I The Thing Itself by Giorgio Agamben

For Jacques Derrida and in memory of Giorgio Pasquali

"The Thing Itself" was ublished in D i!segno" #a giusti$ia net discorso %&ilan" Jaca' ()*+ ,' ed- Gianfranco Dalmasso' - (!(.-

The e/ ression "the thing itself'" to ragma auto' a ears at the beginning of the so!called hiloso hical digression of Plam0s 1e2enth #etter' a te/t whose im ortance for the history of 3estern hiloso hy has yet to be fully established- After 4ichard 5entley had come to sus ect the entire Platonic cor us of letters of being fraudulent' and 6hristo h &einers %in (7*8, and subsequently 9arsten and Friedrich Ast declared them to be inauthentic' Plato0s letters!which until then had always been considered a central arr of the hiloso her0s wor:! were slowly e/ elled from hiloso hical historiogra hy' recisely when it was most fer2ent and acti2e- 3hen hilological o inion began to change in our century' and more and more critics asserted the authenticity of Plaw0s letters %the letter that interests us is by now generally considered to be genuine,' hiloso hers and scholars had ;< brea: the hundred!year!old quaranrine of the Platonic e isodes if they wanted %= study them at all- 3hat had been lost in the meantime was the li2ing connection between te/t and hiloso hical tradition' with the result that the hiloso hical e/cursus contained in the 1e2enth #etter a eared as an arduous' solitary fragment resisting any attem t at com rehension- >aturally' it was also transformed by its long isolation into something rich and strange' which could be considered with a freshness robably unattainable in regard to any other Platonic te/t- The scenario of the letter is well :nown" the se2enty!fi2e!year!old Plato tells Dion0s friends of his encounters with Dionysius and the dramatic failure of ?he latter0s 1icilian olitical ro@ects- In ?he assage that interests us here' Plato recounts the story of his third stay in 1icily- <nce again on the #anguage island because of the tyram0s ersistent in2ications' he decided ro ur Dionysius to the test concerning his rofessed desire to become a hiloso her">ow there is a method'" Plaro writes' "of testing such matters which is n<t ignoble bur really suitable in the case of tyrams' and es ecially such as arc crammed with borrowed doctrinesA and this was certainly what had ha ened to Dionysius' as I ercei2ed as soon as I arri2ed" I &en such as these' he continues' should be immediately shown the whole thing % an to ragma, and the nature and number of its difficulties- If the listener is truly equal to "the thing'" he will then thin: that he has heard the tale of a wonderful life' which must be led without delay and ?B which he must de2ote himself at all costs- <n the other hand' those who are n<t truly hiloso hers and ha2e only an outer glow of hiloso hy' li:e those whose s:in is tanned by the sun' will see the difficulty of "the thing" and thin: it roo hard or e2en im ossible' con2incing themsel2es that they already :now enough and need nothing more- "This' then'" Plato writes' was what I said to Dionysius on that occasion- I did not' howe2er' e/ ound the matter
fully- nor did Dionysius as: me to do soA for he claimed that he himself :new many of the most im ortant doctrines and was sufficiently informed owing to the 2ersions he had heard from his other teachers- And I am e2en rold that he himself subsequently wrote a treatise on the sub@ects in w hich I instructed him' com osing it as though it were something of his own in2ention and quite different from what he had heardA but of all this I :now nothing- I :now indeed that certain others ha2e written about these same sub@ectsA but what manner of men they are not e2en they themsel2es :now5ut thus much I can certainly declare concerning all these writers' or ros ecti2e writers' who claim to :now the sub@ects with which I concern myself ? eri on ego s ouda$oC ' whether as hearers of mine or of other teachers' or from their own disco2eriesA it is im ossible' in my @udgment at least' that these men

should understand anything about this sub@ect- %D istle EII' 8+( "l 7!c +A

- .)!8(,

It is at this oint that Plaw uses the e/ ression to ragma auto' the thing itself!a formulation that remained so determining as an e/ ression of the cause of thin:ing and the tas: of hiloso hy that it a eared again almost twO thousand years later, like a watchword passed on from Kant w Hegel, and then to Husser! and Heidegger: "There does not exist, nor will there ever exist, any treatise of mine dealing with this thing !or i t does nOt at all admit of ver"al expression like other disciplines The Thing #tself $% &mathemata' , "ur, after one has dwelt for a long time close to rhe thing itself &peri to pragma auto' and in communion with it, it is suddenly "rought () "irth in rhe soul, as light that is kindled "y a leaping spark* and &hen it nourishes itself &auto heauto ide trefoil" (+,- . , d $* p 0+-1 This passage has "een cited countless rimes as proof of esoteric intcrprcmtions of 2lato and as irrefum"le documentation for rhe existence of 2law3s unwrirren doctrines 4ccording to these readings, rhe dialogues transmitted "y our culture for centuries as a venera"le legacy would not address what 2law was seriously concerned with, which would have "een reserved for a purely oral tradition! This is nOt rhe place to take a position on this pro"lem, which is surely an important one 5e shall instead seek ro consider the nature of the "thing itself" of which 2laro speaks and which 6ionysius wrongly thought he understood 5hat is the thing of
/

thinking7
4n answer to this 8uestion ean follow only from an anemive reading of the next passage, which 2lato defines as a "stOry and wandering" (mythos kai pianos1 (+,, d +* p 0,-1 and also as a "certain true argumenr, which although # have fre8uently stated it in the past, also seems to "e in need of repetition at the present time" (+,$ a +/9* p 0++1 4ny thought that want: ro grasp its "thing" m;:t thus always reckon with interpreting &his "exrravagam story " <et us then attempt to read it "=ach "eing," 2lato writes,
has three things which are the necessary means "y which knowledge of that "eing is ac8uired* the knowledge itself is a fourth thing* and as a fifth one must posit the thing itself, which is knowa"le and truly is !irst of these comes the name &onoma' * second, the definition &logos'* third, rhe image &eidolon'* fourth, the knowledge #f you wish, then, to understand what # am now saying, take a single example and learn from it what applies to all There is something called a circle &kyklos min #i legomenon', which has for its name the word we have >ust mentioned* and, second, it has a definition, composed of names and ver"s* for "that which is everyv rherc e8uidistam from the cxtremities to the center" will "e the definition of that o">ect which has for its namc "round" and "sphcrical" and "circlc " 4nd in the third place there is that o">ect which is portrayed and o"literated, which is shaped with a lathe and f 3llls imo decay ?;( none of thesc affections is suffered "y the circle itself &au tos ho kyklos, which here is the example of the thing itself' , to which all these others are related, for it is different from them The fourth is knowledge and intelligence and true opinion regarding these o">ects* and all this must "e conceived as a single thing, which exists neither in voices &en p@mnis' nor in +A <anguage

corporeal figures &en somaton skhemasin', "m in souls &en psychllisl Hence it is clear that it differs "oth from d#e nature of the circle itself and from the three previously mentioned Of &hose fouf, intelligence is closest in kinship and similarity ro the fifth* the mhers are further removed The same is e8ually (fue of rhe straight figure and rhe sphere, color, and the good and rhe fair and the >ust, and of all "odies, whether made or naturally produced (such as fire and water and all slich su"stances1, all living creatures, and ethos in the soul and all creations &poiemata' and passions &pathemara' !or if someone does not grasp &he first four for each thing, he will never "e a"le to participate perfectly in knowledge of d#e fifth @oreover, rhe first four things express the 8uality &#i poion til of each "eing no less chan its real essence, on account of the weak ness of language &dia to ton logon asthenes' This is why no man of intelligence will ever venture to entrust his thoughts to language, especially if the language is unaltera"le, like language wrinen with "eers (+,$ a B/+,+ a +* pp 0++/+01 <et us pause for a moment to catch our "reath #n the face of this ex( faordinary excursus, which consri(;res rhe final and mosr explicir presemarion of the theory of the #deas, we can measure the damage done to philosophical hisroriography "y the nineteenth century3s claim of the 2latonic episrles3 falsity lr is nor my inrenrion to clim" thar impervious massif ?ur it is certainly possi"le to seek to esta"lish a first (fail, to determine the difficulty of the clim", and to situate it with respect to the surrounding landscape One remark (hat we can make (and that has already "een made "y, among others, 2as8uali1 concerns the status of unsaya"ility that the :eventh <etter, according ro the esoteric reading of 2lato, would ascri"e (A the thing itself This status must "e tempered "y the fact that from the context it is clear that the thing itself is not something that a"solutely transcends language and has nothing to do with ic 2lato states in the most explicit fashion that "if the first four &which, we recall, include name and logos' are nor grasped" it will never "e possi"le full y to know the fifth #n another important passage in the letter, 2lato writes that the knowledge of the thing itself suddenly emerges in " ru""ing together names, definitions, visions and sense/perceptions, proving them in "enevolent proofs and discussions without envy" (+,, " ,/9* p 0,-1 These une8uivocal statements are, moreover, perfectly coherent with rhe very close relation "etween rhe #deas and language that is s uggested "y the 2latonic dialogues 5hen in the 2haedo :ocrates presents the genesis of the #deas, he says, "it seemed to me necessary to seek refuge in the The Thing #tself + C

fogoi, co find the (rurh of "eings in them" (%% e ,/D1 =lsewhere, he presents the hatred of language as the worst of evils (2hlledn, B% d $ 1 and the disappearance of language as the loss of philosophy itself (:ophist, $DA a D/91* in &he 2armenides, the #deas are defined as "what can "e apprehended to rhe greatest degree "y means of logos" (-0+ c +1 4nd docs not
4ristotle, in his hiswcical reconstruction of 2latO3s (hought at the "eginning of the @etaphysics, state that the theory of #deas was "orn from a skepsis en tois fogois, a search in language (%B9 " n17 The thing irself therefore has its essential place in language, even if language is certainly nOt ade8uate to it, on account, 2lato says, of what is

weak in language One could say, with an apparent paradox, that the thing itself, while in some way transcending language, is nevertheless possi"le only in language and "y virtue of language: precisely the thing of language 5hen 2lato says that what he is concerned with is in no way saya"le like other mllthematll, it is therefore necessary to place the accenr on the la:t three words: it is not saya"le in the same way as other disciplines, "ut it is nOt for (hat reason simply unsaya"le 4s 2lato does nOt tire of repeating (+,- e -/01, rhe reasons why it is inadvisa"le to entrust the thing itself to writing are ethical and not merely logical 2latonic mysticism/ if such a mysticism exists/is, like all authentic mysticism, profoundly implicated in the logoi Eow that we have made these preliminary o"servations, let us closely examine the list contained in the digression The identification of the first four mem"ers does not pose any great difficulties: name, defining discourse, image (which indicates the sensi"le o">ect1, and, finally, the knowledge achieved through them Eame (onoma1 is, in modern terms, which are those of :tOic logic, the "signifier"* logos is the "signified" or virtual reference* "image" is denotation or actual reference These terms arc familiar to us, though it should not "e forgotten that it is only with 2lato and the :ophists that we see (he "eginning of (he very reFection on language that will later lead ro rhe precise logico/grammati cal constructions of the :toa and rhe Hellenistic schools 4s in "ook #O of the <aws or the last pan of the :ophist, here in the :eventh <etter 2lato presents a theory of linguistic signification in its relation to knowledge The difficulty naturally "egins with the fifth term, which introduces a new element into the theory of signification as we know it <et us reread the passage: "=ach "eing has three things which are the necessary means "y which knowledge of that "eing is ac8uired* the knowledge
+$

<anguage

itself is a fourth thing* and as a fifth one m;:t posit the thing itself, which is knowa"le and truly is " ?y "fifth" it seems that we should understand the same "eing with which the excursus "egins in saying that "each "eing has three things " The thing itself would then simply "e the thing that is rhe o">ect of knowledge, and we would thus have found proof for the imcrprerarion of 2latonism (which appeared as early as 4ristorle1 that sees rhe #dea as a kind of useless duplicate of the thing @oreover, rhe list then appears as circular, since what is listed as fifth is what is in &(mh the first to "e named, as the very presupposition from which the whole excursus follows 2erhaps here we can "e aided "y philological attention to details in which, as it has "een said, the good God likes to hide himself 4t this poim the Greek text to "e found in modern editions (in ?urnet3s version, which was in some respects exemplary for all following editions, "ur also in :ouilh.3s more recem text1 reads: pempton d3lluto tithmlli dei ho de gnoston te kai alethes estin, "and as a fifth one must posit the thing itself, which is knowa"le and truly is " ?ur the twO principal codices on which "oth scholars "ase their editions, that is, the 2arisinus grllec;: of -BA9 and

the Htuicanus graecus #, comain a slightly different text, which instead of de* ho ("one must which"1 has dina (""y which"1 #f we restore the text of the codices "y writing di3ho, the translation "ecomes, "lone must' posit the fifth, "y which &each "eing' is knowa"le and truly is "$ #n the margin of this text, a t",reifrh/century hand had noted dei ho as an emendation, and modern editors "ased their text on this variam ?ut the codex that @arsilio !icino had "efore him for his <atin translarion of the works of 2latO still respected the text of di3ho, for !icino3s translation reads as follows: 8uintum vero oportet ipsum ponere 8uo 8uid est

cognosci"ile, id est 8uod #lgnosci potest, aI8ue vere existit

5hat &hen changes, what is the significance of this restoration of &he original text7 =ssentially that the thing itself is no longer simply the "eing in its o"scurity, as an o">ect presupposed "y language and the epistemological process* rather, it is auto di3ho gnoston esnn, that "y which &he o">ect is known, its own knowa"ility and truth =ven if it is inexact, the marginal variant followed "y modern editOrs is not erroneous The scri"e who introduced it (and we have reason to think it was not an inexpert scri"e1 was most likely concerned with the risk &hat knowa"ility itselfthe #dea/would "e, in turn, presupposed and su"stantialiJed as another thing, as a duplicate of the thing "efore or "eyond the thing The thing The Thing #tself C+ itself /hence the t.fm auto as the technical designarion of the #dea/is not another thing "ut the thing itself, nOt, however, as supposed "y the name and the logos, as an o"scure real presupposition (a hypokeimenon1, "ut rather in the very medium of its knowa"iliry, in the pure light of its self/manifestation and announcement to consciousness The "weakness" of logos therefore consists precisely in the fact (hat it is not capa"lc of "ringing this very knowa"iliry and sameness ro expression* it must transform me knowa"iliry of "eings that is at issue in it inm a prcsupposirion (as a hypo/thesis in the etymological sense of rhe word, as

that which is pl4ced "eneath1

This is the sense of the distinction "etween on and 2OiOll, "etween ?eing and its 8ualification, which 2latO insists on several times in the epistle (+,$ e +* +,+ " B/c -1 <anguage/our language/is necessarily presuppositional and o">ectifying, in the sense that in taking place it necessarily decomposes the thing itself, which is announced in it and in it alone, into a "eing a"out which one speaks and a poioll, a 8uality and a determination that one says of it <anguage sup/poses and hides what it "rings ro light, in the very act in which it "rings it ro light 4ccording ro the definition comained in 4ristotle (which is also implicit "oth in :ophist, $D$ e D/9, and in the modern distinction "etween sense and reference1, language is thus always legein ti kata tinos, saying something/onsomething* it is therefore always pre/sup/positional and o">ectifying language 2resupposition is the form of linguistic signification: speaking kat3

hypokeimenou, speaking a"out a su">ect

The warning that 2latO entrusts to the #dea is therefore that saya"ility

itself remains unsaid in what is said and in that a"out which something is said, that knowa"ility itselfis lost in what is known and in that a"out which something is known
The specific pro"lem that is at issue in the letter, and that is necessarily the pro"lem of every human discourse that wants to make a su">ect Out of what is nOt a su">ect, is therefore: how is it possi"le to speak without sup/posing, without hypo/thesiJing and su">ectifying that a"out which one speaks7 How is it thus possi"le legein kat3auto, to speak not "y means of a presupposition "ut a"solutely7 4nd since the field of names is, for the Greeks, that which is essentially said kat3 auto, can language give reasons (logon didonai1 for what it names, can it say what the name has named7 =ven the earliest commentators understood that something like a con+,

<anguage
rradicrion is implicit in this pro"lem 5e possess a gloss of a late 2la& Onie scholiasr that says more or less the following: "5hy is it that in the 2haedrus (he master gives little value to writing and yet, in having written, in some way holds his own work (A "e valua"le7 #n this toO," the scholiast says, "he wamcd to follow rhe truth C;:t as rhe divinity wal;ed () create "oth invisi"le things and things &hat fall under our gaJe, so he also wanted (A leave some things unwritten and others things written " This 8uestion ccnainly holds for the :eventh <etter as well, in which 2lato, writing of what concerns him most and what cannot "e written a"om, seems to challenge rhe weakness of the logos and in a sense to "e( fay himself 4nd it is certainly not a vain >est that, in another leaer, he ends "y re>ecting the authorship of the dialogues circulating under his name, stating that they are the work of "a :ocrates "ecome fair and young "' Here the paradox of 2laro3s written works momentarily flashes up "efore us: in a letter that the moderns have often taken ro "e apocK ryphal, he declares his dialogues to "e inauthentic, aari"uting them to an impossi"le amhor, :ocrates, who is dead and has "een "uried for many years The character a"out which the text speaks now takes the place of the author in the dialogues in which he appears The earliest and sharpest critics, such as 6emetrius and 6ionysius, o"serve that 2latO3: style, which is limpid in the earlier dialogues, "ecomes darker, swollen (Jofos1 and para tactic ( eperriptai alleIois ta kola aph3 etero heteron, "the phrases are hurled one upon the other," 6emetrius writes1 when he conK fronts the su">ects dearest to him ?y a curious coincidence, the weakness of language that is called into 8uestion "y the father of 5estern metaphysics seems to prophesy from a dismnce of &wo thousand years the difficulty implicit in the metaphysical character of our language, which so "urdens the writing of the late HeiK degger ?ut in 2lato the weakness of the logos does nor found a mystical stams of the #dea* on the contrary, it renders possi"le the coming () speech of speech, for the sake of helping speech (#ogoi "oethein1, which in

the 2haedrus ($9B c D1 is descri"ed as the authentic task of philosophical presentation Here the risk is that the nonthematiJa"ility dlat is at issue in the thing itself will "e in turn thematiJed and presupposed once again in the form of a legein ti kata tinos, a speaking a"out that a"out which it is not possi"le to speak The thing itself is not a simple hypostasis of rhe name, something ineffa"le that must remain unsaid and hence sheltered, as a name, in the language of men :uch a conception, which is implicK The Thing #tself +0 idy refuted at the end of the Theatetus, still necessarily hypothesiJes and sup/poses the thing itself The thing itself is nOt a 8uid that might "e sought as an extreme hypmhesis "eyond all hypmheses, as a final and a"solute su">ect "eyond all su">ecrs, horri"ly or "eautifully unreacha"le in its ohscuri ry 5e can, in truth, conceive of such a non linguistic thing only in language, through rhe idea of a language without relation to things l r is a chimera i n rhe :pinoJian sense of the (erm, that is, a purely ver"al "eing The thing itself is not a thing* it is rhe very saya"iliry, the very openness at issue in language, which, in language, we always presuppose and forger, perhaps "ecause it is at "ottom its own o"livion and a"andonment #n the words of the 2haedo (9D d B1, it is what we arc always disclosing in speaking, what we are always saying and communicating, and that of which we nevertheless are always losing sight The presuppositiona # :tru.ture of language is the very stru.ture of tradition* we presuppose, pass on, and there"y/according to the dou"le sense of the word traditio/"etray the thing itself in language, so that language may speak a"out something (kata tinos1 The effacement of the thing itself is the sole foundation on which it is possi"le for something like a tradition to "e constituted

The task of philosophical presentation is to come with speech to help speech, so that, in speech, speech itself does not remain presupposed "ut instead comes to speech 4t this point, the presuppositional power of language touches
its limit and its end* language says presuppositions as presuppositions and, in &his way, reaches &he unpresupposa"Ce and unpresupposed principle (arkhe anypothetos1 that, as such, constitutes authentic human community and communication 4s 2lato writes i n a decisive passage of a dialogue that presems more than mere affinities with the "extravagam myth" of the :eventh <ener:
;ndersfand then that "y the other section of &he intelligi"le # mean what language itself laufo ho logos' tOuches "y the power of dialogue, hypothesiJing nOt "y principles &archai' "ut truly "y hypotheses, underpinnings, footings, and spring"oards, so that it reaches the principle of all things, tOuching it, and, once again holding to the things near it, returns toward &he end, "eing concerned not with the sensi"le, "ut with the #deas, through the #deas, toward the #deas, so that it may end with the rdeas K

# realiJe that # may have gone "eyond the task that # set myself* # may "e guilty, in some way, of precisely the human folly against which the

<anguage

myth of the :evemh <ener warns us (+,, d -/$1: the folly of carelessly consigning one3s own thoughts a"out the thing itself to writing #t is therefore appropriate that # end here, to turn more cautiously to the preliminary historiographical maner that # raised earlier 5e have seen that the digression of the :eventh <etter contains a treatmem of me #dea in its relation to language The determination of the thing itself is, indeed, carried Out in close rclation with a theory of linguistic signification, one that may constitute the first organic exposition of the material, if in an extremely a""reviated form #f this is true, we should then "e a"le to follow its traces in the Greek reflection on language that immediately follows it One instantly thinks of the text that, for centuries, determined all reFection on language in the ancient world, 4ristOtle3s 6e interpretatione Here 4ristotle presents the process of linguisric signification in a way apparently without relation to the 2latOnic digression "5hat is in the voice &ta en tei phrmei'," he writes,
is the sign of affections in (he soul &m #ii psycheil* what is written & ta graphomenaC is the sign of what is in the voice 4nd C;:t as letters are nor the same for all men, so it is with voices ?ut that of which they are signs, that is, affections in the soul, are the same for all* and the things &pragmatal of which the affections are sem"lances &homoiomatal are also the same for all men 0

4 more attentive examination, however, shows precise correspondences with the text of the 2latonic excursus The tripartite division "y which 4ristotle articulates the movemem of signification (en tei phonei, en tei psychei, pragmata1 textually recalls the 2latOnic distinction "etween what is en phrmais (name and logos1, what is en psychais (knowledge and opinion1 and what is en somaton skhemasin (sensi"le o">ect1 (=pistle H##, +,$ c D1 #n view of these affinities with the 2latonic epistle, the disappearance of the thing itself in 6e illterpretatiolle is all the more noticea"le #n 4ristotle, the thing itself is expelled from hermeneia, the linguistic process of signification 5hen, later, it momentarily returns in the philosophy of language (as in :toic logic1, it will "e so estranged from the original 2latonic imention as to "e practically unrecogniJa"le 4risrotle3s hermeneia is therefore defined in opposition to the 2latonic list, of which it constitutes "oth a repetition and a refutation The decisive proof of this polemical distinction is precisely the appearance in the 4ristotelian text of gmmmatfl, leners =ven ancient commematOrs wondered a"out the apparendy incongruous appearance of a fourth interThe Thing #tself +9 prerer alongside the other three (voices, concepts, things1 #f one keeps in mind that the 2latonic excursus aimed &A show precisely the impossi"ility of writing the thing itself and generally &he unrelia"ility, for thought, of every written discourse, the marked difference "erween the &wo texts is even morc evident =xpelling (he thing itself from his theory of signification, 4ristotle a"solves writing of its weakness #n the place of the thing itself, in the .uegories there appears prote ousia, first su"stance, which 4risrodc defines as

that which is said neither a"out a su">ect (kat3 hypokeimenou "y means of a presupposition1 nor in a su">ect 5hat does this definicion mean7 !irst su"stance is not said on rhe "asis of a presupposition* it docs not have presuppositions, "ecause it is itself the a"solute presupposition on which all discourse and knowledge are founded #t alone/as name/can "e said kat3 auto, "y itself* it alone/not "eing in a su">ect//dearly shows itself ?ur in itself, as individuum, it is ineffa"le ( individuum ineffa"ile, according to the formulation of medieval 4ristOtelianism1 and cannot enter inro the linguistic significarion that it founds, except "y a"andoning its status as deixis and "ecoming universal predication The "what," ti, that was at issue in the name is su"sumed into discourse as a kflta tinos, "that a"out which" something is said They/"oth the what and the a"out whicKare therefore the same thing, which can "e grasped as to ti en einai, the ?eing/the/what/that/was # n this logico/temporal process, the 2latonic thing itselIis removed and conserved or, rather, conserved only in "eing removed: e/liminared This is why the gmmma appears in 6e interpretatione 4n attentive examination shows that in the hermeneutic circle of 6e interpretatione, the letter, as the interpreter of the voice, does not itself need any other interpreter #t is the final interpreter, "eyond which no hermeneia is possi"le: the limit of all interpretation This is why ancient grammarians, in analyJing 6e interpretatione, said that the letter, which is the sign of the voice, is also stoikheion tes phones, that is, its element #nsofar as it is the element of that of which it is a sign, it has the privileged starus of "eing an index sui, self/demonstration* like prote owia, of which it constitutes the linguistic cipher, it shows itself, "ut only insofar as it was in the voice, that is, insofar as it always already "elongs to the past The gramma is thus the form of presupposition itself and nothing else k such, it occupies a central place in all mysticism, and as such, it also has a decisive relevance in our time, which is much more 4ristotelian and <anguage mystical than is usually "elieved #n this sense/and only in this sense4riswde, and nOt 2lato, is the founder of 5estern mysticism, and this is why Eeoplawnism could formulate the accord "etween 2lato and 4risL ode that lay at the "asis of its school #nsofar as language "ears within it the ontological structure of presupposition, thought can immediately "ecome writing, without having to reckon with the thing itself and without "etraying its own presupposition #ndeed, the philosopher is the scri"e of thought and, through thought, of the thing and ?eing The late ?yJantine lexicon that goes under the name of :;@ contains, under the entry "4risrode," the following definition: 4ristoteles tes physeos grammateus en ton kalamon apo"rekhon eis noun, "4ristotle was the scri"e of nature who dipped his pen i n thought " @any centuries later, Holderlin unexpectedly cited this phrase from

:uda at a decisive point in his annotations (4nmerkungen1 to his translation of :op hodes, namely, in his attempt to explain the sense and nature of 6arstellung, tragic presentation The citation, however, contains an amendment, which Holderlinian philology, despite its diligence, has not "een a"le to explain Holderlin writes: tes physeos grammateus en ton kalamon apo"rekhon eunoun (instead of eis noun1: "he was the scri"e of nature who dipped his "enevolent pen " Here there is no more dipping of the pen i n thought* the pen/that simple material instrument of human writing/is alone, armed solely with its "enevolence in the face of its task To restore the thing itself to its place in language and, at the same time, to restore the difficulty of writing, the place of writing in the poetic task of composition: this is the task of the coming philosophy