Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Chapter Seven
thesis that it incorporates elements such as: international flows of goods, services
flows; the global circulation of images, ideas and cultural forms; the development
treaties to the activities of national governments. It is the latter issue, which has
also been termed the internationalisation of domestic law, that will be the focus of
globalisation, since they constitute the technologies and service delivery platforms
industries have been leaders in the push towards global expansion and integration,
and the global media provide informational content and images of the world
upon the ways in which media is conceived of as both a cultural form and an
accentuate the degree to which questions concerning media are framed within
those which stress its role in the formation of a distinctive national culture. In the
Australia in the early 1990s became increasingly tied up with the agenda of
33
economic and cultural flows, there is a need to avoid seeing such developments as
of nation-states. There is also a need for caution in associating such trends with a
this regard, since in some respects Australian broadcast media were more national
in terms of their content in the late 1990s than they were 30 years ago. Such a
strategies, competition from imported material, and national cultural policies such
as the Australian content quotas for commercial free-to-air television. This notion
challenged by new delivery technologies such as cable, satellites and the Internet,
new services such as pay television, and by the application of international laws to
intersect with developments in international trade law such as the demand for
Trade Agreements
there are concerns that the processes which lead to the adoption of binding
multilateral rules, and the creation of regulatory regimes that are transnational in
character, erode national sovereignty and exclude the majority of the national
community from decisions which materially affect them. Second, there are
internationally like any other industrial product, and whether the creation of a
regime promoting free trade in cultural goods and services is antithetical to the
product and its relationship to the formation of national identities, and argues that
national sovereignty over this audiovisual space is threatened by the ‘soft power’
In the second and third cases, economic and cultural issues overlap around
the concern that the United States can use its economic advantages and political
cultural policy. This was a major animating concern of the European Community
Services (GATS), that was a part of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations
GATS negotiations. Marc Raboy has expressed concern that the globalisation of
Sir Anthony Mason, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, has
of forces among nations with very different interests. (Mason 1996: 26)
Such a trend generates the danger of what Anthony Giddens (1998: 71) has
practical challenge not only to national sovereignty and autonomy but also
imperatives, as they have produced a negotiating culture that focuses upon ‘the
giving close attention to all the ramifications a treaty may have for sectional
interests in Australia’ (Mason 1996: 27). The issues raised are similar to those
the environment, human rights, and economic development’ (Korbin 1998: 98).
sold internationally like any other industrial product, have been a recurrent theme
sphere. As the concept of culture has been democratised to incorporate all aspects
of a way of life, including popular cultural forms such as film and broadcast
media, the concept of cultural industries has been used less in a pejorative sense,
as in the original formulation of the term by Adorno and Horkheimer (1977), and
by, the wider economic processes of society with which it shares many
The audiovisual sector is, by this definition, the ‘ideal type’ cultural
industry (Sinclair 1996: 38) since, as Schlesinger points out, ‘the “audiovisual” is
both a symbolic arena and an economic one’ (Schlesinger 1987: 228). This does
(Schlesinger 1991a; Klamer 1996). More commonly, concerns about the treatment
38
awareness of the dual nature of culture with a concern about unfair United States
On the one hand, a nation’s culture is the expression of its values, beliefs
The growing presence of cultural industries among the areas subject to the
the focus of cultural policy away from non-economic defences of the value of
‘new economy’. In the early 1980s, UNESCO defined the purpose of cultural
policy as being to ‘establish conditions conducive to improving the means for the
expression and participation of the population in cultural life’ (UNESCO 1982: 9).
In the late 1990s, by contrast, the OECD was focusing on the implications of
policies are intensified, for their critics, by the fact that such discursive shifts are
audiovisual markets. In particular, critics refer to the capacity of the United States
to exercise cultural hegemony on a global scale through the ‘soft power’ attached
to US media and cultural exports. Joseph Nye, Assistant Secretary of Defence for
getting them to agree to norms and institutions that produce the desired
behaviour. Soft power can rest upon the appeal of one’s ideas or the ability
to set the agenda in ways that shape the preferences of others. (quoted in
Such cultural concerns have been amplified by a sense that the global audiovisual
‘playing field’ is not level, but is rather tilted towards the interests of its dominant
player, the United States. In his comprehensive overview of factors underlying the
dominance of the international film markets arises from two related economic
distribution; and the ‘combination of distribution and foreign policy’ that would
circulation’ of Hollywood films (O’Regan 1992: 309). Footer and Graber (2000)
America (MPAA) to control the marketing and distribution of films in the United
States and in a large number of countries in Europe, the Americas and the Asia-
trade rules. The latter point is a reminder of what Miller (1996: 79) terms the
international agreements.
US leadership after the end of World War II.1 The principle underpinning these
41
economic disorder had contributed to World War II, and that global economic
prospects for future conflicts. While the GATT did not eliminate trade barriers, it
over time. It did this partly through a series of global trade rounds, where GATT
members would meet and reach agreement to reduce tariffs and other trade
barriers through bilateral and multilateral negotiations. The GATT also set in
tariffs, or taxes placed upon imports, and to agree to ‘bind’ the tariff, or
world economic growth, with an expansion of world trade of 500 per cent
between 1950 and 1975 (compared with growth in world economic output of 220
per cent), and a decline in the average tariff on manufactured goods in member
countries from 40 per cent in 1947 to 5 per cent by 1990 (The Economist 1990: 7).
Particularly important elements of the GATT have been the way in which
incentives to reduce protection over time are built into the framework, and that the
established between the major trading powers. At the same time, international
services trade had not been a part of the original GATT framework, and when the
agenda for discussion. It emerged as a new issue for GATT negotiations in 1987,
investment measures (TRIMS). With world services exports totalling about $US1
trillion in 1992, accounting for one-fifth of world exports, and with an annual rate
of export growth of 15 per cent between 1982 and 1992, compared with annual
growth of 9.8 per cent for merchandise exports over the same period, it was
international trade in services. Schott and Buurman (1994: 99) observed that ‘the
United States was the demandeur of the services negotiations in the GATT’, since
it was the world’s leading exporter of services, with exports in 1992 totaling
The services sector was undergoing rapid changes during the 1980s and
regulatory framework that was compatible with the trade liberalisation principles
of the GATT would need to: encourage new entrants into the sector; reduce the
to the network for new service providers (Oxley 1991). The need for new rules
and regulations for international telecommunications trade was driven not only by
the pace of growth and change in the sector, but also by the growing significance
product and service in its own right, and as a facilitator of trade in other products
and services.
44
national regulations in broadcasting and related areas, such as film, have been
concerned with content as well as market structure and infrastructure and, unlike
most areas covered by the GATT, have possessed a cultural and informational
dimension. The question of whether a ‘cultural exception’ should exist for films
and television programs has a long history in the GATT,3 and has been a
particularly significant area of conflict between the United States and European
nations, most notably France. In its initial drafting in 1948, Annex IV of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was included at the request of nations
with domestic film quotas. It stated that ‘For cultural reasons, systems of aid to
the production of printed films for cinema exhibition may be maintained provided
Attempts by the United States in 1962 to use the GATT to address barriers to
trade in television programming were rejected by the GATT, on the grounds that
‘even where television was not State owned, government had quite properly taken
The key elements of the GATS that would have an impact upon the
than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other
country’; 4
• Article XVI Market Access, which requires that ‘each Member shall
no less favourable than that provided for under the terms, limitations
and conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule’. This Article also
movements;
less favourable than it accords to its own like services and service
suppliers’.
Other areas of the GATS that were of potential significance included Article VI
licensing requirements in ways that restricted the capacity of other Member states
to supply a service into a Member country; Article VII Recognition, requiring that
suppliers from other Member states to compete in that country’s service markets.
The EC member states led the campaign to restrict the impact of the GATS
national cultures are multifaceted. In 1995, the United States had a surplus of $6.3
billion in its audiovisual trade with the European Commission, and US films
which would give member states the economies of scale to compete with high-
against it, and benefiting from competition that would not be present without the
The issues are wider than those of industry viability, and incorporate
important elements of political and cultural sovereignty. It has been argued by the
public service broadcasting, state cultural policy initiatives to cater for cultural
and linguistic diversity within the nation-state, and a formative role for media in
the development of citizens (EC 1998). In some European nations, most notably
France, cultural concerns run much deeper. For the French, the ‘hegemony of
French language and culture is being diluted, both within France and
internationally. The idea that the United States was using international trade
French President Francois Mitterand argued in the early 1990s: ‘Who can be blind
Saxon culture, under the cover of economic liberalism?’. Similarly, the French
Minister for Culture under the Mitterand government, Jack Lang, had called for
program content quota of 50 per cent, binding upon all EC members. Through the
trade and ‘Europeanise’ audiovisual content among the EC member states, while
strengthening barriers to content from outside of the EC, most notably the United
302), and sought to have the Directive struck down as contrary to the non-
that television was a service and not a good and, second, as services increasingly
audiovisual services. The EC negotiators drew upon the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the exclusion of cultural industries that Canada
had negotiated under Article 2005 of the Agreement (Acheson and Maule 1998).
In order to save the GATT from collapse, in late 1993 US negotiators ‘agreed to
disagree’ with the EC on whether the status of films and television programs was
This outcome was seen as a major political and ideological victory for the
EC, and for other participants in the GATS negotiations, including Australia, who
economic commodities (Grant 1994; Footer and Graber 2000). It was achievable
49
diplomatic entity, using arguments in defence of the Directive that extended the
There has been a dramatic growth in regional trade agreements since 1985,
with 33 regional trading agreements being reached between 1990 and 1994
distance between those nations and other nations, most notably the
In the case of NAFTA, Canada sought to exclude cultural industries from its
agreement with the United States, as an indicator of the relatively weak position
dependence upon proactive national cultural policy, and their very high levels of
scale and scope comparable to those that provide US producers with a major
significant cultural and linguistic barriers, or what Galperin terms the cultural
distance, that exists between the EC member nations. Schlesinger (1997) notes
strategies that underpin the creation of a European single market, and the fact that
Europe, Schlesinger doubts that such policies will adequately service the
identities and meet the interests of cultural and ethnic minorities within EC
citizenship’ will struggle to overcome ‘the seductive pull of the national … [and]
‘cultural exemption’ being sustained by the EC member states, and other nations
with similar concerns about their cultural industries, such as Canada. The first is
internationally competitive, and the extension of the WTO framework from goods
52
to services. Footer and Graber (2000) observe that the concept of a ‘cultural
it would introduce legal uncertainty around the definition of ‘culture’, but also
because it would be open to challenge on the grounds of being, under Article XIV
production, industry development and consumption patterns that are much more
exposure to imported films and television programs, has always been doubly
problematic in light of Jeremy Tunstall’s famous aphorism that ‘The Media are
by the generic and formal conventions of the dominant American sectors (Tunstall
1977). The danger is that protectionist measures for domestic cultural industries,
or exclusion from the trade disciplines of the GATS, will be seen within those
practice cultural products are strongly shaped by the practices of the US film and
53
(1999b) has noted that the European audiovisual policy has fostered industrial
European nations. Galperin has argued that the debate needs to shift from the pros
production and distribution and the normative goals of cultural policy and cultural
development:
creating diverse and inclusionary cultural spaces within and across nation-
The debate in Australia about the inclusion of audiovisual services into the GATT
provides revealing insights into the different policy and debate cultures that exist
treaty negotiations and trade policy. The Australian federal government, those
trade, diversify exports and open up new sectors of the domestic economy to
significant policy issue in the late 1980s, the Industries Assistance Commission
was arguing that: ‘If Australia’s domestic barriers to services trade are significant,
the gains from removing them could be quite large’ (IAC 1989a: 41), and that
‘Australia would benefit from the unilateral reduction of trade barriers … [and]
nations’ (IAC 1989b: 86). The IAC and the Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade (DFAT) were also flagging areas in Australian film and television where
policies to support the local production industry would contravene the principles
of the GATT, including local content quotas for broadcasting, local content
For many in the film and broadcasting sector, this was a profoundly odd,
had a deficit of about $1.25 billion in 1992-93 (Mableson 1995: 69), and a deficit
in trade in television programs that was $150 million in 1987-88 and $200 million
figures, however, was a sense that the development of an Australian film and
local production, and that this had been a significant milestone in Australian
cultural policy. The growing interest among some academics and analysts in
GATS round could be developed, that did not simply rest upon cultural
was the argument that local content regulations and subsidy arrangements for
limited local presence alongside the Hollywood product’ (O’Regan 1992: 91), or a
‘safety net’ for local content (Cunningham and Jacka 1996: 224). O’Regan also
argued that local content quotas for Australian commercial television did not
drama, where linguistic and cultural proximity to the United States made
broadcast media policy debates. In particular, they strengthened the case for
conditions of the final GATS agreement. Jock Given, who was Policy Advisor to
the Australian Film Commission during this period and actively involved in these
negotiations, notes the importance of such ‘hard intellectual work’ for the sector
to work out its common position, to accompany the ‘easy rhetorical line’ of not
‘selling out to the Americans’.5 This was important for two reasons. One was that
it enabled those in the film and television production sector to establish their
The danger was always going down and talking to these people. You need
to be able to engage with where they were at, you needed to be able to talk
about sectoral annotations and MFN derogations, and all that sort of stuff
difficult business, you really don’t understand how difficult it is, and
we’ve heard you and thank you. You let us professionals go off and do it,
57
The second reason why such ‘hard intellectual work’ was valuable was
negotiations, but this needed to occur in ways that ‘keep the rules of the
agreement tough but allow flexibility in the extent to which countries are required
to apply the rules immediately’.7 Given puts this point in the following terms:
pays the bills for cultural subsidy. We also need the GATT because, as a
trade wars. Especially in audiovisual services where it’s not so much dog-
Australia was among the majority of countries that did not make a
aligning itself with the EC, led by France, against the United States. It is
important to be aware, however, that it did not do so for the same reasons as the
EC countries. Whereas the European position was driven primarily by the desire
like Australia were driven far more by the need for communicative boundary
countries such as Australia and Canada enter into such arrangements as exporters
the dynamics of trade in the global cultural economy. Such distinctions tend to be
diverse as Australia, Canada, France and Japan will ‘line up together and speak in
the same broad “cultural sovereignty” terms against US pressures for audio-visual
91). The distinction is important, however, when the interests of Australian film
trade liberalisation. Given has argued that the cultural task of Australian content
regulation is not primarily to defend national culture from globalisation, but rather
59
‘as our part of a global cultural intervention to maintain and enhance difference
regulations for commercial broadcast television. At the same time, other arms of
government, such as the IAC and DFAT, were questioning the necessity or
international trade treaties has been that of a high-profile free trade nation. As a
trade in services.
liberalisation has been politically bipartisan during this period, and in fact pursued
with most vigour by the Whitlam, Hawke and Keating Labor governments. Trade
The influence of such arguments can be seen in the impact of domestic economic
policies that saw effective rates of assistance for manufacturing and agriculture
fall from relatively high levels in the early 1970s to near-zero levels by the end of
Table 7.1
Keating Labor governments in the 1983-96 period. They saw the ‘Banana
protectionism’ (Hawke 1991), while Treasurer Paul Keating claimed that by the
end of the 1990s, ‘Australia will have renounced once and for all the fallacious
doctrine that prosperity can be found behind the insular wall of protection’
(Keating 1991).
as Ross Garnaut and Kym Anderson (1987), who argued: (1) as a small economy
with a high dependence upon export revenues and capital inflow, Australia had a
strong prima facie interest in free trade; (2) that demands for assistance were
export industries and, over time, the national economy; and (3) that domestic
trade liberalisation would enable Australia to benefit from the economic boom
looking and export-oriented.8 Such gains, moreover, would be more than simply
economic. The influential report Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy
(also known as the Garnaut Report) argues that relations with the countries of
(Garnaut 1990: 6). For those involved in broadcast media and other cultural
largely unfamiliar legal and policy areas such as international trade law.
relatively stable industry structures and corporate profit rates, and the primary
economy, policy system and policy culture that were relatively stable and
routinised among the major institutional agents. The social contract between
such as Australian content rules, was based upon the stable and highly profitable
international trade agreements was bound up with the issue of whether there
broad appeal programming, towards a new model, which has been termed ‘post-
illustrated by the belated introduction of pay TV, the drive for policy reform came
from the bureaucracy itself. The resulting incoherence and reluctance to be open
about policy settings was illustrated in the Project Blue Sky case, and the role
63
The Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations (CER) Trade Agreement
came into force in 1983, although a more limited free trade agreement has been in
place since 1965. The CER required the gradual elimination of tariffs on all goods
not otherwise specified in an annex to the agreement (the ‘negative list’) within
five years, and a commitment to liberalise all import quotas and eliminate export
subsidies on goods traded between the two countries. A review of the CER in
1988 led to the signing of a Protocol on Trade in Services between the two
countries, which aimed to liberalise barriers to trade in services between the two
system to govern trade in services compatible with the rules of the GATT. The
and television as part of the ‘negative list’ and thus exempt, but not, significantly,
This had the potential to place the Television Program Standard (TPS) 14
Section 122 (2)(b) of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 to develop a standard
64
content of programs’ and the requirement under Section 160(d) that ‘the ABA is
Australia and a foreign country’. An Australian content standard that did not
Trade in Services to the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations- Trade
Agreement, which required that ‘Each Member State shall accord to persons of
the other Member State and services provided by them treatment no less
favourable than that accorded in like circumstances to its persons and services
provided by them’.
Federal and High Courts, initiated by sections of the New Zealand audiovisual
industry, which established Project Blue Sky in 1993 in order to argue that
Broadcasting Services Act 1992 and the CER. The initial judgment in the Federal
Court by Justice Davies found in favour of Project Blue Sky, finding that the 1995
Australian Content Standard set by the ABA had contravened Section 160(d) of
the Broadcasting Services Act 1992, by being in breach of the Protocol of Trade in
Services of the CER.9 The ABA successfully appealed this finding before the Full
Federal Court in 1996, with the majority judgment of Justices Wilcox and Finn
determining that the ABA faced an impossible task in reconciling the specific
65
Services Act 1992, and that ‘a New Zealand program is not an Australian
Australia, which found in favour of Project Blue Sky, and required the ABA to
modify the Australian Content Standard accordingly, on the basis that Sections
122 and 160 are interlocking rather than conflicting provisions, and that ‘the
Chief Justice Brennan’s argument that the ‘Australian content of a program’ was
‘the matter in which Australian ideas find expression’, and that this was not in
itself guaranteed by the ‘provenance’ of the program, or its being under Australian
creative control, which reopened issues about whether regulatory agencies should
This thesis will not dwell upon the validity of the High Court of
Australia’s legal judgment, other than to note, with Leiboff (1998, 2000), that the
judgment is an adverse one for those seeking to argue in law in favour of cultural
the nature of a service. The failure to include Australian content rules for
Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement, despite the
clear preferences of the local production industry for such an exemption, has been
66
viewed with great suspicion by some within the media production sector. Both
Anne Britton and Christina Spurgeon have claimed in interviews with the author
that they had received guarantees that broadcasting services would be exempt
from CER provisions, and that s. 160(d) of the Broadcasting Services Act was
representatives, but then claiming that it was not included due to an oversight, or a
whether the CER had primacy over the Australian Content standard was indicated
by the so-called ‘riding instructions’ given by the Minister for Transport and
Communications, Bob Collins, to the then ABA Chair, Brian Johns, asking him to
look at the treatment of New Zealand programs under the new Act ‘as a matter of
The other major question arising from the Project Blue Sky case involves
broadcasting services from CER provisions, and the case put by New Zealand
existed as part of the obligations of the ABA under Object 3(e) of the
reflecting a sense of Australian identity, character and cultural diversity’, and that
this objective should have primacy over obligations under international trade
agreements:
Blue, were concerned that relatively small amounts of New Zealand programming
would erode the local content quotas for drama, children’s and documentary
programs, and that New Zealand producers could take advantage of the CER to
concern that recognition of the capacity of the CER to override local content
quotas could, in an era of the GATS and the World Trade Organisation, be the
‘thin end of the wedge’ for the abolition of all forms of cultural protection in order
to comply with international trade and other treaty obligations (Fell 1998).
Advocates of the Project Blue Sky case, such as Jo Tyndall, Executive Director of
the Screen Producers and Directors Association of New Zealand, believed that
68
these concerns were overstated, and that opportunities existed for the two
‘increase the range of issues on which Australia and New Zealand arts lobbies
have similar interests’ (Art & Law 1998: 6). Other New Zealand observers, such
as academic Geoff Lealand, believed that the issue was ‘not money but equity’
between the two trading partners (Lealand 1997: 48), even if he was elsewhere
sympathetic to the ‘emotional and cultural logic’ behind the Australian desire to
protect the local industry by opposing the Project Blue Sky case (Lealand 1996:
227).
agreement between Australia and New Zealand has both similarities and
between the US and Canada, both Australia and New Zealand share English as a
common language, and both have significant cultural and historical similarities.
Both countries share with the EC nations a concern about high levels of US
audiovisual import penetration and its capacity to undermine the local production
nations such as France and Germany, neither Australia nor New Zealand has
by its cultural industries. Both cultures have historically been very open to
external influences, and the governments of both countries have been committed
69
since the 1980s to reducing levels of protection and regulation in order to be more
with Australian programming accounting for 12.9 per cent of programs on New
million annually from program sales to New Zealand, while New Zealand earned
NZ$300 000 a year from trans-Tasman program sales (Lealand 1996: 218, 226).
as the dominant partner in the regional trade agreement that was hostile to
liberalisation of audiovisual trade within the trading bloc. The potential impact of
have been quite minimal. While the MEAA has argued that the amount of New
Zealand material supported through subsidy from New Zealand On Air could
potentially meet up to 70 per cent of the Australian drama quota (Britton 1997),
commercial television networks would find such material suitable for broadcast,
Australia in 1994 is often cited as a case in point. Franco Papandrea (1998) has
estimated that the impact of including New Zealand programs in the schedule of
70
where New Zealand imports have a cost advantage over local programs, since
Zealand content, compared with high preference for Australian content in both of
to a general program of deregulation in the 1980s, this went much further in New
Zealand in the broadcasting sector. It can be argued that much of the Australian
opposition to Project Blue Sky stems from the concern that deregulation went too
far in New Zealand, and that comparable developments in Australia would mean
the end for local content quotas, as part of the ‘race to the bottom’ thesis that
(Bratihwaite and Drahos 2000). New Zealand has no local content quotas, relying
instead upon the public authority New Zealand On Air (NZOA) to fund local
contrast to Australia, where the Australian government funds the ABC as a non-
levels in New Zealand are among the lowest in the world at 24 per cent in 1998,
compared with the 55 per cent transmission quota for Australian commercial
television and local content on the ABC at 58 per cent (Norris et. al. 1999; cf.
NZOA 1998). 14
Given such regulatory disparities, the CER provisions are seen by critics
as a battering ram for enforcing conformity with GATS and other provisions
stipulated by international trade bodies such as the World Trade Organisation. The
Australian view has been that New Zealand should strengthen its own local
content provisions, rather than seek to dismantle the Australian local content
quotas. This position has some support in New Zealand, particularly since the
consequence of the protracted and quite bitter legal disputes has, however, been
benefits of free trade within geographical regions as a basis for expanding scale
economies and building more unified geolinguistic regions in the face of global
competition, has never been on the policy agenda. In Australia, such propositions
have been constructed as the ‘thin end of the wedge’, towards the total
dismantling of policy support for the local audiovisual production industry. In this
Without Frontiers’ in the face of US opposition, even though both draw upon
audiovisual markets.
protestors.15 While WTO negotiations are currently in a degree of limbo after the
Seattle protests, they are continuing nonetheless, with renegotiation of the General
trade negotiations. It has been argued that the GATS Agreement reached at the
end of the Uruguay Round was flawed, by virtue of the quasi-voluntary nature of
the national commitments process, or what Hoekman and Kostecki (1995: 142)
liberalisation in services, believing that the current approach had allowed many
members to ‘essentially preserve the status quo’, and had failed to meet the stated
that the GATS framework would better promote the goal of progressive trade
‘negative list’ approach, where any area where an exemption has not been listed
by a member is covered by the disciplines of the GATS, rather than the approach
taken at the Uruguay Round where members nominated areas where they would
commit themselves to the disciplines of the GATS (Watson et. al., 1999: 288-
290).
member nations sought exemptions from the GATS during the Uruguay Round.
The WTO has observed in its Background Notes that 40 member countries
taken 33 exemptions from the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause of the GATS
(Article II) in the areas of co-production agreements for film and television
for financial assistance, tax benefits and entry procedures for natural persons.
relation to domestic producers. Perhaps most significantly, the WTO notes that:
Uruguay Round of GATS negotiations, as well as the NAFTA and United States-
Canada have flagged their concerns about subjecting cultural industries to the full
1998). To this end, it proposes that the specificity of the audiovisual sector be
general exception under Article XIV of the GATS on General Exceptions, that
currently includes public order, safety and national security provision. The
Canadian government has registered similar concerns about the GATS, but prefers
cultural exemption, that allow member states to utilise specified domestic cultural
1999). Knight has noted that such a position moves beyond national protectionism
validity:
There is at this stage not a clearly defined Australian position on the WTO
Australian Coalition of Service Industries, the Minister for Trade, Tim Fischer,
‘a secure and stable framework for managing our trade’, and providing the
capacity to expand access into new export markets (DFAT 1999). In some services
sectors, such as education where Australia is the world’s sixth largest exporter of
education services (Cunningham et. al. 2000), support for further trade
liberalisation through the GATS, arguing that the sector is already highly
democracy (AVPIG 1999). Moreover, it was argued that such a position had the
Conclusion
negotiating position in relation to the WTO and the GATS has been a highly
supportive one, the Australian audiovisual production sector has tended to see its
GATS. The concerns in the Australian audiovisual sector are reflective of a wider
Such concerns have been played out in a variety of fora, from the opposition of
the Project Blue Sky case, and the issue raised about whether television programs
produced in New Zealand should count as Australian content under the CER
agreement was the ‘thin end of the wedge’ towards dismantling local content
quotas, even if the actual threat of material produced in New Zealand was
minimal. Such debates are bound up with wider questions about television as a
cultural industry, and whether claims about its cultural distinctiveness and