CLANDESTINE & COVERT ACTION

SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR GEORGE J. TENET

Designated Commissioners: Fred Fielding & Jamie Gorelick

1) A Global Strategy of Renditions and Disruptions. The CIA pursued a global

strategy of renditions and disruptions for going after al Qaeda in the period before 9-
11. The DCI has testified that these efforts prevented a number of terrorist attacks
and saved American lives.

a. How effective were the CIA's global efforts at disrupting al Qaeda cells
before 9/11?
b. Given that al Qaeda was turning out thousands of operatives from its training
camps, how much impact did a rendition strategy have on staunching
terrorism before 9/11?

2) Covert Action Strategy. The CIA needed a new strategy in terrorist safe-havens
such as Afghanistan, where the U.S. government was unable to gain the cooperation
of the Taliban movement in arresting or extraditing Bin Ladin. The CIA was using
proxy forces in Afghanistan to plan operations against Bin Ladin as early as 1997.
Beginning in August 1998, the CIA employed proxy forces to carry out covert actions
against Bin Ladin and his principal lieutenants. This strategy continued until 9/11.

a. What was the CIA's covert action strategy for attacking Bin Ladin and al
Qaeda in the Afghanistan terrorist sanctuary after the East Africa Embassy
bombings in August 1998?
b. What were the goals of this strategy, and how effective was it in meeting these
goals?
c. Would arresting or eliminating Bin Ladin in August 1998 have stopped the
9/11 attacks?

In mid-1999, the CIA introduced a new operational strategy called "The Plan, " to
expand proxy options for going after Bin Ladin, and develop more unilateral sources
(as opposed to relying on foreign liaison).

d. How did the CIA's covert action strategy for attacking Bin Ladin and al
Qaeda in the Afghanistan terrorist sanctuary change with the implementation
of "The Plan"?
e. How effective was "The Plan" in attacking Bin Ladin and al Qaeda?

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 In late 2000, the CIA developed an offensive initiative for Afghanistan. It involved
increasing support to anti-Taliban groups, and a major effort to back Northern
Alliance forces to (i) try to postpone a victory by the Taliban army and (ii) tie down
al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan. The Bush administration built on these plans as
part of their Afghan policy.

f. What was the CIA doing to attack Bin Ladin and al Qaeda in the first 8
months of the Bush administration that was effectively different than what it
had been doing during the Clinton administration?
g. How different was the Bush administration's covert action strategy developed
before 9/11 from what the CIA had already been pursuing?
h. If implemented before 9/11, how effective do you think this strategy would
have been in reducing the terrorist threat?

3) Capture vs. Kill. National Security Adviser Samuel Berger testified to the
Commission under oath that he sent specific language to the DCI, regarding covert
action authorities against Bin Ladin, which said: you may kill him. He also said that
these authorities contained explicit language saying UBL could be killed. The
National Coordinator for Counterterrorism Richard Clarke testified to the
Commission under oath that he had told the DCI that the president wanted Bin Ladin
dead, and was assured by Tenet that he knew exactly what the policymakers' intent
was.

a. Please describe your understanding of what the policymakers' intent was in

employing covert action against Bin Ladin in Afghanistan from August 1998
to the end of the Clinton administration. Did you think the intent was for the
CIA to use its assets to kill Bin Ladin?
b. Was it your understanding that the CIA was given covert action authority to
kill Bin Ladin?

4) The Assassination Ban. Senior legal advisers in the Clinton administration have
told us that, even before August 1998, they had determined that an order from the
president to kill Bin Ladin in a covert action would not violate Executive Order
12333, banning assassination. Killing Bin Ladin, they explained, would be justified
in terms of self-defense according to the law of armed conflict.

a. Was it your understanding at the time that E. O. 12333 was applicable in the
case of Bin Ladin?
b. Was it your understanding that if the CIA had been ordered to kill Bin Ladin
this would have been a violation of the assassination ban?
c. Was it your understanding that if Bin Ladin were killed in the context of a
capture operation that this was not a violation of the assassination ban?

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5) Sufficient Covert Action Authority. Some working-level officers in the CIA's
Counterterrorist Center (CTC) have told us they never had the covert authority they
wanted to effectively go after Bin Ladin before 9/11. They complained that their
ability to go after Bin Ladin was inhibited by the fact that they could only kill him
within the context of a capture operation, and that consequently their assets did not
think the U.S. government was serious about wanting to kill Bin Ladin.

a. In your opinion, did the CIA receive appropriate and sufficient covert action
authority to go after Bin Ladin before 9/11?
b. Did you ever express to the policymakers, at any point before 9/11, a concern
that the CIA had insufficient covert action authority to go after Bin Ladin?
c. Did you ever ask for authorities regarding Bin Ladin before 9/11 that you did
not get?

6) CIA Direct Action in Afghanistan. After 9/11, the CIA used its own personnel to
great effect in Afghanistan against al Qaeda and Taliban forces, operating in an
extremely dangerous environment.

Why did the CIA never put its own personnel on the ground in Afghanistan before
9/11 in order to capture or kill Bin Ladin?

7) Capabilities of the Tribal Assets. DCI Tenet told the Commission that in spring
1998 he "turned off" an operation to capture Bin Ladin using CIA employed Afghan
tribal assets. He said this decision was based on the recommendation of his chief
operational officers. The operation's prospect of success was described to him at the
time as less than 30%.

a. Where were the weak points of this operation? Did your operational officers
have confidence in the ability of the tribal assets to carry out the operation?
b. What was the estimated likelihood of the operation being successful, as a
percentage? What would have been an acceptable percentage, that is, a
likelihood of success that would have led you to approve the operation?

For three years, from August 1998 through to 9/11, the CIA continued to employ
these Afghan tribal assets to mount offensive operations against Bin Ladin and al
Qaeda in Afghanistan. About half a dozen times during this period the assets
reportedly attempted to ambush Bin Ladin. By fall 1999, briefings by the
Counterterrorist Center (CTC) stated the tribals' chances of success in capturing Bin
Ladin as less than 10%. [Note: the CIA's new operational strategy for going after
Bin Ladin and al Qaeda, "The Plan " introduced in fall 1999, was in part a response
to this understanding that the CIA could not rely solely on the tribals to capture Bin
Ladin].

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 c. What gave you confidence that CIA's Afghan tribal assets had any more
capability to mount attacks on Bin Ladin after August 1998 than in the spring
of 1998?
d. Did you believe at the time of their reporting that the assets did in fact try to
ambush Bin Ladin?
e. If you had to assign a percentage to the likelihood of the tribal assets carrying
out a successful ambush against Bin Ladin in the period before 9/11, what
would that number have been?
f. Did you ever discuss the capabilities of the tribal assets with policymakers
before 9-11? Please discuss in detail any such conversations.

8) Massoud and the Northern Alliance. In February 1999, the CIA had authority to
employ the Taliban's strongest opponent, Northern Alliance commander Massoud
and his forces in covert action against Bin Ladin. Beginning in mid-1999, the CIA
began to focus more attention on Massoud, with the recognition that "the enemy of
my enemy is my friend. " CIA personnel who met up with Massoud to convey to him
the U.S. government's requirement that he capture rather than kill Bin Ladin told us
that Massoud laughed at such a request.

a. To what extent did Massoud share United States'objectives in Afghanistan?

By fall 1999, briefings by the Counterterrorist Center (CTC) stated Massoud's

chances of success in capturing Bin Ladin as no more than 15%.

b. How confident were you in Massoud and his fighters as a proxy force that
CIA could use against Bin Ladin?
c. If you had to assign a percentage to the likelihood of Massoud carrying out a
successful attack against Bin Ladin in the period before 9/11, what would that
number have been?

From 2000 to 2001, the CIA and policymakers gave great consideration to apian to
use Massoud's forces to tie down the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, although
there was disagreement within the CIA as to how much support to give Massoud. In
early 2001, CIA analysts warned that the Northern Alliance might be knocked off the
battle-field in spring fighting.

d. From 2000 on, were you confident that Massoud would be able to hold back
the Taliban?
e. How concerned were you that Massoud could be defeated in 2001, and with
what potential consequences?

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9) Using Proxies. Although the CIA actively used local forces as proxies to carry out
covert actions in Afghanistan, these proxies do not appear to have ever carried out a
single assault against Bin Ladin or his principal lieutenants before 9/11.

a. Were you confident at the time that the CIA's various proxy forces would
capture or kill Bin Ladin during the period before 9/11? Did this confidence
increase or decrease at any point?
b. Did you inform policymakers of the risks involved in using proxies—as
opposed to U.S. personnel—to carry out covert action against Bin Ladin?
Please discuss in detail any conversations that you had on this topic with
policymakers in the period before 9/11.
c. If you had to assign a percentage to the likelihood of any of the CIA's proxy
forces either capturing or killing Bin Ladin in the period before 9/11, what
would that number be?
d. Did you ever frankly advise policymakers of the chances that any of the CIA's
proxy forces would capture or kill Bin Ladin in the period before 9/11?
e. In short, if the proxy force strategy wasn't working, what steps did you take to
pursue alternatives to use of proxy forces?
f. What alternatives did you recommend to policymakers?

10) Actionable Intelligence. Yesterday, we heard how many senior Department of

Defense officials continually argued that the CIA's inability to produce "actionable
intelligence " limited their ability to undertake military action in the Afghanistan
terrorist sanctuary before 9/11.

a. Why was the CIA unable to produce actionable intelligence sufficient to meet
the military's requirements for action in Afghanistan before 9/11?
b. How is the CIA working with the military to solve this problem now?

Yesterday, we heard how on three occasions between December 1998 and May 1999,
the CIA's intelligence was strong enough to set in motion active preparations to
launch military strikes to kill Bin Ladin. National Security Adviser Berger told the
Commission that on each occasion DCI Tenet advised that the intelligence was not
reliable enough to go ahead with the action.

c. Please explain the basis for your advising against military action on these
three occasions.

11) Predator. According to several NSC and CIA officers, the CIA's senior management
resisted development of the Predator as a reconnaissance platform in 2000, and only
agreed to fly Predator over Afghanistan on an experimental basis.

a. Did you originally support the development of Predator in 2000 as a

reconnaissance platform to use over Afghanistan? Why was there resistance
from some senior CIA officers for this project?

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 The Predator's flights in fall 2000 were very successful: CIA analysts think that Bin
Ladin was spotted on two occasions.

b. In your opinion, did Predator spot Bin Ladin in fall 2000?

c. How valuable was the intelligence Predator collected from reconnaissance
flights in fall 2000?

When winter weather prevented further flights, senior managers at the CIA, including
in the CTC, wanted to bring the Predator back to the U.S. and not redeploy the
Predator until an armed capability was ready. CIA analysts said that, since the
Taliban had spotted the Predator in the fall, further reconnaissance flights might
jeopardize the effectiveness of future armed flights.
CIA senior managers argued with DOD about funding the Predator project, and
about command-and-control issues (including whether the CIA or the military would
pull the trigger on the armed Predator). There were no Predator flights over
Afghanistan in 2001 until after 9/11.

d. What were your reasons for opposing flying Predator for reconnaissance
purposes in 2001?
e. Why didn't the Predator (reconnaissance or armed) fly in spring/summer
2001?
f. Did CIA disputes over funding or command-and-control issues have the effect
of stalling Predator missions?
g. Why did you change your position after the September 4, 2001 Principals'
Committee meeting, and agree to fly reconnaissance flights in 2001?

12) Commission Recommendations. We are considering a range of topics for

recommendations. Currently, the DCI is both the principal analyst of the terrorist
enemy as well as the commander for many operations in the field in the war on
terror.

a. How has the role of the CIA in fighting terrorism changed post-9/11 ?
b. How has the leadership role of the Director of Central Intelligence changed
post-9/11?
c. What do you spend most of your time doing? How much of your time is spent
on full operations against terrorism, and how much is spent on analysis of the
terrorism threat or on other activities? Is this the right balance and use of your
time?

In the DCI's recent Worldwide Threat briefing before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, he stated that the al Qaeda leadership structure has
been seriously damaged since 9/11, but there is still a significant and ongoing
terrorist threat.

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d. Two and a half years after the 9/11 attacks, why has the U.S. Government
been unable to find Usama Bin Ladin, and other terrorist and Taliban leaders
such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, or Mullah Omar?
e. What kind of conflict is the United States currently in—and against what
enemy? Is this a war on "terrorism" or a struggle for the future of the Muslim
world?
f. What is the appropriate role of the CIA and the Intelligence Community in the
war, and what role is inappropriate?

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