Case Analysis

Part 1
CASES
• Vir-jen Shipping vs NLRC GR No. 58011=12 July 20, 1982
• Mc Burnie vs Gauzon GR No. 178034 and 178117 October 17, 2013
• Computer Innovation vs NLRC GR No. 152410 June 29, 2005
• Garcia vs NLRC GR No. 110494 Nov. 18, 1996
Vir-jen Shipping vs NLRC GR No. 58011=12
July 20, 1982
• Brief Background:
The instant case revolves around a petition for certiorari seeking the
annulment or setting aside, on the grounds of excess of jurisdiction and
grave abuse of discretion, the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission in consolidated NSB Cases Nos. 2250-79 and 2252-79.
Herein private respondents have a manning contract for a period of one
(1) year with petitioner in representation of its principal Kyoei Tanker
Co. Ltd. The terms and conditions of said contract were based on the
standard contract of the NSB. The manning contract was approved by
the NSB.
When the vessel M/T Janu was enroute to Australia, the private
respondents demanded to petitioner, through cable communication
vessel that they were not contented with the salary and benefits
stipulated in the manning contract, and demanded that they be given
50% increase thereof, as the ‘best and only solution to solve ITF
problem.’ Vir-jen Shipping countered their offer with only 25%
increase, considering the losses the petitioner were to suffer in the
drastic increase demanded by the seamen. The respondent seamen
agreed but the principal Kyoei Tanker Co. Ltd. terminated the manning
contract for the unexpected and unreasonable demand for salary
increase of the officers and crew of M/T Janu.
Petitioner wrote the NSB asking permission to cancel the manning contract which
was approved by the latter. By reason thereof, the seamen were disembarked in
Japan and repatriated to Manila, and they then filed a complaint with the NSB for
illegal dismissal and non-payment of wages. However, the NSB found that the
termination of the services of the seamen before the expiration of their employment
contract was justified ‘when they demanded and in fact received from the company
wages over and above the contracted rates which in effect was am alteration and
modification of a valid and existing contract.’ Respondent seamen appealed the
decision to the NLRC which reversed the decision of the NSB and required the
petitioner to pay the wages and other monetary benefits corresponding to the
unexpired portion of the manning contract on the ground that the termination of
said contract by petitioner was without valid cause.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the respondent NLRC had no more jurisdiction to entertain private
respondents’ appeal because the NSB decision became final and executory for failure of said
respondents to serve on the petitioner a copy of their ‘APPEAL AND MEMORANDUM OF
APPEAL’ within the ten (10) day reglementary period for appeal and even after the expiration
of said period.

(2) Whether or not the respondent Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion in said NSB Cases Nos. 2250-79 and 2252-79 when it adjudged
the petitioner liable to the respondents-seamen for terminating its employment contracts with
them despite the fact that prior authorization to terminate or cancel said employment contracts
and to disembark the said respondents was first secured from, and was granted by, the National
Seamen Board, the government agency primarily charged with the supervision and discipline
of seamen and the approval and enforcement of employment contracts.
Ruling:
(1) On the jurisdictional issue of the appeal, the Court referred to Article 223 (now 229) of the Labor Code which provides the
provision of appeals, Article 223 of the Labor Code literally provides:

"Appeal. — Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiters or compulsory arbitrators are final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) days from receipt of such awards, orders, or
decisions. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(a) If there is a prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter or compulsory arbitrator;
(b) If the decision, order, or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including graft and corruption;
(c) If made purely on questions of law; and
(d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the
Appellant.
To discourage frivolous or dilatory appeals, the Commission or the Labor Arbiter shall impose reasonable penalty, including
fines or censures, upon the erring parties.”
The Court arrived at the conclusion that the shortened period of ten (10) days
fixed by Article 223 (now 229) contemplates calendar days and not working
days. It was persuaded to this conclusion, if only because it believes that it is
precisely in the interest of labor that the law has commanded that labor cases be
promptly, if not peremptorily, dispose of. Long periods for any acts to be done
by the contending parties can be taken advantage of more by management than
by labor. Most labor claims are decided in their favor and management is
generally the appellant. Delay, in most instances, gives the employers more
opportunity not only to prepare even ingenious defenses, what with well-paid
talented lawyers they can afford, but even to wear out the efforts and meager
resources of the workers, to the point that not infrequently the latter either give
up or compromise for less than what is due them.
(2) The Court held that the NLRC has indeed overstepped the boundaries of its
reviewing authority and was over-lenient. As to whether or not respondents had
breached their contract with petitioner is a factual issue, which peculiar nuance to
determine is with NSB, the fact-finding authority for the case at hand.
Notwithstanding the fact that even if it was nothing more than the interpretation of
the cablegram sent by respondents to petitioner on March 23, 1979 that were the only
question to be resolved, that is, whether or not it carried with it or connoted a threat
which naturally panicked petitioner, which, to be sure, could be a question of law,
still, the Court sees that the conclusion of the NLRC cannot be justified. The
Commission ruled that in the exercise of their right to present any grievances they
had and in their desire to alleviate their condition, it was but well and proper for
respondents to make a proposal for increase of their wages, which petitioner could
accept or reject. The Court did not see it that way.
In its manifestation and comment, even the Solicitor General submitted that
there was valid justification on the part of petitioner and/or its principal to
terminate the manning contract. Likewise, the Court said, “It is timely to add
here in closing that situations wherein employers are practically laid in
ambush or placed in a position not unlike those in a highjack whether in the
air, land or mid-sea must be considered to be what they really are: acts of
coercion, threat and intimidation against which the victim has generally no
recourse but to yield at the peril of irreparable loss. And when such
happenings affect the national economy, as pointed out by the Solicitor
General, they must be treated to be in the nature of economic sabotage. They
should not be tolerated. This Court has to be careful not to sanction them.”
 Mc Burnie vs Gauzon GR No. 178034 and
178117 October 17, 2013
Brief Background:
Andrew James McBurnie is an Australian National who instituted a
complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims against the
respondents. He claimed that on May 1, 1999, he signed a five-year
employment agreement with EGI as Executive President to manage the
latter’s hotels and resorts located in the Philippines. McBurnie worked
until November of the same year until he had an accident and had to return
to his homeland to recuperate. However, when he left for Australia, he had
not yet obtained a DOLE permit to work in the Philippines; and while he
was there, EGI terminated his contract because his services were no longer
need since the intended project would not push through.
EGI, in its opposition to McBurnie’s complaint, denied the existence of employer-
employee relationship because the agreement was to jointly invest in a company
to manage hotels, and the alleged employment contract was executed solely for
the purpose of obtaining a working permit.

The Labor Arbiter declared the illegal dismissal illegal and awarded $985,000.00
as salary and benefit plus P2,000,000.00 for damages and attorney’s fee. EGI
appealed to NLRC and posted an appeal bond of P100,000.00, and filed a
memorandum of appeal and a motion to reduce bond to which the Commission
denied and required an additional bond of more than P54 Million. Because of
EGI’s failure to post the required additional bond, thus the appeal was dismissed.

EGI appealed to the CA which enjoined the enforcement of the LA’s decision in
favour of McBurnie.
Issue
Whether or not an appeal bond reduction is allowable in cases of appeal
of an employer.
Ruling
On the matter of the filing and acceptance of motions to reduce appeal bond, as provided in Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011
NLRC Rules of Procedure, the Court hereby RESOLVES that henceforth, the following guidelines shall be observed:

(a) The filing of a motion to reduce appeal bond shall be entertained by the NLRC subject to the following conditions: (1)
there is meritorious ground; and (2) a bond in a reasonable amount is posted;
(b) For purposes of compliance with condition no. (2), a motion shall be accompanied by the posting of a provisional cash
or surety bond equivalent to ten percent (10,) of the monetary award subject of the appeal, exclusive of damages and
attorney's fees;
(c) Compliance with the foregoing conditions shall suffice to suspend the running of the 1 0-day reglementary period to
perfect an appeal from the labor arbiter's decision to the NLRC;
(d) The NLRC retains its authority and duty to resolve the motion to reduce bond and determine the final amount of bond
that shall be posted by the appellant, still in accordance with the standards of meritorious grounds and reasonable amount;
and
(e) In the event that the NLRC denies the motion to reduce bond, or requires a bond that exceeds the amount of the
provisional bond, the appellant shall be given a fresh period of ten (1 0) days from notice of the NLRC order within which
to perfect the appeal by posting the required appeal bond.”
 Computer Innovation vs NLRC GR No.
152410 June 29, 2005
Brief Background:
Herein private respondent Reynaldo Cariño (Cariño) was hired in September of
1995 by petitioner Computer Innovations Center (CIC) as Instructor of
Computer Technical Course, and he was promoted to Head of the Education
Department of CIC in May of 1997. On March 26, 1998, Cariño received a call
from petitioner Nelson Yu Quilos (Quilos) of CIC, who advised Cariño to resign
from his position. Two days later, or on March 28 1998, Quilos met Cariño at
the company's technician's laboratory and informed the latter that his services
with the company should cease by March 31, 1998. Thus, the aggrieved Cariño
lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal against CIC and Quilos with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Branch in
Davao City.
CIC, however, claimed that it received reports from its other employees
regarding Cariño's purported unprofessional conduct, adverting to a
general lack of interpersonal skills and moonlighting activities which
conflicted with the interest of CIC – the moonlighting activities which
Cariño admitted during the meeting on March 28, 1998, and had refused
a promotion offered by CIC conditioned on his termination of
involvement with other computer schools. Instead, as claimed by CIC,
Cariño announced during the said meeting that he would resign from
CIC, reporting for work only until March 31, 1998.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on August 29, 1999, concluding that Cariño had
been illegally dismissed, and further ordering petitioners to pay the amount of Two
Hundred Twenty Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Six Pesos and Sixty Six Centavos
(P220,666.66) representing backwages, separation pay, and thirteenth (13th) month pay. A
copy of the Decision was received by petitioners on November 5, 1999, and on November
15, 1999, they filed a Notice of Appeal dated November 12, 1999 before the NLRC
Regional Arbitration Branch, Davao City, attaching thereto a Memorandum on Appeal.
They likewise posted a bond of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), a sum nowhere near the
sum of the award made by the LA. However, in their Memorandum of Appeal, petitioners
had requested a reduction of the cash or surety bond to Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) –
citing the ground for the reduction of the appeal bond was the purportedly great possibility
of the reversal of the Labor Arbiter's decision in light of the serious errors in the findings of
fact and application of law as well as the harshness and unfounded nature of the award.
The Commission denied said motion for reduction of appeal bond and
dismissed the appeal on the ground of "non-perfection." The NLRC ruled that
"the mere perception [that] the appealed decision would be reversed on appeal
[did] not justify the reduction of the required appeal bond." The NLRC
decision was affirmed by the CA.

Herein petitioners has invoked the ruing in Star Angel case that there is a
distinction between the filing of an appeal within the reglementary period and
its perfection, and that the appeal may be perfected after the said reglementary
period. In Star Angel case, it was held that the filing of a motion for reduction
of an appeal bond necessarily stays the reglementary period for appeal.
Issue
Whether or not the ground for appeal bond reduction in the instant case
is allowable.
Ruling
The Court referred to Article 223 (now 229) of the Labor Code which is quite
clear-cut on the matter. The relevant portion of Article 223 (now 229) provides:
ART 223. Appeal. - Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final
and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within
ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. . . .
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer
may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount
equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. (Emphasis
Supplied)
Logically, it is inferred that by the explicit provision of law, an appeal is
perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. Such
requirement for posting the surety bond is jurisdictional and cannot be
trifled with. The word "only" makes it perfectly clear that the lawmakers
intended the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the
exclusive means by which an employer's appeal may be perfected. As
evinced by the language of Article 223 (now 229), the posting of such
bond is required before the NLRC can acquire jurisdiction over the
employer's appeal. x x x Invocation of this rule as a means of argument
against the strict imposition of the cash bond requirement is off-base,
taking into consideration Article 223 (now 229).
Likewise, the NLRC Rules of Procedure reaffirms the explicit jurisdictional principle in Article 223 (now 229),
even as it allows in justifiable cases, the reduction of the appeal bond, to wit:
RULE VI.
APPEALS
....
Section 3. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. '(a) The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as
provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the
posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 5 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum
of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for;
and a statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision, order or award and proof of
service on the other party of such appeal.

A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisite aforestated shall not stop the running of the
period for perfecting an appeal.
....
Section 6. Bond. 'In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the Regional Director or
his duly authorized Hearing Officer involves a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond, which
shall be in effect until final disposition of the case, issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney's fees.
The employer, his counsel, as well as the bonding company, shall submit a joint
declaration under oath attesting that the surety bond posted is genuine.

The Commission may, in justifiable cases and upon Motion of the Appellant, reduce
the amount of the bond. The filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the
running of the period to perfect appeal.(Emphasis Supplied)
As it is very clear from both the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules of
Procedure that there is legislative and administrative intent to strictly
apply the appeal bond requirement, and that the Court should give
utmost regard to this intention. There is a concession to the employer, in
excluding damages and attorney's fees from the computation of the
appeal bond. Not even the filing of a motion to reduce bond is deemed
to stay the period for requiring an appeal. Nothing in the either Labor
Code or the NLRC Rules of Procedure authorizes the posting of a bond
that is less than the monetary award in the judgment, or would deem
such insufficient postage as sufficient to perfect the appeal.
The appeal bond requirement is a rule of jurisdiction and not of
procedure, and it cannot be trifled with. There is little leeway for
condoning a liberal interpretation thereof, and certainly none premised
on the ground that its requirements are mere technicalities. It must be
emphasized that there is no inherent right to an appeal in a labor case, as
it arises solely from grant of statute, namely the Labor Code. Non-
compliance with such legal requirements is fatal and has the effect of
rendering the judgment final and executory.The herein petitioners
cannot be allowed to seek refuge in a liberal application of rules for
their act of negligence.
Moreover, while indeed the Court noted that in Star Angel case it was
held that the filing of a motion for reduction of an appeal bond
necessarily stays the reglementary period for appeal. However, in the
instant case, the motion for reduction of appeal bond, which was
incorporated in the appeal memorandum, was filed only on the tenth or
final day of the reglementary period. Under such circumstance, the
motion for reduction of appeal bond can no longer be deemed to have
stayed the appeal, and the petitioner faces the risk, as had happened in
this case, of summary dismissal of the appeal for non-perfection.
In the Star Angel case, the distinction between the period to file the appeal and to perfect the appeal has
been pointedly made only once by the Court in the case of Gensoli v. NLRC thus, it has not acquired
the sheen of venerability reserved for repeatedly-cited cases. The distinction, if any, is not particularly
evident or material in the Labor Code; hence, the reluctance of the Court to adopt such doctrine.
Moreover, the present provision in the NLRC Rules of Procedure, that "the filing of a motion to reduce
bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect appeal" flatly contradicts the notion expressed
in Star Angel that there is a distinction between filing an appeal and perfecting an appeal.

Said disposition of Star Angel was premised on the ruling that a motion for reduction of the appeal
bond necessarily stays the period for perfecting the appeal, and that the employer cannot be expected to
perfect the appeal by posting the proper bond until such time the said motion for reduction is resolved.
The unduly stretched-out distinction between the period to file an appeal and to perfect an appeal was
not material to the resolution of Star Angel, and thus could properly be considered as obiter dictum.
The Court, in closing, said, “One final note. As earlier stated, the underlying purpose of the appeal
bond is to ensure that the employee has properties on which he or she can execute upon in the event
of a final, providential award. The non-payment or woefully insufficient payment of the appeal bond
by the employer frustrates these ends. Respondent Cariño alleges in his Comment before this Court
that petitioner Quilos and his wife have since gone abroad, and wonders aloud whether he still
would be able to collect his monetary award considering the circumstances. Petitioners, in their
Reply and Memorandum, do not aver otherwise. Indeed, such eventuality appears plausible
considering that Quilos himself did not personally verify the petition, and had in fact executed a
Special Power of Attorney in favor of his counsel, Atty. Bernabe B. Alabastro, authorizing the filing
of cases in his name. It does not necessarily follow that the absence of Quilos from this country
precludes the execution of the award due Cariño. However, if the absence of Quilos from this country
proves to render impossible the execution of judgment in favor of Cariño, then the latter's victory
may sadly be rendered pyrrhic. The appeal bond requirement precisely aims to prevent empty or
inconsequential victories by the laborer, and it is hoped that herein petitioners' refusal to post the
appropriate legal appeal bond does not frustrate the ends of justice in this case.”
 Garcia vs NLRC GR No. 110494 Nov. 18,
1996
Brief Background:
Herein petitioner Rey O. Garcia was hired by private respondent Mahal Kong Pilipinasto edit
articles, news items, literary contributions, essays, manuscripts, and other features to be
published in the Say Magazine and other publications owned by private Respondent. On
March 16, 1992, petitioner’s employment was terminated. At that time, he was allegedly
receiving a monthly salary of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00). Thus, Garcia filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondent with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). Summons were thereafter duly served on private respondent to appear
for a mandatory conference to be held on April 29, 1992, and on the appointed date, private
respondent, represented by Necy Avecilla, sought a postponement of said conference which
motion was granted and reset the conference on May 8, 1992. Yet again, on May 8, 1992,
private respondent failed to appear prompting the Labor Arbiter to reset the conference on
May 27, 1992 - with warning that failure to appear and submit its position paper on said date
will be deemed a waiver of its right to be heard and to present its evidence.
On May 27, 1992, both parties appeared. Herein petitioner filed an amended
complaint, a copy of which was served on private respondent in open court, and by
mutual agreement of the parties, the filing of their respective position papers as well
as the next hearing was scheduled on June 9, 1992. However, on said date private
respondent yet again failed to attend and instead filed a letter requesting for the
postponement of the hearing. Petitioner objected and instead moved that private
respondent be declared in default and that he be allowed to present his evidence ex
parte. Said motion was granted and petitioner was given one (1) week to submit his
position paper and documentary evidence after which the case was to be considered
submitted for decision. Herein petitioner filed his position paper on June 11, 1992
and on June 15, 1992, private respondent, through a letter from Marilou L. Bocobo,
requested Labor Arbiter Nieves V. de Castro for time to answer petitioner’s
allegations. The letter-request, found to be merely dilatory, was denied.
The LA ordered the reinstatement of herein petitioner to his former
position effective August 16, 1992 with full backwages of P24,000.00
(from March 16, 1992 to August 15, 1992) and all other benefits
complainant was receiving prior to his termination with notice to
respondent that reinstatement order is immediately executory even
pending appeal. Herein private respondent received a copy on
September 10, 1992, of the said decision. And instead of filing an
appeal therefrom, private respondent, through its company president
Michael G. Say, wrote yet another letter to the labor arbiter expressing
surprise and disappointment of allegedly erroneous decision.
Since no appeal was filed from said decision, the same became final and
executory. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued on November 13,
1992. Private respondent filed a petition for preliminary injunction with
respondent NLRC. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the said
resolution contending that the subject decision had long become final
and executory. However, on March 10, 1993, respondent NLRC issued a
resolution declaring the decision dated August 13, 1992 as vacated and
set aside and the writ of execution was declared quashed. A new
decision was rendered remanding the case for reception of evidence
with dispatch.
Issue
Whether or not the unverified letter sent by private respondent, through
its company president, is proper appeal.
Ruling
The Court took note that in the case at bar, records bear out that private
respondent did not comply with the foregoing mandatory rules on
appeals. After receiving a copy of the decision, private respondent
through its president, wrote the labor arbiter who rendered the decision
and expressed dismay over the judgment. No appeal was taken
therefrom within ten (10) days from September 10, 1992, the date
private respondent received a copy of such judgment. Neither was a
cash or surety bond posted by the private Respondent.
Assuming arguendo that said letter is considered a valid notice of
appeal, the lack of posting of a cash or surety bond as required by law,
is fatal. The posting of bond in appeals of employers with monetary
consideration is not merely a procedural matter but jurisdictional. It is
elementary that when a judgment in question involves a monetary
award, the second paragraph of Article 223 (now 229) of the Labor
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, provides that an appeal by the
employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
NLRC in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment
appealed from.
The NLRC in the instant case has clearly committed grave abuse of
discretion and lack of jurisdiction in treating the letter of private
respondent’s president as an appeal from the judgment of the labor
arbiter.

Time and time again, the Court has held that the perfection of an appeal
in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional. Failure to conform with the rules
regarding appeal will certainly render the judgment final and executory,
hence, unappealable.