Labor Relations

Case Assignment#3

1. Juanito A. Garcia and Alberto J. Dumago vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc.

G.R. No. 164856, August 29, 2007

Facts:

The case stemmed from the administrative charge filed by PAL against petitioners 3 after they were allegedly caught in the
act of sniffing shabu when a team of company security personnel and law enforcers raided the PAL Technical Center’s
Toolroom.

After due notice, PAL dismissed petitioners for transgressing the PAL Code of Discipline,4 prompting them to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal and damages which was resolved by the Labor Arbiter in their favor, thus ordering PAL to
the immediate reinstatement of petitioners.

Prior to the promulgation of the Labor Arbiter’s decision, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) placed PAL,
which was suffering from severe financial losses, under an Interim Rehabilitation Receiver, who was subsequently
replaced by a Permanent Rehabilitation Receiver.

The NLRC reversed said decision and dismissed petitioners’ complaint for lack of merit.6

Subsequently the LA issued a Writ of Execution respecting the reinstatement aspect of his Decision, and issued a Notice
of Garnishment. Respondent moved to quash the Writ and to lift the Notice while petitioners moved to release the
garnished amount.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners may collect their wages during the period between the Labor
Arbiter’s order of reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC decision overturning that of
the Labor Arbiter

HELD: YES. [E]ven if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on
the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal
until reversal by the higher court. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal
period and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to reimburse
whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the
period.

It settles the view that the Labor Arbiter's order of reinstatement is immediately executory and the employer
has to either re-admit them to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal,
or to reinstate them in the payroll, and that failing to exercise the options in the alternative, employer must
pay the employee’s salaries.

x x x Then, by and pursuant to the same power (police power), the State may authorize an immediate implementation,
pending appeal, of a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is designed to stop,
although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the
survival or even the life of the dismissed or separated employee and his family. 16

The social justice principles of labor law outweigh or render inapplicable the civil law doctrine of unjust enrichment
espoused by Justice Presbitero Velasco, Jr. in his Separate Opinion. The constitutional and statutory precepts portray the
otherwise "unjust" situation as a condition affording full protection to labor.

Even outside the theoretical trappings of the discussion and into the mundane realities of human experience, the "refund
doctrine" easily demonstrates how a favorable decision by the Labor Arbiter could harm, more than help, a dismissed
employee. The employee, to make both ends meet, would necessarily have to use up the salaries received during the
pendency of the appeal, only to end up having to refund the sum in case of a final unfavorable decision. It is mirage of a
stop-gap leading the employee to a risky cliff of insolvency.
2. Benguet Electric Cooperative Inc. vs. NLRC, et,al
G.R. No. 89070, May 18, 1992

Facts:

Private respondent Peter Cosalan was the General Manager of Petitioner Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. ("Beneco"),

Having been made aware of the serious financial condition of Beneco and what appeared to be mismanagement, Cosalan
initiated implementation of the remedial measures recommended by the COA. The respondent members of the Board of
Beneco reacted by adopting a series of resolutions which resulted in the ouster of Cosalan as General Manager of
Beneco and his exclusion from performance of his regular duties as such, as well as the withholding of his salary and
allowances.

Respondent Cosalan nevertheless continued to work as General Manager, in the belief that he could be suspended or
removed only by duly authorized officials of NEA, in accordance with provisions of the loan agreement between NEA and
petitioner Beneco 2Accordingly, Cosalan requested petitioner Beneco to release the compensation due him but was
denied.

Cosalan then filed a complaint with the NLRC against respondent members of the Beneco Board, challenging the legality
of the Board resolutions which ordered his suspension and termination from the service and demanding payment of his
salaries and allowances.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision (a) confirming Cosalan's reinstatement; (b) ordering payment to Cosalan of his
backwages and allowances by petitioner Beneco and respondent Board members, jointly and severally.

Respondent Board members appealed to the NLRC, and there filed a Memorandum on Appeal. Petitioner Beneco did not
appeal.

The NLRC modified the award rendered by the Labor Arbiter by declaring that petitioner Beneco  alone, and not
respondent Board members, was liable for respondent Cosalan's backwages and allowances,

Beneco, through its new set of directors, moved for reconsideration of the NLRC decision, but without success.

Issue: WON NLRC had acted with grave abuse of discretion in accepting and giving due course to respondent
Board members' appeal although such appeal had been filed out of time;

HELD: YES. There is no dispute about the fact that the respondent Beneco Board members received the
decision of the labor Arbiter on 21 April 1988. Accordingly, and because 1 May 1988 was a legal holiday, they had
only up to 2 May 1988 within which to perfect their appeal by filing their memorandum on appeal. It is also not
disputed that the respondent Board members' memorandum on appeal was posted by registered mail on 3 May
1988 and received by the NLRC the following day. 4 Clearly, the memorandum on appeal was filed out of time.

Respondent Board members, however, insist that their Memorandum on Appeal was filed on time because it was
delivered for mailing on 1 May 1988 to the Garcia Communications Company, a licensed private letter carrier. The Board
members in effect contend that the date of delivery to Garcia Communications was the date of filing of their appeal
memorandum.

Respondent Board member's contention runs counter to the established rule that transmission through a private
carrier or letter-forwarder –– instead of the Philippine Post Office –– is not a recognized mode of filing
pleadings. 5 The established rule is that the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is
not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court, and that in such cases, the date of actual receipt by the
court, and not the date of delivery to the private carrier, is deemed the date of filing of that pleading. 

3. Sutherland Global Services vs. Labrador

G.R. No. 193107, March 24, 2014

Facts

Petitioner Sutherland is engaged in the business of process outsourcing and technology consulting services for
international clients.3 It hired Labrador as one of its call center agents with the main responsibility of answering various
queries and complaints through phoned-in calls.4
In his two years of working at Sutherland, Labrador committed several infractions. 5 But it was only on June 2008 that
Labrador was finally charged with violation for transgressing the "Non-Compliance Sale Attribute" policy clause stated in
the Employee Handbook. Under Sutherland’s Employee Handbook, Labrador’s action is classified as an act of dishonesty
or fraud.6 Sutherland sent Labrador a Notice to Explain7 in writing why he should not be held administratively liable.

An administrative hearing was conducted that took into consideration Labrador’s past infractions.

After investigation, a recommendation was issued finding Labrador guilty of violating the Employee Handbook due to
gross or habitual neglect of duty.9 

With the request of Labrador, Sutherland allowed him to resign instead of termination, due to humanitarian purposes and
considering his stay and contribution to the account.

Months after tendering his resignation, Labrador filed a complaint for constructive/illegal dismissal before the NLRC. 12

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 13 He found just cause to terminate Labrador’s employment,
and that his resignation letter had been voluntarily executed.

Labrador filed his Memorandum on Appeal 14 with the NLRC. In Sutherland’s Answer,15 it noted that there were formal
defects in Labrador’s Memorandum on Appeal warranting its immediate dismissal, Notwithstanding these defects, the
NLRC reversed the LA’s ruling. The NLRC applied a liberal interpretation of the rules and admitted Labrador’s
Memorandum on Appeal. It further ruled that Labrador’s resignation was involuntary. Thus, it ordered Labrador’s
reinstatement with payment of backwages and allowances.

Sutherland filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which dismissed the petition, ruling that technical rules are not binding
in labor cases.

On the substantive aspect, the CA also affirmed the NLRC’s finding that Labrador had been illegally dismissed

Issue: WHETHER LABRADOR’S APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LABRADOR’S FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH THE NLRC’S RULES OF PROCEDURE.

HELD: NO. Court held that technical rules are not necessarily fatal in labor cases; they can
be liberally applied if – all things being equal – any doubt or ambiguity would be resolved in
favor of labor.20 These technicalities and limitations can only be given their fullest effect if
the case is substantively unmeritorious; otherwise, and if the defect is similar to the
present one and can be verified from the records (as in this case), we have the discretion
not to consider them fatal.

4. Diones Belza vs. Danilo Canonero, et. al.

G.R. No. 192479, January 27, 2014

Facts:

Petitioner Diones N. Belza hired respondents as technicians particularly assigned at the Makati Medical Center, one of its
clients.

In 2005, however, DNB lost in the bidding for the services it was rendering to the medical center.1âwphi1 As a
consequence, DNB terminated respondent technicians from employment without giving them new assignments or paying
them separation pays. The technicians filed a complaint against DNB for constructive illegal dismissal and non-payment of
separation pay.

Following DNB’s failure to file its position paper in the case despite notice, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision holding it
liable for illegal dismissal and ordering it to pay respondent technicians "backwages plus separation pay.

DNB appealed but the NLRC dismissed the same as a non-perfected appeal given that DNB did not accompany its
memorandum of appeal with the required certification of non-forum shopping.

Issue: whether NLRC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing its appeal on the ground that its memorandum
of appeal was not accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping.
Ruling: NO. The fact that DNB had not actually engaged in forum shopping is not an excuse for its failure to comply with
the requirement, an omission that allowed the period for perfecting the appeal to run inexorably. 1 The NLRC was,
therefore, justified in dismissing DNB’s appeal.

DNB points out that the requirement of certification of non-forum shopping has no meaning in relation to its appeal from
the Decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC since such a certification is required under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court only in initiatory pleadings and since it was respondent technicians, not DNB, who initiated the labor case with their
complaint. But insisting on such requirement even on appeal is a prerogative of the NLRC under its rule making power
considering the great volume of appeals filed with it from all over the country. The Court held that substantial compliance
with the requirement may be allowed when justified under the circumstances but the Court finds no grave abuse of
discretion on NLRC's part when it found no such justification in this case.

5. Marlon Bed Uya, et. al. vs. Ace Promotion and Marketing Corporation
G.R. No. 195513, June 22, 2015

APMC employed petitioners as merchandisers and assigned them to various retail outlets and supermarkets under fixed-
term employment contracts. The last contracts of employment 9 that petitioners signed were until January 30, 2007.

On January 29, 2007, APMC informed petitioners that their last day of work would be on January 30, 2007.

Before the Labor Arbiter, complaints11 for illegal dismissal and money claims against respondents were filed by petitioners.
They alleged that: they are regular employees of APMC, having continuously worked in APMC since 1997; they are bona
fide members of the SSS and the company’s HDMF; the expiration of the Promotional Contract between APMC and Delfi
does not automatically result in their dismissal; and, the said Promotional Contract is still subsisting as new workers were
hired as their replacements. .

Respondents, on the other hand, countered that APMC is a legitimate job contractor that hires employees for a specific
job on a contractual basis. which employment was necessarily terminated upon the end of the term.

The Labor Arbiter declared complainants to have been illegally dismissed and ordered their reinstatement or payment of
separation pay, payment of backwages, unpaid wages, ECOLA, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

Respondents filed a Memorandum of Appeal with Motion for Reduction of Bond 15 with the NLRC. They contended that the
awards granted to complainants amounting to 6,269,856.89 should be decreased

In their Opposition with Motion to Dismiss Appeal, 18 complainants prayed for the dismissal of respondents’ appeal based
on insufficiency of the bond posted. This thus resulted in the non-perfection of the appeal, and consequently, the Labor
Arbiter’s Decision had become final and executory.

Without acting on respondents’ motion for reduction of bond and the complainants’ opposition thereto, the NLRC rendered
a Decision finding complainants to be contractual employees hired for a specific duration. . They were therefore not
illegally dismissed.

The CA rendered a Decision24 dismissing the complainants’ petition. It found respondents’ willingness and good faith in
complying with the requirements as sufficient justification to relax the rule on posting of an appeal bond. Moreover, the CA
agreed with the NLRC in finding that complainants were not illegally dismissed. The termination of their employment was
simply brought about by the expiration of the fixed period as stipulated in their contract

Issues WON the reduction of appeal bond is proper. YES

HELD: The rules, specifically Section 6 of Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, allows the
reduction of the appeal bond subject to the conditions that: (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on
meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant .
Otherwise, the filing of a motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. The Court
may relax the rule under certain exceptional circumstances which include fundamental consideration of substantial justice,
prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment and special circumstances of the case combined with its legal
merits, and the amount and the issue involved.31 

In the case at bench, the Court finds that respondents’ motion to reduce appeal bond was predicated on meritorious and
justifiable grounds.

Again, the filing of a motion to reduce bond predicated on meritorious grounds coupled with the posting of a reasonable
amount of cash or surety bond suffice to suspend the running of the period within which to appeal. As discussed,
respondents in this case have substantially complied with these requirements and, on account thereof, their appeal from
the Labor Arbiter’s Decision was timely filed. Clearly, the NLRC was conferred with jurisdiction over respondents’ appeal
thus placing the same within the power of the said labor tribunal to review.

With respect to the NLRC’s failure to initially act upon respondents’ motion to reduce bond The NLRC is not bound by
technical rules of procedure and is allowed to be liberal in the application of its rules in deciding labor cases. 39 Further, the
NLRC is mandated to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively,
without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.

6. Manila Mining Corporation vs. Amor

G.R. No. 182800, April 20, 2015

Facts

Respondents were regular employees of petitioner Manila Mining Corporation, When the mine tailings reached the
maximum level , petitioner temporarily shut down its mining operations pending approval of its application to increase said
facilty’s capacity by the (DENR-EMB), Although the DENR-EMB issued a temporary authority for it to be able to continue
operating for another six (6) months and to increase its capacity, petitioner failed to secure an extension permit when said
temporary authority eventually lapsed.4

Petitioner served a notice, informing its employees and the DOLE of the temporary suspension of its operations for six
months and the temporary lay-off of two-thirds of its employees. 5 After the lapse of said period, petitioner notified the
DOLE that it was extending the temporary shutdown of its operations for another six months. 6 Adversely affected by
petitioner’s continued failure to resume its operations, respondents filed the complaint for constructive dismissal and
monetary claims with the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter held petitioner liable for constructive dismissal, ordering [petitioner] to
pay separation pay, moral damages. exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed its memorandum of appeal before the NLRC11 and moved for the reduction of the appeal bond
to ₱100,000.00, on the ground that its financial losses in the preceding years had rendered it unable to put up one in cash
and/or surety equivalent to the monetary award.12 In opposition, respondents moved for the dismissal of the appeal for
imperfect appeal and disproportionate appeal bond. Without addressing the procedural issues raised by respondents,
however, the NLRC reversing the appealed decision and dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.

The CA nullified the NLRC’s decision and ruled that petitioner failed to perfect its appeal thus, the Labor Arbiter’s Decision
had already attained finality.

Issue: was the motion to appeal perfected. NO

No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious grounds and upon the posting of a bond in
a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award. In this case, we see that with no proof to substantiate its
claim, petitioner moved for a reduction of the appeal bond on the proferred basis of serious losses and reverses it
supposedly sustained in the years prior to the rendition of the Labor Arbiter's decision.

Respondent correctly called attention to the fact that the check submitted by petitioner was dishonored upon presentment
for payment, thereby rendering the tender thereof ineffectual. Although the NLRC chose not to address the issue of the
perfection of the appeal as well as the reduction of the bond in its Resolution dated 25 April 2005, the record shows that
petitioner only manifested its deposit of the funds for the check 24 days before the resolution of its appeal or 116 days
after its right to appeal the Labor Arbiter’s decision had expired. Having filed its motion and memorandum on the very last
day of the reglementary period for appeal, moreover, petitioner had no one but itself to blame for failing to post the full
amount pending the NLRC’s action on its motion for reduction of the appeal bond. If redundancy be risked it must be
emphasized that the posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards
from the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Since it is the posting of a cash or surety bond which confers jurisdiction upon the
NLRC,40 the rule is settled that non-compliance is fatal and has the effect of rendering the award final and executory. 41

vvphi1 Although appeal is an essential part of our judicial process, it has been held, time and again, that the right thereto
is not a natural right or a part of due process but is merely a statutory privilege. Thus, the perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure of a party to
conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory. Once a decision attains finality, it
becomes the law of the case and can no longer be revised, reviewed, changed or altered. The basic rule of finality of
judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error,
the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by law.

7. Mindanao Times Corporation vs. Mitchel R. Confesor

 G.R. No. 183417, February 5, 2010

Facts.

Respondent was employed by petitioner as Associate Editor in six months.

Respondent resigned on June 17, 2003. And later he filed a verified complaint5 before the Labor Arbiter for payment of
separation pay and pro-rated 13th month pay for 2003. He later amended his complaint 6 from one of money claims to
illegal dismissal,

The Labor Arbiter, finding that respondent was constructively dismissed, ordered petitioner to pay him ₱71,909.77
representing backwages, as well as separation pay and 10% of the total award as attorney’s fees.

Both parties appealed to the NLRC in Cagayan de Oro City In compliance with the appeal bond requirement, petitioner
deposited the amount of ₱71,909.77 with the United Coconut Planters Bank and surrendered to the NLRC the
passbook8 covering the deposit, along with a Deed of Assignment 9 it executed assigning the proceeds of the deposit in
favor of respondent and authorizing the NLRC to release the same in the event that the Labor Arbiter’s Decision becomes
final and executory.

The NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed respondent’s complaint, holding that there was no
constructive dismissal since respondent effectively resigned from his employment.

Respecting the issue raised by respondent of whether the bank deposit complied with the appeal bond requirement, the
NLRC held that it was in substantial compliance

The Court of Appeals initially dismissed respondent’s appeal. However, on its Motion for Reconsideration, however, the
appellate court set aside the NLRC Resolution and reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s Decision which it declared to have
become final and executory.

In concluding that the Labor Arbiter’s Decision had become final and executory, the appellate court held that the bank
deposit of petitioner failed to substantially comply with the appeal bond requirement, noting that its Deed of Assignment
"cannot be a substitute for the cash or surety bond contemplated under the Rules for the perfection of appeal" as the deed
"does not ensure payment of the adjudged monetary award in case the appeal fails."

Issue: WON bank deposit and the deed of assignment constituted substantial compliance with the rule on
perfection of appeal.

Ruling: NO.

Clearly, an appeal from a judgment as that involved in the present case is perfected "only" upon the posting of a
cash or surety bond. The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving
monetary awards from the decision of the LA.

The filing of the bond is not only mandatory but also a jurisdictional requirement that must be complied with in order to
confer jurisdiction upon the NLRC. Non-compliance therewith renders the decision of the LA final and executory. This
requirement is intended to assure the workers that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their
favor upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal. It is intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to delay or
evade their obligation to satisfy their employees' just and lawful claims.

In the present case, the Deed of Assignment, as well as the passbook, which petitioner submitted to the NLRC is
neither a cash nor a surety bond. Petitioner’s appeal to the NLRC was thus not duly perfected, thereby rendering
the Labor Arbiter’s Decision final and executory.

8. Karj Marketing Network, Inc. vs. Miguel Mara

G.R. No. 190654, July 28, 2020

On 6 July 2006, Respondent MIGUEL ANGEL P. MARA (hereinafter Respondent) instituted a complaint before the
Labor Arbiter against the Petitioner for non-payment of 14th month pay and refund of his car's maintenance
expenditures, damages and attorney's fees.

In March 2004, Respondent commenced his employment with the Petitioner as Assistant General Manager. In his
complaint, Respondent alleged that the Petitioner agreed to grant him with a "retention incentive 14th month bonus"
pursuant to the Offer Sheet purportedly executed by the Petitioner; that in said Offer Sheet, Petitioner likewise
undertook to provide Respondent with a brand new Isuzu Fuego or its equivalent and that it shall also shoulder
Respondent's car's repairs and maintenance costs.

On the other hand, in its position paper. Petitioner contested the Respondent's allegations, contending that the 14th
month bonus being claimed by the latter is discretionary in nature and that there is no document that would show
that such gratuity is part of the regular compensation of the employees. Likewise, Petitioner rejected Respondent's
claim for reimbursements of car repairs alleging that per the company car policy, in order that the Respondent could
be entitled to such benefit, he should have used a brand new or second hand Toyota Altis and not a 1999 Black
BMW used by the Respondent, hence, Respondent's claim for such reimbursements failed to comply with the
procedure laid down by [the] company car policy.

On 16 October 2006, Labor Arbiter ARTHUR L. AMANSEC rendered a decision, the faIlo thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby made ordering the respondents to pay the complainant P198,800.00 or 14th
month pay benefit for the years 2004 and 2005. The respondents are also ordered to refund to the complainant the
amount of P289,000.00 as company car maintenance costs.

Aggrieved thereby, Petitioner filed an appeal before the NLRC.

It came to pass that prior to the issuance of the aforesaid Labor Arbiter's decision, three creditors of the Petitioner
instituted before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Para[ñ]aque City a Petition for Involuntary Insolvency against the
Petitioner which was raffled to Branch 196, which on 2 October 2006, issued an Order, ruling thus:

As a consequence of the filing of the petition, respondent corporation in the petition is enjoined from disposing, in
any manner, of its property except in so far as it concerns the ordinary operations of commerce or industry in which
it is engaged in and furthermore, from making any payments outside of necessary or legitimate expenses of its
business or industry so long as the proceeding is pending.

Meanwhile, on 28 November 2008, the NLRC dismissed Petitioner's appeal, dispositively holding as follows:

With the appeal having been filed without the required bond, we have no recourse but to dismiss respondent's
appeal for non-perfection.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari with the CA arguing that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed petitioner's appeal despite the RTC Order5 dated
October 2, 2006 (RTC Order), which petitioner claims was a legal justification for not posting the cash or surety
bond normally required for an appeal.6

In its Decision, the CA affirmed the NLRC, ruling that an appeal bond is an indispensable requirement in perfecting
an appeal before the NLRC. Accordingly, the CA held that the NLRC did not commit any error in dismissing
petitioner's appeal.7

The CA further found petitioner's claim that the RTC Order prohibited it from disposing of its property as
baseless as the posting of the bond did not mean that petitioner had to dispose a portion of its property.
And even if such constituted a disposal of property, it would not have been a violation of the RTC Order
because the case involves payment of an employee's benefits, which is within the ambit of a legitimate
operation of petitioner's business.

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioner claims that it was barred from posting the bond following the RTC Order

ISSUE: whether the CA was correct in affirming the NLRC's strict adherence to the requirement for the posting of an
appeal bond in order to perfect an appeal before it. NO

Indeed, as the CA ruled, the posting of the bond is "an indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the
employer."17 As the Court held in Viron Garments Manufacturing, Co., Inc. v. NLRC18 (Viron), the mandatory
nature of the bond "is clearly limned in the provision that an appeal by the employer may be perfected 'only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond.' The word 'only' makes it perfectly clear, that the lawmakers intended the posting
of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the exclusive means by which an employer's appeal may be
perfected."19

As against this rule, the Court has recognized exceptional circumstances where it relaxed the requirement for
an appeal bond.
The requirement that the employer post a cash or surety bond to perfect its/his appeal is apparently intended to
assure the workers that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their favor upon the
dismissal of the employer's appeal. It was intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to delay, or even
evade, their obligation to satisfy their employees' just and lawful claims.22

Here, the Court deems the existence of the insolvency proceedings as an exceptional circumstance to
warrant the liberal application of the rules requiring an appeal bond. The failure to file an appeal bond did
not contradict the need to ensure that respondent, if his claim is deemed valid, will receive the money
judgment. 1âшphi1

The rule on a requirement of an appeal bond cannot operate in a vacuum. "[W]hen the law does not clearly
provide a rule or norm for the tribunal to follow in deciding a question submitted, but leaves to the tribunal
the discretion to determine the case in one way or another, the judge must decide the question in
conformity with justice, reason and equity, in view of the circumstances of the case."23

Here, there seems to be an absence of rule or norm to follow on whether to require an appeal bond when
the appealing employer is subject of involuntary liquidation proceedings. But the NLRC, mandated to act
with justice, reason and equity, should have allowed the appeal and ruled on the merits considering the
circumstances of the case.

Here, petitioner informed the labor tribunals of the pendency of the insolvency proceedings. In fact, it also
informed the NLRC that it had apprised the insolvency court of the pendency of the case in its Motion to
Suspend Proceedings. Even as it wanted a suspension of the proceedings, it still filed a Notice of Appeal
and Memorandum of Appeal Ad Cautelam. It was therefore an error for the NLRC to dismiss the appeal
outright when the foregoing shows that the law itself provides many measures of protection for the
employee, such that an appeal before the NLRC may be allowed to proceed despite the lack of an appeal
bond.

Here, respondent failed to prove his entitlement to his claims. Although he submitted an Offer Sheet that showed he
is entitled to 14th month pay, the validity of this Offer Sheet was controverted by the evidence of petitioner showing
that the signatory thereto was not one of its stockholders or officers at the time the Offer Sheet was executed. The
Offer Sheet was executed on December 5, 2003, but Banzon only started working for petitioner on September 6,
2004, and he was likewise not reported as an officer or stockholder of petitioner in its 2003 GIS.
As to the reimbursements for repairs of the cars, respondent also failed to prove his entitlement to it. He failed to
submit any document to prove that he incurred expenses for the repair and maintenance of the car. "Mere allegation
is not proof or evidence."39 Given this, the Court denies his claim for reimbursements.

8. Jose Del Pilar, et. al vs. BATELEC II

G.R. No. 160090, February 19, 2020
Complainants were employees of BATELEC II occupying various positions. They held rallies to denounce the
alleged corrupt, anomalous and irregular activities of some BATELEC II officials. They were dismissed for
participating in an illegal strike, prompting the nine complainants and eight other employees, namely: Edgardo
Cabrera, Bibiana Carig, Lamberto Katimbang, Evelyn Mendoza, Arthur Mercado, Jaime Suarez, Imelda Villana and
Gloria Villapando to file a case for illegal dismissal against BATELEC II. On October 15, 1993, Labor Arbiter Pedro
C. Ramos rendered a Decision1 in favor of the complainants

A writ of execution was issued on October 29, 1993.  Complainants were reinstated in the payroll and were also
1a₩phi1

paid backwages, allowances and other benefits from December 1, 1992 to March 31, 1995. BATELEC II however
filed a Manifestation with Motion on March 31, 1995 before the Labor Arbiter stating that reinstatement has become
impossible because of a major reorganization and streamlining that it had undergone, which resulted in the abolition
of some positions pertaining to complainants. BATELC II offered to pay one (1) month salary for every year of
service. On September 29, 1995, the Labor Arbiter ordered BATELEC II to pay the complainants their separation
pay.

On April 25, 1996, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) issued a Resolution5 denying the appeal of
complainants for lack of merit. Complainants filed a Motion for Reconsideration and it was Partially granted in a July
23, 1996 Resolution6 by the NLRC, which further ordered the payment of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) each to
all complainants by way of indemnity. The NLRC found that the complainants were arbitrarily dismissed for an
authorized cause which warranted the payment of indemnity.

Complainants filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). During the pendency of the case,
Edgardo Cabrera, Lamberto Katimbang, Gloria Villapando, Imelda Villena, Bibiana Carig and Jaime Suarez entered
into an amicable settlement with BATELEC II. Hence, their complaints were dismissed. On May 26, 2000, the CA
rendered its Decision7 ordering BATELEC II to pay complainants separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary
for every year of service and full backwages from April 1, 1995 up to the finality of its Decision.

BATELEC II elevated the case to this Court and challenged the award of full backwages. In a Resolution10 dated
June 20, 2001, this Court upheld the ruling of the CA and ruled that the award of backwages is proper, regardless of
whether or not there was physical or legal impossibility of reinstatement, BATELEC II having failed to observe the
procedure for termination of employment as set forth in Article 283 of the Labor Code. An Entry of Judgment11 was
issued declaring its finality as of September 13, 2001.

Only nine complainants, now petitioners in G.R. No. 160090, remained and they filed a Motion to Approve
Computation in the amount of P20,791,837.00.12 BATELEC II argued that the impossibility of complainants'
reinstatement took effect on March 31, 1995, hence, no computation can be had beginning on that date.

BATELEC II appealed to the NLRC. It refuted the computation submitted by complainants regarding the backwages.
It also questioned the very award of backwages because said amount is only awarded to illegally dismissed
employees and not to those whose former positions had already been abolished and reinstatement is no longer
possible. In a Resolution16 dated March 22, 2002, the NLRC partially granted the appeal and ruled that in
computing for backwages, the base pay is the basic pay plus allowances, like 13th  month pay and excluding all
other benefits.

Undeterred, BATELEC II elevated the case to the CA raising as issue the payment of full backwages and its
coverage.

At any rate, the Court has invariably ruled that Article 223 of the Labor Code requiring bond in appeals involving
monetary awards, must be liberally construed, in line with the desired objective of resolving controversies on their
merits.

Secondly, granting ex-gratia argumenti that Respondents-Appellants were required to put up a bond to perfect their
Appeal, their failure to do so was a legal technicality which we could, as we did, ignore to serve the [ends] of
substantial justice.

It bears to stress that if the wrong computation prevails, BATELEC II will pay Complainants-Appellees the fantastic
amount of P20,791,839.00 (their Computation, p. 977, Records). As a consequence, they will end up becoming the
owner of BATELEC II and/or BATELEC II will close up for the huge amount is far more than its total capitalization.
Worse, the whole number of its employees, as compared to the few number of Complainants-Appellees, only nine
(9) in all, will certainly be economically dislocated. Thus, to prevent unjust enrichment of Complainants-Appellees at
the expense of BATELEC II, the "goose that lays the golden eggs", and its whole workforce, all due to the
unquenchable monetary hunger of Complainants-Appellees, this Commission has to entertain the instituted Appeal
regardless of whether or not the corresponding appeal bond was posted.

Thirdly, the final and executory decision does not fix the exact amount of the awarded separation pay and full
backwages. It leaves the same still to be computed with the right to due process being afforded to both parties in the
process. Since the right amount has not yet been judicially fixed with finality, it is most unfair that Respondents-
Appellants should be required to post a bond to perfect their appeal questioning, in the exercise of their right to due
process. Complainants-appellees' computation in the fantastic amount of P20,791,837.00, since they do not yet
know the right amount of the bond.

In Toyota Alabang, Inc. v. Games,29 this Court was emphatic in declaring that Article 223 of the Labor Code
and Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure "do not limit the appeal bond requirement only
to certain kinds of rulings of the [Labor Arbiter]. Rather, these rules generally state that in case the ruling of
the [Labor Arbiter] involves a monetary award, an employer's appeal may be perfected only upon the
posting of a bond. Therefore, absent any qualifying terms, so long as the decision of the [Labor Arbiter]
involves a monetary award, as in this case, that ruling can only be appealed after the employer posts a
bond."30

However, we agree that this procedural rule may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice. First, the
case was already in its execution stage. BATELEC II had already posted an appeal bond when it appealed
the case for the first time on its merit. The purpose of an appeal bond, which is to ensure, during the period
of appeal, against any occurrence that would defeat or diminish recovery by the aggrieved employees
under the judgment if subsequently affirmed,31 has in fact been satisfied. The winning party was already
secured of payment by the losing party, or in default thereof, by the surety company. Second, at the time
when an appeal was made from the March 22, 2002 NLRC Resolution, the final award, upon which the bond
should be based, has not yet been settled. In the fairly recent case of Sara Lee Philippines, Inc. v.
Macatlang,32 the Court decreed that the NLRC may dispense with the posting of the bond when the
judgment award is: (1) not stated or (2) based on a patently erroneous computation.

9. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corporation vs. Belio Icao

G.R. No. 196047, January 15, 2014

The instant petition stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages filed by private respondent Belio C. Icao
[Icao] against petitioners Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company (LCMC) and its Chief Executive Officer [CEO] Felipe U.
Yap [Yap] before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.

Private respondent was an employee of petitioner LCMC as a lead miner. He was charged with "highgrading" or the act of
concealing, possessing or unauthorized extraction of highgrade material/ore without proper authority. Private respondent
vehemently denied the charge. Consequently, he was dismissed from his work.

Private respondent filed a complaint on illegal dismissal againts petitioner, claiming that his dismissal from work was
without just or authorized cause since petitioners failed to prove by ample and sufficient evidence that he stole gold
bearing highgrade ores from the company premises.

The labor arbiter rendered a Decision holding petitioner and its CEO liable for illegal dismissal and ordering them to pay
respondent Icao ₱345,879.45, representing his full backwages and separation pay. 3 The alleged highgrading attributed by
LCMC’s security guards was found to have been fabricated;

Petitioner and its CEO filed an Appearance with Memorandum of Appeal 7 before the NLRC. Instead of posting the
required appeal bond in the form of a cash bond or a surety bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award of
₱345,879.45 adjudged in favor of Icao, they filed a Consolidated Motion For Release Of Cash Bond And To Apply Bond
Subject For Release As Payment For Appeal Bond. They requested therein that the NLRC release the cash bond of
₱401,610.84, which they had posted in the separate case Dangiw Siggaao v. LCMC, 9 and apply that same cash bond to
their present appeal bond liability. They reasoned that since this Court had already decided Dangiw Siggaao in their favor,
and that the ruling therein had become final and executory, the cash bond posted therein could now be released. 10 They
also cited financial difficulty as a reason for resorting to this course of action and prayed that, in the interest of justice, the
motion be granted.

The NLRC First Division dismissed the appeal of petitioner and the latter’s CEO for non-perfection. 11 

The CA affirmed the NLRC and held that petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of law and consequently lost the
right to appeal.16

THE ISSUE

The sole issue before the Court is whether or not petitioner complied with the appeal bond requirement under the Labor
Code and the NLRC Rules by filing a Consolidated Motion to release the cash bond it posted in another case, which had
been decided with finality in its favor, with a view to applying the same cash bond to the present case. YES

The Petition is meritorious. The Court finds that petitioner substantially complied with the appeal bond requirement.

First, there is no question that the appeal was filed within the 10-day reglementary period.23 Except for the alleged failure
to post an appeal bond, the appeal to the NLRC was therefore in order.

Second, it is also undisputed that petitioner has an unencumbered amount of money in the form of cash in the custody of
the NLRC. To reiterate, petitioner had posted a cash bond of ₱401,610.84 in the separate case Dangiw Siggaao, which
was earlier decided in its favor. Therefore, once the appeal is finally decided and no award needs to be satisfied, the bond
is automatically released. Since the money is now unencumbered, the employer who posted it should now have
unrestricted access to the cash which he may now use as he pleases – as appeal bond in another case, for instance. This
is what petitioner simply did. Third, the cash bond in the amount of ₱401,610.84 posted in Dangiw Siggaao is more than
enough to cover the appeal bond in the amount of ₱345,879.45 required in the present case.

Fourth, this ruling remains faithful to the spirit behind the appeal bond requirement which is to ensure that workers will
receive the money awarded in their favor when the employer’s appeal eventually fails. 24 There was no showing at all of
any attempt on the part of petitioner to evade the posting of the appeal bond. On the contrary, petitioner’s move showed a
willingness to comply with the requirement. Hence, the welfare of Icao is adequately protected.

Having complied with the appeal bond requirement, petitioner s appeal before the NLRC must therefore be reinstated.

9. Emmanuel M. Olores vs. Manila Doctors College, et. al.

G.R. No. 201663, March 31, 2014
Facts:
Respondent is a private higher educational institution dedicated to providing academic degrees and certificate
courses related to Allied Medical Services and Liberal Arts and Sciences while petitioner, who started as a part-time
faculty, was hired as a full-time instructor for a fixed term starting November 2008.

For the second semester of academic year 2009-2010, petitioner was given the assignment load for Bioethics and
Philosophy of Man. Petitioner submitted the final grades of his students to Mr. Jacinto Bernardo, Jr., the chair of the
Humanities Area. Bernardo charged petitioner with gross misconduct and gross inefficiency in the performance of duty for
employing a grading system not in accordance with their system. These acts included a) adding 50 pts to the final
examination raw scores; b) 50 pts to students who have not been attending classes; c) crediting only 40% instead of 60%
of the final examination; d) failing to credit the essay questions; and e) adding further incentives (1-4 pts) aside from 50
pts.

Acting on the report of Bernardo, respondent created the Manila Doctors Tribunal (MDT) which was tasked to
ascertain the truth. The culpability of petitioner was established; hence, petitioner was dismissed on June 7, 2010 for
grave misconduct and gross inefficiency and incompetence.

Petitioner filed a case for: a) illegal dismissal with a claim for reinstatement; b) non-payment of service incentive
leave and 13th month pay; c) moral and exemplary damages; d) attorney’s fees; and e) regularization. The Labor Arbiter
found merit in petitioner’s charge for illegal dismissal, ordering the respondent to reinstate him but also giving him the
option to receive a separation pay instead. However, it dismissed petitioner’s claim for regularization.

Respondent appealed from the aforesaid decision to the NLRC. However, the same was denied for respondent’s
appeal was not accompanied by neither a cash nor surety bond as mandated by Section 6, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, to wit –

"SECTION 6. BOND. – In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer
may be perfected only upon the posting of a bond, which shall either be in the form of cash deposit or surety bond
equivalent in amount to monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney’s fees."

Respondent, thus, sought reconsideration of the NLRC’s resolution. In a Decision dated September 30, 2011, the
NLRC granted respondent’s appeal and reversed its earlier resolution, dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
Petitioner filed a certiorari petition with the CA but the same was dismissed. While it is true that the only way by which a
labor case may reach the CA is through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it must, however, be
shown that the NLRC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the instant case, the records do not show
and neither does petitioner make a claim that it filed a motion for reconsideration of the challenged decision before it came
to the CA through this action.

Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner asserts that Section 223 ( 229) of the Labor Code and Section 6, Rule
VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC are consistent in saying that in case of judgment involving a
monetary amount, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon posting a cash or surety bond. Thus, he argues
that since the NLRC did not acquire jurisdiction over the instant case, the decision of the Labor Arbiter had already
become final and executory.

Issue:
Whether respondent’s appeal with the NLRC was perfected despite its failure to post a bond

Ruling:

No. Article 223 ( 229) of the Labor Code states that an appeal by the employer to the NLRC from a judgment of a Labor
Arbiter, which involves a monetary award, may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the NLRC, in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment
appealed from.

Here, it is undisputed that respondent’s appeal was not accompanied by any appeal bond despite the clear monetary
obligation to pay petitioner his separation pay in the amount of P100,000.00. Since the posting of a bond for the perfection
of an appeal is both mandatory and jurisdictional, the decision of the Labor Arbiter sought to be appealed before the
NLRC had already become final and executory. Therefore, the NLRC had no authority to entertain the appeal, much less
to reverse the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
10. Princess Joy Placement and General Services, Inc. vs. German A. Binalla
G.R. No. 197005, June 4, 2014
Facts:

On August 9, 2004, respondent German A. Binalla filed a complaint against local manning agent CBM Business
Management and Manpower Services (CBM)and/or Princess Joy/Al Adwani General Hospital (Al Adwani) for various
money claims arising from his employment with Al Adwani, in Taif, Saudi Arabia from April 19, 2002 to April 28, 2004.

Binalla, a registered nurse, that he was "re-processed" – an arrangement where Princess Joy recruited and
deployed him, but made it appear that it was undertaken by CBM under a different contract submitted to and certified by
the POEA. He complained that he was made to work under an inferior contract and that Al Adwani itself violated the terms
of his four-year contract. Despite the service of summons to Princess Joy and CBM, it was only Princess Joy which made
submissions to the labor arbiter. It denied that it recruited and deployed Binalla for overseas employment.

LA Aurellano found that Princess Joy and CBM jointly undertook Binalla’s recruitment and deployment in Saudi
Arabia through "reprocessing."

Princess Joy appealed the LA’s ruling by filing with the NLRC a Notice of Appeal, a Memorandum of Appeal, and
a Motion to Reduce and Fix Bond, all dated November 24, 2005, accompanied by a surety bond of ₱250,000.00 for LA
Aurellano’s monetary award of ₱800,875.00, exclusive of damages. Binalla opposed the motion, contending that the
appeal was made in violation of the NLRC rules.

On May 12, 2006, the NLRC issued an order allowing Princess Joy to post the balance of the appeal bond to
make it equal to ₱800,875.00. Binalla moved for reconsideration and opposed the posting of the additional bond. Through
a Compliance dated July 21, 2006, Princess Joy posted with the NLRC the required additional bond of ₱550,875.00. The
NLRC then acted on the appeal and issued a resolution dated July 27, 2007 reversing LA Aurellano’s decision.

The NLRC ruled that the facts and evidence of the case do not establish "reprocessing" as the means for Binalla’s
deployment to Saudi Arabia. It declared that, on the contrary, substantial evidence existed pointing to CBM’s sole liability
as the recruiting and deploying agent of Binalla.

Binalla moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied the motion, prompting him to seek relief from the CA
which ruled that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided the appeal on the merits despite Princess
Joy’s failure "to comply with the essential requirement to perfect an appeal." It found the ₱250,000.00 posted by Princess
Joy insufficient in relation to the monetary award of ₱800,875.00. While it acknowledged that Princess Joy moved for a
reduction of the bond, it stressed that the employer must post the bond within the 10-day period for appeal inasmuch as
the motion does not stop the running of the reglementary period; otherwise, the appeal is not deemed perfected. It noted
that the NLRC did not act on Princess Joy’s motion to reduce and fix bond within the 10-day period. There being no
perfected appeal, it opined, the labor arbiter’s judgment had become final and executory.

Issue:
Whether Princess Joy’s appeal to the NLRC was not perfected as it failed to post a bond equivalent in amount to the labor
arbiter’s award within the ten-day appeal period.

Ruling:

No. The NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of and acting on Princess Joy’s motion to
reduce the appeal bond as it is allowed under Rule VI, Section 6 of the NLRC 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure, and the
motion was filed within the ten-day appeal period, together with the notice of appeal and the memorandum of appeal.
Also, the motion was accompanied by a surety bond of ₱250,000.00, an indication of a genuine effort on the part of the
agency to comply with the bond requirement.

Compared with LA Aurellano’s award of ₱800,875.00 to Binalla, the Court finds the initial bond posted by Princess Joy
reasonable, considering that it is questioning the unusually large amount of the awarded damages. Significantly, the
agency posted an additional bond as required by the NLRC in its May 12, 2006 order thus, bringing the amount equal to
the labor arbiter’s monetary award. The Court takes this occasion to impress upon the parties that the Court takes a
liberal approach on the appeal bond requirement in "the broader interest of justice and with the desired objective of
deciding cases on the merits." In Intertranz Container Lines, Inc. v. Bautista the Court reiterated its call for a liberal
application of the law and the rules on the appeal bond requirement "with an eye on the interest of substantial justice and
the merits of the case."

In this light, the CA committed a reversible error in imputing grave abuse of discretion on the NLRC for acting on the
motion to reduce bond even beyond the ten-day appeal period.

11. Grand Shipping Lines, Inc. et. al vs. Wilfredo Galvez, et.al.
G.R. No. 178184, January 29, 2014
Facts:
 Richard Abis, an oiler, reported pilferage committed by respondents, alleging that the latter store substantial
volume of fuel oil which is siphoned and sold to other vessels out at sea; respondents would then divide among
themselves the proceeds of the sale. A complaint for qualified theft was then filed against respondents who were
terminated thereafter.

As regards the dismissal of herein respondents, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the filing of a criminal case for
qualified theft against them did not justify their termination from employment. It ordered petitioners to reinstate
complainants with full backwages and to pay their money claims.

Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal With A Very Urgent Motion to Reduce Bond before the NLRC and posted a
cash bond in the amount of ₱500,000.00, citing economic depression, legality of the employees’ termination, compliance
with labor standards, and wage increases as grounds for the reduction of appeal bond. The NLRC denied petitioners’
motion to reduce bond and directed them to post an additional bond in the amount of ₱4,084,736.70 in cash or surety
within an unextendible period of 10 days; otherwise, their appeal would be dismissed. Petitioners failed to comply with the
Order. Thus, on February 3, 2003, complainants moved for the dismissal of the appeal since petitioners had thus far
posted only ₱1.5 million supersedeas bond and ₱500,000.00 cash bond, short of the amount required by the NLRC.

The NLRC, despite its earlier Order denying petitioners’ motion for the reduction of bond, reduced the amount of
appeal bond to ₱1.5 million and gave due course to petitioners’ appeal. On appeal, the CA held that the NLRC’s act of
entertaining the appeal is a jurisdictional error since petitioners’ failure to post additional bond rendered the Labor Arbiter’s
Decision final, executory and immutable.

Issue:
Whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in granting the reduced bond

Ruling:

No. There was substantial compliance with the rules on appeal bond. In case of a judgment involving a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer [may] be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from.

Nonetheless, the Court has consistently held that rules should not be applied in a very rigid and strict sense.  This
is especially true in labor cases wherein the substantial merits of the case must accordingly be decided upon to serve the
interest of justice. When there has been substantial compliance, relaxation of the Rules is warranted.

In the case at bench, petitioners appealed from the Decision of the Labor Arbiter awarding to crewmembers the
amount of ₱7,104,483.84 by filing a Notice of Appeal with a Very Urgent Motion to Reduce Bond and posting a cash bond
in the amount of ₱500,000.00 and a supersedeas bond in the amount of ₱1.5 million. The Court finds this to be in
substantial compliance with Article 223 of the Labor Code. It is true that the NLRC initially denied the request for reduction
of the appeal bond. However, it eventually allowed its reduction and entertained petitioners’ appeal. We disagree with the
CA in holding that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion as the granting of a motion to reduce appeal bond lies
within the sound discretion of the NLRC upon showing of the reasonableness of the bond tendered and the merits of the
grounds relied upon. Hence, the NLRC did not err or commit grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of petitioners’
appeal before it.

12. Pedro C. Perea vs. Elburg Ship Management, Philippines

G.R. No. 206178, August 9, 2017
Facts:

Perea entered into a Contract of Employment[ with Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc. (Elburg) under its
principal Augustea Atlantica SRL/Italy; he was hired as a fitter for 9 months. On May 15, 2010, Perea had difficulty
breathing while repairing a pipe. The following day, he had chest pains with palpitations. He was seen by a doctor that
same afternoon and was advised to take medication and to rest for three (3) consecutive days. However, he did not feel
any better even after resting and taking medications; thus, he asked to be repatriated.

A few days later, Perea was welding when the oxygen and acetylene torch he was holding exploded. He hit his
left shoulder and twisted his fingers in trying to avoid the explosion. He took a pain reliever to ease the pain but three (3)
days later, he found that two (2) of his fingers had grown numb. He was sent to a medical facility in Turkey and later on
repatriated.

The company-designated physician stated that the cause of hypertension was not work-related. Perea consulted
Dr. Antonio C. Pascual who found him to be medically unfit to work as seafarer.
 Perea filed a complaint for underpayment of his sick leave pay, permanent disability benefits, compensatory,
moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees which was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter for lack of merit. On appeal,
the National Labor Relations Commission dismissed Perea's appeal and affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision in toto.

The National Labor Relations Commission ruled that Perea's failure to disclose his pre-existing condition of a
"fractured/dislocated right elbow" on his pre-employment medical examination "would bar him from claiming
compensation/disability benefits," even if the cause of his repatriation had no connection with his pre-existing condition.

Issue:
whether the issue of the concealed pre-existing condition was rightly ruled upon by the National Labor Relations
Commission when it was not raised by any of the parties

Ruling:
No. Rule VI, Section 4(d) of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission,
categorically states that in deciding an appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission shall limit itself to the specific
issues elevated on appeal.

Petitioner was correct to assail the National Labor Relations Commission's ruling on the concealment of a pre-existing
fracture or dislocated elbow because it appears that it was never raised by the parties before the Labor Arbiter or even the
National Labor Relations Commission. In fact, aside from petitioner questioning this ruling, the alleged concealment of a
pre-existing injury was also not raised as an issue before this Court. The National Labor Relations Commission clearly
erred in considering a matter that was never raised for resolution on appeal.

13. Smart Communications, Inc. vs. Solidum

G.R. No. 204646, April 15, 2015
Facts:
Smart hired respondent Jose Leni Z. Solidum (Solidum) as Department Head for Smart Buddy Activation. On 21
September 2005, Isla gave Solidum a memorandum informing him of alleged acts of dishonesty, directing him to explain
why his employment should not be terminated, and placing him under preventive suspension without pay for 30 days.
Another memorandum, alleging modified acts of dishonesty was given on October 22, 2005.

Solidum thereafter received another memorandum, terminating his employment “for fraud or willful breach of trust,
falsification, misrepresentation, conflict of interest, serious misconduct and dishonesty-related offenses.” He filed against
Smart a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, non-payment of salaries, actual, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees.

The Labor Arbiter found that Solidum’s preventive suspension and dismissal were illegal and that he was entitled
to reinstatement and other monetary awards. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s 3 July 2006 Decision and dismissed
for lack of merit Solidum’s complaint. It held:

In the case at bar, records show that respondents appealed from the Labor Arbiter’s Decision to the Commission on
July 25, 2006. The Commission resolved respondents’ appeal on January 26, 2009, reversing the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter dated July 3, 2006. Notably, there is no showing in the records that respondents reinstated complainant
to his former position. Hence, pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended, relative to the reinstatement
aspect of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, respondents are obligated to pay complainant’s salaries and benefits,
computed from July 13, 2006, when respondents received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision which, among
others, ordered the reinstatement of complainant, up to the date of finality of the Commission’s resolution reversing
the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, which, for this purpose, is reckoned on May 29, 2009, when the Commission denied
complainant’s Motion for Reconsideration.

We so hold that the date of finality of Our Decision reversing the Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated July 3, 2006 is August
10, 2009, and the computation of complainant’s reinstatement or accrued salaries/wages and other benefits should be
up to August 10, 2009.

The same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the NLRC’s 29 May 2009 Decision became final and executory on 10
August 2009

Ruling:
No. The NLRC’s 29 May 2009 Decision became final and executory on 10 August 2009 as shown on the entry of
judgment. Moreover, the certification issued by the NLRC states that the NLRC’s 29 May 2009 Decision became final and
executory on 10 August 2009:

This is to certify that the Decision in NLRC Case No. 00-11-09564-05/NLRC CA No. 049875-06, entitled: Jose Leni Z.
Solidum vs. Smart Communications, Inc., Napoleon L. Nazareno, and/or Ricky P. Isla, was promulgated on 29 May
2009; the same was mailed on 11 June 2009 and in the absence of return cards, the decision had become final and
executory on 10 August 2009 (Does this mean nga walay objection? HAHAHA naglibog ko), (after sixty (60) calendar
 days from the date of mailing), and had been recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment, pursuant to Rule VII
Section 14 of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC which provides: “The Executive Clerk or Deputy
Executive Clerk shall consider the decision, resolution or order as final and executory after sixty (60) calendar days
from date of mailing in the absence of return cards, certifications from the post office, or other proof of service to
parties.

14. Purisimo M. Cabaobas, et. al. vs. Pepsi Cola Products, Philippines
G.R. No. 176908, November 11, 2015
Facts:
In 1999, PCPPI’s Tanauan Plant allegedly incurred business losses. To avert further losses, PCPPI implemented
a company-wide retrenchment program denominated as Corporate-wide Rightsizing Program (CRP) from 1999 to 2000,
and retrenched forty-seven (47) employees of its Tanauan Plant on July 31, 1999.

Petitioners alleged that PCPPI was not facing serious financial losses because after their termination, it
regularized four (4) employees and hired replacements for the forty-seven (47) previously dismissed employees. They
also alleged that PCPPI's CRP was just designed to prevent their union, Leyte Pepsi-Cola Employees Union-Associated
Labor Union (LEPCEU-ALU), from becoming the certified bargaining agent of PCPPI's rank-and-file employees.

PCPPI countered that petitioners were dismissed pursuant to its CRP to save the company from total bankruptcy
and collapse; thus, it sent notices of termination to them and to the Department of Labor and Employment. Audited
financial statements were also presented to support its claim that the act was a valid exercise of management prerogative.

The Labor Arbiter found the dismissal illegal. On appeal, the NLRC dismissed the complaints for illegal dismissal
and declared the program a valid exercise of management prerogative.

Issue:
Whether the dismissal was valid

Ruling:
Yes. The Court observes that Pepsi had validly implemented its retrenchment program. Records disclose that both the CA
and the NLRC had already determined that Pepsi complied with the requirements of substantial loss and due notice to
both the DOLE and the workers to be retrenched.

The Court finds it difficult to attribute any act of union busting or ULP on the part of Pepsi considering that it retrenched its
employees in good faith. As earlier discussed, Pepsi tried to sit-down with its employees to arrive at mutually beneficial
criteria which would have been adopted for their intended retrenchment. In the same vein, Pepsi’s cooperation during the
NCMB-supervised conciliation conferences can also be gleaned from the records. Furthermore, the fact that Pepsi’s
rightsizing program was implemented on a company-wide basis dilutes respondents’ claim that Pepsi’s retrenchment
scheme was calculated to stymie its union activities, much less diminish its constituency. Therefore, absent any perceived
threat to LEPCEU-ALU’s existence or a violation of respondents’ right to self-organization–as demonstrated by the
foregoing actuations–Pepsi cannot be said to have committed union busting or ULP in this case.

Finally, this case does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the rule that only questions of law are proper in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Settled is the rule that factual findings of labor
officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction, are generally accorded
not only respect but even finality, and bind the Court when supported by substantial evidence. Certainly, it is not the
Court's function to assess and evaluate the evidence all over again, particularly where the findings of both the CA and the
NLRC coincide. (I think ang reason is : In any proceeding before the Commission, the rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of the LC which shall be used in every and
all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case.)

15. Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 120567, March 20, 1998
Facts:
Private respondents are flight stewards of the petitioner. Both were dismissed from the service for their alleged
involvement in the April 3, 1993 currency smuggling in Hong Kong. On April 3, 1995, the NLRC issued a temporary
mandatory injunction enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from enforcing its February 22, 1995 Memorandum of
dismissal.

Issue:
Whether the NLRC erred in entertaining an action for injunction even without a complaint for illegal dismissal before the
labor arbiter

Ruling:
Yes. Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one's substantive rights or interest. It is not a
cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to only when there is a
pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. The
application of the injunctive writ rests upon the existence of an emergency or of a special reason before the main case be
regularly heard.

Under the Labor Code, the power of the NLRC to issue an injunctive writ originates from "any labor dispute" upon application by a party
thereof, which application if not granted "may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor
of such party."

It is an essential requirement that there must first be a labor dispute between the contending parties before the labor arbiter. In the
present case, there is no labor dispute between the petitioner and private respondents as there has yet been no complaint for illegal
dismissal filed with the labor arbiter by the private respondents against the petitioner.

The petition for injunction directly filed before the NLRC is in reality an action for illegal dismissal. This is clear from the allegations in
the petition which prays for; reinstatement of private respondents; award of full backwages, moral and exemplary damages; and
attorney's fees. As such, the petition should have been filed with the labor arbiter who has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide such case.

The NLRC shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by labor arbiters as provided in Article 217(b) of the Labor
Code. In short, the jurisdiction of the NLRC in illegal dismissal cases is appellate in nature and, therefore, it cannot entertain the private
respondents' petition for injunction which challenges the dismissal orders of petitioner. Article 218(e) of the Labor Code does not
provide blanket authority to the NLRC or any of its divisions to issue writs of injunction, considering that Section 1 of Rule XI of the New
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC makes injunction only an ancillary remedy in ordinary labor disputes."

Thus, the NLRC exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order granting private respondents' petition for injunction and
ordering the petitioner to reinstate private respondents.

16. Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services Local Chapter vs. Coscocuela
140 SCRA 302
Facts:
Petitioner union filed a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor and Employment against Super Garments Manufacturing
Corporation on May 12, 1985. The strike commenced on June 8, 1985 and is said to be still on.

Super Garments and Rustan Commercial Corporation have separate compartments in the same building at Malugay and
Mayapis streets. It is called the Yupangco building.

It is alleged by the petitioner union that goods of Super Garments were spirited out of its strike-bound premises thru
Rustan’s warehouse. Whereupon, the union picketed not only Super Garments but also Rustan. As a result Rustan filed
Civil Case No. 10905 before the respondent judge for injunction and damages thru the PECABAR law office and petition
No. 971 with the National Labor Relations Commission also to enjoin the union from picketing its premises.

The respondent judge issued the writ after finding no employer-employee relationship between the parties. Hence, this
petition wherein petitioner union claims that respondent judge has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction because the case
is a labor dispute, that the prerogative belongs to the Minister of Labor and Employment. On the other hand, private
respondent Rustan says that the respondent judge has jurisdiction because there is no labor dispute between it and the
union even as it went to the National Labor Relations Commission to seek identical relief.

Issue:

Whether the grant of injunction was proper

Ruling:
No. There appears to be no labor dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent for which reason the latter
was justified in seeking relief in respondent judge’s court. The unfair labor complaint filed by petitioner union on July 12,
1985 does not prove a labor relationship. By the same token it was improper for the private respondent to have filed Case
No. 971 with the National Labor Relations Commission.

17. PAFLU vs. Salas

G.R. No. L-39084, February 23, 1988
Facts:

PAFLU filed a complaint for ULP with the Court of Industrial Relations against Northwest Manufacturing Corporation and
Gan Hun. The CIR ruled in favor of PAFLU and issued a writ of execution and ordered the sheriff to commence levying
the personal properties of Gan Hun. However, it was found out that he is only a boarder of Wong King Yuen who later on
filed a complaint for damages with the Court of First Instance. The CFI issued an injunction restraining the sheriff from
proceeding with the sale of the property. PAFLU contests the jurisdiction of CFI to issue such injunction, hence, the
petition.
Issue:

Whether or not the CFI has the jurisdiction to issue the injunctive relief in question.

Held:

Yes. It was clear that the civil case was an ordinary civil action for damages and not a labor dispute. Even if the act
complained arose from a labor dispute between the union and another party, there is no labor dispute between PAFLU
and Wong King Yuen. It was clear that the jurisdiction of CIR can be invoke only when there is a dispute arising between
or affecting employees and employers or when an employer – employee relationship exists between the parties. There
being no labor dispute between the parties, the CFI has the jurisdiction to issue relief sought in civil case.

18. Rustans Supervisory Union vs. Dalisay

G.R. No. L-32891, April 29, 1971
Facts:

The union wrote to the company that a great number of supervisory personnel had affiliated with it and presented a set
of proposals for incorporation into a CBA. The recognition had been unheeded so the union declared a strike and
picketed the company premises. The company filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against the
union and its officers in the CFI of Lanao del Norte. The union filed with the Court an urgent motion to dissolve or lift the
writ because they were engaged in industrial dispute with the company which was guilty of ULP in refusing to negotiate
with them.

Issue:

Whether or not CFI has jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief involving ULP cases.

Held:

No. It has long been settled that were acts complained of by the company are directly interwoven with ULP charge
against it by the union. The main case does not come under the jurisdiction of CFI even if it involves violence,
intimidation and coercion as averred in the complaint. As in the case, the CIR has exclusive jurisdiction. If the purpose of
the action is to obtain some injunctive relief against certain acts of the union members, the same can be obtained from
CIR which is given ample powers to act thereon.

19. Froel M. Po-od vs. Ablaze Builder, Inc. et. al

G.R. No. 230791, November 20, 2017
Facts:

Respondent Ablaze Builders, Inc. hired petitioners as construction workers for a project, specifically on the finishing
phase. A project engineer allegedly told petitioners that they are dismissed because there is no more work to be done,
even if the phase in which they are working on was not yet finished. Aggrieved by their verbal dismissal, petitioners filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA which was found that there was in fact no actual termination of nor
abandonment by employees. Hence, it dismissed the case.

Petitioners averred, among others, that respondents unceremoniously terminated their employment without giving
them an opportunity to explain their side. Hence, they claim backwages but not reinstatement in view of their strained
relations with their employer. Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that the company did not terminate petitioners'
employment, but rather, this is a case of abandonment of work on the part of the petitioners.

This case is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA, which reversed the decision of the NLRC
and reinstated that of the LA, finding no unlawful termination of petitioners Froel Pu-od, et. al.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred when it gave due course to respondent’s petition for certiorari

Held: No.

The 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure mandate that a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision must be filed within
10 calendar days from receipt of said decision, otherwise, the decision shall become final and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision must be filed before the remedy of a petition for certiorari may be
availed, to enable the commission to pass upon and correct its mistakes without the intervention of the courts. Failure
to file a motion for reconsideration of the decision is a procedural defect that generally warrants a dismissal of the
petitioner for certiorari.

The SC held that despite procedural lapses, fundamental consideration of substantial justice may warrant this Court to
decide a case on the merits rather than dismiss it on technicality.

Likewise, the NLRC is not restricted by the technical rules of procedures and is allowed to be liberal in the application of
its rules in hearing and deciding labor cases.

20. Genpact Services, Inc., et. al. vs. Maria Katrina Falseco
G.R. No. 227695, July 31, 2017
Facts:

Respondents Maria Katrina Santos-Falceso and two others filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims
against petitioners Genpact Services, Inc. (Genpact) and Danilo Sebastian Reyes. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit. The NLRC affirmed the LA ruling.

Respondents moved for reconsideration, which was partly granted by the NLRC, increasing respondents’ entitlement to
separation pay. The NLRC resolution explicitly stated that “no further motion of similar import shall be entertained.”
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed outright the
petition purely on procedural grounds.

It held that petitioners’ failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC prior to elevating the case to it is a
fatal infirmity which rendered the petition dismissible. It further noted that petitioners did not present any plausible
justification nor concrete, compelling and valid reason for dispensing with the requirement.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition

Ruling: Yes.

Given the extraordinary nature of a Rule 65 petition, the general rule is that a motion for reconsideration must first be
filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.

xxx This notwithstanding, the foregoing rule admits of well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is a patent
nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have
been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower
court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and
there is extreme urgency for relief; (f ) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting
of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where
the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

A review of the records reveals that the exceptions in items (d) and (e) are attendant in this case.
The dispositive portion of the NLRC’s June 30, 2014 resolution which partially granted respondents’ motion for
reconsideration, and accordingly, increased their entitlement to separation pay to one month salary per year of service -
reads in its entirety:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is partly granted. The assailed Decision is modified in
that GENPACT Services LLC is ordered to pay complainants separation pay of one month salary per year of service. The
amounts already received by complainants shall be deducted from the amounts due. No further motion of similar
import shall be entertained. SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied).

Otherwise worded, the highlighted portion explicitly warns the litigating parties that the NLRC will no longer entertain
any motions for reconsideration. This circumstance gave petitioners the impression that moving for reconsideration
before the NLRC would only be an exercise in futility in light of the tribunal’s aforesaid warning.
Section 15, Rule VII of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure provides that the remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration
may be availed of once by each party. In this case, only respondents had filed a motion for reconsideration before the
NLRC. Applying the foregoing provision, petitioners had an opportunity to file such motion in this case, if they wished.
However, the tenor of such warning effectively deprived petitioners of such opportunity, constituting a violation of their
right to due process.

All told, petitioners were justified in pursuing a direct recourse to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. To rule otherwise would be antithetical to the tenets of fair play and undue prejudice to
petitioners’ rights. Since the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari solely on procedural grounds, a remand of the case
for a resolution on the merits is warranted.

21. Cristobal vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc.,

G.R. No. 201622, October 4, 2017
Facts:

IN a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by petitioner Angelito L. Cristobal against respondents Philippine Airlines, Inc.
(PAL) and Lucio Tan, the Labor Arbiter (LA) found for the former.

The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the LA decision but reduced the award of moral and
exemplary damages.

Cristobal filed a motion for partial reconsideration. PAL also filed a motion for reconsideration. The NLRC resolved both
motions in its decision dated May 31, 2011, deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages and reducing the
amount of Cristobal’s retirement benefits.

On June 24, 2011, Cristobal filed a motion for reconsideration on the reduction of his retirement benefits. The NLRC
denied his motion, deeming it a second motion for reconsideration of its May 31, 2011 decision.

Cristobal filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed it. It found that his June 24, 2011
motion was a second motion for reconsideration. Thus, it did not toll his period to file a petition for certiorari assailing
the May 31, 2011 decision. Consequently, it was filed out of time.

Issue: Whether or not the CA commit a reversible error

Held: Yes.

The National Labor Relations Commission Rules of Procedure prohibits a party from questioning a decision, resolution,
or order, twice. In other words, this rule prohibits the same party from assailing the same judgment. However, a
decision substantially reversing a determination in a prior decision is a discrete decision from the earlier one. Thus, in
Poliand Industrial Ltd. v. National Development Co., 523 Phil. 368 (2006), this Court held:

Ordinarily, no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be
entertained. Essentially, however, the instant motion is not a second motion for reconsideration since the viable relief it
seeks calls for the review, not of the Decision dated August 22, 2005, but the November 23, 2005 Resolution which
delved for the first time on the issue of the reckoning date of the computation of interest...

This Court ruled similarly in Solidbank Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166581 & 167187, December 7, 2015, where
the Labor Arbiter dismissed a labor complaint but awarded the employee separation pay, compensatory benefit,
Christmas bonus, and moral and exemplary damages.

In its petition assailing the Court of Appeals Resolution, the employer bank claimed that the Court of Appeals erred in
granting the employee’s second motion for reconsideration, a prohibited pleading. This Court held:

The Amended Decision is an entirely new decision which supersedes the original decision, for which a new motion for
reconsideration may be filed again.

Anent the issue of Lazaro’s “second” motion for reconsideration, we disagree with the bank’s contention that it is
disallowed by the Rules of Court. Upon thorough examination of the procedural history of this case, the “second”
motion does not partake the nature of a prohibited pleading because the amended decision is an entirely new decision
which supersedes the original, for which a new motion for reconsideration may be filed again.

xxx

Here, the National Labor Relations Commission May 31, 2011 Decision substantially modified its September 30, 2010
Decision. Thus, petitioner was not precluded from seeking reconsideration of the new decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission, and it was clearly an error for the Court of Appeals to find that petitioner’s petition for certiorari
was filed out of time on that ground.

22. Grace R. Aluag vs. BIR Multipurpose Cooperative, et. al.

G.R. No. 228449, December 6, 2017
Facts:

Petitioner Aluag was hired by Respondent as cashier since 1994 until she was terminated on 2013. Her job includes
receiving remittances and payments deposit all collections and perform other duties as the general manager general
manager (GM) may assign to her.

She alleged that she was tasked to give verbal reports on Respondent until she was required to put them in writing.

She alleged that her task to make verbal reports was later on required to be in writing, and so writing, and so when the
when the Respondent’ loan processor accepted post-dated checks with prior approval of the General manager, she
submitted a report of bounced checks and deposited the remaining checks in her possession.

Thereafter, she was preventively suspended before she gave birth. Then she filed a complaint in the NLRC alleging that
she was illegally suspended, but later changed it to illegal dismissed.

 The Respondent averred that Aluag was dismissed for loss of trust and confidence due to her violations of the BIRMPC’s
by-laws, rules and regulations. It added that the external auditor reported that the cashier failed cashier failed to
regularly report to regularly report post-da post-dated checks and did not observe monitoring.

he LA dismissed the complaint for illegal illegal dismissal, but the NLRC ruled otherwise. The CA reversed, and reinstate
CA reversed, and reinstated the LA ruling. It LA ruling. It held that the held that the BIRMPC observed the 2-notice rule.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly reversed and set aside the NLRC ruling, and accordingly held that BIRMPC had
just cause to terminate Aluag's employment.

RULING: Yes. The SC found that BIRMPC sufficiently observed the standards of procedural process in dismissing Aluag by
(a) issuing a written notice specifying her infract infractions; (b) granting her ample opportunity to be heard or explain
her side when she was required to submit an explanation; and (c) serving a written notice of termination after verifying
the infraction committed.

 There is a different approach in reviewing the CA’s decision in a labor case. In a Rule 45 review which is a Rule 45 review
which is limited to questions of law, the Court examines the correctness of the CA's Decision in CA's Decision in contras
contrast with the review of jurisdictional errors under r Rule 65 which is resorted to determine the presence or absence
of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision.

Moreover, in labor case, grave abuse may be imputed to the NLRC when its findings and conclusions are not supported
by substantial evidence.

The SC found agrees with the NLRC that NLRC that the cashier failed to failed to regularly report rly report Post-Dated
Checks (PDC) Checks (PDC) received and did not observe proper monitoring of checks due to checks due to be
deposited. There are checks which be deposited. There are checks which were not deposited at all.

It also held that procedural due process is met even without an actual hearing as long as the employee is accorded a
chance to explain her side of the controversy, as what happened here.

23. Ma. Charito C. Gadia vs. Sykes Asia, et. al

G.R. No. 209499, January 28, 2015
Facts:

Sykes Asia is a corporation engage in Business Process Outsourcing which provides support to international clients from
various sectors by carrying on some of their operations. Sykes Asia contracted with Alltel and hired Gadia as customer
service representative. Later, Alltel informed the employees about the termination of services and Sykes Asia informed
its employees termination under the Alltel. Gadia filed a complaint for illegal dismissal in which the Labor Arbiter
favored the corporation. The NLRC reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiters decision and said Gadia was a regular
employee and was unjustly dismissed. The Court of Appeals reversed NLRC’s decision and reinstated the LA’s ruling,
hence the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.

Held:

Yes. The NLRC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the petitioner was a regular employer of Sykes Asia when it was
established by substantial evidence that they were merely project – based. In labor disputes, grave abuse may ascribe to
NLRC when inter alia, its findings and conclusions reached thereby are not supported.

24. Protective Maximum Security Agency, Inc. vs. Celso Fuentes

G.R. No. 169303, February 11, 2015
Facts:

The security agency provides for commercial, industrial and personal residences a security service. Fuentes was a hired
as security guard and was assigned to PICOP and posted to security checkpoint. A group of armed persons ransacked
and inflicted to Fuentes and other guards at Post 33. The incident was reported to the PNP. After the initial investigation,
PNP found out and believed that Fuentes conspired with the NPA and was criminally charged. Fuentes was detained and
later released because the case was dismissed for lack of probable cause. Fuentes filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
and other money claims against the security agency.

Issue:

Whether or not NLRC has the power to overturn the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter.

Held:

Yes. The NLRC is not bound by the findings of the Labor Arbiter. Article 223 of the Labor Code provides that the decision
of the Labor Arbiter is final and executory unless appealed to NLRC. In addition, the NLRC has the authority to reverse
the decision of the Labor Arbiter provided there is serious errors of fact – findings which would cause grave or
irreparable damage or injury to the appellant.

25. Unicol Management Services, Inc. vs. Delia Malipot

G.R. No. 206562, January 21, 2015.

Facts:

Respondent Delia Malipot is the surviving spouse of the deceased seaman Glicerio Malipot (seaman Glicerio) with whom the latter has
two minor children.

On July 16, 2008, seaman Glicerio was processed for hiring by petitioner Unicol Management Services (petitioner Unicol), acting for
and in behalf of its principal, petitioner Link Marine Pte. Ltd. (petitioner Link Marine) for the vessel Heredia Sea as Chief Engineer
Officer with a monthly salary of $2,500.00 for a contract duration of four (4) months.

Prior to his employment, seaman Glicerio was made to undergo a rigorous pre-employment medical examination conducted by
petitioners’ designated physicians and was found fit to work physically and mentally. On August 18, 2008, seaman Glicerio left the
Philippines to join the vessel Heredia Sea.
In her complaint, respondent alleged that seaman Glicerio suffered emotional strain when petitioners refused to allow him to go home
and be with his family. As early as November 16, 2008, seaman Glicerio already manifested his desire to end his contract and gave
petitioners enough time to secure his replacement. His request was relayed by the Master of Heredia Sea to petitioners’ Port Captain.
However, the Port Captain did not allow seaman Glicerio to leave the vessel.The Port Captain also allegedly threatened seaman
Glicerio by telling him that once he leaves and sets his feet on Philippine soil, he will immediately be arrested and will never be
employed by any vessel ever again, and he will be made to pay for all the expenses of his deployment.

Respondent further contended that seaman Glicerio became depressed, especially when December came and he was still not allowed
to go home. Seaman Glicerio called up and texted respondent, begging her to talk to the Port Captain and allow him to go home. He
soon became ill and experienced chest pains and palpitations. He was seen by a physician at the Fujairah Port Medical Center in
Fujairah, United Arab Emirates and was diagnosed with Muscoskeletal pain and Emotional trauma/illness. Despite this, seaman
Glicerio was not repatriated. Even when his 4-month contract expired on December 18, 2008,he was still not allowed to join his family
for Christmas. Respondent stressed that his death was compensable because his emotional trauma was caused by the conditions of
his job and aggravated by the acts of the Port Captain.

For their part, petitioners alleged that seaman Glicerio was hired for the first time by petitioner Unicol and seconded to one of its
principals, petitioner Link Marine to board the vessel Heredia Sea. This employment was contained in the Contract of Employment
approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). The period of employment, as stipulated in said contract,
was for a period of four to six months starting August 18, 2008 and ending February 18, 2009.

Regrettably, before the end of his employment contract, or on January 13, 2009, petitioners received information that seaman Glicerio
committed suicide by hanging in the store room of the Heredia Sea. This report was confirmed by the Certification of the Philippine
Consulate General at Dubai, and the accompanying documents, namely: Medico Legal Report issued by the Ministry of Justice of the
United Arab Emirates and the Death Certificate issued by the Ministry of Healthof the United Arab Emirates.

As a result of the foregoing events, respondent filed a Complaint before the Labor Arbiter claiming death compensation under seaman
Glicerio’s POEA contract.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the heirs and awarded US$71,500 as death benefits for failure of the company to prove by
substantial evidence that the deceased seaman committed suicide as it relied on the inconclusive report of the medico-legal consultant.
This ruling was set aside by the NLRC as it was found that suicide was duly established.

Accordingly, respondent filed a certiorari petition before the CA alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
gave weight to the Medico-Legal Report issued by Dr. Osman Abdul Hameed Awad and the Death Certificate issued by the United
Arab Emirates Ministry of Health as the same are inconclusive as to the cause of seaman Glicerio’s death. On petition before the Court
of Appeals, death benefits were again awarded although modified to deduct the amounts already given by the company to the heirs.

Issue:

Whether or not the NLRC may receive evidence submitted for the first time on appeal.

Ruling:

Yes. First, this Court would like to underline the fact that the NLRC may receive evidence submitted for the first time on appeal on the
ground that it may ascertain facts objectively and speedily without regard to technicalities of law in the interest of substantial justice.

In Sasan, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission 4th Division, 19 We held that our jurisprudence is replete with cases allowing the
NLRC to admit evidence, not presented before the Labor Arbiter, and submitted to the NLRC for the first time on appeal. The
submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure considering that rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and Labor Arbiters are directed to use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all
in the interest of substantial justice. In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as
documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal.20

Moreover, among the powers of the Commission as provided in Section 218 of the Labor Code is that the Commission may issue
subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of such books, papers, contracts, records, statement
of accounts, agreements, and others.21 In addition, the Commission may, among other things, conduct investigation for the
determination of a question, matter or controversy within its jurisdiction, proceed to hear and determine the disputes in the absence of
any party thereto who has been summoned or served with notice to appear, conduct its proceedings or any part thereof in public or in
private, adjourn its hearings to any time and place, refer technical matters or accounts to an expert and to accept his report as evidence
after hearing of the parties upon due notice.22 From the foregoing, it can be inferred that the NLRC can receive evidence on cases
appealed before the Commission, otherwise, its factual conclusions would not have been given great respect, much weight, and
relevance23 when an adverse party assails the decision of the NLRC via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
the CA and then to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45.24

26. Virgilio G. Amabe vs. Asian Construction, et, al

G.R. No. 183233, December 23, 2009
Facts:
The petitioner was hired by respondent Asian Construction (Asiakonstrukt) as radio technician/operator . His services were terminated
on the ground of retrenchment. He thus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and illegal deduction of his pay.

Because Asiakonstrukt failed to submit financial statements to prove losses, the Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner was not validly
dismissed. Respondents are ordered to pay Virgilio Anade his 13th month pay, illegal deductions and overtime pay.

When the case was elevated to the NLRC, Asiakonstrukt submitted the certified true copies of the Audited Financial Statements from
1998 to 2000, NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter’s Decision by holding that petitioner was not illegally dismissed and reduced the
reimbursable amount of illegal deductions.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by Order4 dated August 31, 2005, hence, he appealed to the Court of Appeals,
assailing the consideration by the NLRC of the Audited Financial Statements which were submitted only on appeal.

By Decision5 of December 26, 2007, the appellate court held that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when
it considered the financial statements as they "already form part of the records on appeal."

Citing Clarion Printing House, Inc. v. NLRC,6 the appellate court noted that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence on
appeal as technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases. And it affirmed the ruling of the NLRC that petitioner is only
entitled to the illegal deductions for the period 1997-1999 in the amount of ₱88,000.00, as the prescriptive period for money claims is
only three years from the time the cause of action accrues.

Issue:

Whether or not the NLRC is correct when it held that petitioner was not illegally dismissed taking into consideration the certified true
copies of the Audited Financial Statements from 1998 to 2000 submitted by Asiakonstrukt.

Ruling:

No. The losses must be supported by sufficient and convincing evidence,10 the normal method of discharging which is the submission of
financial statements duly audited by independent external auditors.11

In the present case, Asiakonstrukt failed to submit its audited financial statements within the two years that the case was pending
before the Labor Arbiter. It submitted them only after it received the adverse judgment of the Labor Arbiter.

Indubitably, the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence on appeal as technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases.
There is, however, a caveat to this policy. The delay in the submission of evidence should be clearly explained and should adequately
prove the employer’s allegation of the cause for termination. 12 In the present case, Asiakonstrukt proffered no explanation behind the
belated submission. And the financial statements13 it submitted covered the period 1998-2000. Further, note that the audited financial
statement14 covering the period 1998-2000 was prepared in April 2001, which begs the question of how the management knew at such
date of the company’s huge losses to justify petitioner’s retrenchment in 1999.

Furthermore, from the certification15 issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), it would appear that Asiakonstrukt
failed to submit its financial statements to the SEC, as required under the law, for the period 1998-2000 and 2003-2005, thereby
lending credence to petitioner’s theory that the financial statements submitted on appeal may have been fabricated. Indeed,
Asiakonstrukt could have easily submitted its audited financial statements during the pendency of the proceedings at the labor arbiter’s
level, especially considering that it was in late 2001 that the case was decided.

For failure then of Asiakonstrukt to clearly and satisfactorily substantiate its financial losses, 16 the dismissal of petitioner on account of
retrenchment is unjustified. 

27. Unibersidad de Sta. Isabel vs. Marvin Julian L. Sambajon, Jr.

G.R. No. 196280 and 196286, April 2, 2014

Facts:

Universidad de Sta. Isabel (petitioner) is a non-stock, non-profit religious educational institution in Naga City. Petitioner hired Marvin-
Julian L. Sambajon, Jr. (respondent) as a full-time college faculty member with the rank of Assistant Professor on probationary status,
as evidenced by an Appointment Contract4 dated November 1, 2002, effective November 1, 2002 up to March 30, 2003.

After the aforesaid contract expired, petitioner continued to give teaching loads to respondent who remained a full-time faculty member
of the Department of Religious Education for the two semesters of school-year (SY) 2003-2004 (June 1, 2003 to March 31, 2004); and
two semesters of SY 2004-2005 (June 2004 to March 31, 2005).5

Sometime in June 2003, after respondent completed his course in Master of Arts in Education, major in Guidance and Counseling, he
submitted the corresponding Special Order from the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), together with his credentials for the
said master’s degree, to the Human Resources Department of petitioner for the purpose of salary adjustment/increase. Subsequently,
respondent’s salary was increased, as reflected in his pay slips starting October 1-15, 2004. 6 He was likewise re-ranked from Assistant
Professor to Associate Professor.

In a letter dated October 15, 2004 addressed to the President of petitioner, Sr. Ma. Asuncion G. Evidente, D.C., respondent vigorously
argued that his salary increase should be made effective as of June 2003 and demanded the payment of his salary differential. The
school administration thru Sr. Purita Gatongay, D.C., replied by explaining its policy on re-ranking of faculty members, that teachers in
the Universidad are not re-ranked during their probationary period. 

Respondent insisted on his demand for retroactive pay. Petitioner reiterated the school policy on re-ranking of teachers.

However, respondent found the above explanation insufficient and not clear enough. In his letter dated January 12, 2005, he pointed
out the case of another faculty member --whom he did not name --also on probationary status whose salary was supposedly adjusted
by petitioner at the start of school year (June) after he/she had completed his/her masters degree in March. Respondent thus pleaded
for the release of his salary differential, or at the very least, that petitioner give him categorical answers to his questions. A dialogue
between the parties ensued but led to conflict.

On February 26, 2005, respondent received his letter of termination. On April 14, 2005, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against the petitioner.

Labor Arbiter Jesus Orlando M. Quinones ruled that there was no just or authorized cause in the termination of respondents
probationary employment. The NLRC rendered its Decision affirming the Labor Arbiter and holding that respondent had acquired a
permanent status pursuant to Sections 91, 92 and 93 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, in relation to Article 281 of
the Labor Code, as amended.
Both parties filed separate appeals before the CA. On motion by respondent, the two cases were consolidated (CA-G.R. SP Nos.
108103 and 108168).

The CA sustained the conclusion of the NLRC that respondent had already acquired permanent status when he was allowed to
continue teaching after the expiration of his first appointment-contract on March 30, 2003. However, the CA found it necessary to
modify the decision of the NLRC to include the award of back wages to respondent.

Issue:

Whether the NLRC correctly resolved an issue not raised in petitioner’s appeal memorandum

Ruling:

Yes. Section 4(d), Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, which was in force at the time petitioner appealed the
Labor Arbiter’s decision, expressly provided that, on appeal, the NLRC shall limit itself only to the specific issues that were elevated for
review, to wit:

Section 4. Requisites for perfection of appeal. x x x.

xxxx

(d) Subject to the provisions of Article 218 of the Labor Code, once the appeal is perfected in accordance with these Rules, the
Commission shall limit itself to reviewing and deciding only the specific issues that were elevated on appeal.

We have clarified that the clear import of the aforementioned procedural rule is that the NLRC shall, in cases of perfected appeals, limit
itself to reviewing those issues which are raised on appeal. As a consequence thereof, any other issues which were not included in the
appeal shall become final and executory.18

In this case, petitioner sets forth the following issues in its appeal memorandum:

5.01

WHETHER THE MARVIN JULIAN L. SAMBAJON, JR. WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED FROM THE UNIVERSIDAD DE STA. ISABEL.

5.02

WHETHER THE UNIVERSIDAD DE STA. ISABEL SHORTENED THE PROBATIONARY PERIOD OF MARVIN JULIAN L.
SAMBAJON.

5.03

WHETHER RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO DAMAGES. 19

Specifically, petitioner sought the correct interpretation of the Manual of Regulations for Private School Teachers and DOLE-DECS-
CHED-TESDA Order No. 01, series of 1996, insofar as the probationary period for teachers.

In reviewing the Labor Arbiter’s finding of illegal dismissal, the NLRC concluded that respondent had already attained regular status
after the expiration of his first appointment contract as probationary employee. Such conclusion was but a logical result of the NLRC’s
own interpretation of the law. Since petitioner elevated the questions of the validity of respondent’s dismissal and the applicable
probationary period under the aforesaid regulations, the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in fully resolving the said issues.

As the Court held in Roche (Phils.) v. NLRC20:

Petitioners then suggest that the respondent Commission abused its discretion in awarding reliefs in excess of those stated in the
decision of the labor arbiter despite the absence of an appeal by Villareal. To stress this point, they cited Section 5(c) of the Rules of
Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission which provides that the Commission shall, in cases of perfected appeals, limits
itself to reviewing those issues which were raised on appeal. Consequently, those which were not raised on appeal shall be final and
executory.

There is no merit to this contention. The records show that the petitioners elevated the issues regarding the correctness of the award of
damages, reinstatement with backpay, retirement benefits and the cost-saving bonus to the respondent Commission in their appeal.
This opened the said issues for review and any action taken thereon by the Commission was well within the parameters of its
jurisdiction.

28. University of Santo Tomas vs. Samahang Mangagawa ng UST (SM-UST)G.R. No.
169940, September 14, 2009

Respondent Samahang Manggagawa ng U.S.T. (SM-UST) was the authorized bargaining agent of the non-academic/non-teaching
rank-and-file daily- and monthly-paid employees (numbering about 619) of petitioner, the Pontifical and Royal University of Santo
Tomas, The Catholic University of the Philippines (or UST), a private university in the City of Manila run by the Order of Preachers. In
October 2001, during formal negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) for the academic year 2001 through 2006,
petitioner submitted its "2001-2006 CBA Proposals".

In November 2001, the parties agreed in principle on all non-economic provisions of the proposed CBA, except those pertaining to
Agency Contract or contractualization (Art. III, Sec. 3 of the proposed CBA), Union Leave of the SM-UST President (No. 4 of the
Addendum to the proposed CBA), and hiring preference.

In December 2001, petitioner submitted its final offer on the economic provisions,

On the other hand, respondent reduced its demands for the first year from P8,000.00 monthly salary increase per employee to
P7,000.00, and from P75,000.00 signing bonus to P60,000.00 for each employee, but petitioner insisted on its final offer. As a result,
respondent declared a deadlock and filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board -National Capital Region
(NCMB-NCR).

Conciliation and mediation proved to be futile, such that in January 2002, majority of respondent’s members voted to stage a strike.
However, the DOLE Secretary timely assumed jurisdiction over the dispute, and the parties were summoned and heard on their
respective claims, and were required to submit their respective position papers.

On May 31, 2002, the DOLE Secretary issued an Order directing to execute within ten (10) days from receipt of the Order a Collective
Bargaining Agreement incorporating the terms and conditions of the Order as well as other agreements made in the course of
negotiations and on conciliation.4

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Secretary of Labor. Thus, respondent filed an original petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals, claiming that the awards made by the DOLE Secretary are not supported by the evidence on record
and are contrary to law and jurisprudence.

On January 31, 2005, the appellate court affirmed the Secretary’s decision with the modification that the P10,000.00 signing bonus
awarded is increased to P18,000.00.

Petitioner claims that it began paying the wage adjustment and other benefits pursuant to the May 31, 2002 Order of the DOLE
Secretary; and that to date, 572 out of the 619 members of respondent have been paid. It now argues that by their acceptance of the
award and the resulting payments made to them, the said union members have ratified its offer and thus rendered moot the case
before the Court of Appeals

Issue:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED PALPABLE ERROR OF SUBSTANCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
MEMBERS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY ACCEPT THE ARBITRAL AWARD OF THE
SECRETARY OF DOLE

Ruling:

No. Going now to the question of whether respondent’s members’ individual acceptance of the award and the resulting payments made
by petitioner operate as a ratification of the DOLE Secretary’s award which renders CA-G.R. SP No. 72965 moot, we find that such do
not operate as a ratification of the DOLE Secretary’s award; nor a waiver of their right to receive further benefits, or what they may be
entitled to under the law. The appellate court correctly ruled that the respondent’s members were merely constrained to accept payment
at the time. Christmas was then just around the corner, and the union members were in no position to resist the temptation to accept
much-needed cash for use during the most auspicious occasion of the year. Time and again, we have held that necessitous men are
not, truly speaking, free men; but to answer a present emergency, will submit to any terms that the crafty may impose upon them.19

Besides, as individual components of a union possessed of a distinct and separate corporate personality, respondent’s members
should realize that in joining the organization, they have surrendered a portion of their individual freedom for the benefit of all the other
members; they submit to the will of the majority of the members in order that they may derive the advantages to be gained from the
concerted action of all.20 Since the will of the members is personified by its board of directors or trustees, the decisions it makes should
accordingly bind them. Precisely, a labor union exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with
employers concerning terms and conditions of employment.21 What the individual employee may not do alone, as for example obtain
more favorable terms and conditions of work, the labor organization, through persuasive and coercive power gained as a group, can
accomplish better.

29.Jag and Haggar Jeans and Sportswear Corp vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 105710, February 23, 1995

Facts:

In September 1988, the Lakas Manggagawa sa Jag (Union) composed of the rank-and-file employees of Jag & Haggar Jeans and
Sportswear Corporation, petitioner herein, staged a strike. Petitioner filed a petition to declare the strike illegal.

On November 29, 1988, Labor Arbiter Eduardo Madriaga rendered a decision, declaring the strike illegal and ordering the dismissal of
the officers, as well as the members of the Union who took part in the illegal strike. 

The affected officers and members of the Union appealed the decision to NLRC. On August 31, 1989, NLRC rendered its decision
setting aside the Labor Arbiter's decision and ordering the reinstatement of the affected employees 

Acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner, NLRC, on May 31, 1990 modified its earlier decision rendering that:

1. Officers of the Union Norma Jocson-President Narciso Sinag-Vice President; Gloria Gavis-Treasurer; Luzviminda
Guspid-Secretary; and Apolinario Sta. Ana-PRO are hereby declared to have lost their employment;

2. The Union Board Members and Shop Stewards may be dismissed by respondent-appellee subject to the payment
of separation pay equivalent to one-half month for every year of service; and

3. The mere union members are directed to report for work within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision and
management is ordered to accept them to their former or equivalent position.

Again, the aggrieved officers and members of the Union filed a motion for reconsideration while petitioner filed a Manifestation/Motion
for Clarification (Rollo, p. 15).

Pending resolution of the two motions by NLRC, both parties agreed to negotiate a settlement and to defer the enforcement of the
decision.

On July 30, 1990, the two motions were dismissed by the NLRC (Rollo, p. 15).

On October 23, 1990, a compromise agreement was executed and signed by petitioner and the Union represented by its officers, in
which:

1. The Company shall pay to the officers and members of the Union named in the aforesaid decision separation pay equivalent to one-
half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service.

2. Additionally, the Company shall pay to the officers of the Union mentioned in item No. 2 of the Decision, namely the Union Board
members, and Shop Stewards financial assistance in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos.

3. The Company shall also pay to the members of the Union mentioned in item No. 3 of the Decision, namely those who should be
allowed to work, financial assistance in the amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos.

Out of a total of 114 affected employees, 90 of them availed of the benefits provided for under the Compromise Agreement.

On May 15, 1991, 24 of the affected employees moved for the execution of the May 31, 1990 Decision of NLRC.

Petitioner filed an opposition, citing the Compromise Agreement, which had been availed of by 90 of the affected employees.

Labor Arbiter Salimathar Nambi issued an order, denying the motion for execution In the meantime, 12 of the 24 affected employees
also availed of the benefits under the Compromise Agreement. The remaining 12 employees appealed to NLRC from the denial of their
motion for execution. On February 26, 1992, NLRC set aside the order of Labor Arbiter Nambi and directed petitioner to accept the
union members to their former or equivalent position with back wages from July 30, 1990 until they were reinstated. The motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Issue:

Whether or not the Compromise Agreement entered into by petitioner and the Union is binding upon private respondents.

Ruling:

No. The waiver of reinstatement, like waivers of money claims, must be regarded as a personal right which must be exercised
personally by the workers themselves. "For a waiver thereof to be legally effective, the individual consent or ratification of the workers
or employees involved must be shown. Neither the officers nor the majority of the union had any authority to waive the accrued rights
pertaining to the dissenting minority members, . . . . The members of the union need the protective shield of this doctrine not only vis-a-
vis their employer but also, at times, vis-a-vis the management of their own union, and at other times even against their own
imprudence or impecuniousaess" (General Rubber and Footwear Corporation v. Drilon, 169 SCRA 808 [1989]).

We have ruled that ". . . when it comes to individual benefits accruing to members of a union from a favorable final judgment of any
court, the members themselves become the real parties in interest and it is for them, rather than for the union, to accept or reject
individually the fruits of litigation" (Esso Philippines, Inc. v. Malayang Manggagawa sa Esso (MME), 75 SCRA 73 [1977]).

The authority to compromise cannot lightly be presumed and should be duly established by evidence (General Rubber and Footwear
Corporation v. Drilon, supra; Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa La Campana v. Sarmiento, 133 SCRA 220, [1984]).

We also find no reason for the union members to enter into a compromise when the decision of NLRC ordering their reinstatement is
more advantageous to them than their being dismissed from their jobs under said Compromise Agreement.

The Compromise Agreement does not apply to private respondents who did not sign the Compromise Agreement, nor avail of its
benefits.

However, while respondents Domingo Namia and Rizalde Flores are not bound by the terms of the Compromise Agreement, they are
bound by the amended decision of NLRC rendered on May 3, 1990 which provides that members of the board of directors of the union
may be dismissed by petitioner subject to the payment of separation pay. The two respondents did not appeal the amended decision
after the denial by NLRC of their motion for reconsideration thereof.

30. Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. vs. Amurao III

G.R. No. 167225, October 22, 2014

Facts:

On February 16, 1989, petitioner Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. (RMN) hired respondent Michael Maximo R. Amurao III (Michael) as a
radio broadcaster for its DWKC-FM station and production manager for its metropolitan radio operations at a monthly salary of
₱28,400.00.1

Years later, RMN decided to reformat and restructure the programming of its DWKC-FM station to meet the demands of the
broadcasting industry. On April 25, 2002, the president of RMN met with Michael and other personnel of the station to inform them of
the management's decision, advising them that the reformatting and restructuring of the station's programs would necessarily affect
their employment; but assuring that they would be paid their retirement pay and other benefits. 2 To formalize the discussions had in
their meeting, RMN furnished Michael and other personnel separate letters dated May 14, 2002

However, Michael and the other personnel refused to sign in receipt when the letters were served on them. Not long after, however,
they accepted the offer of RMN and executed affidavits relinquishing all their claims against the employer. In Michael’s case, the
Affidavit of Release/Quitclaim Dated May 30, 2002.

On October 14, 2002, or 5 months after receiving his benefits and his execution of the quitclaim, Michael filed a complaint against RMN
for illegal dismissal with money claims in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision6 declaring the dismissal of Michael as illegal on the ground that the reformatting and
restructuring of RMN’s radio programming did not fall under any of the just or authorized causes specified under Article 282, Article 283
and Article 284 of the Labor Code.

RMN appealed to the NLRC, contending that the decision of the Labor Arbiter was premature for being rendered without first issuing an
order either setting the case for hearing or declaring the same submitted for decision in violation of Rule V, Section II of the Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC, as amended;8 that the quitclaim signed in its favor was valid and binding because it represented a voluntary
and reasonable settlement of Michael’s claims; and that Michael was estopped from filing the illegal dismissal case against it.9

In its decision rendered on November 28, 2003,10 the NLRC found no merit in the contention of RMN that the appealed decision was
prematurely rendered.

Issue:

Whether the quitclaim executed by the employee was valid and effective against him.
Ruling:

Yes. RMN consistently contended that a series of negotiations between Michael and the management preceded the giving of the
settlement pay that they had considered as reasonable. 19 Not once did Michael refute this contention. Worth noting is that Michael
signed the quitclaim to release RMN from any and all claims that could be due to him by reason of his employment after he receiving
the agreed settlement pay of ₱311,922.00.

Not all quitclaims are per se invalid or against public policy. A quitclaim is invalid or contrary to public policy only: (1) where there is
clear proof that the waiver was wrangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person; or (2) where the terms of settlementare
unconscionable on their face. In instances of invalid quitclaims, the law steps in to annul the questionable waiver. Indeed, there are
legitimate waivers that represent the voluntary and reasonable settlements of laborers’ claims that should be respected by the Court as
the law between the parties. Where the party has voluntarily made the waiver, with a full understanding of its terms as well as its
consequences, and the consideration for the quitclaimis credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and
binding undertaking, and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind.20 A waiver is essentially contractual.

In our view, the requisites for the validity of Michael’s quitclaim were satisfied.1âwphi1 We explain.

Firstly, Michael acknowledged in his quitclaim that he had read and thoroughly understood the terms of his quitclaim and signed it of his
own volition. Being a radio broadcaster and production manager, he occupied a highly responsible position in the company.It would be
implausible to hold, therefore, that he could be easily duped into simply signing away his rights. Besides, the language and content
ofthe quitclaim were clear and uncomplicated such that he could not claim that he did not understand what he was signing.

Secondly, the settlement pay of ₱311,922.00 was credible and reasonable considering that Michael did not even assail such amount as
unconscionably low, or even state that he was entitled to a higher amount.

Thirdly, that he was required to sign the quitclaim as a condition to the release of the settlement pay 21 did not prove that its execution
was coerced. Having agreed to part with a substantial amount of money, RMN took steps to protect its interest and obtain its release
from all obligations once it paid Michael his settlement pay, which it did in this case.

And, lastly, that he signed the quitclaim out of fear of not being able to provide for the needs of his family and for the schooling of his
children did not immediately indicate that he had been forced to sign the same.22 Dire necessity should not necessarily be an
acceptable ground for annulling the quitclaim, especially because it was not at all shown that he had been forced to execute it. Nor was
it even proven that the consideration for the quitclaim was unconscionably low, and that he had been tricked into accepting the
consideration.23

With the quitclaim having been freely and voluntarily signed, RMN was released and absolved from any liability in favor of Michael.
Suffice it to say that the quitclaim is ineffective in barring recovery of the full measure of an employee's rights only when the transaction
is shown to be questionable and the consideration is scandalously low and inequitable.24 Such is not true here.

31. Dario Nacar vs. Gallery Frames, et. al.

G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013

Facts: Dario Nacar filed a labor case against Gallery Frames and its owner Felipe Bordey, Jr. Nacar alleged that he was dismissed
without cause by Gallery Frames on January 24, 1997. On October 15, 1998, the Labor Arbiter (LA) found Gallery Frames guilty of
illegal dismissal hence the Arbiter awarded Nacar P158,919.92 in damages consisting of backwages and separation pay.

Gallery Frames appealed all the way to the Supreme Court (SC). The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the
decision became final on May 27, 2002. After the finality of the SC decision, Nacar filed a motion before the LA for recomputation as he
alleged that his backwages should be computed from the time of his illegal dismissal (January 24, 1997) until the finality of the SC
decision (May 27, 2002) with interest. The LA denied the motion as he ruled that the reckoning point of the computation should only be
from the time Nacar was illegally dismissed (January 24, 1997) until the decision of the LA (October 15, 1998). The LA reasoned that
the said date should be the reckoning point because Nacar did not appeal hence as to him, that decision became final and executory.

ISSUE:

Whether a re-computation in the course of execution of the labor arbiter's original computation of the awards made, pegged as of the
time the decision was rendered and confirmed with modification by a final CA decision, is legally proper.

RULING:

Yes. A source of misunderstanding in implementing the final decision in this case proceeds from the way the original labor arbiter
framed his decision. The decision consists essentially of two parts.

The first is that part of the decision that cannot now be disputed because it has been confirmed with finality. This is the finding of the
illegality of the dismissal and the awards of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, backwages, attorney's fees, and legal interests.

The second part is the computation of the awards made. On its face, the computation the labor arbiter made shows that it was time-
bound as can be seen from the figures used in the computation. This part, being merely a computation of what the first part of the
decision established and declared, can, by its nature, be re-computed. This is the part, too, that the petitioner now posits should no
longer be re-computed because the computation is already in the labor arbiter's decision that the CA had affirmed. The public and
private respondents, on the other hand, posit that a re-computation is necessary because the relief in an illegal dismissal decision goes
all the way up to reinstatement if reinstatement is to be made, or up to the finality of the decision, if separation pay is to be given in lieu
reinstatement.

That the labor arbiter's decision, at the same time that it found that an illegal dismissal had taken place, also made a computation of the
award, is understandable in light of Section 3, Rule VIII of the then NLRC Rules of Procedure which requires that a computation be
made. This Section in part states:

[T]he Labor Arbiter of origin, in cases involving monetary awards and at all events, as far as practicable, shall embody in any such
decision or order the detailed and full amount awarded.

Clearly implied from this original computation is its currency up to the finality of the labor arbiter's decision. As we noted above, this
implication is apparent from the terms of the computation itself, and no question would have arisen had the parties terminated the case
and implemented the decision at that point.

However, the petitioner disagreed with the labor arbiter's findings on all counts - i.e., on the finding of illegality as well as on all the
consequent awards made. Hence, the petitioner appealed the case to the NLRC which, in turn, affirmed the labor arbiter's decision. By
law, the NLRC decision is final, reviewable only by the CA on jurisdictional grounds.

The petitioner appropriately sought to nullify the NLRC decision on jurisdictional grounds through a timely filed Rule 65 petition for
certiorari. The CA decision, finding that NLRC exceeded its authority in affirming the payment of 13th month pay and indemnity, lapsed
to finality and was subsequently returned to the labor arbiter of origin for execution.

We see no error in the CA decision confirming that a re-computation is necessary as it essentially considered the labor arbiter's original
decision in accordance with its basic component parts as we discussed above. To reiterate, the first part contains the finding of illegality
and its monetary consequences; the second part is the computation of the awards or monetary consequences of the illegal dismissal,
computed as of the time of the labor arbiter's original decision.

31. Christian Literature Crusade vs. NLRC and Loida del Rosario

G.R. No. 79106, April 10, 198

Facts:

Sometime in January, 1975, private respondent Loida del Rosario (hereinafter referred to as del Rosario) was hired by petitioner
Christian Literature Crusade (hereinafter referred to as Crusade) as a bookkeeper. Later, on October 4, 1976, an application for
clearance to terminate the services of del Rosario on the ground of incompetence was filed by Crusade with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment. The application was opposed by del Rosario. On November 20, 1976, del Rosario was placed under preventive
suspension.

On March 31, 1982, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision denying the application for clearance filed by Christian literature Crusade
and it (applicant) is ordered to reinstate Loida del Rosario to her former position/or substantially equivalent position, with backwages for
a period of three (3) years without deductions from possible earnings elsewhere, and without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
formerly appertaining to her.

On August 9, 1982, a writ of execution was issued by the Labor Arbiter upon motion of del Rosario, there being no appeal. On August
27, 1982, the award of backwages in the amount of THIRTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY PESOS (P 13,680.00) computed
on the basis of del Rosario's P 380.00 monthly salary was satisfied. However, on the issue of reinstatement, the Sheriff stated in his
return that del Rosario was not reinstated in view of the "Manifestation and Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Execution of the Decision
Per Reinstatement of the Complainant Loida del Rosario,' filed by Crusade.

On February 2, 1983, del Rosario filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution" praying therein for
reinstatement with payment of allowances and 13th month pay from 1976, the date of her dismissal, up to January, 1983, amounting to
P 20,072.00.

On February 28, 1983, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued by the Labor Arbiter for del Rosario's reinstatement.

On April 13, 1983, a Manifestation and Motion was again filed by del Rosario alleging that the computation of her backwages should
include the allowances and 13th month pay. The Labor Arbiter denied the Motion for Recomputation of the Backwages.

The Labor Arbiter later issued a second Alias Writ of Execution for the purpose of reinstatement of del Rosario, which was not satisfied.

The motions for recomputation of her backwages having been denied, del Rosario appealed to the NLRC regarding the interpretation of
the March 31, 1982 decision of the Labor Arbiter.

The NLRC rendered a decision, affirming the appealed Order and remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter of origin for execution of the
reinstatement aspect of the 31 March 1982 Decision and likewise of the award hereto indicated after proper computation.
Del Rosario filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration before the NLRC arguing that the latter erred in "holding that the amount of P
380.00 covers the allowance and that her monthly rate was P 260.00 and prayed for payment of additional backwages based on a
computation of P 380.00 monthly rate with corresponding privileges and benefits on the basis of said monthly rate.

Later, a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution was filed anew by del Rosario, alleging that based on her computation, she is
entitled to backwages including living allowance and 13th month pay in the total amount P 80,329.15 from September 1, 1982 to March
15, 1987 and prayed for the payment of the same and reinstatement. On June 2, 1987, the Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution
reinstating Loida del Rosario to her former position or a substantially equivalent position.

Issue:

Whether or not del Rosario is entitled to additional backwages from September 1, 1982 to March 15, 1987.

Ruling:

No. It is a well-settled rule that the execution of judgment must conform to that which is ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of
the decision Laingo vs. Camilo, G.R. No. L-35833, June 29, 1984, 130 SCRA 144; National Steel Corporation vs. National Labor
Relations Commission and Pelagio Remolado, G.R. No. 74711, September 19, 1988). Where the writ of execution is not in harmony
with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the writ has pro tanto no validity (Mutual Security Insurance Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-47018, September 11, 1987,153 SCRA 678). This is so because once a judgment has become final and executory
or partially executed as in this case, it may no longer be amended, modified or altered. What remains to be done is purely the
ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment.

In case of defiance or non-compliance with the writ of execution, as in this case, where Crusade paid del Rosario three (3) years
backwages but failed and refused and still fails and refuses to reinstate her despite several writs of execution, the remedy is not for the
grant in another writ of execution of continuing backwages up to the time of actual reinstatement. The grant of additional backwages to
serve as damages or as penalty to Crusade for persistently refusing to reinstate del Rosario has no basis in the decision sought to be
enforced and hence, it may not be resorted to in order to compel reinstatement. The remedy is provided in the case of D.M. Consunji,
Inc. vs. Pucan, et al., G.R. No. 71413, March 21, 1988, 159 SCRA 107, wherein an alias writ of execution was likewise issued directing
payment of additional backwages after the prior award of backwages equivalent to five (5) years and seven (7) months had been fully
satisfied. The Court, in nullifying the order for payment of additional sums, therein held:

To ensure compliance with the court's order, and realizing the stubborn refusal to reinstate him, petitioner (sic) should
have resorted to more drastic remedies such as the filing of a motion to cite petitioner in contempt. In this way,
prompt compliance could have resulted.

Thus, del Rosario should have filed a motion to cite Crusade in contempt for refusing to reinstate her despite several writs of execution
issued by the Labor Arbiter.

The case of TUPAS Local Chapter No. 979 vs. NLRC, supra, relied upon by del Rosario in support of her claim for continuing
backwages, is inapplicable to the case at bar. It should be noted that the Court's departure therein from the usual equivalent of the
three years backwages generally awarded by this Court was still within its power to do, the reinstatement of the workers therein being
by virtue of a return-to-work order, not by virtue of a final and executory judgment. In Davao Free Workers Front vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-
29356, October 31,1974, 60 SCRA 408, this Court, in departing from the general rule, merely upheld the trial court's decision, which
was not yet final and executory, awarding the employees therein unlawfully dismissed full backwages without qualification from
dismissal to reinstatement. Likewise, in National Shipyards and Steel Corporation vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-32724, June 28,1974, 57 SCRA
642, this Court merely upheld the industrial court's questioned orders and resolutions in implementation of this Court's long final and
executory decision in a previous case involving exactly the same subject matter. Said orders and resolutions provided for the
employee's reinstatement with backwages until actually reinstated. In upholding the same, this Court said that the matter of
reinstatement with backwages was long resolved and may no longer be reopened.

Read: Arts. 225,226,227,228,229,230 and 231.