CIVIL LAW REVIEW - BALANE Allarey, Arnesto, Azis, Badi, Bayalan, Mendoza, M.

Article 2 (CC) NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION V. COA September 8, 2004 Facts: The National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the president, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officio members. After personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members turned over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria beginning December 12, 1994. However, the NAC resident auditor disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives for the period December 12, 1994 to June 27, 1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038. The National Government Auditing Office upheld the auditors order and notices of disallowance were subsequently issued. The NAC filed the present petition, contending that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing COA Memorandum No. 97-038 without the required notice and publication under Article 2 of the Civil Code. Issue: WON the publication required by NCC, Art. 2 is needed for the validity and effectivity of COA Memorandum No. 97-038. Held: No. Ratio: The COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria or any allowance whatsoever to the NAC ex officio members official representatives. Contrary to petitioners claim, COA Memorandum No. 97-038 does not need, for validity and effectivity, the publication required by Article 2 of the Civil Code. We clarified this publication requirement in Taada vs. Tuvera: [A]ll statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. (Emphasis supplied.) COA Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely an internal and interpretative regulation or letter of instruction which does not need publication to be effective and valid. It is not an implementing rule or regulation of a statute but a directive issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-executing prohibition imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution on the President and his official family, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives from holding multiple offices and receiving double compensation. COA Memorandum No. 97-038 does not, in any manner or on its own, rule against or affect the right of any individual, except those provided for under the Constitution. Hence, publication of said Memorandum is not required for it to be valid, effective and enforceable.
1

This Taada case is not the one assigned in our syllabus. This was promulgated 29 December 1986. Fn.10 of the case: 146 SCRA 446, 453-454 [1986].

CIVIL LAW REVIEW - BALANE Allarey, Arnesto, Azis, Badi, Bayalan, Mendoza, M. Article 40 (CC) GELUZ v. CA July 20, 1961 Facts: Nita Villanueva came to know defendant Antonio Geluz for the first time in 1948 through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband Oscar Lazo before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff Lazo was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion. It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing the action and award of damages. The CA and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code. Issue: W/N the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same Held: NO. Ratio: Article 2206, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb. This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents cannot expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in this case, both the trial court and the CA have not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.

CIVIL LAW REVIEW - BALANE Allarey, Arnesto, Azis, Badi, Bayalan, Mendoza, M. Article 43 (CC) JOAQUIN v. NAVARRO May 29, 1953 Facts:

Issue: 1. Held: 1.

The main question related to the sequence of the deaths of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their children, all of whom were killed in the massacre of civilians by Japanese troops in Manila in February 1945. The trial court found the deaths of this persons to have accurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls, named Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin Navarro, Jr.; 3rd. Angela Joaquin de Navarro, and 4th, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court except that, with regard to Angela Joaquin de Navarro and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared to have survived his mother. While the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together with their three daughters, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, and their son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the German Club. During their stay, the building was packed with refugees, shells were exploding around, and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the people inside the building, especially those who were trying to escape. The three daughters were hit and fell of the ground near the entrance; and Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer heaven. They could not convince Angela Joaquin who refused to join them; and so Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his son, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Angela Conde, and a friend and former neighbor, Francisco Lopez, dashed out of the burning edifice. As they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the German Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people inside, presumably including Angela Joaquin. Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby, the stayed there about three days They flied toward the St. Theresa Academy in San Marcelino Street, but unfortunately met Japanese Patrols, who fired at the refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his daughter-in-law. At the time of the masaccre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was aged 70; his wife Angela Joaquin was about 67 years old; Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30; Pilar Navarro was two or three years older than her brother; while the other sisters, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y Joaquin, were between 23 and 25. Only the witness Lopez survived.

W/N the statutory presumption on survivorship (NCC 43 or the Rules of Court then) is applicable to the case.

No it is not applicable. Most provisions, as their language plainly implies, are intended as a substitute for lacks and so are not to be available when there are facts. With particular reference to section 69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the situation which it present is one in which the facts are not only unknown but unknowable. By hypothesis, there is no specific evidence as to the time of death . . . ." . . . it is assumed that no evidence can be produced. . . . Since the facts are unknown and unknowable, the law may apply the law of fairness appropriate to the different legal situation that arises."

Ratio: It is our opinion that the testimony of Lopez contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his mother. It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the foregoing decision that the evidence of the survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls.

CIVIL LAW REVIEW - BALANE Allarey, Arnesto, Azis, Badi, Bayalan, Mendoza, M. While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out, it must be noted that this possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction from proven facts that it was the other way around. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., it will be recalled, was killed, while running, in front of, and 15 meters from, the German Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in five seconds or less, and so died within that interval from the time he dashed out of the building. Now, when Joaquin Navarro, Jr. with his father and wife started to flee from the clubhouse, the old lady was alive and unhurt, so much so that the Navarro father and son tried hard to have her come along. She could have perished within those five or fewer seconds, as stated, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote. True, people in the building were also killed but these, according to Lopez, were mostly refugees who had tried to slip away from it and were shot by Japanese troops. It was not very likely that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. made an attempt to escape. She even made frantic efforts to dissuade her husband and son from leaving the place and exposing themselves to gun fire. This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where she was may well give an idea, at the same time, of a condition of relative safety in the clubhouse at the moment her husband, son, and daughter-in-law left her. It strongly tends to prove that, as the situation looked to her, the perils of death from staying were not so imminent. And it lends credence to Mr. Lopez' statement that the collapse of the clubhouse occurred about 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was shot in the head and dropped dead, and that it was the collapse that killed Mrs. Angela Navarro. The Court of Appeals said the interval between Joaquin Navarro's death and the breaking down of the edifice was "minutes". Even so, it was much longer than five seconds, long enough to warrant the inference that Mrs. Angela Joaquin was sill alive when her son expired The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes, besides the collapse of the building, by which Mrs. Navarro could have been killed. All these are speculative , and the probabilities, in the light of the known facts, are against them. Dreading Japanese sharpshooters outside as evidenced by her refusal to follow the only remaining living members of her family, she could not have kept away form protective walls. Besides, the building had been set on fire trap the refugees inside, and there was no necessity for the Japanese to was their ammunition except upon those who tried to leave the premises. Nor was Angela Joaquin likely to have been killed by falling beams because the building was made of concrete and its collapse, more likely than not, was sudden. As to fumes, these do not cause instantaneous death; certainly not within the brief space of five seconds between her son's departure and his death. The question of whether upon given facts the operation of the statutory presumption is to be invoked is a question of law.

CIVIL LAW REVIEW - BALANE Allarey, Arnesto, Azis, Badi, Bayalan, Mendoza, M. Article 50 (CC) ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS V. COMELEC 18 September 1995 Facts:

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed a certificate of candidacy on 8 March 1995, aspiring for a Congressional position for the First District of Tarlac. MOntejo opposed the said candidacy because the 1year residency requirement was not satisfied in view of the statement of having resided in Leyte for seven months in her Certificate of Candidacy and Voters Registration. Marcos then filed an amended certificate where the date of residency was changed from seven months to since childhood. The amended certificate was not accepted for being filed out of time. She consequently filed the amended COC in the COMELECs head office in Intramuros alleging that the entry of the word seven was an honest misrepresentation. The COMELEC denied the same and its MR and disqualified Romualdez-Marcos mainly due to her lack of intention to reside in Tacloban.

Issue: W/N Romualdez-Marcos satisfies the recidency requirement for purposes of her candidacy. HELD/RATIO: YES. Article 50 CC dictates that for purposes of the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligation, the domicile of a natural person is his habitual residence. This was illustrated in Ong v. Republic that this means ones personal home. "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently. The foregoing however, does not apply in election cases. For purposes of electoral matters, it is decided that the term residence is synonymous with the term domicile. In addition, the fact of residence and not is indicated in the forms is controlling. In view of this, is can be said that the entry of the word seven is really an honest mistake. As to the allegation that Romualdez-Marcos is domiciled in Manila evidenced by the fact that she has been elected there, the SC reasoned that a person can have several residences at certain times but those are not necessarily his domicile. The SC then outlined the different modes of acquiring a domicile: 1. Domicile of origin which is acquired by operation of law, that which is acquired by a child from his parents, which in this case is Tacloban. A domicile once acquired is retained until a new one is gained. 2. A domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose. In absence of any of the foregoing, the domicile is deemed to continue. 3. Domicile attained by operation of law through marriage,in view of Art 110 of the CC that the husband fixes place of the family home. In relation to this, the wife may choose a different domicile when the circumstances so dictate. In the present case, Pres. Marcos did not seem to have chosen either Batac or San Juan to be the family home, so that Mrs. Marcos is still deemed to have not changed her domicile of origin. 4. Even if it can be said that Romualdez-Marcos acquired a new domicile by virtue of marriage, she acquired the right to either revert to her domicile of origin or choose a new one after Mr. Marcos died and by her acts it is clear that she intended her domicile to be Tacloban CIty. Romualdez-Marcos possesses the necessary requirement of residency, and thus she is allowed to run.

CIVIL LAW REVIEW - BALANE Allarey, Arnesto, Azis, Badi, Bayalan, Mendoza, M. SALUDO JR., VS. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL (AMEX) April 19, 2006 Facts: Ancieto Saludo (Congressman of S. Leyte) filed damages against AMEX, Inc. (head office in Legaspi, Makati) for alleged wrongful dishonour of Saludos credit card with RTC Maasin, Leyte. Cause of action stemmed from the stalleged wrongful dishonor of Saludo's credit card and the supplementary card (1 during his daughters purchases in nd US and 2 paying his hotel while he was there with other delegates from the Philippines); wrongful charged for late payment. Subsequently, his credit card and its supplementary cards were cancelled. AMEX raised affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and improper venue. None of the parties was a resident of S. Leyte. AMEX asserts that Saludo is not a resident of S. Leyte evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate he presented CNFS was issued at Pasay and that his law office is located in Pasay. RTC: In favour of SALUDO (Leyte is a proper venue) Being the incumbent Cong. of S. Leyte his residence can be taken judicial notice of Core v. Core- residence, for purposes of fixing venue of an action, is synonymous with domicile. This is defined as the permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on the facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. A person can have but one domicile at a time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. Venue could be at place of his residence. CA: reversed RTC (improper venue) Koh vs. CA- domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. Deemed Judicial admission that Saludos residence in Pasay: (Community tax certificate, as indicated in his CNFS was issued at Pasay City. Under RA 7160- ctc shall be paid in the place of residence of an individual. Saludos law office is also in Pasay City. Choice of venue is given to plaintiff, but said choice is not left to his caprice and cannot deprive a defendant 2 of the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of Court (R4.2 ) SC: reversed CA and AFFIRMED RTC

ISSUE: 1. w/n Saludo was a resident of S. Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint? YES 2. w/n RTC-Leyte is the proper venue? YES Ratio: For purposes of election law is more stringent in that it is equated with the term "domicile." When parsed, therefore, the term "residence" requires two elements: (1) intention to reside in the particular place; and (2) personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. For purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted. Thus, it is understood to mean as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. Residence in civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in a place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other place. Thus, if a person lives with his family habitually in Quezon City, he would have his domicile in Quezon City. If he also has a house for vacation purposes in the City of Baguio, and another house in connection with his business in the City of Manila, he would have residence in all three places.

SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

CIVIL LAW REVIEW - BALANE Allarey, Arnesto, Azis, Badi, Bayalan, Mendoza, M. In CAB, Saludo has a house in Makati City for the purpose of exercising his profession and also a house in Macrohon, S. Leyte, for election purposes where he also lives or stays physically, personally and actually then he can have residences in these two places. Because it would then be preposterous to acknowledge and recognize Saludo, Jr. as congressman of Leyte without also recognizing him as actually, personally and physically residing thereat, when such residence is required by law. The fact then that Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City is of no moment because granting arguendo that he could be considered a resident therein, the same does not preclude his having a residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo. It is bound to know that, under the Constitution, one of the qualifications of a congressman or representative to the House of Representatives is having a residence in the district in which he shall be elected.