Manila Electric vs.

Sotero Remoquillo

G.R. No. L-8328 May 18, 1956

Manila Electric Company, petitioner,
vs.
Sotero Remoquillo, in his own behalf and as guardian of the minors Manuel, Benjamin, Nestor,
Milagros, Corazon, Clemente and Aurora, all surnamed Magno, Salud Magno, and the Court Of
Appeals (Second Division), respondents.
Montemayor, J.

Nature:

Appeal of the Decision of CA affirming the Decision of RTC ordering the Petitioner Manila
Electric to pay Respondents the damages awarded

Facts:

On Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Peñaloza, his stepbrother, to repair a “media
agua” said to be in a leaking condition. Standing on said “media agua”, Magno received from
his son thru that window a 3’ X 6’ galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion, turned
around and in doing so the lower end of the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire
of the Manila Electric Company strung parallel to the edge of the “media agua” and 2 1/2 feet
from it, causing his death by electrocution.

His widow and children fled suit to recover damages from the company. CFI ruled in their favor.
CA affirmed. Hence this appeal.

The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary wire carrying a charge of
3,600 volts was installed there some 2 years before Peñaloza’s house was constructed. A similar
incident took place, during the construction thereof. The owner already complained to
Defendant, and as a result Defendant moved one end of the wire farther from the house by
means of a brace, but left the other end where it was.

Regulations of the City of Manila required that “all wires be kept 3 feet from the building.”
However, appellant contends that the reckoning should be from the side of the house, then the
distance was almost 7 feet, or more than the minimum prescribed. That it was the fault of the
owner why the distance was less than what was prescribed, for the “media agua” built was
longer than what was allowed, because the city authorities gave him a permit to construct a
“media agua” only 1 meter wide, but instead he built one having a width of 65 3/4 inches, 17
3/8 inches more than the width permitted by the authorities.

Issue:

Whether or not Petitioner Manila Power could be held liable for damages for the death of Efren
Magno? (NO)

Ruling:

The death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence and in some measure by the
too close proximity of the “media agua” or rather its edge to the electric wire of the company
by reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval
of said illegal construction of the “media agua”. We fail to see how the Company could be held
guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence. Although the city ordinance called for a
distance of 3 feet of its wires from any building, there was actually a distance of 7 feet and 2
3/4 inches of the wires from the side of the house of Peñaloza. Even considering said regulation
distance of 3 feet as referring not to the side of a building, but to any projecting part thereof,
such as a “media agua”, had the house owner followed the terms of the permit given him by
the city for the construction of his “media agua”, namely, one meter wide, the distance from
the wires to the edge of said “media agua” would have been 3 feet and 11 3/8 inches. In fixing
said one meter width for the “media agua” the city authorities must have wanted to preserve
the distance of at least 3 feet between the wires and any portion of a building. Unfortunately,
however, the house owner disregarding the permit, exceeded the one meter fixed by the same
by 17 3/8 inches and leaving only a distance of 2 1/2 feet between the “Media agua” as illegally
constructed and the electric wires. And added to this violation of the permit by the house
owner, was its approval by the city through its agent, possibly an inspector. Surely we cannot
lay these serious violations of a city ordinance and permit at the door of the Company, guiltless
of breach of any ordinance or regulation. The Company cannot be expected to be always on the
lookout for any illegal construction which reduces the distance between its wires and said
construction, and after finding that said distance of 3 feet had been reduced, to change the
stringing or installation of its wires so as to preserve said distance. It would be much easier for
the City, or rather it is its duty, to be ever on the alert and to see to it that its ordinances are
strictly followed by house owners and to condemn or disapprove all illegal constructions. Of
course, in the present case, the violation of the permit for the construction of the “media agua”
was not the direct cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it. Had said “media agua”
been only one meter wide as allowed by the permit, Magno standing on it, would instinctively
have stayed closer to or hugged the side of the house in order to keep a safe margin between
the edge of the “media agua” and the yawning 2-story distance or height from the ground, and
possibly if not probably avoided the fatal contact between the lower end of the iron sheet and
the wires.

We realize that the presence of the wires in question quite close to the house or its “media
agua” was always a source of danger considering their high voltage and uninsulated as they
were, but the claim of the company and the reasons given by it for not insulating said wires
were unrefuted as we gather from the findings of the Court of Appeals, and so we have to
accept them as satisfactory. Consequently, we may not hold said company as guilty of
negligence or wanting in due diligence in failing to insulate said wires. As to their proximity to
the house it is to be supposed that distance of 3 feet was considered sufficiently safe by the
technical men of the city such as its electrician or engineer. Of course, a greater distance of say
6 feet or 12 feet would have increased the margin of safety but other factors had to be
considered such as that the wires could not be strung or the posts supporting them could not
be located too far toward the middle of the street. Thus, the real cause of the accident or death
was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. When he was called by his stepbrother to
repair the “media agua” just below the third story window, it is to be presumed that due to his
age and experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had
training and experience for the job. So, he could not have been entirely a stranger to electric
wires and the danger lurking in them. But unfortunately, in the instant care, his training and
experience failed him, and forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6-feet iron sheet with
both hands and at arms length, evidently without looking, and throwing all prudence and
discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms with the motion of his body,
thereby causing his own electrocution.

In support of its theory and holding that Defendant-Appellant was liable for damages the Court
of Appeals cites the case of Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co., 55 Phil., 427. We do not think the
case is exactly applicable. There, the premises involved was that elevated portion or top of the
walls of Intramuros, Manila, just above the Sta. Lucia Gate. In the words of the Court, it was “a
public place where persons come to stroll, to rest and to enjoy themselves”. The electric
company was clearly negligent in placing its wires so near the place that without much difficulty
or exertion, a person by stretching his hand out could touch them. A boy named Astudillo,
placing one foot on a projection, reached out and actually grasped the electric wire and was
electrocuted. The person electrocuted in said case was a boy who was in no position to realize
the danger. In the present case, however, the wires were well high over the street where there
was no possible danger to pedestrians. The only possible danger was to persons standing on
the “media agua”, but a “media agua” can hardly be considered a public place where persons
usually gather. Moreover, a person standing on the “media agua” could not have reached the
wires with his hands alone. It was necessary as was done by Magno to hold something long
enough to reach the wire. Furthermore, Magno was not a boy or a person immature but the
father of a family, supposedly a tinsmith trained and experienced in the repair of galvanized
iron roofs and “media agua”. Moreover, in that very case of Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co.,
supra, the court said that although it is a well- established rule that the liability of electric
companies for damages or personal injuries is governed by the rules of negligence,
nevertheless such companies are not insurers of the safety of the public.

But even assuming for a moment that under the facts of the present case the Defendant
electric company could be considered negligent in installing its electric wires so close to the
house and “media agua” in question, and in failing to properly insulate those wires (although
according to the unrefuted claim of said company it was impossible to make the insulation of
that kind of wire), nevertheless to hold the Defendant liable in damages for the death of
Magno, such supposed negligence of the company must have been the proximate and principal
cause of the accident, because if the act of Magno in turning around and swinging the
galvanized iron sheet with his hands was the proximate and principal cause of the electrocution,
then his heirs may not recover. Such was the holding of this Court in the case of Taylor vs.
Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, 16 Phil., 8. In that case, the electric company was
found negligent in leaving scattered on its premises fulminating caps which Taylor, a 15- year
old boy found and carried home. In the course of experimenting with said fulminating caps, he
opened one of them, held it out with his hands while another boy applied a lighted match to it,
causing it to explode and injure one of his eyes eventually causing blindness in said eye. Said
this Tribunal in denying recovery for the injury:

“, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for
the negligent act of the Defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises,
 nevertheless Plaintiff’s own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident
which inflicted the injury.”

To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric
wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning
around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking
back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the
latter’s length of 6 feet. For a better understanding of the rule on remote and proximate cause
with respect to injuries, we find the following citation helpful:

“A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause
did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the
injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and
the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though
such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger
existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was
not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets
into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.” (45 C.J. pp. 931-
332.).

In view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed
and the complaint filed against the Company is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA

G.R. No. 97336 Feb. 19, 1993

Gashem Shookat Baksh, petitioner,
vs.
Hon. Court of Appeals and Marilou T. Gonzales, r espondents.
Davide, Jr., J.

Nature:

Petition by certiorari of the Decision of CA, affirming the Decision of RTC

Facts:

On October 1987, Private Respondents Marilou, without assistance of a counsel, filed before
RTC a complaint for damages against Petitioner for the allege violation of their agreement to
get married.

Marilou is 22 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation
duly respected in her community, accepted the love on the condition that they would get
married of Gashem is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan
City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges.

Marilou On August 1987, they decided to get married after the end of the school semester,
October. Petitioner visited the private respondent’s parents to secure their approval; the
petitioner forced her to live with him; she was a virgin before she began living with him .
However, a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner’s attitude towards her started to
change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she
sustained injuries, during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig
a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and
asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living
in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her
damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses
amounting to P600.00, attorney’s fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and
remedies as may be just and equitable.

In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the
parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true
facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never
proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither sought
the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not
maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had
deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with
a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is
baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court
and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched
reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as
moral damages. The mere breach of promise is not actionable.

RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. Private respondent is not a woman of loose morals, never
had a boyfriend before, and because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed
herself to be deflowered by him. This young, innocent, trustful country girl.

Issue:

Whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of
Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Ruling:

It is true that in the present, breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. This
notwithstanding, Civil Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the
concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the
untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books.

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold,
that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his
love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate
cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to
entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify
the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because
of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which
followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her
virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he
would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that
made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the
cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral
seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The
petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or
Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the seduction.

Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of
promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction.

These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he
harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the
latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him,
dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by
good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have even
remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words
directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that
indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust
which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of
love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner
clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect
Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such
deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to
act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his obligations.
Child Learning v. Tagorio

G.R. No. 150920 Nov. 25, 2005

Child Learning Center, Inc. and Spouses Edgardo L. Limon and Sylvia S. Limon, petitioners,
vs.
Timothy Tagario, assisted by his parents Basilio Tagorio and Herminia Tagorio, Respondents.
Azcuna, J.

Facts:

Timothy Tagorio, a Grade IV student at an academic institution operated and maintained by

Child Learning Center, Inc. (CLC), entered the boy’s comfort room, however, found himself
locked inside. Timothy started to panic and so he banged and kicked the door and yelled
several times for help. When no help arrived he decided to open the window to call for help. In
the process of opening the window, Timothy went right through and fell down three stories.
Timothy was hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious multiple physical injuries.
Hence this action against the Petitioner for damages.

RTC ruled in favor of the Respondents, CA affimed. Hence this petition.

Issue:

In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or
negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.

Fault, in general, signifies a voluntary act or omission which causes damage to the right of
another giving rise to an obligation on the part of the actor to repair such damage.
Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. Fault requires
the execution of a positive act which causes damage to another while negligence consists of
the omission to do acts which result in damage to another.

In this tort case, respondents contend that CLC failed to provide precautionary measures to
avoid harm and injury to its students in two instances: (1) failure to fix a defective door knob
despite having been notified of the problem; and (2) failure to install safety grills on the window
where Timothy fell from.

The fact, however, that Timothy fell out through the window shows that the door could not be
opened from the inside. That sufficiently points to the fact that something was wrong with the
door, if not the door knob, under the principle of res ipsa loquitor.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to
warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant’s negligence;
(2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the
accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured.
Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of their school toilets are
at all times in working condition. The fact that a student had to go through the window, instead
of the door, shows that something was wrong with the door.

As to the absence of grills on the window, petitioners contend that there was no such
requirement under the Building Code. Nevertheless, the fact is that such window, as petitioners
themselves point out, was approximately 1.5 meters from the floor, so that it was within reach
of a student who finds the regular exit, the door, not functioning. Petitioners, with the due
diligence of a good father of the family, should have anticipated that a student, locked in the
toilet by a non-working door, would attempt to use the window to call for help or even to get
out. Considering all the circumstances, therefore, there is sufficient basis to sustain a finding of
liability on petitioners’ part.

Petitioners’ argument that CLC exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees is not decisive. Due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees is applicable where the employer is being held responsible for the acts
or omissions of others under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. In this case, CLC’s liability is under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, premised on the fact of its own negligence in not ensuring that all
its doors are properly maintained.

Our pronouncement that Timothy climbed out of the window because he could not get out
using the door, negates petitioners’ other contention that the proximate cause of the accident
was Timothy’s own negligence. The injuries he sustained from the fall were the product of a
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening cause, that originated from
CLC’s own negligence.
Joseph v. Bautista

Gr No.L-41423 Feb. 23, 1989

LUIS JOSEPH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CRISPIN V. BAUTISTA, PATROCINIO PEREZ, ANTONIO SIOSON, JACINTO PAGARIGAN,
ALBERTO CARDENO and LAZARO VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Regalado, J.

Nature:

An Appeal by Certiorari to reverse and set aside the Decision of CFI dismissing the complain of
the petitioner.

Facts:

Respondent Perez is the owner of a cargo truck for conveying cargoes and passengers for a
consideration. Petitioner, with a cargo of livestock, boarded the cargo truck, driven by
defendant Villa, after paying the sum of P9.00 as one way fare to Valenzuela. When Villa tried
to overtake a tricycle, a pick-up truck, supposedly owned by respondents Sioson and Pagarigan,
then driven by respondent Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck which was then in the
process of overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo truck to veer towards the shoulder
of the road and to ram a mango tree. As a result, petitioner sustained a bone fracture in one of
his legs.

Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent Perez, as owner of the cargo truck,
based on a breach of contract of carriage and against respondents Antonio Sioson and Lazaro
Villanueva, as owner and driver, respectively, of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict.

Respondent Sioson filed his answer alleging that he is not and never was an owner of the pick-
up truck and neither would he acquire ownership thereof in the future.

On September 24, 1973, petitioner, with prior leave of court, filed his amended complaint
impleading respondents Jacinto Pagarigan and a certain Rosario Vargas as additional alternative
defendants. Petitioner apparently could not ascertain who the real owner of said cargo truck
was, whether respondents Patrocinio Perez or Rosario Vargas, and who was the real owner of
said pick-up truck, whether respondents Antonio Sioson or Jacinto Pagarigan.

Respondent Perez filed her amended answer with crossclaim against her co-defendants for
indemnity and subrogation in the event she is ordered to pay petitioner's claim, and therein
impleaded cross-defendant Alberto Cardeno as additional alternative defendant.

On September 27, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva, Alberto Cardeno, Antonio Sioson and
Jacinto Pagarigan, thru their insurer, Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid petitioner's
claim for injuries sustained in the amount of P 1,300.00. By reason thereof, petitioner executed
a release of claim releasing from liability the following parties, viz: Insurance Corporation of the
Philippines, Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan.
On December 2, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva, Alberto Cardeno and their insurer, the
Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid respondent Patrocinio Perez' claim for damages
to her cargo truck in the amount of P 7,420.61.

Consequently, respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and Villanueva filed a "Motion to

Exonerate and Exclude Defs/ Cross defs. Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson
and Jacinto Pagarigan on the Instant Case", alleging that respondents Cardeno and Villanueva
already paid P 7,420.61 by way of damages to respondent Perez, and alleging further that
respondents Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan paid P 1,300.00 to petitioner by way of
amicable settlement.

Thereafter, respondent Perez filed her "Opposition to Cross-defs.' motion dated Dec. 2, 1974
and Counter Motion" to dismiss. The so-called counter motion to dismiss was premised on the
fact that the release of claim executed by petitioner in favor of the other respondents inured to
the benefit of respondent Perez, considering that all the respondents are solidarity liable to
herein petitioner.

Respondent Judge dismissed the case. The motion for the reconsideration was denied. Hence,
this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge erred in declaring that the release of claim executed by
petitioner in favor of respondents Sioson, Villanueva and Pagarigan inured to the benefit of
respondent Perez? (YES)

Ruling:

The argument that there are two causes of action embodied in petitioner's complaint, hence the
judgment on the compromise agreement under the cause of action based on quasi-delict is not
a bar to the cause of action for breach of contract of carriage, is untenable.

A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the
defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. It is true that a single act or
omission can be violative of various rights at the same time , as when the act constitutes
juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. However where there is
only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of the number of rights
that may have been violated belonging to one person.

The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the- delict or wrong violating the
rights of one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only
one cause of action arises. In the case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner sustained
a single injury on his person. That vested in him a single cause of action, albeit with the
correlative rights of action against the different respondents through the appropriate remedies
allowed by law.

The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only one cause of action
involved although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the defendants therein
were not necessarily identical since the respondents were not identically circumstanced.
However, a recovery by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the
other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery
for the same act or omission which, obviously, stems from the fundamental rule against unjust
enrichment.

There is no question that the respondents herein are solidarily liable to petitioner. On the
evidence presented in the court below, the trial court found them to be so liable. It is
undisputed that petitioner, in his amended complaint, prayed that the trial court hold
respondents jointly and severally liable. Furthermore, the allegations in the amended complaint
clearly impleaded respondents as solidary debtors. We cannot accept the vacuous contention of
petitioner that said allegations are intended to apply only in the event that execution be issued
in his favor. There is nothing in law or jurisprudence which would countenance such a
procedure.

The respondents having been found to be solidarity liable to petitioner, the full payment made
by some of the solidary debtors and their subsequent release from any and all liability to
petitioner inevitably resulted in the extinguishment and release from liability of the other
solidary debtors, including herein respondent Patrocinio Perez.

The claim that there was an agreement entered into between the parties during the pre-trial
conference that, after such payment made by the other respondents, the case shall proceed as
against respondent Perez is both incredible and unsubstantiated. There is nothing in the records
to show, either by way of a pre-trial order, minutes or a transcript of the notes of the alleged
pre-trial hearing, that there was indeed such as agreement.
Ochoa v. G&S Transport

G.R. No. 170071 March 9, 2011

HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA namely: RUBY B. OCHOA, MICAELA B. OCHOA and JOMAR
B. OCHOA, Petitioners,
vs.
G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 170125
G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA namely: RUBY B. OCHOA, MICAELA B. OCHOA and JOMAR
B. OCHOA, Respondents.
Del Castillo, J.

What is clear from the records is that there existed a contract of carriage between G & S, as the
owner and operator of the Avis taxicab, and Jose Marcial, as the passenger of said vehicle. As a
common carrier, G & S "is bound to carry [Jose Marcial] safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for
all the circumstances." However, Jose Marcial was not able to reach his destination safely as he
died during the course of the travel. "In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the
common carrier is at fault or is negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. In fact, there is
even no need for the court to make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the
common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier
exercised extraordinary diligence." Unfortunately, G & S miserably failed to overcome this
presumption. Both the trial court and the CA found that the accident which led to Jose Marcial’s
death was due to the reckless driving and gross negligence of G & S’ driver, Padilla, thereby
holding G & S liable to the heirs of Jose Marcial for breach of contract of carriage.

The acquittal of Padilla in the criminal case is immaterial to the instant case for breach of
contract

Article 31 of the Civil Code provides, viz:

When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

In this case, the action filed by the heirs is primarily for the recovery of damages arising from
breach of contract of carriage allegedly committed by G & S. Clearly, it is an independent civil
action arising from contract which is separate and distinct from the criminal action for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide filed by the heirs against Padilla by reason of the same
incident. Hence, regardless of Padilla’s acquittal or conviction in said criminal case, same has no
bearing in the resolution of the present case. There was therefore no error on the part of the
CA when it resolved this case without regard to the fact that Padilla has already been acquitted
by the RTC in the criminal case. Moreover, while the CA quoted some portions of the MTC
Decision in said criminal case, we however find that those quoted portions were only meant to
belie G & S’ claim that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the driver of
the delivery van which allegedly hit the Avis taxicab. Even without those quoted portions, the
appellate court’s ultimate finding that it was Padilla’s negligence which was the proximate cause
of the mishap would still be the same. This is because the CA has, in fact, already made this
declaration in the earlier part of its assailed Decision. The fact that the MTC Decision from
which the subject quoted portions were lifted has already been reversed by the RTC is therefore
immaterial.
Philippine School of Business Administration, Et. al. v. CA

Gr No. 84698 Jan 4, 1992

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P. PAULINO,
ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA,
respondents.
Padilla, J.

Facts:

A stabbing incident which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the the Philippine
School of Business Administration (PSBA), where he is enrolled as a third year commerce
student, prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the RTC for damages against the
said PSBA and its corporate officers. It was established that his assailants were not members of
the school's academic community but were elements from outside the school. Substantially, the
plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for the victim's untimely
demise due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means
and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim. During the proceedings a quo,
Lt. M. Soriano terminated his relationship with the other petitioners by resigning from his
position in the school.

Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they
are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of
action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions,
such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article.

The respondent trial court denied their motion to dismiss. CA affirmed the trial court's orders.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the motion to dismiss filed by PSBA was properly denied? (YES)

Ruling:

At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent appellate court primarily anchored its
decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
Pertinent portions of the appellate court's now assailed ruling state:

Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code is an adoption from the old Spanish
Civil Code. The comments of Manresa and learned authorities on its meaning should
give way to present day changes. The law is not fixed and flexible (sic); it must be
dynamic. In fact, the greatest value and significance of law as a rule of conduct in (sic)
its flexibility to adopt to changing social conditions and its capacity to meet the new
challenges of progress.
 Construed in the light of modern day educational system, Article 2180 cannot be
construed in its narrow concept as held in the old case of Exconde vs. Capuno and
Mercado vs. Court of Appeals; hence, the ruling in the Palisoc case that it should apply
to all kinds of educational institutions, academic or vocational.

At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff liable unless they
relieve themselves of such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 2180 by
"proving that they observed all the diligence to prevent damage." This can only be done
at a trial on the merits of the case.

While we agree with the respondent appellate court that the motion to dismiss the complaint
was correctly denied and the complaint should be tried on the merits, we do not however agree
with the premises of the appellate court's ruling.

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in
loco parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza,
Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. In all such cases, it had been
stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused
or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the
acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist
in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the
PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract
between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with .
For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would
presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education
or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their
students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of
imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher
mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or
grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant
threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to
maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.

Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA
and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176
shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual
obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or
implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence
of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the
private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat
aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-
airline's liability as one arising from tort, not one arising from a contract of carriage. In effect,
Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract,
for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort . (Austro-America S.S. Co. vs. Thomas,
248 Fed. 231).

This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already of a
similar mind. In Cangco vs. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus:

The field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than that of contractual obligation,
comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields,
figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another
by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a
contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the
same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an
extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.

Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations,
particularly Article 21, which provides:

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good custom or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
(emphasis supplied).

Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened the petitioner's employee
to forcibly oust the private respondent to cater to the comfort of a white man who allegedly
"had a better right to the seat." In Austro-American, supra, the public embarrassment caused to
the passenger was the justification for the Circuit Court of Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award
damages to the latter. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that should the act which
breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be violative of Article 21, then there is a cause to
view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the
contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in
providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if
there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual
obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be
relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the
contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a
condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist
independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in
Article 21 of the Civil Code.

This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of schools,
above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its
students against all risks. This is especially true in the populous student communities of the so-
called "university belt" in Manila where there have been reported several incidents ranging from
gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to
anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security
measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group determined to carry
out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school
may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students
was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the
circumstances of persons, time and place.

As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondents'
complaint, the record is bereft of all the material facts. Obviously, at this stage, only the trial
court can make such a determination from the evidence still to unfold.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The court of origin
(RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of
the Court. Costs against the petitioners.
Air France V. Carrascoso

18 Scra 155 September 28, 1966

AIR FRANCE, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Sanchez, J.

Facts:

Respondent, boarding the plane of the Petitioner, was forced to vacate his first class seat he
was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white
man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. Respondent refused to give
up the seat “over his dead body”; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G.
Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out
that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all
across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man;" and
plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.

Issue:

The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish
plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That
said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at
Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso
to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in
the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and
humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term
bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the
facts and circumstances set forth therein. 34 The contract was averred to establish the relation
between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.

Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed
petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in
Bangkok, Carrascoso was ousted by petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a white man; 35
and (b) evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection
on the part of the petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there
is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the
complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the
evidence is not even required.

The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is
well settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his
employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:

ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the
provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable.

A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation. 43 And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the
public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts
and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended
with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give
ground for an action for damages.

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to
be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such
employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.

Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of
contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to
falsely notify her that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection,
though the language used was not insulting and she was not ejected." 46 And this, because,
although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature"
nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". 47 And in another case,
"Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor came to collect his fare tendered
him the cash fare to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as
soon as the train reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point to destination,
there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor in using
insulting language to him, as by calling him a lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of South
Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said passenger.1awphîl.nèt

Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of
Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of
public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant
exemplary damages — in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant
should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The
manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal
precept. And this, in addition to moral damages.
Regino V. Pangasinan Colleges Of Science And Technology, Gr No. 156109, Nov 18, 2004

KHRISTINE REA M. REGINO, Assisted and Represented by ARMANDO REGINO, petitioner, vs.
PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, RACHELLE A. GAMUROT and ELISSA
BALADAD, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.

Upon enrolment, students and their school enter upon a reciprocal contract. The students agree
to abide by the standards of academic performance and codes of conduct, issued usually in the
form of manuals that are distributed to the enrollees at the start of the school term. Further,
the school informs them of the itemized fees they are expected to pay. Consequently, it cannot,
after the enrolment of a student, vary the terms of the contract. It cannot require fees other
than those it specified upon enrolment.
Nature of the case: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

Facts: Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at
Respondent Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST). Reared in a poor family,
Regino went to college mainly through the financial support of her relatives. During the second
semester of school year 2001-2002, she enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under
Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as teachers.

In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the "Rave Party and Dance
Revolution," the proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the school's tennis and
volleyball courts. Each student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100 each.
The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students who purchased tickets with
additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to
take the final examinations.

Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending dance parties and
celebrations, Regino refused to pay for the tickets. On March 14 and March 15, 2002, the
scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic and statistics, her teachers -- Respondents
Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad -- allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests.
According to petitioner, Gamurot made her sit out her logic class while her classmates were
taking their examinations. The next day, Baladad, after announcing to the entire class that she
was not permitting petitioner and another student to take their statistics examinations for failing
to pay for their tickets, allegedly ejected them from the classroom. Petitioner's pleas ostensibly
went unheeded by Gamurot and Baladad, who unrelentingly defended their positions as
compliance with PCST's policy.

Issue: Whether or not the PCST is liable for tort.

Held: In her Complaint, petitioner also charged that private respondents "inhumanly punish
students x x x by reason only of their poverty, religious practice or lowly station in life, which
inculcated upon [petitioner] the feelings of guilt, disgrace and unworthiness;" 33 as a result of
such punishment, she was allegedly unable to finish any of her subjects for the second
semester of that school year and had to lag behind in her studies by a full year. The acts of
respondents supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, mental agony and "demoralization of
unimaginable proportions" in violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code. These
provisions of the law state thus:

"Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."

"Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage."

"Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they
may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs, lowly station in life,
place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition."

Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise bound by a contract. An
academic institution, however, may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with
its students, since the act that violated the contract may also be a tort. We ruled thus in PSBA
vs. CA,34 from which we quote:

"x x x A perusal of Article 2176 [of the Civil Code] shows that obligations arising from
quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between
parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this
impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even
when there obtains a contract. In Air France v. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private
respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat
aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the
petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort, not one arising form a contract of
carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist
even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. x x x
This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was
already of a similar mind. In Cangco v. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher
elucidated thus: 'x x x. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break
the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the
contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no
contract existed between the parties.'

"Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations,
particularly Article 21 x x x."35
Reciprocity of the School-Student Contract - In Alcuaz v. PSBA,23 the Court characterized
the relationship between the school and the student as a contract, in which "a student, once
admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester." 24 Two years later, in Non v.
Dames II,25 the Court modified the "termination of contract theory" in Alcuaz by holding that the
contractual relationship between the school and the student is not only semestral in duration,
but for the entire period the latter are expected to complete it." 26 Except for the variance in the
period during which the contractual relationship is considered to subsist, both Alcuaz and Non
were unanimous in characterizing the school-student relationship as contractual in nature.

The school-student relationship is also reciprocal. Thus, it has consequences appurtenant to and
inherent in all contracts of such kind -- it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and
obligations. The school undertakes to provide students with education sufficient to enable them
to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the students agree to abide by
the academic requirements of the school and to observe its rules and regulations. 27

The terms of the school-student contract are defined at the moment of its inception -- upon
enrolment of the student. Standards of academic performance and the code of behavior and
discipline are usually set forth in manuals distributed to new students at the start of every
school year. Further, schools inform prospective enrollees the amount of fees and the terms of
payment.

In practice, students are normally required to make a down payment upon enrollment, with the
balance to be paid before every preliminary, midterm and final examination. Their failure to pay
their financial obligation is regarded as a valid ground for the school to deny them the
opportunity to take these examinations.

The foregoing practice does not merely ensure compliance with financial obligations; it also
underlines the importance of major examinations. Failure to take a major examination is usually
fatal to the students' promotion to the next grade or to graduation. Examination results form a
significant basis for their final grades. These tests are usually a primary and an indispensable
requisite to their elevation to the next educational level and, ultimately, to their completion of a
course.

Education is not a measurable commodity. It is not possible to determine who is "better

educated" than another. Nevertheless, a student's grades are an accepted approximation of
what would otherwise be an intangible product of countless hours of study. The importance of
grades cannot be discounted in a setting where education is generally the gate pass to
employment opportunities and better life; such grades are often the means by which a
prospective employer measures whether a job applicant has acquired the necessary tools or
skills for a particular profession or trade.

Thus, students expect that upon their payment of tuition fees, satisfaction of the set academic
standards, completion of academic requirements and observance of school rules and
regulations, the school would reward them by recognizing their "completion" of the course
enrolled in.

The obligation on the part of the school has been established in Magtibay v. Garcia, 28 Licup v.
University of San Carlos29 and Ateneo de Manila University v. Garcia, 30 in which the Court held
that, barring any violation of the rules on the part of the students, an institution of higher
learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the
course they seek to pursue.

We recognize the need of a school to fund its facilities and to meet astronomical operating
costs; this is a reality in running it. Crystal v. Cebu International School 31 upheld the imposition
by respondent school of a "land purchase deposit" in the amount of P50,000 per student to be
used for the "purchase of a piece of land and for the construction of new buildings and other
facilities x x x which the school would transfer [to] and occupy after the expiration of its lease
contract over its present site."

The amount was refundable after the student graduated or left the school. After noting that the
imposition of the fee was made only after prior consultation and approval by the parents of the
students, the Court held that the school committed no actionable wrong in refusing to admit the
children of the petitioners therein for their failure to pay the "land purchase deposit" and the
2.5 percent monthly surcharge thereon.

In the present case, PCST imposed the assailed revenue-raising measure belatedly, in the
middle of the semester. It exacted the dance party fee as a condition for the students' taking
the final examinations, and ultimately for its recognition of their ability to finish a course. The
fee, however, was not part of the school-student contract entered into at the start of the school
year. Hence, it could not be unilaterally imposed to the prejudice of the enrollees.

Such contract is by no means an ordinary one. In Non, we stressed that the school-student
contract "is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution
to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all
educational institutions." 32 Sections 5 (1) and (3) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution provide:

"The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all
levels and shall take appropriate steps to make such declaration accessible to all.

"Every student has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."

The same state policy resonates in Section 9(2) of BP 232, otherwise known as the Education
Act of 1982:

"Section 9. Rights of Students in School. – In addition to other rights, and subject to the
limitations prescribed by law and regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall
enjoy the following rights:

xxx    xxx    xxx

(2) The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and
to continue their course therein up to graduation, except in cases of academic
deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations."
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Orders
REVERSED. The trial court is DIRECTED to reinstate the Complaint and, with all deliberate
speed, to continue the proceedings in Civil Case No. U-7541. No costs.
Construction Development Corporation Of The Philippines V. Estrella, Et.Al., Gr No.147791,
Sept. 8, 2006

CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. REBECCA

G. ESTRELLA, RACHEL E. FLETCHER, PHILIPPINE PHOENIX SURETY & INSURANCE INC.,
BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS CO., and WILFREDO DATINGUINOO, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Nature of the case: This petition for review assails the March 29, 2001 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 46896, which affirmed with modification the February 9, 1993
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. R-82-2137, finding
Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. (BLTB) and Construction Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP) liable for damages.

Facts: On December 29, 1978, respondents Rebecca G. Estrella and her granddaughter, Rachel
E. Fletcher, boarded in San Pablo City, a BLTB bus bound for Pasay City. However, they never
reached their destination because their bus was rammed from behind by a tractor-truck of
CDCP in the South Expressway. The strong impact pushed forward their seats and pinned their
knees to the seats in front of them. They regained consciousness only when rescuers created a
hole in the bus and extricated their legs from under the seats. They were brought to the Makati
Medical Center where the doctors diagnosed their injuries. Thereafter, respondents filed a
Complaint5 for damages against CDCP, BLTB, Espiridion Payunan, Jr. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13. They alleged (1) that Payunan, Jr. and
Datinguinoo, who were the drivers of CDCP and BLTB buses, respectively, were negligent and
did not obey traffic laws; (2) that BLTB and CDCP did not exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees; (3) that BLTB allowed its
bus to operate knowing that it lacked proper maintenance thus exposing its passengers to
grave danger; (4) that they suffered actual damages amounting to P250,000.00 for Estrella and
P300,000.00 for Fletcher; (5) that they suffered physical discomfort, serious anxiety, fright and
mental anguish, besmirched reputation and wounded feelings, moral shock, and lifelong social
humiliation; (6) that defendants failed to act with justice, give respondents their due, observe
honesty and good faith which entitles them to claim for exemplary damage; and (7) that they
are entitled to a reasonable amount of attorney's fees and litigation expenses. CDCP filed its
Answer which was later amended to include a third-party complaint against Philippine Phoenix
Surety and Insurance, Inc. (Phoenix). On February 9, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision
finding CDCP and BLTB and their employees liable for damages.

The trial court held that BLTB, as a common carrier, was bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the safety of its passengers. It must carry the passengers safely
as far as human care and foresight provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. Thus, where a passenger dies or is
injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or has acted negligently. BLTB's inability
to carry respondents to their destination gave rise to an action for breach of contract of carriage
while its failure to rebut the presumption of negligence made it liable to respondents for the
breach.
Issue: Whether or not the court of appeals gravely erred in not holding respondents bltb and/or
its driver Wilfredo Datinguinoo solely liable for the damages sustained by herein respondents
Fletcher and Estrella.

Held: The case filed by respondents against petitioner is an action for culpa aquiliana or quasi-
delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 13 In this regard, Article 2180 provides that the
obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable for the acts or omissions of those persons for
whom one is responsible. Consequently, an action based on quasi-delict may be instituted
against the employer for an employee's act or omission. The liability for the negligent conduct
of the subordinate is direct  and primary, but is subject to the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee. 14 In the instant case, the trial court found that
petitioner failed to prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of Payunan, Jr.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals found petitioner solidarily liable with BLTB for the
actual damages suffered by respondents because of the injuries they sustained. It was
established that Payunan, Jr. was driving recklessly because of the skid marks as shown in the
sketch of the police investigator.

It is well-settled in Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,15 that the owner of the other vehicle which
collided with a common carrier is solidarily liable to the injured passenger of the same. We held,
thus:

The same rule of liability was applied in situations where the negligence of the driver of
the bus on which plaintiff was riding concurred with the negligence of a third party who
was the driver of another vehicle, thus causing an accident. In Anuran v.
Buño, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court , and Metro
Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals , the bus company, its driver, the
operator of the other vehicle and the driver of the vehicle were jointly and
severally held liable to the injured passenger or the latter's heirs. The basis of
this allocation of liability was explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals,  thus:

Nor should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner [bus owner]
springs from contract while that of respondents [owner and driver of other
vehicle] arises from quasi-delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs.
Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the
driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers
as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages. x
xx

xxxx

As in the case of BLTB, private respondents in this case and her co-plaintiffs did not
stake out their claim against the carrier and the driver exclusively on one theory, much
less on that of breach of contract alone. After all, it was permitted for them to
allege alternative causes of action and join as many parties as may be liable
on such causes of action so long as private respondent and her co-plaintiffs
do not recover twice for the same injury. What is clear from the cases is the intent
 of the plaintiff there to recover from both the carrier and the driver, thus justifying the
holding that the carrier and the driver were jointly and severally liable because their
separate and distinct acts concurred to produce the same injury. 16 (Emphasis supplied)

In a "joint" obligation, each obligor answers only for a part of the whole liability; in a "solidary"
or "joint and several" obligation, the relationship between the active and the passive subjects is
so close that each of them must comply with or demand the fulfillment of the whole obligation.
In Lafarge Cement v. Continental Cement Corporation ,17 we reiterated that joint tort feasors are
jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. Citing Worcester v. Ocampo,18 we
held that:

x x x The difficulty in the contention of the appellants is that they fail to recognize that
the basis of the present action is tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that
each joint tort feasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates,
but is also jointly liable with his tort feasors. x x x

It may be stated as a general rule that joint tort feasors are all the persons who
command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or
abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their
benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner
as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. x x x

Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The
persons injured may sue all of them or any number less than all. Each is liable for the
whole damages caused by all, and all together are jointly liable for the whole damage. It
is no defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act
are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation
in the tort was insignificant as compared to that of the others. x x x

Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be apportioned among
them, except among themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the
purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the
whole amount. x x x

A payment in full for the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors, of course
satisfies any claim which might exist against the others. There can be but satisfaction.
The release of one of the joint tort feasors by agreement generally operates to
discharge all. x x x

Of course the court during trial may find that some of the alleged tort feasors are liable
and that others are not liable. The courts may release some for lack of evidence while
condemning others of the alleged tort feasors. And this is true even though they are
charged jointly and severally.19

Petitioner's claim that paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion of the trial court's decision is
ambiguous and arbitrary and also entitles respondents to recover twice is without basis. In the
body of the trial court's decision, it was clearly stated that petitioner and its driver Payunan, Jr.,
are jointly and solidarily liable for moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to respondent
Fletcher and P25,000.00 to respondent Estrella. 20 Moreover, there could be no double recovery
because the award in paragraph 2 is for moral damages while the award in paragraph 1 is for
actual damages and attorney's fees.

Petitioner next claims that the damages, attorney's fees, and legal interest awarded by the
Court of Appeals are excessive.

Moral damages may be recovered in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. 21 The award of
moral damages in favor of Fletcher and Estrella in the amount of P80,000.00 must be reduced
since prevailing jurisprudence fixed the same at P50,000.00. 22 While moral damages are not
intended to enrich the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant, the award should nonetheless
be commensurate to the suffering inflicted. 23

The Court of Appeals correctly awarded respondents exemplary damages in the amount of
P20,000.00 each. Exemplary damages may be awarded in addition to moral and compensatory
damages.24 Article 2231 of the Civil Code also states that in quasi-delicts, exemplary damages
may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. 25 In this case, petitioner's driver
was driving recklessly at the time its truck rammed the BLTB bus. Petitioner, who has direct and
primary liability for the negligent conduct of its subordinates, was also found negligent in the
selection and supervision of its employees. In Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals,26 we held, thus:

ART. 2229 of the Civil Code also provides that such damages may be imposed, by way
of example or correction for the public good. While exemplary damages cannot be
recovered as a matter of right, they need not be proved, although plaintiff must show
that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may
consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded.
Exemplary Damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to
serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious
actions.

Regarding attorney's fees, we held in Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v.

National Labor Relations Commission,27 that:

There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called ordinary
and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the
latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his
agreement with the client.

In its extraordinary concept, an attorney's fee is an indemnity for damages

ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The basis of
this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, such as those
authorized in Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the
client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as
additional compensation or as part thereof. 28 (Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded attorney's fees and other expenses
of litigation as they may be recovered as actual or compensatory damages when exemplary
damages are awarded; when the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy the plaintiff's valid, just and demandable claim; and in any other case where the court
deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered.29

Regarding the imposition of legal interest at the rate of 6% from the time of the filing of the
complaint, we held in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals ,30 that when an
obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts
is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for payment of interest in the concept of actual
and compensatory damages,31 subject to the following rules, to wit –

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money,
i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have
been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest
from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest
shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial
demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an

interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the
court at the rate of 6%   per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established
with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable
certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or
extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only
from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case,
be on the amount finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final
and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under
paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such
finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then
an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.32 (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, the legal interest of 6% shall begin to run on February 9, 1993 when the trial court
rendered judgment and not on February 4, 1980 when the complaint was filed. This is because
at the time of the filing of the complaint, the amount of the damages to which plaintiffs may be
entitled remains unliquidated and unknown, until it is definitely ascertained, assessed and
determined by the court and only upon presentation of proof thereon. 33 From the time the
judgment becomes final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% until its satisfaction.

Anent the last issue of whether petitioner can recover under its insurance policy from Phoenix,
we affirm the findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus:
 As regards the liability of Phoenix, the court a quo correctly ruled that defendant-
appellant CDCP's claim against Phoenix already prescribed pursuant to Section 384 of
P.D. 612, as amended, which provides:

Any person having any claim upon the policy issued pursuant to this chapter
shall, without any unnecessary delay, present to the insurance company
concerned a written notice of claim setting forth the nature, extent and duration
of the injuries sustained as certified by a duly licensed physician. Notice of
claim must be filed within six months from date of the accident, otherwise, the
claim shall be deemed waived. Action or suit for recovery of damage due to loss
or injury must be brought in proper cases, with the Commissioner or Courts
within one year from denial of the claim, otherwise, the claimant's right of action
shall prescribe. (As amended by PD 1814, BP 874.)34

The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. A written notice of claim must be filed
within six months from the date of the accident. Since petitioner never made any claim within
six months from the date of the accident, its claim has already prescribed.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 46896 dated March 29, 2001, which modified the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. R-82-2137, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that petitioner is held jointly and severally liable to pay (1) actual damages in
the amount of P79,354.43; (2) moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 each for Rachel
Fletcher and Rebecca Estrella; (3) exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 each for
Rebecca Estrella and Rachel Fletcher; and (4) thirty percent (30%) of the total amount
recovered as attorney's fees. The total amount adjudged shall earn interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from the date of judgment of the trial court until finality of this judgment. From the
time this Decision becomes final and executory and the judgment amount remains unsatisfied,
the same shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per annum until its satisfaction.
Umali V. Bacani, 69 Scra 263

G.R. No. L-40570 January 30, 1976

TEODORO C. UMALI, petitioner, vs. HON. ANGEL BACANI, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and FIDEL H. SAYNES, respondents.

Julia M. Armas for petitioner.

Antonio de los Reyes for private respondent.

ESGUERRA, J.

Nature of the case: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan Branch IX, in Civil Case No. U2412, entitled, "Fidel H. Saynes, plaintiff-appellee
versus Teodoro C. Umali, defendant-appellant", which found the death by electrocution of
Manuel Saynes, a boy of 3 years and 8 months, as "due to the fault or negligence of the
defendant (Umali) as owner and manager of the Alcala Electric Plant", although the liability of
defendant is mitigated by the contributory negligence of the parents of the boy "in not
providing for the proper and delegate supervision and control over their son.

Facts: On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan,
which started from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon and lasted up to about midnight of the same
day. During the storm, the banana plants standing on an elevated ground along the barrio road
in San Pedro Ili of said municipality and near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant
were blown down and fell on the electric wire. As a result, the live electric wire was cut, one
end of which was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the ground under the
fallen banana plants. On the following morning, at about 9:00 o'clock barrio captain Luciano
Bueno of San Pedro Iii who was passing by saw the broken electric wire and so he warned the
people in the place not to go near the wire for they might get hurt. He also saw Cipriano
Baldomero, a laborer of the Alcala Electric Plant near the place and notified him right then and
there of the broken line and asked him to fix it, but the latter told the barrio captain that he
could not do it but that he was going to look for the lineman to fix it.

Sometime after the barrio captain and Cipriano Baldomero had left the place, a small boy of 3
years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite
side of the road, went to the place where the broken line wire was and got in contact with it.
The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only after the electrocution of
Manuel Saynes that the broken wire was fixed at about 10:00 o'clock on the same morning by
the lineman of the electric plant.

Petitioner claims that he could not be liable under the concept of quasi-delict or tort as owner
and manager of the Alcala Electric Plant because the proximate cause of the boy's death
electrocution could not be due to any negligence on his part, but rather to a fortuitous event-
the storm that caused the banana plants to fall and cut the electric line-pointing out the
absence of negligence on the part of his employee Cipriano Baldomero who tried to have the
line repaired and the presence of negligence of the parents of the child in allowing him to leave
his house during that time.

Issue: Whether or not the Petitioner is liable for the injury caused by his employee’s negligence.
(YES)

Held: Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the
victim in this case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendants' lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall
mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not
exempt him from liability. Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his employee’s negligence is
well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which states:

The owner and manager of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on
tile occasion of their functions.

The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer because the
employer is supposed to exercise supervision over the work of the employees. This liability of
the employer is primary and direct (Standard Vacuum Oil Co. vs. Tan and Court of Appeals, 107
Phil. 109). In fact the proper defense for the employer to raise so that he may escape liability is
to prove that he exercised, the diligence of the good father of the family to prevent damage not
only in the selection of his employees but also in adequately supervising them over their work.
This defense was not adequately proven as found by the trial Court, and We do not find any
sufficient reason to deviate from its finding.

Notwithstanding diligent efforts, we fail to fired any reversible error committed by the trial Court
in this case, either in its appreciation of the evidence on questions of facts or on the
interpretation and application of laws government quasi-delicts and liabilities emanating
therefrom. The inevitable conclusion is that no error amounting to grave abuse of discretion
was committed and the decision must be left untouched.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court dated June 27, 1974 is
affirmed.