1. Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v.

COA, GR 169752
NATURE OF THE CASE: Before the Court is a special civil action for Certiorari  and  Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 2 of Rule 64, filed by the petitioner
assailing Office Order No. 2005-021 1 dated September 14, 2005 issued by the respondents
which constituted the audit team, as well as its September 23, 2005 Letter 2 informing the
petitioner that respondents’ audit team shall conduct an audit survey on the petitioner for a
detailed audit of its accounts, operations, and financial transactions. No temporary restraining
order was issued.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

FACTS: The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity over one hundred years ago by
virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on January 19, 1905, by the Philippine Commission. The
petitioner, at the time it was created, was composed of animal aficionados and animal
propagandists. The objects of the petitioner, as stated in Section 2 of its charter, shall be to
enforce laws relating to cruelty inflicted upon animals or the protection of animals in the
Philippine Islands, and generally, to do and perform all things which may tend in any way to
alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their welfare.

The petitioner avers that it does not have the authority to impose fines for violation of animal
welfare laws; it only enjoyed the privilege of sharing in the fines imposed and collected from its
efforts in the enforcement of animal welfare laws; such privilege, however, was subsequently
abolished by C.A. No. 148; that it continues to exist as a private corporation since it was
created by the Philippine Commission before the effectivity of the Corporation law, Act No.
1459; and the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions. The OSG submits that Act No. 1285 and its
amendatory laws did not give petitioner the authority to impose fines for violation of laws12
relating to the prevention of cruelty to animals and the protection of animals; that even prior to
the amendment of Act No. 1285, petitioner was only entitled to share in the fines imposed; C.A.
No. 148 abolished that privilege to share in the fines collected; that petitioner is a public
corporation and has continued to exist since Act No. 1285; petitioner was not repealed by the
1935 and 1987 Constitutions which contain transitory provisions maintaining all laws issued not
inconsistent therewith until amended, modified or repealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner qualifies as a government agency that may be subject to
audit by respondent COA.

HELD: In a legal regime where the charter test doctrine cannot be applied, the mere fact that a
corporation has been created by virtue of a special law does not necessarily qualify it as a
public corporation. What then is the nature of the petitioner as a corporate entity? What legal
regime governs its rights, powers, and duties? As stated, at the time the petitioner was formed,
the applicable law was the Philippine Bill of 1902, and, emphatically, as also stated above, no
proscription similar to the charter test can be found therein. The textual foundation of the
charter test, which placed a limitation on the power of the legislature, first appeared in the
1935 Constitution. However, the petitioner was incorporated in 1905 by virtue of Act No. 1258,
a law antedating the Corporation Law (Act No. 1459) by a year, and the 1935 Constitution, by
thirty years. There being neither a general law on the formation and organization of private
corporations nor a restriction on the legislature to create private corporations by direct
legislation, the Philippine Commission at that moment in history was well within its powers in
1905 to constitute the petitioner as a private juridical entity. 1âwphi1
Time and again the Court must caution even the most brilliant scholars of the law and all
constitutional historians on the danger of imposing legal concepts of a later date on facts of an
earlier date.20
The amendments introduced by C.A. No. 148 made it clear that the petitioner was a private
corporation and not an agency of the government. This was evident in Executive Order No. 63,
issued by then President of the Philippines Manuel L. Quezon, declaring that the revocation of
the powers of the petitioner to appoint agents with powers of arrest "corrected a serious
defect" in one of the laws existing in the statute books. As a curative statute, and based on the
doctrines so far discussed, C.A. No. 148 has to be given retroactive effect, thereby freeing all
doubt as to which class of corporations the petitioner belongs, that is, it is a quasi-public
corporation, a kind of private domestic corporation, which the Court will further elaborate on
under the fourth point.
A reading of petitioner’s charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision by any
agency of the State, unlike government-owned and -controlled corporations. No government
representative sits on the board of trustees of the petitioner. Like all private corporations, the
successors of its members are determined voluntarily and solely by the petitioner in accordance
with its by-laws, and may exercise those powers generally accorded to private corporations,
such as the powers to hold property, to sue and be sued, to use a common seal, and so forth.
It may adopt by-laws for its internal operations: the petitioner shall be managed or operated by
its officers "in accordance with its by-laws in force."
The respondents contend that the petitioner is a "body politic" because its primary purpose is to
secure the protection and welfare of animals which, in turn, redounds to the public good. This
argument, is, at best, specious.
The fact that a certain juridical entity is impressed with public interest does not, by that
circumstance alone, make the entity a public corporation, inasmuch as a corporation may be
private although its charter contains provisions of a public character, incorporated solely for the
public good. This class of corporations may be considered quasi-public corporations, which are
private corporations that render public service, supply public wants, 21 or pursue other
eleemosynary objectives. While purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its members, they
are required by law to discharge functions for the public benefit. Examples of these
corporations are utility,22 railroad, warehouse, telegraph, telephone, water supply corporations
and transportation companies.23 It must be stressed that a quasi-public corporation is a
species of private corporations, but the qualifying factor is the type of service the former
renders to the public: if it performs a public service, then it becomes a quasi-public
corporation.241âwphi1 Authorities are of the view that the purpose alone of the corporation
cannot be taken as a safe guide, for the fact is that almost all corporations are nowadays
created to promote the interest, good, or convenience of the public. A bank, for example, is a
private corporation; yet, it is created for a public benefit. Private schools and universities are
likewise private corporations; and yet, they are rendering public service. Private hospitals and
wards are charged with heavy social responsibilities. More so with all common carriers. On the
other hand, there may exist a public corporation even if it is endowed with gifts or donations
from private individuals.
The true criterion, therefore, to determine whether a corporation is public or private is found in
the totality of the relation of the corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by the
State as the latter’s own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental
functions, then that corporation is considered public; otherwise, it is private. Applying the above
test, provinces, chartered cities, and barangays can best exemplify public corporations. They
are created by the State as its own device and agency for the accomplishment of parts of its
own public works.25
As to the respondents argument that since the charter of the petitioner requires the latter to
render periodic reports to the Civil Governor, whose functions have been inherited by the
President, the petitioner is, therefore, a government instrumentality. This contention is
inconclusive. By virtue of the fiction that all corporations owe their very existence and powers to
the State, the reportorial requirement is applicable to all corporations of whatever nature,
whether they are public, quasi-public, or private corporations—as creatures of the State, there
is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate the activities of a corporation to determine
whether it acted within its powers. In other words, the reportorial requirement is the principal
means by which the State may see to it that its creature acted according to the powers and
functions conferred upon it. These principles were extensively discussed in Bataan Shipyard &
Engineering Co., Inc. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government .26 Here, the Court, in
holding that the subject corporation could not invoke the right against self-incrimination
whenever the State demanded the production of its corporate books and papers, extensively
discussed the purpose of reportorial requirements, viz:
x x x The corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be incorporated for the
benefit of the public. It received certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them
subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law.
It can make no contract not authorized by its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only
preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserve[d] right in the
legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. It would
be a strange anomaly to hold that a state, having chartered a corporation to make use of
certain franchises, could not, in the exercise of sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had
been employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the production of the
corporate books and papers for that purpose . The defense amounts to this, that an officer of
the corporation which is charged with a criminal violation of the statute may plead the
criminality of such corporation as a refusal to produce its books. To state this proposition is to
answer it. While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless
protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation vested with special
privileges and franchises may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such
privileges. (Wilson v. United States, 55 Law Ed., 771, 780.) 27
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner is DECLARED a
private domestic corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. The respondents are ENJOINED from investigating, examining and auditing the
petitioner's fiscal and financial affairs.

Test to Determine whether a Corporation is GOCC or Private in Nature

(a) Charter test;
(b) Purpose test; and
(b) Totality test.
2. Camid v. Office of the President, GR 161414

NATURE OF THE CASE: This Petition for Certiorari presents this Court with the prospect of our
own Brigadoon1 the municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur which like its counterpart in filmdom,
is a town that is not supposed to exist yet is anyway insisted by some as actually alive and
thriving. Yet unlike in the movies, there is nothing mystical, ghostly or anything even remotely
charming about the purported existence of Andong. The creation of the putative municipality
was declared void ab initio by this Court four decades ago, but the present petition insists that
in spite of this insurmountable obstacle Andong thrives on, and hence, its legal personality
should be given judicial affirmation. The Court disagrees.

TINGA, J.

FACTS: The factual antecedents derive from the promulgation of our ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor
General in 1965. As discussed therein, then President Diosdado Macapagal issued several
Executive Orders creating thirty-three (33) municipalities in Mindanao. Among them was
Andong in Lanao del Sur which was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 107. These
executive orders were issued after legislative bills for the creation of municipalities involved in
that case had failed to pass Congress. President Diosdado Macapagal justified the creation of
these municipalities citing his powers under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Then Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a special civil action for a writ of prohibition,
alleging in main that the Executive Orders were null and void, Section 68 having been repealed
by Republic Act No. 2370, and said orders constituting an undue delegation of legislative power.
After due deliberation, the Court unanimously held that the challenged Executive Orders were
null and void. A majority of five justices, led by the ponente, Justice (later Chief Justice)
Roberto Concepcion, ruled that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code did not meet the
well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to the executive
branch, while three justices opined that the nullity of the issuances was the consequence of the
enactment of the 1935 Constitution, which reduced the power of the Chief Executive over local
governments.

Petitioner Sultan Osop B. Camid (Camid) represents himself as a current resident of

Andong,11 suing as a private citizen and taxpayer whose locus standi "is of public and
paramount interest especially to the people of the Municipality of Andong, Province of Lanao del
Sur."12 He alleges that Andong "has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a
complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services for the municipality and its
constituents,"13 even though he concedes that since 1968, no person has been appointed,
elected or qualified to serve any of the elective local government positions of
Andong.14 Nonetheless, the municipality of Andong has its own high school, Bureau of Posts, a
Department of Education, Culture and Sports office, and at least seventeen (17) "barangay
units" with their own respective chairmen. 15 From 1964 until 1972, according to Camid, the
public officials of Andong "have been serving their constituents through the minimal means and
resources with least (sic) honorarium and recognition from the Office of the then former
President Diosdado Macapagal." Since the time of Martial Law in 1972, Andong has allegedly
been getting by despite the absence of public funds, with the "Interim Officials" serving their
constituents "in their own little ways and means." Camid imputes grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the DILG "in not classifying [Andong] as a regular existing municipality and in not
including said municipality in its records and official database as [an] existing regular
municipality."21 He characterizes such non-classification as unequal treatment to the detriment
of Andong, especially in light of the current recognition given to the eighteen (18) municipalities
similarly annulled by reason of Pelaez. 

ISSUE: Whether or not Andong can be classified as a municipality. (NO)

HELD: There are several reasons why the petition must be dismissed. These can be better
discerned upon examination of the proper scope and application of Section 442(d), which does
not sanction the recognition of just any municipality.

The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that
when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are
retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under
existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this
jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.

DE FACTO, By Prescription: Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no
power to create municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities
challenged in actual cases before this Court. However, with the promulgation of the Local
Government Code in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by
executive order but not judicially annulled. The de facto status of such municipalities as San
Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban was recognized by this Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local
Government Code deemed curative whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had
labored under.

Is Andong similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal corporation? It is not. There

are eminent differences between Andong and municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and
Sinacaban. Most prominent is the fact that the executive order creating Andong was expressly
annulled by order of this Court in 1965. If we were to affirm Andong's de facto status by reason
of its alleged continued existence despite its nullification, we would in effect be condoning
defiance of a valid order of this Court.

Court decisions cannot obviously lose their efficacy due to the sheer defiance by the parties
aggrieved.

It bears noting that based on Camid's own admissions, Andong does not meet the requisites set
forth by Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order
that the municipality created by executive order may receive recognition, they must "have their
respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of [the
Local Government] Code." Camid admits that Andong has never elected its municipal officers at
all.60 This incapacity ties in with the fact that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965. Out of
obeisance to our ruling in Pelaez, the national government ceased to recognize the existence of
Andong, depriving it of its share of the public funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections
for the void municipality. The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of
elections in the municipality in the last four decades are eloquent indicia of the non-recognition
by the State of the existence of the town. The certifications relied upon by Camid, issued by the
DENR-CENRO and the National Statistics Office, can hardly serve the purpose of attesting to
Andong's legal efficacy. In fact, both these certifications qualify that they were issued upon the
request of Camid, "to support the restoration or re-operation of the Municipality of Andong,
Lanao del Sur,"61 thus obviously conceding that the municipality is at present inoperative.

We may likewise pay attention to the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, which had
also been relied upon in Jimenez and San Narciso. This Ordinance, which apportioned the seats
of the House of Representatives to the different legislative districts in the Philippines,
enumerates the various municipalities that are encompassed by the various legislative districts.
Andong is not listed therein as among the municipalities of Lanao del Sur, or of any other
province for that matter.62 On the other hand, the municipalities of San Andres, Alicia and
Sinacaban are mentioned in the Ordinance as part of Quezon,63 Bohol,64 and Misamis
Occidental65 respectively. How about the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly nullified in
Pelaez but certified as existing in the DILG Certification presented by Camid? The petition fails
to mention that subsequent to the ruling in Pelaez, legislation was enacted to reconstitute these
municipalities.66 It is thus not surprising that the DILG certified the existence of these eighteen
(18) municipalities, or that these towns are among the municipalities enumerated in the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Andong has not been similarly reestablished through
statute. Clearly then, the fact that there are valid organic statutes passed by legislation
recreating these eighteen (18) municipalities is sufficient legal basis to accord a different legal
treatment to Andong as against these eighteen (18) other municipalities.

We thus assert the proper purview to Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code that it does
not serve to affirm or reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which
had been previously created by presidential issuances or executive orders. The provision affirms
the legal personalities only of those municipalities such as San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban,
which may have been created using the same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enough not
to have been judicially annulled. On the other hand, the municipalities judicially dissolved in
cases such as Pelaez, San Joaquin, and Malabang, remain inexistent, unless recreated through
specific legislative enactments, as done with the eighteen (18) municipalities certified by the
DILG. Those municipalities derive their legal personality not from the presidential issuances or
executive orders which originally created them or from Section 442(d), but from the respective
legislative statutes which were enacted to revive them.

And what now of Andong and its residents? Certainly, neither Pelaez or this decision has
obliterated Andong into a hole on the ground. The legal effect of the nullification of Andong in
Pelaez was to revert the constituent barrios of the voided town back into their original
municipalities, namely the municipalities of Lumbatan, Butig and Tubaran.67 These three
municipalities subsist to this day as part of Lanao del Sur, and presumably continue to exercise
corporate powers over the barrios which once belonged to Andong.
If there is truly a strong impulse calling for the reconstitution of Andong, the solution is through
the legislature and not judicial confirmation of void title. If indeed the residents of Andong
have, all these years, been governed not by their proper municipal governments but by a
ragtag "Interim Government," then an expedient political and legislative solution is perhaps
necessary. Yet we can hardly sanction the retention of Andong's legal personality solely on the
basis of collective amnesia that may have allowed Andong to somehow pretend itself into
existence despite its judicial dissolution. Maybe those who insist Andong still exists prefer to
remain unperturbed in their blissful ignorance, like the inhabitants of the cave in Plato's famed
allegory. But the time has come for the light to seep in, and for the petitioner and like-minded
persons to awaken to legal reality.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner.
3. Basco v. PAGCOR, GR 91649
PARAS, J.:

Facts: A TV ad proudly announces: “The New PAGCOR – Responding Through Responsible

Gaming.” But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking
to annul the PAGCOR charter – PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy
and order, and because – a. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with
a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila city government’s right to impose taxes and
license fees, which is recognized by law; b. For the same reason stated in the immediately
preceeding paragraph, the law has intruded into the local government’s right to impose local
taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local
autonomy; c. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes
PAGCOR – conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together
with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices; d. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory
government away from the monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and
privatization.

In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the
declared national policy of the "new restored democracy" and the people's will as expressed in
the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have a "gambling objective" and therefore is
contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article
XIV, of the present Constitution

Issue: Whether or not the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D.
1869.

Held: No. The petitioners’ argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be
violated by P.D. 1869 and the Court held that it is a pointless argument. Article X of the 1987
Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides: Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the
power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges  subject to
such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on
local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.
The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations"
which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended,
repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as
an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It
cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
"decentralization" (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in
Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It
does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an " imperium in imperio."
Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state
which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary
system of government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local
governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it
 cannot be an  imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a
measure of decentralization of the function of government.
As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local
government units remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political
question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA
539). What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling
is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to
local governments.
As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or express charter
power is generally necessary to empower the local corporation to deal with the
subject. . . . In the absence of express grant of power to enact, ordinance provisions on
this subject which are inconsistent with the state laws are void . (Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala
App. 107 So. 733 Ex-Parte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 following in re Ah You, 88
Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480, as cited in Mc Quinllan Vol.
3 Ibid, p. 548, emphasis supplied)
Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution,
because "it legalized PAGCOR — conducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed
together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices" (p. 82, Rollo). The Court, likewise,
finds no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-
accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude
classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as
the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law
does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989).
The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of
individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847).
The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated
in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827). Just how P.D. 1869 in
legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly
explained in the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D
449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169
as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does
not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.
If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown
because there are other instances to which it might have been applied. (Gomez v.
Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)
The equal protection clause of the 14 th Amendment does not mean that all occupations
called by the same name must be treated the same way; the state may do what it can
to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases in which harm to the
few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid
down were made mathematically exact. (Dominican Hotel v. Arizona, 249 US 2651).
Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory Government
away from monopolies and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization" suffice
it to state that this is not a ground for this Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs
counter to the government's policies then it is for the Executive Department to recommend to
Congress its repeal or amendment.
The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is
and not what the law should be. 1âwphi1 Under our system of government, policy issues
 are within the domain of the political branches of government and of the people
themselves as the repository of all state power. (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA
256).
On the issue of "monopoly," however, the Constitution provides that: Sec. 19. The State shall
regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of
trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. (Art. XII, National Economy and Patrimony)
It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not necessarily prohibited
by the Constitution. The state must still decide whether public interest demands that
monopolies be regulated or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to
decide.
On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family)
and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2
(Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these
are merely statements of principles and, policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing,
meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing
principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives
addressed to the executive and the legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed
to heed the directives of the articles the available remedy was not judicial or political.
The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the
legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil.
387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179
SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other
words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v.
Comelec, supra) Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof,
unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition
must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of P.D.
1869, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of
this petition is therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation
considering the issues of "morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization as well as
the state principles on social justice, role of youth and educational values" being raised, is up
for Congress to determine.
As this Court held in Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board , 162
SCRA 521 —
Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 has, in any case,
in its favor the presumption of validity and constitutionality which petitioners Valmonte
and the KMU have not overturned. Petitioners have not undertaken to identify the
provisions in the Constitution which they claim to have been violated by that statute.
This Court, however, is not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the assailed
legislation may possibly offend some provision of the Constitution. The Court notes,
further, in this respect that petitioners have in the main put in question the wisdom,
justice and expediency of the establishment of the OPSF, issues which are not properly
addressed to this Court and which this Court may not constitutionally pass upon. Those
issues should be addressed rather to the political departments of government: the
President and the Congress.
QUOTABLE QUOTES: “Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral,
and this is precisely so when the gambling resorted to is excessive. This excessiveness
necessarily depends not only on the financial resources of the gambler and his family but also
on his mental, social, and spiritual outlook on life. However, the mere fact that some persons
may have lost their material fortunes, mental control, physical health, or even their lives does
not necessarily mean that the same are directly attributable to gambling. Gambling may have
been the antecedent, but certainly not necessarily the cause. For the same consequences could
have been preceded by an overdose of food, drink, exercise, work, and even sex.”

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

4. Dadole v. COA, GR 125360
NATURE OF THE CASE: Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to annul the decision
and resolution, dated September 21, 1995 and May 28, 1996, respectively, of the respondent
Commission on Audit (COA) affirming the notices of the Mandaue City Auditor which diminished
the monthly additional allowances received by the petitioner judges of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) and Municipal Trial Court (MTC) stationed in Mandaue City.

CORONA, J.

FACTS: In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly
allowances of P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the said city. In 1991, Mandaue City increased the amount to
P1,500 for each judge.

On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued the disputed
Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that: xxx xxx xxx 2.3.2. In the light of
the authority granted to the local government units under the Local Government Code to
provide for additional allowances and other benefits to national government officials and
employees assigned in their locality, such additional allowances in the form of honorarium at
rates not exceeding P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and P700.00 in municipalities may be
granted subject to the following conditions: a) That the grant is not mandatory on the part of
the LGUs; b) That all contractual and statutory obligations of the LGU including the
implementation of R.A. 6758 shall have been fully provided in the budget; c) That the
budgetary requirements/limitations under Section 324 and 325 of R.A. 7160 should be satisfied
and/or complied with; and d) That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of
functions/personnel in accordance with R.A. 7160 . xxx xxx xxx The said circular likewise
provided for its immediate effectivity without need of publication: 5.0 EFFECTIVITY This
Circular shall take effect immediately.

Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to herein
petitioners, namely, Honorable RTC Judges Mercedes G. Dadole, Ulric R. Caete, Agustin R.
Vestil, Honorable MTC Judges Temistocles M. Boholst, Vicente C. Fanilag and Wilfredo A.
Dagatan, in excess of the amount authorized by LBC 55. Beginning October, 1994, the
additional monthly allowances of the petitioner judges were reduced to P1,000 each. They were
also asked to reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1,000 from April to September,
1994. The petitioner judges filed with the Office of the City Auditor a protest against the notices
of disallowance. But the City Auditor treated the protest as a motion for reconsideration and
indorsed the same to the COA Regional Office No. 7. In turn, the COA Regional Office referred
the motion to the head office with a recommendation that the same be denied.

On September 21, 1995, respondent COA rendered a decision denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration. The COA held that: The issue to be resolved in the instant appeal is whether or
not the City Ordinance of Mandaue which provides a higher rate of allowances to the appellant
judges may prevail over that fixed by the DBM under Local Budget Circular No. 55 dated March
15, 1994.
Petitioner judges argue that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City
by dictating a uniform amount that a local government unit can disburse as additional
allowances to judges stationed therein. They maintain that said circular is not supported by any
law and therefore goes beyond the supervisory powers of the President. They further allege
that said circular is void for lack of publication.

ISSUES: Whether LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the
President and for not having been published.

HELD: Yes. On the first issue, we declare LBC 55 to be null and void.
We recognize that, although our Constitution[6 guarantees autonomy to local government units,
the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the
power of supervision by the President. Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
provides that:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. x x x
In Pimentel vs. Aguirre[7], we defined the supervisory power of the President and distinguished
it from the power of control exercised by Congress. Thus:
This provision (Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution) has been interpreted
to exclude the power of control. In Mondano v. Silvosa,i[5] the Court contrasted the President's
power of supervision over local government officials with that of his power of control over
executive officials of the national government. It was emphasized that the two terms --
supervision and control -- differed in meaning and extent. The Court distinguished them as
follows:
"x x x In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform
their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." ii[6]
In Taule v. Santos,iii[7]  we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority
than that of checking whether local governments or their officials were performing their duties
as provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local
governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. "Supervisory power, when
contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not
include any restraining authority over such body," iv[8] we said.
In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim,v[9] the difference between control and supervision was
further delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment
of an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or
redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision
does not cover such authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed,
but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or
replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only
to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act.
They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.
Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. vi[10] The
members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are
subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed
from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. vii[11] In contrast, the
heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from
the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to
the Presidents supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the
sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter
any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law.
Clearly then, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government
unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the
Presidents supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of his
or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit
acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the
President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming
judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the
principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative
departments in governing municipal corporations.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed
decision and resolution, dated September 21, 1995 and May 28, 1996, respectively, of the
Commission on Audit are hereby set aside.
5. Limbonas v. Mangelin, GR 80391

NATURE OF THE CASE: The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this
petition.

SARMIENTO, J.

FACTS: The Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution filed by the Sangguniang
Pampook, "EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG
PAMPOOK AUTONOMOUS REGION XII," 3 on the grounds, among other things, that the
petitioner "had caused to be prepared and signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and
emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing his Certificate of
Candidacy for Congressmen for the First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11,
elections. . . and nothing in the record of the Assembly will show that any request for
reinstatement by Abdula was ever made . . ." 4 and that "such action of Mr. Lim bona in paying
Abdula his salaries and emoluments without authority from the Assembly . . . constituted a
usurpation of the power of the Assembly," 5 that the petitioner "had recently caused withdrawal
of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of the salaries and
emoluments of some Assembly [sic]," 6 and that he had "filed a case before the Supreme Court
against some members of the Assembly on question which should have been resolved within
the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had
become "moot and academic".

ISSUE: Whether or not the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now
constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts.

HELD: The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by
Presidential Decree No. 1618 15 promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the Decree
established "internal autonomy" 16 in the two regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its
Constitution," 17 with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and
responsibilities 18 specified therein.
It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative
matters for the respective regions," 19 except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction
and competence of the National Government," 20 "which include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(1) National defense and security;
(2) Foreign relations;
(3) Foreign trade;
(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking,
and external borrowing,
(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural
resources;
(6) Air and sea transport
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;
(8) Customs and quarantine;
 (9) Immigration and deportation;
(10) Citizenship and naturalization;
(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and
(12) General auditing. 21
In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of
general supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions ..." 22
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There
is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative
powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," 23 "and ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the
pursuit of national development and social progress." 24 At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" 25 over them, but only to "ensure that
local affairs are administered according to law." 26 He has no control over their acts in the sense
that he can substitute their judgments with his own. 27

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the
favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention
from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power
amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. 28

But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim Mindanao under the 1987
Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere administration is a
question foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a local government unit
constituted prior to the ratification of the present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve
that controversy now, in this case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the
proper time and in the proper case.
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. Here shall be
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as hereinafter
provided. 29
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. 30
xxx xxx xxx
See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of
this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines. 31
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art.
X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles
on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the
former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through
the President (and the Department of Local Government). 32 If the Sangguniang Pampook (of
Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain
of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the
Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it
comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree
creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant
to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central government commits an
act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he
President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous
Regions."33 In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to
discharge chiefly administrative services, thus:
SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang Pampook shall
exercise local legislative powers over regional affairs within the framework of
national development plans, policies and goals, in the following areas:
(1) Organization of regional administrative system;
(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region;
(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous Region;
(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;
(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;
(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this Decree;
(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by the
Autonomous Region;
(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other social
services, programs and facilities;
(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and culture
indigenous to the Autonomous Region; and
(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including the enactment of
such measures as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of
the people in the Autonomous Region.
The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that
enactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong
Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree, national
legislation, policies, plans and programs.
The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang Pambansa. 34

Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in
question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The

Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII, is ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member,
Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof. No costs.
6. Milo v. Salanga, GR No. L-37007
NATURE OF THE CASE: This is a petition for review on certiorari of an order of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial District, in Criminal Case No. D-529 entitled "The People
of the Philippines versus Juan Tuvera, Sr., Et Al.," granting the motion to quash the information
filed by accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., herein Respondent. The issue is whether a barrio captain can
be charged of arbitrary detention.

GANCAYCO, J.

FACTS: On October 12, 1972, an information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against Juan
Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat, in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
for unlawfully lodging and locking one Armando Valdez inside the municipal jail of Manaoag,
Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours.

All the accused, including respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr., were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not
sufficient to support the filing of the information. Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S.
Milo filed an opposition thereto. Finding that respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr. was not a public
officer who can be charged with Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Angelito C. Salanga
granted the motion to quash in an order dated April 25, 1973.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, is a public officer who can be liable for the
crime of Arbitrary Detention. (YES)

HELD: The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain
or order the detention of persons accused of a crime. Such public officers are the policemen
and other agents of the law, the judges or mayors. Long before Presidential Decree 299 was
signed into law, barrio lieutenants (who were later named barrio captains and now barangay
captains) were recognized as persons in authority. In various cases, this Court deemed them as
persons in authority, and convicted them of Arbitrary Detention.

In U .S. v. Braganza, Martin Salibio, a barrio lieutenant, and Hilario Braganza, a municipal
councilor, arrested Father Feliciano Gomez while he was in his church. They made him pass
through the door of the vestry and afterwards took him to the municipal building. There, they
told him that he was under arrest. The priest had not committed any crime. The two public
officials were convicted of Arbitrary Detention.

In U .S. v. Gellada, Geronimo Gellada, a barrio lieutenant, with the help of Filoteo Soliman,
bound and tied his houseboy Sixto Gentugas with a rope at around 6:00 p.m. and delivered him
to the justice of the peace. Sixto was detained during the whole night and until 9:00 a.m. of the
next day when he was ordered released by the justice of the peace because he had not
committed any crime, Gellada was convicted of Arbitrary Detention.
Under Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known as The Revised Barrio Charter, the powers and
duties of a barrio captain include the following: to look after the maintenance of public order in
the barrio and to assist the municipal mayor and the municipal councilor in charge of the district
in the performance of their duties in such barrio; to look after the general welfare of the barrio;
to enforce all laws and ordinances which are operative within the barrio; and to organize and
lead an emergency group whenever the same may be necessary for the maintenance of peace
and order within the barrio.

In his treatise on Barrio Government Law and Administration, Professor Jose M. Aruego has this
to say about the above-mentioned powers and duties of a Barrio Captain, to wit: " Upon the
barrio captain depends in the main the maintenance of public order in the barrio. For public
disorder therein, inevitably people blame him.

"In the event that there be a disturbing act to said public order or a threat to disturb public
order, what can the barrio captain do? Understandably, he first resorts to peaceful measures.
He may take preventive measures like placing the offenders under surveillance and persuading
them, where possible, to behave well, but when necessary, he may subject them to the full
force of law.

"He is a peace officer in the barrio considered under the law as a person in authority. As such,
he may make arrest and detain persons within legal limits."

One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that
other public officers like judges and mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be
guilty of this crime. A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show that
they are similar to those of a barrio captain except that in the case of the latter, his territorial
jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and
are given the authority to detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private
respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain,
could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez.

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private respondent Tuvera, Sr.,
can be held liable for Arbitrary Detention.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for certiorari is
GRANTED. The questioned Order of April 25, 1973 in Criminal Case No. D-529 is hereby set
aside. Let this case be remanded to the appropriate trial court for further proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.
7. People v. Monton, GR L-23906
NATURE OF THE CASE: Rule 65 (?)

ANGELES, J.

FACTS: On May 15, 1957, a criminal complaint for libel was filed with the Justice of the Peace
Court (now municipal court) of Miagao, Iloilo, against the above-named defendants-appellees,
for having prepared, signed, and sent a communication to the then President of the Philippines,
denouncing certain illegal and oppressive acts allegedly committed by Jose P. Monteclaro as
City Fiscal of Iloilo, thereby placing him to public hatred, contempt, dishonor, discredit and
ridicule. The complaint was dismissed by the Justice of the Peace Court on the ground that
there was no probable cause to believe that the crime of libel charged therein has been
committed.

The trial court ruled, after consideration of such evidence, that there was no preliminary
investigation held in the case because the affidavit of the offended party does not show that
the latter was examined personally and asked "searching questions" by Fiscal Gison; and that
the certificate of Asst. Fiscal Gison does not state that "a preliminary investigation has been
conducted in this case under my direction having examined the witnesses under oath." The
State has appealed for a second time, contending that a preliminary investigation has been
conducted in this case, and that said preliminary investigation, anyway, was unnecessary

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution is corrent to rely on the mere certification under oath in
the information that a preliminary investigation had actually been conducted. (No)

HELD: The manner of conducting preliminary investigation is defined or described in section 6,

Rule 108 of the old Rules of Court, applicable to this case, which reads —
The justice of the peace or the officer who is to conduct the preliminary
investigation must take under oath either in the presence or absence of the defendant
the testimony of the complainant and the witnesses  to be presented by him or by the
fiscal, but only the testimony of the complainant shall be reduced to writing . He shall,
however, make an abstract or brief statement of the substance of the testimony of the
complainant and the witnesses to be presented by him or by the fiscal, but only the
testimony of the complainant shall be reduced to writing. He shall, however, make an
abstract or brief statement of the substance of the testimony of the other witnesses.
There is nothing in the evidence for the prosecution that can reasonably support its claim that
Asst. Provincial Fiscal Gison had conducted the requisite preliminary investigation. Exhibit "1" is
the affidavit of the complainant, dated May 7, 1958, subscribed and sworn to before the Clerk
of Court which was the basis for the filing of the information against the accused. This piece of
evidence does not show on its face that the offended party was personally investigated by the
said Fiscal as the Rules require. As a matter of fact, it was not before him that the statement
was subscribed and sworn to.
We believe that section 1687 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, giving the
provincial fiscal authority to file an information on the basis of a certification made by him to
the effect that he had conducted a proper preliminary investigation presupposes the existence
of good faith — that no such certification would be made without actual conduct of the same —
so that where evidence adduced do not support such a claim, then, such a certification would
not suffice to dispense with the preliminary investigation to which the defendant is entitled.

Whereas in this instance, the two stages of a preliminary investigation become indefinable and
merged as is the effect of a preliminary investigation conducted by a provincial fiscal, where the
Court of First Instance may, upon filing of the information, issue the warrant of arrest and set
the case for trial on the merits, without necessity of conducting the preliminary investigation
proper, the need for vigilance in the protection of the rights of the accused becomes more
pronounced. Considering the official position of complainant, who himself is a government
prosecutor, it would seem doubly imperative that the provincial fiscal handling the case prove
good faith by presenting to the court the record required to be submitted. In failing to so
present such an important record, or more convincing evidence that the provincial fiscal or his
assistant had personally conducted an investigation, the prosecution has utterly failed to show
its impartiality and objectiveness so essential to the dispensation of justice.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the questioned order of dismissal is hereby affirmed. No

costs at this instance.
8. Pimentel v. Aguirre, GR No. 132988 (Issue: Power of the President over LGUs)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This is an original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking (1) to
annul Section 1 of Administrative Order (AO) No. 372, insofar as it requires local government
units to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent of their authorized regular appropriations for
non-personal services; and (2) to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order,
which withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments.

PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS: Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the
power of control over LGUs. The Constitution vests in the President, however, only the power of
general supervision over LGUs, consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Petitioner
further argues that the directive to withhold ten percent (10%) of their IRA is in contravention
of Section 286 of the Local Government Code and of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution,
providing for the automatic release to each of these units its share in the national internal
revenue.

The solicitor general, on behalf of the respondents, claims on the other hand that AO 372 was
issued to alleviate the "economic difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation" and
constituted merely an exercise of the President's power of supervision over LGUs. It allegedly
does not violate local fiscal autonomy, because it merely directs local governments to identify
measures that will reduce their total expenditures for non-personal services by at least 25
percent. Likewise, the withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs’ IRA does not violate the statutory
prohibition on the imposition of any lien or holdback on their revenue shares, because such
withholding is "temporary in nature pending the assessment and evaluation by the
Development Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal situation."

ISSUE: Whether or not (a) Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their
expenditures by 25 percent; and (b) Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10
percent of their internal revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of
general supervision over local governments.

HELD: Section 1 of AO 372 was upheld by the Court while Section 4 was not.

 GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: Scope of President's

Power of Supervision Over LGUs - Before resolving the main issue, we deem it important
and appropriate to define certain crucial concepts: (1) the scope of the President's
power of general supervision over local governments and (2) the extent of the local
governments' autonomy.

Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President's power over local
governments to one of general supervision. It reads as follows: "Sec. 4. The President
of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. x x x"
 This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. In Mondano v.
Silvosa, the Court contrasted the President's power of supervision over local government
officials with that of his power of control over executive officials of the national
government. It was emphasized that the two terms -- supervision and control -- differed
in meaning and extent. The Court distinguished them as follows: "x x x In administrative
law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."

In Taule v. Santos, we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority
than that of checking whether local governments or their officials were performing their
duties as provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with
local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. "Supervisory
power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior
body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body," we said.

In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim, the difference between control and supervision
was further delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or
accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion,
order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it
themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising
officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay
down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules
are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such
rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no
discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.

Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President.
The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such,
they are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they
can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or
reversed. In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their
sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable.
By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President’s supervision only, not control, so
long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the
same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them
by the Constitution and the law.

 Extent of Local Autonomy: Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on the
President's power over local governments is the state policy of ensuring local autonomy.
In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, we said that local autonomy signified "a more responsive
and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization." The grant of autonomy is intended to "break up the monopoly of the
national government over the affairs of local governments, x x x not x x x to end the
relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and
local government units x x x." Paradoxically, local governments are still subject to
regulation, however limited, for the purpose of enhancing self-government.

Decentralization simply means the devolution of national administration, not power,

to local governments. Local officials remain accountable to the central government as
the law may provide. The difference between decentralization of administration and that
of power was explained in detail in Limbona v. Mangelin as follows: "Now, autonomy is
either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative
powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and
in the process to make local governments 'more responsive and accountable,' and
'ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.' At the
same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs
and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises 'general
supervision' over them, but only to 'ensure that local affairs are administered according
to law.' He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power

in the favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to 'self-immolation,' since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency."

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not
completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous
regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political
subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly
responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social
development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic
growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the
programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a
common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the
President and Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.,
municipal governments are still agents of the national government.
 AO 372: NATURE - Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudential precepts, let us now
look into the nature of AO 372. As its preambular clauses declare, the Order was a "cash
management measure" adopted by the government "to match expenditures with
available resources," which were presumably depleted at the time due to "economic
difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation." Because of a looming financial
crisis, the President deemed it necessary to "direct all government agencies, state
universities and colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations as well as local
governments to reduce their total expenditures by at least 25 percent along suggested
areas mentioned in AO 372.

Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative autonomy in
the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that
local governments have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to
their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as
the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. It extends to
the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the
constraints thereof. They are not formulated at the national level and imposed on local
governments, whether they are relevant to local needs and resources or not. Hence, the
necessity of a balancing of viewpoints and the harmonization of proposals from both local
and national officials,24 who in any case are partners in the attainment of national goals.

Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national government
intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and
otherwise, are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional
fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency of the government,25 primarily
responsible for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social
and economic policies, plans and programs26 for the entire country. However, under the
Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such policies and programs are
subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and
local government units." The President cannot do so unilaterally.

Consequently, the Local Government Code provides: "x x x [I]n the event the national
government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is
hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of
the Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject
to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of
the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local
government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the
collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current
fiscal year x x x."

There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal
matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2)
consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives
and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation
 of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget
and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less
than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third
fiscal year preceding the current one.

Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites before the issuance
and the implementation of AO 372. At the very least, they did not even try to show that the
national government was suffering from an unmanageable public sector deficit. Neither did they
claim having conducted consultations with the different leagues of local governments. Without
these requisites, the President has no authority to adjust, much less to reduce, unilaterally the
LGU's internal revenue allotment. The solicitor general insists, however, that AO 372 is merely
directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his power of supervision over
local governments. It is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities
to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country,
which is facing economic difficulties. Besides, it does not contain any sanction in case of
noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the
powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be
characterized as an exercise of the power of control.

While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 have a rather commanding tone, and while we agree
with petitioner that the requirements of Section 284 of the Local Government Code have not
been satisfied, we are prepared to accept the solicitor general's assurance that the directive to
"identify and implement measures x x x that will reduce total expenditures x x x by at least
25% of authorized regular appropriation" is merely advisory in character, and does not
constitute a mandatory or binding order that interferes with local autonomy. The language
used, while authoritative, does not amount to a command that emanates from a boss to a
subaltern. Rather, the provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to
recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all concerned
would do well to heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and teamwork to help alleviate the
crisis. It is understood, however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their
officials who do not follow such advice. It is in this light that we sustain the solicitor general's
contention in regard to Section 1.

On the other hand, the Court cannot upheld Section 4 of AO 372 because it contravenes explicit
provisions of the Local Government Code (LGC) and the Constitution; and is bereft of any legal
or constitutional basis. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the
shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the
Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made
directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and " shall not
be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for
whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a
compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore, imperative. Section 4 of AO 372, however,
orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10 percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the
assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the
emerging fiscal situation" in the country. Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution
and the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means "something held
back or withheld, often temporarily." Hence, the "temporary" nature of the retention by the
national government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents and their

successors are hereby permanently PROHIBITED from implementing Administrative Order Nos.
372 and 43, respectively dated December 27, 1997 and December 10, 1998, insofar as local
government units are concerned.
9. League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec, GR 176951
NATURE OF THE CASE: These are consolidated petitions for prohibition1 with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of
Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas2 assailing the
constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood
Laws.

CARPIO, J.

FACTS: During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33

municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which
took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by
increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20
million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush" of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure
a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of
fiscal independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12 th Congress7 adopted

Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in
RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11 th Congress.
However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as
Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again
failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16
municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood
bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million
income requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate
also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed
on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March
to July 2007 without the President's signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold
plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the
conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation
of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection
clause.12 Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will
reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will
share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local
Government Code.

ISSUE:
(a) Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution (YES); and
(b) Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause (YES).

HELD:
(a) The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional. First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present
case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while
the cityhood bills became law more than five years later. Second, the Constitution requires that
Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code
and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section
6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national
taxes to local government units. Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear,
plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction. Fifth, the intent of
members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009
remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not
extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. Seventh, even if the exemption
in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption
would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

(b) There can be no resort to extrinsic aids – like deliberations of Congress – if the language of
the law is plain, clear and unambiguous. Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal
language of the law, within the law's four corners. If the language of the law is plain, clear and
unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according to its express terms. If a literal application
of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids
of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law. Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to
amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code, did not provide any exemption from the
increased income requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were
then pending when Congress passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, contains no exemption whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and
unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased
income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law in applying Section
450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.

If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contained an exemption
to the P100 million annual income requirement, the criteria for such exemption could be
scrutinized for possible violation of the equal protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the
exemption, if found in the Local Government Code, could be assailed on the ground of absence
of a valid classification. However, Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by
RA 9009, does not contain any exemption. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws,
which are unconstitutional because such exemption must be prescribed in the Local
Government Code as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Even if the
exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009, such exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of
the equal protection clause. The exemption provision merely states, "Exemption from Republic
Act No. 9009 ─ The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed
under Republic Act No. 9009." This one sentence exemption provision contains no classification
standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from those that are not
exempted. Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that
municipalities with pending cityhood bills should be exempt from the P100 million income
requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy the equal protection clause. The
exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills pending
in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not a valid classification between
those entitled and those not entitled to exemption from the P100 million income requirement.

To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial distinctions,
rationally related to a legitimate government objective which is the purpose of the law, not
limited to existing conditions only, and applicable to all similarly situated. The equal protection
clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions: (1)
The classification must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) The classification must be germane
to the purpose of the law; (3) The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare

UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392,
9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.

IMPORTANT INFORMATION:
- VALID CLASSIFICATION: To be valid, the classification in the present case must be
based on substantial distinctions, rationally related to a legitimate government objective
which is the purpose of the law, not limited to existing conditions only, and applicable to
all similarly situated. The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a
valid classification under the following conditions: (1) The classification must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) The classification must be germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) The
classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.

- Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law

RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11 th Congress. This law specifically
amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code, which now provides:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may
be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred
 million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based
on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as
certified by the Land Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office.
The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the
original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city
proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not
be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city
from P20 million to P100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, does not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement.
Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in
Congress. Thirty-three cityhood bills became law before the enactment of RA 9009. Congress
did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress.
During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29,
exempting from the income requirement of P100 million in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose
cityhood bills were not acted upon during the 11 th Congress. This Resolution reached the
Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint
Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint
Resolution No. 29 filed between November and December of 2006, through their respective
sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 . - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the
income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.
This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from the income
requirement of P100 million prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009. These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from
March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.
Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA
9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 or during the 11 th Congress. The
13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills which became law only in
2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-retroactivity of
laws.17 This basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws,
is not being applied retroactively but prospectively.
- Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution   provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished
or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
 established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria
established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one
Local Government Code.18 The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local
Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of
a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood
Laws.
The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a city.
No other law, not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the
Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must  follow the
same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government
Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code
violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income
requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30
June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any
municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income
requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not
contain any exemption from this income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even
though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The
Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent
municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption
must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including
the Cityhood Laws.
- Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are
essential to implement a fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local government
units. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution provides:
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national
taxes which shall be automatically released to them. (Emphasis supplied)
If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can
be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not
receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or
more. The criteria of land area, population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, must be strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by law, are
material in determining the "just share" of local government units in national taxes. Since the
Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
they prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.
 - Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear,
Plain and Unambiguous
There can be no resort to extrinsic aids – like deliberations of Congress – if the language of the
law is plain, clear and unambiguous. Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal
language of the law, within the law's four corners. 19 If the language of the law is plain, clear
and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according to its express terms. If a literal
application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to
extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law. 20
Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code, did not
provide any exemption from the increased income requirement, not even to respondent
municipalities whose cityhood bills were then pending when Congress passed RA 9009. Section
450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contains no exemption
whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to
convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go
beyond the letter of the law in applying Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009.
10. Tan v. Comelec, GR 73155
NATURE OF THE CASE: Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act
Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del
Norte, which took effect on December 3, 1985, Petitioners herein, who are residents of the
Province of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and municipalities therein, on December 23,
1985, filed with this Court a case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping respondents
Commission on Elections from conducting the plebiscite which, pursuant to and in
implementation of the aforesaid law, was scheduled for January 3, 1986.

ALAMPAY, J.:

FACTS: The challenged law provides: SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and
the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona;
and Salvador Benedicto, all in the northern portion of the Island of Negros, are hereby
separated from the province to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte; SEC. 2. The
boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of Silay, the Municipality
of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the south and the territorial limits of the
northern portion to the Island of Negros on the west, north and east, comprising a territory of
4,019.95 square kilometers more or less; SEC. 3. The seat of government of the new province
shall be the City of Cadiz; SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new province
which are the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval
of this Act. After the ratification of the creation of the Province of Negros del Norte by a
majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite, the President of the Philippines shall appoint the
first officials of the province; SEC. 5. The Commission on Elections shall conduct and supervise
the plebiscite herein provided, the expenses for which shall be charged to local funds; SEC. 6.
This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Petitioners contend that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is unconstitutional and it is not in complete
accord with the Local Government Code as in Article XI, Section 3 of our Constitution, it is
expressly mandated that— “Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of
the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.”

The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros del Norte, namely:
the Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso,
Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.B. Magalona and Don Salvador Benedicto. Because of
the exclusions of the voters from the rest of the province of Negros Occidental, petitioners
found need to change the prayer of their petition "to the end that the constitutional issues
which they have raised in the action will be ventilated and given final resolution.” Respondents,
on the other hand, argue that the remaining cities and municipalities of the Province of Negros
Occidental not included in the area of the new Province of Negros del Norte, de not fall within
the meaning and scope of the term "unit or units affected", as referred to in Section 3 of Art. XI
of our Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not BP Blg. 885, an act creating the Province of Negros del Norte, is
unconstitutional. (YES)

HELD: Section 197 of the Local Government Code enumerates the conditions which must exist
to provide the legal basis for the creation of a provincial unit and these requisites are:

“SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. A province may be created if it has a territory of at least
three thousand five hundred square kilometers, a population of at least five hundred thousand
persons, an average estimated annual income, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not
less than ten million pesos for the last three consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce
the population and income of the mother province or provinces at the time of said creation to
less than the minimum requirements under this section. The territory need not be contiguous if
it comprises two or more islands.

The average estimated annual income shall include the income alloted for both the general and
infrastructural funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring income.”

Aside from the simpler factual issue relative to the land area of the new province of Negros del
Norte, the more significant and pivotal issue in the present case revolves around in the
interpretation and application in the case at bar of Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution,
which being brief and for convenience, We again quote: SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality
or barrio may be created, divided, merged abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to
the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.

It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that there
be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units
affected" whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration
of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing
province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its
existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del
Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected.
The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be
substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area
subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.

We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said
constitutional requirement but eliminates the participation of either of these two component
political units. The alleged good intentions cannot prevail and overrule the cardinal precept that
what our Constitution categorically directs to be done or imposes as a requirement must first be
observed, respected and complied with. No one should be allowed to pay homage to a
supposed fundamental policy intended to guarantee and promote autonomy of local
government units but at the same time transgress, ignore and disregard what the Constitution
commands in Article XI Section 3 thereof. We find no merit in the submission of the
respondents that the petition should be dismissed because the motive and wisdom in enacting
the law may not be challenged by petitioners. The principal point raised by the petitioners is not
the wisdom and motive in enacting the law but the infringement of the Constitution which is a
proper subject of judicial inquiry.
What the Court considers the only significant submissions lending a little support to
respondents' case is their reliance on the rulings and pronouncements made by this Court in the
case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus The Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et
al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 6). In said case relating to a plebiscite held to
ratify the creation of a new municipality from existing barangays, this Court upheld the legality
of the plebiscite which was participated in exclusively by the people of the barangay that would
constitute the new municipality.

This Court is not unmindful of this solitary case alluded to by respondents. What is, however,
highly significant are the prefatory statements therein stating that said case is "one of those
cases where the discretion of the Court is allowed considerable leeway" and that "there is
indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the expression unit or units affected." The ruling
rendered in said case was based on a claimed prerogative of the Court then to exercise its
discretion on the matter. It did not resolve the question of how the pertinent provision of the
Constitution should be correctly interpreted. The ruling in the aforestated case of Paredes vs.
The Honorable Executive Secretary, et al. (supra)  should not be taken as a doctrinal or
compelling precedent when it is acknowledged therein that "it is plausible to assert, as
petitioners do, that when certain Barangays are separated from a parent municipality to form a
new one, all the voters therein are affected."

It is relevant and most proper to mention that in the aforecited case of Paredes vs. Executive
Secretary, invoked by respondents, We find very lucidly expressed the strong dissenting view of
Justice Vicente Abad Santos, a distinguished member of this Court, as he therein voiced his
opinion, which We hereunder quote: 2. ... when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units
affected" it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such
as in the case at bar or an of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. I
see no ambiguity in the Constitutional provision.

This dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos is the— forerunner of the ruling which
We now consider applicable to the case at bar, In the analogous case of Emilio C. Lopez, Jr.,
versus the Honorable Commission on Elections, L-56022, May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 633,  this
dissent was reiterated by Justice Abad Santos as he therein assailed as suffering from a
constitutional infirmity a referendum which did not include all the people of Bulacan and Rizal,
when such referendum was intended to ascertain if the people of said provinces were willing to
give up some of their towns to Metropolitan Manila. His dissenting opinion served as a useful
guideline in the instant case. Opportunity to re-examine the views formerly held in said cases is
now afforded the present Court. The reasons in the mentioned cases invoked by respondents
herein were formerly considered acceptable because of the views then taken that local
autonomy would be better promoted However, even this consideration no longer retains
persuasive value.

The environmental facts in the case before Us readily disclose that the subject matter under
consideration is of greater magnitude with concomitant multifarious complicated problems. In
the earlier case, what was involved was a division of a barangay which is the smallest political
unit in the Local Government Code. Understandably, few and lesser problems are involved. In
the case at bar, creation of a new province relates to the largest political unit contemplated in
Section 3, Art. XI of the Constitution. To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less
than three cities and eight municipalities will be subtracted from the parent province of Negros
Occidental. This will result in the removal of approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the
land area of an existing province whose boundaries will be consequently substantially altered. It
becomes easy to realize that the consequent effects of the division of the parent province
necessarily will affect all the people living in the separate areas of Negros Occidental and the
proposed province of Negros del Norte. The economy of the parent province as well as that of
the new province will be inevitably affected, either for the better or for the worse. Whatever be
the case, either or both of these political groups will be affected and they are, therefore, the
unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution which must be included in
the plebiscite contemplated therein.

It is a well accepted rule that "in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may
give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people, may be gleaned from the
provisions in pari materia." Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new
province of Negros del Norte recites in Sec. 4 thereof that "the plebiscite shall be conducted in
the areas  affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this
Act." As this draft legislation speaks of "areas," what was contemplated evidently are plurality
of areas to participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such plebiscite would
be the people living in the area of the proposed new province and those living in the parent
province. This assumption will be consistent with the requirements set forth in the Constitution.
We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained change made when Parliamentary Bill No.
3644 was enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 so that it is now provided in said enabling law
that the plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas
affected." We are not disposed to agree that by mere legislative fiat the unit or units affected
referred in the fundamental law can be diminished or restricted by the Batasang Pambansa to
cities and municipalities comprising the new province, thereby ignoring the evident reality that
there are other people necessarily affected.

In the mind of the Court, the change made by those responsible for the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 885 betrays their own misgivings. They must have entertained apprehensions
that by holding the plebiscite only in the areas of the new proposed province, this tactic will be
tainted with illegality. In anticipation of a possible strong challenge to the legality of such a
plebiscite there was, therefore, deliberately added in the enacted statute a self-serving phrase
that the new province constitutes the area affected. Such additional statement serves no useful
purpose for the same is misleading, erroneous and far from truth. The remaining portion of the
parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the
parent province, not to mention the other adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently
argue the points raised by the petitioners. Petitioners have averred without contradiction that
after the creation of Negros del Norte, the province of Negros Occidental would be deprived of
the long established Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, as well as the municipality of
Victorias. No controversion has been made regarding petitioners' assertion that the areas of the
Province of Negros Occidental will be diminished by about 285,656 hectares and it will lose
seven of the fifteen sugar mills which contribute to the economy of the whole province. In the
language of petitioners, "to create Negros del Norte, the existing territory and political
subdivision known as Negros Occidental has to be partitioned and dismembered. What was
involved was no 'birth' but "amputation." We agree with the petitioners that in the case of
Negros what was involved was a division, a separation; and consequently, as Sec. 3 of Article
XI of the Constitution anticipates, a substantial alteration of boundary.

As contended by petitioners,— Indeed, the terms 'created', 'divided', 'merged', 'abolished' as

used in the constitutional provision do not contemplate distinct situation isolated from the
mutually exclusive to each other. A Province maybe  created  where an existing province
is divided or two provinces merged. Such cases necessarily will involve existing unit or
units  abolished and definitely the boundary being substantially altered. It would thus be
inaccurate to state that where an existing political unit is divided or its boundary substantially
altered, as the Constitution provides, only some and not all the voters in the whole unit which
suffers dismemberment or substantial alteration of its boundary are affected. Rather, the
contrary is true.

It is also Our considered view that even hypothetically assuming that the merits of this case can
depend on the mere discretion that this Court may exercise, nevertheless, it is the petitioners'
case that deserve to be favored.

It is now time for this Court to set aside the equivocations and the indecisive pronouncements
in the adverted case of Paredes vs. the Honorable Executive Secretary, et al. (supra). For the
reasons already here express, We now state that the ruling in the two mentioned cases
sanctioning the exclusion of the voters belonging to an existing political unit from which the
new political unit will be derived, from participating in the plebiscite conducted for the purpose
of determining the formation of another new political unit, is hereby abandoned. In their
supplemental petition, dated January 4, 1986, it is prayed for by petitioners that a writ of
mandamus be issued, directing the respondent Commission on Elections, to schedule the
holding of another plebiscite at which all the qualified voters of the entire province of Negros
Occidental as now existing shall participate and that this Court make a pronouncement that the
plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect for being a patent nullity. The Court is
prepared to declare the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as null and void and violative of
the provisions of Sec. 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The Court is not, however, disposed to
direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, because We find no legal basis to do so. With
constitutional infirmity attaching to the subject Batas Pambansa Big. 885 and also because the
creation of the new province of Negros del Norte is not in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, the factual and legal basis for the creation of such
new province which should justify the holding of another plebiscite does not exist.

Whatever claim it has to validity and whatever recognition has been gained by the new province
of Negros del Norte because of the appointment of the officials thereof, must now be erased.
That Negros del Norte is but a legal fiction should be announced. Its existence should be put to
an end as quickly as possible, if only to settle the complications currently attending to its
creation. As has been manifested, the parent province of Negros del Norte has been impleaded
as the defendant in a suit filed by the new Province of Negros del Norte, before the Regional
Trial Court of Negros (del Norte), docketed as Civil Case No. 169-C, for the immediate
allocation, distribution and transfer of funds by the parent province to the new province, in an
amount claimed to be at least P10,000,000.00.

- The final nail that puts to rest whatever pretension there is to the legality of the
province of Negros del Norte is the significant fact that this created province does not
 even satisfy the area requirement prescribed in Section 197 of the Local Government
Code, as earlier discussed. It is of course claimed by the respondents in their Comment
to the exhibits submitted by the petitioners (Exhs. C and D, Rollo, pp. 19 and 91), that
the new province has a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less. This
assertion is made to negate the proofs submitted, disclosing that the land area of the
new province cannot be more than 3,500 square kilometers because its land area would,
at most, be only about 2,856 square kilometers, taking into account government
statistics relative to the total area of the cities and municipalities constituting Negros del
Norte. Respondents insist that when Section 197 of the Local Government Code speaks
of the territory of the province to be created and requires that such territory be at least
3,500 square kilometers, what is contemplated is not only the land area but also the
land and water over which the said province has jurisdiction and control. It is even the
submission of the respondents that in this regard the marginal sea within the three mile
limit should be considered in determining the extent of the territory of the new province.
Such an interpretation is strained, incorrect, and fallacious.

The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated therein
the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands."   The use of the
word territory in this particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last
sentence thereof, clearly reflects that  "territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass
of land area and excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control. Said
sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means (a) in physical
contact; (b) touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, text, or adjacent (Webster's New
World Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307). "Contiguous", when employed as an adjective, as in the
above sentence, is only used when it describes physical contact, or a touching of sides of two
solid masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by
reference to words associated with or related to them in the statute (Animal Rescue League vs.
Assessors, 138 A.L.R. p. 110). Therefore, in the context of the sentence above, what need not
be "contiguous" is the "territory" the physical mass of land area. There would arise no need for
the legislators to use the word contiguous if they had intended that the term "territory"
embrace not only land area but also territorial waters. It can be safely concluded that the word
territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with "land area" only.
The words and phrases used in a statute should be given the meaning intended by the
legislature (82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of
construction (In re Winton Lumber Co., 63 p. 2d., p. 664).

The distinction between "territory" and "land area" which respondents make is an artificial or
strained construction of the disputed provision whereby the words of the statute are arrested
from their plain and obvious meaning and made to bear an entirely different meaning to justify
an absurd or unjust result. The plain meaning in the language in a statute is the safest guide to
follow in construing the statute. A construction based on a forced or artificial meaning of its
words and out of harmony of the statutory scheme is not to be favored (Helvering vs.
Hutchings, 85 L. Ed., p. 909).

It would be rather preposterous to maintain that a province with a small land area but which
has a long, narrow, extended coast line, (such as La Union province) can be said to have a
larger territory than a land-locked province (such as Ifugao or Benguet) whose land area
manifestly exceeds the province first mentioned. Allegations have been made that the
enactment of the questioned state was marred by "dirty tricks", in the introduction and passing
of Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 "in secret haste" pursuant to sinister designs to achieve "pure
and simple gerrymandering; "that recent happenings more than amply demonstrate that far
from guaranteeing its autonomy it (Negros del Norte) has become the fiefdom of a local
strongman" (Rollo, p. 43; emphasis supplied).

It is not for this Court to affirm or reject such matters not only because the merits of this case
can be resolved without need of ascertaining the real motives and wisdom in the making of the
questioned law. No proper challenge on those grounds can also be made by petitioners in this
proceeding. Neither may this Court venture to guess the motives or wisdom in the exercise of
legislative powers. Repudiation of improper or unwise actions taken by tools of a political
machinery rests ultimately, as recent events have shown, on the electorate and the power of a
vigilant people.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared

unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the
appointment of the officials thereof are also declared null and void.

IMPORTANT INFORMATION: Petitioners herein deserve and should receive the gratitude of the
people of the Province of Negros Occidental and even by our Nation. Commendable is the
patriotism displayed by them in daring to institute this case in order to preserve the continued
existence of their historic province. They were inspired undoubtedly by their faithful
commitment to our Constitution which they wish to be respected and obeyed. Despite the
setbacks and the hardships which petitioners aver confronted them, they valiantly and
unfalteringly pursued a worthy cause. A happy destiny for our Nation is assured as long as
among our people there would be exemplary citizens such as the petitioners herein.

It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that there
be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units
affected" whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration
of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing
province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its
existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del
Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected.
The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be
substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area
subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
11. Bagabuyo v. Comelec, GR 176970
NATURE OF THE CASE: Before us is the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,1
with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction, filed by Rogelio Bagabuyo (petitioner) to prevent the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from implementing Resolution No. 7837 on the ground that Republic Act No. 93712
- the law that Resolution No. 7837 implements - is unconstitutional.

BRION, J.

FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite is required for legislative apportionment or reapportionment.

(No)

HELD: The Court said that “under these separate historical tracks, it can be seen that the
holding of a plebiscite was never a requirement in legislative apportionment or
reapportionment. After it became constitutionally entrenched, a plebiscite was also always
identified with the creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries of local
government units, never with the concept of legislative apportionment.”

The LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense, be called a

political unit because it is the basis for the election of a member of the House of
Representatives and members of the local legislative body. It is not, however, a political
subdivision through which functions of government are carried out. It can more appropriately
be described as a representative unit that may or may not encompass the whole of a city or a
province, but unlike the latter, it is not a corporate unit. Not being a corporate unit, a district
does not act for and in behalf of the people comprising the district; it merely delineates the
areas occupied by the people who will choose a representative in their national affairs. Unlike a
province, which has a governor; a city or a municipality, which has a mayor; and a barangay,
which has a punong barangay, a district does not have its own chief executive. The role of the
congressman that it elects is to ensure that the voice of the people of the district is heard in
Congress, not to oversee the affairs of the legislative district. Not being a corporate unit also
signifies that it has no legal personality that must be created or dissolved and has no capacity
to act. Hence, there is no need for any plebiscite in the creation, dissolution or any other similar
action on a legislative district.

The LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS, on the other hand, are political and corporate units. They
are the territorial and political subdivisions of the state. They possess legal personality on the
authority of the Constitution and by action of the Legislature. The Constitution defines them as
entities that Congress can, by law, create, divide, abolish, merge; or whose boundaries can be
altered based on standards again established by both the Constitution and the Legislature. A
local government unit's corporate existence begins upon the election and qualification of its
chief executive and a majority of the members of its Sanggunian.
As a political subdivision, a local government unit is an "instrumentality of the state in carrying
out the functions of government." As a corporate entity with a distinct and separate juridical
personality from the State, it exercises special functions for the sole benefit of its constituents.
It acts as "an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs" and the mediums
through which the people act in their corporate capacity on local concerns. In light of these
roles, the Constitution saw it fit to expressly secure the consent of the people affected by the
creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of local government units
through a plebiscite.

These considerations clearly show the distinctions between a legislative apportionment or

reapportionment and the division of a local government unit. Historically and by its intrinsic
nature, a legislative apportionment does not mean, and does not even imply, a division of a
local government unit where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the plebiscite requirement
that applies to the division of a province, city, municipality or barangay under the Local
Government Code should not apply to and be a requisite for the validity of a legislative
apportionment or reapportionment.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioner.
12. City of Pasig v. Comelec, GR 176970
NATURE OF THE CASE: Before us are two (2) petitions which both question the propriety of the
suspension of plebiscite proceedings pending the resolution of the issue of boundary disputes
between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig.

G.R. No. 125646 involves the proposed Barangay Karangalan while G.R. No. 128663 involves
the proposed Barangay Napico. The City of Pasig claims these areas as part of its
jurisdiction/territory while the Municipality of Cainta claims that these proposed barangays
encroached upon areas within its own jurisdiction/territory.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS: On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be
segregated from its mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be
converted and separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City
Council of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay
Karangalan in Pasig City. 1 Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set for
June 22, 1996. Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance
No. 52, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. 2 Plebiscite for this purpose was
set for March 15, 1997.

Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or
cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the Commission on Elections
(hereinafter referred to as COMELEC) on June 19, 1996 (UND No. 96-016) 3 and March 12,
1997 (UND No. 97-002), respectively. In both Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta called the
attention of the COMELEC to a pending case before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal,
Branch 74, for settlement of boundary dispute. 4 According to the Municipality of Cainta, the
proposed barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending
case; hence, the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until after the said
case shall have been finally decided by the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and
Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the
two local governments.

HELD: AS TO THE PREJUDICIAL QUESTION: To begin with, the Court agrees with the
position of the COMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving the boundary dispute between
the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first
be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held. The City
of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil and
criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case.
While this may be the general rule, this Court has held in Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br.
42, 7 that, in the interest of good order, we can very well suspend action on one case pending
the final outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to the first.
AS TO TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION: In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously
claims that the areas covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its
territory, it cannot deny that portions of the same area are included in the boundary dispute
case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in
controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or
the City of Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan
and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to
be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries.
Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until and
unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed
barangays would only be an exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for
potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays. Indeed, in Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections, we held that — "The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial
boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be
clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can
legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction.
Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries
of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which
ultimately will prejudice the people’s welfare.”

Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far more prudent
to hold in abeyance the conduct of the same, pending final determination of whether or not the
entire area of the proposed barangays are truly within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of
Pasig. Neither do we agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in the case
of the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta has already been
rendered moot and academic. The issues raised by the Municipality of Cainta in its petition
before the COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of Barangay Napico
are still pending determination before the Antipolo Regional Trial Court.

In Tan v. Commission on Elections, 10 we struck down the moot and academic argument as
follows — "Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance
with constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province
proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be viewed as already
moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province which
petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by this
Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should
not provide the very excuse for perpetration of such wrong. For this Court to yield to the
respondents’ urging that, as there has been fait accompli, then this Court should passively
accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the
instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief. Respondents’
submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its
duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those
who strut about in the corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge,
divide and/or alter the boundaries of political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily,
confident that this Court will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if they
manage to bring about a fait accompli."

Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance
pending final resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality
of Cainta by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. In the same vein, the plebiscite held on
March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig City, should be annulled and
set aside.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, 1. The Petition of the City of Pasig
in G.R. No. 125646 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; while 2. The Petition of the Municipality of
Cainta in G.R. No. 128663 is GRANTED. The COMELEC Order in UND No. 97-002, dated March
21, 1997, is SET ASIDE and the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of
Barangay Napico in the City of Pasig is declared null and void. Plebiscite on the same is ordered
held in abeyance until after the courts settle with finality the boundary dispute between the City
of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta, in Civil Case No. 94-300.
13. Abbas v. Comelec, GR 89651
NATURE OF THE CASE: The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13)
provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, 1 scheduled for November 19, 1989, in
implementation of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."

CORTES, J.

FACTS: These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and
Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No.
6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional. After a consolidated comment was filed by Solicitor
General for the respondents, which the Court considered as the answer, the case was deemed
submitted for decision, the issues having been joined. Subsequently, petitioner Mama-o filed a
"Manifestation with Motion for Leave to File Reply on Respondents' Comment and to Open Oral
Arguments," which the Court noted.

The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into either
of the following: (a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution; and (b) that
certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.

The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, the Agreement Between the government of the
Republic of the Philippines of the Philippines and Moro National Liberation Front with the
Participation of the Quadripartie Ministerial Commission Members of the Islamic Conference and
the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference" took effect on December 23,
1976. It provided for "[t]he establishment of Autonomy in the southern Philippines within the
realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines" and
enumerated the thirteen (13) provinces comprising the "areas of autonomy." In 1987, a new
Constitution was ratified, which the for the first time provided for regional autonomy, Article X,
section 15 of the charter provides that "[t]here shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted and signed into law on
August 1, 1989.

ISSUE: WON the Organic Act violates the (1) Tripoli Agreement and the (2) Constitution. (No)

HELD: (1) We find it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the nature of
the Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine Government whether under public
international or internal Philippine law. In the first place, it is now the Constitution itself that
provides for the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. The standard for any
inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would therefore be what is so provided in the
Constitution. Thus, any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and the provisions of
the Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining the implementation of the Organic
Act. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty or
international agreement, it would then constitute part of the law of the land. But as internal law
it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress of the Philippines,
rather it would be in the same class as the latter [SALONGA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 320
(4th ed., 1974), citing Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) and Foster v. Nelson, 2 Pet. 253
(1829)]. Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement, being a
subsequent law. Only a determination by this Court that R.A. No. 6734 contravened the
Constitution would result in the granting of the reliefs sought.

(2) Under the constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the result of
the plebiscite. if the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes cast by constituent units
in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region immediately takes effect.
The questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an oversight Committee to supervise the
transfer do not provide for a different date of effectivity. Much less would the organization of
the Oversight Committee cause an impediment to the operation of the Organic Act, for such is
evidently aimed at effecting a smooth transition period for the regional government. The
constitutional objection on this point thus cannot be sustained as there is no bases therefor.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality [Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil.
387 (1925); Salas v. Jarencio, G.R. No. L-29788, August 30, 1979, 46 SCRA 734; Morfe v.
Mutuc, supra; Peralta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30]. Those who
petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the
basis for such a declaration. otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by
petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners
have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is, therefore,
inevitable.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality [Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil.
387 (1925); Salas v. Jarencio, G.R. No. L-29788, August 30, 1979, 46 SCRA 734; Morfe v.
Mutuc, supra; Peralta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30]. Those who
petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the
basis for such a declaration. otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by
petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners
have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is, therefore,
inevitable.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

FROM THE FULL TEXT: 1. The Court shall dispose first of the second category of arguments
raised by petitioners, i.e. that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the provisions of
the Tripoli Agreement.
Petitioners premise their arguments on the assumption that the Tripoli Agreement is part of the
law of the land, being a binding international agreement . The Solicitor General asserts that the
Tripoli Agreement is neither a binding treaty, not having been entered into by the Republic of
the Philippines with a sovereign state and ratified according to the provisions of the 1973 or
1987 Constitutions, nor a binding international agreement.

We find it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the nature of the Tripoli
Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine Government whether under public
international or internal Philippine law. In the first place, it is now the Constitution itself that
provides for the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. The standard for any
inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would therefore be what is so provided in the
Constitution. Thus, any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and the provisions of
the Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining the implementation of the Organic
Act. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty or
international agreement, it would then constitute part of the law of the land. But as internal law
it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress of the Philippines,
rather it would be in the same class as the latter [SALONGA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 320
(4th ed., 1974), citing Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) and Foster v. Nelson, 2 Pet. 253
(1829)]. Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement, being a
subsequent law. Only a determination by this Court that R.A. No. 6734 contravened the
Constitution would result in the granting of the reliefs sought. 3

2. The Court shall therefore only pass upon the constitutional questions which have been raised
by petitioners.

Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in
Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region
which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite.

In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which
declares that "[t]here is hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be
composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in
accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution." Petitioner contends that the tenor of
the above provision makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if
only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created
composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained.

The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs to be clarified.

Firs, the questioned provision itself in R.A. No. 6734 refers to Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution which sets forth the conditions necessary for the creation of the autonomous
region. The reference to the constitutional provision cannot be glossed over for it clearly
indicates that the creation of the autonomous region shall take place only in accord with the
constitutional requirements. Second, there is a specific provision in the Transitory Provisions
(Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the same requirements
embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details, thus:
 SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take
effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units
provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which
shall be held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty
(120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided,  That only the provinces and
cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do
not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain the existing
administrative determination, merge the existing regions.

Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall
take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act
shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is
not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an
autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities
mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single
plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of
(1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces
and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it. [See III RECORD OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 482-492 (1986)].

As provided in the Constitution, the creation of the Autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao is
made effective upon the approval "by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose" [Art. X, sec. 18]. The question has been raised as to what this
majority means. Does it refer to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the
constituent units, or a majority in each of the constituent units, or both?

We need not go beyond the Constitution to resolve this question.

If the framers of the Constitution intended to require approval by a majority of all the votes cast
in the plebiscite they would have so indicated. Thus, in Article XVIII, section 27, it is provided
that "[t]his Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose ... Comparing this with the provision on the
creation of the autonomous region, which reads:

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by

majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X,
sec, 18, para, 2].

it will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the
total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent
units and the proviso underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was
to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same
phraseology as that used for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose."

It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving
the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all
constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units.

More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in which the vote
requirement in the plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18 must have been understood
by the people when they ratified the Constitution.

Invoking the earlier cited constitutional provisions, petitioner Mama-o, on the other hand,
maintains that only those areas which, to his view, share common and distinctive historical and
cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics should be
properly included within the coverage of the autonomous region. He insists that R.A. No. 6734
is unconstitutional because only the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao
del Norte and Maguindanao and the cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen
(13) provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence in
historical and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. By including areas which do
not strictly share the same characteristics. By including areas which do not strictly share the
same characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the scope of
the autonomous region which the constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.

Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by which
Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by
these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common
attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any review of this
ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law. This the Court cannot do without
doing violence to the separation of governmental powers. [Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63
Phil 139 (1936); Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424].

After assailing the inclusion of non-Muslim areas in the Organic Act for lack of basis, petitioner
Mama-o would then adopt the extreme view that other non-Muslim areas in Mindanao should
likewise be covered. He argues that since the Organic Act covers several non-Muslim areas, its
scope should be further broadened to include the rest of the non-Muslim areas in Mindanao in
order for the other non-Muslim areas denies said areas equal protection of the law, and
therefore is violative of the Constitution.

Petitioner's contention runs counter to the very same constitutional provision he had earlier
invoked. Any determination by Congress of what areas in Mindanao should compromise the
autonomous region, taking into account shared historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures, and other relevant characteristics, would necessarily carry with it the exclusion
of other areas. As earlier stated, such determination by Congress of which areas should be
covered by the organic act for the autonomous region constitutes a recognized legislative
prerogative, whose wisdom may not be inquired into by this Court.

Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable classification [People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56

(1963); Laurel v. Misa, 76 Phil. 372 (1946); J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Land tenure Administration,
G.R. No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413]. In Dumlao v. Commission on
Elections  G.R. No. 52245, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 392], the Court ruled that once class may
be treated differently from another where the groupings are based on reasonable and real
distinctions. The guarantee of equal protection is thus not infringed in this case, the
classification having been made by Congress on the basis of substantial distinctions as set forth
by the Constitution itself.

Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates the
constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a
provision in the Organic Act which mandates that should there be any conflict between the
Muslim Code [P.D. No. 1083] and the Tribal Code (still be enacted) on the one had, and the
national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should apply
national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran,
which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made" national
law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible instances of conflict
between provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein an application of national law
might be offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions.

As enshrined in the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. [Art. VIII, Sec. 11. As a
condition precedent for the power to be exercised, an actual controversy between litigants must
first exist [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra;  Tan v. Macapagal, G.R. No. L-34161,
February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 677]. In the present case, no actual controversy between real
litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting
in an alleged violation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may not be
called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict between the provisions the
Muslim Code and national law.

Petitioners also impugn the constitutionality of Article XIX, section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 which,
among others, states:

. . . Provided,  That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The
provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions: Provided,
however,  that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the
existing regions.

According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge regions, a
power which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the President. That the President may
choose to merge existing regions pursuant to the Organic Act is challenged as being in conflict
with Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution which provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,

abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of administrative
regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region, which are mere groupings of
contiguous provinces for administrative purposes [Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which
was made as part of the law of the land by Pres. dec. No. 1, Pres. Dec. No. 742]. Administrative
regions are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution]. While the power to merge administrative
regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally
been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision
over local governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict between the
power of the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision
requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the requirement of a
plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays,
not to administrative regions.

Petitioners likewise question the validity of provisions in the Organic Act which create an
Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer to the autonomous region of the powers,
appropriations, and properties vested upon the regional government by the organic Act [Art.
XIX, Secs. 3 and 4]. Said provisions mandate that the transfer of certain national government
offices and their properties to the regional government shall be made pursuant to a schedule
prescribed by the Oversight Committee, and that such transfer should be accomplished within
six (6) years from the organization of the regional government.

It is asserted by petitioners that such provisions are unconstitutional because while the
Constitution states that the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect upon approval
in a plebiscite, the requirement of organizing an Oversight committee tasked with supervising
the transfer of powers and properties to the regional government would in effect delay the
creation of the autonomous region.

Under the constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the
result of the plebiscite. If the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes cast
by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous
region immediately takes effect. The questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734
requiring an oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do not provide for a
different date of effectivity. Much less would the organization of the Oversight
Committee cause an impediment to the operation of the Organic Act, for such is
evidently aimed at effecting a smooth transition period for the regional government.
The constitutional objection on this point thus cannot be sustained as there is no
bases therefor.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality [Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil.
387 (1925); Salas v. Jarencio, G.R. No. L-29788, August 30, 1979, 46 SCRA 734; Morfe v.
Mutuc, supra;  Peralta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30]. Those
who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish
the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised
by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners
have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is, therefore,
inevitable.
14. Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et. Al, GR 196271

BRION, J.

FACTS: The Court resolves: (a) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Datu Michael
Abas Kida, et al. in G.R. No. 196271; (b) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Rep.
Edcel Lagman in G.R. No. 197221; (c) the ex abundante ad cautelam motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305; (d) the motion for reconsideration filed
by petitioner Atty. Romulo Macalintal in G.R. No. 197282; (e) the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, Datu Casan Conding Cana and Partido Demokratiko
Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan in G.R. No. 197280; (f) the manifestation and motion filed by
petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, et al. in G.R. No. 197280; and (g) the very urgent motion to
issue clarificatory resolution that the temporary restraining order (TRO) is still existing and
effective.

These motions assail the Decision dated October 18, 2011, where we upheld the
constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of
synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August
2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the President’s power to appoint
officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the
terms of the elected officials.

RULING:

ELECTION - The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more
clearly – there was to be a single election in 1992 for all elective officials – from the President
down to the municipal officials. Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily
lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective, highlighting
the importance of this constitutional mandate.

We came to the same conclusion in Osmeña v. Commission on Elections,6 where we

unequivocally stated that "the Constitution has mandated synchronized national and local
elections."7 Despite the length and verbosity of their motions, the petitioners have failed to
convince us to deviate from this established ruling.

Neither do we find any merit in the petitioners’ contention that the ARMM elections are not
covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization because the ARMM elections were not
specifically mentioned in the above-quoted Transitory Provisions of the Constitution.

ARMM; ARMM OFFICIALS ARE ALSO LOCAL OFFICIALS - Article X of the Constitution,
entitled "Local Government," clearly shows the intention of the Constitution to classify
autonomous regions, such as the ARMM, as local governments. We refer to Section 1 of this
Article, which provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.

The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of the State
under the heading "Local Government" indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to
consider autonomous regions as one of the forms of local governments.

That the Constitution mentions only the "national government" and the "local governments,"
and does not make a distinction between the "local government" and the "regional
government," is particularly revealing, betraying as it does the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as separate forms of government, but as
political units which, while having more powers and attributes than other local government
units, still remain under the category of local governments. Since autonomous regions are
classified as local governments, it follows that elections held in autonomous regions are also
considered as local elections.

The petitioners further argue that even assuming that the Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections, the ARMM elections are not covered by this mandate since they
are regional elections and not local elections.

In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule is verba legis, "that is, wherever
possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed."9 Applying this principle to determine the scope of "local
elections," we refer to the meaning of the word "local," as understood in its ordinary sense. As
defined in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged, "local" refers to something
"that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or minor
political subdivision." Obviously, the ARMM elections, which are held within the confines of the
autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao, fall within this definition.

To be sure, the fact that the ARMM possesses more powers than other provinces, cities, or
municipalities is not enough reason to treat the ARMM regional elections differently from the
other local elections. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus . When the law does not
distinguish, we must not distinguish.

RA No. 10153 does not amend RA No. 9054 – A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals
that it fixes the schedule for only the first ARMM elections;11 it does not provide the date for
the succeeding regular ARMM elections. In providing for the date of the regular ARMM
elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws
do not change or revise any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections
subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 merely filled the gap left in RA
No. 9054.

We reiterate our previous observations:

This view – that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding
ARMM elections to legislative discretion – finds support in ARMM’s recent history.

To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The
First Organic Act – RA No. 6734 – not only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it
did not even fix the specific date of the first ARMM elections, leaving the date to be fixed in
another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647, RA No. 8176, RA No. 8746, RA No.
8753, and RA No. 9012 were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections.
Since these laws did not change or modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not
amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any
plebiscite for ratification.

The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided
that the first elections would be held on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter,
Congress passed RA No. 9140 to reset the date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA
No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No.
9054), the new date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the
provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed
RA No. 9333, which further reset the date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was
not ratified through a plebiscite.

From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix
the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts.
Congress only acted consistently with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring
compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII
of RA No. 9054.

PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT IS OVERLY BROAD - Similarly, we struck down the

petitioners’ contention that the plebiscite requirement20 applies to all amendments of RA No.
9054 for being an unreasonable enlargement of the plebiscite requirement set forth in the
Constitution.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region
shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose[.]" We interpreted this to mean that only amendments to, or
revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions –
i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in
the Organic Act21 – require ratification through a plebiscite. We stand by this interpretation.

The petitioners argue that to require all amendments to RA No. 9054 to comply with the
plebiscite requirement is to recognize that sovereignty resides primarily in the people.

While we agree with the petitioners’ underlying premise that sovereignty ultimately resides with
the people, we disagree that this legal reality necessitates compliance with the plebiscite
requirement for all amendments to RA No. 9054. For if we were to go by the petitioners’
interpretation of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution that all amendments to the Organic Act
have to undergo the plebiscite requirement before becoming effective, this would lead to
impractical and illogical results – hampering the ARMM’s progress by impeding Congress from
enacting laws that timely address problems as they arise in the region, as well as weighing
down the ARMM government with the costs that unavoidably follow the holding of a plebiscite.

Interestingly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 posits that RA No. 10153, in giving the
President the power to appoint OICs to take the place of the elective officials of the ARMM,
creates a fundamental change in the basic structure of the government, and thus requires
compliance with the plebiscite requirement embodied in RA No. 9054.

Again, we disagree.

The pertinent provision in this regard is Section 3 of RA No. 10153, which reads:

Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. — The President shall appoint officers-in-charge

for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the
officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.

We cannot see how the above-quoted provision has changed the basic structure of the ARMM
regional government. On the contrary, this provision clearly preserves the basic structure of the
ARMM regional government when it recognizes the offices of the ARMM regional government
and directs the OICs who shall temporarily assume these offices to "perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices."

CONCLUSION: As a final point, we wish to address the bleak picture that the petitioner in G.R.
No. 197282 presents in his motion, that our Decision has virtually given the President the power
and authority to appoint 672,416 OICs in the event that the elections of barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan officials are postponed or cancelled.

We find this speculation nothing short of fear-mongering.

This argument fails to take into consideration the unique factual and legal circumstances which
led to the enactment of RA No. 10153. RA No. 10153 was passed in order to synchronize the
ARMM elections with the national and local elections. In the course of synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the national and local elections, Congress had to grant the President the power to
appoint OICs in the ARMM, in light of the fact that: (a) holdover by the incumbent ARMM
elective officials is legally impermissible; and (b) Congress cannot call for special elections and
shorten the terms of elective local officials for less than three years.

Unlike local officials, as the Constitution does not prescribe a term limit for barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan officials, there is no legal proscription which prevents these specific
government officials from continuing in a holdover capacity should some exigency require the
postponement of barangay or Sangguniang Kabataan elections. Clearly, these fears have
neither legal nor factual basis to stand on.

For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petitioners’ motions for reconsideration.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY with FINALITY the

motions for reconsideration for lack of merit and UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
15. Mariano v. Comelec, GR 118577
NATURE OF THE CASE: At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic
Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled,
"An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the
City of Makati."

PUNO, J.

FACTS: G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by
petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz,
Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and
Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are
residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as
unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds: 1. Section 2
of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code; 2. Section 51 of
R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective
officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. 3.
Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for: (a) it increased the legislative district of
Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a
general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the
return of every census; (b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of
the bill; and (c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section
5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of
Makati stands at only 450,000.

G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmeña as senator, taxpayer, and
concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same
grounds as afore-stated.

ISSUE: WON the afore-cited sections of R.A. 7854 are unconstitutional. (NO)

HELD: The Court finds no merit in these petitions.

SEC. 2, ART. I, RA 7854 - Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of
the proposed city of Makati, thus: Sec. 2.  The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati shall
be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred
to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in
Metropolitan Manila Area  over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River
and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the
municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the
Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate agency
or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction
between the City of Makati and the adjoining local government units.
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the
Local Government Code which require that the area of a local government unit should be made
by metes and bounds with technical descriptions.2

The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of
government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits
of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits, its acts are  ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in
the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of
governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought
to be avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local
government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.

Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about
by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that
the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its
boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area
previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or
multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2
stated that, the city’s land area “shall comprise the   present territory of the municipality.”

The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of
the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the
municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a
becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the
dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by
making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they
defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions.3 We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the
metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled
boundary disputes.4

We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not  per se present an insurmountable
difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing
boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the
ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not
prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission
of the Solicitor General in this regard, viz.:

Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond
cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz.: “the territorial jurisdiction of newly
 created or converted cities should be described by meted and bounds, with
technical descriptions” — was made in order to provide a means by which the
area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the
requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the
establishment of local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long
as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by
referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case,
then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been
sufficiently served.

Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain
therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles,
as petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a
condition sine qua non  for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which
the Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the Code is
to empower local government units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks
to make local governments more responsive to the needs of their constituents
while at the same time serving as a vital cog in national development. To
invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of
description was used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the
Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of the
other way around. This could not be the intendment of the law.

Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will
not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true
intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with
the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Tañada v.
Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an
active instrument of government, which, for purposes of interpretation, means
that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to
defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA
520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the case at bar.

SEC. 52, ART. X - Section 51 states:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective officials of the
Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and
shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is
held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their
offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence . The
appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising
their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city
government of the City of Makati.

They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution which provide:
 Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms . Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term
of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.

Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the
House of Representative, have a term of three  (3)  years and are prohibited from serving for
more than three  (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall
acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present
municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In
particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent
Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that
should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor  in the coming elections, he
can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since
his previous three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor  would not be counted. Thus,
petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political
ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.

We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements
before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1)
there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised
by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.5

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the
occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming
mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-
election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may
or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an
actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not
also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a
petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
PETITIONERS IN THE TWO PETITIONS ASSAILING SEC. 52 - Finally, petitioners in the
two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854.
Section 52 of the Charter provides:

Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. — Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city,

Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts  that shall initially
correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of
Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to
commence at the next national elections to be held after the effectivity of this
Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmariñas and Forbes shall be with the
first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the
second district. (emphasis supplied)

They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for:
(1) reapportionment6 cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is
not expressed in the title of the bill7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands
at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord
with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the
population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section
provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative . Even granting that the population of
Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative
district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000)  shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No
costs

QUOTABLE QUOTES: Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of
an additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the
bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring
a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be
sure, with Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully
index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient
compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such
general subject."
16. Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz, GR 105746
NATURE OF THE CASE: This is a petition for review of the decision dated March 4, 1992 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 of Oroquieta City, 1 affirming the legal existence of the
Municipality of Sinacaban in Misamis Occidental and ordering the relocation of its boundary for
the purpose of determining whether certain areas claimed by it belong to it.

MENDOZA, J.

FACTS: The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by Executive Order No. 258 of then
President Elpidio Quirino, pursuant to §68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. By virtue
of Municipal Council Resolution No 171, 2 dated November 22, 1988, Sinacaban laid claim to a
portion of Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara Baja, and Sinara Alto,3
based on the technical description in E.O. No. 258. The claim was filed with the Provincial Board
of Misamis Occidental against the Municipality of Jimenez. In its answer, the Municipality of
Jimenez, while conceding that under E.O. No. 258 the disputed area is part of Sinacaban,
nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement it had with the Municipality of
Sinacaban.

In its decision dated October 11, 1989, 5 the Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be
part of Sinacaban. It held that the previous resolution approving the agreement between the
municipalities was void because the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban
as fixed in E.O. No. 258, that power being vested in Congress pursuant to the Constitution and
the Local Government Code of 1983 (B.P. Blg. 337), §134. 6 The Provincial Board denied in its
Resolution No. 13-90 dated January 30, 1990 the motion of Jimenez seeking reconsideration.

On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the
Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 14. The suit was filed against Sinacaban, the
Province of Misamis Occidental and its Provincial Board, the Commission on Audit, the
Departments of Local Government, Budget and Management, and the Executive Secretary.
Jimenez alleged that, in accordance with the decision in Pelaez v. Auditor General, 8 the power
to create municipalities is essentially legislative and consequently Sinacaban, which was created
by an executive order, had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim vis-a-vis
Jimenez, of which it remains part. Jimenez prayed that Sinacaban be enjoined from assuming
control and supervision over the disputed barrios; that the Provincial Board be enjoined from
assuming jurisdiction over the claim of Sinacaban; that E.O. No. 258 be declared null and void;
that the decision dated October 11, 1989 and Resolution No. 13-90 of the Provincial Board be
set aside for having been rendered without jurisdiction; that the Commission on Audit be
enjoined from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds by Sinacaban; that the
Department of Budget and Management be enjoined from allotting public funds to Sinacaban;
and that the Executive Secretary be enjoined from exercising control and supervision over said
municipality.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim (YES); and
(2) If it has, whether or not it is the boundary provided for in E.O. No. 258 or in Resolution No.
77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental which should be used as the basis for
adjudicating Sinacaban's territorial claim.

HELD: First. The preliminary issue concerns the legal existence of Sinacaban. If Sinacaban
legally exists, then it has standing to bring a claim in the Provincial Board. Otherwise, it cannot.

The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal
corporation is the ruling in Pelaez v.  Auditor General  that the creation of municipal corporations
is essentially a legislative matter and therefore the President was without power to create by
executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. The ruling in this case has been reiterated in a
number of cases 9 later decided. However, we have since held that where a municipality created
as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity,
its creation can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v . Mendez,
Sr., 10 this Court considered the following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal
corporation, which, like the Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the
President before the ruling in Pelaez v.  Auditor General: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the
validity of the creation of the municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact that following
the ruling in Pelaez no  quo warranto  suit was filed to question the validity of the executive
order creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a
fifth class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a
legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives.
Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure  character of the
municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. No. 7160), §442(d) of which provides that "municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective
officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered
as regular municipalities."

Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a  de
facto  municipal corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized and
acquiesced publicly and officially. Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years
when Pelaez v.  Auditor General  was decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No.
258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40 years later that its
existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is
desired for its revenue. This fact must be underscored because under Rule 66, §16 of the Rules
of Court, a quo warranto  suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be
commenced within five (5) years from the time the act complained of was done or committed.
On the contrary, the State and even the Municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized
Sinacaban's corporate existence. Under Administrative Order No. 33 dated June 13, 1978 of this
Court, as reiterated by §31 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B. P. Blg. 129),
Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez had earlier recognized
Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their common boundary.
The agreement was embodied in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis
Occidental.
Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure  status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered
Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Moreover, following the ruling
in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v.  Mendez, Sr., §442(d) of the Local Government Code
of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban. This provision
states:

Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue
to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of
elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the Code
shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.

Second. Jimenez claims, however, that R.A. No. 7160, §442(d) is invalid, since it does not
conform to the constitutional and statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the
creation of new municipalities. 11

This contention will not bear analysis. Since, as previously explained, Sinacaban had
attained de facto  status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, it is
not subject to the plebiscite requirement. This requirement applies only to new  municipalities
created for the first time under the Constitution. Actually, the requirement of plebiscite was
originally contained in Art. XI, §3 of the previous Constitution which took effect on January 17,
1973. It cannot, therefore, be applied to municipal corporations created before, such as the
Municipality of Sinacaban in the case at bar.

Third. Finally, Jimenez argues that the RTC erred in ordering a relocation survey of the
boundary of Sinacaban because the barangays which Sinacaban are claiming are not
enumerated in E.O. No. 258 and that in any event in 1950 the parties entered into an
agreement whereby the barangays in question were considered part of the territory of Jimenez.

E.O. No. 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises  only the barrios (now called barangays)
therein mentioned. What it says is that "Sinacaban contains" those barrios, without saying they
are the only ones comprising it. The reason for this is that the technical description, containing
the metes and bounds of its territory, is controlling. The trial court correctly ordered a
relocation survey as the only means of determining the boundaries of the municipality and
consequently the question to which the municipality the barangays in question belong.

Now, as already stated, in 1950 the two municipalities agreed that certain barrios belonged to
Jimenez, while certain other ones belonged to Sinacaban. This agreement was subsequently
approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental. Whether this agreement conforms to
E.O. No. 258 will be determined by the result of the survey. Jimenez contends, however, that
regardless of its conformity to E.O. No. 258, the agreement as embodied in Resolution No. 77
of the Provincial Board, is binding on Sinacaban. This raises the question whether the Provincial
Board had authority to approve the agreement or, to put it in another way, whether it had the
power to declare certain barrios part of one or the other municipality. We hold it did not if the
effect would be to amend the area as described in E.O. No. 258 creating the Municipality of
Sinacaban.
At the time the Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 77 on February 18, 1950, the applicable
law was §2167 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which provided:

Sec. 2167. Municipal boundary disputes. — How settled. — Disputes as to

jurisdiction of municipal governments over places or barrios shall be decided by
the provincial boards of the provinces in which such municipalities are situated,
after an investigation at which the municipalities concerned shall be duly heard.
From the decision of the provincial board appeal may be taken by the
municipality aggrieved to the Secretary of the Interior [now the Office of the
Executive Secretary], whose decision shall be final. Where the places or barrios
in dispute are claimed by municipalities situated in different provinces, the
provincial boards of the provinces concerned shall come to an agreement if
possible, but, in the event of their failing to agree, an appeal shall be had to the
Secretary of Interior [Executive Secretary], whose decision shall be final.

As held in Pelaez v. Auditor General, 12 the power of provincial boards to settle boundary

disputes is "of an administrative nature — involving, as it does, the adoption of means and
ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities." It is a power "to fix common
boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities."
It is thus limited to implementing the law creating a municipality. It is obvious that any
alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating a municipality is not the
carrying into effect of that law but its amendment. 13 If, therefore, Resolution No. 77 of the
Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental is contrary to the technical description of the territory of
Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez as basis for opposing the claim of Sinacaban.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisionof the Regional
Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 14 is AFFIRMED.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: As held in Pelaez v. Auditor General, 12 the power of provincial

boards to settle boundary disputes is "of an administrative nature — involving, as it does, the
adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities." It is a
power "to fix common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between
adjoining municipalities." It is thus limited to implementing the law creating a municipality. It is
obvious that any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating a
municipality is not the carrying into effect of that law but its amendment. 13 If, therefore,
Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental is contrary to the technical
description of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez as basis for opposing the
claim of Sinacaban.
17. Sema v. Comelec and Dilangalen, GR 177597
NATURE OF THE CASE: These consolidated petitions seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated
10 May 2007, of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the
legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.

CARPIO, J.

FACTS: The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts
for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight
municipalities.3 Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by
Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054).4 Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of
Maguindanao’s first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having
voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989. On 28 August
2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create
provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,5 enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act
No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight
municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.

ISSUE:
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under
MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in
the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for
such province.

HELD: The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void; and
(3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.

In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to
Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because
the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a
power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3
of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a
province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province
shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law
creating a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because the
legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction
as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201,
enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is
void.
Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic and
legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely
complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as
Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No.
9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID
Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.

R: Full text case is ripe with legal principles

18. Alvarez v. Guingona, GR 118303
NATURE OF THE CASE: This is a Petition for Prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction, petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No.
7720, entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," mainly because the Act allegedly did not
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.

FACTS: Of main concern to the petitioners is whether Republic Act No. 7720, just recently
passed by Congress and signed by the President into law, is constitutionally infirm. petitioners
assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago,"
mainly because the Act allegedly did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives
as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Also, petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average
annual income required under Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in order to be
converted into a component city.

ISSUE:
(a) Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the
computation of the average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion into
an independent component city; and
(b) Whether or not, considering that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own version of HB No.
8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives.

HELD:
(a) The annual income of a local government unit includes the IRAs - Petitioners claim
that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its average annual income for the
last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices falls below the required annual
income of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for its conversion into a city, petitioners
having computed Santiago's average annual income to P 13,109,560.47.

By dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992, after deducting the
IRAs, the average annual income arrived at would only be P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991
constant prices. Thus, petitioners claim that Santiago's income is far below the aforesaid
Twenty Million Pesos average annual income requirement. The certification issued by the
Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance, which indicates Santiago's
average annual income to be P20,974,581.97, is allegedly not accurate as the Internal Revenue
Allotments were not excluded from the computation. Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are
not actually income but transfers and/or budgetary aid from the national government and that
they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like population, land and equal
sharing.
In this regard, we hold that petitioners asseverations are untenable because Internal Revenue
Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units. It is true that for a municipality
to be converted into a component city, it must, among others, have an average annual income
of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices.1 Such income must be duly certified by the Department of Finance. Resolution of the
controversy regarding compliance by the Municipality of Santiago with the aforecited income
requirement hinges on a correlative and contextual explication of the meaning of internal
revenue allotments (IRAs) vis-a-vis the notion of income of a local government unit and the
principles of local autonomy and decentralization underlying the institutionalization and
intensified empowerment of the local government system.

(b) On the enactment of RA No. 7720,

there was compliance with Section 24,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional

prescription,16 originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that
Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a
bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot
be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243
was filed in the Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB No.
8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB
No. 8817 was thus precursive not only of the said Act in question but also of SB No. 1243.
Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated in the
enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987
Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant controversy.

Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was already approved on
Third Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate when the Senate Committee on Local
Government conducted its public hearing on HB No. 8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the
Third Reading on December 17, 1993 and transmitted to the Senate on January 28, 1994; a
little less than a month thereafter, or on February 23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Local
Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate held in abeyance
any action on SB No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817, already approved on the Third
Reading, from the House of Representatives. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional
requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for
as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.

We have already addressed this issue in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance.17 There,
on the matter of the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law, which, as a revenue bill, is
nonetheless constitutionally required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives,
we explained:

. . . To begin with, it is not the law — but the revenue bill — which is required by the
Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to
 emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive
changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. . . . as a result of
the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute —
and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment
of the law — must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the
Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose
amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two
houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

xxx       xxx       xxx

It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197
but of another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was
merely to "take [H. No. 11197] into consideration" in enacting S. No. 1630. There is
really no difference between the Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting
clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause (which, it would
seem petitioners admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on the other hand,
separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter. In either case the
result are two bills on the same subject.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff,
or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local
application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as
they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are
elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national
perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.

Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a
body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. . .

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit with
costs against petitioners

IMPORTANT INFORMATION: Internal Revenue Allotment INCLUDED in income

requirement - By dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992,
after deducting the IRAs, the average annual income arrived at would only be P13,109,560.47
based on the 1991 constant prices. Thus, petitioners claim that Santiago's income is far below
the aforesaid Twenty Million Pesos average annual income requirement.

The certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of
Finance, which indicates Santiago's average annual income to be P20,974,581.97, is allegedly
not accurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were not excluded from the computation.
Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and/or budgetary aid
from the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on
factors like population, land and equal sharing.

In this regard, we hold that petitioners asseverations are untenable because Internal Revenue
Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units.

It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it must, among others,
have an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive
years based on 1991 constant prices.1 Such income must be duly certified by the Department
of Finance.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT - A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State
which is constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs.3
Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended,
however, to be an imperium in imperio,4 the local government unit is autonomous in the sense
that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.5 Power which used to be
highly centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral local
government units to develop not only at their own pace and discretion but also with their own
resources and assets.

The practical side to development through a decentralized local government system certainly
concerns the matter of financial resources. With its broadened powers and increased
responsibilities, a local government unit must now operate on a much wider scale. More
extensive operations, in turn, entail more expenses. Understandably, the vesting of duty,
responsibility and accountability in every local government unit is accompanied with a provision
for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its
functions. Availment of such resources is effectuated through the vesting in every local
government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right
to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue
allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the
utilization and development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.

The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds accrue to
the general fund of the local government and are used to finance its operations subject to
specified modes of spending the same as provided for in the Local Government Code and its
implementing rules and regulations. For instance, not less than twenty percent (20%) of the
IRAs must be set aside for local development projects.9 As such, for purposes of budget
preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of the income of the local government
unit, among others, the IRAs and the share in the national wealth utilization proceeds are
considered items of income. This is as it should be, since income is defined in the Local
Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross
accretions of funds of the local government unit.

The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the
local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without
need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute
income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed
funds. For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the Department of
Finance certified, among others, that the municipality had an average annual income of at least
Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. This,
the Department of Finance did after including the IRAs in its computation of said average
annual income.

Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that "the average annual
income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
transfers, and non-recurring income." To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of
income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs
have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that
unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code
speaks of "funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-
owned-or-controlled corporations". Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 35-9313 correctly
encapsulizes the full import of the above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be
"revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of
the Local General Fund including the internal revenue allotment and other shares provided for
in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other
national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar
others" (Emphasis ours). Such order, constituting executive or contemporaneous construction of
a statute by an administrative agency charged with the task of interpreting and applying the
same, is entitled to full respect and should be accorded great weight by the courts, unless such
construction is clearly shown to be in sharp conflict with the Constitution, the governing statute,
or other laws.

Every law, including RA No. 7720, has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality - It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies
the presumption of constitutionality.19 Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be nullified, it must be
shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful
and equivocal one; in other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable
doubt.20 Those who petition this court to declare a law to be unconstitutional must clearly and
fully establish the basis that will justify such a declaration; otherwise, their petition must fail.
Taking into consideration the justification of our stand on the immediately preceding ground
raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 7720, the Court stands on the
holding that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition
is, therefore, inevitable.
19. Navarro, et al v. Executive Secretary Ermita, GR 180050
NATURE OF THE CASE: For consideration of the Court is the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of
Judgment dated October 20, 2010 filed by Movant-Intervenors1 dated and filed on October 29,
2010, praying that the Court (a) recall the entry of judgment, and (b) resolve their motion for
reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution.

NACHURA, J.

FACTS: On February 10, 2010, the Court rendered its Decision granting the petition. The
Decision declared R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the requirements on
population and land area in the creation of a province under the LGC. Consequently, it declared
the proclamation of Dinagat and the election of its officials as null and void. The Decision
likewise declared as null and void the provision on Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR), stating that, "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply
where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands" for being beyond the
ambit of Article 461 of the LGC, inasmuch as such exemption is not expressly provided in the
law.

To provide a clear perspective of the instant motion, we present hereunder a brief background
of the relevant antecedents— On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into
law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands). 2 On
December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory
plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government Code
(LGC).3 The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. 4 With the
approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of
Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial officials who
took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized
elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on
July 1, 2007. On November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene
O. Medina, former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No.
9355.6 The Court dismissed the petition on technical grounds. Their motion for reconsideration
was also denied. Undaunted, petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao
del Norte, filed another petition for certiorari 8 seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being
unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected,
would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao
del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich
resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land
area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law creating the Province of Dinagat Islands is unconstitutional and
does not comply with the requirements of the LGC and the LGC-IRR. (No)

HELD:
LGC-IRR REQUIREMENTS - Also worthy of note are the requisites in the creation of a barangay,
a municipality, a city, and a province as provided both in the LGC and the LGC-IRR, viz.—

For a Barangay:

LGC: SEC. 386. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A barangay may be created out of a contiguous
territory which has a population of at least two thousand (2,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office except in cities and municipalities within Metro Manila and other
metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly urbanized cities where such territory shall have a
certified population of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants: Provided, That the creation
thereof shall not reduce the population of the original barangay or barangays to less than the
minimum requirement prescribed herein.

To enhance the delivery of basic services in the indigenous cultural communities,

barangays may be created in such communities by an Act of Congress, notwithstanding
the above requirement.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay shall be properly identified by metes
and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The governor or city mayor may prepare a consolidation plan for barangays, based
on the criteria prescribed in this Section, within his territorial jurisdiction. The plan shall
be submitted to the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned
for appropriate action. In the case of municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila area
and other metropolitan political subdivisions, the barangay consolidation plan can be
prepared and approved by the sangguniang bayan concerned.

LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 14. Barangays. – (a) Creation of barangays by the sangguniang

panlalawigan shall require prior recommendation of the sangguniang bayan.

(b) New barangays in the municipalities within MMA shall be created only by Act of
Congress, subject to the limitations and requirements prescribed in this Article.

(c) Notwithstanding the population requirement, a barangay may be created in the

indigenous cultural communities by Act of Congress upon recommendation of the LGU
or LGUs where the cultural community is located.

(d) A barangay shall not be created unless the following requisites are present:

(1) Population – which shall not be less than two thousand (2,000) inhabitants,
except in municipalities and cities within MMA and other metropolitan political
subdivisions as may be created by law, or in highly-urbanized cities where such
territory shall have a population of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants, as
certified by the NSO. The creation of a barangay shall not reduce the population
of the original barangay or barangays to less than the prescribed minimum/

(2) Land Area – which must be contiguous, unless comprised by two (2) or more
islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a barangay sought to be created shall be
 properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural
boundaries.

Municipality:

LGC: SEC. 442. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the provincial treasurer, or at least Two million five hundred
thousand pesos (P2,500,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on the 1991
constant prices; a population of at least twenty-five thousand (25,000) inhabitants as certified
by the National Statistics Office; and a contiguous territory of at least fifty (50) square
kilometers as certified by the Lands

Management Bureau: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population or income of the original municipality or municipalities at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly identified

by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the
municipality proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund of
the municipality concerned, exclusive of special funds, transfers and non-recurring
income.

(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist
and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal
officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be
considered regular municipalities.

LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 13. Municipalities. – (a) Requisites for Creation – A municipality shall not be
created unless the following requisites are present:

(i) Income – An average annual income of not less than Two Million Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱2,500,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive
years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the provincial treasurer. The
average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive
of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income;

(ii) Population – which shall not be less than twenty five thousand (25,000) inhabitants,
as certified by NSO; and

(iii) Land area – which must be contiguous with an area of at least fifty (50) square
kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two
(2) or more islands. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the proposed
municipality is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a
municipality sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.
 The creation of a new municipality shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the
prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne
by the petitioners.

City:

LGC: SEC. 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos (₱20,000,000.00) for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
requisities:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as

certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or,

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the
creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by

metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city
proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not
be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.

LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 11. Cities. – (a) Requisites for creation – A city shall not be created unless
the following requisites on income and either population or land area are present:

(1) Income – An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos
(₱20,000,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on
1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts,
transfers, and nonrecurring income; and

(2) Population or land area – Population which shall not be less than one hundred fifty
thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the NSO; or land area which must be
contiguous with an area of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by
LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a city sought to be
created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.
The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original
LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All
expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.

Provinces:

LGC: SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(₱20,000,000.00) based on 1991 prices and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as

certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or,

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:

Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.

LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 9. Provinces. – (a) Requisites for creation – A province shall not be created
unless the following requisites on income and either population or land area are present:

(1) Income – An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million pesos
(₱20,000,000.00) for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on
1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts,
transfers, and non-recurring income; and

(2) Population or land area – Population which shall not be less than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) inhabitants, as certified by NSO; or land area which must be
contiguous with an area of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified
by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or
is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to
be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.

The creation of a new province shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum
requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It bears scrupulous notice that from the above cited provisions, with respect to the creation of
barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the
creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability
and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided
for.

But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one
(1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in
Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a
municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of
the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is
expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.

There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and
municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the
Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form
part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is,
therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section
442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was
inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly
provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional
oversight in Section 461 of the LGC – and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be
in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.

This interpretation finds merit when we consider the basic policy considerations underpinning
the principle of local autonomy.

Section 2 of the LGC, of which paragraph (a) is pertinent to this case, provides—

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local
autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and
make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the
State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more
powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed
from the national government to the local government units.

This declaration of policy is echoed in Article 3(a) of the LGC-IRR 26 and in the Whereas clauses
of Administrative Order No. 270,27 which read—

WHEREAS, Section 25, Article II of the Constitution mandates that the State shall ensure the
autonomy of local governments;

WHEREAS, pursuant to this declared policy, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, affirms, among others, that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to
attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the attainment of national goals;

WHEREAS, Section 533 of the Local Government Code of 1991 requires the President to
convene an Oversight Committee for the purpose of formulating and issuing the appropriate
rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of all the
provisions of the said Code; and

WHEREAS, the Oversight Committee, after due deliberations and consultations with all the
concerned sectors of society and consideration of the operative principles of local autonomy as
provided in the Local Government Code of 1991, has completed the formulation of the
implementing rules and regulations; x x x

Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful
local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective local
government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve the desired results. The strict
interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counter-productive,
if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended province that consists of
several municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also consist of islands. The
component cities and municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land
area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province
would be made to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers,
even if it consists of several islands. This would mean that Congress has opted to assign a
distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one composed of
islands — and negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural
progress, and the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This preferential option would
prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is
scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a
contiguous land mass.

Moreover, such a very restrictive construction could trench on the equal protection clause, as it
actually defeats the purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the
Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement should be read together with territorial
contiguity.

CONSTITUTIONAL - The matters raised during the said Bicameral Conference Committee
meeting clearly show the manifest intention of Congress to promote development in the
previously underdeveloped and uninhabited land areas by allowing them to directly share in the
allocation of funds under the national budget. It should be remembered that, under Sections
284 and 285

of the LGC, the IRA is given back to local governments, and the sharing is based on land area,
population, and local revenue.30

Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in absurdity,
impossibility, or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction, such
as the legislative history of the law, 31 or may consider the implementing rules and regulations
and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive and/or legislative construction.
Pursuant to this principle, Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR should be deemed incorporated in the
basic law, the LGC.

It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee consisting
of members of both the Executive and Legislative departments, pursuant to Section 533 32 of the
LGC. As Section 533 provides, the Oversight Committee shall formulate and issue the
appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of
any and all provisions of this Code, thereby ensuring compliance with the principles of local
autonomy as defined under the Constitution. It was also mandated by the Constitution that a
local government code shall be enacted by Congress, to wit—

Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among
the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide
for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions
and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of
the local units. (Emphasis supplied.)

These State policies are the very reason for the enactment of the LGC, with the view to attain
decentralization and countryside development. Congress saw that the old LGC, Batas Pambansa
Bilang 337, had to be replaced with a new law, now the LGC of 1991, which is more dynamic
and cognizant of the needs of the Philippines as an archipelagic country. This accounts for the
exemption from the land area requirement of local government units composed of one or more
islands, as expressly stated under Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC, with respect to the creation
of municipalities and cities, but inadvertently omitted from Section 461 with respect to the
creation of provinces. Hence, the void or missing detail was filled in by the Oversight Committee
in the LGC-IRR.

With three (3) members each from both the Senate and the House of Representatives,
particularly the chairpersons of their respective Committees on Local Government, it cannot be
gainsaid that the inclusion by the Oversight Committee of the exemption from the land area
requirement with respect to the creation of provinces consisting of one (1) or more islands was
intended by Congress, but unfortunately not expressly stated in Section 461 of the LGC, and
this intent was echoed through an express provision in the LGC-IRR. To be sure, the Oversight
Committee did not just arbitrarily and whimsically insert such an exemption in Article 9(2) of the
LGC-IRR. The Oversight Committee evidently conducted due deliberation and consultations with
all the concerned sectors of society and considered the operative principles of local autonomy
as provided in the LGC when the IRR was formulated. 33 Undoubtedly, this amounts not only to
an executive construction, entitled to great weight and respect from this Court, 34 but to
legislative construction as well, especially with the inclusion of representatives from the four
leagues of local government units as members of the Oversight Committee.

With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and legislative
construction of the LGC, the many details to implement the LGC had already been put in place,
which Congress understood to be impractical and not too urgent to immediately translate into
direct amendments to the LGC. But Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat
to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the
land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as
an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers,
Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and
transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.

Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in
both Chambers of Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress definitively show the
clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land area
requirement, with respect to the creation of a province when it consists of one or more islands,
as expressly provided only in the LGC-IRR. Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended
by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.

What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government
unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account
its average annual income of ₱82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the
Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement
of ₱20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its
constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the
plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot
operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective
that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province. This Court should not be
instrumental in stunting such capacity. As we have held in League of Cities of the Philippines v.
Commission on Elections35 —

Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read
according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is
not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the
statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within
the statute as if within the letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within
the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and
should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.

So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of Congress, a co-equal

branch of government, it behooves the Court to have at once one principle in mind: the
presumption of constitutionality of statutes. This presumption finds its roots in the tri-partite
system of government and the corollary separation of powers, which enjoins the three great
departments of the government to accord a becoming courtesy for each other’s acts, and not to
interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its official functions. Towards this end, courts
ought to reject assaults against the validity of statutes, barring of course their clear
unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain, the theory in context being that the law is the
product of earnest studies by Congress to ensure that no constitutional prescription or concept
is infringed. Consequently, before a law duly challenged is nullified, an unequivocal breach of,
or a clear conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be
demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to: 1. GRANT the Urgent Motion to
Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors, dated and filed on October 29, 2010; 2.
RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the July 20, 2010 Resolution, and GRANT the Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
dated July 20, 2010; 3. GRANT the Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
dated May 12, 2010. The May 12, 2010 Resolution is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The
provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code
of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355
(An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL,
and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof
are declared VALID; and 4. The petition is DISMISSED.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
- It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local
government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to
deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the LGC, i.e.,
income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. In this
light, Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of each of
these three criteria, placing emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential
consideration.

Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local government units,
particularly of a province, is economic viability.

DISSENTED: JUSTICES CARPIO, BRION, PERALTA, AND DEL CASTILLO

20. Ordillo v. Comelec, GR 93054

NATURE OF THE CASE:

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

FACTS: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,
Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region." The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the
plebiscite showed that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in
only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the
provinces and city above-mentioned.

ISSUE: Whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably
for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute
such Region. (NO)

HELD: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:
"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures,
and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."
The keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that "region"
is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region" used in its ordinary
sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions
into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous
provinces. (Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the
land by P.D. No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it
must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other units
because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in
this case.
The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of the Constitution, as
much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that the words
used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed, must then, be applied in this case. (See Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757,
770, [1988]; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, 422-423
[1970]).
Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6766
strengthens the petitioner's position that the Region cannot be constituted from only one
province.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to
be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government and local
government units. It further provides that:
"SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary
for the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region . . ."
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may
constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of
having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials
exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area.
Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the legislative power in the Cordillera
Assembly whose members shall be elected from regional assembly districts apportioned among
provinces and the cities composing the Autonomous Region.  chanrobles virtual law library
If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera Assembly shall then be
elected only from the province of Ifugao creating an awkward predicament of having two
legislative bodies — the Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan — exercising
their legislative powers over the province of Ifugao. And since Ifugao is one of the smallest
provinces in the Philippines, population-wise, it would have too many government officials for
so few people.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 2259 of
the Commission on Elections, insofar as it upholds the creation of an autonomous region, the
February 14, 1990 memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the February 5, 1990
memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No.
6861 are declared null and void while Executive Order No. 220 is declared to be still in force
and effect until properly repealed or amended.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: Article XII, Section 10 of the law creates a Regional Planning and
Development Board composed of the Cordillera Governor, all the provincial governors and city
mayors or their representatives, two members of the Cordillera Assembly, and members
representing the private sector. The Board has a counterpart in the provincial level called the
Provincial Planning and Development Coordinator. The Board's functions (Article XII, Section 10,
par. 2, Republic Act No. 6766) are almost similar to those of the Provincial Coordinator's (Title
Four, Chapter 3, Article 10, Section 220 (4), Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 — Local Government
Code). If it takes only one person in the provincial level to perform such functions while on the
other hand it takes an entire Board to perform almost the same tasks in the regional level, it
could only mean that a larger area must be covered at the regional level. The respondent's
theory of the Autonomous Region being made up of a single province must, therefore, fail.
Article XXI, Section 13 (B) (c) alloting the huge amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00)
to the Regional Government for its initial organizational requirements cannot be construed as
funding only a lone and small province.
These sections of Republic Act No. 6766 show that a one province Cordillera Autonomous
Region was never contemplated by the law creating it.
The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of the total population of the areas enumerated in
Article I, Section 2 (b) of Republic Act No. 6766 which include Benguet, Mountain Province,
Abra, Kalinga-Apayao and Baguio City. It has the second smallest number of inhabitants from
among the provinces and city above mentioned. The Cordillera population is distributed in
round figures as follows: Abra, 185,000; Benguet, 486,000; Ifugao, 149,000; Kalinga-Apayao,
214,000; Mountain Province, 116,000; and Baguio City, 183,000; Total population of these five
provinces and one city; 1,332,000 according to the 1990 Census (Manila Standard, September
30, 1990, p. 14).
There are other provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 which are either violated or which cannot
be complied with. Section 16 of Article V calls for a Regional Commission on Appointments with
the Speaker as Chairman and are (6) members coming from different provinces and cities in the
Region. Under the respondents' view, the Commission would have a Chairman and only one
member. It would never have a quorum. Section 3 of Article VI calls for cabinet members, as
far as practicable, to come from various provinces and cities of the Region. Section 1 of Article
VII creates a system of tribal courts for the various indigenous cultural communities of the
Region. Section 9 of Article XV requires the development of a common regional language based
upon the various languages and dialects in the region which regional language in turn is
expected to enrich the national language.
The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused with
provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting the Region.
To contemplate the situation envisioned by the respondent would not only violate the letter and
intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would also be impractical and illogical.
Our decision in Abbas, et al. v. COMELEC, (G.R. No. 89651, November 10, 1969), is not
applicable in the case at bar contrary to the view of the Secretary of Justice.
The Abbas case laid down the rate on the meaning of majority in the phrase "by majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units called for the purpose" found in the Constitution, Article X,
Section 18. It stated:
x  x  x
". . . [I]t is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is simple majority of
votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority
of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent
units."
This was the pronouncement applied by the Secretary of Justice in arriving at his conclusion
stated in his Memorandum for the President that:
x  x  x
". . . [i]t is believed that the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) as
mandated by R.A. No. 6766 became effective upon its approval by the majority of the
votes cast in the province of Ifugao. And considering the proviso in Section 13 (a) that
only the provinces and city voting favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province of
Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably — can, alone, legally and validly
constitute the CAR." (Rollo. p. 40).
The plebiscites mandated by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 for the Cordillera and
Republic Act No. 6734 for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao determine — (1)
whether there shall be an autonomous region in the Cordillera and in Muslim Mindanao and (2)
which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in the two Republic Acts, shall comprise
said Autonomous Regions. (See III, Record of the Constitutional Commission, 487-492 [1986]).
The Abbas case established the rule to follow on which provinces and cities shall comprise the
autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao which is, consequently, the same rule to follow with
regard to the autonomous region in the Cordillera. However, there is nothing in the Abbas
decision which deals with the issue on whether an autonomous region, in either Muslim
Mindanao or Cordillera could exist despite the fact that only one province or one city is to
constitute it.
Stated in another way, the issue in this case is whether the sole province of Ifugao can validly
and legally constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The issue is not whether the province
of Ifugao is to be included in the Cordillera Autonomous Region. It is the first issue which the
Court answers in the instant case.
21. Mejia v. Balolong, GR L-1925
NATURE OF THE CASE: This is an action of quo warranto instituted by the petitioners, Flaviano
Mejia, Teofilo P. Guadiz, Ruperto Z. Tandoc and Policronio de Venecia against the respondents,
Pedro U. Balolong, Ricardo Villamil, Toribio Quimosing and Crisologo Zarate on the ground that
the appointments of the latter by the President as councilors of the City of Dagupan were null
and void, and therefore they are unlawfully holding their offices, and that the former are
entitled to said offices because they were elected as such in the general election for provincial,
municipal, and city officials on November, 1947.
FERIA, J.
FACTS: The petitioners in this case presented their certificates of candidacy for councilors of the
City of Dagupan and were elected as such on the general election for provincial and municipal
officials held on November 11, 1947, in conformity with the provision of the Election Code. The
four respondents have also presented their certificates of candidacy for councilors of Dagupan
and were defeated; but the President of the Philippines on December 30, 1947, appointed the
respondents as councilors of the City of Dagupan, in lieu of the petitioners elected as such in
said general election.
Under sections 7 and 11 of Act No. 170, the Mayor of the City of Dagupan shall be appointed by
the President of the Philippines, and the municipal or city councilors thereof shall be elected
during every general election for provincial, municipal officers in accordance with the Election
Code. Section 7 of the Revised Election Code prescribes that on the second Tuesday of
November, 1947, and on the same date every four years thereafter a regular election shall be
held to elect the officials who will occupy all elective provincial, city and municipal offices
throughout the Philippines. And, according to section 88 of the same Act No. 170, "the city
government provided for in this charter shall be organized on such a date as may be fixed by
the President of the Philippines and upon the qualification of the City Mayor and the
appointment or election of the members of the Municipal Board. Pending the next general
election for provincial and municipal officials, the offices of the members of the Municipal Board
shall be filled by appointment of the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments.
The validity of the appointment of the respondents as councilors of the City of Dagupan by the
President of the Philippines depends upon whether the City of Dagupan was created and came
into existence on June 20, 1947, the date Act No. 170 became effective, or on January 1, 1948,
when the city government was organized by Executive Order No. 96. If the first, it is obvious
that the "next general election" referred to in section 11 in connection with section 88, of Act
No. 170 above quoted, when the members of the Municipal Council of the City of Dagupan
were to be elected, was that held on November 11, 1947, and the President had no power to
appoint the herein respondents. Because the offices of the members of the Municipal Board of
the City of Dagupan could be filled by appointment of the President, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, only if the date for the organization of the city government were
fixed pending or before the next general election for provincial and municipal officials according
to the above quoted provisions of section 88 of Act No. 170. After said general election they
shall be filled by the persons elected as such.
ISSUE: Whether or not the four respondents are lawfully holding their positions in the City.
(NO)
HELD: Section 2 of Act No. 170, which became effective upon its approval on June 20, 1947,
provides that:

Sec. 2 Territory of Dagupan City. — The City of Dagupan, which is hereby created, shall
comprise the present territorial jurisdiction of the municipality of Dagupan, in the
Province of Pangasinan.

The President of the Philippines may, by executive order, increase the territory of the
City of Dagupan by adding thereto such contiguous barrios or municipalities as may be
necessary and desirable in the public interest. (Emphasis ours.).

It is evident that the City of Dagupan created by said Act came into existence as a legal entity
or a public corporation upon the approval of Act No. 170, on June 20, 1947; because a statute
which, like Act No. 170, is to take effect upon its approval, is operative from the exact instance
upon its approval or becoming a law. The fact that by Executive Order No. 96 promulgated in
October 1947, the President of the Philippines added the municipality of Calasiao "to the City of
Dagupan" as expressly stated in said Executive Order, is a recognition that the city was already
created and in existence then, because the President is only authorized to increase the territory
of the City and not of the Municipality of Dagupan. But as a city is a public corporation or a
judicial entity, and as such can not operate or transact business by itself but through its agents
or officers, it was necessary that the government of the city be organized, that is, that the
officials thereof be appointed or elected in order that it may act or transact business as such
public corporation or city.

The date of the organization of the city government of Dagupan which the President is
authorized to fix by the provisions of section 88, is not and can not be the date of the creation
of the city, not only because, as we have stated, the City of Dagupan came into existence on
the same date June 20 in which Act No. 170 creating the said city became effective, but
because what was to be organized, according to said section 88, is the city government, and
not the city as an entity, and the word "organize" means "to prepare [the city] for transaction
of business, as assembly, by choosing officers, committees, etc." (Funk and Wagnall College
Standard Dictionary.) It is obvious that to create a public corporation or city is one thing and to
organize the government thereof is another. A public corporation is created and comes into
existence from the moment the law or charter that creates it becomes effective, and in case of
a private corporation it comes into existence as a juridical entity from the time the articles of
incorporation thereof is registered in the proper bureau or office in accordance with law. But a
public as well as a private corporation cannot act or transact business before the governing
body thereof is organized or the officers who shall act for or in their representation have been
chosen either by appointment or election. The organization of the government of a city
presupposes necessarily the previous existence of the city at the time its government is
organized, because no officials of the city may be appointed or elected before the city has come
into existence.

Undoubtedly, the contention of the respondents that the next general election referred to in
sections 11 and 88, in which the members of the Municipal Board of the City of Dagupan shall
be elected, was not the one held on November 11, 1947, because the City of Dagupan had not
then been organized, but the next general election in 1951, is predicated upon the erroneous
assumption that January 1 of 1948 fixed by Executive Order No. 115 as the date for the
organization of the city government of Dagupan was the date of the creation of said city or
when it came into existence, and is apparently supported by the erroneous and confusing
wording of the said Executive Order No. 115 which uses the phrase " organization of the City of
Dagupan, instead of "organization of the city government of Dagupan " as expressly provided in
said section 88 of Act No. 170.

The territory of the City of Dagupan is fixed by section 2 of Act No. 170, as comprising the
territory of the old municipality of Dagupan. Although the President is authorized by the same
section to increase the territory of the city by adding to it such contiguous territory as he may
designate, the exercise of such authority by the President would not and could not affect the
existence of the city, nor the organization of its government. If a new territory is annexed to
the City of Dagupan in time before the election the inhabitants thereof may vote for the
councilors of the city. Otherwise or if the annexation takes place after the election, the
inhabitants of the territory so annexed shall come under the jurisdiction of the government of
said city, although they had not voted for the members of the council thereof. There is nothing
in the record to show that the inhabitants of the Municipality of Calasiao annexed in October
1947 to the City of Dagupan had voted for the councilors of the city during the general election
in November 1947; but whether they had voted or not is immaterial for the reasons above
stated, and because said municipality was segregated from the City of Dagupan by Executive
Order No. 115 on December 1947, and the government of said city was organized on January
1, 1948.

Since the election of the members of the Municipal Board of the City of Dagupan created on
June 20, 1947, was to take and took place at the general election held on November 11, 1947,
and the President of the Philippines was empowered by section 88 to appoint those members
only if the organization of the city government had taken place pending or before the said
election, it necessarily follows that the appointments of the respondents effected on December
30, 1947, are null and void.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: In view of all the foregoing, the four respondents shall be ousted and
altogether excluded from the position of councilor of the City of Dagupan which they are now
unlawfully holding, and that the four petitioners elected by popular vote during the general
election on November 11, 1947, be placed in possession of those offices. It is so ordered with
costs against the respondents.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: DISSENTED BY JUSTICE PARAS
22. Malabang v. Benito, GR L-28113

NATURE OF THE CASE: The petitioners brought this action for prohibition to nullify Executive
Order 386 and to restrain the respondent municipal officials from performing the functions of
their respective office relying on the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General 2 and
Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva.

CASTRO, J.

FACTS: The petitioner Amer Macaorao Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur,
while the respondent Pangandapun Bonito is the mayor, and the rest of the respondents are
the councilors, of the municipality of Balabagan of the same province. Balabagan was formerly
a part of the municipality of Malabang, having been created on March 15, 1960, by Executive
Order 386 of the then President Carlos P. Garcia, out of barrios and sitios of the latter
municipality.

In Pelaez this Court, through Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Concepcion, ruled: (1) that section
23 of Republic Act 2370 [Barrio Charter Act, approved January 1, 1960], by vesting the power
to create barrios in the provincial board, is a "statutory denial of the presidential authority to
create a new barrio [and] implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities," and
(2) that section 68 of the Administrative Code, insofar as it gives the President the power to
create municipalities, is unconstitutional (a) because it constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power and (b) because it offends against section 10 (1) of article VII of the
Constitution, which limits the President's power over local governments to mere supervision. As
this Court summed up its discussion: "In short, even if it did not entail an undue delegation of
legislative powers, as it certainly does, said section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative
Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of
the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory
enactment."

On the other hand, the respondents, while admitting the facts alleged in the petition,
nevertheless argue that the rule announced in Pelaez can have no application in this case
because unlike the municipalities involved in Pelaez, the municipality of Balabagan is at least a
de facto corporation, having been organized under color of a statute before this was declared
unconstitutional, its officers having been either elected or appointed, and the municipality itself
having discharged its corporate functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this
action. It is contended that as a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally
attacked, although it may be inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance
of the State and not of an individual like the petitioner Balindong.

ISSUE: Whether or not the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation

HELD: This has been a litigiously prolific question, sharply dividing courts in the United States.
Thus, some hold that a de facto  corporation cannot exist where the statute or charter creating
it is unconstitutional because there can be no de facto  corporation where there can be no de
jure one, 8 while others hold otherwise on the theory that a statute is binding until it is
condemned as unconstitutional. 9

  An early article in the Yale Law Journal offers the following analysis:

It appears that the true basis for denying to the corporation a de facto  status lay in the
absence of any legislative act to give vitality to its creation. An examination of the cases
holding, some of them unreservedly, that a de facto  office or municipal corporation can
exist under color of an unconstitutional statute will reveal that in no instance did the
invalid act give life to the corporation, but that either in other valid acts or in the
constitution itself the office or the corporation was potentially created....

The principle that color of title under an unconstitutional statute can exist only where
there is some other valid law under which the organization may be effected, or at least
an authority in potentia  by the state constitution, has its counterpart in the negative
propositions that there can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute that
plainly so appears on its face or that attempts to authorize the ousting of a  de
jure  or de facto  municipal corporation upon the same territory; in the one case the fact
would imply the imputation of bad faith, in the other the new organization must be
regarded as a mere usurper....

As a result of this analysis of the cases the following principles may be deduced which
seem to reconcile the apparently conflicting decisions:

I. The color of authority requisite to the organization of a de facto  municipal

corporation may be:

1. A valid law enacted by the legislature.

2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either (a) been
upheld for a time by the courts or (b) not yet been declared
void; provided that a warrant for its creation can be found in some other
valid law or in the recognition of its potential existence by the general
laws or constitution of the state.

II. There can be no de facto municipal corporation unless either directly or

potentially, such a de jure corporation is authorized by some legislative fiat.

III. There can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute alone, the

invalidity of which is apparent on its face.

  IV. There can be no de facto corporation created to take the place of an existing de
jure corporation, as such organization would clearly be a usurper. 10

In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact
that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on
the consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the
organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time
when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation,
as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid
statute to give color of authority to its creation. Indeed, in Municipality of San Joaquin v.
Siva, 11 this Court granted a similar petition for prohibition and nullified an executive order
creating the municipality of Lawigan in Iloilo on the basis of the  Pelaez ruling, despite the fact
that the municipality was created in 1961, before section 68 of the Administrative Code, under
which the President had acted, was invalidated. 'Of course the issue of de facto municipal
corporation did not arise in that case.

In Norton v. Shelby Count, 12 Mr. Justice Field said: "An unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." Accordingly, he held that
bonds issued by a board of commissioners created under an invalid statute were unenforceable.

Executive Order 386 "created no office." This is not to say, however, that the acts done by the
municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity because the
executive order "is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed."
For the existence of Executive, Order 386 is "an operative fact which cannot justly be ignored."
As Chief Justice Hughes explained in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank : 13

  The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been
found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights
and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton
v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559,
566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to
be considered in various aspects — with respect to particular relations, individual and
corporate, and particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to
have become vested, of status of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted
upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult
of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is
manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

There is then no basis for the respondents' apprehension that the invalidation of the executive
order creating Balabagan would have the effect of unsettling many an act done in reliance upon
the validity of the creation of that municipality. 

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, Executive Order 386 is

declared void, and the respondents are hereby permanently restrained from performing the
duties and functions of their respective offices. No pronouncement as to costs.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.