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APCPCWM_4828539:WP_0000045WP_0000045
April 1 2009
Sung Hoon Sean Kim, Ph. D. Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering
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Recent/On-going projects
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LNG RV
Reviewed by LRNA & ABS
FERA
Regas facilities besides trunk deck of No. 1 tank Jet fire
Fire rated walls to protect tanks
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LNG FSRU
A research project FRA using Neptune Emergency relief design
Vent Flare
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Fact
Embrittlement of steel structure exposed to cryogenic spill Dangerous process
Spill on water
Rapid phase transition (RPT) blast? Vapor cloud traveling toward a center of population?
High pressure, flammable and/or cryogenic fluid Flammable refrigerant maybe Safety by distance shall be compromised
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Fire
Jet/Pool fire & the frequency of escalation Passive fire specification
CFD Explosion
Congested semi-closed modules Ductility level blast specification
QRA
Not only related with the process failure but with non-hydrocarbon accidents
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AGBAMI
Pazflor
Future Products & Business Development Institute
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2009. 4.1
Jet fire
- High pressure gas inventory would have more risk of jet fire - Liquid inventory rather limited - Liquid spill to be driven overboard - To be evaporated with energy from ambient air -Dense vapor just release from LNG process would slump over the deck - Less confined and congested topside to have better ventilation - Little smoke - Readily dispersed and having less reactivity
Pool fire
Dispersion
VCE
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Flare & vent - Hot wet flaring - Cold dry flaring - Cold vent Offloading Well fluid reception Tandem offloading - Two phase feed liquid - Mainly exposed riser inlets at one side of the vessel containing mainly liquid Ex. Agbami, 320x59 lifting 35,000 ton topside ~ 1.85 ton/m2
Plant congestion
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330m x 65m, topside weight about 20,000 ton Production 2 MTA through 2 trains Process deck 6m above the hull deck Living Quarter located upwind Flare tower slanted Gas turbines located above the process deck Extended anchoring platform
Future Products & Business Development Institute
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138K LNGC
2-row FLNG
Experimental setup
Impact Pressure Time History
1 Row Tank 2 Row Tank
Economical solution
Cost-effective and optimum solution comparing other Independent CCS
Model test
Pressure
1-row
P ressu re
2-row
1080
1082
1084
1086
1088
1092
1094
1096
1098
1100
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Safety consideration
Conceptual layout review in the current stage
Major FLNG safety issues being considered
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To protect the lifeboat station STL Compartment to be separated from the LQ via the lay-down area
Blast attenuation Safety against the jet fire & dispersion
Grated process deck to be extended to the LQ for easy material handling & working path
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Location
To be located as close to the bow
For good weathervaning capability
Not to be close to LQ
Blast relief Flammable gas Machinery space in the hull to separate
Structural integrity
Longitudinal deformation Swivel movement Blast loading Mechanical ventilation No passive fire fighting on equipment & structure inside the structure
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6m above the hull deck Grated between modules to release flammable gas and explosion
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Fire risk
Jet fire
Safety gap to prevent an escalation from the jet fire
7 or 10 minutes of direct exposure
Pool fire
For in-site layout, BS EN 1473
15 kW/m2 on the unprotected metal outer surface of an adjacent LNG tank Design spill
Dimensioning jet fire shall be identified of the frequency of 1.0E4/yr. Deluge, ineffective to mitigate the jet fire Heat up analysis
Lowesmith (2007) Gas jet fire 0.1
Length Total heat flux 5 180 0.25 0.08
For an FLNG,
Cargo tank protected within the hull Design spill from equipment would be limited
1.0
15 250 0.4 0.095
10
40 300 0.55 0.095
>30
65 350 0.7 0.095 21 2009. 4.1
f hc
The secondary crossway between modules Full redundancy allowing impairment of one route
Port & Starboard The secondary muster area (SMA) aft
Protection of SMA against fire, explosion and heat from the flare
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Layout Clearance btn the hull & the process decks Spaces for CCS maintenance
Maintenance through liquid & gas dome Retractable main cargo pumps Favorable ventilation condition on the hull deck
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Explosion Risk
Release Dispersion Ignition Explosion
Release frequency & inventory to depend on detail design Dispersion depend on
Ventilation condition : Layout, confinement, congestion, buoyancy,
Hazard to be considered
Heat from the flare Drop accident from crane operation
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Consequence of release
RPT on contact with the water within the gap would exert no risk Explosion on the FLNG with little impact on the LNGC
Future Products & Business Development Institute
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2009. 4.1
Operation/Emergency flaring
Start-up Process shutdown
Tip design & tower height will be determined Heat shield on SMA Heat on the MR storage tank
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Flash Gas
BOG/FG Compression
Fuel
Dehydration
Liquefaction
End Flash
Feed Stock
Inlet Separation
C5+
Fractionation
C1+C2
LNG Product
H20 C5+
C3+C4
BOG
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Benefits of SMR
Competitive efficiency Small equipment count Compact heat exchanger adopting aluminum plate fin
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Gas Treatment
AGRU
Little CO2 content in the feed gas from non-associated gas well
Dehydrator
2x100%
Fractionation
Adjust LNG HHV & Stabilize condensate Located around the midship to minimize the motion
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Protection
Shield for HP flanges Drip trays for LP flanges Local SUS plating may be considered
Management
Deluge under the offloading station Spill overboard Evaporation by natural ventilation Closed drain system to return large spill Air blower away from the vessel
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Conclusion DSME, prepared for HSE issues on an LNG FPSO! DSME LNG FPSO
Optimum design & layout will be developed to obtain inherent safety Process risk as well those from SMR will be controlled
A compact process technology would enable a safer design FERA will be used to manage the process risk!
Non-process risk will be controlled HSE will be an independent discipline during whole process of development
Systematic risk assessment Structural design to withstand design accidental loads
Future Products & Business Development Institute
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Thank you!
DSME
Future Products & Business Research Institute
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