Nolasco vs.
Comelec If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor,
The election for mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan was held on May 8, 1995.
The principal protagonists were petitioner Florentino P. Blanco and private
respondent Eduardo A. Alarilla. Blanco received 29,753 votes, while
Alarilla got 23,038 votes. Edgardo Nolasco was elected Vice-Mayor with
37,240 votes.
On May 9, 1995, Alarilla filed with the COMELEC a petition to disqualify
Blanco which led to a search in his address. The search led to the discovery
of various unlicensed firearms and envelopes intended to bribe the teachers
of meycauayan.
On mAy 8 1995, Blanco perpetrated teh most massive vote buying thru his
organization called “movement for blanco”
Flying voters were also used in the scheme.
August 15, the Comelec disqualified Blanco on the grounds of vote buying.
Nolasco, as vice mayor filed a petition for intervention alleging that as vice
mayor, he should be declared mayor in teh event that blanco was finally
disqualified.
Issue: W/N nolasco should be declared mayor upon disqualification of
Blanco?
Ruling: YES.
Section 44, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No.
7160) is unequivocal, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice
Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. — (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in
the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice mayor,
the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent
inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become
the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be.
Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the
other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.
(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of
their predecessors.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective
local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to
qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the
sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes
obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters
in each distribution the immediately preceding election.
In the same vein, Article 83 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing, the
Local Government Code of 1991 provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 83. Vacancies and Succession of Elective Local Officials. — (a) What
constitutes permanent vacancy — A permanent vacancy arises when an
elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume
office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is
otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
(b) Permanent vacancies in the offices of the governor, vice
governor, mayor and vice mayor —
(1) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the
vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall ipso facto become the
governor or mayor.
mayor, or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of
his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member,
shall ipso facto become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as
the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled
automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as
defined in this Article.
Our case law is now settled that in a mayoralty election, the candidate
who obtained the second highest number of votes, in this case Alarilla,
cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is
disqualified.
Reyes vs. Comelec “To simplistically assume that the second placer would
have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the
mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the
elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He
could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field
which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed.”
A final word. The dispute at bar involves more than the mayoralty of the
municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan. It concerns the right of suffrage which
is the bedrock of republicanism. Suffrage is the means by which our people
express their sovereign judgment. Its free exercise must be protected
especially against the purchasing power of the peso. As we succinctly held
in People v. San Juan,16 "each time the enfranchised citizen goes to the polls
to assert this sovereign will, that abiding credo of republicanism is translated
into living reality. If that will must remain undefiled at the starting level of its
expression and application, every assumption must be indulged in and every
guarantee adopted to assure the unmolested exercise of the citizen's free
choice. For to impede, without authority valid in law, the free and orderly
exercise of the right of suffrage, is to inflict the ultimate indignity on the
democratic process."
Maruhom vs. Comelec
Maruhom and Dimaporo were both candidates for mayor in the municipality
of Marogong, Lanao del sur,
During the counting of votes, serious irregularities, anomalies and electoral
frauds were committed at the instance of Maruhom or his followers in that
votes actually casted (sic) for the Dimaporo were not counted and credited in
his favor thru (sic) the concerted acts, conspiracy and manipulation of the
Board of Election Inspectors, military, Election Officer and the Machine
Operator who happens to be a nephew of MAruhom.
As a result of the foregoing irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds, the
MAruhom was illegally proclaimed as winner because he appeared to have
obtained 2,020 votes while the private respondent garnered 2,000 votes with a
slight margin of only 20 votes
Dimaporo, then filed for a petition to annul the proclamation of Maruhom as
the duly elected mayor.
MAruhom filed a counter protest praying to hold in abeyance furhter
proceedings since the protest is subject to the petition filed before this
Honorable Commission.
Maruhom further moved for the dismissal of the protest on the ground that
1. ballot boxes containing the ballots in the protested precincts have been
violated;
2. Automated counting of ballots does not contemplate a manual recount of
the ballots; and
3. Protestant is guilty of forum shopping warranting summary dismissal of the
petitioner of the protest.
Maruhom’s motion was denied for lack of merit.

As a diabolical scheme to cause further delay of the proceedings of the case
more specifically the revision of ballots, the petitioner filed on December 10,
1998, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction and on December 11, 1998, petitioner filed an urgent
motion before the respondent court praying that further proceedings in
Election Case No. 11-127 be deferred until after protestee's petition
for certiorari and prohibition before this Honorable Commission shall have
been finally resolved.
Issue:
W/N teh comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that a
motion to dismiss filed after the answer to an election protest case in the
RTC is not allowed.
Ruling: NO?
Parameters of Comelec’s powers
The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its
contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual
experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly
advantageous position to decide complex political questions . . . . There are
no ready made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience
are necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the ends of good government.
In the matter of the administration of laws relative to the conduct of
election . . . we must not by any excessive zeal take away from the
Commission on Elections that initiative which by constitutional and legal
mandates properly belongs to it.
Succinctly stated, laws and statutes governing election contests
especially the appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the
end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may
not be defeated by technical infirmities.
An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to
dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is
imperative, much more so in this case considering that a mere twenty (20)
votes separates the winner from the loser of the contested election results.
Substantial ruling:
The motion to dismiss was a plot to prevent the early termination of the
proceedings in teh election case evidenced by a confluence of events clearly
showing a pattern of delay employed by MAruhom to avert revision of the
ballots.
Various legal tactics were used by maruhom to delay the proceedings.
It is clear, given the foregoing facts of this case, that the roundabout manner
within which petitioner virtually substituted his answer by belatedly filing a
motion to dismiss three (3) months later is a frivolous resort to procedure
calculated to frustrate the will of the electorate. As pointedly observed by the
COMELEC in its challenged Resolution dated July 6, 1999, 35 petitioner
only filed his motion to dismiss "when the results of the trial appear[ed] to
be adverse to him" 36 or right after the creation of the Revision
Committee had been ordered by the trial court. If petitioner truly intended to
move for the preliminary hearing of his special and affirmative defenses as
he claims, then he should have simultaneously moved for the preliminary
hearing of his special and affirmative defenses at the time he filed his
answer. Otherwise, he should have filed his motion to dismiss "within the
time for but before filing the answer. . ." pursuant to Section 1, Rule 16 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Suffice it to state in this regard that such a whimsical change of mind by
petitioner can not be countenanced much more so in election cases where
time is of the essence in the resolution thereof. Indeed, the Omnibus Election
Code states in no uncertain terms that —
Sec. 258. Preferential disposition of contests in courts. The RTC, in their
respective cases, shall give preference to election contests over all other
cases, except those of habeas corpus, and shall, without delay, hear and
within thirty (30) days from the date of their submission for decision, but in
every case within six (6) months after filing, decide the
same. . . . 37 (emphasis and italics supplied).
Pena vs. HRET
Petitioner and the private respondent were contenders for the said
Congressional Office in the May 8, 1995 elections. On May 12, 1995, upon
canvassing the votes cast, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Palawan
proclaimed Alfredo Abueg as the winner.
The petition was filed with the HRET averring that:
The elections in the precincts of the Second District of Palawan were tainted
with massive fraud, widespread vote-buying, intimidation and terrorism and
other serious irregularities committed before, during and after the voting, and
during the counting of votes and the preparation of election returns and
certificates of canvass which affected the results of the election. Among the
fraudulent acts committed were the massive vote-buying and intimidation of
voters, disenfranchisement of petitioner's known supporters through
systematic deletion of names from the lists of voters, allowing persons to vote
in excess of the number of registered voters, misappreciation, misreading and
non-reading of protestant's ballots and other irregularities.
Abueg filed an answer with an affirmative defense to which pena field a reply.
Subsequent to teh filing of his answer, Abueg filed a motion to dismiss the
eptition averring that HRET has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition for
being insiufficient in form and in substance.
In essence, the motion to dismiss anchors its challenge on the fact that the
petition failed to allege the precincts where the massive fraud and
disenfranchisement of voters occurred, nor did it point out how many
votes would be gained by the protestant as a result of the same.
Pena then filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss attaching a summary of
contested precincts naming 700 precincts where election irregularities
allegedly occured.
HRET ruling: Dismissal of the case
Although it had jurisdiction over the petition, as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House
of Representatives, the said petition, however, fails to state a cause of action,
and is therefore, insufficient in form and substance, meriting its
dismissal. As the failure to indicate the precincts make it virtually
impossible for the tribunal to determine which ballot boxes have to be
collected.
While Protestant has attached as Annex "A" to his Opposition to the Motion
to Dismiss, filed on 10 July 1995, a Summary of contested Precincts, the
defects in his Protest were not cured thereby as the Summary was submitted
only after the Motion to Dismiss had been filed. The Opposition and the
attached Summary do not amend the original Petition.
Pena filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, the present
petition.
Contention:
respondent HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to having
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the election protest of
petitioner considering that:
1. The petition ad acutelam was sufficient in form and in substance and
2. Assuming that the petition was initially defective, the said defect was cured
when pena submitted a summary of contested precincts which form part of the
records of the HRET
Argument:
Nowhere is it provided that the specification of the precincts is a jurisdictional
requirement that must be complied with in order that an election protest can
be entertained by the HRET. To support his submission, petitioner cites the
cases of Yalung vs. Atienza, 52 Phil 781, Arao vs. COMELEC, 210 SCRA
790 and Gallares vs. Casenas, 48 Phil 362, the latter stating that:
From a reading of the allegations of the protest, it may be seen that frauds,
irregularities and violations of the law are alleged therein, which, if true,
would undoubtedly change the result of the elections.
The fact that in the protest the number of votes which would result in favor of
the protestant after the judicial counting is not specified, does not affect the
right of the protestant, for it being known that said omission is a defect of the
protest, the same may be cured by a specification of the votes mentioned in
paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the protest, without thereby adding new grounds for
those already alleged by the protestant.
Applying the same principle to the specification of precincts in the instant
case, the defect in the petition should have been cured by the opposition to the
private respondent's Motion to Dismiss.

Ruling: the SC did not agree with Pena’s contentions.
In the first place, in requiring the private respondent to answer the petition,
the HRET was not ruling on the formal and substantive sufficiency of the
petition. The order to require an answer is but a matter of course, as under
the Revised Rules of Procedure of the HRET, it is provided that:
RULE 22. Summons. — Upon the filing of the petition, the Clerk of the
Tribunal shall forthwith issue the corresponding summons to the protestee or
respondent together with a copy of the petition, requiring him within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof to file his answer.
In the petition, pena makes no specific mention of the precincts where
widespread election fraud and irregularities occured. THIS IS A FATAL
OMISSION AS IT GOES INTO TRHE VERY SUBSTANCE OF THE
PROTEST.
Under Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of HRET, insufficiency
in form and substance of the petition constitutes a ground for the immediate
dismissal of the Petition.
The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form and substance
means that the petition must be more than merely rhetorical. If the
allegations contained therein are unsupported by even the faintest whisper of
authority in fact and law, then there is no other course than to dismiss the
petition, otherwise, the assumption of an elected public official may, and
will always be held up by petitions of this sort by the losing candidate.
The defect in the instant case arises from the failure to allege the
contested precincts. Only a bare allegation of "massive fraud, widespread
intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities", without
specification, and substantiation, of where and how these occurrences took
place, appears in the petition. We cannot allow an election protest based on
such flimsy averments to prosper, otherwise, the whole election process will
deteriorate into an endless stream of crabs pulling at each other, racing to
disembank from the water.
On his second point of argument, Petitioner likewise fails to impress. The
Court has already ruled in Joker P. Arroyo vs. HRET,7 that substantial
amendments to the protest may be allowed only within the same period
for filing the election protest, which, under Rule 16 of the HRET Rules
of Procedure is ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner.
HERE:
While it is conceded that statutes providing for election contests are to be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officers may not be defeated by mere technical questions, the rule
likewise stands, that in an election protest, the protestant must stand or fall
upon the issues he had raised in his original or amended pleading filed
prior to the lapse of the statutory period for filing of the protest.
Admittedly, the rule is well-established that the power to annul an election
should be exercised with the greatest care as it involves the free and fair
expression of the popular will. It is only in extreme cases of fraud and under
circumstances which demonstrate to the fullest degree a fundamental and
wanton disregard of the law that elections are annulled, and then only when
it becomes impossible to take any other step. . . . This is as it should be, for
the democratic system is good for the many although abhorred by a few.
Bince vs. Comelec
Facts:
Bince and Micu were among the candidates in teh synchronized elections on
May 11, 1992 for a seat in the sangguniang panlalawigan in the province of
pangasinan. 10 municipalities comrpise this district.
During the canvassing of the Certificates of Canvass (COC's) for these ten
(10) municipalities by respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) on
May 20, 1992, private respondent Micu objected to the inclusion of the COC
for San Quintin on the ground that it contained false statements.
Accordingly, the COCs for the remaining nine (9) municipalities were
included in the canvass.
PBC rueld against Micu’s objection and thus micu appealed with the comelec.
Comelec ruled that the actual number of votes obtained by candidate Alfonso
C. Bince in the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan is 1,055 votes
whereas petitioner/appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu obtained 1,535 votes for
the same municipality and DIRECTED THE PBC to credit in favor of Micu
and Bince the said number of votes.
21 days after the canvass of teh COC for the 9 municipalities, Micu filed a
petition to correct the statement of votes earlier prepared for alleged manifest
errors IN THE COMPUTATION.
Following the comelec’s motion, the PBC credited to each candidate the votes
as mentioned by Comelec in its june 6 resolution and counted teh rest based
on the COCs for san quintin and and the other 9 municipalities.
Bince won by a margin of 1 vote (27370, 27369) however, he was not yet
proclaimed winner since PBC was devoid of authority.
Thus, after bince filed for a motion for such authority, COMELEC en
banc promulgated a Supplemental Order3 directing the PBC "to reconvene,
continue with the provincial canvass and proclaim the winning candidates for
Sangguniang Panlalawigan for the Province of Pangasinan, and other
candidates for provincial offices who have not been proclaimed 4 as of that
date.
In teh mean time PBC, acting on Micu’s petition for correction of the
Statement of votes of tayug ruled to allow the municipal board of canvassers
of municipalities of tayug to correct the statement of votes and certificates of
canvasses and on the basis of these documents, PBC will continue to canvass
and thereafter proclaim the winning candidate.
Bince appealed this ruling and thereafter, Micu field an urgent motion for the
issuance of an order directing PBC to reconvene and proceed with the canvass
alleging that teh PROMULGATION OF COMELEC RESO on June 29
affirmed PBC ruling on June 24
Bince then filed a petition to cite officers of the PBC for contempt and
alternatively to be proclaimed as the winner.
THE PBC Chairman then filed a petition before the comelec seeking a
definitive and direct order as to who is to be proclaimed as winner alleging
that:
"there were corrections already made in a separate sheet of paper of the
Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass of Tayug and San Manuel,
Pangasinan which corrections if to be considered by the Board in its canvass
and proclamation, candidate Emiliano will win by 72 votes. On the other
hand, if these corrections will not be considered, candidate Alfonso Bince, Jr.
will win by one (1) vote/
Comelec promulgated its resolution which stated:
1. To reconvence immediately and co,mpelete the canvass of the COVs as
corrected;
2. To proclaim the winning candidate for member of the provincial board on
teh basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of canvass
PBC then proclaimed Bince as the winner.
Assailing the proclamation of Bince, private respondent Micu filed an Urgent
Motion for Contempt and to Annul Proclamation and Amended Urgent
Petition for Contempt and Annul Proclamation on July 22 and 29, 1992,
respectively, alleging that the PBC defied the directive of the COMELEC in
its resolution of July 9, 1992.
Issue: whether or not Micu’s correction for SOVs were filed on time.
Ruling: YEs, the petition was filed on time.
Respondent COMELEC did not act without jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion in annulling the proclamation of petitioner Alfonso Bince, Jr. and
in directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan to order the
Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel to make the
necessary corrections in the SOVs and COCs in said municipalities and to
proclaim the winner in the sixth legislative district of Pangasinan.
No error was committed by the comelec when it resolved the pending
incidents on teh case pursuant to the decision of the court in Bince vs.
Comelec.
Neither can the comelec be faulted for subsequently annulling the
proclamation of petitioner Bince on account of a mathematical error in
addition committed by respondent MBCs in the computation of the votes
received by both petitioner and private respondent.
The petitions to correct manifest errors were filed on time, that is, before
the petitioner's proclamation on July 21, 1992. The petition of the MBC of
San Manuel was filed on June 4, 1992 while that of still, the MBC of Tayug
was filed on June 5, 1992. Still, private respondent's petition was filed with
the MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel on June 10, 1992 and June 11, 1992,
respectively, definitely well within the period required by Section 6 (now
Section 7), Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the petition was filed out of time, this
incident alone will not thwart the proper determination and resolution of the
instant case on substantial grounds. Adherence to a technicality that would
put a stamp of validity on a palpably void proclamation, with the inevitable
result of frustrating the people's will cannot be countenanced.
Jurisprudence cited:
Benito vs comelec: Adjudication of cases on substantive merits and not on
technicalities has been consistently observed by this Court.
Juliano vs. Court of Appeals:
Well-settled is the doctrine that election contests involve public interest,
and technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to
stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will
of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. And also settled
is the rule that laws governing election contests must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public
officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
The same principle still holds true today. Technicalities of the legal rules
enunciated in the election laws should not frustrate the determination of the
popular will.
Trinidad vs. Sunga
Petitioner Manuel C. Sunga was one of the candidates for the position of
Mayor in the Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the 8 May 1995
elections. Private respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad, then incumbent mayor,
was a candidate for re-election in the same municipality.
April 1995, Sunga filed letters of complaint with COMELEC for
disqualification against trinidad accusing him of:
1. using three (3) local government vehicles in his campaign, in violation of
Sec. 261, par. (o), Art. XXII, of BP Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code, as
amended).
2. charging Trinidad this time with violation of Sec. 261, par. (e) (referring
to threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion) of the Omnibus
Election Code, in addition to the earlier violation imputed to him in the first
letter-complaint.
3. Followed by an Amended Petition for disqualification consolidating the
charges in the two (2) letters-complaint, including vote buying, and
providing more specific details of the violations committed by Trinidad.
Election results then showed that trinidad garnered the highest number
of votes whiel sunga trailed second.
Sunga then moved for the suspension of the proclamation of Trinidad.
However, notwithstanding the motion, Trinidad was proclaimed the
elected mayor, prompting Sunga to file another motion to suspend
the effects of the proclamation.
Both motions were not acted upon by the COMELEC 2 nd Division.
In 1996, Sunga filed for a Second Urgent Motion to suspend the Effects and
Annul the Proclamation with Urgent Motion for Early Resolution of the
Petition.
However, the COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed the petition for
disqualification. He filed for an MR but was denied by COMELEC En Banc.
Sunga filed the instant petition contending that the COMELEC committed
Grave Abuse Of Discretion in dismissing the petition for disqualification. The
SC ruled that the COMELEC should reinstate the petition for disqualification.
COMELEC 1st division decision
On June 22, 1998, the COMELEC 1st Division (former 2nd Division)
promulgated a Resolution disqualifying Trinidad as a candidate for the 1995
elections. Trinidad filed for a MR, arguing violation of due process. Sunga
filed his Opposition to the Motion and moved for the cancellation of the
proclamation of Trinidad as Mayor in the 1998 elections and that he be
proclaimed, instead.
COMELEC en banc decision
On Oct. 13, 1998, The COMELEC En Banc denied both motions and annulled
the proclamation of Trinidad as mayor in the 1998 elections.
Trinidad alleges that he was effectively denied of due process and that his
disqualification, if any, cannot extend beyond the three-year term because he
was elected in 1995. While, Sunga prays that he be proclaimed as the elected
Mayor in the 1998 elections.
Meanwhile, the criminal cases filed against the Trinidad before the RTC were
dismissed. The Sol Gen filed a Comment reiterating the argument that the
COMELEC is empowered to disqualify Trinidad from continuing to hold
public office and at the same time, barring Sunga’s moves to be proclaimed
elected in the 1998 elections.
Issues:
W/N Trinidad’s proclamation can be cancelled in 1998 on account of the
disqualification during 1995
W/N Sunga as the candidate receiving the second highest number of votes, be
proclaimed as Mayor in the event of petitioners disqualification
Ruling:
1. No. Moot and Academic
Trinidad’s term as mayor under the 1995 elections had already expired on
June 30, 1998. Thus, when the COMELEC rendered the resolution on June
22, 1998, Trinidad was still serving his term. However, when Trinidad filed
for an MR of the same resolution, it had already become moot and academic
as it was filed on July 3, 1998, when his term had already expired.
Further, the Oct. 13, 1998 Resolution was also moot and academic because of
the expiration of Trinidad’s term of office.
In Malaluan vs. COMELEC, the expiration of the challenged term of office
renders the corresponding petition moot and academic.
In Atienza vs. COMELEC, the court rationalized that “because expiration of
the term of office contested in the election protest has the effect of rendering
the same moot and academic.”
When the appeal from a decision in an election case has already become
moot, the case being an election protest involving the office of the mayor the
term of which had expired, the appeal is dismissible on that ground, unless the
rendering of a decision on the merits would be of practical value (Yorac
vs.Magalona).
In the case: It is clear that the issue was already Moot and Academic when the
COMELEC rendered the Oct. 13, 1998 resolution because it was after the
expiration of Trinidad’s term of office.
The COMELEC acted with GAOD in proceeding to disqualify Trinidad for
the 1998 elections on the ground that it comes as a matter of course after it
was found that he was disqualified for the 1995 elections. Further, the
resolution disqualifying Trinidad had not yet attained finality when
Trinidad’s term had expired.
i. June 22, 1998: Resolution disqualifying Trinidad
ii. June 30, 1998: Expiration of Trinidad’s term of office
2. On teh issue of W/N sunga can be proclaimed as winner should Trinidad
be disqualified
No.
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
disqualified for the office to which he was elected does not entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be
declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a disqualified
person may not be valid to install the winner into office or maintain him
there. But in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary
political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the
sincere belief that the candidate was qualified, they should not be
treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Election is the process of complete ascertainment of the expression of
the popular will. Its ultimate purpose is to give effect to the will of the
electorate by giving them direct participation in choosing the men and
women who will run their government. Thus, it would be extremely
repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right
to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality
of votes is proclaimed winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of whom have positively declared through
their ballots that they do not choose him.
While Sunga may have garnered the second highest number of votes,
the fact remains that he was not the choice of the people of Iguig,
Cagayan.
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the
other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the voter. The
second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the election. He was
repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be
considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which
excludes the disqualified candidate; the conditions would have
substantially changed.
Also, what Sunga wants us to do is to disregard the express mandate of
Sec. 44, RA No. 7160,18 which provides in part —
Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the office of the Governor, Vice-Governor,
Mayor, Vice-Mayor. — (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of
the Governor or Mayor, the Vice-Governor or Vice-Mayor concerned shall
become the Governor or Mayor . . .
For purposes of this chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective
local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to
qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office . . . .
This provision is echoed in Art. 83 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal, thus admits no
room for interpretation but merely application. This is the basic legal
precept. Accordingly, in the event that Trinidad is adjudged to be
disqualified, a permanent vacancy will be created for failure of the
elected mayor to qualify for the said office. In such eventuality, the duly
elected vice-mayor shall succeed as provided by law.
Punzalan vs. Comelec
On May 24, 1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed
Ferdinand Meneses as the duly elected mayor, having garnered a total of
10,301 votes against Danilo Manalastas' 9,317 votes and Ernesto Punzalan's
8,612 votes.
Both danilo manalastes and ernesto punzalan filed election protests
which were consolidated seeking th enullification of the election of
meneses allegedly due to massive fraud , irregularities and other illegal
electoral practices during the registration and the voting as well as during the
counting of votes (eg flying voters, false reading of votes)
Meneses also filed a counter protest alleging that he too was a victim of the
massive fraud and illegal electoral practices.
The trial court then ordered a revision of the ballots The result of said physical
count coincided with the figures reflected in the election returns, thus:
Meneses — 10,301 votes; Manalastas — 9,317 votes; and Punzalan — 8,612
votes.
RTC, after election protests, rendered judgment and declared Punzalan as the
winner.
Meneses appealed teh decision while Punzalan filed a motion for execution
pending appeal. RTC granted such motion. Same day, meneses filed before
the comelec a petition seeking the nullification of the RTCs order of execution
peding appeal.
Eventually, Meneses was proclaimed as mayor by teh municipal board of
canvassers. Such proclamation affirmed by teh comelec.
Punzalan then filed a motion for reconsideration which was then denied and
thus, the peition before the SC.
Contention:
Punzalan maintains that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
in declaring as valid the ballots credited to Meneses which did not bear the
signature of the BEI chairman at the back thereof, invoking the ruling of this
Court in Bautista v. Castro 10 wherein it was held that the absence of the
signature of the BEI chairman in the ballot given to a voter as required by law
and the rules as proof of the authenticity of said ballot is fatal.
Issue: W/N the comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion in in declaring as
valid the ballots credited to Meneses which did not bear the signature of the
BEI chairman at the back thereof
Ruling: No
While Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known as "An Act
Providing For Synchronized National and Local Elections and For Electoral
Reforms," requires the BEI chairman to affix his signature at the back of
the ballot, the mere failure to do so does not invalidate the same although
it may constitute an election offense imputable to said BEI chairman.
Nowhere in said provision does it state that the votes contained therein shall
be nullified. It is a well-settled rule that the failure of the BEI chairman or any
of the members of the board to comply with their mandated administrative
responsibility, i.e., signing, authenticating and thumbmarking of ballots,
should not penalize the voter with disenfranchisement, thereby frustrating the
will of the people.
to the effect that a ballot without BEI chairman's signature at the back is valid
and not spurious, provided that it bears any one of these other authenticating
marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark; and (b) in those cases where the
COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent, the presence of
red and blue fibers in the ballots.
Comelec, defined
The appreciation of the contested ballots and election documents involves a
question of fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized
agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country.
It is the constitutional commission vested with the exclusive original
jurisdiction over election contests involving regional, provincial and city
officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over election protests involving
elective municipal and barangay officials.
Consequently, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional
infirmity or error of law, the factual findings, conclusions, rulings and
decisions rendered by the said Commission on matters falling within its
competence shall not be interfered with by this Court.

Bautista vs. Castro
Facts:
Both the petitioner Sergio Bautista and private respondent Roberto Miguel
were candidates for the office above mentioned. After canvass, petitioner
Bautista was proclaimed the winner by the Barangay Board of Canvassers
on May 17, 1982 with a plurality of two (2) votes.
Roberto Miguel then filed a protest before the city court of quezon on the
ground of fraud and illegal practices committed by bautista.
A revision and recounting of the ballots was conducted which resulted in a
tie.
Roberto miguel then field an appeal to teh CFI - judgment rendered on this
appeal declared ROBERTO MIGUEL as the duly elected barangay captain
Sergio Bautista then filed a petition for review on teh following questions of
law:
1) Whether or not the supposed opinion of a person, who was brought by
private respondent but who was never presented as a witness, is competent
and admissible evidence to support the appellate court's (CFI) conclusion
that no less than eighteen (18) votes cast in favor of your petitioner were
written by one and the same person.
2) Whether or not a ballot which does not contain the signature of the poll
chairman be considered a valid ballot. (ISSUE)
3) Whether or not respondent Judge acted correctly in its appreciation of the
contested ballots
Ruling:
The mandatory requirement of authenticationof ballots is found in section 14
BP 222 and section 36 of comelec resolution 1539
These laws leave no room for interpetation. The absence of the signature of
the chairman of the election tellers in the ballot given to a voter as required by
law and the rules as proof of the authenticity of the said ballot is FATAL. This
requirement is mandatory for the validity of the ballot.
--lengthy rules:
We do not agree. Section 36 in its entirety provides:
Sec. 36. Procedure in the casting of votes. (a) Identification of votes. — The
chairman shall check in the certified list of voters the name of the person
offering to vote. He shall then announce the voter's name distinctly in a loud
tone. If there is no challenge, or if having been challenged and the question is
decided in his favor, the voter shall be allowed to vote and he shall affix his
signature on the proper space of the Voting Record (Comelec Form No. 5).
(b) Delivery of ballot. — Before delivering the ballot to the voter, the
Chairman shall, in the presence of the voter, the other members of the board
and the watchers present, affix his signature at the back thereof and write the
serial number of the ballot in the space provided in the ballot, beginning with
No. "1" for the first ballot issued, and so on consecutively for the succeeding
ballots, which serial number shall be entered in the corresponding space of the
voting record. He shall then fold the ballot once, and without removing the
detachable coupon, deliver it to the voter together with a ball pen.
(c) Instructions to the voter. — If a voter so requests, the poll clerk shall
instruct him on how to fill the ballot.The voter shall be reminded that he
should fill the ballot secretly and return it folded so as not to show the names
of the candidates he voted for. He shall also be warned not to use any other
ballot; not to show the content of his ballot; not to put any mark thereon; not
to erase, deface or tear the same; and not to remove the detachable coupon.
(d) Preparing the ballot. — Upon receiving the ballot, the voter shall fill the
ballot secretly.
(e) Returning the ballot. — (1) In the presence of all the members of the
Board, the voter shall affix his right hand thumbmark on the corresponding
space in the detachable coupon; and shall give the folded ballot to the
chairman; (2) The chairman shall without unfolding the ballot or looking at its
contents, and in the presence of the voter and all the members of the Board,
verify if it bears his signature and the same serial number recorded in the
voting record. (3) If the ballot is found to be authentic, the voter shall then be
required to imprint his right hand thumbmark on the proper space in the
voting record. (4) The chairman shall then detach the coupon and shall
deposit the folded ballot in the compartment for the valid ballot and the
coupon in the compartment for spoiled ballots. (5) The voter shall then leave
the voting center.
(f) When ballot may be considered spoiled. — Any ballot returned to the
chairman with its coupon already detached, or which does not bear the
signature of the chairman, or any ballot with a serial number that does not
tally with the serial number of the ballot delivered to the voter as recorded in
the voting record, shall be considered as spoiled and shall be marked and
signed by the members of the board and shall not be counted.
---
Set of ballots and how they were counted
1st set - ballots written by a single hand - dedcuted from protestee appelle
2nd set - ballots not duly authenticated by the absence of the signature of the
chairman on the board of election tellers at the back - this is a mandatory
requirement and lack thereof is fatal.
3rd set - ballots with “arrow with words ‘and party’” - EXCLUDED. It
cannot be said that these writings are accidental. As a general rule, a voter
must write on the ballot only the names of candidates voted for the offices
appearing thereon. Certain exceptions, however, are provided in Section 149
of the Revised Election Code. For example, prefixes such as "Sr.," "Mr.", and
the like and suffixes such as "hijo", "Jr.", etc. will not invalidate the ballot
(par. 5). Initials (paragraph 15), nicknames or appellation of affection and
friendship will not invalidate the ballot, if accompanied by the name or
surname of the candidate, and above all, if they were not used as a means to
identify the voter.
Even under a liberal view, the words written on the ballots under
consideration cannot be considered as falling within the exception to the
rule. Consequently, they are irrelevant expressions that nullified the ballots.
4th set- found in small compartment in the ballot box for spoiled ballots - not
read in counting of votes (excess ballots)
ELECTIONS, how exercised
Carlos vs. Angeles
Petitioner Jose Emmanuel L. Carlos and respondent Antonio M. Serapio
were candidates for the position of mayor of the municipality of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila (later converted into a City) during the May 11, 1998
elections.
MAy 21, 1998 - Municipal Board of canvassers proclaimed Carlos as the
duly elected mayor of Valenzuela having obtained 102,688 votes, the
highest number of votes in the election returns.
June 1, candidate antinio serapio with 2nd highets votes filed protest
challeging the results
In the course of the protest, the municipal treasurer of Valenzuela, who by
law has custody of the ballot boxes, collected the ballot boxes and delivered
them to the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City.
The pre-trial was then concluded and the parties agreed to the creation of
seven (7) revision committees consisting of a chairman designated by the
court and two members representing the protestant and the protestee.
PEr revision, the final tally was
(a) protestant Serapio - 66,602 votes.
(b) protestee Carlos - 83,609 votes, giving the latter a winning margin of
17,007 votes.
THE RTC nevertheless set aside thsi tally because of its finding of
"significant badges of fraud," namely:
1. The keys turned over by the City Treasurer to the court did not fit into the
padlocks of the ballot boxes that had to be forcibly opened;
2. Seven (7) ballot boxes did not contain any ballot and two (2) ballot boxes
out of the seven (7) ballot boxes did not contain any election returns;
3. Some schools where various precincts were located experienced brownouts
during the counting of votes causing delay in the counting although there was
no undue commotion or violence that occurred;
4. Some of the assigned watchers of protestant were not in their posts during
the counting of votes.
Based on these the RTC declared that there was enough pattern of fraud in teh
conduct of the election for mayor in valenzuela and attributed the same to
Carlos who had control over the election paraphernalia and basic services in
the community. Thu, despite the plurality of votes in Carlos’ favor, Serapio
was proclaimed as teh mayor.
Carlos appealed this decision contending, among others that
(3) Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she declared
respondent Serapio as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela despite the fact
that she found that petitioner obtained 17,007 valid votes higher than the valid
votes of respondent Serapio;
Issue:
Whether the trial court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion when the court set aside the proclamation of petitioner and declared
respondent Serapio as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela City despite its
finding that petitioner garnered 83,609 valid votes while respondent obtained
66,602 valid votes, or a winning margin of 17,007 votes.
*note the otehr issue is w/n sc has jurisdiction to review rtc’s decision in an
election contest - YES.
Ruling: YES
In this jurisdiction, an election means "the choice or selection of candidates
to public office by popular vote"19through the use of the ballot, and the
elected officials of which are determined through the will of the
electorate.20"
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the
sovereign power of the people."21
"Specifically, the term 'election', in the context of the Constitution, may refer
to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the
electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of votes."
The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid
votes cast in the election.
"Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who
receive the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office.
For, in all republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one
can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he
or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election."
In case of protest, a revision or recount of the ballots cast for the candidates
decides the election protest case. The candidate receiving the highest number
or plurality of votes shall be proclaimed the winner.
Even if the candidate receiving the majority votes is ineligible or
disqualified, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes or
the second placer, can not be declared elected.
The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to
the repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration
of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes and
does not entitle a candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected." In other words, "a defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office.
"Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural
barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective
officials.
Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end
that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by mere technical objections. In an election case, the court has an
imperative duty to ascertain by all means within its command who is the real
candidate elected by the electorate. The Supreme Court frowns upon any
interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only
the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct
ascertainment of the results."
In this case, based on the revision of ballots, the final tally clearly showed
petitioner Carlos as the overwhelming winner in the May 11, 1998 elections.
But the trial court set this aside due to these badges of fraud:
Failure of keys turned over to city This is an ordinary occurrence
treasurer to fir the padlocks which during elections. The mere
compelled them to forcibly open inability of the keys to fit into the
the locks padlocks attached to the ballot
boxes does not affect the integrity
of the ballots. At any rate, the trial
court easily forced open the
padlocks and found valid votes
cast therein;
7 ballot boxes found empty; court This is pure speculation without
concluded there were missing factual basis. "The sea of suspicion
ballots has no shore, and the court that
embarks upon it is without rudder
or compass."30 On the other hand,
the Summary of Votes as revised
does not show any
unaccounted precinct or whether
there was any precinct without any
ballot or election returns. It is a
standard procedure of the
Commission on Elections
(Comelec) to provide extra empty
ballot boxes for the use of the
Board of Election Inspectors or the
Board of Canvassers, in case of
necessity.
Some schoolhouses experienced There was nothing extraordinary
brownout during the counting of that would invite serious doubts or
votes. suspicion that fraud was
committed during the brownout
that occurred.
There were no reports of cheating
or tampering of the election
returns. In fact, witnesses testified
that the counting of votes
proceeded smoothly and no
commotion or violence occurred.
The absence of watchers for This cannot be taken against
candidate Serapio from their posts candidate Carlos since it is the
during the counting of votes. candidate's own look-out to protect
his interest during the counting of
votes and canvassing of election
returns. As long as notices were
duly served to the parties, the
counting and canvassing of votes
may validly proceed in the absence
of watchers.
"We cannot allow an election protest on such flimsy averments to prosper,
otherwise, the whole election process will deteriorate into an endless stream
of crabs pulling at each other, racing to disembank from the water."
Even assuming that the RTC was correct in holding that the final tally of
valid votes may be set aside because of badges of fraud, the same would be
tantamount to a ruling that there were no valid votes cast at all for the
candidates, and, thus, no winner could be declared in the election protest
case. In short, there was failure of election.
In such case, the proper remedy is an action before the Commission on
Elections en banc to declare a failure of election or to annul the election.
ESSENCE OF ELECTION/ BASIS OF ELECTION
Sunga vs. Comelec
Petitioner Manuel C. Sunga was one of the candidates for the position of
Mayor in the Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the 8 May 1995
elections. Private respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad, then incumbent mayor,
was a candidate for re-election in the same municipality.
April 1995, Sunga filed letters of complaint with COMELEC for
disqualification against trinidad accusing him of:
4. using three (3) local government vehicles in his campaign, in violation of
Sec. 261, par. (o), Art. XXII, of BP Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code, as
amended).
5. charging Trinidad this time with violation of Sec. 261, par. (e) (referring to
threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion) of the Omnibus
Election Code, in addition to the earlier violation imputed to him in the first
letter-complaint.
6. Followed by an Amended Petition for disqualification consolidating the
charges in the two (2) letters-complaint, including vote buying, and providing
more specific details of the violations committed by Trinidad.
Election results then showed that trinidad garnered the highest number
of votes whiel sunga trailed second.
Sunga then moved for the suspension of the proclamation of Trinidad.
However, notwithstanding the motion, Trinidad was proclaimed the
elected mayor, prompting Sunga to file another motion to suspend
the effects of the proclamation.
Both motions were not acted upon by the COMELEC 2 nd Division.
In 1996, Sunga filed for a Second Urgent Motion to suspend the Effects and
Annul the Proclamation with Urgent Motion for Early Resolution of the
Petition.
However, the COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed the petition for
disqualification. He filed for an MR but was denied by COMELEC En Banc.
Sunga filed the instant petition contending that the COMELEC committed
Grave Abuse Of Discretion in dismissing the petition for disqualification. The
SC ruled that the COMELEC should reinstate the petition for disqualification.
COMELEC 1st division decision
On June 22, 1998, the COMELEC 1st Division (former 2nd Division)
promulgated a Resolution disqualifying Trinidad as a candidate for the 1995
elections. Trinidad filed for a MR, arguing violation of due process. Sunga
filed his Opposition to the Motion and moved for the cancellation of the
proclamation of Trinidad as Mayor in the 1998 elections and that he be
proclaimed, instead.
COMELEC en banc decision
On Oct. 13, 1998, The COMELEC En Banc denied both motions and annulled
the proclamation of Trinidad as mayor in the 1998 elections.
Trinidad alleges that he was effectively denied of due process and that his
disqualification, if any, cannot extend beyond the three-year term because he
was elected in 1995. While, Sunga prays that he be proclaimed as the elected
Mayor in the 1998 elections.
Meanwhile, the criminal cases filed against the Trinidad before the RTC were
dismissed. The Sol Gen filed a Comment reiterating the argument that the
COMELEC is empowered to disqualify Trinidad from continuing to hold
public office and at the same time, barring Sunga’s moves to be proclaimed
elected in the 1998 elections.
Issue: W/N sunga may be proclaimed as the winner should trinidad be
disqualified.
Ruling: No.
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
disqualified for the office to which he was elected does not entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be
declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a disqualified
person may not be valid to install the winner into office or maintain him there.
But in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political
and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere
belief that the candidate was qualified, they should not be treated as
stray, void or meaningless.
Election is the process of complete ascertainment of the expression of the
popular will. Its ultimate purpose is to give effect to the will of the
electorate by giving them direct participation in choosing the men and
women who will run their government. Thus, it would be extremely
repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of
votes is proclaimed winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of whom have positively declared through
their ballots that they do not choose him.
While Sunga may have garnered the second highest number of votes,
the fact remains that he was not the choice of the people of Iguig,
Cagayan.
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the
other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the voter. The
second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the election. He was
repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be
considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which
excludes the disqualified candidate; the conditions would have
substantially changed.
Mitmug vs. Comelec
Petitioner sultan mitmug and respondent Datu dagalangit were among
the candidates for the mayoralty position of Lumba bayabao durign the
May 11, 1992 elections.
The turnout was cery low and as a result various petitions were filed
seeking the declaration of failure of election in precincts where less than
25% of the electorate managed to cast their votes. But a special election
was ordered in precincts where not actual voting took place. The
comelec ruled that for so logn as the precincts functioned and conducted
actual voting during election day, low voter turnout would not justify
declaration of failure of election.
In the interim, mitmug instituted a petition seeking annulment of the
special election conducted may 30 1992 alleging various irregularities
but the comelec considered the petition moot since the precincts were
already counted. Other petitions seeking declaration of failure of
elections in some or all precincts of lumba bayabao were filed with
comelec by other mayoralty candidate. Thereafter, a new borad of
election inspectors was formed to conduct the special election and 5 days
after, it convened and canvassed votes. On july 31, 1992, Datu
dagalangit was proclaimed as winner.
Thus, Mitmug filed a petition with the COMELEC to declare failure of
election in in forty-nine precincts where less than a quarter of the
electorate were able to cast their votes. He also lodged an election
protest with the RTC disputing the result of the election in all precincts
in his municipality.
COMELEC denied the petition despite petitioner’s argument that he
has meritorious grounds in support thereto, that is, massive
disenfranchisement of voters due to terrorism.
Held: COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the
petition seeking to declare a failure of election
Before comelec can act on a verified petition seeking to declare failrue
of election, two conditions must concur:
first, no voting has taken place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed
by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless results in
failure to elect; and, - NOT MET
second, the votes not cast would affect the result of the election. - MET
In this case, it is indubitable that the votes not cast will definitely affect the
outcome of the election. But, the first requisite is missing, i.e., that no
actual voting took place, or even if there is, the results thereon will be
tantamount to a failure to elect.
Since actual voting and election by the registered voters in the questioned
precincts have taken place, the results thereof cannot be disregarded and
excluded.
Thus, COMELEC therefore did not commit any abuse of discretion, much less
grave, in denying the petitions outright.
There was no basis for the petitions since the facts alleged therein did not
constitute sufficient grounds to warrant the relief sought. For, the
language of the law expressly requires the concurrence of these conditions to
justify the calling of a special election.
THE ESSENCE OF ELECTION IS PLURALITY OF VOTES. All the
law requires is that the winning candidate must be elected by plurality of valid
votes REGARDLESS OF ACTUAL NUMBER OF BALLTS CAST. Thus,
even if less than 25% of the electrorate in teh questioned precincts cast their
votes, the same must be respected.
Rulloda vs. Comelec
Facts: In the barangay elections of July 15, 2002, Romeo N. Rulloda and
Remegio L. Placido were the contending candidates for Barangay Chairman
of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan. On June 22, 2002, Romeo suffered a
heart attack and passed away at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center.
His widow, petitioner Petronila "Betty" Rulloda, wrote a letter to the
Commission on Elections on June 25, 2002 seeking permission to run as
candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband.
On July 14, 2002, Election Officer Ludivico L. Asuncion issued a directive to
the Chairman and Members of the Barangay Board of Canvassers of Sto.
Tomas as follows:
Just in case the names "BETTY" or "PETRONILA" or the surname
"RULLODA" is written on the ballot, read the same as it is written but add the
words "NOT COUNTED" like "BETTY NOT COUNTED" or "RULLODA
NOT COUNTED."
Based on the tally of petitioner’s watchers who were allowed to witness the
canvass of votes during the July 15, 2002 elections, petitioner garnered 516
votes while respondent Remegio Placido received 290 votes. Despite this, the
Board of Canvassers proclaimed Placido as the Barangay Chairman of Sto.
Tomas.
After the elections, rulloda learned that comelec acting on the separate
requests of Andres Perez Manalaysay and Petronila Rulloda to be substituted
as candidates for Barangay Chairman of Barangay La Fuente, Sta. Rosa,
Nueva Ecija and Barangay Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan, respectively,
issued Resolution No. 5217 dated July 13, 2002 which denied due course to
teh COCs of Andres Manalaysay and Petronilla Rulloda and to direct the
respective election officer to delete teh names of rulloda and manalaysay.
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to annul
Section 9 of Resolution No. 4801 and Resolution No. 5217, both of the
COMELEC, insofar as they prohibited petitioner from running as substitute
candidate in lieu of her deceased husband; to nullify the proclamation of
respondent; and to proclaim her as the duly elected Barangay Chairman of
Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.
Issue: W/N petronilla can substitute her deceased husband in the brgy
chariman elections.
Doctrine:
In our jurisdiction, an election means the choice or selection of
candidates to public office by popular vote through the use of the ballot,
and the elected officials which are determined through the will of the
electorate.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the
sovereign power of the people. The winner is the candidate who has
obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the election.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who
receive the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office.
For, in all republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one can
be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.
Respondent’s basis on argument:
Section 77 of the Omnibus Elections Code, which states:
Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another.
– If after the last day of the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official
candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by the
same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the
candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate
nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of
candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections
not later than mid-day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or
disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-
day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election
inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate or, in the case
of candidates to be voted by the entire electorate of the country, with the
Commission.
Argument Ruling
Placido argued that inasmuch as Ruling: The absence of a specific
the barangay election is non- provision governing substitution of
partisan, there can be no candidates in bgry elections cannot
substitution because there is no be inferred as a prohibition against
political party from which to the said substitution.
designate the substitute. Such an
interpretation, aside from being
non sequitur, ignores the purpose
of election laws which is to give
effect to, rather than frustrate, the
will of the voters.
the votes in petitioner’s favor can His claim is refuted by the
not be counted because she did not Memorandum of the COMELEC
file any certificate of candidacy. Law Department as well as the
assailed Resolution No. 5217,
wherein it indubitably appears that
petitioner’s letter-request to be
allowed to run as Barangay
Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of
her late husband was treated as a
certificate of candidacy.
To reiterate, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes in the
contested election. Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases
should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate.
Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by
mere technical objections.
Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural
barriers must yield if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the
true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. The Court
frowns upon any interpretation of the law that would hinder in any way not
only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the
correct ascertainment of the results.
Topic: CONSTUCTION, LIMITATION, Section 3, COMELEC
RULES OF PROCEDURE
Sec. 3. Construction. - These rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of
ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections
and to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the
Commission.chanrobles virtual law library
Cases:
Pacanan jr. vs. Comelec
Facts: Petitioner Constancio D. Pacanan, Jr. and private respondent Francisco
M. Langi, Sr. were candidates for mayor in the municipality of Motiong,
Samar during the May 14, 2007 elections. After the canvassing of votes, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of Motiong, Samar proclaimed
PACANAN as the duly elected mayor, having garnered a total of 3,069 votes
against LANGI’s 3,066 votes.
Thereafter, langi filed a protest contesting teh results of the elections in 10 of
49 precincts and alleging acts of violence and intimidation and other election
irregularities in the appreciation of the votes by the MBC.
RTC - declared Langi as winner, Pacanan appealed, comelec first division
dismissed for failure to pay appeal fee of 3k within the period to file notice of
appeal. (Sec 3, and 4, rule 40, comelec rules of procedure)
Comelec en banc - denied appeal and held that the Comelec did not acquire
jurisdiction over the appeal because of the non-payment of the appeal fee on
time. Thus, the Comelec First Division correctly dismissed the appeal. Hence,
this petition.
Issue: The respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in failing to consider that assuming
that the correct appeal fee was not paid on time, there are highly justifiable
and compelling reasons to resolve the subject case on the merits in the interest
of justice and public interest.
Petitioner’s contention:
Lastly, petitioner invokes liberality in the application of the election law. He
asserts that the popular will of the people expressed in the election of public
officers should not be defeated by reason of sheer technicalities. Petitioner
argues that the true will of the people of Motiong in the May 14, 2007
elections should be determined by ordering the Comelec to give due
course to his appeal and to resolve the same on the merits.
Ruling: YES
Section 3, Rule 22 (Appeals from Decisions of Courts in Election Protest
Cases) of the Comelec Rules of Procedure mandates that the notice of appeal
must be filed within five (5) days after promulgation of the decision, thus:
SEC. 3. Notice of Appeal. – Within five (5) days after promulgation of the
decision of the court, the aggrieved party may file with said court a notice of
appeal, and serve a copy thereof upon the attorney of record of the adverse
party.
Moreover, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40 of the Comelec rules require the payment
of appeal fees in appealed election protest cases, the amended amount of
which was set at ₱3,200.00 in Comelec Minute Resolution No. 02-0130
A reading of the foregoing provisions reveals that two different tribunals (the
trial court that rendered the decision and the Comelec) require the payment of
two different appeal fees for the perfection of appeals of election cases. This
requirement in the payment of appeal fees had caused much confusion, which
the Comelec addressed through the issuance of Comelec Resolution No. 8486.
Here, petitioner paid ₱1,200.00 to the Comelec on February 14, 2008.
Unfortunately, the Comelec First Division dismissed the appeal on March 17,
2008 due to petitioner’s failure to pay the correct appeal fee within the five-
day reglementary period. In denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,
the Comelec En Banc, in the Resolution dated January 21, 2009, declared that
the Comelec did not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal because of the non-
payment of the appeal fee on time.
However, during the pendency of petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
dated March 27, 2008, the Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 8486 to
clarify the implementation of the Comelec Rules regarding the payment of
filing fees. Thus, applying the mandated liberal construction of election
laws,16 the Comelec should have initially directed the petitioner to pay the
correct appeal fee with the Comelec Cash Division, and should not have
dismissed outright petitioner’s appeal. This would have been more in
consonance with the intent of the said resolution which sought to clarify the
rules on compliance with the required appeal fees.
Barroso vs Ang:
An election contest is clotehd with public interest. The purpose of an election
protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board of
canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is sought is the correction
of the canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the winning
candidate.
An election contest therefore involves not only the adjudication of
private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates but paramount to
their claims is the deep public concern involved and the need of
dispelling the uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate. And the
court has the corresponding duty to ascertain by all means within its
command who is the real candidate elected by the people.
Moreover, the Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject to a liberal
construction. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective
and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and for achieving
just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every
action and proceeding brought before the Comelec.
It has been frequently decided, and it may be stated as a general rule
recognized by all courts, that statutes providing for election contests are
to be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical
objections.
Taguiam vs. Comelec
Facts: Taguiam and Tuddao were candidates for the position of Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Tuguegarao City in Cagayan during the 2007 National and
Local Elections. On May 19, 2007, Taguiam was proclaimed by the City
Board of Canvassers (CBOC) as the 12th ranking and winning candidate for
the said position with 10,981 votes. Tuddao obtained 10,971 votes6 and was
ranked no. 13
Tuddao field a petition for correction of manifest errors in the Election
Returns and Statement of Votes for 27 clustered precincts 7 and for the
annulment of the proclamation of the affected winning candidate in
Tuguegarao City.
He alleged that he was credited with less votes in several Statements of
Votes by Precincts (SOVP) as compared with the tally of his votes in the
election returns ERs), whereas petitioner was credited with more votes. HE
offered evidence in 9 precincts.
Taguiam denied the allegation and argued that the petition should be
dismissed for having been filed late or 6 days after the proclamation of
the winning candidates.
Comelec: the belated filing of private respondent’s petition cannot deter its
authority to ascertain the true will of the electorate and thereafter affirm such
will. Thus, Tuddao was declraed as the rightful winning candidate.
Taguiam filed a motion for reconsideratiob but was denied. Hence, this
petition.
ISsue: whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of
private respondent’s petition for correction of manifest errors in the Election
Returns and Statement of Votes despite its late filing.
Rule: If the petition is for correction, it must be filed not later than five (5)
days following the date of proclamation and must implead all candidates
who may be adversely affected thereby.
Ruling:
While the petition was indeed filed beyond the 5-day reglementary period,
the COMELEC however has the discretion to suspend its rules of procedure
or any portion thereof. Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure state
Sec. 3. Construction. – These rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of
ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections and to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination
and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the
Commission.
Certainly, such rule of suspension is in accordance with the spirit of Section 6,
Article IX-A of the Constitution which bestows upon the COMELEC the
power to "promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before
it or before any of its offices" to attain justice and the noble purpose of
determining the true will of the electorate.
For acting pursuant to its Constitutional mandate of determining the true
will of the electorate with substantiated evidence, the Court finds no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in annulling the
proclamation of petitioner. Said proclamation is flawed from the beginning
because it did not reflect the true and legitimate will of the electorate. Having
been based on a faulty tabulation, there can be no valid proclamation to speak
of.
Suliguin vs. Comelec
FACTS:
MargaritoSuliguin was one of the candidates for Sangguniang Bayan of
Nagcarlan, Laguna during 10 May 2004 elections.
Around 6pm, same date: Municipal Board of Canvassers convened to canvass
the votes for all candidates. Suliguin received 6,605 votes while
EcelsonSumague received 6,647. However in Statement of Votes covering
Precincts 1A-19A, Sumague appears to have received 644 votes only when he
actually received 844. MBOC failed to notice discrepancy &Suliguin was
proclaimed as 8th SB member.
Sumague requested for recomputation of votes, pointing out that he officially
garnered 6,647 votes. MBOC summongSumague&Suliguin to a conference.
MBOC discovered that it had failed to credit Sumague his 200 votes & that he
should have been proclaimed instead of Suliguin.
26 May ’04: MBOC filed before COMELEC a “Petition to Correct Entries in
SOV” for Councilor.
In meantime, 9 Jun: Suliguin took his oath.
21 July: COMELEC 1stDiv granted MBOC’s petition & nullified the
proclamation of Suliguin, ordered proclamation of Sumague.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC erred in granting petition of MBOC to nullify
Suliguin’s proclamation because petition should have been filed not later than
5 days following date of proclamation
HELD:
Negative. In an election case, the Comelec is mandated to ascertain by all
means within its command who the real candidate elected by the electorate is.
The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that would
hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an
election but also the correct ascertainment of the results.
Simple mathematical procedure of adding the total number of votes garnered
by Sumague as appearing in SOVs would readily reveal the result that he has
42 votes more than Suliguin. Such result would, in effect, dislodge Suliguin
from said post & entitle Sumague to occupy 8th seat of SB of Nagcarlan,
Laguna. Suliguin himself never disputed the discrepancy in the total number
of votes garnered by Sumague, and instead questioned the personality of the
MBOC to file the petition and insisted that such petition was not filed on time.
Sec. 3&4 of Rule 1 of Comelec ROP provide that such rules may be “liberally
construed” in the interest of justice. Comelec has the discretion to liberally
construe its rules & at the same time, suspend the rules or any portion thereof
in the interest of justice. Disputes in the outcome of elections involve public
interest; as such, technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed
to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of
the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. Laws governing such
disputes must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in
the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections.
What is involved in the present petition is the correction of a manifest error in
reflecting the actual total number of votes for a particular candidate. A
manifest clerical error is "one that is visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding and is apparent from the papers to the eye of the appraiser and
collector, and does not include an error which may, by evidence dehorns the
record be shown to have been committed."
MBOC is merely doing its function that is mandated by law – to canvass votes
in the election returns submitted to it in due form, adding or compiling the
votes cast for each candidate as shown in the face of such returns and
eventually proclaim the winning candidates.
A subsequent annulment of the proclamation of the respondent does not
constitute a clear violation of his right. In the first place, there is no valid
proclamation to speak of. He was not elected by a majority or plurality of
voters. His alleged right was based on an erroneous proclamation. By any
mathematical formulation, the respondent cannot be construed to have
obtained such plurality of votes; otherwise, it would be sheer absurdity to
proclaim a repudiated candidate as the choice of the voters.
"Where a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation
at all and the proclaimed candidate’s assumption of office cannot deprive the
COMELEC of the power to make such declaration a nullity."
Technicalities of the legal rules enunciated in the election laws should not
frustrate the determination of the popular will.
Lastly, correction sought by Sumague& MBOC is correction of manifest
mistakes in mathematical addition.It does not involve the opening of ballot
boxes; neither does it involve the examination and/or appreciation of ballots.
This only calls for a mere clerical act of reflecting the true and correct votes
received by the candidates by the MBCs involved.
Records indicate that Suliguin’s assumption of office was effected by a
clerical error or simple mathematical mistake in the addition of votes and not
through the legitimate will of the electorate. Thus, his proclamation was
flawed right from the very beginning. Having been based on a faulty
tabulation, there can be no valid proclamation to speak of insofar as
Suliguinis concerned.
BINCE vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Alfonso Bince&EmilianoMicuwere among the candidates in 11
May ’92 elections for seat in SangguiniangPanlalawigan of Pangasinan
allotted to 6thDist, comprising 10 municipalities.
During canvassing of COCs for 10 municipaities, Micu objected to
inclusion of COC for San Quintin on ground that it contained false
statements. COCs for remaining 9 municipalities were included. However,
PBC ruled against objection of Micu.
Micu appealed to COMELEC re said ruling. COMELEC en banc
promulgated resolution, stating that the actual no. of votes obtained by Bince
is 1,055 while that of Micu is 1,535.
21 days after canvass for 9 muni was completed, Micu with MBC of
Tayug& San Manuel filed with PBC petitions for correction of SOVs earlier
prepared for alleged manifest errors committed in computation thereof.
18 Jun: PBC credited in favor of Bince and Micu that votes for each as
indicated in COMELEC resolution. Based on COCs, Bince had 27,370 votes
while Micu had 27,369 votes. Bince was not proclaimed as winner because
of absence of authority from COMELEC.
Bince filed formal motion for such authority.
29 Jun: COMELEC en banc promulgated supplemental order, directing
PBC to reconvene, continue with provincial canvass & proclaim winning
candidates.
25 Jun: Bince appealed the above ruling allowing correction alleging
that PBC had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
21 Jul: PBC proclaimed Bince as elected member of SP. Micu filed
urgent motion for contempt & to annul proclamation of Bince. COMELEC
resolved & annulled proclamation of Bince, directing PBC to reconvene &
proclaim winning candidate.
Bince filed special civil action contening that it was promulgated
without prior notice & hearing.
9 Feb ’93: Court en banc granted, ruling that Bince has been proclaimed
& this proclamation enjoys presumption of regularity & validity, that he
cannot be deprived of his office without due process.
15 Jul: COMELEC 1stDiv promulgated resolution, stating that Bince is
entitled to sit as member of SP. Micu filed Motion for Reconsideration.
COMELEC en banc granted Micu’s motion & annulled Bince’s proclamation.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it annulled Bince’s proclamation
HELD:
Negative. No error was committed by COMELEC when it resolved the
"pending incidents" of the case pursuant to the decision of SC in the aforesaid
case of Bincev. COMELEC on 9 Feb ‘93. In Bince, we nullified the
proclamation of Micu because the same was done without the requisite due
notice and hearing, thereby depriving the Bince of his right to due process. In
so doing, however, we did not affirm nor confirm the proclamation of Bince,
hence, our directive to COMELEC to resolve the pending incidents of the case
so as to ascertain the true and lawful winner of the said elections. In effect,
petitioner's proclamation only enjoyed the presumption of regularity and
validity of an official act. It was not categorically declared valid.
Neither can COMELEC be faulted for subsequently annulling the
proclamation of Bince on account of a mathematical error in addition
committed by MBCs in the computation of the votes received by both
Micu&Bince.
The petitions to correct manifest errors were filed on time, that is, before
the Bince's proclamation on 21 Jul ‘92.Assuming for the sake of argument
that the petition was filed out of time, this incident alone will not thwart the
proper determination and resolution of the instant case on substantial grounds.
Adherence to a technicality that would put a stamp of validity on a palpably
void proclamation, with the inevitable result of frustrating the people's will
cannot be countenanced.
Undoubtedly therefore, the only issue that remains unresolved is the
allowance of the correction of what are purely mathematical and/or
mechanical errors in the addition of the votes received by both candidates. It
does not involve the opening of ballot boxes; neither does it involve the
examination and/or appreciation of ballots. The correction sought by Micu
and MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel is correction of manifest mistakes in
mathematical addition. Certainly, this only calls for a mere clerical act of
reflecting the true and correct votes received by the candidates by the MBCs
involved. In this case, the manifest errors sought to be corrected involve the
proper and diligent addition of the votes in the municipalities of Tayug and
San Manuel, Pangasinan.
Consequently, by margin of 72 votes, Micu won.
Maruhom vs. Comelec
Maruhom and Dimaporo were both candidates for mayor in the municipality
of Marogong, Lanao del sur,
During the counting of votes, serious irregularities, anomalies and electoral
frauds were committed at the instance of Maruhom or his followers in that
votes actually casted (sic) for the Dimaporo were not counted and credited in
his favor thru (sic) the concerted acts, conspiracy and manipulation of the
Board of Election Inspectors, military, Election Officer and the Machine
Operator who happens to be a nephew of MAruhom.
As a result of the foregoing irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds, the
MAruhom was illegally proclaimed as winner because he appeared to have
obtained 2,020 votes while the private respondent garnered 2,000 votes with
a slight margin of only 20 votes
Dimaporo, then filed for a petition to annul the proclamation of Maruhom as
the duly elected mayor.
MAruhom filed a counter protest praying to hold in abeyance furhter
proceedings since the protest is subject to the petition filed before this
Honorable Commission.
Maruhom further moved for the dismissal of the protest on the ground that
4. ballot boxes containing the ballots in the protested precincts have been
violated;
5. Automated counting of ballots does not contemplate a manual recount of
the ballots; and
6. Protestant is guilty of forum shopping warranting summary dismissal of
the petitioner of the protest.
Maruhom’s motion was denied for lack of merit.
As a diabolical scheme to cause further delay of the proceedings of the case
more specifically the revision of ballots, the petitioner filed on December 10,
1998, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction and on December 11, 1998, petitioner filed an urgent
motion before the respondent court praying that further proceedings in
Election Case No. 11-127 be deferred until after protestee's petition
for certiorari and prohibition before this Honorable Commission shall have
been finally resolved.
Issue:
W/N teh comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that a
motion to dismiss filed after the answer to an election protest case in the
RTC is not allowed.
Ruling: NO?
Parameters of Comelec’s powers
The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its
contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual
experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly
advantageous position to decide complex political questions . . . . There are
no ready made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience
are necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the ends of good government.
In the matter of the administration of laws relative to the conduct of
election . . . we must not by any excessive zeal take away from the
Commission on Elections that initiative which by constitutional and legal
mandates properly belongs to it.
Succinctly stated, laws and statutes governing election contests
especially the appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the
end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may
not be defeated by technical infirmities.
An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to
dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is
imperative, much more so in this case considering that a mere twenty (20)
votes separates the winner from the loser of the contested election results.
Substantial ruling:
The motion to dismiss was a plot to prevent the early termination of the
proceedings in teh election case evidenced by a confluence of events clearly
showing a pattern of delay employed by MAruhom to avert revision of the
ballots.
Various legal tactics were used by maruhom to delay the proceedings.
It is clear, given the foregoing facts of this case, that the roundabout manner
within which petitioner virtually substituted his answer by belatedly filing a
motion to dismiss three (3) months later is a frivolous resort to procedure
calculated to frustrate the will of the electorate. As pointedly observed by the
COMELEC in its challenged Resolution dated July 6, 1999, 35 petitioner only
filed his motion to dismiss "when the results of the trial appear[ed] to be
adverse to him" 36 or right after the creation of the Revision
Committee had been ordered by the trial court. If petitioner truly intended to
move for the preliminary hearing of his special and affirmative defenses as he
claims, then he should have simultaneously moved for the preliminary hearing
of his special and affirmative defenses at the time he filed his answer.
Otherwise, he should have filed his motion to dismiss "within the time for but
before filing the answer. . ." pursuant to Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Suffice it to state in this regard that such a whimsical change of mind by
petitioner can not be countenanced much more so in election cases where time
is of the essence in the resolution thereof. Indeed, the Omnibus Election Code
states in no uncertain terms that —
Sec. 258. Preferential disposition of contests in courts. The RTC, in their
respective cases, shall give preference to election contests over all other
cases, except those of habeas corpus, and shall, without delay, hear and
within thirty (30) days from the date of their submission for decision, but in
every case within six (6) months after filing, decide the same. . . . 37 (emphasis
and italics supplied).
Pena vs. HRET
Petitioner and the private respondent were contenders for the said
Congressional Office in the May 8, 1995 elections. On May 12, 1995, upon
canvassing the votes cast, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Palawan
proclaimed Alfredo Abueg as the winner.
The petition was filed with the HRET averring that:
The elections in the precincts of the Second District of Palawan were tainted
with massive fraud, widespread vote-buying, intimidation and terrorism and
other serious irregularities committed before, during and after the voting, and
during the counting of votes and the preparation of election returns and
certificates of canvass which affected the results of the election. Among the
fraudulent acts committed were the massive vote-buying and intimidation of
voters, disenfranchisement of petitioner's known supporters through
systematic deletion of names from the lists of voters, allowing persons to vote
in excess of the number of registered voters, misappreciation, misreading and
non-reading of protestant's ballots and other irregularities.
Abueg filed an answer with an affirmative defense to which pena field a reply.
Subsequent to teh filing of his answer, Abueg filed a motion to dismiss the
eptition averring that HRET has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition for
being insiufficient in form and in substance.
In essence, the motion to dismiss anchors its challenge on the fact that the
petition failed to allege the precincts where the massive fraud and
disenfranchisement of voters occurred, nor did it point out how many
votes would be gained by the protestant as a result of the same.
Pena then filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss attaching a summary of
contested precincts naming 700 precincts where election irregularities
allegedly occured.
HRET ruling: Dismissal of the case
Although it had jurisdiction over the petition, as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House
of Representatives, the said petition, however, fails to state a cause of action,
and is therefore, insufficient in form and substance, meriting its
dismissal. As the failure to indicate the precincts make it virtually
impossible for the tribunal to determine which ballot boxes have to be
collected.
While Protestant has attached as Annex "A" to his Opposition to the Motion
to Dismiss, filed on 10 July 1995, a Summary of contested Precincts, the
defects in his Protest were not cured thereby as the Summary was submitted
only after the Motion to Dismiss had been filed. The Opposition and the
attached Summary do not amend the original Petition.
Pena filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, the present
petition.
Contention:
respondent HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to having
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the election protest of
petitioner considering that:
3. The petition ad acutelam was sufficient in form and in substance and
4. Assuming that the petition was initially defective, the said defect was
cured when pena submitted a summary of contested precincts which form
part of the records of the HRET
Argument:
Nowhere is it provided that the specification of the precincts is a
jurisdictional requirement that must be complied with in order that an
election protest can be entertained by the HRET. To support his submission,
petitioner cites the cases of Yalung vs. Atienza, 52 Phil 781, Arao vs.
COMELEC, 210 SCRA 790 and Gallares vs. Casenas, 48 Phil 362, the latter
stating that:
From a reading of the allegations of the protest, it may be seen that frauds,
irregularities and violations of the law are alleged therein, which, if true,
would undoubtedly change the result of the elections.
The fact that in the protest the number of votes which would result in favor
of the protestant after the judicial counting is not specified, does not affect
the right of the protestant, for it being known that said omission is a defect
of the protest, the same may be cured by a specification of the votes
mentioned in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the protest, without thereby adding
new grounds for those already alleged by the protestant.
Applying the same principle to the specification of precincts in the instant
case, the defect in the petition should have been cured by the opposition to
the private respondent's Motion to Dismiss.
Ruling: the SC did not agree with Pena’s contentions.
In the first place, in requiring the private respondent to answer the petition,
the HRET was not ruling on the formal and substantive sufficiency of the
petition. The order to require an answer is but a matter of course, as under
the Revised Rules of Procedure of the HRET, it is provided that:
RULE 22. Summons. — Upon the filing of the petition, the Clerk of the
Tribunal shall forthwith issue the corresponding summons to the protestee or
respondent together with a copy of the petition, requiring him within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof to file his answer.
In the petition, pena makes no specific mention of the precincts where
widespread election fraud and irregularities occured. THIS IS A FATAL
OMISSION AS IT GOES INTO TRHE VERY SUBSTANCE OF THE
PROTEST.
Under Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of HRET, insufficiency
in form and substance of the petition constitutes a ground for the immediate
dismissal of the Petition.
The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form and substance
means that the petition must be more than merely rhetorical. If the
allegations contained therein are unsupported by even the faintest whisper of
authority in fact and law, then there is no other course than to dismiss the
petition, otherwise, the assumption of an elected public official may, and
will always be held up by petitions of this sort by the losing candidate.
The defect in the instant case arises from the failure to allege the
contested precincts. Only a bare allegation of "massive fraud, widespread
intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities", without
specification, and substantiation, of where and how these occurrences took
place, appears in the petition. We cannot allow an election protest based on
such flimsy averments to prosper, otherwise, the whole election process will
deteriorate into an endless stream of crabs pulling at each other, racing to
disembank from the water.
On his second point of argument, Petitioner likewise fails to impress. The
Court has already ruled in Joker P. Arroyo vs. HRET,7 that substantial
amendments to the protest may be allowed only within the same period
for filing the election protest, which, under Rule 16 of the HRET Rules
of Procedure is ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner.
HERE:
While it is conceded that statutes providing for election contests are to be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officers may not be defeated by mere technical questions, the rule
likewise stands, that in an election protest, the protestant must stand or fall
upon the issues he had raised in his original or amended pleading filed
prior to the lapse of the statutory period for filing of the protest.
Admittedly, the rule is well-established that the power to annul an election
should be exercised with the greatest care as it involves the free and fair
expression of the popular will. It is only in extreme cases of fraud and under
circumstances which demonstrate to the fullest degree a fundamental and
wanton disregard of the law that elections are annulled, and then only when it
becomes impossible to take any other step. . . . This is as it should be, for the
democratic system is good for the many although abhorred by a few.
Fernandez vs. Comelec
Facts:
in the July 15, 2002 synchronized barangayand Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
Elections, respondent Rodriguez, who had obtained 27 votes, emerged as the
winning candidate for SK chairman of Barangay Pandan del Sur, Pandan,
Catanduanes, over his opponent, petitioner Fernandez, who had garnered only
25 votes. Discontented with the results, petitioner instituted an election protest
After the conduct of appropriate proceedings, the MCTC rendered its
Decision4 on January 12, 2004, declaring fernandez the duly elected SK
chairman of the said barangay and ordering her proclamation as such. The
decision was premised on the results of the revision which showed that
petitioner obtained 29 votes and respondent, 24.
Adversely affected, rodriguez appealed the case to the COMELEC. On
December 4, 2006, the COMELEC First Division which nullified the
MCTC’s decision.
On January 31, 2007, the COMELEC First Division, in the other assailed
Order,8 denied fernandez’s motion for reconsideration for having been filed
out of time and found no necessity to refer the same to the COMELEC en
banc.
Fernandez then filed the petition arguing that teh COMELEC had no appellate
jurisdiction over contests involving SK officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction. Even granting that it does, she claimed that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in nullifying the decision of the trial
court.
Issue: W/N the comelec has jurisdiction over contest involving SK officials
(YES) and if so, W/N it gravely abused its discretion (NO)
Ruling:
The 1987 Constitution vests in the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction.17 Construed in relation to the provision in R.A. No.
716018 that includes in the enumeration of barangayofficials the SK
chairman,19 the constitutional provision indeed sanctions the appellate review
by the COMELEC of election protests involving the position of SK chairman,
as in the instant case. Hence, we find nothing improper in the COMELEC's
assumption of jurisdiction over respondent's appeal.
the rule at the present is that trial courts of limited jurisdiction have exclusive
original jurisdiction over election protests involving barangay officials, which
include the SK chairman, and that the COMELEC has the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over such protests.
(note this is probably not the case)
 Fernandez vs COMELEC GR No. 9135 April 3, 1990
“While Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known as “An
Act Providing For Synchronized National and Local Elections and For
Electoral Reforms,” requires the BEI chairman to affix his signature at
the back of the ballot, the mere failure to do so does not invalidate the
same although it may constitute an election offense imputable to
said BEI chairman.
BAUTISTA vs. CASTRO
FACTS:
Sergio Bautista & Roberto Miguel were candidates of as Brgy Captain.
After canvass, Bautista was proclaimed winner by BBOC on 17 May ’82 with
plurality of 2 votes.
25 May: Miguel filed protest on the ground of fraud and illegal acts or
practices allegedly committed by Bautista. It appears that results of the
election in all 4 voting centers in Brgy. Teachers Village were contested.
Revision & recounting of ballots were conducted, resulting in a tie.
RTC rendered decision, declaring Miguel to have the same number of
votes as Bautista. From this, Miguel filed an appeal.
29 Jul: judgment was rendered on the appeal, declared Miguel as Brgy.
Captain & setting aside as null & void the proclamation of Bautista.
Bautista filed petition for review. Considering that erm of office has
already expired on 7 Jun ’88, petition has become moot & academic.
ISSUE: WON a ballot which does not contain signature of the poll chairman
be considered valid ballot
HELD:
Negative. The absence of the signature of the Chairman of the Board of
Election Tellers in the ballot given to a voter as required by law and the rules
as proof of the authenticity of said ballot is fatal. This requirement is
mandatory for the validity of the said ballot.
Respondent court ruled that the presence of an arrow with the words
"and party," was meant for no other purpose than to identify the voter. We
agree. It cannot be said that these writings were accidental. As a general
rule, a voter must write on the ballot only the names of candidates voted for
the offices appearing thereon. Certain exceptions, however, are provided in
Sec. 149 of the Revised Election Code.For example, prefixes such as "Sr.,"
"Mr.", and the like and suffixes such as "hijo", "Jr.", etc. will not invalidate
the ballot; nicknames or appellation of affection and friendship will not
invalidate the ballot, if accompanied by the name or surname of the
candidate, and above all, if they were not used as a means to identify the
voter. Even under a liberal view, the words written on the ballots under
consideration cannot be considered as falling within the exception to the
rule. Consequently, they are irrelevant expressions that nullified the ballots.
LIBANAN vs. HRET
FACTS:
MarcelinoLibanan& Jose Ramirez were among candidates for
congressional seat of Eastern Samar in May ’95 elections.
13 May: after canvass, PBOC proclaimed Ramirez to have been elected
as Representatie of the district with 41,523 votes compared to Libanan’s
40,869 votes.
Libanan seasonably filed election protest before HRET, alleging that the
election was marred by electoral irregularities perpetrated by Ramirez. Also
maintained that the ERs and/or ballots in certain precincts were tampered
with, substituted, or systematically marked in favor of Ramirez. On the other
hand, Ramirez denied.
20 Feb ’96: revision of ballots in the protested precincts commenced.
Noted that during revision, 6 contested precincts were found to have been
merged into 3 precincts.
HRET explained: no spurious ballot was found in this case. For a ballot
to be rejected for being spurious, the ballot must not have any of the
following authenticating marks: a) the COMELEC watermark; b) the
signatures or initial of the BEI Chairman at the back of the ballot; and c) red
and blue fibers. In the present case, all the ballots examined by the Tribunal
had COMELEC watermarks.
HRET ruled in favor of Ramirez. Libanan moved for reconsideration,
arguing that absence of the BEI Chairman's signature at the back of the
ballots could not but indicate that the ballots were not those issued to the
voters during the elections. However, Ramirez still remained to be winner
with lead of 89 votes. HRET ruled that fraud is not presumed & omission of
signature of BEI Chairman is not fatal to validity of ballots.
ISSUE: WON HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the
absence of signature of Chairman of BEI in ballots did not render ballots
spurious
HELD:
Negative. There is really nothing in Sec 24, RA 7166 to the effect that a
ballot, which is not so authenticated shall thereby be deemed spurious. The
law merely renders the BEI Chairman accountable for such failure. The courts
may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and
embrace situations neither provided nor intended by the lawmakers.
In every case before delivering an official ballot to the voter, the
chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors shall, in the presence of the
voter, affix his signature at the back thereof. Any ballot which is not so
authenticated shall be deemed spurious. Failure to so authenticate shall
constitute an election offense.
The cardinal objective in the appreciation of the ballots is to discover and
give effect to the intention of the voter. That intention would be nullified by
the strict interpretation of the said section as suggested by the petitioner for it
would result in the invalidation of the ballot even if duly accomplished by the
voter, and simply because of an omission not imputable to him but to the
election officials. The citizen cannot be deprived of his constitutional right of
suffrage on the specious ground that other persons were negligent in
performing their own duty, which in the case at bar was purely ministerial and
technical, by no means mandatory but a mere antecedent measure intended to
authenticate the ballot.
Theories in the outline:
UNDERLYING PHILOSOPHY OF ELECTION LAWS:
Article II Sec. 1 of the Constitution: “The Philippines is a republican state.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them.”
As a republican form of government, every QUALIFIED CITIZEN has a right
to submit candidacy to teh voters in an election to determine who should
speak or act for them as a lawmaker, which right must be respected. A
democratic and republican government derives its powers from the people at
large. ACTUAL SOVEREIGNTY IS EXERCISED BY PEOPLE BY MEANS
OF SUFFRAGE.
SUFFRAGE
Suffrage - The right and obligation of qualified citizens to vote in the election
of certain national and local officials and in the decision of public questions
submitted to the people. It is the bedrock of all republican institutions.
Suffrage is not a natural right but a privilege which may be given or
withheld by the lawmaking power subject to constitutional limitations
and granted only upon fulfillment of certain minimum conditions.
A POLITICAL RIGHT. Not an absolute right because bound by restrictions.
A means where people express their sovereign judgment. A duty in the nature
of a public trust.
Should be exercised with good faith and with zeal for the benefit of the state.
SUFFRAGE, APPLICABILITY
Not limited to elections- may extend to iniitiative, referendum, recall.
ESSENCE OF ELECTION
Sunga v. COMELEC 288 SCRA 76 - Plurality of votes is the essence of an
election or majority rule. A public office is filled only by those who receive
the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office which is a
basic tenet in all republican form of government.
BASIS OF PLURALITY OF VOTES
LIMITATIONS TO THE LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION (WHEN
LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION POLICY NOT APPLICABLE)
1) When the amendment to pleadings in an election contest
will substantially change the cause of action, defense or
theory of the case;

Mitmug v. COMELEC 230 SCRA - The majority or plurality of votes is 2) When the amendment will alter a final judgment on a
determined by the number of registered VOTERS WHO ACTUALLY substantial matter;
CAST THEIR VOTES OR THOSE WHO ACTUALLY VOTED AND
NOT BASED ON THE NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS. There 3) When the amendments will confer jurisdiction upon the
is no provision in our election laws which requires that a majority of the court when none existed before;
registered voters must cast their votes. All the law requires is that the
winning candidates must be elected by plurality of votes, regardless of the 4) When it seeks to cure a premature or non-existent cause of
actual number of ballots cast. Therefore, even if less than 25% of the action
electorate in the questioned precincts cast their votes, the votes has to be
When the amendment is intended to delay the proceedings of the case.
respected.

ELECTION, defined

CONSTRUCTION OF ELECTION LAWS

ELECTIONS is “the choice or selection of candidates to public office by
Election contests are REASONABLY AND LIBERALLY popular vote” through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials of
CONSTRUED as it is imbued with public interest to give way to the which are determined through the will of the electorate.
will of the electorate and ascertain by all means the real candidate
elected by the people. - Sec. 3 Rule 1, COMELEC Rules of Procedure In the context of the Constitution, the term “election may refer to the
following:
 Reason: to promote the effective and efficient implementation
of the objectives of ensuring the holding of an honest, orderly, (1) Conduct of the polls,
peaceful, free and credible elections and to achieve a just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of (2) Listing of voters,
every action and proceeding brought before the COMELEC.
(3) Holding of the electoral campaign, and

(4) The casting and counting of votes.

PARTS OF ELECTION LAWS

The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or
plurality of valid votes in the election.

In applying the rules of statutory construction however, the

provisions of election laws are divided into THREE PARTS
NAMELY;

1) Those which refers to the conduct of elections required to

be observed by election officials;

2) Those provisions which “candidates for public elective

office” are required to do and comply with;

3) Those provisions which cover procedural rules designed to

ascertain, in case of dispute, the actual winner in the
elections.

1) Those which refers to the conduct of elections required to be

observed by “election officials”;

The rules and regulations for the “conduct of elections” are:

 Mandatory before the elections, but when it is

 Directory only after the elections most particularly if innocent

voters will be disenfranchised by the negligence or omission of
the elections officers (who will be liable either criminally or
administratively).

2. Those provisions which “candidates for public elective office” are

required to do and comply with;

The provision of law which candidates for office are required

to comply with are generally regarded as mandatory and
failure to comply would be fatal to the candidate. Example,
rules prescribing the qualification of candidates (such as age,
citizenship or residency requirements cannot be cured by vox
populi vox dei), deadline or filing of certificate of candidacy or
limitation of period within which to file an election contest.

3. Those provisions which covers procedural rules designed to ascertain,

in case of dispute, the actual winner in the elections.