Rohett PuuI WoIj

In Defense of AnarHism
190
2
Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
I. Te Conict Between Authority and Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . s
1. Te Concept of Authoiity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Te Concept of Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. Te Confict Between Authoiity and Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
II. Te Solution of Classical Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1s
1. Demociacy ls the Only leasible Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. Unanimous Diiect Demociacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
3. Repiesentative Demociacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix A Pioposal foi lnstant Diiect Demociacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4. Majoiitaiian Demociacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
III. Beyond the Iegitimate State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Te Qest foi the Legitimate State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2. Utopian Glimpses of a Woild Without States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
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Preface
Tis essay on the foundations of the authoiity of the state maiks a stage in
the development of my concein with pioblems of political authoiity and moial
autonomy. When l hist became deeply inteiested in the subject, l was quite
conhdent that l could hnd a satisfactoiy justihcation foi the tiaditional demociatic
doctiine to which l iathei unthinkingly gave my allegiance. lndeed, duiing my
hist yeai as a membei of the Columbia Univeisity Philosophy Depaitment, l
taught a couise on political philosophy in which l boldly announced that l would
foimulate and then solve the fundamental pioblem of political philosophy. l had
no tiouble foimulating the pioblemioughly speaking, howthe moial autonomy
of the individual can be made compatible with the legitimate authoiity of the state.
l also had no tiouble iefuting a numbei of supposed solutions which had been
put foiwaid by vaiious theoiists of the demociatic state. But midway thiough
the semestei, l was foiced to go befoie my class, ciestfallen and veiy embaiiassed,
to announce that l had failed to discovei the giand solution.
At hist, as l stiuggled with this dilemma, l clung to the conviction that a solution
lay just aiound the next conceptual coinei. When l iead papeis on the subject to
meetings at vaiious univeisities, l was foiced again and again to iepiesent myself
as seaiching foi a theoiy which l simply could not hnd. Liule by liule, l began
to shif the emphasis of my exposition. linally whethei fiom philosophical
iefection, oi simply fiom chagiin l came to the iealization that l was ieally
defending the negative iathei than looking foi the positive. My failuie to hnd
any theoietical justihcation foi the authoiity of the state had convinced me that
theie was no justihcation. ln shoit, l had become a philosophical anaichist.
Te hist chaptei of this essay foimulates the pioblem as l oiiginally posed it
to myself moie than hve yeais ago. Te second chaptei exploies the classical
demociatic solution to the pioblem and exposes the inadequacy of the usual
majoiitaiian model of the demociatic state. Te thiid chaptei sketches, in a iathei
impiessionistic, Hegelian way, the ieasons foi my lingeiing hope that a solution
can be found, it concludes with some biief, quite Utopian suggestions of ways in
which an anaichic society might actually function.
Leaving aside any faws which may luik in the aiguments actually piesented in
these pages, this essay suneis fiom two majoi inadequacies. On the side of puie
theoiy, l have been foiced to assume a numbei of veiy impoitant piopositions
about the natuie, souices, and limits of moial obligation. To put it bluntly, l
have simply taken foi gianted an entiie ethical theoiy. On the side of piactical
application, l have said almost nothing about the mateiial, social, oi psychological
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conditions undei which anaichismmight be a feasible mode of social oiganization.
l am painfully awaie of these defects, and it is my hope to publish a full-scale
woik in the ieasonably neai futuie in which a gieat deal moie will be said on both
subjects. lf l may steal a title fiom Kant (and thus peihaps wiap myself in the
cloak of his legitimacy), this essay might iathei giandly be subtitled Gioundwoik
of the Metaphysics of the State.
New Yoik City, Maich, 190

I. Te Conict Between Authority and

Autonomy
1. Te Concept of Authority
Politics is the exeicise of the powei of the state, oi the auempt to infuence that
exeicise. Political philosophy is theiefoie, stiictly speaking, the philosophy of
the state. lf we aie to deteimine the content of political philosophy, and whethei
indeed it exists, we must begin with the concept of the state.
Te state is a gioup of peisons who have and exeicise supieme authoiity within
a given teiiitoiy. Stiictly, we should say that a state is a gioup of peisons who
have supieme authoiity within a given teiiitoiy oi ovei a ceitain population.
A nomadic tiibe may exhibit the authoiity stiuctuie of a state, so long as its
subjects do not fall undei the supeiioi authoiity of a teiiitoiial state.
1
Te state
may include all the peisons who fall undei its authoiity, as does the demociatic
state accoiding to its theoiists, it may also consist of a single individual to whom
all the iest aie subject. We may doubt whethei the one-peison state has evei
actually existed, although Louis XlV evidently thought so when he announced,
L`etat, c`est moi." Te distinctive chaiacteiistic of the state is supieme authoiity, oi
what political philosopheis used to call soveieignty." Tus one speaks of populai
soveieignty," which is the doctiine that the people aie the state, and of couise the
use of soveieign" to mean king" iefects the supposed concentiation of supieme
authoiity in a monaichy.
Authoiity is the iight to command, and coiielatively, the iight to be obeyed.
lt must be distinguished fiom powei, which is the ability to compel compliance,
eithei thiough the use oi the thieat of foice. When l tuin ovei my wallet to a thief
who is holding me at gunpoint, l do so because the fate with which he thieatens
me is woise than the loss of money which l am made to sunei. l giant that he
has powei ovei me, but l would haidly suppose that he has authoiity, that is, that
he has a iight to demand my money and that l have an obligation to give it to
him. When the goveinment piesents me with a bill foi taxes, on the othei hand, l
pay it (noimally) even though l do not wish to, and even if l think l can get away
with not paying. lt is, afei all, the duly constituted goveinment, and hence it
1
loi a similai dehnition of state," see Max Webei, Po|::cs os o Voco:on. Webei emphasizes the
means foice by which the will of the state is imposed, but a caieful analysis of his dehnition
shows that it also bases itself on the notion of authoiity (impeiative cooidination") .

has a r:g| to tax me. lt has ov|or:, ovei me. Sometimes, of couise, l cheat the
goveinment, but even so, l acknowledge its authoiity, foi who would speak of
cheating" a thief`
To claim authoiity is to claim the iight to be obeyed. To have authoiity is
then what` lt may mean to have that iight, oi it may mean to have one`s
claim acknowledged and accepted by those at whom it is diiected. Te teim
authoiity" is ambiguous, having both a desciiptive and a noimative sense. Even
the desciiptive sense iefeis to noims oi obligations, of couise, but it does so by
Jescr:|:ng what men believe they ought to do iathei than by asseiting that they
ought to do it.
Coiiesponding to the two senses of authoiity, theie aie two concepts of the
state. Desciiptively, the state may be dehned as a gioup of peisons who aie
oJno+|eJgeJ to have supieme authoiity within a teiiitoiy acknowledged,
that is, by those ovei whom the authoiity is asseited. Te study of the foims,
chaiacteiistics, institutions, and functioning of Je [oco states, as we may call
them, is the piovince of political science. lf we take the teim in its piesciiptive
signihcation, the state is a gioup of peisons who have the r:g| to exeicise supieme
authoiity within a teiiitoiy. Te discoveiy, analysis, and demonstiation of the
foims and piinciples of legitimate authoiity of the iight to iule is called
political philosophy.
What is meant by svree authoiity` Some political philosopheis, speaking
of authoiity in the noimative sense, have held that the tiue state has ultimate
authoiity ovei all maueis whatsoevei that occui within its venue. Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, foi example, asseited that the social contiact by which a just political
community is foimed gives to the body politic absolute command ovei the mem-
beis of which it is foimed, and it is this powei, when diiected by the geneial will,
that beais . . . the name of `soveieignty.`" John Locke, on the othei hand, held
that the supieme authoiity of the just state extends only to those maueis which
it is piopei foi a state to contiol. Te state is, to be suie, the highest authoiity, but
its iight to command is less than absolute. One of the questions which political
philosophy must answei is whethei theie is any limit to the iange of anaiis ovei
which a just state has authoiity.
An authoiitative command must also be distinguished fiom a peisuasive ai-
gument. When l am commanded to do something, l may choose to comply even
though l am not being thieatened, because l am biought to believe that it is some-
thing which l ought to do. lf that is the case, then l am not, stiictly speaking,
obeying a command, but iathei acknowledging the foice of an aigument oi the
Tightness of a piesciiption. Te peison who issues the command" functions
meiely as the occasion foi my becoming awaie of my duty, and his iole might in
othei instances be hlled by an admonishing fiiend, oi even by my own conscience.

l might, by an extension of the teim, say that the piesciiption has authoiity ovei
me, meaning simply that l ought to act in accoidance with it. But the peison him-
self has no authoiity oi, to be moie piecise, my complying with his command
does not constitute an acknowledgment on my pait of any such authoiity. Tus
authoiity iesides in peisons, they possess it if indeed they do at all by viitue
of who they aie and not by viitue of what they command. My duty to obey is a
duty owed to them, not to the moial law oi to the benehciaiies of the actions l
may be commanded to peifoim.
Teie aie, of couise, many ieasons why men actually acknowledge claims of
authoiity. Te most common, taking the whole of human histoiy, is simply the
piesciiptive foice of tiadition. Te fact that something has always been done in a
ceitain way stiikes most men as a peifectly adequate ieason foi doing it that way
again. Why should we submit to a king` Because we have always submiued to
kings. But why should the oldest son of the king become king in tuin` Because
oldest sons have always been heiis to the thione. Te foice of the tiaditional is
engiaved so deeply on men`s minds that even a study of the violent and haphazaid
oiigins of a iuling family will not weaken its authoiity in the eyes of its subjects.
Some men acquiie the auia of authoiity by viitue of theii own extiaoidinaiy
chaiacteiistics, eithei as gieat militaiy leadeis, as men of saintly chaiactei, oi
as foiceful peisonalities. Such men gathei followeis and disciples aiound them
who willingly obey without consideiation of peisonal inteiest oi even against its
dictates. Te followeis believe that the leadei has a r:g| o coonJ, which is to
say, ov|or:,.
Most commonly today, in a woild of buieauciatic aimies and institutionalized
ieligions, when kings aie few in numbei and the line of piophets has iun out,
authoiity is gianted to those who occupy omcial positions. As Webei has pointed
out, these positions appeai authoiitative in the minds of most men because they
aie denned by ceitain soits of buieauciatic iegulations having the viitues of pub-
licity, geneiality, piedictability, and so foith. We become conditioned to iespond
to the visible signs of omciality, such as piinted foims and badges. Sometimes we
may have cleaily in mind the justihcation foi a legalistic claim to authoiity, as
when we comply with a command because its authoi is an e|eceJ omcial. Moie
ofen the meie sight of a unifoim is enough to make us feel that the man inside it
has a iight to be obeyed.
Tat men accede to claims of supieme authoiity is plain. Tat men ovg| to
accede to claims of supieme authoiity is not so obvious. Oui hist question must
theiefoie be, Undei what conditions and foi what ieasons does one man have
supieme authoiity ovei anothei` Te same question can be iestated, Undei what
conditions can a state (undeistood noimatively) exist`
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Kant has given us a convenient title foi this soit of investigation. He called it
a deduction," meaning by the teim not a pioof of one pioposition fiom anothei,
but a demonstiation of the legitimacy of a concept. When a concept is empiiical,
its deduction is accomplished meiely by pointing to instances of its objects. loi
example, the deduction of the concept of a hoise consists in exhibiting a hoise.
Since theie aie hoises, it must be legitimate to employ the concept. Similaily, a
deduction of the desciiptive concept of a state consists simply in pointing to the
innumeiable examples of human communities in which some men claim supieme
authoiity ovei the iest and aie obeyed. But when the concept in question is
nonempiiical, its deduction must pioceed in a dineient mannei. All noimative
concepts aie nonempiiical, foi they iefei to what ought to be iathei than to
what is. Hence, we cannot justify the use of the concept of (noimative) supieme
authoiity by piesenting instances.
z
We must demonstiate by an a piioii aigument
that theie can be foims of human community in which some men have a moial
iight to iule. ln shoit, the fundamental task of political philosophy is to piovide
a JeJvc:on o[ |e conce o[ |e soe.
To complete this deduction, it is not enough to show that theie aie ciicum-
stances in which men have an obligation to do what the Je [oco authoiities
command. Even undei the most unjust of goveinments theie aie fiequently good
ieasons foi obedience iathei than dehance. lt may be that the goveinment has
commanded its subjects to do what in fact they alieady have an independent
obligation to do, oi it may be that the evil consequences of dehance fai outweigh
the indignity of submission. A goveinment`s commands may piomise benehcent
enects, eithei intentionally oi not. loi these ieasons, and foi ieasons of piudence
as well, a man may be iight to comply with the commands of the goveinment
undei whose Je [oco authoiity he hnds himself. But none of this seules the
question of legitimate authoiity. Tat is a mauei of the r:g| to command, and of
the coiielative obligation o o|e, |e erson +|o :ssves |e coonJ.
Te point of the last paiagiaph cannot be too stiongly stiessed. Obedience is
not a mauei of doing what someone tells you to do. lt is a mauei of doing what
he tells you to do |ecovse |e e||s ,ov o Jo :. Legitimate, oi Je jvre, authoiity
thus conceins the giounds and souices of moial obligation.
Since it is indisputable that theie aie men who believe that otheis have authoiity
ovei them, it might be thought that we could use that fact to piove that somewheie,
at some time oi othei, theie must have been men who ieally did possess legitimate
authoiity. We might think, that is to say, that although some claims to authoiity
might be wiong, it could not be that o|| such claims weie wiong, since then we
z
loi each time we oneied an example of legitimate authoiity, we would have to auach to it a
nonempiiical aigument pioving the legitimacy.
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nevei would have had the concept of legitimate authoiity at all. By a similai
aigument, some philosopheis have tiied to show that not all oui expeiiences aie
dieams, oi moie geneially that in expeiience not eveiything is meie apeaiance
iathei than ieality. Te point is that teims like dieam" and appeaiance" aie
dehned by contiast with waking expeiience" oi ieality." Hence we could only
have developed a use foi them by being piesented with situations in which some
expeiiences weie dieams and otheis not, oi some things meie appeaiance and
otheis ieality.
Whatevei the foice of that aigument in geneial, it cannot be applied to the
case of Je [oco veisus Je jvre authoiity, foi the key component of both concepts,
namely iight," is impoited into the discussion fiomthe iealmof moial philosophy
geneially. lnsofai as we concein ouiselves with the possibility of a just state, we
assume that moial discouise is meaningful and that adequate deductions have
been given of concepts like iight," duty," and obligation."
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What can be infeiied fiom the existence of Je [oco states is that men |e|:e+e
in the existence of legitimate authoiity, foi of couise a Je [oco state is simply a
state whose subjects believe it to be legitimate (i.e., ieally to have the authoiity
which it claims foi itself). Tey may be wiong. lndeed, o|| beliefs in authoiity
may be wiong theie may be not a single state in the histoiy of mankind which
has now oi evei has had a iight to be obeyed. lt might even be impossible foi
such a state to exist, that is the question we must tiy to seule. But so long as men
believe in the authoiity of states, we can conclude that they possess the concept
of de juie authoiity.

Te noimative concept of the state as the human community which possesses

iightful authoiity within a teiiitoiy thus dehnes the subject mauei of political
philosophy piopei. Howevei, even if it should piove impossible to piesent a
deduction of the concept if, that is, theie can be no de juie state still a laige
numbei of moial questions can be iaised conceining the individual`s ielationship
with de facto states. We may ask, foi example, whethei theie aie any moial
piinciples which ought to guide the state in its lawmaking, such as the piinciple
of utilitaiianism, and undei what conditions it is iight foi the individual to obey
the laws. We may exploie the social ideals of equality and achievement, oi the
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Tus, political philosophy is a dependent oi deiivative discipline, just as the philosophy of science
is dependent upon the geneial theoiy of knowledge and on the bianches of metaphysics which
concein themselves with the ieality and natuie of the physical woild.

Tis point is so simple that it may seem unwoithy of such emphasis. Neveitheless, a numbei of
political philosopheis, including Hobbes and John Austin, have supposed that the concept as well
as the piinciples of authoiity could be deiived fiom the concepts of powei oi utility. loi example,
Austin dehnes a command as a signihcation of desiie, uueied by someone who will visit evil on
those who do not comply with it (Te Pro+:Jence o[ }vr:srvJence Deer:neJ, Lectuie l).
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piinciples of punishment, oi the justihcations foi wai. All such investigations aie
essentially applications of geneial moial piinciples to the paiticulai phenomena
of (Je [oco) politics. Hence, it would be appiopiiate to ieclaim a woid which
has fallen on bad days, and call that bianch of the study of politics cosv:s:co|
o|::cs. Since theie aie men who acknowledge claims to authoiity, theie aie Je
[oco states. Assuming that moial discouise in geneial is legitimate, theie must be
moial questions which aiise in iegaid to such states. Hence, casuistical politics as
a bianch of ethics does exist. lt iemains to be decided whethei political philosophy
piopei exists.
z. Te Concept of Autonomy
Te fundamental assumption of moial philosophy is that men aie iesponsible
foi theii actions. liom this assumption it follows necessaiily, as Kant pointed
out, that men aie metaphysically fiee, which is to say that in some sense they
aie capable of choosing how they shall act. Being able to choose how he acts
makes a man iesponsible, but meiely choosing is not in itself enough to constitute
o|:ng iesponsibility foi one`s actions. Taking iesponsibility involves auempting
to deteimine what one ought to do, and that, as philosopheis since Aiistotle have
iecognized, lays upon one the additional buidens of gaining knowledge, iefecting
on motives, piedicting outcomes, ciiticizing piinciples, and so foith.
Te obligation to take iesponsibility foi one`s actions does not deiive fiom
man`s fieedom of will alone, foi moie is iequiied in taking iesponsibility than
fieedom of choice. Only because man has the capacity to ieason about his choices
can he be said to stand undei a continuing obligation to take iesponsibility foi
them. lt is quite appiopiiate that moial philosopheis should gioup togethei
childien and madmen as beings not fully iesponsible foi theii actions, foi as
madmen aie thought to lack fieedom of choice, so childien do not yet possess
the powei of ieason in a developed foim. lt is even just that we should assign a
gieatei degiee of iesponsibility to childien, foi madmen, by viitue of theii lack
of fiee will, aie completely without iesponsibility, while childien, insofai as they
possess ieason in a paitially developed foim, can be held iesponsible (i.e., can be
iequiied to take iesponsibility) to a coiiesponding degiee.
Eveiy man who possesses both fiee will and ieason has an obligation to take
iesponsibility foi his actions, even though he may not be actively engaged in a
continuing piocess of iefection, investigation, and delibeiation about how he
ought to act. Aman will sometimes announce his willingness to take iesponsibility
foi the consequences of his actions, even though he has not delibeiated about
them, oi does not intend to do so in the futuie. Such a declaiation is, of couise,
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an advance ovei the iefusal to take iesponsibility, it at least acknowledges the
existence of the obligation. But it does not ielieve the man of the duty to engage
in the iefective piocess which he has thus fai shunned. lt goes without saying
that a man may take iesponsibility foi his actions and yet act wiongly. When
we desciibe someone as a iesponsible individual, we do not imply that he always
does what is iight, but only that he does not neglect the duty of auempting to
asceitain what is iight.
Te iesponsible man is not capiicious oi anaichic, foi he does acknowledge
himself bound by moial constiaints. But he insists that he alone is the judge of
those constiaints. He may listen to the advice of otheis, but he makes it his own
by deteimining foi himself whethei it is good advice. He may leain fiom otheis
about his moial obligations, but only in the sense that a mathematician leains
fiom othei mathematicians namely by heaiing fiom them aiguments whose
validity he iecognizes even though he did not think of them himself. He does
not leain in the sense that one leains fiom an exploiei, by accepting as tiue his
accounts of things one cannot see foi oneself.
Since the iesponsible man aiiives at moial decisions which he expiesses to
himself in the foim of impeiatives, we may say that he gives laws to himself, oi is
self-legislating. ln shoit, he is ovonoovs. As Kant aigued, moial autonomy is a
combination of fieedom and iesponsibility, it is a submission to laws which one
has made foi oneself. Te autonomous man, insofai as he is autonomous, is not
subject to the will of anothei. He may do what anothei tells him, but not |ecovse
he has been told to do it. He is theiefoie, in the political sense of the woid, [ree.
Since man`s iesponsibility foi his actions is a consequence of his capacity foi
choice, he cannot give it up oi put it aside. He can iefuse to acknowledge it,
howevei, eithei delibeiately oi by simply failing to iecognize his moial condition.
All men iefuse to take iesponsibility foi theii actions at some time oi othei
duiing theii lives, and some men so consistently shiik theii duty that they piesent
moie the appeaiance of oveigiown childien than of adults. lnasmuch as moial
autonomy is simply the condition of taking full iesponsibility foi one`s actions,
it follows that men can foifeit theii autonomy at will. Tat is to say, a man
can decide to obey the commands of anothei without making any auempt to
deteimine foi himself whethei what is commanded is good oi wise.
Tis is an impoitant point, and it should not be confused with the false asseition
that a man can give up iesponsibility foi his actions. Evan afei he has subjected
himself to the will of anothei, an individual iemains iesponsible foi what he
does. But by iefusing to engage in moial delibeiation, by accepting as hnal the
commands of the otheis, he foifeits his autonomy. Rousseau is theiefoie iight
when he says that a man cannot become a slave even thiough his own choice, if
he means that even slaves aie moially iesponsible foi theii acts. But he is wiong if
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he means that men cannot place themselves voluntaiily in a position of seivitude
and mindless obedience.
Teie aie many foims and degiees of foifeituie of autonomy. A man can give
up his independence of judgment with iegaid to a single question, oi in iespect
of a single type of question. loi example, when l place myself in the hands of my
doctoi, l commit myself to whatevei couise of tieatment he piesciibes, but only
in iegaid to my health. l do not make him my legal counseloi as well. A man may
foifeit autonomy on some oi all questions foi a specihc peiiod of time, oi duiing
his entiie life. He may submit himself to all commands, whatevei they may be,
save foi some specihed acts (such as killing) which he iefuses to peifoim. liom
the example of the doctoi, it is obvious that theie aie at least some situations
in which it is ieasonable to give up one`s autonomy. lndeed, we may wondei
whethei, in a complex woild of technical expeitise, it is evei ieasonable not to do
so'
Since the concept of taking and foifeiting iesponsibility is cential to the discus-
sion which follows, it is woith devoting a bit moie space to claiifying it. Taking
iesponsibility foi one`s actions means making the hnal decisions about what one
should do. loi the autonomous man, theie is no such thing, stiictly speaking,
as a coonJ. lf someone in my enviionment is issuing what aie intended as
commands, and if he oi otheis expect those commands to be obeyed, that fact
will be taken account of in my delibeiations. l may decide that l ought to do
what that peison is commanding me to do, and it may even be that his issuing
the command is the factoi in the situation which makes it desiiable foi me to do
so. loi example, if l am on a sinking ship and the captain is giving oideis foi
manning the lifeboats, and if eveiyone else is obeying the captain |ecovse |e :s
|e coo:n, l may decide that undei the ciicumstances l had beuei do what he
says, since the confusion caused by disobeying him would be geneially haimful.
But insofai as l make such a decision, l am not o|e,:ng |:s coonJ, that is, l
am not acknowledging him as having authoiity ovei me. l would make the same
decision, foi exactly the same ieasons, if one of the passengeis had staited to
issue oideis" and had, in the confusion, come to be obeyed.
ln politics, as in life geneially, men fiequently foifeit theii autonomy. Teie
aie a numbei of causes foi this fact, and also a numbei of aiguments which have
been oneied to justify it. Most men, as we have alieady noted, feel so stiongly
the foice of tiadition oi buieauciacy that they accept unthinkingly the claims
to authoiity which aie made by theii nominal iuleis. lt is the iaie individual
in the histoiy of the iace who iises even to the level of questioning the iight of
his masteis to command and the duty of himself and his fellows to obey. Once
the dangeious question has been staited, howevei, a vaiiety of aiguments can
be biought foiwaid to demonstiate the authoiity of the iuleis. Among the most
13
ancient is Plato`s asseition that men should submit to the authoiity of those with
supeiioi knowledge, wisdom, oi insight. A sophisticated modein veision has it
that the educated poition of a demociatic population is moie likely to be politically
active, and that it is just as well foi the ill-infoimed segment of the electoiate
to iemain passive, since its entiance into the political aiena only suppoits the
enoits of demagogues and extiemists. A numbei of Ameiican political scientists
have gone so fai as to claim that the apathy of the Ameiican masses is a cause of
stability and hence a good thing.
Te moial condition demands that we acknowledge iesponsibility and achieve
autonomy wheievei and whenevei possible. Sometimes this involves moial de-
libeiation and iefection, at othei times, the gatheiing of special, even technical,
infoimation. Te contempoiaiy Ameiican citizen, foi example, has an obligation
to mastei enough modein science to enable him to follow debates about nucleai
policy and come to an independent conclusion.
s
Teie aie gieat, peihaps insui-
mountable, obstacles to the achievement of a complete and iational autonomy in
the modein woild. Neveitheless, so long as we iecognize oui iesponsibility foi
oui actions, and acknowledge the powei of ieason within us, we must acknowl-
edge as well the continuing obligation to make ouiselves the authois of such
commands as we may obey. Te paiadox of man`s condition in the modein woild
is that the moie fully he iecognizes his iight and duty to be his own mastei, the
moie completely he becomes the passive object of a technology and buieauciacy
whose complexities he cannot hope to undeistand. lt is only seveial hundied
yeais since a ieasonably well-educated man could claim to undeistand the majoi
issues of goveinment as well as his king oi pailiament. lionically, the high school
giaduate of today, who cannot mastei the issues of foieign and domestic policy
on which he is asked to vote, could quite easily have giasped the pioblems of
eighteenth-centuiy stateciaf.
3. Te Conict Between Authority and Autonomy
Te dehning maik of the state is authoiity, the iight to iule. Te piimaiy
obligation of man is autonomy, the iefusal to be iuled. lt would seem, then, that
theie can be no iesolution of the confict between the autonomy of the individual
s
Tis is not quite so dimcult as it sounds, since policy veiy iaiely tuins on disputes ovei technical
oi theoietical details. Still, the citizen who, foi example, does not undeistand the natuie of atomic
iadiation cannot even pietend to have an opinion on the feasibility of bomb shelteis, and since
the momentous choice between hist-stiike and second-stiike nucleai stiategies depends on the
possibility of a successful sheltei system, the uninfoimed citizen will be as completely at the meicy
of his iepiesentatives" as the lowliest slave.
14
and the putative authoiity of the state. lnsofai as a man fulhlls his obligation to
make himself the authoi of his decisions, he will iesist the state`s claim to have
authoiity ovei him. Tat is to say, he will deny that he has a duty to obey the
laws of the state s:|, |ecovse |e, ore |e |o+s. ln that sense, it would seem that
anaichism is the only political doctiine consistent with the viitue of autonomy.
Now, of couise, an anaichist may giant the necessity of co|,:ng with the law
undei ceitain ciicumstances oi foi the time being. He may even doubt that theie is
any ieal piospect of eliminating the state as a human institution. But he will nevei
view the commands of the state as legitimate, as having a binding moial foice.
ln a sense, we might chaiacteiize the anaichist as a man without a countiy, foi
despite the ties which bind him to the land of his childhood, he stands in piecisely
the same moial ielationship to his" goveinment as he does to the goveinment
of any othei countiy in which he might happen to be staying foi a time. When l
take a vacation in Gieat Biitain, l obey its laws, both because of piudential self-
inteiest and because of the obvious moial consideiations conceining the value of
oidei, the geneial good consequences of pieseiving a system of piopeity, and so
foith. On my ietuin to the United States, l have a sense of ieenteiing my countiy,
and if l think about the mauei at all, l imagine myself to stand in a dineient
and moie intimate ielation to Ameiican laws. Tey have been piomulgated by
my goveinment, and l theiefoie have a special obligation to obey them. But the
anaichist tells me that my feeling is puiely sentimental and has no objective
moial basis. All authoiity is equally illegitimate, although of couise not theiefoie
equally woithy oi unwoithy of suppoit, and my obedience to Ameiican laws, if l
am to be moially autonomous, must pioceed fiom the same consideiations which
deteimine me abioad.
Te dilemma which we have posed can be succinctly expiessed in teims of the
concept of a Je jvre state. lf all men have a continuing obligation to achieve the
highest degiee of autonomy possible, then theie would appeai to be no state whose
subjects have a moial obligation to obey its commands. Hence, the concept of a
Je jvre legitimate state would appeai to be vacuous, and philosophical anaichism
would seem to be the only ieasonable political belief foi an enlightened man.
1
II. Te Solution of Classical Democracy
1. Democracy Is the Only Feasible Solution
lt is not necessaiy to aigue at length the meiits of all the vaiious types of state
which, since Plato, have been the standaid faie of political philosophies. John
Locke may have found it woithwhile to devote an entiie tieatise to Sii Robeit
lilmei`s defense of the heieditaiy iights of kings, but today the belief in all foims
of tiaditional authoiity is as weak as the aiguments which can be given foi it.
Teie is only one foim of political community which oneis any hope of iesolving
the confict between authoiity and autonomy, and that is demociacy.
Te aigument iuns thus men cannot be fiee so long as they aie subject to
the will of otheis, whethei one man (a monaich) oi seveial (aiistociats). But
if men iule themselves, if they aie both law-giveis and law-obeyeis, then they
can combine the benehts of goveinment with the blessings of fieedom. Rule [or
the people is meiely benevolent slaveiy, but iule |, the people is tiue fieedom.
lnsofai as a man paiticipates in the anaiis of state, he is iulei as well as iuled. His
obligation to submit to the laws stems not fiom the divine iight of the monaich,
noi fiomthe heieditaiy authoiity of a noble class, but fiomthe fact that he himself
is the souice of the laws which govein him. Teiein lies the peculiai meiit and
moial claim of a demociatic state.
Demociacy auempts a natuial extension of the duty of autonomy to the iealm
of collective action. Just as the tiuly iesponsible man gives laws to himself, and
theieby binds himself to what he conceives to be iight, so a society of iesponsible
men can collectively bind themselves to laws collectively made, and theieby bind
themselves to what they have togethei judged to be iight. Te goveinment of a
demociatic state is then, stiictly speaking, no moie than a seivant of the people as
a whole, chaiged with the execution of laws which have been commonly agieed
upon. ln the woids of Rousseau, eveiy peison, while uniting himself with all,
. . . obey[s] only himself and iemain[s] as fiee as befoie" (Soc:o| Conroc, Bk. l,
Ch. ).
Let us exploie this pioposal moie closely. We shall begin with the simplest
foim of demociatic state, which may be labeled unanimous J:rec Jeocroc,.
z. Unanimous Direct Democracy
Teie is, in theoiy, a solution to the pioblem which has been posed, and this
fact is in itself quite impoitant. Howevei, the solution iequiies the imposition of
1
impossibly iestiictive conditions which make it applicable only to a iathei bizaiie
vaiiety of actual situations. Te solution is a diiect demociacy that is, a political
community in which eveiy peison votes on eveiy issue goveined by a iule
of unanimity. Undei unanimous diiect demociacy, eveiy membei of the society
wills fieely eveiy law which is actually passed. Hence, he is only confionted as a
citizen with laws to which he has consented. Since a man who is constiained only
by the dictates of his own will is autonomous, it follows that undei the diiections
of unanimous diiect demociacy, men can haimonize the duty of autonomy with
the commands of authoiity.
lt might be aigued that even this limiting case is not genuine, since each man is
obeying himself, and hence is not submiuing to a legitimate authoiity. Howevei,
the case is ieally dineient fiom the piepolitical (oi extiapolitical) case of self-
deteimination, foi the authoiity to which each citizen submits is not that of
himself simply, but that of the entiie community taken collectively. Te laws
aie issued in the name of the soveieign, which is to say the total population of
the community. Te powei which enfoices the law (should theie be any citizen
who, having voted foi a law, now iesists its application to himself) is the powei
of all, gatheied togethei into the police powei of the state. By this means, the
moial confict between duty and inteiest which aiises fiom time to time within
each man is exteinalized, and the voice of duty now speaks with the authoiity of
law. Each man, in a mannei of speaking, encounteis his beuei self in the foim of
the state, foi its dictates aie simply the laws which he has, afei due delibeiation,
willed to be enacted.
Unanimous diiect demociacy is feasible only so long as theie is substantial
agieement among o|| the membeis of a community on the maueis of majoi impoi-
tance. Since by the iule of unanimity a single negative vote defeats any motion,
the slightest disagieement ovei signihcant questions will biing the opeiations of
the society to a halt. lt will cease to function as a political community and fall
into a condition of anaichy (oi at least into a condition of non-legitimacy, a Je
[oco goveinment may of couise emeige and take contiol). Howevei, it should not
be thought that unanimous diiect demociacy iequiies foi its existence a peifect
haimony of the inteiests oi desiies of the citizens. lt is peifectly consistent with
such a system that theie be shaip, even violent, oppositions within the commu-
nity, peihaps of an economic kind. Te only necessity is that when the citizens
come togethei to delibeiate on the means foi iesolving such conficts, they agiee
unanimously on the laws to be adopted.
1
1
ln iecent yeais, a numbei of political philosopheis have exploied the possibilities of decision by
unanimity, and it tuins out that much moie can be achieved than one would expect. loi example,
John Rawls, in an infuential and widely iead essay, Justice as laiiness," uses ceitain models taken
1
loi example, a community may agiee unanimously on some piinciples of com-
pulsoiy aibitiation by which economic conficts aie to be seuled. An individual
who has voted foi these piinciples may then hnd himself peisonally disadvan-
taged by theii application in a paiticulai case. Tinking the piinciples faii, and
knowing that he voted foi them, he will (hopefully) acknowledge his moial oblig-
ation to accept theii opeiation even though he would deaily like not to be subject
to them. He will iecognize the piinciples as his own, just as any of us who has
commiued himself to a moial piinciple will, uncomfoitably to be suie, iecognize
its binding foice upon him even when it is inconvenient. Moie piecisely, this
individual will have a moial obligation to obey the commands of the mediation
boaid oi aibitiation council, +|oe+er : Jec:Jes, because the piinciples which
guide it issue fiom his own will. Tus the boaid will have authoiity ovei him (i.e.,
a iight to be obeyed) while he ietains his moial autonomy.
Undei what ciicumstances might a unanimous diiect demociacy actually func-
tion foi a ieasonable peiiod of time without simply coming to a seiies of negative
decisions` Te answei, l think, is that theie aie two soits of piactical unanimous
diiect demociacies. liist, a community of peisons inspiied by some all-absoibing
ieligious oi seculai ideal might hnd itself so completely in agieement on the
goals of the community and the means foi achieving them that decisions could
be taken on all majoi questions by a method of consensus. Utopian communities
in the nineteenth centuiy and some of the lsiaeli kibbutzim in the twentieth aie
plausible instances of such a functioning unanimity. Eventually, the consensus
dissolves and factions appeai, but in some cases the unanimity has been pieseived
foi a peiiod of many yeais.
Second, a community of iationally self-inteiested individuals may discovei
that it can only ieap the fiuits of coopeiation by maintaining unanimity. So long
as each membei of the community iemains convinced that the benehts to him
fiom coopeiation even undei the conditions of compiomise imposed by the
need foi unanimity outweigh the benehts of seveiing his connection with the
iest, the community will continue to function. loi example, a classical laissez-
faiie economy iuled by the laws of the maiketplace is supposedly endoised by
all the paiticipants because each one iecognizes |o| that he is beuei on in the
system than out onJ that any ielaxation of the ban against aiiangements in
iestiaint of tiade would in the end do him moie haim than good. So long as eveiy
businessman believes these two piopositions, theie will be unanimity on the laws
of the system despite the cuuhioat competition.
z
fiombaigaining theoiy to analyze the conditions undei which iational men with conficting inteiests
might aiiive at unanimous agieement on the pioceduial piinciples foi iesolving theii disputes. See
Rawls in P|:|oso|,, Po|::cs, onJ Soc:e,, 2
nd
seiies, eds. P. Lasleu and W. Runciman.
18
As soon as disagieement aiises on impoitant questions, unanimity is destioyed
and the state must eithei cease to be Je jvre oi else discovei some means foi
seuling disputed issues which does not depiive any membei of his autonomy.
luitheimoie, when the society giows too laige foi convenience in calling iegulai
assemblies, some way must be found to conduct the business of the state without
condemning most of the citizens to the status of voiceless subjects. Te tiaditional
solutions in demociatic theoiy to these familiai pioblems aie of couise majoiity
iule and iepiesentation. Oui next task, theiefoie, is to discovei whethei iepiesen-
tative majoiitaiian demociacy pieseives the autonomy which men achieve undei
a unanimous diiect demociacy.
Since unanimous demociacy can exist only undei such limited conditions, it
might be thought that theie is veiy liule point in discussing it at all. loi two
ieasons, howevei, unanimous diiect demociacy has gieat theoietical impoitance.
liist, it is a genuine solution to the pioblem of autonomy and authoiity, and as
we shall see, this makes it iathei unusual. Moie impoitant still, unanimous diiect
demociacy is the (fiequently unexpiessed) ideal which undeilies a gieat deal of
classical demociatic theoiy. Te devices of majoiitaiianismand iepiesentation aie
intioduced in oidei to oveicome obstacles which stand in the way of unanimity
and diiect demociacy. Unanimity is cleaily thought to be the method of making
decisions which is most obviously legitimate, othei foims aie piesented as com-
piomises with this ideal, and the aiguments in favoi of them seek to show that
the authoiity of a unanimous demociacy is not fatally weakened by the necessity
of using iepiesentation oi majoiity iule. One evidence of the theoietical piimacy
of unanimous diiect demociacy is the fact that in all social contiact theoiies, the
oiiginal collective adoption of the social contiact is always a unanimous decision
made by eveiyone who can latei be held accountable to the new state. Ten
the vaiious compiomise devices aie intioduced as piactical measuies, and theii
legitimacy is deiived fiom the legitimacy of the oiiginal contiact. Te assumption
that unanimity cieates a Je jvre state is usually not even aigued foi with any
vigoi, it seems to most demociatic theoiists peifectly obvious.
3. Representative Democracy
Although the pioblem of disagieement is the moie immediate, l shall deal
hist with the dimculties of assembly which lead in demociatic theoiy to
z
Stiictly speaking, this second example of a viable unanimous community is impeifect, since theie
is a signihcant dineience between commiuing oneself to a moial piinciple and calculating one`s
enlightened self-inteiest. loi an illuminating discussion of the moial impoitance of commiuing
oneself to a piinciple, see Rawls, o. c:.
19
the device of a iepiesentative pailiament.
3
Teie aie two pioblems which aie
oveicome by iepiesentation hist, the total citizeniy may be too numeious to
meet togethei in a chambei oi open held, and second, the business of goveinment
may iequiie a continuous auention and application which only the idle iich oi
the caieei politician can anoid to give it.
We may distinguish a numbei of types of iepiesentation, ianging fiom the
meie delegation of the iight to vote a pioxy to a complete tuining ovei of all
decision-making functions. Te question to be answeied is whethei any of these
foims of iepiesentation adequately pieseive the autonomy which men exeicise
thiough decisions taken unanimously by the entiie community. ln shoit, should
a iesponsible man commit himself to obey the laws made by his iepiesentatives`
Te simplest soit of iepiesentation is stiict agency. lf l am unable to auend the
assembly at which votes aie taken, l may tuin ovei my pioxy to an agent with
instiuctions as to how to vote. ln that case, it is obvious that l am as obligated by
the decisions of the assembly as though l had been physically piesent. Te iole of
legal agent is too naiiowly diawn, howevei, to seive as an adequate model foi an
elected iepiesentative. ln piactice, it is impossible foi iepiesentatives to ietuin to
theii distiicts befoie each vote in the assembly and canvass theii constituents. Te
citizens may of couise aim theii iepiesentative with a list of theii piefeiences on
futuie votes, but many of the issues which come befoie the assembly may not have
been iaised in the community at the time the iepiesentative was chosen. Unless
theie is to be a iecall election on the occasion of each unfoieseen delibeiation,
the citizens will be foiced to choose as theii iepiesentative a man whose geneial
platfoim" and political bent suggests that he will, in the futuie, vote as they
imagine they would themselves, on issues which neithei the citizens noi the
iepiesentative yet have in mind.
When maueis have ieached this degiee of iemoval fiom diiect demociacy, we
may seiiously doubt whethei the legitimacy of the oiiginal aiiangement has been
pieseived. l have an obligation to obey the laws which l myself enact. l have
as well an obligation to obey the laws which aie enacted by my agent in stiict
accoid with my instiuctions. But on what giounds can it be claimed that l have
an obligation to obey the laws which aie made in my name by a man who has
no obligation to vote as l would, who indeed has no enective way of discoveiing
what my piefeiences aie on the measuie befoie him` Even if the pailiament
is unanimous in its adoption of some new measuie, that fact can only bind the
deputies and not the geneial citizeniy who aie said to be iepiesented by them.
3
Needless to say, the oiigin of pailiaments histoiically has nothing to do with this pioblem. lt is
iathei the othei way aiound hist theie weie pailiaments, then theie was univeisal suniage.
20
lt can be ieplied that my obligation iests upon my ro:se to obey, and that
may in fact be tiue. But insofai as a piomise of that soit is the sole giound of my
duty to obey, l can no longei be said to be autonomous. l have ceased to be the
authoi of the laws to which l submit and have become the (willing) subject of
anothei peison. Piecisely the same answei must be given to the aigument that
good enects of some soit will iesult fiom my obeying the duly elected pailiament.
Te moial distinction of iepiesentative goveinment, if theie is any, does not lie in
the geneial good which it does, noi in the fact that its subjects have consented to
be iuled by a pailiament. Benevolent elective kingship of a soit which has existed
in past societies can say as much. Te special legitimacy and moial authoiity of
iepiesentative goveinment is thought to iesult fiom its being an expiession of
the will of the people whom it iules. Repiesentative demociacy is said not simply
to be goveinment foi the people but also goveinment (indiiectly) by the people. l
must obey what the pailiament enacts, whatevei that may be, because its will is
my will, its decisions my decisions, and hence its authoiity meiely the collected
authoiity of myself and my fellow citizens. Now, a pailiament whose deputies
vote without specihc mandate fiom theii constituents is no moie the expiession of
theii will than is a dictatoiship which iules with kindly intent but independently
of its subjects. lt does not mauei that l am pleased with the outcome afei the fact,
noi even that my iepiesentative has voted as he imagines l would have liked him
to. So long as l do not, eithei in peison oi thiough my agent, join in the enactment
of the laws by which l am goveined, l cannot justly claim to be autonomous.
Unfounded as is tiaditional iepiesentative goveinment`s claim to the mantle
of legitimacy, it seems impeccable in compaiison with the claims of the foim
of demociatic" politics which actually exist in countiies like the United States
today. Since Woild Wai ll, goveinments have incieasingly divoiced themselves
in theii decision-making fiom anything which could be called the will of the
people. Te complexity of the issues, the necessity of technical knowledge, and
most impoitant, the seciecy of eveiything having to do with national secuiity,
have conspiied to auenuate the iepiesentative function of elected omcials until a
point has been ieached which might be called political stewaidship, oi, afei Plato,
elective guaidianship." Te Piesident of the United States is meiely pledged to
seive the unspecihed inteiests of his constituents in unspecihed ways.
Te iight of such a system to the title of demociacy is customaiily defended
by thiee aiguments hist, the iuleis aie chosen by the people fiom a slate which
includes at least two candidates foi each omce, second, the iuleis aie expected to
act in what they conceive to be the inteiest of the people, and thiid, the people
peiiodically have the oppoitunity to iecall theii iuleis and select otheis. Moie
geneially, the system allows individuals to have some measuiable infuence on
the iuling elite if they choose. Te genealogy of the teim demociacy" need not
21
concein us. lt sumces to note that the system of elective guaidianship falls so
fai shoit of the ideal of autonomy and self-iule as not even to seem a distant
deviation fiom it. Men cannot meaningfully be called fiee if theii iepiesentatives
vote independently of theii wishes, oi when laws aie passed conceining issues
which they aie not able to, undeistand. Noi can men be called fiee who aie subject
to seciet decisions, based on seciet data, having unannounced consequences foi
theii well-being and theii veiy lives.
Some while afei John Kennedy was assassinated, seveial memoiis appeaied
iecounting the inside stoiy of the decisions to invade Cuba in 191 and to iisk a
nucleai wai by blockading Cuba in 192. Moie iecently, with the advent of the
Nixon Administiation, we have begun to leain something of the way in which
Piesident Johnson and his adviseis commiued this countiy to a massive land wai
in Vietnam. As this book is being piepaied foi publication, new decisions aie
being taken in seciet which may involve the United States in the Laotian situation.
ln none of these instances of majoi decisions is theie the slightest ielation
between the ieal ieasons deteimining omcial policy and the iationale given out
foi public consumption. ln what way, it may be wondeied, aie Ameiicans beuei
on than those Russian subjects who weie allowed, by Khiushchev`s decision, to
know a bit of the tiuth about Stalin`
Even those foims of iepiesentative goveinment which appioximate to genuine
agency sunei fiom a cuiious and liule-noted defect which iobs electois of theii
fieedom to deteimine the laws undei which they shall live. Te assumption
which undeilies the piactice of iepiesentation is that the individual citizen has
an oppoitunity, thiough his vote, to make his piefeience known. Leaving aside
foi the moment the pioblems connected with majoiity iule, and ignoiing as well
the deiogations fiom legitimacy which iesult when issues aie voted on in the
pailiament which weie not canvassed duiing the election of deputies, the citizen
who makes use of his ballot is, as it weie, piesent in the chambei thiough the
agency of his iepiesentative. But this assumes that at the time of the election,
each man had a genuine oppoitunity to vote foi a candidate who iepiesented his
point of view. He may hnd himself in the minoiity, of couise, his candidate may
lose. But at least he has had his chance to advance his piefeiences at the polls.
But if the numbei of issues undei debate duiing the campaign is gieatei than
one oi two, and if theie aie as theie aie suie to be a numbei of plausible
positions which might be taken on each issue, then the peimutations of consistent
alteinative total platfoims" will be vastly gieatei than the numbei of candidates.
Suppose, foi example, that in an Ameiican election theie aie foui issues a faim
bill, medical caie foi the aged, the extension of the diaf, and civil iights. Simpli-
fying the ieal woild consideiably, we can suppose that theie aie thiee alteinative
couises of action seiiously being consideied on the hist issue, foui on the second,
22
two on the thiid, and thiee on the last. Teie aie then 3 X 4 X 2 X 3 2 possible
stands which a man might take on these foui issues. loi example, he might favoi
full paiity, Keii-Mills, discontinuation of the diaf, and no civil iights bill, oi fiee
maiket on agiicultuial pioduce, no medicaie at all, extension of the diaf, and a
stiong civil iights bill, and so on. Now, in oidei to make suie that eveiy votei
has a chance of voting foi what he believes, theie would have to be 2 candidates,
each holding one of the logically possible positions. lf a citizen cannot even hnd
a conJ:Joe whose views coincide with his own, then theie is no possibility at all
that he will send to the pailiament a genuine rereseno:+e. ln piactice, voteis aie
oneied a handful of candidates and must make compiomises with theii beliefs
befoie they evei get to the polls. Undei these ciicumstances, it is dimcult to see
what content theie is to the platitude that elections manifest the will of the people.
Te most biting iejection of iepiesentative demociacy can be found in
Rousseau`s Soc:o| Conroc. ln opposition to such wiiteis as Locke, Rousseau
wiites
Soveieignty cannot be iepiesented foi the same ieason that it cannot be
alienated, its essence is the geneial will, and that will must speak foi itself
oi it does not exist it is eithei itself oi not itself theie is no inteimediate
possibility. Te deputies of the people, theiefoie, aie not and cannot be
theii iepiesentatives, they can only be theii commissioneis, and as such
aie not qualihed to conclude anything dehnitively. No act of theiis can
be a law, unless it has been iatihed by the people in peison, and without
that iatihcation nothing is a law. Te people of England deceive themselves
when they fancy they aie fiee, they aie so, in fact, only duiing the election of
membeis of pailiament foi, as soon as a new one is elected, they aie again
in chains, and aie nothing. And thus, by the use they make of theii biief
moments of libeity, they deseive to lose it (Bk. lll, Ch. 1).
Appendix A Proposal for Instant Direct Democracy
Te piactical impossibility of diiect demociacy is geneially taken foi gianted
in contempoiaiy discussions of demociatic theoiy, and it is accounted an unpleas-
antly Utopian aspect of the philosophy of Rousseau, foi example, that it assumes
a community in which eveiy citizen can vote diiectly on all the laws. Actually,
the obstacles to diiect demociacy aie meiely technical, and we may theiefoie
suppose that in this day of planned technological piogiess it is possible to solve
them. Te following pioposal sketches one such solution. lt is meant a good deal
moie than half in eainest, and l uige those ieadeis who aie pione to ieject it out
23
of hand to iefect on what that ieaction ieveals about theii ieal auitude towaid
demociacy.
l piopose that in oidei to oveicome the obstacles to diiect demociacy, a system
of in-the-home voting machines be set up. ln each dwelling, a device would be
auached to the television set which would electionically iecoid votes and tiansmit
them to a computei in Washington. (Tose homes without sets would be supplied
by a fedeial subsidy. ln piactice this would not be veiy expensive, since only the
veiy pooi and the veiy intelligent lack sets at piesent.) ln oidei to avoid fiaudulent
voting, the device could be iigged to iecoid thumbpiints. ln that mannei, each
peison would be able to vote only once, since the computei would automatically
ieject a duplicate vote. Each evening, at the time which is now devoted to news
piogiams, theie would be a nationwide all-stations show devoted to debate on
the issues befoie the nation. Whatevei bills weie befoie the Congiess" (as we
would now desciibe it) would be debated by iepiesentatives of alteinative points
of view. Teie would be backgiound biiehngs on technically complex questions,
as well as foimal debates, question peiiods, and so foith. Commiuees of expeits
would be commissioned to gathei data, make iecommendations foi new measuies,
and do the woik of diafing legislation. One could institute the position of Public
Dissentei in oidei to guaiantee that dissident and unusual points of view weie
heaid. Each liiday, afei a week of debate and discussion, a voting session would
be held. Te measuies would be put to the public, one by one, and the nation
would iecoid its piefeience instantaneously by means of the machines. Special
aiiangements might have to be made foi those who could not be at theii sets
duiing the voting. (Peihaps voting sessions at vaiious times duiing the pieceding
day and night.) Simple majoiity iule would pievail, as is now the case in the
Congiess.
Te pioposal is not peifect, of couise, foi theie is a gieat dineience between the
passive iole of listenei in a debate and the active iole of paiticipant. Neveitheless,
it should be obvious that a political community which conducted its business by
means of instant diiect demociacy" would be immeasuiably closei to iealizing
the ideal of genuine demociacy than we aie in any so-called demociatic countiy
today. Te majoi objection which would immediately be iaised to the pioposal,
paiticulaily by Ameiican political scientists, is that it would be too demociatic'
What chaos would ensue' What anaichy would pievail' Te feckless masses,
swung hithei and yon by the winds of opinion, would quickly ieduce the gieat,
slow-moving, stable goveinment of the United States to disoiganized shambles'
Bills would be passed oi unpassed with the same casual iiiesponsibility which
now goveins the length of a hemline oi the populaiity of a beei. Meietiicious
aiguments would delude the simple, well-meaning, ignoiant folk into voting
24
foi pie-in-the-sky giveaways, foieign anaiis would swing between jingoist mili-
taiism and ciaven isolationism. Gone would be the iestiaining hand of wisdom,
knowledge, tiadition, expeiience.
Te likelihood of iesponses of this soit indicates the shallowness of most mod-
ein belief in demociacy. lt is obvious that veiy few individuals ieally hold with
goveinment by the people, though of couise we aie all willing to obliteiate oui-
selves and oui enemies in its name. Neveitheless, the unbelieveis aie, in my
opinion, piobably wiong as well as untiue to theii piofessed faith. Te initial
iesponse to a system of instant diiect demociacy would be chaotic, to be suie.
But veiy quickly, men would leain what is now manifestly not tiue that
theii votes made a dineience in the woild, an immediate, visible dineience. Teie
is nothing which biings on a sense of iesponsibility so fast as that awaieness.
Ameiica would see an immediate and invigoiating iise in inteiest in politics. lt
would haidly be necessaiy to launch expensive and fiustiating campaigns to get
out the vote. Politics would be on the lips of eveiy man, woman, and child, day
afei day. As inteiest iose, a demand would be cieated foi moie and beuei souices
of news. Even undei the piesent system, in which veiy few Ameiicans have any
sense of paiticipation in politics, news is so populai that quaitei-houi piogiams
aie expanded to half an houi, and news specials pieempt piime television time.
Can anyone deny that instant diiect demociacy would geneiate a degiee of intei-
est and paiticipation in political anaiis which is now consideied impossible to
achieve`
Undei a system of genuine demociacy the voices of the many would diown out
those of the few. Te pooi, the uneducated, the fiightened who today aie caied foi
by the state on occasion but nevei included in the piocess of goveinment would
weigh, man foi man, as heavily as the iich, the infuential, the well-connected.
Much might be endangeied that is woithwhile by such a system, but at least social
justice would fouiish as it has nevei fouiished befoie.
lf we aie willing to think daiingly, then, the piactical obstacles to diiect democ-
iacy can be oveicome. loi the moment, we need not discuss any fuithei whethei
we wish to oveicome them, but since oui investigation conceins the possibility
of establishing a state in which the autonomy of the individual is compatible
with the authoiity of the state, l think we can take it that the dimculties which
in the past have led to unsatisfactoiy foims of iepiesentative demociacy do not
constitute a seiious theoietical pioblem.
2
. Majoritarian Democracy
Te piincipal theoietical weakness of unanimous diiect demociacy is its ie-
quiiement that decisions be taken unanimously in oidei foi them to acquiie the
authoiity of law. As a piactical mauei, of couise, this iequiiement seveiely limits
the actual situations in which a state can fouiish, but it is peihaps an even moie
seiious failing of unanimous demociacy that it oneis no way at all foi men of
good will to iesolve theii dineiences. Piesumably, in oidei foi the concept of a
just state to have moie than idle inteiest, it must at least in theoiy be possible
foi conficts to be iesolved without a loss of autonomy on the pait of the citizens
oi of authoiity on the pait of the state. Te conficts need not be motivated by
divisive self-inteiest, they may simply be disagieements ovei the best way to
puisue the common good.
Te solution which immediately spiings to the foie is, of couise, majoiity iule.
Wheie the electoiate aie divided, take a vote, give to each man one vote, and let
the gioup as a whole be commiued by the piepondeiance of voices. So widespiead
is the belief in majoiity iule that theie is not a single vaiiant of demociatic theoiy
which does not call upon it as the means foi composing dineiences and aiiiving
at decisions. Oui task is to discovei an aigument which demonstiates that the
autonomy of unanimous demociacy is pieseived in a demociacy which is guided
by the iule of the majoiity. ln othei woids, we must inquiie whethei the membeis
of a demociatic polity aie moially bound to obey the decisions of the majoiity,
and if so, why.
Te pioblem, of couise, conceins those who hnd themselves in the minoiity
on any question. Te membeis of the majoiity beai the same ielation to the law
they have passed as do all the citizens in a unanimous demociacy. Since the
majoiity have willed the law, they aie bound by it, and they iemain autonomous
in submiuing to its authoiity. A membei of the minoiity, howevei, has voted
against the law, and he appeais to be in the position of a man who, delibeiating
on a moial question, iejects an alteinative only to hnd it foiced upon him by a
supeiioi powei. His ieadiness to delibeiate, and to be commiued by his decision,
manifests his desiie to be autonomous, but insofai as he must submit to the will
of the majoiity, it seems that his desiie is fiustiated.
One common justihcation of majoiity iule is that, on piudential oi geneial
moial giounds, it woiks beuei than any othei system which has been devised.
loi example, it is said that demociatic politics is a substitute foi the iule of aims
which pievails in lawless societies. Since the majoiity aie, militaiily speaking,
likely to be the supeiioi body, they must be allowed to iule by the ballot, foi
otheiwise they will iesoit to foice and thiow society back into chaos. Oi, again,
2
histoiical obseivation may ieveal that iule by the majoiity tends to advance the
geneial welfaie beuei than any othei system of goveinment (such as iule by the
wise oi the poweiful), since contiaiy to what Plato and otheis have supposed,
the people know theii own inteiest best. Majoiitaiian demociacy, it is said, is
theiefoie the most enective safeguaid against the iule of a hypociitically self-
inteiested elite. liom the point of view of the individual, it might be uiged that
submission to the iule of the majoiity oneis him the best chance, in the long iun,
foi advancing his own inteiests, since by and laige he will hnd himself in the
majoiity as ofen as in the minoiity, and the beneht fowing fiom collective action
will outweigh the losses suneied when his side loses.
All such defenses, and otheis besides which might be based on consideiations
of inteiest oi good consequences, aie, howevei, stiictly iiielevant to oui inquiiy.
As justihcations foi an individual`s autonomous decision to coopeiate with the
state, they may be peifectly adequate, but as demonstiations of the authoiity of
the state as pioofs, that is, of the iight of the state to command the individual
and of his obligation to obey, whatevei may be commanded they fail completely.
lf the individual ietains his autonomy by ieseiving to himself in each instance the
hnal decision whethei to coopeiate, he theieby denies the authoiity of the state,
if, on the othei hand, he submits to the state and accepts its claim to authoiity,
then so fai as any of the above aiguments indicate, he loses his autonomy.
lndeed, the piudential and casuistical defenses of demociacy do not succeed
in distinguishing it moially fiom any othei foim of political community. A man
might hnd that his anaiis fouiished in a dictatoiship oi monaichy, and even that
the welfaie of the people as a whole was enectively advanced by the policies of
such a state. Demociacy, then, could claim to be no moie than one type of de
facto goveinment among many, and its viitues, if any, would be puiely ielative.
Peihaps, as Winston Chuichill once iemaiked, demociacy is the woist foim of
goveinment except foi all the otheis, but if so, then the citizens" of Ameiica aie
as much subjects of an alien powei as the Spaniaids undei lianco oi the Russians
undei Stalin. Tey aie meiely moie foitunate in theii iuleis.
A moie seiious case foi majoiity iule can be founded on the teims of the
contiact by which the political oidei is constituted. Accoiding to many theoiists
of demociacy, the tiansition fiom unanimous iule, as exemplihed by the adoption
of the social contiact, to majoiity iule, on which the subsequent functionings of
the society depend, is piovided foi by a clause in the oiiginal agieement. Eveiyone
pledges himself hencefoith to abide by the iule of the majoiity, and whenevei a
citizen objects to being iequiied to obey laws foi which he has not voted, he can
2
be iecalled to his piomise. On that pact, it is asseited, iests the moial authoiity
of a majoiitaiian state.

But this aigument is no beuei than the pievious one. A piomise to abide by
the will of the majoiity cieates an obligation, |v : Joes so rec:se|, |, g:+:ng v
one's ovono,. lt is peifectly possible to foifeit autonomy, as we have alieady
seen. Whethei it is wise, oi good, oi iight to do so is, of couise, open to question,
but that one can do so is obvious. Hence, if citizens contiact to govein themselves
by majoiity iule, they theieby obligate themselves in just the mannei that they
would be obligated by any piomise. Te state then has a iight to command them,
assuming that it is guided only by the majoiity. But the citizens have cieated a
legitimate state at the piice of theii own autonomy' Tey have bound themselves
to obey laws which they do not will, and indeed even laws which they vigoiously
ieject. lnsofai as demociacy oiiginates in such a piomise, it is no moie than
voluntaiy slaveiy, and the chaiacteiization which Rousseau gives of the English
foim of iepiesentation can as well be applied heie.
Te foice of this point is dimcult to giasp, foi we aie so deeply imbued with
the ethic of majoiitaiianism that it possesses foi us the deceptive quality of self-
evidence. ln the United States, liule childien aie taught to let the majoiity iule
almost befoie they aie old enough to count the votes. Whenevei foice oi wealth
thieatens to dominate a situation, the voice of the majoiity is appealed to as the
highei call of moiality and ieason. Not iule by the majoiity` What else is theie,
one wants to ask. Peihaps it will help, theiefoie, to iefect that the justihcation of
majoiity iule by appeal to an oiiginal piomise opens the way to justihcation of
viitually any othei mode of decision-making, foi the contiacting citizens could
as well have piomised to abide by minoiity iule, oi iandom choice, oi the iule
of a monaich, oi iule by the best educated, oi iule by the least educated, oi even
iule by a daily dictatoi chosen by lot.
lf the only aigument foi majoiity iule is its legitimation by unanimous vote
at the founding convention, then piesumably any method of decision-making at

A gieat deal has been wiiuen, in mitigation of the manifest histoiical implausibility of contiact
theoiies, about the metaphoiical oi mythical chaiactei of the oiiginal contiact." Sometimes, foi
example, it is said that the contiact meiely states in convenient foimthe undeilying moial consensus
of the society. lt should be cleai that a sophisticated inteipietation of this soit will not do, if one
wishes to found majoiity iule on the piomise contained in the contiact. A piomise is an act, not
the meie expiession oi summation of an existing obligation. lt cieates a new obligation wheie
none existed befoie. Whatevei may be my geneial moial obligation to do an act, my piomise to
do it lays an independent buiden of iesponsibility upon me. Hence, those theoiists who tiace the
legitimacy of majoiitaiianism to the contiact cannot, in all consistency, dissolve the contiact into a
myth. Needless to say, theie can be tacit piomises as well as explicit piomises, and theiefoie tacit oi
quasi-contiacts of the soit which aie invoked to explain the obligation of succeeding geneiations.
28
all which was given that sanction would be equally legitimate. lf we hold that
majoiity iule has some special validity, then it must be because of the chaiactei
of majoiity iule itself, and not because of a piomise which we may be thought to
have made to abide by it. What is iequiied, theiefoie, is a diiect justihcation of
majoiity iule itself, that is, a demonstiation that undei majoiity iule the minoiity
do not foifeit theii autonomy in submiuing to the decisions of the collectivity.
John Locke somewhat iecognizes the necessity foi a pioof of the piinciple
of majoiity iule, and at the veiy outset of his SeconJ Treo:se Concern:ng C:+:|
Go+ernen oneis the following
When any numbei of men have so consented to make one community oi
goveinment, they aie theieby piesently incoipoiated, and make one body
politic, wheiein the majoiity have a iight to act and conclude the iest. loi
when any numbei of men have, by the consent of eveiy individual, made
a community, they have theieby made that community one body, with a
powei to act as one body, which is only by the will and deteimination of the
majoiity. loi that which acts [i.e., activates] any community being only the
consent of the individuals of it, and it being one body must move one way, it
is necessaiy the body should move that way whithei the gieatei foice caiiies
it, which is the consent of the majoiity, oi else it is impossible it should act
oi continue one body, one community, which the consent of eveiy individual
that united into it agieed that it should, and so eveiy one is bound by that
consent to be concluded by the majoiity (Ch. Vlll).
Te key to the aigument is the asseition that the body politic must be caiiied
whithei the gieatei foice caiiies it." lf this means that the state must in fact move
in the diiection of the piepondeiance of powei, it is eithei tiivially tiue, powei
being dehned by its enects, oi else nontiivial and false, since fiequently a minoiity
can dominate the conduct of public anaiis even though they command fai less
than a piepondeiance of the available foice in the society. On the othei hand, if
Locke means that the state ovg| to move in the diiection of the gieatei oro| [orce,
then piesumably he believes that the majoiity will possess that supeiioi moial
foice because each individual counts foi one in the moial calculus. Howevei, even
if sense can be made of the notion of a moial foice, we aie still without a ieason
why the minoiity has an obligation to obey the majoiity.
One possible line of aigument is to found the iule of the majoiity on the highei
piinciple that each peison in the society should have an equal chance to make his
piefeiences the law. Assuming foi the moment that the piinciple of equal chance
is valid, does majoiity iule achieve that equality`
29
lt is dimcult to decide, since the notion of having an equal chance of making
one`s piefeiences law is ambiguous. ln one sense, majoiity iule gvoronees to
the membeis of the majoiity that theii piefeience will become law. Hence if a
man knows that he is in the minoiity, he will iealize that he has no chance at all
of enecting his will. Tis is the chaiacteiistic of majoiitaiian demociacy which
diives peimanent minoiities into iebellion, and peimits what Mill quite justly
called the tyianny of the majoiity. A system of legislation by lot might theiefoie
be moie in accoid with the piinciple of equal chance. Each individual could wiite
his piefeience on a piece of papei, and the winning law could be diawn fiom a
twiiling basket. Ten, we might suppose, each citizen could have exactly the same
chance that his will would become law. But piobability is a tiicky science, and
heie again we must pause to ieconsidei. Each citizen, to be suie, would have the
same chance foi his piece of papei to be diawn fiom the basket, but piesumably
what he desiies is simply that the law which he piefeis be enacted, not that the
enactment take place by means of his peisonal slip of papei. ln othei woids,
he would be equally satished by a diawing of any piece of papei on which his
piefeience was wiiuen. Now, if theie aie moie slips with alteinative A on them
than with alteinative B, then of couise the piobability is highei of alteinative A
being chosen. Tus, legislation by lot would onei some chance to the minoiity,
unlike iule by the majoiity, but it would not onei to each citizen an equal chance
that his piefeience be enacted. Neveitheless, it does seem to come closei to the
ideal of equal chances than majoiity iule.
We have cited the device of decision by iandom choice chiefy as a way of
exposing the weaknesses of a ceitain justihcation of majoiity iule, but befoie
going on to yet anothei aigument foi majoiitaiianism, it might be well to considei
whethei iandom decision is a woithy candidate foi adoption in its own iight. ls
it ieasonable to iesolve dineiences of opinion by chance` Does commitment to
such a device pieseive the autonomy of the individual citizen, even when the die
is cast against him`
We must not be too hasty in iejecting the appeal to chance, foi in at least some
situations of choice it would appeai to be the piopei method. loi example, if l
am faced with a choice among alteinatives whose piobable outcomes l cannot
estimate, then it is peifectly sensible to let chance decide my choice. lf l am
lost in the foiest, with not the slightest idea which diiection is most piomising,
and if l am convinced that my best chance is to choose one path and stick to it,
then l might as well spin myself aiound with my eyes closed and stait on in any
diiection. Moie geneially, it is ieasonable to choose at iandom among equally
30
piomising alteinatives.
s
Random decision is also ieasonable in anothei soit of
case, wheie iewaids oi buidens aie to be distiibuted among equally deseiving
(oi undeseiving) citizens, and the natuie of the item to be distiibuted makes it
impossible to divide it and paicel out equal shaies. Tus, if the aimed foices
iequiie only one-half of the available men, and cannot adjust maueis by halving
the seivice time and doubling the diaf, then the faii method of choosing inductees
is to put the names in a bowl and pull them out at iandom.
Since the duty of autonomy dictates only that l use all o+o:|o||e infoimation in
making my decisions, it is cleai that iandomization in the face of ignoiance is not
a deiogation of autonomy. Tis is equally tiue in the second case, of indivisible
payons, though we aie theie obligated to auempt to oveicome the inevitable
unfaiiness by incoipoiating the mauei into a bioadei context and balancing on
futuie iewaids and buidens. lt follows that the use of iandom devices in some
collective decision will not violate aunomy, assuming foi the moment that theie
has been unaninious agieement on theii adoption. But what shall we say of the
decision by lot in cases wheie the obstacle to decision is simple disagieement
among the membeis of the assembly, and not ignoiance of futuie outcomes oi
the indivisibility of payons` ls this, peihaps, a solution to the pioblem of the
subjection of the minoiity`
ln the making of individual decisions, an appeal to chance when the necessaiy
infoimation was at hand would be a willful foifeituie of autonomy. May we then
conclude that the same is tiue foi collective decision` Not so, it might be aigued.
lf we aie peimiued, without loss of autonomy, to bow to the constiaints of igno-
iance, oi to the intiactability of natuie, why may we not with equal justihcation
adjust ouiselves to the limitations of collective as opposed to individual decision-
making` When the assembly of the people cannot ieach a unanimous decision,
decision by lot is the only way to avoid the twin evils of goveinmental ineitia
and tyiannization of the minoiity.
Tis aigument seems to me to be wiong, although my ieasons foi this belief
will only be spelled out with any fullness in the last section of this essay. Biiefy,
theie is a fundamental dineience between those obstacles to decision which aie
outside oui contiol, such as ignoiance, and those obstacles which aie at least
theoietically within oui contiol, such as psychological confict (in the individual)
s
l am delibeiately glossing ovei the much moie contioveisial question, whethei it is ieasonable to
equate a less piobable outcome having a high value to me with a moie piobable outcome having
a low value. Somewhat moie technically, the question is whethei l ought to be guided by my
calculation of the expected value, oi mathematical expectation, of the alteinatives open to me.
Von Neumann and Moigenstein, in theii development of the puie theoiy of games, assume the
iationality of maximization of expected value, but theie is nothing appioaching consensus on the
issue in the contempoiaiy liteiatuie.
31
oi disagieement (in the society as a whole). Wheieas we have no ieason to think
that we could evei completely oveicome natuial obstacles, even in an ideal society,
we must suppose that some method exists foi iesolving conficts among iational
men of good will which allows them to conceit theii activities without foifeiting
theii autonomy. Te gen-eial adoption of decision by lot would violate the an.
tonomy of the citizens.
Te most ambitious defense of majoiitaiianism in the liteiatuie of demociatic
theoiy is that oneied by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in Book lV of the Soc:o| Conroc.
Te fundamental pioblem of political philosophy, accoiding to Rousseau, is to
discovei whethei theie is a foim of association which will defend and piotect
with the whole common foice the peison and the piopeity of each associate, and
by which eveiy peison, while uniting himself with all, shall obey only himself
and iemain as fiee as befoie."
o
Te solution to this pioblem is the social contiact
by which men hist constitute themselves a polity. By means of the contiact, the
many paiticulai and divisive wills of the piepolitical community aie tiansfoimed
into the geneial will of the collective body. Each contiacting paity pledges himself
to place in common his peison and all his powei undei the supieme diiection
of the geneial will, and as one body . .. all ieceive each membei as an indivisible
pait of the whole."
A will is distinguished by Rousseau as geneial by viitue both of its foim and of
its content, oi aim. loimally, a will is geneial insofai as it issues in commands hav-
ing the foim of geneial law iathei than paiticulai edict. Tus, Rousseau consideis
only the laws of the society to be pioducts of the geneial will, applications of
the laws to paiticulai cases aie made by the goveinment, which opeiates undei a
mandate fiom the collective will of the people. Mateiially, a will is geneial insofai
as it aims at the geneial good iathei than at the paiticulai goods of sepaiate indi-
viduals. An individual can be said to have a geneial will, oi to stiive foi a geneial
will, if he aims at the geneial good iathei than his own good, and if he issues
commands having the foim of law. Similaily, the gioup as a whole has a geneial
will when it issues laws which aim at the geneial good. ln this way, Rousseau
distinguishes a tiue political community fiom an association of self-inteiested
individuals who stiike baigains among theii competing inteiests, but nowheie
stiive foi the good of the whole. (Te same distinction is said to be embodied in
the division of function between the Congiess, which iepiesents sectional and
o
Tis is essentially the pioblem which l have called the deduction of the possibility of political
philosophy. Rousseau appeais to be the hist political philosophei to iecognize explicitly the confict
between the demands of moial autonomy and legitimate authoiity. My tieatment of the pioblem
owes a gieat deal to the Soc:o| Conroc. (Bk. l, Ch. Vl)
32
class inteiests, and the piesident, who is supposed to be guided by the national
inteiest.)
lt is Rousseau`s claim that when a political community delibeiates togethei
on the geneial good and embodies its delibeiations in geneial laws, it theieby
acquiies legitimate authoiity ovei all the membeis of the delibeiating body, oi
pailiament. Tencefoiwaid, each membei of the society has a moial obligation
to obey the laws which have been willed by the collectivity. Tat obligation can
be suspended only when the geneial will is destioyed, which is to say only if the
pailiament of all the people ceases to aim at the geneial good oi to issue laws.
Rousseau, in keeping with the tiadition of demociatic theoiy, intioduces the
device of majoiity iule into the founding contiact. But he iecognizes that the
legitimacy of laws enacted by a majoiity of the pailiament cannot be tiaced meiely
to the binding foice of a piomise. ln Book lV of the Soc:o| Conroc, theiefoie, he
ietuins to the pioblem
Except in this oiiginal contiact, a majoiity of the votes is sumcient to bind
all the otheis. Tis is a consequence of the contiact itself. But it may be
asked how a man can be fiee and yet foiced to confoim to the will of otheis.
How aie the opposeis fiee when they aie in submission to laws to which
they have nevei consented`
Rousseau continues
l answei that the question is not faiily stated. Te citizen consents to all
the laws, to those which aie passed in spite of his opposition, and even to
those which sentence him to punishment if he violates any one of them. Te
constant will of all the membeis of the State is the geneial will, it is by that
they aie citizens and fiee. When any law is pioposed to the assembly of the
people, the question is not piecisely to enquiie whethei they appiove the
pioposition oi ieject it, but if it is confoimable oi not to the geneial will,
which is theii will. Each citizen, in giving his suniage, states his mind on
that question, and the geneial will is found by counting the votes. When,
theiefoie, the motion which l opposed caiiies, it only pioves to me that l was
mistaken, and that what l believed to be the geneial will was not so. lf my
paiticulai opinion had pievailed, l should have done what l was not willing
to do, and consequently, l should not have been in a state of fieedom.
Te aii of paiadox which suiiounds this passage has enticed oi iepelled students
of Rousseau evei since the Social Contiact appeaied. Te notion of man being
foiced to be fiee," which was employed by latei idealist political philosopheis
33
to justify the state`s iepiession of the individual in the inteiest of his own tiue
self," can be tiaced to this aigument. Actually, as l shall tiy to show, theie aie no
sinistei implications to Rousseau`s aigument, although it is not valid.
Te foundation of the aigument is a distinction, whose lineage iuns at least to
Plato, between doing what one wills and doing what one wants. An individual
may be said to do what he wills so long as he manages to peifoimthe action which
he sets out to peifoim, but he may theieby fail to do what he wants, if the outcome
of the action is othei than he anticipated. loi example, suppose that l aiiive at a
tiain station just as my tiain is scheduled to leave. Not knowing which tiack l
am to leave fiom, l iush up to a conductoi and shout, Which tiack foi Boston`"
He points at tiack , but l misundeistand him and dash on foi tiack , wheie a
tiain foi Philadelphia is also on the point of leaving. Te conductoi, seeing my
mistake, has only two choices he can allow me to boaid the wiong tiain, theieby
peimiuing me to do what l will, oi bodily hustle me onto the iight tiain, theieby
foicing me to do what l want. Rousseau`s desciiption seems peifectly apposite. lf
the conductoi makes no move to stop me, l will fail to do what l want to do, and
in that sense not be fiee.
Considei anothei case, that of an intein who is on duty in the emeigency waid
of a hospital. A case comes in which lie misdiagnoses as poisoning. He oideis a
stomach pump, which is about to be applied when the iesident in chaige happens
by, iecognizes the case as actually one of appendicitis, foi which the stomach
pump would be fatal, and counteimands the intein`s oidei to the nuise. Heie,
the intein`s aim is of couise to cuie the patient, and he is assisted in achieving
it by the iesident`s counteioidei, which (in a mannei of speaking) foices him to
tieat the patient coiiectly. Had he been peimiued to follow his own diagnosis,
he would have accomplished piecisely the end which he most wished to avoid.
Plato, it will be iecalled, uses this same aigument in the Gorg:os and Rev||:c
in oidei to demonstiate that the tyiant is not tiuly poweiful. Te tyiant, like all
men, wants what is good foi him. Powei, then, is the ability to get what is good
foi oneself. But the tyiant, thiough a defect of tiue moial knowledge, mistakenly
thinks that it is good foi him to indulge his appetites, deal unjustly with his
fellow men, and suboidinate his iational faculties to his unchecked desiie and
will. As a iesult, he becomes what we would today call a neuiotic individual,
he compulsively puisues fantasy-goals whose achievement gives him no ieal
happiness, and he theieby shows himself to be tiuly poweiless to get what he
wants.
Te thiee cases of the man catching a tiain, the intein diagnosing a patient,
and the tyiant have thiee common chaiacteiistics on which aie founded the
distinction between geuing what one wills and geuing what one wants. liist,
it is supposedly quite easy to distinguish between the goal of the individual`s
34
action and the means which he adopts to achieve it. (Tis is, of couise, debatable
in the case of the tyiant, it would haidly be denied in the othei cases.) Hence,
we can speak meaningfully of the agent`s willing the means and wanting the
end, and theiefoie of his doing what he wills but failing to get what he wants.
Second, the goal in each case is some state of anaiis whose existence is objectively
asceitainable, and about which one can have knowledge. (Again, Plato`s example
is open to dispute, this is piecisely the point in the development of his ethical
theoiy at which he makes use of the doctiine that theie is such a thing as moial
knowledge.) lt follows that a man may sometimes know less well what he ieally
wants (i.e., what will ieally accomplish his own goals) than some independent
obseivei. linally, in all thiee cases we aie to assume that the individual places a
puiely instiumental value on the means which he adopts, and would be willing
to give them up if he believed that they weie ill suited to his ends.
Life is full of signihcant situations in which we stiive to achieve some objective
state of anaiis, and in which we would theiefoie be soiiy if oui mistaken views
about the means to those ends weie to be adopted. loi example, if a membei of
Congiess genuinely wishes to ieduce unemployment, and if his tiaditionalistic
convictions about the viitues of a balanced budget aie oveiiiden by a libeial
majoiity which seeks to spend the nation into piospeiity, and :[ vne|o,en
:s |erevon reJvceJ, then (peisonal piide to one side) we may expect him to be
glad that his views weie in the minoiity, foi he can now see that if his paiticulai
opinion had pievailed, he should have done what he was not willing to do, and
consequently, he should not have been in a state of fieedom."
And we can now see what Rousseau intended in the passage quoted above. He
assumes that the assembly of the people is auempting to issue commands which
have the foim of law and aim at the geneial good. Tis is a legitimate assump-
tion foi Rousseau to make, since he is only inteiested in discoveiing whethei a
community which does aim at the geneial good theieby confeis legitimacy on
the laws which it passes. Te fuithei question, whethei one can ofen hnd an
assembly which holds to the ideal of the geneial good instead of puisuing diveise
paiticulai inteiests, conceins the application of Rousseau`s theoiy. Demociatic
theoiists fiequently devote gieat auention to the pioblem of devising safeguaids
against the ineiadicable paitisanship of even the most enlightened men. Although
that is indeed a seiious mauei, theii concein tends to mask theii unexamined
assumption that a majoiitaiian demociacy of thoioughly public-spiiited citizens,
if it evei could exist, would possess legitimate authoiity. Tis is meiely one moie
iefection of the univeisal conviction that majoiity iule is self-evidently legitimate.
By iecognizing the necessity foi an independent justihcation of majoiity iule,
Rousseau plays in political philosophy the iole which Hume plays in the theoiy
of knowledge.
3
Rousseau supposes fuithei that it is an objectively asceitainable fact whethei a
pioposed law has the piopei foim and aims at the geneial good. He thinks, hnally,
that the piopei test of these maueis is a vote, in which the majoiity must inevitably
be coiiect. Hence, when a membei of the assembly gives his suniage," he is not
expiessing his piefeience, but iathei oneiing his opinion on the chaiactei of the
pioposed law. He may peifectly well piefei a dineient measuie, which seives his
inteiest beuei, and neveitheless vote foi the pioposal because he believes it to
aim at the geneial good. Since the majoiity aie always iight, a membei of the
minoiity will by that fact be ievealed as suppoiting inappiopiiate means to his
own end, in shoit, the minoiity aie like the individual who dashes foi the wiong
tiain, oi the intein who piesciibes the wiong tieatment.
Te faw in this aigument, of couise, is the appaiently gioundless assumption
that the majoiity aie always iight in theii opinion conceining the geneial good.
(Rousseau`s appeal to this assumption is contained in the innocuous-looking
woids and the geneial will is found by counting the votes.") What can possibly
have led Rousseau to such an implausible conclusion` Expeiience would seem
iathei to suggest that tiuth lies with the minoiity in most disputes, and ceitainly
that is the case in the eaily stages of the acceptance of new discoveiies. At any
iate, if the natuie of the geneial good is a mauei of knowledge, then theie would
appeai to be no giound foi assuming that the majoiity opinion on any paiticulai
pioposal foi the geneial good will inevitably be coiiect.
l think we can tiace Rousseau`s eiioi to a paii of complicated confusions. liist,
Rousseau has not adequately distinguished between an assembly which auempts
to aim at the geneial good, and one which actually succeeds. ln a chaptei entitled
Whethei the Geneial Will Can Eii," he wiites
lt follows fiom what has been said that the geneial will is always iight
and tends always to the public advantage, but it does not follow that the
delibeiations of the people have always the same iectitude. Oui will always
seeks oui own good, but we do not always peiceive what it is. Te people
aie nevei coiiupted, but they aie ofen deceived, and only then do they seem
to will what is bad. (Bk. l, Ch. 3)
Te confusion lies in failing to distinguish thiee possible conditions of the
assembly. liist, the citizeniy may vote on the basis of piivate inteiest, in which
case they aie not even auempting to iealize the geneial good. Tat is what
Rousseau calls an aggiegate will." Second, the people may stiive to achieve the
geneial good, but choose pooi laws because of theii ignoiance, oi simply the
unpiedictability of impoitant aspects of the pioblems which they face. lnsofai as
eveiyone does his best to iealize the geneial good, the collectivity is a genuine
3
moial and political community. linally, the assembly of the people may aim at
the geneial good and hit it. Tey may delibeiately choose to enact laws which do
in fact onei the best way to achieve the good of the community.
Now, theie may be some giound foi claiming that an assembly which is in the
second condition has legitimate authoiity ovei its membeis, one might aigue that
it acquiies authoiity by viitue of the univeisal commitment of its membeis to the
geneial good. But Rousseau`s pioof of the legitimacy of the majoiity will only
woik if we assume that the assembly is in the thiid condition that whenevei it
is guided by the majoiity it actually succeeds in moving towaid the geneial good.
ln that case, it ieally would be tiue that a membei of the minoiity could get what
he willed (the geneial good) only by failing to get what he voted foi.
Te confusion between tiying to achieve the geneial good and succeeding is
compounded, l would like to suggest, by a second confusion which leads Rousseau
to oveilook what would otheiwise be a iathei obvious eiioi. Teie aie thiee
questions which one might suppose the assembly to be piesented with. Rousseau
mentions two Which law do you piefei` and Which law tends to the geneial
good` A thiid question might also be asked Which alteinative will win` Now
the peculiaiity of this last question is that the majoiity opinion vs |e correc.
lf eveiyone`s vote is a piediction about the outcome, then the membeis of the
minoiity will haidly desiie theii choice to pievail, foi by so doing they would
violate the piinciple of majoiity iule to which they aie piesumably commiued.
Te phiase geneial will" is ambiguous in Rousseau`s usage, even though he takes
gieat caie to dehne it eailiei in his essay. lt should mean will issuing laws which
aim at the geneial good," but it fiequently has foi him the moie oidinaiy meaning
piepondeiant opinion" oi consensus of the gioup." When the assembly is asked
whethei (the pioposition befoie them) is confoimable oi not to the geneial will,"
we may view them eithei as being asked foi theii opinion of the value of the
pioposition foi the geneial good, oi else as being asked to make a piediction of
the outcome of the vote. l suggest that Rousseau himself confused these two
senses, and was theieby led into the manifestly false assumption that the majoiity
opinion of the assembly would successfully expiess what the minoiity weie ieally
stiiving foi, and hence be binding on eveiyone who voted foi oi against.
We appeai to be lef with no plausible ieason foi believing that a diiect democ-
iacy goveined by majoiity iule pieseives the moial autonomy of the individual
while confeiiing legitimate authoiity on the soveieign. Te pioblem iemains,
that those who submit to laws against which they have voted aie no longei
autonomous, even though they may have submiued voluntaiily. Te stiongest ai-
gument foi the moial authoiity of a majoiitaiian goveinment is that it is founded
upon the unanimous piomise of obedience of its subjects. lf such a piomise may
be supposed to exist, then the goveinment does indeed have a moial iight to
3
command. But we have discoveied no moial ieason why men should by theii
piomise biing a demociatic state into being, and theieby foifeit theii autonomy.
Te implicit claim of all demociatic theoiy, l iepeat, is that it oneis a solution to
the pioblem of combining moial libeity (autonomy) with political authoiity. Tis
claim is justihed foi the special case of unanimous diiect demociacy. But none of
the aiguments which we have consideied thus fai succeed in demonstiating that
this claim is also valid foi ma-joiitaiian demociacy.
Tis is not to deny that theie aie many othei ieasons foi favoiing demociacy
of one soit oi anothei undei the conditions which pievail today in advanced
industiial societies. loi example, one might ieply impatiently to all the foiegoing
aigumentation that majoiity iule seems to woik well enough, and that minoiities
do not show signs of feeling tiampled upon, foi all that they may be fiustiated oi
disappointed. To which one need only ieply that the psychology of politics is not
at issue heie. Men`s feelings of loss of autonomy, like theii feelings of loyalty, aie
deteimined by such factois as the ielative degiee of satisfaction and fiustiation
of deeply held desiies which they expeiience. Modein inteiest-gioup demociacy
is, undei some ciicumstances, an enective means of ieducing fiustiations, oi at
least of ieducing the connection between fiustiation and political disanection.
But many othei foims of political oiganization might accomplish this iesult, such
as benevolent autociacy oi chaiismatic dictatoiship. lf demociacy is to make
good its title as the only moially legitimate foim of politics, then it must solve
the pioblem of the heteionomous minoiity.
Appendix Te liiationality of Majoiity Rule
Majoiity iule can be called into question on giounds of its failuie to pieseive the
libeity of the minoiity, but it has commonly been thought to be at least a iational
method of making decisions, supposing that the membeis of the community
aie willing to agiee upon its adoption. ln fact it tuins out that majoiity iule
is fatally fawed by an inteinal inconsistency which ought to disqualify it fiom
consideiation in any political community whatsoevei.
Self-consistency is peihaps the simplest soit of iationality which is demanded
of, all men in theii delibeiations and actions. lf a man piefeis a hist state of
anaiis oi action to a second, and piefeis the second in tuin to a thiid, then in
all consistency he ought to piefei the hist to the thiid. Teie is of couise no
psychological law which foices a man to keep his piefeiences consistent, any
moie than to adopt only means which he believes aie well suited to his ends. But
in exploiing the theoietical possibility of a legitimate state, we aie suiely justihed
in positing a community of citizens who iise to that hist level of iationality.
Piesumably, also, we desiie that the method of gioup decision which we adopt
will lead to collective action having the like viitue of inteinal consistency. Unani-
mous demociacy achieves this end, foi it iepioduces in the laws of the state the
38
common piefeiences of the entiie citizeniy. lf theii piefeiences aie consistent, so
too will be those of the state. lt might be thought that majoiity iule also pieseived
consistency of piefeience, but the facts aie otheiwise. As a simple example will
illustiate, it is peifectly possible foi a gioup of iational individuals with consistent
piefeiences to aiiive, by majoiity iule, at a completely inconsistent oidei of gioup
piefeience' Suppose foi the sake of simplicity that the community consists of
thiee individuals who aie faced with the pioblem of establishing a social ianking
among thiee alteinatives.

Each membei of the voting community is hist asked

to iank the thiee possi-bilities in oidei of his ielative piefeience. He may use
any ciiteiia he chooses such as social utility, peisonal inteiest, oi even whim
but he must be consistent. Te gioup then establishes its collective piefeience
by voting foi the alteinatives, two at a time. Since theie aie thiee alteinatives,
which we can call A, B, and C, theie will be thiee votes in all hist A against B,
then A against C, and hnally B against C.
Te piefeience oidei of the society is completely deteimined by the piefeience
oideis of the individuals, foi whenevei a paii of alteinatives is piesented to
them, each man consults his piivate ianking and votes foi the highei of the
two. Now, theie aie a gieat many possible sets of piivate oideiings which, when
amalgamated by the device of majoiity iule, will pioduce a consistent public
oideiing. loi example, considei the set of oideiings in Table 1.
Individual I Individual II Individual III
A A B
C B C
B C A
Since lndividuals l and ll piefei A to B, they outvote lndividual lll, and the society
as a whole piefeis A to B. Similaily` lndividuals ll and lll outvote lndividual l
and commit the society to B ovei C. Now, if the society piefeis A. to B, and B to
C, then in all consistency, it ought also to piefei A to C. And so indeed it does, foi
lndividuals l and ll vote that piefeience, and theieby oveiiule lndividual lll once
moie. ln this case, majoiity iule has tiansfoimed a consistent set of individual oi
piivate piefeience iankings into an equally consistent social piefeience ianking.
But unfoitunately, it is not always so.

Te paiadox, oi inconsistency, which is developed in the text may be duplicated in any case involving
two oi moie voteis and thiee oi moie alteinatives, assuming that one is peimiued to be indineient
between any paii of alteinatives, as well as to piefei one to the othei. Te votei`s paiadox," as it is
called, has been known foi some time, and was actually the subject of an extended tieatise by the
nineteenth-centuiy mathematician Chailes Dodgson, beuei known as Lewis Caiioll.
39
Considei the set of individual oideiings of the same alteinatives in Table 2.
Individual I Individual II Individual III
A B C
C C A
B A B
When we paii the alteinatives and count the votes, we discovei that theie is a ma-
joiity foi A ovei B (lndividuals l and ll), and a majoiity foi B ovei C (lndividuals l
and ll), but not theiefoie a majoiity foi Aovei C. Qite to the contiaiy, lndividuals
ll and lll piefei C to A, and theiefoie so does the society. Te iesult is that the
gioup as a whole, staiting fiom peifectly consistent individual piefeiences, has
aiiived by majoiity iule at an absuidly inconsistent gioup piefeience.
lt might be objected that we have piesented a false pictuie of iule by the ma-
joiity. Assemblies do not vote on all the paii-wise combinations of possibilities
which aie undei consideiation. Tey eithei vote foi all at once, and allow a plu-
iality to decide, oi else they take measuies up one at a time, adopting oi iejecting
them. lt makes no dineience. Te contiadictions which we have discoveied in
majoiity voting can be iepioduced in any of the oidinaiy vaiiations which might
be adopted by an assembly. loi example, suppose that the pioceduie is followed
of voting on the alteinatives one at a time, until one is adopted, which theieupon
becomes law. Each citizen votes against a pioposal if theie is some alteinative
still in the iunning which he piefeis. On the othei hand, once a pioposal has been
voted down, it is eliminated fiom the contest and is ignoied by the electoiate. Un-
dei this system, one can easily show that the winning measuie is deteimined (in
the paiadoxical case outlined above) solely by the oidei in which the possibilities
aie biought befoie the voteis. To see that this is tiue, considei once moie the
pauein of piefeiences exhibited in Table 2. Teie aie thiee alteinatives, A, B, and
C. Hence theie aie six dineient oideis in which the alteinatives can be piesented
to the assembly, namely ABC, ACB, BAC, BCA, CAB, and CBA. Let us see what
happens in each case undei the system of eliminative voting.
Case 1.
A is put befoie the assembly and loses, since two individuals piefei something
else to it.
40
B is now put befoie the assembly and wins, foi with A eliminated, theie aie
now two individuals who piefei it to anything else (i.e., to C), and only one who
still has a piioi piefeience foi C.
So B wins.
Case z.
A is put befoie the assembly and loses, C is put befoie the assembly and also
loses, leaving B, which wins.
Case 3.
By the same line of ieasoning, when B is put befoie the assembly it loses,
wheieupon A also loses, leaving C, which wins.
Case .
B loses, C wins.
Case s.
Staiting with C, which loses, we end up with A, which wins.
Case o.
A wins.
ln shoit, when alteinative A is voted on hist, alteinative B wins, when alteina-
tive B is voted on hist, alteinative C wins, and when alteinative C is voted on hist,
alteinative A wins. lt is cleaily iiiational foi a society to change its piefeience
among thiee alteinatives whenevei it consideis them in a dineient oidei. Tat
would be like saying that l piefei chocolate ice cieam to vanilla when l am oneied
chocolate hist, but piefei vanilla to chocolate when l am oneied vanilla hist'
Kenneth Aiiow, in an impoitant monogiaph entitled Soc:o| C|o:ce onJ InJ:+:J
vo| Vo|ves, has demonstiated that the inconsistency of the votei`s paiadox infects
viitually eveiy method of social choice which can lay a ieasonable claim to being
called demociatic." How can it be that when iational men with consistent piefei-
ences make collective decisions by the appaiently legitimate device of majoiity
41
iule, they may aiiive at inconsistent gioup piefeiences` What is it about the
piocess of collective decision which intioduces an element of iiiationality`
Te answei seems to be contained in a veiy inteiesting discoveiy of Duncan
Black conceining the conditions undei which majoiity iule can be tiusted to yield
consistent iesults. lt is obvious that we can guaiantee the consistency of majoiity
iule if we aie peimiued to set limits to the paueins of individual piefeience which
the voteis may adopt. ln the extieme case, foi example, if we iequiie eveiyone
to adopt the same piefeience oidei, then of couise majoiity iule will simply
iepioduce that oidei as the social piefeience, which will be consistent. But aie
theie any ieasonable iestiictions that will do the job` And, fuithei, what is the
weakest iestiiction that will ensuie a consistent social piefeience oidei` Te
answei to the lauei question is not yet known, but Black has demonstiated that
undei one inteiesting and natuial iestiiction, majoiity iule will woik consistently.
Biiefy, the iestiiction is that eveiy individual`s piefeience oidei must exhibit
the chaiacteiistic which he calls single-peakedness" when ploued on a single
scale. Tis means that theie is some one-dimensional aiiay of all the alteinatives,
on which each individual can locate his hist choice, and which has the piopeity
that foi eveiy individual, the faithei to the iight an alteinative is fiom his hist
choice, the less he piefeis it, and the faithei to the lef an alteinative is fiom his
hist choice, the less he piefeis it. We aie all familiai with such an aiiay, namely
the lef-iight" spectium in politics. lf we stiing out the vaiious political positions
on the spectium fiom extieme lef, oi iadical, to extieme iight, oi ieactionaiy,
then the following is tiue liist, each individual can locate himself along the
spectium, Second, once he has found his place, which is the position of his hist
choice, then the faithei to the iight oi lef something is, the less he likes it.
8
loi example, a modeiate Republican piefeis a conseivative to a iadical, and he
also piefeis a libeial Republican to a modeiate Demociat. A lef-wing Demociat
piefeis a socialist to a Communist, and also a middle-of-the-ioad Demociat to an
Eisenhowei Republican. And so foith. Black has demonstiated mathematically
that if eveiy peison can satisfactoiily ht his piefeiences onto such a spectium,
then majoiity iule must give a consistent social piefeience.
lt is not completely cleai what the deepei signihcance is of Black`s discoveiy.
One clue seems to be that single-peakedness, oi aiiangement along a lef-iight
spectium, occuis when eveiyone in the society views the alteinatives as embody-
ing vaiying degiees of some one magnitude. Tis is ioughly akin to Aiistotle`s
notion of viitue as a mean between extiemes. Each viitue is seen as occupying a
8
But notice, nothing can be said about his ielative piefeiences among one position to the iight and
anothei to the lef. Tis is because the oideiing of his piefeience is oidinal, not caidinal.
42
position on a scale, midway (ioughly) between an excess and a defect. loi exam-
ple, couiage is analyzed as a mean between iashness and cowaidice. Piesumably,
the fuithei one eiis towaid the diiection of eithei extieme, the woise one is.
ln politics, we might inteipiet the lef-iight spectium as a iefection of vaiying
degiees of goveinment inteivention in social questions. At one end aie the con-
seivatives, who desiie minimum inteivention, at the othei end aie the socialists,
who desiie maximum inteivention, and stiung out between the two aie vaiious
types of modeiates who favoi a mixtuie of inteivention and noninteivention.
v
When a single individual evaluates alteinatives, the vaiiable oi vaiiables with
which he is conceined piesumably iemain the same thioughout his evaluation.
Tis is one of the souices of his inteinal consistency. But when many individuals
evaluate the same objective alteinatives, they may do so in teims of a diveisity
of vaiiables. Te iesult is that when theii decisions aie collectively amalgamated
thiough voting, the gioup piefeience may embody the inconsistency of standaids
of evaluation which existed, in a disaggiegated foim, in the voting population. lt
would seem, theiefoie, that majoiity iule has the best chance of yielding consistent
iesults when the entiie citizeniy views the issues as polaiized, in teims of vaiiables
which make it natuial to piefei alteinatives less and less as they diveige, in eithei
diiection, fiom one`s hist choice.
ln oidei to see how lack of single-peakedness can lead to inconsistency, let us
take a look at a simplihed society in which theie aie thiee voteis, a conseivative,
a welfaie-state libeial, and a socialist, who must choose among thiee alteinatives,
namely laissez-faiie capitalism, welfaie-state libeialism, and socialism. Te con-
seivative, we may assume, would piefei laissez faiie hist, welfaie-state libeialism
second, and socialism last. lt is also plausible that the libeial would piefei welfaie-
state libeialism hist, socialism second, and laissez-faiie capitalism last. But the
socialist, who locates himself at the extieme lef of the political spectium, and
piefeis socialism hist, might not piefei the welfaie state second. He might in fact
think that the welfaie state had the woist featuies of both laissez-faiie capitalism
and socialism, with the viitues of neithei. Te welfaie state thioules individual
initiative, which does afei all have a numbei of socially desiiable consequences
undei capitalism, while also laying upon the society the buiden of buieauciacy
devoid of the iational total contiol possible undei socialism. Te socialist`s pief-
eience oidei might theiefoie iead socialism hist, laissez faiie second, and the
welfaie state last. Table 3 summaiizes these individual piefeience oideis
v
Notice that in this case, the conseivatives and socialists do not focus theii auention upon the same
vaiiable, but iathei on two dineient vaiiables which may be supposed to vaiy togethei. Te consei-
vatives aie conceined with inteivention er se, but the socialists aie piesumably conceined with
social welfaie and social justice, which they believe vaiies diiectly with the degiee of inteivention.
43
Conseivative Libeial Socialist
laissez faiie welfaie state socialism
welfaie state socialism laissez faiie
socialism laissez faiie welfaie state
What would be the iesult of a vote` Te society would piefei laissez faiie to
the welfaie state, two-to-one, it would also piefei the welfaie state to socialism,
two-to-one. But it would not piefei laissez faiie to socialism. Qite to the contiaiy,
by a vote of 2 to 1 it would piefei socialism to laissez faiie. Tus even when the
membeis of a voting assembly see the alteinatives as embodying vaiying degiees
of a single magnitude (state contiol), theie may still not be a single-peakedness,
and hence no consistency in the gioup piefeience.
44
III. Beyond the Iegitimate State
1. Te Qest for the Iegitimate State
We have come to a dead end in oui seaich foi a viable foim of political as-
sociation which will haimonize the moial autonomy of the individual with the
legitimate authoiity of the state. Te one pioposal which appeais genuinely to
iesolve the confict, namely unanimous diiect demociacy, is so iestiicted in its
application that it oneis no seiious hope of evei being embodied in an actual state.
lndeed, since it achieves its success only by iuling out piecisely the conficts of
opinion which politics is designed to iesolve, it may be viewed as the limiting
case of a solution iathei than as itself a tiue example of a legitimate state. A
contiactual demociacy is legitimate, to be suie, foi it is founded upon the citizens`
piomise to obey its commands. lndeed, any state is legitimate which is founded
upon such a piomise. Howevei, all such states achieve theii legitimacy only by
means of the citizens` foifeit of theii autonomy, and hence aie not solutions to the
fundamental pioblem of political philosophy. Majoiitaiian demociacy claims a
deepei justihcation than meiely an oiiginal piomise. lt piesents itself as the only
viable foim of political community in which the citizeniy iule themselves, and
thus pieseive theii autonomy while collecting theii individual authoiity into the
authoiity of the state. Unfoitunately, oui examination of the vaiious aiguments
in suppoit of majoiity iule has ievealed that this additional claim is unfounded.
Whatevei else may be said foi a majoiitaiian demociacy, it does not appeai to be
tiue that the minoiity iemain fiee and self-iuled while submiuing to the majoiity.
Oui failuie to discovei a foim of political association which could combine
moial autonomy with legitimate authoiity is not a iesult of the impeifect iatio-
nality of men, noi of the passions and piivate inteiests which defect men fiom
the puisuit of justice and the geneial good. Many political philosopheis have
poitiayed the state as a necessaiy evil foiced upon men by theii own inability to
abide by the piinciples of moiality, oi as a tool of one class of men against the
otheis in the nevei-ending stiuggle foi peisonal advantage. Maix and Hobbes
agiee that in a community of men of good will, wheie the geneial good guided
eveiy citizen, the state would be unnecessaiy. Tey dinei only in the degiee of
theii hope that so happy a condition can evei be iealized.
Noi does oui dilemma giow out of the familiai limitations of intellect and
knowledge which amict all but the most extiaoidinaiy men. lt may be that in
a technologically complex woild only a few men can hope to mastei the majoi
political issues well enough to have genuinely peisonal convictions about them.
4
By positing a society of iational men of good will, howevei, we have eliminated
such well-known obstacles to the fully just state. Te magnitude of oui pioblem
is indicated by oui inability to solve the dilemma of autonomy and authoiity even
foi a Utopian society' By and laige, political philosopheis have supposed that
Utopia was logically possible, howevei much they may have doubted that it was
even maiginally piobable. But the aiguments of this essay suggest that the just
state must be consigned the categoiy of the iound squaie, the maiiied bacheloi,
and the unsensed sense-datum.
lf autonomy and authoiity aie genuinely incompatible, only two couises aie
open to us. Eithei we must embiace philosophical anaichism and tieat o|| govein-
ments as non-legitimate bodies whose commands must be judged and evaluated
in each instance befoie they aie obeyed, oi else, we must give up as quixotic the
puisuit of autonomy in the political iealm and submit ouiselves (by an implicit
piomise) to whatevei foim of goveinment appeais most just and benehcent at the
moment. (l cannot iesist iepeating yet again that if we take this couise, |ere :s no
vn:+erso| or o r:or: reoson [or |:nJ:ng ovrse|+es o o Jeocro:c go+ernen ro|er
|on o on, o|er sor. ln some situations, it may be wisei to sweai allegiance
to a benevolent and emcient dictatoiship than to a demociacy which imposes a
tyiannical majoiity on a defenseless minoiity. AnJ :n |ose coses +|ere +e |o+e
s+orn o o|e, |e rv|e o[ |e ojor:,, no oJJ::ono| |:nJ:ng [orce +:|| e::s |e,onJ
+|o +ov|J |e resen |oJ +e ro:seJ ovr o||eg:once o o |:ng!)
lt is out of the question to give up the commitment to moial autonomy. Men
aie no beuei than childien if they not only accept the iule of otheis fiom foice
of necessity, but embiace it willingly and foifeit theii duty unceasingly to weigh
the meiits of the actions which they peifoim. When l place myself in the hands
of anothei, and peimit him to deteimine the piinciples by which l shall guide my
behavioi, l iepudiate the fieedom and ieason which give me dignity. l am then
guilty of what Kant might have called the sin of willful heteionomy.
Teie would appeai to be no alteinative but to embiace the doctiine of anai-
chism and categoiically deny any claim to legitimate authoiity by one man ovei
anothei. Yet l confess myself unhappy with the conclusion that l must simply
leave on the seaich foi legitimate collective authoiity. Peihaps it might be woith
saying something about the deepei philosophical ieasons foi this ieluctance.
Man confionts a natuial woild which is iiieducibly o|er, which stands ovei
against him, independent of his will and indineient to his desiies. Only ieligious
supeistition oi the folly of idealist metaphysics could encouiage us to assume
that natuie will piove ultimately iational, oi that the opposition between man
and objects must in piinciple be suimountable. Man also confionts a social
woild which oeors othei, which oeors to stand ovei against him, at least
paitially independent of his will and fiequently capiicious in its fiustiation of
4
his desiies. ls it also folly to suppose that this opposition can be oveicome, and
that man can so peifectly conquei society as to make it his tool iathei than his
mastei` To answei this question, we must deteimine whethei the appeaiance of
the objectivity of society is also ieality, oi whethei peihaps heie, in the iealm of
institutions and inteipeisonal ielationships, man`s estiangement fiom the society
which dominates him is accidental, adventitious, and ultimately eiadicable.
Each individual is boin into a social woild which is alieady oiganized into
iegulai paueins of behavioi and expectation. At hist, he is awaie only of the
few peisons in his immediate physical enviionment and of theii qualities and
appeaiance. Veiy soon, the infant leains to expect iepeated sequences of behavioi
fiom those aiound him. Latei still, the child comes to see these signihcant peisons
as playing ceitain dehned ioles (mothei, fathei, teachei, policeman) which aie
also played by othei peisons in dineient situations (othei childien also have
motheis and fatheis, etc.). Te leaining of language ieinfoices this awaieness,
foi built into the woid fathei" is the notion that theie may be many fatheis to
many childien. Te child matuies and develops a peisonality by identifying with
vaiious iole-beaieis in his woild and inteinalizing as his own the paueins of
behavioi and belief which constitute the ioles. He |ecoes someone in this way,
and also J:sco+ers who he is by iefecting on the alteinatives which life oneis
him. Chaiacteiistically, the adolescent goes thiough a peiiod of iole dehnition
duiing which he tentatively tiies on a vaiiety of ioles, in oidei to test theii
appiopiiateness foi him. (Tis is peihaps a desciiption biased by contempoiaiy
Westein expeiience. ln some cultuies, of couise, the unceitainty ovei ioles which
pioduces an identity ciisis" nevei occuis since it is laid down by the society what
set of ioles the individual shall inteinalize and act out. loi the puiposes of this
discussion, howevei, that point is not signihcant.)
Tus, the social woild piesents to each individual an objective ieality with
independently existing stiuctuies, just as the physical woild does. Te infant
leains wheie his body ends and the objects aiound him begin. He distinguishes
between what is within his contiol (vaiious movements of his body) and what
does not iespond to his will. ln exactly the same way, he leains to iecognize
the intiactable iealities of his social enviionment. When a boy is asked what he
wants to be, he is ieally being asked which alieady existing social iole he wishes
to adopt as an adult. His answei that he wants to be a hieman, oi an engineei,
oi an exploiei indicates that he undeistands peifectly well the natuie of the
question. He may see himself, at least in a society like ouis, as exeicising some
contiol ovei the ioles which he shall adopt, but neithei the questionei noi the
boy would suppose that eithei of them has any contiol ovei the existence and
natuie of the ioles themselves' Even the social iebel chaiacteiistically opts foi
an existing iole, that of bohemian, oi beatnik, oi ievolutionaiy. Like all iole-
4
playeis, such iebels weai the clothes, live in the quaiteis, and use the language
appiopiiate to the iole which they have chosen.
ln any ieasonably complex society, social ioles aie in tuin oiganized into
even moie extensive paueins of behavioi and belief, to which we apply the teim
institutions." Te chuich, the state, the aimy, the maiket aie all such systems of
ioles. Te chaiacteiistic inteiactions of the constituent ioles of an institution aie
deteimined independently of paiticulai individuals, just as the ioles themselves
aie. At this level of complexity of oiganization, howevei, a new phenomenon
appeais which vastly incieases the appaient objectivity of social ieality, namely
what has come to be known as the paiadox of unintended consequences." Each
peison in an institutional stiuctuie puisues goals and follows paueins at least
paitially laid down foi him by the society that is, alieady existing when he
takes on the iole and hence given to him. ln his ioles, howevei, he should be able
to see the ielationship between what he does and what iesults, even though he
may not feel fiee to altei his goals oi tiy new means. ln the piocess of inteiaction
with othei individual iole-playeis, moie fai-ieaching iesults will be pioduced
which may be neithei anticipated noi paiticulaily desiied by any peison in the
system. Tese unintended consequences will theiefoie appeai to the iole-playeis
as somehow not theii doing, and hence objective in just the way that natuial
occuiiences aie objective. To cite a classic example, as each entiepieneui stiives
to inciease his pioht by cuuing his piice slightly, hoping theieby to seize a laigei
poition of the total maiket, the maiket piice of his commodity falls steadily
and eveiyone expeiiences a decline in piohts. lf he thinks about it at all, the
entiepieneui will chaiacteiistically suppose himself to be caught in the giip of a
falling maiket," which is to say a natuial oi objective foice ovei which he has no
contiol. Even afei he iecognizes the causal ielationship between his individual
act of piice-cuuing and the diop in the maiket piice, he is liable to think himself
poweiless to ieveise the woikings of the laws of the maiketplace." (Peihaps it
is woith noting that, contiaiy to the assumptions of classical libeial economic
theoiy, the entiepieneui is as much in the giip of social foices when he plays the
iole of capitalist as when he feels the pinch of the maiket. Even the most casual
cioss-cultuial compaiison ieveals that economic man" is a social iole peculiai to
ceitain cultuies, and not at all the natuial man who emeiges when the distoiting
foices of tiadition and supeistition aie lifed.)
Te expeiience of the entiepieneui is ieduplicated endlessly, so that men come
to imagine themselves moie completely enslaved by society than they evei weie
by natuie. Yet theii conviction is fundamentally wiong, foi while the natuial
woild ieally does exist independently of man`s beliefs oi desiies, and theiefoie
exeicises a constiaint on his will which can at best be mitigated oi combaued,
the social woild is nothing in itself, and consists meiely of the totality of the
48
habits, expectations, beliefs, and behavioi paueins of all the individuals who
live in it. To be suie, insofai as men aie ignoiant of the total stiuctuies of the
institutions within which they play theii seveial ioles, they will be the victims of
consequences unintended by anyone, and, of couise, to the extent that men aie
set against one anothei by conficting inteiests, those whose institutional ioles
give them advantages of powei oi knowledge in the social stiuggle will pievail
ovei those who aie ielatively disadvantaged. But since each man`s unfieedom
is entiiely a iesult eithei of ignoiance oi of a confict of inteiests, it ought to be
in piinciple possible foi a society of iational men of good will to eliminate the
domination of society and subdue it to theii wills in a mannei that is impossible
in the case of natuie.
Considei as an example the economic institutions of society. At hist, men
play theii seveial economic ioles (faimei, ciafsman, tiadei, hsheiman) in com-
plete ignoiance of the netwoik of inteiactions which infuence the success of theii
endeavois and guide them into sequences of decisions, foi good oi ill, whose stiuc-
tuie and ultimate outcome they cannot see. Tese same men imagine themselves
encapsulated in a set of unchanging economic ioles whose paueins, iewaids,
and systematic ielationships aie quite independent of theii wills. Slowly, as the
systematic inteiconnections themselves become moie complex and mutually de-
pendent, man`s undeistanding of the economy as a whole giows, so that, foi
example, entiepieneuis begin to iealize that theii piohts depend upon the total
quantity of goods pioduced by themselves and theii fellow capitalists, and the
accumulation of individual desiies foi those goods which, collectively, constitute
the level of demand. Te hist stage in the masteiy of the economy may consist
simply in the discoveiy of such aggiegate quantities as demand, supply, inteiest
iate, pioht level, and even maiket piice. Tat is to say, men must J:sco+er that the
inteiaction of many individual acts of buying and selling establishes a single mai-
ket piice, which iefects the ielation of supply to demand of the commodity being
maiketed. Afei iealizing that such a maiketwide piice exists, men can begin to
undeistand how it is deteimined. Only then can they considei the possibility
of making that piice a diiect object of decision, and thus hnally fiee themselves
fiom the tyianny of the maiket.
ln addition to the ignoiance which enslaves even those in positions of powei
in the economy (the capitalists in a laissez-faiie system), the puisuit of piivate
inteiest iesults in the exploitation and enslavement of those whose ioles in the
economy caiiy ielatively liule powei. Hence even the faithest advance imaginable
of social knowledge would not sumce to libeiate all men fiom theii social bonds
unless it weie accompanied by a tiansfoimation of piivate inteiest into a concein
foi the geneial good. But if so Utopian a condition weie achieved, then suiely
men could once and foi all ieconquei theii common pioduct, society, and at least
49
within the human woild, move fiom the iealm of necessity into the iealm of
fieedom. Death and taxes, it is said, aie the only ceitainties in this life, a folk
maxim which iefects the deep conviction that men cannot escape the tyianny
of eithei natuie oi society. Death will always be with us, ieminding us that we
aie cieatuies of natuie. But taxes, along with all the othei instiuments of social
action, aie human pioducts, and hence must in the end submit to the collective
will of a society of iational men of good will.
lt should now be cleai why l am unwilling to accept as hnal the negative iesults
of oui seaich foi a political oidei which haimonizes authoiity and autonomy. Te
state is a social institution, and theiefoie no moie than the totality of the beliefs,
expectations, habits, and inteiacting ioles of its membeis and subjects. When
iational men, in full knowledge of the pioximate and distant consequences of
theii actions, deteimine to set piivate inteiest aside and puisue the geneial good,
it must be possible foi them to cieate a foim of association which accomplishes
that end without depiiving some of them of theii moial autonomy. Te state, in
contiast to natuie, cannot be ineiadicably othei.
z. Utopian Glimpses of a World Without States
Tiough the exeicise of Je [oco legitimate authoiity, states achieve what Max
Webei calls the impeiative cooidination of masses of men and women. To some
extent, of couise, this cooidination consists in the moie-oi-less voluntaiy submis-
sion by laige numbeis of people to institutional aiiangements which aie diiectly
contiaiy to theii inteiests. Tieats of violence oi economic sanction play a cential
iole in holding the people in line, although as Webei veiy peisuasively aigues,
the myth of legitimacy is also an impoitant instiument of domination.
But even if theie weie no exploitation oi domination in society, it would still
be in men`s inteiest to achieve a veiy high level of social cooidination, foi iea-
sons both of economic emciency and of public oidei. At oui piesent extiemely
advanced stage of division of laboi, ielatively minoi disiuptions of social cooidi-
nation can pioduce a bieakdown of the fow of goods and seivices necessaiy to
sustain life.
Consequently, it is woith asking whethei a society of men who have been
peisuaded of the tiuth of anaichism a society in which no one claims legitimate
authoiity oi would believe such a claimif it weie made could thiough alteinative
methods achieve an adequate level of social cooidination.
Teie aie, so fai as l can see, thiee geneial soits of puiposes, othei than the
domination and exploitation of one segment of society by anothei, foi which
men might wish to achieve a high oidei of social cooidination. liist, theie" is
0
the collective puisuit of some exteinal national goal such as national defense,
teiiitoiial expansion, oi economic impeiialism. Second, theie is the collective
puisuit of some inteinal goal which iequiies the oiganization and cooidination
of the activities of laige numbeis of people, such as tiamc safety, to cite a tiivial
example, oi the ieconstiuction of oui cities, to cite an example not so tiivial.
linally, theie is the maintenance of oui industiial economy whose functional
dineientiation and integiation to use the sociologist`s jaigon aie advanced
enough to sustain an adequately high level of pioduction. ls theie any way in
which these ends could be seived othei than by commands enfoiced by coeicion
and by the myth of legitimacy`
l do not now have a complete and coheient answei to this question, which is
in a way the tiuest test of the political philosophy of anaichism, but l shall make,
a few suggestions which may open up fiuitful avenues of investigation.
With iegaid to maueis of national defense and foieign adventuie, it seems to me
that theie is much to be said foi the adoption of a system of voluntaiy compliance
with goveinmental diiectives. lf we assume a society of anaichists a society,
that is to say, which has achieved a level of moial and intellectual development
at which supeistitious beliefs in legitimacy of authoiity have evapoiated then
the citizeniy would be peifectly capable of choosing fieely whethei to defend
the nation and caiiy its puipose beyond the national boideis. Te aimy itself
could be iun on the basis of voluntaiy commitments and submission to oideis. To
be suie, the day might aiiive when theie weie not enough volunteeis to piotect
the fieedom and secuiity of the society. But if that weie the case, then it would
cleaily be illegitimate to command the citizens to hght. Why should a nation
continue to exist if its populace does not wish to defend it` One thinks heie of
the contiast between the Yugoslav paitisans oi lsiaeli soldieis, on the one hand,
and the Ameiican foices in Vietnam on the othei.
Te idea of voluntaiy compliance with goveinmental diiectives is haidly new,
but it inevitably piovokes the shocked ieaction that social chaos would iesult
fiom any such pioceduie. My own opinion is that supeistition iathei than ieason
lies behind this ieaction. l peisonally would feel quite safe in an Ameiica whose
soldieis weie fiee to choose when and foi what they would hght.
Voluntaiy compliance would go fai towaid geneiating sumcient social cooidi-
nation to peimit collective puisuit of domestic goals as well. ln addition, l believe
that much could be done thiough the local, community-based development of a
consensual oi geneial will with iegaid to maueis of collective iathei than pai-
ticulai inteiest. ln the concluding chaptei of my book, Te Po+er, o[ L:|ero|:s,
l have oneied a conceptual analysis of the seveial modes of community. l will
simply add that achievement of the soits of community l analyzed theie would
iequiie a fai-ieaching decentialization of the Ameiican economy.
1
Tis last point biings me to the most dimcult pioblem of all namely, the
maintenance of a level of social cooidination sumcient foi an advanced industiial
economy. As liiediich Hayek and a numbei of othei classical libeial political
economists have pointed out, the natuial opeiation of the maiket is an extiemely
emcient way of cooidinating human behavioi on a laige scale without coeicion
oi appeal to authoiity. Neveitheless, ieliance on the maiket is fundamentally
iiiational once men know how to contiol it in oidei to avoid its undesiied con-
sequences. Te oiiginal laissez-faiie libeials viewed the laws of the maiket as
objective laws of a benevolent natuie, modein laissez-faiie libeials piopose that
we go on confusing natuie and society, even though we have the knowledge to
suboidinate the maiket to oui collective will and decision.
Only extieme economic decentialization could peimit the soit of voluntaiy
economic cooidination consistent with the ideals of anaichism and amuence. At
the piesent time, of couise, such decentialization would pioduce economic chaos,
but if we possessed a cheap, local souice of powei and an advanced technology of
small-scale pioduction, and if we weie in addition willing to accept a high level
of economic waste, we might be able to bieak the Ameiican economy down into
iegional and subiegional units of manageable size. Te exchanges between the
units would be inemcient and costly veiy laige inventoiy levels, inelasticities
of supply and demand, consideiable waste, and so foith. But in ietuin foi this
piice, men would have incieasing fieedom to act autonomously. ln enect, such a
society would enable all men to be autonomous agents, wheieas in oui piesent
society, the ielatively few autonomous men aie as it weie paiasitic upon the
obedient, authoiity-iespecting masses.
Tese iemaiks fall fai shoit of a coheient piojection of an anaichist society, but
they may seive to make the ideal seem a bit less like a meie fantasy of Utopian
political philosophy.
Te Anaichist Libiaiy
Anti-Copyiight
May 21, 2012
Robeit Paul Woln
ln Defense of Anaichism
190
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