Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Lines of Inquiry
Preface: The 9/11 attacks represented a new type of warfare, and brought
home the gravity of the threat the U.S. faced. The attacks cost al Qaeda 19
men and reportedly only cost a few hundred thousand dollars. By contrast,
the attacks inflicted upon us over 3000 casualties and, according to a variety
of public estimates, economic losses in excess of $100 billion. As we will
see this afternoon when we discuss the 9/11 plot, the planning and execution
of the attacks was not free from problems, but the plotters were adaptable
and able to make changes to carry out the attacks.
(For FBI) [I would like to direct the following question to the agent who
had responsibility for the West Coast portion of the Penttbom examination
(which is SA Jacqueline Maguire).] The staff statement discussed the arrival
of two of the hijackers, Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar, who arrived
in Los Angeles in January of 2000. After spending a few weeks in L.A.
(which I would like to return to in a moment), they moved to San Diego.
They received assistance from a number of people in San Diego, and in
particular an individual named Mohdar Abdullah.
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What has your investigation uncovered about his relationship with the
hijackers and the types of assistance he provided to them? [They should
include information about him translating for them, helping them find
schools, deal with airline tickets, etc.]
Given that you only investigated the claims for a few weeks, do you
believe that you did an adequate investigation to rule out the possibility that
we have deported someone who participated in the attacks? [FBI will
answer that their investigation was adequate and probably that they do not
believe that Abdullah knew anything about the attacks.]
But even apart from the recent inmate reporting, isn't there other
evidence indicating that Abdullah and the hijackers' other close associates in
San Diego knew in advance about the attacks? [Likely answer is no, but
other evidence includes:
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• In August 2001, the manager of the gas station told some of the
employees that the FBI would be "looking at them" in the
future; another witness confirmed that gas station employees
had to complete paperwork during this period in preparation for
anticipated problems at the station.
(Los Angeles) Going back to the hijackers' arrival in Los Angeles, we know
that Hazmi and Mihdar did not speak English and did not have experience in
Western countries. According to KSM, he gave them permission to seek
help from local Muslim communities and mosques. In San Diego, they
received such help in every aspect of their daily lives such as enrolling in
schools, finding apartments and opening bank accounts.
(For FBI) In light of this, do you believe that Hazmi and Mihdhar
received assistance in Los Angeles? [Likely answer is that they have not
uncovered evidence that they were assisted in Los Angeles.}
Our staff statement reports that they likely spent time at the King Fahd
Mosque in Los Angeles and possibly had an apartment nearby. There has
been press reporting that an imam at the King Fahd Mosque, Fahad al
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(For all) Can you tell us who in the intelligence community received
the reporting in June of 2001 that KSM was sending operatives to the United
States? Did this report go to the FBI, which has responsibility for protecting
against attacks in the U.S.? What was done as a result of this reporting? In
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light of this reporting, why was the attention of the U.S. intelligence
community on an attack outside the United States as opposed to within the
U.S.?
According to the staff statement, during the high threat period in the
summer of 2001, KSM and Binalshibh had a number of coded conversations
that appear to concern the 9/11 attacks. They had a particularly important
conversation on July 20, in which they discussed concerns that Jarrah might
drop out of the plot, and KSM also appeared to instruct Binalshibh to send
funds to Zacarias Moussaoui.
(For all) What more can you tell us about the communications
between the plotters during the summer of 2001 and the July 20
conversation? [Panelists are unlikely to elaborate on this question; it is
merely designed to highlight the existence of the conversations.}
(For all) Can you explain why so many of the hijackers and the nine
other candidate hijackers were Saudis? Was it simply the ease of obtaining
U.S. visas, or were there other reasons that Saudis were selected for the
attacks?
(For all) Where are the other potential hijackers today? Have they
been detained by the U.S. or by another country? Or are they, like Rashid,
living freely in Saudi Arabia or elsewhere?
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