Art 224 (b)
Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the
Commission.
The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.
Art 229
Appeal.
Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final
and executory unless appealed to the Commission by
any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders.
Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the
following grounds:
If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the
part of the Labor Arbiter;
If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud
or coercion, including graft and corruption;
If made purely on questions of law; and
If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which
would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the
appellant.
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon
the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from.
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter
reinstating a dismissed or separated employee,
insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall
immediately be executory, even pending appeal.
The employee shall either be
1. admitted back to work under the same terms
and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or
separation or,
2. at the option of the employer, merely reinstated
in the payroll.
The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the
execution for reinstatement provided herein.
To discourage frivolous or dilatory appeals, the Commission
or the Labor Arbiter shall impose reasonable penalty,
including fines or censures, upon the erring parties.
In all cases, the appellant shall furnish a copy of the
memorandum of appeal to the other party who shall
CASE:
Vir-jen vs NLRC
Highlighted ruling:
PERIOD TO APPEAL FROM LABOR ARBITER
2.1 Ten Calendar Days
Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, decisions, awards or
orders of a labor arbiter cannot be declared final and
executory upon the mere issuance thereof.
A period of ten (10) days from receipt of any order is
granted to either or to both parties involved to appeal to
the National Labor Relations Commission.
file an answer not later than ten (10) calendar days
from receipt thereof.
The Commission shall decide all cases within twenty (20)
calendar days from receipt of the answer of the
appellee.
The decision of the Commission shall be final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt
thereof by the parties.
Any law enforcement agency may be deputized by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission in
the enforcement of decisions, awards or orders. (As
amended by Section 12, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21,
1989)
Sec 1, Rule 6, NLRC rules
RULE VI APPEALS SECTION 1. PERIODS OF APPEAL. –
Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter shall
be final and executory unless appealed to the
Commission by any or both parties within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt thereof;
and in case of decisions or resolutions of the Regional
Director of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) pursuant to Article 129 of the Labor Code, as
amended, within five (5) calendar days from receipt
thereof.
If the 10th or 5th day, as the case may be, falls on a
Saturday, Sunday or holiday, the last day to perfect
the appeal shall be the first working day following
such Saturday, Sunday or holiday . No motion or request
for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal
shall be allowed.
Sec 4(b), Rule 3, NLRC Rules
(b) In case of decisions and final awards, copies thereof
shall be served on both parties and their counsel or
representative by personal service, by registered mail or by
courier authorized by the Commission:
Provided that, in cases where a party to a case or
his/her counsel on record personally seeks service of
the decision upon inquiry thereon, service to said party
shall be deemed effected as herein provided.
Where parties are numerous, service shall be made on
counsel and upon such number of complainants, as may be
practicable and shall be considered substantial compliance
with Article 224 (now 230) (a) of the Labor Code, as
amended. (As amended by En Banc Resolution No. 05-14,
Series of 2014) For purposes of appeal, the period shall be
counted from receipt of such decisions, resolutions, or
orders by the counsel or representative of record.
What does the "10 days" refer to? The Supreme Court says
in the Vir-Jen case:
After mature and careful deliberation, We have arrived at
the conclusion that the shortened period of ten (10)
days fixed by Art. 223 contemplates calendar days
and not working days. We are persuaded to this
conclusion, if only because We believe that it is precisely in
the interest of labor that the law has commanded that labor
cases be promptly, if not peremptorily, disposed of. (Vir-jen
Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, R. Bisula, et
al, G.R Nos. 58011-12, July 20, 1982.)
Since the 10-day period provided in Article 223 of the Labor
Code refers to ten calendar days and not to ten working
days, this means that Saturdays, Sundays and Legal
Holidays are not to be excluded, but included, in counting
the 10-day period. This is in line with the objective of the
law for speedy disposition of labor cases with the end in
view of protecting the interests of the working men.
FACTS:
On different dates in December, 1978 and January,
1979, the Seamen entered into separate contracts of
employment with the Company, engaging them to work
on board M/T' Jannu for a period of twelve (12) months.
After verification and approval of their contracts by the
NSB, the Seamen boarded their vessel in Japan.
On 10 January 1919, the master of the vessel
complainant Rogelio H. Bisula, received a cable from
the Company advising him of the possibility that the
vessel might be directed to call at ITF-controlled
ports said at the same time informing him of the
procedure to be followed in the computation of the
special or additional compensation of crew members
while in said ports.
ITF is the acronym for the International Transport Workers
Federation, a militant international labor organization with
affiliates in different ports of the world, which reputedly can
tie down a vessel in a port by preventing its loading or
unloading,
This is a sanction resorted to by ITF to enforce the payment
of its wages rates for seafarers the so-called ITF rates, if
the wages of the crew members of a vessel who have
affiliated with it are below its prescribed rates.)
In the same cable of the Company, the expressed its
regrets for not clarifying earlier the procedure in
computing the special compensation as it thought
that the vessel would 'trade in Caribbean ports only.
On 22 March 1979, the Company sent another cable to
complainant Bisula, this time informing him of the
respective amounts each of the officers and crew members
would receive as special compensation when the vessel
called at the port of Kwinana Australia, an ITF-controlled
port.
This was followed by another cable on 23 March 1979,
informing him that the officers and crew members had been
enrolled as members of the ITF in Sidney, Australia, and
that the membership fee for the 28 personnel complement
of the vessel had already been paid.
In answer to the Company's cable last mentioned,
complainant Bisula, in representation of the other
officers and crew members, sent on 24 March 1979 a
cable informing the Company that the officers and
crew members were not agreeable to its 'suggestion';
1. that they were not contented with their present
salaries 'based on the volume of works, type of
ship with hazardous cargo and registered in a
world wide trade':
2. that the 'officers and crew (were) not interested in
ITF membership if not actually paid with ITF rate
3. that their 'demand is only 50% increase based on
present basic salary and
4. that the proposed wage increase is the 'best and
only solution to solve ITF problem' since the
Company's salary rates 'especially in tankers (are)
very far in comparison with other shipping
agencies in Manila ...
In reply, the Company proposed a 25% increase in the
basic pay of the complainant crew members, although
it claimed, that it would "suffer and absorb
considerable amount of losses."
The proposal was accepted by the Seamen with
certain conditions which were accepted by the
Company.
Conformably with the agreement of the parties which
was effected through the cables abovementioned, the
Seamen were paid their new salary rates.
Subsequently, the Company sought authority from
the NSB to cancel the contracts of employment of the
Seamen, claiming that its principals had terminated
their manning agreement because of the actuations
of the Seamen.
The request was granted by the NSB Executive Director in a
letter dated 10 April 1979. Soon thereafter, the Company
cabled the Seamen informing them that their contracts
would be terminated upon the vessel's arrival in Japan. On
19 April 1979 they Arere asked to disembark from the
vessel, their contracts were terminated, and they were
repatriated to Manila. There is no showing that the Seamen
were given the opportunity to at least comment on the
Company's request for the cancellation of their contracts,
although they had served only three (3) out of the twelve
(12) months' duration of their contracts.
Short facts:
Certain seamen entered into a contract of employment for a
12-month period.
Some three months after the commencement of their
employment, the seamen demanded a 50% increase of
their salaries and benefits.
The seamen demanded this increase while their vessel was
on route to a port in Australia controlled by the
International Transport Federation (ITP) where the ITF
could detain the vessels unless it paid its season ITF rates.
The facts showed that when the seamen boarded the vessel
M/T Jannu, there was no intention to send their ship to
Australia but would trade in Carribean ports only.
The agent of the owner of the vessel agreed to a 25%
increase, but when the vessel arrived in Japan shortly
afterwards, the seamen were repatriated to Manila and their
contracts terminated.
The private respondents filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of earned wages with the
National Seamen Board.
The Vir-jen Shipping and Marine Services Inc. in turn
filed a complaint for breach of contract and recovery
of excess salaries and overtime pay against the
private respondents.
On July 2, 1980, the NSB rendered a decision declaring
that the seamen breached their employment contracts
when they demanded and received from Vir-jen Shipping
wages over and above their contracted rates. The dismissal
of the seamen was declared legal and the seamen were
ordered suspended.
The seamen appealed the decision to the NLRC which
reversed the decision of the NSB and required the
petitioner to pay the wages and other monetary
benefits corresponding to the unexpired portion of
the manning contract on the ground that the termination
of the contract by the petitioner was without valid cause.
Vir-jen Shipping filed the present petition.
One of the issues brought about here was whether
the appeal of private respondents from the decision
of the National Seamen's Board against them was
filed out of time, considering that
1. copy of said decision was received by them
on July 9, 1980 and
2. they filed their memorandum of appeal only
on July 23, 1980 or fourteen (14) days
later,
whereas under article 223 of the Labor Code which
governs appeals from the National Seamen's Board
to the National Labor Relations Commission per
Article 20(b) of the Code provides that such appeals
must be made within ten (10) days.
Respondent’s contention:
Petitioner has overlooked that under Section 7, Rule
XIII,, Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor
Code, the ten-day period specified in Article 223
refers to working days and that this Court has
already upheld such construction and manner of
computation in Fabula vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 54247,
December 19, 1980.
ISSUE: Did the 10-day period refer to working
days or calendar days?
RULING: Calendar days
Note: that since calendar days, the appeal was
filed out of time because 14 days elapsed from
July 9 to July 23. (BUT even so, the court still
ruled on it)
Based on the fabula case (USED WORKING
DAYS), the number of working days from July 9 to
July 23, 1980, there were exactly ten (10) days,
hence, if We adhere to Fabula, the appeal in
question must be held to have been made on time.
But petitioner maintains that the Minister of
Labor may not, under the guise of issuing
implementing rules of a law as authorized by the law
itself, go beyond the clear and unmistakable
language of the law and expand it at his discretion.
In other words, since Article 223 of the Labor
Code literally provides thus:
Appeal. — Decisions, awards, or orders of the
Labor Arbiters or compulsory arbitrators are final
and executory unless appealed to the
Commission by any or both of the parties within
ten (10) days from receipt of such awards,
orders, or decisions. Such appeal may be
entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(a) If there is a prima facie evidence of abuse of
discretion on the part of the labor Arbiter or
compulsory arbitrator;
(b) If the decision, order, or award was secured
through fraud or coercion, including graft and
corruption;
(c) If made purely on questions of law; and
(d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised
which would cause grave or irreparable damage or
injury to the appellant.
To discourage frivolous or dilatory appeals, the
Commission or the Labor Arbiter shall impose
reasonable penalty, including fines or censures,
upon the erring parties.
The implementing rules may not provide that the
said period should be computed on the basis of
working days. This, indeed, is a legal issue not
brought up nor passed upon squarely in Fabula, and
petitioner prays that this Court rule on the point
once and for all.
After mature and careful deliberation, We have
arrived at the conclusion that the shortened period
of ten (10) days fixed by Article 223 contemplates
calendar days and not working days.
We are persuaded to this conclusion, if only
because We believe that it is precisely in the
interest of labor that the law has commanded
that labor cases be promptly, if not peremptorily,
dispose of.
Long periods for any acts to be done by the
contending parties can be taken advantage of more
by management than by labor.
Most labor claims are decided in their favor and
management is generally the appellant.
Delay, in most instances, gives the employers more
opportunity not only to prepare even ingenious
defenses, what with well-paid talented lawyers they
can afford, but even to wear out the efforts and
meager resources of the workers, to the point that
not infrequently the latter either give up or
compromise for less than what is due them.

All the foregoing notwithstanding, and bearing in

mind the peculiar circumstances of this case,
particularly, the fact that private respondents
must have been misled by the implementing
rules aforementioned.

We have opted to just the same pass on the

merits of the substantial issues herein, even as
We admonish all concerned to henceforth act in
accordance with our foregoing view.

Verily, the Minister of Labor has no legal power

to amend or alter in any material sense whatever
the law itself unequivocally specifies or fixes.