Article Anonymous

From Non-Intervention to Mediation: The Transformation of the US Cyprus Policy
(1960-1967)
ABSTRACT
This article aims to reveal the transformation of the US Cyprus policy during the years 1960-
67. Although the US was reluctant to get involved in the conflict during the early 1960s, the
islands' developments made it impossible for the US to refrain after a point. For this reason,
the US tried to manage the Cyprus dispute with the purpose of avoiding any harm to the
harmony and cohesion in the NATO Alliance. During this period, the US occasionally
confronted Turkey and Greece separately. However, despite all the tensions, it was careful not
to break relations with its allies completely.
On the other hand, Turkey and Greece considered themselves indispensable for the US during
this period. Each ally always expected the support of the US against each other. However,
most of the time, both allies were dissatisfied with the attitude of the US at the same time.
Keywords: Cyprus, Greece, NATO, Turkey, USA.
Introduction
Since the beginning of the Cold War, Turkey and Greece had been essential to rely on in
Anglo-American geopolitical plans of the Middle East. Both states believed that they could
ensure their presence under the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) security
umbrella. For this reason, both states became NATO members and signed several bilateral
agreements with the US in the 1950s. As a result, both states, independent of each other,
wanted to see the US by their side in the face of the threats they faced. However,
unexpectedly, the disagreement over Cyprus in 1960-67 caused both states to broaden their
threat perceptions against each other. This situation caused vital problems within the alliance
for the US. Both states expected the US to get involved in the problems in Cyprus and take
their side. In this case, the attitude of the US gained importance. The US would either not be
involved in the emerging problems in any way, or if it did, it would cause either party to be
dissatisfied with the result. Surprisingly, the US preferences generally dissatisfied both sides
at the same time in this period.
The US adopted an attitude that changed over time in the face of the problems in Cyprus in
1960-67. Therefore, it would be helpful to divide the US Cyprus policy into three periods.
First of all, the US followed a policy of non-intervention in the Cyprus issue during 1960-63
when constitutional disagreements arose on the island. Secondly, in the period between
December 1963 and June 1964, when inter-communal conflicts intensified on the island, the
US for the first time felt the need to warn the parties politely from a distance to ensure order
in Cyprus and showed a will to undertake the task of Britain in the region together. Finally, in
the crises of 1964 and 1967, the US intervened directly in the conflicts that emerged on the
island and mediated between its two allies eliminating the possibility of an armed conflict
between the parties. The US Cyprus policy, which transformed over time in 1960-67 was
determined by the Cold War conditions, Britain's role in the region, and intra-alliance
relations.
This article argues that the US was able to oppose its NATO allies, Turkey and Greece,
from time to time due to the Cyprus dispute in 1960-67. However, it was careful not to
completely break the relations with those allies despite all the tensions. In this period, by
transforming its policy and following a balance between its allies, the US tried to ensure that
the harmony and cohesion within NATO would not be disturbed due to the Cyprus issue. On
the other hand, Turkey and Greece separately considered themselves as indispensable allies
for the US. However, most of the time, both states were disappointed with the US Cyprus
policy at the same time.
In the article, first of all, the emergence of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and the US
behind-the-scenes facilitation efforts in the late 1950s will be briefly discussed. Then, the US
tendency to stay out of the Cyprus dispute in 1960-63 will be investigated in light of the
developments on the island. In the next part, the reasons for the transformation of the US non-
intervention policy in December 1963 and June 1964 will be examined. Lastly, the nature of
the US intervention and mediation activities in 1964 and 1967 will be analyzed in the context
of intra-alliance relations.
The Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and US Facilitation
Following a long period of diplomatic activities in the late 1950s, the final negotiations
between Turkish and Greek prime and foreign ministers to determine the future of Cyprus
were held in Zurich on February 5-11, 1959. As a result of these negotiations, four documents
were signed between the parties: the Gentleman's Agreement, The Draft Treaty Concerning
the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, the Treaty of Alliance, and the Treaty of
Guarantee. Then, it was time for the signed documents to be approved by Britain and Cypriot
community leaders. For this purpose, Turkish and Greek foreign ministers went to London.
The negotiations held in London ended on February 19, 1959. The Memorandum Setting out
the Agreed Foundation for the Problem of Cyprus agreed to establish an independent state
based on a consociational administration in Cyprus. The RoC declared its independence after
all the procedures for the transition process were fulfilled on August 16, 1960.1
Although Stearns strongly argues that 'in the events leading up to Cypriot independence in
1960 … the United States was an interested observer but not a participant, the US was the
mastermind leading to the establishment of the RoC in the late 1950s. 2 As the US started to
take over the leadership of the Western Bloc in the Middle East from Britain in the mid-
1950s, it became the arbiter of geopolitical balance in the Eastern Mediterranean in particular
at this time. In order to convey the power correlations between Greece and Turkey and keep
Cyprus at least neutral in the Cold War conjuncture, the US administration encouraged
Greece and Turkey to reach a compromise on the creation of an independent Cypriot state for
the sake of NATO's southern flank.3 According to Xydis, the negotiations for this compromise
were 'invisibly directed' by the US Embassy in Rome.4
The US administration wholeheartedly welcomed the conclusion of an agreement on the
substance of a final settlement of the Cyprus issue on February 19, 1959. US Department of
State immediately issued an official statement expressing its gratitude for the compromise
among the related parties.5 In addition, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower addressed
messages of congratulation to the Prime Ministers of Greece, Turkey, and Britain upon the
successful conclusion of the Zurich and London negotiations. 6 Finally, when the RoC
declared its independence on August 16, 1960, the US administration recognized the new
state and established diplomatic relations by raising its consulate-general in Nicosia to an
embassy.7
When the RoC was established, the US policy on Cyprus consisted of four main objectives
at first. The first one was to ensure Cyprus' political stability and form a solid front against
communism with Britain, Greece, and Turkey. The second was completing pro-Western
economic development and democratic institutionalization in Cyprus. The third was to ensure
free access to the surveillance and communication facilities on the island. The last was to
make the British bases on the island open to the legitimate use of allied Western countries. 8 In
addition, vital interests of the US in Cyprus were specified in a memo prepared by the State
Department for the National Security Advisor of the US President. These were defined as
access to communications facilities, the need to counter the communist threat, and the
preservation of peaceful relations between the Greek and Turkish communities.9
The Collapse of the Constitutional Order in Cyprus and US Non-Intervention
Despite the long-standing efforts of the parties involved, the RoC's declaration of
independence did not immediately create a peaceful environment in NATO's southeast flank.
As Fouskas rightly pointed out, the Zurich and London Agreements were not designed to give
independence and democratic freedoms to Cypriots.10 Protecting the interests and stability of
Turkey, Greece, and NATO Alliance in the final solution, rather than Cypriot communities,
was the primary purpose.11 Moreover, Cypriot community leaders were not involved in
preparing the agreements in 1959. The Cypriot community leaders accepted the agreements
following the reconciliation of Turkey and Greece. 12 The Greek Cypriot leader Archbishop
Makarios' consent to sign the agreements was only available by the intensive pressure of
Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis and British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd.13
He and other Greek Cypriot politicians sustained the attitude of Makarios against the
Zurich and London Agreements following the independence. For instance, on February 10,
1961, Minister of Interior Polykarpos Giorkatzis and Minister of Labor Tasos Papadopoulos
on April 1, 1962, made public speeches in favor of enosis and against the agreements.14
President Makarios also told the Cyprus Mail newspaper on March 28, 1963: 'Every Greek
who knows me knows very well that I will not try to create a "Cyprus nation." The
agreements have created a state, but not a nation.'15
The US diplomatic staff in Cyprus also noticed the attitude of the Greek Cypriot officials
towards the Zurich and London Agreements. Charles W. McCaskill, the consular officer
responsible for economic and commercial matters of the US, was surprised when he observed
the negative feelings of the Greek Cypriots about the agreements. According to McCaskill,
the Greek Cypriot community believed that the Zurich and London Agreements would not
work since they were not fair, and the guarantees given to the Turkish Cypriot community
were excessive.16
On the other hand, the perspective of the Turkish Cypriot community on the Zurich and
London Agreements was not much different from the Greek Cypriots. Rauf Denktaş, one of
the representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community, expressed his reaction against the
Zurich and London Agreements in a meeting on March 22, 1960, to Nihat Erim, who was the
representative of Turkey in the negotiations during the establishment process of the RoC:
'This state will not and should not run anyway, let's act accordingly. We cannot follow a
Greek Cypriot-friendly policy. If the government demands it, let the others do it.'17
In addition to Cypriot community leaders' negative attitudes towards the Zurich and
London Agreements, problems regarding the functioning of the state began to emerge in the
very first years of the state. The RoC was established based on consociational democracy,
which recognized the two communities and protected their different identities within the
framework of four main principles guaranteed by the constitution. As defined by Lijphart,
these principles were sharing power in a grand coalition, segmental autonomy, minority veto,
and proportionality for different communities in representation and public opportunities.18
Firstly, the executive power was shared by a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot
Vice President, whose powers were almost similar. In addition, a form of grand coalition was
also established in the Council of Ministers, with seven Greek Cypriot and three Turkish
Cypriot ministers. The autonomy principle was implemented culturally by separate
municipalities and two national Communal Chambers with extensive powers regarding
communal matters. The minority veto was implemented through the veto powers of the vice-
president, particularly on foreign affairs, defense, and security issues and the House of
Representatives, regarding taxation, municipal and electoral laws. Lastly, a principle of
proportionality was carried out in favor of Greek Cypriots at a ratio of 70:30 in the structures
of the legislature, judiciary, and civil and military (60:40) services.19
The trial of consociational democracy in the RoC was short-lived. As some critics pointed
out, the most significant cause of the failure was consociationalism itself. 20 In a short period
of three years, problems began to arise between communities regarding the functioning of the
state. First of all, the constitutional provision for a 70:30 ratio in public service jobs could not
be implemented since President Makarios believed there were not enough qualified Turkish
Cypriots to fill 30 percent of the public service positions. In response to this, the Turkish
Cypriot members of the House of Representatives tried to block the renewal of the income-tax
bill inherited from the British Colonial Administration. Another area of constitutional trouble
was experienced in the composition of the national army. The constitutional provision for a
60:40 ratio for establishing a Cypriot army could not be realized since the Greek Cypriots
insisted on mixed units while the Turkish Cypriots demanded company-level separation. The
last significant disagreement was establishing separate municipalities in five major towns.
The British Colonial Administration had given de jure recognition to separate Turkish Cypriot
municipalities following the EOKA rebellion in the late 1950s. The Cypriot constitution later
guaranteed this practice. However, President Makarios attempted to hinder this provision
since its implementation could lead to partition in the future. 21 As a result, the Cypriot
constitution became almost impracticable in a short period of three years.
President Makarios, who did not hesitate to express his negative sentiments about the
Zurich and London Agreements at every opportunity, started to complain that the current
constitution did not enable the functioning of the state in late 1963. For this reason, according
to Makarios, there should have been some radical changes in the constitution. Ultimately, on
November 30, 1963, without consulting Vice-President Dr. Fazıl Küçük, Makarios announced
that he would amend the constitution in thirteen points.22
Considering the amendments requested by Makarios one by one, it was seen that these
were not simply constitutional amendments. 23 Makarios tried to change the structure of the
state radically by reducing the Turkish Cypriot community to a minority under the Greek
Cypriot rule. Turkish Cypriots were forced to leave the Council of Ministers, the House of
Representatives, and other public services protesting Makarios' demands. Consequently, they
created their enclaves for their security on the island. 24 Then, Makarios notified London,
Athens, and Ankara of his proposal about the constitutional amendments. In the face of
Makarios' memorandum, Turkey declared that it was impossible to approve the said
amendments.25 On the other hand, Makarios stated that he sent the memorandums only to
inform the related parties, not because he expected any positive or negative response.26
Ankara's announcement that it would not accept the constitutional amendments caused an
increase in tension on the island. On December 21, 1963, two Turkish Cypriots were killed
when the Greek Cypriot policemen patrolling a Turkish neighborhood in Nicosia wanted to
stop a car. This event sparked the inter-communal conflicts that would spread to the entire
island. Ninety-nine Turkish Cypriots and eighty Greek Cypriots lost their lives in the conflicts
on the island until the end of the year.27
In this period, US Cyprus policy was determined by the Cold War conditions and
geopolitical balances within the alliance in the region. Although the US administration
encouraged Turkey and Greece behind the scenes to compromise on creating an independent
state in Cyprus at the end of the 1950s, it believed that the police force in Cyprus should still
be fulfilled by Britain, which is one of the guarantor's powers. For this reason, the US
administration strictly avoided seeming to favor any side or being an authority that would
provide a solution in the face of inter-communal conflicts. The Washington administration
argued that the emerging problems should be resolved through inter-communal dialogue or
the efforts of the guarantor powers of the 1959 Agreements. This attitude of Washington was
observed clearly in the instructions sent to the diplomatic mission in Cyprus. Secretary of
State Dean Rusk warned Ambassador Fraser Wilkins on January 9, 1963: '... any effort by
either party to draw us into dispute should be politely but firmly rejected.' 28 In this period, the
US Department of State concluded that any intervention to the conflicts in Cyprus would
create an adverse effect and harm the interests of the US in the future.29
US Secretary of State Dean Rusk held meetings with Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun
Cemal Erkin and Cyprus President Makarios while inter-communal relations gradually
deteriorated. In these meetings, whereas Erkin blamed the Greek Cypriot leadership as the
source of the problems in Cyprus, Makarios complained about the intransigent attitude of the
Turkish side. Consequently, both parties expressed that they expect the Washington
administration to play a constructive role in resolving the disputes between parties. However,
Rusk openly rejected these requests. He stated that there were enough problems on the agenda
of the US foreign policy apart from Cyprus at that time. Rusk's proposal to both sides was to
resolve disputes through dialogue between two communities. In addition, he recommended
that the guarantor powers could play a constructive role in case of failure.30
The attitude of the US administration against Makarios' constitutional amendments was in
favor of keeping the balance established by the Zurich and London Agreements in 1959. For
the first time, Makarios mentioned his intention to amend the constitution to the US
Ambassador to Cyprus Fraser Wilkins on June 6, 1963. 31 The US Department of State
informed Ambassador Wilkins on the department's tendency to consider the current
constitution and agreements valid on August 15, 1963. According to the US Department of
State, the problems expressed by Makarios could only be resolved through dialogue between
the parties and the support of the guarantor powers.32 Ambassador Wilkins conveyed this view
to Makarios on August 27, 1963.33 However, in his meeting with Ambassador Wilkins on
November 26, 1963, Makarios declared that he had just completed his study on a
constitutional amendment of approximately ten points. In this instance, Ambassador Wilkins
advised him not to close the channel of dialogue with the Turkish side. Ambassador Wilkins
said it would be more appropriate to present the mentioned plan not directly as a
constitutional amendment but as a proposal to make the constitution more functional.34
Consequently, the US Department of State conveyed its dissatisfaction with Makarios'
study on 'constitutional amendment' to Ambassador Wilkins the next day. According to the
Department of State, the attitude of Makarios ended the possibility of dialogue and
cooperation with Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community. 35 However, Makarios
announced his memorandum on the constitutional amendments on November 30, 1963,
despite all the directions of the US administration. Following Makarios' public statement,
Ambassador Wilkins described the memorandum as a 'well-reasoned legal document' at first
glance.36
Intensification of the Conflicts and Transformation of the US Policy
Following the Greek Cypriot armed groups' attacks in December 1963, the Turkish
government took action. Making a call to Britain and Greece on December 23, 1963, Turkey
demanded to stop the attacks initiated by the Greek Cypriot paramilitary organizations. 37
Upon Turkey's move, the three states issued a joint statement to call a ceasefire the next day.
However, the call was not sufficient to prevent the conflicts in Cyprus. Then, Ankara
conveyed to London and Athens that a joint military intervention might be necessary if an
immediate ceasefire could not be provided. However, Ankara was not successful in getting a
positive response to its call.
For this reason, Turkey decided to act alone. Turkish jets started to fly at low altitudes over
Cyprus on the next day. Ankara announced that an air bombardment would have been carried
out if the Greek Cypriot attacks did not end.38
For the first time, inter-communal conflicts in Cyprus worried the US administration about
a possible military engagement between Turkey and Greece. The US Department of State
immediately contacted Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus to prevent development. On December
23, 1963, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk warned all three administrations to act with
maximum caution. In addition, considering the failure of its warning, the US administration
went one step further in urging Turkey and Greece. The US Department of State reminded
both allies that if the equipment provided to them under the Military Assistance Program is
utilized in Cyprus without their consent, it would be a clear violation of the agreements. 39 In
this period, the primary goal of the US was to end the armed conflicts before they escalated.
However, Washington did not prefer to take any action other than advising or warning the
parties at this stage.
Following the warnings of Washington, Turkish President Cemal Gürsel sent a letter to US
President Lyndon B. Johnson on December 25, 1963. In his letter, Gürsel asked the US to use
all the means immediately to stop the massacres in Cyprus. US President Johnson replied to
him on December 26, 1963. In his response, President Johnson sufficed to state that he would
do everything to support the guarantor powers in every step for a peaceful solution. The US
administration made every effort to maintain its policy of non-intervention in Cyprus during
this period.40 In this regard, the US Department of State also informed its diplomatic mission
at the UN on December 27, 1963: 'Britain, Greece, and Turkey have responsibilities arising
from the agreements. We rely on Britain to be able to lead the discussion constructively. On
the other hand, the US should avoid active participation during the discussions but should
ensure that the discussions occur in a moderate atmosphere.'41 The US administration thus
gave a clear warning to its UN mission that they should maintain their previous positions.
On the other hand, Britain was worried that the tension on the island would have escalated
further if Turkey had acted alone because of the massacres in Cyprus. To prevent this
possibility, Britain offered to make a joint intervention in Cyprus under the British command,
following a call from President Makarios. According to the British administration, the forces
on the island would be used in the first stage. 42 Makarios, Turkey, and Greece accepted the
proposal. On December 27, 1963, the Joint Truce Force was established under British
command in Cyprus.43 However, this was the last time Makarios quickly allowed a NATO-led
Anglo-American plan in Cyprus. In the Cold War conditions, Makarios focused on improving
relations with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) from the beginning of 1964 to distance Cyprus from NATO influence and
to consolidate its independence.44 Although the British plan quickly provided calm on the
island, the conflicts continued in low density.
The Joint Truce Force enabled Turkey to move away from the idea of acting alone on the
island. Encouraged by this development, on January 1, 1964, President Makarios announced
that he intended to abolish the Zurich and London Agreements unilaterally. 45 Makarios'
statement prompted the British administration to take new measures. Defending that the
agreements cannot be abrogated unilaterally, Britain invited the relevant parties to a
conference held in London.46
Upon the invitation of Britain, the London Conference was convened by the participation
of the relevant parties on January 13 - February 2, 1964. At the beginning of the conference,
Duncan Sandys, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, stated that
Britain could no longer keep its troops in Cyprus. For this reason, Sandys asked the parties to
find an alternative solution as soon as possible. 47 Rauf Denktaş, who took the floor on behalf
of the Turkish Cypriot community at the conference, stated that the solution implemented in
1960 could not fully ensure the security of the Turkish Cypriots. According to Denktaş, the
ideal solution would be establishing a bi-communal federal state through geographical
separation and compulsory population exchange.48 Glafkos Clerides, the representative of the
Greek Cypriot community, also accepted the failure of the Zurich and London Agreements.
However, he argued that the island's status should be determined according to demographic
factors, not geographical. According to Clerides, the final solution would only be possible by
implementing a new constitution and abolishing the special rights provided to the Turkish
Cypriots.49 As a result, the Turkish Cypriots brought the thesis of a strengthened federation to
the agenda. The Greeks defended a single-communal unitary structure by eliminating the
guarantees given to the Turks, making it impossible for the parties to agree on a final solution
at the London Conference.50
The statement of Duncan Sandys about British withdrawal from Cyprus at the London
Conference worried the US administration. According to US Secretary of State Dean Rusk, if
the situation in Cyprus gets worse, the most favorable solution would be provided by the
intervention of the British troops.51 However, on January 25, 1964, Sir David Ormsby-Gore,
the British Ambassador to Washington, called the US Undersecretary of State George W.
Ball. He restated that Britain could not maintain peace for a long time in Cyprus. Gore
proposed to establish an international peacekeeping force as soon as possible. 52 The US
administration's concern about this proposal increased even more. According to President
Johnson, the UN would be an alternative to British withdrawal. However, it would not be in
the best interest of the US.53 In addition, in the worst-case scenario, both sides that would
enter a military engagement were NATO members. In this case, any NATO solution would
not also seem possible. For this reason, according to Johnson, the US came to the fore as the
only solution in the Cyprus dispute if Britain, the UN, and NATO were out of the question.
Nevertheless, Johnson was unwilling to accept this responsibility because of the upcoming
presidential election.54
When it became clear that a concrete result would not be reached at the London
Conference, Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü called Raymond Hare, the US Ambassador
to Ankara. İnönü stated that Turkey would have to intervene in Cyprus if no assurance was
given until the next day.55 In the face of the British administration's attitude and İnönü's threat,
the US Undersecretary of State George W. Ball prepared a NATO Peace Force plan to be
deployed in Cyprus. Ball planned to send a NATO Peace Force of 10,000, including 1,200 US
soldiers, to the island in return for the guarantor states' acceptance that they would not appeal
to their right to intervene in the island during the three-month period when the Peace Force
deployed. In addition, Ball proposed to charge a Western European mediator for
reconciliation between the parties in this period. Although President Johnson was cautious
about the proposal, he had to accept the plan.56
Britain and the US announced Ball's plan on January 31, 1964.57 However, the President of
Cyprus, Makarios, refused the plan's implementation. Makarios stated that although he found
the idea of an international peace force reasonable, it would be inappropriate and even
dangerous for Turkish and Greek troops to join NATO military forces. According to
Makarios, it would be more appropriate to settle the conflict on the island through the UN
Security Council rather than NATO.58 This situation showed that following the changing
international conditions, Makarios would not accept the pressures of Britain and the US as
quickly as before. He would seek a solution at the UN with the support of non-aligned
countries.59
Following the refusal of the NATO Peace Force by Makarios, the US administration,
fearing that Turkey would intervene in Cyprus, decided to send the Undersecretary of State
George W. Ball as a special envoy of the President to the region. Ball, who made contacts in
Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, conveyed to the guarantor states that they could take the issue to
the UN if they desired. However, they should understand that the US would not support the
UN. In his meeting with Makarios, Ball clearly stated that they would not protect him from a
Turkish intervention if he continued to block a solution that would remove the reasons for
Turkey. Ball's negotiations with Makarios came to a dead-end in mid-February.60
Upon the failure of Ball, Britain and the Makarios applied to the UN Security Council on
February 15, 1964, for different reasons.61 Following the UN Security Council negotiations, a
draft resolution prepared in line with the views of the US, Britain, and Turkey was
unanimously adopted on March 4, 1964. The Security Council's Resolution 186 appointed
Finnish diplomat Sakari S. Tuomioja as the UN Cyprus Mediator and sent a UN peacekeeping
force to Cyprus. However, the UN Peace Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was only fully
operational on March 27, 1964.62
When the UNFICYP fully started to work on the island, President Makarios sent a note to
Turkey and Greece on March 31, 1964. He pointed out that the Joint Truce Force became
non-functional following the deployment of the UNFICYP. Therefore, he demanded the
withdrawal of Turkish and Greek troops on the island as soon as possible. 63 Ankara's response
to Makarios' note was that the Turkish troops in Cyprus could only be withdrawn by ensuring
Turkish Cypriots' security. On the other hand, Athens replied that the Greek troops had
already withdrawn before the arrival of the UNFICYP.64
Realizing that the Turkish troops in Cyprus would not leave the island, President Makarios
decided to take new steps. Makarios' first move was to announce that he had unilaterally
abolished the Treaty of Alliance on April 4, 1964. Vice President Dr. Fazıl Küçük protested
Makarios' decision by declaring that it would not be possible to terminate a treaty without his
approval.65 Likewise, Turkey acknowledged that Makarios' statement had no legitimacy.66
President Makarios started negotiations to purchase heavy weapons and military equipment
to strengthen the air and naval forces in May 1964. The next move of Makarios was to begin
working to form a Cypriot army.67 Turkey protested this attempt before the UN on May 27
and June 3, 1964.68 However, ignoring Turkey's protests, Makarios accused Turkey of
threatening to intervene in Cyprus, incompatible with the UN Charter.69
The developments in Cyprus in April and May of 1964 were considered the last straw on
the Turkish side. On June 2, 1964, the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu,
MGK) recommended the government carry a military intervention in Cyprus. After the
decision, the troops to land in Cyprus were ready in Iskenderun. 70 Nihat Erim, Chairman of
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Turkish Parliament, was instructed to go
immediately to New York to prevent the noise in the UN Security Council following the
intervention.71 The day after the note given to Makarios on June 3, 1964, Raymond A. Hare,
US Ambassador to Ankara, was informed of the situation. The Ambassador asked Foreign
Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin to Washington for twenty-four hours to convey the situation.72
The US administration took immediate action following the news from Ambassador Hare.
First, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk called Turgut Menemencioğlu, Turkey's Ambassador
to Washington, to warn him. Rusk conveyed that if Turkey intervened in Cyprus without
consulting its allies, this action would have serious consequences.73 After the first contact of
the Department of State with the Turkish Embassy in Washington, US President Lyndon B.
Johnson also instructed Lynn L. Lemnitzer, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR), to immediately go to Ankara. Johnson asked Lemnitzer to meet with Turkish
military officials in Ankara urgently and declare that a possible intervention would harm
NATO interests.74
The US foreign policy decision-makers decided to send a letter to Prime Minister İsmet
İnönü as a more deterrent way following the initial reactions to prevent Turkey's intervention
in Cyprus. US President Lyndon B. Johnson sent the famous letter on June 5, 1964. The letter
was prepared by Harlan Cleveland, an adviser to the President of the United States, and his
deputy, Joseph Sisco. The letter had quite harsh statements while informing Turkey about the
possible consequences without consulting its allies.75 In the letter, Johnson clearly emphasized
that if the USSR attacks Turkey following a possible intervention in Cyprus without the
approval of its allies, NATO does not have to defend Turkey. 76 As a result of the letter,
Turkey had to give up its military preparations to intervene in Cyprus.
US President Johnson invited Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and Greek Prime
Minister George Papandreou to a meeting in Washington to discuss the state of emergency in
Cyprus. In Washington, Johnson held two separate meetings with İnönü and Papandreou on
June 22-24, 1964. However, these talks did not provide any positive results apart from the
decision to start negotiations between the parties in Geneva. Although both leaders
complained about the attitudes of the other in Cyprus, they could not receive the support they
expected from Washington.77
The developments that took place on the island in the period from December 1963, when
inter-communal conflicts broke out in Cyprus, until June 1964, when the US President
Johnson prevented Turkey from intervening, proved that the US would not be able to force
the parties to act in line with the interests of the alliance without directly getting involved in
the dispute. Following the announcement of the British administration that it could no longer
continue its police force on the island at the end of January 1964, the US administration
showed a will to carry out the task together for the first time. However, it was just limited to
the police force. In other words, the main idea of the US administration in showing such a will
was not to play a constructive role in restoring peace on the island. In this period, the US only
tried to appease the situation by preventing possible damage to the alliance's interests in the
Mediterranean.78
1964 Crisis and the US Mediation

The negotiations, which were agreed on during the meetings of US President Johnson with
Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and Prime Minister George Papandreou in Washington on June
22-24, 1964, started in Geneva on July 11, 1964. One of the former Secretary of State, Dean
Acheson, was appointed as the mediator for the negotiations. As well as his skills, being a
legendary figure of the Truman Doctrine, which provided $400 million in aid to Turkey and
Greece in 1947, played a significant role in Johnson's appointment for Acheson as the
mediator.79 Despite being interrupted by the news from Cyprus on August 6, 1964, the
Geneva negotiations were concluded on 15-31 August 1964. At Papandreou's request, the
Turkish and Greek delegations did not attend the same sessions at the negotiations, and the
mediator Acheson held separate meetings with the two delegations.
Before leaving Washington, Dean Acheson held discussions with Undersecretary of State
George W. Ball and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Philips H. Talbot on finding a solution to the inter-communal conflicts in Cyprus. As a result
of these negotiations, Acheson went to Geneva with the assumption that an independent
Cyprus would contain the risk of a Greco-Turkish war, harm the relations of Turkey and
Greece with the US, strengthen the influence of the USSR in the region, and pose a threat to
American interests.80 However, as he expressed to the Greek representative Demitiros
Nikolareisis during the negotiations, Acheson did not bring a comprehensive American plan
when he came to Geneva.81 Acheson went to the Greek delegation with the notes he took
during his meetings with the Turkish delegation and returned to the Turkish delegation with
the notes he took during the meeting with the Greek delegation. Acheson's cycle repeated
until the end of the negotiations.
In the first meetings held in Geneva, Turkey defended the preservation of the Zurich and
London Agreements and alternatively taksim (partition) or federation thesis. The first
proposal of Greece was the annexation of the island to Greece or, in other words, enosis, in
return for special rights to the Turkish Cypriot community. 82 Acheson proposed to both
delegations that Karpas Peninsula should be left to Turkey to be used as a base with its
sovereign rights and that the rest of the island be left to Greek sovereignty. 83 Thus, Acheson
thought that he could meet both taksim and enosis demands up to a point and make both
Turkey and Greece 'happy' by a 'double enosis.'84
The first proposal put forward by Acheson during the negotiations was not found
acceptable by both delegations in Geneva. The Greek representative Demitiros Nikolareisis,
Ambassador to Belgrade, refused to leave a sovereign zone to the Turks in response to
Acheson's proposal. He suggested that Turkey should be given the right to have a unit under
the command of NATO in British bases. On the other hand, the Turkish representative Nihat
Erim, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Turkish Parliament, argued that
the Karpas Peninsula proposed by Acheson would not be sufficient. He found the idea of
using British bases out of the question. 85 While the mediation continued on Acheson's offer
and counter-offers, the negotiations had to be suspended on August 6, 1964, following the
news coming from Cyprus.
While the negotiations in Geneva were continuing, President Makarios, being afraid of a
NATO-led plan under the leadership of the US, took steps to damage the conference and
bring the island under Greek Cypriot domination. The efforts of Makarios started even before
the Geneva Conference was opened. Immediately after it became clear that Turkey and
Greece would meet in Geneva to settle the Cyprus problem, President Makarios declared that
he attached no importance to a Greco-Turkish dialogue supervised by the US government
'since the talks were carried out in the absence of the mainly and directly interested Cypriot
people.'86 When the negotiations began, he directly opposed Acheson's 'double enosis'
proposal since independence was preferable.87
In the middle of July 1964, Makarios declared twenty-five items as strategic goods and
prevented them from being sold to Turkish Cypriots without the permission of the Ministry of
Interior. In addition, he later imposed some restrictions on the import of goods sent to the
Turkish Cypriots.88 The next step of Makarios was the armament of the island. For this
purpose, Makarios established an organization called the National Guard and ensured the
coming of 5,000 Greek officers to the island.89 He did not face a severe reaction due to the
ongoing negotiations in Geneva. Then, he launched an attack against the Turkish Cypriot
warriors safeguarding Kokkina (Erenköy) region on August 6, 1964. By this attack, he
planned to disrupt the Geneva talks. As a matter of fact, Makarios achieved his goal by
interrupting the negotiations.
Following the events in Cyprus on August 6, 1964, it was decided to conduct flights over
the island at the MGK meeting in Ankara. The next day, as the flights by the Turkish jets
were not sufficient, it was decided to bombard the Greek Cypriot forces. Thereupon, when
Greek warplanes bombed Turkish Cypriot targets, the crisis on the island grew. 90 The US and
Britain took action to prevent the events from getting worse. They provided a ceasefire at the
UN Security Council.91 After the ceasefire, the Geneva negotiations continued as the events
calmed down.
The Geneva negotiations, which were interrupted by the Greek Cypriot attack on August 6,
1964, continued on August 15, 1964, following the ceasefire provided by the UN Security
Council. As in the first round of negotiations, mediator Acheson first conveyed the parties'
proposals to the other, but both rejected the other side's proposals. 92 When the talks came to a
deadlock, the US Department of State sent a message to Geneva to be conveyed to the
Turkish and Greek delegations. In the message, Secretary of State Dean Rusk reminded both
parties that they owed their military strength only to their NATO membership and that they
could not direct it to each other under any circumstances. 93 However, this warning did not
successfully get the delegations' consent to the plans presented to them.
After the parties refused to accept each other's proposal, mediator Acheson presented his
solution. Acheson envisioned a base for Turkey to be leased for fifty years in an area smaller
than the Karpas Peninsula in Cyprus.94 The Turkish delegation maintained its insistence on the
idea of a sovereign base, as in the first round of negotiations. 95 On the other hand, the Greek
delegation initially approached Acheson's proposal positively. However, the Greeks also
rejected it ultimately.96
By the Turkish and Greek delegations' refusal to the final proposal of the mediator
Acheson, the negotiations broke up on August 31, 1964, without reaching any conclusion. US
Undersecretary of State Ball attributed the failure of the Geneva talks to two reasons at the
National Security Council (NSC) meeting held on September 1, 1964, in Washington. First,
the government's weakness in Greece to take any responsibility in Cyprus, and second,
Turkey's insistence on a sovereign base.97 Although the US administration continued to worry
about the failed experience in Geneva, it preferred to leave the Cyprus dispute to its course.
The US Department of State tried to help the parties in Geneva but realized that it was
fruitless. Washington decided not to present a new proposal or plan to settle the dispute for a
while.98
Cyprus Dispute at the UN
Following the unsuccessful Geneva talks, Galo Plaza was appointed to replace the UN Cyprus
Mediator Sakari S. Tuomioja, who passed away. On March 26, 1965, Plaza presented his
report on the Cyprus dispute to UN Secretary-General. 99 In addition to parties' views on the
problem, Plaza listed his suggestions for the settlement in the report. According to Plaza's
report, the events in Cyprus since December 1963 made it difficult to return to the pre-1964
conditions. Plaza criticized the Zurich and London Agreements as impracticable and called
for self-determination in Cyprus. For this reason, the report concluded that the Cyprus dispute
could only be resolved by the establishment of a genuinely independent and unitary state.100
Plaza's report caused a great disappointment on the Turkish side. According to the Turkish
government, Plaza exceeded the limits of his duty by making suggestions on the essence of
the conflict without obtaining the parties' consent. 101 Although Ankara's harsh stance on the
report calmed after the statement of UN Secretary-General U Thant that 'he had found nothing
in the Mediator's report which could be considered incompatible with his functions as defined
in the Security Council's resolution of March 4, 1964', in the letter sent to him on behalf of the
government, the opinion about the inadmissibility of the report was repeated. 102 On the other
hand, Greece and Greek Cypriots found Plaza's report very positive and constructive. The
only reservation of both sides about the report was the report's limitations on the principle of
self-determination.103
Plaza's report was entirely at odds with the US policy in Cyprus. 104 Nevertheless, Turkey's
reaction to Plaza's report worried Washington. The US administration was afraid that Turkey's
negative and uncompromising stance towards the report might have commenced new
discussions in the UN Security Council. For this reason, the US Department of State decided
to warn Turkey in a friendly but harsh manner. A telegram was sent to the Secretary of State
Dean Rusk, who was in Tehran at the time, explaining the situation. In the telegram, Rusk
was asked to immediately go to Turkey and meet with Foreign Minister Hasan Esat Işık. Rusk
would confront Turkey with the facts. On the other hand, the US Department of State would
do its best to prevent the report from being discussed publicly.105
Despite the reaction of the US, Turkey maintained its hostile attitude towards Plaza's report
and applied it to the UN. At the same time, President Makarios also applied to the UN for
different reasons. The UN General Assembly addressed the issue on December 11-17, 1965.
Encouraged by Plaza's report, the Greek Cypriots claimed that the constitution of the RoC
was no longer valid. They demanded 'full' independence within the principle of self-
determination during the negotiations held at the UN General Assembly. On the other hand,
Turkey argued that the international agreements establishing the RoC were still valid. Turkish
representatives brought the acts of violence by the Greek Cypriots against the Turkish Cypriot
community on the island to the attention of the UN General Assembly.106
After the discussions, UN General Assembly Resolution 2077 (XX) was adopted by forty-
seven affirmative, five negative, and fifty-four abstentions votes. Non-aligned countries were
meeting in Cairo on August 10, 1964, and Plaza's report dated March 26, 1965, was
influential in the voting. In the resolution, it was emphasized that the RoC, as an equal
member of the UN, has the right to full sovereignty and independence without any foreign
interference. In addition, it was repeated that other member states also have to respect the
sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Cyprus.107
UN General Assembly Resolution 2077 (XX) was the severest decision adopted at the UN
against Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community. However, the US also voted negatively
together with Turkey. Even though the US administration warned Turkey in a friendly but
harsh manner due to its attitude after Plaza's report, the US sided with Turkey in the voting.
According to Parker Hart, the US Ambassador to Ankara, the US negative vote was a
significant development in erasing the Johnson letter traces and strengthening Turkey-US
relations. This development did not please Greece and the Greek lobby in the US.108
1966-67 Bilateral Talks
A period of relative calm prevailed in Cyprus following the UN General Assembly Resolution
2077 (XX). As a result of pressures from the US, on the other hand, Turkey and Greece
decided to start bilateral talks at different levels for the settlement of the conflict. The
government of Süleyman Demirel, who took office in Turkey in 1965, was convinced after
the UN General Assembly Resolution 2077 (XX) that the best way to make progress on
Cyprus was to hold talks between the two countries. Greece also found the bilateral talks
helpful to learn Turkey's current position.109
The meetings between Turkey and Greece first started on June 25, 1966, at the lower level.
These meetings laid the groundwork for future talks between the Foreign Ministers of the two
countries. Following the preliminary meetings, Greek Foreign Minister Ioannis Toumbas
invited Turkish Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil to bilateral talks in Paris. As in the
negotiations under the mediation of Dean Acheson in Geneva, the talks in Paris developed
within the framework of the island's unification with Greece in return for a base to be given to
Turkey.110 Hence, no conclusion could be achieved at the Paris talks.111
On April 21, 1967, a military coup took place in Greece by a junta composed of colonels.
The military junta planned to gain legitimacy by achieving enosis through negotiations in
Cyprus. For this reason, the military junta began to put pressure on the start of the bilateral
talks between Prime Minister Konstantinos Kollias, the supreme Court Judge appointed to the
Prime Ministry after the coup, and Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel. 112 Although
Turkish Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil thought that an ill-prepared meeting could
have adverse effects, Turkey welcomed the offer not to appear intransigent to the international
community.113 The first part of the meetings between the two prime ministers was held in
Keşan on September 9, 1965, and the second part was in Alexandroupolis (Dedeağaç) on
September 10, 1965. In the end, the talks were fruitless. 114 Following the Alexandroupolis
meeting, a joint statement was issued by the parties. 115 However, the announced statement had
been prepared by Turkish Foreign Minister Çağlayangil before the negotiations. Due to the
unsuccessful completion of the meetings and the lack of a common will to prepare a new
declaration, the previously prepared text by Çağlayangil was issued as a joint statement. For
this reason, although the Keşan-Alexandroupolis talks were unproductive, the announced
statement drew a very positive picture.116
The US Department of State was disappointed, especially with the fiasco of 1967 talks.
Following Ioannis Toumbas, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, that the Paris
talks were very positive, the US administration was hopeful that a solution would be reached
with the Keşan-Alexandroupolis talks. In a telegram he sent to the US Embassy in Athens,
Secretary of State Rusk stated that they were astonished at the proposals that were so far from
each other, although they did not expect great results from the talks. Rusk attributed the
failure of the negotiations to the fact that Turkey, which learned of Greece's intention to reach
a political solution as soon as possible, probably demanded huge compensation in return. 117
However, the attacks launched by the Greek Cypriot forces against the Turkish Cypriot
community revealed the truth in November 1967.
1967 Crisis and Vance's Shuttle Diplomacy
Two months after the Keşan-Alexandroupolis talks held in September 1967, armed conflicts
broke out in Cyprus again. On November 15, 1967, the Greek Cypriots desired to restart the
police patrol, removed about a year ago, on the road between Agios Theodoros (Boğaziçi) and
Kophinou (Geçitkale). On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots tried to prevent the patrol by
setting up barricades. The National Guard, led by Georgios Grivas, attacked the Turks with
heavy weapons. The Greek Cypriot troops captured Agios Theodoros in a short time. Then,
they headed to Kophinou, which had nothing to do with the patrol mission. Thus, the Greek
Cypriot forces achieved dominance in both regions.118
Following the armed conflicts in Cyprus on November 15, 1967, the MGK met in Turkey.
The Council recommended the government intervene by the next day if the Greek Cypriots
did not evacuate their captured areas. The decision was communicated to President Makarios
by a memorandum on November 16, 1967. The next day, a memorandum was also submitted
to Greece. The expulsion of Georgios Grivas, the removal of the Greek Division that had been
deployed secretly by Papandreou in 1964 from the island, and the dissolution of the National
Guard were requested in the memorandum. 119 By the recommendation of the MGK, the
Turkish parliament also authorized the Turkish government to send the armed forces outside
the Turkish borders on November 17, 1967.120
In the face of the armed conflicts in Cyprus, the US once again confronted the danger of
two NATO allies going to war against each other. Taking immediate action, the US
administration sent a message to Turkey, Greece, and Makarios on the same day. A call was
made to stop the armed engagements and restore the status quo in the message. US
Ambassador Parker T. Hart, who conveyed the message of the US administration to Ankara,
informed Washington that Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, who had been focusing on
domestic policy issues for months, suddenly took a pro-war stance in the face of the events in
Cyprus.121 Having received the news that Greece refused to fulfill the demands of Turkey in
the memorandum given on November 17, 1967, and therefore Turkey was about to complete
its war preparations, the US administration was alarmed. At that moment, the US
administration had two options: First was inviting the Greek King Constantine II and Turkish
President Cevdet Sunay to Washington to have a joint meeting to settle the problem or send a
representative to the region to mediate between the parties. By the advice of the Secretary of
State, US President decided that the second choice would be more reasonable.122
US President Johnson appointed Cyrus Vance, former Secretary of the Army, as a
mediator between Turkey, Greece, and Makarios to ease the crisis in Cyprus. Asking Vance to
go to the region urgently, Johnson's instruction was obvious: 'Do what you have to do to stop
the war.'123 Following his land in Ankara on November 23, 1967, Vance met with President
Cevdet Sunay, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, and Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri
Çağlayangil. Vance's arrival was initially considered a 'living Johnson letter' in Ankara. 124
During his first meeting with Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, Vance told him: 'I did
not bring you any letter. ... Whether or not Greece interferes, you will be the winner of a
possible military engagement. ... What will you do after you land on the island? What are
your intentions now that you are willing to risk war?' This attitude of Vance relieved Ankara's
concerns. In response to Vance's question, Çağlayangil replied: 'We want Georgios Grivas to
be removed from the island, for Greece to withdraw its soldiers secretly sent to the island in
violation of the Zurich and London Agreements, and for the National Guard to be
dissolved.'125 Vance believed that the Turks would not take any action until his mission was
over following his first meetings in Ankara.126
Cyrus Vance moved to Athens the same day after his first meetings in Ankara. Arriving in
Athens late at night, Vance met Greek Foreign Minister Panayotis Pipinelis the next day. In
his meeting with Pipinellis, Vance first conveyed to him Ankara's position and the conditions
presented as indispensable for settling the conflict. Pipinellis, on the other hand, stated that
any self-respecting government could not accept the conditions proposed by Turkey.
According to Pipinellis, in order not to be humiliated, the only thing Greece could do was
gradually withdraw extra Greek troops on the island on the condition that an alternative
policing force was established.127 Vance could not obtain any positive result in the first round
of negotiations between Turkey and Greece.
Cyrus Vance carried out shuttle diplomacy between Ankara and Athens while conveying
the parties' views to each other. However, by November 27, 1967, Vance realized that no
compromise could be reached in this way. At this point, Vance prepared a plan that both sides
might accept.128 Accordingly, a study would be conducted in the first stage to remove the
extra Turkish and Greek troops sent to the island following the conflicts in December 1963.
However, the Turkish Foreign Minister raised the first objection to the plan, İhsan Sabri
Çağlayangil. He opposed the three months for the Greek troops to leave the island and argued
that this period should be limited to a maximum of forty-five days. Vance flew back to Athens
with Çağlayangil's counter-offer.129 In his meeting with Foreign Minister Panayotis Pipinellis
in Athens, Vance conveyed his final plan and Turkey's opinion. He asked Greece to accept the
plan as such. Thereupon, Pipinellis informed Vance that Greece also welcomed the plan,
provided that Turkey should not propagate through the solution in question. 130 Thus, on
November 28, 1967, Turkey and Greece agreed on the solution prepared by Vance.
Following the reconciliation between Turkey and Greece, Cyrus Vance moved to Cyprus
on November 29, 1967, to get President Makarios to accept the solution. However, nothing
came out of Vance's first meetings in Cyprus. Neither President Makarios nor Foreign
Minister Spiros Kyprianou approached Vance's plan positively. 131 The main issue was that the
Greek Cypriot administration criticized and demanded to change in the solution was the
increase in power of the UNFICYP.132 Vance stated that if a compromise could not be reached
due to Makarios' rejection, it was only a matter of time before the Turks landed on the
island.133 Likewise, Greece put pressure on Makarios to reach a compromise with Vance.
Under pressures from the US and Greece, Makarios approved Vance's plan, provided that the
National Guard would not be disbanded and the Cypriot police force would not be placed
under UNFICYP command.134 Thus, the removal of Georgios Grivas and the Greek Division
from the island was approved by all parties.135
Upon a reconciliation between Turkey, Greece, and Makarios, UN Secretary-General U-
Thant called all parties on December 3, 1967, to ensure peace and security in Cyprus. U-
Thant's call was accepted by all parties immediately. By the agreement, on December 8, 1967,
411 Greek forces left Cyprus at the first stage. 1,500 Greek forces were added to that group on
December 13, 1967, and 1,300 on December 27, 1967. Likewise, Turkey ended the
preparations for landing on the island and enabled the vigilant troops to return to their main
headquarters.136 Thus, by the efforts of mediator Vance, a Greco-Turkish war was once again
prevented at the last moment. However, as Ercüment Yavuzalp, Turkey's Ambassador to
Nicosia, emphasized, Vance, devoted all his energies only to preventing a Greco-Turkish war
in the negotiations between the parties as in the instructions given to him. Therefore, as a
result of the Vance mission, no progress was also made on the essence of the dispute.137
Conclusion
The collapse of the constitutional order in the RoC following its independence caused a
regional crisis. During this period, the emerging inter-communal conflicts on the island
confronted Turkey and Greece, despite being NATO allies. US approach as the leader of
NATO was to stay away from the dispute as much as possible. Regardless of all the efforts of
Turkey and Greece, the US considers the dispute as a conflict that needed to be resolved
through the guarantor powers. For this reason, the US did not want to get involved in the
Cyprus dispute at first.
By 1964, the developments in Cyprus caused Britain, one of the guarantor powers, to
declare that it could no longer maintain peace and stability on the island alone. This
development compelled the US to transform its long-standing policy of non-intervention in
Cyprus. At this stage, the US first showed a will to solve the Cyprus dispute through NATO.
However, the ineffectiveness of NATO in Cyprus by Makarios' refusal was a driving factor
for the US to take more responsibility.
The first responsibility that the US took alone in Cyprus was fulfilled by the
Undersecretary of State George W. Ball. Undersecretary Ball was sent to the region as the
special envoy of the President of the US. He held meetings with the relevant parties to ensure
peace and stability in Cyprus. During this period, the most crucial priority of the US was to
prevent a Greco-Turkish war on the southeast flank of NATO. In line with this goal, the US
definitively stopped Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus in June 1964. This attitude of the
US created a great disappointment in Turkey.
Following the prevention of a military intervention of Turkey in 1964, the next attempt of
the US on the Cyprus dispute was to act as a mediator between Turkey and Greece. However,
in the mediation negotiations held in Geneva under the leadership of Dean Acheson, the US
wanted to create a shared understanding in line with the parties' perspectives to the conflict
instead of implementing its agenda. While the US was trying to meet the demands of both
allies, the allies were not willing to accept the solution presented to them by the US.
Since a consensus could not be reached in the talks held in Geneva, the US preferred to
leave the Cyprus dispute to its course for a while. In this process, significant developments
took place at the UN regarding the dispute. These developments were not compatible with the
general policies of the US and Turkey. At this point, the US preferred to act together with
Turkey. However, Turkey's willingness to take an active stance in the face of the
developments worried the US. For this reason, the US prevented Turkey from taking steps
that would cause escalation. In this process, while Turkey felt the disappointment of being
blocked by the US again, Greece was also disappointed that the US acted together with
Turkey at the UN General Assembly voting.
The year1966-67 were spent in bilateral negotiations between Turkey and Greece on the
Cyprus dispute. The fact that the parties could not reach an agreement in these negotiations
surprised the US, which hoped that the talks would be productive. However, the development
that worried the US in Cyprus emerged in November 1967. The attacks launched by the
Greek Cypriot forces led by Grivas against two Turkish settlements in the south of the island
urged Turkey to decide again to carry a military intervention on Cyprus. The US
administration appointed Cyrus Vance as a mediator to appease the parties and restore the
status quo. The shuttle diplomacy carried out by Vance once again prevented a Greco-Turkish
war on Cyprus. Although the US once again prevented an intra-alliance conflict on the
southeast flank of NATO, it could only temporarily calm the dispute. At the end of the Vance
mediation, Turkey seemed to achieve its goals in Cyprus, but it faced the fate of being
blocked by the US once again. On the other hand, the temporary solution in question was also
somewhat humiliating for Greece.
Notes
1
Clement Dodd, The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2010, pp. 38-40.;
Norma Salem, ‘The Constitution of 1960 and its Failure’, in Norma Salem (eds), Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and its
Resolution, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1992, p. 118.; Şükrü Sina Gürel, Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878-1960): Kolonyalizm,
Ulusçuluk ve Uluslararası Politika [The History of Cyprus (1878-1960): Colonialism, Nationalism and International
Politics], İmge, Ankara, 2020, pp. 399-412.
2
Monteagle Stearns, Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, Council on Foreign Relations
Press, New York, 1992, p. 25.
3
Gregoris Ioannou, The Normalisation of Cyprus’ Partition Among Greek Cypriots, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2020, p.
24.
4
Stephen G. Xydis, Cyprus: Reluctant Republic, Mouton, The Hague & Paris, 1973, p. 460.
5
‘United States Views on the Cyprus Settlement: Statement Issued by the Department of State, February 19, 1959’,
American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, US GPO, Washington, 1963, p. 775.
6
US Department of State Bulletin, XL(1029), 19.02.1959, p. 368.
7
Altuğ Günal, ‘ABD’nin 1974 Kıbrıs Askeri Darbesindeki Rolü’ [US Role in 1974 Cyprus Military Coup], OPUS
Uluslararası Toplum Araştırmaları Dergisi, 10(17), 2019, p. 2170.
8
T. W. Adams, ‘The American Concern in Cyprus’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
401(1), 1972, p. 98.; Rifat N. Bali, American Diplomats in Turkey: Oral History Transcripts (1928-1997), Vol. I, Libra,
İstanbul, 2011, p. 343.
9
‘Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brubeck) to the President’s Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Bundy)’, 13.07.1962, FRUS 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey,
US GPO, Washington, 1994, p. 530.
10
Vassilis K. Fouskas, ‘Reflections on the Cyprus Issue and the Turkish Invasion of 1974’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 12
(3), 2001, pp. 115-116.
11
Melek Fırat, ‘1945-1960 Yunanistan’la İlişkiler’, [Relations with Greece in 1945-1960] in Baskın Oran (eds), Türk Dış
Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar [Turkish Foreign Policy: Events, Documents,
Comments from the Independence War to the Present], Vol. I, İletişim, İstanbul, 2009, p. 612.; Şevki Kıralp, ‘Defending
Cyprus in the Early Postcolonial Era: Makarios, NATO, USSR and the NAM (1964–1967)’, Journal of Balkan and Near
Eastern Studies, 21(4), 2019, p. 368.
12
Klearchos A. Kyriakides, ‘The 1960 Treaties and the Search for Security in Cyprus’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern
Studies, 11(4), 2009, p. 429.
13
Gürel, op. cit., p. 158.
14
Nihat Erim, Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs [Cyprus as I Know and Witnessed], Ajans Türk, Ankara, 1975,
pp. 177-178.
15
Hüner Tuncer, Kıbrıs Sarmalı: Nasıl Bir Çözüm? [Cyprus Spiral: What Kind of a Solution?], Kaynak, İstanbul, 2012, p.
71.
16
Bali, op. cit., p. 343.
17
Nihat Erim, Günlükler: 1925-1979 [Diaries: 1925-1979], Vol. II, YKY, İstanbul, 2005, p. 705.
18
Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, Yale University Press, New Haven &
London, 1977, p. 25.
19
Christalla Yakinthou, Political Settlements in Divided Societies: Consociationalism and Cyprus, Palgrave Macmillan,
Basingstoke, 2009, pp. 52-53.; Pınar Erkem, ‘Ethnic Nationalism and Consocitional Democracy in Cyprus’, Beykent
University Journal of Social Science, 9(2), 2016, p. 100.
20
Neophytos Loizides, ‘Arend Lijphart and Consociationalism in Cyprus’ in Michaelina Jakala et al. (eds),
Consociationalism and Power-Sharing in Europe: Arend Lijphart’s Theory of Political Accommodation, Palgrave
Macmillan, Cham, 2018, p. 160.
21
T. W. Adams, ‘The First Republic of Cyprus: A Review of an Unworkable Constitution’, The Western Political
Quarterly, 19(3), 1966, pp. 484-486.; Süha Bölükbaşı, ‘The Cyprus Dispute and the United Nations: Peaceful Non-
Settlement between 1954 and 1996’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 30(3), 1998, p. 416.; Salem, op. cit., pp.
121-122.
22
Erim, Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs, op. cit., p. 191.
23
For detailed information about the amendments requested by Makarios, see Ibid., pp. 193-199.
24
Kıralp, op. cit., p. 369. Greek Cypriots described this act as a ‘withdrawal’ while Turkish Cypriots described it as an
‘expulsion’. See Cihat Göktepe, ‘The Cyprus Crisis of 1967 and its Effects on Turkey’s Foreign Relations’, Middle Eastern
Studies, 41(3), 2005, p. 431.
25
Mehmet Gönlübol, Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, 1919-1995 [Turkish Foreign Policy with Events 1919-1995], Siyasal,
Ankara, 1996, p. 376.
26
Fırat, op. cit., p. 623.
27
Melek Fırat, 1960-1971 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu [Turkish Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Problem
Between 1960-1971], Siyasal, Ankara, 1997, p. 125.; Dodd, op. cit., p. 51.
28
‘Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus’, 09.01.1963, FRUS 1961–1963, op. cit., p. 540.
29
‘Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom’, 16.02.1963, FRUS 1961–1963, op. cit.,
p. 548.
30
‘Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State’, 19.12.1963, FRUS 1961–1963, op. cit., p. 767.
31
‘Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State’, 06.06.1963, FRUS 1961–1963, op. cit., pp. 564-565.
32
‘Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus’, 15.08.1963, FRUS 1961–1963, op. cit., pp. 569-570.
33
‘Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State’, 27.08.1963, FRUS 1961–1963, op. cit., pp. 572-573.
34
‘Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State’, 26.11.1963, FRUS 1961–1963, op. cit., p. 584.
35
36
‘Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State’, 30.11.1963, FRUS 1961–1963, op. cit., p. 587.
37
38
T. C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni, 1964 [Bulletin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1964], No. 1, p. 5.
39
Süha Bölükbaşı, Barışçı Çözümsüzlük [Peaceful Non-Settlement], İmge, Ankara, 2001, pp. 99-100.
40
US Department of State Bulletin, L(1282), 20.01.1964, p. 90.
41
Bölükbaşı, op. cit., p. 103.
42
43
T. C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni, 1964, op. cit, p. 5.
44
Kıralp, op. cit., pp. 370-377.
45
Tözün Bahçeli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, Westview Press, Boulder, 1990, p. 61. In fact, there were other
subsidiary factors in Makarios’ this intention, such as relocation of the Turkish regiment on the island, flights of Turkish jets
over low altitude, etc.
46
Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs: 1964, Harper&Row, New York, 1965, p. 56.
47
Kim Dergisi, 17.01.1964, p. 13.
48
49
50
Zeki Kuneralp, Sadece Diplomat [Just a Diplomat], İstanbul Matbaası, 1981, pp. 184-185.
51
‘Memorandum of Conversation’, 24.02.1964, FRUS 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, US GPO,
Washington, 2000, p. 2.
52
George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, New York, W. W. Norton, 1982, p. 340.
53
During this period, the US administration considered the UN an arena for Third World demagoguery and communist
obstructions. According to Washington, moving the Cyprus dispute to the UN was likely to have two major negative
consequences. First of all, it would give the USSR a right to voice. Secondly, the prolonged functioning of the UN could
bring things to an inextricable. See H. W. Brands Jr., ‘America Enters the Cyprus Tangle, 1964’, Middle Eastern Studies,
23(3), 1987, pp. 349-350.
54
‘Memorandum of Conference With President Johnson’, 25.01.1964, FRUS 1964–1968, op. cit., pp. 4-6.
55
Ball, op. cit., p. 341.
56
‘Editorial Note’, FRUS 1964–1968, op. cit., p. 8.
57
‘United Kingdom-United States Proposal for Establishment of a Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus Drawn From North
Atlantic Treaty Countries: Joint Proposal by the UK and US Government to the Parties Concerned, January 31, 1964’,
American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, US GPO, Washington, 1967, p. 556.
58
‘Cypriot Rejection of the United Kingdom-United States Proposal for Establishment of a Peacekeeping Force: Note From
the President of Cyprus (Archbishop Makarios) to the UK and US Governments, February 4, 1964 (Excerpts)’, American
Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, op. cit., p. 556.; T. C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni, 1964, op. cit., p. 8.
59
By Makarios’s refusal to implement a NATO plan in Cyprus, NATO had no chance to play any role in resolving the
Cyprus conflict. Therefore, NATO was both reluctant and inefficient to be a problem solver in Cyprus anymore. During this
period, NATO’s role in Cyprus was generally limited to the ‘watching briefs’ published annually by the Secretary-General.
See Philip Windsor, ‘Nato and the Cyprus Crisis’, The Adelphi Papers, 4(14), 1964, p. 7.; Evanthis Hatzivassiliou,
‘Revisiting NATO’s Stabilizing Role in South-Eastern Europe: the Cold War Experience and the Longue Durée’, Southeast
European and Black Sea Studies, 12(4), 2012, pp. 523-524.
60
Ball, op. cit., pp. 342-345.
61
For a memo, which provides a brief assessment of the contents of the initial discussions at the UN Security Council, in the
Directorate of State Archives (BCA), see BCA, 30-1-0-0/71-452-4, 19.02.1964.
62
Ü. Haluk Bayülken, Cyprus Question and the United Nations, Milli Savunma Bakanlığı, Ankara, 1983, pp. 37-41.; UN
Yearbook 1964, UN Office of Public Information, New York, 1966, pp. 152-168. As the attacks against the Turkish Cypriot
community continued during the period until UNFICYP took office, the Turkish government decided to deliver an
ultimatum to Makarios on March 12, 1964, warning that he urgently needed to comply with the ceasefire provisions;
otherwise, the right to intervene arising from the treaties would have to be used. See BCA, 30-18-1-2/176-14-18,
12.03.1964.
63
[‘Letter Dated 1 April 1964 From the Permanent Representatives of Cyprus Addressed to the President of the Security
Council’, UN Security Council, Doc. S/5636, 01.04.1964]
<https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/5647> (06.06.2021).
64
[‘Letter Dated 6 April 1964 From the Permanent Representatives of Cyprus Addressed to the President of the Security
65
[‘Letter Dated 6 April 1964 From the Permanent Representatives of Turkey Addressed to the President of the Security
66
67
UN Yearbook 1964, op. cit., p. 156.
68
[‘Letter Dated 29 May 1964 From the Permanent Representatives of Turkey Addressed to the President of the Security
<https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/5726> (06.06.2021).; [‘Letter Dated 6 June 1964 From the
Permanent Representatives of Turkey Addressed to the Secretary General’, UN Security Council, Doc. S/5743, 05.06.1964]
69
[‘Letter Dated 9 June 1964 From the Permanent Representatives of Cyprus Addressed to the President of the Security
70
Ball, op. cit., p. 350.
71
Erim, Günlükler: 1925-1979, op. cit., p. 771.
72
‘Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State’, 04.06.1964, FRUS 1964–1968, op. cit. pp. 103-104.
73
‘Memorandum of Telephone Conversation’, 04.06.1964, FRUS 1964–1968, op. cit., pp. 104-105.
74
75
Undersecretary of State George W. Ball, who reviewed the draft of Johnson's letter before it was sent, later called the
letter ‘the most brutal diplomatic note I have ever seen’. See Ball, op. cit., p. 350.
76
‘Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State’, 05.06.1964, FRUS 1964–1968, op. cit., pp. 106-107.
For the full text of the letter dated June 5, 1964, sent by the US President Lyndon B. Johnson to the Turkish Prime Minister
İsmet İnönü, see ‘Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State’, 05.06.1964, FRUS 1964–1968, op.
cit., pp. 107-110.
77
‘Memorandum of Conversation’, 22.06.1964, FRUS 1964–1968, op. cit., pp. 146-148.; ‘Memorandum of Conversation’,
23.06.1964, FRUS 1964–1968, op. cit., pp. 148-151.; ‘Memorandum of Conversation’, 24.06.1964, FRUS 1964–1968, op.
cit., pp. 151-155.; ‘Memorandum of Conversation’, 24.06.1964, FRUS 1964–1968, op. cit., pp. 155-159.
78
Fotios Moustakis, The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO, Frank Cass, London, 2003, p. 36.
79
Dougles Brinkley, ‘The Cyprus Question: Dean Acheson as Mediator’, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, 15(3-4), 1988,
p. 6.
80
Ibid., pp. 11-12.
81
‘Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State’, 14.07.1964, FRUS 1964–1968, op. cit., p. 183.
82
‘Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State’, 14.07.1964, FRUS 1964–1968, op. cit., pp. 183-184.
83
‘Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State’, 19.07.1964, FRUS 1964–1968, op. cit., pp. 186-188.;
‘Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State, 27.07.1964, FRUS 1964–1968, op. cit., pp. 196-198.
84
Fouskas, op. cit., p. 115.
85
‘Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State’, 19.07.1964, FRUS 1964–1968, op. cit., pp. 186-188.;
‘Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State, 27.07.1964, FRUS 1964–1968, op. cit., pp. 196-198.
86
Kıralp, op. cit., p. 373.
87
Fouskas, op. cit., p. 114.
88
[‘Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operations in Cyprus’, UN Security Council, Doc. S/5950,
10.09.1964] <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/
Cyprus%20S%205950.pdf> (06.06.2021).
89
Fırat, 1960-1971 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu, op. cit., p. 138.
90
Bölükbaşı, op. cit., p. 132. For a memo on the events that took place after August 11, 1964, in Cyprus, see BCA, 30-1-0-
0/38-228-9, 11.08.1964.
91
[‘Resolution Adopted by the Security Council at Its 1143rd Meeting on 9 August 1964’, UN Security Council, Doc.
S/5868, 09.08.1964] <https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/5868> (06.06.2021).
92
93
‘Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva’, 15.08.1964, FRUS 1964–1968, op. cit., pp. 254-256.
94
95
96
‘Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State’, 22.08.1964, FRUS 1964–1968, op. cit., pp. 284-285.
While Acheson later stated that his proposal gave Greece the chance of enosis, Glafkos Clerides, who was the Speaker of
the House of Representatives of the RoC at the time, considered Acheson’s proposal as the closest moment to enosis. See
Adams, op. cit., p. 101.; Niyazi Kızılyürek, Glafkos Klerides: Tarihten Güncelliğe Bir Kıbrıs Yolculuğu [Glafkos Clerides:
A Cyprus Journey from History to Contemporary], İletişim, İstanbul, 2007, p. 132.
97
‘Summary Notes of the 542d Meeting of the National Security Council’, 01.09.1964, FRUS 1964–1968, op. cit., p. 297.
98
‘Memorandum of Conversation’, 04.02.1965, FRUS 1964–1968, op. cit., pp. 356-358.; Aylin Güney, ‘The USA’s Role in
Mediating the Cyprus Conflict: A Story of Success or Failure?’, Security Dialogue, 35(1), 2004, p. 30.
99
Bayülken, op. cit., s. 44.
100
[‘Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary-General’, UN Security Council, Doc. S/6253,
26.03.1965] <https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/6253> (06.06.2021).
101
‘Developments Relating to the Situation in Cyprus’, American Foreingn Policy: Current Documents, 1965, US GPO,
Washington, 1968, p. 510.
102
UN Yearbook 1965, UN Office of Public Information, New York, 1967, p. 199.
103
[‘Letter Dated 8 April 1965 From the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece Addressed to the Secretary General’, UN
Security Council, Doc. S/6280, 09.04.1965] <https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/6280>
(06.06.2021).
104
Van Coufoudakis, ‘U.S. Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question An Interpretation’, Millennium: Journal of
International Studies, 5(3), 1976, p. 251.
105
‘Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Tehran’, 06.04.1965, FRUS 1964–1968, op. cit.,
pp. 393-395.
106
UN Yearbook 1965, op. cit., p. 205.
107
[‘UN General Assembly Resolution 2077 (XX) Question of Cyprus’, Resolutions Adopted on the Reports of the First
Committee, 18.12.1965] <https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2077%28XX
%29&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION> (06.06.2021).
108
Parker T. Hart, Two Allies at the Threshold of War: Cyprus, A First Hand Account of Crisis Managment, 1965-1968 ,
Duke University Press, North Carolina, 1990, pp. 27-28.
109
Hart,op. cit., pp. 18-19.; Bayülken, op. cit., p. 46
110
İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, Anılarım [My Memories], Yılmaz, İstanbul, 1990, p. 384.; Turgut Tülümen, Hayat Boyu Kıbrıs
[Cyprus in Lifetime], Boğaziçi, İstanbul, 1998, pp. 98-99.
111
Following his return from Paris, Foreign Minister Toumbas had a meeting with Phillips Talbot, the US Ambassador to
Athens. Interestingly, in this meeting, the Minister informed the Ambassador that the Paris talks were in a very positive
atmosphere. See ‘Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State’, 24.12.1966, FRUS 1964–1968, op.
cit., pp. 521-522. Göktepe attributes the failure of the Paris talks to the political instability in Greece. See Göktepe, op. cit.,
p. 434.
112
Fırat, 1960-1971 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu, op. cit., p. 219.
113
BCA, 30-1-0-0/10-61-22, 19.10.1967.; Çağlayangil, op. cit., p. 385.; Tülümen, op. cit., pp. 112-114.
114
For detailed information on the Keşan-Alexandroupolis talks, see Zeki Kuneralp, A Footnote to Turco-Greek History:
The Keşan–Alexandroupolis Talks September 9–10, 1967, ISIS, İstanbul, 1998, pp. 11-63.; Tülümen, op. cit., pp. 117-120.
115
T. C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni, 1967 [Bulletin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1967], No. 36, pp. 40-41.
116
Çağlayangil, op. cit., pp. 386-387.
117
‘Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece’, 15.09.1964, FRUS 1964–1968, op. cit., p. 636.
118
UN Yearbook 1967, UN Office of Public Information, New York, 1969, p. 278.; Ercüment Yavuzalp, Kıbrıs Yangınında
Büyükelçilik [Ambassadorship in Cyprus Fire], Bilgi, Ankara, 1993, pp. 80-85.
119
T. C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni, 1967, op. cit., p. 47.; Çağlayangil, op. cit., pp. 390-391.
120
Nicos Panayiotides, ‘1960-1974: The Destabilising Foreign Interventions in the Internal Affairs of the Republic of
Cyprus’, in Michalis Kontos, Sozos-Christos Theodoulou, Nikos Panayiotides and Haralambos Alexandrou (eds), Great
Power Politics in Cyprus: Foreign Interventions and Domestic Perceptions, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle
upon Tyne, 2014, p. 79.
121
Hart, op. cit., p. 52. For the public statement of Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel stating that Turkey was forced
to resort to non-peaceful means in Cyprus regarding the events that broke out on November 15, 1967, see BCA, 30-1-0-
0/16-89-10, 00.11.1967. Ercüment Yavuzalp, Turkey’s Ambassador to the RoC, also states in his memoirs that Turkey
made the necessary preparations for a military intervention the next day with great determination. The Turkish government
immediately began to move the military forces, taking the necessary authority from the Grand National Assembly of
Turkey. See Yavuzalp, op. cit., p. 89.
122
Nasuh Uslu, The Cyprus Question As an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations, 1959-2003,
Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2003, pp. 100-101.; Bölükbaşı, op. cit., p. 184.
123
Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1983, p. 144.
124
Çağlayangil, op. cit., p. 392.
125
Ibid., pp. 393-394.
126
127
128
‘Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State’, 27.11.1967, FRUS 1964–1968, op. cit., pp. 670-
671.
129
130
According to Zeki Kuneralp, the former Ambassador of Turkey to London and then Secretary-General of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, one of the most important factors in the peaceful resolution of the 1967 crisis was Greek Foreign Minister
Panayotis Pipinelis. See Kuneralp, Sadece Diplomat, op. cit., p. 204.
131
‘Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State’, 29.11.1967, FRUS 1964–1968, op. cit., pp. 682-
684.
132
‘Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State’, 30.11.1967, FRUS 1964–1968, op. cit.,
pp. 685-686.
133
Hart, op. cit., p. 91.
134
Yavuzalp, op. cit., p. 108.
135
Although Georgios Grivas and the Greek Division were removed from the island following the Vance plan, the National
Guard was not dissolved. This situation resulted mainly from US’s unwillingness to push Makarios in that way. For the US,
the National Guard essentially constituted a domestic issue, and, more importantly, it could be used to keep Makarios under
control. On the other hand, the removal of the Greek Division from the island pleased Makarios since he did not trust
military junta in Greece. See Sotiris Rizas, Realism and Human Rights in US Policy toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus,
Lexington Books, London & New York, 2018, p. 69.
136
Hart, op. cit., p. 107-108.
137
Yavuzalp, op. cit., p. 98.

Article Anonymous

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Article Anonymous

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

From Non-Intervention to Mediation: The Transformation of the US Cyprus Policy

1964 Crisis and the US Mediation

You might also like