which the enemy would not take advantage of the suspension of
bombing--i.e., check the likelihood of compliance with the San Antonio formula. Not only is it important that we explore
these points before we become trapped in a cessation of bombing, but it is to our interest to accomplish as much
preliminary work as possible in this first meeting when our opponents are still under the pressure of the present level of
bombing. We can afford more foot-dragging here than would be tolerable in a follow-on negotiation with bombing
suspended. In the light of these considerations, the agenda of the meeting should include the following:
/2/See Document 177.
a. An understanding as to what actions would cease if the U.S. accedes to the Hanoi demands. Our side should make
clear that in agreeing to stop "other acts of war" we will not include unarmed reconnaissance of North Viet-Nam or attacks
against targets at sea or on land outside of the limits of North Viet-Nam which are related to infiltration or other aspects of
the war in South Viet-Nam.
b. A verification of the promptness and likely productiveness of follow-on negotiations. To make such a verification, our
negotiators should obtain agreement as to the date, place and attendance of the next meeting. Furthermore, they should
seek agreement as to the agenda because we know from past experience that debate over this subject as well as that of
the attendance could be dragged out interminably if not agreed to in advance. Furthermore, it is impossible to form a
judgment of probable productiveness of talks unless we know in advance the subjects which will be addressed.
c. A unilateral statement of what we mean by our assumption that during these talks "Hanoi will not take advantage of our
restraint." In the course of this unilateral declaration, we should also make clear that we are not going to tolerate footdragging in the follow-on negotiations and that we are resolved in such a case to break off discussions and to resume full
scale bombing.
If you accept the foregoing outline as the desired agenda for the first meeting, then it seems to me very important to reach
an agreement within our own family on the following points which are presently unresolved:
a. Where and when do we wish the follow-on negotiations to take place?
b. What is our preferred agenda for the follow-on negotiations?
With regard to the latter point, it is my view that the agenda of the follow-on negotiations should include the following
topics:
a. Mutual agreement to cease reinforcements from outside South Viet-Nam.
b. The conditions governing the eventual withdrawal of foreign forces.
c. Disposition of the Viet Cong. This is likely to be the hardest point to negotiate since it includes such matters as the
amnesty arrangements permitting their return to South Vietnamese society and political life, the subsequent participation of
the Viet Cong in the political life of South Viet-Nam, provision for the economic resettlement of the Viet Cong and the
removal of those so desiring to North Viet-Nam.
d. The conditions for a cease-fire. It is important, I think, to hold this item to last since it in itself is as difficult to negotiate as
all the foregoing items. However, the cease-fire arrangements should be made easier if both parties know how they have
come out in the agreements on the preceding points which constitute the political settlement.
Since the coming meeting with Hanoi representatives is likely to be the prelude to the follow-on substantive negotiations
and since the ground work for the latter must be laid in the former, it seems to me very important that a single negotiating
team with the same leader represent our side at both meetings. As this will be the most important diplomatic encounter
since Panmunjom where the war may be won or lost, we need the best talent in the country on the negotiating team and a
very able, tough chief negotiator thoroughly conversant with the ramifications of the Viet-Nam situation to head it. Clark

Clifford, Cy Vance or possibly Alex Johnson would seem to me to meet these requirements./3/
M.D.T.
/3/In an April 3 memorandum to the President, Rostow noted that he and Taylor did not believe that Harriman should be
"the man to carry this negotiation--should it develop--beyond its first stage" since he was not in the best of health and he
did not possess "an understanding and sympathy for the South Vietnamese." They instead recommended that the
President select Vance as "the man who will carry this negotiation for the long pull." (Johnson Library, National Security
File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 70)

180. Notes on Telephone Conversation/1/

Washington, April 4, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson,
Chron./Schedule--April 1968. Confidential; Personal. Prepared by Davidson.
NOTES ON TELEPHONE CONVERSATION FROM
GOV. HARRIMAN TO SECRETARY CLIFFORD
Gov. said was hoping get some decisions today; asked if C.[lifford] had decided whom he wanted to have go with H.
C. said the main man would be military since there were so many military aspects to the matter. He had suggested name
to the President. However, no decision yet since Pres. had gone to NY and would be back this afternoon; the Pres. had
indicated he probably would want to talk to Westmoreland over the weekend when he sees him in Honolulu.
Gov. said he had heard rumors as to whom they had in mind; had known him for years; had been appointed Gov's liaison
when Gov. was Chairman of the Three Wise Men in Paris./2/
/2/Reference is to General Andrew Goodpaster.
C. said yes; that he is really topflight fellow; whether decision would be made to release him for this kind of thing or
whether they have some other place where he is needed, he did not know.
Gov. asked if he was head of the school now, to which C. replied affirmatively; that they had in mind taking him out and
putting him on a much more important job. C. asked if Gov. had any idea when mission would take off. Gov. said Monday
would be meeting, which would mean Sunday morning take-off, but we of course had not heard from the other side. C
agreed probably would not hear yet.
Gov. continued that lined up somebody from the WH and somebody from the Department--he always travels light--and that
it is terribly important to have someone from Defense whom C and the Chiefs trust. C. asked how Gov. would react if he
able to come up with an able civilian to go along with the military. Gov. said this is going to be rather long, tough
discussion; that in the long run they would need somebody from the civilian side; Gov. would be glad to take him along to
break him in.
C. said he had an awfully able fellow--Paul Warnke; that he's really top-flight, but will have to think about it; that he
(Warnke) carrying a big load and would be hard to replace. Gov. said he knows him quite well, having dealt with him on
negotiations as well as on PW's, and thinks he is good fellow, if you can spare him. C. said he'll look into it.
H. said that if C. can settle "that military fellow" and Paul, he would be elated. That he would like terribly strong team in
whom C. and the Chiefs would have full confidence./3/
/3/According to notes of a telephone conversation that same day, Harriman discussed Goodpaster's possible detail to any
potential negotiation team. Rostow also mentioned that Jorden would be the White House's addition to the team, a move
that Harriman lauded. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, KennedyJohnson, Chron./Schedule--April 1968)

181. Notes of Meeting/1/

New York, April 4,1968, 3:47-4:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held at the United Nations.
Those attending were the President, U Thant, Goldberg, Jones, and Tom Johnson. The President was in New York for the
day in order to attend the ordination of Archbishop Terrence James Cooke. The President had requested that Goldberg
arrange the meeting with U Thant following the service. (Ibid., President's Daily Dairy)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
U THANT--SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS
U Thant: Thanks for your helpfulness. You were very magnanimous in the process for peace. I congratulate you. I regret
your decision. Your speech will generate a process for peace in Vietnam.
The President: That is encouraging. We tried to convince our people some move had to be made. We felt this was a step. I
hope conditions will permit it to be a big step. If there is any recognition of it we will take another one. I will not do anything
to endanger my men. We are hopeful it will permit initiation of some exchange. That will be encouraging.
I have asked Ambassador Goldberg to brief you on the speech.
U Thant: Thank you for that. As I indicated to you it is important that Peking has not broadcast Hanoi's statement up to 1
a.m. today. Hanoi ignored Peking.
Peking Radio never broadcast some statements. Hanoi doesn't care about Peking's attitude. These are factors that
indicate Hanoi is somewhat independent of Peking. This indicates relative independence of Hanoi from Peking. You should
keep this in mind. It is difficult for even doves in Hanoi to come in with a statement like they did yesterday.
On Monday I transmitted a message to Hanoi:
--Not to react negatively immediately to the President's speech.
--Please consider it carefully and react after very carefully reading it.
--Also told General DeGaulle not to react negatively.
I have nothing to advise on the next step. But this is a very important step. Hanoi really wants to talk to you.
There are some procedural questions. I think Geneva would be the best place since Geneva has historically been
involved. When I was in New Delhi, if parties agree to talks, she will be privileged to have them in New Delhi as Chairman
of the ICC. The French also said, not officially, the French Government would be privileged to host talks in Paris.
I am at your disposal. My sole concern is to contribute as best I can to bringing about peace. Coming from the country I do,
our experience in Burma in World War II--95% of our people were elated--we worked for them. The more they stayed, the
more Japanese stayed on, the more bitter the feelings were. We began to regard the Japanese as foreigners--just as the
British. Now our relations with the Japanese are excellent. Now all my people are very anti-Communist. The Communist
backbone was broken in Burma with advisers.
I think you should test Hanoi. Hanoi is very independent of the Communists. In the final analysis, they will come with nonaligned constitution. It is necessary that U.S. has a long and difficult task. I have a high regard for Thompson and
Harriman. I hope Goldberg can be involved. I am at your disposal. I leave this evening for Geneva. If possible, I may talk
with Bo.
There is no immediate prospect for a resolution. I may talk to Bo.
The President: That would be very desirable. Your evaluation and assessment is a reasonable one. You demonstrate a

very constructive attitude. I appreciate your statement and your doing what you did Sunday. I do not hold out much hope
from this message, but I do have hope. I wanted to appeal to the UN and ICC and others who could be in a position to
help. I asked the Soviet Ambassador to come down. I spent some time with him.
The Soviets thought we would never get out of Vietnam because of investment and bases there. Rusk and Clifford and I
put in a plan--a modification of the Goldberg plan. We would help both of them if we could, if they would let us.
From the Kosygin talks in Glassboro,/2/ I don't think they understand Americans. We want to communicate the hope of
tomorrow.
/2/Reference is to the President's meeting with Kosygin during June 1967; see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V,
Document 207.
I have tried in this effort to stop the bombing against most of the people, and it continues only where these efforts directly
threaten our men.
I stretched this as far as I could. Goldberg wanted to stop it all. But I could not endanger our men. If they would not have a
crash program, O.K. But now they are desperately rushing in supplies. Ninety percent of the population is above the 20th
parallel.
Secretary Clifford feels we have 9-10 months to do what we can for this world. We have to take some chances.

182. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/

Washington, April 4, 1968, 0139Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE.
Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Read and Davidson on April 3; cleared by Harriman, Read, Bundy, and Rostow; and
approved by Katzenbach. Also sent to Vientiane and repeated to Saigon and as Tosec 74 to Rusk in Wellington during his
visit to New Zealand for the ANZUS Council meeting. The text of this message was repeated in telegram 142994 to New
Delhi, Moscow, Paris, and London, April 6, and transmitted to U Thant in telegram 143091 to The Hague, April 7. (Ibid.)
For a record of the ANZUS meeting, see Document 183.
141478. Literally Eyes Only for Secretary and Ambassadors.
1. As quickly as feasible please deliver following written message to highest ranking DRV official you can reach.
Begin Text. The USG has noted the April 3 statement of the DRV indicating "its readiness to send its representatives to
make contact with U.S. representatives".
The United States accepts the proposal of the DRV. Ambassador W. Averell Harriman will be available forthwith to
establish contacts with the representatives of the DRV. For its part the U.S. would propose that such contacts be
established in Geneva on April 8, 1968, but the U.S. will attempt to meet any reasonable alternative suggestions of the
DRV for time and place for establishing such contacts. End Text.
2. Please report soonest on action taken to deliver foregoing or any problem which arises in connection with delivery./2/
/2/In telegram 5597 from Vientiane, April 4, Sullivan replied that Hurwitch hand-carried the sealed message, which
included a request that it be transmitted to Hanoi, to the DRV Embassy. When told that the Charge, Nguyen Chan, was
"out shopping," Hurwitch left the message with his secretary. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
Katzenbach

183. Record of ANZUS Council Meeting/1/

Wellington, April 5, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 4 ANZUS. Secret; Limdis.
Rusk represented the United States, Prime Minister Keith Holyoake acted as host and represented New Zealand, and
Minister for External Affairs Paul Hasluck led Australia's delegation to the Seventeeth ANZUS Council meeting. The record
was prepared by Robert Lindquist, Country Director for Australia and New Zealand in EA.
[Omitted here are the opening remarks by the delegations, followed by a report on the British withdrawal from Southeast
Asian affairs.]
III. Viet-Nam
Holyoake suggested passing on to other agenda items and asked if anyone had comments regarding Viet-Nam.
Hasluck said he had three questions:
1. In the light of the Tet offensive is there perhaps some need for improvement of allied intelligence techniques? The
Secretary recalled that prior to the offensive we had received a fair amount of strategic information and as a result U.S.
forces were on a general alert. However, we did not have adequate detailed intelligence information as to specific timing,
targets, etc. This is due, he said, to a number of factors, including apathy and fear on the part of local population, and he
agreed that improvements in this area would be desirable.
2. How long can the North Vietnamese sustain their present level of military effort, Hasluck queried? The Secretary
responded that this is hard to estimate. In fact, he said, they would have the capability to maintain military operations
almost indefinitely. However, this would not mean that they would not decide to stop operations for a variety of reasons,
including materiel and manpower costs.
3. How effective will 135 thousand additional South Vietnamese troops be and how soon will their military effectiveness be
achieved? The Secretary replied that South Vietnamese recruits are given a nine-week basic training course and thus
would begin to show up in military units about June. He noted that two-thirds of GVN forces are volunteers and that the
now effective policy of battlefield promotions has had good effect on military morale.
Hasluck asked the Secretary's assessment of the domestic South Vietnamese political situation. The Secretary replied that
relationships between Thieu and Ky are improving and leadership cooperation now is more satisfactory. Neither, however,
is a dynamic figure capable of inspiring and guiding national efforts. We have made clear in Viet-Nam, the Secretary said,
that the one thing we cannot tolerate is a coup against the constitutional South Viet-Nam Government that has been
established. The Secretary predicted that the upcoming period of contacts and possible negotiations with North Viet-Nam
would be difficult and troublesome and he said we hope that problems can be avoided by consultation with the GVN and
other allies.
[Omitted here are discussion of issues relating to SEATO, Japan, and Laos, and a joint communique issued at the
conclusion of the meeting.]

184. Editorial Note

When President Johnson ordered the partial cessation of bombing, private individuals acting as unofficial negotiators were
in North Vietnam. Americans Harry Ashmore and William Baggs of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, who
had been involved in overtures to the North Vietnamese in 1967, were granted entry visas by the North Vietnamese
Government in March 1968 in order to facilitate the peace process. Following a briefing by Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs William P. Bundy, Ashmore and Baggs arrived in Hanoi on March 29. As a result of their
conversation on April 1 with Hoang Tung, a spokesman for the Hanoi regime, Ashmore and Baggs reported to
Ambassador to Laos William Sullivan through the offices of the Indonesian Ambassador to North Vietnam, Nugroho, that
their efforts had produced tentative procedures for the initial meetings between the United States and North Vietnam. In an
April 2 covering memorandum transmitting an intelligence report on the channel to the President, Walt Rostow noted that it
appeared that "our two blind hogs (Baggs and Ashmore) have found an acorn." (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 70) In telegram 6972 from Vientiane, April 2, however, Sullivan notified the

Department of his skepticism at having "to play cloak and dagger with these two characters." (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
Following another conversation with Tung on April 4, Ashmore and Baggs assisted him in composing an aide-memoire on
April 5 which they believed had approval from the highest levels of authority in the North Vietnamese Government.
Immediately returning to Vientiane, they turned over the aide-memoire to Sullivan, who subsequently transmitted it to the
Department in telegram 5650, April 5. It reads:
"The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has repeatedly protested against the U.S. action in illegally laying
hold of civilians and military personnel on board fishing boats and freighters even in the territorial waters of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam demands that the United States stop all its
arrogant acts, respect the sovereignty, territory, and security of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and release
immediately, unconditionally and without any need for an agreement between the two parties, all citizens of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam now being illegally detained. As for the captured American pilots, they are regarded by the
Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as guilty to the Vietnamese people. Acting upon orders from the U.S.
Government, they have bombed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, an independent and sovereign country, killing
civilians and destroying property of the Vietnamese people. However, in accordance with the humane and lenient policy of
the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, they have enjoyed good treatment. On the occasion of the last Tet
festival, for the first time, three of the captured U.S. pilots were released in view of their correct attitude during their
detention. With regard to the 'limited bombing' of North Vietnam announced by President Johnson, the Government of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam made clear its view in its April 3, 1968 statement. The U.S. Government has not seriously
and fully met the legitimate demands of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, of progressive American
opinion and of world opinion. However, for its part, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declared its
readiness to appoint its representative to contact the U.S. representative with a view to determining with the American side
the unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam, so that the talks may start." (Ibid.)
The Department requested that Ashmore and Baggs return to Washington. (Telegram 142968 to Vientiane, April 6; ibid.)
After a conversation he had with Ashmore and Baggs in Tokyo as they were en route to the United States, Ambassador to
Japan U. Alexis Johnson reported that they considered the message from Tung to be an official reply to the United States.
In addition, Ashmore and Baggs noted that they had confirmed to Tung their transmission of the aide-memoire. (Telegrams
7219 and 7220 from Tokyo, April 7; ibid., S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 461, Sept. 11, Meeting XXI)
Once back in Washington, Ashmore and Baggs briefed Ambassador Harriman on their visit, but the message did not have
the impact they expected it would. Rostow decried the fact that they had "acted as negotiators" and "took a position that
washed out reciprocal action by the DRV if we stopped bombing." (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, April 6;
Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Crocodile, Chronological, Vol. I, 3/31-4/10/68) In an April 12
letter to Secretary of State Rusk, the President railed against any further such private contacts since they always seemed
to result "in a posture of quasi-negotiation which misleads Hanoi and undercuts our position at home." (Ibid., Memos to the
President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 72)
The full report of Ashmore and Baggs was submitted as a memorandum to Harriman dated April 10. (National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 461, Sept. 11 Meeting) For Ashmore and Baggs' account of their
overture, see Mission to Hanoi (New York: G.P. Putnam's, 1968), passim. Bundy's comments on the particulars of this
book are in a memorandum to Rusk, September 9. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET)

185. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, April 6, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting, which was held in the White
House, lasted from 1:30 to 5:10 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Westmoreland was in Washington because the
President's planned trip to meet with him in Honolulu was canceled due to riots following the April 4 assassination of civil
rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr.
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND
THOSE ATTENDING WERE

The President
General Westmoreland
Nick Katzenbach
Averell Harriman
General Wheeler
General Taylor
Dick Helms
Clark Clifford
Harry McPherson
George Christian
Abe Fortas
Horace Busby
Jim Jones
Walt Rostow
Tom Johnson
The President: I want General Westmoreland to report on:
a. Successor to General Westmoreland
b. Deputy Commander
c. Military Advisor
d. Views on Harriman draft
e. Suggestions he has to Harriman
f. Report on military position in Vietnam, particularly at Khesanh and along DMZ
g. Evaluation of enemy
h. Evaluation of ARVN
i. Evaluation of tactics
General Westmoreland:
1. Since Tet enemy has suffered colossal military defeat. He has lost 60,000 men and 18,000 weapons.
2. I say to Ambassador Harriman he will be negotiating from position of strength.
3. The enemy has manpower and logistical problems.
4. North Vietnam has 20,000 men moving down. He needs 40,000 to fill depleted ranks. He needs replacements
everywhere.
5. Tet offensive dates back to last summer. Lost their advocate of protracted war strategy. They moved away from that
strategy in September 1967 and initiated a major two-phase offensive, first stage was the offensive at Dak To. He
attempted to cut Highway 4 leading to Delta to put economic pressure on Saigon. This was designed to take headlines
from inauguration of newly-elected South Vietnam government and secure real estate. This was designed to be coup
d'etat. He thought he would get a public uprising and mass defections in ARVN and by whole units. He was deceived by
the American press into thinking the ARVN were no good. He found they were stronger than expected.
Viet Cong infiltrated with the crowd.
He did catch South Vietnam off guard in many places.

Intelligence showed he would attack in Tet period but not on D-day for psychological reasons.
He expected to dominate the "3-10 military district" and to be successful in the highlands.
I chose to hold Khesanh. We reinforced in December and January. We wanted to force him to commit. It was small enough
to supply by air.
The enemy suffered severe defeat at Khesanh. He lost 10,000 to 15,000 men and 325th had to retreat to Laos.
I know there was great concern back here about Khesanh. This was a Dienbienphu in reverse. We created best targets we
have had during the war. From mid-January until a few days ago we had 6,000 secondary explosions and 1,300 bodies
seen on the ground, knocked out 900 bunkers and 300 gun positions.
North Vietnamese are not ten feet tall as press has portrayed them. The Dienbienphu veterans are old, grey-haired men
now.
The ARVN performed well. Introduction of M-16 to ARVN has helped them greatly.
We should have produced M-16 rifles sooner and given them to ARVN one year earlier. But we got in patent fights and
debates between lawyers.
Harriman will have hand with four aces and enemy will have a hand with two deuces.
He has 8-2/3 divisions in North Vietnam now. He could bring down two divisions, well-equipped but not well led.
He could set up multiple fronts. He has DMZ fronts, MR 10 front, 10-3 front.
The President: What do you think of South Vietnam government and Army?
General Westmoreland: My advisers made a study of the South Vietnam armed forces:
a. Navy }
b. Marines } received high marks
c. Air Force }
d. Army--5% poor; 28% excellent
67% satisfactory
RF and PF fought well except in 4th Corps. Only 2% did not.
Enemy made maximum use of weapons. They were superior to ARVN weapons.
As for government, Thieu is gaining stature and self-confidence.
There is a conflict between Thieu and Ky but I am not worried about it.
I think they both should stay.
There is friction between Thieu and Vien/2/ because of quarrel between two wives.
/2/Cao Van Vien.
Vien will resign when I leave (Westmoreland). That will not hurt. He has been very receptive to advice. Kim or Tri/3/ may

come back to head Joint General Staff.

/3/Le Van Kim and Nguyen Bao Tri.
Would bring Kim back as Minister of Defense and Vy/4/ as chief of Joint General Staff.
/4/Nguyen Van Vy.
Vy is respected by other generals, but he would not be a dynamic leader.
We need a replacement for 3rd Corps commander.
4th Corps commander is breath of fresh air.
I had Abrams explain U.S. attitude toward the war to South Vietnamese commanders. I gave them a hard-line pep talk. I
made analogy of Battle of Bulge. This appeals to them very much.
Walt Rostow: Were they shook up over bombing pause and President's announcement?
General Westmoreland: They were puzzled by it. I urged the South Vietnamese to take the fight to a weakened enemy.
General Taylor: Was Thieu concerned?
General Westmoreland: I explained it to them. They are sensitive about a coalition government but they are reconciled to
moves we have made so far.
Newspapers tried to make them believe this would lead to Communist takeover.
Walt Rostow: What about necessary equipment of RF and PF?
General Westmoreland: We will give them M-2's and BAR's plus machine guns and mortars. We are giving them light antitank weapons.
General Taylor: How can you bring this home to American officials? It is not a losing proposition.
Dick Helms: If you relieve a seige of a bastion, you get headlines.
The President: He has worse problem with press than we do.
General Westmoreland: I am under instructions to play down relief of Khesanh.
Clark Clifford: What is situation around Khesanh?
General Westmoreland: There are still 7 or 8 battalions there. I do not know if they will stand and fight.
General Wheeler: Why have they counterattacked Hill 471? He may have been trying to protect corridor.
Clark Clifford: How is Route 9?
General Westmoreland: This route will be open next Tuesday./5/ We will not try to maintain permanent security. We will
route convoys in there.
/5/April 9.
General Taylor: How are you supplying Khesanh task force?

General Westmoreland: By air and land, air drop extraction.

General Wheeler: I feel that playing offensive low-key was prudent and wise. Press discounts MACV briefing session.
The time has come for efforts back here to look at relief of Khesanh in proper perspective. There is great story here. Not a
single day when supplies haven't been dropped in. Bombing support has been great.
Westy had two divisions tied down.
Clark Clifford: What is the situation in A Shau Valley?
General Westmoreland: It is an unusual piece of terrain 20 kilometers long and 1 kilometer wide.
The enemy has dominated and developed in the Valley. I hope to go in during May. Enemy moves by truck. He has
upgraded road east toward Hue.
A Shau is at division line between Northeast and Southeast. Weather bad except in April and May. It is a major logistic
base. It goes through tip of Laos. Enemy has strong anti-aircraft system in there. We captured 23 mm munitions.
Harry McPherson: Have you noticed any change in the enemy since the peace overture?
Is the enemy in a position to capture a city, score a tactical victory, or attack Saigon?
General Westmoreland: He will have some initiatives.
The President: What would happen if we stopped all bombing?
General Westmoreland: It would facilitate their supply during rain, Laos supply roads would be bad anyway. But he can run
convoys in North Vietnam day and night and build up.
The President: If he accepted San Antonio formula, what would our situation be?
General Westmoreland: It is going to be tough to determine whether or not he is "taking advantage."
The enemy will insist on cease fire in South. This would be an intolerable condition.
The President: What about his forces at home?
General Westmoreland: He can bring down two divisions in the next 2 or 3 months.
General Westmoreland: 20,000 in two divisions. He could recruit 21,000 in the South. He could augment by 60,000 men.
He may lose 60,000 by that time.
We think we are inflicting 20,000 losses a month on him now.
He may withdraw into Cambodia. I am skeptical about Phnom Penh (Cambodia) as site for talks. Many Cambodians are
working with Viet Cong.
If we could bomb over there it would be very disconcerting to him.
The President: They would impeach me.
Nick Katzenbach: Senator Mansfield thinks Sihanouk is the greatest leader in the Far East.
The President: Have they ordered fire stopped against DMZ?

General Wheeler: Pattern of attacks remain relatively constant. We have encountered less resistance North and South of
Route 9.
Averell Harriman: I agree that a cease-fire is impossible. In de-escalation we talked about demilitarization of the DMZ.
General Westmoreland: I hope he does fight.
The President: Are you glad he changed his tactics?
General Westmoreland: Yes, sir.
It has accelerated the attrition inflicted on the enemy. He has suffered a military defeat of major magnitude.
The President: Is the light at the end of the tunnel any nearer?
General Westmoreland: Yes, South Vietnam can take over bigger share of burden. Losses in the last few days have made
that statement more credible.
Clark Clifford: Under what condition would a cease-fire be acceptable?
General Westmoreland: I do not see the acceptability of that.
Nick Katzenbach: When you think of a cease-fire, do you know another way to approach it?
General Westmoreland: We would like for the North Vietnamese to go home and turn in their weapons.
Abe Fortas: We must have a different term from cease-fire.
Clark Clifford: One of the great goals on the minds of Americans is for a "cease-fire."
One of the big problems is that we would have tough time determining if they were "taking advantage" without aerial
reconnaissance.
General Wheeler: Near DMZ we must have low-level reconnaissance. First test of de-escalation step is that they must be
tangible.
The President: Do we have a contact?
Nick Katzenbach: Message in Vietnam was transmitted.
Tonight Collingwood will be on television from Tokyo./6/
/6/In Hanoi Charles Collingwood, a reporter for CBS, met with senior North Vietnamese leadership, including both Dong
and Trinh. In reporting to Sullivan on his meetings, Collingwood noted that most of what was contained in the aidememoire on opening initial talks was repeated in an interview he had with Trinh. Trinh had added that the DRV had
"unhappy memories" of Geneva and preferred Phnom Penh, which would be less expensive for them. (Telegram 5652
from Vientiane, April 5; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 461, Sept. 11, Meeting
XXI) Collingwood broadcast this interview from Tokyo on April 7. In an April 11 memorandum to Katzenbach, Hughes
observed that Trinh had "apparently sought to avoid a rigid separation of the 'contact' and 'preliminary talk' steps" and
seemed to "merge" both phases together. (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
Walt Rostow: We could jump them. Say we have a response we are following.
Averell Harriman: On April 3 you learned of Hanoi message, you acted on it and message was delivered by midnight.
The President: I am ready to play honest with Collingwood. I think somebody is playing dirty pool with me.

Nick Katzenbach: On 6:30 broadcast, Collingwood will take two minutes. Let's put out that we took initiative. His
information was given to U.S. government and will be acted on promptly.
Did the President establish contact?
Yes
On day of April 3.
We have information it was received.
We notified them in Laos.
Nick Katzenbach: When we gave similar message in Moscow we were told they already had information. We sent it to the
French, to U Thant, to Dobrynin here and to the Indians./7/
/7/In telegram 3409 from Moscow, April 6, DCM Emory Swank reported that he had passed the message to DRV
Ambassador Nguyen Tho Chan in Moscow that day. Chan mentioned that he was familiar with the message. (Ibid., POL
27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) Thompson and Bohlen had discussed the Vientiane message with Dobrynin the previous day.
(Memorandum of conversation, April 5; ibid.) See also footnote 1, Document 182.
We established contacts.
We have further information which does not appear to be a response to our proposal for Geneva.
You saw statement from Hanoi. You conveyed willingness to accept on same day. We have informal contacts which do not
appear to be an answer to what you say./8/
/8/Before Collingwood's broadcast, Christian read a statement to the press on April 6 that described the message passed
to the DRV Embassy in Laos 2 days earlier and added: "The United States Government has not yet received a formal reply
from the Government of North Viet-Nam. We have received messages through private individuals recently in Hanoi, but
these do not appear to be a reply to our proposal. We hope to receive an official reply from Hanoi soon." For the full text of
the statement, see Department of State Bulletin, April 22, 1968, p. 513.

186. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, April 7, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The notes were prepared on April 8. The
meeting, which was held in the Cabinet Room from 3:05 to 4 p.m., followed the President's luncheon with Westmoreland
and Rusk. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) A complete transcript of the meeting and a summary are ibid., Transcripts of
Meetings in the Cabinet Room. A list of participants is at the end of the notes.
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
GENERAL WESTMORELAND
The President: General Westmoreland will visit with General Eisenhower. Let's not make him late.
Walt Rostow: General Westmoreland will discuss future deployment at the DMZ.
General Westmoreland: We want to move ahead on strong-point obstacle system. The enemy artillery and rockets forced
a deferment in this program. Khesanh has been relieved.
The President: Can we replace U.S. troops there with Vietnamese?

General Westmoreland: Yes, sir. First link-up of troops at Khesanh was a Vietnamese battalion.
Clark Clifford: We must look into the M-14 utilization.
Secretary Rusk: You may want to give them to RF and PF.
The President: Get the answer on M-14's as soon as you can./2/
/2/According to the transcript of the meeting, the group discussed the M-14 rifle, noting that a large number were on hand
but were not being to sent to Vietnam because of a problem with the powder charge in the cartridge, an issue that was
being resolved. The President stated: "If we should get the right answer on M-14s, we've got it made because you've got a
million of them that are ready, so that's what we want to get the answer on, and then start hauling. And then get Thieu and
Ky and all their crowd and get things boosted up and show them how much better equipment we are going to get them and
then say, 'God damn it, let's go, because we are going out of office in January here. Wheeler has just got one year term
left and I've just got nine months and Westy hasn't got but three or four months, and we want to get this thing as far along
as we can. You fellows have got to carry on.'"
Walt Rostow: Point 2 is a discussion of operational plans under conditions of a total bombing cessation.
General Westmoreland: We need a better company level-battalion level radio. Want recommendations on this.
On general offensive operations, I have talked to Thieu and Vien to get South Vietnamese moving on all intelligence.
I will have another meeting to give South Vietnamese another spur. Intelligence must be sharpened. We must have a
psychological war campaign.
Operational plans under conditions of total bombing cessation would be no different than those we now have.
Secretary Rusk: We must make sure assumption of not taking advantage holds during bombing stand-down./3/
/3/According to the transcript, Rusk said: "Hanoi supported the action that you took last Sunday, but if you go into a
complete bombing stop without insisting upon the assumption you stated in the San Antonio formula, we'll have deep
trouble all of our own. so we've just got to make it clear that assumption remains in effect, and if they think they are going
to be able to go full-blast while we are stopping our part of the war, then we are in real trouble."
The President: Should we give the message we sent to Hanoi.
Nick Katzenbach: No, we gave a digest of it yesterday./4/ Let's get rid of Baggs and Ashmore.
/4/See footnote 8, Document 185 .
The President: We will name Abrams as Westmoreland's successor.
Have Cy Vance and General Goodpaster drop in and out of negotiations as military.
Send Goodpaster as Abrams' successor temporarily./5/
/5/According to the transcript, on this point the President stated: "I would, if it is at all feasible, have [Westmoreland] say to
General Eisenhower today that we would like for Goodpaster to start out--my thought would be to have a diplomatic,
political head of the negotiating team and a military department representative too, and I would suggest that we try to have
Averell since he has been designated, and anybody else we designate, they resign. I want them to resign to me instead of
Averell. Have Averell there, and then ask Cy Vance to take Goodpaster for the military operations, and Cy can drop in and
out because if he has to come home, it's not too long. He wouldn't be able to go a year or two, but he would be able to go
a month or two and back and forth, and Dean says he thinks that would work out all right. He is free to do this without
being encumbered anywhere else. I believe he might get along with them. Then, we use Goodpaster and whoever else
that backed him up until July in these things, and then we could send him on out to be Abrams' deputy when Abrams
moves up, and that would cover both waterfronts. Even if this thing got deep and we couldn't carry him, we would have to
make a choice which we could make--which is more important. But that would be the tentative plan." In his news
conference of April 10, the President announced Abrams' appointment as COMUSMACV. See Public Papers of the

Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 504-507.
General Wheeler: Let Services nominate the Deputy.
The President: Talk to Averell about this. I will talk to Cy. Get Vance to replace Thompson./6/
/6/Thompson returned to Moscow on April 17.
The President: I am ready to announce Abrams now.
General Wheeler: I am ready.
Clark Clifford: I am ready.
The President:/7/ We talked about morale of troops. You keep a constant check on that.
/7/According to the transcript, at this point the President received a call from Califano, who reported on rioting in
Washington and elsewhere and a request from Governor Spiro Agnew for the dispatch of federal troops to Baltimore.
General Westmoreland: I will.
The President: Resumption of reconnaissance flights.
Clark Clifford: We stopped reconnaissance north of 20th parallel during delicate period.
When do you want us to resume it?
General Westmoreland: My opinion is that we need good intelligence
--MIGs
--SAMs
--New roads
--Traffic into Haiphong
We must resupply agent teams in North by air./8/
/8/Documentation on the Special Operations Groups operating inside North Vietnam is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,
volume XXVIII.
Clark Clifford: We need to keep our reconnaissance going. Unless we do we are working from blind hand.
Secretary Rusk: We must have occasional reconnaissance flights up there.
Clark Clifford: We will start an occasional reconnaissance program.
The President: What have we agreed to do that we haven't done?
Clark Clifford: Callup 24,000 reserves./9/ We are all in agreement on this callup. We will proceed on that basis.
/9/This figure included the 13,500 previously promised to Westmoreland with the balance constituting replacements for
units rotating home.

The President: I am ready. I want them to have something to do.

Clark Clifford: We will be ready to assure you they have guns, equipment, training program.
General Wheeler: I am going to see General Johnson and check on this today.
The President: You want extra men and fighter squadrons.
General Westmoreland: I would like to have 3 squadrons and 2 squadrons as part of 13,500 program.
General Wheeler: We need to get these carriers rehabilitated.
Clark Clifford: I have got to cut $3 billion out of DOD budget.
Clark Clifford: We will have last report on question of bombing by 7:00 a.m. tomorrow. I am willing to make a flat,
categorical statement that no U.S. planes hit N.W. North Vietnam.
The President: What else do we need to do?
General Westmoreland: I like the idea of stationing men in Hawaii./10/
/10/These troops were to form a strategic reserve.
The President: What do you plan to put in Hawaii?
General Wheeler: If callup is limited to 24,000 we can't put troops in Hawaii.
The President: Any SAMs around Khesanh or in DMZ?
General Westmoreland: No, I put no credence in that report.
General Wheeler: There are two just above DMZ.
The President: When is Bunker coming in?
Nick Katzenbach: Wednesday,/11/ 10:00 a.m.
/11/April 10.
General Westmoreland: We will either meet in Hawaii or not./12/
/12/After this meeting the President and Westmoreland met with the White House press corps to discuss the General's
report on Vietnam. For text of their statements, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B.
Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 498-499. In telegram 24137 from Saigon, April 6, Bunker described Thieu's uneasiness,
which was "based on fear and suspicion that the U.S. in its anxiety for peace will concede too much"; Thieu also warned
about "a morale collapse here in two or three days" if it appeared that the United States was willing to make concessions in
the negotiations with the DRV. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 71) As
a result, Rostow recommended that the President send a "reassuring message" to Thieu through Westmoreland.
(Memorandum from Rostow to the President, April 6; ibid.)
The President gave Westmoreland a letter for Thieu dated April 7 in which the President proclaimed: "At the same time I
want it clearly understood by you and the South Vietnamese people that my offer Sunday night does not in any way dilute
our commitment to our goal of peace and self-determination. We are ready to seek an honorable peace but at the same
time a vigilant America stands ready to defend an honored cause whatever the price, whatever the burden, whatever the
sacrifice that duty may require. As I have said, the United States will never accept a false solution to this war." (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Pres. Thieu Correspondence) The Embassy was notified of
the letter in telegram 143730 to Saigon, April 9. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 196769, POL 27 VIET S) Bunker reported in telegram 24409 from Saigon, April 10, that Westmoreland had discussed with
Thieu that morning his meeting with the President and the letter. (Ibid.)

ATTENDING THIS MEETING WERE

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Rusk
Clark Clifford
Nick Katzenbach
General Westmoreland
General Wheeler
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson

187. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, April 8, 1968, 12:15-1:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. Secret. Drafted by Christian. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
Walt Rostow
George Christian
The President examined a proposed reply to Hanoi's message which arrived through our Ambassador at Vientiane at 4:00
a.m./2/
/2/The North Vietnamese response was transmitted to Washington by Sullivan in telegram 5697 from Vientiane, April 7.
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) In an
attached covering note transmitting the telegram to the President, April 8, Rostow noted: "Here is the official reply to our
message of April 3-4. It is virtually identical with that given independently to Baggs and Ashmore, on the one hand, and
Collingwood on the other." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Crocodile, General,
Chronological Summary, Vol. I [2 of 2]) The DRV reply preempted a message to the DRV Embassies in the Soviet Union,
India, and Laos, which noted that communications passed through Ashmore and Baggs or Collingwood, or to the Swiss
Government through the DRV Ambassador in Peking were not considered official by the U.S. Government. In addition, the
DRV was requested to clarify its position through the Embassy in Vientiane "or through an official communication in any
manner it desires." (Telegram 143098 to Vientiane, New Delhi, and Moscow, April 7; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) During a brief press conference at the White
House on April 8, the President publicly confirmed receipt of the DRV message through Vientiane, and indicated that he
would meet with Bunker at Camp David the next day. For text of his statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, p. 500.
Secretary Rusk said that the South Vietnamese would have a strong preference for New Delhi as the site of the talks. He
said there was something to be said for Rangoon. The President said he would prefer Rangoon or Djakarta. Mr. Rusk
proposed that we suggest a range of four cities.
Secretary Clifford pointed out that the President and others have said that we would meet anywhere, anytime. The
President said, "We have to assume there is drinking water there." He was referring to the need for communications and
other facilities necessary for discussions.
Secretary Rusk said the North Vietnamese might choose Vientiane and this would not be a bad place for us. The President
said that from their selfish standpoint he would think they would take New Delhi. Secretary Clifford said if he were the
North Vietnamese he would stick [to] Phnom Penh because it is their first choice and they are trying to test us.
The President said he had heard General Westmoreland's views for many hours, was still sorting it out in his mind how to
interpret them./3/ He said he did not accept Westmoreland's view that North Vietnam is crying for peace because of battle
wounds. He said he saw some bitterness in the General, who feels he has been made the goat and has been pulled out
because he didn't get support in Washington.

/3/See Documents 185 and 186.

Secretary Clifford said that General Wheeler had reported that Westmoreland had some bitterness but none toward the
President.
The President said that Westmoreland was Marshallesque and reserved, but he did tell Mrs. Johnson on the telephone
that he got full support from the Commander-in-Chief.
The President said that Westmoreland reported that he had a good meeting with President Eisenhower.
The President and the two Secretaries discussed the method of bringing Cyrus Vance into the talks as a companion of
Ambassador Harriman. The President said he wanted Vance's participation to be on a joint basis with Harriman./4/
/4/Earlier that morning, the President met with Vance to discuss the peace negotiations. (Johnson Library, President's
Daily Diary) Notes of the meeting have not been found.
The President then discussed the possibility of bringing Ambassador Bunker to Camp David tomorrow. The two
Secretaries thought this would be a good idea. Neither felt the President should attend the King funeral.
The President said Bunker's big job is going to be to work on the South Vietnamese. He said they have to realize we've got
to finish up by January 20. The President said Bunker is highly important in achieving this.
The President urged Secretary Clifford to solve "the gun problem." He said, "If you can't shove the M-16's, shove the M14's as fast as you can."
Secretary Clifford said he understood the ARVN did not want the M-14 because it was too heavy, but he would get onto
the situation again.

188. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of
State Rusk/1/
Washington, April 9, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Instructions for Governor Harriman
Governor Harriman and I wish to confirm our understanding of today's review of the draft instructions.
Our understanding is that today's meeting confirmed the instructions in accordance with the attached draft. On the specific
question of paragraph 5(c), dealing with the rate of infiltration of North Vietnamese troops, our understanding is that
Secretary Clifford's suggestion was adopted, i.e., that no change would be made in the instructions, but that Governor
Harriman should understand that, in presenting this point, reference should be made to the increased infiltration rate of
recent months as abnormal, and the clear record should be that we were thinking in terms of a normal rate such as had
prevailed when the San Antonio formula was first given to the North Vietnamese last August.
We further understand that we would not include under paragraph 5 a record indicating expectation that the North
Vietnamese, in response to our bombing cessation, would be taking advantage if they did not accept demilitarization of the
DMZ and/or compliance with the Laos Accords. In other words, these matters would not be used as examples of "not
taking advantage." However, we would expect that they would be raised--either in the contacts or in the talks--as early US
objectives.
We suggest that, if you approve, this memorandum and the instructions be given to Secretary Clifford and Mr. Rostow to
be sure that there is complete agreement on the way these matters will be handled./2/

/2/No approval is indicated. Concurrence on the instructions came at the afternoon meeting; see Document 189.
WPB

Attachment

INSTRUCTIONS FOR GOVERNOR HARRIMAN/3/

/3/A notation at the top of the page reads: "Draft as reviewed at the White House April 6, 1968."
Basic Objective
To make arrangements with the North Vietnamese representative for prompt and serious substantive talks looking towards
peace in Viet-Nam, in the course of which an understanding may be reached on a cessation of bombing in the North under
circumstances which would not be militarily disadvantageous. Such understanding to be within objectives defined below.
Specific Objectives
1. Cessation of the Bombing
The US is prepared to agree to a cessation of naval, air and artillery bombardment of North Viet-Nam. In keeping with
North Vietnamese statements, it is our understanding that such action on our part will lead promptly to talks in which both
sides would be free to raise any elements which they believe would lead to a peaceful settlement. We are prepared in
these talks to make arrangements to this end, including agreement on announcement of bombing cessation and
subsequent talks.
2. Prompt Talks
Substantive talks should be held within 3 to 7 days following the cessation of bombing.
3. Serious Talks
We should seek explicit confirmation by the North Vietnamese that any topic relevant to the substance of peace could be
raised in the substantive talks.
4. Participants
In any substantive discussions we expect to take account of the interests of the South Vietnamese Government and of our
Manila allies. Participation in any such discussions affecting South Viet-Nam must not exclude the Government of the
Republic of South Viet-Nam./4/
/4/In an April 8 memorandum to Helms, Carver described the views of the so-called "Non-Group" on the instructions. This
group was an informal subcabinet-level group, chaired by Katzenbach and comprised of varying membership, which met
weekly to discuss issues relating to the war. Most of the "Non-Group" took issue with this sentence in the instructions,
which they believed "was designed to be fuzzy and not to direct that we will insist upon GVN participation in any such
second-stage discussion," and recommended that it be clarified. (Central Intelligence Agency, SAVA (Carver) Files, Job
80-R01720R, GAC Chrono., April 1968-May 1968)
5. Not Taking Advantage
We should provide an adequate basis for the expectation that North Viet-Nam would not attempt to improve its military
position as a result of the US cessation. North Viet-Nam should understand that the US would regard as acts of bad faith
inconsistent with its restraints any such attempts. We would consider as examples of bad faith:

a) Artillery or other fire from or across the DMZ.

b) Ground attacks across the DMZ or the massing of additional forces or supplies in North Viet-Nam or the DMZ in a
manner which poses a direct threat to Allied forces in South Vietnam.
c) An increase in the movement of North Vietnamese troops and supplies into South Viet-Nam.
6. Reconnaissance Flights
The US intends to continue certain reconnaissance flights, and the record should not preclude such flights.

189. Notes of Meeting/1/

Camp David, Maryland, April 9, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. Top Secret. Drafted by Christian. The notes are a digest of a series of
meetings that occurred on April 9 at Camp David. Bunker arrived at Camp David at 8 a.m. with Rusk, McNamara, and
Wheeler, and immediately joined the President, Rostow, Christian, and Jones. After breakfast the group met in the living
room of the Aspen Lodge from 9:04 until 10:30 a.m. Following brief remarks to a group of reporters, the group continued to
meet from 10:50 until 12:25 p.m., when the President left to greet Bundy and Harriman at the helipad. A working lunch
began at 12:50 and lasted until 1:25 p.m., when the President retired for a nap. The President rejoined the discussion at
2:15 p.m. The meeting ended at 4:15 p.m., and the President, accompanied by Bunker and Harriman, answered reporters'
questions. Those who had arrived that day returned to Washington at 4:30 p.m. by helicopter. (Ibid., President's Daily
Diary) For the President's statements to the press, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B.
Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 500-502.
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING AT CAMP DAVID
ATTENDING THE MEETING
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Wheeler
Ambassador Bunker
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Jim Jones
Ambassador Bunker arrived at the Aspen House at 8 a.m. The President met him at the helicopter pad.
The President discussed the advisability of canceling the Austrian dinner./2/ The consensus was that it should go on if at
all possible.
/2/Reference is to the scheduled dinner the next day with Austrian Chancellor Josef Klaus.
Ambassador Bunker: Thieu is acting like a leader. The Vietnamese forces did better than the press indicated. None of the
things the enemy expected to happen happened.
President Thieu has moved ahead on a great many fronts--mobilization, upped it from 65,000; civil side, 14 new province
chiefs and will be putting in more, increased taxes by decree and put tax bill to the assembly, ten draft laws on various
subjects, closed black market and bars and nightclubs.
He and Ky are working together better. On April 2 their joint press conference tried to put to rest the division--put Ky in
charge of Civil Defense. Ky will preside over several councils; and Ky was very pleased. They're conferring together two or
three times a day. I've always thought it was manageable.
Ky would like to replace Prime Minister Loc, who is not very effective. He is leaning toward Tranh Van Huong, the best of

the lot.
There's uneasiness about the negotiations. Thieu is calling in corps commanders today to soothe them./3/
/3/In an April 8 memorandum to Katzenbach, Habib described the widespread fears of a U.S. "sell out" among South
Vietnamese governmental and political leadership. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET)
Everything is in the right direction. Since November 1 this government has really made quite substantial advances.
The Tet offensive gave them confidence, spurred them on. They reacted well on recovery.
The Vietnamese forces are doing well.
General Wheeler: They have more actions going for them than before Tet.
Secretaries Clifford and Rusk: Did the attitude of the American people (Ambassador Diem's message)/4/ cause some of
this?
/4/Not found.
Ambassador Bunker: He was very helpful. As far as I can see, the Tet offensive had more effect in the United States than
in Vietnam.
It caused a physical and psychological damage, uncertainty, questions about security. But this phase has passed because
of good reaction of the military.
Thang carrying on many more initiatives in tough IV Corps where the Viet Cong have been for twenty years. They are
making steady progress and much faster progress. There were many elements of strength we didn't realize were there.
Thieu says Tet offensive based on weakness and not strength . . . wanted to get to negotiations and willing to sacrifice
men to get in better posture.
Thieu thinks they will make one more big effort this summer--to keep the pressure on in I Corps and Highlands; harass
cities--airfield--try to hold on to as much real estate as they can, so they can go to negotiations and say "we control a lot of
territory."
The President: What are the big problems now?
Ambassador Bunker: In the Vietnam forces, some changes of command are needed, more equipment and sophisticated
weapons. It is very important for their morale to get better guns.
They're trying to do almost too much. We need to help them on what they can do.
The negotiations are very sensitive to them. We have to move with deliberate speed; they are worried, apprehensive. I
didn't get to him on the announcement we would talk until thirty minutes after he heard it on the radio.
The indications of sensitivity are: They think they need an Ambassador here who is not quite as close to the United States
as Bui Diem.
It is important that I have time to talk to Thieu before the next step. The PF are vulnerable to propaganda. The Viet Cong
tell them peace is coming./5/
/5/In an April 6 memorandum to Bunker, Komer described Thieu's acceleration of recruitment for the RVNAF and an
administrative revision of the four corps but cautioned about the administrative and military "foul-up" that could come from
poor planning for the build-up. (U.S. Army Center of Military History, DepCORDS/MACV Files, Westmoreland Memos,
RWK 1967-1968)

Secretary Rusk: Can't we do it the other way around?

Ambassador Bunker: They're under cover, hard to find. But we can do something here.
General Wheeler: They've had good intelligence of attack in Pleiku area. They're trying to spoil it.
(There was then a short break in the meeting.)/6/
/6/The President made a telephone call to Tom Johnson at 9:04 a.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
(Ambassador Harriman and Secretary Bundy were invited to fly up for lunch.)
Secretary Rusk: If we do better militarily, will news coverage from Vietnam improve?
Ambassador Bunker: Oh Lord, I don't know.
Mr. Rostow: How serious is the stagnation in the economy?
Ambassador Bunker: Beginning to pick up. Commodities are moving from the Delta. Viet Cong concentrating more on road
interdiction. Moving convoys by water to Delta and back with rice.
The President directed Secretary Rusk at 9:35 a.m. to have Bundy dispatch a reply to DRV./7/
/7/In telegram 5720 from Vientiane, April 9, Sullivan reported that Chan gave him a letter which read: "Pursuant to the note
of 8 April 1968, we wish to inform you that, if the government of the United States agrees with the choice of Phnom Penh
for the preliminary meeting, the ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the Kingdom of Cambodia Nguyen
Thuong will make contact 12 April 1968 at Phnom Penh with the American representative having the rank of ambassador.
This will be a preliminary contact designed to prepare official conversations between the two parties." (National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) The message, received in the
Department at 2:18 a.m., was sent to Camp David as telegram CAP 80762 where it was received at 7:45 a.m. (Ibid.) The
message was preceded by a Radio Hanoi broadcast the previous evening which also offered Phnom Penh as a site for the
talks. (The New York Times, April 9, 1968) While the DRV preferred the Vientiane channel, the message was also passed
through Moscow. (Telegram 143634 to Moscow and New Delhi and telegram 3435 from Moscow, both April 9; National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
Bundy's reply, transmitted in telegram 143729 to Saigon, April 9, reads in part: "The USG notes that agreement has now
been reached that there should be contacts between representatives of the two sides at the rank of Ambassador. We
affirm that the American representative will be Ambassador Averell Harriman. In its note of April 4 the USG expressed a
preference for Geneva as the place for contacts between representatives of the two sides. The note of the DRV of April 8
expresses preference for Phnom Penh. Phnom Penh presents difficulties for the USG because of technical problems
arising from the absence of a United States mission at that location. Therefore, the USG suggests any alternative location
equally convenient to both sides, specifically, Vientiane, Rangoon, Djakarta, or New Delhi. Any of these locations would be
acceptable to the USG if agreeable to the host Government. Ambassador Harriman would be prepared to meet with a
representative of the DRV at a mutually agreed location on Monday, April 15, or as soon thereafter as is agreeable to the
DRV. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, the USG notes that none of the Americans recently in Hanoi has been
authorized to represent the USG on any of the matters which are the subject of this exchange of notes." (Ibid.)
Mr. Rostow: Where is pacification?
Ambassador Bunker: Chieu Hoi low, but better than reports. We are getting out into countryside. Most of RD teams are
back. Thieu very good on pacification; wants to simplify system and Komer agrees. Concentrate on hamlets where
population is and along the routes of communication.
Pacification's weakness is that it comes from the top--needs to come from the bottom.
When attack came, they largely bypassed hamlets and attacked cities and towns. Before Tet we figured 5400 hamlets
were secure--this is down by 800, but only 200 were attacked and are either contested or under VC control.
In going into negotiations, let's keep in mind we are strong and not weak./8/

/8/In an April 8 memorandum to Bunker, Komer argued that as a result of the enemy's defeat at Tet, "our bargaining
position is a lot stronger than Washington seems to think." He noted that this position would erode if cleavage between
Washington and Saigon arose. "Yet if we can't convince Washington, we'll be in a descending spiral out here," Komer
concluded. (U.S. Army Center for Military History, DepCORDS/MACV Files, Chron. File, Komer (1968))
Thieu thinks May-October will be enemy's next big effort. But we'll never again be surprised. We can defeat them, or we
may spoil it before it ever comes off.
I try to be objective. The Tet offensive was harmful, but mostly psychological.
Mr. Rostow: How prepared are they for negotiations?
Ambassador Bunker: Not at all. They think those who want to live under Marxism should go north.
Mr. Rostow: Have they given any thought to the Viet Cong coming in as a political party, but not in government?
Ambassador Bunker: Not as a party. They realize NLF is highly organized and disciplined, coalition would lead to a
takeover like Czechoslovakia.
From the standpoint of the GVN this is not a good time for negotiations. In three or four months they'll be stronger.
Secretary Clifford: If they are getting stronger, etc., why do they feel such a concern for the NLF?
Ambassador Bunker: They are not afraid of them militarily, but politically. They are fearful if they take to their bosom, they'll
end up running the show.
Walt Rostow: You can reject a coalition if you hold the line, but we are for a one-man, one-vote proposition. The
Constitution bars Communism, but does not ban land reform party.
(At this point there was a picture break on the patio--10:45 a.m.)
Ambassador Bunker: It would be a good idea to ask Thieu to meet you in Honolulu just before you see Park.
The President: Get Gorton/9/ settled down on his date to come here--that leaves several others. Meet Thieu there, send
him back out, announce date for State visit./10/
/9/John Gorton, Australian Prime Minister.
/10/Telegram 144253 to Saigon, April 9, instructed the Embassy to deliver a message from the President inviting Thieu to
meet with him at Honolulu on April 18. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Pres.
Thieu Correspondence) When Thieu expressed reluctance due to the fact that he had yet to determine a replacement for
Loc (who for the time being remained Prime Minister), Rostow sent a message from Camp David to Bunker and Bundy in
Washington requesting that Thieu come to Honolulu on April 17 or April 18 if possible. A notation on the message, dated
April 10, reads: "Amb. Bunker talked with the President--President agreed message should not be sent." (Ibid., Country
File, Vietnam, 1 EE (4), Post Tet Political Activity) Bunker called the President at 2:22 p.m. on the afternoon of April 10
soon after the President had returned to the White House. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
I will be in Honolulu early part of next week for a day with Thieu and a day with Park--Monday/11/ and Tuesday . . . Thieu
on Monday and Park on Tuesday.
/11/April 8.
Dean, get out to Gorton and others that when the situation makes possible we will be seeing Thieu, not for policy change
but to make ready for his visit later.
Ambassador Bunker: Put it up to Thieu to see if he wants to bring Ky.
The President: On the matter of reserves, how much do you recommend on the first call-up?

Secretary Clifford: 24,500, and do it tomorrow./12/

/12/In a press conference on April 11, Clifford announced the call-up of 24,500 reservists and a new troop ceiling of
549,000. He also stated: "We have concluded that Americans will not need always to do more and more but rather that the
increased effectiveness of the South Vietnamese government and the South Vietnamese forces will now permit us to level
off our effort and in due time to begin the gradual process of reduction." For text of Clifford's remarks, see Department of
State Bulletin, April 29, 1968, pp. 552-554, and The New York Times, April 12, 1968.
The President: Will Thieu make the 135,000?
Ambassador Bunker: It looks O.K. He wants to do 135,000 plus another 25,000.
The President: What about our equipment for them?
General Wheeler: I think we'll make it.
Secretary Clifford: Combat units of ARVN have M-16s by June 68, RF and PF in July [will have] 3/4 of M-16s that come
out will be going to ARVN.
General Wheeler: From a practical point of view, must arm U.S. troops with M-16 first or the roof will blow off the Capital.
The President: Buzz, are we taking a gamble on not trying to stop infiltration except in Panhandle?
General Wheeler: We lost a little by pulling back. But not on the Hanoi-Haiphong cutback. We are losing something from
Than Hoa south to the 19th parallel. We wish we could give a good hard knock in the next day or two.
Secretary Clifford: We feel comfortable with the 19th to avoid mistakes.
General Wheeler: Between Laos Panhandle and strikes above DMZ, we're using as many sorties as we ever did.
(Averell Harriman and William Bundy arrived at 12:40 p.m.)/13/
/13/Before he went to Camp David, Harriman met with Nitze and Warnke at the Pentagon to discuss the military aspects of
the upcoming negotiations with the North Vietnamese. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers,
Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Chronological Files, April 1968)
Mr. Harriman: Geneva has many advantages from our point. New Delhi, if in Asia, for the larger talks.
(At this point, the meeting was recessed for lunch.)
The President: Could this be a Tet ploy?
Secretary Rusk: I think they want to get rid of all the bombing of NVN. They seem to want to go through with their part of
war full-scale. The first talks will be tough. Hang in there. Either get them to make concessions or get them to take the
responsibility for breaking off the talks.
Walt Rostow: Their military position is not strong, but they think their political position in the United States is strong.
Ambassador Bunker: I agree. I think they're doing it to exploit our position here.
The President: Would they have come along with feelers if we
hadn't made our speech?
Mr. Bundy: They may have been wanting to tease us. And quickness with which they responded indicated they might have
had something in mind, but probably not what resulted.

Secretary Clifford: If they play us for fools, Buzz and I have some choice targets we want to recognize.
Mr. Harriman: They broke the '62 agreements before the ink was dry. We should see positive results.
The President: The stronger we are offensively, the better our position on negotiations will be.
The group agreed with the President.
The President: Thieu is doing better on TV--reaching a lot of people?
Ambassador Bunker: Yes--and also radio. He is making shorter speeches. He does very well.
2:30 p.m.:
The President: Are we all agreed on draft instructions to Ambassador Harriman? Mr. Clifford?
Secretary Clifford: Yes, sir./14/
/14/In notes of the meeting in a memorandum for his personal files, dated April 9, Harriman observed: "Bunker seems to
lack an understanding that President Johnson has the balance of this year to carry out his policies, and that there is little
chance that American opinion will support a 30-billion dollar war in Vietnam, with the present rate of losses, for much
longer. He has not adjusted himself to the realities of the American people's unwillingness to continue indefinitely at the
present rate." He also described Clifford's intervention to prevent alteration of instructions for the negotiating team by
recommending that Bunker's proposals be given to the negotiators only as guidance. "There is no doubt that Clifford's
initiative saved the instructions from mutilation," he concluded. (Ibid.)
The President: Gen. Wheeler?
General Wheeler: Yes, sir.
Ambassador Bunker: I have a couple of questions. Can they continue to infiltrate 10,000 and let them continue to use Laos
as a corridor? There they've built up all-weather roads.
Secretary Rusk: Our assumption has been there would be no more than the general level at the time the San Antonio
formula was presented. Perhaps we should talk about reduced infiltration.
General Wheeler: 6,500 last September.
The President: So they've about doubled.
Secretary Clifford: The condition at the time of San Antonio was my position with the Congress.
Ambassador Bunker: The present increases may be able to make up the terrific losses which have occurred.
Ambassador Harriman: What is the most important military de-escalation they can take?
Ambassador Bunker debated whether Laos should be included in efforts to reduce infiltration.
Secretary Rusk and General Wheeler: We ought to at least insist that all parties subscribe to the 1962 Geneva accords.
We should re-establish the DMZ.
Ambassador Bunker: The most important thing is to keep Thieu going--don't let him think we're selling him out./15/
/15/Following this meeting and the departure of the guests, the President and Christian met with Sharp. (Johnson Library,
President's Daily Diary) According to notes of this meeting, Sharp discussed military matters in Vietnam and recommended
Admiral John McCain as his replacement for CINCPAC. (Ibid., Meeting Notes File) On April 11 the President named
Abrams as COMUSMACV and designated Goodpaster as Abrams' deputy.

190. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, April 11, 1968, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 71. Secret.
Mr. President:
Herewith the short and the longer cable from Sullivan./2/
/2/Attached but not printed are two telegrams. Telegram 5777 from Vientiane, April 11, reported the receipt of the DRV
letter. Telegram 5784 from Vientiane, April 11, transmitted the text of the DRV letter, which acknowledged receipt of the
April 10 U.S. letter and reaffirmed the DRV view that "a preliminary contact between the representatives with rank of
Ambassador of both parties has as its goal that of permitting the American side to determine the unconditional cessation of
bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV and (of permitting) the two parties to agree on the date, the place, and
the level of official conversations. It is a preliminary contact that is necessary to engage in rapidly with a view toward
beginning the official conversations between the two parties with the least delay." Expressing surprise that the United
States was "now refusing the choice of Phnom Penh for preliminary contact between the representatives," the DRV
proposed Warsaw as an alternative. The letter next designated Nguyen Thuong, DRV Ambassador to Cambodia, as the
DRV representative if the preliminary contact took place at Phnom Penh, but named Ha Van Lau as representative if the
contact took place at Warsaw. Finally, the DRV agreed that the contact would begin April 15 at Phnom Penh, or April 18 at
Warsaw. At the end of the telegram, Sullivan commented that he thought the choice of Warsaw indicated that the DRV did
not want "a particularly quiet set of contacts." (Ibid.)
It is clear that Hanoi's objectives are:
--to take our temperature;
--to see if we're capable of being pushed by the U.S. doves into a location we obviously do not want;
--to use the question of place as propaganda around the world, as Sullivan notes in his final paragraph of comment.
I informed Bill Bundy of your view, and he said that he would draft in the sense you directed, but he believes we should
walk around the question and look at all its implications before making a final decision. I told him to prepare a draft for
submission to you, and that you would decide if you wanted a meeting on this matter./3/
/3/The reply, transmitted in telegram 145154 to Vientiane, April 11, outlined "certain minimum standards of fairness and
equity" for the location of the contacts, such as the requirement for a neutral country where both sides had adequate
representation and communications. In addition, the preliminary contacts should take place in an Asian capital. The
previous offer of the four acceptable locations was reiterated. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) The reply was delivered at 1340Z on April 12. (Telegram 5806 from
Vientiane, April 12; ibid.) In an April 12 note to the President, Jones noted: "Walt talked to Goldberg who has talked to U
Thant. U Thant will send a message to Hanoi saying he believes Rangoon will be the best place for talks. Goldberg asked
that U Thant's message be kept secret. U Thant thinks Hanoi chose Warsaw because of a great deal of pressure from
China." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Crocodile, General, Chronological Summary, Vol. I
[2 of 2])
If we decide to turn down Warsaw, I believe we should enter the propaganda fight openly by explaining precisely why we
need a place where the South Vietnamese and our other allies, including their press, can operate comfortably--which
neither Phnom Penh nor Warsaw permit. If we are silent, we shall be pilloried. If we fight for a good neutral place, I think
we can carry opinion with us.
Walt

191. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) and President

Johnson/1/
Washington, April 11, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson,
Chronological/Schedule, April 1968. No classification marking. The President's Daily Diary notes a telephone call by the
President to Harriman at 11:46 a.m. on April 11. (Johnson Library)
Governor Harriman called the President.
H--Mr. President, I wanted you to know I feel very strongly that Warsaw has a number of advantages over any other place.
The President--I have rejected it outright, flat, all the way. I saw where the State Department said it was excellent. But as
long as I am President we are not going to Warsaw where we have been once before and negotiate in that kind of
atmosphere. I feel strongly it ought to be neutral, have adequate communications and some of the other people with
experience feel the same way, such as Ellsworth Bunker.
H--I would also hope to be among those consulted.
The President--Yes, you have told me your opinion now. I would also like to be consulted and decide before the State
Department decides. I have drafted and just LDX'd my reply./2/
/2/See footnote 3, Document 190.
H--I will obey orders.
The President--I hope so.
H--But I hope I can always tell you how I feel. I have to tell you this was a major step forward in kicking the Chinese out of
the situation. The people in Eastern Europe want to end this conflict and have a reasonable settlement. It doesn't bother
me to negotiate in an Iron Curtain country.
The President--It does bother me. I don't want any part of Warsaw, Czechoslovakia, or any of these other Eastern
European countries. I think it ought to be in Asia, in a neutral territory. We shouldn't be dictated to through Tass./3/
/3/The DRV proposal of Warsaw was first disclosed through a report from the Soviet news agency Tass. According to a
memorandum of conversation, April 11, Katzenbach chided Dobrynin for Soviet release of the offer through public
channels, which tended "to give the impression that what we are engaged in is a propaganda exercise rather than a
serious effort to bring about peace in Vietnam." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Crocodile-Paris to be filed) In a memorandum of conversation with Dobrynin, April 12, Thompson noted: "In the course of my talk with
Dobrynin today, I probed to find out whether the North Vietnamese had been in contact with the Soviets about their recent
move for talks with us. He said he had no information to indicate that they had consulted the Soviets before the President's
speech on the matter but that the North Vietnamese had informed their Ambassador in advance of the reply they were
making to our proposal. (I believe he was referring to our proposal of Geneva.)" (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) According to a more detailed memorandum
of this same conversation with Dobrynin dated April 12, Thompson told him that "Warsaw was almost like our proposing
Taiwan." (Ibid.) Christian read a statement to the press acknowledging the Tass dispatch, the DRV message in Vientiane,
and the U.S. reply. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 29, 1968, p. 551.
H--I am a fellow who takes orders. I have dealt with these countries for a long time, and I think my judgment is better than
Bunker's.
The President--It may be. It may be better than mine.
H--But I would like to be able to tell you how I feel.
The President--You did you see.
H--We have a tough proposition to get the kind of peace you want in Asia. We have got to use all of our resources to get

it.--I am a soldier. I obey orders.

Note: (I understand that in addition to Katzenbach and Bundy, Clark Clifford agrees in favoring Warsaw. W.A.H.)

192. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) and Cyrus R.
Vance/1/
Washington, April 11, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson,
Chronological/Schedule, April 1968. No classification marking.
V called H to talk about his announcement about accompanying WAH had got to the press, and that he had been in touch
with Geo Christian about it, and they had confirmed it, etc./2/ Conversation turned to site of contacts:
/2/Reference is to the announcement that Vance would join Harriman as a member of the negotiating team. See The New
York Times, April 11, 1968.
H--There was a flap this morning about this Warsaw business.
V--I would have liked it myself. It seemed to me fine.
H--The offer was a slap in the face at the Chinese. The Eastern Europeans are frightfully keen to see the war over for the
same reasons as the Western Europeans--they don't want to see a confrontation between the US & the USSR. But the
President has decided against it, partly because Bunker was with him this morning and Bunker thought it would create
difficulties in Saigon. He was very firm.
V--I think Averell, we are going to get into a real problem if we keep saying "no".
H--I know. But he made the decision. And that's that. So we have to--the statement has gone back to them that on
reconsideration we thought Asia was probably the right place as they had first thought. That we were quite ready to
consider any of the places they had mentioned. Neutral places, where the local people are not committed. This isn't the
language they use. But it ought to be a place where they each have missions so we could have reasonable
communications. So we have gone back on that basis. I don't disagree with you at all. But the boss made the decision.
H--I am afraid it was bad luck. The trouble was that TASS announced it. And the President assumed that Moscow had
leaked it. But this was a name correspondent from Hanoi who put it on the air. We can't very well criticize them for doing
that because our correspondents do that all the time. We had it here from Sullivan about the same minute in the Code
Room. The President heard it on the air first. That was naturally not very pleasant. And Bunker there, having breakfast,
said for God's sake, "no". I think Clark, Nick, Bill Bundy, agree with me. I am sorry because I think we need people in place
that can help us. But there is logic in this and Nick's put out a revised statement. I don't know what they will do. We have
accepted the date of the 18th.

193. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, April 11, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room. No classification marking. The President met
alone with Mills from 2:26 to 3:10 p.m. (Ibid., Daily Diary) These are summary notes of the meeting; a complete record of
the meeting is the transcript made from its recording. (Ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S NOTES ON MEETING IN CABINET ROOM ON
APRIL 11, 1968 WITH WILBUR MILLS

The President said he was sorry he was late but had to try to get off a message to Hanoi./2/ Congressman Mills asked
what the situation looked like and the President said they were just propagandizing; that they wanted to trap us. He
reported to the Congressman that we had said we would go anywhere and that we will, but that assumes they have got
good drinking water and communications so they are trying to get the U.S. to go to Cambodia, which they could not do.
The President then said we suggested New Delhi, also Rangoon and Burma. We also suggested Jakarta, Indonesia and
later suggested Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
/2/See footnote 3, Document 190.
The President reported we would be willing to go to Singapore, Japan or any place that was fair, but they came back with
Warsaw. He said they want to propagandize and they get Fulbright to say why is Johnson delaying. He said he would go
anywhere. He explained that if we went to Warsaw we would just be at their mercy and the President said he was trying
his best to defend us. The President said the basic things necessary--communications for both sides so they can go back
and let the governments know what is happening.
The President said:
"I've got to tell my Senate, I've got to tell my people what is involved. I can't do it if we don't have communications. I've got
to consult with Military men about the effect of this and all that and second it is a neutral territory where they are not
advocates, and the press is not Prussian and Bunker told me this morning--he is the wisest man we've got in our whole
department and he was in helping me on it and he said now I negotiated a bunch of agreements. I negotiated three
yesterday and they didn't even know what was being negotiated. I negotiated the Panama Canal by taking the
Ambassador and going off in hiding for three days. I negotiated the Dominican Republic by getting off the desk. I
negotiated the Indonesia by hiding down there at Middleburg. But if you try to negotiate in a county fair or chautauqua-whenever you say something on one side it is just like negotiating with labor unions--they go out and put it in the paper and
the other side flares back, Nixon flares back and you never negotiate anything and you just can't budge except in a neutral
atmosphere. That is what he told me yesterday and again today. So that's our problem there."
The President reported to Congressman Mills that he was signing the Civil Rights Bill that afternoon. He said he was doing
so so he wouldn't go off and get all blown up a little later.
The President reported he had tried to avoid a message to Congress because he could not forego riots. The President
said that he had to do something because he was being accused of running out. He said he had to resolve the question-bearing in mind what was the wisest position for the country. He said his own feeling was that there is not anything more
important, not even the Hanoi thing, than for us to be fiscally responsible.
He went on to say that there was much division on this subject and Congress kept switching around. He said they go one
way and then another. He said that yesterday the Senate had turned down his budget by more than a two to one vote, and
that it all meant nobody was taking leadership now and that is the way it is now. He said that he tried to take leadership,
but that he could not deliver Mills, could not deliver Mansfield, and could not deliver Russell Long. He said it did not do any
good for him to talk because he did not have the horsepower to deliver any of them. He said we have got to try to find out
something we can do and all get together and study it. The President said:
"I am willing to get behind you; if I could appoint you President I would take Ways and Means and do what you think about
it. I can't do that. My God, I have given all I have got. I have given my life--my political life. I have walked out. Now I did it. I
did it gladly. I don't regret it. I am happy about it, and I don't want to see this country go down the drain, and I am more
aware about it than you are. And I think I know more about it than you do. I don't think you see what is happening. And I
don't think the Congress sees. I don't think the Senate sees. And I think there has got to be a position somewhere in
between what you want in the way of a tax bill and what we want; what you want in the way of expenditures and what we
can take in middle of the year expenditures. We have to find that. Now, I don't know where that is. I am unable to put that
together at my old age. I put together lots of things, but I thought that not as a candidate would help, but Hell, I think it is as
bad now as it was before. So I don't know what to do."
[Omitted here is discussion of budget legislation.]

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968

Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 194-221

194. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, April 13, 1968, 1145Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE.
Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Crocodile. Received at 8:04 a.m.
24711. 1. I saw Thieu and Ky separately this afternoon to report on my trip to go over ground of where we stand on
negotiations and Harriman's instructions. They created no difficulties.
2. I told Thieu the President had suggested Honolulu meeting in order personally assure him of our support of him and
South Viet-Nam as we move into new phase. I said President and others in Washington were encouraged by what I had to
report on VN Govt's post-Tet efforts, offensive spoiling operations, growing confidence here, etc.
3. Turning to our estimate of Hanoi's next moves I said they clearly want talks and only question now is where and when.
We expect Hanoi will concentrate at exploratory talks on getting total cessation of bombing. Our agreement to that will
depend on Hanoi's agreement to hold substantive talks within a few days of cessation, and talks must be serious and
embrace all relevant topics. I outlined our position on "no military advantage" and gave examples of bad faith. Finally I said
we intend continue reconnaissance.
4. I did not make specific reference to GVN participation in substantive discussions with Hanoi. Instead suggested Thieu,
Ky and FonMin constitute small group to meet as necessary on policy with Berger, Calhoun and me; that Calhoun and
FonMin would keep in daily touch; that VN liaison group negotiations would be reporting, not policy deciding group, and
that we would be happy supply them with secure communication channels.
5. Thieu agreed to all this and asked a few questions on what "no military advantage" meant and how we could assure
this. Gave him a few examples, such as noticeable increase in troops moving south or across DMZ, and he did not press
this hard. He was more concerned as to whether we would regard escalation of fighting in South as a breach of faith after
total cessation. I avoided direct answer saying we intend to maintain offensive pressure on enemy in South during
negotiations. His second concern was what he called "the danger" that Hanoi will ask for complete cease-fire in South,
soon after they get cessation of bombing in North. I said we very conscious of this danger, and so far as we are concerned
a de-escalation and cease-fire in South would be subjects for later not early discussions.
6. Thieu said in addition to Bui Diem, their liaison team would have a military man, possibly their Ambassador to Canberra
or London,/2/ and probably the Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee Tran Chanh Thanh.
/2/Tran Kim Phuong and Le Ngoc Chan.
7. Thieu said we had his agreement to go along on basis I had outlined.
8. Talk with Ky: I went over above ground with Ky, with much the same points raised and with same result. He is strongly
of view that Hanoi is hurting, wants negotiations, and will move swiftly to get total cessation of bombing and total cease
fire. Latter, he said, would be "disastrous" now. Enemy has taken severe punishment during and since Tet and at Khe
Sanh, and we must keep hitting them. We must not agree to cease fire. Spirit of South Vietnamese forces is now high, and
there is growing confidence. He has just returned from Fourth Corps area (he made trip by road), RD cadres are now back
in most places, Gen. Thang is encouraged, and he came away with feeling things are moving there.
9. I told Ky of procedural proposals I had discussed with Thieu for joint consultation here. I said separate meetings with
Thieu and Ky were time-consuming. There was need for speed in consultations once negotiations started, and we should
all meet together. He agreed.
10. At end Ky said he also approved way we were approaching preliminary talks and instructions to Harriman. In this
connection, he said great danger would arise from Hanoi's efforts divide US and South Viet-Nam. We must not allow that
to take place./3/
/3/In INR Intelligence Note No. 283 to Rusk, April 17, Hughes described South Vietnamese reactions to the prospect of

negotiations and the impact of that prospect upon the South Vietnamese. There was a prevailing mood of "quiet bitterness"
over concern that the United States would acquiesce to the DRV demands for linking a full halt to a peace settlement and
forcing a coalition government on the GVN. On a positive note, however, Hughes observed that internal divisions among
the top leadership of the GVN had "apparently defused." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET S) Additional reporting on South Vietnamese attitudes toward the peace negotiations is in
telegram 25197 from Saigon, April 19. (Ibid.)
Bunker

195. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, April 13, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Crocodile, General, Chronological Summary,
Vol. I [2 of 2]. Confidential. Sent as telegram CAP 80812, April 13, to the LBJ Ranch where the President had traveled the
previous day.
SUBJECT
qoute any time, any place unquote
I promised a memo outlining the way we are handling this problem.
Line Nick Katzenbach took in small backgrounder yesterday was:
(1) When we, in the past, stated our readiness to meet at any place, we assumed Hanoi preferred quiet, private contacts.
Now, Hanoi has, by its own choice, made discussion of a site a public issue. Hanoi is trying to take propaganda advantage
of the U.S. statements by pressuring us into a disadvantageous meeting place.
In addition, we have noted:
(2) It now is clear that the site of first contacts may well become the setting for more formal talks. Thus, the site must meet
certain minimal requirements. These are:
--place where U.S. and NVN have diplomatic representation;
--where GVN and other allies and interested parties would have ready access;
--where the host government is not involved with either side in the Vietnam war;
--where we can expect even-handed treatment for the press of both sides;
--where official communications are adequate to the needs of both sides.
(3) We note that President's statement of March 31 (to which Hanoi responded) said we were ready to meet quote at
Geneva or any other suitable repeat suitable place unquote. In our formal note to Hanoi we repeated the suggestion of
Geneva but said would try to meet quote any reasonable alternative suggestions unquote./2/
/2/See Documents 169 and 175.
(4) A message received from Hanoi said the place of contact will be Phnom Penh quote or another place to be mutually
agreed upon unquote./3/
/3/See footnote 7, Document 189.
(5) We had indications Hanoi would prefer a site in Asia. Cambodia is the only country in Asia--except for North Vietnam

and Communist China--with which we do not maintain diplomatic relations. We suggested four capitals of Asian neutral
states--all of which would be acceptable and where NVN is represented./4/
/4/See footnote 7, Document 189.
(6) Warsaw is capital of a communist country--one that sides openly and actively with North Vietnam. Most of our allies are
not represented there and might not even have access. Tight local controls could limit access to friendly powers and to the
noncommunist press. Harassment and intimidation of our delegation would not be unlikely./5/
/5/In INR Intelligence Note No. 270 to Rusk, April 12, Hughes noted that North Vietnam proposed Phnom Penh "to place
us in the most difficult possible position," but believed that Warsaw would be an acceptable "fall-back position" for the
United States and was surprised at its rejection. Hughes speculated that a period of deadlock would follow. He suggested
that proposing a site either unofficially or through a third party would break the impasse. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
(7) We recall the experience in Korea at Kaesong (in communist territory) where our delegation had to travel to and from
under a white flag and where we were totally at the mercy of the other side in arrangements and facilities. We got evenhanded treatment only when we moved to Panmunjon in the demilitarized zone.

196. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, April 13, 1968.
Nick Katzenbach could only raise Bill Fulbright. Hickenlooper was in transit somewhere.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 72. Confidential. Apparently
sent to the President at the Ranch.
Nick found Fulbright quite understanding about Warsaw. He said that we might think, if we have to, about making a deal:
Warsaw for the preliminary contact; Geneva for the conference of substantive talks. Fulbright took the occasion, however,
to attack Harriman as a Hawk, saying that we could not be serious about seeking peace if Harriman was our negotiator.
Clark Clifford contacted Margaret Chase Smith, Mendel Rivers, William Bates, Stu Symington, and Richard Russell. He
found them all quite comfortable with our position and grateful that they had been informed.
In the course of the conversation, Clark underlined a thought which he suggested I pass along to you. One of the purposes
of his press conference/2/ was to begin to suggest to the American people that we have a long-range plan leading to our
disengagement as the South Vietnamese expanded their armed forces and their capabilities for dealing with the military
problem. He feels that it is particularly important now for us quietly to introduce this theme because it is not certain that the
negotiations will be productive. If they are, they may take a long time. If they break down, we must have a concept for
continuing our commitment in Vietnam for the long pull but on a basis which has some light at the end of the tunnel.
Therefore, he is inclined to believe we should play the negotiations in low key without excessive optimism and keep part of
the public attention focused on the idea we have come to a ceiling in our forces and are looking to slow but ultimate
disengagement. He believes the President might pick up this theme from time to time. I suggested Thieu also might
occasionally speak in this vein.
/2/See footnote 12, Document 189.

197. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security
Council (Smith)/1/
Air Force One, April 15, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE.
Top Secret. Received at 3:07 p.m.; no dispatch time is indicated. Rostow was with the President on board Air Force One

en route to Honolulu. Smith forwarded the message to Rusk under cover of an attached note.
Please communicate following to Sec Rusk personally from the President.
President wishes Sec Rusk to see Dobrynin and make points set out below--underlining Soviet interest in responsibility for
present exchanges leading to successful negotiations along lines discussion at Camp David.
Same points should be made by Goldberg to U Thant, urging Rangoon again./2/
/2/Rusk telephoned Goldberg at 6:48 p.m. to inform him of the President's request. Notes of the conversation are ibid.
Goldberg met with U Thant on April 17; see Document 199.
It is now two weeks since the President stopped the bombing of North Vietnam in the area containing 90 percent of the
North Vietnamese population and more than three-quarters of the area of North Vietnam.
The President had two purposes in mind in taking this unilateral step.
First, it would be matched by a comparable step in deescalating war.
Second, it would lead promptly to contacts and negotiations. With respect to the first, our information is that North
Vietnamese are engaged in a massive effort to bring additional military forces into South Vietnam.
We must consider whether, in effect, they intend to take advantage of our restraint.
With respect to the second objective, the United States has proffered Geneva--plus Vientiane, Rangoon, Djakarta, and
Delhi, four Asian neutral sites--as suitable and appropriate points for initial diplomatic contacts.
Any fair minded observer must judge the sites proposed by Hanoi as not neutral.
The United States believes it urgent that a neutral site soon be found--convenient and suitable to both parties--preferably
in Asia, the region most directly and vitally interested in secure and stable peace in Southeast Asia./3/
/3/Rusk met with Dobrynin that evening at 7 p.m. After the meeting, Rusk dictated to Smith a message for the President
which reads: "Within minutes after receiving the President's message I saw Ambassador Dobrynin and made the points
suggested by the President almost verbatim. Substantially the same points had been made to Dobrynin earlier by
Ambassador Thompson and Ambassador Harriman at my request. Dobrynin was aware that my demarche to him was a
direct result of a message which I had just received from the President from Honolulu. Dobrynin made no direct comment
except to say that he would relay the message immediately to his government. He asked about other possible sites and I
said that other possibilities could of course be considered. I also explained to him the importance of a neutral site where
we could have on-the-spot liaison with our allies. He asked if we had made that point to Hanoi and I told him that we had
not because we thought it might increase difficulties for Hanoi. He seemed to think that liaison with our allies was a
reasonable point and could help Hanoi understand what is in our minds. He told me that he would let me know of any
response from Moscow." (Ibid.)
Signed Rostow

198. Notes of Meeting/1/

Honolulu, April 16, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. Transcribed from Tom
Johnson's handwritten notes. The meeting, which lasted from 10 a.m. to approximately 1 p.m., was held at CINCPAC. The
principal individuals attending were the President, Wheeler, Ambassador to Korea William Porter, Chief of Protocol Angier
Biddle Duke, Rostow, Bundy, Vance, Murphy, Sharp, McCain, General Charles Bonesteel of the Joint Staff, and Krulak.
(Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

[Omitted here is a briefing on events in Korea and Vietnam.]

Pres[ident]: Go into infiltration from North. What about 17,050 in April? Looks like twice as much infiltration in last 4 weeks
than anytime before.
Wheeler: Westy said not all going to SVN. They are replacement & new units. Looks like substantial increase in last 2
months.
Pres: Has modification of bombing affected this?
Sharp: Haven't been able to detect it.
Wheeler: Since Jan., 80,000 enemy KIA. Not back to pre-Tet position.
Pres: What effect will weather in Laos have on inf[iltration]?
Sharp: Can move easier because of air strikes. Some weather/road problems. Not sure how far he can go.
Pres: Do you think he suffered as a result of Tet?
Sharp: Yes, sir.
Wheeler: Also, we know he did because of no 2nd level of attacks. He wants to mount them but can't.
Rostow: Have we taken stock of strength of main-force units?
[Speaker not indicated]: MACV assesses all captured units against strengths. Figures are impressive, but aerial
reconnaissance does not reflect main infusion into S[outh]. No large number of replacements seen yet.
Pres: Are they regrouping or running?
Wheeler: He is avoiding contact where possible & attempting to get recruits. Our people are carrying the fight to the
enemy.

199. Telegram From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to the President's Special
Assistant (Rostow) in Hawaii/1/
Washington, April 17, 1968, 1449Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 6 G (4)b, 4/11-24/68, Talks with Hanoi. Secret.
CAP 80921. Following is Ambassador Goldberg's report of his conversation with U Thant: on a site for contacts with the
North Vietnamese.
Re: Vietnam
Summary: Amb Goldberg and Sisco met with SYG and Bunche to review current state of matters re site of U.S.-NVN talks.
Goldberg stressed reasons why Warsaw or any other Communist capital caused difficulties for U.S. as a site, our strong
desire to get talks started promptly, and our willingness to consider neutral sites where proper atmosphere could prevail
with reasonable communications, and opportunity for proper liaison with our allies./2/ SYG confirmed he sent message to
Bo over weekend through French indicating our preference for Rangoon and willingness to meet there on 16th./3/ SYG
has not received reply; he pointed out that since he had to work through French, Bo had not received this message until
Sunday morning, April 14.
/2/Bunche told Goldberg in a telephone call on April 12 that U Thant had met with Mai Van Bo that morning. Bo requested

that Thant persuade the United States to accept Warsaw as the site for talks since the President had said he would meet
with representatives of Hanoi "anywhere, any time." (Notes of telephone conversation by Sisco, April 12; Johnson Library,
National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 72) As reported in telegram 2798 from Warsaw, April 12,
the Polish Government also pressed for acceptance of its capital, at Hanoi's behest. (Ibid.)
/3/In a memorandum to Rusk and a separate memorandum to Rusk and Katzenbach, both dated April 13, Sisco confirmed
that Goldberg had requested that Thant transmit to the North Vietnamese the U.S. preference for Rangoon and a meeting
there on April 16. However, he noted the impression that Thant had received from Bo regarding the importance of China's
reaction to any potential site, especially in regard to places like India and Burma, governments with which China had poor
relations. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
Thant sent this message to Bo by way of the French Mission to the United Nations. (Telegram 12705 from Paris, April 16;
ibid.)
1. Goldberg said he had been asked by Pres Johnson to speak to SYG and to express our concern over delays in getting
talks started and our desire to get prompt agreement on venue./4/ Goldberg said there are number of possible sites which
would be acceptable where neutral atmosphere could prevail. It important that site provide for proper atmosphere where all
concerned could be treated with dignity, moreover important site permit opportunity for proper liaison with our allies.
Goldberg pointed out difficulties we have with Phnom Penh and detailed reasons for our difficulties with Warsaw or other
Communist capitals as site. He reminded SYG we have made number of suggestions including Rangoon where we
confident Ne Win would approach matter with proper neutral spirit. SYG interjected that he sure Ne Win would agree to
have Rangoon as site if both sides agreed.
/4/See Document 197 and footnote 2 thereto.
2. Goldberg confirmed to SYG that we are maintaining our contact in Vientiane. SYG said he transmitted message through
French to Mai Van Bo over the weekend, expressing our preference for Rangoon and our willingness to meet there on
16th. Since French FonOff was closed Saturday evening for Easter holidays, French did not get message to Bo until
Sunday evening. SYG then made same points which Bunche communicated to us over this past weekend. SYG said
important consideration for Hanoi is Peking and that Hanoi wishes to keep its reaction as little violent as possible. He
attributes particular significance to fact Hanoi responded positively to Pres Johnson's speech against Peking's advice. He
cited Chou En-lai postponement of his trip to Phnom Penh as a reflection of Peking's irritation that Sihanouk had agreed to
Phnom Penh as a site. He said Hanoi finds Delhi very difficult because of bad relations between India and ChiComs. For
same reason, though not as difficult, Rangoon is in same category. Hanoi had suggested Warsaw because it felt Peking's
reaction would be less violent. In SYG's judgment Hanoi will probably be more agreeable to Geneva or Paris than Delhi,
Rangoon or Djakarta but he had no info to confirm this.
3. Goldberg confirmed that Geneva would be acceptable to U.S., although we had suggested Rangoon on assumption that
being an Asian capital it would be more convenient to all concerned. In response to SYG's query, Goldberg confirmed that
we have approached Russians to seek their support for a neutral site. Bunche reported that Malik seemed optimistic and
said at a recent luncheon that in his judgment talks would get started within a week. SYG expressed hope for early
agreement and despite difficulties Hanoi has with Delhi as a site, his judgment is NVN meeting with Kaul indicates Delhi
not necessarily precluded. SYG asked Goldberg whether Paris would be acceptable to U.S., and Goldberg responded that
no such suggestion or proposal had been made but that his personal judgment was that this probably would be acceptable
since our basic objection was to meeting [in] a Communist capital.
4. In closing SYG mentioned that he had discussed with Bo question of NVN sending a correspondent to UN which had
been previously raised with SYG some months ago. SYG said he was not making any proposal to U.S. at this time. He
realized that this would be very difficult for U.S. From his own point of view if NVN decided to send someone it would be
helpful as a point of contact since his operation is cumbersome, having to go through third parties to reach Hanoi. He
stressed to Goldberg that he had made clear to Bo that he had not discussed this matter with U.S. nor could he guarantee
that should NVN decide it wished to send a correspondent that he would get a visa. SYG said that if Hanoi so decided, he
would let Goldberg know so that matter can be discussed. Goldberg said that without making any commitment we would
be prepared to discuss the matter if the occasion arose./5/
/5/That same day, the DRV announced that it would appoint as Minister Xuan Thuy, a former Foreign Minister and member
of the delegation to the 1961-1962 Geneva Conference on Laos and the man who would likely lead the DRV delegation in
the upcoming peace talks. In telegram 5852 from Vientiane, April 17, Sullivan described Thuy as "a sophisticated and
urbane person" who strictly adhered to the "Hanoi party line." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)

200. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/

Washington, April 18, 1968, 2113Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE.
Secret; Flash; Exdis; Crocodile; Nodis. Drafted by Read, cleared by Harriman, and approved by Rusk.
149160. 1. You should immediately arrange delivery to DRV Embassy with appropriate salutations the following message:
Text
The USG has made clear its readiness to enter into contacts with the DRV without further delay. The concern of the United
States is to save lives--to serve the cause of humanity, not to make propaganda.
To have the best chance for success, initial contacts should occur in a setting fair to both sides.
The USG has proposed four countries in Asia as appropriate sites for the initial contacts: Laos, Burma, Indonesia/2/ and
India, and the US remains of the view that Asia is the proper region for discussions of peace in that area. In addition, the
US has suggested Switzerland as an appropriate site.
/2/In telegrams 149726 to Djakarta and 150327 to Rangoon, both April 19, the Department expressed hope that the
negotiations would occur in either capital. It also noted in each telegram: "It may be that the addition of ten more sites to
our list would make it a little easier for Hanoi to accept one of the original sites we suggested, although we have no
indication whatever out of Hanoi that such would be the case." (Ibid.)
These five countries do not exhaust the list of appropriate sites. If their governments are willing, the United States
representatives are prepared to meet with representatives of the DRV in Colombo, Tokyo, Kabul, Kathmandu,
Rawalpindi,/3/ and Kuala Lumpur./4/ If the DRV prefers a European site, the USG is ready to meet in Rome, Brussels,
Helsinki or Vienna. US representatives, Ambassador Harriman and Ambassador Vance, are ready to meet at any of the
suggested sites at the earliest date suggested by the DRV. End Text.
/3/In backchannel telegram 6221 to Rawalpindi, April 18, Ambassador Benjamin Oelhert was instructed to deliver to
President Ayub Khan a message from President Johnson requesting him to discuss with Kosygin the possibility of
Rawalpindi as a venue. (Ibid., POL 27-14 VIET) Ayub's reply, as reported in backchannel telegram 311 from Rawalpindi,
April 19, in part reads: "As requested by you, I immediately took up with Mr. Kosygin the question of a venue for Vietnam
peace contacts. His reaction was that after your repeated statements that you would be prepared to hold talks anywhere at
any time, there should be no problem about the selection of a venue. He considers that you might agree to Warsaw where
both sides have official representatives. He further considers that talks can begin at once following a positive response
from you. He said that the selection of a site does not depend on USSR but is for both North Vietnam and USA to decide.
It is purely my personal assessment that whatever may be the Soviet public stance, inwardly they too are anxious that
talks should start and peace should be restored as soon as possible." (Ibid.)
/4/On April 17 and 18 The New York Times published stories concerning an April 16 meeting among U Thant, Goldberg,
and Sisco, and asserted that Thant would suggest Paris as a site for talks. In a memorandum to Rusk the same day,
Harriman described Thant as "the best intermediary to make a suggestion of a new location to both Hanoi and ourselves."
If Thant was to be used, Harriman advised that he be given several capitals to suggest, such as Colombo, Vienna, Kabul,
and "including Paris." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, KennedyJohnson, Subject File, Vietnam, General, April 1968) In telegram 4647 from USUN, April 18, Goldberg reported that he
had informed Bunche of the additional U.S. proposals and that Paris would be expressly left off the list. In turn, Bunche
noted that Paris had not been formally proposed although the Secretary-General had mentioned it in his talks with Bo.
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) In an April
18 memorandum to Rusk, Harriman argued for Paris, noting that especially Manac'h and Sainteny would be invaluable in
overcoming any impasse if the talks were held there. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special
Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Subject File, Vietnam, General, April 1968) The President discussed these
initiatives with Daley the next day. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation
Between Johnson and Daley, April 19, 1968, 10:21 a.m., Tape F6804.03, PNO 1-2)
2. Secretary Rusk will be making public statement along foregoing lines at 1630 Washington time today, so delivery should
be effected with maximum speed./5/
/5/For text of Rusk's statement, see Department of State Bulletin, May 6, 1968, p. 577. On April 20 the DRV rejected all of

the sites proposed by the United States, noting that it did not have representation in the suggested venues and that these
nations were not in fact neutral. See The New York Times, April 20, 1968.
Rusk

201. Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special
Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, April 21, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE.
Secret. In telegram 151356 to Bangkok, Canberra, Manila, Saigon, Seoul, and Wellington, April 23, the Department noted:
"We are suggesting to Hanoi that they consider an appropriate and suitable capital, not yet proposed by either party, where
our representatives could have a private discussion limited solely to the question of selection of a site for contact." The
Ambassadors at these posts were directed to "emphasize that subject matter for discussion in this private contact would be
limited to site selection. By this means we seek to end debate over mutually agreeable site." (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
Some Alternatives on a Site for Talks with Hanoi
1) A neutral ship
--ask U Thant to arrange
--ask host country to propose
(Note: we suggested a ship for armistice talks in Korea)
2) Accept their choice for "contacts" (i.e. Phnom Penh or Warsaw) if they accept our site for "talks" (Rangoon, Delhi, etc.)
3) Send a representative (possibly our No 2 negotiator) to Warsaw to make contact with Hanoi's representative to arrange
a mutually agreed site
4) Negotiate a site through already established contacts (e.g. Vientiane with our Ambassador and their Charg)
5) Ask the Pope to propose Vatican City as the site
6) A rotation plan--one month in their spot, one month in ours, e.g. Phnom Penh and Rangoon, Warsaw and Delhi
7) Rotation plan between capitals of the Co-Chairmen (i.e. London and Moscow)
8) Ask the Co-Chairmen (British and Soviets) to agree on and propose an "appropriate" site
9) Rotate talks among the three ICC capitals (Delhi, Warsaw, Ottawa)
10) Get a third party (e.g. U Thant, Co-Chairmen, etc.) to propose Bucharest
11) A site on the DMZ in Viet-Nam with guarantees for the security of the site base camps and access roads (as in
Panmunjom)/2/
/2/Jorden's memorandum is attached to an April 22 memorandum from Bundy to Rusk in which Bundy commented on
these proposals. He opposed the idea of a neutral ship as a "gimmick" and termed the Vatican a "non-starter," described
the British and the Soviets as a "weak team" but thought that the proposal of Bucharest had possibilities, although he
preferred Geneva or even Paris. (Ibid.) In a memorandum transmitting Jorden's memorandum to the President, April 22,
Rostow noted that Rusk's "preference is something like para. 4 in attached list; that is, diplomatic discussions about sites

between our Ambassador and theirs in either Warsaw or Vientiane." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to
the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 72)
Bill

202. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/
CM-3230-68
Washington, April 22, 1968.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80-R01580R, 284--Order of Battle. Top
Secret. In the attached covering note to Helms, April 22, Wheeler wrote: "Dear Dick: Attached is my memorandum to Clark
outlining Westy's views on the current Order of Battle strength problem. I share Westy's concern in this matter. I cannot
help but feel that airing these greatly increased strength figures at this time would be detrimental to our effort in the long
run. Sincerely, Bus." The CIA's differences with MACV over Order of Battle estimates had grown since the previous fall.
The issue is outlined in a paper Enthoven submitted to Clifford on June 28 entitled "Uncertainties About VC/NVA Force
Levels." (Johnson Library, Alain Enthoven Papers, Statistics on the War) The CINCPAC/MACV dissent to the CIA's
analysis is in a joint MACV/PACOM memorandum to Helms, April 19. (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry
Subject Files, Job 80-R01580R, 284--Order of Battle)
SUBJECT
VC/NVA Order of Battle
1. As you know, MACV and CINCPAC representatives are in Washington attempting to reconcile total enemy strength
issues growing out of the leak of CIA figures in the New York Times./2/ They report that CIA representatives are about to
forward a paper to Mr. Helms with total enemy strength including political infrastructure of 480,000 to 615,000, about twice
the previously agreed figures. They base these figures on essentially the same evidence and argumentation which were
reflected by USIB in the formulation of SNIE 14/3/67./3/ The only new element in the CIA case was the correct assertion
that MACV OB figures do not always reflect all-source evidence. MACV representatives have agreed to adjust figures on
this basis, but this has made no appreciable effect on the wide CIA divergence from the SNIE.
/2/At the MACV-CINCPAC conference, MACV refused to accept any substantive changes. (Memorandum SC No.
07068/68 from Paul Walsh, Deputy Director, Economic Research, to Helms, May 2; ibid., O/DDI Files, Job 78-T02095R,
April 1968 OB Conference)
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Document 397.
2. The primary item of MACV's disagreement is the CIA position that the so-called insurgency base, consisting of self
defense forces, secret self defense forces, assault youth, etc., should be quantified at a strength of 210,000 to 230,000.
The MACV position is that quantification is not possible, and that it gives the enemy credit for thousands of people who
exert no military effect. DIA holds that some quantification of the insurgency base is possible.
3. MACV's refusal to quantify the insurgency base stems from the following factors:
a. A representative cross section of prisoners picked up during the Tet offensive were questioned by MACV. Not one has
admitted to being a member of any of the organizations which CIA would quantify as "the insurgency base."
b. If there were these thousands of people armed and in sympathy with the enemy, that is, in the "insurgency base," then it
is likely that they would have joined the enemy during the recent Tet offensive. On the contrary, the population rejected the
Viet Cong; they did not flock to their cause.
4. There is a much larger issue involved here than intelligence methodology. The acceptance of this inflated strength,
which General Westmoreland believes cannot even be estimated with any degree of confidence, is contrary to our national
interest. The effect that its inevitable public announcement would have on the American public, which recognizes no
qualification in semantics between "military" and "insurgency base," is obvious. The enemy, for his part, would be given a
psychological tool of incalculable value in any subsequent negotiations.

5. I am substantially in agreement with General Westmoreland.

Earle G. Wheeler

203. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of
State Rusk/1/
Washington, April 22, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE.
Secret; Nodis; Crocodile.
SUBJECT
Next Steps on a Location for Contacts
1. Rejection of Warsaw.
We have instructed Gronouski Saturday to make it crystal clear to the Poles that Warsaw is not acceptable./2/ While this
will doubtless reach Hanoi, the repeated Hanoi propaganda that we have not categorically responded on Warsaw--plus the
U Thant message from Mai Van Bo to the same effect/3/--seems to indicate that we should submit a formal message to
Hanoi, through Vientiane, that Warsaw is unacceptable.
/2/In telegram 150456 to Warsaw, April 20, the Department instructed Gronouski to inform the Polish Government that the
United States would not accept Warsaw as a site since it was likely that "Hanoi's hopes of pressing us into Warsaw has
caused them to delay in looking at other sites." (Ibid.)
/3/See Document 199.
In so doing, we could take the occasion to argue quite bluntly that Warsaw is out principally because of its avowed role as
a supplier of grant military equipment to NVN. We could latch on to Hanoi's own complaint that some of our latest 10
suggestions were "support bases" on our side; presumably this would refer to Japan and Malaysia; but we could point out
that none of our 10 have actually supplied grant military equipment, whereas the Poles have.
At the same time, I think there would be considerable propaganda advantage if we were to narrow our criteria to a simple
and single criterion of "an adequately impartial atmosphere." We could go on to say that such an atmosphere almost
necessarily involved adequate and dignified treatment, with communications facilities, for representatives of both parties,
adequate press access and facilities, and no difficulty in fair access for liaison representatives from vitally interested allies
on both sides. This would be a far more palatable presentation of what we are actually after, would meet Hanoi's
propaganda point that we have now raised "four conditions," and would be much more consistent with the fact that 10 of
our 15 nominations have been places where Hanoi does not have resident representatives.
In short, I propose a message to this effect as our first move, and believe it should be done today. I will revise your existing
draft in this sense.
2. US Proposal of Another Site.
In my judgment, we should clearly not do this. Hanoi will have grave reservations about accepting anything that we have
proposed, even secretly. With 15 already in the hopper from us, we have no need to do more as our own initiative in any
event.
In my judgment, we should also refrain from further public comment at this point beyond a simple restatement of the
position we have taken, perhaps adding a reference to the use of diplomatic channels as the best way to handle the
matter. Even the ship idea seems to me to partake much too much of a gimmick, at least coming from us. It follows that, if
the President is to say anything on the subject, it should be a simple and moderately stated defense of the position we
have taken to this point. I re-worked the Saturday draft in this sense, but would now strongly suggest omitting the ship idea
or any new proposal.

3. Getting Someone Else to Propose a New Site.

This seems to me by far the most promising avenue. The questions are:
a. What site would we like to see proposed?
b. What would be the best channel through which to get it proposed?
c. What would be the other elements in the scenario, notably the timing of consultation with Saigon and the allies, and
getting required assurances that the prospective site would provide facilities for our allies and the press as required?
I address these questions below, with a recommendation at the end.
Choice of Site
On Bucharest, we have an intelligence report that the Romanians are interested. Bunker thinks he could sell it in Saigon,
and our Ambassadors to the allies are hopeful with the exception of Unger/4/ as to the Thai; however, if we got Saigon
aboard, the Thai could hardly cavil.
/4/Leonard Unger, Ambassador to Thailand.
Bucharest can be distinguished from Warsaw in the following respects:
a. A Romanian is President of the General Assembly.
b. The Romanian diplomatic record is accurate and impartial.
c. The Romanians have been fairly muted on Viet-Nam at least in the past year.
d. While Romania is on record as supplying assistance that includes defense items, we have every reason to believe the
quantities have been token.
e. Romania is conspicuously the most independent of the Eastern Europeans and--it could be argued--should be at least
as acceptable to the Chinese as Warsaw. Like Warsaw, it has a Hanoi Embassy, and also Soviet and Chinese Embassies.
f. Romania has had no record of interference with the press in recent years--as Warsaw has--and it has no present internal
political problem such as Polish antisemitism. (The latter point might have particular weight in some liberal Jewish circles
here.)
On the other hand, Bucharest would still have some negative factors in Asia simply because it is a Communist capital./5/
/5/Bucharest continued to remain a possible site. In an April 20 memorandum commenting on East European sites, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Walter Stoessel noted that despite physical limitations, Bucharest was
attractive because "Romania has been relatively restrained in its criticism of U.S. policy in Viet-Nam and has attempted to
play a constructive role in the conflict." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL
27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) In telegram CAP 81020 to the President, April 20, Rostow relayed an intelligence report which
said that the Romanian Government was fully supportive of the proposal to use its capital and would endeavor to facilitate
discussions in Bucharest. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 72) In
telegram CAP 81024 to the President, April 21, Rostow reported that several of the allied nations would not object to
Bucharest. (Ibid.) Telegram 152367 to Bangkok, Canberra, Manila, Seoul, and Wellington, April 24, reported that Thieu
"was prepared to go along" with Bucharest as a site for the talks if no better alternative could be found; the Ambassadors
were urged to prepare their counterparts for the possibility of Bucharest's selection. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) In a conversation with Bogdan on April 25,
Harriman noted that the United States would not propose Bucharest but would accept it as a site for contacts, although not
as the place for substantive talks. (Ibid.)
The second possible site in several minds is Paris. DeGaulle's vitriolic criticism of the war, the overwhelmingly hostile
French press, and unlimited press access can all be considered drawbacks. On the other hand, Paris would probably be
far more acceptable and explainable than Bucharest in Saigon and with our allies. The South Vietnamese have

representation there, and so do all of our allies./6/

/6/In an April 23 memorandum to Wallner, which was transmitted to Davidson the next day, John Gunther Dean, a political
officer at the Embassy in Paris, discussed the pros and cons of Paris as the site for initial talks. In arguing in opposition to
Paris, Dean advised that accepting it as the site "would be tantamount to rewarding DeGaulle for his past unfriendly
position on Vietnam," cautioned that the French Government had followed a policy of "benevolent neutrality" toward Hanoi
and thus might undertake actions during the talks that would further favor the North Vietnamese, and warned that the
French media and Vietnamese exiles in Paris would provide a great deal of anti-American pressure. He noted in Paris'
favor that its access, communications, and diplomatic representation were good; the city was large enough for informal
meetings on a discreet basis; and the French could possibly prove useful by reporting on the DRV delegation and by
ensuring a role for France in postwar Indochina. (Ibid., S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 461, Daniel Davidson Negotiating Papers,
French) Wallner discussed this matter in telegram 13000 from Paris, April 23, noting in particular: "I take the liberty to
rehearse the disadvantages which as seen from here far outweigh the obvious material and technical advantages of
access to all parties, good communications and excellent accommodations." (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14
VIET/CROCODILE)
A third site, foreshadowed in one Indian report from a North Vietnamese representative, would be Cairo. Nasser has been
considerably less hostile than DeGaulle, and one can assume that he would accede to the necessary arrangements.
Nonetheless, our own makeshift diplomatic status there, plus the emotional aspects of identification with Cairo at this
moment, seem to argue strongly against it.
Who Should We Get to Propose a New Site?
In the case of Bucharest, we could act through U Thant to Manescu, or we could approach Manescu, through a friendly
third country such as the British. If we did the latter, we could have the British spell out the assurances we would need, so
that we would have this under way at the same time.
If we wish Paris to be proposed, we could certainly get U Thant to do this.
Other Elements of the Script.
Whoever we use, we should make clear that we cannot finally accept the site until we have consulted with Saigon and our
allies. We should do this just as soon as we have some plausible official report that the proposal is in train.
Moreover, we need to be sure that we get--either directly or through third parties--the required assurances.
Conclusion.
This course of action has much to commend it, but it is inherently cumbersome and could involve misunderstanding.
Bucharest, with the British going through Manescu, seems the best bet for discretion and responsibility. If we use U Thant
at all, we risk distortion and getting ourselves out on a limb.

204. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, April 22, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes Files. Secret. The President had returned from visiting the LBJ Ranch in Texas
earlier that day aboard Air Force One. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
Meeting With the President, Monday, April 22, 1968, 6:00-9:00 p.m.
PRESENT
The President
Secretary Dean Rusk
Secretary Clark Clifford
Walt W. Rostow

The President asked Mr. Rostow to define the problem.

On the basis of the attached memorandum (Tab A),/2/ he said that we had come to a point where it was to our interest to
attempt to break the deadlock on the site for "contacts." Our objective should be:
/2/Document 201.
--To produce a formula which would induce Hanoi to move, if it now faces real problems with a site and wishes to talk.
--To create a situation, if Hanoi would not move, which would convince our people that we had done all that was possible.
In the latter case we could resume full-scale military action with public support.
Mr. Rostow cited the list of possible initiatives to break the log jam, as developed by William Jorden, and suggested that
the Secretary of State be heard.
Sec. Rusk said the best way to proceed was to raise with Hanoi the possibility of private ambassadorial talks in either
Warsaw or Vientiane, narrowly addressed to arranging a mutually-agreed site for "contacts."
The President indicated that he preferred Vientiane.
A draft was prepared, in line with Sec. Rusk's proposal, in which we would propose that the ambassadors in Vientiane
meet for this narrow purpose; but we would withdraw Vientiane from our list of places for the proposed subsequent
"contact."
There were two reasons for the latter condition:
--Vientiane was one of the places on our list which Hanoi did not like, and it was judged fair to soften that point by
withdrawing it from our "contact" list;
--The initiation of this principle would make it more difficult for Hanoi to propose Warsaw for the ambassadorial discussion
of site, because we would have created the precedent that the place for discussion of site would not be the place for the
contact itself.
The President continued to feel somewhat uneasy about proposing a site for private ambassadorial talks, which we had
already proposed for "contact" and which they had refused.
Sec. Clifford then underlined his grave uneasiness with our proposing Vientiane. He suggested, instead, that we simply
give Hanoi the option of listing, say, three locations which had not previously been considered by either side for the limited
private discussions.
It was generally agreed this was about as fair a proposal as we could make; and our people would judge it so, if it were
made public. Moreover, we would probably not have difficulties with our allies in private discussions to establish a site at
almost any point Hanoi might suggest, since the talks would not be substantive. We could, therefore, take very
considerable risk on this point.
After several drafts were formulated and examined, the attached was agreed by the President and dispatched by the
Secretary of State to Vientiane for transmission to Hanoi. (Tab B)/3/
/3/The text of telegram 151353 to Vientiane, April 23, was attached. The telegram requested Sullivan to pass to Chan a
note which read: "The United States proposes that we give consideration to additional capitals, not previously considered
by either side, for the sole purpose of private discussions to agree on a site and time for proposed contacts. The United
States hopes that the DRV will find this suggestion reasonable and will indicate, say, three appropriate locations suitable
for this limited purpose. The United States Government will give the response of the DRV prompt consideration." (National
Archives and Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
Underlying the discussion was agreement that there would be great frustration in the U.S. and difficulty in subsequently
conducting the war at full throttle unless the President's initiative of March 31 resulted in some kind of contact with Hanoi
and a clear demonstration that they were not operating in good faith.

WR

205. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, April 23, 1968, 2:15-3 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House.
Those attending were the President, Rusk, Clifford, Wheeler, Helms, Rostow, Christian, and Tom Johnson. Wheeler and
Helms left the meeting at 2:35 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S TUESDAY LUNCHEON
MEETING WITH HIS
FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS
Secretary Rusk: The message to Vientiane should be briefed generally to the allies./2/
/2/See footnote 3, Document 204.
The President: Was the flash gotten out?
Secretary Rusk: The message to Vientiane was delivered. The message to Bunker has not been./3/
/3/Telegram 151361 to Saigon, April 23, informed Bunker of the message to Vientiane and requested that he consult the
GVN especially on Bucharest as a site. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69,
POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
The President: Somebody asked me how I read accurate accounts of what Hanoi is doing. I tell them I read leaks from the
State Department in the New York Times.
Secretary Clifford: We may get an inquiry back from the message to the effect when will we stop all bombing?
Secretary Rusk: A "forum" is a "forum" as I put it to reporters in my backgrounder about the March 31 speech.
The President: There will be no speech this week. What are the indications on a Saigon attack now?
General Wheeler: A captured Colonel said this plan of attack was expected. It was unfortunate it leaked because we could
have clobbered them. It is the first time since the Civil War that we have given away information like this.
We have the following courses of action:
First, go back to RP 6 for 48 hours including Hanoi and Haiphong./4/
/4/Route Package 6 was the bombing run over the northeastern portion of North Vietnam.
Second, executing attacks selectively in Haiphong.
Third, executing attacks selectively in Hanoi.
I would not recommend it on military or political grounds. It would only be pinprick and would result in high losses.
The fourth course of action would be to open up the 19th and 20th parallel area for all types of attacks. I would recommend
this as well as a resumption of Water [Sea] Dragon./5/
/5/Naval operations off the coast of North Vietnam.

In summary, nothing north of the 20th parallel should be hit.

The weather will start turning in May. We had one good day only since March 31. I would recommend opening the area
between the 19th and 20th parallel for three or four days.
The President: Lets get maps--photography and estimates and I'll meet on it.
Secretary Rusk: I wouldn't object to route reconnaissance between the 19th and 20th parallels.
Secretary Clifford: Let's wait two or three days for a response to the message.
Secretary Rusk: If there were a major attack on Saigon, I would go back to RP6.
The President: It would bother me if we didn't. I am surprised Buzz did not recommend it. If they hit us, let's call them and
raise them. We can't sit back and let them hit us without letting them have it.
Secretary Rusk: I want to hit Hanoi and Haiphong if they hit Hue and Saigon.
Secretary Clifford: From the military standpoint, the military results of a few days does not justify the military gains. If the
President wants to make a decision-The President: I think we are going through a temporary armistice. I think they will break it as soon as it suits them.
Mr. Rostow: [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
Secretary Rusk: If there is a major attack on Saigon or Hue we should look at a heavy response.
The President: Do we have a plan to respond with if they take advantage of our restraint? I want maximum results if they
violate the restraint we have shown. If they do, let's damage them as much as possible without being reckless.
They are having a celebration. There is no incentive for them to act. I will not act until May 1 unless they take advantage of
us.
Let's have the plan in case they violate it. Let's rub out the leak on the 19th. The 20th is what we agreed to, not the 19th.
Secretary Clifford: We will have ready a plan for use against Hanoi and Haiphong.
The President: We want it to be appropriate.
Secretary Rusk: Put it on key targets.
The President: Phucyen airfield--you may want to hit it.
General Wheeler: They have IL-28's on it increasingly.
The President: Goldberg tells me NPT/6/ will be put off until September, then past election.
/6/Reference is to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Secretary Rusk: There is a feeling that the General Assembly should not get involved in domestic political issues.
Secretary Clifford then discussed the MACV announcement of missions against North Vietnam--the pros and cons of
changing present method of announcement, and the problem that will arise when sorties now mounted in Laos are shifted
to North Vietnam as Laos weather deteriorates.
Secretary Rusk: We have group sorties in limited missions. We can't stop putting out announcements. Put more sorties

into a mission.
General Wheeler: There was a press policy of being completely open on everything.
The President: Let's explore this. Also let's explore the whole area of press relations. Perhaps some South Vietnam rules
out there. I don't know why we haven't had censorship out there. This AP report of the VC Colonel wasn't helpful.
Secretary Rusk: Our principal power is what we ourselves say.
George Christian: There is very little power. The best limitation is what we ourselves put out.
[Omitted here is discussion of strategic arms issues.]
The problem of entering base area 607 in Laos was discussed./7/
/7/Base Area 607 was just across the Laotian border from Thua Thien Province in South Vietnam. A limited conventional
penetration of the area was planned in connection with the Operation Delaware/Lamson 216 thrust into the NVA
operational areas in the Ashau Valley. In memorandum CM-3265-68, April 29, Wheeler informed Clifford about the
specifics of the operation. (Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 72 A 1499, Vietnam 381, JanApril 1968) For further documentation on the offensive, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol XXVIII, Documents 356364.
Secretary Rusk: I would send indigenous forces in with U.S. advisers. Our Ambassador (Sullivan) has great problems with
this. We should limit this to "Ashau Valley fighting."
General Wheeler: Westy wants to put one battalion in for 3-5 days. We will call it the Ashau Valley operation.
Director Helms: All you have are primitive tribesmen in the area.
General Wheeler: Ambassador Sullivan is worried about three sites for Air America flights being knocked out. We have a
plan to hit Route 7 up to the 20th parallel.
The President: Let's get the Defense supplemental up, together with other items.
A situation report was given on the progress with M-16s and helicopters.
Secretary Clifford: By July we will have provided all combat ARVN with M-16s. We have two additional sources for M-16's
now in line. We have Colt on a 7-day a week, 3-shift basis. They are pushing for 50,000 M-16s this month.
We will turn out almost 700,000 more M-16s.
The helicopters are going well. We got prior clearance on April 10 from the committees. It will take $477 million for 1,075
more choppers. A program for additional engines is underway./8/
/8/In an address before the Associated Press luncheon the previous day, Clifford noted that the comprehensive review he
undertook during February and March had "confirmed the judgment, already reached by President Thieu, that the South
Vietnamese were ready to take on more of the responsibility and to carry more of the military burden." For full text, see
Department of State Bulletin, May 13, 1968, pp. 605-607.
The President: Are we losing choppers and planes?
General Wheeler: We are losing helicopters, not aircraft.
Secretary Clifford: We lost 11 in one action. We are comfortable with helicopters.
Secretary Rusk: You wrote the candidates that you would brief them in 1967.

The President: Put those two items on my desk--what we did before. I will decide after that.
Secretary Rusk: We must not be silent on the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.
The President: Let's take it up later.

206. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, April 24, 1968, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson,
General, April 1968. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held at Harriman's home in Georgetown.
SUBJECT
Vietnam
PARTICIPANTS
Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large
I asked Ambassador Dobrynin to come to call at N Street this morning. The Secretary suggested that I inform him of our
latest message to Hanoi through Vientiane./2/ I found that the Secretary had mentioned the subject to him last night at the
White House reception, but I was able to explain it in greater detail. I underlined that we hoped Hanoi's and our
Ambassadors or representatives could get together in some place where we both have representatives and come to an
agreement on a mutually agreeable site for contacts. We had the impression that any capital we mentioned would be
turned down by Hanoi as a matter of face.
/2/See footnote 3, Document 204.
He asked whether Warsaw was out, and I replied that it was, definitely. He then asked whether we had any particular
places in mind, and I said no. I said I thought almost any place, now that we had made the point of turning Warsaw down
as a supplier of military equipment to North Vietnam. He asked in which countries we both had Ambassadors or
representatives. I mentioned the first four that we had proposed, adding Paris and the several Eastern European countries
including Romania. He inquired about Algiers. I explained that Algeria had followed the UAR's lead in breaking with us last
June.
I asked him whether there were any further questions he wanted to ask, as the Secretary wanted him to be kept fully
informed. He asked a few questions about negotiations, whether we envisioned a Geneva-type conference. I told him our
mind was open. It would depend a good deal on how the discussions developed and what Hanoi wished. I said he should
not hesitate to inquire if he or his Government had any questions, as I would try to answer them.
He asked about the political scene, and whom I thought very privately would get the Democratic nomination. I said I
thought it was too early to make an intelligent guess. He spoke of knowing both "Bobby" and Hubert Humphrey well. He
assumed that Hubert Humphrey would get the support of President Johnson, to which I agreed.
(Harriman copy only: He then told me a joke that was going around the Diplomatic Corps of President Johnson's
preference for a successor: First, Hubert Humphrey; second, Nelson Rockefeller; third, McCarthy; fourth, Nixon; fifth, Ho
Chi Minh; sixth, Kennedy)
[Omitted here are brief personal remarks.]

207. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, April 25, 1968, 0900Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret;
Immediate; Nodis. Received at 5:43 a.m. This telegram is printed in full in Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 419425.
25643. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my forty-eighth weekly message.
A. General
1. The past week seems to have been, in a sense, one of suspended animation. There has been a feeling of expectancy in
the air, people waiting to see whether talks will get underway, and where they will be held. Your statement on the need for
agreement on a site to which the interested parties would have adequate access under conditions which would be fair to
both sides/2/ is considered here to be eminently reasonable and is strongly supported. At the same time, I have the
impression that the general feeling of apprehension, the fear of American abandonment, which I reported in last week's
message,/3/ has subsided somewhat; although some anxiety is still evident there is much more confidence in our
intentions. I think it is fair to say that concurrently there has been some hardening of popular and government attitudes and
positions in respect to negotiations and the whole range of questions they raise. In the speech of the Prime Minister on
April 17, in the resolutions adopted by the Confederation of Vietnamese Labor Unions, and in the two anti-Communist
meetings held in Saigon over the weekend, as well as in statements by members of the government and the Assembly,
opposition to any form of coalition with the NLF, insistence on the freedom and territorial integrity of South Viet-Nam, on its
primary role in negotiations, and its determination to carry on, alone if necessary, to see that the fruits of its long struggle
are not lost through negotiations have been emphasized repeatedly.
/2/Reference is to the President's remarks on April 15. For the full text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 511-513.
/3/Telegram 25197 from Saigon, April 19. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69,
POL 27 VIET S)
2. Your joint communique with President Park has had a good effect here./4/ Virtually all Vietnamese leaders were much
reassured by the statement regarding Vietnamese participation in the peace talks. I think this statement alone has taken a
good deal of the edge off of their fears. Vietnamese in general also seem to be more encouraged than otherwise by the
delay in finding an acceptable site for preliminary contacts. The snag over a site has at least had the merit of
demonstrating to them that we are not going to be bullied or cajoled into dealing with Hanoi on whatever terms it chooses
to demand. The delay has also given many people here time to absorb this turn of events and to evaluate more soberly the
meaning of your March 31 speech, various subsequent allied statements, and Hanoi's response.
/4/For this joint U.S.-South Korean communique, which contained a statement of dedication to the cause in Vietnam, see
Department of State Bulletin, May 6, 1968, pp. 575-577.
3. Leaders such as Tran Van Huong and the head of the Senate's independence bloc, Senator Nguyen Van Chuc, this
week publicly expressed confidence that the U.S. would not abandon Viet-Nam. Prime Minister Loc's speech, which I have
mentioned, is generally positive in tone. He noted that Thieu is trying to carry out the promises made at Manila, referring to
the establishment of constitutional government and the attack on corruption as examples. He added that freedom loving
peoples everywhere are "looking with confidence at the role and leadership of the United States in the task of stopping the
Communists' bold invasion." He then said that in the light of GVN performance "Viet-Nam has the right to expect from her
allies that they keep the promises they made in Manila/5/ with the view to halting Communist inroads."
/5/Reference is to the Manila Declaration of October 1966 calling for the withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops from South
Vietnam within 6 months of enemy disengagement. See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. IV, Document 281.
[Omitted here is discussion of military, political, civil, and economic matters.]
Bunker

208. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/

Vientiane, April 25, 1968, 1106Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE.
Secret; Flash; Nodis; Crocodile. Received at 6:56 a.m.
6057. Ref: Vientiane 6055./2/
/2/Sullivan reported in telegram 6055 from Vientiane, April 25, that a reporter saw two North Vietnamese diplomats coming
to the U.S. Embassy in order to arrange the 4:30 p.m. appointment. Sullivan surmised, therefore, that the meeting would
be observed by the local press. (Ibid.)
1. Hurwitch and I called on Chan and Con at 1630, in accordance arrangements reported reftel. Chan apologized for
asking us to come to him, but said that he felt press too active at our Embassy. We confirmed to him that Con had been
sighted in his visit to us and that we were probably followed to his place in any event.
2. Chan opened conversation with small talk about our recent visit to Luang Prabang and about other matters of no direct
import. In due course, he turned to note which Hurwitch had delivered April 23./3/ He said he wished make an observation.
That note had spoken of "private discussions" and yet we had in very short order told the world press about the note. This
indicated there was a difference between our words and our actions.
/3/See footnote 3, Document 204.
3. I challenged Chan on this point and said that a careful study of what had been said in Washington would indicate that
nothing had been said about the contents of the note or even giving precision about the date when it had been delivered.
Our spokesmen had merely answered a direct question by admitting that a communication had been passed since the
note of April 18./4/ I undertook to send him the exact text of what was said. (We will send material from USIS wireless file
tomorrow.)
/4/Document 200.
4. Chan repeated that this was merely an observation and dropped the subject. He then went on to recite one sentence
which contained the whole sum and substance of the meeting, to wit: "My government has received your note of April 23
and is studying it." (This same sentence was repeated verbatim twice again before seance ended.)
5. We sought to determine whether Chan had any indications about the time frame in which he expected "study" to be
completed. He merely repeated his sentence.
6. Chan then led conversation to his "surprise" that we had turned down Phnom Penh and Warsaw. I returned favor by
citing our "astonishment" that they had not replied to Geneva, New Delhi, Rangoon, etc. I pointed out that Geneva was city
where I had met so many of his colleagues such as Xuan Thuy and Ha Van Lau. This subject petered out on that general
line.
7. Next he turned to local situation and asked what I thought Lao attitude was. I said that most of their thoughts were
turned to possibilities for "honest negotiations" and universal compliance with 1962 Geneva Agreements. This led on to
some more tit for tat about Souvanna, U.S. and DRV "assurances" of peace, Ho Chi Minh's respect for the King, etc. No
hits, no runs, no errors, nobody left on base.
8. We concluded by assuring him that our Embassy was always open and that we were ready to receive a reply at any
time. He said he would not fail to let us know.
9. When he emerged, AP correspondent Goldsmith and local stringer were in driveway, took pictures of handshakes, etc.
They then raced us back to Embassy and asked if they could report that "ball was now in U.S. court." My only comment
was that "ball was still in the air."
10. Comment: Rather difficult to analyze this whole performance unless it was effort to eschew role of "dog in the manger"
and give some impression of action. My spies tell me that Soviets and Poles both visited Chan this morning. There may,
therefore, be some pressure from that general direction to keep Hanoi looking active rather than immobile./5/
/5/In telegram 6075 from Vientiane sent eyes only to Vance, April 26, Sullivan noted: "During my conversation with Nguyen
Chan yesterday, he asked me what I could tell him about Ambassador Vance. I said you were an old retired
undersecretary of Defense with a bad back and a twisted knee, that you had lynched Negroes in Detroit, suppressed
Turkish patriots in Cyprus and conspired with warmongers in Korea. Chan seemed gratified. If there is any other good

word you would like me to put in for you, pls let me know." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
Sullivan

209. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, April 25, 1968, 5:50-7 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room. No classification marking. These notes are a
summary of the transcript of the meeting's recording. Those attending the off-the-record session were the President and
Tom Johnson and a group of editors and reporters from the Washington Star that included Newbold Noyes, Crosby Noyes,
A. William Hill, Charles Seib, John Cline, Burton Hoffman, John Cassady, Paul Hope, Mary McGrory, Tommy Noyes, Jack
Horner, and Bernard Gwertzman. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
SUMMARY OF MEETING WITH REPORTERS FROM
WASHINGTON STAR AND PRESIDENT IN CABINET ROOM
The President was asked if he would be willing to talk a little bit about how he thought the campaign year was likely to
develop and if he had any ideas on the subject.
The President reported that he did, but that he was not the best informed; that he had not been in as close touch with it as
he normally was and would like to be. He said that he felt back in March when he made the announcement that he felt that
was the best thing he could do to try to bring about talks and some solution of this serious problem that is killing so many
of our boys and killing so many other people every day out in Vietnam.
The President said:
"I had the impression--rightly or wrongly--that as a candidate, being in the nose cone, so to speak, or the volcano, or the
typhoon, that others in the world would misjudge our situation and feel like they had pressures on the President that would
require him to take actions that he might not think were most desirable because of his own political problems. I thought the
simplest and easiest and best thing to do would be to just say that I did not want to become involved in any personal
partisanship in the campaign myself and that I would try to keep the Presidency from being involved during this period."
The President told the group that he felt the best interests of the country could be served better if he did not get into
partisan politics. They asked him if he thought the Vice President would run and they were told he had not been confided
in. He told them he did not feel he could do what he was doing and at the same time sit behind the scenes and manipulate
some campaign.
The President told the group there were several conflicting viewpoints on the success of the Tet offensive. Some people
think that as a result they are anxious to talk. The President did not agree. He expressed the opinion that he did not think
the Tet offensive was a gain for them militarily. He felt that psychologically they would benefit from it and believed they
had. Other viewpoints differed among some of the professional people./2/
/2/In a brief news conference an hour prior to this meeting, the President responded to a question about variant reporting
out of Vietnam concerning the military situation: "I don't know what conflicts you are talking about." The unidentified
questioner responded, "Stories about an impending attack and then reports to the contrary." Johnson replied, "We do have
reports like that." The President also announced Goldberg's resignation and replacement by Ball. For the full text, see
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 537-539.
The President told them that there was no difficulty in meeting in private and trying to select a site for any possible talks,
but for public meetings--that was a different story. He told them that we had said we would meet in Geneva or any other
suitable place. They came back and said they would meet in Cambodia or Warsaw or a mutually acceptable place so it
narrowed down to suitable or mutually acceptable--those three words. Ours was suitable and theirs was mutually
acceptable. They indicated they would like to do it near at home and not far away and where maybe Russia is present,
China is present and they would be wanting to talking to them. On the other hand, we would want to be talking to the South
Vietnamese probably, the Australians, the Koreans, Philippines and others. The President then told them of a number of
suggested sites. Warsaw, Cambodia, and Laos were some of those. The President said that places like Warsaw--we

would have no way of communicating with our people and in Cambodia it was being used as a haven for North
Vietnamese and he felt that these things would not be good.
The President then outlined to them some of the things that were taking place in the war in Vietnam, how the North
Vietnamese were moving supplies, etc. from over in Cambodia to be used against our men. He said the same thing was
true in Haiphong; that it was an arsenal and the streets were just packed with implements and storage which have been
unloaded from the docks and it's just one great big armory and they are completely immune from anything./3/
/3/According to the full transcript of the recording of the meeting, the President noted that 70,000 more NVA troops had
infiltrated southward since the partial bombing halt. Admitting that only 30,000 of this number had infiltrated since March,
Johnson did, however, see this as an overall increase in infiltration. (Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the
Cabinet Room)
The President said:
"I think our two big problems, the two biggest problems I have as President. I'm not talking about personal problems, but
Presidential problems. One, trying to keep the country from dividing to a point where we are impudent [imprudent?] and
two, trying to keep Ho Chi Minh from dividing us to the point. The Intelligence report this morning practically all of it was
devoted to what Minh had said about the lack of wisdom of our government. And North Vietnam is really putting it out
quoting our own people to do their job for them.
"So that is a problem I have tried to meet on March 31st. I mean in some degree to get it away from them. The second one
is to keep him from dividing us with our Allies. They are frightened to death. And I think they have that same feeling in
South Vietnam, that if this ball bounces the wrong way that they--all of them--will be assassinated and they would be run
over, they would be locked up and they would be in concentration camps and they'd be slaves--if the Communists take
over they would be slaves for the rest of their lives. And they don't think they are going to be guaranteed anything so they
are upset. And my two big tests, I think, are whether I would be able to get our country to think our policy is a reasonable
one and give me support, not as a Democratic candidate for re-election, but as President of the country until January."
The President was asked if he thought there was any chance of getting a settlement in Vietnam by January. He told them
he would not want to prophesy; that he wanted to and hoped so and that he was working feverishly at it, but did not want to
make any predictions.
The President said he did not see why they would not accept something which he thought would be to their advantage-"we will come home and you go home and we will take whatever resources we can get the Congress to give us and we will
try to help rebuild North Vietnam and South Vietnam and Laos and Southeast Asia like we did in Europe with the Marshall
plan. That ought to be pleasing to Ho Chi Minh. I think presently he feels like he is entitled to South Vietnam and he's going
to try to get it if he can and I don't think he can get it during my political lifetime. I don't think he could have got it if I had
been there four more years. But I think he feels that he is somewhat immune, that we are not going to take over his
government and we are not going to try to install a new system in his country. He had had his eye on this country all these
years and I think that he feels that sometime he can do in Washington what he did in Paris. I think that he must be realizing
that he cannot--that it is unlikely that he will have another Dien Bien Phu. But he must be encouraged by the performance
here."/4/
/4/The President added: "And I was trying to take away some of that encouragement by letting Senator Kennedy and
Senator McCarthy and [Republican candidate Harold] Stassen and Nixon and them talk out these political issues and
debate their views on Vietnam and other things and try to keep the government together. That's what I am going to do if I
can." (Ibid.)
There was then discussion on the proposed march on Washington.
[Omitted here is discussion of the international economic situation.]
One of the group said he wanted to ask one last sixty four dollar question and that was whether or not there would be
anything that would make the President change his mind about running. His answer was that he did not think so, that he
did not see any./5/
/5/The President added a final comment on Vance's appointment to the peace delegation, in particular noting: "He has a
serious physical problem and a serious financial problem and I keep him working just as much of the time that the body will
bear and the bank will permit." (Ibid.)

210. Letter From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Washington, April 26, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson,
Vietnam, General, April-Dec. 1968. Top Secret; Nodis; Personal. In a telephone conversation 2 days later, the President
and Wheeler discussed the impact of the bombing halt on the military situation in Vietnam. (Johnson Library, Recordings
and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Wheeler, April 28, 1968, 11:10 a.m., Tape
F6804.03, PNO 3)
Dear Bus:
In connection with our brief conversations regarding deescalation in South Vietnam, I want to put on paper the following
thoughts of possible negotiated mutual deescalation.
I start with the premise, which I know you share, that a cease-fire is not practical at this time. We must therefore prepare
for a fight-and-negotiate situation. In negotiations for any mutual deescalation, we should have first in mind the
improvement of conditions to permit the GVN to expand its political influence and military control.
Fundamentally, I believe that in considering deescalation, we should emphasize the kinds of actions on the part of the
NVN/VC which would be easily verifiable. My judgment is naturally affected by the fact that North Vietnam did not live up to
its signature on the Laos Agreement for one day.
The kinds of deescalation by NVN/VC which would be of immediate value to us include:
(1) The reestablishment of the DMZ.
(2) The withdrawal of two divisions from the DMZ/I Corps area back into North Vietnam.
(3) The reduction of the flow of reinforcement of men and materiel to the south. (This would create some difficulty in
policing.)
(4) Ending VC interference with traffic on the main highways.
(5) Ending mortar and rocket attacks on our installations and the cities.
(6) Ending of terrorist actions within the cities, and perhaps as a second step, in the villages.
I suggest that a study be made of what we could afford to do in return for some of the above restraints on the part of the
NVN/VC. I would not suggest attempting to match each action by a parallel one by us, but rather to list in the same way
various steps which we might be willing to consider taking, providing meaningful action were taken by the NVN/VC. We
would have to await the development of the negotiations to make a decision on exactly how we play each card.
I am afraid that negotiations may well be protracted, and, as I have said, we will have to continue a fight-and-talk policy,
but I would hope under conditions in which the GVN would be able to expand its moral influence and physical control in the
country.
The rallying of the people of South Vietnam is a vital factor in the political and military developments. The continued
support of the American people is another consideration that must be borne in mind. In the postwar period, we have found
the American people have supported action abroad for a longer time than was first estimated, providing they were able to
see light at the end of the tunnel.
Sincerely,
Averell/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Harriman signed the original.

211. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/

Vientiane, April 27, 1968, 1130Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE.
Secret; Flash; Nodis; Crocodile. Received at 8:02 a.m.
6113. 1. Septel transmits an English translation of full text of note which I received at 1600 today from North Vietnamese
Charge Nguyen Chan. Operative paragraph is as follows:
"In answer to the note of the American Government dated April 23, 1968,/2/ the Government of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam believes that it is necessary for Hanoi and Washington to engage in conversations promptly. The Government of
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has given instructions to Mr. Do-Phat-Quang, Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the Peoples Republic of Poland, to be prepared to enter into
discussions with the Ambassador of the United States at Warsaw the 30th of April 1968 or several days thereafter,
regarding the place and the date of conversations between the two parties."
/2/See footnote 3, Document 204.
2. After Hurwitch and I read this text, we observed that the suggestion of Warsaw was not really responsive to our note of
April 23, in which we had proposed "additional capitals, not previously considered by either side," for the limited purpose of
agreeing on a site and time for the proposed contacts. Chan's reply was a bland but studied statement that his government
was fully aware of the contents of our note of April 23.
3. We then went on to point out that his unofficial French translation used the word "conversations" rather than "contacts"
in this paragraph. I asked him to check this against the Vietnamese text and to see if this was an accurate translation.
Chan studied the text and confirmed that it was. (Our Embassy Vietnamese language officer confirms that "conversations"
is correct.) I asked if he could explain the meaning of this change in wording from "contacts" to "conversations." He
referred to AFP story from Hanoi which had characterized his Embassy as a "letter-box," and said he was only authorized
to deliver these notes, not to explain them to us.
4. I went on to say that, without prejudice to what Washington might feel about their nomination of Warsaw again, this
change in vocabulary was bound to introduce "complexities" and we would doubtless need some explanation of what this
was all about. Did it, for example, involve the complete elision of the "contacts" phase of the process, or were they merely
attempting to hold "contacts" under a guise? Chan simply repeated his status as a postman, not an interpreter.
5. I finally said that I, too, would speak as a postman and would therefore refrain from comment on all the statements
which were made in the first two paragraphs of his note. Instead, I would assure him that, despite the several confusing
questions raised by his third paragraph, we would send the full text to Washington immediately./3/
/3/The first part of the note reads: "The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has suggested to the
Government of the United States the choice of Phnom Penh or Warsaw as a place for preliminary contacts between
representatives with the rank of ambassador, with a view to prepare for official conversations between both sides. But the
American side has raised objections; in addition it has advanced unjustified conditions for the choice of a site and has
proposed fifteen other places. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has declared that the fifteen places
proposed by the United States are inadequate and that the objections of the American Government to the choice of Phnom
Penh and of Warsaw are without foundation. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam reaffirms that at this
time. It is clear that the Government of the United States is deliberately seeking to delay conversations between both
sides. This attitude is in complete contradiction to the declarations of President L.B. Johnson and of other American
officials saying that they desire prompt negotiations with the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and are
ready to go anywhere. In the meantime, the Government of the United States continues to intensify the naval and air
bombing against an important part of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, from the seventeenth to the
twentieth parallels; the Navy of the United States continues to violate Vietnamese territorial waters and Vietnamese air
space. The Government of the United States must cease unconditionally bombing and all other acts of war on all the
territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Such is the legitimate demand of all the Vietnamese people and of the
progressive people in the United States." (Telegram 6114 from Vientiane, April 27; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
6. Comment: This note is obviously a very tricky maneuver which merits careful study. It looks to me from its tenor that it

may be intended for publication. However, even in a public forum, it would seem to beg some explanation. On the other
hand, it may be worded with deliberate imprecision in order to evoke another "Trollope ploy," since, read at its most liberal
variant, it would suggest that "conversations" of substance could start even while the bombing continued. The price we
would have to pay for achieving this movement would be the agreement to meet for a limited purpose at the Ambassadorin-residence level at Warsaw, thereby enabling Hanoi to claim one brass ring on the first swing of the merry-go-round.
7. It is doubtful that I will get any explanations of the third paragraph through Chan, even though I asked for them. It is also
a moot question whether a note from Washington asking for explanations would advance matters substantially, since they
presumably expect us to piece the puzzle together from its internal construction. Given the fact that paragraph 2 talks
about ceasing bombing (but does not pose this as a prior condition to "conversations") and given the fact that the business
in Warsaw is characterized as "discussions" (word taken from our note of April 23) it would seem to me that there is a
reasonable case to assume that the "contact" phase has been dropped.
8. A reply from Washington, carefully phrased to assure that Ambassador Gronouski would talk only about time and place,
but also assure that the next immediate phase would be full-fledged substantive conversation while bombing and other
acts of war continue, would put us in position to assume a pure "fight-talk, talk-fight" situation, possibly with less strain on
our alliances than the three-phase scenario proposed in our note of April 23. It would be trading some "form" for some
"substance," and, in the long run, possibly giving us the better of the bargain.
9. On the other hand, merely accepting their note as it now stands, without stipulating our own provisions, runs the very
real risk of letting Hanoi turn the Ambassador-in-residence "discussions" into a "contact" phase in which Ambassador
Gronouski would be expected, as a condition precedent to agreeing upon a date and place for conversations, to
"determine the unconditional cessation of bombing and all other acts of war," as DRV specified in its original note
proposing Warsaw.
10. It would seem to me therefore that, if we are willing to accept Warsaw as a place for "discussions," we should stipulate
that those "discussions" are exclusively to fix the date and place for "conversations" which would address all matters of
substance between the two parties, including those matters mentioned in paragraph 2 of Chan's note. This would assure
that subject of bombing could only come up in the "conversations" rather than in "discussions," and in some place like
Geneva rather than Warsaw.
11. If this, however, is to be done, it should also be pointed out that the very last words in the third paragraph offer an
ambiguity. "The two sides," as it reads in Vietnamese, or "the two parties," as it reads in French, is broad enough so that it
could include the U.S. and all its allies on one side of the table, and the DRV and its friends and allies on the other side.
Whether it is prudent at this stage to try to pin this one with precision in a reply is questionable. It might presumably,
however, be a major issue in the "discussions" that Ambassador Gronouski may be called on to conduct. The imprecision
with which it has deliberately been phrased in this particular note is possibly dictated by the problems Hanoi will have in
handling the question of Chinese association with these "conversations."
Sullivan

212. Memorandum of Telephone Conversations Between Secretary of Defense Clifford and Secretary of State
Rusk/1/
Washington, April 27, 1968, 10:20 a.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE.
No classification marking.
TELEPHONE CALL FROM SECRETARY CLIFFORD
C has read all the messages./2/ Sec said the President called and President feels very strongly this not responsive and
they are still trying to drag us in kicking and screaming to place where clearly we don't want to go; they ignored our
proposal about suggesting a capital not previously mentioned by either side. President feels very strongly we cannot use
Warsaw for this purpose. President wants us to go right back to them. Sec said we are now considering whether we
suggest another place, some place else where they have an Ambassador. Sec said it is hard to find a place where they
have an Ambassador where we have one and which has not already been named by either side. Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Romania, USSR--that just about wraps it up./3/

/2/See Documents 211 and 213.

/3/According to notes of a telephone call Rusk received from Rostow at noon that day, Rostow told him that the President
was considering keeping the discussions at Vientiane, offering to continue the talks in countries where both the United
States and the DRV had representation, such as Algeria, Guinea, Indonesia, Laos, Mali, Tanzania, and Egypt, or bringing
in a mediator such as the Pope, U Thant, or UN General Assembly President Manescu. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) In telegram 4812 from USUN, April 27,
Goldberg reported that he told Manescu of U.S. interest in Bucharest as a site. Manescu replied that his government "will
not avoid facilitating serious action for peace and being the theater for that action." (Ibid.)
C believes they have accepted 90% of the offer we made because the main offer we made was reversing the procedure
we were on, saying let's go back to the beginning and have talk to be limited to discussion of time and place; they have
agreed to that. C said they have left it at lowest level of contact, our Ambassadors in Poland. C thinks this contributes
strongly to thought this would be solely time and place. They know we have named negotiators and that we are not going
to let Gronouski get into negotiations any more than they would let their Ambassador in Poland get into them. C thinks we
can arrange the meeting in such way that it not difficult problem for the President to accept this offer. C said every problem
the President had about Warsaw is now eliminated because it is very low level. C said we really should consider with all
seriousness unfortunate results that could occur if we turn it down.
C hopes he, Sec, Rostow, President might have chance to talk about this at length, with a preliminary meeting between C,
Sec and Rostow. Sec said President feels very strongly about this. C agrees but said President's first reaction would be an
emotional one. C said President doesn't know the burden he is carrying in this country to refuse to have some kind of talk;
the country is holding him personally responsible. Sec said he would call Walt and see if he can arrange for a meeting
when the President gets back.
11:30 a.m.
C said he just had a long talk with President who agrees C and Sec should be talking while President is gone. President
won't be back until 5:00 or 6:00 and C doesn't suppose President would want to see them today but likely want to see
them tomorrow. C asked Sec if he could come over for lunch. It was agreed Sec and Katzenbach would come to C's office
as soon as Vice President's TV appearance was over. C will not have anyone from his side, just C, Sec, Katz and
Rostow./4/
/4/The President lunched from 1:10 to 4:02 p.m. that day with Rusk, Rostow, Clifford, Wheeler, Fortas, Christian, and Tom
Johnson. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) Notes of the discussion during this luncheon have not been found.

213. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/

Washington, April 27, 1968, 2216Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE.
Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Crocodile. Drafted and approved by Bundy, and cleared by Rusk, Clifford, Rostow, and Robert
Houdek of S/S-S.
154613. You should arrange to deliver following note to North Vietnamese Embassy. If in your opinion it can be done
without creating an issue, we would prefer that you ask North Vietnamese Charge to come to your Embassy to receive
note.
"The U.S. Government agrees with the statement of the Government of the DRV, in its note of April 27,/2/ that it is
necessary for Hanoi and Washington to engage in conversations promptly.
/2/See Document 211. On April 27 the Department informed the Embassies in Thailand, Australia, the Philippines,
Vietnam, Korea, and New Zealand of the DRV message and this reply in telegram 154614. (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
The U.S. Government notes that the DRV has now agreed that representatives of the two countries should hold private
discussions for the sole purpose of agreeing on a location and date.

The U.S. Government notes that the DRV did not respond to its suggestion of April 23 that we meet for this limited purpose
in a 'capital not previously considered by either side.'/3/ The U.S. Government suggested the DRV might wish to indicate
three appropriate locations suitable for this limited purpose. The U.S. Government does not consider that the suggestion of
Warsaw is responsive or acceptable.
/3/See footnote 3, Document 204.
The U.S. Government is prepared for these limited discussions on April 30 or several days thereafter. The U.S.
Government would welcome the prompt response of the DRV to this suggestion."
Rusk

214. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of
State Rusk/1/
Washington, April 30, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE.
Secret; Nodis; Crocodile.
SUBJECT
Thoughts on Getting a Site for Contacts
1. The Current Exchanges in Vientiane. It seems to me that Hanoi is finding it annoying that we are able to depict the
Vientiane discussions as a continuing serious effort; both yesterday and today, they have attacked my remarks, limited as
they were. This suggests to me the strong possibility that they may hold up some time on any reply to our last message
and even seek to give the impression that things have broken down.
2. Utility of Direct Contacts Elsewhere. Even if Hanoi should propose some place for direct discussions on a site for
contacts, it is very hard to know just how we would instruct our representative. He could try to draw Hanoi out on its
reasons for not accepting any of our sites, but the odds seem heavy that he would simply reiterate Warsaw. Any chance
for progress would appear to depend on a third party to whom we could refer in any suggestion we put on the table.
Otherwise, I suspect we would be up against a basic unwillingness on Hanoi's part to accept anything that comes directly
from us.
3. The Basic Situation. I continue to feel strongly that time is not at all on our side. Whether it is right or wrong, fair or
unfair, the impression is dominant in Europe that we are responsible for the delay, and the same impression is widespread
here. Moreover, any new offensive action on the other side could at any time present us with a most serious dilemma. If
we break off or delay progress on that ground--and still more if we take retaliatory bombing action--we are again likely to
emerge very sharply minus in the propaganda arena. It is very hard for us to get away from the fact that we have engaged,
since April 1, in a highly publicized "major offensive" called "Complete Victory," and that more recently we have engaged in
publicized offensive operations in the A Shau Valley and elsewhere. Obviously, these were right actions on our part, but
the fact is they put us in a very difficult position to contend that any offensive actions on the other side are a reason for
changing our approach or engaging in retaliatory military action.
4. Third-Country Possibilities. In my judgment, this means that we should be focused very hard on getting an acceptable
third country invitation to both sides as rapidly as possible.
a. On Bucharest we are well advanced and could hear at any time from the Romanians that they are prepared to behave in
the necessary way. Nonetheless, I question seriously whether Bucharest--while it would be accepted with a grimace in
South Viet-Nam and by our allies--would be the best place. To the American public, it would not be easy to distinguish
from Warsaw. Its acceptance would cause many to argue that we had been captious about Warsaw. Moreover, rejection of
Warsaw and ultimate acceptance of Bucharest might well be depicted in South Viet-Nam and among our allies as
indicating a pattern of our fighting for a time and then yielding to accept what really amounts to much the same thing. This
seems to me to be a poor pattern to set at the outset of this negotiating process.
b. Tehran has now been suggested for a possible third-country initiative. While this would be of some mild use in keeping
the ball in the air, the fact is that the Shah has taken a strong public position in support of our Viet-Nam policy. The odds

are overwhelming that Hanoi would reject Tehran, and would have wide support in doing so--since the press would
immediately dig up the things the Shah has said, plus the fact that there has been an Iranian medical mission in South
Viet-Nam.
c. Paris has obvious difficulties, well outlined by Wallner last week. Nonetheless, as Chip Bohlen has pointed out, these
difficulties relate much more to Paris as a site for talks than as a site for contacts. It is abundantly clear that the South
Vietnamese would strongly prefer Paris to Bucharest, and it has the overriding advantage that all of our allies, as well as
the South Vietnamese, have resident representation. All in all, Paris seems to me by all odds the least worst site--of those
likely to be accepted by Hanoi. Moreover, a third-party offer of Paris--if rejected by Hanoi--would put us in a very much
stronger position on the propaganda front.
d. Vienna seems to be a long-shot possibility, if we can rely on reports that the North Vietnamese are not really hostile to it.
Nonetheless, it suffers from the fact that it is our suggestion, and an offer directly from the Austrian Government seems
unlikely to be accepted by Hanoi, or to gain for us in the propaganda sense if Hanoi failed to act or turned it down.
5. Conclusion. My own conclusion is that we should consider an immediate step to get Paris proposed by a third party, on
a quiet and official basis. The obvious party--and I think without difficulty for this purpose--would be U Thant. We can send
Ambassador Goldberg to him with a simple message that if Paris were to be quietly proposed, without fanfare, we would
be prepared to accept it--although we most definitely do not believe it wise to take a public position. U Thant would almost
certainly pass the message to Hanoi. Either Hanoi would accept and we could get started, or we would have a much
stronger case if they delayed or turned it down.

215. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, April 30, 1968, 10:50 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and
Rusk, April 30, 1968, 10:50 a.m., Tape F6804.03, PNO 5. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared
specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
President: Dean, can't we do something on Bucharest before we get another proposal from them?
Rusk: I talked to Arthur [Goldberg] yesterday about it. He's seen--he's in touch with Manescu and has not heard anything
back from him on this.
President: I'm tired of waiting on that though. That's just-Rusk: Well, the key is to whether representatives of our allies could be there.
President: Well, let's find out from them direct if we can't some way, because we've waited a week on it. We went out to
Thieu and then we went out to everyone else. We've waited. We found this ploy and I don't want any more delays if I can
avoid it on Bucharest because I don't--I think they'd have a little trouble turning down Bucharest. What I think we ought to
do, I think we ought to just say to them, if it's just for the site, let's make it as limited as their reply was on Warsaw. Now
everybody's ready to go to that whether by God they had it or not. So, I wouldn't worry too much if they refuse to let us
have somebody come in there on the first talk. Why, we could fuzz that up and go alone if we had to on Bucharest. I
wouldn't feel so bad about it. I'd much rather do it than gamble on getting drug in by Paris. I'm getting very squeezy about
that. I keep reading these interviews. What I'd like to do is try to say if I could, direct as I could to our Ambassador, we
would, if you'd suggest it publicly, we would be, there'd be a very prompt response, period, or something like that.
Rusk: Well, I think Manescu made this point pretty strongly that on Bucharest the Romanians could not volunteer it. Maybe
we ought to use U Thant--see if he could work it out.
President: Well, I don't like U Thant. Is there another channel somewhere?
Rusk: Well, I might try, let's see-President: This gets us into all that Goldberg flak. We had a day of him yesterday. You have no idea how much time that

man has taken.

Rusk: Well, let me find out first from the Romanian Ambassador here before lunch whether he's gotten anything back on
this, and then I'll have a suggestion at lunch as to how we can get going on it.
President: I'm sure Clark will be against anything else until we get the Clifford formula over with. But I'm not. I'm going to
do something and I'd like to do it right if I could. But I've waited now a week on Bucharest and I just in my bones know it
would be difficult to, it would be a problem for them. At least it would show that I was not too adamant, that I had some
flexibility, if I was to go that far. The Pope's going to ask us, I think tomorrow./2/
/2/In a telephone conversation with Daley 2 days earlier, the President stated: "I've got two or three little plans in the mail
that might work out on our peace thing, might give us a little chance. We got a little closer to a site yesterday, and I haven't
told another human this, but I'm playing with His Holiness a bit to try to get him to take a step or two that we think might be
productive, and he tentatively agreed to it. He has to talk to some of his people. So, we're working at it every day, and
things are lightening up some there." (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Daley, April 28,
1968, 6:45 p.m., Tape 6804.03, PNO 4)
Rusk: Let me see what I can do about it.
President: All right.

216. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, April 30, 1968, 1:25-2:25 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the
White House. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE TUESDAY LUNCHEON
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Wheeler
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
Secretary Rusk: On site problem, Rumanian Ambassador said they expected to hear today on whether they would accept
other representative.
We need third party to propose Rumania: British-U.N.-India. I prefer India to suggest Rumania. Algerians want to get into
this./2/
/2/Other intermediaries involved with the site selection included India, Indonesia, Switzerland, and the Vatican. In telegram
155877 to New Delhi, April 30, the Department requested that Bowles assess whether India could play a role in finding a
mutually agreeable site, such as Bucharest, Algiers, Dar es Salaam, and Cairo, but any such proposal would have to be
submitted by the Indian Government "as its own idea." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files, 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) In telegram 13492 from New Delhi, May 1, Bowles expressed confidence
that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi would undertake the request. (Ibid.) Bowles subsequently delivered such a message to
the Indian Government. (Telegram 13617 from New Delhi, May 2; ibid.) The administration also received an offer from the
Indonesian Government, which had been encouraged by Poland, for the use of one of its naval cruisers, to be stationed in
the Tonkin Gulf, as the site. (Telegrams 6312 from Djakarta, April 26, and 6360 from Djakarta, April 28; ibid.) In addition, in
consultations with North Vietnamese representatives in Peking, Switzerland concluded that the Hanoi leadership most
likely would accept either Geneva or Paris as the site for talks. (Memorandum of conversation between Swiss Ambassador
Felix Schnyder and Harriman, May 1; ibid.) Finally, in an April 30 message delivered by the Apostolic Delegate Luigi

Raimondi, the Pope proposed the Vatican as a site. (Ibid., POL US-VAT) The President's letter of appreciation to the Pope
was transmitted in telegram 158496 to Rome, May 5. (Ibid.)
The President: Let's talk about that later. Let's be prepared for three or four places. Bucharest is okay.
Walt Rostow: The bombing targets are between 19th and 20th parallels.
Secretary Clifford: The flow is increasing. Captured documents do not indicate an enemy moving toward peace.
There are four targets south of the 20th with military value, but there is a serious political situation. This could indicate
failure on quest for sites. It could also show them we mean business and bring them back to reality.
(General Wheeler showed photographs of four sites.)
The President: Dean, (Secretary Rusk) do you have any trouble with it?
Secretary Rusk: No.
General Wheeler: Do locks bother you?
Secretary Rusk: No.
General Wheeler: No civilian casualties would result.
Secretary Rusk: Time is running out.
The President: Do you recommend it, Buzz?
General Wheeler: Yes.
Secretary Clifford: I would not recommend it immediately. Let's wait and get response from Hanoi. It could disturb
relationship we are trying to build with them.
Let's hold up for a reply.
Secretary Rusk: Is that airfield getting muddy?
General Wheeler: Yes. There are significant military implications to the airport.
The President: I do not want to go to Paris. I think they are not in the least interested genuinely in peace. We need to find
out what my March 31 speech has done to us.
I do not think Bunker's proposal/3/ will get us to the peace table by the elections. I believe they are giving us same
treatment they did at Tet.
/3/Bunker requested ICC representatives to convey to the North Vietnamese categorical U.S. rejection of Warsaw and the
need to continue to search for additional sites. (Telegram 25903 from Saigon, April 29; ibid., POL 27-14
VIET/CROCODILE) In backchannel telegram Saigon 339 to Rostow, April 30, Bunker noted: "In conclusion, I believe that
what is most needed is a continuation of the present U.S. attitude of firmness and patience combined with announced
willingness to meet with the other side on reasonable terms. I see no need for dramatic or hasty actions to demonstrate
our reasonableness and the genuineness of our intentions. On the other hand, I believe that we should make known in
accurate but non-polemical terms the military advantage which Hanoi is taking of this prolonged period of haggling in order
to reinforce Communist elements in the South through the infiltration of unprecedented quantities of men and supplies. In
another week or so, we may be forced to indicate to Hanoi that, in the absence of progress on talks, we shall have to reexamine our bomb restriction policy. This may jar loose a decision on their side, but we should be serious in issuing this
warning, and not do it as a bluff." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 84, Ellsworth Bunker Papers,
Vietnam Telegrams--Chronological)

This is the 30th day of the pause. We are going into our fifth week. We counseled patience, but you have to look at the
calendar. We have to start laying the groundwork for what may come.
Do you think, Buzz (General Wheeler), that time is limited when we can continue to keep the area above the 19th off limits
without hurt?
General Wheeler: Yes sir. They are moving men and equipment south quite rapidly.
(CIA Director Helms gave paper on infiltration into South.)/4/
/4/Not found.
The President: Can't we hit anything in water between 19th and 20th?
General Wheeler: No sir.
The President: What is answer that you use to counter hitting them in nose only rather than going way up?
General Wheeler: There is no nose. There is a network of roads. Plus there is no way to get them all at the "gate."
Secretary Rusk: The boys in Laos want us to extend bombing East.
The President: Is Sullivan worried?
Secretary Rusk: He is for it.
Secretary Clifford: Sullivan favors alternative A. We prefer alternative B to hit area in Laos./5/
/5/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXVIII, Document 361, footnote 3.
CIA Director Helms: A is ten miles from 20th. B is 15 miles from 20th.
The President: Let's take out B now. See how it looks.
Walt Rostow: MACV wants a briefing on what is going on in Haiphong-Hanoi area.
We have three questions: (See Question 8--Section marked)./6/
/6/Presumably an attachment distributed at the meeting; not found.
Let's lay it out in matter of fact way.
George Christian: We should show the photos and give facts on increase in infiltration.
Secretary Rusk: I do not think we should show pictures. It looks like military pressure on you. We should have quiet
backgrounding.
Secretary Clifford: There should be backgrounding in both Saigon and in Washington. I do not think the pictures should
have been used. We want to go on with reconnaissance.
The President: Is there anything on Ike?
General Wheeler: He is resting comfortably. Nothing serious at the moment.
We can get benefit without showing pictures. Information on infiltration would be good to get out.

The President: I do not want Ho to get impression he can take this country away from us. We are not reeling under the
Doves' attack. I have talked with a number of people. We have left Ho with the impression that we are leaving the country.
We have got to be very careful.
I am going to have a televised news conference later this week. I am not going to give them the impression we are tied
down or running out.
President Park agreed to give 5000 military or 6000 civilians.
The State Department reporters' notes were terrible. I told him we would get him an additional $100 million over the $300
million we had already given him. Park said July 1 was target date.
I would like to look again at expediting supplies.
General Wheeler: He has 10,000 support troops for men from Korea.
Secretary Clifford: Gave the President a brief memorandum on $100 million--how it is to be used./7/
/7/Not found.

217. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 1, 1968, 12:55 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Crocodile Paris to be filed. Confidential. The
notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
You may wish to consider calling in the members of the Vietnam negotiating team, plus the senior members of the
government who will be backstopping the effort--if it ever begins--and talking to them along the following lines.
1. All members of the government must understand that in dealing with Hanoi--and their Communist friends--we are not
dealing with diplomats in the old classical 19th Century tradition. They may well behave in formal diplomacy with
correctness, skill, and lucidity. But they view diplomacy as the net outcome of their ability to influence the following factors
during the negotiation itself:
--the military situation on the ground;
--the political situation inside South Vietnam;
--U.S.-GVN relations;
--"world opinion" and U.S. political forces that might bear on the Executive Branch.
2. As a government we shall, therefore, have to fight the battle on all these fronts, in addition to diplomacy itself. Our
experience with the first month since the President's March 31st statement already demonstrates this fact beyond doubt.
Therefore, the President wishes the government to think automatically in terms of all these dimensions of the negotiation in
relationship to one another and to working towards a total U.S. policy which advances our interests.
3. Beyond that the President wishes those concerned to know that one major reason that he withdrew from candidacy was
to assure that the positions taken in the months ahead on Vietnam would be positions that he judged right in the U.S.
interest, freed of any short-run U.S. political pressures. The President wishes peace in Southeast Asia at the earliest
possible moment. He wishes all members of the government to apply to this end all the imagination, skill, experience and

insight of which they are capable. But this Administration will only settle for an honorable peace as we understand it.
4. Therefore, the President asks all members of the government to operate as a united team. There will, of course, be
differences of view among us and debates on this move or that move at one time or another. These debates and
discussions must be kept wholly within the family. We are negotiating with Hanoi, not with each other. That negotiation
should take place between governments and not between the U.S. government and the press./2/
/2/In an effort to mute Congressional criticism of the site discussions, Johnson noted the following during a telephone
conversation with Fulbright on May 2: "Now that is what is happening. This is in the Hue area. They're getting ready to hit
us, according to their intelligence and their conversations, in the next 10 days. They have brought down between 30 and
40 thousand men since March 31--since this offer. We haven't brought in any, but we have that many more to face. If you
are out there, that is what you are up against. We think they have brought between 75,000 and 100,000, since the Tet
offensive, from North Vietnam. Now I don't believe much that they are going to pick any site and I think they are using this.
The pressure we ought to put on them is to put pressure on nearly any damn site in the world and that's what you ought to
be suggesting. Say, I don't speak for anybody, but I don't see what's wrong with Bucharest, I don't see what is wrong with
Cairo, I don't see what is wrong with the Vatican and the Pope--his secretary of state has been most sympathetic with
them, I can assure you, just leaned over with their side. They've called for us to stop the bombing and they've called for
them to stop their thing. There could not be a more neutral place. Bucharest is Communist, so I don't guess they could
cuss us there. Algeria is. I just can't understand it. So let's keep the heat on them and you help me do that instead of
talking about this damn Cambodia. I know Mansfield loves Cambodia and he has great confidence in them, but they are
running over with enemy troops now. Just like Poland is grinding around the clock to supply equipment. And I think it's as
reasonable to ask an allied group to go to Poland as it is to ask North Vietnam to go to Thailand." (Ibid., Recordings and
Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Fulbright, May 2, 1968, 10:47 a.m., Tape
F6804.03, PNO 8-10; this transcript prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian)
Walt

218. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret;
Immediate; Nodis. The telegram is printed in full in Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 426-432.
Saigon, May 2, 1968, 1135Z.
26229. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my forty-ninth weekly message.
A. General
1. I have not detected much change in the mood of the GVN or the people since my message of last week./2/ Although
some anxiety is still evident, the feeling of apprehension regarding American intentions, apparent in early April, has very
considerably lessened. In my talks with Thieu within the last few days, he has exhibited a quality of orderly thinking about
the plans and purposes of the enemy's politico-military strategy and has viewed with a quiet self-confidence our ability to
cope with the next enemy offensive which he is certain is coming. He believes our spoiling operations may have delayed
Hanoi's efforts to launch another offensive, but that it cannot be long delayed, the timing probably May or early June. One
excellent result of your March 31 statement and Clark Clifford's speech/3/ has been that the Vietnamese are really
beginning to face up to the fact that the time will come when they will be on their own. This, together with the after effects
of the Tet offensive, has meant that the GVN and the Vietnamese people are buckling down to the job of mobilizing their
resources with much greater energy and determination than they have heretofore exhibited. In this Thieu has taken the
lead. He had grown in stature and in confidence and is beginning to exhibit qualities of real leadership. He has set about
the numerous tasks involved in getting the mobilization bill through the Assembly, in setting up machinery for its
implementation, and restructuring the government so that it will function more effectively, and making plans to broaden its
base in order to widen popular support with characteristic thoroughness; also with characteristic caution in view of the
sensitive problems and relationships involved with Ky, the military, Loc, and others./4/
/2/Document 207.
/3/See Document 169 and footnote 8, Document 205.
/4/Bunker reported in telegram 26386 from Saigon, May 4, that 2 days earlier Thieu saw Tran Van Huong to discuss

Huong's assumption of the premiership. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69,
POL 27 VIET S)
2. In fact, I have some fear that, spurred on by our urging, as well as by the other factors I have mentioned, the GVN may
be trying to do too many things at once, its reach may be beyond its grasp. There are obvious limitations on the human
resources available to it and on their capabilities and these are being strained to the limit. There are, however, some
untapped resources both here and among individuals abroad which should be utilized. I have previously urged Thieu to
bring back competent people who, for one reason or another, have either left or been forced to leave the country, but
whose talents under the changed conditions now existing, I believe, could be put to good use. We can also help by
influencing the government to concentrate on the priorities. For the immediate present, I think these are a) getting the right
kind of mobilization bill passed with adequate and effective machinery for its implementation; b) the restructuring of the
government, broadening its base to give it wider popular support and organizing itself so that decisions can be taken more
quickly and, of equal importance, followed through and implemented: good decisions often are made by Thieu at the top,
orders are given to carry them out, but the breakdown comes in the follow-through; c) effective pulling together and
coordination of all the GVN pacification activities, as the US supporting side is coordinated; and d) a continuing program to
equip, train, and improve the Vietnamese armed forces.
3. Enemy propaganda has stressed the theme that 1968 is the year of climax and it seems to me that there is reason to
believe that Hanoi in fact now intends to move on the negotiating, as well as military front. I also think that the present
stalemate in agreeing on a site for negotiations is a preview of the kind of tactics we may expect from Hanoi, that it is
prolonging the stalemate in order to strengthen its military posture in South Vietnam, to continue a massive infiltration of
men and materiel, and trying to get the maximum propaganda advantage out of what it chooses to picture as our
unreasonableness./5/
/5/The first two consultative meetings between Embassy and GVN officials on negotiations were held May 2 and 6.
(Telegrams 26094 from Saigon, May 3, and 26630 from Saigon, May 7; ibid., POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
[Omitted here is discussion of political, military, civil, and economic issues.]
Bunker

219. Letter From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Ambassador at Large (Harriman)/1/
Washington, May 3, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of Defense, Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 911/305 (26 April 68), IR 3867. Top Secret;
Sensitive.
Dear Averell:
This is in response to your letter of 26 April suggesting that a study be made of those deescalatory steps which we could
afford to do in return for some illustrative restraints on the part of NVA/VC forces./2/
/2/Document 210.
I am enclosing three attachments which explore this subject. The first is a "shopping list" of possible deescalatory steps by
both sides with no attempt to match or equate individual actions (Enclosure A). The second attachment contains some
two-sided deescalatory steps (Enclosure B). My evaluation of the contents in these two attachments is that deescalation
probably would be feasible only in the DMZ area. Beyond those specific actions related to "no advantage" validation,
neutralization of the DMZ, and POW exchanges (thru US Step 10, Enclosure B), the risks become high due to the difficulty
of validating compliance by the enemy in most cases. For example, if he agrees to withdraw certain units from a specified
area, how can we be sure that he has not augmented remaining VC units with NVA filler personnel? If he agrees that NVA
will not attack certain areas or LOCs, how would we know whether a subsequent attack was carried out by the VC or the
NVA? These are some of the practical problems in validation that would cause us difficulty.
My view of deescalation centers on three points: (1) Deescalation of military pressure will not be operationally feasible until
negotiations reach a productive stage; (2) The objective of any deescalatory step should be the verified withdrawal of NVA
forces from SVN. Otherwise, we can become entangled in piecemeal deescalatory steps that would only buy time for the

enemy and provide him the capability to cheat; (3) Initial deescalation should focus on the DMZ to test the good faith of
North Vietnam.
I recently exchanged views with Westy on the subject./3/ He pointed out quite correctly that a negotiated deescalation is
manageable only if NVN approaches the problem with complete sincerity, since monitoring withdrawals accurately would
be virtually impossible. If areas for mutual withdrawal result from negotiations, he identified five areas, in order of priority,
which promise the greatest gain in relation to the risks involved: (1) Any or all of II CTZ, less the coastal provinces; (2)
Northern III CTZ--specifically Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Phuoc Long provinces; (3) Western I CTZ, less Quang Ngai
province; (4) Coastal areas in II CTZ, less major bases and installations; (5) Quang Tri province.
/3/This exchange is contained in telegrams CJCS 4270 to Westmoreland, April 19, and MAC 5388 to Wheeler, April 23.
(U.S. Army Center for Military History, William C. Westmoreland Papers, Eyes Only Message Files, 1-30 April 1968)
In his view, the enemy would likely select the following areas for mutual withdrawal calculated to cause the greatest
difficulty to friendly forces at the least expense to North Vietnam: (1) Capital Military District (CMD) Central III CTZ; (2) IV
CTZ; (3) Quang Tri/Thua Thien provinces; (4) Remainder of I CTZ; (5) Coastal provinces, II CTZ; (6) Kontum and Pleiku
provinces.
I'm sure you understand that these are preliminary assessments for the current time frame. Without doubt, we will continue
to see considerable shifting of NVA/VC forces. Such assessments will, of necessity, continue to be reviewed. Some
additional comments by Westy are also attached to this memorandum (Enclosure C)./4/
/4/Printed from an unsigned copy. Enclosure C, attached but not printed, summarized Westmoreland's views on the
negative aspects of mutual withdrawal, the mechanics of implementing such a withdrawal, and preferable alternatives.

Enclosure A
HYPOTHETICAL DEESCALATION STEPS
BY US

BY NVN

1. Stop artillery or other fire into or across the DMZ.

1. Stop artillery or other fire from or across the

DMZ.

2. Agree to neutralization of DMZ.

2. Stop ground attacks across the DMZ or the

massing of additional forces or supplies in North
Vietnam or the DMZ in a manner which poses a
direct threat to Allied forces in South Vietnam.

3. Agree to inspection and verification procedures in

DMZ: (a) ICC; (b) Joint Commission.

3. Desist from any increase in the movement of

North Vietnamese troops and supplies into South
Vietnam.

4. Take one or more of the following actions:

a. Publish names of POWs.
b. Permit Red Cross to visit prisoners.
c. Permit Red Cross to inspect POW camps.
d. Permit mail and packages to POWs.
e. Return bodies of deceased POWs.
f. Exchange sick and wounded POWs.
g. Exchange all POWs.

Note: The above items could be further broken

down into sub-items.

5. Offer safe conduct to exfiltrating units.

4. Remove forces from southern portion of DMZ.

6. Provide transportation to enemy desiring transit

north.

5. Remove supplies from southern portion of DMZ.

7. Pull back US troops from DMZ a certain distance.

6. Remove forces from northern portion of DMZ.

8. Remove US troops from a specified area.

7. Remove supplies from northern portion of DMZ.

9. Cease leaflet operations.

8. Agree to neutralization of DMZ.

10. Place ceiling on in-country reinforcements.

9. Agree to inspection and verification procedures in

DMZ: (a) ICC; (b) Joint Commission; (c) noninterference with unilateral inspection.

11. Discontinue use of newer type weapons.

10. Take one or more of the following actions:

a. Publish names of POWs.
b. Permit Red Cross to visit prisoners.
c. Permit Red Cross to inspect POW camps.
d. Permit mail and packages to POWs.
e. Return bodies of deceased POWs.
f. Exchange sick and wounded POWs.
g. Release prisoners of VC.
h. Exchange all POWs.

12. Relinquish low level recce.

11. Cease attacks on US bases.

13. Discontinue ground operations in border area.

12. Cease use of heavy mortars/rockets against

province and district capitals.

14. Limit size of ground operations to battalion size

force.

13. Cease ground attacks on province and district

capitals.

15. Cease construction/operation of the obstacle

barrier.

14. Cease attacks on specified roads, railways, and

water-borne traffic.

16. Stop use of (pick one):

a. defoliation and crop destruction weapons.
b. 105mm or larger artillery.
c. Anti-personnel mines.
d. Riot control agents.
e. Napalm.
f. CBU-24s.
g. Tanks.

15. Conduct no operations larger than battalion

size.

17. Cease operations from out-of-country: CVAs,

patrol ships, air operations from Guam, Thailand.

16. Withdraw some NVA forces to a specified area

in SVN.

18. Stop use of B-52s.

17. Withdraw some NVA forces to sanctuaries in

Laos and Cambodia.

19. Stop use of armed helos.

18. Withdraw some NVA units from SVN to NVN.

20. Provide amnesty for the VC.

19. Cease incidents of terrorism and sabotage.

21. Stop close tactical air support in SVN.

20. Force VC to cease tax collections.

22. Stop providing equipment in-country to TCCs.

21. Remove NVA forces to a specified distance

north of the DMZ.

23. Cease-fire.

22. Remove SAMs from area north of DMZ.

24. Disestablish certain logistic bases.

23. Announce and observe a cease-fire.

25. Implement provisions of Manila Communique

24. Comply with Geneva Accords of 1962 (remove

for withdrawal.

NVA troops from Laos).

25. Make command and control communications in
the clear.
26. Cease propaganda broadcasts.
27. Negotiate with GVN.
28. Recognize the GVN as legal government.
29. Recognize the 17th parallel and two Vietnams.

Enclosure B
TWO SIDED DEESCALATORY ACTIONS
(Listed in Desired Order of Accomplishment)
Sequence

Mutual
Deescalatory
Step

Impact on NVN

Impact on US

Impact on
SVN

Remarks

Neutralization of
the DMZ by
removal of all
military forces.
Includes
prohibition of
artillery fire
across the DMZ.

--test of
intentions.
--reduces
infiltration.
--reduces
offensive
capability.
--probably
removes
support base
for majority of
NVN forces in
northern I CTZ.

--remove some
pressure on I
CTZ.
--permits some
redeployment of
forces.
--reconnaissance should be
able to verify.

--no risks to
SVN
security.

Neither side has a

legal right to be in
the DMZ. True
neutralization of
the DMZ should
precede
consideration of
sub-sequent
sequential
deescalatory
steps.
A Joint
Commission
arrangement
might be
negotiated.
Otherwise,
unilateral
inspection and
verification will be
necessary.
Another possibility
would be to
revitalize the ICC
to include giving
unrestricted
access to
inspection points.

Exchange
POWs.

--test of good
faith and
intentions.
--indication of
interest in
further cooling

--psycholog-ical
boost if
successful;
added resolve if
turned down.

--willing to
ex-change.
--involves
little risk.

If NVN is seriously
interested in
mutual steps to
deescalate, the
exchange of
POWs should be

down of
pressures.

early step in this

process.

NVA/US
withdrawal from
a geographic
area (e.g., a
province).

--would remove
pressure from
NVA and
permit
regroupment.
--could provide a sanctuary from
US/FW
firepower.
--most likely to
turn over areas
where VC
strength is
maximum.

--could for-feit
use of bases.
--verification
would depend
on nature of
terrain.
--agreement
would have to
be broken if
ARVN had
military
reverses.

--would
require
diversion of
ARVN
forces from
other
missions.
--the ARVN
could be
exposed to
superior
enemy
forces.
--the capability of the
ARVN to
provide
security will
be a
deciding
factor in the
stability of
the GVN.

The specific areas

that would be the
subject of a
negotiated
withdrawal should
be determined by
COMUSMACV
based on the then
existing tactical
situation. In
general, I CTZ and
highlands are
probably the most
appropriate areas
to try this plan.
If the results are
satisfactory in one
province, adjacent
provinces could be
considered for the
same type of
deescalation.

Cease offensive
air/ground
operations in a
specified area.

--NVN would
accept if own
forces were
threatened; not
likely to agree
in area where
its strength is
superior.
--provides
sanctuary for
respite and
tactical
regroupment.
--provides
propaganda for
con-sumption
in the local
area.

--intelligence
collection would
suffer.
--could result in
a freeze in
place.

--would
sustain
pockets of
territory
under VC
control.
--could
result in
wavering
morale of
the local
people if
ARVN were
not in
position of
mil-itary
strength.

The effectiveness
of this type of
deescalation
would depend
largely on the
progress of
negotiations
toward a final
settlement. It
should not be
undertaken in the
early stages of
talks. This step is
completely
unacceptable from
a military point of
view unless
accompanied by
substantial NVA
withdrawals.
A fully agreed and
supervised ceasefire should be
associated with
and follow a
substantial
withdrawal of NVN
forces from SVN.

220. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, May 3, 1968.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80-R01580R, 284--Order of Battle. Secret;
No Foreign Dissem; CIA Internal Use Only.
PARTICIPANTS
CIA:
The Director, Mr. Richard Helms
Mr. Paul V. Walsh
JCS:
The Chairman, General Earle G. Wheeler
Lt. Gen. George S. Brown
Executive Col. D.P. McAuliffe
Maj. Gen. William E. Depuy
Col. A.C. Edmunds
DIA:
The Director, General Joseph Carroll
Maj. Gen. Grover Brown
1. This meeting convened at 1030 on 3 May 1968. It was called by General Wheeler in response to Mr. Helms' offer to
brief the Chairman on the community problems in estimating enemy strengths.
2. Mr. Helms opened the meeting by explaining generally the inability of the intelligence community to reach agreement on
estimates of enemy strengths in South Vietnam. He pointed out that in addition to differences in estimates on agreed OB
categories, there was a fundamental difference on whether certain categories of forces--the so-called irregular groups-should be quantified and included in the estimates.
3. Mr. Walsh gave a brief run-down on the CIA concept of an insurgency base and the elements contained in it, and
presented a comparison of the CIA and MACV estimates.
4. General Carroll and Mr. Walsh discussed the various problem areas in the estimates, the points of disagreement and
possible alternatives for their resolution.
5. The consensus of the meeting is summarized in the following points:
a. These estimates have a high degree of political sensitivity and all concerned should exercise the utmost discretion in
dealing with them and controlling their dissemination.
b. There is a real need to present these estimates in such a way that the combat threat is clearly distinguished from
political or irregular threats. The qualitative differences within groups should also be considered and probably new
terminology needs to be created.
c. The disagreement on some elements--e.g., Political Infrastructure--could probably be eliminated if the terms were
redefined.
d. The current method of attrition, its shortcomings, and the impact this has on maintaining strength estimates is in need of
a basic overhaul.
e. The requirement that monthly OB reports be published is a basic contributor to the confusion and problems associated
with strength estimates.
6. General Carroll was instructed to draft for General Wheeler's signature a message to MACV indicating that there are a
number of soft areas in the estimates which warrant immediate investigation, and making the following points:
a. MACV should examine the entire question of attrition with a view to devising better methods.
b. Consideration should be given to differentiating the combat threat between full-time and part-time guerrillas.

c. Consideration should be given to the best means of presenting and quantifying the elements not included in the military
OB.
d. The question of definition of Political Infrastructure should be reexamined.
7. It was agreed that all concerned must go back to the drawing board and that CIA and DIA would cooperate in working
out new formats and definitions and resolving existing differences.
8. Mr. Helms agreed that he would withhold dissemination of the CIA figures pending completion of this reexamination.
9. General Wheeler agreed to take steps to reduce MACV's OB reporting requirements, particularly those generated by
OSD/SA./2/
/2/The CIA intelligence estimate SC No. 10295/68, "North Vietnam's Ability to Withstand Manpower Attrition," was
submitted to the JCS on June 10. (Central Intelligence Agency, O/DDI Files, Job 78-T02095R, Briefing Paper for General
DePuy, The Attrition of Vietnam Communist Forces) In a June 11 memorandum to Helms, Wheeler noted that the enemy
might suffer losses of 350,000 during 1968 and suggested that while the enemy still was intent upon military victory, he
doubted that the Communist forces "can absorb such losses over a protracted period of time and maintain the level of
battlefield effectiveness required to pursue this strategy and attain his goals." (Ibid.) The CIA-DIA estimate of NVA
presence in South Vietnam, as later published in August, was some 40,000-60,000 greater than that of MACV of roughly
100,000. In addition, the CIA-DIA estimates of main and local forces, administrative cadre, and guerrillas, as advanced in
December, were all substantially higher than those of MACV. The contrasting range in total enemy forces was 265,000355,000 by the CIA and DIA to 233,305-239,305 for MACV. (CIA Memorandum, "Chronology of the VC/NVA OB Problem,"
October 22, 1969; ibid., OER Papers on OB) Additional periodic CIA estimates of the enemy's strength are ibid., MACV
Press Briefings and OB Problems. For further discussion of the dispute over the enemy order of battle, see Harold P. Ford,
CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962-1968 (Langley, Va.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998),
pp. 85-141.
Paul V. Walsh
Deputy Director
Economic Research

221. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 3, 1968, 7:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 74. Secret; Sensitive;
Crocodile.
Mr. President:
Here is the full text of the Hanoi message, plus Sullivan's comment./2/
/2/The attached telegram was received at 1:49 a.m. in the Department of State, but the "comment" by Sullivan in telegram
6241 from Vientiane, May 3, was received at 12:24 a.m. In a telephone call at 1 a.m., Rostow informed the President that
word had been received from the North Vietnamese that they had agreed to open discussions at Paris in a week's time.
The President replied: "Well, I'd rather go to almost any place than Paris." While Rostow saw little opportunity of
substituting another site, he noted that at least the South Vietnamese would be much more comfortable with Paris than
Warsaw. Rostow urged caution in any reply to the North Vietnamese, however, given their intention was solely to discuss
the full cessation of bombing and other military actions. In addition, Rostow reassured Johnson that the bombing could be
restarted if the conditions laid down in the San Antonio formula were violated. The President added that he did not want
word of Hanoi's offer to leak out before a response was discussed. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of
Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Rostow, May 3, 1968, 1 a.m., Tape F68.06, PNO 1; transcript prepared
specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian)
I read this as indicating that your handling of this matter over the past month has convinced them:
--That you were in no hurry and were firm;/3/

/3/In a May 2 memorandum to Rostow, Jorden discussed the reasons for the administration's firmness in insisting upon "a
site where both sides can be sure of equal and fair and disinterested treatment." (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to
the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 74)
--Meanwhile, our men in the field, the GVN, and the ARVN convinced them that time was not their friend.
I don't think they are going to be easy to deal with; but I do believe that we enter this from a position of strength and a
sense on their side that the clock is ticking against them:
--It was they who rejected the option of waiting until after the election;
--It was they who rejected a stage of negotiation devoted merely to discussing time and place;
--It was they who added the phrase "to have subsequent conversations on the problems of interest to the two sides"--their
version of "productive negotiations" from the San Antonio formula.
Paragraph 5 of Sullivan's cable is a just tribute to his Chief./4/
/4/This paragraph in telegram 6241 reads: "Congratulations to those in Washington whose eyeballs are made of such stern
stuff. Among our Asian friends, these two successive retreats by Hanoi from firmly held positions will be taken as a sign
that the North Vietnamese are badly hurting and need negotiations in a very real way."
But our reply will have to deal with: "to determine with the American side the unconditional cessation of bombing and all
other American acts of war against the DRV."
My first reaction is that our reply should quote the following passage from your speech of March 31 to lay a basis for our
position: "Even this very limited bombing of the North could come to an early end--if our restraint is matched by restraint in
Hanoi." But you will, of course, wish to consider this matter this morning in the light of the views of Sec. Rusk and Sec.
Clifford.
W.W. Rostow/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Attachment
Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/6/
Vientiane, May 3, 1968, 0418Z.
/6/Secret; Nodis; Crocodile.
6243. 1. Following is an unofficial translation of the unofficial French version which accompanied the note handed to
Ambassador Sullivan by NVN Charge today.
"(1) The Government of the DRV has declared itself ready to name its representative with the rank of Ambassador to
contact the representative of the U.S. at Phnom Penh or Warsaw in order to prepare for official conversations. World public
opinion has warmly welcomed this correct attitude and demanded that the U.S. answer promptly the proposal of the DRV
Government.
"But the American side, although it has repeatedly declared itself 'ready to go anywhere' for conversations, has made
condition after condition for the choice of a site. It has, besides, suggested places incompatible with its own conditions.
"On April 23, 1968, the American side has raised a new question, suggesting that the two sides engage in private
discussions about the places and the date of contact and consequently should choose in addition a site for these private
conversations.

"As a sign of good will the Government of the DRV gave instructions to its Ambassador at Warsaw to be prepared to enter
into discussions with the American Ambassador regarding the place and the date of conversations, but the American side
refused.
"(2) Since the declaration of April 3, 1968 of the Government of the DRV, preliminary contacts should have been
undertaken leading to official conversations between the two parties but the U.S. Government has deliberately engaged in
dilatory maneuvers./7/ In the face of the situation the Government of the DRV believes that official conversations between
Hanoi and Washington should take place immediately. The Government of the DRV has decided to name Minister Xuan
Thuy as its representative to engage in official conversations with the representative of the USG to determine with the
American side the unconditional cessation of bombing and all other American acts of war against the DRV, and to have
subsequently conversations on the problems of interest to the two sides. The Government of the DRV favorably receives
the attitude of the French Government which is disposed to offer Paris as a place for conversations between the DRV and
the U.S., as the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Monsieur Couve de Murville, declared on April 18, 1968. The
Government of the DRV considers that Paris, as well as Phnom Penh and Warsaw, is a suitable place for the official
conversations between both sides. These official conversations will begin on May 10, 1968, or several days thereafter.
/7/The United States had deemed acceptable the Indonesian offer of a peace ship in the Tonkin Gulf, but the DRV rejected
it the following day. (Telegrams 156173 to Djakarta, May 1, and telegram 6429 from Djakarta, May 2; National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) In a memorandum to the
President, May 1, 12:50 p.m., Rostow noted that the Indonesians were "selling the idea in Hanoi in part on the grounds
that our Allies could be excluded." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 6G(6), Talks with Hanoi)
May 3, 1968"/8/
/8/Telegram 157530 to Seoul, Manila, Bangkok, Canberra, and Wellington, May 3, notified the Embassies of the DRV
message. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
Telegram 157542 to Vientiane, May 3, instructed Sullivan to deliver the following message "at once" to the DRV Embassy:
"The USG accepts the time and place proposed by the Government of the DRV in its note of May 3." (Ibid.) The DRV
acknowledged this acceptance in a hand-delivered note to the Embassy in Vientiane. (Ibid.) In telegram JCS 4785 to
Sharp and Westmoreland, May 3, Wheeler informed them of the DRV message and cautioned about a possible military
offensive by the enemy prior to the start of negotiations, noting that "a bloody repulse of some spectacular initiative by
NVA/VC forces" would serve to strengthen the U.S. negotiating position. (Ibid., RG 407, Litigation Collection,
Westmoreland v. CBS, MACV Backchannel Messages to Westmoreland, 1-31 May 1968)
Sullivan

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968

Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 222-239

May 4-31: Opening of the Peace Negotiations and the

May Offensive
222. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, May 4, 1969, 4:30-5:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White
House. Those attending were the President, Rostow, Wheeler, Clifford, Rusk, Fortas, and Christian. Taylor joined the
meeting at 5:07 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
The President: Walt and Bus will explain what is happening.
General Wheeler: Starting at midnight their time, we had a number of attacks, mostly airfields, also city of Kontum./2/
/2/A second NVA/VC offensive known as "mini-Tet" began on May 4. In a telephone conversation with Clifford that
morning, the President noted that enemy infiltration figures had reached a new monthly high of 35,000 during April. He
stressed the need for opponents in the Congress to be informed that "we have men right there that are about to get run
over damn easy." (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Clifford,
May 4, 1968, 10:13 a.m., Tape F6805.01, PNO 1-3)
Information we have is that the attack in Danang area was light. But Chu Lai and Pleiku airfields were temporarily closed.
Overall, attacks relatively light.
Could well be prelude to attack later this week. This was one of their objectives--air capability--in Tet offensive.
It will be tomorrow night before they renew attacks.
Hit 18 places.
President: Dean, what is the significance?
Secretary Rusk: I think we can expect pretty heavy fighting as we move into talks. Have no trouble going to 20th but rather
the news carry their attacks good first. [sic]
General Wheeler: Have sent carrier command an alert message, he recommended no movement of his search and rescue
vessels without their discovery.
Secretary Clifford: What is behind it? I believe it is their reaction to licking on Warsaw. I would be surprised if this is prelude
to wide offensive. Too early in negotiations. We're limited in retaliation. This not time to use retaliation--save Thanh Hoa for
now. We'll get a more dramatic opportunity.
This attack of theirs will disconcert world opinion.
Secretary Clifford: Bus, I'd get ready for attack on Thanh Hoa, and maybe others. Psychological value of getting ships and
planes in place. Keep in position for a while, even if we don't use.
Secretary Rusk: I don't think there will be indignation at Hanoi, only at us if we retaliate.
Mr. Rostow: I think their intention is to do more than slap our wrists over Warsaw.
The President: Don't agree that Warsaw was a big victory. Think they wanted Paris.

Mr. Rostow: They have a fixed picture of negotiations. Think it would be easier for us to get back to the 20th now than after
Harriman is in Paris. Proceed to selected target between 19th and 20th.
Justice Fortas: Perhaps they are testing to see if your hands are tied by dove sentiment. But have a hunch it is too soon for
counter-reaction. Would wipe out great gain and make negotiation more difficult. You might issue a statement to help build
up sentiment.
Secretary Rusk: I don't think we should leave the impression that anybody's hands are tied in the South.
President: I think we ought to background---35,000 infiltrated this month
--hit airfields today
--doesn't look like they are very serious
Then authorize the ships to move and hold.
Justice Fortas: Think we have to get away from infiltration as only reason for concern. Been using vastly increased flow for
purposes of attacking airfields; tie infiltration to their military actions.
General Wheeler: It would be fatal for us to be forced into de facto cease fire.
Secretary Rusk: What's going on in Ashau?
General Wheeler: Finding caches of weapons, anti-aircraft guns, rice--not as many troops as thought. Believe he's in Laos.
Weather turning bad; Westmoreland will have to move out in next three or four days./3/
/3/Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216, which began on April 19, involved air-supported assaults against NVA staging areas
in Thua Thien Province near the Laotian border. The operation ended on May 10.
Secretary Clifford: Get ships out. May have to get ready not only for Thanh Hoa, but also Hanoi and Haiphong.
Secretary Rusk: I think we should look for bigger game. When I asked Dobrynin if he would be for return to Geneva Laos
accords if we stop bombing, he said "Yes." That means stopping infiltration./4/
/4/As reported in a memorandum of conversation between Rusk and Dobrynin, May 3. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-USSR)
Background only on:
--80,000-100,000 last 4 months---April record month.
I will talk to Ball about "Meet the Press"./5/
/5/Ball appeared on this televised interview program on May 5 and discussed the increase in Communist infiltration into
South Vietnam. See The New York Times, May 6, 1968.

223. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 5, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 74. Secret.
Mr. President:
Knowing that you are giving much thought to the problems of the coming negotiations and the positions to be taken by
your representatives, I am venturing to summarize some of the points which seem to me most important for discussion
with our emissaries before their departure.
a. Our Objective: "The independence of South Viet-Nam and its freedom from attack . . . The people of South Viet-Nam to
be allowed to guide their own country in their own way." It is against this objective that we should measure all our actions
at the conference table. We will have succeeded if we attain it--otherwise, we have lost.
b. Cessation of Bombing: It is clear that the first objective of our opponents will be to end the bombing of North Viet-Nam
and then settle back to an unhurried talk-fight kind of negotiation during which they will be under little pressure to show
progress. They may feel that we are trapped in the San Antonio formula and must negotiate from within its confines but,
fortunately, they have given us an "out" if we want to use it and I certainly think we should. The formula was predicated on
the assumption that North Viet-Nam would take no advantage of a complete cessation of our bombing, an assumption
which is obviously invalid in view of the advantage being taken of even the presently restricted bombing, evidenced by the
high level of infiltration in April and the recently renewed attacks on the cities. This is not the restraint we had hoped for--it
is taking advantage of our conciliatory gesture and augurs ill for restraint if we took the further step of a complete bombing
pause.
Under these new circumstances, I think we should feel completely free to use the bombing issue flexibly as benefits our
interest in the negotiation. At a minimum, we should not agree to a complete cessation without first verifying that the
subsequent talks will be "prompt and productive", to salvage the most useful part of the San Antonio formula. "Prompt"
could be left to subjective determination based on the expedition shown in tackling the items on the agenda but
"productive" is a term which requires careful attention. A judgment as to whether negotiations will be "productive'' can not
be made without some understanding of the likely course of subsequent events, to include a knowledge of who will attend
the conferences and what will be the content and order of the agenda for the discussions. Since, in our past experience
with Communist negotiators, they have usually tried and often succeeded in wrangling interminably over such matters, it
appears to me of the utmost importance that we not stop the bombing until these matters are settled. We can not possibly
have ground to believe that subsequent negotiations will be "productive" until these points are agreed.
c. The Preferred Agenda: If we are to press for an agreed agenda before stopping the bombing, we need to have
agreement among ourselves as to the desired order of events. At the risk of repeating views previously advanced, I will
give my own preferred order of agenda items and some of the reasons for the preference:
Item 1: Understandings with regard to a cessation of the bombing to include the points made in paragraph b above. Efforts
to determine the restraints which enemy will observe if we give up bombing. Establishment of the point that we will
continue air reconnaissance of North Viet-Nam even if we stop bombing (if we are convinced of the essentiality of the
reconnaissance).
Item 2: The conditions for the withdrawal of foreign forces (North Vietnamese, US/FWF) and the disposition of military
bases in South Viet-Nam. Methods of verification by both sides.
[Since this matter is a major negotiation objective of the enemy, if we can establish our sincerity on this point early in the
game, the rest of the negotiation should be made easier.]/2/
/2/All brackets in the source text.
Item 3: The cessation of external reinforcement by NVN and US/FWF. The problem of rotation on our side. Methods of
verification by both sides.
[If the conditions for withdrawal of foreign forces have been previously agreed, this point should not be too difficult.]
Item 4: Measures affecting the Viet Cong. Their future political rights and economic privileges. Their freedom of choice of
homeland. (North or South Viet-Nam.) Any "carrots" which the U.S. might contribute to make the deal more attractive to
Hanoi.
[This group of subjects is likely to prove the most formidable stumbling block in the path of our negotiators. In establishing

our position, it will require close coordination with the GVN--indeed, a case can be made for making this matter a subject
for direct discussion between the GVN and the NLF in a "side" negotiation to which we would be observers. Alternatively, it
could be combined with the cease-fire discussion which is the next point on this suggested agenda. In any case, we need
private discussions with our allies to reach agreement on a formula for Viet Cong political participation which is not a sellout coalition solution. Your formula of "one man, one vote" seems to me to provide the basis for a satisfactory US/GVN
position.]
Item 5: A cease-fire in South Viet-Nam.
[I have retained this item for last because it is as complex as all the preceding ones in combination and is likely to
consume an inordinate amount of time unless both sides know by this point how they will come out on the preceding
topics. With this knowledge, they may be more amenable to reason in working out the details of a cease-fire. Ideally, a
cease-fire should be so timed as to set in motion the execution of the foregoing agreements in an atmosphere of
cooperation in carrying out a program agreed to by both sides in their respective self-interest.
Since there will be great pressure at the outset of the negotiations to stop the fighting as the first order of business, we
might consider initiating immediate cease-fire negotiations by the opposing military commanders on the pattern of the
French Army-Viet Minh parleys in 1954. This device would allow them to run concurrently with the Paris discussions and,
not being at governmental level, would allow VC/NLF participation without serious objections from the GVN. It might be an
advantageous forum for Vietnamese-to-Vietnamese discussions of the future of the Viet Cong mentioned above, even
though much of this problem is non-military.]
Item 6: Timing of implementing actions; international supervision of implementations; international guarantees of the
settlement.
It seems important that your negotiators receive your guidance before leaving on such matters as have been briefly
discussed above. The order of events is important as is the development of the U.S. position or positions on each of the
items on the agenda. I am sure that, over the past three years, much work has been done on these points by many
officials and many agencies of government but now is the time to sort out the parts of past studies which have value in
establishing a coherent position in the actual situation which we are facing.
I am attaching a list of questions suggested by the points raised in this paper which may be worth discussion at your
Monday meeting on this subject./3/
/3/This attachment for the next day's meeting listed six questions relating to the impending negotiations on the following
topics: the status of the San Antonio formula, the nature of evidence demonstrating that the talks would be "prompt" and
"productive," the value of aerial reconnaissance, the respective roles of the GVN and NLF, the fate of the current
constitutional framework of the GVN, and inducements the United States could offer to bring the DRV to a settlement. For
the discussion at the meeting Monday, May 6, see Document 225.
MDT

224. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 6, 1968, 8:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Crocodile--Paris to be filed. Secret. The notation
"ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
My memorandum to you on negotiating problems is set out in the way most people believe negotiations will run./2/
/2/Not found.
This memorandum states what I believe is the optimum way they should run in our interest; and it states the reasons why I
do not rule it out as wholly impossible that Hanoi may agree.

1. The southern settlement: the heart of the matter. The war is about the future of power and politics in South Vietnam. The
quickest way to end the war is to get an agreement on that subject. Then all the other matters could fall quickly and
naturally into place. The reason Hanoi starts with a cessation of bombing and then, quite possibly, a cease-fire in place--is
to improve its bargaining position on the question of power and politics in South Vietnam.
From our point of view, therefore, I believe it would be wise for Harriman to seek an early quiet talk with the North
Vietnamese negotiator in Paris--or, perhaps, Cy Vance could have a quiet, informal talk with Mai Van Bo. He should
suggest that if we want peace soon, the way to do it is to get the GVN in touch with "a member" of the NLF and let them go
to work on the southern settlement. Perhaps they could best do it in South Vietnam while the formal negotiations go
forward in Paris. It would be hard in Paris to keep such a conversation from becoming known, given the intensity of
scrutiny and gossip that will surround the negotiations.
We could then press Thieu to offer a one-man one-vote solution which would permit the NLF, disguised as a popular front
party, to run if--repeat if--it accepts the constitution as the basis for political life.
2. Would Hanoi accept such a procedure? The conventional wisdom is that they would refuse. And that may be correct.
But it is not certain that they would refuse, for these reasons:
--Under pressures that we may not wholly understand, they appear to be in something of a hurry.
--They are now bringing down the probable peak number of infiltrators. It is probably a peak in infiltration because they
cannot afford 30,000 per month indefinitely and because they know we cannot stop the bombing if infiltration continues at
30,000 a month. Therefore, they may calculate that in the weeks ahead they may be at maximum strength inside of South
Vietnam and with the passage of time we again shall impose heavy attrition on their forces and weaken their bargaining
position on the ground. They have reports that in VC villages the children are being taught to chant the following: "Blood
will flow in May; there will be peace in June." If they are stirring these kinds of hopes, it must mean, technically, that they
are thinking about a quick, rather than a protracted, negotiation.
3. I repeat, all the conventional pre-negotiating indications are that they will go slowly and try via a bombing standdown
and perhaps a cease-fire to increase their leverage and diminish ours; but I believe our negotiators should make a serious
try to go promptly for the gut issue: a negotiation by South Vietnam for a political settlement, preferably to be conducted in
secret in South Vietnam.
Walt

225. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, May 6, 1968, 1:20 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. The meeting ended at 3 p.m. (Ibid., President's
Daily Diary) A summary of the meeting and a full transcript of it are ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
Additional notes of the meeting, taken by Harold Johnson, are in the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Harold K. Johnson
Papers, Notes on Meetings with the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and the President, Dec. 1967June 1967.
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS
ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
Ambassador Harriman
Ambassador Vance
General Goodpaster
General Taylor
Philip Habib
William Bundy
Under Secretary Katzenbach

General Johnson
Walt Rostow
George Christian
W. Jorden
The President: I want a most careful screening of the personnel in Paris--I want to be positive. I want the negotiators to get
my feelings. I don't want to influence you with my pessimism. I hope you're optimistic.
Truman and Eisenhower have given me their reservations. They say be cautious about trusting them./2/
/2/According to the transcript of the meeting, the President stated: "I talked to President Truman the other day out at
Kansas City. He expressed some of the reservations that he had. I talked to President Eisenhower and he has given me
some of the reservations that he had. I don't agree, in total, with what either of them say, but the general feeling both of
them have is that we have to be very cautious and not be very trusting with these folks, because first of all, you can't
always believe everything they say. And second of all, they don't always carry out what they agree to do as both
Presidents have reminded me in the number of talks that I have had with them. So I want to stress that first of all I'm glad
that we are going to talk to them but I am not overly hopeful as I said in my statement. And second, I know that a good
many of you think that I have a good deal at stake and the government has a good deal at stake and this is an election
year and we sure would like to do what we could with all of these things that come about in a resolution. I'm very anxious
to bring about a resolution but not because it's election year and not because of my own political state because I made that
decision on March 31st. So you don't need to feel any expediency required of me of anything. No political conditions that I
can see with the parties."
I'm glad we're going to talk, but I'm not overly hopeful. Some of you think we want resolution of this in an election year. I
want it resolved, but not because of the election. Don't yield anything on that impression.
Just think of the national interest--now and ten years from now./3/
/3/In an April 23 memorandum to Harriman and Vance, Goodpaster described the relationship between the objectives of
both sides in the negotiations and their relative military abilities on the battlefield. In a May 4 covering memorandum
transmitting a copy of Goodpaster's memorandum to the President, Rostow wrote: "You should know that Governor
Harriman, at a meeting last Thursday of Katzenbach's committee, argued, in effect, that the 'domestic political scene'
required that we seek a quick settlement, even at some cost to our interests. Andy Goodpaster today told me that after
presenting a paper to Harriman (copy attached) he replied: we can't get all we'd like because of domestic political factors.
Harriman may be reflecting your wishes on the matter. But--if not--I would assume that the President should judge the
domestic political factor at each stage of the negotiation, in the context of each negotiating issue. If that judgment is
correct, you may wish to tell our negotiators on Monday that their job is to achieve U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia and
leave it to the President to assess at each stage, on each issue, the extent to which domestic politics plays a role--if,
indeed, it has a role." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 74)
Secretary Katzenbach: Here are the issues:
1. They'll make a long statement denouncing U.S. aggression--"hear U.S. affirm conditions to stop bombing." They'll have
a hard line on the bombing, and they'll stay with it. If pressed, they'll define "other acts of war" to include any and every
violation of the border.
2. They will label the San Antonio formula as conditions--label them unacceptable.
Director Helms: They'll be tough at first--may say no further meetings until bombing settled.
Secretary Rusk: They'll probably make their statement public; we should do likewise. They'll come in with a roar.
Secretary Clifford: We've been put on notice we're being divided in two phases: bombing and acts of war; then other
things.
Mr. Rostow: But they noted our position that we will be determined by March 31 speech.
Ambassador Harriman: I think their answer indicated they're willing to hear our conditions for stopping the bombing.
The NVN signed an agreement in 1962 and never kept one word of it. So I'm under no illusions.

They're arriving in Paris with a force of 43. They have asked for a villa. This indicates they are ready for phase I and phase
II. They seem to be dug in for a period of time.
Secretary Rusk: Move with deliberation. May want to do some other works--if and when we see we can stop all bombing,
may want to talk to USSR, get concessions from them.
Ambassador Harriman: I suggest Cy Vance come back and forth--it's only seven hours away.
Ambassador Vance: The government should speak with only one voice. Very harmful if otherwise.
Secretary Clifford: Suppose they say they want agreement on stopping bombing, do nothing else till that is done. Let's face
that very real problem.
Secretary Rusk: We would quote heavily from the March 31 speech about reduction of violence. They would have to take
the burden of breaking off the talks. Make them impose the ultimatum.
Ambassador Harriman: We would have to carefully define "other acts of war"--not reconnaissance.
Secretary Clifford: They could make a sharp issue if they took the San Antonio formula and called upon us to adhere.
Ambassador Harriman: Because they've repudiated the San Antonio formula, they'll probably use other approach.
The President: Assume they do say what Clark says, what do we say? Assume if you take advantage, everything here
comes to naught.
Secretary Rusk: Start with points which go beyond our minimum position: DMZ, Laos Accords, control by ICC, etc.
General Johnson: Take no action that would impede military actions in the South./4/
/4/In CM-3284-68 to Harriman, May 8, General Johnson argued the necessity for "exerting maximum military pressure on
the VC/NVA during the negotiations," since it would keep them paying a price, prevent them from bettering their military
position, and force them to negotiate seriously. (Department of Defense, Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
911/305 (8 May 68) IR 3864) In making a similar argument to Clifford in JCSM-289-68, May 8, Johnson, for the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, wrote: "In the final analysis, no combination of concessions which North Vietnam/National Liberation Front
are likely to make unilaterally would afford the allied forces advantages commensurate with those afforded North Vietnam
by the cessation of bombardment." (Ibid.)
Secretary Rusk: If they ask for a cease-fire, our response should be mutual withdrawal of forces, amnesty, application of
Manila formula.
Secretary Katzenbach: It is unlikely they'll propose a cease-fire. More likely to say they are going to refrain as gesture, so
they can control it.
The President: Should we propose mutual withdrawal, re-institute DMZ, supervised election?
Ambassador Vance: Might propose DMZ.
Mr. Rostow: The critical question will be at what stage we want discussions of political settlement in the South. Earlier we
get to that, the better off we'll be. They may try to move us to more inhibited military position.
Natural way to end this war is not a cease-fire, but to get at a political settlement before there's a cease-fire.
Secretary Rusk: Advantage in our making strong case at opening. The moment we agree Hanoi has a right to talk about
political reorganization in the South, that is a big concession.
Mr. Rostow: I wholly agree.

The President: Shouldn't Bunker be getting Thieu to go ahead on talking with the NLF?
Secretary Katzenbach: I don't think Hanoi wants to talk about a political settlement in the South. They'll say we should talk
to NLF about that.
Secretary Clifford: Combine March 31 speech and their response of April 3. You were willing to take first step to deescalate. We can't say publicly, but San Antonio has been disposed of. They didn't respond to San Antonio.
General Taylor: On the cease-fire question, at some point I think they'll try. Against our interest, because it takes weeks
and months to put into effect. We should say get experts to work on it while we continue to talk in Paris.
Secretary Rusk: It has merit.
Secretary Clifford: They may say "we're prepared to offer a cease-fire." Have to face up to it. Makes it difficult for us to
explain why we can't accept it.
The President: Don't you trump their cease-fire by Manila formula?
Secretary Clifford: They then say they're willing to work toward it, but while doing that, have a cease-fire.
Ambassador Vance: U.S. can't speak for the GVN on this.
Mr. Rostow: (1) We agree to talk about cease-fire. (2) But try to push talks in another direction.
The President: What would you do about stopping the bombing?
Mr. Rostow: Start with March 31--assumptions about their behavior--then stop.
Secretary Katzenbach: I think they'll reject conditions.
Secretary Rusk: Ave [Harriman] could say we're willing to stop unconditionally, but also talk about what you're going to do
unconditionally.
Director Helms: The leaders think they're in a position to win--want you to give something more.
Ambassador Harriman: When they accepted March 31, they were riding high. A lot has changed in the past month. They
thought they were winning. How they judge last month may be something else.
General Goodpaster: We'll come quickly to force withdrawals. We might take this up in trial areas so their performance can
be judged. We and they don't have some measure of relative positions. They may be more optimistic./5/
/5/According to the transcript of the meeting, Goodpaster's full statement was: "Sir, I think that we will come pretty quickly
to this question of force withdrawals. This will be one of the blue chip questions. There are some possibilities here which
might be considered. It's possible that this could be taken up in trial areas initially and their performance could be observed
and we would learn the extent to which we could be sure over what they have done, and that we can, in fact, verify. I think
it would be valuable all around to us and to the South Vietnamese if they saw through actual experience in a selected area
what the outcome was, whether they are able to maintain their position, so that this topic, I think has got to feel right to
them. In a more general way, it has seemed to me that the negotiations, to have validity, cannot help but to be coupled
with the situation on the battlefield. And if a step of this kind involving force withdrawal in a certain area can be
accomplished in a way that meets our objectives, we would then lay the basis for carrying this thing forward, extending it to
other areas. It could be that along with such force withdrawals there could be coupled other forms of de-escalation. But all
of this, I would think, lies very well down the road. There are still ambiguities. I'm sure there will remain ambiguities as to
just what the situation is as to our military strength on the battlefield and as to theirs. We probably don't have the same
assessment today as to how well we're doing and how well they're doing."
The President: In your opinion, have we increased or decreased our military strength because of bombing curbs?
General Goodpaster: What they've been able to do not much different from what they could have done. Their advantage

though is more ease in supply and pulling people off repairs in North.
Mr. Rostow: We were pinning down establishment by instrument bombing.
General Johnson: I don't think it's hurt much at this stage. I disagree with General Goodpaster on some thing--the level of
terror in October, culminating in Tet, was necessary for him to try to regain losses. Now he didn't score well in second
wave. I think he hurts.
Ambassador Vance: I think we should define our objectives in the South. Fight and talk, or reduce violence?
Secretary Rusk: Basically it's status quo ante--pulling North and South apart militarily--shooting for time for Asians to look
after selves.
Mr. Rostow: The crucial problem is how to deal with a coalition government.
Mr. Bundy: The principle of the South Vietnamese settling it themselves should be our position.
Ambassador Harriman: I hope Bunker will get Thieu to carry out his campaign promise to bring some into government who
have a following--like Huong.
Secretary Rusk: Should have a later meeting, before the group leaves Thursday./6/
/6/In a May 6 memorandum to Wheeler, Harold Johnson wrote: "Have had a two-hour inconclusive meeting at White
House with the negotiators. Top man was very clear that no yielding on any point required for reasons of political
expediency. He is concerned with security interests of this nation one year from now and ten years from now. There will be
another meeting later on this week. Harriman, nudged by Vance, seeking guidance on military objective. I stated that
political objective was needed first. Rusk stated that basic objective is status quo ante with hope that it could be permanent
for at least a few years. I then said that military objective should be elimination of enemy force to the extent that police
could assure maintenance of law and order in South Vietnam. Vance appeared to be searching for a mutual de-escalation.
I believe that on basis of discussion today the next meeting can be more productive and more definitive." (U.S. Army
Military History Institute, Harold K. Johnson Papers, Notes on Meetings with the Secretary of Defense, the National
Security Council, and the President, Dec. 1967-June 1967)

226. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, May 7, 1968, 1-3 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. In a May 7 background paper for the
President, Rostow listed as negotiating issues requiring policy guidance the right to undertake reconnaissance flights, the
need to make explicit the assumptions upon which the halt was based, the "possibilities for significant formal chatter"
regarding substantive issues, the participation of the GVN and NLF, further mutual de-escalation and the mechanisms for
disengagement, allied participation in any settlement, and as proposed by Vance, the specific agenda and tactics to follow
in the talks. (Ibid., National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Meetings with the President, May-June 1968 [2])
NOTES ON TUESDAY LUNCHEON, MAY 7, 1968
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Clifford
Secretary Rusk
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
General Johnson
George Christian
Tom Johnson
Secretary Rusk: The delegation is small. Daniel Davidson is a good man. The Staff is very good, and I would go ahead.

We are bringing Kaplan in to help on press problems. Also, Bill Sullivan has a personal knowledge of NVN's chief
negotiator. Do you have any objections?
The President: No objections.
Secretary Clifford: No objections. It is better to start with a small staff.
Secretary Rusk: I told Cy and Averell to expect the President to be involved with these decisions.
General Johnson: Who would substitute for General Goodpaster when he is due to report to Vietnam?
The President: Maxwell Taylor has a lot of diplomatic and military background./2/
/2/In a May 8 memorandum to Wheeler, Harold Johnson noted: "I failed to identify another topic that I raised concerning
replacement for Goodpaster on the negotiation delegation. Rusk pointed out Bunker's affinity for Palmer. I informed him
that Palmer would probably be leaving about 15 June to become Vice Chief of Staff and would not be available. I also said
that Abrams probably could get along without Goodpaster for some period of time but that Andy would be needed
eventually. There was a long silence when the President finally said that the man in whom he had confidence and liked the
way that he conveyed his ideas was General Taylor. Thus, it is conceivable that he may replace Goodpaster on the
delegation. I advance this now because I could foresee some reservations among the Chiefs. I have not mentioned it to
them, however." (U.S. Army Military History Institute, Harold K. Johnson Papers, 199-208)
Secretary Rusk: I agree with you about Max Taylor, but a lot can happen between now and June.
Secretary Clifford: The best thing we can do is to get peace in Vietnam.
The President: I want Rusk and Clifford and Helms to brief Bobby [Kennedy] when he wants it.
Secretary Rusk: If I were a candidate I would not accept a briefing.
The President: Why? A man's judgment is no better than his information.
Secretary Rusk: They aren't interested in information.
George Christian: It wouldn't appeal to the group he is appealing to.
Secretary Clifford: I had a good visit with Fulbright.
Secretary Rusk: Do you know the difference between rape and seduction?
Secretary Clifford: I have read about both; I have not been involved in either (laughter).
Secretary Clifford: Friday, May 17, is date we have chosen on MAP program. We had good discussion about Vietnam. He
wanted Mansfield and John Sherman Cooper at the discussions in Paris.
Fulbright wanted to know how seriously the President wanted peace. I told him, "Bill, about 50 times as much as you do."
The President: I have told the press that consultations would be helpful. I rely closely on Rusk, but I would hear from Ball,
Rostow, Goldberg and Clifford.
Everybody's judgment is important, if we reached point where we need the judgment of Congress, we would go to
Mansfield and McCormack and Dirksen. I told the Leadership that we have to depend on senior people like Mansfield and
Dirksen.
Secretary Rusk: We would like to use Leonhart and Wyn Brown/3/ while Bundy is so involved. Both are discreet men.
/3/William Leonhart of the NSC Staff and Winthrop Brown, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Liaison with the

Governors.
Walt Rostow: Leonhart has responsibilities to a staff of 15. He doesn't want it to collapse.
Secretary Rusk: We need the best backstopping team we can get.
The President: Any matters arising where Congress is concerned, we will take up with Mansfield and Dirksen, McCormack
and Ford. The normal procedure would be Senator Mansfield and Senator Dirksen. The ranking Committeeman is
Hickenlooper.
[Omitted here is discussion of an NIE on the Soviet Union.]
The President: Should we have a second meeting with Harriman and Vance?
Secretary Rusk: Yes, we should have another meeting./4/ "Our side, your side" approach is a good one. We should not
pull our punches. We should not understate our own case. I hope Averell will start off with a firm position. We ought to
press for more than the Clifford formula. We need to make them face up to the hard issues including the no advantage
formula.
/4/See Document 227.
The President: You (Secretary Clifford) and Dean go over everything with them. We want them to be tough traders. Let's
not put our minimum condition on the table first.
Bombing Between 19th and 20th Parallel
Secretary Clifford: We are now confining bombing below 19th.
General Johnson: The Air Force wants to go up to 20th. Others do not want to do anything to upset the sitting down at the
table this week on the 10th. A violation might occur./5/
/5/In a May 7 memorandum to Wheeler, Harold Johnson noted: "Rolling Thunder was raised and I showed a map of the
targets in relation to the 20th parallel. Forces are in position. I reported that the JCS were agreed that no actions taken this
week should jeopardize the initiation of talks with North Vietnam. I said that there was confidence that strikes against these
targets could be controlled but that there could not be an absolute assurance that an inadvertent crossing of the 20th
parallel would not occur. The discussion was desultory. The President was assured that forces were in position and that
strikes could be initiated promptly following a decision. There was no decision and I did not press for one." (U.S. Army
Military History Institute, Harold K. Johnson Papers, 199-208) A joint State-Defense message sent as telegram 160360 to
Vientiane, May 8, transmitted the approval of a "change in rules to permit daylight bombing in Laos with entry and/or
departure across Western Laos border." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69,
POL 27 VIET S)
Secretary Clifford: If a plane goes over the 20th Parallel, we would kick ourselves forever.
The President: When would the first meeting be?
Secretary Rusk: Friday./6/
/6/May 10.
The President: What's happening in the South?
Walt Rostow: The attack squads are being contained.
General Johnson: (Showed map of Saigon)./7/
/7/Major fighting had taken place over the last 2 days, notably in Saigon, where skirmishes with VC units continued for a
week.

The President: I am uncomfortable about infiltration.

[Omitted here is discussion of the NATO troop meeting and the Poor People's March on Washington.]

227. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, May 8, 1968, 6-7 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the
Cabinet Room of the White House. Mansfield and Dirksen joined the meeting at 6:30 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
Harold Johnson also took notes of this meeting. (U.S. Military History Institute, Harold K. Johnson Papers, Notes on
Meetings with the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and the President, December 1967-June 1968)
Johnson also summarized the meeting in a May 8 memorandum to Wheeler. (Ibid., 199-208)
NOTES ON THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
NEGOTIATING TEAM
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
William Bundy
General Johnson
Walt Rostow
Under Secretary Katzenbach
Cyrus Vance
Ambassador Harriman
General Goodpaster
Bill Jorden
General Taylor
George Christian
Phil Habib
Tom Johnson
The President: I will read the opening statement tonight./2/
/2/Reference is to the statement to be read by Harriman at the first session of the official conversations in Paris on May 13.
Drafts of the statement have not been found; for text of the final statement as read by Harriman, see Department of State
Bulletin, June 3, 1968, pp. 701-704.
Secretary Rusk: The delegation leaves tomorrow morning. Habib will talk to North Vietnam tomorrow about exact meeting
time. We expect the North Vietnamese to have very strong statement. We will stick to the March 31 speech in key points.
Ambassador Harriman may have to answer some of their statements on the spot.
The issues are:
1. The "no advantage" clause of the San Antonio formula.
2. Cessation of bombing. That is the heart of the matter.
3. The matter of reconnaissance. We must have this. They are in the South and have their intelligence.
4. Important political issues. Go ahead and get their views on more formal talks and views on terms for settlement. Thieu
and Ky suggested "our side, your side" theory of the United States with South Vietnam, and Hanoi with their allies.
5. I hope we can avoid argument about an agenda. If there is no agreed agenda we should be able to add or subtract from
it when we need it./3/

/3/These issues were addressed in a State Department paper entitled "Immediate Issues Requiring Policy Guidance," May
8. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Meetings with the President, May-June 1968 [2]) This
paper was attached and sent to the President at 4 p.m. under cover of a memorandum by Rostow, May 8. Nitze's critique
of this paper is in a May 8 memorandum to Clifford. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Vietnam War-Courses of Action, Post-Paris Talks, 1963, 1967-1968, n.d.)
The President: Should you propose the Manila formula to start with, to set the record straight on what we are for?
Ambassador Harriman: We have proposed the following:
1. Re-establish the DMZ.
2. Leave South Vietnam to themselves.
3. Economic cooperation.
4. End aggression in the South.
Under Secretary Katzenbach: I agree with the opening statement, but I think we should "feel them out."
The President: We should talk about the new Marshall Plan for that area. The statement doesn't give "effective pitch". We
need something a truck driver can understand.
Under Secretary Katzenbach: We will work on it further.
Ambassador Harriman: I am glad to have that advice.
Secretary Rusk: Our allies agree on this language. The South Vietnamese are very concerned about the idea of
supervised elections.
Walt Rostow: Maybe there should be a seven-point plan.
Secretary Clifford: I like the statement. Some parts can be explained further.
General Johnson: I see nothing objectionable from the Joint Chiefs of Staff point of view.
Walt Rostow: On Page 5 there is a new note I would add (handed notes to Cy Vance).
The President: What did we do at Manila?
Bill Bundy: The principle of self-determination was set forth quite clearly.
The President: Put in language which is in accord with Manila.
I am concerned about MIG engagement in Panhandle. One of our F-4's was shot down.
General Johnson: We do not know if MIG's staged from base 6 miles south of the 20th parallel. We cannot prove they are
on that airfield.
The President: Let's check to see if they staged there or not.
Walt Rostow: DIA thinks they did fly from there.
Secretary Rusk: There could be operations between 19th and 20th Parallel.
The President: We have tried to play it cool to get this thing going. I am getting to be nervous about the infiltration and this

MIG activity. General Chapman told me the North Vietnamese-Viet Cong were not standing and fighting.
(Senator Mansfield and Senator Dirksen entered)
Secretary Rusk: A major step forward was "our side, their side" formula given us by the South Vietnamese. We need to
see what they are willing to do if we stop the bombing. Since the first of the year they have been increasing their infiltration
about 80,000 to 100,000.
The President: The month of May may be the worst month with highest infiltration.
Secretary Rusk: We want to talk to Mansfield and Dirksen when issues come to a head. We have had nothing to indicate
Hanoi is moving toward basis of settlement. Even if we stop bombing, we must have minimum reconnaissance to know
what is going on.
The President: Since March 31 we have imposed unusual restraints on ourselves including many acceptances of sites
agreeable to us but not agreeable to them.
We stopped bombing above the 19th Parallel. We will coordinate all our activities carefully between Washington, Paris and
Saigon. There is no hurry here. We must feel our way--every step of the way. We need to be able to take care of
ourselves. We want to start with a maximum position. Always it is easier to retreat than move forward. We want them to
negotiate with one point in mind "What is in our national interest--now and in the future."
There are no Democrats or Republicans on this panel. This is strictly an American team.
I will discuss everything with Senator Mansfield and Senator Dirksen first. Secretary Clifford is going over tomorrow./4/ I
may ask you to fly over at some point.
/4/Clifford was going to Brussels to attend the NATO Ministerial meeting. According to notes of a May 7 telephone
conversation between Harriman and Clifford, the latter had invited the delegation to fly over with him "for two reasons--the
pleasure of your company and if we have anything to talk about, we can do it on the plane." (Ibid., Harriman Papers,
Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Chronological File, May-June 1968) The delegation arrived in Paris on
May 9.
I only want one spokesman during this session. We must have a common line./5/
/5/A full transcript and a summary of the meeting from this point on are in the Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in
the Cabinet Room.
Secretary Clifford: Only one guarantee--the discussion will be lengthy and difficult. It took a month to get a site. It will take
a long time. At present, there is a certain euphoria. I do not know why Hanoi has chosen to negotiate. It is possible they
want us to relax our military posture. Hanoi will try to divide the United States during this time. They will attempt to divide
the American people. We all want war to stop--but on a decent and honorable basis. We need to present an appearance of
unity during these talks.
Ambassador Harriman: Cambodia and Warsaw would have been an insult to Saigon.
Secretary Rusk: They have been willing to begin talks even though we have not completely stopped the bombing.
Senator Mansfield: I can't find fault with anything said here tonight.
Senator Dirksen: I haven't let you down yet.

228. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, May 10, 1968, 0820Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE.
Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Crocodile. Received at 6:11 a.m. Repeated to Paris for the delegation. Bunker reported on the
same subjects in his 50th weekly message to the President, telegram 26826 from Saigon, May 9. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
Bunker's weekly message is printed in full in Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 433-438.
26928. 1. I am not worried about the outcome of the fighting which has been going on around Saigon since Saturday,/2/
because the ARVN, police and US forces are very substantial and we can manage anything which they throw in, including
their reserves. There are, however, some aspects of this and related matters on which I want Washington to have my
views.
/2/May 4.
2. The VC main strategy manifests itself in several ways, two of which are assassination and sabotage. Assassination is
concentrated on police outposts, and sabotage at public utilities. One power station is already out of action as result of
sabotage, and two were damaged by shelling. A pre-offensive attack was directed against Vietnamese TV station and
failed, but could be attempted again. Further sabotage efforts must be expected on other power stations, the water works,
post office, government buildings, etc. This is well understood here and I am assured that every effort is being made to
give all practical protection, especially to key power and water installations, but this does not preclude further individual
successes by the VC.
3. A byproduct of the fighting has been some thousands of temporary evacuees, who have fled from the fighting areas,
some of whom will have lost their homes and will need to be provided for. The hospitals are now full of wounded. There is
a reduction in vegetable and meat supplies into the city, although some supplies are coming through from the northeast.
Rice is ample.
4. The aim--or at least one aim--of all this is pretty clear: to produce as much terror and havoc in the city for as long as
possible, in order to cause as much trouble as possible to the authorities and the people, with the hope of overwhelming
and collapsing the administration of the city services, producing mass discontent and hopefully the uprising which they
failed to achieve in the Tet offensive. There is no sign of panic or such collapse, and our military and the Vietnamese
authorities are very confident that they are going to bring this under control before it reaches that stage.
5. That they have other aims in mind is obvious, such as influencing the Paris talks, impressing American and world
opinion with their continued ability to mount substantial campaigns in order to cause more despair in the American public,
etc. What emerges is that they are making another great effort, not on the scale of Tet but still impressive, and they have
the capability of keeping this going here for some days and possibly weeks. If they break off this attack it will be to
resupply, then start again some weeks hence, although perhaps on a reduced scale in view of their increasingly difficult
resupply problems during the monsoon season in Laos. They are in any case willing to pay a very heavy price in terms of
losses./3/
/3/On May 9 Sullivan, en route to Paris, discussed the second NVA/VC series of attacks with Westmoreland and Calhoun
at Udorn. "All evidence which Westmoreland presented bears out his contention that North Vietnamese are in serious
military decline and that their current situation is getting worse," Sullivan reported. "Fact that they chose to launch their
current Saigon offensive even though their attack plan was compromised gives indication of their desperation and of its
political motivation." (Telegram 6399 from Vientiane, May 9; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET S) Harriman asked Sullivan, who attended the Geneva talks of 1961-1962 as Harriman's
deputy, to become part of the Paris delegation.
6. Along with this there has been an extraordinary movement South, and infiltration, in the last four months, and this
continues. (However, our success at Khe Sanh, the A Shau Valley campaign with its capture of huge supplies, and our
spoiling operations in April, also with capture of heavy supplies, have inflicted great losses on the enemy's manpower and
supplies.) Hanoi and NLF broadcasts have called for the bombing of the Palace and American Embassy by VNAF
defectors, and a mass uprising. We must expect that one or more of our installations in and around Saigon will be singled
out at any time over the next days or weeks for special sabotage, with a possibility of more casualties to Americans.
7. There is some interesting evidence of what is going on on the enemy's side. In I Corps just north of Hue on May 1, 102
NVA troops surrendered, the largest single batch in this war, induced by the amplified broadcasts of a captured sergeant.
The highest level defector of this war, Lt Colonel Tran Van Dac who joined the VC in 1945 and rose as a commissar and
propagandist, defected on April 19 and revealed the plans and timing of the present offensive. This information was used
in our preparations for the attack on Saigon, and has proven substantially correct. On May 8 another Lt Colonel defected
near Saigon on the grounds that the political commissars were asking the impossible in military terms and he could not
take it any more. He and others have added that morale is not as good as it was, and there is waning confidence in the
ranks now that the VC can win. There is evidence that replacements from the North and impressed Southerners are being

thrown into battle with little military training. There is also some evidence that Hanoi was moving toward a bid for talks
even before the March 31 speech and that they are anxious to continue the talks.
8. It is my view that Hanoi and the NLF are hurting, are now engaged in a huge gamble, and this is a year of climax. They,
perhaps, still hope for a collapse in Saigon. I feel certain they will fail. Perhaps most important in terms of their gamble is
that they now hope to win because of what they regard as our desperate desire for peace. The speeches of McCarthy,
Kennedy, Galbraith and others, articles in the US press and TV, the shift in Newsweek, Walter Cronkite and others, may
have convinced them that if they negotiate and fight we will be ready to throw in the sponge by forcing a coalition on the
South Vietnamese.
9. The arrogance of their May 3 reply--to arrange for the complete cessation of bombing and other acts of war--was part
propaganda and part bravado./4/ All the evidence suggests they are going to be tough in the negotiations and are out to
obtain the colossal concession of coalition government. They, or at least some in the North, must be arguing that the
United States regards its bargaining position as weak, and therefore that they are in a strong position. Unless we act with
genuine confidence in the strength of our bargaining position, I am fearful of the outcome.
/4/See Document 221.
10. Washington knows my position as a result of my visit. I think we are in a very strong position to negotiate, and that it is
Hanoi which is worried, or at least some in Hanoi are worried, for I suspect they have their hawks and doves just as we do.
11. The conclusions I draw from all the foregoing are clear:
A. Harriman's orders to agree to a full cessation of bombing in the North should be amended.
B. We should demand as a condition of full cessation a substantial reduction in the unprecedented NVN movement South,
which we are in a position to observe.
C. We should demand a reduction now in the level of violence in the South.
D. Most important, we should under no circumstances agree to full cessation of bombing in the North, while Saigon is
under harassment and attack. I can think of nothing more calculated to cause despair here than to agree under these
conditions. The suspicion in the South as to our negotiating intentions is that we are ready to go very far, even to coalition
with the NLF or its new alliance, to stop the war. If we cease our bombing of the North while Saigon is under attack, this
suspicion would enormously increase and could become unmanageable in terms of maintaining morale and unity here.
Thieu is expected to establish a new and broader government shortly and we must not handicap it at the outset. A full
cessation of bombing under Harriman's present instructions would encourage the hard liners in Hanoi to think we are ready
to call it quits, and in the debates which must be taking place in the North they would be justified in their view that the thing
to do is to keep the pressure on Saigon./5/
/5/Bunker's reports on the GVN's position on negotiations are in telegrams 26805 and 26833 from Saigon, both May 9.
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) In telegram
162732 to Paris, May 11, the Department noted its agreement that an agreement on full cessation in the midst of ongoing
attacks inside South Vietnam would seriously undermine the GVN's morale. (Ibid., IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace
Conference, Todel Chron.) In telegram 13887 from Paris, May 12, Harriman noted that while he and Vance did not believe
that their instruction required amendment, they were concerned that the NVA/VC might not reduce military activities in the
South while talks went on. (Ibid., Delto Chron.)
E. I myself would go further, and even while the talks proceed I would bomb power stations, railway yards, and military
installations near and in the cities below the 20th parallel, adding to their troubles in the North, creating more refugee
problems for them, and putting new strains on their facilities.
F. In short, until they reduce the movements south and call off the campaign against Saigon, we should not agree to a full
cessation, and at some stage we should let Hanoi know why. As a footnote, we would look ridiculous if we agreed to a full
cessation, and a few days later had one of our American installations blasted by sabotage with heavy American
casualties./6/
/6/In an undated memorandum to Clifford, Nitze agreed that the re-establishment of the demilitarized zone and the
diminution of violence in the South had to be agreed upon prior to a complete bombing halt but that no specific prior
agreement was needed on the reductions in NVA infiltration. He also stated his opposition to Bunker's call for an
expansion of the bombing. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Vietnam War--Courses of Action, Post

Paris Talks, 1963, 1967-1968, n.d.)

Bunker

229. Information Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President
Johnson/1/
Washington, May 11, 1968, 2:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Crocodile-Paris General, 4/9/68-5/11/68. Secret.
The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
SUBJECT
Procedural Agreement Reached at Paris Talks
Our delegation to the Paris talks reports that at the meeting today the North Vietnamese were businesslike and that the
atmosphere was good. (Tab A)/2/
/2/Neither tab is printed. Tab A was the text of telegram 13865 from Paris, May 11, in which Vance summarized his second
procedural meeting with Ha Van Lau held that day. Both negotiators agreed upon procedures to be followed in the official
conversations. A full report on the meeting is in telegram 13866 from Paris, May 11. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Delto Chron.) Vance reported on the first procedural meeting of May 10,
during which these issues initially were raised, in telegrams 13832 and 13852 from Paris, both May 10. (Ibid.)
Agreement was reached on the procedures to be followed. (Text is at Tab B.)/3/
/3/Tab B was a paper entitled "Procedures for the Conversations Between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the
United States of America," May 11. The agreed procedures included: the composition of each party to the official
conversations would be limited to no more than ten persons and only to citizens of each nation; only designated
representatives had the right to take the floor; Vietnamese and English would be the official languages with French a
working language; there would be no joint minutes; the press would not attend the sessions; the sessions would be held at
the Hotel Majestic beginning at 10:30 a.m.; the time for the next session would be determined at the end of each meeting;
and the French Government would be responsible for maintaining security and order both "outside and inside" the
conference hall.
Cy Vance made clear to the North Vietnamese that our acceptance of Paragraph 2. (C), which refers to the citizenship of
persons participating in the talks, was an entirely reasonable arrangement so long as the United States and the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam are discussing matters of primary concern to them./4/ However, our acceptance of this
provision should not be construed to affect in any way the role which must be played by the legitimate Government of
South Vietnam at the appropriate time.
/4/Section 2(C) of Tab B reads: "To be allowed to attend the sessions between the two parties, as well as to work at the
site chosen for the conversations, the components of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam party must be citizens of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and those of the United States party must be citizens of the United States."
Later in the meeting and in response to this point, the North Vietnamese representative said he took note of our statement
and understood it but it was not necessary to discuss it here.
The first substantive meeting is scheduled for 10:30 a.m. Monday,/5/ Paris time. North Vietnamese Minister Thuy will
speak first. Ambassador Harriman will follow with his opening statement which you have already approved.
/5/May 13.
Bromley Smith

230. Editorial Note

The first plenary meeting of the official conversations between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the United
States began at 10:30 a.m. on May 13, 1968, in the International Conference Hall of the Hotel Majestic. Xuan Thuy, the
chief negotiator for the DRV, set the tone for the 3-hour session in his opening statement, a hard-line presentation of his
side's objectives. He insisted that the talks were to be aimed solely at compelling the United States to terminate its
remaining bombing over the territory of the DRV. Discussion of other questions would begin only after that. Thuy also
related the long history of "U.S. aggression" against his nation.
At the conclusion of the North Vietnamese statement, W. Averell Harriman, the head of the U.S. delegation, noted his
rejection of and disagreement with various points in the statement. Harriman then read his prepared statement. He
described the U.S. objective in the Vietnam conflict as an effort "to preserve the right of the South Vietnamese people to
determine their own future without outside interference or coercion." He in turn charged that it was the DRV which had
continued its aggression with attacks subsequent to President Johnson's speech of March 31. He reiterated the long-held
position of the U.S. Government that some form of reciprocal restraint was required from the DRV, and suggested the
restoration of the demilitarized zone as an initial "test of good faith." He also emphasized that a restoration of the Geneva
Accords of 1954, in conjunction with honoring the Geneva Accords of 1962, would provide the best means for peace in
Vietnam.
Thuy responded that Harriman's statement contained no new elements and again repeated his earlier critique of U.S.
policy. The DRV delegation's suggestion to have the next meeting 2 days later was accepted. Telegrams 13926, 13936,
and 13963 from Paris, May 13, reported on the meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS
Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference, Delto Chron.) Harriman and Vance's telegrams reporting on the meetings
are also in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Paris Todel-Delto. Other collections
of HARVAN telegrams are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN(Outgoing) and HARVAN-(Incoming), and ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSCFiles, Paris Talks/Meetings, HARVAN
Cables.
Biweekly meetings began with the second meeting on May 15; beginning in June, the meetings were held on a weekly
basis. These public sessions quickly devolved into polemics and thus became opportunities to chastise the other side.
Although continuing for nearly the next 5 years, the meetings at the Majestic provided little more than a forum for
propaganda and public posturing and soon lost their significance in terms of the diplomatic evolution of the Paris talks. In
addition to the record of the formal negotiations as reported in the cable traffic from Paris cited above, the summary
records and complete transcripts of the official conversations are ibid., RG 59, EA Files: Lot 71 D 10; see also Paul
Kesaris, ed., Transcripts and Files of the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam, 1968-1973, Reels 1-2 (Frederick, Md.: University
Publications of America, 1982). Delegation member William Jorden's notes of these meetings are in the Johnson Library,
William J. Jorden Papers, WJJ Notes, Paris Meetings.

231. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 13, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 8I, 1/67-12/68, Taylor Memos--General. Secret.
In an attached note transmitting the memorandum to the President, May 16, Rostow wrote: "Herewith Gen. Taylor's
thoughts, in support of Amb. Bunker, on the need to go slow on total bombing cessation." A notation by the President on
the covering note reads: "Walt--Review with Rusk & Clifford. L"
Mr. President:
In his cable of May 10 (Section II, Saigon 26928),/2/ Ellsworth Bunker makes a case against a total cessation of bombing
of North Viet-Nam for an inadequate return to which I heartily subscribe. To gain the advantages from a total cessation
which he seeks and to avoid the adverse consequences he foresees (suspicion and despair in South Viet-Nam;
encouragement to increased violence in North Viet-Nam), I would suggest the adoption of the following negotiation
position, immediately or progressively as the talks develop:
/2/Document 228. Commenting on the views of both Bunker and Taylor in a May 18 memorandum to Rostow, Ginsburgh
noted that they "involve potential pitfalls if not properly related to the total talking-fighting scenario." He advised against any
public disavowal of the San Antonio formula and equating attacks on Saigon with those in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. He
recommended that the administration "use the very next occasion of any significant enemy offensive action to resume

bombing between 19 and 20" parallels or, even if the NVA/VC did not attack in South Vietnam, resume bombing anyway if
several weeks of no progress at Paris elapsed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan,
Misc. & Memo's, Vol. I)
a. Tacit or overt disavowal of the San Antonio formula.
While insistence on evidence of "productive" discussions as a price for a total cessation of bombing offers possibilities for
maneuver under the San Antonio formula, the "no advantage" condition has always been difficult to use to advantage. To
equate "no advantage" to the maintenance of normal levels of infiltration poses impossible problems of establishing what is
normal and of proving departures from that normal after we have stopped the bombing.
However, we now have the possibility of getting rid of the San Antonio formula on the ground that it has been invalidated
by subsequent events which make it impossible for us to assume that no advantage would be taken of a total cessation of
bombing. Since March 31, we have instituted a unilateral geographical restraint on our bombing and the enemy response
to it has been to take the fullest advantage of it by conducting infiltration at an ever increasing rate and by resuming the
attack of South Vietnamese cities after the pattern of the Tet offensive. It is impossible to consider a further reduction of
our bombing until these escalatory acts of the enemy cease and we receive some tangible evidence indicating the
adoption of appropriate restraints in compensation for the present restrictions on our bombing,
b. Resumption of bombing between 19th and 20th parallel.
We have this action available to us at any time. We would be justified in taking it now but I would prefer holding it for use at
some point during negotiations when it will produce maximum effect. If our adversaries reject our demand for the restraints
mentioned in the preceding paragraph, that would be an excellent time to renew our bombing up to the 20th parallel.
c. Discussions of total cessation of bombing.
The foregoing actions would not preclude a continuing discussion of a total cessation of bombing but we should try to keep
it within the confines of the total package of issues to be negotiated. The bombing is our primary "persuader" and should
be retained to the last to make a maximum contribution to "prompt and productive" discussions and agreements. We
should not be reluctant to resume bombing in the Hanoi-Haiphong area whenever it becomes apparent that the enemy is
increasing his activities in the South or deliberately stalling the negotiations.
If you see any merit in the foregoing views, I would suggest that they be passed to our negotiators in Paris.
MDT

232. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, May 14, 1968, 1:10-2:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The President's Daily Diary indicates the
meeting lasted until 3:03 p.m. (Ibid.)
NOTES OF TUESDAY LUNCHEON
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Wheeler
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
The President: I do not know what we should do about conference report on taxes. Labor is completely against it. If we

don't do it, Congress will go for more than $6 billion. Mills has gotten by with an increase in debt limit without trouble in the
past. Watson says he cannot live with the ceiling under this conference report. Nitze says he can't live with it at Defense,
but Budget tells me you can by substituting military for civilians in jobs.
Secretary Rusk: We do not have recommendations of our team about how to handle tomorrow's Paris meeting. We either
must speed up delegation or slow down talks. There was nothing new on the first day. We must not get too itchy to move
on to new steps. We may want to repeat a few lines on Laos and Cambodia. I am concerned about time factors. We
should tomorrow stick to opening statement--not push on to something new./2/
/2/That evening at 7:30 p.m., Rostow sent the President a copy of a proposed telegram written by Rusk and concurred in
by Clifford, containing a redraft of the statement to be made by Harriman on May 15. (Ibid., National Security File, Files of
Walt Rostow, Vol. 76) It was transmitted as telegram 164167 to Paris, May 15. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference, Todel Chron.)
The intervention by Trudeau in Canada is not good. It is like U Thant's--it asks us to stop bombing; doesn't ask Hanoi to do
anything./3/
/3/During a visit to Canada that weekend, Thant charged that the U.S. bombing was of "questionable morality and doubtful
legality" and urged Johnson to enact an unconditional cessation of bombing. At the same time, Canadian Prime Minister
Pierre-Elliot Trudeau issued a similar statement. See The New York Times, May 13-14, 1968.
The President: Are you concerned about Thieu's problem in forming a new cabinet?
Secretary Rusk: Yes, but Ky will go along if there are no changes in general.
Walt Rostow: The "deal" is that Ky will be main negotiator in "your side, our side" situation.
CIA Director Helms: It is troublesome until it settles down.
Secretary Rusk: Are you meeting with South Vietnam legislators?
The President: They are not on the schedule.
Secretary Rusk: They are volatile.
The President: I called Senator Fulbright Friday./4/ He was going to Arkansas. What is the military situation in Vietnam?
/4/No record of the President's call to Fulbright on Friday, May 10, is in his Daily Diary.
General Wheeler: General Westmoreland says it is relatively optimistic. The enemy has taken heavy losses.
Westmoreland is coming out of Ashau Valley because of the weather. I do not expect enemy successes.
Secretary Clifford: The breakdown is as follows: I Corps--94 U.S. Maneuver battalions vs. 47 enemy battalions, two to one
in our favor. We are in good shape in the coastal areas.
II Corps--the U.S. has 61 Maneuver battalions vs. enemy 25-28.
III Corps--the U.S. has 90 battalions vs. enemy 14-17.
IV Corps--the U.S. has 48 battalions vs. enemy 11-13.
Hence, they are not going to run over us.
Secretary Rusk: Can we avoid massive destruction of housing as we did in Saigon?
General Wheeler: No, except house to house fighting.

Secretary Clifford: 20,000 dwellings were destroyed in Saigon. It was close to Tet figure of 27,000 dwellings destroyed.
The South Vietnamese are quick to call in artillery.
General Wheeler: That is true. They show less restraint than we do.
Secretary Clifford: We have had a good play on the role of South Vietnam. Life did a good story. South Vietnam did well in
Ashau Valley.
Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland want our negotiations in Paris to have a man with recent Vietnamese
experience. General Wheeler and the Pentagon favor it. Secretary Rusk and I think we must be careful that man is not too
much brass. We think it would be good on a rotating basis available to them. We don't want him to be of high rank./5/
/5/In telegram 26832 from Saigon, May 9, for Rusk and Clifford, Bunker despaired that "no high level military officer from
here thoroughly conversant with and up to date on the whole military situation has been added to the staff to help Averell
and Cy interpret what is going on here." He suggested that following a proposal by Westmoreland, a military officer could
be sent to Paris from Vietnam every 2 weeks on a rotating basis. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET) In a May 9 note to Nitze, Read indicated that Rusk, Bundy, and Rostow concurred
with the proposal, and he requested that Nitze likewise concur and note his acceptance in a transmission of the proposal
to Clifford. There is no indication of concurrence from either Nitze or Clifford on the memorandum. (Ibid.)
Secretary Rusk: I would have no problem with rotating Colonels.
General Wheeler: It would be good to do it on a two-week basis.
Secretary Clifford: Let's do it with no higher than Colonels sent.
Secretary Rusk: Is that okay with the President?
The President: Yes.
Bombing Targets Between 19th and 20th Parallels
General Wheeler: We propose extending armed reconnaissance to 19 50' to establish buffer zone.
(Jim Jones enters. President agrees to 3:00 p.m. Cabinet Meeting)./6/
/6/The President met with the Cabinet from 3:04 to 5 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) According to notes of
the meeting, which was dominated by discussion of fiscal matters, Clifford reviewed the military situation in Vietnam,
specifically noting the following: "there has been a change of tactics between the time of Tet and now. The wearing
process is becoming too severe. They attacked 129 cities, following up only in Saigon. As Secretary Rusk said, that has
not been successful. The status of our forces is good. We have superior forces in all for corps and sufficient strength in
coastal areas to meet the enemy's threat. Effort in May may be the first step with another step in June and July. The
enemy has been engaged in a plan to get men down. 113,000 are passing down to South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
In April and May there were 66,000. We can expect the enemy will maintain a tough military posture during the time of
negotiations." Rusk added: "We took major step of de-escalation--has been [bombing restrictions on] 70% of land and 90%
of the population. They have done nothing." (Ibid., Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings)
General Wheeler: Showed the President a map with proposed targets. I also recommend seeding and rain-making in area.
The President: Are we together on this?
Secretary Rusk: I have no problems with seedings. The North Vietnamese representative in Paris used the 20th Parallel in
his statement.
Secretary Clifford: Psychologically, it would be a bad time to expand our bombings. It would be difficult to ask them to
phase down. The targets are not worth the political and psychological problems created. The product of our bombing will
not be that important. General Wheeler and I will have to talk this out.

CIA Report
Secretary Rusk: I also am concerned that Hanoi thinks it can mobilize public opinion such that they can do anything and
we must stop all our efforts. They must learn you did not withdraw in order to bend to their wishes. I would not oppose
strikes between 19th and 20th.
The President: I want to hear both sides. I am sensitive that we do anything to hinder negotiations. I also worry that we kill
some of our people by holding back to 19th.
Study this document carefully and let's meet on this tomorrow.
Secretary Clifford: I appear on Friday/7/ before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. They will want to get into sensitive
areas.
/7/May 17.
Secretary Rusk: I would memorize the March 31 speech and not go beyond it.
Secretary Clifford: I cannot go into the San Antonio formula?
Secretary Rusk: I would say to them what I have said to newsmen: "I make no point in my negotiating with you. We are
trying to negotiate with Hanoi in Paris."
Walt Rostow: The rate of infiltration is one you must get down.
President: What are the latest figures?
General Wheeler: Starting in November through May, we show 113,400 infiltrees. (These are starts--not actual infiltrators
into the South.) During March, April and May, there were 76,000 people on the move. They will start to arrive in June,
extending into August for another round of attacks in July.
The President: I got the impression that since Tet there were 100,000 starting down.
CIA Director Helms: The figure was 80,000.
Walt Rostow: 100,000 since January 1.
CIA Director Helms: That's right.
General Wheeler: Two Divisions in North Vietnam are starting to move.
[Omitted here is discussion of the situation in Czechoslovakia and postponement of the convening of the UN General
Assembly.]
Walt Rostow: I have analyzed the North Vietnamese statement in Paris./8/ It says again that the United States is the
aggressor. "U Thant, DeGaulle, Senator Kennedy and Fulbright say you should stop bombing." They want world opinion to
sway us. The sooner we show we will do what is right, the better.
/8/See Document 230.

233. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, May 15, 1968, 5:53-6:50 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret.

NOTES ON THE MEETING IN THE CABINET ROOM
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Wheeler
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
CIA Director Helms: There has been no use of airfield on May 13, 14 and 15 by MIG 21's or forays south of the 20th
Parallel. There has been an increase in SAM emplacements. They do try to knock everything out of the air down as far as
Danang when they operate out of it, including B 52's if they can./2/
/2/In CM-3282-68 to Clifford, May 8, Harold Johnson noted that Sharp had requested authorization to pursue enemy
planes and bomb enemy targets such as Bai Thuong Airfield, a major staging area for MiG attacks, and the Thanh Hoa
bridge, actions with which the JCS concurred. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 196769, POL 27 VIET S) In a May 15 memorandum to Rusk, Read noted that both Bundy and Katzenbach had concurred in
the request for authorization but wanted greater guarantees that the 20th parallel would not be crossed. (Ibid.)
Secretary Rusk: UPI 88 is most unfortunate. (UPI 88 attached.)/3/
/3/Not printed. United Press International news story 88, datelined Saigon, May 15, reported leaked information from
"authoritative military sources" that permission for an attack on Bai Thuong Airfield was withheld because of its potential
impact on the Paris talks and that this decision underscored the administration's de facto limitation of the bombing to the
19th parallel.
Secretary Clifford: The reasons why I think the President should delay a decision for a week are:/4/
/4/Clifford's reasons for not expanding the bombing up to the 20th parallel are derived from two memoranda he received
from Warnke. In the first, dated May 14, Warnke noted the disadvantageous position of the DRV by having to talk while
bombing continued; therefore, "this geographic expansion of the bombing would enable the North Vietnamese to get off
the hook on which they are now impaled" and lead to a hardening of their negotiating position or to the collapse of the
Paris talks. (Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, VIET 385.1
(Jan-May 1968)) In his second memorandum, May 15, Warnke described analyses of several agencies regarding the air
interdiction campaign, which demonstrated the "pointlessness" of expanding the bombing up to the 20th parallel. He cited
the CIA's assessment that a greater concentration of attacks would not significantly impact infiltration routes and noted the
conclusion of the President's Science Advisory Board (PSAB) "that we are at least as well off with our present campaign
restricted to the southern area of the Panhandle of North Vietnam as we would be with any other bombing campaign which
would involve the northern parts of that country." (Ibid.)
1. In Paris we have a posture based on the March 31 speech, and the fact that we have been bombing only up to the 19th.
I do not think we should be the first to change our position.
2. Our hope is that we can persuade them to de-escalate, such as demilitarization of the DMZ. We are in a weak position if
we take an escalatory step.
If you do the job on the airfield you hit it hard and pound it later.
3. They are negotiating while we bomb up to the 19th. They may have to ask for total cessation or no more conversations.
There is a question of face involved.
4. Curious Oriental approach--this action could give them reason to break off negotiations. It is small chance, but I do not
like to gamble on it.
5. The target is not important enough to warrant this. It will not affect the future of the war. The CIA says "it would hinder

but not seriously impede" flow into the South./5/

/5/The CIA's assessment is quoted in Warnke's May 15 memorandum to Clifford.
The President's annual science advisory report says this type of bombing doesn't seriously affect their movement./6/ We
might cut the flow down 25%, but it will not cut down much.
/6/PSAB Chairman Donald Hornig had presented the Board's findings during a May 3 meeting with Rostow, Wheeler, and
McConnell. The report noted that infiltrated supplies stood only a 10 percent chance of interdiction while in North Vietnam
but a 25 percent chance of being interdicted in Laos. It also concluded that an expansion of the bombing to the 20th
parallel would not appreciably impact the enemy's infiltrative capabilities, but conversely a halt to the bombing over the
remaining territory of the DRV "would not result in an appreciable increase in the movement of supply." (Memoranda from
Rostow to the President, May 4 and May 6, memorandum from Ginsburgh to Rostow, May 6, and memorandum from
Hornig to the President, May 6; all in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 3 F-Memos on
Bombing in Vietnam, 3/67-10/68)
Therefore, it is not worth the risk. The talks are going well. They have not laid down any ultimatums. The polemics were
expected.
They might take some action. If they did, I would not object to hitting the airfield. If they do not move within a week, you
may want to reconsider this action.
Secretary Rusk: We have three proposals:
1. Challenge and pursuit between 19th and 20th by our aircraft.
2. Strike the airfield.
3. Targets.
I do not think the "escalation" argument holds. They have taken advantage of our restraint. They have moved planes south
of the 20th. They are negotiating expecting us to operate up to the 20th.
I worry about UPI 88 very much. It confirms to Hanoi there is a 19th parallel confinement. We should not let MIG's operate
between 19th and 20th.
I would authorize air to engage MIG's and use Talos missiles.
I suggest the JCS send a message on the gravity of this leak. It looks like an effort to put pressure on Washington.
I would put off until next week hitting the airfield.
Secretary Clifford: I would hope we wouldn't do it. This is an overt act on our part. They will pick it up immediately. We do
not want to give them that type of argument. Planes could get north of the 20th.
General Wheeler: The JCS suggests only VFR conditions on attack on the base. (Visual flight rules.) Control system would
be for electronic planes warning them of the 20th penetration. There is a possibility of penetration.
From the military point of view, these are worthwhile targets. MIG's can operate off sod field. It is a staging field. They can
refuel, go down to the south and sooner or later try to knock off a B 52. It also gives them a chance to hit at our planes in
Laos.
They have stacked up supplies. They are moving three times as much supply into the south, including PT boats. They
pose a threat to naval forces. They have 76,000 men on the road south. They may move the 330th division and the 350th
division. On the 19th of May--Ho has a birthday. We may have some surprises.
Military targets are worthwhile.

Secretary Rusk: We did not promise not to put U.S. aircraft north of the 20th. We promised not to bomb. If a plane veers
over 20th in a turn, I have no problems.
We do not want steady erosion of our strength due to Joe Clark,/7/ U Thant, Trudeau of Canada, and others.
/7/Senator Joseph Clark.
From a political point of view, we must let them know our position of March 31 cannot be steadily eroded by world opinion.
I would take it in stages. First, engage them in air.
Walt Rostow: World opinion we must consider, but we must remember they have shown an act of goodwill only by coming
to the conference table and demanding a complete halt to bombing without any response by them.
The President: Jorden is doing an unusually good job in Paris. But all of us here should talk to opinion molders.
I consider UPI 88 rank insubordination. I am concerned.
I did not like the story on the draft being the lowest in some time. This looks like a blueprint of deterioration.
You do not get any gains at a peace table by weakness.
Walt Rostow: We must show them they can't push us back by this kind of pressure. They are taking our temperature. We
are getting nowhere now with formal fencing.
I think we should bring aircraft in, both in the air and with route reconnaissance. Up to Route 7. We should move back in
quietly.
Would they break up the negotiations? Nobody knows. The intensity of their movements give us a case that they aren't
interested in serious talks. They have not done much at all in Hanoi except conventional propaganda.
The President: We can't win war or peace based on public opinion. We should show whatever strength we can. I do not
think this will affect the negotiations. We should not go above the 20th parallel. All of Clark's arguments will apply in a
week. We will wait until next Tuesday,/8/ as Clark suggests.
/8/May 21.
We already have made an overly generous concession by taking Hanoi and Haiphong off the list.
After Tuesday, have a few planes up in that area very carefully.
General Wheeler: The recommendations came out of the Embassy.
Walt Rostow: It was signed Bunker./9/
/9/See Document 228.
The President: We have got to do anything we can to nick them.
We ought to support our men or get out. I am not for this gradualism. If it busts up the meeting, they weren't interested in
serious talks anyway.
Go out with wire to Harriman./10/
/10/A possible reference to telegram 165857 to Paris, May 17. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-May 1968)

234. Memorandum From Daniel I. Davidson and Richard C. Holbrooke of the U.S. Delegation to the Vietnam Peace
Talks to Ambassador Harriman and Ambassador Vance/1/
Paris, May 16, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 461, Chron.-1968--Mr. Davidson.
Secret.
SUBJECT
Is Hanoi Signaling a Possible DMZ for Bombing Trade?
Among the most interesting aspect's of Thuy's May 15 statement was his treatment of the DMZ./2/ His description of
American military action in the DMZ was clear and surprisingly accurate. He did not accuse us of basing artillery in the
DMZ but of basing long-range artillery below the DMZ and firing into the DMZ and the area above it. He did not accuse us
of basing infantry in the DMZ, or of sending U.S. forces into the northern portion, but he accused us of conducting clearing
operations in the southern portion of the DMZ.
/2/In his statement, Thuy insisted that the United States unconditionally end all acts of war such as the bombing and naval
attacks in the southern part of North Vietnam, reconnaissance missions, psychological warfare operations, commando
raids, and "artillery bombardment from south of the DMZ." (Telegram 14098 from Paris, May 15; ibid., IS/OIS Files: Lot 90
D 345 Peace Conference, Delto Chron.) A summary of the May 15 session was transmitted in telegram 14057 from Paris,
May 15. (Ibid.) In a note transmitting a copy of this telegram to the President, May 15, Rostow labeled the session "the hair
pulling contest in Paris." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. I)
Thuy then stated that the U.S. must cease its arrogant sabotage of the DMZ and the firing of its artillery units into the DMZ
and across into the territory of the DRV and it must also pull out all its own and its satellite forces from the southern portion
of the DMZ. This demand was apparently emphasized by the North Vietnamese spokesman at his press conference
yesterday.
It is possible that this is Hanoi's way of beginning a discussion of the DMZ, a subject they know is of prime importance to
us. There are other indications suggesting that the North Vietnamese may be trying to signal their interest in a detailed
discussion of the DMZ. Manac'h told Anderson/3/ (who passed it on to Vance) that he thought the DRV was interested in
the possibilities of a deal involving the DMZ. Bui Diem said that French journalists had told him that if the U.S. had first
stopped the bombing, North Vietnam might be willing to make a deal concerning the DMZ.
/3/Robert Anderson, Political Counselor at the Embassy in France.
In our previous internal discussions, many of us had regarded an attempt to obtain a truly demilitarized DMZ as hopeless,
since standing by itself, the result of that achievement would so strongly favor us. What Hanoi might be trying to do with its
accusations of U.S. violations of the DMZ is to create a situation where it looks as if demilitarization is a concession (or
move towards the Geneva Accords) by both sides. Actually, as Hanoi knows, the trade would be the DMZ for a bombing
cessation. The difference between the apparent trade and actual trade would allow Hanoi to contend it had never
negotiated over bombing and that the U.S. had stopped unconditionally. In this sense it would be like our old Phase APhase B formula. The resemblance increases if Phase A is to be the stopping of bombing and Phase B demilitarization of
the DMZ.
Hanoi knows full well the importance we attach to the DMZ. It must have realized that we will not cease military operations
in the DMZ unless it does. It is possible that in their discussion yesterday they have defined the actions in the DMZ which
they wish us to take in return for similar actions on their part./4/
/4/Telegram [document number not declassified] from Paris, May 16, reported that Harriman and Vance suggested waiting
until after the meeting on May 18 with the DRV delegation before resuming bombing in order to give the North Vietnamese
a chance to respond with a proposition on the DMZ. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam,
Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. I) Rostow sent the telegram to the President at 1 p.m. on May 16.

235. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, May 16, 1968, 1220Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET. Secret; Immediate;
Nodis. Received at 11:25 a.m. The telegram is printed in full in Pike, The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 439-444.
27497. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my fifty-first weekly message.
1. A number of significant events occurred during the past week.
2. The back of the enemy attack on Saigon has been broken and again he has suffered extremely heavy casualties. From
the beginning of the attacks on the night of May 4-5 to midnight May 15, in the country as a whole the enemy lost 11,633
killed (more than half in the Saigon area) and well over 2,000 weapons. Friendly losses for the same period were 907 KIA,
169 missing, and something over 300 weapons. The enemy clearly suffered a heavy setback militarily. But I think it is also
clear that he had objectives other than military. One was an attempt to bolster his position at Paris and impress American
and world opinion with his ability to mount substantial campaigns against the cities and towns of South Vietnam. In shifting
their strategy from the countryside to the cities, and especially Saigon, they are hoping by means of repeated attacks,
raids, sabotage, shelling and the destruction of more and more parts of the city to undermine the fabric of government and
to produce the uprising that would destroy it. One cannot ignore the fact that in creating another 125,000 refugees or
evacuees in Saigon and Gia Dinh and in the severe damage or destruction of another 16,000 houses (probably a
conservative estimate) the enemy has had a considerable measure of success. In the recent attacks, except for I Corps
and Saigon, mostly by rocket and mortar fire, much of the enemy's main force has been uncommitted and he is, therefore,
in a position to continue his harassing attacks. That he will continue to be defeated and suffer heavy losses, I have no
doubt. But if he continues to create refugees, to destroy and damage houses and industrial plants, the question is how
long this can be endured without threatening all that has been achieved here.
3. Hanoi, I think, is taking a calculated gamble, believing that our desire for peace and to deescalate the war is now so
great that we cannot reverse this trend, that we will not dare to restore full bombing of the North or retaliate against Hanoi.
It is for this reason that in my two messages this past week (Saigon 26928 and 27121)/2/ I urged that we not agree to
cease our bombing of the North without specific commitments from Hanoi with respect to activity in the South. It seems to
me we should make it clear that the attacks against Saigon and the cities, which are essentially attacks on civilians, are
just as much "taking advantage" of the San Antonio formula as the doubling of the rate of infiltration which has occurred
since August-September 1967 and the attacks on the demilitarized zone; and that these cannot be carried out with
impunity and without fear of retribution.
/2/Telegram 26928 is Document 228. Telegram 27121 is not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
4. Thieu inaugurated a series of weekly radio and television speeches to the nation May 9. It was a good speech reviewing
the impact of the recent attacks, noting the heavy casualties inflicted on the enemy, but also the damage and suffering
caused by the Communists. He emphasized the fact that the enemy had increasingly resorted to sabotage, assassination,
and indiscriminate shelling accompanied by considerable political activity. He congratulated the people and the armed
forces for their performance during this new test of their courage and determination. He concluded his speech by
expressing the hope that in his next address to the nation, probably this week, he would be able to speak to them on the
subject of "reorganizing" the government.
5. In my talk with him on May 14, Thieu said that he was in the final stages of deciding on the new structure of the cabinet
and was examining with Tran Van Huong names for those to be replaced. He said that he had talked with Ky on the day
before and had overcome his objections to Huong as Prime Minister. Thieu himself had canvassed the whole field and
remarked that, "the fact is there is no one to appoint Prime Minister except Huong." His decision not to make any change
in the military commands is also reassuring. This presumably, for the present at least, will apply also to General Loan as
Director-General of the National Police. In any case, it appears now doubtful that Loan will be able to resume his duties for
some time. His leg wound is apparently serious enough to make it possible that some amputation may be necessary. Even
if his leg is saved, he will lose some mobility and it seems unlikely that he can continue actively as police director. The
circumstances under which this situation has developed are such as to avoid what might have been a source of friction
between Thieu and Ky.
6. Concern over the subject of negotiations seems to be a countrywide subject in South Vietnam at present, linked, as it is,
to the future of every South Vietnamese in the most direct way. Reports from various sources in II, III, and IV Corps, I
think, give some general indications of how the average person is thinking. An observer from Gia Dinh Province in III
Corps feels that the peace initiative had produced three divergent positions: in the first group are GVN officials, the military,
wealthy businessmen, some educators, Catholics and those who came South after 1954. This group strongly opposes
peace moves at this time, for it feels that the GVN is in no position to emerge from talks with results that will be acceptable;

that the result of talks would see the formation of a coalition government with eventual takeover by the Communists. In the
second group are low to middle income urban workers who were initially pleased with the prospects of peace, but now
seem concerned about their economic future in a peace-time situation without the U.S. presence. In the third group are the
peasants and farmers in rural areas without any political views or ideological beliefs who would welcome an early end to
the fighting on practically any terms.
7. In II and IV Corps also, there seems to be evidence that the urban and rural poor want peace more than anything else
and are not greatly concerned in the manner in which this might be achieved. There is on the other hand a growing body in
the cities who have seen death and destruction all around them, who have been outraged by the terror tactics of the Viet
Cong, and who are increasingly apprehensive of any arrangement which would threaten to bring the Communists to
power. In the rural areas also, although there is much bending with the wind, there is growing resentment at the enemy
tactics of forced heavy taxation, of abduction, and assassination and terror.
8. A welcome development of this attitude has been the gathering momentum of the self-defense program throughout the
country. In a radio and television speech on May 11, Vice President Ky outlined the objectives of the people's self-defense
organization: 1) to mobilize the entire population; 2) to create a force in the rear areas to release the army for combat; 3) to
strengthen the will of the people for defense of the national cause; 4) to create a people's force to strengthen the voice of
the Republic of Vietnam at the conference table; 5) to permit the country to maintain a total war of an extended duration;
and 6) to distribute the national potential rationally to permit it to fight and produce at the same time. The students seem to
have taken hold with a good deal of enthusiasm and have already been pressed into service in Saigon. Professor Nguyen
Van Truong, of the University of Saigon, remarked that he thought the students were enthusiastic in participating in the
defense of the capital and that if the Communists attack them or attempt to kidnap them, they will meet with strong
opposition.
9. I have reported quite fully on our discussions with Thieu, Ky, and Dr. Tran Van Don on the subject of peace
negotiations. They have been pleased with the two statements made by Ambassador Harriman. But at yesterday's
meeting, I sensed some sensitivity on their part that we might be getting into substantive talks without their presence. I
note that Ambassador Bui Diem expressed some similar fears in Paris. This continues to be a highly sensitive matter here
and could be politically explosive.
[Omitted here is discussion of political, military, and economic matters, pacification, and urban recovery.]
Bunker

236. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 18, 1968, 12:40 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Paris Todel-Delto 11, 5/17-24/68.
Secret; Nodis; Harvan.
Mr. President:
Herewith Harriman's brief account of today's slugfest.
We're clearly deadlocked on reciprocity; and we shall see whether:
--they stick and test us by seeing how long we can take it, while they try to mount political pressure on us;
--or, let some third party suggest a face-saving form of reciprocity.
Their choice will be significant. If they hold--and are in no hurry--it suggests they are content to enjoy peace and quiet
down to the 19th parallel and await political events in Saigon and the U.S.
If something turns up on the side in coming days, it suggests they may be in Paris for serious business.
W.W. Rostow/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Attachment
Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State
Paris, May 18, 1968, 1450Z.
14293. Delto 82. From Harrison and Vance. Ref Paris 14240 (Delto 76); State 165857 (Todel 108)./3/
/3/Telegram 14240/Delto 76 from Paris, May 17, transmitted the delegation's planned opening remarks. (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. I) These remarks had been redrafted in
accordance with instructions transmitted in telegrams 165857 and 165860 to Paris, both May 17. (Ibid., Harvan Paris
Todel-Delto 11, 5/17-24/68) According to a notation on a May 17 memorandum from Rostow to the President, the
President affirmed Rostow's suggestion that Harriman make a statement noting the "positive propositions" he had made as
well as "the areas of potential agreement" that had been indicated. (Ibid.)
1. May 18 meeting opened 10:30 a.m. and ended 2:40 p.m. Thuy asked to speak first and them launched into a diatribe
concerning US offenses and crimes against North Viet-Nam, South Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia, and humanity. He took two
hours fifteen minutes to present all this, beginning and ending with rigid statement that purpose of our meeting was to
"determine" cessation of bombing and all other acts of war, and when to take up other matters of interest to both sides.
2. I opened with notes (Paris 14240), supplemented by a few comments on the inaccuracies of Thuy's statement. I then
moved to the details of North Vietnamese military presence in South Viet-Nam, utilizing large part of info contained in State
165857, plus other info concerning the specific NVN regular army units fighting around Saigon. DRV del squirmed visibly
during these remarks.
3. I continued by asking for their response to our proposals on DMZ, Laos and Cambodia, and called upon them to end
polemics. I then laid emphasis on the pertinent sentences of the President's March 31 speech, which I stated was the
basis for our meeting. I closed by asking again, "What restraints will you take to contribute to peace?"
4. Thuy said he would reply to the questions which I had put to him. He then responded in brief fashion, not really
answering any of my questions. He stated categorically that the first thing which had to be determined was when we were
going to stop the bombing and all other acts of war. He said only after fulfilling the requirement of cessation of bombing
can other questions be taken up. I asked him to read carefully the sentences of the President's March 31 speech to which I
had referred, reiterating the danger to US and allied forces. He said it is the US which has launched attacks on the DRV,
and it is up to the US to exercise restraint. He added, "The US cannot ask for evidence of restraint on the part of the DRV."
Since we had hit a head-on disagreement there were a few moments of silence. Thuy then said he had nothing further to
say today and suggested we adjourn. He asked when we would like to meet again, and I suggested Wednesday May 22,
to which he agreed./4/
/4/Thuy set the tone during the next meeting on May 22 by re-reading his statement of May 18. (Telegrams 14502/Delto
113 and 14503/Delto 114 from Paris, May 22; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90
D 345, Paris Peace Conference, Delto Chron.) In Intelligence Note No. 371 sent to Rusk, May 20, Hughes noted:
"Throughout this week, the Hanoi regime strove hard for propaganda effect, showed itself more sensitive to U.S.
propaganda charges than might have been expected, and tried to back up its Paris team with spectacular military gestures
and pressures in South Vietnam." (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET)
Harriman

237. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/

Washington, May 18, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. I. Confidential.

Extensive enemy rocket and mortar attacks on Saigon began on May 18, and a separate Capital Military District Command
was set up to reduce or eliminate the attacks. Its mission later evolved into one of combating and infiltrating the VCI.
(Memorandum from Helms to Rostow, June 17; Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 79-207A, AA-3-FE
Division 1968)
Mr. President:
You asked for my comments on Saigon's 27539 (attached)./2/
/2/Not printed. In the telegram, dated May 17, Bunker noted: "I want to make it clear that I am not suggesting cessation of
attacks as trade off for stopping bombing. Still less that we should cease fighting while talking. But it seems to me that
Hanoi should be made to understand that attacks on Saigon or other centers of population, which are essentially attacks
on civilians, are in our view 'taking advantage' of San Antonio formula, and cannot be carried out with impunity and without
fear of retaliation. I believe this is just as much 'taking advantage' as the more than doubling of the rate of infiltration which
has occurred since August/September 1967, or violation of the DMZ."
My own personal view is that we should not become embroiled in a highly theoretical and "precious" application or
interpretation of the San Antonio formula. To me, your speech of March 31 opened a new chapter which brushes aside
much of the discussion which preceded it. You paid for that new chapter by a major act of de-escalation. To me, the most
important fact about the present situation is that seventy-eight percent of the land area and ninety percent of the population
of North Viet-Nam are free from bombing while there is not a single square mile of South Viet-Nam which is immune from
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese attacks by rockets, mortars or infantry.
Although you reaffirmed the San Antonio formula in your March 31 speech, I do not believe that we should accept all of the
barnacles which accumulated around the San Antonio formula--including the so-called Clifford interpretation.
The simple truth is that no one in the world can tell us what will happen if we stop all of the bombing of North Viet-Nam.
Hanoi refuses to tell us and therefore no one else is able to tell us. This is not a problem of diplomatic technique; there are
many many ways by which Hanoi could let us know what in fact they would do if we stop all the bombing. This could be
done without any loss of face on their part. It boils down to a question of will. Of course they would be glad to exchange
some sort of talks, somewhere, for a full cessation of the bombing while they go ahead with their part of the war full scale.
I realize that I am branded as a "hawk" and that this has been an embarrassment to the Administration in some quarters.
But looking at all of our experiences in the management of crises in the past three decades, I cannot, for the life of me, see
how we can achieve any peace unless some elementary notions of reciprocity, fairness and equity are maintained.
Averell Harriman has already called to the attention of Hanoi the impact of the recent attacks on Saigon on the discussions
in Paris and on our attitude toward the good faith of the other side. I don't think that Bunker's cable requires us to do
anything different than we have thus far been doing in Paris. But I do believe that our discussions in Paris must be based
upon the most simple, honest and fair considerations and that we should not spin spider webs of logic to confuse the
requirements of a fair and honorable peace in Southeast Asia. This is why I objected to Averell's use of the so-called
"Romanian formula" at the discussions in Paris today.
Hanoi still nurtures the illusion that they can somehow mobilize domestic and world public opinion to force your hand. The
beginning of wisdom on their part is a demonstration by us that they cannot succeed in any such nonsense.
Finally, let me say that the present attitude of Hanoi is such that some of the argumentation among our own people is
beside the point. Hanoi is not providing any handholds for us to grasp in any direction--therefore we should not come apart
among ourselves in the absence of some movement by Hanoi.
Dean Rusk

238. Notes of Secretary of Defense Clifford's Staff Meeting/1/

Washington, May 20, 1968.
/1/Source: U.S. Army Military History Institute, Harold K. Johnson Papers, Notes on Meetings with the Secretary of
Defense, the National Security Council, and the President, Dec. 1967-June 1968. No classification marking. The notes

were taken by Johnson. According to a notation on the notes, the meeting began at 9:30 a.m. The participants are not
indicated.
1. Luncheon meeting w/Mr. McNamara on Saturday 18 May 68.
Discuss SVN and a number of programs.
Most interested in new job and has long-range goals.
2. Paris talks going about as SecDef expected.
NVN maybe be over-doing the propaganda point.
Press cynical about polemics.
Present formal discussions not likely to lead to anything. At some point private contacts and private discussions should be
broached. None at this stage.
SVN is concerned at direction of Paris talks.
USG is encouraged with selection of Tran Van Huong.
Encouraging factor in discussions is that no ultimatum has been announced by NVN.
3. Military developments in SEA./2/
/2/Wheeler gave this portion of the briefing. He reviewed the same information in CM-3333-68 sent to Rostow on May 20.
(Department of Defense, Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 911/337 (20 May 68))
75-85,000 in pipeline moving south.
As many as 35,000 could--rpt could--be in SVN.
Peak period of resupply into northern provinces--July-Aug.
10,000 tons moving through Thanh Hoa.
51 new trans-shipment points between 17-19 .
Yen Bai completed.
4-5 SAM BNs operational below Thanh Hoa.
Enemy improving his offensive capability and strengthening his defense of his home land.
Need to discuss strategy followed in the countryside./3/
/3/According to Nitze's handwritten notes of the meeting, dated May 22, Carver followed Wheeler with an assessment of
the internal military and political situation inside Vietnam. Nitze's notes of this reads: "Danang, serious, 2 NVA Divisions,
seems under control. Huong--Southerner, strengthen base. Difficulty--may not sit well with Ky, Khang, Vien. Were not
formally consulted. Generals displeased. Thieu & Huong need tact during next ten days." (Library of Congress, Manuscript
Division, Nitze Papers, Defense Department, Deputy Secretary of Defense Notes, 1968, 4 of 6)
[Omitted here is discussion of a march on Washington, Clifford's appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, and hearings before the House Armed Services Committee on various military-related issues.]

239. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/
JCSM-315-68
Washington, May 21, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of Defense, Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 911/372 (13 May 68) IR 3945. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Adequacy of the Strategic Reserve and Related Matters
1. Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 13 May 1968, in which you requested answers to five specific questions
concerning the adequacy and readiness of our strategic reserve and the status of plans for the expansion and
modernization of the Armed Forces of the Government of South Vietnam./2/
/2/Clifford transmitted the questions to Wheeler in this May 13 memorandum. The President had asked Clifford in a May 7
memorandum to ask the JCS to respond to these questions. (Both in Johnson Library, Clark Clifford Papers, Memos on
Vietnam, February-August 1968)
2. The answers to the questions posed in the reference are contained in the Appendix hereto and, for the most part,
represent a compilation of information previously provided, updated to insure currency. More detailed answers to questions
3 and 4 will be provided in the response to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 16 April 1968,
subject: "RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (U)."/3/ The reply by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is expected to be
forwarded during the week of 20 May 1968.
/3/In this memorandum to Wheeler, April 16, Nitze argued that given the possibility that an agreement on mutual deescalation might be achieved at Paris, the JCS needed to develop a plan to reorient the RVNAF toward self-sufficiency.
(Department of Defense, Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JMF 911/535 (16 Apr 68))
3. This memorandum will serve to confirm the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on these matters, as presented during
their meeting with you on 20 May./4/ A more detailed overview of the entire worldwide US military posture is contained in
JCSM-221-68, dated 10 April 1968./5/
/4/See Document 238.
/5/Not found.
4. Without attachment, this memorandum is Unclassified.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler/6/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/6/Printed from a copy that indicates General Wheeler signed the original.

Appendix
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELATED TO THE STRATEGIC
RESERVE AND CURRENT CAPABILITIES
Question 1. What can we do to get help to Westmoreland if he becomes involved in another major enemy offensive?
Answer

1. (TS) Army. There are currently no CONUS-based Army forces that are deployable. Under emergency conditions, four
brigades above Program 6, totaling about 17,000 personnel, could be provided during July-August by drawing down other
units of the Strategic Army Force (STRAF), but these brigades could not be sustained on a permanent basis. This would
then leave the STRAF no combat-ready Army forces available to reinforce Europe--or to meet possible contingencies
elsewhere in the world.
2. (TS) Navy. At the present time, Seventh Fleet Navy forces are heavily committed to operations in Southeast Asia. In the
event of another major enemy offensive, all Seventh Fleet units could be provided to Southeast Asia for a surge effort of
about 30 days duration. After notification and transit time, on-line CVAs could be increased from three to five, cruisers from
one to three, and destroyers providing naval gunfire support from seven to thirteen. To continue the surge effort beyond
this would require redeployment of naval units from other worldwide assets. As an example, to maintain more than 3 CVAs
on Yankee Station would necessitate reduction of CVA deployments to the Mediterranean.
3. (TS) Air Force. Following the deployments approved under Programs 5 and 6, the only Air Force tactical fighter and
reconnaissance units which will be available for immediate deployment are two F-100 tactical fighter squadrons and two
reconnaissance squadrons ordered to active duty from the Air National Guard. In addition, 32 AC-119 gunships can be
provided between July and December, eight AC-130 gunships provided in September, and 50 A-1 aircraft between July
and November.
4. (TS) Marine Corps. One and one-ninth Marine division/wing team (MEF) is available but could be deployed only by
revision of current tour/rotation policies and involuntary extension of terms of service and could not be sustained without
mobilization. One F-4 squadron at Iwakuni, Japan, can be deployed and sustained. There are no Marine Corps forces
included in the approved Reserve callup.
Question 2. What is the status of our plans to strengthen the strategic reserve? How can they be further expedited? When
do we need to call up additional reserves? Will anything more be required in the way of Congressional action?
1. (TS) Status of Plans to Strengthen Strategic Reserve
a. On 2 April 1968, a three-increment Reserve callup totaling 56,877 was recommended for the period April through May
for support of Southeast Asia deployments and for the initial rebuilding of the strategic reserve. This force included five
infantry brigades and two tactical fighter squadrons (see DJSM-380-68, dated 2 April 1968).
b. On 6 April 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed the above position in response to an OSD alternative proposal and
recommended that the decision on subsequent Reserve callup be reviewed in 30 days and that inactivation of the 6th
Infantry Division be delayed pending this review. Actual callup authorized on 11 April 1968 was 24,550, which included two
infantry brigades and two tactical fighter squadrons (see JCSM-215-68, dated 6 April 1968)./7/ On 7 May 1968 this number
was reduced by 1262 personnel when the callup of selected Air Force units was cancelled.
/7/Not printed. (Department of Defense, Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JMF 911/372 (9 Mar 68))
c. On 10 April 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that measures should be taken to improve the military posture in
order to:
(1) Sustain and permit more effective use of forces already in Southeast Asia.
(2) Provide and sustain the additional forces approved for deployment to Southeast Asia.
(3) Restore and maintain NATO-deployed and augmentation forces.
(4) Restore and maintain other deployed forces.
(5) Respond effectively to other contingencies.
(6) Establish and maintain a high state of readiness in the Reserve component forces in order to augment Active Forces
rapidly, when required.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff also stated that the level of forces necessary to achieve the required posture was set forth in
JSOP 70-77, emphasized the urgency in attaining these levels, and pointed out that the need to move ahead quickly on

reequipping and modernizing our forces was of the utmost importance (see JCSM-221-68, dated 10 April 1968)
d. The Army has initiated planning based on a tentative OSD decision for a 4-1/3 division STRAF which, in fact, would
reduce rather than increase the capability for strengthening the STRAF. Similarly, Air Force capability is being reduced by
a directed inactivation of B-52 and F-101 squadrons and Navy ASW capability is being reduced by directed inactivation of
CVS/CVSGs and VP squadrons.
2. (TS) How Can the Plans for Strengthening the Strategic Reserve be Expedited?
a. By prompt approval of the recommendations contained in JCSM-215-68, dated 6 April 1968. In that memorandum, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that without the full callup (56,877) it is unlikely that units of the strategic reserve could be
brought to levels of training necessary for contingency deployments because of personnel turbulence imposed by the need
to sustain Southeast Asia deployments. The principal need is to restore a deployment capability; this requires trained,
deployable manpower. The only source, on a timely basis, is from callup of Reserve units and individuals, as well as
extensions of terms of service. Alternatively, for the Army, continue to raise the level of readiness of the 6th Infantry
Division force.
b. By deferring programmed inactivation of units within the current active structure and by bringing to a high state of
readiness certain portions of the Ready Reserve.
3. (TS) When Do We Need to Call Up Additional Reserves?
a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that a total of 56,877 be alerted for callup prior to 29 May 1968.
b. Without a congressional extension of the President's authority, which expires on 30 June 1968, the decision to call up
the additional forces recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff must be made by 30 May 1968, if the desired 30-day notice
to the Reserve units is to be available. This means action should be initiated now to seek such a callup. It may be
desirable to bring certain Air Force units of the Ready Reserve to a high state of readiness (Combat Beef) rather than to
call them immediately to active duty.
c. In addition to the Reserve recall of 58,877 personnel to sustain Southeast Asia deployments, Navy personnel
deficiencies require the extension of terms of service and the recall of individual Reservists.
4. (TS) Will Anything More be Required in the Way of Congressional Action?
Required actions are:
(1) Supplemental appropriations.
(2) Extension of Presidential authority for callup of Reserve units beyond 30 June 1968.
(3) Authority to call individual reservists for periods of active duty up to 24 months.
(4) Authority to extend terms of service for a period not to exceed 12 months.
Question 3. What is the status of US/GVN plans for expanding the Armed Forces in South Vietnam? What are the target
operational dates for the new units? How realistic are the forecasts of operational readiness?
Question 4. What are the critical equipment and personnel shortages which must be overcome if the foregoing plans are to
be executed on time?
Answer
The answers to questions 3 and 4 are being developed in detail in response to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, dated 16 April 1968, subject: "RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (U)." The program now being prepared
by the Joint Staff and the Services, is expected to cost approximately $1.5 billion over the next 5 years. It provides for the
modernization of the existing FY 1968 force structure and for further expansion and modernization of the RVNAF structure
to a strength of about 801,000. Additionally, it provides for the turnover of US equipment to the RVNAF if negotiations
require a mutual US/North Vietnamese Army withdrawal of forces. While it appears that the strength goal of about 801,000

can be reached by end FY 1969, the complete expansion and modernization of the South Vietnamese Air Force and Navy
will not be achieved prior to FY 1973, due to the time necessary to reach minimum required training levels for the relatively
sophisticated equipment to be provided. The time to reach minimum training levels is the controlling factor in the rate of
transfer for some equipments. There will be some adverse impact on the readiness of CONUS and non-Southeast Asia
deployed US forces as a result of equipment being diverted to the RVNAF.
Question 5. Are the Joint Chiefs of Staff satisfied that we are running no unacceptable risks in this period of reduced
strategic capabilities? What happens if the enemy were to increase pressures in Laos, Thailand, Korea, the Middle East or
elsewhere?
Answer
(TS) No. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that we are running high risks in the current situation. In JCSM-221-68, dated 10
April 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the issue which most concerns them is the decreased readiness of US
forces worldwide and the limited capability of the strategic reserve. Further, the risks associated with the current military
posture and the possibility of communist-inspired diversionary contingencies erupting elsewhere increase as the
commitment in Southeast Asia is prolonged. The current negotiations with North Vietnam provide no valid basis for a
relaxation of efforts to improve our limited military capability. The following are of specific concern:
a. There are no major Army combat forces ready to reinforce NATO on a timely basis without redeployment from
Southeast Asia. Only 1-1/3 Marine division/wing teams are available to meet the M+60 commitment of 2 MEFs to NATO
without redeployment from Southeast Asia and then they can be sustained only under conditions of mobilization. Naval
reinforcement of NATO (10 CVAs and seven CVSs earmarked) would require substantial redeployment from Southeast
Asia. Air Force augmentation to USCINCEUR of 37 tactical fighter squadrons can be provided by redeployment of forces
from Southeast Asia and Korea and from the remaining Air National Guard
b. Until the seizure of the USS Pueblo, the Air Force had no tactical air support forces in Korea; they now have five tactical
fighter and one interceptor squadron there on a temporary basis. On 22 April 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended
that the Air Force posture in Korea be maintained, and they provided a plan to stabilize this posture through CY 1968 (see
JCSM-215-68). Because personnel were deployed on temporary duty, decisions on replacements must be made
immediately. The two US divisions deployed in Korea are both operating at reduced strength levels and, from a logistic
standpoint, are inadequately supported. As an initial step in improving the level of combat readiness and consequently the
defensive capabilities of US Eighth Army, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended that 8,500 filler spaces be
authorized in Korea. As of this time, approval has not been granted.
c. Fighter/attack and B-52 sortie rates in the western Pacific and the additional deployment of aircraft to Korea have
resulted in a SIOP degradation of about 250 alert weapons programmed against more than 200 targets.
d. Twenty-eight ships of the Atlantic Fleet are now in caretaker/reduced manning status or were decommissioned earlier
than planned because of personnel drawdowns to support Southeast Asia and other worldwide commitments. The inability
to utilize these ships has worsened the already severely-taxed sustaining base. Additionally, the deficiencies in the
material condition of certain ships and aircraft, including their logistic base, and the shortages in certain critical ratings
contribute to the steady decline of the staying power of Navy forces.
e. Simultaneous employment of Reserve forces to deal with civil disturbances in a number of different US cities or the
prolonged use of Active Forces in this role would reduce further the limited capability to reinforce deployed forces and to
respond to other contingencies.
f. The current military posture of the US provides an exceedingly limited range of response options in the event the USSR
or CPR and/or their allies choose to exert pressure in locations outside the immediate area of current operations in
Southeast Asia. A case in point is Korea, currently the most volatile region outside Southeast Asia and one in which the
United States would be directly involved from the outset. In the event of hostilities there, timely reinforcement would be
extremely doubtful. The National Command Authority thus would be confronted with an early decision to employ nuclear
weapons in order to avert disaster to US and ROK forces and the possible loss of South Korea to communist aggression.
g. Increased procurement funds and production capacity must also be made available to resolve the many deficiencies in
our worldwide logistic support forces, facilities, and materiel.
h. Should increased pressures in any area result in a requirement to commit significant US forces, such forces could only
be made available through immediate mobilization of Reserve component forces and/or by the redeployment of forces
from Southeast Asia. In the former case, the most constraining factor is time, both to train and deploy Reserve component

forces as well as production lead time required for essential items of equipment which have been withdrawn or diverted to
higher priority active units. The redeployment of forces from Southeast Asia would require not only time but, perhaps more
importantly, a reassessment of US priority interests with the possible loss of hard-won gains in Southeast Asia.

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968

Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 240-257

240. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/

Paris, May 20, 1968, 1820Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on
Vietnam, 1968-1969, Delto Chron. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Harvan. Received at 3:15 p.m. and repeated to Moscow.
14365. Delto 100. Subject: Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Zorin./2/
/2/A memorandum of this conversation is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files,
Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Paris Peace Talks, Subject File, HARVAN and HARVAN/PLUS, Meetings with the
Soviets: Zorin-Oberemko.
1. After considerable squirming in an effort to induce Governor Harriman over to Soviet Embassy, Ambassador Zorin
(accompanied by First Secretary Bogomolov) finally came to lunch May 19 with Governor Harriman and Ambassador
Shriver at latter's residence. Zorin was cordial enough in his own stiff way, but as expected he kept himself within the strict
limits of Soviet public position, and consequently nothing resulted from meeting on matters of substance.
2. Governor Harriman set forth the US position, emphasizing the important unilateral step taken by the President in his
speech of March 31st, and explaining that US could go no further without some indications of restraint by Hanoi. He noted
our disappointment that rather than restraint, Hanoi had increased flow of troops and material to the South. He said that
meeting in Paris resulted from the President's initiative and was based on Hanoi's acceptance of the President's statement
in March 31 speech. Instead of discussing substance of what would be necessary to permit the US to stop the bombing
completely, Hanoi representatives were simply using the meeting to make propaganda.
3. Zorin's reply, repeated throughout conversation with little variation, was that North Vietnamese position was clear (and
was supported by USSR): no further steps could be taken or even discussed until US unconditionally stopped bombings of
DRV. North Vietnamese came to Paris not on basis of the President's March 31st speech, but on basis their own
declaration of April 3rd;/3/ they were not bombing US, US was bombing them, and nothing could be done until this
stopped. Harriman disputed this and pointed out that even in Hanoi's April 3 statement and others since, Hanoi had
indicated each time that they expected some discussions prior to a decision by US to stop bombing completely.
/3/See Document 175.
4. Zorin was not responsive to any suggestions made by Governor Harriman and Ambassador Shriver to get talks out of
current impasse. When Governor Harriman suggested possibility of private informal meeting with North Vietnamese,
perhaps with Soviets present, Zorin said anything like that was "far off." Ambassador Shriver said rather than some formal
agreement, perhaps one could envisage private understandings, maybe even some informal listing of steps that might be
taken as first measures; what was fundamental was that in order to stop bombing US had to have some view of road
ahead. Zorin merely replied that "US should be under no illusions," that whatever the forum, Hanoi would not move ahead
until bombing stopped. In repeating this he added at one point that he did not believe that unless bombing was stopped
Hanoi would make any moves before US elections.
5. In response to this, Governor Harriman emphasized that if Hanoi did not show some restraint, US as a military necessity
could not continue bombing restraint indefinitely and might have to resume unlimited bombing again and perhaps other
measures. (This was stated not as threat but as a consequence that might follow from Hanoi's continued delays.)
6. Recalling that Kosygin had assured him the USSR wanted to see fighting stopped in Vietnam, Governor Harriman spoke
of USSR's influence in Hanoi and emphasized role USSR could play in helping talks out of current impasse in direction of
settlement. To this end Governor Harriman said he wished to have frank dealings with Zorin and others in Soviet Embassy,
and was prepared to call on Soviet Ambassador at his Embassy at a later stage, particularly as American Embassy was
surrounded by press. While conceding nothing on substance and reiterating that unconditional US bombing cessation was
essential first step, Zorin agreed emphatically that contacts should continue, both through himself and also through Soviet
Minister Oberemko and Bogomolov with others from US side.
Shriver

241. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, May 21, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting lasted from 1:15 to 3:10 p.m.
(Ibid., President's Daily Diary) An agenda for the meeting, prepared on May 21 by John Walsh of S/S, was sent to Rusk
prior to the meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164, Presidential
Luncheon Memoranda)
ATTENDING THE MEETING
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Wheeler
Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
Mr. Rostow: We have an urgent matter to decide with reference to tomorrow's instructions to our representatives in Paris.
The point is on total cessation vs. partial cessation.
Secretary Rusk. The word "cessation" means total. Harriman told Zorin in meetings and word may get around to NVA./2/ I
would not put it to the NVA in general meeting tomorrow and let it get around to NVA indirectly.
/2/See Document 240.
Secretary Clifford: I had not seen the cables before. This is a bad time to come out with a threat. I would do it privately first
in any case.
Director Helms: Communists believe things said privately. They do not believe things said publicly.
General Wheeler: It could be taken as an ultimatum.
The President: It's o.k. to say it privately. That's o.k. with me if you want to. Where are we in Paris and Moscow?
Secretary Rusk: The NVA has three illusions they follow:
(1) No NVA troops in South--fraudulent.
(2) Crest of NVA military success in South--misinformed.
The President: Could it be true?
Secretary Rusk: They believe they are in strong position. They may be misinformed.
(3) Third point is that world opinion will force us to accept major change in policy.
(4) We do not have governmental pressure on us.
(5) World opinion won't make us change our course.
I do not think we should change our course. NVA has already discredited itself in Paris with contention they have no troops
in the South.
We should see what they are willing to do if we will stop the bombing.

We may get something out of talks in Moscow, but we doubt it. Stewart goes there tomorrow night.
Bombing between 19th and 20th parallels--should we move in? Let's hear the CIA paper on the situation between the 19th
and 20th.
Director Helms:
(1) Continued flow of supplies
(2) Increase in flow of ammunition
(3) No flights since 11 May of MIGs at airfield
(4) AA situation is same
(5) Infiltration continues as before
General Wheeler: All of North Vietnam show 97,000 North Vietnam on move into Laos or South Vietnam. [sic] Peak seems
somewhere in July. High level of reconstruction--lines of communication and supply plants. South of the 20th parallel, 5 or
6 battalions of SAMs and light anti-aircraft extended.
Evidence bears out conclusion they are stepping up their capabilities, both in the South and defending itself in the North.
Therefore, we should resume between 19th and 20th parallels. There are political considerations you must take into
account./3/
/3/The basis for this recommendation was memorandum CMCM-28-68 to the JCS, May 16, in which Chapman argued for
a bombing resumption on the basis that the North Vietnamese were not bargaining in good faith. (Department of Defense,
Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 911/305 (16 May 68) IR 4060)
Secretary Clifford: I feel same as last week. We have had a good week. We had to go through this week. We are in a
better posture in standpoint of world and domestic opinion. The opponents have been inflexible. Have not sought to seek
means of agreement. We have given image of nation seeking peace. They have given impression of nation seeking only
propaganda.
Second, they weakened themselves with ridiculous statement about not having troops in the South. We will continue to
improve our position. I would not want to jeopardize our position just now by bombing between the 19th and 20th parallels.
San Antonio formula has been overtaken by events. We are in a sound position now. We must ask them to do something
to match our restraint. If we were to extend bombing we might have problem of them insisting that we stop all our bombing.
Negotiations have gone on for only 10 days. They may do something serious. They may find out their strategy is not
working well. We must watch to make sure we do not change our position. We got North Vietnam to the bargaining table
by the President's offer of moderate restraint./4/
/4/In telegram 14355 from Paris, May 20, Harriman transmitted a draft of his statement for the session on May 22.
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference, 1968-1969,
Delto Chron.) According to a notation on a note from Rostow transmitting a copy of the telegram to the President, May 20,
the President instructed that Harriman add "continue to" to an operative sentence describing the assumption of "great
risks" of the bombing cessation. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos,
Vol. III) In a memorandum to the President, May 21, 11:30 a.m., Rostow noted Rusk's concern that the phrase could
"undercut Harriman's warning to Zorin." (Ibid.) In a memorandum to the President, May 21, 11:50 a.m., Rostow noted the
delegation's opposition to the wording on the following grounds: "They believe it implies that we cannot continue the
present partial cessation of bombing indefinitely. It would be read as an overt threat that, unless they moved along the
negotiations, we were going back to total bombing of North Vietnam." (Ibid.) The statement Harriman made at the session
is in telegram 14429/Delto 107 from Paris, May 21. (Ibid.) The delegation's report on the meeting is in telegrams
14502/Delto 113 and 14503/Delto 114 from Paris, both May 22. (Ibid.)
There is no particular pressure on us at the present time. I know of no pressure to extend bombing by Congress, by public,
by press.

Life Editors think the President is on the right track.

The next general approach--the targets are not worth it. They have not been using the airfield. It does not constitute clear
and present danger to us now.
South of the 19th parallel, there are 50 new trans-shipment points. Benefit of bombing is only temporary.
South of the 19th parallel our methods are effective. We had 3,000 sorties in February, 5,000 in March, 7,000 in April and
9,000 in May.
General Maxwell Taylor's memo says resumption of bombing is available at any time./5/ We should use this only when it
would produce maximum effect in Paris.
/5/Document 231.
The last point, as long as matters proceed this way, it is important to help keep talks going from political standpoint.
I urge us to keep talks going
--keep bombing off 19th and 20th parallels
--keep talks going
Secretary Rusk: I hate to freeze to the 19th ourselves. We should not have dramatic attack, but we could engage MIGs. I
would recommend route reconnaissance across the 19th parallel.
We should not have rigid limits on the 19th. I would take two steps of route reconnaissance and engaging MIGs.
The President: I agree with you, Dean.
Secretary Clifford: We voluntarily limited ourselves to the 19th. We have made progress in Paris. I do not want to shift our
positions. I think it is worth postponing for another week.
It doesn't help us to do this. We are waiting for them to de-escalate. The heat is on them. If we go back in, we remove
some of this heat.
The President: How long can we go on with 19th without getting trapped into never being able to do anything above the
19th?
I think our force brought them to table, not our eloquence of March 31. All we are doing now is to let them build it back up.
There are advantages to our bombing between the 19th and 20th.
Their terror hasn't blown up the peace conference.
We have a duty to try to stop all we can from coming into the South.
I never thought we would stay out of 19th and 20th. I think we should do it if it's to our military advantage.
I am under the impression military people feel very strongly that we should bomb up to the 20th. Isn't that right?
Wheeler: (Nodded "yes".)
Secretary Clifford: That is right. Military does feel that way. We haven't had any incidents above the 20th which would
upset the talks. I do not think it would substantially reduce the flow if we went up to the 20th more than 20% or 25%. We
are doing a good job south of the 19th parallel.

The benefit does not warrant the chance or the risk; it will make it more difficult for him to take a step down.
The President: The longer we stay out, doesn't that make it more difficult to go back?
Secretary Clifford: No.
Secretary Rusk: I think it does make it more difficult.
Secretary Clifford: I happen not to agree with that.
The President: Buzz, what do you think?
General Wheeler: Militarily, it is a hub of communications and trans-shipment points. You have heavy 1-A leading out.
I would dispute fact they could replace Than Hoa.
Between the 17th and 19th parallels, there are smaller trans-shipment points, POL facilities, etc. Rear depots are large
(Haiphong and Hanoi).
Selected items shipped to forward depots. South of that, they have distribution points. There is a big concentration in
Hanoi and Haiphong. Next biggest, Theu Huoi and Vien. Then the smallest ones are southward.
Militarily, you should go ahead.
Political factors may outweigh this.
The President: Do we suffer from this restraint?
General Wheeler: To a degree. It's not quantifiable. The enemy gains when you permit him to put supplies close to the
lines safely.
The President: How much do we suffer in Hanoi and Haiphong--not striking them?
General Wheeler: Military price is going up. Weather is clearing. From the 1st to the 15th monsoon changes. Good
bombing until mid-September. We have had six clear days for bombing in May.
The President: Clark, how long would you wait?
Secretary Clifford: My approach is pragmatic. We made practical decision not to go above 19th to avoid incidents above
20th.
The President: I thought we decided to lay off for awhile until things cooled off. I thought we pulled back to appeal to
Fulbright after first thing we did was to bomb right up to the 20th the day after the March 31 statement.
I think every day the clock is ticking.
Mr. Rostow: Issue in Paris is whether we can be pushed into another unilateral action toward total cessation of bombing.
Second, Harriman told Soviet ambassador we cannot sit indefinitely. It would give us some credibility to move forward a
bit.
Secretary Clifford: I think a sufficient answer to them is refusal to stop the bombing--we don't need to move it forward.
I do not want to take action which will produce minimal results. Perhaps we will take only 1,000 of 4,000 tons out.
The President: I don't want to go on doing this. Everything we do is not total. North Vietnam may misread this as a

voluntary act of foolishness.

Secretary Clifford: I feel this deeply. I do not want to appear stubborn.
The President: Shouldn't we stop what we can? What rewards have we gotten from this? Haven't we let more men and
ammunition get through because of this?
Secretary Clifford: It is entirely possible.
The President: When was the last strike on Hanoi?
General Wheeler: The last strike was on April 1.
Secretary Rusk: I would be against dramatic strike. I would be for planes doing something--route reconnaissance or air to
air or hit coastal shipping.
Secretary Clifford: You can go up to the 20th when conditions warrant.
The tone of last week has been general support for your policy. Something will come out of Paris conference. I hope so.
With limitations placed on the military, we have no real plans to win the war. If you limit---no invasion into the north
--no mining of harbors
--no invasion of sanctuaries
Then I do not believe you can win militarily.
Our hopes must go with Paris.
Enemy controls the situation in the South.
--they can hit and run
--they can attack cities
--they can control casualties
We can hope only for success in Paris. We are in a war we can't win.
In the fall of 1967, the North Vietnamese decided earlier plans were no good. They put their stack in. That was Tet. They
didn't win. Now, they may have concluded it is a good time to have a political settlement.
They can't win war militarily. We can't win the war militarily.
The President: I disagree.
General Wheeler: I disagree to some extent.
Secretary Rusk: We have sought to keep North Vietnam from overtaking South Vietnam by force. We have succeeded in
that.
Secretary Clifford: Hanoi cannot win the war militarily. They know that. That doesn't mean we have won it.

I do not believe they are going to give up that effort unless we reach some agreement in Paris. If Paris does not come off,
we will be back where we were before. They are not running out of manpower. They can continue at rate indefinitely.
The Soviets and Chinese will continue to help them. We must settle at Paris. Otherwise, I do not see a conclusion ahead. I
see it dragging on indefinitely.
We lost so many men. They don't seem to be bothered by their loss of men. We had a rapid erosion in support. March 31
changed all that.
We will start another period of erosion. I want to bring about a good result in Paris. We should not do anything in Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk: We will not get a solution in Paris until we prove they can't win in the South.
Secretary Clifford: They have already seen they can't win in the South. They have turned to Paris hoping for a political
deal.
Secretary Rusk: It is worth their sending men to Paris in return for no bombing of the North. That is a real bonus.
The President: I will put it off again against my judgment. Let's wait until Wednesday. I think we should hit everything below
the 20th parallel. Let's wait until Wednesday.
I like Dean's suggestion of planes out hitting certain targets.
[Omitted here is discussion of the Pueblo.]
On the Filipino engineering unit:
General Wheeler: They can't support it until June.
Secretary Clifford: They want to go down from 1,800 to 1,400.
General Wheeler: 70 per week isn't getting much attention.
The President: What is the progress with the Korean troops?
General Wheeler: South Korean Minister of Defense will be here next week.
Secretary Rusk: The Soviets want to sign NPT in Geneva.
The briefing of Presidential candidates was discussed.
On the state of the Strategic Reserves:
Secretary Clifford: We'll come back to you on that one.
The President: How are the expenditures running in the Department of Defense?
Secretary Clifford: About as expected.
Secretary Rusk: Are you saving any money by not bombing North Vietnam?
Secretary Clifford: Now, now--you can't put it on a cost basis. The B-52s really do cost.
The President: What do you think of our military situation in Vietnam, Buzz?
General Wheeler: We are in a good position.

The President: Are we stronger or weaker?

General Wheeler: Stronger.
The President: Any problems with changes in South Vietnam government?
Secretary Rusk: I don't think so. It will represent 60% of the votes.

242. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 22, 1968, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. II. Secret. The
notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
You asked for my comments on Clark Clifford's memorandum of May 20 relating to Amb. Bunker's cable on an appropriate
response in the North if Saigon is again attacked./2/
/2/Regarding Bunker's cable, see footnote 2, Document 237. In his May 20 memorandum to the President, Clifford noted:
"The thrust of Bunker's cable is that Hanoi should be made to understand that attacks on Saigon or other centers of
population are, in our view, 'taking advantage' of the San Antonio Formula and cannot be carried out with impunity and
without fear of retaliation. I believe that this is a weak position. I believe that, at this stage of the negotiations, it is unwise
for us to adhere to the San Antonio Formula. I think it is sounder for us to contend that that Formula has been superseded
by the President's March 31st speech and events that have occurred since then." (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc & Memos, Vol. II)
Clark's view is that: under the language of the March 31 speech an attack on Saigon does not fall under the category of
matching restraint by Hanoi. He does not see a link between our cessation of bombing in the North and attack in the South
on the cities. He believes that the restraint we should seek is a reduction in the flow of men and materiel from the North
into the South.
He could have strengthened his formal argument, as others have done, by noting there is a certain danger in raising the
question of how Hanoi uses its forces in the South, because on that basis they could try to restrict our military activities in
the South.
What Clark does not deal with is the view--strongly felt in South Vietnam--that we could have serious morale problems
among troops and civilian population in South Vietnam if two circumstances converge:
--A prolonged stalemate in Paris, with the bulk of North Vietnam a sanctuary;
--Another major attack on Saigon or Hue, or both.
In short, while Clark can make a perfectly good, logical and quasi-legal case, based on the language of the March 31
speech, he is not wrestling with a problem which could become more real with each passing day and which could become
acute if, say, after another month of fruitless talks in Paris and another month of sanctuary in Hanoi-Haiphong, Saigon gets
hit hard again with another 100,000 refugees, etc.
We must think about this problem very hard in the light of the two reports in the last day that Hanoi plans to stonewall in
Paris until the Democratic nominee is chosen; and then stonewall further if that candidate is Sen. Robert Kennedy. The
underlying postulate of Clark's view, as presented at lunch yesterday,/3/ is, I believe, this: We can hold a tolerable basis of
support for our policy in Vietnam indefinitely if there are some kind of talks in Paris and, I would add, if U.S. casualty
figures are not excessive. If Paris breaks up, he fears an erosion of U.S. support for the war.
/3/See Document 241.

It follows logically that he wishes to take absolutely no risk that we trigger an end to the Paris talks--or even give the other
side any kind of credible excuse for breaking them up.
In turn, he is very anxious, therefore, to keep the bombing between the 19th and 20th parallels available as a riposte to
another attack on Saigon, or something equivalent. I would guess that he feels they would not walk out if we replied by
bombing up to the 20th; they would walk out if we resumed operations against Hanoi-Haiphong.
What Clark's analysis does not say, in my judgment, is what policy we should follow if there is no break in the Paris talks
and if they continue to "read the telephone book" to us each time we meet. I doubt that we can sit still indefinitely under
those circumstances.
But whatever I may think, the problem which should be systematically addressed is this: What are our alternatives if we
face a telephone-book strategy in Paris until the Democratic convention plus a telephone-book strategy until November if
Senator Kennedy is nominated in Chicago, plus a telephone-book strategy until the end of January 1969 if Sen. Kennedy
should be elected in November. Our options are roughly these:
--to hold bombing to the 19th parallel;
--to move bombing to the 20th parallel;
--to resume bombing on the old pattern in Hanoi-Haiphong;
--to resume bombing in Hanoi-Haiphong plus other measures which might force Hanoi and its allies to an earlier decision.
I have in mind, for example, mining the North Vietnamese harbors and/or sending some of our forces northward across the
DMZ./4/
/4/In a May 18 memorandum to Rostow, Ginsburgh recommended the following: the San Antonio formula not be explicitly
disavowed; bombing be resumed when the enemy launched its next offensive; and any bombing over Hanoi and Haiphong
be extensive and effective. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 77)
All the current indicators are that Hanoi does not now plan to negotiate seriously with us, on the basis of your March 31
speech; but these current indicators may not be correct. They may be putting out the Bobby Kennedy stories because they
feel that we are so anxious to get a settlement soon that this might force us to soften our position on a further unilateral deescalation. We might get something out of Stewart's talks in Moscow./5/
/5/See Document 246.
Nevertheless, I believe it appropriate that, on a contingency basis, we begin to examine the options open to us if they
continue simply to stonewall in Paris.
Walt

243. Summary Notes of the 568th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 5, Tab 63. Secret; Sensitive; For the President
Only. Those attending were the President, Humphrey, Rostow, Katzenbach, Clifford, Fowler, Nitze, McConnell, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Walter J. Stoessel, Christian, Smith, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Economic Affairs Edward Fried. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) A summary and a partial transcript of the meeting are ibid.,
Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room. Nitze's notes of the meeting are in the Library of Congress, Manuscript
Division, Nitze Papers, Defense Department, Deputy Secretary of Defense Notes, 1968, 4 of 6.
Washington, May 22, 1968, 12:15-1:10 p.m.
Vietnam--France--Germany

[Omitted here is a brief discussion of the political situation in France.]

The President: Asked Under Secretary Katzenbach to comment on the talks with the North Vietnamese in Paris.
Under Secretary Katzenbach: We are still in the propaganda phase. We have made serious proposals but have received
no answer from the North Vietnamese who even refuse to acknowledge there are any North Vietnamese troops in South
Vietnam. The Hanoi representatives are prepared to stay in Paris and even read the telephone directory if necessary to
keep nonproductive talks going for a long time.
The President: The North Vietnamese made a pretty good trade. They get partial suspension of the bombing for merely
sitting and talking in Paris.
Under Secretary Katzenbach: The fate of the discussions in Paris turns on the military situation in Vietnam.
The President: Why is Secretary Clifford optimistic?
Secretary Clifford: We are making progress in the talks in Paris.
a. The Paris talks are a propaganda-plus for us. The North Vietnamese public posture is suffering. Ambassador Harriman
is taking a reasonable and positive position, resulting in public opinion gains for us. The absurd position taken by the North
Vietnamese concerning their refusal to acknowledge that their troops are in South Vietnam is hurting them. This will lose
them public support.
b. It is important that we have forced the North Vietnamese to talk even though we are still bombing a part of North
Vietnam. For three years Hanoi has said it would not do this. In addition, the interdiction bombing which we are now doing
is causing them more damage than our previous bombing program.
c. Hanoi has not issued an ultimatum stating that it would break up the Paris talks unless all of our bombing of North
Vietnam stops./2/
/2/In Intelligence Note No. 395 to Rusk, May 24, Hughes transmitted INR's assessment that Xuan Thuy's statement on
May 22, "in case the official conversations do not produce results, the U.S. side must bear full and entire responsibility,"
did not imply that the DRV was prepared to break off the talks but instead was a means of applying additional pressure on
the U.S. delegation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET) In a
memorandum to the President, May 20, 9 a.m., Rostow noted that captured directives indicated that Hanoi foresaw no
serious movement in Paris until the GVN had been weakened militarily. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country
File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. I)
It is doubtful that the Paris talks were a good deal for the North Vietnamese. Our interdiction efforts continue and we are in
a position to try for a deal more advantageous to us.
The North Vietnamese came to Paris to negotiate seriously. They hope to erode support for the war in the United States by
causing high U.S. casualties. They will fail in this. They will conclude that they cannot prevail militarily and will then seek to
negotiate a political solution of the war./3/
/3/According to the transcript of the meeting, Clifford stated: "The President asked Nick, did he think they had a pretty good
deal now. I don't believe it's a particularly good deal for them, in my opinion. Maybe we differ in that regard. I believe we're
doing a very respected job of interdiction as we are now--concentrating our bombing where we are. The fact is, I think they
could get a better deal if they'd handle it skillfully. If they were to make some move that would result in our stopping the
bombing entirely, they'd have a better deal than they have now. So all of the factors that have taken place indicate to me
that they have come prepared to negotiate seriously and it is my belief that they will continue to negotiate seriously. As has
been suggested, obviously the military phase is a very important factor. They have increased the level of their military
activity in the South. Our casualties have increased as a result of that. I believe they'll probably continue to do that on the
basis that they can sustain from a public relations standpoint higher casualties better than we can. And I believe that by
forcing us into a higher casualty position they hope to erode support back here. I don't believe that they'll be successful in
that and I think the time will come when they will agree to some kind of disposition of the matter. I think that is their
intention by accepting the President's offer and the basis of that is, I believe, that they have reached the definite conclusion
that they cannot prevail militarily in South Vietnam. And, therefore, if they conclude that they cannot prevail militarily, then I
think they're searching for the best type of solution that they can find. That's the way I feel about it, Mr.
President." (Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room)

The President: Asked for a study from CIA within the next two weeks which would be sent to the JCS for their comment,
giving: a.
present rate of North Vietnamese losses and the length of time they can support such losses; b. the quality of the men
being infiltrated into South Vietnam and the training they have received; and c. the number of officers available to them,
i.e., the accuracy of reports that the North Vietnamese have a shortage of officers./4/
/4/According to the transcript of the meeting, the President also stated: "Clark and I had a little disagreement. That is what
he is talking about. Clark's young enough and fresh enough and dashing enough and adventurous enough still to be very
hopeful on this thing and I want people like that and I always like to have them. Back home a man nominated another
fellow for an office and the fellow called his wife right quick and said, 'Come here, mama, I want you to hear what Mr.
Collier's got to say.' So, when I get in these meetings from time to time and I've been reading these cables all morning, I
say 'Come here, mama, I want you to hear what Mr. Clifford's got to say.' You can read them and kind of draw certain
deductions and conclusions from them that are at least pleasing to me. If we're not always in complete agreement on
them, I hope he's right and [not that] he's wrong."
USIA Director Marks: World press reaction to the Paris talks has been good. A study made by USIA of the world press
supports this conclusion./5/
/5/The study has not been found.
[Omitted here is discussion of Germany and European security issues.]
The President: Turning again to Vietnam, asked for a joint State/Defense/CIA paper recommending what policy should be
followed if there is no break in the Paris talks./6/ The options are to hold the bombing of North Vietnam down to the 19th
parallel as is now being done, move the bombing up to the 20th parallel, return to the bombing pattern we had before
March 31, or return to the pre-March 31 bombing pattern, plus intensification.
/6/See Document 248.
There is no evidence that the North Vietnamese will negotiate seriously. They will do no more than remain in Paris to talk
rather than negotiate until the next Administration takes over. We should be cautious and not say anything which might
divide us from our South Vietnamese, Australian, Korean, and Philippine allies.
Ho Chi Minh's objectives are to divide us from our allies and to divide us at home.
We should be cautious in making statements about what we expect to come out of the Paris talks. UK Foreign Minister
Stewart may get something during his coming visit to Moscow. We are not making much progress. However, the North
Vietnamese cannot do a Panmunjom, i.e., talk endlessly without progress, because time will run out on them on January
20 when a new Administration comes in.
Bromley Smith

244. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 23, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 8 I, 1/67-12/68, Taylor Memos--General. Secret.
According to an attached note, the President requested Clifford's and Rusk's comments on the memorandum.
SUBJECT
Negotiations
It does not appear to me that we are preparing either Hanoi or our own and the international public for an action which I
feel sure we will have to take in Paris in the near future. We are reacting far too little, it seems to me, to actions of Hanoi in
raising the level of military action in South Viet-Nam while heckling us to stop the bombing. By our quiescence, we seem to
accept as a matter of course the continued high rate of enemy infiltration and repeated acts of accentuated violence--I am

thinking particularly of the recent shelling of Saigon for which there has been no reprisal and, indeed, no strong protest to
indicate that we take these things seriously. In their fight-talk campaign, the other side is increasing the fighting in the
South while trying to talk us out of our freedom to retaliate in the North.
We have three readily available responses to Hanoi's increasing belligerence and to the intransigence of their negotiators
at the conference table. The first is to resume bombing back to the 20th parallel. The second is to bomb throughout all
North Viet-Nam as we did prior to March 31. The third is to go beyond former bombing levels and include therein the
mining of Haiphong harbor.
The timing of these steps is, of course, of great importance as is the preparation of public acceptance for them. I believe
that the first step, bombing to the 20th parallel, should be taken now and the fact acknowledged as soon as the press
raises the question. Concurrently, we should communicate privately to the Hanoi representatives what we have already
said to Zorin with regard to our inability to continue to limit our bombing to the 20th parallel without prompt evidence of
restraints on their side. At the same time, we should make clear to the Hanoi representatives in Paris that they are wasting
their breath in calling for a total cessation until they match the restraint which we have already shown.
With the warning on the official record, we should then make repeated public statements explaining and justifying what we
may have to do. About a week after the warning, in the absence of a conciliatory move from them, we should resume our
pre-March 31 pattern of bombing. A further expansion of the bombing would remain for the time being an ace in the hole.
In my judgment, these tough positions are inevitable and the sooner we take them and establish our firmness with the
other side, the sooner we can get on to serious business.
I would not worry too much about a possible walk-out by our adversaries, although we can expect them to threaten it and
even go through the motions. In the Panmunjom negotiations, you will recall that there was a prolonged break because of
inability to agree on the issue of the involuntary repatriation of prisoners of war, but eventually the other side gave in and
came back. In the Paris negotiations, I would anticipate similar gestures but also a similar capitulation if we keep a
remorseless military pressure on them throughout.
M.D.T.

245. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, May 23, 1968, 1030Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret;
Immediate; Nodis. Received at 9:03 a.m. and repeated to Paris for the Vietnam mission. This telegram is printed in full in
Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 445-451.
28053. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my fifty-second weekly message.
1. The last week was noteworthy for a number of items:
2. On May 18th President Thieu announced the resignation of the Loc Cabinet, his decision to reorganize the government,
his invitation to Tran Van Huong to serve as Prime Minister and Huong's acceptance. In an excellent brief speech Thieu
paid tribute to the accomplishments of the Loc government, sought to set at rest unfounded rumors which had been
circulating about the attitude of the military, the Buddhists, the Southern separatists, and threatened discriminations
against Northerners. He made it clear that he had no intentions of replacing the corps commanders, that he would not
tolerate discrimination in any form and called attention to the fact that the Congress, representing the whole people,
exercised supervision over the activities and effectiveness of the government. He called on people of all persuasions to
extend comprehension and assistance to the new government in the common cause.
3. Tran Van Huong is now engaged in intensive consultations with a broad range of political figures, clearly hoping to
establish as wide a base as possible for his new Cabinet. Thieu told me yesterday that he will be meeting again in the
afternoon with Huong to go over the Cabinet list, that they have planned to talk with Vice President Ky today, and that he
hoped to announce the new government by Friday or Saturday at the latest./2/ It is planned to reduce the Cabinet from the
17 to 13 or 14 and to set up a smaller group, in the nature of a war cabinet, consisting of Thieu, Ky, the Prime Minister and
two or three others who will meet daily to deal with urgent matters and see that decisions are implemented. Thieu indicated

that most effective of the present Ministers would be retained, though not necessarily in the same positions: Lu-Y (Health),
Sieu (Transport), Tri (Revolutionary Development), Vy (Defense), Tinh (Finance), and possibly others. Huong has been at
some pains to make clear the fact that he wants to put together a balanced team in terms of regions and other interest
groups.
/2/On Friday, May 25, Huong announced the formation of a new Cabinet comprising Phan Quang Dan for Chieu Hoi,
Nguyen Van Vy for Defense and Veterans Affairs, Tran Thien Khiem for Interior, Tran Chanh Thanh for Foreign Affairs,
Tran Lu-Y for Health and Social Welfare, Le Van Thu for Justice, An Ngoc Ho for Economy, Dam Si Hiem for Labor, Tran
Luy for Public Works, Communications, and Transport, Nguyen Van Tho for Education and Youth, Truong Thai Ton for
Agriculture and Land Reform, Ton That Thien for Information, Luong The Sieu for Public Works and Communications, and
Paul Nhur for Ethnic Minority Affairs, with Dang, Mai Tho Truyen, and Vu Quoc Thuc as Ministers of State. In his 53d
weekly message, telegram 28566 from Saigon, May 29, Bunker offered an expanded analysis of the Huong Cabinet, which
he termed "a considerable move toward civilian government." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S) In a June 1 memorandum for the record reporting a May 31 conversation with
Thieu, Komer reported Thieu's explanation for Loc's replacement: "Loc has been like a 'daughter-in-law serving several
mothers-in-law.' Loc knew who was corrupt (Thieu mentioned the Customs Director, Port Director, police, and some others
whose names I didn't catch), but Loc was unwilling to act against them. This was the Prime Minister's job, not the
President's." (U.S. Army Center for Military History, DepCORDS/MACV Papers, President Thieu: 1968)
4. Reaction to the Huong appointment continues to come in and is generally favorable, although there are some who
prefer to reserve their views until the composition of the Cabinet is known. Huong has a reputation for personal integrity,
honesty, toughness, and a fighter against corruption; he also has a reputation for stubbornness, of which Thieu is aware
but which he believes will not prevent their working well together. Thieu told me a week ago that Huong's concern was that
he be given enough leeway to work to the end of more effective and honest government. Thieu is prepared to do this and
said that he had gone through a long list and "the fact is there is no one to appoint Prime Minister except Huong."
5. In addition to the generally favorable comment on Huong's appointment it was encouraging that one of the leading
extremist Buddhist figures, Thich Phap Tri, denied publicly that the An Quang group was opposed to Huong, and in fact
expressed satisfaction at the appointment.
6. Unfortunately, as so often in the past, there has been irresponsible reporting on the appointment of the new Cabinet.
The reports of a serious crisis or showdown between Thieu and Ky over the Huong appointment appears to be lacking in
foundation. While Ky is unhappy over developments, because of Huong's known independence, I know of no evidence that
he will attempt to do anything to obstruct it./3/ In fact it is reported that the conversation Huong had with Ky last Tuesday/4/
went very well, and that Huong handled it with tact and skill. The AP story of May 17 which predicted a Thieu-Ky
showdown over the appointment of the new Cabinet was written by a new correspondent recently arrived in Viet-Nam after
some years of service in Latin America who accepted at face value one of the countless rumors always circulating in
Saigon.
/3/The Department expressed concern over Thieu's reorganization of the government without full consultation with Ky and
other generals. (Telegram 163374 to Saigon, May 14; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1967-69, POL 15 VIET S) In Intelligence Note No. 366 to Rusk, May 17, Hughes noted that many of the top generals
opposed Thieu's plans to move more civilians into the Cabinet because the GVN needed to remain unified under the
military. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) In a conversation with Berger reported in telegram 28633 from Saigon, May 30, Ky noted
extensive dissatisfaction among other generals and Cabinet members with Thieu's installation of the new government and
his direction of the country. "Some have approached me to make a coup, but I have told them that a coup is out of the
question," Ky noted. "I tell them they must be patient. They must wait. There are a thousand ways to destroy a leader
without a coup, and so if you think we have unity here, I can tell you that we are now more divided than ever." (Ibid., POL
15-1 VIET S)
/4/May 21.
7. That Hanoi's current strategy is an all out effort, militarily and psychologically, to strengthen its hand in negotiations
continues to be evident. While as I reported in my last message/5/ the enemy's major attack on Saigon was broken off, he
is covering his withdrawal with a series of rocket and mortar attacks on a variety of targets. This has included
indiscriminate firing at Saigon in the early morning hours of May 19 and additional mortar and rocket attacks against the
capitals of Ba Xuyen, Dinh Tuong, and Binh Thuan Provinces early on May 21.
/5/Document 235.
8. The indiscriminate attacks on civilians in Saigon have had an impact in psychological terms as well as added to the list
of dead, wounded, and homeless. Three Vietnamese police and three civilians are known dead; 32 civilians and one

American soldier are reported wounded; and some 500 people have had their homes destroyed. The home of Nguyen Luu
Vien, Deputy Prime Minister in Ky's last Cabinet, was hit by a 122 mm. rocket just after he had gotten his family awake and
downstairs. He and his family suffered scratches but were otherwise unhurt. He dismissed the attack as blind terror
designed to impress world opinion as proving that the Communists are masters in South Viet-Nam. Nguyen Phu Duc, an
advisor to President Thieu, had an experience very similar to Vien's.
9. In our fifth joint discussion on problems of negotiations yesterday morning Thieu gave his estimate of Hanoi's objectives
and brought up a subject which is obviously of increasing concern to the GVN, i.e., how long the present situation of a
partial bombing halt with no reciprocity can be allowed to go on./6/
/6/A full report on the meeting is in telegram 27938 from Saigon, May 22. (National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
10. Thieu said that the VC/NVA is "testing our patience" and are in no hurry to engage in serious talks. They mean to
exploit the partial bombing halt for as long as possible in order to increase infiltration and to mount new large scale attacks.
He was concerned that the death and destruction which is daily visible in the cities would have a cumulative psychological
impact on the people. Statistics of VC/NVA losses (which the enemy can still afford in any case) make little impression on
most people, but the destruction of their homes is evident. Their faith in the government strength and capacity to protect
them from these attacks will more and more be sapped. Thieu believed that within another month the enemy would
probably launch another major attack, and would continue harassment of the cities in order to discredit the GVN and
attempt to create an uprising against it.
11. Thieu felt that the talks so far in Paris have been favorable to our side and that we should use the time to attract
international support, but should be careful not to allow our patience to be misread as weakness. He expressed the view
that Hanoi would attempt to measure our patience and to exploit the us political situation; that they might attempt to await
the development of our political campaign to form a judgment as to the desirability of moving toward a settlement or of
awaiting installation of a new administration. He added that though this question was of great concern to him, he thought
that we could "wait a while, but not too much longer," before putting a time limit on Hanoi's delaying tactics at Paris. Do
observed that the enemy was clearly "taking advantage" already of the partial cessation.
12. Thieu, Ky and Do have all commented favorably on the performance of our delegation at Paris, and especially on
Ambassador Harriman's statements.
13. It is also increasingly apparent that Hanoi's current strategy of all out effort to strengthen its hand for a political
settlement is directed at the countryside as well as the cities. Documentary evidence shows that the enemy is placing new
emphasis on destroying the local GVN administrative structure, and on setting up a VC administration in its place. His
effort to strengthen his apparent political base in the cities by organizing front groups is being supplemented by a
campaign to organize rural "liberation committees" at provincial, district, village, and hamlet levels. This effort, I think, is
designed among other things to reinforce the NLF claim to such wide control over the people in the countryside as to justify
a major role for it in a coalition government.
14. The other side of the coin, however, is the evidence disclosed by recent documents and interrogations of some of the
senior Communist officers who have rallied recently. These have brought out a number of signs of growing Communist
morale problems in the wake of their heavy losses and defeats during the Tet and May offensives. LTC Tran Van Dac, a
political officer in the area north of Saigon, states that allied air and artillery strikes have caused severe mental tension
among Communist troops and cadres. Problems of supply and the evident discrepancy between VC propaganda and the
reality regarding both ARVN/allied fighting spirit and the extent of popular support for the VC have also had a depressing
effect on morale. Another report indicates that most of the people living in VC controlled areas are weary and that the VC
promises to bring an end to the war this year will have a disastrous effect on morale if this does not occur. A result of this
attitude has been an increase in desertions out of fear of combat losses and an overwhelming desire for survival inspired
by the recent peace negotiations. Against this background of declining morale a document captured in Binh Duong
Province prepared by the chief of the political staff of an element subordinate to COSVN emphasizes that the purpose of
the peace talks, as the Communists see it, is to confirm the defeat of the allies and a VC victory. It states that nothing can
be expected from diplomatic debates unless a major military victory is achieved. Consequently VC personnel must not let
themselves be lured by peace illusions but most support peace negotiations by fighting harder to achieve more decisive
victories; a significant contrast between the mood at the top and in the lower ranks which speaks for itself.
[Omitted here is discussion of pacification, urban recovery, and additional political, economic, and military issues.]
Bunker

246. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/

Washington, May 24, 1968, 1913Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-May 1968.
Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan. Drafted and approved by John Walsh of S/S. Repeated to Moscow and London.
170294/Todel 220. Ref: Paris 14616./2/ UK Embassy passed this morning to Secretary identical text contained reftel,
which we have repeated separately to Ambassador Thompson and Bruce.
/2/In telegram 14616 from Paris, May 24, Harriman and Vance reported that they had received a report on the visit to
Moscow of British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart from Sir Patrick Reilly, British Ambassador to France. (Ibid.) With
U.S. encouragement Stewart visited Moscow May 22-24 to discuss the issue of Vietnam with the Soviet leadership.
In addition, following message from Stewart was conveyed to Secretary:/3/
/3/This preliminary report on Stewart's trip, May 23, was transmitted directly to Rusk. Rusk sent it to the President, noting
that Stewart came away with "some reasons for optimism about DRV intentions." (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 81)
"I was very glad to have the message David Bruce passed me on Monday./4/ It was also most valuable to have the
opportunity of discussing the course the talks have taken in Paris with Sullivan and Davidson./5/ Both of these 'briefs' were
helpful when we were preparing for my present visit to Moscow.
/4/In telegram 166803 to London, May 18, the Department instructed Bruce to urge Stewart to "strongly take the line that, if
we are to stop the bombing totally, the Soviets should play their part in moving toward de-escalation by cutting back not
only their military supplies to the North but their supplies and related equipment that go to the South and are related to
movement toward the South." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 46 1, Stewart
Visit) Bruce apparently passed the message on Monday, May 20.
/5/In telegram 14309/Delto 94 from Paris, May 19, Harriman informed the Department that he would send Sullivan and
Davidson to brief Stewart on the Paris negotiations. (Ibid., IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on
Vietnam, 1968-1969, Delto Chron.) Telegram 9133 from London, May 20, reported on their May 20 meeting with Stewart.
(Ibid., HARVAN-(Incoming)-May 1968)
Pat Dean will be giving your people a detailed account of my talks with Gromyko here today. He was perfectly friendly and
relaxed but it was clear to me that he had no insight into how the North Vietnamese in Paris intend to play their hand. His
presentation to me of the North Vietnamese position was entirely orthodox and uncompromising. Under pressure he fell
back on the basic thesis that the United States was the aggressor and therefore it fell to the U.S. to make all moves
towards the next stage in the talks in Paris.
I made it clear that I thought it perfectly reasonable for the United States to insist on some measure of restraint by the
North Vietnamese before the United States could proceed to an unconditional cessation of the bombing of the North. I said
that I thought this indication could best come by an act of de-escalation in the DMZ. The Americans were not seeking a
more favorable position but they could not accept a less favorable one. If Hanoi would act in this way it would remove the
first block to progress in Paris and we could then go forward to deal with the many other difficult questions which remained.
As regards an eventual political settlement I said that the U.S. wanted to ensure that the people of South Vietnam had a
free choice. I warned Gromyko that he could not count on a static political situation in the United States. If there were no
visible response from Hanoi to the pull-back in the bombing and U.S. soldiers were to be in danger, there would be a
serious risk of a movement of U.S. opinion which could make the situation much worse.
This could be a most important turning point for better or for worse. If Hanoi were to ignore this factor and let this
opportunity slip they would bear a very heavy responsibility.
Gromyko listened very carefully to all this. His response was unsympathetic and routine. He drew a distinction between
official and public opinion in the United States and professed to doubt whether opinion in America would allow the
Government to take a tough line again.
I have no reason to doubt that he will pass on a full account of these exchanges to the North Vietnamese.

As a parting shot Gromyko made it absolutely clear that the convening of the Geneva Conference or any other similar
conferences was totally 'unrealistic in present circumstances.' I did not take him to mean however that he was not content
to keep the co-chairmanship on ice and he did not dissent when I reminded him of the communique issued after the Prime
Minister's visit to Moscow when we agreed to do all we could 'jointly or singly.'
We brought home no bacon today. At the same time I am sure it is right to keep pegging away at the Russians both in
order to keep them, as they would wish to be, in the picture and because I am sure that they cannot afford not to pass on
all that I said to Hanoi and Xuan Thuy in Paris."/6/
/6/Additional documentation on the Stewart trip is in Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Documents on British Policy
Overseas, Series III, Vol. I, Britain and the Soviet Union, 1968-1972 (London: The Stationery Office, 1997), pp. 35-40.
Rusk

247. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/

Paris, May 25, 1968, 1749Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on
Vietnam, 1968-1969, Delto Chron. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan. Received at 2:47 p.m.
14709/Delto 154. From Harriman.
1. I called on Zorin at his Embassy this morning for about an hour's talk, accompanied by Embassy officer Perry. Young
Bogomolov interpreted./2/
/2/A memorandum of this conversation is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files,
Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Paris Peace Talks, Subject File, HARVAN and HARVAN/PLUS, Meetings with the
Soviets: Zorin-Oberemko.
2. In reply to my question, Zorin admitted he had instructions to keep in contact with me in accordance with my suggestion
to Dobrynin. I said I felt sure Soviet Government wished to see fighting stopped, and therefore I would tell him frankly of
our impressions of our conversations to date. I described the futility of across-the-room highly publicized speeches, and
Hanoi representative's refusal of my suggestion to undertake unpublicized discussions. I suggested that he might wish to
encourage the NVN delegation to have informal contacts with us through a member of the delegation or staff. He said this
was impossible until we stopped bombing.
3. After some discussion, he asked whether I suggested contacts between one member each of the delegations, or more
than one. I replied either, and urged him to think over my suggestion.
4. He gave me the usual line, handed Stewart by Gromyko./3/ I explained in detail that we considered the President's
March 31 speech the basis for our meeting, and rejected the idea that the only reason for meeting was to learn the hour
and date of bombing cessation. I said that if this was all, no meeting would have been necessary. I explained our
interpretation of the language of Hanoi's April 3 statement, which proposed "contacts with the view of determining with the
American side" etc. I told him we had constantly been ready to talk about the cessation of bombing, but would insist upon
discussing at the same time relevant matters on the basis of the President's speech.
/3/See Document 246.
5. One point of a little less rigidity on his part came when I said we would not insist on an agreement for restraint, that we
would accept signs of restraint instead of words. He seemed interested in this and asked whether we had made this clear
to the other side. I said yes, but if he thought there was any doubt I would make it clear again on Monday,/4/ but suggested
he might wish to bring this to their attention as well. I explained that unfortunately Hanoi had thus far increased the
movement South and the action around the DMZ, rather than shown any signs of restraint. When he refused to pass any
messages to NVN representatives as intermediary, I said that I wasn't asking him to tell me what he was going to do, but
that I would assume that in accordance with his instructions he would bring this to the attention of the other side./5/

/4/May 27.
/5/In 171322 to Paris, May 26, the Department expressed "serious concern" at Harriman's intention to raise this idea again
directly and suggested that instead he focus on the restoration of the DMZ. (National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, 1968-1969, Todel Chron.)
6. Several times, when he stated Hanoi's rigid position, I said that if the North Vietnamese maintained that attitude I
thought the situation would become dangerous. I made no threats, but emphasized the kind of pressure the President
would be under from public opinion, which would complain that Hanoi, while enjoying a limitation of bombing, was not
talking seriously or showing restraint.
7. The best I can say is that Zorin was somewhat less argumentative and at least listened courteously. He will certainly
report our talks to Moscow.
Harriman

248. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of
State Rusk/1/
Washington, May 25, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET. Top Secret;
Nodis; Harvan; Limdis. Rusk's initials appear on the first page. A copy was sent to Katzenbach.
SUBJECT
Possible Changes in our Bombing Pattern
Paris 14694,/2/ just received, seems to me to make excellent sense. It suggests we initiate selected bombing between the
19th and 20th about next Wednesday,/3/ to give a chance for us to convey a general warning message before then. I
would add that I think we would make considerable gains in Saigon if we authorized Bunker to consult with Thieu before
we actually took the step. Thieu would certainly agree, and this could be a safety valve on his general concerns.
/2/In telegram 14694 from Paris, May 25, Harriman and Vance noted: "We believe we should not renew bombing north of
20 degrees but suggest for your consideration desirability of attacking a few carefully selected targets between 19 and 20
degrees. We believe we should make clear to DRV through third party here that their failure to show restraint in response
to our limiting of bombing cannot be maintained indefinitely, and that not only have they shown no restraint, but in fact
have been escalating through increased infiltration and attacks against allied military forces and cities. It is possible that
this course of action might move DRV from their present position, although it is unlikely. As long as we stay south of 20
degrees and hit a few selected targets, however, we believe we should be able to handle the press and world
opinion." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. II) In a May 25 note
transmitting a copy of this telegram to the President, Rostow wrote: "Herewith Harriman and Vance evaluate Hanoi's
intentions. Suggest 'few carefully selected targets between 19th and 20th . . . not before Wednesday'" (Ibid.) An evaluation
of alternatives to full bombing resumption is in CIA intelligence memorandum SC 07073/68, May 22. (Central Intelligence
Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80-R01284R, Rolling Thunder Program)
/3/May 29.
On the question of resuming bombing north of the 20th, at any point, we have under way the project described in Tab A
attached, and will have submissions Monday--on which we will try to base a decent summary analysis. In essence, it
seems to all of us at this moment that resumption north of the 20th is not now an imminent issue. The difficult contingency
would be a major attack in the Highlands and particularly a major attack on Da Nang or Hue. We should be getting our
thoughts in order against these contingencies, and particularly looking at the one-shot option.
For your background, you might be interested in reading Tab B--an Agency draft evaluation of the whole situation--and Tab
C, which is my own assessment of where we stand and my suggestion of how we might play the next 3-4 weeks in
Paris./4/ The latter was pouched to Habib last night, and seems to be pretty generally agreed at staff levels here.
/4/Tabs B and C are attached but not printed. Tab B is a May 24 draft of Document 263. Tab C is a draft joint State-

Defense-CIA assessment, written by Bundy on May 23, which described the current strategy as "effective" and made
recommendations for the near term.

Tab A
STATE-DEFENSE-CIA PROJECT
ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION UNDER CERTAIN
ASSUMED CONDITIONS
Terms of Reference
Assumed Situation
The first assumption is that Hanoi continues to be totally inflexible in Paris and in particular to reject any form of reciprocal
restraint in return for our stopping the bombing. This is a fixed assumption.
A second assumption--which may vary in degree--is that the North Vietnamese continue a high level of military action in
the South. This might simply be scattered attacks all over the country, but there are indications that it may include a major
offensive in the Highlands, an attack on Da Nang or Hue, and other such specific and identifiable major surges in offensive
action.
Basic Question
A basic issue to be examined under the project is what course of action we should adopt in the face of such an assumed
situation. The project should also examine timing factors that could affect when we undertook any of the possible courses
of action.
The courses of action we are asked to examine are as follows:
Option A: Going on roughly as we are in Paris and other diplomatic channels registering only generalized indications that
we cannot continue indefinitely to apply present restraints, and not changing our bombing pattern in the North./5/
/5/A memorandum from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense to Clifford, May 28, noted: "The CIA favors
maintenance of the current situation (Option A)." (Johnson Library, Clark Clifford Papers, Southeast Asia: [Material on
Bombing, May 1968]) The CIA's commentary on the options was attached to this memorandum and is summarized in
footnote 3, Document 255.
Option B: Resuming bombing and other military action between the 19th and 20th parallels.
Option C: Hitting selected targets in Hanoi and Haiphong, on past patterns.
Option D: Hitting targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas, plus additional targets not previously struck in these areas and
elsewhere north of the 20th.
Option E: In the event of a major enemy offensive action in the South, carrying out a one-time strike north of the 20th,
directed at a major target or targets not previously struck.
For Options B-E, there is the clear question of how and to what degree we should progressively signal our impatience so
that the change in pattern does not come as a total surprise.
In the succeeding individual pages, the key questions are listed, with assignments for initial draft contributions to be
received not later than Monday noon.

249. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, May 25, 1968, 1:54 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. The meeting, which ended at 3:45 p.m., was
held in the White House. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) These notes were taken by Christian. The previous day, Clifford
sent a memorandum to Wheeler discussing alternative military actions in the event the Paris talks stalled or terminated.
(Ibid., Alain Enthoven Papers, Strategy)
ATTENDING THE LUNCHEON WERE
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
Director Helms
General Wheeler
Walt Rostow
Justice Fortas
General Taylor
George Christian
The President: We have received a wire from Ambassador Harriman./2/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 248.
Secretary Rusk: Vance told me on the phone he was a little reluctant about route reconnaissance. Cy prefers pinpoint.
The President: What about their air activity, Bus?
General Wheeler: They're carrying out an unprecedented number of training flights north of the 20th parallel, both with IL28's and MIGs. They haven't been south of the 20th parallel since May 11.
Mr. Rostow: They're using Bonnie and Clyde pilots.
General Wheeler: They're hoping to take Danang and hold it for a day.
The President: What are the respective strengths there?
General Wheeler: We've got more horses than they have.
General Taylor: When General Westmoreland is here, make the maximum public relations use of him.
Secretary Rusk: Will there be a strategy change under Abrams?
General Wheeler: The pattern will be about the same. He may consolidate forces.
Mr. Rostow: Who will keep an eye on the ARVN?
General Wheeler: One of his staff.
The President: How will the new Vietnam Cabinet be received in the court of public opinion?
Secretary Rusk: I believe it will be plus marks--be stronger in terms of political solidarity.
The President: I'm afraid they're going to divide off Ky.
Secretary Rusk: He's taking wait and see attitude.

Director Helms: It is dangerous--Ky keeping his generals close to see if Thieu goes too far.
The President: Should Ky come here with Thieu? Ask Bunker to think about it./3/
/3/A discussion of a possible visit by Thieu to the United States is attached to a May 28 memorandum from Rostow to the
President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Presidential Meetings and Trips, President's Meeting w/Pres. ThieuHonolulu, Memos & Misc. (2 of 2))
Secretary Rusk: I don't believe we should have a joint session for Thieu. It won't do us any good.
The President: Clark, anything new to report?
Secretary Clifford: I was before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee./4/ There was a good deal of discussion about
Paris and the bombing. They have a good understanding of what the Communists are up to. They seem to be relaxed
about things.
/4/In an appearance before this Committee on May 23, Clifford stressed that the DRV was pursuing a "fight and negotiate"
strategy and that the United States had to be prepared to do the same. See The New York Times, May 24, 1968.
(General Wheeler discussed the offensive action planned to disrupt enemy threat to Ben Het. It would involve some
bombing and artillery in uninhabited area of Cambodia used for North Vietnam retreat.)/5/
/5/In telegram 14986 to Sharp, May 25, Westmoreland noted that the NVA, operating out of its sanctuaries in Cambodia,
was launching an attack, the principal objective of which was to seize Kontum City after eliminating fire support bases such
as that at Ben Het. In response, Westmoreland had ordered pre-emptive B-52 strikes in Kontum province in order to force
the NVA to withdraw to its border sanctuary areas. He now requested that advance authorization be given for hot pursuit of
the enemy units into the Cambodian border areas. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Walt Rostow Files, Meetings
with the President, May-June 1968 [1]) In telegram 28267 from Saigon, May 25, Bunker transmitted his endorsement of
the action, which he considered a "maximum opportunity" to "inflict the maximum punishment on the enemy." He added: "It
seems to me that we must grasp this nettle firmly. Our forces have been taking heavy casualties, particularly in I Corps,
since January, and part of the reason are the Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries and the stepped-up Hanoi military effort.
I believe that we should at this critical juncture of the war and negotiations let them know that we are no longer going to
allow this uninhabited area to be used in this fashion." (Ibid.)
Secretary Rusk: I need time to think about it--especially B-52s.
General Wheeler: I don't need a decision for several days. I would like to have it Monday or Tuesday./6/
/6/May 27 or 28.
Secretary Clifford: I see a military need, but concerned because of negotiations. Before we do it, let's talk to our
representatives in Paris. Maybe we should have Vance back after the Monday meeting. We also can discuss with Cy the
bombing north of the 19th parallel, and clear up the North Vietnamese interpretations.
General Taylor: That is a reasonable proposition.
Mr. Rostow: General Westmoreland envisions doing this after an attack across the Cambodian border. I don't think Hanoi
would break up the talks.
Justice Fortas: Vance's return will be big publicity.
The President: We've got to lay some predicates for resuming if we have to. We've got to prepare for the day of reckoning.
We're not informing people of what they're doing. You wait till we have some military disaster--that'll be it. They'd rather
negotiate with Kennedy, McCarthy or Humphrey.
General Taylor: I'd go back to the 20th right now.
The President: Let's set predicate--we can't pop it all at once.

Secretary Clifford: The bombing sorties in North Vietnam are up from 3200 in February to 9100 in May.
The President: I want Rusk and Clifford to get together and figure out how to get back to the 20th parallel with little
bombast.
The President: Let's have Vance come back.
To review:
1. Clark and Dean lay out program to get back to the 20th parallel.
2. Tell Cy to come back.
3. Meet again Tuesday--I've made up my mind on the 20th.
The President: Dean, what is your prediction on Paris?
Secretary Rusk: Not going to change in Paris till they've carried out more attacks in South Vietnam. We've got to play
these things out. I don't think there'll be anything until July at least--they may wait for the August convention. The
Rumanian Foreign Minister expressed the same view.
Director Helms: We believe the objectives of fight and talk are to bring down the South Vietnam government. I don't see
any give in the North Vietnam position for some time.
Secretary Clifford: You made a generous offer in San Antonio to stop all bombing, yet they took the tougher offer on March
31. What happened in between? The big event was disappointment with Tet. I think they decided they couldn't succeed
militarily. I think they're in Paris to seek a political settlement.
I believe something will come out of Paris. There's hope now on the part of the American people. If we do anything to
wreck Paris--Bobby shoots up--public opinion goes against us. We need to keep the talks going through August 26. We
may get bits and scraps by then. We must maintain the talks.
The President: Bus, are we in good shape now as we were when talks began?
General Wheeler: Better. We haven't lost much. It could worsen. They'll try to drag talks out to keep bombing off their
backs. You couldn't get them out of Paris with a team of oxen and bullwhips.
The President: What should we do?
General Wheeler: Fight--keep the pressure on. If we get an opportunity to hit them in Cambodia, do it./7/
/7/In an agenda for the meeting prepared for the President, which he saw beforehand, Rostow noted: "Gen.
Westmoreland, strongly supported by Amb. Bunker, requests the right to attack with artillery and airpower enemy bases
across the border in Cambodia after attacks in the Kontum-Pleiku area are turned back. The area is uninhabited. Gen.
Westmoreland believes that the area meets the conditions mentioned by Sihanouk to Bowles in January 1968 for areas in
which he would close his eyes to such operations." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Walt Rostow Files, Meetings
with the President, May-June 1968 [2])
General Taylor: They're combining political and military fronts.
Mr. Rostow: I'd go back to 20th after we talk to Cy--I'd begin to think about the way to settle the war by the end of the year.
We ought to be thinking about the possibility of forcing this to a crisis. Get things rougher.
Secretary Rusk: I think bombing south of the 20th parallel more effective.
General Wheeler: I disagree.

Secretary Clifford: In concentrating attacks, we're doing a better job--In April 1967, 242 trucks; April 1968, 765 trucks
knocked out. In Laos: April 1967, 138; April 1968, 1400.
General Wheeler: The 1967 figures do not reflect a better spotting and night vision this year.
Justice Fortas: The program you outlined seemed to be right. If it is important to move up to the 20th, move up. Should
examine whether Paris platform is being used adequately for public education. For the moment, American people
enraptured by the fact that talks are going on. I think both of us have to stay in Paris. But unless we react to the high
casualty figures--in Paris, by Harriman--people will lose confidence.

250. Paper by the Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/
Saigon, May 26, 1968.
/1/Source: U.S. Army Center of Military History, DepCORDS/MACV Papers, Komer-Westmoreland File, 1968. No
classification marking. Westmoreland's commentary on his last days in Vietnam is in his historical summary for the month
of May. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 407, Litigation Collection, Westmoreland v. CBS, History File
#32, 1-31 May 1968)
FINAL ADVICE BY GENERAL WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV
1. The most competent and honest officers should be installed as province and district chiefs. Your best fighters and
disciplinarians should be placed in command of combat troops.
2. Insure that each commander takes a personal interest in the welfare of his troops and their dependents.
3. Continuously concentrate on timely intelligence and gear your organization to react immediately thereto, both with
respect to enemy military elements and political infrastructure.
4. Take extraordinary steps to deny the enemy knowledge of your plans and operations.
5. Emphasize night operations to gain the initiative on the enemy and deny his freedom of movement.
6. Appreciate that the greatest gain that can be made with minimum resources is improvement in the performance and
morale of the Regional and Popular Forces.
7. Give more emphasis to administrative and logistical support organizations that are essential to sustained combat
operations.
8. Training must be a continuous process with more attention given to in-place classes and exercises when the tactical
situation permits. Psy war and motivational training are essential parts of this program.
9. Pacification must be supported by all elements of the Government of Vietnam, of which the RVNAF is a major part. All
soldiers must realize their important role and be required to assume always a proper, friendly and helpful attitude toward
the people.
10. Maintain the offensive spirit!/2/
/2/This last sentence is handwritten. Westmoreland met with the President at the Ranch on May 30. Notes of the meeting
have not been found, but Westmoreland's report is summarized in a statement he made to the press that day. See
Department of State Bulletin, June 17, 1968, pp. 784-786. In a telephone conversation with Richard Russell on June 3, the
President described the meeting with Westmoreland and the General's reaction to being reassigned as Army Chief of
Staff: "I saw him the other day and the liberals and the doves have got him a little cowed and I am very fearful that he may
feel that he has been demoted and humiliated. I didn't feel that way. Buzz Wheeler told me that he wanted this
assignment." He later added: "He came in and visited me the other day and he just didn't have the warmth that he had had
before and I believe he has been rocked a little. I believe he feels that we have lost confidence and I am sure you can get
him out of that and for that reason I do think that playing it low key would be better. I want him to be strong and I want him

to regain and recapture something that McNamara took away from the military." (Johnson Library, Recordings and
Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Russell, June 3, 1968, 11:45 a.m., Tape
F6806.01, PNO 3; transcript prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian)

251. Editorial Note

On May 27, 1968, the Special Subpanel of the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) submitted a report to
President Johnson entitled "The Effects of Air Strikes in North Vietnam and Laos." The PSAC report was based on an
extensive review of government-wide studies of various aspects of the bombing campaign. The report noted that the
bombing had not "significantly weakened the will of the North Vietnamese to carry on," interdiction had failed to prevent the
enemy from increasing his capabilities, and the bombing in Laos had limited impact on the flow of men and materiel
southward. "It is our judgment that with prudent planning the enemy should have been able to schedule and move supplies
to South Vietnam at a rate which would accommodate the losses inflicted by the bombing campaign in North Vietnam," the
authors of the report concluded. "We believe that factors other than our air campaign in North Vietnam will largely
determine the scale of the war in South Vietnam in the future." None of the possible alternatives for continuing bombing
appeared promising, as air attacks only in Laos and South Vietnam would likely be about as effective as more expanded
attacks that included targets in North Vietnam. The authors recommended the development of integrated operational plans
for air interdiction, procurement of better equipment, increased identification and analysis of the vulnerability of the North
Vietnamese logistics system, a review of air-supported anti-infiltration operations, increased photographic reconnaissance
of all of North Vietnam, and the continuation and improvement of electronic surveillance operations. (Washington National
Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, 1968, 330 VIET 385.1 (Jan.-Dec.))
In CM-3402-68 to the President, June 17, General Wheeler noted the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the PSAC
recommendations. (Ibid.) On June 21 Secretary of Defense Clifford transmitted Wheeler's memorandum to the President,
as well as another memorandum containing the concurrence of himself and the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force.
(Ibid.)

252. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/

Paris, May 27, 1968, 1955Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on
Vietnam, 1968-1969, Delto Chron. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan. Received at 4:49 p.m.
14827/Delto 176. From Harriman.
1. I called on Zorin at 6 o'clock this evening for about an hour's talk./2/ We started by discussing the way the talks were
going. In answer to his questions, I told him we were making no progress. I explained our position on basis for talks, and
read him my statement at this morning's meeting on this subject./3/ I also pointed out my reference to no evidence of
restraint which I had told him I would make clear to North Viet-Nam again.
/2/A memorandum of this conversation is in the Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service,
Kennedy-Johnson, Paris Peace Talks, Subject File, HARVAN and HARVAN/PLUS, Meetings with the Soviets: ZorinOberemko.
/3/Harriman discussed the specifics of North Vietnamese military operations in the South. (Telegram 14774/Delto 163 from
Paris, May 27; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference
on Vietnam, 1968-1969, Delto Chron.)
2. This led to a discussion on the propriety of our asking restraints from the North Vietnamese, and I insisted again that
North Vietnamese could not expect further restraints on our part, when in fact they were increasing their attacks on the
northern provinces and pouring men and material to the South. Later I referred also to attacks on Saigon. I emphasized
that the type of propaganda speeches by the North Vietnamese could not last indefinitely and again suggested that we
might make progress if one or two from each side had informal private discussions. I expressed hope that he might find
some way to put this thought into the North Vietnamese ear.

3. He defended the North Vietnamese position in the usual manner, and declined to make any suggestion to them. He did
suggest, however, that we might propose private talks directly to them. He said they probably would not accept the
proposal at first, but might later on, depending upon the progress of the official discussions.
4. I then recalled to him that in answer to his charge at our last meeting, I had denied any change in the pattern of US
bombing./4/ I told him that the President had explained to Dobrynin on March 31st that the 20th parallel would be the limit
of bombing, whereas in fact Zorin may have noticed that during the past month or more, there had been no attacks above
the 19th parallel. Today, in order to keep him accurately informed, I had to tell him that the pattern might change because
of the lack of restraint on the part of North Viet-Nam. Targets north of the 19th parallel might be hit to check the large flow
of men and material to the South. I was not, however, suggesting any change from the position stated by the President to
Dobrynin.
/4/See Document 247.
5. I told him I was disappointed in the exaggeration and falseness of the North Vietnamese statements. This was having a
bad effect in the US and world wide because of their obvious fantasies. He commented that the North Vietnamese didn't
think much of our position.
6. He was again cordial but dodged any responsibility. As he was so indefinite, I concluded by asking him to inform his
government that I was worried by the arrogance and rigidity of the North Vietnamese attitude and to explain our
concern./5/
/5/In telegram 173047 to Moscow, May 29, the Department noted that Harriman had "come to conclusion that Zorin is not
receptive to suggestions as to how talks might be moved on to more productive track." (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, 1968-1969, Todel Chron.)
Harriman

253. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, May 28, 1968, 8:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The breakfast meeting, which ended at 10:50
a.m., was held at the White House. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Vance had returned from Paris the previous day.
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS
ATTENDING THE MEETING
The President
Secretary Clifford
General Taylor
Cyrus Vance
General Wheeler
CIA Director Helms
Leonard Marks
George Christian
Walt Rostow
Robert McNamara
Justice Abe Fortas
Under Secretary Katzenbach
Tom Johnson
Prime Minister of Australia Gorton joined the meeting
Cyrus Vance: We believe the North Vietnamese are hurting, but they continue indefinitely. Here are our conclusions:

1. There should be no bombing north of the 20th parallel. Hanoi would break off talks.
2. We should consider bombing selectively north of the 19th parallel.
3. Ambassador Thompson should see Gromyko to back up Harriman's meeting with Zorin/2/ to tell the Soviets that
unilateral restraint can go on only so long; that private talks are necessary.
/2/See Document 241.
4. We should keep all options open, specifically the option to go to the San Antonio formula.
More specifically:
5. They almost admitted the presence of troops in the South yesterday. We should continue to push them to admit this./3/
/3/During the May 27 formal session, Thuy stated that any Vietnamese has the right to fight for his country in any part of
Vietnam. (Telegrams 14774/Delto 163 and 14801/Delto 164 from Paris, May 27; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, 1968-1969, Delto Chron.) When
Harriman pressed Thuy at the May 31 session, Thuy categorically rejected that the DRV had any troops in South Vietnam.
(Telegrams 15232/Delto 203 and 15264/Delto 205 from Paris, May 31; ibid.)
6. We should push hard on the North Vietnamese presence in Laos.
7. We should stay away from talks about Cambodia.
8. We must push them to admit the facts about civilian losses in Hue.
9. It is essential to probe for private conversations.
The President: Will they do anything until the convention?
Mr. Vance: That is most unlikely.
The President: Are they polite?
Mr. Vance: Polite, proper, but their words are very strong.
The President: Why do you think that we are getting the best of them in propaganda?
Mr. Vance: Based on the press, my talks, and reports.
Mr. Katzenbach: There may be a small degree of movement before the conventions that won't mean anything.
General Wheeler: We have identified 107,000 in infiltration groups--half of which are in location. Tonnages in May (1st 21
days): 4800 short tons, 8000 tons in April. The infiltration continues at an accelerating rate.
Mr. Katzenbach: Aren't most of these replacements?
Wheeler: Yes.
The President: They started 107,000 down. Westy estimates 106,000 killed.
General Taylor: These figures are well beyond replacement needs.
The President: 7,900 U.S., 400 Allies, 106,000 enemy.

Secretary Clifford: I doubt if the North Vietnam attach as much significance to our convention as we are. It is possible they
will change position before three months. That's my guess.
We have a five-stage bombing campaign between the 19th and 20th. It is gradual. I have not favored going north of the
19th.
General Wheeler: Only stage 5 involves specific targets. We spotted 938 vehicles--almost a record high. Also, almost a
record high waterborne craft.
The President: Why do JCS think we should be back between 19th and 20th?
General Wheeler: There are five points:
1. Organization of North Vietnamese supply network. From north to south, there are
general depots
forward depots
distribution points.
There are a number of supply areas between the 19th and 20th parallels.
2. People have to go through this area. Headquarters of rear services is in Than Hoa.
3. They have moved to the south a number of patrol boats. These could pose a threat to Naval forces.
4. Airfield north and west of Than Hoa. It was used the other day. It gives range well south of DaNang. Threatens B-52
missions.
General Taylor: I agree with Bus. From a political and psychological standpoint, these men won't be moved by eloquence
and language.
The President: Do we gain a military advantage by going between the 19th and 20th?
General Taylor: Somewhat.
The President: What about the great propaganda advantage they will win--or breaking off negotiations?
General Taylor: We'll have to show what they are doing, too. They won't break off talks, as long as they want talks.
The President: I am not quite as optimistic as Clark and Cy about our position in the world opinion. We have such a good
case. Look at what Ho is doing. Hitler in his prime day didn't do this.
Justice Fortas: The people in the U.S. infatuated with what is going on in Paris. They aren't reading what is going on in
Saigon except casualty lists. We have two platforms:
1. Usual one
2. Paris platform.
The Paris platform is the best one. It is covered, here and abroad. We must show what North Vietnam is doing. For
example, what we found at Hue./4/ Give them a detailed statement of what they have done in recent weeks. That type of
groundwork is necessary.
/4/On April 30 the Embassy in Saigon reported that more than 1,000 South Vietnamese civilians, massacred during the

NVA/VC takeover of Hue at Tet, had been found in 19 different mass graves. The victims had been beaten to death, shot,
beheaded, or buried alive. (The New York Times, May 1, 1968)
Mr. McNamara: I am skeptical about North Vietnam planning their strategy around our conventions. They want to weaken
us domestically. They want to weaken us militarily. We have never shown the world what they are doing. Let's push them
on the ropes--use our intelligence data and release the data. Push the DMZ theme.
I have a different view of the military advantage to going back between the 19th and 20th. If we do it, tie it to psychological
and political reasons. If it can help you at the conference table, do it.
Mr. Rostow: There is a limited military advantage to going back. We get more trucks. We tear up roads.
General Wheeler: We have better night vision devices. We have better forward air controllers.
Mr. Rostow: The major reason is political. It would show them in Paris we mean business.
General Wheeler: Westy says it would be useful to go back to the 19th and 20th area.
The President: Get up pros and cons of why we should go back.
Mr. Katzenbach: North Vietnam has an objective to destroy South Vietnamese government. Make South Vietnam
government nervous.
I feel comfortable about this situation now. You have press on more pro-U.S. attitude. Country is not divided much on this.
It is more united today than any time I can remember. I would not want to do anything to upset this situation.
The President: Two thirds of Congressmen will vote for $4 billion cut. All shudder at the thought of $6 billion. But it now
looks like $6 [billion] is inevitable.
It will take $2 billion or $3 billion from DoD--non-Vietnam.
At 6 p.m. there will be a Joint Leadership meeting.
(At 9:45 a.m. Clifford and Wheeler departed.)
Mr. Katzenbach: You will have trouble going above the 19th in view of world opinion. It will be misinterpreted. It may hurt
you on tax bill.
The President: We were foolish announcing we had restricted to the19th. On the tax increase, no Congressman wants to
vote for taxes in a political year.
In summary, Cy, you have seen:
--No progress
--No give
--May not do anything before conventions.
Mr. Vance: We will proceed carefully and be patient.
(At 10 a.m. Prime Minister Gorton arrived at the meeting.)/5/
/5/Gorton was on an official State visit to the United States May 23-31. For the record of the visit and a joint communique
of May 28 which pledged Australian support for the effort in Vietnam, see Department of State Bulletin, June 17, 1968, pp.
786-792. Documentation on Gorton's visit is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXVII, Documents 37 and 38.

Mr. McNamara: There are three roles Australia can play:

1. Shows our people we are not alone. If U.S. is to play any role, Australia must stand alongside the U.S.
2. Economic role is important. States in area need economic assistance. Provides lever to get Japan to play greater
economic role.
3. Military support to Malaysia. U.S. won't get support in Congress for unilateral role in Malaysia.
Mr. Katzenbach: Do people feel comfortable?
Prime Minister Gorton: Australia will stand with the United States in other areas. Australia will stand along in Malaysia and
Singapore. We aren't large enough to stand there alone. Our presence would be small. It won't be backed up by England.
We have a couple of brigades. We lose what we've got if we don't get support. From public relations standpoint, it may be
useful.
Mr. McNamara: Short of China moving, Australian support is important. U.S. will have mobility to move in.
General Taylor: Instability in Southeast Asia is great now. It will be greater when British aren't there.
Prime Minister Gorton: We don't know how much importance can be attached to a small force of this type.
The President: Vance says Australians are good allies in Paris. Your people have been first class.
Mr. Vance: The North Vietnamese have insisted there be no private talks.
Summary:
1. No tangible progress.
2. We have better press.
3. North Vietnamese credibility has been shaken.
--They claim no troops in South.
--They claim no troops in Laos.
--They deny they caused casualties in area.
We have made constructive proposals:
--DMZ re-established
--Laos accords
--Eventual withdrawal
--Private discussions
4. No give in North Vietnam position except one.
5. No sign of restraint on ground. Agree we would stop bombing first. Then go on to other matters before actually stopping.

6. The North Vietnamese have ability to continue fighting.

7. We should continue to push on North Vietnamese presence in the South.
8. We must probe for private conversations.
The President: All our people ought to be told what they are doing and what we are doing. We are going to reassess to see
what we can do.
Our morale at home is not as good as morale out in the field.
Prime Minister Gorton: Will proposition be put forward for a ceasefire?
Mr. Vance: We do not believe this will be put forth in near future. We do not anticipate they will put forth this proposition.
Prime Minister Gorton: What does the near future indicate?
Mr. Vance: We do not know.
General Taylor: Cease-fire would take a great deal of negotiation.
Mr. McNamara: Before we can talk about a cease-fire we must get them to admit presence in the South.
Prime Minister Gorton: A cease-fire could be disastrous.
Justice Fortas: North Vietnam now takes the position they are not in South Vietnam at all. If you have a cease-fire, they
would pretend only people affected would be Americans and Viet Cong. As long as they do not admit they are in the
South, they don't have to move.
Prime Minister Gorton: We must have no partial conquest of South by permitting North Vietnam to stay in the South.
The President: We could find no worse situation than our pulling out with North Vietnamese remaining in the South. If they
pull out, we pull out.
Director Marks: On world opinion, newspaper opinion since March 31 shows:
1. President removed self in interest of peace
2. U.S. restrained
3. U.S. wanted talks
4. Very skilled negotiating team
5. Reasonable U.S. negotiating terms
6. Hanoi's intransigence.
The President: Location of North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia: There was a graphic presentation.
Prime Minister Gorton: I have no suggestions about Paris. I fear a cease-fire leaving South Vietnam under North
Vietnamese control.
Cessation of the bombing bothers me. We must have an understanding along the lines of the San Antonio formula before it
is further sealed down.

The President: What is the sentiment in your country?

Prime Minister Gorton: The morale is first class by men in the front lines. The support is good.
--The R&R program is excellent.
--We hope U.S. men will return and live in Australia.
--Families have taken R&R boys in. Kids will stay in homes rather than hotels.

254. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, May 28, 1968, 6:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting ended at 7:24 p.m. Those
attending were the President, the Vice President, Rostow, Clifford, Katzenbach, Wheeler, Helms, Vance, Bundy, Tom
Johnson, Mansfield, Dirksen, Fulbright, Hickenlooper, Russell, McCormack, Albert, Ford, Laird, Senators Robert Byrd and
Milton Young and Congressmen Hale Boggs, Thomas Morgan, George Mahon, Leslie Arends, Frances Bolton, and
William Bates. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF BI-PARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP
MEETING WITH CYRUS VANCE
The President: Vance came in late last evening. He met with the Executive branch this morning./2/ I wanted you to get all
the information he has. We want your advice and suggestions.
/2/See Document 253.
We are concerned about our situation in Vietnam. We have shown restraint. They have shown none. We lost 1,100 men in
the last two weeks.
Mr. Vance: I have little to add to what you already know.
Procedural discussions took two days and amounted to four total hours.
Substantive sections now are all from printed documents. Their room to improvise is quite limited.
Thumb-nail sketches on each member of the North Vietnamese delegation. Outlined they have background in propaganda.
They are using talks as a propaganda device. It seems a fight-and-talk strategy. Broadening of government in South
Vietnam has been a step forward.
No tangible progress at conference table.
In public opinion, North Vietnam credibility has been shaken by denial of having troops in South.
U.S. has made constructive proposals.
We have sought to have private talks without success.
We need to get into private discussions.
We are going to be patient.

Things have gone about as expected.

Road will be long and difficult.
Congressman Mahon: Are there reasons which would cause North Vietnam to engage in private talks or do they consider
these talks merely a second front?
Mr. Vance: They may want to change their position. I do not know.
Congressman Ford: Do you discuss our military operations and theirs?
Mr. Vance: We have not been able to get into informal dialogue.
They charge us with being aggressors. They allege we violate 1954 accords.
They refuse to acknowledge they have troops in the South.
President: They have shown no restraint.
Mr. Vance: They say we should get first to the cessation of the bombing.
Bill Bates: What reason are they there?
Mr. Vance: They want to reach a solution on their terms. There will be compromise on down the road.
Senator Dirksen: Has instability in France affected talks?
Mr. Vance: Not yet.
Senator Young: Can they act without bowing to China or Russia?
Mr. Vance: Yes. They show that by fact they are talking. They went away from China's advice.
Senator Russell: What do you mean they have admitted they have troops in South?
Congressman Boggs: Any private contact?
Mr. Vance: No.
Congressman Laird: Withdrawal of troops--was this same as declared in Manila?
Mr. Vance: Yes.
Senator Fulbright: Do they think we should stop all bombing before going on to substantive matters?
Mr. Vance: Yes.
Senator Fulbright: Could you have private talks about substantive matters before bombing is halted?
Mr. Vance: Yes.
Senator Mansfield: I am not discouraged.
I am delighted with line with patience.

Secretary Clifford:
1. We are going through stage of negotiations you must go through with the Communists.
Lengthy conferences are not unusual.
I am hopeful about the meeting.
President made an exceedingly generous offer last September.
On March 31, President made a substantially tougher offer.
They accepted it. Why?
Something happened between September and March 31.
They concluded guerrilla war was a failure. They conducted Tet offensive. It was a dismal failure from their standpoint.
They lost many men. They held no cities. They did not get government to fall.
They concluded they cannot win militarily in Vietnam.
So, they seek a political settlement in Paris.
We must stay with these negotiations as long as we can.
General Wheeler: Military activity in South has been substantial
--Just South of DMZ
--in Saigon area
--in Western highlands.
They have shown no signs of restraint in North.
107,000 men are being moved into Laos and South Vietnam.
28,000 May
37,000 April
20,000 May
The full number has not reached South Vietnam. There will be peak in June.
They have been rebuilding bridges north of 20th parallel on permanent basis. Rebuilt railroads. They have improved
airfields.
There is no substantial movement of AA.
Senator Russell: What is policy in our forces on MiGs in South?
General Wheeler: If they penetrate south of 19 , we go after them. They could go south to 16, near Danang. They may
try to knock down a B-52.

Secretary Katzenbach: These have not been negotiations yet. Patience is important. So is firmness.
Objectives of North Vietnam.
1. Destroy Saigon government.
2. Split us from allies.
3. Seek to win propaganda war.
Secretary Katzenbach: There will be further efforts in South to strengthen their position in the South.
Exposure of North Vietnamese delegation to Western press. They have been exposed for what they are.
President: We are grateful to Cy Vance.
Congressman Ford: From JCS point-of-view, are you in agreement with guidelines you have?
General Wheeler: Yes.
Support for war was low. In reducing bombing on March 31 to 20th, we lost very little because of bad weather.
We did take some psychological loss.
As weather gets better military costs get higher.
I thought we should limit ourselves to try to bring this miserable war to a close.
Senator Byrd: How long can we refrain from bombing north of 20th?
General Wheeler: It will depend on talks in Paris.
It will depend on political factors. We need to give diplomatic track a full chance of success.
Secretary Clifford: We have increased number of sorties south of 20th. We are concentrating now on Panhandle.
In March we knocked out-180 trucks of 1967 March
680 trucks of 1968 March
242 April 67
765 April 68
Director Helms:
1. North Vietnam had political objective
--bring down South Vietnamese government.
--bring diviseness between U.S. and allies.
--cause dissent in U.S. over war.

40% of men coming down are for Saigon area.

2. World opinion has shifted since March 31.
Anti-Americanism has quieted.
The intelligence shows they intend to go all out.
President: Enemy wants to bring out division between Allies and show we were a country divided./3/
/3/Vance met the next day with the Cabinet from 12:10 to 1:25 p.m., at which time the Paris negotiations were discussed.
(Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) Notes of this meeting have not been found. Both the President and Vance made
brief statements regarding the Paris talks following this meeting. See Department of State Bulletin, June 17, 1968, p. 780.

255. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of
State Rusk/1/
Washington, May 29, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164, Secretary's Luncheon Meetings
with the President--1968 (2). Secret; Nodis; Harvan.
SUBJECT
Military Action Between the 19th and 20th Parallels
1. Nature of Military Action. I believe--as does Cy Vance--that resumed action in this area should initially be on a selected
basis and directed at specific targets such as the airfield and other installations where we have our strongest case of
action by the other side. The weight of attack should be adequate, but not so that it would lead to sensational headlines.
The question of route reconnaissance should be left to follow--on the theory that our initial impact will guide the public
reaction, and that specific targets have a much more persuasive initial rationale.
2. Timing. While we have already laid a significant private base through the Harriman/Zorin conversation,/2/ and have built
a general picture of major military action by the other side, there is still a question whether we would do better to act at
once or to wait for visible offensive actions by the other side in the Highlands--which look like coming very shortly in any
case. The latter would give us a much better public case and avoid the implication of any unilateral "re-escalation" on our
part. This at least deserves discussion, although I would see no major adverse effect on the Paris talks or on public opinion
if we were to go ahead very soon.
/2/See Document 241.
3. Thompson/Gromyko Gambit. My own inclination would be against saying anything more to the Soviets. Harriman's
message was quite clear enough, and raising to the Gromyko level might even tend to engage Soviet prestige in
strengthening the defense of the area.
4. Telling Thieu. Whenever we decide to act we should try to get word to Thieu in advance. We should not be asking him
to highlight what we are doing in any way, but our telling him would be a useful indicator both of general consultation and
of our taking the over-all problem seriously.
5. On a total view, I believe that this action--on a limited and selected scale initially--would be a useful signal at this point.
However, we should not exaggerate its significance. Since our actions would still be within the scope of the March 31
speech, I doubt very much if Hanoi would draw any conclusion that we were thinking of going north of the 20th, or would
significantly moderate its general military pattern. I attach George Carver's analysis, which deals with this option on pages
8-9./3/ (I understand that Clark Clifford also has Carver's memorandum.)
/3/Attached but not printed was Carver's undated analytical paper entitled "Alternative Courses of Action Under Certain
Assumed Conditions," in which he evaluated the assumptions and options presented in the attachment to Document 248.
On pages 8-9, he evaluated Option B, which was "more to our liking as a symbol of American impatience" since it

represented a hardened military position within the limits set by the President's March 31 speech. However, as it would not
lead to any restraints on Hanoi's part, Carver judged it as only "one of the first steps that should be tried." Option A was the
best course of action, since "any significant American escalation above the 20th parallel would be widely regarded abroad
and within the U.S. as unjustified."

256. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/
JCSM-343-68
Washington, May 29, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of Defense, Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 911/305 (24 May 68) IR 4055-4057. Top
Secret; Sensitive.
SUBJECT
Possible Courses of Action and Alternatives in Vietnam Under Certain Conditions (U)
1. (TS) Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 24 May 1968, subject: "Possible U.S. Courses of Action if Paris
Talks Stall or Break Down,"/2/ which requested judgments on steps to be taken by the United States in the event that
current talks in Paris fail to be productive in the near term or break down completely or are abandoned.
/2/In this memorandum, I-35539/68 to Wheeler, May 24, Clifford requested that the JCS respond to two "eventualities." He
outlined five options if the North Vietnamese remained "unresponsive" at Paris: A) continuation of the present restrictions;
B) extension up to the 20th parallel; C) return to the campaign prior to March 31; D) expansion of the attacks to include all
targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong area; or E) a complete cessation. If the talks broke down completely, there were three
alternative courses of action: 1) continue with the present strategy; 2) expand the ground war into Laos, Cambodia, or
North Vietnam; or 3) adopt a revised strategy that would "achieve the optimum balance between maximum security for the
South Vietnamese population and minimum casualties." (Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense,
OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, 1968 Secretary of Defense Files, VIET 092.2)
2. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the military actions which are required to create favorable conditions for
satisfactory negotiations are very nearly identical with those military actions which should be taken if the talks are broken
off.
3. (TS) Currently, US/Free World/Government of Vietnam Forces are significantly stronger than enemy forces in South
Vietnam (SVN). However, in view of the enemy's lack of restraint in the face of our partial bombing cessation, the
US/Government of Vietnam position in SVN may deteriorate with time, unless Hanoi deescalates or full bombardment is
resumed.
4. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimate that North Vietnam's (NVN's) objective in Paris is to gain by negotiations what it
cannot gain through aggression in SVN. It is probable that NVN hopes for circumstances which would result in a
withdrawal of US Forces from SVN and a weak South Vietnamese Government which would have to accept a coalition or
ultimate defeat.
5. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it clearly undesirable and unnecessary to accept circumstances which would lead
to precipitous withdrawal or negotiations from weakness. They believe that military actions, which are feasible in terms of
forces, costs, time, and risks, can be undertaken which would either render the enemy incapable of continuing the war or
cause him to recognize the inevitable destruction of his capability to continue the war.
6. (TS) The two situations provided in the reference are discussed in paragraphs 7 and 8, below. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
consider that forceful action by the United States is necessary in each of the two situations proposed. The actions
recommended are designed to influence NVN towards productive, meaningful negotiations or, in the event of their
breakdown, to make it as costly and difficult as possible for NVN to continue its support of the war in SVN.
7. (TS) Policy if North Vietnam Remains Unresponsive in Paris Talks
a. A primary objective of NVN is, and has been, to force the United States into a unilateral cessation of bombing.
Nevertheless, implicit in the President's 31 March 1968 offer was the threat of resumption of prior bombardment if NVN

took advantage of a bombing cessation or if prompt and productive talks did not follow such a cessation.
b. NVN intransigence at the negotiation table has been accompanied by a continued high level of offensive operations in
SVN. Moreover, rather than restrictions by NVN, they have taken advantage of the bombing cessation by increasing the
movement of men and materiel to the South. While US casualties have increased during this period, NVN has enjoyed
immunity from attack in its heartland, its major cities, and its base of military aggression. Without reciprocal deescalation
on the part of NVN and movement towards productive discussions, the military risks increase.
c. The five courses of action outlined in the reference are evaluated in Appendix A hereto./3/
/3/In the attached Appendix A, entitled "Alternative Courses of Action Under Certain Assumed Conditions," undated, the
JCS evaluated the various options and recommended that Option D be initiated.
d. To move from partial to complete cessation of bombing in NVN entails a substantial increase in risk to the security of
allied forces when compared to the risks accepted by the unilateral, though partial, cessation of 31 March 1968. Bombing
directly supports allied forces in I CTZ and has an immediate capability to influence the course of the battle. Loss of this
capability, which bombing affords, would, as the President's statement on 31 March 1968 conveyed, ". . . immediately and
directly endanger the lives of our men and our allies, . . ." unless there were rapid and visible comparable restraint by the
enemy. Prompt reciprocal deescalatory acts must be identified and verified in order to lessen the military risks, alleviate
mistrust by SVN, and help achieve US national objectives in Southeast Asia.
e. Cessation of the bombing without an agreed and effective deescalation of the war in the South would be difficult to
reconcile with the increase in US casualties, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe would result from the cessation of
bombing. Psychologically, the American people could well relate cessation of bombing with "unnecessary casualties."
f. Without significant progress in negotiations, forceful action by the United States is necessary to redress the military
disadvantages attributable to the partial bombing cessation. Expansion of target lists and areas of operation in the past on
a gradual incremental basis did not prove effective in making it as difficult and costly as possible for NVN to continue its
aggression in SVN. A concerted air and naval campaign capable of accomplishing US objectives must include action of
such scope and timeliness as to exceed NVN's ability to accommodate.
g. The extension of the bombardment limit from 19 N to 20N would not bring significantly increased pressure on NVN nor
seriously restrict the flow of men and materiel on the part of an enemy determined to "fight and talk." US gradualism would
invite continuation of unproductive talks, continuing high rates of infiltration, and increased fighting in SVN as part of the
North Vietnamese process of attempting to wear down what they hope to be a war-weary divided enemy. Another option
considered is that of a one-time, large-scale air strike north of the 20th parallel. However, such a strike beyond announced
limits would be to the disadvantage of the United States because it could elicit unfavorable public reaction. Moreover, while
a one-time strike could produce significant damage against a portion of the enemy strengths attacked, the benefits would
probably not be sufficient to compensate for aircraft losses in the absence of authority for poststrike reconnaissance,
restrike, and sustained pressures.
h. Recommendation
In the face of continued NVN intransigence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that Course of Action IV, Option D
(Expand Bombardment Beyond Authorities Existing Prior to 31 March 1968) be initiated and continued until Hanoi begins
prompt and productive talks. This campaign, utilizing the good weather period extending into November, should consist of
bombardment by air and naval forces against all of NVN, with specific exceptions related to the ChiCom buffer zone. A
decision relative to expanded bombing of NVN is time sensitive and should be made soon enough to permit taking
advantage of the good weather associated with the southwest monsoon (May-November).
8. (TS) Policy if Paris Talks Breakdown or are Abandoned
a. The three broad alternatives outlined in the reference in the event the current talks in Paris breakdown or are
abandoned are set forth below and are evaluated more fully in Appendix B hereto./4/
/4/In the attached Appendix B, the JCS evaluated the three alternatives in Clifford's memorandum.
b. Alternative 1 (Continue Present Strategy) maintains the initiative and favorable US/Government of Vietnam negotiating
position, should negotiations be resumed.

c. Major operations under Alternative 2 (Expand the Ground War into Laos, Cambodia, and/or North Vietnam) would be at
least 6 months or more away and would require an additional Reserve callup and mobilization. Expanded covert
operations and small-scale overt operations in these areas, as required, supported by airpower, would increase
effectiveness of operations in SVN.
d. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the present strategy is designed to achieve the objectives of Alternative 3 (Revise
Strategy To Achieve the Optimum Balance Between Maximum Security for South Vietnamese Population and Minimum
US Casualties). They assume that this alternative is intended to represent a "demographic strategy"; i.e., a withdrawal of
allied forces from selected areas of SVN temporarily or permanently. This alternative would assume current levels of
forces and intensity of combat, with a change only in tactics to be executed in SVN. The change in tactics would unduly
prolong the war through the adoption of a defensive posture and voluntarily surrendering to the enemy the tactical
initiative, as well as some of the population and much of the territory of SVN. This would be tantamount to a military defeat
for our forces. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that Free World casualties would increase. Therefore, of the
three alternatives, this course of action is the least suitable.
e. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, should it become necessary to resume full-scale hostilities in Southeast Asia,
such an undertaking should be free of the militarily confining restraints which have characterized the conduct of the war in
the North to date. Specifically, authorities should be granted for closure of North Vietnamese ports by mining; for
unrestricted air warfare against all targets of military and/or economic significance to and including Route 4, except that no
approach closer than 2 nm to the ChiCom border would be made; and extension of normal naval surface operations to
21-15N, 15 miles south of the ChiCom border.
f. Monetary cost for these three alternatives cannot be estimated without a determination of the extent of operations to be
undertaken and forces required.
g. Recommendation. In the event talks breakdown or are abandoned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend Alternative 1
(Continue Present Strategy) combined with:
(1) An expanded air and naval campaign against NVN, as set forth in subparagraph 8e, above.
(2) Expanded covert and small-scale overt operations in Laos, Cambodia, and the DMZ, as required, supported by air
power, to increase the effectiveness of operations in SVN.
9. (U) Although the foregoing and Appendices A and B respond to the questions posed in the reference, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff consider that the questions directly address specific courses of action rather than the broader problem of policy.
Therefore, they are preparing additional comments and recommendations as a matter of urgency.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler/5/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/5/Printed from a copy that indicates General Westmoreland signed the original.

257. Memorandum for Record/1/

Saigon, May 31, 1968.
/1/Source: U.S. Army Center of Military History, DepCORDS/MACV Papers, 84c-Pacification Concepts: 1967-1968.
Secret. Prepared by Komer on June 2.
SUBJECT
Meeting with Prime Minister Tran Van Huong Friday, 31 May 1968
I made my first call on the new Prime Minister on Friday, 31 May 1968. Clay McManaway accompanied, as I want him to
continue as my pacification and recovery liaison with the Prime Minister's office. After a few remarks on the happy
coincidence of our first meeting occurring on "Demi-Tet"--the fifth day of the fifth month of the lunar calendar and an
auspicious day for beginning new relationships--I turned directly to substance.

Role and Importance of the RD Ministry. Covering briefly the origin of the RD Ministry in the inability of the regular
ministries to carry out the kinds of programs needed in a wartime situation and its post-Diem evolution into the one civilian
organization that has an impact at the hamlet level, I stressed the need to retain it as a Ministry until it is absolutely certain
that the regular ministries are again capable of assuming responsibility for their different programs. I stated that it would be
best to insist on proven performance before turning back any of the health, education, agriculture or public works programs
to the respective ministries. I did not foresee this as likely for the next year or two.
The Prime Minister agreed; he stated that his appreciation of the importance of the RD Ministry was evidenced by his
retaining the RD portfolio himself.
Pacification. With regard to pacification the Prime Minister stated his two guiding principles: First, protect the people and
thereby gain their confidence; then involve the people in programs, in particular health and education. I agreed that
security is paramount, but also pressed the importance of increasing the peasants' income, primarily through increased
agricultural production and price policies that benefit the farmer over the consumer.
The Prime Minister showed evident surprise at these statements and enthusiastically agreed, saying again that the people
want first of all security and secondly enough money to live. He was born to a poor family and had worked as a "coolie." So
he understood what the people wanted. But security and confidence in the government's will and ability to protect the
people is overriding in importance. Until there is this confidence we cannot expect the people to cooperate with us or tell us
what they know of the enemy; to cooperate with the government today too often means not only death, but an atrocious
kind of death at the hands of the VC.
Leadership. I agreed in turn with the Prime Minister and emphasized that gaining the people's confidence is above all a
function of leadership. I stressed that one of the most important things he could do was to get the best leadership in the
right places. In this connection I offered our assistance in providing information on the performance of Province and District
Chiefs, reminding the Prime Minister of our extensive advisory organization throughout the country. The Prime Minister
acknowledged the offer, but cautioned me on the differences between Vietnamese and Americans. He said he hoped I
would understand that the Vietnamese think with their "hearts" (feelings) more so than with their "heads," and that he must
be certain of his facts and all related factors before moving against anyone. He underlined the importance of his first
moves being right.
He then went on in this vein that because of internal politics and because of the feelings about the Paris talks, prominent
officials may feel constrained from time to time to say things in public that offend or that contradict private working
relationships. He hoped I would understand that this would not indicate any real problems or genuine anti-Americanism.
He said he thinks we can work well together, we the Americans will supply the "head" (i.e., the logic and reason) and he,
Huong, will provide the "heart," (i.e., the feeling for and understanding of the people and Vietnam). I assured the Prime
Minister that we Americans are sympathetic people also and that sentiment for the plight of Vietnam is an important reason
for our being here. However, I agreed that only the Vietnamese can really understand Vietnam. I thought that the first
stage of wisdom for Americans here is the realization that we do not really understand the Vietnamese peasant. But we
can provide management and technical skills and, working with knowledgeable Vietnamese, we can make an effective
team.
Prime Minister--A Man of the People. At this point the Prime Minister spoke eloquently and movingly of his peasant origins,
the poverty of his parents and his early years, his days with the Viet Minh; in sum, the Prime Minister said, he is a man of
the people and he knows and understands the people (Comment: He mentioned his participation in terrorist acts when he
was with the Viet Minh and said he could not stand the atrocities and left them for this reason. Here and earlier the Prime
Minister made the point quite forcefully that it is not so much death that the people fear as the thought of an atrocious
death at the hands of the VC).
Mobilization. After first suggesting he consider expressing his feelings for the people at an appropriate time (because the
American audience would be very impressed indeed could they hear Mr. Huong's words), I stressed my understanding of
the importance of mobilization. Then I urged that the program be carried out in such a way as to avoid crippling important
elements of the civil administration, citing several examples of damage already done. Mr. Huong spoke for a few moments
of the loss of a combative spirit among the people, in particular the youth who have run from the war and hidden
themselves in the civil ministries; and the hope he has that mobilization will somehow work to revive the people's spirit. He
ended by acknowledging the dangers to the civil administration and agreed that the method of implementation must avoid
paralyzing the government.
American Aid. I referred to a remark that the Prime Minister had made to Ambassador Bunker about American assistance
not reaching the Vietnamese people and said I wanted to assure him that the great bulk does reach the people. I referred
to PL 480 rice as a good example of a major segment of the AID program that goes directly to the people. Mr. Huong said
the thought he had meant to convey was that a great many people are benefitting from American aid before it ever reaches
the people and in some cases the amount of aid finally arriving at its destination is less than intended. Taking rice as the

example, he implied rather strongly that there is corruption involved in the import of US rice. I assured the Prime Minister
that we had no indication of any double-dealing in this program but he persisted, saying he knows how it works, and it
does not work the way we think it does.
Dr. Dan. The last subject we discussed was the assumption of the Chieu Hoi portfolio by Dr. Dan. I said I understood that
Dr. Dan was reluctant to accept the Prime Minister's request to become Chieu Hoi Minister and expressed concern should
this excellent idea not become a reality. The Prime Minister agreed on the political importance of the Chieu Hoi Ministry
and said he hopes Dr. Dan will accept. I then offered two points to use in discussion with Dr. Dan: (1) While the Chieu Hoi
Ministry is very important politically, it is not a complicated program and it would not take all of Dr. Dan's time to run it; and
(2) Furthermore, Col. Anh in the Chieu Hoi Ministry is like Col. Lac in the RD Ministry; he's been there forever, knows
everything, and can run the Ministry for Dr. Dan--leaving the latter free to do other things as well.
Mr. Huong restated his feeling about the importance of the Chieu Hoi Program and at one point said, in a rather dramatic
way, that he (Huong) knows "many things;" so many that his life may be in danger. At this I assured him of our concern
and constant readiness to assist in any way. The conversation continued as we walked to the door, with Mr. Huong
expressing his long-held affection for and confidence in Col. Lac.
Comment: The meeting was cordial and at times animated. I was quite encouraged by Prime Minister Huong's obvious
grasp of the situation. The new Prime Minister is an impressive man and projects an image of wisdom, strength and
confidence. Most encouraging./2/
R.W. Komer/3/
/2/Bunker's assessment of Huong and his leadership potential is in telegram 29472 from Saigon, June 8. (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S) The telegram is printed in full in
Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp 461-467.
/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Komer signed the original.

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume V, Vietnam 1967

Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 258-277

June 1-July 15: Soviet Involvement and Possible North Vietnamese

Restraint
258. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, June 3, 1968, 1257Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 8 I, 1/67-12/68, Taylor Memos--General. Secret.
Received at the LBJ Ranch at 9:47 a.m. The President arrived in Texas on May 29 and returned to Washington on June 4.
(Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
CAP 81231. As you know, Ellsworth Bunker has warned us rather solemnly of the effects on South Vietnamese morale of
continued attacks on Saigon while we leave Hanoi-Haiphong unmolested./2/ Attached is:
/2/In telegram 28566 from Saigon, May 29, Bunker wrote: "It seems to me, therefore, that there is a strong argument for
linking any cessation of bombing in the North to the cessation of terror attacks on the cities of the South and I believe that
a failure to link these two factors could seriously impair our position in the type of negotiations on which we have entered
where the enemy is apparently determined to maintain maximum military pressure." (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
1. A passage from a personal letter to me from Bob Komer in the same vein;/3/ and
/3/In his May 28 letter to Rostow, Komer wrote: "Is there no way in which we could hold their cities hostage for ours? Why
couldn't we tell Hanoi's negotiators privately that if the VC/NVA attack Saigon again we will attack Hanoi? Or that if they
attack Danang, we will strike Haiphong? We wouldn't publicly insist on reciprocity, but simply say privately that we would
exercise it. If they broke off the talks on this basis, our case would seem strong to me. Alternatively, if we go to a complete
bombing cessation, it really ought to be tied to some such unilateral declaration that further attacks on our cities would lead
to renewed bombing of theirs." (Ibid., Komer Files: Lot 69 D 303, Vietnam/Turkey) The portion of Komer's letter quoted in
the telegram printed here is omitted.
2. A memorandum to you from General Taylor./4/
/4/In a May 31 memorandum to the President, Taylor advised the removal of geographical restrictions on the bombing
campaign to allow for linking the bombing to enemy attacks. The targets bombed, their locations, the number of sorties
flown, and the bombing tonnage could all be adjusted in accordance with the scale of the NVA/VC actions. The text of this
memorandum was included in the telegram printed here but is omitted.
The issue is likely to become, at least temporarily, more acute with the bad accident with the U.S. rocket in Saigon
yesterday.
The indications are, however, that the enemy feels he has struck paydirt in the harassment of Saigon; and intelligence
suggests further attacks in the days ahead.
As I see them, our choices are:
--Do nothing;
--Go back to the 20th parallel which will help a little but not be a serious reply to the harassment of Saigon;
--After warning the enemy, establish a tit-for-tat policy towards Hanoi-Haiphong, conducting raids not on a regular basis
but as direct response to attacks on Saigon;
--Go back to Hanoi-Haiphong on a regular basis.

No one can predict whether the enemy will break up the talks on this basis. He might suspend them while we were
attacking Hanoi--or he might not. I have no recommendation at this time; but I do not think we should simply ignore the
warnings coming to us from Saigon.
At the minimum, we may wish to have Westmoreland's assessment while he is here, including the possibility of measures
which would cut down the possibility of enemy penetration of Saigon.
I have noted your message about Saigon in relation to tomorrow's Glassboro speech./5/ I doubt that we should publicly
warn the enemy about Saigon attacks unless we have decided actually to move in retaliation; but I shall discuss the matter
with Secretaries Rusk and Clifford today.
/5/The President delivered a speech at Glassboro State College in New Jersey in commemoration of the 1-year
anniversary of his meeting there with Kosygin. In the speech, the President noted the lack of "some gestures on the other
side toward peace" at Paris and stressed the need for Soviet cooperation in bringing about the peaceful resolution of
Vietnam and other issues. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I,
pp. 679-684.
[Omitted here are excerpts from Komer's letter and Taylor's memorandum.]

259. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, June 3, 1968, 1712Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 80. Secret; Harvan.
Received at 1:54 p.m. at the LBJ Ranch.
CAP 81241. Herewith Harriman recommends that we postpone consideration of bombing between 19th and 20th parallels
until we see what the Hanoi Politburo man Le Duc Tho brings with him at Wednesday's meeting./2/
/2/June 5.
1. In light of Le Duc Tho's arrival in Paris today we recommend that considerations of bombing between 19 degrees and 20
degrees be deferred.
2. Although we, of course, do not know what instructions Tho may be bringing, there is possibility that because of his
position, more flexibility may be introduced into our discussions, including possibility of private conversations./3/
/3/In Intelligence Note No. 418 to Rusk, May 31, Hughes noted INR's speculation that Tho was being sent to Paris for two
reasons: to shore up the delegation (believed to have been handled poorly by Thuy) and to allow for "greater
maneuvering" and thus a shift "either toward movement, or to stonewall for a long period of time with greater effectiveness
than the delegation has shown to date." The assessment of Tho was that while he was "reported to be a hard-liner, a
member of the pro-Chinese wing of the Party," he also "favored a less doctrinaire and violent policy than Le Duan in South
Vietnam." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET)
3. In these circumstances, bombing between 19 and 20 degrees might thwart these possibilities and therefore it would be
well to test the water.

Attachment
Paris 15436, June 3, 1968
1. In light of Le Duc Tho's arrival in Paris today we recommend that considerations of bombing between 19 degrees and 20
degrees be deferred.

2. Although we, of course, do not know what instructions Tho may be bringing, there is possibility that because of his
position, more flexibility may be introduced into our discussions, including possibility of private conversations.
3. In these circumstances, bombing between 19 and 20 degrees might thwart these possibilities and therefore it would be
well to test the water.
Harriman

260. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/
JCSM-354-68
Washington, June 4, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of Defense, Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 911/305 (24 May 68), IR 4055-4057. Top
Secret.
SUBJECT
US Policy With Respect to Negotiations With North Vietnam (U)
1. (U) Reference is made to JCSM-343-68, dated 29 May 1968, subject: "Possible Courses of Action and Alternatives in
Vietnam Under Certain Conditions (U)," which addressed specific courses of action rather than the broader problem of
policy./2/ This memorandum provides additional comments and recommendations on the broader subject of US policy.
/2/Document 256.
2. (U) In a major policy statement in September 1967 and repeated in October of that year, General Giap stated that the
North Vietnam (NVN) objectives were:
a. Protect NVN.
b. Overthrow the present Government of Vietnam (GVN) and seize its apparatus.
c. Unite all of Vietnam under communist control./3/
/3/Giap made this statement in the North Vietnamese newspaper Quang Doi Nhan Dan, September 14-16, 1967, and in
the Soviet newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda, October 21, 1967.
3. (C) North Vietnam has achieved a major portion of the first of these objectives by our action in partially halting the
bombing. This has provided immunity to about 90 percent of the people and 70 percent of the territory of NVN. The current
hard-line negotiating position of that Government in Paris is designed to attain the remainder of this objective.
4. (C) To attain the second objective (overthrow the GVN and seize its apparatus), NVN had engaged in overt military
aggression in South Vietnam (SVN), is providing support and direction to the Viet Cong/National Liberation Front
Insurgency, and has attempted to gain support of world opinion by a concerted propaganda attack against US actions in
Southeast Asia and concurrently to demonstrate that the GVN with allied assistance is incapable of protecting its citizens.
The following actions by NVN support the basic NVN objectives: assassination and kidnapping of public officials, random
assaults on population centers, disruption of commerce, infliction of casualties on US and South Vietnamese forces--all
designed to alter progressively public attitudes within the United States, SVN, and the world at large. Were NVN
successful in achieving the first two objectives, they would likely take the view that time would take care of the third.
Communist ideology disregards time as a major consideration in developing strategic and tactical objectives.
5. (TS) To date, military operations in Southeast Asia have been conducted within a framework of policy guidelines
established to achieve US objectives. Principal among these policy guidelines are:
a. We seek to avoid widening the war into a conflict with Communist China or the USSR.

b. We have no present intention of invading NVN.

c. We do not seek the overthrow of the Government of NVN.
d. We are guided by the principles set forth in the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962.
6. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that these guidelines are valid. However, although progress is being made within
the above framework, it has not been commensurate with the military power available in Southeast Asia, largely because
constraints on the employment of this power have resulted in a program of graduated application of military pressure. NVN
has the advantage of the use of certain sanctuaries for retreat and regroupment without fear of attack. The enemy has the
advantage of uninterrupted importation of war material. He knows that certain restrictions on US military operations will
give him tactical advantage. He also has the advantage of being able to gauge his own military efforts against the
announced US military force buildup. He knows that we will not destroy his country or his Government because we have
publicly so stated. Because of these advantages, more than 3 years of gradually increasing pressures have not caused the
enemy to cease his aggression. On the contrary, NVN has been able to maintain its capability to support an everincreasing intensity of conflict, with the resulting greater expenditure of US resources and increase in US casualties.
7. (S) A continuation of the restraints associated with the current policies during protracted negotiations of the type
experienced so far can result only in progressive deterioration of the allied capability to block attainment of the North
Vietnamese objectives as they relate to SVN. It appears, therefore, that considerable intensification of direct pressure on
NVN is needed.
8. (TS) In the event that current negotiations fail to produce early and substantial progress or break down, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff believe that the air and naval attacks on all of NVN should be resumed and that restraints in such attacks
heretofore imposed within the current policies should be removed. At a suitable time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will make
appropriate recommendations, dependent upon developments.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler/4/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/4/Printed from a copy that indicates General Wheeler signed the original.

261. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, June 4, 1968, 1:45-3 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. Fortas and Taylor are listed as attending but
their presence was not recorded in the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.)
NOTES ON THE PRESIDENT'S TUESDAY LUNCHEON
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Wheeler
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
Justice Fortas
General Taylor
George Christian
Tom Johnson
The President: The Trejos meeting was a good one. They have some population problems and are not too happy about all
the conditions placed on World Bank loans./2/

/2/Prior to this luncheon, the President met with Jose Joaquin Trejos Fernandez, President of Costa Rica.
Are they still in Saigon, Clark?
Secretary Clifford: We are in some trouble. It does not appear to be too serious. Westy (General Westmoreland) said they
always can infiltrate small groups in.
Westy said a linear defense system around Saigon is not practical. It would take two divisions and would not do much
better.
General Wheeler: The Vietnamese appointed General [Nguyen Van] Minh to run the Saigon defense--ARVN, police, RF
and PF.
The President: Would you brief us, Dick? (CIA Director Helms)
Director Helms: There are new elements around Khesanh. There were 83 defectors to ARVN last night. Heavy men and
material flow continues into the South. There have been no MIG flights below 20th. We found 100 mm weapons around
DMZ. Thieu disagrees on general mobilization in the House.
Walt Rostow: General Abrams and Ambassador Berger called on Ky. He was in a black mood. He talked of resigning over
men shot up by our helicopter./3/ We have a potential problem with Ky and General Thang. Killing his allies has put him
very down in the dumps. It is a very serious problem.
/3/On June 2 a rocket launched from a U.S. helicopter destroyed a school building that was being used as a command
post during the fighting in Saigon. Killed in the explosion were seven high-ranking South Vietnamese officials. Most of
those killed or injured were associates of Ky. Among the dead was Lieutenant Colonel Pho Quoc Chu, Ky's brother-in-law.
In the immediate aftermath of the incident, Thieu was able to further consolidate his power at Ky's expense by relieving Ky
allies Nguyen Ngoc Loan as National Police Chief and Van Van Cua as Mayor of Saigon. See The New York Times, June
3-9, 1968.
The President: What happened on that chopper, Bus?
General Wheeler: South Vietnam called for chopper support. One rocket of flight of three went erratic. It landed in the
command post area and killed the men who directed the operation. This was an accident. It was unfortunate.
Secretary Clifford: The President may want to show great concern. One of the men killed was Ky's brother-in-law. It is
something of a national tragedy. The President may want to send some Government official to the funeral. Real concern
must be shown. Ky may not think it was an accident.
The President: How do you get through the Senate with only Senator Young against you?
General Wheeler: I have a simple recipe--stay out of politics.
The President: Where are we on Thieu's visit?
Secretary Rusk: A visit to Washington during June wouldn't be good with all these demonstrations.
Secretary Clifford: General Wheeler and I need to go to South Vietnam after General Abrams gets in. I want to get closer
to the situation. We may go in July, depending on the President's wishes.
Walt Rostow: Warren Christopher/4/ says mid or late July would be best from Resurrection City standpoint (July 24-25
open) for Thieu visit. Your calendar has the above dates open.
/4/Deputy Attorney General.
Secretary Clifford: I was for Thieu coming before. Now with Paris going on I would be for indefinite postponement.
The President: What effect will the convention have on Thieu's visit?

Secretary Clifford: I don't know.

The President: Do you believe Ky may think we did that deliberately?
Secretary Clifford: Some indications are that he may feel that.
The President: Is it true that a man can buy his way out of the South Vietnamese draft?
General Wheeler: Not that I know of.
The President: I thought it was good that 83 men came over to our side.
I get long letters from my reporter out there--Chuck Robb./5/ He said all the peasants want is to be left alone.
/5/On June 3 intelligence information indicated that the Viet Cong were planning to kidnap Captain Charles Robb,
President Johnson's son-in-law. By June 5 his unit was ordered to relocate and an effort was to be made to keep his
location confidential. (Memoranda from Rostow to the President, June 3 and June 5, and memorandum from Carver to
Rostow, June 5; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Report of VC Plan to Kidnap Capt. Robb)
Johnson discussed this kidnapping effort in a June 3 telephone conversation with Russell. (Ibid., Recordings and
Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Russell, June 3, 1968, 11:45 a.m., Tape
F6806.01, PNO 3)
[Omitted here are brief discussions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Arab-Israeli dispute.]
The President: The President read Chuck Robb's letter to him about fighting in Vietnam, Lynda and hope that HHH would
be next President.
[Omitted here is additional discussion of the Arab-Israeli dispute and the world financial situation.]
19th and 20th Parallel
The President: Ambassador Harriman recommends deferring this./6/
/6/In telegram 15453/Delto 231 from Paris, June 4, Harriman advised against bombing urban areas in the DRV in response
to the attacks on Saigon because the North Vietnamese would break off the Paris talks. In addition, such an exchange
represented "a modification of the March 31st offer." (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. &
Memos, Vol. III) Rusk transmitted this telegram to the President at 10:45 a.m.; the notation "ps" on the covering
memorandum indicates that the President saw it. (Ibid.)
Secretary Rusk: I am for air to air action now. We can hold up 48 hours on ground action. Let's take gradual approach.
Secretary Clifford: Cy Vance went over reconnaissance approach. He said he would prefer specific targets. The Joint
Chiefs have those targets.
Secretary Rusk: Let's hit them and not say anything about it.
General Wheeler: We reviewed targeting. We located two bridges on railroads and a railroad siding. The railroad is being
used.

262. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, June 5, 1968, 10:32 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Kosygin [3]. Secret; Nodis. A notation on the
memorandum reads: "Shown to Pres. 6/5/68."

The attached letter to you from Kosygin will require careful consideration tomorrow.
The key points appear to be:
1. Kosygin's statement that "we have grounds to believe" that a full cessation of bombing would "promote a breakthrough."
2. Such a U.S. act would not involve "a loss for the interests of their safety" or for U.S. prestige.
3. Soviet commitment that they have urged, in effect, "unofficial contacts" on Hanoi.
4. The final reference to the "decisive significance" of the "essence of the position" taken.
Obviously, we must come to grips with Moscow bilaterally to clarify these matters.
But it could be a breakthrough.
It may, incidentally, explain the one week delay in Paris./2/
/2/Reference is to Le Duc Tho's delayed arrival at the Paris talks.
Walt Rostow/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Attachment
Letter From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson/4/
Moscow, June 5, 1968.
/4/The message was transmitted by Dobrynin. This official translation of Kosygin's message, as undertaken by the
Language Services Division of the Department of State and which does not differ in substance from this unofficial
translation, is LS No. 2450, June 5. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Pen Pal
Correspondence, Kosygin) Copies were sent to Secretary Rusk and Under Secretary Katzenbach.
Dear Mr. President:
There is hardly a necessity to speak in detail of how crucial is the present moment when, at last, direct official contacts
between the representatives of the USA and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam have been established. In our firm
opinion the beginning official talks between highranking representatives of the USA and DRV in Paris present a real
possibility to find a way out of the situation which has developed in Viet-Nam with the aim of halting the many-years-old
and bloody war being conducted there. I think you will agree that the peoples of the entire world expect positive results
from the American-Vietnamese meetings in Paris since to a large extent not only the restoration of peace in the region of
Indo-China but also the relaxation of international tension as a whole depend on the outcome of these meetings.
According to information which comes to us both from represent-atives of the DRV and from representatives of the USA
thus far progress has not been attained at the talks in Paris. And is it possible seriously to expect such progress under
conditions when the U.S.A. continues the bombardment of a significant part of the territory of the Democratic Republic of
Viet-Nam? We have more than once already expressed to you personally and to your representatives our opinion that a
full and unconditional cessation by the United States of bombardments and other acts of war against the DRV can open
the path to peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam. And if the Government of the DRV gave its agreement to the beginning of
official talks with representatives of the U.S.A. even before a full cessation of bombings of the territory of the DRV, that
does not signify at all that it is possible to hope for further progress of the talks without such a cessation. These
bombardments and other acts of war by the U.S.A. against the DRV are now the main obstacle hindering movement
forward at the meetings in Paris.

I and my colleagues believe--and we have grounds for this--that a full cessation by the United States of bombardments
and other acts of war in relation to the DRV could promote a breakthrough in the situation that would open perspectives for
peaceful settlement. Such a step cannot bring about any adverse consequences whatever for the United States neither in
the sense of a loss for the interests of their safety nor even in the sense of a loss for their prestige. For a great world power
the ultimate positive result of one or other act outweighs many times all other considerations to which an excessively
exaggerated meaning is sometimes given. We decided, Mr. President, candidly to express to you these considerations, in
view of the great significance that a peaceful settlement of the Viet-Nam problem and an end to the bloodshed would have.
One would like to hope that opportunities that are presenting themselves will not be missed.
I would like to express one more thought. Mr. A. Harriman expressed the wish that on our part some assistance be given
to the establishment of unofficial contacts between the delegations of the U.S.A. and DRV in Paris and that this point of
view be brought to the cognizance of the Viet-Nam representative. I take this opportunity to advise you that we brought this
to the cognizance of our Vietnamese friends since we for our part consider that all forms of contact between the sides must
be used. It is important that this serve the success of the talks. But you, Mr. President, cannot but agree that the forms of
contacts by themselves decide nothing. The decisive significance lies with the essence of the position which is taken by
one side or the other.
Respectfully,
A. Kosygin

263. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/

SNIE 53-68
Washington, June 6, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 81. Secret; Limited
Distribution. According to a note on the cover page, the SNIE was drafted by the CIA, the intelligence organizations of the
Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency. It was submitted by Helms and concurred in by the
USIB. The cover page and a table of contents are not printed. In an attached covering memorandum transmitting the SNIE
to Johnson, June 10, Rostow wrote: "This is a well-balanced CIA document on the Vietnam situation which you may wish
to read."
THE VIETNAM SITUATION
The Problem
To estimate probable developments in the Vietnam situation over the next six months or so.
Assumptions
For the purpose of this estimate we make two assumptions: that the discussions between the US and Hanoi are not
broken off completely in this period and that the US does not resume full-scale bombing of North Vietnam.
Conclusions
A. The Vietnamese Communists are striving through their current fight-talk strategy to produce a decisive result in the war
this year. Hanoi will coordinate intensified military and political operations in the South with diplomatic moves, all designed
to disintegrate the fabric of the GVN, intensify pressures for peace within the US, and bring about major concessions in the
Paris talks.
B. Communist forces are suffering extraordinary military losses, but with massive replacements from the North, they will be
able to maintain a high level of military pressures during the summer. We do not believe, however, that the Communist
military effort by itself will be decisive. ARVN's fighting effectiveness will probably not be seriously weakened, and the
Saigon government, despite continuing political and administrative weaknesses, will probably retain the capability to cope,
at least minimally, with the problems of the war.

C. Nevertheless, developments in the Paris talks or in US politics could severely test the GVN's stability and even its
survival. Saigon will press for a tough stand by the US and for major concessions from Hanoi. Moves toward compromises,
whether at US initiative or Hanoi's, could touch off a severe crisis in Saigon, especially if a formal political role for the NLF
appeared likely. In the end, Saigon's appraisal of US policy, in the context of the Presidential elections, could be decisive in
the continuing viability of the GVN.
D. For its part, the regime in Hanoi is feeling the strains of the long and costly struggle. These will intensity if the war is
protracted at the present high levels. While we expect no early shift in strategy, if, by year's end, the situation has not taken
a turn in its favor Hanoi will probably be obliged once again to undertake a thorough review of its options.
Discussion
1. The beginning of formal diplomatic contacts in Paris has opened a new phase and added new complexity to the Vietnam
problem. For the near term at least, the struggle within South Vietnam is still the predominant factor, but maneuvers at the
negotiating table will become increasingly important, affecting Hanoi's calculations and especially the mood and outlook in
Saigon.
I. The Communist Position
2. A number of factors have led the Vietnamese Communists into the present phase of fighting and talking. Ever since the
US intervened in force, they have assumed that the war would have to culminate in some kind of negotiations, but they
were determined to avoid such talks until their battlefield position permitted them to negotiate from a position of apparent
strength. The 1968 winter-spring offensive, they believed, would achieve such a position. Having shifted the focal point of
their operations to the urban areas and generally intensified their military pressures they anticipate that the confidence and
authority of the GVN and the ARVN will be badly shaken if not demolished, that large parts of rural areas will pass from
GVN control, that popular support for the GVN will fade, and that the US will be demoralized by these setbacks and by the
prospect of a long, costly effort to regain lost ground. In a US election year they apparently expect the overall
political/military results will cause the US to seek an end to the war on terms favorable to the Communists.
3. Fight-Talk Tactics. Thus, Hanoi expects that the present phase, lasting perhaps through a change in the US
Administration, will prove decisive in its revolutionary struggle. Communist forces will try to maintain continuous military
pressures, especially around cities and towns, erode the pacification program in the countryside, and, at times and places
of their choosing, launch major offensive thrusts. Hanoi will coordinate these intensified military and political operations in
the South with diplomatic moves, all designed to disintegrate the fabric of the GVN, intensify pressures for peace within the
US, and bring about major concessions in the Paris talks.
Military Capabilities
4. In terms of capabilities to sustain this fight-talk strategy, the next few months are likely to be critical. Since last fall the
Communist forces have made notable gains in firepower, and have expanded their force structure through an
unprecedented level of infiltration from the North. From mid-February until early May there was a relative lull in large-scale
Communist offensive operations, and Communist forces have been recruiting, refitting, and regrouping. As a result of
these activities, plus the large number of replacements and new units now in the pipeline, and intensified recruiting in the
countryside, Communist forces will be capable of undertaking a series of major attacks between now and the fall.
5. The main thrusts will probably be against targets of political and psychological importance. A special effort is already
underway against Saigon, and similar tactics may be applied against other key provincial centers. These attempts to
penetrate urban areas may be followed at some stage by heavier and more direct assaults. The present pattern of
infiltration, current troop dispositions, and weather conditions also suggest a major effort in the Central Highlands fairly
soon, a renewed effort in the Da Nang area, and perhaps the eastern DMZ during the summer./2/
/2/In its situation report on Vietnam for June 10, SC No. 01009/68, sent to the President by Helms the next day, CIA
analysts characterized the current enemy offensive against Saigon as "a measured application of force which the enemy
apparently hopes to sustain over a period of weeks and months" as opposed to the surprise attack at Tet. The analysts
concluded: "Although the enemy tactics differ from those used in the attacks on Saigon during Tet, the maximum
objectives of the current offensive are apparently similar. The Communists are now seeking to create tension in the capital,
disrupt its economy and normal life, causing disorder and destruction. They appear to hope that they can establish
conditions in which impatience, indignation, hardship, and fear will generate widespread and active popular discontent with
the government. In effect, the Communists appear to be trying to create conditions in which a 'popular uprising' might be
possible. Available intelligence does not permit an assessment as to how confident the Communists are of achieving this
end. It does seem clear that they judge Saigon to be crucial and that, if they could break the will of the people in the city,
the impact would be felt throughout the country." In addition, attacks that began in I CTZ and in Kontum Province on June

9 were viewed as portents of a major enemy offensive in those areas. (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry
Subject Files, Job 80-R01580R, 266-Vietnam)
6. At the same time, the Communists will have to face problems of their own, which will limit the extent to which they can
effectively carry out at least some of their plans. The problem of preparing and executing major offensives against urban
areas has become more complex and difficult, and the possibility of achieving surprise has been reduced. Allied
counteroperations and mobility continue to disrupt Communist plans and impose heavy costs on their forces. Casualties
since 1 January have been extraordinary, and large concentrations of enemy forces, such as at Khe Sanh, have proved
highly vulnerable to Allied firepower. The quality of Viet Cong forces, particularly the guerrillas, appears to have declined
somewhat, and the increasing reliance on North Vietnamese replacements has allowed less and less time for combat
training in the South, familiarization with terrain, and assimilation into existing units. There are also continuing problems of
morale, though the Communist defection rate is still low, and these problems could be aggravated if costly military
operations do not bring an early peace. Despite an increase in logistical capability from the North through Laos, as well as
in-country, it will be a major problem for the Communists to supply large forces in forward positions over extended periods
of combat. Additionally, the Communists have to calculate their intensified military operations could cause the US to
resume full-scale or at least augmented bombing over the North, thus adding to their problems of repair and rehabilitation.
7. In sum, we do not believe that the Communists can succeed in inflicting a decisive defeat on US/ARVN forces on any
large scale or across any broad front. Nor are Communist forces strong enough to seize and hold urban areas for an
extended period. But they can create great disruption and turmoil and bring about the destruction of parts of the areas
attacked. Moreover, their forces will probably be able to maintain a strong position in much of the countryside.
Political Factors
8. As for their political position, the North Vietnamese leaders are probably fairly confident that their position in South
Vietnam and in Paris is a strong one; that they are better able to withstand pressures for peace than the US; that they can
afford to wait for elections in the US without fear of serious deterioration in their combat effectiveness; that they cannot be
defeated in the field; and that the US will be constrained from escalation and will eventually have to move toward a
compromise settlement, which in itself will threaten the stability of the government in Saigon.
9. Nevertheless, in our view, there are good reasons for Hanoi to have doubts over the future. In North Vietnam there are
the cumulative strains of the war resulting in part from the large combat losses of the past two years and accentuated by
the current infiltration rate. Aside from this heavy drain on North Vietnamese manpower, there is no doubt that the bombing
in the North severely tasked North Vietnam's recuperative capabilities and constant strain and pressure to work long hours
on a modest diet produced some lowering of morale in the North. While Hanoi's control mechanism has coped adequately
with these problems, the regime could hardly contemplate an indefinite prolongation of the war along with confidence and
assurance.
10. To Hanoi the position of the GVN may appear precarious but the North Vietnamese cannot be sure that its collapse is
inevitable by any early date. In particular Hanoi has reason to be concerned over its failure to develop any significant
popular support let alone promote a "general uprising" in South Vietnam. Communist forces have not been able to sustain
the "continuous attacks" called for after Tet, and the tactical initiative in some areas has passed to Allied forces. And the
political atmosphere in the US probably seems more uncertain and ambiguous to Hanoi than in the period from the Tet
attacks through President Johnson's address of 31 March.
11. On balance, it would appear that the Communists can and will carry out a vigorous military and political campaign at
least through the summer. The military situation in South Vietnam is not likely to improve much, if at all, for Hanoi by the
end of the summer, and it may be worse. In any case, we believe the military campaign will not by itself produce a decisive
result. Thus, the outcome of the total Communist effort will depend on such political considerations as the viability of the
GVN in face of the Communist onslaught and on the course of the talks in Paris.
II. The GVN Position
12. The Tet offensive, the continuing intense Communist military and political effort, and especially the Paris talks have
added new dimensions to the general situation in South Vietnam. South Vietnamese doubts of the future have probably
increased sharply, and there is considerable concern about the strength and depth of the US commitment. Despite some
tightening of the ranks both inside and outside the government, the total response of the GVN has not yet taken shape,
and the non-Communist political forces have still not developed the kind of political cohesion that would permit the
leadership to act with sureness in the new situation. These factors tend to reinforce one another and could undo the
government. On the other hand, the South Vietnamese leaders have shown no tendency toward panic or political
extremism and thus far at least appear more inclined to look for ways to strengthen the government and improve the war
effort.

National Leadership
13. We consider the chances for a significant increase in governmental cohesion and national political unity to be slight
over the next six months. Longstanding divisive factors continue to be strong and the problems created by the transition to
constitutional government have added new aspects to the rivalries between civilians and military, within the military, and
among the numerous civilian political and social groupings. Meanwhile, neither the new constitutional institutions nor the
three national "fronts" founded just after the Tet offensive appear to have mobilized any appreciable degree of mass
popular support behind the government.
14. On the positive side, President Thieu has strengthened his image and support within the Assembly and among the
civilian politicians. He appears increasingly committed to enlarging the role of civilians in the government, despite the
conflict this raises with many of the senior generals. A new Prime Minister, Tran Van Huong, has been appointed, and his
prospective Cabinet includes several civilians who, like Huong, command a measure of popular support. It is thus more
broadly based than its predecessor and has more prestige. This, together with the President's apparent interest in
asserting his own role more strongly, could lead, in time, to more vigorous and effective government performance.
15. Optimism on this score must be tempered, however, by the fact that the proposed Cabinet includes some potentially
disruptive individuals, and still excludes representatives from a number of important political groups. Moreover the National
Assembly, while it has generally supported the government, is nevertheless intent upon maintaining its independence of
the executive, which will be unable to count on an assured majority in either House. Difficulties between the executive and
legislature over the tough issues to be faced during the next few months may tempt the executive to circumvent the
legislature on critical issues.
16. More importantly, however, the contest and maneuvering between President Thieu and many of the senior generals,
including Vice President Ky, are continuing and indeed have been exacerbated by Thieu's efforts to expand his own
personal power and consequently limit the influence of the generals. Moreover, Huong's penchant for independence and
his announced intention to eradicate corruption wherever he finds it may aggravate rather than ease civil/military tensions.
An attempt by Thieu and Huong to effect major changes in the military command over the objections of the senior generals
would almost certainly precipitate a severe crises.
17. In general, however, it does not appear likely that constitutional government will be overturned by a military coup.
Despite their unhappiness with Thieu, the senior generals have accepted the new situation, while making it clear that any
reshuffling of the military structure must have their collective approval. Rumors of a coup will recur. However, the
inclination of some of the senior generals to mount a coup is tempered by their realization that the probable US reaction
would be extremely adverse and that such a move would, at present, play into Communist hands in the US-DRV
conversations in Paris.
18. At this point, the Huong Cabinet and military appear to share strong opposition to any concession to Hanoi on a
political settlement of the war. Indeed, it is possible that if issues arising in Paris seemed to threaten the future of the GVN,
this in itself could become the basis for greater unity between the civilians and the military. It is also possible, though
perhaps less likely, that the same trend of events in Paris--particularly if it appeared that elements within the GVN were
prepared to go along--could prompt the generals to abandon their relatively cautious behavior, ignore the consequences in
the US, and stage a coup precisely in order to sabotage those talks as a preparation for "going it alone" against the
Communists.
19. On balance, however, we think it most likely that Thieu, Huong, and the generals will play their cards carefully and
each will avoid drastic actions that would provoke drastic responses by the others. In the end, there may be a modest gain
in the stability of the constitutional system and a slight enhancement of the domestic political standing of the GVN. At the
same time, because of the hopes generated by Huong's appointment, the failure of his government could represent a
costly setback.
20. Administrative Viability. In urban areas the government is still laboring to some extent under the problems of
dislocations and disruptions created by the Tet offensive. Recovery in some areas has been painfully slow. Nevertheless,
with US help, the government's administrative machinery has remained largely intact and has continued to function.
Several Communist offensives on the scale of that at Tet could, of course, physically overwhelm the GVN's ability to cope.
But more likely is the type of action which has occurred in the Saigon area since early May. Similar attacks in various
areas will result in continuing pressure on the GVN's administrative ability, but in view of US assistance, we do not believe
that the situation will reach unmanageable proportions for the GVN. Even so, as the burdens imposed by continued
Communist pressure accumulate, the GVN's ability to provide administrative services to the people will probably suffer a
further decline.
21. The Economy. The South Vietnamese economy was dealt a considerable blow by the Tet offensive. The present

situation is one of near stagnation, and it could deepen into crisis unless the GVN acts decisively to bolster confidence and
to stimulate a return to more normal levels of activity. Physical damage to communications, industry, and marketing
facilities has continued during the recent attacks in and around Saigon. The industrial sector has made little effort to
resume normal operations nor have manufacturers whose plants were undamaged expanded their activities to pick up the
slack. Movement of basic food supplies into the capital area continues to be adequate, however, and there should be no
prolonged shortages of rice or others foodstuffs in any part of the country. The mercantile community lacks confidence in
security conditions and is uncertain of the future. Import activity appears to be at a standstill except for such items as
foodstuffs, pharmaceutical and building materials. Consumers appear reluctant to spend for anything other than
necessities, but, if the security situation improves, the threat of inflation will increase dramatically as the demand for goods
outstrips the supply.
The Countryside
22. Since the Tet offensive, the GVN has been able to reestablish some of its previous control in terms of territorial security
(outposts, logistic bases, and open roads). GVN military units are now better deployed and more active in rural areas than
immediately after the Tet offensive. The GVN's 600-odd revolutionary development teams are functioning once again.
23. But the GVN's overall representation in the countryside remains significantly less than before Tet. ARVN's commitment
to urban defense has increased in the face of the continuing threat to the cities posed by large NVA/VC units and this has
further weakened peasant confidence in the GVN's ability to provide security in the countryside. In the face of increased
rural insecurity and demands of urban recovery, the GVN's emphasis on civic action programs appears to have
diminished. In response to the current challenge, President Thieu has ordered pacification to be "refocused" so that the
program will concentrate on hamlets surrounding provincial and district capitals and LOCs. By the end of March, the GVN
exercised a reasonable degree of control over 1.1 million fewer rural inhabitants than prior to Tet. In addition, some 7,200
hamlets were considered to have a functioning administration prior to Tet; by April, this figure stood at 4,400, though it
does not necessarily follow that the VC now control a large proportion of the balance. Thus the GVN recovery effort has a
long way to go, will most likely be slow, and, as in the past, will be subject to sudden reversals in the face of renewed
Communist military action.
24. The Armed Forces. In addition to continuing US military support, the ability of the government to exercise its authority
in South Vietnam depends heavily on the presence and the combat effectiveness of ARVN. The government is now
undertaking measures to increase troop strength, to strengthen top level leadership, to raise morale, and to improve
firepower. Some progress will be made in all these fields, and in general ARVN's performance since Tet has been more
aggressive. Nevertheless, the GVN's Armed Forces face some long term problems. Overall leadership remains spotty, the
quality of training is low, especially for technical personnel, and the efficiency of the selection and promotion system is
questionable. Although improved, the basic motivation continues to be weak, making the armed forces susceptible to shifts
in the prevailing political and psychological climate.
25. In sum, we believe that ARVN's fighting effectiveness will not be seriously weakened. But on the other hand, ARVN is
unlikely to increase its overall effectiveness significantly during the next several months or to assume a larger burden of
the combat during 1986.
Popular Attitudes
26. It is not possible to estimate popular attitudes with much confidence. There is no doubt that popular resentment of the
Viet Cong has increased as a result of the Tet attacks, incursions in populated areas, and increasingly harsh pressures on
the peasants. At the same time, there is also increased hostility toward the government and the ARVN for failing to provide
protection against the Viet Cong, for looting, and for widespread destruction from air strikes and artillery. And the US is
also blamed for destruction of urban areas.
27. The predominant sentiment, however, is probably one of increasing concern to avoid the hazards of the war. The
Communists have failed to rally broad popular support, but thus far so has the GVN. The bulk of the people remain
passive, though there is a strong desire for peace in rural areas; this desire may also strengthen in urban areas if they are
subjected to continuous Communist harassment along the lines of the attacks in Saigon. Most of the people respond to
power and authority, whether that of the Viet Cong or the GVN. Left to themselves they are likely to remain uncommitted
and disengaged until a decisive break in the struggle becomes obvious.
28. The Communists hope to exploit and add to the growing popular desire for peace. In the cities, they are currently
engaged in a major effort to establish a new front, the so-called "Vietnam Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace
Forces," and to attract important leaders as well as the masses to it. So far, the success does not appear to be significant,
but the Communists are probably looking to a longer term impact. Their basic aim is to advance the image of the Alliance
as a credible "third force" which can bring peace to the nation and work out a coalition government with the Liberation

Front; they may also attempt to develop it into a major political factor in the Paris talks. In the coming months, the alliance
will almost certainly gain some adherents among lesser known and neutralist and leftist oriented politicians and may
possibly attract some well known figures, particularly if the Huong government fails. However, the Alliance is unlikely to
gain a large popular following during this period unless there is a major break in favor of the Communists in the military
situation or in the negations.
III. External Factors
The Paris Talks
29. The diplomatic moves emanating from either side in the Paris talks will obviously have a profound impact on the
psychological mood prevailing in Saigon and throughout the country. Hanoi will probably wish to keep the talks going for
some time. It sees the discussions as an opportunity for propaganda on key issues as well as a means to divide
Washington and Saigon and increase pressures on the US for concessions. At the same time, Hanoi does not want to risk
the resumption of the bombing by breaking off the talks at any early date. In effect, Hanoi believes time is running against
the Allied side. But if the North Vietnamese should conclude that this belief is unfounded they might moderate their
negotiating position.
30. During the course of the Paris talks the GVN expects, and will continue to press for, the closest possible consultation
and coordination with the US. It will be sensitive to nuances, rumors, and background noises in Paris and the US. In
general, Saigon will oppose any concession to Hanoi without a major concession in return. From Saigon's point of view the
bombing issue provides an early test of tendencies in US policy. If the bombing of the North were stopped without clearcut
and credible restrictions being placed on North Vietnamese support to Communist forces in the South, Saigon's confidence
in the US would be severely shaken.
31. At a later stage in the negotiations, it is almost certain that any serious discussion of a compromise settlement giving
the Alliance or the NLF a formal political role in Saigon would touch off a severe crisis in the GVN. This would still be true
even if these discussions resulted from a considerable scaling down of North Vietnamese demands. At this point, Saigon
would fear that an "imposed" solution involving a political role for the Communists was imminent. The Communists would
attempt to exploit the uncertainties in Saigon and these efforts would add to the confusion and demoralization throughout
the GVN.
US Politics
32. Developments in Paris are but part of the larger question of how US policy will develop in an election period and after.
Both Hanoi and Saigon consider that the US election casts a shadow of uncertainty over the future. For its part, Hanoi may
not feel the need to make any significant changes in its position at least until after the Presidential nominations and until it
has digested any differences in policy between the nominees. US developments, however, are of much more immediate
importance to Saigon. Election rhetoric in the US is bound to be amplified and magnified in Saigon and perhaps badly
distorted. In the end, Saigon's appraisal of US policy could be decisive in the continuing viability of the GVN.

264. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, June 6, 1968, 1810Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET. Secret; Flash;
Nodis. Received at 2:59 p.m.
29369. Ref: State 177491./2/
/2/The Department transmitted the text of Kosygin's letter in telegram 177491 to Saigon, June 6. (Ibid.) This letter is printed
as an attachment to Document 262.
1. It is true as Mr. Kosygin states that progress has not been made in talks in Paris but it seems to me important to point
out that talks have begun only because of a major concession on our part, namely the halting of bombing over a major part
of North Vietnam. Rather than indicating any reciprocal measure of restraint or desire to reduce the level of violence, the
DRV to the contrary has continued its attacks against the civilian population of Saigon and other cities of South Vietnam
and has taken advantage of the bombing cessation to greatly step up its infiltration of men and materiel through Laos and

the DMZ, both of which it is pledged to respect. Can Mr. Kosygin really think it reasonable to expect us to further expose
our own forces and those of our allies to greater vulnerability without any indication of a desire for mutual accommodation
from the other side other than the vague statement that all other matters could then be considered?
2. Mr. Kosygin mentions the fact that he has brought to the cognizance of the DRV in response to our request the
desirability of establishing unofficial contacts between the delegations. It seems to me this is now where our main effort
should be directed. It is hard for me to conceive that progress can be made while talks remain in the public arena in Paris
where the give and take and flexibility necessary in any talks or negotiations, called by whatever term, is impossible. It has
been my experience, limited though I recognize it to be, that progress is possible only if talks can be carried on privately
and secretly between the parties. It seems to me that this is the direction in which Mr. Kosygin's influence can most
helpfully be exerted in the interest of the progress he professes to want, indeed which all of us want. I believe that only in
this way can a fruitful exchange of the limits of possibilities be had.
3. Finally, I believe that to go beyond the concessions we have already made would confirm in the minds of the GVN and
the Vietnamese people the apprehension and suspicions of our intention they once held and which have now greatly
subsided because of what they see as the firm yet reasonable position we have taken in Paris. Certainly we share with Mr.
Kosygin a sincere desire for the restoration of peace in Southeast Asia, a relaxation of tensions, and an end to bloodshed
but can he think it unreasonable that the DRV should also make some contribution to this end?
4. Comment: I have, as you know, believed that there must be some limit to the "taking advantage" of our bombing
restriction by the other side, and that we should so indicate to them privately. Whether or not we should intimate to Mr.
Kosygin that there is some limit to our patience you are certainly in a better position to judge than I. This question,
however, is coming increasingly to the fore in the minds of the Vietnamese and I have contemplated making this the
subject of a further message.
Bunker

265. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, June 9, 1968, 2:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting, which lasted until 6:40 p.m., was
held in the Cabinet Room. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS
ATTENDING THE MEETING
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
Ambassador Thompson
Cyrus Vance
Averell Harriman
Abe Fortas
Charles Bohlen
Walt Rostow
Richard Helms
Jim Jones
Tom Johnson
Secretary Rusk: We are here today to assess the importance of the Kosygin message/2/ and how we might deal with it.
/2/Attached to Document 262. Action relating to the Kosygin letter was delayed by news of the assassination of Robert
Kennedy (word of which the President received early on the morning of June 5) and his June 8 funeral.
This is a very significant message. The fact that he sent it on his own initiative rather than in response to anything is

significant.
This is important. We must determine what they mean by it. He also associates "his colleagues" with it.
He says a complete bombing cessation could lead to a breakthrough. He says this would lead to a peaceful settlement.
Kosygin says if we take such a step it will not result in any negative consequences for the United States--either its security
or its prestige.
The message is hard to interpret. If we stopped all bombing and NVN continued to carry on war, there is nothing in this
message which would condemn the Soviets. We need a clarification.
The degree to which we do anything without further clarification is what needs to be discussed here today. We need
guarantees they would do something concrete in response to the bombing halt.
We also need to know what would be the effect on the morale of our own men if we stopped bombing and Hanoi continued
their activities "flat out."
The Soviets think we should have unofficial contacts between our two delegations in Paris.
In summary:
1. It is an important message.
2. It lacks clarity.
3. We must seek clarification.
We need to tell Kosygin that most of North Vietnam's territory and population is free from bombing while none of South
Vietnam is free of attacks.
We need to know what they specifically will do if we stop bombing.
The President: What do you think, Averell?
Averell Harriman: This is an extremely important letter. We think this is an extraordinarily definite statement for the Soviets
to make. We do need clarification. We want them to know what is going on in South Vietnam.
Cy and I have a slightly different approach which is not as good as Clark Clifford's.
In any case, we should lead Kosygin on.
Cy Vance: I agree with that.
Averell Harriman. This could be a breakthrough.
The President: Dean thinks it lacks clarity and we need to seek clarification. Do you agree?
Averell Harriman: Yes, sir, I do. But I think, as Clark does, that we should assume the message means what we want it to
mean.
(2:55--Message reviewed--see Clark Clifford's draft of Appendix A.)/3/
/3/Appendix A is not attached and has not been found. Rusk, Rostow, Clifford, Harriman, Vance, Rostow, Thompson,
Bohlen, and Read met at 10 a.m. that morning and again at 1:20 p.m. to discuss a draft letter to Kosygin. (Johnson Library,
Dean Rusk Appointment Books, 1968-1969) Notes of the meeting have not been found. Rusk's 5-page draft of the letter,

his third revision of it, dated June 9, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69,
POL 27-14 VIET. In a memorandum to the President, June 9, 9:40 a.m., Rostow wrote: "At the 10:00 o'clock meeting I
shall raise with my colleagues the possible wisdom of putting into this letter a reference to the position which we took at
Paris before the formal exchanges began, when Cy Vance was talking to their No. 2, that we would insist on GVN
participation when interests of the GVN were involved. My feeling is that it is important that we record this position with
Moscow, so that there can be no ambiguity. We might even go further and suggest to the DRV, via Moscow, that it might
be wise for them to undertake "informal contacts" with the GVN at a relatively early stage, as well as informal contacts with
us." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Vol. 81) Harriman described both the morning and
afternoon meetings of June 9 in a December 14 memorandum. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman
Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Trips and Missions, Paris Peace Talks, 1968-69, Chronological
File, Dec. 1968-Jan. 1969) The memorandum is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume VII.
Cy Vance: We are at a central crossroad.
I agree with Dean. It is significant.
We do not know what it means.
It may mean the Soviets are willing to assist with resolution of the conflict.
We must answer right. If we don't, we may lose the chance and strengthen the hand of Peking in Hanoi.
The North Vietnamese have changed in Paris---in their attitude
--in admitting North Vietnam presence in South
--in sending Le Duc Tho
On the "con" side, they may be:
1. Testing our mettle. If we give, they will be tougher later on.
2. If we stop bombing, it will be tough to restart.
3. Time is on their side, they think.
The enemy can fight for 12-18 months. They can control the level of the war. Time is not on our side. Clark's draft is the
best way to respond.
The President: What does Kosygin's letter say to you?
Secretary Rusk: At worst, he is trying to get us to stop bombing and all other acts of war against them without any
commitments by Hanoi and by Soviets as to how they will respond to it.
It would be costly to stop bombing and restart it.
The President: Can we say for a few days we will stop it and go back if there is no restraint by them?
NVN are not unique. If they have a serious interest in peace, they can let us know that certain specific things will happen.
They can do this without losing face.
The absence of this shows there is nothing yet they will do for sure.
I don't think the South Vietnamese will stand still without reason to believe there will be some de-escalation on the enemy
side. We would have problems with South Koreans, and other allies as well.

The President: If we stopped bombing tomorrow, how long would we have to go before we could expect results?
Secretary Rusk: It could be several weeks and into the fall.
The President: Didn't they double shipments down into the South in May over March?
Secretary Rusk: Yes.
General Wheeler: Infiltration groups of 127,000 men were identified. May is the highest month so far. Also the shipment
south of supplies are up double over March. Also, they have moved anti-aircraft batteries into the Panhandle and have
shown no restraint.
The President: How long could we stand it without jeopardizing our position in I Corps ? What would we do?
General Wheeler: We could hold for about a month.
We suffer 7,500 U.S. casualties for every 100,000 they infiltrate in.
The President: How long could we take it?
General Wheeler: About 30 days. Morale may go to hell in a handbag.
The President: Couldn't you start bombing back?
General Wheeler: I don't know. This couldn't be stood very long.
The President: I would take the chance if I had a reasonable supposition of results and if I could get back in bombing when
we need to.
General Wheeler: I don't see anything new and startling in the Kosygin letter.
This may not be on Kosygin's initiative. Averell talked to Zorin. It may be a response to that conversation. I agree with
Dean that the matter should be pursued. We should probe to see if we can get assurances from the Soviets.
Also, we need private talks with North Vietnamese.
Secretary Rusk: The key difference is whether we go back with request for clarification or whether we are prepared to rely
on what he has said so far. The private talks in Paris with Hanoi may be more important than those with Soviets.
Clark Clifford: We have a great opportunity here. We should take serious advantage of it. All of us want to bring the war to
a conclusion. It is good for you to get the benefit of all of our views. We won't end the war by negotiations with the North
Vietnamese. They control the level of the war. They can go on indefinitely from the manpower aspect. Soviets and Red
China continue to supply them with all they need. The combat in South Vietnam has not forced them to end this war.
Bombing in South or North won't stop war. What will stop it is an arrangement with the Soviets so they can use their
leverage--which we don't have--to bring the Soviets to force Hanoi to stop it. The cost of the war for the Soviets is
becoming heavier. The Kosygin letter has the same tone as the hot line message he made to us at the time of the Middle
East crisis.
It is a very remarkable and promising letter. It is temperate and statesmanlike.
Key passages are
1. "My colleagues and I think--we have grounds to do so . . ."
2. Also the fact that they say our security interests will not be damaged.
He says he has information to lead him to that conclusion. He says it will lessen international tensions as a whole. I would

take him at his word.

The President should accept it in good faith. It is in our own interests to do this.
We should accept his statement as assurance. We should take him up on it.
The President: We took him up on it at the time of the 37-day pause./4/
/4/The pause lasted from December 24, 1965, to January 30, 1966; see ibid., vol. IV, Document 57.
Clark Clifford: I favor this pause. Circumstances are different. I did not favor the 37-day pause, you will remember. He is
asking us to give up the bombing. The price is not too great for us to take the chance.
Let's give it a test. The aid to North Vietnam was not great until we started bombing their sister Socialist state. Now we
may be stopping 25% of their flow. They will be able to keep up the level of their fighting even if bombing continues.
We should accept his letter as assurances. He honestly wants war to end. If we stop bombing, the Soviets will turn
pressure on North Vietnam to stop the fighting. The Soviets are sending 80% of supplies. They have the means to make
them stop this war.
If there is no action on their part in two weeks we should get message to Kosygin saying we have to start bombing again.
We have better position to start again than we ever had before March 31 on this.
If it doesn't happen we would resume bombing.
As far as Saigon is concerned, we are the chief suppliers of men and material. We have lost 26,000 men and it is costing
us $25 billion this year alone.
In summary, we should do the following:
1. We should accept his letter as assurances.
2. We will find out if they aren't assurances.
3. We have good record with Kosygin. We shouldn't affect it by an improper response to his letter.
Walt Rostow: We could state that we would give one week for him to state if these are not assurances.
We could follow on his reference to Ambassador Harriman's talks with Ambassador Zorin.
It would give:
1. Kosygin a chance to come back if he isn't giving assurances.
2. Restraint would be expected as we define it.
3. Resumption would be required if no response is forthcoming.
The President: Why not try to get clarification before burning our bridges?
We could say we know you are acting in good faith, but that we know what happened on the 37-day pause before. Say if
we do it again, and we are all wrong again, we electrify the world with hope and get nothing.
Walt Rostow: I do not see how the President could take this act without some kind of assurances. Our relations with
Soviets are hopeful outside of the Vietnam situation.

The President: We would have problems with our allies. Also with our own people.
How many boys will we gamble if we do this?
Abe Fortas: There isn't much difference of opinion, really. Clark Clifford wants to wait until Kosygin comes back with a reply
before acting.
I read Kosygin's letter differently.
They are saying they may be able to get something underway, but only if North Vietnam doesn't have to lose face.
Clark Clifford is being very rigid and tough in asking for specific restraints, however.
We need to get an informal understanding.
It appears they want you to agree to stop bombing before they will agree to de-escalation. We must have an informal
understanding beforehand.
We should say we appreciate this and will stop bombing provided informal talks are fruitful. I would leave out specific
conditions.
Clark Clifford is not being easier in first full paragraph at top of page 2.
We will stop bombing if a mutually satisfactory set of terms is reached.
Secretary Rusk: We have said we will stop bombing first if we know then what will follow.
Walt Rostow: The important thing is that Le Duc Tho has gone to Paris. Rate of attrition is leading to a deterioration of the
quality of the enemy forces. They can control the intensity of the violence, but if they scale down they know their position
on the ground will rapidly deteriorate given the U.S.-South Vietnamese ground strength.
We need to force Kosygin to be explicit about his assumptions.
Ambassador Thompson: This does seem to be an opportunity to get the Soviets to bring pressure to bear on Hanoi.
The President: How does this differ from the 37-day pause? You thought then we would wait no longer than 12 days. This
will raise hopes. There will be excuses to wait again. I got burned on it before.
Ambassador Thompson: If you took a step and they didn't react, you could go back to all bombing. They should consider
that.
The President: I feel we should say we will stop all bombing when we are sure of restraint by them.
Ambassador Bohlen: Main interest of Soviets in Vietnam has been ideological. If you stop the bombing of all of North
Vietnam, it would strengthen the hand of Soviet influence in Hanoi.
If you could live with this for two or three weeks militarily we should try the full pause.
This letter may have resulted from Harriman's talk with Zorin. I would go back to all bombing if they didn't respond.
Secretary Rusk: That would break up talks.
Ambassador Bohlen: So what. I would if they aren't going to do more than they have since the talks started.
The President: The bombing doesn't stop all their men and supplies. It stops some. It raises the price. Since March we
haven't done much.

Richard Helms: I don't see anything new in this note. The Russians would like to see us call off bombing. I do think that
NVN and VC can go on for a year.
I think we should see what specifically they have in mind.
Some Senators can't wait until you get out of this war.
Secretary Rusk: We should say:
Point 1--It is important to have informal talks with the Soviets in Paris.
Point 2--We will examine a halt to bombing.
Point 3--We will be prepared to discuss this matter further with you.
We should say we are prepared to accept his statement as assurances if they are that.
Abe Fortas: For my part, it looks as though we will institute a complete cessation without public knowledge of what the
precise nature of private understanding may be.
You can't admit to "acts of war" against NVN, as is written in draft one.
Clark Clifford: We have an offer from Kosygin. We need to agree to his offer if these are assurances on his part. We say if
you are really assuring us, we are willing to proceed and test it out.
I don't think we should reply in a way that could be interpreted as a rejection of his offer.
I think he has gone as far as he can go.
We come to the question about relative importance of our bombings. The restriction in bombing has not led to the step-up
in our losses. They have done it by putting more intensity in their fighting in the South.
The President: All I know is what they were doing before March 31 and after March 31.
General Wheeler: Slackening off of the bombing has contributed to higher losses.
4:15--The President leaves the meeting./5/
/5/The President left the meeting at 4:13 p.m. to make a telephone call to the Situation Room. (Johnson Library,
President's Daily Diary)
4:19--The President returns.
(During interval Secretary Rusk suggested changes in the first draft.)
The President: What do all of you think?
Ambassador Thompson: I like it (the new draft).
Clark Clifford: Dean's language brings into question our willingness to take him up on his offer.
We must remember a lot has happened since the bombing pauses before I would take whatever minor risk is involved.
The President: I am not willing to take their assurance and rely on it on face value.
We have softened. They have done nothing.

Clark Clifford: I think we are better off today because of the March 31 speech than if you hadn't have made it. It started us
on the road toward the ultimate conclusion of war.
This could be the next step.
Abe Fortas: What is the difference between Rusk's last statement and Clark Clifford's?
(Rusk read his statement.)
Abe Fortas: You are close together. Clifford says:
"Unless you tell me our assumption is wrong we will be prepared to stop bombing."
Clark Clifford: Dean is saying private talks must produce agreement before we stop bombing.
Secretary Rusk: You can't determine the outcome of a war by manpower studies.
The President: I think we may have them beaten now. Only thing that will stop us from making a peace is ourselves.
I think Clark is unrealistic about attitude of how our men will react to this.
Secretary Rusk: We must be precise with the Soviets.
Ambassador Bohlen: We should follow up the Soviet hint. I would ask a straight, simple clarification.
Secretary Rusk: If Soviets are for informal contacts, isn't it worth exploring it with Harriman in Paris ?
Averell Harriman: We will never end this war without Soviet help. We should move forward with Kosygin.
(The President was then shown a draft by Harriman.)
Averell Harriman: We need to keep the Soviets involved.
Secretary Rusk: My draft was designed to meet your four points.
Averell Harriman: You put back a lot of propaganda in your letter.
Clark Clifford: When we have as much disagreement as we have today, we must look at things behind it.
You called my position unrealistic. I believe it is realistic.
We are not ending the War, even though we have massive firepower, huge B-52 flights, largest number of troops ever in
Vietnam.
We can't bring war to a conclusion militarily.
We should go on with our 95% fighting--that in the South. I am willing to try for a political settlement, by taking this risk of
stopping the bombing.
The President: I don't think being soft will get us peace.
Averell Harriman: Rusk's letter is to them propaganda.
(4:20 p.m.--no agreement on drafts)

The President: What importance do we attach to bombing of the North?

General Wheeler: Considerable importance.
Militarily, we are on the strategic defensive. We always have been. Nobody wins a war by being on the defensive. The only
offensive pressure we have had was the bombing, which has been unduly restrictive.
They suffered from the restricted bombing.
They turned down your San Antonio formula, but accepted a tougher March 31 formula. There is much involved, but if we
stop all our activities North of the 17th, they can take advantage of it.
They can:
1. Move forces to DMZ to support further action.
2. Load Panhandle with anti-aircraft equipment.
We lost more planes in lower route packages because of anti-aircraft inventory.
3. They could load SAM's up to DMZ. They will fire at B-52's without us being able to do anything about it.
The President: What about Clark's proposition of two weeks cessation of bombing?
General Wheeler:
1. The enemy can go all out.
2. He can mass forces North of the DMZ.
3. He can move aircraft South.
4. He can rehabilitate air bases.
5. You would suffer tactical setbacks.
6. Some units might be overrun.
7. You run a military risk.
8. You won't be run out of South Vietnam.
9. Our people could hold for a while.
On the negotiating situation:
I defer to the diplomats how to respond. It should be straight to him from the President. I believe it is in the best interest not
to move to give up the one offensive action you have without some assurance--formal or informal--that you will get
something in return. Don't buy it as unclear as it is now. It would weaken your position.
The President: Let's ask Bunker and our Ambassador in Korea for their reactions./6/
/6/The Department transmitted the text of the proposed letter to Kosygin in telegram 179514 to Saigon and Seoul, June 10.
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET) In telegram 29571 from
Saigon, June 10, Bunker commented: "I agree that we should seek to stimulate a more specific discourse with both Hanoi
and Moscow, but I believe that it must be on terms which will be clearly understood by both of them and which will not be

misunderstood by our Vietnamese friends and allies. My feeling, in brief, is that the proposed reply, which suggests we are
prepared to stop the bombing in return for Soviet assurances, is much in need of strengthening if it is to be convincing to
Hanoi and Moscow, as well as to our allies. Our experience in dealing with Communists, whether European or Asian, over
the past 20 odd years is that they understand firmness and clarity and are quick to take advantage of vague and uncertain
actions which suggest to them that we are in a weak position. As I have said before, I do not believe that we are in a weak
bargaining position and this fact should be reflected in our reply, while making quite evident our desire to move towards
mutual de-escalation and a peaceful settlement." (Ibid.)
I fear there may be a blow up in South Vietnam. I do not look for any change of government without great grief. Whatever
we agree on, let's get Bunker and Porter to agree on it.
Averell Harriman: Keep dialogue going with Kosygin. That will end this war. Our dialogue with North Vietnam won't.
Clark Clifford: All four of us recommend General Seignious to replace General Goodpaster as Military Adviser.
General Wheeler: We are for him from the JCS standpoint.
The President nodded approval.
5:09 p.m.--Rusk draft brought in.
5:10 p.m.--The President left for church service./7/
/7/The President had declared Sunday as a national day of mourning for Robert Kennedy.
6:12 p.m. The President returns--reads final draft--approves it. It is attached as Appendix B./8/
/8/Rusk's final draft, which was virtually the same as Document 269, except for minor semantic alterations, is in the
Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Meeting with the President, 6/11/68.
The President: Is this agreeable to all of you?
Secretary Rusk: O.K.
Averell Harriman: It is all right.
Cy Vance: It is all right.
Clark Clifford: It is all right.
Walt Rostow: It is all right.
General Wheeler: O.K

266. Editorial Note

In meetings over several days, President Johnson briefed two of the Presidential candidates on battlefield conditions, the
improvement in the South Vietnamese military, and apparent progress at the Paris negotiations. On June 10, 1968, the
President met with New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller. According to a recording of the meeting, Johnson cited three
points that demonstrated increasing moderation in North Vietnamese thinking: 1) they were essentially confirming the
presence of their troops in the South, a charge always denied by them; 2) they claimed to have inflicted extensive
casualties on U.S. forces and thus were insisting on immediate compromise, a call which belied their own desire for
substantive negotiations; and 3) they believed that public opinion, both domestic and worldwide, would compel the United
States to come to terms favorable to Hanoi. Rockefeller vowed to toe the line on Vietnam, expressly assuring the
President: "Believe me, I'd like to get the nomination, but I'm not going to do it at the expense of this country." (Johnson
Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room) The next day, the President briefed Senator Eugene McCarthy on

the same topics. A full transcript of the recording of this meeting is ibid.

267. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, June 10, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Meetings with the President, 6/11/68. Secret;
Nodis.
SUBJECT
Proposed Reply to the Kosygin Letter
Because of my absence from Washington yesterday, I have only just seen the Kosygin letter, our draft reply, and Bunker's
reaction to that draft./2/ My thoughts on the subject follow:
/2/See Document 265.
A close reading of K's letter indicates that it offers nothing new of substance but retains the old ambiguities about the
contribution which a total cessation of bombing "could contribute" to the "prospects of a peaceful settlement." As I read it, it
is remarkable only by its moderate tone and its timing.
The moderate tone suggests that K would really like a favorable response from us and hopes that we will oblige him. It
also indicates that he wants to place the American interest in the foreground of any discussion as the motivating force for
any agreement.
As to the reason for the timing of the letter, one can speculate along several lines:
a. The arrival of Tho to head the North Vietnamese negotiating team probably marks the opening of a new phase in the
Paris negotiations. K's letter is the opening gun of a new diplomatic offensive to accompany and exploit the military
escalation in South Viet-Nam, with its initial target our will to continue the bombing.
b. Hanoi senses that we are probably considering a return to our former bombing pattern in North Viet-Nam and K has sent
his letter to make that decision more difficult for us and at least to cause us to delay in taking it.
c. Hanoi is hurting badly even under the restricted bombing and has called for help from the USSR to obtain prompt relief.
Whatever the reason for the letter, it is clearly a bear trap to be approached with caution. Frankly, I do not find that caution
in some of the passages of our proposed draft. It seems to limit our concern to the safety of our military forces and to
accept the preeminence of the U.S. interest over that of our allies. There is no indignation expressed for the civilian losses
in South Viet-Nam and for the continuing attacks on Saigon. There is a dangerous willingness to accept private
assurances of unspecified content, either from Hanoi or from the USSR, in exchange for a cessation of our bombing.
For a variety of reasons. I advise against the dispatch of the letter as presently written. Generally speaking, I agree with
the views of Ambassador Bunker and the changes of text which he recommends--if you decide to stay generally within the
framework of the present text. I can think of at least two other approaches to our reply:
a. Confine the answer to amenities and queries about the meaning of the ambiguous language. This kind of exchange can
go on for a long time while feeling out the adversary.
b. Stiffen the reply even beyond Bunker's suggestions, making perfectly clear that we are not going to give up our bombing
without precise agreements covering reciprocal actions and hinting broadly that we are fed up with the present stalling and
expect to relax our self-imposed constraints soon.
My objections to the present text are in general that the course of action implied therein will or may result in the following:
a. It can drive a wedge between us and the GVN and contribute to the collapse of that government--a major enemy

objective.
b. It will encourage the Hanoi leaders and convince them that they are right in assuming we are defeated--at least in spirit.
c. Any cessation of bombing will make it almost impossible to resume, thus setting the stage for another Panmunjom.
d. It will further confuse and divide our people who have been assured in the past by their leaders that the bombing
restrains infiltration and gives indirect protection to our troops. A cessation now at a time of increased enemy infiltration, of
heightened levels of military and terrorist activities and of record-breaking U.S. casualties would defy explanation to any
but the extreme left wing of American public opinion.
M.D.T.

268. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, June 11, 1968, 10:15 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. III. Secret;
Sensitive. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that it is likely that, if we are to preserve the talks in Paris, we shall have to take
the risk of breaking them up--and so demonstrating to Hanoi.
The judgment is premature, since we do not know how the Russians will treat our reply; and that comes first.
But here is my reasoning:
1. Hanoi, on balance, regards our move of March 31st as taken from weakness--domestic political weakness.
2. They probably calculate that, above all, we don't want to rock the boat in Paris. Our backing down to the 19th parallel
has helped convince them.
3. Therefore, they can safely:
--take the fullest possible advantage of what we regard as an act of de-escalation by increasing rather than reducing their
effort and attacking Saigon while Hanoi is a sanctuary;
--take their own sweet time in the Paris negotiations.
4. In short, I believe they are laughing at us and playing us for suckers on the diplomatic-military front, in the short run.
5. On the other hand, I am pretty sure that they regard their longer run, basic position as weak and requiring a negotiated
settlement within, say, the next year:
--the evidence is now that they were about to take an initiative around March 31;
--as you know, I do not believe their intense military activity, with abnormally high casualties and North Vietnamese
infiltration, is a stable military position;
--if Thieu-Huong keep coming forward, they may conclude time is not their friend in South Vietnamese politics;
--the Russians and Eastern Europeans may not be willing to keep them afloat at the cost of a billion dollars a year for long;

and the Russians may even have exacted a commitment from them to wind up in 1968 in return for the billion dollar
grubstake for the winter-spring offensive.
6. If this is so, Bus Wheeler may be right: we couldn't get them out of Paris with a team of mules.
7. What follows from these tentative judgments:
--Sect. Rusk should see Kuznetsov in New York, after we despatch the letter to Kosygin, and talk more somberly to him
than the tone of your letter to Kosygin. Specifically: we can't live, in any case, with this level of infiltration; we can't live with
Saigon a target and Hanoi a sanctuary; we can't live with this protracted telephone book strategy in Paris;/2/
/2/Rusk met with Vasily Kuznetsov, First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, in New York on June 14.
(Memoranda of conversation, June 14; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-EX Files: Lot 79 D 247)
Prior to this meeting, he met with U Thant to discuss Vietnam. Telegram 2244 from USUN, June 14, reported on this
conversation. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, UN, Vol. 8) It is scheduled for publication in Foreign
Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXXIII.
--We should have some Senators speak to this theme: McGee, Brooke, Jackson, others;
--If Kosygin's reply is not satisfactory we should continue the dialogue and then:
--move back to the 20th parallel;
--have Averell tell the North Vietnamese that we shall have to match every rocket on Saigon with, at least, a bomb on
Hanoi.
8. This may move the negotiations off dead center. It will, if para. 5 above is correct. If para 5. is wrong, they will withdraw
from Paris.
9. That would be a most serious situation; but what would it mean? It would mean they are not prepared for an honorable
negotiation nor for an honorable settlement. If so, we'd better face it.
10. I understand--and with sympathy--Clark Clifford's view that this could be a mortal blow to the Vice President's political
position. But where Clark is wrong is in believing that we--or the Vice President--can continue to live with the undignified
and humiliating situation where:
--they respond to March 31 with escalation, not de-escalation;
--they refuse to negotiate seriously in Paris;
--they shell Saigon and weaken the GVN, while Hanoi goes scot-free.
It is a long time from June to August and August to November.
11. If they do not respond to our communications and actions, and if they walk out of Paris because we exact reprisals on
Hanoi for the shelling of Saigon, I do not believe we can or should return to a simple status quo ante . We should do more
against both Hanoi and Haiphong.
12. I set these thoughts down reluctantly. I hope that Kosygin's reply will make them irrelevant. But, for what they may be
worth, I thought you should have them.
Walt

269. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin/1/

Washington, June 11, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin.
Secret; Nodis. The letter was delivered by Rusk to Dobrynin at 6:35 p.m. that evening. (Ibid., Dean Rusk Appointment
Books, 1968-1969)
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I was very glad to receive your letter of June 5/2/ and have given it the most careful study. I think you and I agree as to the
great importance of a peaceful resolution of the Vietnamese problem and of a halt to the bloodshed. I think you and I would
also agree that the Soviet Union and the United States have a very special responsibility with respect to the reduction of
tensions and the stabilization of peace in the world.
/2/Printed as an attachment to Document 262.
We are prepared to end the bombardment of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam if we know it will lead to the deescalation of the war. In this connection, I have given special attention to your statement that a cessation of bombing and
other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam cannot result in any kind of negative consequences for the
United States in the sense of damaging the interests of its security.
Does this statement apply to the security interests of the United States with respect to our own and allied forces in VietNam? Obviously, the military capability of the DRV would be further enhanced by the total cessation of bombing. A
decision must be made by the DRV not to take advantage of this cessation; we and Hanoi must be clear on this point.
Such a decision need not be made public. You will understand that I must be concerned about the position of our troops
and allied forces in South Viet-Nam and the safety of the civilian population which depends upon them for security. Any
light which you can throw upon this vital point would be appreciated.
As a result of my unilateral action, Hanoi and its civilian population are now free from military attack. At the same time
Saigon and its civilian population have been subjected to the most vicious and indiscriminate attacks, attacks which
continue even as I write this letter. I would be less than candid with you if I did not tell you that this is a situation which
could easily become intolerable.
We shall make every effort to discuss these matters constructively with the representatives of the DRV in Paris. We are
prepared to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam as a further step toward peace. But we do need to know the steps the
DRV will take toward further de-escalation of the violence.
Of course, Mr. Chairman, we would be glad to pursue these matters directly with the government of the Soviet Union. If
you are in a position to tell us privately and with precision that there would be no adverse military consequences to our
own and allied forces as a result of a bombing cessation, we would be prepared to accept your statement and would issue
the necessary orders.
We appreciate the fact that you have informed the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam of our interest in
unofficial contacts between our respective delegations in Paris, as well as the fact that you believe that all forms of contact
between the parties should be utilized. Our delegation in Paris is ready for such contacts and we would hope very much
that the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam would be responsive. I do believe it important that we keep in
close touch with each other on this matter.
Sincerely yours,
Lyndon B. Johnson/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

270. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Saigon, June 11, 1968.
/1/Source: U.S. Army Military History Institute, William C. Westmoreland Papers, History Files, #33, 1-30 Jun 68.

Confidential. Prepared by General Westmoreland on June 20 on board the USS Wilson. That same day, Westmoreland
arrived in the Philippines, and began a cruise to Hawaii where he arrived on June 26. Also on June 20, the President and
Clifford discussed Abrams' request to abandon Khe Sanh. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of
Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Clifford, June 20, 1968, 3:34 p.m., Tape F6806.02, PNO 3)
SUBJECT
Final Day in Saigon, 11 June 1968
1. Having returned late from a dinner party given by the ambassador the previous evening, I found considerable
administrative work in terms of efficiency reports and autographing of pictures to be done before leaving the command. I
therefore set the alarm for 0500 and proceeded to work at the desk in my bedroom. At approximately 0615, the Viet Cong
started a rocket attack and bracketed the quarters. I continued to work, appreciating that the probability of getting hit by
such indiscriminate shelling was very remote. My first thought was that this was the greatest compliment extended to me
yet--the VC were giving me a 22-gun salute upon departure. This was the largest bombardment thus far in the center of
the city, and I do suspect it was planned for the occasion of my last day, since this was well known.
2. I assembled, as a first order of business, the domestic help at my quarters, along with the US Army MP guards and the
Vietnamese MSS security personnel. I thanked them all for their loyal and efficient support and stated that I would never
forget what they had contributed to my welfare and safety. I then gave to each of the Vietnamese members of my
household--in particular Hai and Thuong; Vien, my most loyal and efficient driver; Sgt Tat and his MSS security guards--a
letter which included an appropriate piaster gratuity.
3. I then proceeded to the hospital, where I called on MG Loan, who had been wounded during the communist attempt to
attack Saigon on the 5th of May. Loan is apparently going to retain his limb but will probably be lame. He seemed to be in
reasonable morale but disappointed that he is temporarily out of action, He did not comment on his recent replacement as
Chief of Police by Col Hai/2/ but expressed appreciation for my assistance to his country, and we parted to the exchange
of good wishes and the hope that we would meet again.
/2/Tran Van Hai.
4. I then went to the room of Col Cua,/3/ recently wounded by an accident caused by a rocket malfunction from a US
Cobra helicopter. Cua had recently been replaced as mayor. He was not badly wounded, was cheerful and obviously
pleased that I had stopped by to see him.
/3/Van Van Cua.
5. I then proceeded to the palace, where I had an appointment with Vice President Ky at 0930. He and I spent 45 minutes
together, mostly reminiscing. Ky went out of his way to make the point that he was very disturbed by the way the press had
treated him. He deplores their efforts to create friction between him and Thieu. Ky pointed out that he and Thieu had been
working together since early 1965, that he had supported Thieu for the Presidency, and that it made no sense at all to
assume that he was now going to turn against Thieu. Ky stated that I, of course, understood his attitude and patriotic
support but the US mission personnel, who were completely new, did not understand this. Ky went on to explain that a
coup was not only impossible now, it was senseless and the days of physical conflict within the senior circle was a thing of
the past. It was essential that they talk through their problems and not resort to forceful means to bring about political
change.
6. I then proceeded to the President's office, where I again spent 45 minutes, reminiscing with Thieu on our friendship and
reviewing the current situation. Thieu agreed with my military assessment of the situation, but expressed great concern at
the political advantage being gained by Hanoi in support of their talks in Paris. He implied that the cessation of bombing
had been a political victory for Hanoi and this was now being capitalized on by the indiscriminate shelling of Saigon, which
has resulted in no retaliation or reaction by our side. He feels, therefore, that this could be the beginning of a general
deterioration in the relative political posture of the US and South Vietnamese governments in the eyes of the world and
particularly to the Vietnamese people in the south. As we parted company, Thieu again thanked me for my contribution
and stated that he and Mrs. Thieu were looking forward to seeing me and Mrs. Westmoreland during their forthcoming trip
to Washington.
7. We then drove to the headquarters, where I paid my last call on MG Kerwin, and thence to the VIP lounge at Ton Son
Nhut, where my friends were assembled. After a brief visit together, I shook hands all around; reviewed an honor guard
staged by Gen Vien at plane-side; said good-bye to Gen Vien, who apologized for Mrs. Vien's not being present, stating
that the emotional strain would be too much and she would break down in the process so asked to be excused; and bade
farewell to Ambassador Bunker and Gen Abrams. I then boarded the T-39 and was on my way.

8. After getting airborne, I sadly remembered that I had not bade a final farewell to my trusted driver, Vien, Sgt Tat and his
loyal MSS guards, and the Vietnamese motorcycle CanSat who had so efficiently guided me around the city. Of course, I
had said good-bye to them earlier in the morning, but they were not conspicuous on my departure and I neglected to go
out of my way to find these hard-working people who had done so much for me behind the scenes. I shall write them
additional, special notes on assuming my new duties.
W C Westmoreland
General, United States Army
Commanding

271. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/

Washington, undated.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET. Secret. In an
attached memorandum transmitting a copy of the paper to Rostow, June 12, Read wrote: "In response to your request, I
attach a brief balance sheet on the Paris talks to date."
BALANCE SHEET ON PARIS TALKS
1. Gains.
a) In terms of US and world opinion, we have gained widespread approval for our unilateral action of de-escalation which
brought about the talks. Our proposals for restraint and de-escalation (DMZ restoration, respect for 1962 Laos Agreement,
respect for Cambodia's neutrality and territorial integrity) have generally been regarded as constructive, as has our
proposal to limit polemical exchanges.
b) We have focussed on the fantasy of Hanoi's denial that they have troops in the South, and have made public an
impressive body of detailed evidence of Hanoi's violation of the DMZ and direct North Vietnamese intervention in both
South Viet-Nam and Laos. In turn, Hanoi has sought to develop a rationale justifying North Vietnamese presence in the
South (the "right" of all Vietnamese to attack the enemy wherever he is), while still refusing to admit that this constitutes
aggression. These new formulations, however, may lay the groundwork for eventual withdrawals.
c) In terms of making substantive progress on discussing matters related to the bombing cessation, we have made no
visible headway. Our efforts to arrange private talks or at least limit polemics have been rebuffed. Nevertheless, the
dialogue has begun, and may be developing more give and take./2/ We have set forth our position on matching restraints
in specific, realistic terms, and have indicated readiness to accept flexible language on "acknowledging responsibility" for
cessation of bombing if that would lead to prompt agreement on matters related to cessation. We have warned Hanoi that
the attacks on Saigon are not conducive to progress in Paris.
/2/During the tea break at the eighth session on June 12, Harriman and Vance broached with Thuy and Tho the idea of
secret talks outside of the formal venue. (Telegrams 16113/Delto 268 and 16137/Delto 271, June 12; ibid., IS/OIS Files:
Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, 1968-1969, Delto Chron.)
d) Hanoi's decision to send Politburo member Le Duc Tho to join the North Vietnamese Delegation cannot yet be
assessed. At a minimum, it signifies Hanoi's interest in avoiding any early break-off, and at a maximum may portend some
greater seriousness in Paris.
2. Losses
a) In terms of our relations with the GVN, our principal loss has been the unsettling effect of the talks in Saigon, at a time
when the enemy is intensifying mortar and rocket attacks on the city and continuing heavy infiltration. Demands for
retaliation, or for breaking off the talks, are being heard with greater urgency in responsible Government and legislative
circles.
b) In terms of US public opinion, impatience with apparent deadlock in Paris and continued heavy US casualties in South
Viet-Nam may reopen public debates and lead to demands for all-out action against the North.

272. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, June 12, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET. Secret; Nodis.
Drafted by Bohlen.
SUBJECT
Kosygin Message and Reply
PARTICIPANTS
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of USSR
Charles E. Bohlen, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
During a conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin after dinner at the Italian Embassy last night (at which Dobrynin had
arrived about an hour and a half late), I said to Dobrynin that he must have been writing quite a telegram following his
interview with the Secretary. Dobrynin admitted that that was what he had been doing. I then asked how he evaluated our
reply, to which Dobrynin replied that he was somewhat "disappointed" since we seemed to raise conditions, etc., and he
did not feel we had made a very responsive answer to the Soviet suggestion./2/ I told Dobrynin that this Kosygin message
had been the subject of a very intensive meeting on the part of the American Government virtually all day Sunday./3/ The
chief subject of discussion was exactly what did the Soviet Government have in mind, and it was felt the necessity of
obtaining somewhat more clarification. I told him that I personally felt that in matters of this kind big decisions could not be
based on speculation or guess. I then went on to say that personally I had felt that one thing the Soviets were trying to tell
us was that their commitment to North Vietnam is primarily due to attacks on it by the United States, and therefore logically
if the attacks totally ceased then the obligation of the Soviet Union in this regard would be considerably less. Dobrynin
laughed and said "I see you have had experience in Soviet affairs", without, however, committing himself to my analysis.
/2/According to a memorandum of conversation, June 13, Dobrynin also told Thompson that he was "disappointed" in
President Johnson's reply. To counter Thompson's insistence that the response to Kosygin's letter would have been
different "were it not for past history," Dobrynin "observed that in this case his statements had been made in writing by the
head of the Soviet Government and moreover that he had spoken in the name of the Government." (Ibid.)
/3/June 9; see Document 265.
I then went on to say that I thought with his knowledge of the United States he should really be able to inform his
government of the public affairs position that the President found himself in. On the 31st of March he had taken a
considerable step in the direction of the cessation of the bombardment and there had been literally no response from the
other side except to increase infiltration and raise the level of violence in South Vietnam. The President could not be
expected on the basis of guesses to take action which would appear to the American public to have no counterpart at all.
There was of course the question of the effect on the morale of our forces and our allies in South Vietnam, as well as the
very important problem of the effect on the government in Saigon. Dobrynin appeared interested in this reference to the
attitude of Saigon and the possible effect on the morale of troops in the field, and flatly stated that the Soviet Union had
less interest in the developments in South Vietnam than they did in the attacks on North Vietnam.
The conversation ended with my saying that we hoped for a constructive and sensible reply.

273. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker) and the
Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam (Berger)/1/
Washington, June 13, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 1 EE (6), 6/68, Post Tet Political Activity. Secret.
Sent through back channels to Saigon. Five days earlier, Vietnamese Senator Tran Van Don had informed the Embassy
that, at Thieu's request and with the support of Huong, he was to form a new front group that would include all political
groups. (Telegram 29475 from Saigon, June 8; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 196769, POL 13 VIET S) A report on the evolution and development of the Lien Minh is in CIA Intelligence Information Cable

TDCS DB-315/02565-68, August 1. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Substantive Political Files, Job 91-R0084R, DDI
Files on Vietnam, Vietnam 1968 (General), Part IV)
CAP 81279. The cable (State 181155)/2/ in response to news of Thieu and Huong interest in a large national political party
went out from Washington without high-level attention. But you should know that we are all interested in this development
and regard its success as critical to the consolidation of all that we have been trying to achieve in Vietnam by military and
political means.
/2/ln telegram 181155 to Saigon, June 12, the Department requested the Embassy's assessment of the viability of a
national political organization and the problems that would encumber its formation and operation. (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 13 VIET S)
We look forward greatly to your own reflections on how best this new impulse in the GVN may be encouraged and
backstopped by the U.S. and, in particular, what we can do from here to help you.
As you know, I have brooded about this problem for some years. Only you on the spot can assess how this initiative can
be nursed along, but for what it may or may not be worth, here are a few thoughts which did not emerge clearly in the
cable.
1. The operational objective of this party or coalition is, of course, to prepare itself to beat the inevitable Communist
Popular Front, under whatever name, that will seek power politically in South Vietnam after the war. From the beginning,
this election objective should be kept in mind in organizing the party and preparing the way for it to back a single
Presidential and Vice Presidential slate.
2. Obviously the concept of this party is emerging because intelligent South Vietnamese fear the Communist capacity for
organization, and fear equally their own history of and instinct for factional fragmentation. Fear is a pretty good beginning
for men to group together; but, equally, the party requires a platform and a vision on which all non-Communist groups
might agree. The headings will be clearer to you and the South Vietnamese than to me. But among them might well be:
--loyalty to the Constitution and the constitutional process;
--true independence of everyone, including the U.S.;
--equity with respect to rural and urban affairs;
--rapid economic development;
--ending of corruption;
--a commitment to cooperation with the New Asia and its institutions;
--a willingness to normalize relations with North Vietnam, but no unification unless the people of South Vietnam want it
under conditions where there is no duress.
3. In my judgment, quite obviously, this should be, in a double sense, the government's political party. Under present
constitutional circumstances I think we have to put aside the old Diem fixation in this matter. The South Vietnamese should
be studying the experience of Mexico, India, Tunisia, Malaysia, and South Korea in particular with respect to this party or
coalition. Specifically, the constitutional government should build the party for the good straightforward purpose of getting
itself re-elected. On the other hand, this very wide-based party, like any other, should be one of the instruments which
influence the content of the government's policy. Its broad and, if possible, almost universal non-Communist political base
should ensure that the government is sensitive to the widest possible spectrum of interests in the country.
The ability to beat the Communists in national elections obviously must rest on the ability to beat them in both open and
closed politics at the local level. This suggests to me that an effective party must have the means for exercising influence
at the local and provincial levels, whether through elections or more informal mechanisms. The task is to help our friends
find and institutionalize that blend of idealism and self-interest that makes an effective political party. Among other things,
this is going to mean access to power by party members at both the national and local levels--for otherwise nobody is
going to lose sleep politicking for an existing government.

You will forgive me for what is, almost certainly, an exercise in teaching the sucking of eggs; but I believe you both know
my long-standing concern with the issue.
In any case, we all look forward greatly to getting your own reflections./3/
/3/Bunker reported his concurrence with Thieu's contention that such an umbrella group would be an effective means of
eventually dealing with the NLF in terms of national reconciliation. (Telegrams 29880 from Saigon, June 13, 29981 from
Saigon, June 14, and 30500 from Saigon, June 20; ibid., POL 27 VIET S) This idea was seconded in joint Embassy-CIA
Station telegram 30859 from Saigon, June 24, in which the prospects for a national political movement were assessed. It
concluded: "This view of the realities here demands that the American mission focus its energies on a few key objectives,
in revolving around improved Government of Vietnam performance and effectiveness, not only technically but politically. If
this can be accomplished, it will facilitate the formation of a political mechanism whereby the people will return this
government to power or bring in another nationalist combination which is acceptable or at least reject any alternative
offered by the political guerrillas who pick up where the 122 millimeter rockets leave off." (Ibid., POL 13 VIET S) Further
operational issues were discussed in joint Embassy-CIA Station telegram 4461 from Saigon, June 26. (Central Intelligence
Agency, DDO/ISS Files, Job 78-32, [word not declassified]/Chronological File, Vol. 2) Telegram Director 12439 to Saigon,
June 28, transmitted approval for the Station and the Embassy "to proceed with actions on several different levels to
stimulate the development of a political vehicle in preparation for an eventual free electoral contest with the NLF." (Ibid.)

274. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/

Paris, June 14, 1968, 1858Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Conference on
Vietnam, 1968-1969, Delto Chron. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan. Received at 3:37 p.m.
16376/Delto 285. From Harriman and Vance.
1. We lunched with Zorin June 13. Oberemko present. Bogomolov interpreted with Perry's assistance.
2. Zorin first brought up Senator Kennedy's death and linked this to violence engendered by Viet-Nam war. We explained
Palestinian/Arab background of assassin with no indications so far of any accomplices.
3. We commented on our recent trips to the US, pointing out the widespread public support the President has received
since March 31 speech, and expressed concern over rising demands for retaliation on Hanoi for indiscriminate shelling of
Saigon.
4. Zorin brought up his recent talk with Cyrus Eaton, who had told him American public most anxious for early end of
war./2/ Harriman then asked Zorin whether Eaton had correctly reported Kosygin's willingness after bombing stopped
totally to pitch in and help on question of Viet-Nam and SEA settlement. Zorin replied "If you make that assumption you will
not be far wrong." When Harriman pressed him for specific statement, Zorin said it was "inconvenient" for him to find out
precise details. Harriman said that if Kosygin was in fact interested in our ultimate objectives, Zorin could report to him.
Harriman explained them by drawing on Manila Communiqu and President's Johns Hopkins speech./3/
/2/In telegram 16058 from Paris, June 11, Harriman summarized the following message from Kosygin relayed by
industrialist Cyrus Eaton: "That the Soviet Union wanted to see a peaceful solution in Viet Nam, that he would do
'everything in his power' to get a settlement on the broader issues but that the United States should show flexibility on the
lesser matters that influenced public opinion but which were not in the long run significant. Under this latter heading it was
clear that Kosygin included stopping of all bombing of North Viet Nam." (Ibid., A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN(Incoming)-June)
/3/For the October 25, 1966, Manila Communiqu, which stated that U.S. and allied withdrawal would occur 6 months after
the complete withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from the South, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. IV, Document
281. In the President's April 7, 1965, speech at Johns Hopkins University, he offered a billion dollar redevelopment plan for
the Mekong Delta; see ibid., vol. II, Document 245.
5. We then discussed negotiations in some detail, stating we thought the best way to end deadlock would be to encourage
private talks. Zorin tried to argue Hanoi's contention that air attacks had in fact been increased and total cessation was

essential. He stated that he had seen the North Vietnamese delegation on a number of occasions, including private talks
with Tho. He summarized their position in four points:
(1) US was the aggressor in sending troops to Vietnam and bombing North and could not expect Hanoi to concede
anything in return for total cessation of bombing.
(2) Hanoi could go no further in talks until US had stopped the bombing "or reached an understanding on cessation of
bombing."
(3) Private talks could not begin under present circumstances.
(4) North Vietnamese would be prepared to talk freely about all other outstanding problems once bombing question was
settled.
6. We both emphasized present impasse as a result of Hanoi's escalation, mentioning attacks on Saigon which posed
serious dangers for success of talks.
7. Harriman then bluntly told Zorin that as we saw it, it was through Moscow's influence that these talks have started in
Paris against Peking's wishes. If the talks broke up, Moscow's prestige would suffer to the advantage of Peking. Therefore,
Moscow clearly had a stake and should use its influence now to jar situation off dead center. Harriman continued that there
were certain points of US, Soviet and Hanoi common interest. One, for example, was a desire to have North Viet-Nam
remain free of Chinese domination. Harriman expressed the belief that we could readily agree that North Viet-Nam remain
a socialist state with South Viet-Nam neutral and non-aligned, leaving unification of the two for the future to be determined
by both. Harriman suggested Soviet Union could play a crucial role in getting the two sides together in a private talk, after
dark, in the Soviet Embassy, or elsewhere. Zorin was rigid: no private talks until total cessation of bombing.
8. In a brief personal talk with Oberemko over coffee, Vance answered his question by assuring him that the US was
serious in desiring a peaceful settlement. Oberemko, however, stated frankly he could not say whether there would be any
military restraint on Hanoi's part if we stopped the bombing completely.
9. The entire conversation, though friendly, was rigid. Zorin is quite obviously so cautious that he is not the most
satisfactory man to deal through./4/
/4/In telegram 184205 to Saigon, June 15, Rusk discussed his unfruitful meeting with Kuznetsov the previous day.
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam,
1968-1969, Todel Chron.)
Harriman

275. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, June 17, 1968, 0159Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. IV, 6/16-30/68.
Secret; Sensitive. Received at 9:35 a.m. at the LBJ Ranch, where the President stayed June 13-18.
CAP 81355. Herewith preliminary report of Bill Jorden's dinner. From this text and my conversation with Jorden I would
agree with evaluation at the end; namely a serious exploratory probe. We should look for an early renewal./2/
/2/In a memorandum to the President, June 19, 8:15 a.m., Rostow wrote: "As you know, the North Vietnamese probed Bill
Jorden at dinner on our view of the NLF and a political settlement in the South. There have been other indications that they
want to know 'what the Americans really want' by way of a settlement. Some of us have long felt that mutual de-escalation
in a war of this complex kind, without a fixed front, was very difficult to manage, unless a political settlement had been first
achieved. Therefore, I have been considering the possibility of having Jorden (or whomever Harriman designates) lay
informally before the North Vietnamese at the next informal session a scenario of how we could get from here to there; that
is, all the way to a peace settlement." (Ibid.) Attached was a June 18 memorandum by Ginsburgh to Rostow, setting out a
sequential approach at Paris for a phased mutual de-escalation. At the tea break during the June 19 session, Tho stated

that a political settlement had to precede a military settlement. (Telegrams 16567/Delto 301 and 16587/Delto 304 from
Paris, June 19; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference
on Vietnam, 1968-1969, Delto Chron.) In a memorandum to the President, June 19, 1 p.m., Rostow suggested that
discussions over political issues needed to be encouraged in order for the talks to progress. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 82)
Paris 16457/Delto 290.
1. High points of Jorden-Thanh Le meeting were as follows:
(A) Absence of any give on mutual restraint at present stage.
(B) Their interest in our definition of "appropriate time and circumstance," timing of withdrawal of U.S. forces and
circumstances of same, and questions by Le concerning movement on their part which might justify end of bombing.
(C) Total absence of any denial that North Vietnamese forces were in fact present in South Viet-Nam.
(D) North Vietnamese acknowledgment of willingness to discuss withdrawal of their forces from the South "at an
appropriate time."
(E) Implication that this and "other matters of mutual interest" could be discussed after all bombing "and other acts of war"
on territory of DRV ended.
(F) Effort to probe our attitude toward Liberation Front and its program.
2. Meeting lasted three hours. Atmosphere was cordial throughout. But argumentation was serious and intense on both
sides. Jorden stressed desirability of keeping fact and content of talk confidential. Thanh Le agreed.
3. Present in addition to above were: Kaplan, Nguyen Van Sao, and interpreter Trong.
4. Jorden's and Kaplan's feeling that this was a serious exploratory session by North Vietnamese.
5. Full report follows in septel./3/ Harriman
/3/Telegram 16458/Delto 291 from Paris, June 17. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files:
Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, 1968-1969, Delto Chron.)

276. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, June 19, 1968, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting, which lasted until 2:30 p.m., was
held in the Mansion of the White House. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH HIS
FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS
ATTENDING
The President
Secretary Clifford
Undersecretary Katzenbach
CIA Director Helms
General Wheeler
George Christian
Walt Rostow
Tom Johnson

President: Are you concerned about Jorden's conversation?/2/

/2/See Document 275.
Undersecretary Katzenbach: I am encouraged by it.
The President: Does he indicate we might change our position?
Walt Rostow: He did change our position. Our first position was for clean DMZ, no infiltration. He went back somewhat. On
the whole, it was an appropriate time to change and show some flexibility. We would settle, I am sure, for a stop in the
infiltration for a halt in the bombing.
General Wheeler: I am not disturbed by this small shift in our position.
The proposed reply to the Indian Ambassador did not say what we would settle for in return for bombing cessation./3/
/3/On June 15 Indian Ambassador B.K. Nehru informed Rusk that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi requested U.S.
concurrence in her suggestion to the North Vietnamese leadership that, in return for the complete cessation of bombing by
the United States, the DRV should give the Indian Government "a guarantee or assurance that infiltration through the DMZ
would be immediately stopped and that Hanoi would agree to prompt and effective restoration of the DMZ." (Memorandum
from Bundy to Katzenbach, June 18; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL
27-14 VIET)
Undersecretary Katzenbach: The question is--would you cease bombing for re-establishment of the DMZ with ICC
inspection. The answer is either "yes" or "no" or "maybe."
Director Helms: Laos is not mentioned.
Undersecretary Katzenbach: It was put in by implication.
I would consider saying that restoration of DMZ might be worth it from our point.
Secretary Clifford: I thought Jorden's position was well within the President's statements. It was useful. It was a forward
development.
On India, I do not want to take the "back-door" approach through India. I would prefer keeping it in Paris. It might come out.
Are Vance and Harriman for the Indian approach?
Undersecretary Katzenbach: Yes, they are for it.
The Indians are saying the U.S. has done something; now they (NVN) should do something.
Secretary Clifford: What can Mrs. Gandhi do that our negotiators cannot do?
I am concerned she will say this is it. She will be our negotiator not knowing or understanding the nuances.
Undersecretary Katzenbach: I think it is good for Hanoi to know that the Indians believe they should do something
militarily. The Indians have a function in this.
Secretary Clifford: If Mrs. Gandhi could make her views known to Hanoi, that's good. This has to be worked out in Paris, I
believe. I would welcome the Indian offer.
General Wheeler: Indians have been untrustworthy in the past. They could undercut the efforts in Paris.
Walt Rostow: Permit the Indians to say that it is our impression that DMZ would be a major concession for a cessation of
bombing. We could also express our concerns over infiltration and Saigon. India would say it would assume operating

responsibility for the policing of the DMZ.

Say this should be worked out between the parties directly.
We gave the Harriman-Vance mission examples of what we considered taking advantage of the pause. The Indians can't
handle definition of what is meant by "demilitarization".
Secretary Clifford: That makes a lot of sense to me.
The President: I have sympathy with that (Rostow proposal).
I don't want another front from Paris. We should be cautious on this. All of you agree and come back to me on it.
Undersecretary Katzenbach: You could give very clear definition of what DMZ means.
1. Abrams' Plan
Undersecretary Katzenbach: We have no problem except public relations one.
[Omitted here is a brief discussion of the Berlin crisis and the Non-Proliferation Treaty.]
8. Korean Civilians and Korean Light Division to Vietnam
Secretary Clifford: Pak will send 5,000 civilians at an exorbitant price. Wheeler says we could use the civilians.
General Wheeler: The price for 5,000 civilians is too high. We still have no assurance Pak is willing to go ahead with a light
division. We will get $100 million for Korea.
[Omitted here is a brief discussion of ratification of the anti-ballistic missile agreement.]

277. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, June 20, 1968, 11:15 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 83. Secret; Sensitive.
Mr. President:
You ask: where do I think we should go from here?
1. At tea-break, during the next talk, Harriman or Vance should pick up Tho's statement: "there can never be a settlement
of military matters without prior agreement on a political solution." He should ask:
--Is Tho suggesting we proceed promptly in Paris to discussion of a political solution? If so, we should have to introduce
the GVN into the talks.
--If Paris is inappropriate, perhaps informal contacts might be undertaken by their side with the GVN elsewhere.
If we get no rise from Tho at tea-time, we should try again at the next informal dinner meeting.
2. We should discuss Tho's statement and its implications with Thieu promptly and promptly inform him of the ambiguous
NLF probe in Saigon of which I informed you yesterday. (Code name: Antwerp)/2/ We should urge Thieu to take the
initiative in seeking contact with the Communists to explore a one-man-one-vote constitutional solution.

/2/In a memorandum to the President, June 19, 6 p.m., Rostow first transmitted to him news of the Antwerp contact. (Ibid.,
National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, ANTWERP) Attached to this memorandum were memoranda from Lansdale
to Bunker, June 10 and June 13, laying out the details of the episode. On June 10 and again on June 12, Ho Quang
Phuoc, an associate of Lansdale's, had informed him of a message passed to him which had come indirectly from
Southern Vietnamese within the NLF leadership. Due to dissatisfaction with the dominance of Northerners within the
organization, these leaders were willing to disband openly the NLF if the United States would replace the current GVN
regime with a "provisional government." The Southern leaders were even willing to allow Thieu to remain as President
provided an acceptable Prime Minister with full powers to negotiate could be put in place. Lansdale believed that "we have
probably heard fairly and accurately from the NLF leadership through this channel." (Ibid.) Lansdale's memorandum was
originally attached to a June 13 memorandum from Bunker to Bundy. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-7 VIET S/BUTTERCUP)
3. Jointly with Thieu we should pursue the Antwerp contact./3/
/3/In a June 21 memorandum to the President, 12 p.m., Rostow argued that the Antwerp contact "could be serious" if, in
light of the heavy casualties suffered, the Southerners in the NLF were "seeing a rapid erosion of their own strength and an
increased dominance of their activities by Northerners." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam,
Antwerp) Calhoun attended an additional meeting with the intermediaries on June 20. (Telegram 30600 from Saigon, June
21; ibid.) Further information on the Antwerp contacts is in an undated memorandum attached to a June 22 memorandum
from Carver to Helms. (Ibid.) A critical assessment of the individuals reported to have been involved with Antwerp is in a
memorandum to Bundy from Helms and telegram CAS 348 from Saigon, both dated June 20. (Ibid., Memos to the
President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 83) On June 26 Bunker and Berger briefed Thieu on Antwerp; Thieu noted that any approach
originating from the NLF "must be given serious consideration." (Ibid.) In telegram 193726 to Saigon, June 29, the
Department authorized the Embassy to proceed with the contacts. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/ANTWERP)
4. I doubt that Hanoi will accept Paris talks on this matter, with the GVN, so long as bombing continues. Therefore, private
informal contacts in Viet Nam or elsewhere between the GVN and the NLF seem the logical route to progress. If such talks
are undertaken, Paris could devote itself quietly to certain legitimately bilateral U.S.-Hanoi issues:
--contingent plans and schedule for withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from the South; U.S. forces to base areas,
before departure on the Manila formula;
--plans to re-establish the DMZ;
--plans to re-establish the Laos Accords of 1962.
5. Behind all this, Mr. President, is a hunch, rather than a judgment, that Hanoi is having the same kind of problem with its
generals we have with the JCS. For example, when the North Vietnamese are told we wish to re-establish the DMZ in
return for a total cessation of bombing, they tell their diplomats: "Don't you realize that with the bad weather in Laos that
means virtually cutting off our forces in the South? Impossible." In all conscience, well-balanced mutual de-escalation is
very tough to negotiate in a war of this kind, without a fixed front. They may, therefore, be moving to the conclusion that a
fight-and-talk strategy will have to persist on about present terms until a southern political solution is negotiated. Then the
war could be rolled up briskly.
6. Of course, I could be wrong on one of two counts:
--Kosygin may come back with an acceptable mutual de-escalation formula;
--Hanoi may not be interested in coming to grips with serious negotiating problems until the next Administration is installed.
W. W. Rostow/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968

Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 278-298

278. Notes on Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of Defense Clifford and the Ambassador at Large
(Harriman)/1/
Washington, June 21, 1968, 7:05 p.m.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson,
Subject File, Clifford, Clark, 1963-68. No classification marking.
C: First let me welcome you back. Second, I want to bring to your attention a situation that has been developing here
because I have been informed that we are all to meet at the White House for breakfast tomorrow./2/
/2/See Document 279.
H: Yes Bill Bundy is here with me and we were discussing it.
C: Apparently is on two matters. You are to report to the President on the situation in Paris; the reason for its being so
early is because Dean (Secy Rusk) is getting off for Iceland./3/ Another item to be discussed is one that Bill Bundy can fill
you in on, the code name is Antwerp./4/
/3/Rusk was in Reykjavik June 22-26 to attend the NATO Ministerial meeting.
/4/See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 277.
H: He has just been telling me about it; it doesn't look as if there's much in it.
C: Yes. I wanted to give you a little bit of background. I was asked about the situation in Paris during my press conference
and in a very guarded manner I indicated by expression that bits and straws are in the wind that could indicate some slight
movement./5/ I was very guarded but I wanted to give you the background for indicating, even in that background manner,
optimism. There is a great deal of pressure on the President at this time to relate Saigon and Hanoi. He gets it every day.
He is informed that it's terrible with our position with SVN, our own troops and even our posture in the world for us to permit
Saigon to be shelled while Hanoi is not touched. He is beginning to get restive. Tied up with this approach is, I think, an
effort on the part of some to indicate that perhaps nothing at all will ever come out of Paris. And the tie-up between the 2
arguments is that when it is suggested, he might go ahead and order bombing of Hanoi or issue an ultimatum. The obvious
answer is that that could break up the talks./6/
/5/At a Pentagon news conference on June 20, Clifford listed what he considered to be "bits and straws that indicate that
there is some movement" at the Paris talks, including Tho's arrival and the informal chats during breaks at the Majestic.
Harriman affirmed the signs of progress in a statement to the press the next day. See The New York Times, June 21 and
22, 1968. In a June 21 news conference, however, Rusk downplayed the significance of any progress at Paris by noting:
"Of course, we are a long way from substance when we have to point to the fact that coffee breaks are becoming longer,
that the atmosphere is somewhat more informal, that there may be opportunities for a little more give and take." See
Department of State Bulletin, July 8, 1968, pp. 33-38.
/6/At a meeting earlier that day, Clifford briefed the President and the Cabinet on the enemy's shelling of Saigon and
continuing infiltration. He concluded: "I think that they're making a very serious propaganda mistake to bomb and kill
civilians in Saigon. It doesn't seem to make any sense. It's not contributing in any way to their military posture or military
force. They think they're accomplishing something. I believe they're hurting themselves." (Johnson Library, Transcripts of
Meetings in the Cabinet Room)
H: It would break it up alright.
C: Then the attitude of some very militarist gentleman will, as a matter of fact say that talks will not amount to much so we
are not giving up very much. What I think we must do is if there is ever any occasion in the most guarded manner to
indicate that something is happening . . .

H: I supported what you said in Paris, in Boston and in Washington, but I also had to say that when the NVNamese said
we made no progress, of course not since they are to blame. On this other thing--you saw what Huong said--unthinkable
that they should recommend bombing Hanoi [and] killing innocent people . . .
C: I did see that. You will find at the breakfast tomorrow that this is going to come up for discussion.
H. I was very strong for sending somebody to Moscow--somebody of authority; I don't know whether you saw my letter to
Zorthian (?) [Zorin]./7/ We must give it to them before we go in. Dobrynin said they were told they were going to talk to us.
I'm going to see him tomorrow,/8/ but I think we ought to bring these fellows in. I'll be here until the middle of next week
and hope you'll give me a half hour or so, and as you know I agreed fully with that letter.
/7/Not found.
/8/See Document 280.
C: I continue to feel that we missed the opportunity.
H: The opportunity is still there.
C: Well, I just wanted you to know the background.
H: One thing we got them to do is they're fighting down there.
C: Yes, I consider that to be a straw--obviously we can't make much of it but we have to keep up encouragement.
H: One thing Cy and I fully agree on--he is a very good partner, we agree--I look forward to seeing you, Clark, thanks for
calling. I think you said exactly the right thing and I supported it.

279. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, June 22, 1968, 8:45-9:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The notes are incorrectly dated June 21.
NOTES ON PRESIDENT'S MEETING OF FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
Ambassador Harriman
CIA Director Helms
Justice Fortas
General Taylor
General Wheeler
Under Secretary Katzenbach
William Bundy
William Jorden
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
The President: There are several points I'd like to cover.
1. All of us in the government should give thought to doing everything we should on the psychological front. Things seem
to be getting better for them since the bombing stopped.

2. I want every proposal from the best brains in the government for something additional to do that we are not doing.
3. Before Dean (Secretary Rusk) leaves today I wanted to hear from all of you. Give him your views and advice.
4. We were helped by Secretary Clifford's and Secretary Rusk's news conferences this week./2/
/2/See footnote 5, Document 278.
5. I am worried about the situation in Saigon.
Secretary Rusk: The situation in Saigon is more fragile than Bunker thinks it is.
The President: Maybe you or Clark (Secretary Clifford) should go out.
Secretary Clifford: Tentatively plan for General Wheeler and I to go out on July 13.
Ambassador Harriman: We are interested in what Secretary Rusk has to say. Why are you so worried about Saigon?
The President: There is instability between Ky and Thieu. He doesn't like sitting in the back row after all of the command
positions he has held.
CIA Director Helms: He says too many times a week to too many people that he isn't going to mount a coup. That shows it
is on his mind.
Secretary Rusk: Ambassador Dobrynin told Ambassador Bohlen that Hanoi told Moscow they would be meeting with us
privately./3/
/3/A possible reference to a meeting between Bohlen and Dobrynin on May 31. The memorandum of conversation of this
meeting is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-EX Files: Lot 76 D 435, US/USSR
Conversations on Vietnam and Southeast Asia.
We should lay it on the line about these attacks on Saigon. We should use our propaganda line to the fullest.
Secretary Rusk: Indians propose a plan to get Hanoi to re-establish the DMZ in return for a halt in the bombing. They want
to send a man to Hanoi. I think we should encourage them to do that.
We need to sort out the political problems at the top in Saigon. We need to get Ky back into the main business.
Key Southern leaders in the Viet Cong should be subject to defection. Each one is worth a squadron of aircraft. Group
defections are very important. Let's try to get more. These are contagious.
Assistant Secretary Bundy: We must do some hard thinking about what we say in private conversation.
Walt Rostow: We must probe the proposal that a political solution must precede a military settlement.
We must proceed to get with Thieu on proposals for informal political exchanges, defections and contact with the NLF.
Secretary Rusk: We must talk with Thieu soon so he knows all that is going on.
The President: Should Ambassador Bunker do more to encourage Thieu?
Assistant Secretary Bundy: It is a political hot potato--a question of dealing with the NLF. They say they can't do this as
long as the NLF is doing this or that. There are Southerners in the NLF who dislike how North Vietnamese are taking over
Viet Cong units. I doubt that this is a real NLF contact.
Secretary Rusk: We need to separate the Viet Cong from North Vietnam.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: Total absence of NLF representation in Paris must be troublesome to Southern
Communists.
Walt Rostow: Look at the situation on the ground. The Southern NLF is being ground to bits and taken over by North
Vietnam. In July and August we could take political and military leadership.
The President: Will they hit Hue and DaNang?
General Wheeler: They may. They have the capability after they put the 320th [NVA Division] together to make a good
push.
General Abrams is not in any trouble.
Secretary Rusk: Wouldn't they pull units back if they are getting ready for a big offensive?
Under Secretary Katzenbach: Thieu is not expendable under the Constitution. Huong is. He could be a better link.
General Taylor: We are dealing with Southern wing of the Viet Cong in the Antwerp thing.
The President: (Ambassador Harriman) Would you give us a summary of your talks?
Ambassador Harriman: Nothing concrete has been done. The most interesting thing was putting the political settlement
before a military settlement.
I don't know if you should attach the importance which Washington analysis did to Bill Jorden's private contact.
They are paying attention to what is being said.
We should try to draw a wedge between Hanoi and the NLF. Only citizens of North Vietnam have been allowed to sit at the
conference table.
I told Zorin the Russians have a stake in this. We must get Russians engaged in this.
You have got to go to the top, to members of the Politburo. Top Soviets are involved. Zorin came to see us. He said they
don't know what would happen if the bombing stopped.
Ambassador Harriman: The President's position has improved internationally since March 31.
Bill Jorden did a good analysis of editorials. World showed you took initiative. Now they are stepping up attacks on Saigon.
The American people are solidly behind you.
Cyrus Vance ought to go to Saigon. They haven't faced up to the fact they have to negotiate. We must get Saigon to
recognize that we aren't their satellite. Behavior of the South Vietnamese Generals must be required.
The President: How do we stand vs. March 31?
General Wheeler: We are stronger militarily. Khe Sanh is relieved. Ashau Valley is cleaned out once more. The enemy lost
heavily in two sizable defections. One high-ranking officer defected.
Secretary Rusk: There is some advantage to Cy Vance and Ambassador Bunker talking. Also in keeping South
Vietnamese in touch with the situation.
Ambassador Harriman: That's right. We must show that we aren't selling them down the river.
Secretary Rusk: A trip by Cy would be good.

William Jorden: Re the Press in Europe and Asia, our position has never been better. The enemy has lost ground with
propaganda movies and brochures.
Ambassador Harriman: The Press has confidence in Bill.

280. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, June 22, 1968.
/1/National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET. Secret; Nodis. Drafted
by Harriman. The meeting took place at Harriman's house in Georgetown. Rostow sent Harriman's memorandum of
conversation to the President on June 25. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow,
Vol. 83)
PARTICIPANTS
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large
Ambassador and Mrs. Dobrynin had dinner with my wife and myself. We talked informally before dinner and during dinner,
and Dobrynin and I alone after dinner. They came about 7:30 and left about 10:30.
The following points were covered:
Dobrynin repeated what he told the Secretary and myself, that he had received word that the North Vietnamese delegates
would talk privately with Vance and myself but had not specified when. In questioning him, he indicated that this had
resulted from my talks with Zorin./2/ Zorin is evidently reporting our conversations in detail. For instance, he knew that I
had suggested to Zorin that we meet at night at the Soviet Embassy or any place else so that the meeting could be
assured secrecy.
/2/See Document 274.
Because of Dobrynin's query, I had to explain in some detail why the President could not stop bombing North Vietnam
completely without restraint by Hanoi. I explained the increased North Vietnamese infiltration; the massing of troops
around the DMZ, the shelling of Saigon, and ways in which Hanoi had arrogantly escalated its military action while the
President had taken a major step in de-escalation. He kept saying, "but you have 500,000 troops in Vietnam, why should
you be afraid?" I reiterated, of course, the President's March 31st speech and expressed my personal opinion that it would
be a mistake for us to end all the bombing unless there were some reasonable indication of good will on the other side, as
I feared Hanoi would not take any action of restraint even after full cessation. I said I thought that if we could get together
privately with the Hanoi delegates, we might find a way. He then said he thought that the two-phase proposal was a good
one. I agreed and indicated that that was the sort of thing we could explore privately but not in public.
I urged him to ask his Government to follow-up with the North Vietnamese representatives the necessity of private talks
promptly. He agreed to do so. He firmly reiterated that the Soviets wanted to see the war ended in Vietnam in order that
we could get on to other matters. I underlined again, as I had with Zorin, that if these talks in Paris broke up Moscow would
lose prestige and Peking would gain. This he did not dispute. He expressed the belief that the Soviet Government would
be freer to express its opinions to the North Vietnamese after the bombing had stopped completely. He indicated that
Moscow would feel released when a "sister socialist State" was no longer being hit. He said he regretted that the Kosygin
letter to the President/3/ did not receive a more responsive reply. He told me that since Kosygin had stated, "I and my
colleagues . . . have reason to believe there would be a breakthrough", he had expected the reply would have accepted
Kosygin's assurances, acted upon them and then insisted that the Soviet Government produce. Dobrynin said he thought
we had missed an opportunity. I commented that the stakes were too serious to take such a risk and felt that the President
had made a responsive reply and regretted no further word had been received.
/3/Printed as an attachment to Document 262.
He then spoke about Kosygin's new letter expressing willingness to discuss mutual nuclear restraints and said he felt the
reply was good, although he did not know whether his Government would agree to a public statement by July 1st.

I asked him about Cyrus Eaton's visit, as I understood Kosygin had seen him./4/ He replied that no doubt Eaton was
received by Kosygin, Brezhnev and others--they liked him--but he doubted that Kosygin would send me a specific
message through him. I told him that when Zorin had raised the subject of Eaton's visit I explained to him Kosygin's alleged
request for information on our ultimate objectives. I asked if Zorin had passed on my statement giving an outline of those
objectives. Dobrynin answered in the affirmative.
/4/See footnote 2, Document 274.
We discussed the possible desirability of a senior U.S. official visiting Moscow during the course of the summer to talk
directly with Soviet leaders about Vietnam and possibly other subjects. He commented that no official of the Government
other than myself had been to the Soviet Union since the Secretary's visit to sign the Test Ban Agreement in the summer
of 1963 and that a visit could help clarify our mutual positions. I said that we would have to negotiate directly with the NVN
their restraints during private talks; that if those could be agreed upon, a number of other subjects would be opened up
regarding which the Soviet Government could undoubtedly play a useful role. I pointed out one of the subjects of
importance was how the Vietnamese could be induced to talk together their own future problems--the Saigon Government
with both Hanoi and the NLF. I told him that information we had received through third parties indicated the Hanoi
representatives in Paris took the Saigon Government more seriously since Huong had become Prime Minister. I filled him
in on the details of the strengthening of the Government and its broadened appeal.
He admitted that Zorin was one of the "old school" diplomats but believed he reported accurately. However, he appeared
to acquiesce when I asked him to discuss with his colleagues in Moscow the possibility of sending a man from the Foreign
Office, familiar with Far Eastern affairs, to talk to us in Paris. Of course he knew Oberemko, Zorin's Minister Counselor,
well, and I told him that Vance had had a couple of talks with him which were frank and useful./5/ When I asked him why
the Soviet Government did not have a more alert man than Zorin in Paris, he assured me it was one of those
administrative questions involved in giving to Zorin a responsible position because of his long status in the Foreign Office.
He said he obviously wasn't the best of choices since he did not speak French or, in fact, English, and was rigid. I told him
I regretted that someone more "modern" than Zorin was not in Paris but that Zorin had behaved "correctly" towards me. I
thought he was slowly becoming more relaxed, particularly since I'd seen him four times and there had been no mention of
it in the press. I explained that not only contact with me, but also contact with Hanoi representatives was involved. Zorin
had admitted to me that he had seen the North Vietnamese on a number of occasions.
/5/The most recent meeting between Vance and Oberemko was a luncheon on June 17. A report on this meeting was
transmitted in telegram 16519 from Paris, June 18. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot
93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-June 1968)
Dobrynin was non-committal on other subjects, such as Berlin and Czechoslovak developments. He agreed when I said
that Moscow, Hanoi and Washington had one thing in common--the desirability of Hanoi's being free from Peking's
domination. I suggested this should mean Hanoi's and Moscow's willingness to cooperate with Southeast Asian
development in accordance with the President's Johns Hopkins speech. To achieve the primary objective of independence
from Peking, Hanoi would have to learn to live peacefully with its neighbors. He did not demur.
Sunday, June 23, 1968
Soviet Embassy
I stopped in to see Dobrynin for a few minutes Sunday morning. After thinking over my conversation, I wanted to be sure
that I had been firm enough in stating that we could not stop all the bombing without an understanding with Hanoi on
restraints on their part and that he would report this to his Government. He argued a bit, but I'm satisfied he has accepted
my statement. We touched on PanAm's first flight to Moscow as an occasion for a possible visit to Moscow, and he
suggested that perhaps I might come.
Dobrynin concluded by telling me he did not know how long he would remain in Moscow. His wife and daughter are, of
course, staying in Washington.

281. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/

Paris, June 24, 1968, 2150Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-June
1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. In a memorandum transmitting a copy of this telegram to the President, June 24, Rostow

wrote: "Herewith Zorin--hitherto silent and frozen--suggests the A-B-C formula for private exploration by Vance on
Wednesday to Shriver, in the course of a courtesy call. This is probably Kosygin's reply to you. I have arranged that
Shriver's cable be flashed for comment to Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Bunker. The sequence is clearly: A. We name
to Hanoi a 'date certain' for cessation of bombing, i.e., a date to come into effect when B is agreed. B. We negotiate what
they would do when bombing has stopped. C. We stop; and they stop doing what we negotiate after a pre-negotiated
interval. This could be the turning point, notably if shipments are not coming through China." (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Vietnam, M-Q, Vol. II, Paris Talks--Messages from Other Posts)
16928. Summary:
Soviet Ambassador Zorin today recommended to me that U.S. delegation should utilize "coffee break this Wednesday" to
propose to Xuan Thuy directly Phase A-Phase B plan. He stated his belief that U.S. agreement in principle to stop
bombing on a date certain would be followed by willingness NVN to enter into unofficial, by which he meant non-public,
talks looking toward deciding on circumstances which would follow in Phase B. Upon deciding Phase B circumstances
Phase A would be executed. Thereafter at an interval Phase B actions would be carried out. Though Zorin emphasized he
could not guarantee results he unequivocally reiterated three times his belief that North Vietnamese would respond. And
he said we should not be put off from pursuing this approach even if NVN's first response was "nyet." (End Summary)
Having scheduled routine protocol visit with wife to Soviet Embassy I was advised that Zorin preferred to see me alone on
business. He opened discussion by requesting my views on U.S. political situation to which I responded fully. I outlined
candidly my views on possibilities Humphrey, Nixon, McCarthy, Rockefeller. I emphasized President Johnson much freer,
more knowledgeable on details and thus in better position than any successor to reach understandings with Soviet Union
on subject V-N. I recalled Glassboro speech, new consular treaty ceremony and President's remarks at White House.
Although Zorin started our conversation professing little knowledge of domestic U.S. political picture, he responded to my
analysis by saying he agreed with me completely, that precious time should not be wasted, and that U.S. should take first
big step by stopping the bombing. After I repeated our well-known position, he repeated their litany.
Having unloaded himself of their regular incantations, he proceeded to add his opinion that if we would set a specific date
for stopping the bombing the North Vietnamese would respond immediately by entering into unofficial talks to achieve
complete peace. I said talk was cheap, that President could not stop bombing for an agreement to talk, that even if
President wanted to do so he would lose support of the country and lose any chance of obtaining Congressional approval
of his actions, that such an action might well elect Nixon and thus make peace negotiations even more difficult for North
Vietnamese.
He appeared to accept these arguments and responded by introducing Phase A-Phase B plan. (He did not use this phrase
name for plan but was obviously referring to Phase A-B concept.) I pointed out my belief this plan had been brought to
attention North Vietnamese with no results. He asked if plan had actually been discussed with North Vietnamese, directly.
When I could neither affirm or deny exact details, he recommended that plan be brought up directly by Vance with Xuan
Thuy./2/ To assure myself Zorin's exact intention I repeated to him my understanding his recommendation as set forth in
Summary above. He responded yes "Vance should say that" and he thereupon lifted a heretofore untouched glass of wine
and said "a votre sante."
/2/In telegram 189086/Todel 521 to Paris, June 24, Harriman sent the following message to Vance: "Dobrynin told
Secretary and myself that Hanoi representatives in Paris had informed the Soviet Government they would talk to us in
private but had not specified how soon. You may find opportunity at tea break Wednesday to raise this subject again
without, of course, involving the Soviets." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D
345, Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, 1968-1969, Todel Chron.)
Zorin's manner today totally different than on occasion of embassy lunch with Harriman, Perry and me. Zorin was full of
smiles, laughed out loud 2 or 3 times, and upon my departure said he hoped Mrs. Shriver would soon call upon Mrs. Zorin.
Zorin mentioned Vance's talk with Oberemko and was apparently aware that Vance had gotten nowhere with Phase APhase B idea on that occasion./3/ Zorin also completely frank and expansive on French elections which is subject of
separate message./4/
/3/See footnote 5, Document 280.
/4/Telegram 16929 from Paris, June 24. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D
345, Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, 1968-1969, Todel Chron.)
Ambassador Vance has read this cable.

Shriver

282. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, June 25, 1968, 1:20-2:35 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret.
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH TUESDAY
LUNCHEON GROUP
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Under Secretary Katzenbach
Secretary Clifford
Ambassador Ball
CIA Director Helms
General Wheeler
General Taylor
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
Walt Rostow: The first item is the cable to Vance following up on Zorin-Shriver talk.
Under Secretary Katzenbach provided a copy of the cable (Appendix A)./2/
/2/The telegram to Vance is printed as Document 283.
The President: Have they let up on civilian attacks on Saigon?
General Wheeler: It has been about four days since they have attacked Saigon with rockets.
The President: Is that significant?
General Wheeler: No, I do not think so.
Secretary Clifford: Could it be the lull before the storm?
General Wheeler: It sure could.
The President: I think it may be.
CIA Director Helms: I agree.
Under Secretary Katzenbach: The response time of Abrams to mortars is fantastic. It takes only 90 seconds.
General Wheeler: The 122 mm mortars have a range of seven miles.
Secretary Clifford: We hope the Russians won't give them longer rockets.
General Wheeler: Saigon is 28 miles in size. It isn't hard to hit.
Under Secretary Katzenbach: Ambassador Harriman has a theory about the Soviets which has merit. There is no use in
dealing with them anywhere except at the top./3/

/3/According to the Daily Diary, the President met with Harriman from 12:53 to 1:18 p.m. A notation in the Diary reads:
"Amb. Harriman said he wanted to discuss the following items with the President: 1. The 'Straws in the Wind,' and the
general outlook in Paris. 2. The need for Soviet help in getting private talks going and later to obtain their future
involvement in the situation. He asked for the President's guidance on these two subjects." (Johnson Library, President's
Daily Diary)
Walt Rostow: Proposal of language to India.
Ambassador Ball: We agree on the language.
General Taylor: Yes, I agree although all we are getting is old stuff about stopping the bombing.
The President: Does this sign us on to stop bombing if they do this?
Under Secretary Katzenbach: It comes close to it, but we have a way out.
If they agree to the DMZ, we will stop bombing. This is a complete demilitarization.
The President: Are you for this, Bus?
General Wheeler: Yes sir.
The President: Are we adequately protected?
General Wheeler: Yes sir. I believe so.
General Taylor: I would have difficulty with stopping the bombing in exchange for the DMZ. I don't think we should equate
bombing to re-establishment of the DMZ./4/
/4/In a June 24 memorandum to the President, Taylor suggested making a formal proposal for dividing the peace talks into
negotiations on political issues at Paris and those on military issues at a location in the DMZ. (Ibid., National Security File,
Country File, Vietnam, 8 I, 1/67-12/68, Taylor Memos-General) According to a notation on an attached covering note from
Rostow, the President directed that Taylor's memorandum be circulated to both the State and Defense Departments.
Also, who will verify demilitarization of DMZ.
Walt Rostow: I have some uneasiness. It looks like a softer position than the one we gave Vance.
CIA Director Helms: I do not think a third party should decide what the Democratic Republic of Vietnam should assure us.
The President: Let them wait. Let's see what Vance gets out of the other one.
Under Secretary Katzenbach: We can do that.
Secretary Clifford: India as Chairman of the International Control Commission (ICC) will have some role to play in the final
analysis. Maybe we should get them in on it now.
Walt Rostow: If the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) will talk to us about conditions--as the Soviets tell us--we won't
need this section on conditions.
The President: I do not want to make a proposal to stop the bombing through India.
Walt Rostow: We now have language agreed to by all bureaucracy on Seabed project. (Appendix B)/5/
/5/Not found. Reference is presumably to the U.S. position on an arms limitation initiative on the peaceful uses of the
seabed and the ocean floor.

Ambassador Ball: We can live with this.

The President: What about the Pope's appeal for a ceasefire?
Under Secretary Katzenbach: This thing has taken us off the hook here.
The President: Draft him (the Pope) a letter saying we have gone along with a ceasefire in fourteen points--in U Thant
proposal, and in the State of the Union Message./6/
/6/No letter has been found. For documentation on correspondence between President Johnson and Pope Paul about
Southeast Asia, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XII, Documents 301 ff.
[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East.]

283. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/

Washington, June 25, 1968, 1944Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Paris Todel--Paris Delto VI. Secret;
Immediate; Nodis/Harvan. Drafted by Bundy; cleared by Rostow, Clifford, Harriman, and Read; and approved by
Katzenbach. Repeated to Reykjavik for Rusk who was attending the NATO Ministerial meeting, Moscow, and Saigon.
190068/Todel 529. Paris 16928 and 16929./2/
/2/See Document 281 and footnote 4 thereto.
1. We agree that at a tea break you should act on Zorin's suggestion and probe possibilities of private discussion of twophase approach to bombing and military de-escalation. You should inquire whether they would be interested in private
discussions whereby the US would agree to cease all bombing of the DRV on a day certain to be communicated to them.
Before that day, an understanding would be reached on the "circumstances," i.e., actions on Hanoi's part toward deescalation, which would be carried out following upon the cessation.
2. The main purpose of approach should be to find out whether they are willing to talk in these terms. In this approach, we
believe you should avoid specifying the precise "circumstances" we would regard as satisfactory. However, if they show
interest and inquire as to what you have in mind, you could indicate that we have already noted the importance of
restoration of the DMZ and have expressed our concern (in the terms used by Harriman on June 12) concerning: firing of
artillery and other weapons from and across the DMZ into SVN; ground attacks launched in the area of the DMZ; and the
massive increase in infiltration that has taken place and continues. Finally we have made clear our concern about the
continuing attacks on the civilian population of Saigon. All these points should be mentioned, but in the sense that these
are the kind of topics we would visualize discussing in private talks, avoiding the implication that these are our final and
irrevocable "circumstances" but simply saying that these are the kind of topics we have in mind.
3. In your approach, you should avoid the label "Phase A-Phase B." There have been many formulations in the past to
which this label has been attached, and which have been communicated to Hanoi. Some of these have included the
possibility of additional US actions--over and above stopping the bombing--at "Phase B." You should, at least initially, deal
with the actions on which understanding would be reached through private talks as wholly those of Hanoi. If they raise the
possibility that the US might take additional actions in a second phase, you should state that this is a matter that could be
discussed.
4. Further, you will note that we do not believe that you should, in you initial approach, specify that the "second phase
actions" would follow "at an interval"--the phrase used between Zorin and Shriver. We wish to stay fluid on this point as
well, while not excluding the possibility. Accordingly, if they should ask whether we envisage a time gap between the
stopping of the bombing and the going into effect of the understood actions, you should state that this is another matter
that could be considered in the private discussions.
5. For your own background, we will send you a history of the past formulations to which the label "Phase A-Phase B" has
been attached and which have been communicated to Hanoi./3/ However, we repeat, it seems to us important to avoid this

label so that there will be no confusion as to what we are now proposing./4/

/3/A list of the various U.S. formulations of the Phase A-Phase B proposal was transmitted in telegram 190161 to Paris,
June 25. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on
Vietnam, 1968-1969, Todel Chron.)
/4/Harriman telephoned Vance and informed him that this telegram was on its way. "I feel rather strongly you ought to
make engagement yourself and establish your contact; it should have started with you, though I appreciate your man,"
Harriman noted. Vance stated that he did not need further guidance. (Notes on Telcon, June 26; Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Chronological File, May-June
1968)
Katzenbach

284. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, June 26, 1968, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 84. Secret.
Mr. President:
Herewith a summary of Phil Habib's telephone call about today's Paris meeting, which ended at 9:30 a.m. our time./2/
/2/Full reports on the session are in telegrams 17021/Delto 343 and 17060/Delto 347 from Paris, June 26. (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, 19681969, Delto Chron.)
1. It ran four hours.
2. The formal statement from the other side was pure boilerplate.
3. The coffee break was "extremely interesting":
--for the first time, Thuy suggested the coffee break;
--Vance and Habib were at the table with Thuy and Lau, their No. 3 man. (Tho was not there. The thought crossed my
mind that he might be in Moscow.)
--Cy covered the two points that we wished to probe. First, the follow-up on Tho's remark of last week that a political
settlement should precede military action. Thuy responded that there could of course be talks of a political settlement after
a total bombing cessation. Second, the A-B formula.
4. Habib says that it was clear that Thuy was anticipating Vance's raising of this formula. Vance did so in line with the
instruction which you cleared yesterday, in general terms. Thuy was obviously much interested but confined himself to
stating that they would give it "most careful study."
5. Thuy then made a procedural suggestion. At the next meeting, scheduled for next Wednesday,/3/ he urged that he and
Harriman carry on the formal discussion, but that Lau and Vance meet separately but concurrently for the whole duration
of the meeting rather than merely for a coffee break. This would, of course, substantially expand the opportunities for
private exchanges. Cy said we would consider their proposal.
/3/July 3.
Cy then raised the desirability of more frequent private meetings rather than merely the Wednesday sessions. Thuy was
not directly responsive but said this proposal "could be considered."/4/

/4/In a memorandum to the President, June 26, 7:10 p.m., Rostow noted: "You will wish to know that after today's meeting,
a representative from the North Vietnam delegation approached a junior member of our delegation and asked if Cy Vance
were willing to meet their man Lau at some mutually agreed place for discussion tomorrow of the proposition we put to
them today. He said that if that was an impossible situation an informal contact would have to wait until the next formal
meeting on Wednesday. Katzenbach and Vance are inclined to proceed. We believe that Vance's standing instructions are
sufficient to handle this contact." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos,
Vol. IV, 6/16-30/68)
6. In short, we are apparently launched on an exploration directly of the A-B formula.
7. We shall be getting Cy's own report of all this shortly, as well as his recommendations including, apparently,
recommendation on how we approach the Russians during the coming week, perhaps via Zorin.
W. W. Rostow/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

285. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/

Paris, June 28, 1968, 0448Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-June
1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan/Plus. Received at 11:42 a.m. The "Plus" slug was added to limit further the
distribution of telegrams relating to these private talks. (Telegram 191904 to Paris, Saigon, and Moscow, June 27; ibid.)
Tho left for Hanoi the next day, stopping off in Moscow for consultations with the Soviets. In telegram 17256 from Paris,
June 30, Vance suggested that Tho's departure was related to the recent talks with Lau and Zorin. (Ibid.)
17153/Delto 355. From Vance.
1. I met with Ha Van Lau from 10:30 to 12:40 night of June 27/28 at house in Vitry sur Seine not far from DRV delegation
headquarters. The location was proposed by the DRV and apparently once served as a communications center for them.
Also attending the meeting were Habib and Negroponte on our side, and on DRV side, Nguyen Minh Vy, interpreter
Nguyen Dinh Phuong and Tran Quang Co, who took notes.
2. I opened by asking Lau if he had had chance to think over the suggestion I had put to him and Xuan Thuy at
Wednesday's coffee break. Lau said that it had been put in rather simple terms and thus he as yet had no basis on which
to form a judgment.
3. We repeated the proposal saying that the US would agree to cease all bombardment of North Vietnam on a day to be
communicated to the DRV. Before that day, an understanding would be reached on the circumstances to be carried out
following upon the cessation.
I repeated the proposal to be sure that it was understood. I commented that this seemed to me a way to make progress
and overcome the obstacles to our discussions. I said it would meet the suggestions made by the DRV and not jeopardize
our forces in Vietnam. I then emphasized the value of discussing these matters privately and stressed the importance we
attached to maintaining the utmost secrecy.
4. Lau then said he had some questions. He reminded us that the DRV demands the unconditional cessation of bombing
and all other acts of war against all of its territory and that this has been formulated in a 3-point proposal by Xuan Thuy.
Lau wondered whether other acts of war were included in our proposal or not. I replied that one of the questions we would
have to discuss was what constituted other acts of war.
5. Lau asked for examples of the circumstances we had in mind. I said that we had spoken often of the importance of the
reestablishment of the DMZ, and added that we had indicated our concern regarding such matters as: artillery fire from
and across the DMZ; the launching of attacks across or in the area of the DMZ; increased infiltration of troops into the
South; and continuing attacks on the civilian population in the cities in the South. I said these would be the kinds of things
we should talk about in discussing the circumstances which would follow the cessation of bombing.

6. Lau asked if the discussion of circumstances would come before or after the cessation of bombing. I replied before. I
then reiterated that this proposal would meet the DRV demands, yet at the same time provide the protection for our forces
and those of our allies--a matter which concerns us greatly.
7. Lau then said that he would think it over but commented by way of preliminary observation, that he saw nothing new in
what we were saying when compared with what we had said in previous meetings between the full delegations or in the
meeting between Jorden and Le.
8. I pointed out that our proposal contained something very new. Lau remarked that there was indeed something new, the
date of cessation of bombing would be fixed beforehand. Habib then added that there was something else, the
implementation of conditions follow rather than precede the cessation, thus they are not conditions in the true sense of the
word. In fact, the proposal allows the DRV to meet their request of no prior conditions and at the same time allows us to
meet our requirements for what will follow. Moreover what follows will not be linked with the cessation of bombing as far as
the public is concerned.
9. Lau replied that these ideas were only slightly different from ones we had advanced previously--different in terms of
sequence but as far as the substance of the matter was concerned he said there was nothing new, and what we were
asking is still tantamount to reciprocity. Lau said suppose the discussion of circumstances to follow the cessation of
bombing does not achieve any results--then what will happen? He said our proposal still involved the element of
reciprocity, and he was sure we recalled that Xuan Thuy had already rejected this on numerous occasions.
10. I said I was aware of this and that I had read and reread Xuan Thuy's statements many times. I said that I had tried to
find a way to overcome the obstacle to progress in these discussions--a way in which we could meet the DRV demands
and at the same time provide the necessary protection of our forces. I said that by talking of time sequence the question of
time develops into one of substance. At this point I emphasized that I did not want to mislead Lau. I said that before the
bombing was stopped, we would have to reach an understanding on the circumstances that would follow the cessation of
bombing. I said I did not want any misunderstanding on this point.
11. Habib then commented that the question of prior conditions is not apparent in our proposal because we are taking a
step first and what the DRV does will follow upon the cessation of bombing. I then pointed out that some of the
circumstances which would follow upon the cessation of bombing would be acts of mutual restraint such as the
reestablishment of the DMZ and as such would appear related to each other and not the cessation of bombing which had
taken place before.
12. Lau responded by saying that in substance there is still a demand for reciprocity. He then reiterated the DRV position
that we must cease all bombing and other acts of war unconditionally, and whether the conditions are imposed before, at
the same time, or after the cessation of bombing, it was tantamount to reciprocity. Lau said that if the DRV discusses these
proposals before the cessation of bombing or simultaneously it would be contradicting its previous position. Lau said he
wanted to think that the U.S. is interested in seeking a solution but he regretted that our suggestions offered nothing new
and suggested we speak of substance rather than appearances.
13. Lau then said we had not answered his question. What would happen if we disagree on circumstances which should
follow the cessation of bombing? I replied that unless we agree to the circumstances the bombing will not stop. I also said
that our proposal would meet the basic need of the DRV since the bombing would be stopped, the circumstances would be
reasonable, and they would lead to a lessening of the conflict permitting us to go on to the discussion of other matters
leading to peace. I said that I believed that our objective as well as that of the DRV was to find an honorable solution which
would permit peace to return to Viet-Nam and permit it to develop along lines of its own choosing.
14. Lau then plunged into a long and somewhat emotional monologue. He said that his people would progress, it was just
a question of time and as long as the people were determined to go forward no one could hinder this progress. The North
Vietnamese people are attached to peace, which in their view must be in independence and in freedom. The DRV is an
independent and sovereign country and yet the U.S. sends planes to bomb it. The U.S. repeatedly changes its reasons for
bombing North Vietnam and has also repeatedly admitted that such bombings have not been effective and perhaps even
had the results opposite to those intended. The longer the U.S. prolongs these bombardments the greater the resistance
from the people of Vietnam. The DRV demands that the U.S. unconditionally cease the bombing of its territory. This is a
very legitimate demand and if it cannot be met then our talks will not progress. The DRV believes its demand is motivated
by the principle of sovereignty and independence of its country. As for the U.S. reasons for bombing, one day they are this,
one day they are that, and none of the reasons stand up to scrutiny. The U.S. has no reason to bomb Vietnam and no right
to destroy it.
15. The U.S., Lau continued, has raised the question of restraint and the circumstances which we have raised are actually
demands for reciprocity--demands which the DRV has repeatedly rejected. The DRV cannot accept the principle of

restraint and if the U.S. wants to find a solution it must manifest this desire by some act of good will--that is the cessation
of bombing. After that we can discuss other matters. The Vietnamese do not want to destroy the prestige of other people-they want friendship on the basis of mutual respect but they cannot accept an infringement on their independence and
sovereignty. We have said the conflict should end in order to stop the suffering of our two peoples. How? To end the
conflict we must go back to the origin of the situation which in substance is aggression by a country which has come from
far across the sea. The U.S. argument that North Vietnam is aggressing against South Vietnam is wrong and Lau said he
was sure that even in the U.S. many people did not believe this to be the case
16. I replied that I did not think we could make progress by talking about who is the aggressor. I then emphasized that
bombing of North Vietnam is purely for military reasons and that as a military man Lau should understand this. I said the
bombing is absolutely necessary to protect our troops and those of our allies. I said, moreover, we have already taken
certain actions unilaterally; we have stopped bombing over a great part of the DRV and since early April have up to now-not bombed beyond the 19th parallel although this has not been publicly announced; and that since early April there have
been no allied troops operating in the DMZ, while at the same time North Vietnamese troops have used the DMZ as a
base to move troops into South Vietnam and to conduct attacks against allied forces in South Vietnam.
17. I said as far as Vietnamese independence was concerned we respect it and have said we have no intention of
overthrowing or harming the Government of North Vietnam. I stated what we want to assure is the right of the South
Vietnamese and North Vietnamese to decide their own future without force or outside interference. I reminded Lau that we
were prepared to withdraw our troops from South Vietnam as stated in the Manila Communique if North Vietnam removed
theirs.
18. At this point Vy interjected that if we kept restating our position it would compel Lau to further restate his. Habib replied
that each side knew the other's general position but we were addressing ourselves to a very specific question and the best
thing that Lau could do is to think about our proposal with great care. I again said I thought our suggestion met the
requirements of both sides and without loss of face for either side.
19. Lau said that was a matter of opinion. He repeated his view that we were just talking about appearances and not
substance. He again asked what will happen if we could not agree on the circumstance to follow the bombing cessation,
stating that if agreement could not be reached then there would be no cessation, bringing us back full circle to the old
question of reciprocity.
20. We then went over the same points several more times. I emphasized again the need for protecting the security of our
forces in I Corps. Lau referred me to Thuy's comments on this subject; Vy then said complete cessation of bombing is the
most logical first step, and then there would be discussion of other matters.
21. Lau then referred to Thuy's arguments at the 9th session to the effect that rather than showing restraint we had
intensified the war in North and South since March 31./2/ Lau said we had not answered this charge: I replied that we had.
He then said that, frankly speaking, he could not stomach our claim that we had ceased bombing over DRV territory
containing 90 percent of population. This not true, he said, maintaining that there are 4-1/2 million in area we are bombing.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 275.
22. As for the bombing, it has intensified at very same time U.S. speaks of restraint. What DRV demands is that all
bombing stop. As for South Vietnam, Lau continued, he had just read in newspapers that all areas around Saigon had
been declared free bomb zones; but these are densely populated areas with countless hamlets and villages. What right
does U.S. have to declare these areas free bomb zones? Never have B-52s bombed so heavily, so indiscriminately. The
indignation of the Vietnamese people is aroused.
23. While the US talks of safety of its troops, Lau continued, it is massacring Vietnamese people daily, not to mention the
activities of puppet troops, now US intends to raise their number to one million; US plans to bring troops from Thailand;
and it has just added billions to its war budget. Lau said he was citing these figures not for propaganda purposes but
because they were the facts. US must match its words with its deeds, if not, words are meaningless.
24. I replied that as far as the DRV population living south of 20th parallel is concerned, the figures we had used were
based on the best information available to us and there has been no intent to falsify or deceive. As for the bombing, I said
that compared to first three months of year it had in fact increased but this was in large measure due to weather and the
increase in military movement by the DRV southwards since March. I said that as he well knew, the infiltration rate in May
was the highest ever and it was continuing at an abnormally high rate in June.
25. As for our actions in South Vietnam, there have been indiscriminate rocket attacks by the Vietcong and North

Vietnamese Army troops against Saigon. We have responded to them. We will defend Saigon. Regarding the number of
our troops in South Vietnam, we don't keep it secret. As for number of GVN troops, that's for the GVN to decide. The DRV
refers to them as puppets. Here we have difference of view. We believe South Vietnamese people have right to determine
their future. If they weren't being attacked they would not need to increase their troop strength or seek allied help. No one
has right to impose another's future by force. These aren't words, this is something we believe deeply.
26. Habib then asked if we stopped bombing what military action will the DRV take? Vy replied that DRV would then talk
about related matters.
27. Lau then remarked that he agreed with my statement that South Vietnam people should have right to defend
themselves against use of force, but this did not apply to US puppets who do not represent the people. US puppet and
satellite troops number more than 1 million; they are equipped with best of weapons; and yet what have they been able to
achieve? The truth is that the South Vietnamese have the right to self-determination by uniting behind the NLD.
28. Again displaying some emotion, Lau asked, "Remember Ben Suc? You razed it. Remember Cu Chi district? You razed
it." These were only examples he said. Vietnamese people in the South would rather die than live in slavery. As long as US
aggression continues, the Vietnamese people will struggle until fundamental national objectives are attained. These words
are not propaganda, Lau said; they are spoken from the heart.
29. As for US continuation of bombing to protect its troops, Lau went on, it is absurd and not new. The US has advanced
these ideas at previous meetings. The US proposes fixing a date for bombing cessation beforehand but only after an
exchange of views. This is nothing new.
30. I said that I rejected his statement that continuation of bombing to protect our troops was absurd. I said it was
necessary for their protection. As for self determination, I said we had different points of view. I then said that while we may
have covered much of same old ground this evening, I did not agree that there had been nothing new in our suggestion
and asked him to reflect seriously on it.
31. Habib then said we differ on what great majority want in South Vietnam. We are prepared to leave South Vietnam. Is
DRV? They spoke of weapons we had brought to Vietnam but what of weapons DRV had brought there? Nationalists in
Saigon are not puppets. They wished to determine their own future. They want North Vietnamese out. They want our
forces out eventually. We agree complete cessation of bombing in DRV is a possible first step in these negotiations. What
will DRV do if we the stop bombing? Neither they nor anyone else has been able to tell us what military actions they would
take following a cessation.
32. Lau replied that the people in Saigon we call nationalists are more American than we are. In the U.S. there are people
who call for a complete cessation of bombing while the nationalists in Saigon want to resume the bombing of North
Vietnam and bomb Hanoi. "We know them very well," Lau said, "and if you continue to rely on them you will never find your
way out of Vietnam."
33. As for our proposal, Lau said he would think about it. He said he did not want to deal in recriminations but a
Vietnamese solution must be based on an assessment of the past and present. If we don't agree on at least essential
points of the past, it will be difficult to find a solution for the future. This was the first talk between us. Lau said he had paid
serious attention to my remarks and hoped that I would reflect further on his.
34. I said I thought that through frank discussion we might solve our problems and suggested that we might meet again.
35. Lau concluded by saying that DRV was convinced its point of view is correct and true. We may be convinced of our
position. That is our privilege, but there's only one truth. DRV cannot accept anything contrary to truth or aspirations of the
people.
36. I asked Lau whether we should fix a date for another meeting or whether we should leave it open. Lau replied that they
would need some time to think things over. I said perhaps we could have further discussion at the formal Wednesday
meeting. Lau nodded.
Comment:
37. I gave my preliminary comments on this meeting in the telecon with Walsh of S/S./3/
/3/Not found.

38. The meeting did not produce any progress. The North Vietnamese did, however, get a precise exposition of our
proposal. They understand its content and they are fully aware of its implication. They only agreed to study it. They said
they found nothing new in it. We pointed out there was something new and emphasized the constructive nature of the
proposal which could open the way to progress in these negotiations. Lau said they would sleep on it to see if there was
anything new.
39. Notwithstanding the foregoing the meeting was useful. It was a necessary first step in this dialogue and it proceeded
about as we could expect. They are deliberate and persistent and there was more of the standard party line than we
anticipated. We limited our response in this regard to the minimum possible, and we sought to keep their attention on the
specific proposal. In the next episode we will hopefully find it possible to keep their attention concentrated on the specific
problem, now that we have worked our way through a good deal of the polemics they seem to require./4/
/4/In a June 29 memorandum to the President, Taylor noted: "The report of this meeting is very interesting and, although
inconclusive, is moderately encouraging in offering the possibilities of further substantive talks in private." He believed that
the North Vietnamese would relent on the issue of reciprocity, and thus the "circumstances" for cessation and the scenario
for future negotiations needed to be more fully developed before further exploration in this channel. (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 8 I, 1/67-12/68, Taylor Memos--General)
40. I will be seeing Zorin the morning of June 28 to inform him of what we have done subsequent to his suggestion. We will
wish to consider what should be done in the Russian channel to follow on./5/
/5/See Document 286.
Vance

286. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/

Paris, June 28, 1968, 1735Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-June
1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Harvan/Plus. Received at 2:17 p.m. In the covering note transmitting a copy of this
telegram to the President, June 28, 6 p.m., Rostow wrote: "You will wish to have this account of Cy Vance's meeting with
Zorin, for the 6:15 p.m. meeting with Sec. Rusk. Zorin, essentially, proposes this: 1. We stop bombing. 2. They take deescalatory steps in the next phase; but we also take further steps. The key issues are: Firmly to negotiate phase 2 before
the bombing stops; Whether what they do in phase 2 compensates us for the bombing cessation plus the additional
actions that Zorin suggests." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 84)
According to his diary, the President met that evening with both Rusk and Rostow "to discuss the Middle East paper and
Paris talks." (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Notes of the meeting have not been found.
17226/Delto 361. 1. I called at Soviet Emb today and talked with Amb Zorin for hour and half. Bogomolov interpreted. Zorin
was quite cordial, and proceeded in businesslike manner with minimum propaganda and few wasted words.
2. I began by telling Zorin we wanted to keep him fully informed about progress of talks, and said that after his talk with
Amb Shriver I had spoken with Xuan Thuy during Wednesday's tea break and put suggestion to him in exact form
discussed between Zorin and Shriver. I then recounted arrangements for my meeting with Ha Van Lau, told Zorin meeting
lasted two hours, and described in general terms course of meeting./2/ I summarized by saying I believed Ha Van Lau
understood our suggestion and its implications clearly, that Lau's response was negative but that he said he would think
about it. I told Zorin I assumed North Vietnamese would discuss this matter with him and I hoped he would see it got the
serious attention it deserved, since I felt it provided a realistic way to overcome obstacle to progress in talks.
/2/See Document 285.
3. Zorin said this proposal had been presented to various persons in various languages, and he wanted to ask exactly how
I put it to Ha Van Lau. I said: "The US would agree to stop all bombing and bombardments of the DRV on a day certain to
be communicated to you (DRV). Before that day an understanding would be reached on the circumstances which would be
carried out following upon the cessation." I added that in response to questions I told Ha Van Lau that an understanding
concerning the "circumstances" had to be reached before bombing stopped, but this would be private understanding; and
that if we could not agree on "circumstances," then bombing would not be stopped.

4. Zorin replied that I had put proposition in form hard for Hanoi to accept, for I was still posing conditions and demanding
reciprocity, which he wished to emphasize DRV could not accept. Here he thumped table to emphasize his statement that
DRV would never accept demand for reciprocity, "no matter how it was dressed up." Zorin then said he had envisaged a
two phase proposal with a time interval between the two phases. The first phase would involve a cessation of bombing and
the second phase would involve carrying out reciprocal actions on both sides. He asked whether our suggestion involved
two phases with a time interval between. I said we envisaged, as far as public was concerned, two phases, with time
interval between, which must be as short as possible, but between US and DRV, in private, we had to have a clear
understanding of what would happen in the second phase before we ceased bombing. I said we could not jeopardize the
safety of our troops and other allied forces and therefore we must know with absolute clarity what would happen in the
second phase. I mentioned the reestablishment of the DMZ, and said it would appear to world US and DRV actions in
DMZ were reciprocal steps and not connected with bombing cessation. I said I had mentioned other specific
"circumstances" to Ha Van Lau which would also have to be thrashed out between us. Key point, I repeated, was that we
had to know what would happen if we stopped bombing, and no one had told us this yet.
5. After proposing toast Zorin had more to say. He stated that we had fewer troops in Viet-Nam before we started to bomb
than we did now so why was it necessary to bomb when we had 500,000 troops there. I pointed out his non sequitur and
stressed the fact that DRV had escalated the fighting and infiltration and thus the danger to our troops since March 31st. I
said we could only assume unless we got some assurance to the contrary that they would take further advantage if we
stopped all the bombing. Zorin then said what difference does it make when the measures of restraint are taken by them.
He said if there were a time interval the measures could be agreed to then. I repeated that was unacceptable, and that we
had to know in advance what measures of restraint they would take if the bombing were to be stopped. I repeated again
that we could not jeopardize our forces and those of our allies.
6. Zorin now began to warm to his subject, and referred to a conversation between a member US delegation and DRV
delegation about possible steps in reducing troops, retiring certain divisions, etc. He said this was already second phase
talk. Zorin then tried to explain very specifically what he meant by the two phases. When he encountered difficulty in
making himself as clear as he wished, he went over to his desk, got paper and pencil, and spent some five minutes writing
out diagram on single sheet of paper. At top was Phase I, cessation of bombing, with heavy black line separating it from
Phase II. Phase II was composed of parallel columns with several points in each column. One column was US and the
other DRV.
7. Zorin said with elaborate emphasis that he was not proposing anything, but merely giving his "personal" thoughts--as a
result of listening to both sides--as to what might give best results for the negotiations. (He repeated this caution at end of
meeting.) He then explained his diagram with great earnestness, getting ahead of interpretation in his eagerness to get his
ideas across. First phase was bombing cessation, with no reciprocity "formally," emphasis on "formally." Second phase,
US and DRV would undertake two or three measures each. (1) US would suggest pull-back of certain troops or divisions or
closing of certain bases (he cited closing of Khe Sanh as example) by US, at same time suggesting certain parallel
measures to be taken by DRV. (2) Second point, to suggest certain measures that would help guarantee security of US
and allied troops ("since this was purpose of our asking reciprocal measures for bombing cessation"). E.g., he said
reducing military activity in various areas, and when I asked if he had in mind DMZ as a possibility he replied it was good
possibility. (3) Third point (he stressed this and it was obvious he attached considerable importance to it), discuss some
political step that could be taken simultaneously, so that US proposals would include both military and political steps. His
description of possible political steps was vague. (Later I questioned him specifically on this and asked whether he was
suggesting that a topic for discussion be listed or did he mean that action to be taken should be listed. He smiled and said
he recognized US problem, that we had Saigon standing at our backs, but he had in mind something vague, some
suggested step "on principle" that would not touch directly on interests of Saigon or FLN.) Finally, Zorin said this list of
steps to be taken would be open-ended, that is we would make it clear to DRV that further concrete steps would also be
negotiated. He did not make it clear whether he was suggesting a fourth point on each side of his list saying just that.
8. Picking up his sheet of paper, Zorin said we should draw up "this list," including specific steps for each side. He said he
was unable to advise us on concrete steps we might wish include. US should "propose this now." US would agree to stop
bombings on certain date, and both sides would "agree to discuss" specific points listed, which would constitute beginning
of second phase--to start say two or three weeks after bombing cessation. Thus US would avoid asking direct reciprocity
(pointing to diagram to show that reciprocity came only in Phase II) but would achieve what US wanted, namely measures
to protect US and allied troops. Then he stressed that if US wanted it made clear what would happen in Phase II, then it
must propose concrete measures for both sides; otherwise Hanoi would not provide clear picture of what it would do. Zorin
said he could not guarantee DRV would accept concrete steps US proposed, but he had reason to believe they would
agree to talk on this basis, if it was presented as reasonable minimum measure, and if DRV saw us willing to reduce level
of military activity and simultaneously include something from political sphere.
9. I asked several questions to clarify his position, including what would happen during interval between Phase I and
Phase II--that is how did we know DRV would not take advantage. Zorin replied his idea was that "now, at this stage," we
would already agree on one or two of points in Phase II. I asked if he thought points in Phase II would be carried out by
DRV. Zorin said if DRV agreed, they would abide by agreement, they were as responsible as US. I asked why his diagram

did not constitute "reciprocity" in DRV eyes. He pointed to heavy line between Phase I and II and said reciprocity was
below line but not above it. I again tried to get a clear answer by asking whether DRV would agree to this plan before
bombing ceased. Zorin replied he thought there were grounds for concrete conversations and this plan would not be
rejected.
10. At this stage we had to close hurriedly since Zorin said he was overdue for appointment. I promised to study what he
had said.
11. Comment--I had the impression from two remarks of Zorin that Zorin or a member of his staff had talked to the North
Vietnamese since our meeting of last night. Zorin had obviously thought about the proposal he advanced and when he had
trouble finding the right word, sketched out his plan on paper without undue hesitation. Unfortunately, I could not get a
clear statement from him on whether the proposed reciprocal actions in Phase II of his proposal would be agreed to before
the bombing was stopped. His emphasis on the word "formally" in paragraph 7 above suggests he was saying that.
However, in paragraph 5 he implied the measures would be agreed upon in the interval following the bombing cessation.
At the end of our talk when I tried to get a clear answer (paragraph 9), he fuzzed the issue./3/
/3/Taylor analyzed Zorin's proposals in a June 29 memorandum to the President, highlighting Zorin's call for "concrete
proposals covering actions to be taken in Phase II" and his definition of the DRV's insistence against reciprocity as
implying no public connection between the halt and de-escalatory acts. The separation would be reinforced by a "lapse" of
several weeks. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 8 I, 1/67-12/68, Taylor Memos--General) In
a June 29 memorandum concerning Zorin's proposals, Bundy suggested actions to be taken either solely by each side or
jointly that the U.S. delegation could propose at Paris. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET) In a July 1 memorandum to Clifford, Warnke noted: "The Zorin formula seems to involve a
requirement that we agree unconditionally to stop the bombing while, at the same time but not semantically related, both
sides would agree on a list of certain restrictions on military activity to be discussed sometime after the bombing cessation.
The key factor is that the reduction in military activity to be discussed would be reciprocal, with each side agreeing on
certain de-escalatory measures. The reciprocity would occur after, not before, the bombing halt." He recommended
working out a formula for cessation within the framework of the Zorin proposal. (Washington National Records Center,
Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, VIET 092.2)
12. I will be considering this conversation in light of our talk with Lau and will submit my suggestions for follow up./4/
/4/In telegram 17248/Delto 362 from Paris, June 29, Vance recommended that he and Habib not "seek further clarification"
with Zorin at the present time. Instead, they would ask the North Vietnamese whether or not they wanted to continue with
the private exchanges. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN(Outgoing)-June 1968) In telegram 4443 from Moscow, June 29, Thompson noted: "I informed Dobrynin last night of our
action on Zorin suggestion. In reply my question he said he did not think there would be further communication from
Kosygin at this time." (Ibid.)
Vance

287. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, June 30, 1968, 0600Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret;
Immediate; Nodis. Received at 3:19 a.m. In telegram 193328 to Saigon, June 28, Katzenbach had discussed his ideas on
the inter-relationship between the Paris talks and the political situation in Saigon. (Ibid., A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN(Outgoing)-June 1968)
31393. Dept pass to Paris for Vietnam Mission. Ref: A. State 191958; B. State 193995./2/
/2/In telegram 191958 to Saigon, June 27, the Department notified Bunker of its decision to postpone a visit by Thieu to the
U.S. mainland primarily due to "the specific chance of hostile demonstrations" likely to arise and instead suggested either
"high-level visits from here or Paris" or a trip by Thieu to Honolulu in mid-July, preceded or followed by a visit by Clifford
and Wheeler to South Vietnam. In telegram 193995 to Saigon, June 29, the Department made the following request:
"Highest levels would now like your urgent judgment on the advisability of proposing to Thieu a meeting with the President
in Honolulu in the general time period July 10-13--with the Clifford visit to follow--or conceivably at the other end of the
Clifford visit, with Clifford returning to Honolulu at the same time the President came." (Both ibid., RG 59, Central Files

1967-69, POL 7 VIET S)

1. I have been considering the questions raised in reftel A which pose extremely difficult and delicate problems for Thieu.
He is now publicly committed to an official visit to the United States in the near future and hardly a day passes without
some reference to it. For example, during his public meeting with the representatives of the "Front of Fronts" June 29
several of the questions raised with him were centered on this fact. I believe that major considerations of "face" are
involved and that our handling of this issue must reflect this fact. Thieu has recently been increasingly subjected to private
criticism as being too much in the Americans' pocket, in contrast to some of the more nationalistic and particularly northern
leaders. In our handling of the visit we must be sure that we do not make it appear as if Thieu were a puppet and subject to
American whims.
2. I do not know how strongly Thieu will feel about letting the visit slip and I would hope that I could be given considerable
flexibility in handling it with him. If Thieu amenable to Honolulu talks I think we should suggest to him that simultaneous
announcement make clear that proposal to meet in Honolulu was originated by Thieu; that he made this proposal in lieu of
State visit because he decided in view threats of new Communist offensive attacks he could not be away from Viet-Nam
for length of time customary for a State visit; that both sides felt need for summit consultations at this time to review military
situation and Paris talks; and, finally, that State visit not abandoned but deferred.
3. It would seem most useful to me to have a Honolulu meeting immediately after the Clifford visit here, as some of the
preparatory discussions could in fact take place during that visit. I would therefore urge that if this change in plans is
ultimately considered necessary, the Honolulu meeting be scheduled for about July 19 or 20.
4. With reference to para three of reftel B, I agree that we must in the last analysis leave the decision as to who would
accompany him up to Thieu. I think it would be most useful to have Ky along, since this conforms to past practice and
would also involve Ky in whatever decisions and public statements emerge from the meeting. While we can see advantage
in having Huong present, a case can be made that it would be more appropriate as well as necessary for the head of
government to remain in Saigon in the absence of the President. Moreover, there would be some language difficulties
since Huong speaks no English, although interpreting arrangements could undoubtedly be worked out.
5. In sum, I hope that we can hold off on the final decision on Thieu's official visit until after I discuss the matter with him. If
he should feel that it is politically essential to him despite all the factors outlined in reftels, I would like to report his views
and my recommendations before a final decision is made. Request urgent instructions so that I can take this matter up with
Thieu when I next see him./3/ I have an appointment with him Monday/4/ afternoon.
/3/In telegram 194062 to Saigon, June 30, the Department provided additional reasons for Thieu's concurrence in a
meeting in Honolulu instead of the U.S. mainland. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan
Paris Todel--Paris Delto VI--6/16-30/68)
/4/July 1.
Bunker

288. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 1, 1968, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 86. Secret; Harvan.
Mr. President:
We have just completed a meeting of almost two hours on Viet Nam negotiations of just the kind you wished us to have;
General Taylor, as well as Secretary Rusk, Clark Clifford, Bill Bundy, etc., were present./2/
/2/Notes of this meeting taken by Helms are in Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI
(Helms) Chrono, 01 Jan-31 July 1968.
We:

--reviewed where we are in the negotiation, looking back to the beginning;

--considered what Averell and Cy should do on Wednesday;/3/
/3/July 3.
--and looked further down the road.
The consensus was that our negotiators limit themselves on Wednesday to asking, essentially, this question: Are you
willing to sit down and discuss in private with us a proposition in which:
--we would stop bombing; but before the bombing actually stops we achieved a clear understanding on actions that would
follow;
--in the actions that would follow we can envisage some that would be applicable to both sides; some to one side; and
some to the other;
--any time interval between the stopping of the bombing and the package of actions would have to be short;
--they would have to understand that aerial reconnaissance must continue after cessation of bombing.
We would tell them that if they were prepared to sit down on this basis we would be prepared at that time to put in concrete
proposals.
In short, it was agreed that on Wednesday we would not actually put in concrete proposals, but simply ask them if they are
prepared to talk on the basis of this structure which Zorin commended to us.
While we were talking, the attached cable came in to the Secretary from Vance. The general view was that paras. 1-10.A.
were on the right track except that we must try to negotiate a delay of less than seven days. Something like 48 hours
would be nearer right. There was strong resistance to an early implementation of paras. 10.B. and C. at this time./4/ There
was considerable discussion of the attacks on urban areas. Secretary Rusk wants them firmly brought into the conditions;
Secretary Clifford feels that we can probably do without that assurance, relying on our own military capabilities to keep
them from bombing Saigon too heavily.
/4/In the attached telegram 17321 from Paris, July 1, Vance characterized the two phase proposal based upon Zorin's
formula: "In sum, we would propose to present to the North Vietnamese an elaboration of our first suggestion so as to
relate North Vietnamese restraints to mutual actions taken in Phase 2, rather than to our bombing cessation in Phase 1." In
order to enact the halt under Phase 1, an understanding on certain actions required in Phase 2 needed to be reached. In
paragraph 10 (A), Vance outlined the military actions relating to the DMZ which both sides would take. In paragraph 10 (B),
he noted required actions relating to current force levels. In paragraph 10 (C), he noted the actions relating to the
withdrawal of troops on both sides.
We are putting our proposition on a quick turnaround to Paris tonight. In the light of what Cy says, we shall present a fairly
unified view at lunch tomorrow for your final decision.
W. W. Rostow/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

289. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 2, 1968, 10:40 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Meetings with the President, July-December 1968
[2]. Secret; Harvan; Plus. A notation on the memorandum reads: "Lunch item."

Mr. President:
Herewith outgoing to Vance, as a result of yesterday's meeting,/2/ and Vance's response (Tab A)./3/
/2/See Document 288. According to notes of the President's luncheon with Rusk, Clifford, Ball, Wheeler, Taylor, Helms,
Rostow, Christian, and Tom Johnson on July 2, Rusk stated: "We had a good meeting yesterday. We should not put forth
what Phase II should be yet. Vance and Harriman should press for a private meeting on the subject. Hanoi is up against a
major obstacle. Something is stirring on the other side. Still we must know what they would do if we stop bombing. If you
approve, we will seek a private meeting on Phase II." The President replied: "That is fine." (Johnson Library, Tom
Johnson's Notes of Meetings)
/3/In the attached telegram 194772/Todel 587 to Paris, July 2, the Department informed the delegation that "it would be
premature to table a possible second phase package at this point" until a basis of understanding was developed with the
DRV. It instructed Vance to state to his counterpart: "We do insist that, before the bombing actually stops, we must have a
clear understanding on actions that would follow the second phase." The telegram added the following sentence: "In the
actions to be clearly understood, we can envisage actions on the U.S. side and measures that would be equally applicable
to both sides." Rostow rewrote the sentence as: "In the actions clearly understood, we can envisage actions on the U.S.
side, actions on the DRV side, and measures that would involve appropriate actions on both sides." In telegram
17324/Delto 366 from Paris, July 2, Harriman noted that he and Vance would carry out this instruction at the next tea
break. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-July 1968)
Also attached is a Harriman-Zorin conversation, instigated by the latter (Tab B)./4/
/4/In the attached telegram 17332/Delto 369 from Paris, July 2, Harriman and Vance reported on a meeting with Zorin in
which the Soviet Ambassador inquired about reaction to his previous suggestion. They replied that while the suggestion
remained under study, it was viewed as "a constructive suggestion so long as agreement was reached on both stages
beforehand." The full report of the conversation was transmitted in telegram 17425/Delto 381 from Paris, July 3. (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Paris Todel--Paris Delto VII)
Sect. Rusk will have a draft outgoing cable for you at lunch--if not earlier.
I have told State I believe it should contain the addition I have inserted on page 2.
But there is a larger issue which we debated amiably yesterday and on which Zorin's cable bears. The issue is this: on the
next occasion, should we merely ask the North Vietnamese if they are prepared to sit down with us to work within the Zorin
framework, or should we fill in what we want and are prepared to do in Phase 2?
Yesterday I had suggested the latter; Sect. Rusk suggested that we move more cautiously and simply raise the structure in
principle--then proceeding in a private session, if they showed interest, to fill in Phase 2. He argued persuasively that they
were probably making critical decisions in Hanoi right now and we should not put in a proposal which might scare them off
by being too tough.
Now Zorin tells us: "It was critical that the columns in Phase 2 be filled out in detail. He said without the specific points in
Phase 2 the proposal would mean nothing."
The question that you may wish to decide at lunch is, therefore, whether we proceed promptly to lay before them a Phase
1-Phase 2 proposal of substance.
We should recall that they have already had in the Jorden dinner,/5/ as well as by way of example in other conversations,
what we have in mind: the DMZ; reduced infiltration; no shelling of Saigon; continued reconnaissance. It is just barely
possible if we frame the proposal in this way, with familiar items but Phase 2 filled in, we could advance the pace of
movement.
/5/See Document 275.
At the base of the matter is this judgment: since the biggest development in Paris has been the Soviet willingness to get
into the middle of this--beginning with Kosygin's letter--should we be prepared to take their advice, so long as we could live
with the proposal if it is accepted?/6/
/6/In telegram 31593 from Saigon, July 2, the Embassy relayed its own ideas of the minimum requirements Hanoi had to

meet in order for a full cessation to occur. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82,
HARVAN-(Incoming)-July 1968) In telegram 196665 to Paris and Saigon, July 4, the Department transmitted a tentative
proposal to be made to the North Vietnamese in private talks. (Ibid.) In telegram 197553 to Paris and Saigon, July 6,
Katzenbach analyzed the similarities and differences in the positions put forth by both the Paris delegation and the
Embassy in Saigon. (Ibid.)
Walt

290. Memorandum From the President's Special Counsel (McPherson) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 3, 1968, 11:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of Harry McPherson, Memoranda for the President (1968) [2 of 2]. No
classification marking.
Yesterday a very able man whom I got to know in Vietnam last summer, John Paul Vann, called from Denver. He is on
home leave from his job as the top civilian in the pacification program in III Corps. He is something of a legend out there,
and has always been pretty skeptical of our efforts, while certain that we could do much better if we tried.
Vann says two things are clear about the enemy in III Corps today: first, he has incurred the terrific animosity of the civilian
population through his rocket attacks; second, he has almost committed suicide militarily. Vann is convinced that the
enemy determined to shoot everything he had, with a "termination" date--an exhaustion date--of November.
His information sources are 3 Vietnamese cadre in each province--men who used to be political advisors with the RF and
PF. Ironically, he says Vietnamese Government officials cannot believe his sources because they are not paid agents of
the GVN. Partly as a consequence of this, the GVN has been slow to exploit what he calls "a new willingness on the part of
the civilian population in III Corps to line up with the Government."
The ARVN is improving somewhat in III Corps, but the real change is in RF-PF performance--the first improvement he has
seen in 7 years in Vietnam. He says the RF and PF can put a much higher percentage of riflemen in the field out of total
strength than either the ARVN or U.S. military forces. And "men on the ground with rifles are more important in this war
than artillery and air." RF and PF units in III Corps have just received their first shipment of M-16s, and he expects modern
weapons to make a real difference in their performance.
Vann says General Abrams has started to master the "chief security problem in the area around Saigon--the chaotic
organizational situation. Until now there have been a dozen separate commands, US and GVN, and cooperation between
them has frequently been miserable. This is beginning to change." He is extremely high on Abrams, whom he says "is the
first senior commander to cope with the GVN military situation."
Vann says the enemy exploited the two principal weaknesses in U.S. military tactics during the Tet offensive: our
unwillingness to fight at night, and our reliance on air and artillery.
As to the first, he says almost all our night actions are close-in ambushes designed to protect our positions. Therefore the
enemy has 12 hours every day to change his position, re-supply, and rest.
As to the second, he says our reluctance to use infantry has permitted the enemy to dig in and hold almost any position,
since only direct hits by artillery or air can destroy him. The absence of infantry harassment has enabled him to move
whole regiments into position to attack populated areas.
The one thing the enemy did not count on, says Vann, was that we would use air and artillery in populated areas. He has
taken heavy losses in the cities, much heavier than he expected. We have also suffered psychological losses among the
urban population through the use of air and artillery, but "to be ruthlessly candid about that, the people in the urban centers
have no place to go; many are bitter, but they do not become assets for the enemy because the government controls the
urban areas."
Vann believes we can start to withdraw some U.S. forces in the reasonably near future "without loss of over-all military
effectiveness--indeed, with some gain. The size of our non-combat element is far too great. We ought to start rotating units
through central base camps, instead of giving each unit a base of its own. The Vietnamese are getting much better, and

they will get better still if we start to reduce the size of our presence in Vietnam."
The main purpose of his call was to say that "while we were ridiculously optimistic in the past, we may be dangerously
pessimistic now. There has been a major decline in enemy fortunes in III Corps, at least, and the opportunity exists now for
exploiting that decline and substantially improving our prospects."
Since Vann is a former Army Colonel who resigned in Vietnam back in the early 60's because he thought General Harkins
was lying about the war, his present views are worth considering.
Harry C. McPherson, Jr./2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

291. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/

Paris, July 3, 1968, 1411Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Paris Todel--Paris Delto VII. Secret;
Flash; Nodis; Harvan; Plus. Received at 10:52 a.m. In an undated covering note to the President, Smith noted: "Harriman
and Vance report on today's Tea Break exchange. Hanoi is linking halt in shelling of Saigon and release of three U.S.
prisoners to our B-52 strikes north of the DMZ. North Vietnamese agreed to another private talk, possibly Friday."
Additional discussion of the tea break is in telegram 17455/Delto 392 from Paris, July 3. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, 1968-1969, Delto Chron.) Reports
on the July 3 formal session are in telegrams 17406/Delto 346 and 17408/Delto 376, both July 3. (Ibid.) Jorden's notes of
this session are in the Johnson Library, William Jorden Papers, WJJ Notes.
17409/Delto 377. From Harriman and Vance. Subj: Tea break--11th session, July 3.
1. Tea break lasted for about 45 minutes.
2. Xuan Thuy and Lau met with us in a new room. Vy sat with Habib and Seignious. Bo and Le sat with Jorden and
Kaplan. Hieu and two others sat with Holbrooke.
3. After Thuy's polite inquiry about wedding, I said I understood some talks took place while I was gone, and asked Thuy
how he felt about them. Thuy said he had heard what took place at the meetings between Le and Jorden and Lau and
Vance. He said he felt there was nothing new in these conversations. I said I felt there had been something new and that
this should be explored in depth. I added that we do have certain new ideas which we would like to talk over. Thuy said he
didn't think there was anything new--if it was new it was new in form and not in substance. Vance said he felt what we said
the other night was new and the variation to which Governor Harriman had referred was new, but Thuy and Lau would
have to judge for themselves after further discussion. We said we felt it best to arrange a second meeting between Vance
and Lau outside Majestic. Thuy nodded affirmatively and Vance suggested that he and Lau arrange a mutually convenient
date--perhaps Friday. We said the place we used last time was satisfactory and suitable for future conversations. Lau
replied "Let us consider the date."
4. I then remarked that I had heard that Le Duc Tho had gone to Hanoi, stopping for talks in Moscow and Peking. I asked
when he would return to Paris. Thuy said he would be in Hanoi for some time.
5. Thuy then said he felt meeting the other day was just a meeting for meeting's sake. Vance said he did not agree and
that constructive proposals were put forward by us in an attempt to make progress. Thuy said "How? I am afraid they will
lead us into deeper impasse." Vance said, "I hope not."
6. I then asked whether there was any significance to the fact that Saigon had not been shelled in past two weeks./2/ Thuy
replied "It must have as now we have released prisoners. I think this is understandable to you." I asked if the two actions
had the same significance and whether no shelling of Saigon would continue. Thuy replied "The rockets have stopped.
What is your attitude?" I asked whether this was for political or military reasons. Thuy replied that it was hard to answer. He
then said he must point out B-52 bombing around DMZ and Saigon. He said bombing around DMZ was of unprecedented
intensity. Lau interjected "75 planes in and just north of DMZ." I stated bombing at DMZ was to counter NVA build-up. I
then said if DRV intended to reduce military action around Saigon and DMZ that they should say so clearly.

/2/The VC had not shelled Saigon since June 18 and no South Vietnamese city had been shelled since June 21. However,
B-52 bombardment of the area north of the DMZ and south of the 19th parallel, halted since May 9, had resumed on July
1.
7. Thuy said that means we can't settle this question because it returns to the principle of reciprocity. He said if we linger in
this spot we will never solve this problem./3/
/3/Norwegian Ambassador to the PRC Ole Algard reported DRV Ambassador to the PRC Ngo Minh Loan's statement
during a meeting in Peking that the DRV was prepared to enact measures of restraint in return for a complete bombing
cessation and that "several of proposals which were set forth by Harriman in this connection will be further
considered." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/OHIO)
8. Thuy said he agreed Vance and Lau should meet, but that they should think over carefully what they are going to say.
Thuy said we know each other's position and now should go into ways of settling unconditional cessation of bombing.
9. I then said I wanted to express thanks for release of three pilots. I said the last time we released three North Vietnamese
seamen and asked whether they would rather have more seamen released or some North Vietnamese officers. Thuy
repeated in several different forms that release of pilots was not an exchange of POWs, and that DRV demanded return of
their seamen who were illegally seized in DRV territorial waters. I replied I was not suggesting a POW exchange but was
thinking about a reciprocal gesture that might be made by the U.S. Thuy declined further comment.
10. In conversation with Habib and Seignious, Vy said the North Vietnamese wanted very much to have peace. War was of
no value to either side. Habib remarked that the private meeting between Ambassadors Vance and Lau, at which Vy was
present, was a successful beginning for the kind of private discussion which we found useful. Vy said that they had found
the Lau-Vance talks "very interesting." He agreed that it was desirable to continue the private talks. They were, however,
looking for "something new" from us.
11. Vy said they would be interested in hearing more of the "contents" of what we propose. Habib said there was a good
deal more to discuss and in a continuation of the private talks greater precision and presentation of details would be
possible. Vy asked Habib to tell him what this would involve. Habib replied that such matters were worthy of discussion
and precise presentation and that under the proper conditions of private talks this could be done. Vy said "we are waiting
to hear from you" and added that they would honor the secret nature of the private talks. Habib replied that we were ready
to talk further at any time and that he presumed that Governor Harriman was making this clear to Minister Thuy. The rest
of this conversation was of a nonsubstantive nature.
Harriman

292. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

San Salvador, July 7, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. V(a), 7/68. Secret;
Sensitive. This memorandum was transmitted as telegram SSWH 0007 from Rostow to Bromley Smith, July 7, with the
request to forward it to both Paris and Saigon. (Ibid.) It was sent to Saigon as CAP 81557 to Bunker and to Paris as CAP
81558 to Harriman and Vance, both July 7. (Ibid.)
TEXT OF MEMORANDUM SENT PERSONAL
FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO
Under-Secretary Nicholas Katzenbach
Ambassador Harriman (Paris)
Ambassador Bunker (Saigon)
I have been following with attention and fascination the exchanges on the appropriate no-bombing formula.
May I offer a wholly personal commentary, as viewed from a San Antonio motel, Air Force One, and the Salvadorian
Fraternity House from which I am now operating./2/

/2/Rostow stopped in Texas en route to the Organization of Central American States meeting at San Salvador, El
Salvador, which began on July 5. The President left for El Salvador from the LBJ Ranch on July 6 and returned on July 8.
He arrived back in Washington on July 10. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
At the risk of caricature it looks like this.
1. Saigon draws a wholly persuasive picture of political and psychological catastrophe brought on by a talk-and-fight
strategy in which we permit attacks on Saigon-Danang-Hue at a time when there are no attacks on North Vietnam.
Presumably VC-NVA personnel in South Vietnam plus infiltrators through Laos would permit this.
2. Washington and Paris--with somewhat different emphasis--appear to believe that a version of the Zorin formula
involving a closing down of the DMZ would have political-psychological-military effects strongly to our (U.S.-GVN) net
advantage.
3. In part the correct judgment depends on a military assessment of:
--infiltration capabilities through Laos under weather likely over next several months;
--our capability to defend Hue, Danang, and Saigon.
4. I suspect it is precisely this obviously delicate political-psychological-military equation Hanoi is now assessing.
5. It may be clarifying, therefore, to pose the issue to which the equation on both sides is addressed:
--can the constitutional Thieu government survive?
--can it be destroyed by a combination of enemy action and U.S. diplomacy?
All the serious evidence outside the formal Paris changes is addressed, after all, to the question of the future political
structure of South Vietnam of which the latest Kapitsa-French conversations are only the latest example.
6. Therefore, I draw this tentative conclusion: The critical issue in judging whether an honorable peace is now possible is
not the exact terms for a bombing cessation but whether Hanoi has come to the point where it will accept the Thieu
Government as interlocutor on both a southern political settlement and such issues as DMZ, future of Vietnam, etc.
7. If this judgment is correct the key issue for discussion is the issue raised by the Paris interpretation of Zorin; that is,
Hanoi's willingness to accept a your-side-our-side formula. I could easily be wrong at this distance, but my interpretation of
Saigon's anxiety is much less Hanoi's military strength than it is U.S. and Hanoi negotiating the fate of South Vietnam and
Southeast Asia.
8. This line of argument is obviously open to debate; but if it is right, it means that the GVN view of a no-bombing-for-DMZ
deal would be one thing if the issue of GVN negotiating participation were settled satisfactorily: a quite different matter if
the latter issue were still in contention--as it obviously now is.
9. I raise for your consideration then, the question of making central rather than peripheral Hanoi's willingness to discuss a
settlement with the GVN, either directly or through a cut-out. If they say: "Yes," then the basis for peace may exist. If "No,"
then peace is still far off.
10. In short I believe, tentatively:
--we should probe the Paris negotiators and Moscow hard on the structure of future southern politics.
--we should elevate the relative priority we are establishing for your-side-our-side.
11. The question for Saigon is: How much is the problem military; how much solved if the GVN is in the middle of a
negotiation.
12. The question for Washington and Paris is whether it would not be wiser to try to settle the future negotiating structure

before or concurrently with the negotiation of a Stage I-Stage II package.

13. Seen from a distance this emphasis makes sense since the point of the enterprise is not to find a way to stop bombing
but to find a way to an honorable peace.
14. I repeat: This is in no sense a formal White House message.

293. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 8, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Vietnam--W.W. Rostow. Top Secret; Sensitive;
Literally Eyes Only for the President. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
As you know, there has been an extensive exchange of views between Washington-Paris-Saigon on our terms for a total
bombing cessation. ("Washington", for these purposes, includes Nick Katzenbach, Bundy, Clifford, but not Rusk, and no
definitive JCS position. Rusk has encouraged the exchange, but kept his freedom of action.)
Paris is pressing for us to respond to Soviet advice and table a proposal at the earliest private session. (Brom indicated
this morning it could come this Friday.)/2/ And, in any case, the Delegation wishes to be equipped with definitive
instructions on this key matter.
/2/July 12. Reference is to Bromley Smith.
(You should know Secretary Rusk is more reserved. He believes Hanoi is now considering where it goes from here; the
other side has not yet accepted in principle the Zorin proposal as a framework for negotiation. Therefore, we should not
hurry to lay out a detailed proposition.)
The purpose of this memo is to summarize the elements in the proposal that has been examined in these exchanges; and
the areas of agreement and of debate. (I ordered all the exchanges typed up in a book for you, so that when you get to
Washington the material will be available.) Secretary Rusk, General Taylor, and I may have views which differ even on
some points otherwise agreed. I don't know the precise nature of Secretary Rusk's reservations; but I shall indicate
General Taylor's views and mine, point-by-point.
I. Phase I
--U.S. agrees to cease bombing North Vietnam and "other activities" that involve the "use of force;" that is, excluding
reconnaissance. (Agreed.)
--Prior to execution of above a clear mutual understanding will be reached on substance of Phase II. (Agreed.)
--A time interval would be accepted by U.S. between bombing execution of Phase II. (Washington proposed 3-4 days;
Paris a week; when queried, Paris said Phase II actions might vary in time with respect to bombing cessation, within a
week; Saigon not yet heard from on this point. Walt Rostow thinks 48 hours is sufficient to save Hanoi's face and the deal
will be difficult to hold for longer than two days after total bombing cessation.)
--After some exchange, it now appears agreed that it will be difficult to deliver on a promise of "secrecy" on the deal.
Therefore, while formally respecting the separation of the two stages in public statements, we should not make excessive
promises to Hanoi on this point.
II. Phase II
--Restoration of the DMZ. No personnel or equipment in or moved through DMZ. (Agreed)

--Military Action near DMZ. No fire across DMZ or "massing of forces" on either side. (Agreed); but Abrams being asked
what is operational meaning for our forces of "no massing".
--Military Restraints in the South. Washington proposes no "rocket, mortar, or sabotage" attacks on Saigon. Bunker wants
no attacks of any kind on Saigon, Hue, Danang, arguing most dangerous psychological effects on GVN and ARVN of such
attacks, with no bombing of the North. Taylor strongly agrees. Paris wants restraint on Saigon treated as "an assumption"
and does not want to go beyond Saigon./3/
/3/According to notes of a July 8 telephone conversation with Vance, Katzenbach noted the following position of the Paris
delegation: "They felt it was possible to try to get a commitment against indiscriminate acts against Saigon (not including
major forces) although they thought it doubtful they could succeed. They did not think it feasible to raise the question of
attacks against Hue and Danang." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-I Files: Lot 74 D 271, NK
Chron 1968)
Washington also initially raised issue of whether, for purpose of symmetry (and to meet Zorin's proposal) we should
undertake some symbolic restraint in the South to give the appearance of paying something (other than bombing cessation
in North) for enemy's laying off Saigon. I believe consensus is now that each action, on each side, need not be matched:
We are trying to negotiate a package as a whole.
--Infiltration Rate and Force Levels. Washington initially proposed that the U.S. and DRV keep forces at present levels and
agree "not to increase military personnel in SVN" above level at time of bombing cessation. Also proposed: an initial "token
withdrawal" on both sides, equal in size (about 5000 men); plus subsequent weekly withdrawals. Paris agreed, but said
weekly withdrawals could be held for a later stage. Saigon said no withdrawals whatsoever in early stage of Phase II
negotiations.
(As you see, we have shifted from infiltration rate to force levels. I'm sceptical that this is to our advantage because:
--Our force levels obvious; enemy's not. Enemy could cheat.
--Our infiltration intelligence has been recently better than order of battle.
--Infiltration rate determines the intensity with which enemy can sustain fighting; if we leave order of battle fixed, and no
limit on infiltration, he could run an intense fight-and-talk strategy. If infiltration limited, his fighting capacity limited. But this
is a military matter and you will wish to know JCS and Abrams' views.
--Laos. After initially considering an interim proposal to freeze Laos activities on both sides at present levels, consensus
appears emerging that we should insist strongly that a Laos settlement, on basis Geneva Accords of 1962, is essential to a
final agreement but we do not overload Phase II negotiations, at early stage, with Laos issue; that is, infiltration and
bombing of Laos would continue.
--Prisoners of War. After some thought it is pretty generally agreed we should not introduce the question of U.S. prisoners
of war into the actions that accompany bombing cessation and opening of Phase II.
--Agreements in Principle on Elements in an Ultimate Settlement. There is an interesting difference between Paris and
Washington on Zorin's rather fuzzy suggestion that we should negotiate something about subsequent talks before the
bombing stops.
A. Washington thought he referred to the items that should comprise the substance of a settlement.
B. Paris thought he referred to the structure of talks and how Saigon and the NLF could be introduced into the talks.
There is no great problem about A, although Saigon has sought to assure that post-war supervision of agreements and
post-war rehabilitation be included.
B, in my judgment, may turn out to be the critical issue; that is, whether and when Hanoi agrees to GVN participation in the
talks--on a your-side-our-side basis or some other basis, for example, secret bilaterals. We're in a precarious position up to
that point, especially if bombing of the North has totally stopped. Once Hanoi recognizes the GVN as a legitimate
interlocutor, things could move fast.

In any case, it is agreed the key elements in a final settlement, which we could lay on the table before bombing stops, look
something like this:
--Mutual withdrawal of NVN and Allied forces (Manila);
--Internal political structure of South Vietnam decided by South Vietnamese in free choice;
--Full compliance 1962 Laos Accords;
--Both sides respect neutrality of Cambodia;
--Effective international supervision of agreements;
--Post-war rehabilitation.
III. The Paris-Saigon Compromise
After one round of detailed exchanges, Paris and Saigon came in with hard-core proposals that were pretty close.
Paris said it should try to negotiate for Phase II.
--DMZ;
--No attacks on Saigon;
--Fix force levels;
--Your-side-our-side for negotiations in Phase II.
Saigon wanted:
--DMZ;
--No attacks on Hue, Danang, and Saigon;
--Reduced level of infiltration.
Saigon has not yet indicated the priority it places on negotiating your-side-our-side before the bombing ceases; but wishes
us to "probe" Hanoi on this point.
Right now the issues appear to be:
--Saigon OR Saigon, Hue, and Danang.
--The priority we attach to prior agreement on GVN role in Phase II talks, before bombing stops.
IV. The Taylor Warning
General Taylor feels strongly that there should be a general statement made to the Hanoi negotiators in working out Phase
I and Phase II that our no-bombing position is generally contingent on their not improving their military position. He says:
"They must never think that we will never again resort to the sanction of bombing."
(I would add an observation to Hanoi and the Soviets along the lines of my comment to Kopytin, the TASS-KGB man who
came in for a chat;/4/ namely, that once bombing totally stops, it is extremely important that there be prompt forward
movement on substantive issues. An intense talk-and-fight strategy, with no substantive progress, and no bombing of the
North could create very serious problems for Saigon and for us in the United States. The San Antonio phrase "productive"

still matters.)
/4/Aleksandr Kopytin.
V. A General Observation
Thus far Hanoi has conducted itself:
--with no commitment to the Zorin framework for negotiation;
--no willingness to recognize the GVN as a legitimate interlocutor;
--no commitment to honor the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962.
In trying to negotiate a measure of mutual military de-escalation, we are, therefore, flying blind.
We have no real knowledge of Hanoi's basic intention:
--To seek military and political advantage, by embarrassing our relations with Saigon;
--Or to save face on the bombing of the North and try to negotiate an early peace.
Until we have a better sense of Hanoi's intentions, we should proceed cautiously, paying great attention to Bunker's
anxieties about Thieu's position. That is why I regard Hanoi's acceptance of the GVN into the negotiation as so critical.
VI. Schedule
As I understand a double-talked conversation with Brom Smith this morning the schedule is as follows:
Tuesday: A meeting chaired by Secretary Rusk to prepare for the President a statement of the consensus plus a statement
of key differences, if any, and issues for the President's decision./5/
/5/The meeting chaired by Rusk was held in the Secretary's Conference Room from 4:32 to 6:18 p.m. the next day. Those
in attendance were Rusk, Rostow, Helms, Clifford, Nitze, Warnke, Wheeler, Taylor, Ball, Katzenbach, Bundy, and Read.
(Johnson Library, Dean Rusk Appointment Books, 1968-1969) Notes of this meeting have not been found, but it is
summarized in a memorandum to the President from Rostow, July 9, 7 p.m. In this memorandum, Rostow noted that Rusk
and the assembled group had decided to instruct Harriman and Vance to determine whether the North Vietnamese would
set a date for the next private session at which examples inherent to the two-phase proposal would be presented. (Ibid.,
National Security File, Memos to the President, Vol. 87)
Wednesday: Meeting with the President and dispatch of instructions to Paris./6/
/6/From 1:32 to 3 p.m., the President met with Rostow, Rusk, Clifford, Wheeler, Taylor, Helms, Christian, and Tom
Johnson. The agenda items were "NATO, Vietnam and Paris Talks." (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Notes of the meeting
have not been found. Prior to this meeting, the President met from 12:10 p.m. to 1:15 p.m. with the full Cabinet and several
staff assistants in order to review a number of issues, including a "report on military situation in Vietnam." (Ibid.) In his
briefing, Clifford noted that the NVA had pulled back to regroup north of I Corps and rendered the following assessment:
"We believe that the reason that they are not engaging in combat now is that conditions do not suit them and they are
preparing for a summer offensive." The full transcript of this meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
Friday: An informal Paris meeting, I think./7/
/7/Vance and Lau did not meet privately on July 12. During the tea break at the formal session on July 10, the primary
topics of conversation were the U.S. elections and the intensified bombing ongoing since July 1. Reports of the formal
session are in telegrams 17730/Delto 418 and 17748/Delto 425 from Paris, both July 10. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, 1968-1969, Delto Chron.)
Walt Rostow

294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, July 10, 1968, 2327Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference on
Vietnam, 1968-1969, Todel Chron. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Bundy, cleared by Rostow and Jeanne Davis of S/S,
and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Paris for Harriman and Vance.
199837. Saigon deliver by hand to Ambassador from Secretary.
1. Highest levels wish you to convey to Thieu following thoughts concerning Honolulu meeting:
a. President hopes that entire focus of meeting will be on direct personal encounters between himself and Thieu. He would
like to have Thieu explain frankly what he sees as key problems now and into the future. Then, if staff work is required to
move toward best answers on these problems, matter would be referred to staffs. But entire emphasis would be on
smallest possible groups at all times and on private and direct exchanges between President and Thieu.
b. It would help if you could elicit from Thieu kind of key problems he would hope frankly to discuss with President in this
manner.
c. The President understands that Thieu has suggested Harriman or Vance come to Honolulu (this came to us today
through Bui Diem). However, President's feeling is that this might create undesirable impressions (a) of US/GVN crisis
about Paris talks, and/or (b) of impending breakpoint in Paris talks, and would therefore strongly prefer that I be prepared
to handle all matters relating to details of Paris talks. (For Paris: President would entertain possibility of quick trip to
Washington by Harriman or Vance prior to departure if developments made this desirable.)
d. In line with above concept, President expects to have absolute minimum staff accompanying--specifically, myself,
Secretary Clifford, General Wheeler, Rostow, and Bundy. He would therefore suggest Thieu staff be on similar lines--i.e.,
unless economic problems are in fact among the key ones Thieu wishes to discuss, Economic Minister might be omitted,
and the same for General Lac./2/ We leave it to you to judge how to make this point, and perhaps it would best follow your
discussion of what the key topics would be.
/2/Economic Minister Au Ngoc Ho and Brigadier General Hoang Van Lac, Deputy Minister of Revolutionary Development.
2. From your own mission, President would appreciate your recommendations on the basis of the smallest number that
can do the job. General Wheeler is cabling Abrams directly to express President's concern about his being absent from
Saigon, plus the feeling that the Clifford visit should bring back a fairly clear picture of the military situation and problems in
any case. We assume you would wish some appropriate member of your political staff and would appreciate your
recommendation whether Bob Komer should come--which may take you right back to what the central problems will be.
But this is the kind of minimum size the President has in mind.
3. On Thieu's transportation, President hopes that you can move him in the direction of a PanAm charter such as he
previously contemplated. If he should suggest our providing an aircraft, please let us know.
Rusk

295. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 12, 1968, 4:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Kosygin [3]. Secret. A notation on the
memorandum by the President reads: "Walt--Call me Monday about this. L."
Mr. President:

I set out the following idea not because I believe it to be correct nor because I recommend it; merely because I think you
should have available all the options of which we can conceive.
1. I begin with the fact that both Tommy Thompson and Chip Bohlen feel a certain regret that we did not pick up Kosygin's
message,/2/ institute a total bombing halt, and then lean very heavily on the Soviet Union to produce results, against the
background of a threat to resume bombing if the results did not take place. As old Soviet hands they are impressed that
Kosygin should have used the following language in addressing you: "My colleagues and I think--and we have grounds to
do so--that complete cessation by the United States of bombing and other acts of war with respect to the DRV could
contribute to a breakthrough in the situation and produce prospects for a peaceful settlement."
/2/Attachment to Document 262.
2. The fact is that since June 5 the over-all level of combat in South Vietnam has greatly diminished and the shelling of
Saigon has ceased.
3. But also we have every reason to expect in August--if not earlier--a major offensive in I Corps and against Saigon.
4. The idea would be for Sect. Rusk to tell Dobrynin or Tommy to tell Kosygin that:
--We note the de-escalation in the actual fighting in South Vietnam in recent weeks;
--We note the cessation of shelling of Saigon;
--We are prepared to stop bombing on Day X;
--It is, of course, essential after the bombing cessation:
--that this low level continue;
--that Saigon not be attacked;
--that we move promptly to a reinstallation of the DMZ;
--that the U.S. and Soviet Union discuss the reinstallation of the Geneva Accords of 1962 (Dobrynin told Sect. Rusk flatly
this would be possible after a bombing cessation);
--and, as Chairman Kosygin told the President, that he and his colleagues had grounds to believe that the DRV would
move rapidly towards a "peaceful settlement."
5. Before actually instituting a bombing cessation, we would require from the Soviet Union some broad understanding
along these lines.
6. This is pretty high-risk poker; and the case is good for waiting to see if in fact Hanoi responds directly to the Zorin
suggestion. But the fact is that the Kosygin letter gives us an opening for this gambit if you should decide you would like to
force the issue./3/
/3/Rostow attached this memorandum to a memorandum he sent to the President on June 14. In the June 14
memorandum, Rostow noted the risks inherent in the approach through Moscow: relations with the Soviets could be
damaged if they failed to secure North Vietnamese compliance and bombing had to resume, a stoppage followed by a
resumption would have severe domestic political ramifications, and the possibility that the United States might not respond
if, regardless of a cessation, the North Vietnamese attacked Saigon anyway. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files
of Walt Rostow, Kosygin [3]) Attached to this memorandum was the text of a draft message to Kosygin laying out the
operative details of this proposal. There is no indication of its transmittal to Kosygin.
Walt

296. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/

Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80-R01580R, 266--Vietnam. Secret. Sent to
Rostow with copies to Katzenbach and Nitze. In the attached covering memorandum transmitting a copy of the paper to
Helms, July 12, William Nelson, Chief of CIA's Far East Division, wrote: "This memorandum responds to a request from
the Director of Central Intelligence to Chief, Far East Division for a briefing paper on the above subject for passage to the
Secretary of State and other senior government officials." In a separate attached covering note transmitting a copy of the
paper to Rusk, July 15, Helms wrote: "Here is the report on Agency efforts to induce defections in South Vietnam. This is in
response to your request of me some days ago. It is clear from paragraph 11 that additional organizational work needs to
be done in Saigon inside the American community. You might want to raise this as an item in Honolulu." In another
attached covering note transmitting a copy of the paper to Rostow, July 15, Helms wrote: "Secretary Rusk asked me for
the attached report and I have sent him the original. In my note covering this paper, I have suggested to Secretary Rusk
that he may want to raise the organizational problem outlined in paragraph 11 with appropriate individuals in Honolulu later
this week." A notation on this covering note reads: "Identical notes with Xerox to: Katzenbach and Nitze."
SUBJECT
CIA Programs to Induce Desertions and Defections in South Vietnam
1. CIA conducts unilaterally or in cooperation with other agencies in Vietnam a wide gamut of defector inducement
programs which range from the pin-pointed approach to high-level VC cadre to broad propaganda appeals to enemy
troops of all categories.
Inducement of Desertions
2. CIA and MACV jointly conduct a sizable program designed to induce desertion by VC and NVA soldiers. Through black
radio and leaflets continuing efforts are made to lower the morale of the individual enemy soldier to the point where he
realizes the futility of his situation and begins to seek an alternative to inevitable death. Radio and leaflet output
emphasizes the endless sacrifice these soldiers are required to make the awesome fire power they must face and the
heavy casualties their units endure. The privation caused by lack of sufficient food and medicine, the dissension between
Northerner and Southerner, the failure of the people of South Vietnam to support them except when forced to do so, and
the failures and inadequacies of their own command and support structure are additional themes. Publicity is given to
defections, particularly those involving high ranking officers and groups, and defectors are used in a variety of ways to
attempt to induce the defection of their comrades.
Rewards Program
3. The Station has also worked closely with MACV in the development of a program of awards utilized by both U.S. forces
and the GVN to encourage defectors and to obtain information leading to the capture of VC/NVA leaders. Under the code
name Born Free, a comprehensive program of rewards has been instituted to encourage defectors and stimulate the flow
of voluntary information. Other programs providing related incentives include awards to ralliers for weapons turned in and
monetary awards to RD cadre for capture of VC. The GVN Ministry of the Interior has a pacification fund separate from the
Chieu Hoi Program which provides rewards for capturing or killing VC cadre.
Contributions of Phoenix
4. The Phoenix Program,/2/ formerly called ICEX (Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation), has now expanded
sufficiently to permit its district centers scattered throughout South Vietnam to proceed with some effectiveness in the
defection field. The following order of priority has been established: Defection in place, inducement to rally, capture,
destruction of infrastructure elements. In some areas the Phoenix Program has progressed to the point where the province
Phoenix representative [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] selects a province level VC political or military
leader of significant stature for concentrated attention to achieve his neutralization according to the foregoing order of
priorities. This is designed to supplement the day-to-day endeavor to capitalize on intelligence to eliminate the
infrastructure. The recent capture of Col. Le Van Ngot in III Corps is an example of an effective PRU operation utilizing the
intelligence resources available through Phoenix.
/2/"Phoenix" referred specifically to U.S. activities in support of the anti-Viet Cong infrastructure plan while comparable
South Vietnamese activities were known as "Phung Hoang." The South Vietnamese program received Thieu's public
endorsement in Decree No. 280-a/TT/SL, July 1, which established the Phung Hoang program as part of a general
campaign to accelerate the pacification of the rural areas of South Vietnam. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/ISG Files,

Job 77-186, Phoenix--GVN Decrees and Directives) Status reports by the CIA Station in Saigon are ibid., Phoenix-Progress Reports, 1967, 1968, 1969. Additional indications of progress in this program are in MACV's periodic reports in
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 472, Records of the U.S. Forces in Southeast Asia, HQ MACVCORDS, Phung Hoang Directorate, General Records, 1967-1971, 1601-9A, Phoenix Newsletters.
Operational Support
5. In addition to operational endeavors, the intelligence capabilities of the CIA Station provide a steady flow of useful
information and analysis which is utilized by the various components involved in the inducement of deserters and
defectors. For example, the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] National Interrogation Center (NIC) provides a
considerable volume of comment from prisoners and ralliers concerning the effectiveness of radio and leaflet operations.
This data provides insights useful for refining the content of these psychological operations to increase their effectiveness.
The Station has provided a variety of papers on the character and life of the NVA soldier in South Vietnam and on his
strengths and vulnerabilities which have been used in the planning of psychological operations.
Precise Targeting of Prospective Defectors
6. [10-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
Exploitation of High Level Defectors
7. The intense military pressures on VC and NVA military units resulting in part from changed and more aggressive enemy
military operations has created new operational opportunities and a somewhat increased flow of higher level military
defectors. The use of a recent defector, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] provides insight into methods for
exploiting successes to achieve further success. [5 lines of source text not declassified] around South Vietnam, and
newsmen have been given access to him for in-depth interviews.
[heading and 1 paragraph (11 lines of source text) not declassified]
Intelligence Operations
9. In 1966, the CIA Station revamped its program to gain access for intelligence purposes to strategic level leadership in
the VC and to encourage defections from that leadership. Since that time, our efforts have resulted in vastly expanding CIA
knowledge of the top enemy leadership. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
Enemy Response
10. The variety and extent of these various programs resulted in 1967 in counter-action by enemy forces to reduce the
desertion rate through more stringent controls over their personnel and through intensified political indoctrination. One
cause for the drop in Chieu Hoi rate in late 1967 appears to have been this enemy effort for greater indoctrination and
tighter control.
Problems and Proposals
11. Although the various programs to induce defections and desertions are extensive, there remain many opportunities for
improvement both in organization and tactics. The complexity of the problem creates difficulties in organization and
coordination which are not currently adequately met by existing procedures. Two mission council committees have
responsibilities relating to this problem. One group, the Psychological Operations Committee (chaired by the JUSPAO
director) has not met for a year. The Prisoners and Detainees Committee confines itself almost exclusively to U.S. POW
problems. An ad hoc psychological operations committee, consisting of representatives from the Embassy, MACV,
JUSPAO and CIA has been useful in discussing the exploitation of specific opportunities [1-1/2 lines of source text not
declassified]. It would appear desirable to establish a Vietnamese-American working group to concentrate on defection
inducement and to insure that appropriate techniques and procedures for handling high level ralliers are developed. There
is a continuing problem in insuring that new techniques in this field are reported to all echelons for implementation (a
problem complicated by the rapid turnover in personnel). Various opportunities for action in this field by the GVN have not
been aggressively exploited. President Thieu, for example, could give personal publicity to recent ralliers and could
increase public attention and GVN support for the National Reconciliation Program by establishing a "Council on National
Reconciliation". Opportunities available to enemy cadres who rally need to be publicized more vigorously since, despite
considerable effort, recent evidence indicates that enemy personnel are not well-informed concerning these programs.
Enemy indoctrination to the effect that capture will result in torture and death is apparently effective and must be
neutralized not only by counter-propaganda but by practical improvements in GVN structure and practices to eliminate

excesses which substantiate this indoctrination. CIA has cooperated in an effort to develop more systematic procedures for
processing and adjudicating prisoners as one effort to this end.
Summary
12. In summary, the CIA contribution to defector and deserter inducement falls into two broad areas: (1) a selective effort
organized and implemented essentially by CIA to induce individual high level defectors, and (2) a broad variety of actions
to support programs of other agencies in this field. Problems of coordination and management exist to some degree on the
American side but there is a continuing and intensive search for new ideas and operational initiatives which is achieving
some success. On the GVN side, at senior levels, there is a pattern of apathy and some opposition to programs which
involve acceptance of enemy personnel back into the Vietnamese community without retribution. On lower levels there in a
spotty but in general a cooperative attitude in pushing the various programs forward.

297. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France and the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, July 13, 1968, 1807Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-July 1968.
Secret; Priority; Nodis; Harvan; Plus. Drafted by Katzenbach and Rusk, cleared by Rostow and John Walsh (S/S), and
approved by Rusk. An analysis of this telegram is in a July 12 memorandum from Rostow to the President. (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. V(b) 7/68) At the end of Rostow's
memorandum, the President wrote: "Vance is cleared for Tuesday return." Vance returned to Washington on July 16.
202032/Todel 676. Ref: Paris 17843; State 199838./2/ Personal for Harriman and Vance from the Secretary.
/2/In telegram 17843 from Paris, July 11, Harriman and Vance noted: "If we wish to determine whether the North
Vietnamese are seriously interested in the formula, we should be prepared if necessary to lay it out for them in full. So that
they understand its implications." They therefore recommended that their instructions "be modified to allow Vance to go as
far circumstances warrant to expose Phase 1-Phase 2 proposals." They wanted to limit the term "indiscriminate attacks" to
include only rocketing and shelling of cities but not the use of mines, explosives, and personnel to implement these attacks
as the Department wanted. In addition, they proposed a proscription of any alteration of the composition of military units,
suggested a "token withdrawal" of troops from each side, and recommended that no set agenda items be listed for the
expanded talks. (Ibid.) In telegram 199838 to Paris, July 10, the Department transmitted to the delegation instructions for
their private meeting with the North Vietnamese on July 15. (Ibid.)
1. The President and I believe that certain shades of difference which appear in reference cables could be reduced by a
fuller exposition of what is really on our minds.
2. We see little evidence that the Hanoi delegation is prepared seriously to discuss other factors on which there must be an
understanding before there is a complete cessation of the bombing. Their delegation may be awaiting the return of Le Duc
Tho, they may be awaiting the results of the new offensive which they clearly seem to be preparing, they may be marking
time for political developments in the United States, or they may feel that they are under no pressure to get going.
Chairman Kosygin just recently wrote Prime Minister Gandhi pressing the point that we stop all of the bombing before
anything else could be done and asked her to press this upon the United States. What the Soviets are doing behind the
scenes, we just do not know clearly. There has been no further answer to the President's message to Kosygin on this
subject.
3. Under these circumstances we are reluctant to make a full and detailed exposition of our views until it is quite clear that
Hanoi is prepared to sit down and seriously discuss the problem on a two-way basis. Otherwise, there would be nothing
more than a unilateral exposition to someone who is not really listening. It would put Hanoi in a position to make our views
public at any time and in such a way as to inject questions of detail into public debate in this country and to stimulate fears
and suspicions among the South Vietnamese and other Asian allies.
4. It seems to me that the question is basically one of timing. I would think that you have plenty to talk about in your
Monday private meeting within the framework of State's 199838. You could begin with a discussion of the concept of the
Phase One-Phase Two approach. If they reject this in principle at the outset, this could be pursued at some length on the
basis that it is an attempt on our part to meet their problem--namely, to prepare the way for a stopping of the bombing by
the United States as a first step. If they seem sufficiently interested as to want a sample of what you are talking about, you
could go into the DMZ point in considerable detail. At the same time, you could mention the other topics as a sort of

agenda for a further discussion of the Phase One-Phase Two concept. It would of course be of great value if you could
elicit from them their thoughts on topics Phase Two would have to take into account.
5. It seems to me that State's 199838 gives you plenty of ammunition for your next private meeting, pending Vance's return
on Tuesday/3/ for further detailed discussion here.
/3/July 16.
6. On your specific question as to whether you are authorized by State's 199838 to put down a complete package, you
should not put down what purports to be a complete package until you and we have resolved such questions as the
withdrawal of forces by both sides from South Viet-Nam and the broad questions referred to in Paragraph 13. As indicated
above, you are authorized to explore the concept of Phase One-Phase Two fully, explore the DMZ in great detail, and
indicate more generally the other topics that you would wish to explore further. It seems to me that this is in itself more
than you can possibly cover in a single meeting.
7. "Indiscriminate attacks" certainly include rocketing and shelling of cities and should include other acts primarily designed
for terroristic purposes. We think this should ordinarily include mines and explosive devices used for such purposes and
certainly could include use of NVA/VC personnel on the ground in indiscriminate attacks primarily for political purposes.
You should use above as illustrative in order to probe any DRV reactions. We would like to get as much as we can in this
connection.
8. Military experts here are concerned that prohibition against alteration and composition of military units could raise
technical problems for both sides. It appears to give a certainty and security which is more apparent than real since it is
possible to attach large numbers of additional troops to existing units. In any event, it is scarcely necessary for you to
make this an initial proposal. If they are interested, we can negotiate the details subsequently.
9. You need not include proposals with respect to complete withdrawal by each government of its forces from SVN. We
think it may interest the other side and you may raise it if as a result of your discussions this appears to you useful. The
principle is obviously an important one and should be of considerable interest to the North Vietnamese but we leave timing
to your discretion. We continue to have under consideration your proposal with respect to token withdrawals and
appreciate the argumentation you have provided. We are not, however, persuaded this should be an initial proposal on our
part but are wont to believe it should await evidence of their seriousness with respect to Phase One-Phase Two proposal.
If there is evidence of willingness to negotiate on this basis we will reconsider your recommendation.
10. You need not raise the broad matters contained in Paragraph 13 of our Reftel. These are discretionary with you and
were intended to be responsive to a point in Zorin's original suggestions on which you reported he "attached considerable
importance" (Paris 17226 7.13 Delto 361)./4/
/4/Document 286.
Rusk

298. Telegram From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) and
Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Saigon, July 15, 1968, 1745Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 88. Secret. In a covering
note transmitting a copy of the telegram to the President, July 15, 5:35 p.m., Rostow wrote: "This back channel message
from Bunker on how Thieu is building a big national political party will interest you. He's learning; but the party has a long
way to go." The notation "ps" on the covering note indicates that the President saw the telegram. It was re-transmitted as
telegram 32844 from Saigon, July 17. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL
13 VIET S)
CAS 5314. Pass following message "eyes only" from Amb Bunker to SecState and Mr. Walt Rostow. [less than 1 line of
source text not declassified] please pass to Harriman, Vance and Habib. Subject: Thieu on political party formation and
financing.

1. Berger and I had a long and very satisfactory talk with Thieu after dinner at the residence on July 13 on how he
visualized the problems of building political support for his government and what his plans were. I introduced the subject by
referring to our previous conversation on this some months ago.
2. He said he had worked from behind the scenes to encourage the foundation of Lien Minh (National Alliance for Social
Revolution), an alliance of nationalist elements. After it was surfaced he had addressed it on July 4 at the headquarters of
the CVT, and he was continuing to work quietly with its leaders.
3. Its three main components were the Free Democratic Forces, headed by Nguyn Van Huong; the Farmer-Worker
Association (a CVT-Hoa Hao amalgam) led by Tran Quoc Buu, head of the CVT,/2/ and the National Salvation Front,
under Senator (ex-General) Tran Van Don. The first two had cadres in Saigon and in the country running into some
thousands, allegedly 30,000 in the case of the CVT. Senator Don had no real organization, but he had many friends, and
his extraordinary personality and energy, his capacity for leadership and his political sense made him an important
influence. The Front of All Religions had not joined, but were not unfriendly and were watching how the Lien Minh
developed.
/2/In telegram 32032 from Saigon, July 8, Bunker reported a discussion he had with Thieu 2 days before, in which Thieu
noted the support of Tran Quoc Buu's CVT for the Lien Minh. (Ibid.)
4. It was not a real political party or organization at the present time, but a loose alliance of groups and people, all of them
saw the need to develop a political party, once peace was established, when it was essential that there be a united political
party to compete against the Communists when the struggle was transferred to the political arena. It was impossible to
form such a party now; there were too many suspicions, jealousies and divisions./3/
/3/Cleavage between Thieu and Ky surfaced during the early part of the summer. In telegram 188955 to Saigon, June 22,
the Department predicted: "If Thieu-Ky relationship continues in its present state, we foresee serious potential problems.
Based on past experience with such crises, various elements within Vietnamese body politic will begin to choose sides and
make open confrontation almost inevitable. Members of the National Assembly will probably react in this predictable way,
as well as Buddhists and northern refugee Catholics. Situation could develop to the point where Thieu or Ky (or both)
would have to go." (Ibid., POL 15 VIET S)
5. How, he asked rhetorically, can such a loose alliance be converted into a political party with support in the cities and in
the countryside? If it was built now as an organization in support of him, or even his government, it would fail--the people
were deeply suspicious of personal or government parties. Lien Minh was conceived as a organization to help save the
nation. He had therefore decided that the component elements should be encouraged to develop actual projects and
programs of help to the people. It could be done by the component elements in the name of Lien Minh, and he and the
government would financially assist these projects and programs. He had asked the Lien Minh leaders to supply him with
such a program by the time he returns from Honolulu.
6. The Farmer-Worker Association already had programs and projects and could easily expand them, especially in the
cities. In addition there were many idealistic and patriotic individuals and small groups in the country who were doing
something already, and these could be financed if they would come in under the umbrella of Lien Minh. He mentioned a
pharmacist who had organized a large group of students for work among the refugees, but who was running out of money,
as a sample of the kind of element that he expected might come into Lien Minh if he could find the finances for them.
7. All of this will require money, and a good deal of it, and obviously he could not supply funds on the scale required. Thieu
therefore conceived of solving this problem in two ways. He needed a comparatively small amount of confidential funds to
supply Lien Minh and its component leaders to help them develop cadres for Lien Minh. These would be the future national
and local leadership. The very much larger funds for the projects would be openly available, publicly accountable, and
come out of Revolutionary Development funds. The Lien Minh projects would be performed on behalf of the Revolutionary
Development program./4/ He hoped we would be able to help in both ways.
/4/In a July 31 memorandum to Bunker, Komer noted that Thieu's call to apply Lien Minh political influence to RD projects
would also help that organization. "By funneling support to worthwhile projects requested by public assemblies, the
government could build up Lien Minh as an influential group which brings home the bacon." (U.S. Army Center for Military
History, DepCORDS/MACV Files, 104--RD Planning: 1967-1968)
8. I asked if he was getting any private funds from business men. He said a little, but not enough. If Lien Minh got off the
ground and began to show itself as a success he could get more from that source, but never enough for the needs.
9. Berger asked how he intended to avoid the charge of favoring one leader over another in Lien Minh, in the distribution of

confidential funds, adding there was already a suspicion that he regarded the Free Democratic Forces and Nguyen Van
Huong as his preferred instrument for political action. He said this was a real problem--he called it "the problem of
maintaining an equilibrium"--and it would require his personal attention and effort, and also would involve him personally in
the division of the confidential funds.
10. Thieu said he did not intend to supply large funds at the outset--it would only risk the danger that the fund would be
pocketed by too many people. He would dole it out for say, three months, and then see how much had been done and who
was producing results. He thought it would take six to nine months before one could tell whether Lien Minh would prove a
viable and vital organization. If it showed it was going to be a success, he expected that the "satellite" organizations--Hoa
Hao, Cao Dai and others--would want to join in order to get help for the Revolutionary Development projects. The
Buddhists and Catholics were divided but he expected some of them too would want to associate themselves with Lien
Minh.
11. In response to a query he said he thought the upper and lower houses would fall in line in support of Lien Minh if it
proved a success. Already he had good support in both houses and new and more unified blocs were being formed in both
houses in support of the government. At some stage, he hoped Lien Minh would evolve as a political party, or more
accurately a political coalition, but it would be in support of his government, not of him personally. He referred to the
mistake of Diem, who built Can Lao as a personal political party, and said he did not intend to repeat Diem's mistake.
12. Berger, who was as fascinated as I was by this exposition, asked where he learned his politics. "In the school of hard
experience," he said with a smile.
13. I told Thieu that, as I had earlier indicated, we were ready to help, and we could talk further after Honolulu when the
program for Lien Minh was further developed. He expressed his appreciation.
14. Comments: Thieu's conceptions and plans are, in many essential aspects, very close to our thinking. We had not
thought of the concept of getting the component organizations of Lien Minh to work on proj-ects under the Revolutionary
Development program, and I regard this as a very imaginative conception. He needs financial help, and we can supply it
through confidential means, and/or arrange for it openly through the Revolutionary Development funds. He and I agreed
that we must keep clear of Lien Minh and not suffocate it with our attention or caresses. There are obviously many
problems. All we have at the moment is a conception and the mere skeleton of an organization. Thieu has a certain
reserve about whether it will succeed. I regard that as healthy and agree that it is too early to have a solid judgment on its
longer-run future, since this will depend on many factors that are largely unknown now./5/
/5/Bunker reported positive appraisals of Thieu's establishment of the Lien Minh in his weekly messages transmitted in
telegrams 31757 from Saigon, July 4, and 32385 from Saigon, July 11. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968

Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 299-318

July 16-August 31: The Lull in Fighting, the U.S.-South Vietnamese

Conference at Honolulu, and the Third Enemy Offensive
299. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/
Paris, July 16, 1968, 0228Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-July 1968.
Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Harvan; Plus. Received at 12:13 a.m.
18012/Delto 458. From Vance.
1. I had my second meeting with Lau evening July 15. We met for two and one half hours at same location as first
meeting./2/ The same persons participated on both sides.
/2/See Document 285.
2. We began by saying we were glad to meet again; it is through this type of private discussion we can explore our
respective views and perhaps overcome the obstacles presently facing us, and thus make progress towards a peaceful
settlement. We asked Lau for any observations he might wish to make. Lau replied that he had reexamined what we had
told him at our first private meeting and had tried to find matters to which the DRV could give further consideration, but
thus far he had found nothing new. Lau then recalled that at our tea session last Wednesday/3/ we had said we wanted to
meet again, and had something to tell them. Thus, perhaps, we should be the first to speak.
/3/July 10. See footnote 7, Document 293.
3. We then said we had some new thoughts or variations of our prior proposal. We said it was important that there be no
misunderstanding between us and it was essential that we both have clearly in mind the concept that we are now
suggesting. We then outlined the concept: the US is prepared to stop the bombing of NVN on a specified date, without
demanding reciprocal actions, if we can reach an understanding on the mutually-related actions which each of us would
take after the cessation of bombing. In effect this means that we envisage two separate and distinct phases; the time
interval between the two phases should be as short as possible. Before we actually cease the bombing we would need to
have a clear understanding of what would happen in the second phase. The second phase actions would include
appropriate measures by both sides.
4. We then described this suggestion graphically, drawing a sketch with two phases, a line between them, and two parallel
columns--one headed US and the other DRV--for the actions to be taken by both sides in Phase 2. We wrote in four
numbers under each column but did not put in any headings. We wrote in under Phase 1 of the outline that on a specified
date the US would cease all air, naval and artillery bombardment and all other activities that involve the use of force on or
within the territory of the DRV.
5. At this point we paused and asked him if he understood the proposal and if he found the formula acceptable in principle.
He replied that he understood the proposal but wished to know what kind of actions we had in mind in Phase 2. We said
that under Phase 2 there were the following headings: (A) Restore the DMZ; (B) No increase in US or DRV force levels in
SVN after the cessation of bombing; (At this point Lau interjected asking what the word "level" means. We replied that it
meant strength. Vy then gave an example which reflected clear understanding of the proposal.); (C) Substantive
discussions to commence as soon as the bombing stops, with either side free to raise any topic relevant to a peaceful
settlement; (D) In the discussions described in point (C) above, our side would include representatives of the GVN and the
DRV side could include whomever they wished; (E) No indiscriminate attacks on population centers such as Saigon,
Danang and Hue; (F) We would be willing to consider other actions of a similar nature which were relevant and which the
DRV might want to raise.
6. We asked Lau's views with respect to our suggestion. Lau asked when the items listed in Phase 2 would be discussed.
We replied right now. Lau then said that means before the cessation of bombing. Lau then asked if the items in Phase 2
were to be implemented after the completion of Phase 1. We replied yes and in the shortest time possible after the

cessation of bombing, although the time interval might vary with the particular item under discussion. Lau then asked what
we meant by the shortest possible time. We said this was a matter we would have to discuss. Some of the actions involved
are possible to implement promptly. Others might take more time, but timing would be a matter for further discussion.
7. Vy asked for the specifics of what we had in mind with respect to restoration of the DMZ. We said it would involve (A)
The restoration of the DMZ in the full sense of the Geneva Accords; i.e., no military personnel or equipment of any sort
would be located in or moved through the DMZ; (B) Both sides would invite the ICC to reestablish an enlarged presence in
the DMZ to inspect and verify compliance with its restoration; (C) Both sides would refrain from artillery or other fire from or
across the DMZ and from any massing of forces on either side of the DMZ in such a way as to constitute a direct threat to
the other. We said that this proposal would be a measure of mutual de-escalation without prejudice to any political
settlement. We added that we are not proposing that the 17th parallel be made a permanent border excluding reunification.
8. Lau then said he had some preliminary remarks. At the previous meeting we had said that the US would fix the date for
the cessation of bombing and prior to that both sides would discuss the circumstances leading to such cessation. Lau had
asked what were the circumstances, and we had replied in a way similar to today. At our last private meeting Lau had also
asked whether the US would cease the bombing in the event that no agreement could be reached on the circumstances,
and we had said no. Lau had characterized this as tantamount to reciprocity, a concept which has been rejected on
numerous occasions by the DRV. Today, Lau said, our proposal is more systematic and orderly, but presents nothing new
in comparison with the last time. Today we mentioned Phases 1 and 2, and the shortest possible interval between the two
phases, but it seemed to Lau that Phase 1 continues to depend on the discussion of what will happen in Phase 2. Lau then
repeated his questions, asking what would happen if we do not agree on the circumstance leading to the cessation of
bombing. We replied that reciprocity is not involved in Phase 1 actions, but an understanding must be reached first on
Phase 2, and we would like to hear Lau's views on this subject.
9. Vy then said if the US ceases the bombing, we could then proceed to related matters, each side raising whatever
subjects it wishes. DRV can't go into specifics of Phase 2 now. We then asked what their general comments were on
Phase 2. Lau replied that DRV has had occasion to express views on them in both official sessions and in private talks.
We replied that a number of these items had not been raised before, or were raised in a different context. Before they were
raised in a context of a reciprocal act, directly connected to the cessation of bombing. Now they would follow from an
understanding of what was to happen after we would cease the bombing. Lau's answer, on the other hand, was not new at
all and in fact identical to that which has been given on numerous occasions in plenary sessions. Lau responded that he
had not misunderstood our proposal, but the context is not really new. We then pointed out that the items listed in Phase 2
were reciprocal to each other, and not to the cessation of the bombing.
10. We then went over the same point several times, including a discussion of the meaning of the word "understanding."
Lau came back to his question of what would happen if we could not reach agreement on the circumstances. We replied
that the best approach would be to discuss these circumstances, explore them, and see if we could reach agreement. Vy
interjected that in the meanwhile the bombing would continue. Lau added that what the DRV wants is the cessation of the
bombing and other acts of war first. Then each side can raise whatever matters it wants to for discussion. We asked what
the problem was in discussing the circumstances first. Lau replied "because we can't foresee agreement on all of the
items."
11. We suggested that we might actually agree on the items in Phase 2, and even if we don't, what would be lost? Lau said
that we wouldn't lose anything, but these proposals would not meet the DRV demand "for unconditional cessation of
bombing and all other activities that involve the use of force on or within the territory of the DRV." For example, we raise
questions such as the DMZ, and attacks against cities. These are items concerning the South and hence the NLF.
12. We pointed out that the restoration of the DMZ does not involve the NLF; it does involve the US and the DRV. What is
involved is a series of mutual actions which are within both our capacities to carry out.
13. Lau then continued with his preliminary observations. He said there were a number of matters on which our views
differ. For instance, with respect to the restoration of the DMZ, DRV has explained many times that it is the US and its
"puppets" which have sabotaged the status of the DMZ. During the past few years, DMZ has been sabotaged by land, air
and sea. Thus if we now speak of restoring the DMZ, it is the US which must do so unilaterally. If the US respects the
DMZ, then automatically its status will be restored. Instead, the US wants to turn the DMZ into a no-man's-land, and not a
genuine demilitarized zone as called by for by the Geneva agreements. US has placed artillery in Con Thien and Gio Linh,
firing in and across the DMZ. Tens of thousands of men have been sent in the DMZ to burn the vegetation, destroy the
villages, and dislocate the population. Toxic chemicals have been spread throughout the DMZ, affecting many local
inhabitants. As for American air activities, they also constitute a violation of the DMZ. Planes from Danang use the DMZ air
space when the conduct bombing raids in the DMZ, leaving virtually no communities in that area. Similarly, naval vessels
and patrol boats have violated the territorial waters of the DMZ, and fishermen of these waters can no longer earn a living.
Foregoing, said Lau, were his ideas on the DMZ. Who, then, is responsible for restoring its status? To suggest that
responsibility for its restoration is reciprocal is to justify our actions, and that is why Xuan Thuy has spoken on this subject

so extensively.
14. Vy then interjected that the question should be posed in a different manner, the question is one of the hundreds of
thousands of troops that the US had sent to Viet-Nam in violation of the entire Geneva Accords. The DRV looks at things
from this angle, and the fact that we are viewing the situation from different angles complicates these talks.
15. We said that while we hold different views on who first violated the DMZ, we are trying to find a solution to the problem
facing us now. We are proposing the restoration of the DMZ to the status provided in the Geneva Accords. If such status is
restored, then the acts described by Lau would stop. Would the DRV take equivalent steps? We said that the DMZ would
not become a no-man's-land, but rather a truly demilitarized zone with effective international supervision. Vy then
remarked that we were only speaking of one item--the DMZ. If discussions proceed at this rate, we will be going on for a
long time.
16. Lau then said that we could be sure that the cessation of bombing is a condition which will lead to the settlement of
other important questions. He emphasized "important questions." He said each side could raise whatever subjects it
wanted to. Agreement would be reached on what questions would be discussed first, which ones to implement first, and in
so doing "we shall abide by the aim of the Paris talks." Lau said that he had not commented on the substance of the items
contained in our Phase 2 because they are the prerogative of the NLF, but he did not feel that our presentation of these
conditions differed in any way from previous proposals, in that they are contrary to the DRV demand for an unconditional
cessation of the bombing. He believed therefore that we should not prolong the bombing of NVN because it will not solve
the problem either on the battlefield or at the conference table. It will, in fact, create additional obstacles. Moreover, world
public opinion demands an immediate cessation of bombing so that these talks can progress.
17. We said that DRV misreads public opinion. We have taken certain steps and are prepared to stop the bombing but if
we did so without an understanding of what would happen afterwards it is only reasonable to assume that the danger to
US and allied troops would increase. Lau replied that our professed concern for the safety of allied troops was simply an
argument to justify prolonged bombing. We have after all already evacuated Khe Sanh, which in effect cancels the validity
of that argument. We said that it does not.
18. We then asked Lau whether DRV would stop firing artillery across the DMZ if we did. Lau replied that we should go
ahead and stop the firing and the DRV will know what to do. We asked how we could do this without knowing what the
DRV would do, and then asked whether DRV would not put its troops into the DMZ were we to agree to refrain from putting
our troops into the DMZ.
19. Lau replied that we charged that we had brought our troops to SVN in response to aggression from NVN. We say we
will withdraw our troops if NVN withdraws. That is the general question. As for the DMZ, the US asks if it stops artillery fire
and withdraws its troops from the DMZ, will the DRV do the same? If we put the question this way, it means we do not
seriously want to stop firing across the DMZ nor do we seriously want to withdraw our troops. The US insists that the DRV
was the first to violate the DMZ and that the DRV is responsible. The DRV position is that the US has caused these
violations and that it should stop them. It has first artillery into the DMZ. It should stop it. It should withdraw its troops from
the DMZ. For its part, it is the consistent policy of the DRV to respect the Geneva Accords.
20. We said that our proposals were serious and that we meant what we said. We then asked what their response would
be if we referred only to the future and not to what has happened in the past. We asked whether they would agree that in
the future each side would refrain from the activities we had specified concerning the DMZ, without any reference to
previous actions. This would be fully consistent with the original status of the DMZ, and also consistent with the DRV not
wanting to admit what its present activities are in that zone.
21. Lau asked why we just didn't carry out these steps unilaterally and simply inform the DRV on what day the bombing
would stop and what day the artillery would stop firing across the DMZ, and "you will see what will happen because our
government has consistently respected the DMZ. Reality will give you the reply." These actions, Lau said, would create the
favorable conditions for a settlement.
22. We advanced a hypothetical question--if we were to take the actions outlined regarding the DMZ without requesting
any related action by DRV, and then certain actions would follow in the DMZ on the part of the DRV, would the DRV agree
to the return of the ICC to verify the DMZ status as provided in the Geneva Accords? Lau avoided answering and said that
the ICC had left the DMZ because of our military activity. We said that regardless of who first violated the DMZ, the ICC
could nonetheless return and perform its function. Lau then observed that we had discussed this specific question in some
detail, but his impression remained that our real intention in restoring the DMZ was to return to the situation prevailing in
1954 as part of our effort to seize SVN. We replied emphatically that this was not our purpose. Lau then said that his
impression was strengthened by recent statements of high US administration officials, such as Clifford and Rusk,
preparatory to the Honolulu conference. DRV feels that the US has not yet given up its claim to SVN, that it still wants to

keep troops there, and that it still wants to maintain the Thieu/Ky administration in power. DRV considers the Thieu/Ky
clique merely an instrument for the implementation of US neo-colonialist policy. If the US continues to support this clique,
how can the DRV believe in US sincerity?
23. We replied that we stand by our commitment regarding troop withdrawals as formulated in the Manila Communique.
We meant what we said in Manila, and we will carry out that commitment. As for the future of SVN, we want it to be free to
determine its own future without coercion or outside interference. We assume the DRV agrees. Is that a correct
assumption?
24. Lau said that the US concept of withdrawal of troops as stated by Secretary Clifford depends on the degree of
modernization and reinforcement of the South Vietnamese Army. We replied that there is nothing in Secretary Clifford's
statement which abrogates the Manila declaration.
25. We then pointed out that we have taken the DRV statement that the cessation of bombing must take place first
seriously. We have proposed a formula for reaching that stage, and there will be many things to resolve afterwards, but
this is a first step to which we can turn our very precise attention. Lau agreed, and said that not only was he giving the
matter attention, but that he had asked for clarification of our overall objectives. Lau then repeated his point that our
insistence on restoration of the DMZ suggests a desire to return to the situation prevailing in 1954 at the time of Diem, who
violated the DMZ from the very beginning. It was the same Diem who said that the 17th parallel was a frontier of the United
States. Thus the DMZ is among the specific items to be discussed between us, but there must also be a statement of
general US policy.
26. We took strong exception to Lau's remarks about the GVN, and emphasized that it is the duly elected government. We
said we had suggested a formula which could lead to the cessation of bombing, a pulling apart of forces, thus starting a
de-escalation which could lead to peace. Our proposal was serious and constructive, and we hoped that DRV would give it
serious thought.
27. Lau said that his remarks tonight were only preliminary in nature, and that he would consider our proposals. Lau
concluded by assuring us that our "concrete" proposals would be considered carefully and DRV would try to see if there
was anything new compared with our last meeting.
28. Comment: The meeting produced a more sober examination of our proposal than the prior meeting. Lau did not reject
it. He said they would study it carefully to see whether it presented anything new. They sought details and explored in
some depth the DMZ proposal in which they were quite interested. At one point it appeared that they were interested in
finding out whether we were asking for all the items in Phase 2, but we refused to be drawn into such a discussion, leaving
the implication that we were asking for all items. It is clear they understand the Phase 1/Phase 2 concept and its
implications. The ball is now in their court and we will consider what steps to take next.
Harriman

300. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Paris, July 16, 1968, 12:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson,
Trips and Missions, Paris Peace Talks, Calendar, May 9-July 1968. Secret. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy.
The conversation was also reported in telegram 18036/Delto 462 from Paris, July 16. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-July 1968)
PARTICIPANTS
Soviet Ambassador Zorin
Sergei Bogomolov, First Secretary, Soviet Embassy
Governor Harriman
Jack Perry, Second Secretary, American Embassy
After thanking Ambassador Zorin for the message about a visit to Moscow/2/ (which was discussed later in the
conversation), Governor Harriman said he wished to report that Ambassador Vance met Ha Van Lau July 15th during the

evening and had a long talk./3/ He did not know if Zorin knew about this. Zorin said he did not, and the Governor said
Zorin's "two phases" idea was brought out very clearly, and Vance and Ha Van Lau spent some two and a half hours
discussing it in depth. Ha asked a number of questions, and expressed the usual skepticism saying "nothing new"--which,
said the Governor, one would expect from an experienced negotiator, as Zorin would understand since he was one of the
best. (Zorin laughed heartily at this reference to professional skepticism among negotiators.) Ha did not admit the proposal
was new, but he did say these were "concrete proposals" and the North Vietnamese would examine them. The Governor
added that Vance had gone to the US, or he would have asked him to come along to answer questions. Both Vance and
Mr. Habib, who accompanied him, said last night's meeting was a serious discussion. We offered to meet with them again
to hear propositions from the Vietnamese side regarding Phase II measures. The Governor said that since Zorin had
discussed this matter with Ambassador Vance, he wished him to have a full report. The Governor hoped that if Zorin met
with the North Vietnamese, he would tell them this was a serious offer and would encourage them to move forward.
/2/Oberemko delivered this message during a meeting with Harriman on July 13. (Telegram 17962/Delto 451 from Paris,
July 15; ibid.)
/3/See Document 299.
Zorin replied with a smile that he would not be able to discuss our proposition very well with the Vietnamese because he
did not know what we had proposed. The Governor said that Phase I was cessation of bombing, and Zorin said he knew
that, but he would like to know what we said about Phase II.
The Governor said our first point in Phase II was to re-establish the DMZ on both sides. This was discussed in
considerable detail. The second point was to hold to present force levels--that is, no further increases in number of troops
by the North Vietnamese or by the US, and GVN Allies. Replacements would be allowed, but no increment in the number
of troops. As for verification, this had not been discussed. Zorin asked specifically whether there would be some agreed
verification body or this would be done by each side for itself, but the Governor replied that verification had not yet been
examined. The third point, the Governor went on, was that substantive discussions would begin as soon as the bombing
stopped. These would be "your side-our side" discussions (a phrase Zorin evidently had not heard and which had to be
explained), namely that each side bring anyone it wished on its side of the table; the US would certainly have the GVN on
its side, while the North Vietnamese would decide their side. Zorin showed considerable interest in this point, and asked if
this would include the FLN. When the Governor replied that it had not been discussed, Zorin asked if "in principle" the US
would be agreeable. The Governor replied affirmatively, and said if the North Vietnamese had asked, we would have said
yes. The Governor continued that a further point on the Phase II list was that there would be no further indiscriminate
shelling of Saigon and other cities (and he noted in passing that they seem to have abandoned this anyway as there had
been no such shelling for three weeks). Zorin asked if the US had promised no indiscriminate shelling in return, or what.
The Governor said we merely proposed to consider any action that they would put on the list.
The Governor went on that the only question explored in depth was that of the DMZ; the others were really only headings.
The most optimistic word he could report was that Ha had said, "You have made concrete proposals, we can examine
them." But he did not admit they were new. The Governor remarked that this was a favorite phrase from the days of the
impossible Korean negotiations, "What you say is not new." He commented in passing that he was not comparing the
Vietnamese with the North Koreans, for he had much more respect for the North Vietnamese; the North Koreans were truly
"tough" whereas the North Vietnamese--who were also tough--nevertheless were educated in France and had a certain
French veneer or French manners.
The Governor concluded that Ambassador Vance had gone to Washington to report to the President prior to the
President's trip to Honolulu to meet with the GVN leaders. He did not think Vance would be going to Honolulu, so he
should be back before the end of the week.
The Governor noted he had hoped Vance and Habib would get a chance to ask if the shelling of Saigon had stopped for
good, but the North Vietnamese were so interested in Zorin's proposal that they did not get a chance. The Governor said
he was very grateful to Zorin for receiving him on such short notice. He would be meeting with Xuan Thuy tomorrow, and
would wish to discuss the shelling question. He would like to ask about the proposals made last night, but did not want to
press too hard since he imagined the delegation would want to report to Hanoi./4/ The Governor said his impression was
that Hanoi did not want to offend Peking right now, and anything smacking of "reciprocity" they feel would offend Peking.
Ha Van Lau had told Vance that if the US stopped the bombing, they would agree to discuss the Phase II measures; but
Vance had replied that there must be an understanding first, before the bombing was stopped. Vance's impression was
that they were serious in making this statement, and were not merely trying to evade the issue. Vance did not get any
impression of a favorable reaction, but he did believe they would seriously study the proposals. During the conversation Ha
would say, for example, "If you observe the DMZ, we will know what to do (in return)." Ambassador Vance thought we
were not so far apart now on substance as on form; he may be wrong, but that was his impression now.
/4/During the formal session at the Majestic on July 17 from which Thuy was absent, Lau described U.S. violations of the

Geneva Accords. During the tea break, Lau provided the names of three U.S. pilots whom the DRV planned to release.
Harriman did not broach the proposals made during the Vance-Lau meeting. (Telegrams from Paris 17730/Delto 418 and
17748/Delto 425, July 17; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace
Conference, 1968-1969, Delto Chron.) The pilots were scheduled for release on July 19 but were held in Hanoi until
August 2. Details of their release are in telegrams 203485 to Vientiane, July 16; 205574 to Moscow, July 19; 18442/Delto
498 from Paris, July 24; and 208587 to Paris, July 25. (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-7 VIET) A reciprocal release of
14 North Vietnamese seamen captured in 1966 was planned subsequent to the release of the 3 American pilots.
(Telegrams 206921 to Vientiane, Paris, and Saigon, July 22; 212693 to Vientiane, Paris, and Saigon, July 31; 18979 from
Paris, August 3; and 19134 from Paris, August 7; ibid.) On October 21, at the request of their government, the 14 North
Vietnamese seamen boarded a fishing boat and sailed northward. (Telegram 39093 from Saigon, October 22; ibid.)
Reports of the discussion between the delegations relating to this reciprocal release, which occurred at the tea breaks
during the formal sessions at the Majestic, are in telegrams 18096/Delto 465 and 18124/Delto 472 from Paris, both July
18; telegrams 18435/Delto 496 and 18457/Delto 499 from Paris, July 24; telegrams 19131/Delto 566, 19134/Delto 567,
and 19137/Delto 568 from Paris, all August 7; and telegrams 19455/Delto 599 and 19460/Delto 601 from Paris, August 14.
(Ibid., IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference, 1968-1969, Delto Chron.) A scenario for the release of the
seamen and talking points for the August 7 meeting are in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers,
Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnso, Trips and Missions, 1968-69 Paris Peace Talks, POW's: Release of North
Vietnamese Seamen.
Zorin merely said, "We will see," and said he had no comment now. Turning to the Governor's trip to the USSR, he said
that August would probably not be very good, because the responsible people would not be in Moscow. (The Governor
had said at the beginning of the conversation that August would be all right with him, although he would have to talk to the
President before doing anything.) The Governor said he would not want to go if Kosygin were not there. Zorin said he
would not be there, but would be vacationing in the South. The Governor said he could not go now, since Vance was going
away, and would prefer to go later, considering the stage at which the negotiations now were fixed; if progress were made,
and the bombing could be stopped, it might be useful to go later. Zorin said of course that would be excellent. The
Governor said obviously he could not go twice, and perhaps he would wait and see later when it would be best to go. Zorin
said this was the Governor's initiative, so it depended on him. The Governor said he was grateful for the invitation; he
hoped it would be more than a pleasure trip, and that something meaningful would come from it. Zorin said for that, the US
must stop the bombings first.
The Governor said he wanted to be sure he did not give a wrong impression about what Vance had said to Ha. The US
had to have an agreement on Phase II before the bombing stopped. But since Ha did not appear shocked at this twophased proposal, we think the problem now is more form than substance.
Zorin said in his personal opinion, if the US made the bombing cessation conditional on other things, then everything would
fall through, for this would look like "reciprocity," which the Vietnamese would not accept. He thought they could agree on
these other steps; but the US could not make bombing cessation conditional on agreement on all of the Phase II steps.
The Governor had used the phrase "mutual understanding" at one stage, and Zorin thought the North Vietnamese might
consider this, but insistence on a firm agreement would be "reciprocity." The Governor said Zorin had stated the issue
clearly. The President was firm, and Hanoi was firm. Nevertheless he thought Zorin's device of two phases was a possible
way to end the impasse. The Governor said he knew Hanoi had said many times it would not agree to "reciprocity," but
now the US was offering not "reciprocity" but rather "mutual steps" in Phase II. If there was good will on Hanoi's part, the
Governor said he thought perhaps they could find this acceptable.

301. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, July 17, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Vietnam War, Courses of Action--Post Paris Peace
Talks 1968. Top Secret; Nodis; Harvan/Plus. In an attached note transmitting a copy of the memorandum to Clifford and
Wheeler, Nitze wrote: "Cy Vance and I met for one hour and thirty minutes with J.P. McConnell, Tom Moorer, Westy, and
Lew Walt in Executive session yesterday afternoon. Cy had previously obtained approval from highest authority to discuss
with the Chiefs all aspects of his assignment in Paris. Herewith follows a Memorandum for the Record which I prepared
following our meeting. J.P. has reviewed it and it has his full concurrence." The memorandum was transmitted to Clifford
and Wheeler in telegram WDC 10622 to Honolulu, July 18.
SUBJECT
Mr. Vance's Meeting with The Chiefs, Wednesday, 17 July 1968

During the initial part of the meeting attended only by the Joint Chiefs, Mr. Vance and myself, Mr. Vance reviewed his
private conversations with Van Lau and Vy. He went through an exposition of the Phase I, Phase II Proposal and the other
side's reaction thereto using his reporting cable as a talking paper. He said that in a post mortem on these talks, Habib and
he had come to the following conclusions:
1. The other side thoroughly understood our Phase I, Phase II Proposal.
2. They had not rejected the Proposal.
3. They wanted to find out what was our minimum position, but following his instructions, he had discussed only the DMZ
part of the Proposal in detail.
4. The other side was interested in the DMZ, although they might find difficulty in formally agreeing to this in advance. After
about two weeks, we might want to consider handling this through the "assumption" route.
5. They may be prepared to accept some of our other proposed actions in Phase II.
6. They understood our force level proposal and may be interested in it.
7. The portion of our Proposal dealing with the GVN presence in the further talks seemed to give them the most problem.
In the subsequent discussion with the Chiefs, Mr. Vance indicated that he thought the other side was prepared to accept
the "no indiscriminate attacks on Saigon" point because they realized the serious propaganda loss to them from such
attacks.
The Chiefs wanted to know Mr. Vance's views on the Soviet attitude and Mr. Vance described his discussions with Zorin
and drew the conclusion that the Soviets were attempting to be helpful.
In the middle of the session, Admiral Jack McCain and Vice Admiral Nels Johnson joined us. During this portion, the
discussion revolved around actions north of the DMZ. Mr. Vance said he thought that B-52 strikes north of 17 10 could
well be prejudicial to the negotiations, and recommended against them. He thought bombing north of the 19 would
impinge negatively upon the chance for success in the talks and, in any case, he understood that the bombing south of 19
was being effective. He thought hot pursuit by fighter aircraft north of 19 to 20 would not present a problem in that one
could argue it was connected with self defense. He thought the use of Talos between 19 and 20 would be less defensible
because it could not be directly connected with self defense. Admiral McCain and Vice Admiral Johnson then left the
meeting.
Mr. Vance asked the views of the Chiefs with respect to a 5,000 man troop reduction if tied to agreement on the DMZ. The
Chiefs took the view that it might well be possible to pull out two battalions of the Marine Corps Special Landing Force and
some support troops totaling 5,000 and move them to Okinawa. They would then be in a position for rapid re-entry if they
were needed. The Chiefs indicated that they would not be opposed to this action if it were tied to agreement on the DMZ.
General Westmoreland said that it was his view that such an action would be favorably received by the GVN Government-they would view this as a vote of confidence in the increasing strength of the ARVN.
The discussion then turned to the ICC. The Chiefs urged that planning and discussion with the Indians and the Canadians
would be helpful in order to cut down the lead time for an ICC presence in the DMZ. They were also interested in assuring
that the ICC would accept American helicopters. The Acting Chairman said he would put this problem to the Sea Cabin
group in the Chairman's office./2/
/2/Sea Cabin was the code name for an ad hoc group consisting of representatives of the Joint Staff, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs which examined
the major military issues that would arise from the President's ordering of a bombing halt. See Historical Section, Joint
Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vietnam War,
1960-1968, Part III (Washington: unpublished mss., 1 July 1970), pp. 47-8-47-10.
There was further discussion of the importance of having a strong GVN delegation if they were to hold their own in
discussions with the DRV representatives.
Paul H. Nitze

302. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Clifford to President Johnson/1/

Washington, July 18, 1968.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1250, VIET 337 1968.
Top Secret. A notation on the memorandum reads: "Dep Sec. has seen." For his personal assessment of the trip, see
Clifford, Counsel to the President, pp. 550-553.
SUBJECT
Trip to South Vietnam, July 13-18, 1968
My report will consist of three parts: My dominant impressions, a narrative which includes answers to the questions you
have raised and a complete (but not verbatim) report of the meeting we had with President Thieu.
First, I will set forth the dominant impressions I have upon the completion of the trip.
1. Additional large-scale enemy attacks are anticipated in I Corps and in the Saigon area, perhaps in July but more
probably in late August. The enemy is apparently now engaged in refitting and preparing for such attacks. It must be
anticipated that his units will be up to strength, well-armed and that such attacks will be synchronized.
2. Our field commanders from General Abrams on down are confident that the enemy can be turned back and defeated.
3. Our commanders are satisfied with the resources at their command, both as to men and materiel. They are unanimous
that they are in a stronger position today than they were at either Tet or the enemy May offensive.
4. I am most favorably impressed by General Abrams. He is intelligent, experienced and resourceful. He appears to have
the quality of flexibility which will be so necessary in the days ahead. The other field commanders are outstanding, and in
General Wheeler's opinion, are the best we have.
5. The major problem we face here is that of putting the ARVN and the other South Vietnamese forces in a position to take
over more of the war. Despite all the talk over the years, they still are badly in need of better leadership, better training,
additional equipment and an improvement of living conditions for themselves and their families. Present plans for
equipping the South Vietnamese forces are, in my opinion, inadequate to enable them to assume as rapidly as possible
the amount of the total burden which they should be carrying.
6. There is apparent an obvious shift in the emphasis on and importance of the pacification program. I believe that this shift
results from the reaction of all to the change in the enemy tactics and the enemy's attempts to bring down the government
of Vietnam by his attacks upon the cities. Both President Thieu and Ambassador Komer stressed the desirability of cutting
down on the number of tasks required of the pacification people in order to place the major emphasis on territorial
security./2/
/2/In a July 16 memorandum to Bunker and Abrams, Komer argued that all the pacification effort needed was additional
time: "If we can only hold the negotiating line long enough to defeat the next enemy offensive effort and let the
GVN/RVNAF grow in relative power, we can reasonably expect to be in a much greater position of strength than is visible
at present." He added: "In sum, if we can buy another 3-6 months, we will be in a position either to prove that our whole
Vietnam enterprise has at long last borne fruit or, at the worst, to begin disengaging gracefully from behind a GVN/RVNAF
which is at least strong enough to have a fighting chance of holding up its end." (U.S. Army Center for Military History,
DepCORDS/MACV Papers, Komer-Abrams File--1968)
Throughout my discussions during the trip, I endeavored to develop the facts in response to the various subjects which you
have raised with me. In your letter of July 10, 1968, you wrote:
"I am greatly concerned about the next Communist offensive in South Vietnam. General Abrams now appears to believe
that there will be a maximum effort in I Corps and against Saigon in August.
"I count on you to go into this matter deeply with Abrams and make the best assessment possible of the probable strength
and timing of that offensive.

"In particular, I would like you to develop the best answers you can and to the following specific questions:
"Could more of the ARVN be brought into I Corps so that the burden of conflict there could be more evenly shared?
"How can the ARVN effort be better dramatized and their contribution to the war kept in the headlines?
"Does Abrams have enough men and materiel to cope with the military tasks that lie ahead?
"What, if anything, does he need urgently?"/3/
/3/The full text of the letter from Johnson to Clifford, July 10, is in the Johnson Library, Clark M. Clifford Papers, South
Vietnam Trip, July 13-19, 1968, Memorandum to the President from Secretary Clifford. In responding to the President's
letter in a July 11 memorandum, Clifford wrote: "I have received your memorandum outlining issues which you want me to
pursue deeply with General Abrams. With General Wheeler's assistance, I will make the best assessment possible of the
military situation and outlook. Also, following our discussions in South Vietnam, I will provide for you the best answers
which can be developed to your specific questions on the ARVN and resources for General Abrams." (Ibid.)
In your White House message to me of July 15, you asked additionally for a careful review of any reductions in
expenditures that we might make in South Vietnam which would contribute to the $3 billion defense cut we face. You
asked also that we consider any additions we might have to make in next year's defense appropriation bill. Other points
raised in that message are for action and discussions on my return to Washington, rather than being directly related to the
trip./4/
/4/The message transmitted to Clifford from Rostow, July 15, is ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt
Rostow, Vol. 88.
We discussed in detail, both in Saigon and in the field, the matter of timing and probable strength of the attacks that should
be expected and the targets that will be involved.
Ambassador Bunker, General Abrams and the South Vietnamese and U.S. Field Commanders uniformly expect a renewal
of the enemy attacks within the next few weeks. Because of the losses incurred by the enemy during both Tet and in the
course of the May attacks, it is not anticipated generally that the enemy forces will be adequately reconstituted and
resupplied for significant attacks until the latter part of August. President Thieu, in fact, suggests late August, September or
even October as more likely dates. He and Vice President Ky also believe strongly that the enemy attacks cannot be
sustained for more than 2 months once they are initiated.
All agreed that the objective of the attacks will be primarily psychological and political, rather than military.
Our Embassy and military officials in Saigon, our Field Commanders and South Vietnamese, all believe that the focal
points of the anticipated attacks will be populated areas in I Corps and Saigon. President Thieu also lists the Pleiku/Kon
Tum areas of II Corps as a likely target, but U.S. officials discount this latter threat.
I found unanimous agreement that we are in a position to meet anything that the enemy has to offer. General Abrams said
in a written report to me:
"The present and programmed U.S./Free World Forces are adequate to cope with the enemy forces in South Vietnam and
those known to be infiltrating."
He added in conversation that the situation is "entirely one that can be handled", and he believes that there is "at least a
50-50 chance that the attacks can be aborted by our own military operations." Lt. Gen. Rosson, our Troop Commander in I
Corps, states that he feels "very comfortable" and has no need for additional forces. Major General Stillwell, our
Commander in the Northern section of I Corps, states that he is not only comfortable, but completely confident and ready
for any eventuality.
Similarly, General Abrams, Lt. Gen. Weyand, and Major General Hay are confident that they will be able to cope with any
enemy military efforts in III Corps, including Saigon. In response to my question whether we are in a better position to
withstand them than at Tet and in May, Lt. General Weyand replied: "By far."
In no quarter, at any level, did I find any suggestion that we would not be able to handle the anticipated attacks, that

additional manpower should be rushed to Vietnam, or that there were equipment needs to be met in anticipation of the
attacks.
General Abrams noted in his brief written report to me that he was expecting all units planned in the present deployment
program of 549,500. He also assumes that the presently planned civilianization program will be implemented
successfully./5/ This program, as you know, would free 12,500 military personnel by replacing them with civilians in
Vietnam. The only suggestion of any possible need for additional troops came in this regard, General Abrams said: "In the
event the civilianization program is not successful, some adjustments in military space ceilings may be required." General
Abrams believes that we should maintain our B-52 and tactical air sorties at the currently planned levels in order to
maintain our capacity to support friendly operations and preempt enemy thrusts.
/5/General Abrams' report was not found.
Here is a brief rundown of the numerical strength of friendly and enemy forces, first in I Corps and later in III Corps around
Saigon.
In I Corps, 305,000 friendly forces face an enemy strength of 135,000. The friendly forces consist of 190,600 U.S. troops,
108,000 in the various categories of South Vietnamese armed forces and 7,500 Republic of South Korea Marines. Of the
U.S. forces, 151,000 are III Marine Amphibious Forces. The 108,000 South Vietnamese include about 42,000 regular
ARVN, 27,000 Regional Forces, 25,000 Popular Forces and 13,000 consisting of other irregulars, police and provincial
reconnaissance units.
The 135,000 enemy forces include about 38 percent regular North Vietnamese. The total of 52,000 NVA are in combat
maneuver units and combat support units. They constitute over 70 percent of the enemy maneuver battalions in the area.
In III Corps, the area which embraces Saigon, enemy forces total about 60,000 men. This compares with a total
U.S./SVN/Allied troop strength of 218,000. The enemy Main Force units amount to approximately 36,000, with the balance
consisting of local forces, guerrillas and Viet Cong Infrastructure. General Weyand believes that this force ratio is well
within his capacity to withstand and defeat any attack. He said "General Khang (his South Vietnamese counterpart) and I
agree we have the forces to do the job."
The friendly forces have recently been reorganized to provide a separate defense force for the Saigon/Gia Dinh area. The
U.S. forces for this key region are under the direct command of Major General Hay, who reports to Lt. General Weyand.
He has at his disposal a division equivalent, amounting to about 9,000 men. South Vietnamese forces assigned to the
defense of the capital number around 30,000. The rest of the allied forces in III Corps are, of course, available to react
quickly to any enemy attack on Saigon.
General Abrams cannot predict what the enemy will do if the anticipated attacks are aborted or defeated. He notes that the
present level of infiltration would enable the enemy to sustain his existing force structure at a low rate of combat. He
emphasizes that the enemy has lost many of his best assets, including a substantial number of guerrillas and many of his
trained leaders. The depletion of guerrilla forces has come about through casualties and through their elevation into main
force units. This has diminished the enemy's capability to continue a protracted war at a low level of hostilities.
In the wake of the enemy's defeat at Tet and in May, and in the light of the unanimous view of both United States and
ARVN commanders that they are ready and able to meet whatever the enemy can present in the way of attacks, I inquired
repeatedly why the Communists would go ahead with these attacks in the face of what should appear to be inevitable
defeat. In his intelligence briefing at MACV, Brigadier General Davidson/6/ suggested that the enemy might be underestimating our capability and might be failing to recognize the growing strength of the Vietnamese government. He also
said they are in a position where they must seek political ends by military means. President Thieu and Vice President Ky
gave somewhat the same answer./7/
/6/Lieutenant General Phillip B. Davidson, MACV G-2.
/7/Most of Clifford's conclusions in this report were derived from his and Wheeler's discussion with Thieu, Ky, Huong, and
members of the GVN Cabinet on June 16. A record of the meeting is in Clifford's summary, "Meeting with President Thieu
and His Colleagues," undated. (Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A
1250, VIET 337 1968) Clifford also reported on the meeting in telegram 32822 from Saigon, July 17. (National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S) In a July 17 memorandum, Bunker reported
on a conversation with Thieu, Ky, and Huong prior to the meeting with Clifford in which "Thieu told the others that once the
South Vietnamese participate in the Paris negotiations an ultimatum should be presented to the North Vietnamese giving
them the alternatives of 'an all-out attack or of leaving the conference table.'" (Johnson Library, National Security File,

Country File, Vietnam, 3 E (2), 1/68-8/68, Future Military Operations in Vietnam)

In addition to satisfying myself that General Abrams has the manpower and material needed to meet and defeat any
enemy attacks, I placed special emphasis on determining the present status and performance of the South Vietnamese
forces. As for force strength, the authorized increase of 84,000 will bring the total of South Vietnamese under regular
ARVN, Regional Forces, and Popular Forces. However, adequate arrangements have not been made to provide these
forces with the equipment and leadership necessary to enable them to take on a greater share of the burden. Except for
M-16 rifles, no equipment has been ordered for the 84,000 new men. As presently programmed, equipment for RVNAF
modernization and improvement will not be fully supplied until fiscal year 1970. Communication facilities, particularly for RF
and PF, do not permit their optimum performance. We are currently studying ways in which this equipment schedule can
be expedited.
Even more serious is the deficiency in RVNAF officers. The shortages are greatest in the captain-to-colonel ranks. Our
figures show almost 4,000 too few captains, almost 1,000 too few majors and substantial shortages in lieutenant colonels
and colonels. General Vien disputed the shortages other than captain, but admitted that he was not prepared to discuss
this question. RF and PF similarly are seriously short of officers. I have asked General Abrams to present to General Vien
our figures on these deficiencies. We also stressed in our meeting with President Thieu and his colleagues the importance
we place on revising their promotion criteria to insure that an adequate number of officers of appropriate rank are
generated to meet the present and expanding demand.
The ARVN divisional units are now deployed to provide the widest area coverage for territorial security. One airborne
division operates throughout South Vietnam in reaction to strong enemy pressures. It is in III Corps, committed to defend
the Saigon Capital Military District.
You asked about bringing more ARVN into I Corps. There are presently 42,000 ARVN fighting in I Corps along with 27,000
RF and 25,000 PF. The first ARVN Division is highly regarded by our commanders, largely because of its commander,
General Truong.
This again highlights the importance of leadership.
General Abrams and I believe that it is impracticable to replace any U.S. forces now in I Corps with further ARVN forces.
The ARVN strength in that Corps will increase in September when a new three battalion regiment becomes operational.
The present deployment of U.S. and ARVN forces represents the best utilization now feasible. Rather than trying to shift
the roles of the two forces, we should equip, train and man the RVNAF as priority items so that U.S. forces may be
gradually withdrawn from Vietnam.
While this long range development takes place, certain transitional steps may be taken. For example, General Abrams
thinks that some special units, such as artillery battalions and armor battalions, may gradually be transformed from U.S. to
RVN by substituting individual RVN for U.S. personnel. He believes that such a transition might be made within three
months or so.
In spite of the progress made by the ARVN, it is going to be difficult to dramatize its participation in the war. I attempted to
emphasize this point while in South Vietnam, both at a press conference at Da Nang after our day in I Corps and at
another session with reporters as we left the country. We emphasized that of the four divisions in Northern I Corps, three
were U.S. divisions and one an ARVN division. I quoted our commanders that these four operated as one entity and that
General Truong, the Commander of the First ARVN Division, could "wear stars in any army in the world."
Basically, however, the problem of dramatizing the ARVN will not be solved just by public affairs emphasis. In fact, General
Abrams agrees with me that great care must be exercised in over-emphasizing ARVN improvements. He points out that
claims of improvement have been made for several years, whereas actual discernible improvement did not begin until a
year ago. Accordingly, the press will doubt statements of RVNAF improvements until actual results are visible.
The most dramatic evidence will come when ARVN units do, in fact, substitute for American troops. General Abrams is
confident that this can be done. Until that time, the dramatization problem will be a difficult one.
In the interim, some public affairs steps can and should be taken. The MACV people are already working to influence the
Vietnam Joint General Staff to increase and upgrade the RVNAF information personnel. MACV and the embassy are
continuing to try to sell the ARVN story. U.S. advisers are encouraging senior RVNAF commanders to talk to news media
following a successful action. U.S. commanders are attempting to defer interviews to RVNAF counterparts. All of these
steps have, however, been taken in the past with little to show for them.

I have asked Phil Goulding to send one or two experts from his office to Vietnam to spend perhaps three weeks in Saigon
and in the field, collecting information to prove that a portion of the RVNAF is, indeed, effective today. From that
information, we should be able to assemble a series of speeches which point up the role of the ARVN and to write talking
papers which can be used for backgrounders and press conferences in Washington.
Additionally, while in Saigon I discussed with Phil and with Brigadier General Sidle, the MACV Chief of Information, the
absolute necessity of still greater efforts to tell the RVNAF story. But weighted down by fire fighting and day-to-day
operational details as they are, I believe that our best hope for the short term lies in a pro-RVNAF sweep of Vietnam by
one or two of Phil's people.
We should not delude ourselves into thinking that this will do the job. It will be only a small step compared to the first actual
substitution of an RVNAF unit for a U.S. unit.
We have discussed with both General Abrams and General Goodpaster the possibility of a contribution here to the three
billion dollar cut.
We discussed also whether there were additional expenditures which the General could predict at this time for the FY 1970
program.
The generals here have no ready suggestions on how to contribute to the three billion dollar cut and I have been unable to
find any specific items which could be deleted or deferred at this time. Needless to say, their attention here is focused
heavily on the anticipated offensives by the enemy of late August or so. I believe that little help can be expected in the near
future from here on the reduction of planned expenditures.
As for FY 1970, General Abrams and General Goodpaster believe it is too early to consider these programs seriously at
this time. The single program which will inevitably add to our spending here will be increased emphasis on supplying and
equipping the ARVN and the popular and regional forces of South Vietnam. As you know, we have been working on this
program in the Pentagon. General Wheeler's people have developed a plan which is now being worked over by Alain
Enthoven and other civilian advisors.

303. Editorial Note

President Johnson and President Thieu arrived in Honolulu on July 18, 1968. Thieu had requested that his State visit to
the mainland United States be postponed and instead that he and Johnson meet at Honolulu July 19-20. (Telegram 31871
from Saigon, July 5; Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Honolulu Cables [1 of
2]) Telegram 197463 to Saigon, July 6, transmitted Johnson's agreement. (Ibid., [2 of 2])
From 11:35 a.m. to 12:51 p.m. on July 19, the Vietnamese Ministers accompanying Thieu made presentations to both
leaders, after which the delegations lunched together. A formal State dinner honoring Thieu was held that evening. From
8:03 to 8:43 a.m. on July 20, both delegations attended a working breakfast. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
Background materials, talking papers on various topics, and an itinerary for the conference are ibid., National Security File,
International Meetings and Travel File, LBJ-Thieu, Honolulu Briefing Book. The exchange of telegrams setting up the
conference is ibid. and National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S.
A joint communique was released upon the departure of both Presidents from Honolulu on July 20. The portion entitled
"Paris Talks" reads: "The two Presidents considered the current status of the Paris talks--already fully reported to the
South Vietnamese and Allied governments--and weighed at length the contingencies that might arise. The two Presidents
deplored the use of the discussions for propaganda purposes on the North Vietnamese side, and such unrealistic positions
as Hanoi's refusal to admit the presence of North Vietnamese forces in the South. They agreed that the basic objective in
the Paris talks is to open the way to a stable and honorable peace. In the face of continued high infiltration and other
military actions directed from Hanoi, however, they saw no alternative but to continue to press for realistic discussions on
the appropriate actions by both sides. The two Presidents again affirmed that the Republic of Vietnam should be a full
participant playing a leading role in discussions concerning the substance of a final settlement, and that their two
governments would act in full consultation with each other, and with their allies, both in the present phase and throughout."
For the full text, see Department of State Bulletin, August 12, 1968, pages 162-165. For Johnson's statement to the press
at the close of the conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69,
Book II, pages 828-830. Telegrams 32830 from Saigon, July 17; 203569 from Saigon, July 17; and 204340 to Saigon, July
18, report on bilateral discussions relating to the genesis of the communique. (All in National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 EA)

304. Notes of Meeting/1/

Honolulu, July 19, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, George Christian Papers, Classified-George Christian (1 of 2). No classification marking.
These notes were transmitted to Harriman and Vance in telegram 206919/Todel 725 to Paris, July 22. (National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
Notes for U.S. briefing on Honolulu meetings and Joint Communique
1. Secretary Clifford and General Wheeler reported to the President on the military situation in Viet Nam./2/
/2/Clifford and Wheeler reported to the President in a meeting on July 18, 2:45-4 p.m. Also present were Rusk, Rostow,
Bundy (who had accompanied Clifford on the trip to South Vietnam), Helms, Bunker (who had left Saigon with Clifford's
delegation), Temple, Jones, Christian, and McPherson. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) A record of the meeting
by McPherson, "Notes from a Honolulu meeting before the Johnson-Thieu Conference," undated, is ibid., George Christian
Papers, Classified-George Christian (1 of 2). Wheeler's briefing was based on his memorandum CM-3489-68 to the
President, July 19, entitled "Military Situation in Vietnam," in the Washington National Records Center, Department of
Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, 1968 Secretary of Defense Files, VIET 385. Clifford's written report to the
President is printed as Document 302.
--They noted the present lull, which is similar to that in the second half of April preceding the May attacks on Saigon.
--They found no evidence whatsoever that the enemy was engaged in an effort to match our de-escalation beginning on
March 31, but a vast amount of evidence that he was absorbing infiltrators from the North to fill up his units and reequipping for another major series of attacks.
--There is no firm evidence on the exact timing of such attacks which could come any time in the weeks ahead.
--They noted the remarkable success of the Vietnamese mobilization effort. In June the armed forces of South Viet Nam
reached a level of 765,000, 48,000 more than the original goal for this date. It is expected the total will exceed 800,000 by
the end of 1968.
--They reported to the President on the accelerated schedules of re-equipment of the ARVN with M-16 automatic rifles and
schedules for equipping paramilitary forces down to hamlet level on a high priority basis.
--They reported U.S., Vietnamese, and allied forces were fully prepared for the enemy's forthcoming offensive and in high
morale.
2. The President went over these matters with President Thieu who also reported at some length the progress of the new
government, including its enlarged tax measures; the unified organization of the defenses of Saigon; the effective
cooperation of the legislative and executive branches on the difficult issues of mobilization and increased taxes.
3. They also reviewed the talks in Paris. They noted that there had been no substantive progress and no response from
the other side to the President's action on March 31 which lifted bombing from 90% of the population and 78% of the land
area of North Viet Nam. (Contrary to rumors which appear to be circulating, there was no discussion of an unrequited total
bombing cessation.)
With heavy fighting in prospect and no evidence that the other side was prepared to engage in serious substantive
negotiation, there was no discussion of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Viet Nam. As the communique states, "as
North Viet Nam takes its men home and ends its aggression against South Viet Nam, U.S. forces will be withdrawn"--a
position agreed among all the allies at Manila. The communique also notes that "President Thieu stated his Government's
determination to continue to assume all the responsibility that the scale of the forces of South Viet Nam and their
equipment will permit, while preparing the Vietnamese nation and armed forces for the importance and decisive role that
will be theirs in the coming stage of the struggle."
In general, the evident Communist preparations for another major attack, and the failure of the Paris talks to exhibit

progress after more than 3-1/2 months required the two Presidents to focus primarily on the urgent tasks of continuing to
deal with Communist aggression.

305. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/

Paris, July 21, 1968, 1255Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan, Paris Todel--Paris Delto VIII, 7/1122/68. Secret; Nodis; Harvan; Plus. Received at 9:23 a.m. The following notation by Rostow appears on the telegram: "For
the President From Walt Rostow--Herewith Zorin chats indecisively on last Vance-Lau talk. He suggests a Hanoi interest in
cutting down a straight DMZ deal, dropping other items, plus a Hanoi desire to avoid anything explicit." Shriver's
assessment of the Harriman-Zorin conversation is in telegram 18279 from Paris, July 20. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-July 1968)
18283/Delto 486. From Harriman and Vance.
1. Yesterday afternoon, July 19, we met with Ambassador Zorin for about 45 minutes. Highlights follow.
2. Vance described briefly his trip to the US. We noted we had observed the decline in military activity in South Viet Nam
but were unable to determine its significance at this time. We said we noted from captured documents and prisoners that a
build up for a new offensive was in progress; yet at the same time there had been a marked decline in military action. We
said we would watch carefully to see what happens on the ground in South Viet Nam. We commented that we did not
anticipate any major decisions coming out of the Honolulu meeting.
3. Zorin then said that he had had a very brief conversation with Lau at a Soviet concert. He said that he had talked to Lau
over the noise of drums and dances, so his conversation had been very brief.
4. Zorin said that Lau indicated two things made the North Vietnamese resist our proposal: first, we were still insisting that
agreement be reached on Phase 2 before Phase 1 took place; and second, that there were matters of substance in Phase
2 which gave them problems. Zorin added that Lau had definitely displayed interest in what Vance said.
5. Zorin went on to say that Lau commented that US was laying great emphasis on reestablishing the DMZ, but what the
US had in mind was not acceptable in the form in which Vance outlined it. He said that Lau said his impression was the US
attached most importance to the DMZ, since they had put this first in their plan.
6. Zorin then took his usual hard line that we should stop the bombing and that progress would immediately be made in the
talks. We countered this with the usual arguments.
7. Zorin asked if a date had been set for the next meeting, and we replied no, that the ball was in the North Vietnamese
court./2/ We said that we had presented concrete proposals which they said they would study. Zorin replied that he
believed Lau would want to meet with Vance again; and that he (Zorin) would be seeing Lau and would discuss with him in
detail Lau's views with respect to the proposal made at Vance's last meeting with Lau./3/
/2/The possibility of another Vance-Lau meeting was raised unsuccessfully during the tea break at the July 24 formal
session. (Ibid.) A summary of this session is in telegram 18457/Delto 499 from Paris, July 24. (Ibid.)
/3/See Document 299.
Harriman

306. Editorial Note

Secretary of Defense Clifford held a regular morning meeting with his staff on July 22, 1968, to discuss Vietnam. The
meeting started at 8:30 a.m., but neither the ending time of the meeting nor its participants is recorded. Deputy Secretary
of Defense Nitze took the following notes of Clifford's remarks during the meeting:

"Must get out of there.

"1. Use all influence on those in Washington.
"2. Persuade our negotiators of the rightness of our cause.
"3. Convey to our representatives in Saigon they seeing it too narrowly, from GVN pt. of view. Shld. look at it from interest
of U.S.
"Convictions.
"1. No way can we terminate war militarily.
"2. GVN doesn't want war to stop now. Money flows. Compulsion to build up ARVN will be lessened. List includes 300/400
H's [helicopters], T-39 planes, artillery. Corruption runs through everything.
"3. What do we do? Candidates moving away." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Defense
Department, Deputy Secretary of Defense Notes, 1968, 4 of 6)

307. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/

Washington, July 23, 1968, 0031Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-July 1968.
Secret; Priority; Nodis; Harvan; Plus. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Alan Parker of S/S.
206932. Eyes only for Harriman and Vance from the Secretary. Despite one or two elliptical efforts by Hanoi
representatives to suggest that they have de-escalated the fighting on the ground, I believe that we should maintain the
public position expressed in the Honolulu communique while continuing private explorations. In the first place, we would
look and be silly if we proceeded on the theory that the other side had made a political decision to de-escalate the violence
only to find ourselves confronted with new and major attacks which are now in prospect. Only yesterday there were serious
bombing incidents in Saigon and the enemy forces in the Saigon area are only twenty-four hours away. Perhaps even
more important, if we were to acknowledge, without any assurances from Hanoi, that the present somewhat lower scale of
fighting results from Hanoi's "de-escalation," many soft-headed people would take that as a sufficient answer to the
President's March 31 speech and call upon us to take another major step of unilateral de-escalation such as a nonreciprocal ending of the bombing.
The purpose of this message is not to foreclose any options whatever but simply to suggest that we not box ourselves in
by accepting the present lull as a response to the March 31 speech. I would of course be glad to have any comments you
wish to make./2/
/2/In replying, in telegram 18337 from Paris, Harriman and Vance wrote: "In short, we fully agree it is important not to box
ourselves in by either accepting or rejecting the present lull as a response related to the March 31 speech. Consequently,
we believe we must continue to examine carefully the pattern and meaning of actions in South Vietnam." (Ibid.)
Rusk

308. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, July 24, 1968, 1:30-3:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House.
Helms, Wheeler, Rostow, and Taylor left the meeting at 3 p.m., and Christian and Tom Johnson left at 3:15 p.m. Rusk and
Clifford remained until 3:54 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

NOTES OF THE MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT WITH

HIS FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS AT LUNCH
ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Maxwell Taylor
CIA Director Helms
General Earle Wheeler
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
The President: I want to sit down with Mr. Nixon to see what kind of world he really wants. When he gets the nomination he
may be more responsible. He says he is for our position in Vietnam. He thinks Democrats will go the other way./2/
/2/See Document 310.
What should we do about the Democratic platform on Vietnam? Senator Mansfield rejects the "straws in the wind"
statements./3/
/3/From 8:38 to 10 a.m. on July 15, both Mansfield and Dirksen met with the President in an off-the-record session.
(Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) Although notes of the meeting have not been found, in a July 17 memorandum
to the President entitled "Viet Nam and the Paris Negotiations," Mansfield discussed the meeting and elaborated on the
points he had made. He stated his support for the President's current peace initiative but emphasized that "the difficulty is
that we do not have the cards" since most were held by the North Vietnamese and the rest by the Soviet Union and China.
The talks would not move forward unless they were enlarged to include the NLF and GVN. Mansfield urged the President
to enact a full cessation, and to pressure the GVN if necessary, in order to bring this about. (Ibid., National Security File,
Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. V(a) 7/68) In a July 24 memorandum to the President, Rostow argued
that Mansfield was unaware of several facts, including the private contacts among U.S., North Vietnamese, and Soviet
diplomats in Paris, the burden placed on the NVA in maintaining hostilities, measures to arrange expanded representation
in Paris, and efforts by Thieu and Huong to "create an atmosphere conducive to such talks" in spite of resistance from the
lower house of the National Assembly. Rostow attached a draft letter for the President to send to Mansfield but, "in view of
the sensitivity of some of these facts," advised against sending it and instead recommended using it as a talking paper for
future contacts with Mansfield and Dirksen. (Ibid.) The President and Rusk discussed the situation in Paris with Dirksen in
a meeting from 3 to 4:30 p.m. on July 27. A full transcript of the meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet
Room.
The GOP may be of more help to us than the Democrats in the last few months.
Secretary Clifford: Ike said he would be glad to see me.
The President: Eisenhower has helped me in every critical thing I have asked him to help on. You would be good to talk
with him.
Secretary Clifford: On the '70 budget we have been examining our assumptions. We had assumed the war would continue
at the same level. You can't cut down without it leaking.
The President: The situation seems like they are taking advantage of our restraint.
Secretary Clifford: Every B-52 flight costs $35,000 from Thailand. $42,000 from Okinawa and $48,000 from Guam.
The bombs cost $31,000. I hope the targets are worth it.
[Omitted here is discussion of the military budget and the situation in Czechoslovakia.]
The President: Any comment on Paris?
Secretary Rusk: Hanoi is considering it.

The President: How did we come out with Honolulu?

Secretary Rusk: Pluses in Saigon. I was pleased with the conference.
The President: Chal Roberts built up false hopes./4/
/4/Reference is to journalist Chalmers Roberts.
Secretary Rusk: Nobody in our department thought the conference was anything other than Walt Rostow's backgrounder
over here said it was.
The President: Study Mansfield's letter and draft a reply.
[Omitted here is additional discussion of the situation in Czechoslovakia, printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume
XVII, Document 72.]

309. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 26, 1968, 11:15 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. V(a) 7/68. Secret.
The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
You asked me yesterday: Do you think they are serious in Paris?
My short answer was: Yes. But it may be helpful if I set down where I would guess Hanoi now stands with respect to
peacemaking--emphasizing that this is only one man's guess and I could be wrong.
1. Military Situation
I do not believe Hanoi regards its military posture as stable for the long pull. If they mount major attacks they must count
on taking very high casualties and increasingly North Vietnamese casualties. Although such attacks may have political and
psychological effects in Saigon and in Washington they cannot count on even a maximum military effort being decisive. On
the other hand, if they fall back to low levels of attritional warfare, as in 1967, they must count on a progressive extension
of GVN control over the country. It was that fact which led them to abandon attritional warfare and go for broke starting at
Tet 1968.
Therefore, I believe they are playing for the best end of the war they can bring about in the next 6-12 months. They regard
their best hopes for a substantial achievement of their objectives to be in the politics of Saigon and Washington. They
regard their military actions as a means of affecting the politics of Saigon and Washington.
2. Politics in Saigon
I do not believe they have abandoned hope that they can break the Thieu government, create a loose or chaotic political
situation in Saigon and insert, somehow, men they control into key spots. But I believe they are somewhat discouraged by
the relative success of Thieu in moving forward towards a stable government. The critical decision that they must make is
whether they finally decide that the only way to end the war is to negotiate with Thieu's government. They have not made
that decision. If they make it, they must accept the likelihood that they will not get better terms than those offered in the
Honolulu communique/2/ and in your TV statement of December 19 just before you went to Canberra./3/ Arguing for an
early decision are two possibilities:
/2/See Document 303.
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Document 441, footnote 5.

--if they delay, it is conceivable that the Thieu government will gather strength, legitimacy, and public support with the
passage of time. It could be a substantially stronger government next spring than it is now.
--equally important is the likelihood that the ARVN will be bigger, better equipped, and more confident next spring than it is
now. Armed forces of a million men in South Vietnam, with the possibility of further re-equipment with tanks, helicopters,
aircraft, etc., is not attractive from a straight North Vietnamese point of view.
Arguing against a decision to accept the Honolulu communique terms and the legitimacy of the GVN are:
--the hope that the Thieu government will break either from the pressures of internal Vietnamese politics or because of
strains in the US-GVN relationship.
--but most important of all in postponing a decision is the hope that U.S. political life will either yield a Mendes-France/4/
(e.g., McCarthy), or that fears of this trend in the United States will produce a hardline coup in Saigon which would open
the way to political turmoil, etc.
/4/Pierre Mendes-France was elected French Premier in June 1954; he vowed to terminate the Franco-Viet Minh War
within a month of coming to office and was successful in doing so.
Therefore, of the three key elements in Hanoi's equation (the military situation, the politics of Saigon, and the politics of
Washington) I believe U.S. politics remains the ultimate focus of their thought and action.
3. U.S. Politics
With respect to U.S. politics, they are examining both trends in public opinion and the candidates. I am inclined to think that
if McCarthy is not nominated by the Democrats, they will judge that time is running against them in terms of the military
situation and developments in South Vietnam and that they had better negotiate seriously. That is why I am inclined to
agree with Thieu and Ky that September could be the month in which negotiations get serious. If McCarthy is nominated, I
would assume they would await the election in November. If they proceed with the mid-August third offensive it will be, on
this view, primarily to try to shake American public opinion and influence the Democratic convention.
Therefore, preparing the American press and media for this mid-August offensive--and trying to assure that we do not get
a reaction like that after Tet--could be critically important if (I repeat) if this chain of thought is correct.
4. I will do a memorandum during the day setting out my thoughts on how the press and the public might be prepared for
the third offensive./5/
/5/In a memorandum sent to the President at 5:45 p.m. that evening, Rostow noted that the biggest public relations
problems faced by the administration were how to prepare the public for the coming third enemy offensive and how to
suggest that "the U.S. public reaction to the Tet attacks was excessively pessimistic" and thus "it would be helpful for all of
us to be prepared to play it cool this time." He recommended a series of briefings by Abrams and other military men to
carry out this task. (Johnson Library, Office Files of Harry McPherson, Vietnam 1968) In a memorandum to the President
at 9:50 p.m. that evening, Rostow suggested that the President make a statement, backed up by statements by Abrams,
Bunker, Rusk, and Clifford, informing the public of the coming offensive and urging that, "aside from this build up, the signs
are favorable" that increasing strength and stability in South Vietnam and "a growing sense of realities" on the part of the
North Vietnamese would lead to a successful outcome in the near future. (Ibid.) Asked to write a speech for the President
along these lines, McPherson argued, in a July 29 memorandum to the President, that Johnson should not make the
speech, since if the enemy did not launch the offensive until late August, "the McCarthy people would be given quite an
argument: that the Administration had let six weeks of lull go by, and instead of using that as the basis for moving the talks
forward, had continued (and even intensified) the bombing of North Vietnam." (Ibid.)
Walt

310. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, July 26, 1968, 6-7:35 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room. No classification marking. Tom Johnson joined
the meeting at 6:33 p.m., and Rostow and Rusk at 6:40 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) A full transcript of the meeting
is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room. Tom Johnson's handwritten notes of the meeting are ibid., Tom
Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Beginning at 11:15 a.m., Rusk met with Wallace to brief him, first at the State Department
then at 12:20 p.m. at the White House. (Ibid., Dean Rusk Appointment Books, 1967-1969) The President joined Wallace's
briefing from 12:45 to 1:05 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S NOTES ON MEETING IN CABINET ROOM
WITH RICHARD NIXON. JOINED LATER BY
SECRETARY RUSK, TOM JOHNSON AND WALT ROSTOW
In talking with Richard Nixon, the President said:
"We have said to very responsible people--first, we have got talks set off with the Soviets. It is a question of timing and
date on both offensive and defensive weapons. Now when you do that, that would likely include a lot of other things--the
Middle East, very well Vietnam, probably North Korea and things of that nature. We don't know what time or date that will
be. We will get on it early. We have asked them to set a date and they have asked us to set a date. I would assume it will
be sometime within the next few weeks.
"Second, they have said in effect to us, you ought to conduct a certain course in Vietnam, which we considered
unreasonable. We have in effect said to them, we will be glad to consider your suggestions. Now if we did that, what would
you theorize the other side would do? In other words, you being responsible, and being the power? Now they have two in
their court right this moment. Now the Vice President indicating that he might stop the bombing would be a very bad thing
right at this moment when you are stopping it for nothing. You are giving it away free right when they are responding to us
and what they would be willing to give in Paris."
The President then asked Mr. Nixon if he followed what he was saying.
Mr. Nixon replied:
"Yes, the Vietnamese. In other words, your people Thompson-Harriman have informed the Soviets, look here it is really the
ball on their side of the net. You have three proceedings to de-escalate."
The President said that was correct. He then asked Mr. Nixon if we did stop the bombing, what would he say that they
would do?
Mr. Nixon said that in terms of stopping the bombing that would mean the bombing--everything North across the line on the
South. In other words, that is what the President is prepared to do with a bombing pause.
The President then said:
"We don't say we will get it, but it's the Communist line of attack. You ask Edgar Hoover. You have seen these things come
and go. One time it's a pause, the next time it is something else. The next time it is Nixon, the next time it is McCarthy, the
next time it is the Texas Rangers. The line at the moment with them all is just stop the bombing--just stop the bombing
altogether. First, it was stop the bombing in Hanoi and Haiphong. Now we stopped 90 percent of the population and 78
percent of the area. Now then they come in and say we'll do some more if you will react to it at all--March the 31st. Now I
said we have taken the first step. Now if you will take a step we will take other steps. But they are not doing that."
Mr. Nixon asked if it were the North Vietnamese and the Soviets also.
The President answered that that was correct--the North Vietnam powers.
The President said:
"Now in these talks--the Russians come along and put on a campaign right now. We rather think they are behind the
campaign. Yesterday it was written in the Record--Javits, Hatfield, Morse--all got up and just raised hell for Johnson to stop
the bombing now./2/ What that meant was that my son-in-law down in the DMZ with the rifle company would have to take
30 percent more cuts than they have ever faced there before because we are stopping 30 percent of them that are coming
through there."

/2/Javits and other Senators criticized the Honolulu Conference and called for an immediate halt to the bombing of North
Vietnam. See The New York Times, July 26, 1968.
Mr. Nixon said that he had been informed he had a nephew out there too now, and the President told them that he
conducted himself like he had someone out here.
Mr. Nixon told the President he did not want him to get involved in their fights because it was not necessary, as they would
handle that on the Republican side, but the reason that he thought the Rockefeller proposal was rather silly actually was
that we have proved our good faith and that is what he said in the answer./3/ He said that he did not know what more we
could do and asked the President if this was his position basically that we have to do anything more to prove our good
faith?
/3/At a news conference on July 13, Governor Nelson Rockefeller criticized the Johnson administration for not tabling a
specific bargaining plan that would overcome the climate of mistrust on both sides at Paris. He proposed a four-phase plan
beginning with a pullback by both sides and the insertion of an international peacekeeping force, followed by the
withdrawal of most, but not all, foreign troops from South Vietnam and the cessation of military activity by the VC. Elections
would follow, and U.S. troops would withdraw entirely. In the last phase, the DRV and the GVN would negotiate the
process for reunification, at which point the buffering troops would depart. See ibid., July 14, 1968.
The President told Mr. Nixon that time and time again we have proved our good faith and in each instance it has been
rejected. He said: "Bobby Kennedy come in this office and asked for two things--one, he recommended Bill Moyers to be
appointed Secretary of State to succeed Dean Rusk. I turned that down forthwith. I never knew Dean Rusk until I came in
this Administration. He has acted wisely and ably in my judgment every day."
Mr. Nixon said he concurred in that.
The President went on to say:
"Now the second thing is--would we have a pause and how long. Oh, two or three days and that would do it. I was
convinced it would not do any good, but I called in the Joint Chiefs and they said it would not do any harm so we put on a
pause for a week--eight days. They did not respond to it. Since that time we have had about six different pauses,
unilateral, on our own, including one 37 days./4/ The 37 days was a Russian pause. They started it. They have more
contacts back here than you do. We are meeting with folks every day, but we have been up on the Hill. We have seen
everybody on down, these very able top flight men and, of course, we know who they see and who they talk to naturally."
/4/Reference is to the bombing pause during the winter of 1965-1966.
Mr. Nixon said that he hoped so. He added that he thought that was a rather silly suggestion of Bobby Kennedy and
McCarthy to suggest that Hoover should resign. He said you just don't pull the rug out from under a man when he is doing
a job.
The President said he would have been rather uncomfortable during the period of the last five years without Hoover in
town. The President said that Mr. Rusk would visit with Mr. Nixon shortly. He added that the Russians sold the long pause
and the first man he guessed they really sold it to was Mac Bundy. The President said he went out to lunch with them and
they convinced him that if we would pause for twelve days they could deliver North Vietnam, that they would respond to
that act. The Joint Chiefs did not think that twelve days would be dangerous, but felt psychologically it would injure our
soldiers out there and some of our people here--that it would be just twelve days wasted. The President said:
"It is like picking cotton when it gets ready to be picked. Two or three days later they got hold of McNamara and they sold
McNamara on it. I went to Texas and they all got to talking to Rusk and he would not buy it and finally this went on for
several days and then Rusk called me and said that he thought in the light of things we ought to try it.
"I came back from Texas and met with General Wheeler and spent an hour and a half with him and he reviewed it all
carefully with the Joint Chiefs. And he said that we could carry out their suggestion of not less than 12 and not more that
20 days advantage really to our side if I would pledge to him that I wouldn't go more than 30 or 40 days. He sure did not
want to give up much more than that time. The rain was on up there and they had a few holidays as I remember, during
Christmas or Tet or something that would use up some of them that we wouldn't actually lose much there, but we could get
these planes and put them over there where we needed them and that he would go along although he wouldn't
recommend it or instigate it because of the psychological effect in the Congress."
The President told Mr. Nixon that when he got it from the Joint Chiefs, he sent it out to General Taylor and he came in and

reviewed the whole thing and he agreed that he would do the same thing. The President said neither of them would
instigate it or recommend it or advise, but all of them would defend it. It was their feeling, however, that we could get back
in business if we took that long a pause.
The President said he agreed to it and twelve days later it produced nothing, twenty days it produced nothing, thirty days it
produced nothing and in thirty days the President said he started to try desperately to get back to the shore. He said by
thirty-seven days he got back, but if it had been longer, he never would have got back because each day they would bring
somebody in and keep them there and he could not bomb a Russian official or a Canadian official or anybody else in
Hanoi so he had trouble. He said then finally one day they got it clear and got back in.
The President said the North Vietnamese were told that if they would show us that they were willing to stop anything, then
the U.S. would take another move but did not say what that move would be. He said they had done nothing for three
months. The President said:
"Now then we've got back and said this. If we would stop the bombing, to North Vietnam in private conversation, would you
agree to the re-establishment of the DMZ, would you agree to stop your infiltration? Now if we do ours first, would you
come along at a later time and agree to do that? We want to see if you are really sincere. Now let's assume that you want
us to stop and suppose we do stop, would you go to phase two? Now here is what is in phase two. Now you let us know
how you feel about that before we actually act on the other. They have not responded. The word we received yesterday
said they have it under serious consideration."
Mr. Nixon asked if the President was talking about the North Vietnamese and he said that he was.
The President said:
"At the same time we said to the Russians you want us to stop the bombing. If we stop the bombing can you get them to
stop this? You want a de-escalation. Now we are willing to de-escalate, but if we de-escalate, can you get them to deescalate also? They are not giving us action on it. We assumed that if we had these discussions that they would respond
to it, but they have never responded to it before."
The President said that he had received a letter the day before from Kosygin./5/ He said it was not on that, but it touched
generally on the situation. The President said we were trying to arrange the time and the talks. He said he had not
discussed this with any other candidate and wanted Mr. Nixon to keep it confidential. The President told him:
/5/Not further identified.
"So for this reason if you were the President and I was a Democratic nominee, I would do like I did when Eisenhower was
President and that is about what you have said that I have read--'that I am not responsible for this country until I become
President. I expect to be President on January the 20th, at which time I will take control of it and I will try to launch some
initiatives and my judgments and do what I think is right. In the meantime, I don't have all the information. I don't have all
the facts and I do not want to convey the impression that half a dozen people are speaking for this country or that we have
got seven Commander-in-Chiefs trying to direct the affairs of this country. After I become President I plan to direct and
assume my responsibility. Until then I do not plan to confuse and frustrate and make people wonder who is President of
this country. 'And that is what I'd do if I were running against you and you were President. I told one of the Democrats
yesterday--I said, some of these days you are going to find the people are going to rise up and say who in the hell are for
our men, who's going to speak for our men, who's going to support our men and you are going to be wishing you had
supported us instead of letting Nixon do it and I think that it's true."
Mr. Nixon said as the President knew he (Nixon) had supported the commitment in Vietnam. He said he did not agree on
the basis that we got dragged into it. He said the President and he knew that the reason we were there is in order to try to
have peace in the Pacific. He said if you don't stop aggression there you aren't going to have peace in the Pacific. He said
the way it was conducted was the President's responsibility, but it was the commitment that is very, very important there.
Mr. Nixon said:
"There are terrible pressures regarding Vietnam. You see, I've been down there, my God--I was talking to the House
members the other day, and I was talking to the Senate members and they said you know Ford stood very firm on that.
You've just got to get a commitment. There is a whole group that believes we are losing the war, we've already lost. That's
the line. Now the briefing I had, of course, put a different view on that. I think the problem that we have now is that really-to put it quite frankly here--like Henry Clay, who was probably one of the least principled men who ever ran for the
Presidency, but he used to say that he'd rather be right than to be President. I think you have to realize, and I'm sure you

do, that what may be the right thing may be politically wrong in this country. You know the country is running away from us.
Frankly, the press, I don't say that in any mean and bitter sense, but they have begun finally to get through."
Mr. Nixon then asked the President if he felt that way also and the President said that he did. Mr. Nixon then said as a
example he had talked with a newspaper man who said Jack Valenti/6/ had told him that the President was planning to
have a bombing pause between the two conventions and he said people then start running to Nixon and saying that he
had to play tough until after the election if he wanted to win.
/6/Special Assistant to the President, 1963-1966.
The President said that he had not seen Jack Valenti in months, that he would never discuss this kind of subject with him,
and that he would have a bombing pause any time he could get anybody to underwrite the other side and he never would
until he did.
Mr. Nixon went on to say:
"Let me say one thing. I would never put any credence in any of these stories but the only reason I raise it is to point out
how serious it was and the real problem that we have. The problem that we have now and speaking as a party man, I want
to do the right thing--is to be able, and I'm not here to write a statement for the platform today and I'll take on some of the
Congress, but to be able to write a statement that doesn't run basically against Javits and now Morton, and a lot of guys up
there don't know better. That's our problem. You hear for example, and I don't carry tales to you, but this is all around town
too that I understand that Hubert is under tremendous pressure. He's got to fight McCarthy a political year is bad, but
fighting this kind in a political year is the worst. So I suppose Hubert--and I respect him and admire him. He's a hell of a
man. He looks here, here's McCarthy. He's a hard man. Hubert is a guy that really should be over there with those people
because he's supporting them. I think he really believes it is right. And so he gets a bunch of guys in and says now what
can he be for. I think he'll have to come up with a bombing pause." He asked the President if he agreed and the President
said he did not believe that he would. He said he thought there would be pressure on him to. He said Humphrey asked the
President the night before what he thought about it and the President said he thought it was absolutely ridiculous.
The President then reiterated that if the North Vietnamese would guarantee to us that they would establish a DMZ and
would not infiltrate it, that he had already given them something for nothing and why give them any more.
Mr. Nixon said that eventually he would have to take a position on this and he hoped it would be a responsible one. He
said, "If it is, it may be politically awfully hard to sell, but we have to do it. That's the real thing."
The President said:
"Well, now here is the basic mis-assumption that a good many people in this country are making and I may be wrong, but
this is my best judgment. My best judgment is that we're not losing the war. We're winning it. Now my best judgment is
we're very close to winning it. My best judgment is that they will make another all-out grasp sometime the latter part of July
to the 15th of August. They expect it now any day. And if they do, our people think they are ready for it. They hope they do.
Westmoreland said to me, I hope they do. I said--how can you hope? He said that I would rather get them by the
thousands than run them one by one. They told me that in Honolulu and it shocked the whole group there."
Mr. Nixon said then we are pretty close to winning there?
The President said he wouldn't say that exactly, but he would say that we are very close to letting the world know that they
are out of business almost. He told Mr. Nixon they had suffered over 120,000 losses since January and they just could not
keep on suffering that. He said the reason--there were two things.
"In the first place, I am not an amateur in this office and I don't love this power that they all talk about a great deal. But I
carefully calculated this thing from August of last year and I told McNamara in August that if he wanted to go to the World
Bank he could. He said he'd stay over here as long as I wanted and I said you go on. And he said--'does that mean that
you're not going to run.' I said no, but I had told John Connally. He had told me that he wouldn't run for Governor. If I
thought I needed him and wanted that Delegation and wanted him to be out in front and I told him that if I were in his place
I wouldn't run for Governor. Now you can take two things into your consideration. He came back in October. He asked me
if there had been any change and I told him no. He was the only one I talked to."
Mr. Nixon said that Connally was a good man.

The President then told Mr. Nixon that he had a statement and decided to put it in his State of the Union but then he didn't.
He said he figured March 31st was the last day he could--that Truman had done it he believed on March 30th and he felt it
would be unfair to not go on and announce it, not waiting if he were going to run because he wanted everybody to have a
chance. He said he did not care who it was.
He said:
"I thought I understood Bobby's reasoning pretty well, and so I concluded that I could not get a tax bill and I had to keep
the country fiscally sound and save the dollar, that I couldn't get them to the Conference table and I had no chance for
peace if I did not, that I could not clean up Vietnam during my time, doubtful if I ever could but certainly I couldn't between
now and January as a candidate. Now the question was--was it more important for me to be a candidate and try to take
another four years to do these things, or to drop the candidacy part and try to do them now. Well, I concluded the latter,
rather long. I'm happy I did. I've got my tax bill. I'm getting along better with the other things. I don't think that you can get
hurt by our continuing our present posture there as candidates. I'm talking about as long as you take the position that you
support our men, and you certainly want to see them supported and do a good job that you are not responsible for all of
these decisions we are making, but when you are--you will assume that responsibility. Now I told Humphrey that is the way
I would play it. I said if you play it any other way you ought to say this: 'I have no authority to speak for the Administration.'
This does not represent its policy at all and don't you leave the impression that Humphrey is saying things that means
Johnson because what you're saying doesn't mean Johnson."
Mr. Nixon told the President:
"One thing that I want to assure you of, which I am sure you know, is we have come to the end of a line and we have got to
look back and nobody at this time wants to make any decision to prolong this damn war a day longer or one that ended it
and then have another one in four or five years. I have always put it in terms of winning the peace--not winning over North
Vietnam. Winning the peace--so that is the thing I am particularly interested in."
The President told Mr. Nixon that his position on that he thought was a pretty sound one.
Mr. Nixon said:
"Another thing I want to say is strictly personal between us. As you well know, the campaigns are going to be rough, but
you can be sure that there will be nothing personal. I've kept that out and intend to continue to in respect to what you've
done. I have said many times that you are the hardest working President that we have ever had in this office. I believe
this."
The President said that he had tried.
Mr. Nixon said beyond that on this issue that they had to do the right thing and the only thing that he would appreciate
would be if the President would just keep him posted--that he'd be standing out there.
The President said:
"I think you have been very responsible. No person has been of more help to me as President than President Eisenhower,
my fellow predecessor, and I hope that whoever is President that I can be of help to them."
Secretary Rusk joined the meeting and the President reviewed briefly the points that he had touched on with Mr. Nixon. He
suggested Secretary Rusk might want to give Mr. Nixon his evaluation of the situation. He told Secretary Rusk that he
thought Mr. Nixon's attitude in connection with what had been done in our relations with other nations had been a
responsible one and that the President wanted to help him with any facts that we have that would be of value to him and
the other candidates so that they don't get misled or so they don't mislead somebody else.
Mr. Nixon said that Bob Ellsworth, his advisor, might want to talk with the President about Mr. Nixon going to the Soviet
Union between Conventions. He said he would only do it if he thought that he could be helpful and only for the purpose of
listening so that he could know these people.
[Omitted here is discussion of the situation in Czechoslovakia.]
Mr. Nixon asked if there was any way that the Czechoslovakia situation could be put on the scales in the Vietnam
situation--was there any way that we could "play the game or is that too dangerous?"

Secretary Rusk thought the sacrifice that we would make in either place would be unacceptable. He said there was not
much room there so far as the physical construction is concerned.
Secretary Rusk said on the Paris talks just to sum it up very quickly--the two delegations are there without an agreed
agenda, the U.S. is there on the basis of the President's March 31st speech, the Hanoi delegation is there on the basis of
their April 3rd statement which said the only purpose is to get us to come to a decision if all of the bombing stopped./7/
/7/See Documents 169 and 175.
Secretary Rusk said to a certain degree we have been talking past each other. He said that he felt Hanoi had lost some
ground in the world opinion and the propaganda side. Their claim that they had no troops in South Vietnam was just
laughed at and their rocket attacks on Saigon while the talks in Paris were going on bounced back on them. There is no
way to know why they let up on this--whether it was for propaganda reasons or what. He said that what we were really
trying to find out was the answer to one simple question--what would happen if the bombing were stopped. He said nobody
in the world--no human being is thus far able to tell us. Hanoi refuses to and no one else is able to.
Secretary Rusk said:
"I'll make one remark that ought to be very closely held and that is that Hanoi is saying, at the moment, that they are giving
serious consideration to what we've said on this subject. They have not yet answered. They have apparently not had their
own answer from Hanoi. We think they are at least thinking it over. We have no reason to be encouraged about it, or
discouraged about it. It's the Hanoi delegation in Paris."
Secretary Rusk went on to say that there was no doubt but what was happening in North Vietnam was the principal
interest of the Soviet Union and all across this country. On the other hand, the Soviets are unable to say what would
happen if we stopped the bombing. He said they sort of leave general enticements that the atmosphere would be
improved, what might happen and that sort of thing, but even with the capacity of the Soviet Union and the United States to
have the most secret communications they are unable to tell us what would happen if we stopped the bombing. We do
think the Soviets have been discussing these problems with Hanoi. We're inclined to believe--to the extent they have some
influence to say to Hanoi--at least try to be serious about this. But we don't expect Moscow to go out in advance of Hanoi,
and even in a somewhat public position because I think they are nervous about just pushing Hanoi, holding it in the arms
of Peking among other things.
Mr. Nixon asked if they felt they could pull the plug on the supplies because of Peking and Secretary Rusk said that was
right. He said he also thought that they were ideologically motivated and if Hanoi should get away with it in Southeast Asia,
the leadership of the Communist world would be involved. Secretary Rusk said we were working that side of the street too.
The President said we have said in effect the same thing to the Soviets and said: "If we stop the bombing would you see
that certain things are done? To neither of those questions do we have operational answers."
Mr. Nixon said:
"It's too bad we have an election at this time and they say why not stop the bombing and so on and so forth. I frankly didn't
intend to go in that direction, but it does show you how far your own advisers can go, particularly on this point, and I think
as I said to the President earlier that our problem here is American public opinion which really thinks, well, let's go the extra
mile and that is, how far can you go without getting something in return. Now as far as you see it at the present time, this is
just one bit of leverage, a very important bit of leverage that you have left in order to get them to do something. Is this an
important military aspect?"
Secretary Rusk reported that it was because we were knocking out an awful lot of trucks. He said we had been knocking
the dickens out of them, and units that have been moving down and things of that type.
Mr. Nixon said the thing he wanted to know was whether there was any indication that they would do something. He
wanted to know if they were hurting so much that they might be willing to do something.
Secretary Rusk said he felt that in the last ten days they were more interested in the problem and were willing to listen,
although they haven't said too much yet. They say they are seriously considering it. He said:
"The fact that the war has been prosecuted against them so effectively brings them to the point that they now might
consider trying to find a way to de-escalate. Let me remind you of something--going back twenty years. There were no

objective reasons why the communists had to stop the bringing in of guerrillas into Greece. There was no objective reason
why they had to lift the Berlin blockade when they did. When the Korean War was highly [finally?] drawing to conclusion,
heavens there were 600 million Chinese back there that they were not brought into the thing, you see. In other words,
there is a physical capability to continue something of this sort, but long before you get to that there is a possibility that for
reasons of their own, which we do not fully understand, they decided that they had better bring it to an end in some
fashion."
Mr. Nixon spoke up and said "you never know."
The President said if we thought we were hurting because we had lost 10,000 men out of 200 million, imagine what must
be happening to them when they have lost 100 odd thousand out of a much smaller population.
Mr. Nixon said he had felt that way for a long time but then you get this loud propaganda that we are confronted with. He
expressed concern on the stand that some of the Republicans had taken and he said it might be a pretty hard decision on
the part of the candidate not to run--to run away from it.
Secretary Rusk said he might make one frivolous remark on this--that there were about a dozen elements involved in this
matter of peace settlement in Vietnam and his mathematicians tell him that you get 40 million different combinations out of
those elements. He said that all sorts of people have come forward with all sorts of readjustments of various elements that
we have been talking about for a long time. He said the trouble with all of them is that Hanoi says no to all of them. He
pointed out that there were a lot of proposals made that do not involve Washington. He said, in fact they were not even in
Hanoi, that Hanoi continues to say no to all of them.
Mr. Nixon said that it was the idea too--the Rockefeller proposal, like so many others very well intended, but this is done in
order to do our good faith. He said what we had been doing was trying to prove our good faith. He said you would find out
that 78% of the land there in North Vietnam is untouched.
The President said that was one of the seven or eight good faith news he pointed out. He said there had been five or six
pauses and he did not know how many different propositions--25 or 30. Secretary Rusk said at least 30.
The President said:
"Thirty various proposals that were made by the United Nations or by India, or by Great Britain or by somebody else, by
the Pope. We found that out that they said no to all of them. We made just five or six pauses and now we stopped the
bombing over Hanoi and Haiphong and said--now you give us some little indication to show us that you're interested and
we'll stop some more. But he said no, we're right at this stage where we have said we are going to continue as we are
unless and until you can give us some indication that the next move we make will not endanger our own American boys'
lives."
Mr. Nixon agreed that he had to say that.
The President said:
"I said to a man last night, as I told you. Do you think that I, as Commander-in-Chief, ought to look that boy in the eye and
say to him, I'm going to stop the bombing and he said why and I say so 30 percent more trucks can hit you tomorrow. If it
were South of the DMZ, I'd say okay, I'll tell you why I stopped so we wouldn't go across the DMZ. I'd tell you why I
stopped because they quit shelling Saigon. But when I look at him and he says why did you stop and I would say so 30
percent more trucks can hit you, that's not a very good answer. That's the only answer I've got now. Now if any of these
fellows give me another answer, if Reischauer or McCarthy or anybody can give me another answer, I am willing to
consider it. Or North Vietnam, but it's apparent they don't."
Secretary Rusk said that those who say they are not going to do anything that would get in the way or complicate the Paris
talks are in the strongest possible position because in fact, at this moment, almost anything can happen in Paris. In other
words, if you make any comments later, it depends on how this thing moves.
Mr. Nixon said, "Well, it is the right position. As I have said several times, you can only have one President at a time and
one Secretary of State and who else can negotiate." Secretary Rusk told him he would be surprised at how many
Secretaries of State we have got in this country at the moment.
The President recounted the incident when Walt Rostow briefed President Eisenhower on Tet and he asked President

Eisenhower: "What will come out of Tet. Do you predict that thing will hold up there and they will have a change of
Government and we will have a lot more problems?"
President Eisenhower said "Well, here is what I say. I say that they did not have a military victory. They may have,
speaking of the North Vietnamese, they may gain a psychological victory. We'll have to see what develops in the way of
the press and the turn of events and so forth. But I think all of us agree that it was somewhat of a psychological victory but
they paid in a kamikaze way. They paid a very heavy price for that victory." Rostow then gave President Eisenhower a
rundown on the situation.
The President pointed out that they said two or three things at Honolulu that he thought Mr. Nixon ought to know for his
peace people--namely, the one man, one vote, let them participate, form the Constitution.
Mr. Nixon asked how that could be defined in relation to the whole jazz about Coalition Government.
Mr. Rostow answered by saying that on the political side, everybody in South Vietnam is against a Coalition unless they
have decided upon it, that Coalition can be either one in which Communists take over. He said there had been some
Coalition Governments in Eastern Europe which were a way to take over the power and there had been some CosmeticCommunist menaces that have to come out so that Hanoi understands this and they were after Tet certainly to get a
Coalition Government in Eastern European type.
Mr. Rostow then discussed at length the types of governments. After the review, Mr. Nixon said:
"So in effect they would allow a Nationalist Marxist Party. There would be no objection to that?" Mr. Rostow said that was
correct.
Mr. Nixon then asked if their constitution did not use the term communist and he was told that it did.
Mr. Rostow pointed out there were three things. The first, was the one man, one vote and the marginal shift in its position.
The President spoke up and said this was what they agreed to. He said this ought to be a little palatable to "your" people. It
ought to be to the peaceniks or to the group, the Javits.
Mr. Rostow said the second was that Thieu and President Johnson agreed that they will be prepared any time they are
ready, even before a political settlement, to talk about the total cessation of hostilities. He pointed out that we have
conducted with the South Vietnamese a series of bi-weekly meetings between Ambassador Bunker and the Vietnamese
leaders on major issues involved in making peace. He said they had a very complex, interesting session of all of the
changes to be on the 1953 courts, for example. He said without fixed concepts, it is a complicated and difficult question.
The two Presidents were prepared to make the proposition to Hanoi that any time they were prepared to sit down and talk
seriously about the problems of how to handle this kind of war, we were prepared to do it. He went on to say that this is not
any sort of a simple-minded cease fire, but it is serious subjects in very complex circumstances and Thieu is quite
prepared to go forward.
[Omitted here is discussion of the USS Pueblo.]
Mr. Nixon made this point:
"Here is the argument that is made. They say now if you can get that Vietnamese thing off the plate then the Soviets would
be willing to help out on a lot of things. They would help you out with the Pueblo. They'd help you out with this and that.
What is the answer to that? I don't believe it myself, but (interrupted)."
The President said he had said all along that if the Vietnamese problem was out of the way we could move along. He said
he did not know of any period in the history when there had been more agreement with them than the Consular
Agreement, had the Space Agreement, had the non-proliferation agreement and now are talking about offensive and
defensive weapons. He said the U.S. feels that they are going to be guided by their own interests and we think it is to their
interest as well as to our interest that North Korea turn these folks loose.
The President said:
"We think they are going to try to get them to do it, if they can. I thought that at Glassboro and I left Kosygin the proposition
that we had made to him that he felt was not an unreasonable proposition./8/ Nothing came out of it. I don't know whether
North Vietnam wouldn't follow his suggestions or whether his own people wouldn't follow them when he got back. We don't

ever know about those things. I don't know whether if Vietnam was out of the way we would make any more progress with
them or not. I seriously doubt that we would. I'm not able to prove it. The only answer I can give to it is that we have our
responsibilities. We're going to have to live up to them out there. As long as I am President we are going to and I am going
to try to turn this thing over to whoever does just like it was turned over to me, keep the commitments that we will make."
/8/For documentation of the summit between Johnson and Kosygin at Glassboro in June 1967, see Foreign Relations,
1964-1968, vol. XIV, Documents 217 ff.
Mr. Nixon said:
"Let's suppose that we chickened out basically. Call it any way you want it. It is going to be interpreted that way if we agree
to a Coalition Government or any of the others. Let's suppose that happens. I think we should all say that because I think it
is true. The nations in that area are stronger today than they were three years ago because we have kept the cork in the
bottle. But let's suppose it happened today. What's going to be the effect on Thailand and Malaysia and Japan, particularly
Japan, or do they care any more?"
Secretary Rusk said privately they would rather have us stay in there. He said this is a very private part of the conversation
about General Ne Win./9/ Secretary Rusk said privately General Ne Win is a real hawk on Vietnam--Morarji Desai of India
is very strong; Panto de Panas has recently won an election in that anti-American opposition there, and his brother is even
stronger. They haven't changed. He reported that the Philippinos are a little relaxed about it. They think they could be
doing more than they are doing and we have been trying to get them to do it.
/9/Burmese Prime Minister Ne Win.
Mr. Nixon posed the following question:
"The fundamental point that I constantly try to bring up. I can only do it through the Republican side with these guys. I say
well, look, let's forget all the other arguments. Let's forget the Domino Theory--the nations are now stronger, they can keep
it, and after all we can withdraw and forget everything else. Let's suppose that this war is ended in a way that it is
interpreted, doesn't make any difference what it is, interpreted as a defeat for us and a win for them. Doesn't this have a
massive effect on the cost at Peking and the cost in Moscow?"
Secretary Rusk agreed that is right, but there is a danger in our own country--that's the real problem. He said the most
important thing in the world for a candidate is that if he were to become President his credibility would be respected by the
other side in a moment of crisis. Mr. Rostow agreed with Mr. Rusk's summation.
Mr. Nixon said he appreciated the time the President had given him. He said as he told the President earlier, the problem
of the candidate is very complicated at the moment. He said he had always talked about the commitment. He said: "In
other words, I could never see the argument that is made by some of my colleagues that say well, we shouldn't be there
but now since we're there we are honor bound to stay. The main point is that we are there for a reason, as I understand it,
and I think this is the fundamental point. I think your San Antonio speech was the one that laid it on the line so strong."
Secretary Rusk said we were there for a reason that was almost unanimously agreed to by both parties when the
commitment was made.
Mr. Nixon said:
"And I do want to say too that apart from any differences that we naturally have to have politically at this time that I have
really admired the way that all of you have stood up under great fire. The way you handled yourself before that miserable
questioning you had. I know some of the things that you've gone through in your background."
Mr Nixon said what concerned him is what has happened to American public opinion, within a matter of six months starting
with the Tet offensive. "It isn't just the Gallup and Harris reports. You know you can sense it--Congressmen coming back.
Congressmen have stood up before--just like a bunch of jelly at the present time. And the reason is--and this is the
fundamental thing they raise such a fuss about. I have just been on the Hill and the fellow who has stood very firmly with
me in this issue said you've got to change your position. I said why? And he said the war is lost. Now if you put it that way,
that is what we've got to be concerned about. If that's the case, then we've got to find a way to get out."
Secretary Rusk said nobody told that to our fellows in Vietnam. They don't feel that way out there. He said in the last few
months they have captured 48 battalions worth of equipment from the other side.

The President asked Mr. Nixon if he wanted to address himself briefly that the war is lost and Mr. Nixon said he thought
the President's people covered it very well.
The President suggested he clear it with General Wheeler and General Abrams and specifically what has actually
happened in numbers so he could bear that in mind. Mr. Nixon replied that he did not think he needed any convincing on
that. He said he did not buy the idea that the war was lost--that if the President thought that he would have told him.
The President said a lot of the information was public record but if there were things Mr. Nixon wanted to know in the
weeks ahead, he hoped he would feel free to pick up the telephone and call him.
Mr. Nixon said the only thing he would need information on, for example, if the President was going to move in the
direction of a bombing pause or something of that sort, he would like to know because he did not intend to advocate one.
He said he told the President that because there is a little discussion, but on the other hand, if the President was going to
move in such a direction, he thought he should know so that they won't be out there fighting a battle that has already been
lost.
[Omitted here is discussion of impending foreign aid legislation.]

311. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, July 29, 1968.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI (Helms) Chrono, Jan-Jul. 1968, 01 Jan31 Jul 1968. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Clifford.
SUBJECT
Hanoi's Intentions and the Lull in Combat
1. You will recall that Ambassador Vance, in a message to you last week, asked for a paper dealing with Hanoi's intentions
in the light of the current lull in the fighting in South Vietnam./2/ The attached is that paper.
/2/The request was transmitted in telegram 18337/Delto 491 from Paris, July 23. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-July 1968)
2. The completion of this paper was somewhat delayed because of important differences of view, among the highly
restricted number of individuals in the Agency cleared to read the relevant materials, on the issues involved. All are agreed
that Hanoi wants an early end to the conflict but there is disagreement on future tactics and on the price which Hanoi may
be willing to pay for peace. There are those who feel that Hanoi may forgo further major military action, considering that its
best prospects lay in opening political discussion which would expose a brittle situation in Saigon and in the United States.
Others believe that Hanoi will be unwilling to rely on these means entirely and fully expect the Communists to again apply
intensive military pressures.
3. On peace terms, some feel that whatever Hanoi's tactics, the Communists are still striving for an outcome clearly and
decisively favorable to them in South Vietnam. In this view, Hanoi attaches great importance to securing a unilateral halt to
the bombing, because it would greatly unsettle the GVN and open the path for further political exploitation. Others feel that
Hanoi's moves, particularly since early June, indicate considerable flexibility with respect to the terms of a settlement and a
willingness to move away from many of their long-standing positions.
4. While the attached paper does not go to either extreme, its tone with respect to the prospects of a negotiated settlement
in the near term is, in my personal view, too sanguine.
Richard Helms/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.

Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/4/
Washington, July 29, 1968.
/4/Top Secret; Nodis; Harvan; Plus.
NORTH VIETNAMESE INTENTIONS
Summary
Recent Communist moves suggest more flexibility in North Vietnam's negotiating position than has been evident in the
past. Hanoi may be preparing for a negotiated settlement which stops short of full Communist control, but which assures
them opportunities to obtain a dominant role for the Communists in South Vietnam.
Nevertheless, in the absence of substantial US concessions, we do not believe that the Communists are yet prepared to
agree to measures restricting their future military actions. The current military lull may have been designed in part for
political effect, but it also is being used to prepare another round of Communist attacks.
If the Communists are prepared to scale down their demands for a settlement, they are unlikely to give any clear indication
of this until the results of further military efforts are known.
[Omitted here are five pages comprising the body of the paper.]

312. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/

Paris, July 29, 1968, 1925Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-July 1968.
Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Harvan; Plus. Received at 4:09 p.m. In a note transmitting a copy of the telegram to the
President, July 29, 6:40 p.m., Bromley Smith wrote: "Ambassadors Harriman and Vance in the attached cable argue for a
cessation of the bombing now based on certain assumptions. Secretary Rusk may raise this cable with you when he calls
at 6:45 p.m. You may wish to consider the substance of the cable at tomorrow's luncheon meeting." (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Paris Todel--Paris Delto, IX--7/23-3l/68) The notation "ps" on the
covering note indicates that the President saw the telegram.
18692/Delto 524. From Harriman and Vance.
1. We have reached a stage in the Paris talks which makes it desirable to take stock of where we are and to consider
where we go from here.
Part I--Where We Are
2. The present position we have taken--as reflected in the Phase 1-Phase 2, proposal--is only in the early stages of
exploration. Hanoi has had this proposal before it in general form since June 26, and in fairly detailed form since July 15.
The North Vietnamese did not propose a new meeting last week, commenting that they were in the process of examining
the Honolulu communique.
3. It is possible that, if we stick to our present course, we will in time be able to extract the understanding we are seeking
from Hanoi. In addition to taking a good deal of time, any undertaking they will give us will probably not be explicit enough
to enable us to know with confidence what they will do after we stop the bombing. We are likely to confront slowly paced,
minor and ambiguous concessions as Hanoi tries to get a bombing cessation at the least price.
4. We may, of course, have a further reading at this Wednesday's session, but we so not believe anything sufficiently new
will come out of this meeting, or of any discussion in the near future.

5. We believe Hanoi's thinking about the pace and content of the Paris talks is influenced to some extent by coming events
in the US. These events--conventions, elections, change of administration--set a time frame which we need to take into
account as we estimate what the other side is likely to do.
6. This forces us to look at what happens in the next two months without clear and visible progress here. If we do nothing
new, we leave the initiative and timing to Hanoi. Two major factors then come to bear:
A. The possibility of our taking action which may deter the launching of the expected enemy attacks and thus save
American and allied lives; and
B. The prospect that the month of August, and particularly the Democratic convention, will produce a further division of
domestic US opinion which will severely weaken the base which is necessary for the long, hard negotiations required to
achieve a just solution. It is possible that this division may become so deep that it will force the new administration to a
precipitous withdrawal with the result that all our sacrifices to achieve US objectives will have been for naught.
7. If the enemy mounts his expected major offensive, the only way we gain is if the attacks are sharp and decisively
defeated in short order. We note that General Abrams is confident that the attacks will be repelled, but we also note that
estimates from Saigon are that the enemy may be able to sustain major attacks for up to two months. Thus it would appear
that the odds for a quick, decisive outcome are not great. US casualties will have a bad effect at home and civilian
destruction will create problems in South Viet-Nam.
Part II--A New Course
8. A major change in these prospects is possible during the month of August. It would necessarily involve a speed-up of
our own timetable and, admittedly, some risks. On our part, it would require a return to the San Antonio formula in which
we would make certain assumptions regarding Hanoi's actions after the cessation. On Hanoi's part, it would involve the
one thing that Hanoi had been willing to commit itself to--that is a readiness to move into substantive negotiations
immediately following a full cessation of bombing and all other activities involving the use of force on or within the territory
of the DRV.
9. As we look back on March 31, we can see that our initiative forestalled Hanoi's plans and greatly lengthened our lease
on US public opinion, while actually stimulating Saigon far more than it was upset. An August initiative by us would
certainly repeat the first two effects. It would have risks in Saigon (and some with our allies), but Thieu has put himself in a
much stronger position since April and our most sensitive allies--on Bundy's reading--trust this administration and probably
would give us the benefit of the doubt.
10. To justify our moving in this direction, we could point to the lull in Communist military activity in Saigon and elsewhere
in Viet-Nam. A case can be made that his has now continued long enough to serve as a plausible rationale for
implementation of the San Antonio formula. It can be cited in such a way as to bring world opinion to bear as a constraint
on the future actions of the North Vietnamese. Such a public position, combined with a cessation of bombing, may preempt a major NVA/VC offensive.
11. It would make no difference if Hanoi publicly claimed that we had stopped the bombing without reciprocal action on
their part. This has always been implicit in the Phase 1-Phase 2 formula; what will count will be what they do rather than
what they say. Moreover we can draw our own conclusions for the public.
12. The essence of this course of action would be that, after consultation with our allies, we would tell Hanoi privately that
we are prepared to stop the bombing and all other activities involving the use of force on or within the territory of the DRV,
and the President will announce this shortly. (We propose that this be done no more than two days before the President's
announcement, so that Hanoi would have insufficient time to react.) When we tell them, we would state the assumptions
on which we are proceeding. These assumptions would be:
A. Within a very few days following the cessation of bombing, we expect to begin serious, substantive talks (on an our
side-your side basis) in which the GVN would participate and in which the DRV would be free to bring to the table any
South Vietnamese elements they see fit.
B. The de-militarized status of the DMZ would be restored. No military personnel or equipment of any sort should be
located in, or moved through the DMZ. There will be no artillery or other fire across the DMZ and no massing of forces in
the area of the DMZ in such a way as to constitute a direct military threat.
C. There will be no indiscriminate attacks against major centers such as Saigon, Hue and Danang.

D. There will be no increase of North Vietnamese force levels in South Viet-Nam. (It is worth noting here that the good
flying weather that will continue through October will provide us with a greater ability to verify this assumption between now
and October than between November and April.)
13. We and our allies must be prepared to resume the bombing if Hanoi invalidates our assumptions. Obviously no threat
would be made to Hanoi in this regard.
14. In presenting this proposal to the GVN and ICC, we believe that three points should be made:
A. If assumptions are invalidated we will resume bombing;
B. We will not engage in any follow-on substantive talks without GVN presence on an our side-your side basis; and
C. This action may deter NVA/VC from mounting the major attacks that are expected.
15. Concurrent with the actual presentation to the North Vietnamese, a letter should be sent to Kosygin recalling his
assurances in the earlier exchange, and informing him of precisely what we are telling Hanoi. It is suggested that the letter
not require a Soviet answer, but leave it open to the Soviets whether they wish to reply. We should inform the Soviet
Ambassadors in Washington and Paris. The Soviet Ambassadors in these capitals will undoubtedly be informed of the
letter by their government, as they have been in the past.
Part III--Some Further Thoughts
16. We recognize that our short-term objectives in para 12 above do not address a basic long-term objective of securing
NVN withdrawal from SVN. This is a subject for early consideration in the substantive talks with the ultimate objective of
ending NVN movement of troops and supplies into SVN and the withdrawal of NVN military and paramilitary forces from
SVN, Laos and Cambodia.
17. While we cannot be sure that the course of action presented in Part II will forestall a new NVN offensive, it may well do
so. Thus, in addition to moving the negotiations forward, stopping the bombing could over the near future save the lives of
many American troops who might otherwise be killed in defeating North Vietnamese attacks. Moreover, the pre-emption of
a major North Vietnamese offensive would forestall Hanoi from achieving the psychological and political objectives which
Secretary Clifford, General Wheeler and the US Mission believe to be the primary purpose of such attacks. If, indeed,
Hanoi launched major attacks along lines of Tet or May offensives after a bombing cessation, it would clearly demonstrate
its unwillingness to act in good faith to seek a negotiated peace. Its position throughout the world would be severely
damaged. In the US, the public would close ranks behind the administration and a resumption of the bombing program
would meet with general understanding
18. If we are to pursue this course, we must be assured that the GVN is prepared to participate in an appropriate and
productive manner. The GVN must field a delegation with authority to negotiate and comprised of individuals with whom
we can work. The procedures to be followed within "our side" should be agreed, including among other things, the
expectation that GVN and US representatives would engage separately in private meetings with the other side (with close
consultation, of course).
19. We have discussed this idea in general terms with Under Secretary Katzenbach and Assistant Secretary Bundy. We
recommend that Ambassador Vance, circumstances in Paris permitting, leave for Washington after the meeting of
Wednesday, July 31, in order to provide some further thoughts and additional elaboration on the course of action outlined
in Part II above.
Harriman

313. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/

Washington, July 30, 1968, 0134Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-July 1968.
Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Harvan; Plus. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by William Shepard of S/S-S. A

notation on a copy of the telegram sent to the White House reads: "Sent 9:34 p.m. July 29." (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. V(a), 7/68)
211189/Todel 787. Eyes only for Harriman and Vance from the Secretary.
1. I have discussed your Delto 524 with the President and the Secretary of Defense./2/ This short message is to let you
know as soon as possible, pending a more extensive comment, that we wish to stay firmly on our present course and
press for a constructive Hanoi response to the proposals we have already made. They have told us they are "seriously
considering" those proposals. We have not yet had a reply and believe that we are entitled to an answer. The proposals
we have made, especially in the Phase 1-Phase 2 framework, are reasonable, fair and generous if there is any interest on
the part of Hanoi in a tolerable peace in South East Asia. Such a tolerable peace is our central objective for which we have
already made major concessions without significant response from Hanoi.
/2/Delto 524 is Document 312. Rusk met with the President and Clifford beginning at 6:45 p.m. Rusk left the meeting at
8:05 p.m., and Clifford apparently stayed until 8:30 p.m. (Ibid., Dean Rusk Appointment Book, 1968-1969) While complete
notes of the meeting have not been found, Clifford's handwritten summary points from the meeting indicate that the
principal topic of conversation was the planned summit between the President and Kosygin and its impact on the election
and on the Vietnam negotiations. (Ibid., Clark Clifford Papers, Handwritten Notes, Memos, etc.)
2. We have reason to believe that Hanoi, Moscow and others are trying to mount a concerted campaign to force us to stop
all of the bombing without any corresponding action at all from Hanoi. It may be that they are counting on the convention
and electoral period to achieve this end. They must be disabused of this idea if there is to be peace. We will continue to
give thought to all alternatives but we should not leave the impression that further delay by Hanoi will cause us to make
further unilateral concessions.
3. In view of the above we believe that Vance should remain in Paris for the present to be available for Hanoi's response
and further discussion along that line rather then return at this point and stimulate a lot of speculation that we are about to
make new moves in the absence of such a response.
4. I will go over this in detail with Katzenbach upon his return and be in touch with you further. Warm regards.
Rusk

314. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, July 30, 1968, 9:57 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and
McNamara, July 30, 1968, 9:57 a.m., Tape F6807.02, PNO 14. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared
specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
[Omitted here is discussion of U.S. foreign aid assistance on family planning and the Pope's opposition to it.]
President: Now, there are some very strange developments on this cable thing that concern me. They've been meeting
over in Defense on stopping this thing, and I gather Clark looks with favor upon it. Do you know anything about this?/2/
/2/Reference is to Document 312.
Rusk: No, no.
President: Well, they're boxing us in on this.
Rusk: He didn't express that yesterday.
President: This is a little move going on around from overseas.

Rusk: Clark was the only one who was supposed to have that cable. Have others been meeting on it?
President: Yeah. I think he's the only one who has it, but I think he's kind of expressing the viewpoint that's contained in the
cable. And I think we've a good, full-fledged, bone-up movement along this direction and I think we've got to meet, headoff, before they take it over. And I think we probably ought to do it by saying that our position is as stated in the President's
speech, we made this move, and we're very anxious for them to show that they'll take some steps if we take some steps, if
they won't use them to hurt us, and we're not going to stop the bombing until they agree to stop some, because if we don't,
they're gonna make--the New York Times is kick-off these folks over here. Cy came over and had this view when he was
here before. I think another thing we probably ought to tell Cy today is that we want to go into this with him but we think it
could be gone into a little later.
Rusk: Did you see my telegram I sent you?/3/
/3/Document 313.
President: No, I hadn't seen either one of them.
Rusk: One of them I had to dig out of a deep safe this morning. But I couldn't get at it last night.
President: Did they just ignore it?
Rusk: No, I think--you can see what's in the telegram. It was taken over by hand and I think Brom Smith is bringing it up to
you.
President: All right.
Rusk: But I--no--Cy did not talk to me along these lines except that he did say that looking down the road that we ought to
give further thought to the assumptions under the San Antonio formula. But he recommended to me that we stay on our
present track.
President: Well, that's what he did to me too. He recommended it for a few days while he was exploring this other, but he
had this idea in his mind when he was here and made a pitch at me. But I told him no, we didn't want it. But he's bought it
now. I think we have another Goldberg plan there in front of us, don't you?
Rusk: Well, if there's a ganging up on it, I think so.
President: Yes sir, no question about it. Well, why don't you hit it this morning? Why don't you just cut him off?
Rusk: Well, I'll see what I can do. I will do my best on that.

315. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, July 30, 1968, 11:54 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and
McNamara, July 30, 1968, 11:54 a.m., Tape F6807.02, PNO 15. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared
specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
President: Yes, Dean?
Rusk: Was I too much of a hawk?
President: No, not at all. I didn't hear the prepared statement. I got in about six minutes late because the operator here
couldn't get us connected. But when I got connected, I heard it, and it sounded like you had a bunch of Viet Cong
questioners all day./2/

/2/At 11 a.m. that day, Rusk convened a press conference at which he read a statement noting that the enemy had moved
significant numbers of its forces near South Vietnam's cities and continued large-scale movements through the DMZ. In
response to reporters' questions, he insisted that the U.S. Government had not received an adequate reply from Hanoi
regarding peace overtures. See Department of State Bulletin, August 19, 1968, pp. 185-192. In a telephone conversation
with Governor Richard Hughes of New Jersey, Johnson criticized the activities of various antiwar Senators and made the
following comment: "What they're asking me to do is be the biggest boob of our time. Just as the Communists get ready to
hit us, they want me to do what I did at Tet--take a vacation, let our men accept a Tet holiday, and as I do it, and call off
our bombing, let them hit me full length, and I just--I just--I just don't see it. Now, Rusk doesn't see it. He covered it fully in
his press conference today. Although, God, I want to be a hero, and I want to get the war over, and I've got two boys in it,
both of them in combat every day, and one of them has lost over half of his men, I just can't do any more than I'm doing
that I know of." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson
and Hughes, July 30, 1968, 8:46 p.m., Tape F6807.02, PNO 17; transcript prepared specifically for this volume in the
Office of the Historian)
Rusk: Yes I did. I think that my press fellows tell me that there'll be some question from some of the boys like Chalmers
Roberts and others as to whether this is a change. I would suggest that if George Christian gets that question, he simply
say, "No, that the President's views are contained in the March 31st statement and in the Honolulu communique and that
the Secretary's remarks were wholly within the four corners of those two things."
President: I told George Christian you ought to say there's been as near as we can tell no change in either side since
March 31st; that we've taken the position that we will stop 90 percent of it if they'll take some action, and we do not
interpret that they have taken any, and while they did not hit Saigon yesterday, they did hit Danang the day before--the 119
rockets, and infiltration is now the highest point it's ever been, and for us to say to our men that we're going to expose not
only to the 70 percent that's coming in but to the other 30 percent that we're now destroying in return for we know not what,
the answer is a loud, strong "no."
Rusk: Well, I'll try to get a transcript over so that you can see the first part of it as quickly as you can.
President: Fine. And I'd have your man tell them too that this is exactly March 31st and Chalmers Roberts as usual is just
roaming around trying to read things into something that's not there.
Rusk: Right. Thank you.

316. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, July 30, 1968, 1-2:05 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Mansion of the
White House. Rusk, Clifford, Wheeler, and Smith left at 2:05 p.m. and Taylor and Helms at 2:20 p.m. Christian and Tom
Johnson remained until 3:05 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS
ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Taylor
General Wheeler
CIA Director Helms
George Christian
Bromley Smith (in Walt Rostow's absence)
Tom Johnson
The President: I want a report from General Taylor on the whole situation regarding this new wave of demands to stop the
bombing and all of the facts about enemy activities and the level of fighting./2/
/2/See Document 321. A July 30 memorandum for the record by Taylor summarizing the meeting reads: "At the outset, the
President expressed the view that the Soviet Union, Hanoi and many political elements in the U.S. were bent upon forcing

him to give up all bombing of North Viet-Nam, preferably prior to the Democratic convention. He noted an apparent
divergence of views within CIA with regard to Hanoi's intentions in relation to the apparent lull in combat. I expressed
feeling the need for a thorough paper analyzing all the evidence and suggesting courses of action to counter the campaign
which the President had mentioned. He immediately charged me with the task and told me to get Bunker's views. After the
luncheon, I followed him to his bedroom to get further guidance as it was not clear from the previous conversation whether
he wanted me to pay a visit to Viet-Nam. He indicated that a trip was not necessary although I should go out whenever I
felt it necessary. The immediate need is a paper by this weekend which will give him all the argumentation that can be
used to frustrate the pressures to stop the bombing. He expressed dissatisfaction with his senior officials in not speaking
out publicly in support of his position. He thinks that the JCS should do more public speaking. He is clearly distressed by
evidence of division within his official family on matters relating to the war in Viet-Nam and the peace talks in
Paris." (National Defense University, Maxwell Taylor Papers, Project Lull)
General Taylor: I will do that, sir.
The President: I believe the International Communists have a movement under way to get me to stop the bombing. What is
the situation on infiltrators?
General Wheeler: As of July 24, there were:
28,400 infiltrators who started down in March
37,700 infiltrators who started down in April
30,600 infiltrators who started down in May
16,900 infiltrators who started down in June
44,200 infiltrators who started down in July
The President: What effect would a complete bombing halt have?
General Wheeler: It would permit 30% more troops and supplies to reach South Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk: It would add 50% to what is getting through now.
The President: Let's say that. I would like General Wheeler to summarize the reasons we should not stop the bombing.
General Wheeler: We have 120 miles of attack zone to hit enemy supplies now. We have had good luck, getting 30% of
the traffic. This increment would move into the DMZ and up to the DMZ if the bombing stopped.
General Wheeler: We have hit them hard in this area. There would be loss of morale in the U.S. forces in the DMZ area. It
gives the military disadvantage.
The President: Give me a paper on it./3/
/3/See footnote 5, Document 319.
General Wheeler: The JCS does oppose a complete bombing pause.
[Omitted here is discussion of the Czech situation.]
[The President:] I would like to see Bill Bundy for a report on his talks with the Allies./4/
/4/The President received a half-hour briefing from Bundy regarding his consultations on Vietnam with allied nations and
the Paris delegation that evening at 5:10 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Notes of the meeting have not been found.
Now, Bus, I read about all this offensive they plan for us. What are we doing?

General Wheeler: Abrams is trying to pre-empt their attacks. He is using B-52s to hit their staging areas. He wants U.S.
commands to intercept these people.
Secretary Clifford: When we were in South Vietnam, we asked all U. S. field commanders if they have all the men,
equipment, and supplies needed for any offensive. All field commanders said yes. Our men want them to go ahead with
the offensive.
The President: I would like to see us knock the hell out of them.
General Taylor: Is it to our advantage to keep a third attack from coming out?
The President: Westmoreland said it is to our advantage for them to go ahead with the offensive.
Director Helms: It would permit us to concentrate against them in large numbers.
General Wheeler: I would open up the area between the 19th and 20th parallels. We could hit logistic targets, operate Sea
Dragon, conduct air-to-air operations and hit their airfield.
The President: Let's review that Friday/5/ morning to see how we would react if they hit Saigon.
/5/August 2.
I want to get back up to the 20th parallel. Let's get ready for that if they hit us.
Dean, you go out to Vance and Harriman and tell them to hold on to their hats if attacks against our forces occur.
General Wheeler: Saigon, Danang and Quang Tri are possible targets of major attacks, Abrams says.
General Taylor: Should Vance and Harriman tell opposite members?
Secretary Rusk: It might be seen as a threat. They may see it as a dare.
The President: I would like for them to know they will be hit and hit hard if they attack us.
Secretary Rusk: They would see us telling them that we would hit them as a threat.
Secretary Clifford: On Cambodia, here are the bases in Cambodia--"Parrots Beak" area is of much concern. (Shows maps
of the area.)
General Wheeler: Two years ago there were only 200 people there. Now there are 2,000 people there. The 9th Viet Cong
division goes back in there to rehabilitate and rest. There may be prisoner of war camps in there.
Secretary Clifford: We will send reconnaissance flights in.
General Wheeler: We will have five low-level flights.
The President: Senator Mansfield says Sihanouk is a great statesman. I would show him these maps and photos of the
enemy positions.
General Wheeler: It is 25 miles from Saigon. They can get in sampans and hit us easily in Saigon.
Secretary Clifford: It appears that diplomatic efforts will not get the release of our men the Cambodians are holding.
We could discourage the U. S. tourists to Cambodia as "dangerous under present conditions." We could not protest.
Secretary Rusk: U.S. tourist trade amounts to 1/4 of Cambodia's tourist trade ($1 million).

Secretary Clifford: We could supervise the Mekong traffic and make it difficult for Cambodian ships. We might apprehend a
Cambodian ship if it violates GVN territorial waters.
We could increase surveillance and as the last alternative, we could attack the VC staging area.
The President: I look with favor on showing these pictures to Sihanouk. Give them a strong statement.
Director Helms: There is another staging area up north.
The President: Bring those photos in.

317. Information Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President
Johnson/1/
Washington, July 31, 1968, 11:15 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. V(a), 7/68. Secret.
The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
SUBJECT
Report on Today's Paris Meeting by Secure Telephone From Paris
State Department was given the following summary of today's four hour Paris meeting on Vietnam:/2/
/2/The Paris delegation's reports on the 15th formal session are in telegrams 18798/Delto 531 and 18824/Delto 536 from
Paris, both July 31. (Ibid., Harvan Chron., Vol. XVI, 7/26-31/68)
1. The meeting can be described as a "holding action" by the North Vietnamese.
2. During the Tea Break Colonel Lau, who spoke for the North Vietnamese in the absence of Chief Delegate Thuy, said:
--He would be in contact with our negotiators about a private meeting.
--Did not answer clearly in response to Ambassador Vance's direct question as to whether the North Vietnamese were
seriously considering the private proposal we had made to them. He merely said that serious consideration had been given
to the proposal but that then they had been confronted by the Honolulu communique.
--The North Vietnamese asked whether there had been a change in U. S. policy and whether Ambassadors Harriman and
Vance spoke for the U.S. Government.
3. In the regular public session the usual exchange took place. The North Vietnamese attacked the Honolulu communique
and described Secretary Rusk's press conference as bellicose. Ambassador Harriman rebutted charges with special
emphasis on North Vietnamese troops in the south.
4. Ambassador Harriman stressed the Lao situation in the larger meeting.
Brom

318. Editorial Note

During a press conference from 4:37 to 5:24 p.m. on July 31, 1968, President Johnson fielded questions relating to
Vietnam. The President denied an assertion that as a result of the Honolulu Conference his Vietnam policy had changed to
where he now required a formal commitment from North Vietnam before ordering a bombing cessation. He countered that

over 30,000 North Vietnamese troops had infiltrated southward during the month of July. "There is, therefore, evidence that
a massive enemy effort is underway to re-equip--the President has this evidence where he can see it--and to retrain for
massive attacks upon South Vietnam and particularly on certain specified major cities," he proclaimed. He noted his
determination not to stop the bombing under such conditions. For full text of the statement, see Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pages 856-865.

319. Information Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President
Johnson/1/
Washington, August 1, 1968, 7:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. VI, 8/68-9/68. Top
Secret. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it and the attachments.
SUBJECT
Responses to General Taylor's Memorandum on Bombing Policy
Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford and General Wheeler have sent in the attached papers giving their views on General
Taylor's memorandum to you concerning our bombing policy in North Vietnam.
You will recall that General Taylor discussed three alternatives-1. Stop the bombing completely
2. Continue our present policy
3. Linking the level of our bombing to that of enemy violence in South Vietnam
General Taylor's memorandum is at Tab D./2/
/2/In his July 30 memorandum to the President, attached but not printed, Taylor argued that implementation of the third
alternative required lifting "the geographical limitations on the bombing target system." He believed that if this policy was
enacted, the following statement should be issued: "Available data indicate that in recent weeks enemy violence in South
Viet-Nam, measured in attacks, terrorism, harassment, sabotage, and the resultant military and civilian loss of life on our
side, has subsided slightly (or we could indicate an approximate percentage) under that of the period immediately following
the President's March 31 speech. U.S. military authorities have been directed to make a comparable reduction in the sortie
rates being flown against North Vietnamese military targets for the immediate future." Taylor concluded: "I think we should
try the second alternative now but prepare to shift to this last one."
In brief, the two Secretaries and General Wheeler oppose linking the level of our bombing to that of enemy violence in
South Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk believes it is too complicated to administer and seems to use military resources in a way that does not
achieve relatively simple objectives. He defers, however, to his military colleagues on the military aspects of the
suggestion. (Tab A)/3/
/3/In his July 31 memorandum to the President, attached but not printed, Rusk noted: "My concern about General Taylor's
ingenious third course of action is that it is too complicated to administer and seems to me to use military resources in a
way that does not achieve relatively simple objectives. It would put any bombing of North Viet-Nam on an almost purely
political basis and therefore expose us to political charges that it is an obstacle to peace and ought to be eliminated." In a
July 30 letter to Rusk, Taylor requested that he prepare this memorandum. (National Defense University, Maxwell Taylor
Papers, Project Lull) In a memorandum for the record, August 1, Taylor described his meeting with Rusk that day, during
which Rusk noted that "we should stay on our present course in Paris and give nothing away at this time" and suggested
that it was "preferable to maintain the low level of military and diplomatic activity throughout August in order to avoid
introducing any disturbing factor into the domestic political scene." (Ibid.)
Secretary Clifford believes the suggestion is unworkable and would be unproductive. Our bombing is now tied to the

security of our own forces and should not be tied to other variables. (Tab B)/4/
/4/In his August 1 memorandum to the President, attached but not printed, Clifford concluded: "In summary, I agree with
General Taylor on his recommendation that we should not now deviate from our present course. I see no reason to let
present or prospective public pressures dictate our course of action. We should not allow such pressures to force us to
embark on an expansion of the bombing, to a premature cessation of the bombing or to abandonment of our search for a
bombing halt under circumstances where such further restraint on our part promises to bring us closer to a satisfactory
settlement." In a letter to Clifford, July 30, Taylor requested that he prepare this memorandum. (National Defense
University, Maxwell Taylor Papers, Project Lull) In a memorandum for the record, July 31, Taylor described his meeting
with Clifford and Nitze that day. Clifford proposed that the President announce that within a week bombing would end if the
DMZ was not violated, infiltration did not increase, attacks on major cities subsided, and substantive talks including the
GVN began. Bombing would resume if attacks occurred or if the enemy rejected the offer. "Clifford seemed to feel that a
long drawn-out negotiation without bombing is more tolerable than the maintenance of military pressure on Hanoi at the
cost of high casualties," Taylor noted. (Ibid.)
General Wheeler considers the suggestion not to be in our best interests. He says that the value of having an answer to a
possible charge that we fail to deescalate when the enemy does is not worth the cost in reduced military effects of our
bombing, a predictable increase in friendly casualties, and the loss of our allies' confidence in the U.S. policy of steadfastly
awaiting meaningful deescalation by Hanoi. (Tab C)/5/
/5/In CM-3532-68 to the President, August 1, entitled "Alternative Bombing Proposals," attached but not printed, Wheeler
noted: "With respect to the three alternatives, under the current circumstances I favor the second alternative; however,
insofar as that part of it which includes a major public relations campaign is concerned, I am not confident that it would be
successful." In CM-3531-68 to the President, July 31, entitled "Cessation of Bombardment of North Vietnam," Wheeler
argued that the halt would give the Vietnamese Communists significant military advantages while endangering U.S. and
GVN forces, a stoppage would be impossible to resume, and that "free of any degree of military pressure, I conjecture that
the enemy will feel even less constrained to engage speedily in productive negotiations leading to a fair and just
peace." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 90)
Both Secretaries and General Wheeler come out strongly in support of our remaining on our present course in Paris as
well as in Vietnam. General Taylor's memorandum makes clear that he also shares this view. (I have not given to General
Taylor copies of these papers.)/6/
/6/A passage in Nitze's notes of the August 1 meeting of the Secretary of Defense's "8:30 Group" consisting of his top
advisers reads: "N[itze] suggested take that part of last part of T[aylor] proposal and adapt it to our purposes. Make criteria
general. We interpret as second alternative C[lifford]'s modification of H[arriman]V[ance] proposal. 7 days before announce
intention & assumptions. If no objection from other side go ahead. If rejection then resume." (Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Department of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense Notes, 1968, 5 of 6) On August 3
Clifford discussed with the "8:30 Group" his meeting with the President the previous day at the Ranch. In his notes of the
meeting, Nitze wrote: "C[lifford] conversation with P[resident]. Now had done everything necessary to implement our
commitment. 1. Turned enemy back. 2. Developed ARVN. 3. Because of success, shld. recognize and find reasonable
basis for disposition." The U.S. offer was summarized in the following manner: "Week after R[epublican] convention. One
week later wld. stop. Assume. Ample opportunities for them to say no. If Hanoi a) rejected or b) levelled major attacks no
trouble in resuming." (Ibid.)
Brom

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968

Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 319-345

319. Information Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President
Johnson/1/
Washington, August 1, 1968, 7:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. VI, 8/68-9/68. Top
Secret. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it and the attachments.
SUBJECT
Responses to General Taylor's Memorandum on Bombing Policy
Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford and General Wheeler have sent in the attached papers giving their views on General
Taylor's memorandum to you concerning our bombing policy in North Vietnam.
You will recall that General Taylor discussed three alternatives-1. Stop the bombing completely
2. Continue our present policy
3. Linking the level of our bombing to that of enemy violence in South Vietnam
General Taylor's memorandum is at Tab D./2/
/2/In his July 30 memorandum to the President, attached but not printed, Taylor argued that implementation of the third
alternative required lifting "the geographical limitations on the bombing target system." He believed that if this policy was
enacted, the following statement should be issued: "Available data indicate that in recent weeks enemy violence in South
Viet-Nam, measured in attacks, terrorism, harassment, sabotage, and the resultant military and civilian loss of life on our
side, has subsided slightly (or we could indicate an approximate percentage) under that of the period immediately following
the President's March 31 speech. U.S. military authorities have been directed to make a comparable reduction in the sortie
rates being flown against North Vietnamese military targets for the immediate future." Taylor concluded: "I think we should
try the second alternative now but prepare to shift to this last one."
In brief, the two Secretaries and General Wheeler oppose linking the level of our bombing to that of enemy violence in
South Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk believes it is too complicated to administer and seems to use military resources in a way that does not
achieve relatively simple objectives. He defers, however, to his military colleagues on the military aspects of the
suggestion. (Tab A)/3/
/3/In his July 31 memorandum to the President, attached but not printed, Rusk noted: "My concern about General Taylor's
ingenious third course of action is that it is too complicated to administer and seems to me to use military resources in a
way that does not achieve relatively simple objectives. It would put any bombing of North Viet-Nam on an almost purely
political basis and therefore expose us to political charges that it is an obstacle to peace and ought to be eliminated." In a
July 30 letter to Rusk, Taylor requested that he prepare this memorandum. (National Defense University, Maxwell Taylor
Papers, Project Lull) In a memorandum for the record, August 1, Taylor described his meeting with Rusk that day, during
which Rusk noted that "we should stay on our present course in Paris and give nothing away at this time" and suggested
that it was "preferable to maintain the low level of military and diplomatic activity throughout August in order to avoid
introducing any disturbing factor into the domestic political scene." (Ibid.)
Secretary Clifford believes the suggestion is unworkable and would be unproductive. Our bombing is now tied to the
security of our own forces and should not be tied to other variables. (Tab B)/4/
/4/In his August 1 memorandum to the President, attached but not printed, Clifford concluded: "In summary, I agree with
General Taylor on his recommendation that we should not now deviate from our present course. I see no reason to let
present or prospective public pressures dictate our course of action. We should not allow such pressures to force us to
embark on an expansion of the bombing, to a premature cessation of the bombing or to abandonment of our search for a
bombing halt under circumstances where such further restraint on our part promises to bring us closer to a satisfactory

settlement." In a letter to Clifford, July 30, Taylor requested that he prepare this memorandum. (National Defense
University, Maxwell Taylor Papers, Project Lull) In a memorandum for the record, July 31, Taylor described his meeting
with Clifford and Nitze that day. Clifford proposed that the President announce that within a week bombing would end if the
DMZ was not violated, infiltration did not increase, attacks on major cities subsided, and substantive talks including the
GVN began. Bombing would resume if attacks occurred or if the enemy rejected the offer. "Clifford seemed to feel that a
long drawn-out negotiation without bombing is more tolerable than the maintenance of military pressure on Hanoi at the
cost of high casualties," Taylor noted. (Ibid.)
General Wheeler considers the suggestion not to be in our best interests. He says that the value of having an answer to a
possible charge that we fail to deescalate when the enemy does is not worth the cost in reduced military effects of our
bombing, a predictable increase in friendly casualties, and the loss of our allies' confidence in the U.S. policy of steadfastly
awaiting meaningful deescalation by Hanoi. (Tab C)/5/
/5/In CM-3532-68 to the President, August 1, entitled "Alternative Bombing Proposals," attached but not printed, Wheeler
noted: "With respect to the three alternatives, under the current circumstances I favor the second alternative; however,
insofar as that part of it which includes a major public relations campaign is concerned, I am not confident that it would be
successful." In CM-3531-68 to the President, July 31, entitled "Cessation of Bombardment of North Vietnam," Wheeler
argued that the halt would give the Vietnamese Communists significant military advantages while endangering U.S. and
GVN forces, a stoppage would be impossible to resume, and that "free of any degree of military pressure, I conjecture that
the enemy will feel even less constrained to engage speedily in productive negotiations leading to a fair and just
peace." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 90)
Both Secretaries and General Wheeler come out strongly in support of our remaining on our present course in Paris as
well as in Vietnam. General Taylor's memorandum makes clear that he also shares this view. (I have not given to General
Taylor copies of these papers.)/6/
/6/A passage in Nitze's notes of the August 1 meeting of the Secretary of Defense's "8:30 Group" consisting of his top
advisers reads: "N[itze] suggested take that part of last part of T[aylor] proposal and adapt it to our purposes. Make criteria
general. We interpret as second alternative C[lifford]'s modification of H[arriman]V[ance] proposal. 7 days before announce
intention & assumptions. If no objection from other side go ahead. If rejection then resume." (Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Department of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense Notes, 1968, 5 of 6) On August 3
Clifford discussed with the "8:30 Group" his meeting with the President the previous day at the Ranch. In his notes of the
meeting, Nitze wrote: "C[lifford] conversation with P[resident]. Now had done everything necessary to implement our
commitment. 1. Turned enemy back. 2. Developed ARVN. 3. Because of success, shld. recognize and find reasonable
basis for disposition." The U.S. offer was summarized in the following manner: "Week after R[epublican] convention. One
week later wld. stop. Assume. Ample opportunities for them to say no. If Hanoi a) rejected or b) levelled major attacks no
trouble in resuming." (Ibid.)
Brom

320. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze)/1/
Washington, August 2, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Vietnam War, Courses of Action--Post Paris Talks
1968. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The time of the meeting and a list of participants have not been found.
SUBJECT
Non-Group meeting of August 1
Mr. Katzenbach opened the meeting by raising the question of what initiatives might be possible in Paris. He asked
whether the Non-Group thought there would be any point in our trying to discuss with the North Vietnamese the idea of
mutual withdrawal in somewhat greater detail. He suggested this might be done on the ground that if they go North rather
than South there will be no reason for us to bomb.
He explained that his dread is that when the bombing stops and we get to discussing the political future of the South this
puts us in the worst possible public position. We don't really know what kind of political settlement to urge and we would
then be forced into the public position of balking at anything other than flat public support for the Thieu Government.

Mr. Helms voiced the view that our thinking about Paris is handicapped by the fact that we have never really thought out,
as a government, what it is that we want. Mr. Katzenbach said that, for his part, he would regard the following as a
satisfactory minimum settlement:
1. The North Vietnamese would get out of the South, with a minimum of cheating.
2. The North Vietnamese would get out of Laos with somewhat more cheating.
3. Cambodia would be left to struggle along by itself and probably could do so.
As for what we would give up in order to get the North Vietnamese to go along with this kind of a settlement, Mr.
Katzenbach said we would be willing to take out our troops and give up our bases. He assumed, however, that we would
continue to give aid to South Vietnam of both an economic and military nature.
Mr. Helms indicated his assent and said that this assumed we would let the ARVN cope with the Viet Cong. Mr.
Katzenbach said they could either cope with them or make a deal with them.
Mr. Nitze said that this would be highly satisfactory from our standpoint, but that it leaves North Vietnam with nothing to
show for casualties which must run about 200,000 killed-in-action, equivalent to a couple of million Americans on a
proportionate basis. He asked how this could be regarded as anything but a complete victory for us. Mr. Katzenbach said
that if the mutual withdrawal could be phased out slowly so as to bring us closer to 1971, when elections are to be held,
the North Vietnamese might be more willing to accept some such solution.
Mr. Helms expressed the opinion that any such settlement would require creation of some sort of a supervisory
commission, since otherwise there would be no way of telling whether or not, in a guerrilla war, North Vietnam was
complying. Mr. Katzenbach expressed some doubt on this point, noting that a phased withdrawal would leave us with
some capability to detect violations and that we would have access to such sources as prisoner interrogation.
Mr. Nitze stated that the key issue is that of how large an insurgent base the GVN can handle. The ethnic composition of
this insurgent base makes relatively little difference. This fact might make the policing effort somewhat simpler.
The general consensus was that we have not spelled out to the North Vietnamese what we mean by mutual withdrawal. It
was agreed that it would be useful to make it clear that we want them out, that we are prepared to get out ourselves, and
that we will be able to stop the bombing if we can agree in principle on this.
There was also agreement that some continued North Vietnamese presence in Laos could be tolerated, provided it is
confined to the northern part and that the Ho Chi Minh Trail is blocked.
Some difference of opinion was revealed on the question whether North Vietnam would require something more than
assurance that the US is willing to give up its bases and withdraw its troops. Mr. Helms expressed some surprise, though
not disagreement, at the general acceptance of the proposition that we would be willing to abandon Cam Ranh Bay and
similar bases. Mr. Nitze noted that they would not be inactivated but rather turned over to the South Vietnamese. Mr.
Moorsteen thought that it was quite possible that the North Vietnamese did not really believe the Americans would be
willing to pull out and that they might regard this as a sufficient basis for settlement. Mr. Leonhart noted that the Manila
Communique is consistent with the interpretation that US forces will withdraw only after the Viet Cong stopped fighting.
There was some discussion of the problems involved in our participation in a political settlement for the South. If the
mutual withdrawal formula is inadequate, the question arises as to what we might have to agree with North Vietnam to
bring pressure on the GVN to do.
The over-all conclusion that emerged was that we should seek to move the emphasis in Paris from what Mr. Nitze referred
to as the "procedural point of linkage" (between our bombing and restraint by Hanoi) to the question of our mutual
withdrawal, trying to be precise as to the Manila formula. Mr. Nitze remarked the possible disadvantage of "enlarging the
carrot" that we dangle in Paris within days after the very tough statements in the press conferences of the President and
Secretary Rusk. Everyone was in accord with the fact that little could be done, in any event, until after the Republican
Convention. Mr. Bundy suggested that it was not unusual in negotiations to have public bluster and private flexibility.
There was also considerable speculation about the so-called "third offensive." Some thought this would not occur during
the Convention at Miami but that it might take place later in the month in an effort to influence the result in Chicago. Others
conjectured that it would not take place until September, if at all.

The procedure generally agreed upon was to try to utilize the Russians by going back to Premier Kosygin. Mr. Bundy said
that the unfortunate element of our previous reply to Kosygin was a call for a "precise" explanation as to what Hanoi's
response would be if we were to stop the bombing./2/
/2/See Document 269.
Mr. Bundy was asked to develop papers in which we would comment to Kosygin that we had noted the reduction in North
Vietnamese activity and were interested in knowing what the purpose and meaning of this phenomenon might be. The
letter could continue that the presence or absence of further attacks would be regarded by us as quite meaningful. If, for
example, the present lull continues through September 1st, we would regard this as a basis for further steps on our part.
There was also comment about the difficulty North Vietnam might feel in bringing the conflict to an end, even if its leaders
have given up hope of victory. In this connection, Mr. Leonhart reported a conversation he had had with a Japanese
official, who observed that the Japanese had known after Saipan that they could not win. The official had remarked upon
the "struggle to end the war."
Paul C. Warnke

321. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, August 2, 1968.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Maxwell Taylor Papers, Vietnam Policy 1968. Top Secret. The attached note
transmitting a copy of the memorandum to Smith reads: "Brom: Please pass my report electronically to the President at the
Ranch so he may have it for his reading tomorrow. M.D.T." Taylor drafted this report in his capacity as Chairman of the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. In his note transmitting a copy of the memorandum to the President,
August 2, 8:30 p.m., Smith wrote: "Here is General Taylor's evaluation of the lull in enemy activities in South Vietnam.
General Taylor plans to send you a separate paper covering recommended actions based on the conclusions he has
reached. If any public use is to be made of this paper, I recommend that you do not use one sentence in the report until we
have learned whether the 18,000 figure included in it is agreed within the Intelligence Community." (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 8 I, 1/67-12/68, Taylor Memos--General) The notation "ps" on this covering
note indicates that the President saw Taylor's memorandum; a separate notation indicates that the memorandum was
received at the Ranch at 11 a.m. on August 3. The President visited his Texas ranch August 2-19. (Ibid., President's Daily
Diary)
SUBJECT
Evaluation of the Lull in Enemy Activities in South Viet-Nam
At your luncheon on Tuesday, July 30,/2/ you asked me as Chairman of your Intelligence Board to examine the available
information with regard to the so-called lull in South Viet-Nam and to determine whether, in fact, there was a significant lull
and, if so, to evaluate its military and political significance.
/2/See Document 316.
In carrying out your instructions, I have discussed the points at issue with Secretaries Rusk and Clifford, Deputy Secretary
Nitze, Director Helms and the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General McConnell. Also, I have obtained by
cable the views of Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams which you have seen in their entirety./3/ In highly
summarized form, the following are the conclusions which I have drawn from my discussions with these officials and from
Bunker's most illuminating cable./4/
/3/See Document 319.
/4/In telegram 34163 from Saigon, August 1, Bunker reported that he and Abrams opposed a full cessation on the grounds
that it would undermine Thieu, demonstrate weakness in the peace negotiations, provide a military advantage for the
enemy, and be difficult to resume the bombing. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt
Rostow, Vol. 90)
Is there a lull?

There has been a very significant lull in the combat activities of the enemy in South Viet-Nam. Since about mid-June,
virtually all of the indicators of these combat activities have turned downward. However, concurrently there have been
many indications of intense activity devoted to other forms of military activity such as the refitting, retraining, reorganizing,
and repositioning of many of his units. Battle casualties are down in comparison with the first five months of 1968 but our
casualties in the so-called lull are higher than in the corresponding period of 1967.
With regard to enemy political activities in South Viet-Nam, there is no detectable lull--indeed political propaganda in
support of the NLF and the Alliance has increased. Efforts to proselyte by propaganda are at a high pitch but there seems
to be some reduction in the organization of Liberation Committees in the countryside. In Saigon, the Alliance seems to be
gaining a measure of support among some of the intelligentsia.
What is the military significance?
As to the military significance of the lull in combat activities, there is unanimity of opinion that it has been imposed upon the
enemy largely by military necessity. If there were no political negotiations in progress, there would still be ample reason for
the enemy to take time out to replace the severe losses of the Tet and the May 5 offensives and to assimilate the heavy
influx of recruits arriving from the north during the spring and summer. Also, the heavy losses in supplies and equipment
must have created logistic problems requiring a period of relative inactivity for resolution. However, the requirements for
the reconstitution of units probably do not explain entirely the remarkable low level of current combat activity. It seems
likely that, if he wanted, the enemy could be more aggressive now than is presently the case and, at the same time, build
up his combat effectiveness.
This regeneration of combat capability is probably both for the purpose of regaining lost strength and also with the
objective of developing a renewed capability for another large scale offensive some time this year. While evidence as to
the possible timing of a renewed offensive is mixed, several dates have been mentioned in intelligence reports, most of
them falling in the period August 3-18. By that time, the newly arrived recruits should be well integrated into their units and
ready to take part in an offensive. Also, it will be convention time in the U.S., a fact which may have a bearing on enemy
timing.
As to likely places for attack, recent enemy movements and dispositions may be interpreted as threats to the coastal
region of I Corps from the DMZ through Danang to Quang Nai, Ban Me Thuot, Loc Ninh, Tay Ninh and Saigon. Estimates
of the possible scale of the offensive vary from a country-wide, coordinated effort on the Tet pattern to a lesser offensive
like the one in May or even something substantially smaller. In spite of heavy losses, the massive infiltration during the
spring and summer has allowed him to raise his current North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Main and Local Force units by
about 18,000 over their strength just prior to the Tet offensive. Thus, in terms of numbers, the enemy appears to be in
good shape to strike a powerful blow. However, Abrams has the general initiative and, this time, there should be no
possibility of a surprise.
What is the political significance?
With regard to any political motivation for the lull, there is a general feeling that there is no clear evidence to suggest that
the lull is primarily for the purpose of influencing the Paris negotiations. There are too many valid military reasons to
support such a view. However, there is general agreement that the enemy has the opportunity to make political virtue out
of military necessity by exploiting the lull as evidence of an ostensibly sincere desire to lower the level of violence as a
tacit, conciliatory gesture. He can not exploit this point officially without giving up his position on reciprocity but some Hanoi
representatives in private conversations have alluded to their current restraint on the battlefield. Unfortunately, U.S. critics
of our policy need no prompting and make the case for Hanoi on their own initiative.
Summary
There is an enemy-initiated lull in combat activities in South Viet-Nam accompanied by an intensification of enemy military
activities for the purpose of replacing losses, refitting units and creating a renewed offensive capability. That capability may
be exercised at any time in a number of places.
There has never been a lessening of enemy political activities in South Viet-Nam--in fact, in this period they have
increased.
The combat lull was imposed on the enemy by military necessity but, as a bonus, he has the option of exploiting it for
political purposes in relation to the peace talks. There is no evidence to believe that it is a genuine signal of a desire to
deescalate in order to facilitate prompt and productive talks in Paris./5/

/5/According to a memorandum to Taylor from Grover Brown, Assistant Director for Intelligence Production, Defense
Intelligence Agency, and summary notes from PFIAB-CIA-DIA representatives, both dated August 1, the enemy would
continue the military buildup while taking political advantage of the supposed "lull" and might refrain from a renewed
offensive if the negotiations swung in his favor. (Both in National Defense University, Maxwell Taylor Papers, Project Lull)
In a memorandum to Rusk entitled "North Vietnamese Links Between the Lull in the South and the Bombing of the North,"
August 8, Hughes noted INR's speculation that Hanoi may have intended the lull to be "a reciprocal gesture for a bombing
halt" and that such a halt might pre-empt another large-scale attack. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S) An analysis of Communist political activity during the lull was transmitted to
Taylor in CIA memorandum No. 0609/68, "Recent Vietnamese Communist Political Action in South Vietnam," August 1.
(Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80-R01580R, 266--Vietnam)
M.D.T./6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
Note: Because of the need for a prompt reply to your directive, I have not been able to consult the other members of your
Intelligence Board in preparing this paper. With regard to recommendations of actions as a consequence of the
conclusions of this report, I shall prepare and submit a separate paper./7/
/7/Not found.

322. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/

Paris, August 3, 1968, 1300Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-August
1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Harvan; Plus. Received at 9:57 a.m.
18977/Delto 550. From Harriman and Vance.
1. Yesterday afternoon we met with Amb Zorin for about one and one-half hours. Also present were Oberemko,
Bogomolov and Perry./2/
/2/Rusk's comments on this meeting were transmitted in telegram 214858 to Paris, August 3. (Ibid.) The message was
repeated as telegram CAP 81796 from Smith to the President, August 3. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country
File, Vietnam, Harvan Paris Todel--Paris Delto, X, 8/1-10/68) It was further discussed in a memorandum from Smith to the
President, August 3. (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 90)
2. We said that we wished to review with Ambassador Zorin where we were in the negotiations and where we were going
from here. We thought it fair to say that a very definite difference had come into the talks with the North Vietnamese-perhaps due to reality or perhaps due to misunderstanding. The Hanoi representatives were making a great deal of two
events, the Honolulu meeting and Secretary Rusk's July 30 press conference./3/ He asked us if there had been a change
in US policy and we had said no. We said the North Vietnamese think they can say anything bellicose they want to and we
will ignore it. In the Honolulu communique and in the Rusk statement we said we wanted peace, but if they wanted to fight,
then we would fight. We said that we had not brought with us a list of bellicose statements by Hanoi representatives, but
they were legion, including statements at the time of signing in Moscow of supply agreement with Deputy Prime Minister of
DRV, by Ho Chi Minh, Giap, and others. We said that we had accepted them as nothing unusual in time of war.
/3/See Document 303 and footnote 2, Document 315.
3. We said that we wanted Amb Zorin to know that there was no change in the President's policies set forth in the March
31 speech. We said that the point of Secretary Rusk's statement was that we were ready for moves towards peace, but we
had to have some indication of what Hanoi's attitude would be after a bombing cessation. We said we had to deal with
realities. We said it was true that there had been a lull in the shelling of Saigon since June 21 and in military attacks
generally, but at the same time there was a great increase in the forces coming from the North--last year the influx was
something like 8,000 per month, but it was now about 30,000--there were more North Vietnamese units in Saigon area
than ever before--the proportion of North Vietnamese soldiers in Viet Cong units was up from 25 percent to 70 percent.
Therefore, while there was a certain lull, there were also continuing signals (captured documents, prisoners--including

some of high rank--and defectors) that new attacks were planned against Saigon and other major cities. We said that
Secretary Rusk had said that we must get some clear indication from Hanoi as to what their intentions were. We said that
both the President and Secy Rusk had said that we must know what would happen if we stopped the bombing, and we
must know this either directly from Hanoi or indirectly thru third parties, such as the Soviet Union.
4. We said that we hoped Zorin would convey two things to his govt. First, we need some indication directly or by third
parties that Hanoi would show restraint if we stopped the bombing--in other words, is restraint or escalation their aim?
Second, it would be most serious for the Paris talks if the Viet Cong carried out their third wave offensive which was being
planned. We said that our talks were at a critical stage. We had hoped we could move forward with the Phase 1-Phase 2
proposals and continue along that path, but we needed evidence or direct word from Hanoi or the Soviets or someone that
Hanoi was willing to show restraint.
5. We said that when we discussed our Phase 1-Phase 2 proposal with Ha Van Lau over tea at our last meeting,/4/ our
impression was that the North Vietnamese were not interested in continuing the exploration of our proposal. We said that
we were at a critical point in our discussions and that we had come to Zorin as the representative of a vote we believed
wanted the talks to succeed in the hope that they could do something constructive.
/4/See Document 317.
6. Zorin said he had listened attentively but the picture we had drawn was very one-sided. Zorin said of course factual
situation on the ground and the Paris talks were connected. But he recalled Secy Rusk saying on June 21 that the ending
of shelling in Saigon and the lessening of military activities in adjacent areas would be a sufficient sign for the su to stop
them bombing./5/ We said that was incorrect. We said that was the interpretation some newspapers had placed on Secy
Rusk's statement but that was not what Secy Rusk said. We pointed out that Governor Harriman had said publicly that the
stopping of the shelling of Saigon was "ending an escalation" which had started after March 31, and therefore, could not be
considered as a restraint.
/5/See footnote 5, Document 278.
7. Zorin said he did not know exactly what words Secretary Rusk had used, but that everyone had interpreted the
statement as he (Zorin) had put it. Zorin said after Secretary Rusk's statement the shelling stopped and had been stopped
for about six weeks. He said that he had previously asked him whether the military lull was significant. Zorin said the real
fact was that for a long time there had been no shelling; this was clear to the whole world and this was a lessening of the
military activity about which the US had protested. Zorin said if the US wanted to proceed further on the road to deescalation, it had now an excellent basis for so doing. Zorin said that the US had not lessened its military activity, but
instead stepped up its bombing. He said, furthermore, that the US had had the meeting in Honolulu which seemed to
everyone not a peaceful meeting, but one that showed a hardening of the US position. Zorin said the July 30 statement of
Secretary Rusk further hardened the US position.
8. Zorin said that the US insisted that the initiative come from Hanoi and they must give assurances that they would be
"good children," and then the US would think about cessation of bombing. In other words, the US now demanded new
assurances at a time when North Vietnamese military activity had lessened and US activity had increased. These were the
facts and one must see the talks against this background.
9. Zorin said the US had formulated practical proposals and had submitted them to the North Vietnamese. These were
discussed and the Vietnamese asked for clarification. This clarification was given. He said he knew of his own knowledge
that the North Vietnamese were further studying the proposal and wished to get additional clarification about other points,
but at this very moment came the Honolulu meeting and the statement of Secretary Rusk. Zorin said that there could be no
question to any objective observer that if a man negotiating a proposal is faced with new facts, he has to take those facts
into consideration. Zorin said that he knew from personal conversations with the North Vietnamese that they had received
the impression from these two new facts that the US had made the proposals as a diplomatic gambit, while at the same
time the US was preparing new blows against North Vietnam. Zorin said that the North Vietnamese had therefore
suspended consideration of the US proposals. He said, "So, instead of asking any questions as they would have done,
they put off any further meeting with the US representatives." Zorin said that he could assure us that the putting off of
further meetings was purposeful.
10. Zorin then referred to a US newspaper article reprinted in the August 3 "Le Monde" which said that there were less
North Vietnamese troops in the South than in the first quarter 1968, but more US troops. He said that the article also stated
that Hanoi had given an indication of its intentions by stopping the shelling of Saigon, and that these things together
satisfied the San Antonio formula. We said that the statements in the article were incorrect and that the infiltration of North
Vietnamese troops into South Vietnam was higher in June and July than in any other month, and that our estimates
indicated that it would be approximately the same level in the month of August. Zorin replied that he agreed with the

conclusion of the article; that now was the best time to stop the bombing. He said, in his opinion, if the US waited it would
be worse; the favorable situation might cease to exist. He said an opponent was an opponent, war was war, and that any
action evoked a counter-action. He said if the US increased pressure, Hanoi would do the same. He stated that now was
the time to make a real effort to reverse the trend.
11. We thanked Zorin for informing us about his talks with the North Vietnamese and said that he could pass our
conversation with him on to the North Vietnamese. We said that Zorin had said our statement was one-sided, but we found
Zorin's analysis even more one-sided. We then went over the points made by the President in his press conference
leading to the conclusion that Hanoi's intentions were to increase military activity. We said these facts annulled any signals
of restraint to which Zorin referred. We said we had asked the North Vietnamese twice at the tea breaks if what they were
doing represented restraint, and they refused to say so. We said that this was a critical moment and that we hoped the
Soviet Government would pass the word to Hanoi that they must give some indication of their intentions. We said that if
there were new attacks on Saigon and other cities in August, the situation would be even worse. We asked Zorin to pass
this on and to get something done that would enable the President to carry out what he hoped to do--namely, to stop the
bombing when the other side showed real restraint.
12. We said we wished to assure Zorin that our Phase 1-Phase 2 proposals were not a diplomatic gambit. We made them
in all seriousness in an attempt to find a way to overcome the obstacles which confronted the two sides. We stated that the
proposals still stood and that we had the authority of our government to discuss them further. We said that taking an
objective view, one side said actions were louder than words, and the other side maintained some actions were louder
than other actions but there had been no words. We said an interested third party that really wanted peace should try its
best to bring the two together.
13. Zorin said the US did not provide the conditions for the USSR to do something, even if it wanted to. The US has
worsened the situation, depriving the other side of any chance to discuss its proposals, because it threatened and
demanded more and more. Zorin replied that the President had stated that "any sign" of restraint from the other side would
be sufficient. We said that when the US talked of restraint, we meant real things, such as the rate of infiltration, pulling
back from the DMZ, and cessation of attacks on the cities, and not simply a momentary cessation of shelling while troops
were being built up for a new attack. Zorin answered that the "sign" was a cessation of shelling and reduction of other
military action for six weeks. Now the US had said this was not enough; it was raising the price. We said this was an unfair
statement, that Governor Harriman had made it clear on radio and television that the cessation of shelling would not be
sufficient. Zorin in-sisted that the US had raised its demands--that originally it said it needed a sign and now it said it
wanted a guarantee from the Soviet Union. We replied that if there were some indications of restraint, these had been
belied by other indications on the ground. We said the point was that the signals were in conflict.
14. We said we wanted to again express appreciation for what Zorin had done and hoped he would pass on our
statements to Moscow. We repeated that further attacks would be most serious. Zorin replied that he would transmit what
we had said. He asked us to take into account what he had said and remarked that the situation as it now stands was not
favorable to negotiations. It was not Hanoi that was placing obstacles in the road, but the US.
Harriman

323. Telegram From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson in
Texas/1/
Washington, August 4, 1968, 0056Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. VI, 8/68-9/68.
Secret; Harvan; Plus. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 8:25 a.m. The notation "ps" on the telegram indicates that the
President saw it.
CAP 81812. By secure telephone from Paris, Ambassador Vance gave the following summary to the State Department of
his two hour and forty-five minute private talk today with North Vietnamese delegate Lau:
North Vietnamese reaction to all six points of the Phase One-Phase Two proposal bordered on rejection of the entire
concept.
Strongest objection was raised to our requirement that South Vietnamese Government participate in substantive talks to
follow bilateral meetings.

Reaction was negative to four other points--restoration of the DMZ; level of forces in South Vietnam; substantive talks
immediately to follow bombing halt; and no attacks on major cities. No reaction to the sixth point which offered to discuss
additionally any other subject they wanted to raise.
The debate produced the fullest expression yet of Hanoi's views. There was an inconclusive discussion of mutual
withdrawal of troops. The Vietnamese did not mention their current public line which alleges that we stiffened our terms in
the Honolulu communique and the Rusk press conference.
There was no indication that the North Vietnamese were preparing to break off the talks but the discussion left no room for
optimism that Hanoi would accept our offer. Vance is pessimistic.
Full cable report from Paris will be relayed in the morning./2/
/2/As transmitted in telegram 18992/Delto 556 from Paris, August 5. (Ibid., Harvan Chron., Vol. XVII, 8/1-7/68)

324. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, August 5, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, George Elsey Papers, Van De Mark Transcripts (1 of 2). No classification marking.
CMC at 0830 Monday 5 August '68 after spending weekend at Ranch, to Nitze, GME, Warnke, Pursley, Henkin/2/--for
Goulding
/2/Daniel Z. Henkin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.
Re V.Nam--finally, Sunday p.m., CMC saw LBJ alone/3/
/3/Although Clifford was a guest of the President in Texas that weekend, no meeting between him and the President is
recorded in the Daily Diary. (Johnson Library) However, Clifford's talking points for the meeting are in his handwritten notes
entitled "Talks with LBJ," August 4. (Ibid., Clark Clifford Papers, Mr. Clifford's Pencilled Notes, Vietnam)
I said we have now substantially done everything it was our obligation to do:
--we have prevented subjugation
--we have turned enemy back
--we have developed ARVN
--Now we shld find basis for settlement in Paris--Now! (N. Vam army only 30% of population--They can go on & on forever
but we can't! (due to domestic situation!)
I ended up by taking position we have been ready since San Antonio last Sept '67 to stop bombing if only they would talk.
We shld be relaxing our attitude whereas a hardening has taken place--this is wrong direction "So I have a new approach
to Paris."
I outlined my new approach--a week after Repub Convention LBJ should: 1) a TV speech program to say
--one week from today Bombing will stop
--he'll notify Hanoi
--he is prepared to have negotiations start substantive talks

--he'll answer they not take advantage

--they'll agree to demobilize
--stop firing across D.M.Z.
--stop mil. [movement across the] D.M.Z.
--a continued cessation of shelling of Saigon
If Hanoi chooses not to accept, they would say so--to the world. If they said nothing, their silence to whole world would be
assent & we could stop the bombing & be ready for substantive talks.
At same time--or before--a private letter to Kosygin telling him & asking his help.
This would notify the world of our de-escalatory move.
If Hanoi
A) rejects
or B) silent & then leveled an attack
no problem in resumption of bombing. It would get full support.
!!! LBJ says he didn't agree with anything CMC had said, but it was "interesting." He then made a speech on "firmness."
He'd rather lv office with a "fine military solution" than be craven.
a) However, he did say "talk to Rusk"
b) Then he asked CMC to put on paper
these 2 make CMC think there is a possibility.
CMC then refers to this morning's Harriman report on a conversation in Paris with Sov Amb Zorin. Zorin asked Harriman
"what's going on?????" All well until Honolulu communique, then Rusk press conference, then LBJ's./4/ You've guessed
it!!!
/4/See Document 318.
CMC says he has to agree with Zorin!
CMC further amplifies his pt. of view that it's to our advantage to get out whereas G.V.N. wants lot more time; yrs more of
our money & effort.
CMC wants to reduce the level of combat--this is calculated to do that.
CMC: The President has rejected 100% out of hand the last Harriman-Vance approach--(The flaw was just private
approach to Hanoi--But this puts it up to them in such a way they'd be on the spot)
Pres's offer would be public & he'd be protected by the publicity: He couldn't be privately double-crossed!
Nitze notes we are approaching the ceiling of men in V.Nam.
CMC: we can not, we must not go over the ceiling of 549,500.

Nitze: J.C.S. trying to find a gimmick of not counting invalids etc etc etc
CMC--No! Even on a temp. basis we must not go over--politically it'll be murder.
[Omitted here is discussion of potential arms control talks with the Soviet Union.]
0930 Staff meeting
CMC--"Paris is our only real hope for an early resolution of the conflict in SE Asia" & he notes in troubled tones the
confusion of the past week--the alleged "hardening" of U.S. position.
Gen. Wheeler confirms solid evidence of an impending attack--although we're doing all we can to thwart & spoil
forthcoming attacks. The "lull" is merely a cycle; they're making a political virtue (i.e. the lull) out of a military necessity
(need to re-train & re-equip).
Westmoreland makes a self-confident speech about how much we know about the enemy & how we'll lick the offensive.
CMC asks why do they go into attack when we're so much better off than in Tet?
Westmoreland--"They have no choice--For morale reasons they must go on offensive."
CMC--needles Westmoreland--how does it help morale to go in & get licked?
Westmoreland no answer; Wheeler tries to help him out.
CMC--says Is it possible that they really aren't go[ing] to launch attacks--but that all enemy is doing is filling out his units?
Just rebuilding to be prepared for whatever may come out of Paris?
Wheeler says reconnaissance & intelligence all pt. to an attack.
Gen. Walt #2 USMC says only victory enemy has had was psych victory here in U.S. during Tet. He's going to try to do the
same again.
(GME personal view is that Tet simply woke up Am. people to facts in V. Nam that it was a lousy war we shldn't be in &
that we couldn't win. I disagree that it was a psych. defeat: . . . It was a psych. awakening!)
[Omitted here is discussion of potential arms control talks with the Soviet Union.]

325. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/

Washington, August 6, 1968.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80-R01580R, 271--Vietnam Task Force.
Secret. This unsigned memorandum was derived from telegram CAS 6132 from Saigon, August 6. In an August 8 covering
note transmitting a copy of the memorandum to Smith, Helms wrote: "I believe the President will be interested to read this
report. Would you please pouch it to him at the Ranch? For your information, and that of Walt's, George Carver returns to
Washington late today and will be briefing the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board tomorrow." No record of that
meeting has been found. According to attached covering notes, the memorandum was also sent to Rusk, Katzenbach,
Bundy, Clifford, Nitze, and Wheeler. Carver was in Vietnam for a 2-week observation mission July 20-August 8.
SUBJECT
Some Observations on Thieu and Ky
1. The following are comments and observations by George Carver based on his meetings with President Thieu and Vice
President Ky on 2 August 1968.

2. The meeting with Vice President Ky was delayed since he was in a prolonged session (subsequently described as
cordial) with two Lower House deputies who had often been sharply critical of Ky. Carver noted that this session itself was
a small straw in Saigon's freshening political breeze. Ky received Carver in his private office at the Palace, wearing a U.S.style tropical worsted summer uniform without rank insignia and looking considerably older and more grave than in early
1965 when they last had met. The atmosphere was cordial and relaxed but quite correct. He said all the proper things with
apparent sincerity.
3. Ky stressed the need for unity in the face of a common enemy, said nothing obviously critical of Thieu, and emphasized
several times that the Thieu-Ky problem was a thing of the past. He stressed that no "nationalist" could any longer think in
terms of coups or similar actions. In short, he has swallowed his pill, and though he obviously does not like its taste, he is
taking it (for the time being at least) with dignity, perspective, and reasonably good humor. His vanity and desire to be
appreciated, however, are still very near the surface. He beamed visibly at the suggestion that the considerable over-all
progress over the past few years was due in no small part to his efforts. Ky beamed again at the suggestion that he
apparently was one who recognized the need for subordinating personal to national interests. Ky seemed quite proud of
the fact he had just been chosen out as a pilot in the F-5 jet; with a touch of irony, he noted that he had more time for flying
since he wasn't too busy now.
4. Carver's session with Thieu was equally cordial but more formal. Thieu handles himself with quiet confidence and an
increasingly sure touch. He was obviously pleased with Honolulu's outcome. He thinks more clearly about the future than
most Vietnamese. Thieu noted that the struggle had long been in a primarily military phase, would eventually reach a
primarily political stage, and is about to enter a transitional stage between the two. The Communists were now busily
preparing for this transitional stage leading to the political struggle ahead, and we ought to do the same. Few Vietnamese
display this kind of realism./2/
/2/The Department had urged Bunker to encourage Thieu to make an unofficial overture to the North Vietnamese or the
NLF. (Telegram 216256 to Saigon, August 6; Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt
Rostow, Vol. 90) In a meeting on August 7, Thieu told Bunker that he had given Bui Diem authority to establish private
contacts with the North Vietnamese in Paris. (Telegram 34711 from Saigon, August 7; ibid.) In telegram 216978 to Paris
and Saigon, August 7, Rusk described Thieu's response as "not having the sense of urgency we would like to see," and he
directed the delegation to encourage Bui Diem to move forward and the Embassy in Saigon to press to have the additional
personnel sent to Paris immediately. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82,
HARVAN-(Incoming)-August 1968)
5. Carver noted some interesting comparison and contrast in the reactions of Ky and Thieu to certain salient points. Both
strongly endorsed the need for the Vietnamese to demonstrate unity in their opposition to the Communists. It was in this
context that Ky made his "no coup" comments and mentioned his overtures to opposition deputies in the interest of unity. It
was in the same context that Thieu raised the necessity for him to personally provide the missing element of leadership
necessary to get the "Lien Minh Alliance" off the ground./3/
/3/In telegram 34703 from Saigon, August 7, Bunker reported on a conversation with Thieu during which the pilot
mechanism for the involvement of the Lien Minh in rural development was outlined: "Thieu said the program for Lien Minh
had now been worked out and submitted to him. It would be tested out initially in Saigon. A committee, organized on
functional lines like a cabinet, would be set up with sub-committees to study and oversee the program, making
modifications as experience indicated. Once the Saigon program seemed to be progressing satisfactorily, then it would be
extended out into the provinces. A program to train cadre would be developed and plans made to expand the organization
since it was important that centers also be established outside the capital." (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL US-VIET S)
6. Ky readily assented to the desirability of aggressively exploiting the policy of National Reconciliation in the case of
appropriate Viet Cong defectors. He said he was urging his colleagues to move with more aggressive imagination on this
score. Thieu, on the other hand, was much cooler. He didn't disagree, but noted that there were "many problems" and
quickly switched to a more congenial subject.
7. Ky reacted enthusiastically to the suggestion that peasant youth ought to be tapped for leadership at lower levels.
Expressing vigorous assent, he expounded--with some emotion--his views on the need for a non-Communist social
revolution. Thieu, on the other hand, gave pro-forma assent, but patently has little interest in any juggling of the social
order and sees no need for upsetting things by attempting to do so. Once again, after polite, perfunctory agreement (in
effect, acknowledging the problem without accepting the solution), Thieu quickly switched to other topics.
8. In sum, Carver observes that Thieu seems to be performing well and steadily growing in his role as President, and Ky
seems to have accepted his secondary role with reasonable grace. While Thieu lacks Ky's vision, flair, and intuitive,
emotional grasp of the basic social problems which constitute the seedbed of Vietnam's insurgency, Ky lacks Thieu's
capacity for sustained endeavor, attention to detail, and patience. Ky may be cultivating the image of a dedicated patriot
ready, waiting, and available in an hour of crisis, but this may be acceptable so long as it keeps Ky on his good behavior.4

/4/In his August 8 report on the trip, Carver concluded: "On the whole, despite the real Communist menace and emotional
worries about American policy, I found the political atmosphere in Saigon at least momentarily healthier than it has been in
over a decade. Vietnamese moods are mercurial, but formerly repressed or taboo thoughts and ideas--peace, settlement,
even hazy notions of victory in a finite time frame--are now openly talked about. The light of day is helping to dispel at least
some of their mystery for the Vietnamese. Thieu's government may be strongly liked by only a few and distrusted (in some
measure) by many. It is inclined (I think dangerously but not irremediably so) to approach Vietnam's problems with the
same concepts that permitted these problems to reach their present crisis proportions, but for the time being, at least,
Thieu's government is governing." (Central Intelligence Agency, SAVA (Carver) Files, Job 80-R01720R, GAC Trip to
Saigon)

326. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, August 8, 1968, 8:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, George Elsey Papers, Van De Mark Transcripts (1 of 2). No classification marking. Prepared
by Elsey.
He [CMC] reports that late yesterday, 5:30+ he met at Rusk's with Rusk & Cy Vance/2/ (home from Paris) "I found it
exceedingly interesting conference. As we got into it, I had thought we were agreed that a purpose of the meeting was to
explore new avenues. I found that
/2/No other record of the meeting has been found. The brackets are in the source text.
--Harriman & Vance have concluded N VNam had rejected Phase I & Phase II approach;
--I said no, let's regard it as still open but let's look for other alternatives too.
"I sat back with increasing wonderment. I began to sense what was going on--" In a quietly assuring manner, Rusk
knocked down every single new approach!
"I believe honestly that Rusk assumes there'll be no settlement & it's a mistake to . . . an approach! Every idea he is
opposed to--on grounds that any new approach by us would be an indication of weakness!"
If Vance were to come back with new approaches, it would be regarded as weakness. Rusk is on limited & restricted--the
operation is so tightly controlled by him. Ha Van Lau says he will not agree to any prior understanding--(before stopping
bombing)./3/ Rusk says--bombing goes on until we get a firm commitment as to what they'll do. Thus, an absolute Total
impasse! "The main concern I have, says Rusk, is lest they get some idea of weakness?"
/3/See Document 323.
CMC says he struggled--to get Rusk to accept some new approaches.
CMC says I firmly told him. All we are saying, despite its unsuccessful nature, all that is being suggested we keep on
fighting & killing boys. --Rusk's answer--"You never can tell when 'they'll break!' & give in!"
CMC says Rusk is just following LBJ's line.
Nitze reports 2 hrs of Vance with the J.C.S. Vance reported thus far it was a failure of Phase I-Phase II--that idea was
dead. What killed it was Rusk's Press conference & his linkage of all actions in Phase II with Ph. I.
J.C.S. came to conclusion that no pt. in terminating the bombing!
J.C.S. taking strong views of excellent shape we're in & so good that enemy can't make an August attack! This leads Nitze
to say maybe he agrees with Rusk. If enemy is really as weak as JCS says, they must be on verge of caving in & starting
negotiations to moving.

Nitze says they (Vance & J.C.S.) also talked about Domestic Support in U.S. for V.Nam war. Dom. Support--Wheeler
agrees we're in trouble--other chiefs think not--all agree however that to bomb Hanoi wld. bring the roof down from U.S.
pub. opinion. It will take 2 yrs. without negotiations to wind up the war.
[Omitted here is discussion of reparations from Israel for its attack on the U.S.S. Liberty in June 1967.]

327. Notes of Meeting/1/

Johnson City, Texas, August 10, 1968, 12:25 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting lasted until 1:15
p.m. Nixon and his party arrived at the Ranch at 11:59 a.m. A lunch followed this briefing after which Nixon departed.
(Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Vance returned to Paris on August 12. The President had offered Nixon the opportunity for
the meeting during a telephone conversation on August 8. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone
Conversation Between Johnson and Nixon, August 8, 1968, 4:09 p.m., Tape F6807.02, PNO 21)
NOTES ON BRIEFING OF FORMER VICE PRESIDENT NIXON
AND GOVERNOR AGNEW
THOSE ATTENDING THE BRIEFING WERE
The President
Former Vice President Nixon
Secretary Rusk
CIA Director Helms
Cyrus Vance
Governor Agnew
Tom Johnson
[Omitted here is discussion of Czechoslovakia (see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XVII, Document 78) and the
Middle East.]
CIA Director Helms: Vietnam--The war is at the tensest point. Lull is not hard to explain.
--Lost 128,000 men
--Needed to fill out units
--Units now coming back
--Attack could come anytime.
The primary objective is--ruination of Saigon's government.
Secretary Rusk: The offensive has been slowed by 40 [percent] of equipment being captured. They may be tired of military
activity.
Nixon: Would the attacks be city attacks?
CIA Director Helms: Yes, city attacks.
[Omitted here is discussion of Latin America.]
Vance: No tangible progress on central issue.
--Some advance. We have gone to Paris.

--We have had three prisoners released. We may get more out.
Le Duc Tho is on the way back from Hanoi.
Cessation of bombing.
Public sessions--rigid and unbending.
We will stop bombing under right conditions.
Private Conversations: We have tried to come up with formula to let us stop the bombing with no public [omission in the
source text].
Vance: They have refused to suggest anything at this point. They will not permit the Thieu-Ky government to sit at the
table.
I arranged the original talks at a Tea Break. So far no progress.
Governor Agnew: Is there any difference between private and public talks?
Vance: There is no difference between private and public talks on substance.
Le Duc Tho--he stops at Peking and Moscow enroute to Paris./2/
/2/Tho returned to Paris from his 6-week trip on August 13.
There is possibility of discussion between third country.
Secretary Rusk: We just got a message that they could not do this until September./3/
/3/Not further identified.
Nixon: Why are they talking?
Vance: Eventually they want a solution.
Secretary Rusk: They want a solution, but on what terms?
Vance: They would like it on their basis./4/
/4/A memorandum for the record by John Walsh of S/S, August 8, described a conversation between former NSC Staff
member Chester Cooper and Vance. At the request of the Humphrey campaign, Cooper informed Vance that the Vice
President planned to issue a statement calling for an immediate halt to the bombing. Vance replied that his public reaction
to the statement would be critical since it would interfere and damage the Paris negotiations. Cooper telephoned Vance
the next day and reported that "the Vice President would be prepared to leave public life rather than to do anything that
would damage our negotiating position or harm our country." The substance of this exchange was relayed to both Smith
and Rusk. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET)
Nixon: We have people on our side who are constantly screwing us on propaganda. They signed an agreement in 1954
which gave them less on paper than they could have won on the battlefield.
What about China? What are they doing? Are the North Vietnamese sophisticated?
Vance: They are. They have sophistication.
Nixon: Do they still believe we have lost the war?

CIA Director Helms: The North Vietnamese are convinced they won after Dien Bien Phu.
The President: They think we believe that we lost the war. They don't think so.
Nixon: We have got to tell our people to remember that every word they write will be read by Hanoi.
Governor Agnew: How much information comes from Peking?
CIA Director Helms: Peking supports Hanoi with ammunition, munitions, food.
The President: We cannot certify how much influence on Hanoi China is.
CIA Director Helms: Ho wants their help, not their advice.
The President: I cannot tell you how much influence either Kosygin or Mao has.
The President: When we have a pause, we have a difficult time getting back.
Nixon: Who talks to the Soviets?
Secretary Rusk: We talk to Soviets in Washington and in Paris.
Nixon: Is there a shift in the Soviet attitude?
The President: The USSR suggested the 37-day pause. They can't deliver.
Secretary Rusk: The current mood is "stop the bombing".
Nixon: Any discussions with the Chinese?
Vance: No.
Nixon: Do we talk at Warsaw?
Vance: Yes.
Secretary Rusk: If Tito were reaching out to grab Greece, you would have a parallel.
Nixon: What is the Laos situation?
Secretary Rusk: There is nothing decisive.
Governor Agnew: What is the relationship between the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong? What is the degree of military
deficiency before and after?
CIA Director Helms: 90% North Vietnamese now vs. 60% earlier.
Governor Agnew: This might offset qualities.
CIA Director Helms: They are not as good now as they were.
Nixon: What about Thieu's attitude? He did not object to the Viet Cong being at negotiations.
Secretary Rusk: We and the South Vietnamese would be at the table on an our-side-your-side basis, but the Viet Cong
won't sit down with the Hanoi government.

The President: They have no problem making their views known.

Secretary Rusk: [omission in the source text]
Nixon: It's so much like a labor negotiation. You cannot give away the game in advance.
Secretary Rusk: In Latin America no coup has occurred in 27 years. Things are beginning to stabilize. The next
Administration will see more movements in the Communist world. Mao is 75. Lots of ferment. It may evolve to nonCommunist mainland.
Nixon: Why are they enamored with philosophy that even old Communism is outdated?
The apparatus is working./5/
/5/In a memorandum for the record, August 12, summarizing this briefing, Helms wrote: "Mr. Vance covered developments
in then Paris peace negotiations, including details of the private talks between the Americans and the North Vietnamese.
He carefully pointed out the total unwillingness of the North Vietnamese to meet across the table with the South
Vietnamese Government. It came as an obvious surprise to the candidates that the North Vietnamese expect the GVN to
negotiate directly with the National Liberation Front. Lack of progress in the talks was underlined, but the point was
carefully made that patience might yet get something started, perhaps in the private dialogue. Mr. Nixon made it clear that
he had no intention of saying or doing anything which would make the job of the American negotiators more
difficult." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI (Helms) Chrono, Aug.-Dec. 1968)

328. Editorial Note

On August 12, 1968, Secretary of Defense Clifford met with the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff and
representatives of the services. Among the participants were Deputy Secretary Paul Nitze, Army Chief of Staff General
William Westmoreland, Secretary of the Navy Paul Ignatius, Under Secretary of the Air Force Townsend Hoopes, Air
Force Chief of Staff General John McConnell, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke, and Special Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense George Elsey. Staff Secretary R. Eugene Livesay took notes of the meeting and transcribed the
parts dealing with the war in Vietnam. The first topic of discussion was the Paris negotiations:
"Mr. Clifford said it has been an interesting week as far as the negotiations in Paris. This is one subject that we comment
on each week. Mr. Vance has been back and he had dinner with him which lasted way into the evening. Mr. Vance makes
a logical, objective and effective negotiator. He is not discouraged. Mr. Clifford said that he sees in the papers that some
people engaged in meeting their own problems place different interpretations on the way the negotiations are proceeding.
Although Mr. Vance had no progress to report he states that there is a better understanding among the negotiators. Mr.
Clifford said he is rather encouraged by the report that Le Duc Tho is coming back to Paris from Hanoi. He stopped briefly
in Peking, and is now having an extended visit in Moscow. It seems there is a real possibility that he will arrive in Paris in
time for the Wednesday negotiating session. Both Mr. Harriman and Mr. Vance feel Tho is the senior negotiator. He is a
member of the Politburo and a close personal friend of Ho Chi Minh. As long as he stayed in Hanoi there was not much
hope that progress would be made."
Later in the meeting, the subject of the military situation in Southeast Asia arose:
"Mr. Clifford said we get a weekly report on the military situation. We continue to get indications of the enemy activity and
plans. General McConnell will give the report today in lieu of General Wheeler. General McConnell passed around maps to
the group at the table. He said there was a cable in from General Abrams on Saturday concerning enemy intentions.
Places where attacks are expected are noted on the maps. The map of the DMZ shows the location of 7 regiments which
can attack there at any time. We do not expect any prior to 15 August or possibly up to 3 or 4 days afterwards. Intercepted
communications indicate there will be country-wide attacks. The disposition of the troops, shown on the third map, indicate
that they are capable of making attacks on Hue, Da Nang and Chu Lai, and two or three other locations, each with division
size attacks. General McConnell then turned to the map of Saigon and said that all indications are that they will not attack
Saigon at first but will delay for 3 or 4 days after initiation of the country-wide attacks.
"General McConnell said that General Abrams still continues to pound the daylights out of the enemy with B-52s, tactical
fighters, artillery, etc. We are doing considerable ground reconnaissance, particularly with Air Cavalry Units and using
ground follow-up after air attacks. The Defense Intelligence Agency estimates agree with those of General Abrams.
General McConnell said he has prepared a memorandum to the President which outlines the whole situation which either

he or Mr. Clifford can forward. He will give it to Mr. Clifford after the meeting.
"General McConnell said that in Thailand we might have an attack against Nakhon Phanon. All indications point to such an
attack. The enemy has considerable forces 12-25 kms east. There are 25 Thai Security personnel, 150 Air Police, Army
gunships and Air Force gun-equipped C-47s there. We have sent up one company of U.S. infantry and 30 Special Forces
officers to assist.
"Last week, during 9-11 August, the allies had 15 killed (10 U.S., 1 ARVN, 4 civilians) and 97 wounded (66 U.S., 16
ARVN., 15 civilians), by allied forces. This may cause us unfavorable publicity. Mr. Clifford said he had already seen
reports on this in the paper. Mr. Goulding said that each incident was reported separately but not added up as General
McConnell has done.
"General McConnell said that air activity continued as usual. Over the weekend, 37 U.S. and 605 enemy were killed. There
were 154 light contacts, all by small units. General Abrams has been able to move our forces around. We are flying 1,300
fixed wing airlift sorties a day which represents 3,000 tons of supplies and 13,000 troops. We continue to capture large
tonnages of ammunition and food all over South Vietnam but particularly close to the DMZ, the Ashau Valley and IV Corps.
"Mr. Clifford asked if General Westmoreland had any comments. General Westmoreland said that intelligence on caches is
coming mostly from ralliers. We are back in the Ashau Valley. We lost three helicopters going in. The enemy, however, has
not chosen to confront our forces. They may attack with some of their units, however, we do hold the high ground. Another
significant development is that our riverine forces are moving further south than ever before.
"General Westmoreland said as to the accidental firings on our own troops he feels that this is the price we pay for a one
year tour of duty. This turnover requires the constant training of officers in a complex business. The accidents are basically
the result of 'green' troops. He believes that our commanders overall have done a magnificent job in assimilating new
arrivals. General McConnell said that these types of accidents are much less than in World War II. Mr. Clifford said he
recalls several incidents from the Italian campaign. General Westmoreland said we now report publicly on such casualties;
in World War II we did not report them because of censorship.
"Mr. Clifford asked General Westmoreland if he actually believed there was going to be another enemy offensive. General
Westmoreland said the enemy plans to move but we believe that our fire power and maneuvers will preempt his attacks in
several areas or reduce them to manageable proportions. He will attempt wide-spread initiatives. In some cases we will
thwart these with B-52s. Elsewhere they will have some tactical success but with great casualties.
"General Westmoreland says another interesting recent development is the repeated public stance by President Thieu on
the South Vietnamese progressively taking over more of the war, which they are capable of doing. General Westmoreland
recalls that both he and Mr. Clifford talked to Thieu about this on several occasions. The fact that Thieu is making public
statements is a good development. The ARVN is fighting extremely well in all Corps areas. General Westmoreland said
that he had deployed a whole U.S. brigade of the 9th Division to open Highway 4 and secure it for hard-topping; he set a
deadline for the ARVN to take over as of 1 August. They met this deadline. Mr. Clifford asked if they had done well since
then. General Westmoreland said yes. Mr. Clifford said he thought the enemy had closed a bridge on this road. General
Westmoreland said this was north of the area he is talking about.
"General Walt said that he agreed with General Westmoreland. The enemy wants to make an attack. In order for him to
make an attack he has to build up his forces on the battlefield and move supplies forward. In the last two weeks he hasn't
been able to do so in I Corps. In fact, the troops have actually abandoned large amounts of supplies. They could move
across the DMZ. General McConnell said they had been moving divisions in North Vietnam back towards the south
gradually. General Westmoreland said that he has a hunch that they will attack a location near the Rockpile
area." (Johnson Library, Clark Clifford Papers, Minutes of the Secretary of Defense Staff Meetings, March-September
1968)
Additional notes of this meeting by Nitze are in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Defense
Department, Deputy Secretary of Defense Notes, 1968, 5 of 6.

329. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/
Washington, August 14, 1968, 1807Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Paris Todel--Paris Delto XI, 8/11-31/68.

Secret. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 2 p.m.

CAP 81976. Herewith account of tea break in Paris this morning. As I reported by phone, the rest was rough
propaganda./2/
/2/Quoted below is the text of telegram 19450/Delto 598 from Paris, August 14. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference, 1968-1969, Delto Chron.) The summary
report of the 17th formal session at the Majestic is in telegram 19455/Delto 599 from Paris, August 14. (Ibid.)
1. We met during tea break with Thuy and Lau for about twenty minutes.
2. We inquired about Le Duc Tho and were informed that he was well but was resting after his trip.
3. We asked about the return of the seamen and said as it was an act of good will we wanted to return them in the time
and manner the DRV wishes./3/
/3/See footnote 4, Document 300.
Thuy replied that the subject had been reported to Hanoi which will decide the matter in consultations in Vientiane. We
said then we could relax here and Thuy replied we have other work.
4. We said that although no progress was made at last Lau/Vance meeting,/4/ we believe it would be useful to meet again.
We said that we had a chance to reflect on the conversation as Lau had suggested. We did have a reaction to what had
been said. Lau said you mean you will have comments on my comments. We replied yes. Lau said he thought in principle
Minister Thuy would permit the meeting. Thuy said he agreed in principle but there must be something new. We asked
Thuy whether he had any new suggestions on their side. Thuy replied that the DRV position had been clear from the start.
The US must stop the bombing and we can then go on to other subjects.
/4/See Document 323.
5. We said at the last tea break there was talk of road blocks./5/ We said it was the job of negotiators to seek to clear out
road blocks. That is difficult to do in open sessions: it is more effective in private talks.
/5/The delegation's reports on the 16th formal session were transmitted as telegrams 19131/Delto 566 and 19137/Delto
568 from Paris, both August 7. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN(Incoming)-August 1968)
6. Thuy said that from the outset DRV had said that U.S. must unconditionally cease all bombing; on the U.S. side we have
demanded reciprocity and restraint but the DRV cannot accept that and therein lies the obstacle. Thuy added that recent
statements in the U.S. made the problem more complicated. We replied, maybe for you but not for us.
7. We said that we had not said that we had reached an impasse but rather a roadblock, and we should sit down and see if
we can clarify the situation and reach an understanding. We noted that at the last Lau/Vance meeting Lau had said there
were certain matters on which we were so far apart that he thought we could not reach an understanding.
8. We then referred to the Hien/Davidson/Holbrooke/Negroponte dinner and said we were impressed with Hien's
knowledge of the U.S. although we did not necessarily agree with his conclusions./6/
/6/The dinner with Phan Hien of the DRV delegation was reported in telegram 19329/Delto 587 from Paris, August 11.
(Ibid.)
9. We said that when Vance was in the U.S., he reported to and met with the President, the Secretary of State, Secretary
of Defense and others.
10. We suggested that Lau let Vance know what a mutually convenient date would be for a further meeting. Lau said he
would check his calendar./7/
/7/In telegram 223146/Todel 934 to Paris and Saigon, August 17, the Department noted its desire to have Vance
concentrate on the "our side-your side" formula during his next visit with Lau. (Ibid.) Regarding the August 19 Vance-Lau

meeting, see footnote 2, Document 334.

11. Thuy then inquired about the three pilots. We replied they are well and were happy to be back with their families. We
said the military were satisfied with the way the pilots were returned and that we hoped that the satisfactory way this return
had been handled would encourage them to release additional pilots.

330. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey/1/
August 18, 1968, 5:23 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and
Humphrey, August 18, 1968, 5:23 p.m., Tape F6808.01, PNO 3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared
specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. The President was in Texas; Vice President Humphrey was in
Boston. Prior to this call the President called Nixon and gave him virtually the same briefing. (Ibid., Recording of Telephone
Conversation Between Johnson and Nixon, August 18, 1968, 5:01 p.m., Tape 6808.01, PNO 2)
President: Hello.
Humphrey: Hello, Mr. President.
President: How are you, my friend?
Humphrey: I'm fine sir, up in Boston here today, doing a little work with the letter carriers.
President: Wonderful. I--this is not important, but I thought it was kind of significant, and you would want to know it, and I
called you confidentially for that purpose. When you were here, I told you about a rather important friend of ours who's
contemplating a trip. I've been notified that he will not make that trip, at least that side trip to Hanoi, the reason being that
he did not get permission.
Humphrey: I see.
President: So I think it's pretty--our people think it's significant that they're not interested in doing much. They're waiting to
see what happens to our convention and to our people. I think that at this time we've got one more week to go and I don't
think they're paying much attention to Gene,/2/ some, but I think that they're trying to see if they can get a better deal out of
Nixon than you, and it's evident that they can't, but they wouldn't let him come.
/2/Eugene McCarthy had submitted a Vietnam peace plank to the Democratic Platform Committee the previous day.
Humphrey: Yeah. Did you perchance have a chance to hear me on "Face the Nation"?/3/
/3/In this televised interview program earlier that day, Humphrey rejected much of McCarthy's peace plank and noted his
strong opposition to any mechanism allowing for the introduction of a coalition government in South Vietnam.
President: I got the latter part. I didn't get the other. You sure did look good on it.
Humphrey: I thought we kind of firmed up on the Vietnam position, Mr. President.
President: I think that's awfully important and I thought that what you said--I don't think anybody can ever touch you if you'll
make it clear, just one thing. What they're asking you to do is to stop the bombing of men and supplies who are going
southward aggressively over the DMZ to kill my boys, your boys, our boys.
Humphrey: That's right. Yes, sir.
President: Now, we'll be anxious to stop it. We've stopped it eight times. We stopped it for 37 days. We stopped it on
Buddha's birthday and when we've stopped it, what have they done? They just bring more men in, hit more cities. Now, if
they was--we'd be glad to stop it again if they'd just tell us they won't kill extra men because we do stop it. We don't want

that to be their gratitude. We don't want them to show their gratitude for our stopping by killing Chuck Robb/4/ and a bunch
more. Now, the American people understand that and they won't ever get mad at us if we get to them. We're not getting to
them. I'm not, Rusk's not, Clifford's not. Clifford touched on it just a little bit the other day. Because we don't want to get
into this campaign--get the war into it. But that is it. And Rusk sent me an analysis today, you ought to get, when you get
back to Washington, Rostow to give you an analysis of those seven points of McCarthy's. What is new in them is that he
just proposes in effect to turn over Southeast Asia to the Communists. That's the net of it.
/4/See footnote 5, Document 261.
Humphrey: I took him on pretty hard today. I said that I thought it was rather irresponsible, and that I didn't think we--we
couldn't go for an imposed coalition government. We ought not to define military tactics in a Democratic government.
President: You can't do that. You just can't do that. You just say this--which you did and which Clifford did--that you are
willing and anxious and eager to stop the bombing, that we have stopped eight times, that the last time we stopped
officially it was on Buddha's birthday. We stopped it--unilaterally--we stopped it, they didn't have to do anything. Now what
did they do? They hit our cities and so forth. Since then, they've brought 120,000 men in. Now, they've asked us to stop it
again--we're willing to stop it the ninth time.
Humphrey: Yes, sir.
President: We stopped it once for 37 days and they just built up. Now we'll stop it the ninth time provided they not use that
stopping to kill a lot more Americans. Now, what you're asking them to do--they're asking me to do--is to stop bombing the
men and materiels that are coming in, hand grenades and bombs and other things, stop bombing these so they can get
through to hit our men. Now, we'll be willing to stop it if they won't bring them through to hit our men. Now, do you want us
to let them come through to hit our men or do you want us to stop all we can? That's the question.
Humphrey: That's the net of it. Yeah.
President: Then the move's up to them. We're willing to stop the bombing. Now, they ought to address them and say,
"We'll stop it but do you insist on getting through and using these grenades on our men?" You see. Thank you.
Humphrey: All right. Thank you, Mr. President. Bye now.

331. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/
Washington, August 19, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Vietnam War, Courses of Action--Post Paris Talks,
1963, 1967-1968, n.d. Secret.
Clark:
As I told you the other day, I think that your press conference hit precisely the right tone in relating the current lull to the
enemy's expected third offensive./2/
/2/Clifford's August 15 speech contained, in addition to the specifics mentioned in this memorandum, a mention that
bombing would end if the DRV informed the United States "that they have reduced the level of combat, and that that
constitutes a de-escalatory step." See The New York Times, August 16, 1968.
I was troubled, however, by some of your remarks on the bombing.
I would agree that before March 31st the enemy had decided to increase substantially his infiltration. Furthermore, there is
certainly no evidence--and I have no reason to argue--that the restriction of the bombing has had any effect whatsoever on
his decision to engage in this massive infiltration effort.
However, I cannot agree that

--the restriction on the bombing has had no effect on the number of infiltrees arriving in SVN;
--the enemy will move the men and materiel they choose to; and
--if their losses go up in the process of moving, then apparently they just move more men and supplies.
In my view, we simply do not have enough information to make a net judgment of the impact of the bombing restriction on
the number of infiltrees.
On the plus side, we do not know that
--the restricted bombing campaign is much less costly to us in terms of aircraft and crew losses;
--we have been killing many more trucks and a larger percentage of the trucks moving south.
On the negative side, however, we know that
--greater numbers of trucks and people than ever before are getting through;
--the elapsed time for movement of men and supplies has probably been substantially decreased because they enjoy a
free ride down to 19 degrees. (A decrease in transit time, of say 30 to 50 percent, decreases the enemy's pipeline requirement by a corresponding amount.)
We simply do not know:
--to what extent the greater efficiency in killing trucks results from greater concentration of effort or from improved
techniques of detection and attack;
--whether attacking trucks north as well as south of 19 degrees would have the net result of more or less supplies getting
to the south;/3/
--how the level and rate of flow of men and supplies would be affected by attacks on targets other than trucks north of 19
degrees./3/
/3/A notation in Nitze's hand reads: "within limits we do."
The major uncertainty in any of our evaluations of the bombing is that we have no way of knowing what the enemy would
really like to do. Hence, we have no way of evaluating the restraints which the bombing places on the fulfillment of his
desires.
I understand--and have lived for many years now in amiable disagreement with--the argument which states that:
--enemy requirements in SVN are limited (although I personally believe the intelligence experts have consistently
underestimated the magnitude of these requirements);/4/
/4/A notation in Nitze's hand reads: "30 tons-60 tons-600 tons."
--enemy inputs to meet these requirements are relatively small in comparison with their total requirements and in any event
are easily supplied by outside sources without cost to NVN;/5/
/5/A notation in Nitze's hand reads: "why in disagreement."
--therefore, it is an easy matter for the enemy to budget for whatever level of effort he desires in the south.
There is a fundamental fallacy in this notion that the enemy has necessarily achieved what he desires.

In any real war, the net thrust in the field results from a balancing of all the factors rather than from the subordination of all
else to a single absolute priority. This rule holds for every war of which I know, in my own experience or from history. In
government--even totalitarian government--there is never an absolute priority. In this case the enemy's activity must be
considered against a background of the total constraints upon him. Hanoi has to budget not just for its activities in SVN but
for its total war effort: feeding, clothing and housing their people; air defense; repair; recruitment and training.
For example, I do not doubt for a moment that the enemy would have wished to mount an even larger offensive at Tet. In
their current efforts to get ready for a third crack at us, I do not doubt that they would want to put in as much as they could
against us to make this effort decisive.
Therefore, I must conclude that there were effective constraints on the enemy's level of effort at Tet just as there are
constraints which affect his third offensive.
The major constraint acting against him is, of course, our forces and allied forces in the field in the south. One of the other
constraints has been and remains our bombing of the north.
You will find that arguments which begin with the notion that the enemy is putting in all he "chooses to" shift--at a certain
point--to: in any case, "bombing is not decisive." Of course it is not decisive. But our action in SVN has not been decisive
yet either. No one constraint is, in itself, decisive. Our task is to build all those constraints to the point where he decides to
accept as his best realistic option what we mean by an honorable peace.
The bombing is, then, simply one of the constraints operating against the enemy. Any reduction of our bombing effort
enables him to increase the weight of his effort against us in the field.
One way to put the question is this: If we stop bombing, would Hanoi cancel the shipment of supplies to the south or send
fewer men?
The answer obviously is no. With the battle in its present intense and perhaps critical stage, Hanoi is trying to get the
maximum possible impact within limits set by all its constraints.
In any case, Clark, that is my reaction to: "they will move the men and material that they choose to". Life and war are just
not like that.
Walt

332. Editorial Note

Maintaining the Nation's stand in Vietnam was the primary topic of President Johnson's speech to the Veterans of Foreign
Wars organization in Detroit on August 19, 1968. The President laid out the components of the peace that he was seeking
in Southeast Asia: reinstitution of the demilitarized zone, removal of foreign forces from Laos and the implementation of the
Geneva Accords of 1962, withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam subsequent to the withdrawal of North Vietnamese
forces, and self-determination in South Vietnam in accordance with its constitutional framework. Following a specific
reference to his March 31 withdrawal speech, Johnson noted: "We have made a reasonable offer and we have taken first a
major step. That offer has not been accepted. This administration does not intend to move further until it has good reason
to believe that the other side intends seriously to join us in de-escalating the war and moving seriously toward peace. We
are willing to take chances for peace, but we cannot make foolhardy gestures for which your fighting men will pay the price
by giving their lives." In an allusion to the impending third enemy offensive of 1968, Johnson added: "So, my friends, let's
not be hoodwinked. Let's not be misled. In short, our people and their people must understand one thing: We are not going
to stop the bombing just to give them a chance to step up their bloodbath." For the full text of the speech, see Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pages 896-903.
As a result of this speech, members of the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris for the first time personally attacked
President Johnson during and after the formal negotiating session held on August 28. An analysis of their reaction to the
President's stiffened policy is in Intelligence Note No. 688 from Thomas Hughes of the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research to Secretary of State Rusk, August 30. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET)

333. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, August 20, 1968, 2:05-2:36 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking.
NOTES ON PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH TUESDAY LUNCHEON GROUP
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
Ambassador Ball
General Westmoreland
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
The President: We need to check the problems of troops in Chicago if riots develop at time of convention.
General Westmoreland: We have worked out detailed plans on contingency basis.
The President: Mayor Daley is calling up troops (National Guard) today.
Secretary Clifford: We have had a group working on this for some weeks. All hell could break loose.
The President: What about 3rd wave?
CIA Director Helms: The enemy is in position to have 3rd wave. It will probably come out like measles in next ten days to
two weeks.
The President: We really don't know?
CIA Director Helms: Yes.
General Westmoreland: Attacks are associated with major offensive in Northern I Corps and III Corps near Saigon. This is
a prelude to a general offensive. I expect it about the 24th or 25th at the beginning of the convention./2/
/2/The second of the "mini-Tet" offensives started with minor battles in the delta region and in the northern provinces
beginning on August 18 and intensified over the next several weeks. On August 22 Saigon was the target of VC rocket
attacks. The peak of the offensive occurred during the final week of August; it continued into mid-September.
Secretary Clifford: They can go either way. They are ready.
Secretary Rusk: I am not sure what their military men believe they are capable of doing. They may be allergic to these
political orders.
Walt Rostow: I honestly don't know what they will do.
General Westmoreland: I think their attacks are diversionary.
Walt Rostow: There was a low rate of infiltrators this month. This possibly indicates they will keep the forces in place.
Secretary Rusk: They brought in replacements beforehand.
Walt Rostow: My mind is more open than a few days ago.

General Westmoreland: The capability is there. We have preempted much of their attacks.
General Westmoreland: The South Vietnamese are stronger.
[Omitted here is discussion of strategic missile talks and the situation in the Middle East.]
The President: Can Hanoi move until they see who is nominated and what his views are?
Secretary Rusk: We will not get a movement before the convention.
Secretary Clifford: I see nothing to suggest they will attach significance to the convention.
Secretary Rusk: Vance got the impression that this is a holding action at Paris.
The President: Will they seriously negotiate before the convention?
Secretary Clifford: I agree they will not.
Ambassador Ball: I agree.
The President: Is Ball crying over there about his instructions?
Secretary Rusk: I would not think so.
Secretary Clifford: What reaction did we get from Averell Harriman on your Press Conference?/3/
/3/See Document 332.
Secretary Rusk: "I hope we would not undermine the March 31 statement."
The President: The Pope was turned down by Hanoi./4/
/4/In an August 18 letter to the President, the Pope noted that although he had planned to visit both North Vietnam and
South Vietnam in order to bring about peace, his overture had been rejected by the DRV. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Pope Paul VI) In telegram CAP 82324 to the President in Texas, August 31,
Rostow noted that he, Clifford, and Rusk had come down against using the Pope as a channel for communication with the
DRV because it would undercut both the Paris delegation and the Soviets. (Ibid.) Both are printed in Foreign Relations,
1964-1968, vol. XII, Documents 311 and 312.
/5/See Document 342.
What about the Norway thing?/5/
Secretary Rusk: They feel the Paris talks are too direct and too publicized.
Ambassador Ball: McCarthy has a fundamental shift in his position. He wants an interim coalition to prepare for election.
Secretary Rusk: Tonight's meeting with the Platform Committee will raise question on the Middle East, ABM, USS Liberty.
General Westmoreland: We are bombing trucks laden with war materiel.
The President: The Christian Science Monitor said today that the greatest number of infiltrators got through in the period
when we were doing the most bombing below the 20th.

334. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/

Paris, August 21, 1968, 1403Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-August
1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Harvan; Plus. Received at 10:26 a.m. The delegation's reports on the 18th formal session
are in telegrams 19705/Delto 636 and 19708/Delto 637 from Paris, both August 21. (Ibid.)
19703/Delto 635. From Harriman and Vance.
1. Today's tea break, although short, was one of the most interesting we have had. Thuy, Tho and Lau sat with us.
2. After some light conversation, we touched on the Czech situation and Tho observed that each country has its own way
of settling its problems.
3. Tho said that the Viet-Nam problem must be solved by us here. We replied that we agreed.
4. We remarked that we wished to apologize for accusing Thuy of making no constructive proposals. We said he had
made one constructive proposal--that we meet only once a week. After good-natured laughter by Tho, et al., we said we
hoped in the future there would be reason to meet more frequently. Governor Harriman said as he had mentioned
previously we would like to invite Tho and Thuy to have a meal or private meeting with us at any time.
5. Thuy replied that he had said to us both that it is normal to have both private and plenary meetings, but it is results
which count. Thuy said Lau had told him about Lau/Vance meetings and Thuy's preliminary analysis is that we have
offered nothing new toward peaceful settlement.
6. Thuy stated that we had said that the DRV offered no constructive proposals. The DRV has made its proposal on
cessation of bombing, which is realistic and it has not been realized. Thuy said we had suggested today more private
meetings and Thuy would like more time to study what Vance had said in private meetings and hoped we would study
what they had said.
7. We remarked that although nothing tangible had come of Lau/Vance talks, we thought the talks were useful./2/
/2/In telegram 19629/Delto 627 from Paris, August 19, Vance reported on his fourth private meeting with Lau, which
occurred that day. Lau noted that he would not discuss details of the Phase 1-Phase 2 peace proposal until the bombing
ceased unconditionally and he rejected GVN participation in the substantive talks. He did, however, want Vance to report
on his recent meetings in Washington. Vance informed him that "the President wants to know what would happen if all
bombing stopped" and that other American leaders shared similar concerns. Lau did note that negotiations on Phase 2 and
other matters would move forward after the complete bombing halt. (Ibid.)
8. Tho said that comrade Thuy had expressed his views of private talks suggested by Harriman. However, he would like to
think it over and let us know his answer in due course. Tho commented that any negotiation includes both official and
private meetings. The important thing, however, is that one should come to the conversations with good will and
seriousness. That is the only way to get results.
Comment: We both felt that Tho took over conversation at this point as Thuy was being too negative.
9. Tho added that Thuy and he had stated repeatedly that the DRV came to Paris with serious intent and good will. Tho
said their demand for cessation of bombing was serious and only after that could we settle other questions.
10. We said we were glad to hear their views on private talks. On cessation of bombing, President Johnson had stated our
position and you have stated your position. We said, as we previously had said, it is the function of negotiators to discuss
these matters frankly to see if the roadblocks can be removed.
11. Thuy replied that roadblocks can be removed but bombing destroys the road and the traffic can't move because the
cars fall in the hole. We replied bombing only makes holes in the road but doesn't build roadblock that we here must
remove. Thuy smiled and repeated that cars fall in the holes created by the bombing.

12. The atmosphere of the conversation was relaxed. Tho was more forthcoming than Thuy.
Harriman

335. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Trueheart) to
the Deputy Director (Denney) and Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes)/1/
Washington, August 21, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, East Asia Country File, Vietnam 1968. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Recent Covert Action Against North Vietnam
Maritime Operations
During recent months an average of between 15 and 20 missions have been carried out by Vietnamese-manned PTF's
below the 20th parallel. About a third of these missions have involved landings by rubber boats either on Tiger Island or on
beaches south of Thanh Hoa. Prisoners have been taken on these over-the-beach operations and during the seizure and
inspection of North Vietnamese fishing junks.
There are indications that the North Vietnamese are slowly developing a defense of sorts against PTF raids. An increasing
number of reports have been received, largely as a result of the interrogation of prisoners taken in North Vietnam, that the
North Vietnamese Navy is equipping fishing junks with automatic weapons and explosives and is training their crews to
defend the fishing fleets.
The most recent example of the North Vietnamese attempts to retaliate against the PTF's occurred on August 7. Three
PTF's came upon some 35 fishing junks just above the 19th parallel. PTF's, in searching the junks, unwittingly came upon
an armed craft. When one of its crewmen had been taken aboard a PTF he was discovered to have a hand grenade in his
possession. While he was being disarmed the crew of the junk sprang into action, killing two PTF crew members by rifle
fire. Another junk crew member obviously on a suicide mission, scrambled aboard the PTF with explosives strapped to his
body. He was killed before he could set off the explosives. At this point four additional junks opened fire on the PTF with
small arms and mortars. Coastal defense guns also commenced firing. The PTF's then circled around the armed junks,
firing on them until they sank. Nine military personnel and 2 civilians were captured and 12 killed on the enemy side. Two
PTF crew men were killed and 6 wounded. Mortars fired from the armed junks opened up holes in the PTF decking. Some
200 rounds were fired by coastal defense guns, the closest rounds landing some 50 meters from the scene of the
engagement.
Despite the failure of this particular attempt by the North Vietnamese to retaliate against the PTF's, further North
Vietnamese attacks are likely. Additional armed junks are reported, sometimes in numbers as high as 40, below the 20th
parallel. Previous small scale attacks occurred in December 1967 and July 1968.
In-Place Teams
On August 7, 1968 Hanoi radio announced the capture of a 12 man "Spy Commando" group. This group has been
identified by MASCO as the team "Easy" which infiltrated North Vietnam by parachute on August 10, 1963. While it is not
clear when the team came under Hanoi's control, it has been evident for the last few months that the team has been
"doubled." It is possible that Hanoi decided to announce capture of the team as a means of demonstrating lack of faith on
the part of the US in entering peace negotiations. At the same time the announcement would demonstrate to the North
Vietnamese public the regime's efficiency in capturing an infiltration group. Hanoi's announcement may also have been
hastened by an order given to the team in late spring to begin moving toward a landing zone from which 4 of the team
members could be exfiltrated.
It is possible that Hanoi will make further announcements of the capture of such teams since there is some evidence that
others of the remaining 6 infiltrated groups above the 20th parallel maybe doubled.
Approximately 4 "Strata" teams are in North Vietnam to conduct road watch activities North of the DMZ along the LaosNorth Vietnam border at all times. These teams are infiltrated and exfiltrated by helicopter./2/

/2/The specific activities of the MACV Special Operations Group teams are discussed in an April 29 memorandum from
Trueheart to Hughes. (Ibid.)
Psychological Activities
Black radio operations have now been expanded to a total of 14 hours per day on two frequencies; white radio activities
are carried on for two hours daily while gray transmitters broadcast six hours per day in Cantonese and 20 hours in
Vietnamese. In addition, airborne transmitters over the Gulf of Tonkin broadcast for 3-1/2 hours daily, usually repeating
black radio broadcasts. Each of these broadcasts is carried on two different frequencies./3/
/3/The initial proposal for these operations was discussed initially at a joint INR-CIA meeting on June 13. (Memorandum
from Trueheart to Hughes, Denney, and Deputy Director for Research Allan Evans, June 18; ibid.)
The success of those broadcasts devoted to the notional Sacred Sword Patriotic League (SSPL) is attested by a report
(based on an interrogation) that, early in July, 17 Catholic men and women put to sea from Nghe An Province in the hope
that they would be captured by SSPL boats, as they call the PTF's. At the 30 fathom curve they met 2 US warships
(destroyers?). The warships gave the Vietnamese food but would not take them aboard. They sailed about until their food
gave out in the hope that they would encounter PTF's. Some wanted to commit suicide rather than to return to North
Vietnam. However, they were deterred by the women aboard who reminded them that since they were Catholic they would
not go to heaven if they committed suicide. On their return to Nghe An the leaders of the group were arrested and have not
been heard of since./4/
/4/This report is now being checked with the 7th Fleet. [Footnote in the source text.]
Among other psychological activities, more than 100 letters are mailed in third countries to North Vietnam every month.
Some one and a half million leaflets are distributed over North Vietnam, along with some three to five hundred news
letters. Over a thousand fixed frequency radios and several hundred rice bowls, the latter bearing the symbol of the SSPL,
are given to fishermen on junks stopped and searched by the PTF's.
Intelligence Reports
Approximately 100 intelligence reports are prepared and distributed every month, some from in-place teams, but the bulk
from captives taken off junks. Several junk captives are being used as agents. They are tasked to discover certain
information, return to North Vietnam by boat (as do all captives) and are taken again at some later time at which they
furnish the information required.

336. Memorandum for Personal Files/1/

Paris, August 22, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson,
Johnson, Lyndon 1968-69. Personal; Secret.
I believe that the failure of the President to stop all bombing of North Viet-Nam in late July or early August (as we
recommended) is an historic tragedy of possibly wide consequences. It is my belief, weighing all the evidence, that Hanoi
would have been preempted from a new widespread attack--particularly in the DMZ area and on Saigon. (Even Xuan Thuy
is quoted as saying to a French reporter "Why doesn't President Johnson try us out? If we fail to respond, he can start
bombing again.") If the bombing of North Viet-Nam had been stopped, we would then have satisfied the Soviet leaders and
could have been in the midst of discussion on how to proceed from here. President Johnson's trip to the Soviet Union
would have been publicly laid on. Nuclear restraint talks would perhaps have been more active, and other bilateral matters
might have been more active, and other bilateral matters might have been in process of opening up.
These factors might have weighed in the balance to help the more cautious viewpoint in the Soviet councils to prevail
against the intervention in Czechoslovakia. This may seem far fetched but it certainly looked as if the Kremlin leaders were
divided and couldn't agree for some weeks. If they had been involved all out on a new tack with the U.S., it is difficult to
believe they would have thrown that all down the drain. Whereas instead, the image of Johnson looked rigid re Viet-Nam,
and this did not give much hope to early U.S. moves. In fact, it seems that the decision to invade Czechoslovakia was
made at the last minute as Johnson was invited to Moscow only a few days before their action, and it was almost

announced the morning of the invasion./2/

/2/The summit was cancelled by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20. The President and his advisers
discussed the relationship of the invasion to Vietnam on August 22. (Notes of the Cabinet Meeting, August 22; Johnson
Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings) The summary and full transcript of this latter meeting are ibid., Transcripts of
Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
W. Averell Harriman/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

337. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Abrams) to the President's Special
Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Saigon, August 23, 1968, 1304Z.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, 1968 Secretary
of Defense Files, VIET 092.2. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to Wheeler, McCain, Bunker, and General George Brown,
Commander, 7th Air Force. General Wheeler's office distributed copies to, among others, Clifford, Nitze, Rusk, and Helms.
MAC 11409. The questions you have posed come at a very important time./2/ We are convinced that the enemy has
determined to make, over the next days and weeks, the maximum military effort of which he is capable at this time.
Because the bombing over the North Vietnamese Panhandle is so linked to the military effort he can make in South
Vietnam, I am happy that you have posed the questions and that I can address them now.
/2/These questions were transmitted in CAP 82092 from Rostow, August 23. (Ibid.) In an August 19 memorandum to
Clifford, Rostow argued that Hanoi would increase significantly its southward infiltration if the United States halted the
bombing. (Johnson Library, Alain Enthoven Papers, Bombing of North Vietnam) In critiquing Rostow's assertion in a
memorandum to Nitze, August 22, Enthoven, noting that the bombing did not impair the NVA/VC in the South from
receiving adequate supplies and reinforcements, instead argued that North Vietnam would reduce its infiltration in
accordance with a reduction in its attritional losses after an end to the bombing campaign. (Ibid.)
Question 1: What is the effect of our current bombing operations in North Vietnam?
Several effects are of importance. One is the destruction of materiel itself. We believe we are now destroying or damaging
approximately 15 per cent of the trucks believed to be moving into South Vietnam. This amounts to an average of 90
trucks per week. Second, and of greater importance, is the reduction we have caused in the number of trucks moving.
While other factors may also be at work, it is our conviction that the air interdiction program in the North Vietnam
Panhandle has been the primary agent which has reduced trucks detected from a level of 1000 a day in mid-July to
between 150 and 200 a day at the present time. A third effect is to prevent the enemy from massing artillery and air
defense means in the area to the north of the DMZ form which they can attack our forces. Further, we interfere with his
ability to concentrate forces and supplies for sudden attacks through the DMZ against our units. There are, of course, other
effects such as pinning down many thousands of essential air defense and LOC support forces.
Question 2: What would be the military effect of a cessation of the bombing?
Again, there are several important effects. First, military materiel (much of it POL and ammunition, as fires and secondary
explosions testify) would be able to reach the DMZ or the borders of Laos unimpeded. We believe the current attrition from
truck destruction alone, not to mention truck park storage areas, is running several hundred tons per week on the average
in the NVN Panhandle. Second, the truck flow could be expected to return to a level of 1,000 a day or even higher within
as little as a week. If we take average truck loading at 3-1/2 tons, we are talking about an increase, repeat increase, in
southward movement which could amount to 1,500 tons per day or more. Next, the enemy would be able to mass artillery,
air defense means, and ground units freely north of the DMZ for use against our forces. He could deploy his air force into
areas north of 17 degrees from which to threaten or attack our forces and installations throughout much of South Vietnam.
He would be able to reopen his railroad as far south as Vinh and subsequently to Dong Hoi. He would thereby free
additional numbers of trucks to support his forces in the south. Finally, freed from interdiction north of 17 degrees, the
enemy could move reinforcements to the DMZ by truck or rail thus drastically shortening transit time.

Question 3: Since March 31 what is the average number of trucks destroyed and trucks damaged per week? What is the
average number of trucks sighted in the Panhandle per week? We are aware of the difficulties, but what is your best
estimate of the total number of trucks (sighted and unsighted) that flow through the Panhandle each week and the
proportion of this total that we are now getting?
As indicated above, we are currently averaging about 90 trucks destroyed and damaged per week since 31 March. The
average number of trucks detected in the Panhandle per week has been 1300. Our best estimate of total number flowing
into the Panhandle each week during that period is 620. We estimate that we are destroying or damaging 15 per cent of
these. I would like to emphasize however that, as indicated above, we believe the major impact of our bombing effort is
found in the reduction of truck flow, rather than in the numbers actually destroyed.
Question 4: What is the estimate of military casualties we inflict on the enemy each week in the bombing of North
Vietnam?
The military casualties resulting from our bombing efforts are obviously extremely difficult to estimate with any confidence.
Destroyed and damaged trucks probably account for some 200 casualties (KIA and WIA) weekly. Also, nearly one-half of
the 235 weekly road interdictions we are averaging occur at night when road crews are present. There are undoubtedly
substantial casualties among road repair/maintenance crews and also among air defense crews, but any estimate would
be extremely speculative. A figure of 5 to 10 thousand per month does not seem unreasonable. However, military
casualties in North Vietnam are not, in my judgment, the most significant measure of the effectiveness of our bombing. As
indicated above, its major effects lie in reducing the weight of effort that can be directed against our forces.
Question 5: Is there any possibility of your providing for the President even an approximate estimate of the additional
casualties we would take if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam?
During the period May through July this year we have been sustaining in the fighting in I Corps losses amounting to an
average of 240 killed in action each week. Approximately 70 percent of these have been U.S. The intensity of enemy
action, i.e. the scale and duration of combat in which his units are involved, is a direct determinant of the magnitude of our
losses. Assuming that the cessation of bombing would be reflected in a several-fold increase in his logistic capability to
support combat, and in the intensity of combat, we would have to expect a several-fold increase in U.S. and allied
casualties in I Corps. With the bombing authority now in effect, I am able with forces available to limit the enemy's
capability in South Vietnam by interdicting his roads and destroying substantial amounts of his munitions and supplies
before they reach South Vietnam. In addition, I am able to suppress his artillery and air defense north of the Ben Hai so
that our positions just south of the DMZ are secure. If the bombing in North Vietnam now authorized were to be
suspended, the enemy, in 10 days to two weeks, could develop a capability in the DMZ area in terms of scale, intensity
and duration of combat on the order of five times what he now has. If he should develop this, it would, in my judgment,
make our positions in northern Quang Tri to include Dong Ha and the Cua Viet untenable. I cannot agree to place our
forces at the risk which the enemy's capability would then pose.3
/3/In an August 23 memorandum to Rusk, Bundy criticized the facts and conclusions that Abrams reached in his telegram.
First, the reduction in numbers of trucks moving southward was likely related to heavy flooding. Second, in the event of a
bombing halt, it was not likely that the DRV could increase the flow of tonnage by an additional 1,500 tons per day. Third,
casualty rates far exceeded any past predictions by the CIA. Fourth, Bundy doubted that the enemy could multiply his
logistical capabilities by a factor of five and would hesitate to increase his capability since bombing would resume if such
an increase was detected. "I find these responses a highly exaggerated and tendentious presentation," Bundy concluded.
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 72 D 192, Dean Rusk White House
Correspondence, PR-Hold-Vietnam-FE) Similar criticisms of the supposed factual errors and logical fallacies in Abrams'
response are in memoranda from Warnke to Clifford, all dated August 29. (Washington National Records Center,
Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, 1968 Secretary of Defense Files, VIET 092.2) In an undated
memorandum to Wheeler, Clifford also was critical of Abrams' telegram. (Johnson Library, Alain Enthoven Papers,
Bombing in North Vietnam) Warnke's analysis of both Rostow's memorandum and Abrams' telegram are in an August 30
memorandum to Clifford. (Ibid.)

338. Editorial Note

From 1:07 p.m. to 3:06 p.m. on August 23, 1968, President Johnson, his foreign policy advisers, and key Executive Branch
officials, including Secretary of Defense Clifford, Secretary of State Rusk, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Wheeler,
and Army Chief of Staff Westmoreland, met with the bipartisan leaders of Congress in order to brief them on world
developments. While the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was the major topic of discussion (see Foreign Relations,
1964-1968, volume XVII, Document 85), the subject of Vietnam was also addressed:

"Secretary Rusk then gave a summary of developments in Viet Nam.

"The President called on General Westmoreland for his views. He reported that one of the chief worries was the possibility
of a third general offensive by the enemy. At the Tet offensive a new psychological victory was achieved, but the
communists suffered a very severe military defeat. He likened the Tet offensive from the standpoint of the American troops
to the Battle of the Bulge. To the Vietnamese this was their Pearl Harbor. This woke them up like nothing else had before
and in this sense it was a blessing in disguise. This created a political atmosphere that permitted national mobilization, the
drafting of 18 and 19 year old youngsters which traditionally had not been done in Vietnamese society. It permitted us to
weed the men from the boys among the officer, non-commissioned officer ranks and the poor ones released. It gave
confidence to the ARVN because they fought bravely and well in general, and it gave them that confidence that they
needed which has served them well since that time. It also served to accelerate the modernization of our men with better
weapons. He then gave a brief summary as to what might be expected in the future.
"The President then called on Secretary Rusk to give his concluding observations on the situation in Vietnam.
"The President said that he wanted to make one observation before the meeting concluded. He said as follows:
"'Because you are confronted with and because we are deeply concerned with the welfare of our men and our country and
the lives of our men who are committed to our custody, I just thought I'd share with you just one paragraph from a cable I
have received from General Abrams:
[Omitted here is the text of Abrams' answer to Question 5 in his telegram MAC 11409, Document 337.]
"The President continued:
"'So that's a sample of what the responsible career Commander in the field has to say about some of the plans that are
proposed and the Commander-in-Chief has to constantly bear these recommendations in mind in making these
judgments.'" (Summary of Meeting in the Cabinet Room, August 23; Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the
Cabinet Room)

339. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the President's Counsel (Murphy)/1/
August 26, 1968, 8:04 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and
Murphy, August 26, 1968, 8:04 a.m., Tape F6808.01, PNO 10-12. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared
specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. The President was in Texas; Murphy was at the Democratic
National Convention in Chicago. According to notes of message to Johnson transmitted by telephone at 12:31 a.m. on
August 25, Humphrey noted: "We're doing well on the platform. I've been keeping a watch on it." (Ibid.) Rusk's assessment
of the platform is in telegram CAP 82062 from Rostow to the President, August 18. (Ibid., National Security File, Files of
Walt Rostow, McCarthy Platform--1968) Another critique of the minority plank by Wheeler was transmitted to the President
in telegram CAP 82215, August 28. (Ibid., White House Central Files, Conference Files, NB 19/CO 312, Vietnam, Situation
in, January 1968)
Jones: I have missed this part. You say you have been working on something?
Murphy: I have been working on this thing with Hale Boggs and he has come up with some language that seems to me to
be all right, and the Vice President will go along with it. Hale would like to personally tell you what the language is. In this
language "to stop all bombing of North Vietnam unless this action would endanger the lives of our troops"--/2/
/2/A draft speech for the President to deliver at Chicago by Rusk and Presidential speechwriter Horace Busby was
transmitted in telegram WH 82068 from Rostow to the President, August 18. (Ibid., National Security File, Files of Walt
Rostow, Speech Draft--President's Address to the Democratic Convention) Rostow's revisions are in his telegram WH
82076 to the President, August 19. (Ibid.) A finalized version of the speech was sent to Deputy Special Counsel Larry
Levison from Califano in telegram LBJWH 8259, August 27. (Ibid.) Numerous other drafts and modifications of the speech
are ibid.
[Jones passed the telephone to the President.]

President: Charlie, it does. We got that positively. Let's don't mislead and deceive people. I had rather be a poor peasant
and wear a wooden shoe than be out on the door by myself.
Murphy: In that case, well-President: The "unless" is no goddamn meaningful. We know it. Read Abrams' wire/3/ in front of you. He says it does.
/3/Document 337.
Murphy: Well, in that case, the language would not call for the bombing to be stopped.
President: Well, that's right. But why do you want to imply that you are going to stop it? You're just saying to Hanoi
something that it would take me a year to explain and then they'd say I am running away from it.
Murphy: I suppose one consideration is it's a really critical situation here at the convention and it looks like the chairman of
the platform committee who is sitting here might not be able to go to his platform committee except with a disagreement
between the President and the Vice President. He thinks that would be a terrible situation.
President: Well, the President is not going to agree to stop all of the bombing, Charlie. Period. Now I just hate to say it; I
am just like you. I had rather vote for Nixon than to kill my boys.
Murphy: Well, I am with you, but I don't think we can sell that. Now, Hale is here and he would like to-President: I don't want to get into that because I don't want to talk to anybody at the convention. I don't care what they
would like to do.
Murphy: All right, sir.
President: I just positively don't want to do it and I think you had better say you are talking to Jim Jones. That is why I
asked you to go out there. If I had wanted to negotiate with each one of these individuals, I would go out there. I just can't
do it. But I would say to them--if they won't go for the language that we suggested, which I think puts Hanoi off bad
enough, then they have to go on their own responsibility, which I will not accept./4/
/4/The President was not so definite in a telephone conversation with Postmaster General Marvin Watson that day at 10:39
a.m. He noted: "I wouldn't let anybody else know it because you tell somebody within the delegation, they'll go tell some
Texas reporter and it'll be around. So we can't tell anybody. But I would tell Daley that's what we want to do and that's what
we plan to do, and that's what you're going to recommend to him, and you believe that if you tell me that he wants me and
you want me and both of you say that there's no danger and both of you say that there'd be a hell of a demonstration for
me, you believe I'll do it, but you can't say, but you believe I will. And that you want him to be in a position to say that he
invited me but hasn't talked to me and hasn't been in communication with me, where he can honestly say it." In this same
conversation, Watson and the President discussed a possible draft of Senator Edward Kennedy and whether the President
would address the convention. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation
Between Johnson and Watson, August 26, 1968, 10:39 a.m., Tape 6808.02, PNO 5-6)
[The President then put Jones on the line to speak to Boggs. In the ensuing conversation, they discussed the language of
the platform on Vietnam. Boggs expressed his concern over the likelihood of open disagreement between the President
and the Vice President on this issue. Boggs also objected to the conditionality of the President's preferred statement,
especially the phrase, "This action should take into account a positive response from Hanoi." He noted that the convention
would break up over the inclusion of this formulation. Boggs expressed concern about presiding over something that would
result in a three-way split among Johnson, Humphrey, and the doves, which he characterized as "utter pandemonium."
Jones then asked for Murphy and handed the telephone back to the President.]
President: Charlie, we are not going to write the platform from down here. These are responsible men. Humphrey says to
me that he does not favor "stop the bombing." If he tells the truth, he ought to stay with it. If he doesn't, he ought to go on
his own. Now it's that simple. We do not favor any words that say "stop the bombing." Let's make that clear and repeat it
over and over again. We do not favor any words that say we are ready to stop the bombing. We think that signals Hanoi
that the convention has ordered the commander in chief to stop the bombing. That's number 1. We think it plays politics
with the war, number 2. We think it puts a bunch of draft-dodgers and pacifists who've never seen a uniform in charge of
telling us that we can't bomb the people until they get out of the DMZ or even then where they can run over our men. So
we do not favor anything that says "stop the bombing." Now, is that clear? Now, if they've got to have that language to

satisfy their pacifists, the language ought to say what they mean. Now, the language that Dean Rusk and the [National]
Security Council people and the President would not find it necessary to just get out and denounce, although they might
not accept it or follow it, but just might not have to split off from, would be language that says this: "stop all bombing of
North Vietnam when this action would not endanger the lives of our troops in the field." Now that would mean--what we
mean by that is this: the President would determine when, the [National] Security Council would determine when--the Vice
President's a member of it--the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State would determine when. Those policy
decisions are made in Washington. But we could never stop the bombing if we thought by so doing we would have a
bloodbath, and no son-of-a-bitch ought to ask us to. Now that's number 1. Now that's all we're saying. Now then, if you
want to go further, I don't see any need to go further at all, but if you want to go further, you could say this action--what
action--stopping the bombing--this action should take into account a positive response from Hanoi, or if you want to say a
response from Hanoi. Now, we're not going to just take this action unilaterally, as I said on March 31st. We've taken
unilateral action at those two big cities because that would not endanger the lives of our men. But if I move it right down to
the DMZ, where they can come through day and night instead of only at night, where they can come bumper to bumper, a
thousand trucks a week were coming in July 15, we've got them down to 150 now, but if we stopped the bombing a
thousand would start immediately next week. Now Abrams said it would increase their strength five-fold. Now he said
when they increase their strength five-fold he has to pull out of the northern I Corps area. That means Chuck Robb and
every damn one of them get run over. They've got to retreat. Now these fools who don't know anything about it cannot tell
us that we've got to retreat, because we're not going to do it. Now if we have to be against the platform and say that we're
a bunch of idiots, and that we can't have a Republican platform, we can't even stand for the Democratic war as strong as
Nixon does, why then we have to just say so, and let them write what they want to. But this business about its timing
indicates that they are determined to stop the bombing and then the timing is a matter that they want me to hurry up on but
they give me a week or so. So the word "timing" ought to be out of there, just whatever they say. Now we can't do anything
on "the prospect of the dream." We did 90 percent of it and said that if you'll match any of it, we'll take further steps. But
when they put "the prospect" in there, they just say I ought to take this action on hope. Now, I just can't do that. And I think
that we ought to say to them, that if its 30-30-30 [split between the positions of the President, the Vice President, and the
antiwar Democrats], if Hale resigns, all these other things, there's not any of them is as important as killing a bunch of men.
Now, we're just now going to kill the men, and now we're going to say so when that platform's over with. Now, if you give
me the language which I'm going to say, I'll give it to you and you can take it down and let Jim see it--wait a minute--give
me that [to Jones]--you get you a pencil now and take this down--if we have a speech, Charlie, this is what we're going to
say, and this is going to be the President's position. There's no use in agreeing to something today and unwriting it
tomorrow night: "This country's pledge to freedom is written in the treaties that we Democrats and Republicans have
concluded by solemn constitutional process. They link our safety to the safety of allies in this hemisphere, across the
Atlantic, and on the western rim of the Pacific. They were made to prevent World War III and to protect the vital national
interests of the United States. There could be no greater disservice to peace than to let those who might become
adversaries think that these treaties might not mean what they say. Our fidelity is written in the blood that our sons have
shed on battlefields in Korea and Vietnam, for where we had to fight to stop aggression before it led to World War III, we
did fight. I know there are well-intentioned people who want to stop our bombing in Vietnam regardless of the
consequences. No American wants peace more than I. Hanoi knows that I am prepared to stop the bombing--I have
stopped it eight times. Today, four-fifths of North Vietnam is free from bombing, although every square mile of South
Vietnam is subject to bombing with rockets and mortars. Need I remind you that the President is commander in chief.
Those who carry the burden of the battlefield tell me that stopping the bombing of North Vietnam would increase severalfold the enemy's capabilities at the DMZ and that such action would immediately require allied forces to withdraw from
important strategic areas of I Corps. That is why I have said we cannot substantially increase the dangers to our own men
by this unilateral action and why we need some response from Hanoi."
[The President then noted that the Vice President had told him that he agreed with what the President had said at the
August 18 VFW speech. The President added: "We are not going to change our position because I've got 550,000 men
that are there, and I'm not going to do either of two things. One, I'm not going to substantially increase their capability and
two, I'm not going to order my men to retreat." He concluded with additional criticism of the Humphrey Vietnam plank.]/4/
/4/The vote for the pro-administration Vietnam plank on August 28 was 1,576 in favor and 1,041 opposed. In a telephone
conversation with Humphrey at 4:40 p.m. that day, the President informed him that while he could have come to Chicago,
he had decided against it because Humphrey was "doing a good job" on the Vietnam plank. He suggested that the Vice
President allow word of the President's support for him leak out. (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation Between
Johnson and Humphrey, August 27, 1968, 4:40 p.m., Tape 6808.03, PNO 3) Humphrey accepted the nomination on
August 29. During a telephone conversation with the Vice President that day, Johnson recommended a number of
prospective running mates for Humphrey. (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Humphrey,
August 29, 1968, 10:41 a.m., Tape 6808.03, PNO 4)

340. Editorial Note

On August 26, 1968, Secretary of Defense Clifford met with Department of Defense staff and service representatives for

the weekly Secretary of Defense staff meeting. Among the participants were Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Earle Wheeler, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense George Elsey,
Secretary of the Navy Paul Ignatius, Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown, Army Chief of Staff General William
Westmoreland, Air Force Chief of Staff General John McConnell, Marine Corps Commandant General Leonard Chapman,
and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas Moorer. Staff Secretary R. Eugene Livesay took notes of the meeting and
wrote a summary of the major topics discussed. The participants first discussed events in Vietnam and Southeast Asia
during the preceding week:
"Mr. Clifford said it has been a full week and it will be well to go back and review it. Activity in Southeast Asia picked up
perceptively. As General Abrams has been warning us and we in turn have been alerting the American public it may be
that the enemy's third offensive has started. Mr. Clifford, however, believes it is too early to reach this conclusion. General
Abrams feels it has been started. The activity has been mainly in the I and III Corps. Casualties are up substantially. The
usual Thursday announcement this week may show our casualties twice that of the preceding week. Another indicator
shows a great degree of participation by the ARVN in repelling the attacks. ARVN casualties are also up substantially and
will be much higher than ours.
"He sees a reason to delay his own personal decision on whether or not the enemy's third offensive has started. There is
some possibility that General Abrams' 'spoiling' operations might be successful, and he would like to give General Abrams
every opportunity to abort this offensive. An enemy third offensive would have the effect of being generally inimical to our
interests. It could have an adverse effect on negotiations in Paris, particularly if the enemy escalates and we are forced to
escalate. If the enemy is determined to start the third wave offensive then we would have to face up to it. Later on he
would like General Wheeler and General Westmoreland to comment on this activity.
"Mr. Clifford said that last Monday the President spoke to the Convention of Veterans of Foreign Wars in Detroit, Michigan.
It was a stern speech. The President reiterated his attitude that Hanoi has to take some action before he takes further
deescalatory steps."
Later in the meeting, a general discussion of the military situation in Southeast Asia occurred:
"Mr. Clifford said this has been an important week in Southeast Asia. It may augur for serious developments ahead. He
would like for General Wheeler followed by General Westmoreland to comment.
"General Wheeler said that in North Vietnam the enemy continues to rehabilitate the lines of communications and other
facilities, including various commercial installations (e.g. cement plants). Movement of enemy troops and supplies to the
South is at a high level. Yesterday there was a dog fight between 2 F-4s and 2 MIG 21s, although none of the aircraft were
damaged. Infiltration is at a high rate. In July 1968 we identified 18,700 enemy moving south. The total from 31 March-31
July 1968 is between 100,000 and 110,000. Mr. Clifford asked if the July figure is less or more than June. General Wheeler
said a little more. In March 1968 they moved 28,000; April-37,700; May-30,000; June-16,900; and July-18,700. Supply
movements to support the additional people and the step up in military activity are substantial.
"There has been a perceptive step up this past week in operations country-wide in South Vietnam. Activity has been
particularly heavy around DaNang and Chu Lai in I Corps and Tay Ninh in III Corps. The enemy is also pushing toward
Saigon. There was considerable activity in the Duc Lap Special Forces camp but the enemy is now retreating from this
engagement into Cambodia. Enemy agents and documents appear to confirm that the third offensive has started. General
Abrams had previously noted that the enemy plans included attacks on outlying installations initially. These attacks were to
draw U.S. and ARVN forces from important target areas to give the enemy a greater chance of success when the third
wave attacks start. General Wheeler said he thinks the evidence of step up in activity is highlighted by casualties. This past
week 323 U.S. were killed, nearly twice as many South Vietnamese--594, and around 5,000 Viet Cong/North Vietnamese,
the highest since May 1968 for the enemy. Furthermore, there was considerable fighting over the weekend. Yesterday we
lost 50 men killed, the South Vietnamese 120, and the enemy 928. There is no slackening off by the enemy. In fact, his
activity is showing a steady climb. We have not discussed this publicly. We find it is better for the newsmen to discover this
increased activity by themselves and apparently they are. We can anticipate a continued rise of enemy activity in the next
several days. When they will be able to attack major objectives we are not sure.
"Mr. Clifford asked why the shelling of Saigon only lasted one day. General Wheeler said that he thinks that they were able
to sneak in and set up a position but our quick reaction forced them out right away. General Westmoreland said he would
agree. Saigon defenses have never been in better shape. This is partly because the South Vietnamese have put a single
officer in command. At the time of the Tet offensive General Vien had to take command of the defense of Saigon. Only an
officer of his stature was able to control General Loan who was in charge of the police. During the May offensive General
Khang was in command of the Saigon defense. General Loan cooperated with him because they were friends. President
Thieu was not happy with this arrangement but he needed to get his ducks lined up before making a change. Fate
intervened and when General Loan was wounded, an overall commander was put in charge of both South Vietnamese
military and the South Vietnamese police for the defense of Saigon. The cohesiveness of these forces has been improved.

Among other actions taken is a decision that he, General Westmoreland, made about a year ago to have all of the watch
towers being manufactured sent to the Saigon area. The watch towers contain starlight scopes, radios, and are manned by
personnel using high power field glasses. From these towers they are able to triangulate on enemy fire. The towers are
tied into the fire direction center for counter fire. The fact that we were able to react quickly to the recent firings isn't to
suggest that they won't try to do it again.
"As to whether the third wave offensive has started or not, General Westmoreland feels that it has. He sees it as a
sustained effort and we may not see a greatly increased tempo over that apparent now. He does believe there will be
some increase. Some intelligence indicates it will last until 10 September. They will try to infiltrate cities with sapper units
and their objective will be to destroy communications, such as blowing bridges. They are hitting the outposts which allows
them to operate with impunity and to hide the movement of supplies. They are trying to win a tactical victory for the
headlines it will bring. They will also attempt to have us divert resources from the high priority areas. Another purpose in
hitting outposts is that when our forces concentrate to meet these attacks they can move supplies through areas away
from the outpost. He thinks the attack on Duc Lap Special Forces camp was for this purpose. It is in a remote area and
manned by CIDG personnel. They brought considerable forces against the camp and blew a bridge on the only route. We
reinforced the camp with Army infantry battalions and used tactical air to put back the attack. A political reason for this
attack against the Special Forces camp was to attract the native tribesmen (Montagnards) to their side. Their chief leader
(Y-B'ham Enoi) recently visited Saigon to work with the Saigon Government on better arrangements between the FULRO
movement and the Saigon government. The enemy is trying to impress these tribes with the feeling that the enemy is
going to win and this would stop the growing rapport between Saigon and FULRO.
"General Westmoreland said the Achilles Heel of the enemy is logistics. Logistics governs their ability to sustain their
offensive. This stresses the importance of their lines of communications. He thinks we are in a sound posture. Our mobility,
flexibility and firepower allows us to shift our forces readily and concentrate firepower. It is also interesting to see some of
the recent high kill ratios. For example, in one engagement 215 enemy were killed vs. 7 friendly. In another area 436
enemy were killed in two days.
"General Westmoreland said in summary he believes that the third wave offensive has started, but General Abrams'
counter-actions have kept it to a low order detonation. He sees a sustained enemy effort, with some step-up in the
tempo." (Johnson Library, Clark Clifford Papers, Minutes of Secretary of Defense Staff Meetings, March-September 1968)

341. Editorial Note

At 11:15 a.m. on August 27, 1968, President Johnson received a telephone call from Senator Everett Dirksen. Subsequent
to discussion of the President's health and the Democratic National Convention, the following conversation ensued:
"Dirksen: Are you any closer to going out there to that convention?
"President: No, no. I haven't made any plans to go and rather doubt that I will. I don't know. I might change my mind, but I
haven't made any plans to go and I don't know what I can contribute. I think they'll have a big knock-down drag-out with the
pacifists and the fellows that Hanoi has been working on. But it looks like the vote has been pretty good. They took
Kennedy and McCarthy and McGovern, and they wrapped all their doves together, and they couldn't get but 30 votes.
"Dirksen: What's the late word from Paris?
"President: Nothing. They're waiting to see if they can have a better deal with anybody that they select. They know that
they can't get a better one from me. They know they can't get a better one from Nixon. So they're trying to play this other
side. I can tell you this--this would ruin us if it got out, but to show you their attitude--the Pope sent his man over and he
came to the Ranch and he wanted to propose that he go from Bogota to Hanoi and then to Saigon and that he would say
to them that we would stop the bombing if they would do certain things. We told him that we'd be enthusiastically for his
doing that and that we'd do anything that was reasonable. See, he was very pleased, and went back. The next--a few days
ago, he came and said that they wouldn't let him into Hanoi--they just told him to go to hell. At the proper time, I think, after
we get the conventions out of the way, he might let that leak out. It would be a mistake if he didn't--if he did--if we did, but I
think that that pretty well reflects their present attitude. They're hoping that somebody that'll insist on a coalition
government or somebody that'll insist on stopping the bombing."
The President then urged Dirksen to "let out" word of the government's estimate that infiltration would increase five-fold if
the bombing halted. Discussion of other political issues followed. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording
of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Dirksen, August 27, 1968, 11:15 a.m., Tape F6808.02, PNO 7; this

transcript prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian)

342. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency (Carver) to
Director of Central Intelligence Helms/1/
Washington, August 29, 1968.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, SAVA (Carver) Files, Job 80-R1720R, GAC Chrono, June 1968-August 1968.
Secret; Sensitive.
SUBJECT
A Vietnam Hunch
1. I have a strong visceral hunch, unsupported by evidence, that our friends in Hanoi are contemplating some major move-either military, political or both--within the next few days.
2. There are two small straws in the wind which precipitated this feeling. One is the quadrille currently being danced in
Oslo in conjunction with the Ohio exercise. As you may recall, on 2 July the Norwegian Charge in Peking was sought out
by the North Vietnamese Ambassador (Loan) who used the pretext of delivering a memo on the Geneva Accords but was
obviously fishing for an invitation to Oslo, ostensibly because Hanoi was dissatisfied with Paris and interested in opening
other channels./2/ This overture has gone through various permutations, the net result of which is that the DRV
Ambassador in East Germany is supposed to go to Oslo to talk to the Norwegian Foreign Minister and the Norwegians
have arranged (through Harriman and the Department) for a U.S. briefing officer (Dan Davidson) to be taking a vacation in
Oslo at the time of the North Vietnamese Ambassador's visit. The most interesting feature of this exercise has been the
scheduling, which was on the verge of being set about three weeks ago when the North Vietnamese suddenly pushed it
back to mid-September. It is now set for 20 September./3/
/2/See footnote 3, Document 291.
/3/The delegation in Paris became involved after Harriman and Vance encouraged the contact. (Telegram 18302/Delto 487
from Paris, July 22; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET OHIO)
Ngo Minh Loan, DRV Ambassador to China, indicated his wish to have a DRV diplomat, first himself and then Ambassador
to the Soviet Union Nguyen Chan, meet with Norwegian officials in Oslo at the same time an American representative
would be there. (Telegram 216977 to Oslo, Paris, and Saigon, August 7; telegram 19233/Delto 576 from Paris, August 8;
telegram 216977 to Paris, August 8; telegram 217164 to Paris, August 8; telegram 5992 from Oslo, August 9; telegram
218776 to Oslo and Paris, August 9; telegram 218055 to Paris, August 9; and telegram 218821 to Paris, Oslo, Saigon,
Moscow, and Kathmandu, August 9; all ibid.; and telegram CAP 81918 from Smith to the President, August 9; Johnson
Library, President's Appointment File--Diary Backup, August 1968) Harriman suggested and the Department agreed to
send Davidson to Oslo in order to receive a briefing from the Norwegian Government on the talks with Chan. (Telegram
18825/Delto 537 from Paris, July 31; telegram 212498 to Paris, July 31; and telegram 18855 from Paris, August 1;
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET OHIO) During the course of
the Ohio contact, Loan stated that the DRV was not satisfied with the course of the Paris talks and desired to establish
contacts in other venues such as Norway. INR noted that the DRV likely pursued this initiative to pre-empt retaliation
resulting from their third offensive. (Memorandum from Hughes to Rusk, September 6; ibid.) Further documentation on the
contact is ibid., S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 461, OHIO (DID).
A scheduled meeting between Chan and the Norwegians for August 15 was cancelled. Loan notified them that Chan could
come to Norway no sooner than sometime in the next month, and a meeting was scheduled for September 20. (Telegrams
5997 from Oslo and 218915 to Paris, both August 10; telegram 220574 to Paris, August 14; telegram 221207 to Oslo,
Paris, and Saigon, August 14; telegram 221310 to Oslo, Paris, and Norway, August 15; telegram 6141 from Oslo, August
20; telegram 224140 to Paris, August 20; telegram 224590 to Oslo, Paris, Saigon, and Moscow, August 20; and telegram
6222 from Oslo, August 26; all ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET OHIO)
3. The other straw in the wind is Thuy's comment to Harriman and Vance at the 28 August tea break. Harriman and Vance
said they hoped Thuy and Le Duc Tho could soon get together with them informally over dinner. Harriman's house was
offered as the locale. Thuy answered that September 2 was the DRV National Day and they would be very busy until then.
After September 2 the North Vietnamese would give an answer to the invitation./4/
/4/Reports by the delegation on the 19th formal session were transmitted in telegrams 20029/Delto 653 and 20036/Delto

657 from Paris, both August 28. (Ibid., A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-August 1968)
4. This is all pretty tenuous but the date juggling in Oslo and Paris hits me as more than coincidental. I am possibly hypersensitized by what happened just before Tet in the Buttercup operation. As you will remember, Buttercup/1 suddenly
became unavailable and was not even able to attend the courier's briefing because of the press of other business./5/ Had
we read these tea leaves right, we would have been alerted to the fact that something was in the wind. I have that same
sort of hunch now. The North Vietnamese may be planning nothing more than an attempt against Saigon, for which
numerous warning signs are already up. They may simply hope that this time enough confusion will be caused and popular
demonstrations mounted to alter the political atmospherics and, hence, not wish to engage in much serious discussion
anywhere until they have made their try.
/5/See Document 6.
5. If my hypothesis has any validity, something along these lines (i.e., a Saigon attack) is the most logical explanation.
There is always the possibility, however, of something more dramatic such as an NLF call (sufficiently endorsed by Hanoi)
for an immediate, unpoliced, in-place cease fire. In any event, I intend to ensure that my colleagues remain particularly
alert and watchful during the next few days.
George A. Carver, Jr.

343. Editorial Note

In August 1968 Ambassador Bunker requested covert financial support of President Thieu's efforts to assist the
development of a newly-established political organization that aspired to become a broadly-based group with mass appeal,
the National Alliance for Social Revolution, colloquially referred to by the Vietnamese as the Lien Minh. In September the
303 Committee authorized the first allotment of what would become $725,000 of funding, pending further review of the
entire program. Only half of the authorized total was passed in increments to Thieu during the period September 1968March 1969. With this funding, the Thieu government established the Lien Minh in its principal base in Saigon and
particularly the Cholon area, formed committees in several provinces, and began cadre training. Initially an organization
comprised of six political parties, the Lien Minh drew its membership from Ky's National Salvation Front, Thieu's Free
Democratic Forces, and the Congress of Vietnamese Trade Unions, South Vietnam's largest labor federation.

344. Memorandum for the 303 Committee/1/

Washington, August 29, 1968.
/1/Source: National Security Council, 303 Committee Files, Vietnam, 1965-1969. Secret; Eyes Only. A typed note reads:
"Approved by the 303 Committee on 3 September 1968. Final approval to be obtained from the Secretaries of State &
Defense and from HA."
SUBJECT
Proposal for Financial Support of Government of Vietnam-Sponsored Political Front in South Vietnam
1. Summary
Political activity in South Vietnam over the last 12 months has resulted in the emergence of political leaders and groupings,
in and out of the Government, some of whom are now united in the realization of the need to develop a viable political
mechanism to compete with the National Liberation Front (NLF). These elements, with the support of President Nguyen
Van Thieu, have organized the "National Alliance for Social Revolution", known in Vietnamese as the "Lien Minh". As the
result of recent conversations with President Thieu, in which Thieu has thrown his weight behind this Alliance, Ambassador
Bunker now proposes that the U.S. Government covertly finance the Lien Minh with the sum of [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified] to be spent in increments over the remainder of the FY 1969 [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified]./2/
/2/See Document 343. In telegram CAS 375 from Saigon, August 26, Bunker wrote: "I believe the total funds required for
Lien Minh will be substantially greater than we had at first anticipated. While President Thieu states that his other

commitments prevent him from supporting Lien Minh financially, I believe that once the program demonstrates its
capabilities, the Vietnamese can be brought to realize that their financial participation will be necessary and desirable. I
shall actively encourage President Thieu in this direction. In the meantime, I strongly recommend that the 303 Committee
endorse full financial support for this activity. A tentative Lien Minh budget calls for [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] for the four-month September-December 1968 period. I believe a more realistic total figure for this period to
be [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and recommend that the 303 Committee authorize this amount and a
similar rate of support for the final two quarters of FY 69. We here will move ahead as aggressively as possible to tighten
up the planning which has already taken place, and to the extent we are able and deem wise, will do what can be done to
insure that costs do not become excessive in terms of results achieved." (National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 VIET S) In CAS 374 from Saigon, August 26, [text not declassified]: "At present
our intention is to concentrate our support in developing Lien Minh's organizational infrastructure." Thieu would receive
[text not declassified] of previously authorized funds that week while the balance of the [text not declassified] programmed
for political action would be disbursed very soon as well. An additional [text not declassified] would be requested promptly
to finance activities for the rest of 1968 and an additional [text not declassified] for the balance of FY 1969. (Department of
State, INR/IL Historical Files, East Asia Country File, Vietnam (Lien Minh) 1968) Carver's assessment of the request
outlined in these two telegrams is in his August 27 memorandum to Helms. (Central Intelligence Agency, SAVA (Carver)
Files, Job 80-R01720R, GAC Chrono, January 1968-August 1968) In a memorandum to Helms, August 29, Carver
provided a more detailed assessment. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Meetings with the
President, July-December 1968 [2]) Trueheart assessed the request in an August 26 memorandum to Hughes.
(Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, EAP General Files, EA Weekly Meetings, 1968)
2. Problem
On 1 December 1967, the 303 Committee approved a proposal to provide [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
to support individual assembly members and nascent political parties in Vietnam. This action reflected awareness by both
President Thieu and the US Mission of the lack of an effective political force to compete with the NLF in South Vietnam.
Since that time, President Thieu has achieved the coalescence of three political groupings which offers some hope of
becoming a political bulwark for the existing government, a potentially significant competitor to the NLF, and a vehicle for
manifesting the extent to which the Vietnamese are united in their opposition to Communist rule. The three groupings are
Tran Van Don's National Salvation Front (NSF), Tran Quoc Buu's CVT-Hoa Hao Farmer Worker Association (CVT/FWA),
and Nguyen Van Huong's Free Democratic Forces (FDF)./3/ The amalgamation of these elements into a significant front
capable of attracting additional political support depends upon a variety of factors including:
/3/In a July 26 memorandum to George Denney, Deputy Director of INR, Donald S. Macdonald, then INR Deputy Director
for Coordination, noted: "In October 1967 some [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was spent to aid
Revolutionary Dai Viet and CVT (labor) candidates for the Assembly. Prior to this the 303 Committee had in August
approved the expenditure of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in FY 68 for the creation of a left wing political
group which would serve as an alternative to the National Liberation Front, particularly for any high ranking defectors from
the latter organization. There is no evidence to suggest that this program has ever been fully implemented." (Ibid., East
Asia Country File, Vietnam 1968)
(a) the ability to crystallize and channel political emotions;
(b) a political and social program which is attractive to the population of South Vietnam;
(c) effective political organization; and
(d) demonstrated performance.
Needed first is sufficient financial support for organizational and cadre training purposes. Ambassador Bunker has been
authorized to make available to President Thieu [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] as previously cleared by
the 303 Committee and is now asking the 303 Committee to authorize the passage of an additional [less than 1 line of
source text not declassified] for the remainder of FY 1969.
3. Factors Bearing on the Problem
a. Origin of the Requirement--This specific proposal was initiated by Ambassador Bunker in a telegram to the Department
of State and CIA dated 26 August 1968. It relates to the requirement initially proposed by Ambassador Bunker in
November 1967, and approved by the 303 Committee on 1 December 1967, to organize a mass political movement in
Vietnam.

b. Relationship to Previous 303 Committee Actions--On 1 December 1967, the Committee approved a proposal to give
Ambassador Bunker discretionary authority to stimulate and encourage the evolution of Vietnamese political groups and
authorized [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for this purpose.
c. Operational Objective--Our objective is to create a pro-government political front in South Vietnam which is capable of
involving and engaging the interest of Vietnamese in the political life of their country, of encouraging unity by providing a
vehicle for the concrete expression of widespread opposition to Communist rule, of attracting the political support of all
non-Communist political parties in South Vietnam and, in the process, to become an effective competitor to proCommunist organizations in South Vietnam.
d. Proposal
(1) It is proposed that Ambassador Bunker be given discretionary authority to provide financial assistance to President
Nguyen Van Thieu, for support of the Lien Minh, in the following amounts:
U.S. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for the period September-December 1968.
U.S. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for the period January-June 1969.
(2) A total sum of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] (of which [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
requires approval of the Committee at this time) would be passed to President Thieu throughout FY 69 in increments and
would be used by him to finance the organization of the basic Lien Minh structure and training of political cadre.
Ambassador Bunker says that President Thieu sees the Lien Minh as "a political instrumentality which will permit the
people to identify more closely with the Government, and would provide a magnet for rallying nationalist sentiment to
confront the Communists in the political area in the not too distant future." President Thieu intends to develop a program to
permit Vietnamese women to participate in Lien Minh and plans to use the organization as a catalyst for self-help activities.
(Note: Although President Thieu was informed that American financial assistance was considered "seed money" and that a
larger GVN contribution was expected, the President emphasized his limited financial assets and said that he hoped the
Americans "would provide most of the Lien Minh finances.")
(3) [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] working under the Ambassador's direction, would pass funds directly to
President Thieu and provide advice and assistance in the use of those funds. The President has appointed one of his key
senior advisors as his designee with whom [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to work on the organization (but
not the funding) of Lien Minh.
e. Risks Involved
While risks are certainly involved in this endeavor, on balance they do not appear excessive. There should be no direct
evidence of U.S. funding. Funds are to be passed only to President Thieu who would be unlikely to divulge their origin. Our
Embassy reporting already indicates that Lien Minh insiders are assuming GVN funding of the organization. As the funds
are put to use, allegations of U.S. backing are also likely to be made by Thieu's political opposition but in today's Vietnam
this sort of comment is not unusual and in fact would tend to contradict more dangerous and widespread charges of U.S.
intentions to "sell out" the GVN. Alleged use of GVN funds could lead to charges of corruption against Lien Minh
supporters but such allegations would be manageable as the organization becomes a useful and constructive link between
the government and the people. Incremental funding, which permits some leverage over the shape and substance of the
organizations, should assist in moving Lien Minh toward the intended constructive role and thereby minimize such
criticism. Further, as the organization gains momentum it can logically be the recipient of legitimate community
development funds. Finally our own intensive [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] coverage of the GVN political
scene should give us a constant reading on the risk factor and allow time for remedial steps if it grows to critical
proportions./4/
/4/In telegram 38284 from Saigon, September 20, Bunker reported Thieu's statement that "he is not in a hurry to call for
general support for the Lien Minh" in order to have adequate time to find the right people to lead the organization and to
avoid the appearance of creating a personal political party. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1967-69, POL 13 VIET S)
f. Support Required from Other Agencies
None.
g. Timing of the Operation

[1 line of source text not declassified] Ambassador Bunker's direction when it is endorsed by the 303 Committee.
4. Coordination
a. U.S. Departments and Agencies--This proposal was discussed with Assistant Secretary Bundy and Mr. Rostow on 26
August 1968, and they have approved in principle.
b. U.S. Ambassador
Ambassador Bunker initiated this proposal to the Department of State and the CIA on 26 August 1968.
c. Host Country
President Nguyen Van Thieu has solicited U.S. financial and advisory support for this operation.
5. Recommendation
In the national interest, discretionary authority is requested for the Ambassador to spend U.S. [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified] for support and development of Lien Minh and its projects for the remainder of FY 1969. [less than 1
line of source text not declassified] would be expected to report periodically to the 303 Committee on the actions taken and
funds expended in implementation of this proposal. While additional funds are likely to be necessary beyond FY 1969
every effort will be made to obtain legitimate alternative funds from Vietnamese sources or, at least, to encourage the
Vietnamese to raise on their own funds sufficient to mask the American contribution and give the Vietnamese a sense of
having a direct personal stake in, commitment to and identification with this activity./5/
/5/A memorandum for the record, September 5, by Peter Jessup of the 303 Committee staff, recorded the minutes of the
303 Committee's meeting of September 3. According to this memorandum, during the meeting Bundy "made a few
comments in support of 'getting something moving in a direction considered vital.' He said there were admitted risks but
pointed out we were dealing with people we trust, with professional talent, and that putting all the eggs in Thieu's basket
was preferable to a separate funding of factional groups." Both Rostow and Nitze agreed with the recommendation subject
to higher-level approval. The Committee approved the measure. (National Security Council, 303 Committee Minutes,
1968) However, Clifford expressed reservations about the scheme and it was not immediately approved. (Memorandum
for the Record, October 3; ibid.) The Bureau of the Budget was unwilling to release the funds without Clifford's approval.
(Memorandum for the Record by Bohlen, October 9; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, East Asia Country File,
Vietnam (Lien Minh) 1968) Although a decision on the dispersal of full program funds was put off until the next
administration came into office and until Thieu came up with a firm proposal, on November 25 Rusk, with the concurrence
of President-elect Richard Nixon's transition representative Robert Murphy, authorized Bunker to dispense an additional
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for the Lien Minh as a stop-gap measure. (Memorandum from Bundy to
Rusk, November 25; ibid.)

345. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey/1/
August 31, 1968, 10:18 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and
Humphrey, August 31, 1968, 10:18 a.m., Tape F6809.01, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared
specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian. The President was in Texas. He spoke with Nixon at 9:30 a.m. and
with Rusk at 9:55 a.m. prior to calling Humphrey. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) In a conversation with the Vice President 2
days earlier, the President made the following remarks: "The best thing we can do together is try to get you peace before
November. Now, you have laid the groundwork with the platform. Be careful, don't say anything, it runs away from it. But
let us then go into Hanoi and say, 'Now, goddammit, you're not going to get anything better from Humphrey. He's going to
be worse. Let's get peace.' You wrap that up, you'll have a landslide." (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation
Between Johnson and Humphrey, August 29, 1968, 10:41 a.m., Tape 6808.03, PNO 4-5) Humphrey had accepted the
Presidential nomination of the Democratic Party on August 29.
Humphrey: I think you'll find that on our Vietnam situation that the platform resolution is not only supported but--I met with
the Newsweek and Time people, and that bothered me. I said I thought that the biggest contribution made to the campaign
was both that Mr. Nixon and myself both say that our positions on Vietnam were so close together that the enemy should

understand that the President receives our combined support and that the foreign policy on Southeast Asia was not going
to be, as far as Vietnam is concerned, a matter of public debate or of public differences. And I think that we can
somewhere along the line get that kind of thing out, maybe together./2/
/2/During a telephone call from Harriman in Paris, Bill Moyers, a former Presidential aide, noted: "There won't be any
change in policy here for awhile. The platform plank is in accordance with the President's wishes." In response to
Harriman's question as to why he had not tried to arrange a compromise, Moyers replied: "Some of us did. We went to the
VP and suggested a compromise between the minority report and the majority report, but they were not interested in a
compromise. It seems to me, Governor, that the Humphrey forces had decided that they were going to take their stand as
close as they can to Nixon in the belief that no one can cut back from the Left. Nixon is not going to get any support from
the Doves, so he thinks he is not going to make the war an issue but campaign as close as he can to the Nixon
position." (Memorandum of telephone conversation, August 31; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman
Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Subject File, Elections, Campaign--1968, General) In a
congratulatory note to Humphrey written that day, Harriman offered to return to Washington and meet with Humphrey and
his advisers in order to provide as much assistance as possible to the Vice President's campaign. (Letter from Harriman to
Humphrey, August 31; ibid., Humphrey, Hubert H., 1963-1968)
President: I had suggested to Rusk--we had talked about the possibility, when we could, of maybe getting a joint statement
from Humphrey and Nixon to Harriman to say to Hanoi that you better get on with the business of making peace without
killing a lot of extra people, your own, you're losing them by the thousands, and a good many of ours that you've stepped
up the last few days. You just must not count on this political year division. We're going to be united at the water's edge,
and I'm authorized by both the Vice President and Nixon to say to you that there's going to be no division that you can
exploit between now and this election. We think that a carefully worded statement of two or three sentences that Harriman
could say to them quietly without a threat might save a lot of lives. If they harden, as they're appearing to do, nobody can
tell, the date's now September the 2nd, then we must harden. We've got to meet it.
Humphrey: Well, I think that'd be helpful. I really do. I think it'd do away with any kind of trepidation. I think that if
somebody'd like to quietly take the initiative on it and get it done.
President: Well, I'll have Rusk talk to his people and get a couple of sentences up and I'll be talking to both of you.
Humphrey: I think that would be very, very good for us.
President: I'll be talking to both of you a little later.
Humphrey: All right, sir.
President: Okay.
Humphrey: Thank you. Bye bye.