Abunado v.

People
FACTS: September, 1967 Abunado marries Narcisa
1988 Narcisa leaves for work in Japan
1992 Narcisa returns to the Philippines upon finding out that her husband is having an extra-marital
affair and has left her conjugal home. She found out that her husband had contracted a second marriage
with Zenaida Binas on January 1989.
1995 A bigamy case was filed against Abunado
Abunados defense: petitioner claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullity of marriage
was a prejudicial question, hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should have been suspended
during the pendency of the annulment case. Petitioner, in fact, eventually obtained a judicial declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Narcisa on October 29, 1999.
ISSUE: Is the petition for annulment or declaration of nullity a prejudicial question?
HELD: NO it is not. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to
the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion
would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial
question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is
required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the
second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that
his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting
before the first marriage was annulled.








QUIMIGUING vs ICAO
FACTS: Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City
and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to have
carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and without her consent. As
a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant and as a consequence, Carmen
stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages and attorneys fees. The
complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of
action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a
baby girl but the court ruled that no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no
cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.
HELD: Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines. The conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted by those persons
who will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in Article 742.
Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of parents
and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates article 40
aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his wife to
yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmens rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim
compensation for the damage caused.
GELUZ vs CA
FACTS: Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the petitioner
and physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before she
and Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents, she decided
to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again on October 1953 since she found it
inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955, she again
became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latters daughter Lucida at
Geluz clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan
campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He doesnt have any idea nor given his consent on
the abortion.
ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages
from the physician who caused the same.
HELD: The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death of a person
does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality which trial court and Court
of Appeals predicated.
Both trial court and CA wasnt able to find any basis for an award of moral damages evidently because
Oscars indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates he was unconcerned with the
frustration of his parental affections. Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz,
he turned his wifes indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only
he but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries. It shows that hes after obtaining a large money
payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorneys fees that serves as indemnity
claim, which under the circumstances was clearly exaggerated.


Republic Act No. 6809 December 13, 1989

AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided,
majority commences at the age of eighteen years."
Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed.
Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the
child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established
by existing laws in special cases.
"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and
guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third
paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."
Section 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills, bequests, donations, grants, insurance
policies and similar instruments containing references and provisions favorable to minors will not
retroact to their prejudice.
Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: December 13, 1989










DE JESUS vs SYQUIA
FACTS: Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by
the defendants brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an
unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber
shop. He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia
got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.
In the early months of Antonias pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February 1931, he
even wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to
the child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to
eat on time for her and juniors sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth
and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.
After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila where
they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant
suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this time.
It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the
arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr.
that was first planned.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to Antonia
during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.
2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of
the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence,
the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.
HELD:The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters
are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that
the writing shall be indubitable.
The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a
natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit the
status.
Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia
Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing in civil law.
Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to
recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.
Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to
Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it is only the trial
court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of pension.





LIMJUCO vs THE ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGANTE
FACTS: Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public
convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially
capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of
public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its
special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain
and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a
contravention of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality.
HELD: The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the Civil
Code, estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of the
settlement and distribution of his properties. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical
administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his
death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending application for public convenience before the
Public Service Commission.
Supreme Court is of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the
Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O.
Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as
amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.

DUMLAO VS QUALITY PLASTICS
FACTS: Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28, 1962 ordering defendants Soliven,
Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus
legal rate of interest from November 1958 before its decision became final or else Quality Plastics is
hereby authorized to foreclose the bond. Defendants failed to pay the amount before the limit given.
Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-
tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962 which
he has given as security under the bond.
Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics was not aware on
Orias death. The summons and copies of complaint was personally served on June 24, 1960 by a
deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter acknowledged and signed in his own behalf and his co-
defendants.
Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly
probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on March 1, 1963 for the annulment of the judgment
against Oria and the execution against his land (T-873). Dionisio also sued in his capacity as
administrator of Orias testate estate.
ISSUE: Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his land be annulled on the ground of lack
in juridical capacity.
HELD: Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just learned that Oria was already dead
prior case T-662 was filed. The Dumalaos agreed in their stipulation that indeed Quality Plastics was
unaware of Orias death and that they acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.
However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment against him is a patent nullity.
Lower courts judgment against Oria in T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person as far as Oria
was concerned. He had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity which is the fitness to be the
subject of legal relations was lost through death.
The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order to annul the judgment against Oria does not
follow that they are entitiled to claim attorneys fees against the corporation.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662
against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by
OCT No. 28732 is also void.

MO YA LIM YAO VS. COM OF IMMIGRATION
FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant, a temporary alien visitor, whose authorized stay in the Philippines was to
expire, claims herself to be lawfully naturalized by virtue of her marriage with co-plaintiff, a Filipino
citizen. Solicitor General opposes on the ground that the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien
does not automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship, because record shows that the same
does not posses all the qualifications required of applicants for naturalization (CA 473), even if she has
proven that she does not suffer any disqualification there under.
ISSUE: Whether or not an alien who married a naturalized Filipino is lawfully naturalized.
HELD: Yes, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina
provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines (Sec. 15 and 4, CA 473).

FRIVALDO VS. REPULIC
FACTS: In 1988, Juan Frivaldo won as governor of Sorsogon. Salvador Estuye, President of the League of
Municipalities of Sorsogon, filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldos election and
proclamation because apparently, Frivaldo, in 1983, was naturalized as an American. In his defense,
Frivaldo said that he was forced to be naturalized because the then President Marcos was after him; but
that participating in the Philippine elections, he has effectively lost his American citizenship pursuant to
American laws. He also assailed the petition as he claimed that it is in the nature of a quo warranto
which is already filed out of time, the same not being filed ten days after his proclamation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo can validly serve as a governor.
HELD: No. He has not regained Filipino citizenship. As far as Philippine law is concerned, he is not a
Filipino. He lost his citizenship when he declared allegiance to the United States. Even if he did lose his
US citizenship, that did not restore his being a Filipino because he did not undergo naturalization or
repatriation proceedings. Neither did his participation in the 1988 elections restore his Philippine
citizenship. At best, he is a stateless person. He cannot serve as governor when he owes allegiance to a
foreign state. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent
violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country.
The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the
people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application
when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he
must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any
other state.

UTENGSU VS REPUBLIC
Facts: Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental on October 6,
1927, where he also finished his primary and secondary education. He went to the United States, where,
from 1947 to 1950, he was enrolled in the Leland Stanford Junior University, in California. In April of the
same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4) months vacation. Then, to be exact, on July 15,
1950, his present application for naturalization was filed. Forthwith, he returned to the United States
and took a postgraduate course, in chemical engineering, in another educational institution. He finished
this course in July 1951; but did not return to the Philippines until October 13, 1951.
Petitioner contends, and the lower court held, that the word residence, as used in the aforesaid
provision of the Naturalization Law, is synonymous with domicile, which, once acquired, is not lost by
physical absence, until another domicile is obtained, and that, from 1946 to 1951, he continued to be
domiciled in, and hence a resident of the Philippines, his purpose in staying in the United States, at that
time, being, merely to study therein.
Issue: Whether or not the application for naturalization may be granted, notwithstanding the fact that
petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did not return until several
months after the first date set for the hearing thereof.

Held: While, generally speaking, domicile and residence mean one and the same thing, residence
combined with intention to remain, constitutes domicile while an established abode, fixed permanently
for a time for business or other purposes, constitutes a residence, though there may be an intent,
existing all the while, to return to the true domicile.
Where the petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition for naturalization
and did not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof, notwithstanding
his explicit promise, under oath, that he would reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of
the filing of his petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship, he has not complied
with the requirements of section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and, consequently, not entitled to a
judgment in his favor.

ROMUALDEZ MARCOS VS COMELEC
FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then
pursued her college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in
Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during
1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a
Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as
Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when
Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila.
She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte
for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte
and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with
the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which
she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte
despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of
law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond
with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law
does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she
kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new
one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated
that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even
obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act,
which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run
for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned
Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent
COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.