Qualification Of Local Elective Officials

Torayno v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 137329 (August 9, 2000)
FACTS: This case involves a petition for quo warranto filed against the respondent on the
ground that he was not able to fulfill the requirement of residency of 1-yr in Cagayan de Oro City
when he ran for mayor. Respondent previously served as governor of Misamis Oriental for 3
consecutive terms before he registered as a voter in Cagayan de Oro City and subsequently ran
for mayor.

HELD: Respondent was able to fulfill the residency requirement needed for him to qualify as a
mayoralty candidate. He bought a house in Cagayan de Oro City in 1973. He actually resided
there before he registered as a voter in that city in 1997.

Villarosa vs. HRET

G.R. No. 143351, September 14, 2000

FACTS:
Quintos contested the proclamation of Amelita Villarosa. Issue: whether JTV votes should be
counted in favor of Villarosa. JTV is the nickname of Villarosas husband, who is the incumbent
representative of Occidental Mindoro.

HELD:
Villarosas use of JTV as her nickname was a clever ploy to make a mockery of the election
process. HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that the only issue for its
determination was whether "JTV" votes or variations thereof should be counted in favor of
VILLAROSA and in ruling that such votes are stray votes.

Maruhom v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 139397 (May 5, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for mayor. Because of several
irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds, the petitioner was illegally proclaimed as the
winner. Petitioner filed a case with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation, but later withdrew
it. He also filed an election protest with the RTC. Petitioner orally moved for dismissal of the
protest, but it was denied. The court ordered the Revision Committee to convene and start the
revision of the ballots. Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing the petition.

HELD: The SC held that the summary dismissal of petitioners Motion to Dismiss was not a
grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC. The filing of the motion to dismiss, in fact, appears
to be part of a perfidious plot to prevent the early termination of the proceedings as evidenced
by a confluence of events clearly showing a pattern of delay employed by petitioner to avert the
revision ballots. Also, a motion to dismiss is not a prohibited pleading in an election contest filed
before the regular courts.
 Maruhom vs COMELEC

Maruhom challenges in her Petition the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in

declaring her registration in Marantao void. She asserts that Section 2, Article
IX(c) of the Constitution prohibits the COMELEC from assuming jurisdiction or
deciding issues involving the right to vote. Section 33 of Republic Act No. 8189,
or the Voters Registration Act of 1996 (VRA), confers upon the MTCs and
MeTCs original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of inclusion and
exclusion of voters in their respective cities or municipalities.

ISSUE:

Is the challenge on Maruhoms registration, an issue on the right to vote and

thus, beyond COMELEC jurisdiction?

HELD:

The present case is not about her being denied her right to register as a
voter, but is all about her making false material representations in her COC,
which would warrant the cancellation of the same. The resolutions of the
COMELEC en banc merely defeated Maruhoms intent to run for elective office,
but it did not deprive her of her right to vote. Although Maruhoms registration
in Marantao is void, her registration in Marawi still subsists. She may be
barred from voting or running for mayor in the former, but she may still
exercise her right to vote, or even run for an elective post, in the latter.
It is settled that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over a petition filed under
Section 78 of the OEC.[21] In the exercise of such jurisdiction, it is within the
competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to
material facts was made in the COC.
Libanan vs Comelec Case Digest
MARCELINO C. LIBANAN vs. HRET

G.R. No. 129783. December 22, 1997

Facts: Petitioner Marcelino Libanan and private respondent Jose Ramirez were among the
candidates for the lone congressional seat of Eastern Samar in the May 1995 elections. After the
canvass of the returns was made on 13 May 1995, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Eastern
Samar proclaimed respondent Ramirez to have been duly elected Representative of the District.

Petitioner Libanan filed an election protest before the HRET claiming, among other things, that the
absence of the BEI Chairmans signature at the back of the ballots could not but indicate that the
ballots were not those issued to the voters during the elections thus, indicating that they were
spurious and invalid. He averred that the law would require the Chairman of the BEI to authenticate
or sign the ballot before issuing it to the voter.

Issue: Whether or not the ballots without the BEI Chairmans signature are valid.

Held: A ballot without BEI chairmans signature at the back is valid and not spurious, provided that it
bears any one of these other authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark; and (b) in
those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent, the presence of
red and blue fibers in the ballots. What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid
down by the HRET that a ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long as it bears any one of
these authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or initials, or
thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and (c) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are
blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the presence of red or blue fibers in the ballots. It is
only when none of these marks appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and
subject to rejection.

Facts: GMA was proclaimed by the congress as duly elected President of the
Philippines. Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, FPJ, filed
an election protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. However, the protestant
died in the course of his medical treatment at St. Lukes Hospital. Now, the widow of
FPJ, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe submitted a manifestation with urgent petition/motion to
intervene as a substitute for deceased protestant FPJ.
Issue: Whether the widow may substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during
the pendency of the latters protest case.

Ruling: No. The court held in Vda. de De Mesa that while the right to a public office is
personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal
and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would
oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. Hence, substitution
and intervention is allowed but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is
the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is
entitled to the avails of the suit. Herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any
claim to the august office of President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we
can conclude that protestants widow is not a real party in interest to this election
protest.

RONALD ALLAN POE a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., protestant, vs. GLORIA
MACAPAGALARROYO, protestee. P.E.T. CASE No. 002. March 29, 2005

FACTS:

On June 24, 2004, Mrs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) was proclaimed as the
duly elected President of the Philippines and movie-actor Fernando Poe, Jr was
the second-placer.

Mr. FPJ filed an election protest before this Electoral Tribunal and Mrs. GMA
filed her Answer with Counter Protest. Mr. FPJ died on December 14, 2004. Mr.
FPJs counsel submitted to the Tribunal a Manifestation with Urgent
Petition/Motion to Intervene as a Substitute for Deceased Protestant FPJ BY
THE WIDOW, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe a.k.a. Susan Roces.

As movant/intervenor, Mrs. Poe claims that there is an urgent need for her to
continue and substitute for her late husband to ascertain the true and genuine
will of the electorate in the interest of the Filipino people.
Mrs. GMA contends that under the Rule 14 of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, only the registered candidates who obtained the 2nd and 3rd highest
votes for the presidency may contest the election of the president.

Mrs. GMA also stresses that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction over actions of
surviving spouses to ascertain the vote of the electorate as the Tribunal has
jurisdiction only over election protests and quo warranto cases. Mrs. GMA,
further asserts that the widow of a deceased candidate is not the proper party
to replace the deceased protestant since a public office is personal and not a
property that passes on to the heirs. She points out that the widow has no
legal right to substitute for her husband in an election protest. Since no such
right survives the husband, considering that the right to file an election protest
is personal and non-transmissible.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a widow is allowed to substitute/intervene during the pending

protest case.

RULING:

The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is guided by its Rules, as well as the Rules
of Court in a suppletory manner. Considering the transcendental importance of
the electoral contest involving the Presidency, a rush to judgment is simply out
of the question. Yet decide the matter we must, without further delay, to
prevent popular unrest and avoid further destabilization of government at the
highest level.

Rule 14 of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal Rules provides:

Rule 14. Election Protest.Only the registered candidate for President or for
Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest
number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President,
as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of
the winner.

Stated above, the Rule effectively excludes the widow of a losing candidate.
PET Rules, however, does not have any rule on substitution nor intervention
but it does allow for the analogous and suppletory application of the Rules of
Court, decisions of the Supreme Court, and the decisions of the electoral
tribunals. Hence Rule 19, section 1 of Rules of Court A person who has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the parties
or an interest against both

Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court allows substitution by a legal

representative. This rule to an election contest, the Court ruled that a public
office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the
heirs upon death. Thus, the Court consistently rejected substitution by the
widow or the heirs in election contests where the protestant dies during the
pending protest case.

However, this rule is not purely personal and exclusive. Hence, we have allowed
substitution and intervention but only by a real party in interest. A real party
in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment and
the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit. In the case, Mrs. Poe herself
denies any claim to the office of the President and will not directly benefit from
the outcome. Thus, given the circumstances of the case, the protestants widow
is not a real party in interest to this election protest. Mrs. Poe a.k.a. Susan
Roces to intervene and substitute for the deceased protestant is DENIED for
lack of merit.
SAQUILAYAN V. COMELEC 416 SCRA 658 (DINO)

FACTS:

1. SAQUILAYAN and JARO were candidates for the Office of Municipal Mayor of
Imus, Cavite.

2. SAQUILAYAN was proclaimed winner.

3. JARO instituted an Election Protest Case before the RTC, contesting the
results of all 453 election precincts. He alleges the ff:

a. Votes in favor of JARO were considered stray

b. Ballots and votes were misappreciated (considered null and void,

or counted in favor of SAQUILAYAN)

c. Votes that were void (containing stickers or markings) were

counted in favor of SAQUILAYAN, etc..

4. SAQUILAYAN filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was denied by the RTC.

5. Questioning the denial of his Motion to Dismiss, the COMELEC (Division)

ruled in favor of SAQUILAYAN and ordered the dismissal of the election protest.
It ruled that JAROs allegations failed to state a cause of action, on the basis of
Pena v. HRET.

* Pena v. HRET held that the bare allegations of massive fraud, widespread
intimidation and terrorism, without specification and substantiation of where
and how these occurrences took place, render the protest fatally defective.

6. Upon reconsideration sought by JARO, the COMELEC En Banc,

SAQUILAYANs Motion to Dismiss was again dismissed, and the Election
Protest Case was ordered to proceed.

HELD:

1. The present case is similar to Miguel v. COMELEC, which the COMELEC En

Banc used as basis in ordering the Election Protest Case to proceed.
2. IN both cases, the protestants questioned all the precincts in their respective
municipalities.

3. As Miguel v. COMELEC is more recent than Pena v. HRET (as used by the
COMELEC Division), then the former should prevail in case of a conflict.

4. Furthermore, election contests involve public interest. Technicalities and

procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constituted an
obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate.

5. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by
mere technical objections.

6. Allowing the election protest to proceed would be the best way of removing
any doubt as to who was the real candidate chosen by the electorate.

7. Decision of COMELEC En Banc affirmed.

Penera vs. Commission on Elections, et al.

G.R. No. 181613
25 November 2009
(motion for reconsideration)

Facts:

On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court affirmed the COMELECs decision

to disqualify petitioner Rosalinda Penera (Penera) as mayoralty candidate in
Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for engaging in election campaign outside the
campaign period, in violation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the
Omnibus Election Code).

Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing that she was not yet a candidate at
the time of the supposed premature campaigning, since under Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated
election system for the process of voting, counting of votes, and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections), as
amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one is not officially a candidate until the
start of the campaign period.

Issue:

Whether or not Peneras disqualification for engaging in premature

campaigning should be reconsidered.

Holding:

Granting Peneras motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court En Banc held
that Penera did not engage in premature campaigning and should, thus, not be
disqualified as a mayoralty candidate. The Court said

(A) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision (or the assailed Decision)
considered a person who files a certificate of candidacy already a candidate
even before the start of the campaign period. This is contrary to the clear intent
and letter of Section 15 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, which states that a
person who files his certificate of candidacy will only be considered a candidate
at the start of the campaign period, and unlawful acts or omissions applicable
to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of such campaign period.

Thus, applying said law:

(1) The effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a
candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign
period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.

(2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only for

acts done during the campaign period, not before. In other words, election
offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon the start of the campaign
period. Before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot
be so committed. Since the law is clear, the Court has no recourse but to apply
it. The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial
measures, is not the Court but the Legislature.
(B) Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15 of R.A. 8436, as amended,
does not provide that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the
campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of
the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts
done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but
becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. Besides, such a law
as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails
freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.

(C) That Section 15 of R.A. 8436 does not expressly state that campaigning
before the start of the campaign period is lawful, as the assailed Decision
asserted, is of no moment. It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful
unless expressly declared unlawful by law. The mere fact that the law does not
declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is
no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that partisan
political activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is
sufficient for Congress to state that any unlawful act or omission applicable to
a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period. The
only inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the
start of the campaign period, are lawful.

(D) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision also reversed Lanot vs. COMELEC
(G.R.No. 164858; 16 November 2006). Lanot was decided on the ground that
one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the
campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators
who explained that the early deadline for filing certificates of candidacy under
R.A. 8436 was set only to afford time to prepare the machine-readable ballots,
and they intended to preserve the existing election periods, such that one who
files his certificate of candidacy to meet the early deadline will still not be
considered as a candidate. When Congress amended R.A. 8436, Congress
decided to expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the
provision in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that a person who files his certificate of
candidacy shall be considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign
period. Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of
candidacy under the early deadline required by the automated election system
would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan political act done before the
start of the campaign period. This provision cannot be annulled by the Court
except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The assailed Decision,
however, did not claim that this provision is unconstitutional. In fact, the
assailed Decision considered the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision
was self-contradictory reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality
of the said provision.

Chavez vs Comelec Case Digest

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

211 SCRA 315

Facts: On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a Resolution in GR No. 104704, disqualifying Melchor
Chavez, private respondent therein, from running for the Office of Senator in the May 11, 1992
elections. Petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate through
the fastest available means this Courts Resolution dated May 5, 1992 to all regional election
directors, provincial election supervisors, city and municipal election registrars, boards of election
inspectors, the six (6) accredited political parties and the general public; and (2) order said election
officials to delete the name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates tally
sheets, election returns and to count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor, Chavez in favor of
Francisco I. Chavez. On May 8, 1992, the Comelec issued Res. No. 92-1322 which resolved to
delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order
the crediting of all Chavez votes in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation of Melchor
Chavez name in the list of qualified candidates.

Issue: Whether or not the law allows pre-proclamation controversy involving the election of the
members of the Senate.

Held: A simple reading of the petition would readily show that petitioner has no cause of action, the
controversy presented being one in the nature of a pre-proclamation.

While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local
elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not
allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives. Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides: For purposes of the elections for
President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-
proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be.
However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or
upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass
or election returns before it.

Quinto V. COMELEC

COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their

certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions.

FACTS:

Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution
declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso
facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it
only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.

HELD:

NO.

In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing
Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective
officials in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld
the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no
violation of the equal protection clause.

However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal
protection clause was an obiter dictum since the issue raised therein was
against the repealing clause. It didnt squarely challenge Sec. 66.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials.

Applying the 4 requisites of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply
with the second requirement that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a
governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous
or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at
promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by
eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by
political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is
also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate
arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the
performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather
than to their office work.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts
without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or
not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso
facto resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election. This
scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position
in the government to wield influence in the political world.

The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they
be partisan or non partisan in character, whether they be in the national,
municipal or brgy. level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to
restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.
 Torayno v. COMELEC

Facts:

Vicente Emano was provincial governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms until 1995
election and his certificate of candidacy showed that his residence was in Tagoloan, Misamis
Oriental. On 14 June 1997, while still governor he executed a voter registration record in
Cagayan de Oro City which is geographically located in Misamis Oriental, claiming 20 years
of residence. He filed candidacy for mayor in the said city and stated that his residence for
the preceding two years and five months was in the same city. Rogelio Torayno Sr filed
petition for disqualification of Emano fo failing to meet the residency requirement. Emano
won the mayoral post and proclaimed winner. Torayno filed for annulment of election of
Emano. COMELEC upheld its decision.

Issue:

Whether or not Emano failed the constitutional residency requirement?

Decision:

Petition dismissed, COMELEC resolution affirmed. Emano was the overwhelming choice of
the people of Cagayan de Oro. The court find it apt to reiterate the principle that the
manifest will of the people as expressed through the ballot be given the fullest effect.
Emano was actually and physically residing in CDO while discharging his duties as governor
and even paid his community tax certificate in the same. The residency requirement intends
to prevent the possibility of a stranger unacquainted with the conditions and needs of the
community from seeing an elective office to serve that community.
 FRIVALDO VS COMELEC

FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and
assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the
COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was
not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative
defenses that he was naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself
against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter
must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an
indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid

repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he
automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United
States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between
him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could
do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725.
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation.

FACTS:

Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won. Raul R. Lee
questioned his citizenship. He then petitioned for repatriation under
Presidential Decree No. 725 and was able to take his oath of allegiance as a
Philippine citizen.

However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had already ruled
based on his previous attempts to run as governor and acquire citizenship, and
had proclaimed Lee, who got the second highest number of votes, as the
newly elect Governor of Sorsogon.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Frivaldos repatriation was valid.

HELD:

The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal and because of the
curative nature of Presidential Decree No. 725, his repatriation retroacted to
the date of the filing of his application to run for governor. The steps to
reacquire Philippine Citizenship by repatriation under Presidential Decree No.
725 are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of
the oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is only upon taking
the oath of allegiance that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to
the date of the filing of the application, then it should not have explicitly
provided otherwise. He is therefore qualified to be proclaimed governor of
Sorsogon.
 Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC

FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her

domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the
Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree,
education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban.
Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went
to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel
Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married
late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos
Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as
Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as
a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang
Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member
of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative

of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the
incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for
the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with
the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest
misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to
rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the
seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible

in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The

court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence
or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7
months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile

of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and
establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term
residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When
Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin
and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and
acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her
actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose
Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner
even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living
in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary

residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the
First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24,
May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent
COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to
proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.

PEREZ vs COMELEC and AGUINALDO G.R. No. 133944. October 28,

1999

FACTS:
 On March 26, 1998, private respondent filed his certificate of
candidacy for Representative of the Third District of Cagayan in the May 11,
1998 elections. Four days later, on March 30, 1998, petitioner, as a voter and
citizen, filed in the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private
respondent as a candidate on the ground that he had not been a resident of the
district for at least one (1) year immediately before the day of the elections as
required by Art. VI, 6 of the Constitution.
On May 10, 1998, the First Division of the COMELEC, in a unanimous
resolution,[11] dismissed the petition for disqualification, finding private
respondent Aguinaldo qualified to run as representative for the Third District of
Cagayan.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition
for certiorari and eventually pass upon private respondents eligibility for the
office of Representative of the Third District of Cagayan?

RULING:
the following provision of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6 Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
(COMELEC) shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
As already stated, the petition for disqualification against private
respondent was decided by the First Division of the COMELEC on May 10,
1998. The following day, May 11, 1998, the elections were
held. Notwithstanding the fact that private respondent had already been
proclaimed on May 16, 1998 and had taken his oath of office on May 17, 1998,
petitioner still filed a motion for reconsideration on May 22, 1998, which the
COMELEC en banc denied on June 11, 1998. Clearly, this could not be
done. Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the continuation of proceedings for
disqualification even after the elections if the respondent has not been
proclaimed. The COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to entertain the
motion because the proclamation of private respondent barred further
 consideration of petitioners action. In the same vein, considering that at the
time of the filing of this petition on June 16, 1998, private respondent was
already a member of the House of Representatives, this Court has no
jurisdiction over the same. Pursuant to Art. VI, 17 of the Constitution, the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive original
jurisdiction over the petition for the declaration of private respondents
ineligibility. As this Court held in Lazatin v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal:[14]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

When does section 6 of R.A. 6646 apply to petitions for disqualifying a
candidate and when does it not apply?

In the case supra, R.A 6646, section 6 cannot be applied since there was
already a decision made by COMELEC based on substantial
evidence, dismissing the petition for disqualification, finding private respondent
Aguinaldo qualified to run as representative for the Third District of
Cagayan.Accordingly he was proclaimed elected and, on May 17, 1998, he was
sworn in office. It thereforebarred further consideration of petitioners action.
Petitioners remedies should have been:
1) to reiterate her prayer in the petition for disqualification, and move for the
issuance of an order by the COMELEC suspending the proclamation of private
respondent pending the hearing of the said petition and, in the event the
motion was denied before the proclamation of private respondent, file a petition
for certiorari in this Court with a prayer for a restraining order to enjoin the
proclamation of private respondent;

2) to file a petition for quo warranto in the House of Representatives Electoral

Tribunal within ten (10) days after the proclamation of private respondent as
Representative-elect on May 16, 1998.

In the case of Lonzanida where this court held that the clear legislative
intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the
disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered. The
outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the election
but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought
to be disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and may encourage
him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until
after he has been proclaimed.
In Aguam v. COMELEC this Court held- Time and again this Court has given
its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with authority to annul any
canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that a candidate
proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the exercise of such
power. It of course may not be availed of where there has been a valid
proclamation. Since private respondents petition before the COMELEC is
precisely directed at the annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we
perceive that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by the
Constitution and law to COMELEC xxx Really, were a victim of a proclamation
to be precluded from challenging the validity thereof after that proclamation
and the assumption of office thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene.
It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding
is to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected. From serving, or to
prosecute him for violation of the election laws. Obviously, the fact that a
candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification
is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate
investigation.