EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Makalintal v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 15013, 10 July 2003

Facts:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal,
a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from
constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the
subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully
used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a
lawyer.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law violates the constitutional mandate under
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and
the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress.

Ruling:
Yes. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the
winning candidates for President and Vice President for the entire nation must remain
in the hands of Congress as its duty and power under Section 4 of Article VII of the
Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the winning candidates only for
Senators and Party-list Reps.
FPJ vs. Arroyo, P.E.T. Case No. 002, March 29, 2005

Facts:
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) was proclaimed President of the Philippines in the
2004 Elections. Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, FPJ,
filed seasonably an election protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) in
July 2004. However, on December 14, 2004, FPJ died. In January 2015, the widow of
FPJ, Jesusa Sonora Poe (Susan Roces) filed a Manifestation with Urgent
Petition/Motion to Intervene as a Substitute for Deceased Protestant FPJ. She claimed
that because of the untimely demise of her husband and in representation not only of
her deceased husband but more so because of the paramount interest of the Filipino
people, there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late husband
in the election protest initiated by him to ascertain the true and genuine will of the
electorate in the 2004 elections.

Issue:
Whether or not the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the
pendency of the latter's protest case?

Ruling:
The PET does not have any rule on substitution nor intervention but it does allow for
the analogous and suppletory application of the Rules of Court, decisions of the
Supreme Court, and the decisions of the electoral tribunals. Rule 3, Section 16 of the
Rules of Court allows substitution by a legal representative. However, in applying this
rule to an election contest, it has been ruled that a public office is personal to the public
officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, the substitution
by the widow or the heirs in election contests are denied since they are not the real
parties in interest. This is not to say that death of the protestant necessarily abates the
pending action. While the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public
officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to
the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to
continue the protest proceedings. Hence, we have allowed substitution and
intervention but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who
would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the
avails of the suit. In Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias and Lomugdang v. Javier, we
permitted substitution by the vice-mayor since the vice-mayor is a real party in interest
considering that if the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the vice-mayor
succeeds to the office of the mayor that becomes vacant if the one duly elected cannot
assume office. In contrast, herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any
claim to the august office of President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we
can conclude that protestants widow is not a real party in interest to this election
protest.

Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on intervention in the
absence of such a rule in the PET Rules. In such intervention, the interest which allows
a person to intervene in a suit must be in the matter of litigation and of such direct and
immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the effect of the
judgment.
Legarda vs. De Castro, P.E.T. Case No. 003, March 31, 2005

Facts:
Loren B. Legarda filed an election protest against Noli L. de Castro before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). De Castro filed a motion for its outright dismissal
but the PET confirmed its jurisdiction over the protest. De Castro filed a motion for
reconsideration assailing the PET resolution. He argues that where the correctness of
the number of votes is the issue, the best evidence are the ballots; that the process of
correcting the manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or election returns is a
function of the canvassing bodies; that once the canvassing bodies had done their
functions, no alteration or correction of manifest errors can be made; that since the
authority of the Tribunal involves an exercise of judicial power to determine the facts
based on the evidence presented and to apply the law based on the established facts,
it cannot perform the ministerial function of canvassing election returns; that the
averments contained in the protest are mere conclusions of law which are inadequate
to form a valid cause of action; and that the allegations are not supported by facts. He
also contends that the Tribunal cannot correct the manifest errors on the statements
of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC).

Issue:
Whether or not the election protest sufficient in form and substance?

Ruling:
In the instant protest, protestant enumerated all the provinces, municipalities and cities
where she questions all the results in all the precincts therein. The protest here is
sufficient in form and substantively, serious enough on its face to pose a challenge to
protestee's title to his office. The instant protest consists of alleged ultimate facts, not
mere conclusions of law, that need to be proven in due time.
Considering that we find the protest sufficient in form and substance, we must again
stress that nothing as yet has been proved as to the veracity of the allegations. The
protest is only sufficient for the Tribunal to proceed and give the protestant the
opportunity to prove her case pursuant to Rule 61 of the PET Rules. Although said
rule only pertains to revision of ballots, nothing herein prevents the Tribunal from
allowing or including the correction of manifest errors, pursuant to the Tribunals rule-
making power under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
National Amnesty Commission v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 156982, 8
September 2004.

Facts:
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created in
1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is
tasked to receive, process and review amnesty applications. However, in 1997, NAC
resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these
representatives pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038. Meanwhile, in 1999, the
NAC passed Administrative Order No. 2 (the new Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Proclamation No. 347), which was approved by then President Joseph
Estrada. Section 1, Rule II thereof provides that ex officio members may designate
their representatives to the Commission. Said Representatives shall be entitled to per
diems, allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be authorized by law.
Petitioner invoked Administrative Order No. 2 in assailing before the COA the rulings
of the resident auditor and the NGAO disallowing payment of honoraria to the ex officio
members' representatives, to no avail.

Issue:
Whether or not the COA erred in disallowing payment of honoraria pursuant to Section
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling:
We hold that the position of petitioner NAC is against the law and jurisprudence. The
COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria or any
allowance whatsoever to the NAC ex officio members' official representatives.
Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government
offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation
therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides as follows:
"Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold
any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure,
directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They
shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office."
Bitonio v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 147392, 12 March 2004

Facts:
In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of the
Bureau of Labor Relations in the Department of Labor and Employment. In a Letter
dated May 11, 1995 Acting Secretary Jose S. Brilliantes of the Department of Labor
and Employment designated the petitioner to be the DOLE representative to the Board
of Directors of PEZA. As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA, the
petitioner was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the
years 1995 to 1997. After a post audit of the PEZA’s disbursement transactions, the
COA disallowed the payment of per diems to the petitioner. Disallowance is in
pursuance to COA Memorandum No. 97-038.

Issue:
Whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner
for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors’ meetings as representative of the
Secretary of Labor.

Ruling:
Yes. The COA anchors the disallowance of per diems in the case of Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary7 where the Court declared Executive Order No.
284 allowing government officials to hold multiple positions in government,
unconstitutional. Thus, Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries, and their Assistant
Secretaries, are prohibited to hold other government offices or positions in addition to
their primary positions and to receive compensation therefor, except in cases where
the Constitution expressly provides. The Court’s ruling was in conformity with Section
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during
their tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in
any business or be financially interested in any other contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil
degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as members
of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as
Secretaries, Undersecretaries, Chairmen, or heads of bureaus or offices,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and subsidiaries.
Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No 231658, 5 December 2017

Facts:
On July 4, 2017, the Court rendered its Decision finding sufficient factual bases for the
issuance of Proclamation No. 216 and declaring it as constitutional. Petitioners timely
filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. After a careful review of the arguments
raised by the parties, we find no reason to reverse our July 4, 2017 Decision.
All three Motions for Reconsideration question two aspects of the July 4, 2017
Decision, i.e., the sufficiency of the factual bases of Proclamation No. 216 and the
parameters used in determining the sufficiency of the factual bases. Petitioners,
however, failed to present any substantial argument to convince us to reconsider our
July 4, 2017 Decision.

Issue:
Whether the President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus had sufficient factual basis.

Ruling:
Yes. This is consistent with our ruling that "the President only needs to convince
himself that there is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a
rebellion was committed or is being committed." 7 The standard of proof of probable
cause does not require absolute truth. Since "martial law is a matter of urgency, the
President is not expected to completely validate all the information he received before
declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus."
Notably, out of the several facts advanced by the President as basis for Proclamation
No. 216, only five of them were being questioned by the petitioners. However, they
were not even successful in their refutation since their "counter-evidence were derived
solely from unverified news articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the
sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof. It was not even shown that
efforts were made to secure such affirmation albeit the circumstances proved futile."
Even granting that the petitioners were successful in their attempt to refute the
aforesaid five incidents, there are other facts sufficient to serve as factual basis for the
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading,
G.R No. L-14279, October 32, 1961

Facts:
Eastern Sea Trading is a consignee of several shipments of onion and garlic, some of
it coming from Hong Kong and Japan. None of the shipments has the certificate
required by the Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 for the release. The goods were
seized and subjected to forfeiture for the violation of Section 1363 (f) of the Revised
Administrative Code, in relation to the aforementioned circular of the Central Bank.
The respondents claims that the Central Bank has no authority to regulate transactions
not involving foreign exchange, the shipments are in the nature of “no-dollar” imports,
the shipments does not involve foreign exchange, and the seizure and the forfeiture
of goods from Japan cannot be justified under Executive Order 328, which is an
executive agreement extending the effectivity of trade and financial agreements with
Japan. The executive order has questionable validity, because it was not concurred
by the Senate.

Issue:
Whether or not the Executive Order is subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the
senate

Ruling:
Yes. Executive agreements and treaties are not like treaties which requires the
concurrence of the 2/3 of the Senate. Agreements can be validly entered into without
such concurrence. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties
are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our
scheme of government than are the more formal instruments — treaties and
conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times
that of more formal documents denominated 'agreements' or 'protocols'. The point
where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and
agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or
otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertain. It would seem to be
sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not
anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant
precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered
into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as
the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the
admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally,
international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc.
Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in
conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general
subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to
the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently
of any legislation.
BAYAN vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000

Facts:
On March 14, 1947 The Philippines and the US has forged a Military Base Agreement
in order to strengthen the defense and security relationship between the Philippines
and the USA. Three years later the Philippines and the US entered in to a Mutual
Defense Treaty.
The impending expiration of the Philippine-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, The
Philippines and the US sought to negotiation for the possible extension of the
agreement. However the Philippine Senate has rejected the extension of the
agreement.

In a panel between the Philippine and The US, both sides has discussed the possibility
of Visiting Force Agreement. Negotiation of both panels has led to a consolidated draft,
which resulted to a final series of conferences and negotiations. The agreement was
approved by President Fidel Ramos.
President Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA with the concurrence of the Senate have
been officially entered into force.

Issue:
Whether or not the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution.

Ruling:
Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution deals with the treatise or international
agreements in general, in which case, the concurrence of at least 2/3 of all members
of the Senate is required to make the subject treaty or international agreement, valid
and binding on the part of the Philippines.
In the case at bar, the President referred the VFA to the Senate and has extended its
concurrence is immaterial. The fundamental law is clear that the concurrence of the
Senate is mandatory to comply with strict constitutional requirements.
With regards to the 2/3 votes, 16 members of the Senate favorably acting on the
proposal is an unquestionable compliance with the requisite number of votes
mentioned on Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
Therefore, the VFA is governed by the provision of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005

Facts:
The Rome Statute established the international Criminal Court which “shall have the
power to exercise its jurisdiction over the person for the most serious crimes of
international concern and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdiction”.
Its jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide, crime against humanity, war crimes and
the crime of aggression defined in the statute. The Philippines has signed the Statute.
However, the provision require to be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of
the signatory states.

Petitioners filed instant petition to compel respondents to transmit the signed text of
the treaty to the Senate of the Philippines for ratification in accordance to the Section
21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioner theorized that it is the function of the Senate to ratify both international
law and domestic law. It is the duty of the executive to transmit the signed copy of the
Rome Statute to allow the Senate to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification
of treaties. Petitioner submit that the Philippines has ministerial duty to ratify Rome
Statute under treaty law and customary international law.

Issue:
Whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a
ministerial duty transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute.

Ruling:
No. The President, being the head of the state, is re regarded as the sole organ and
authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with the foreign
nations. In realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate
with other states.

It should be emphasize that under our constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the
President, subject to concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however is
limited to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence to the ratification. It is within
the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate, or having
secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, 15 July 2003

Facts:
The PCGG represented by Office of the Solicitor General filed petition for forfeiture
before the Sandiganbayan the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos with an aggregate amount
of US$658 million. Before pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental
Agreements were executed by Marcos’ children and PCGG Chairman for a global
settlement of assets of the Marcos. The Sandiganbayan granted petitioner's motion
for summary judgment, ruling the amount said amount held in escrow in the PNB as
ill-gotten wealth of the late President Ferdinand Marcos and thus forfeited the same in
favor of the Republic of the Philippines. Later, however, the Sandiganbayan reversed
the said decision, and, hence, this petition.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the respondents raised any genuine issue of fact which would either
justify or negate summary judgment.

(2) Whether petitioner was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with
Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379.

Ruling:
The Court held that the respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact
in their pleadings. Thus, on motion of petitioner Republic, summary judgement should
take place as a matter of right. This is after the court summarily hears both parties with
their respective proofs and finds that there is no genuine issue between them.
Summary judgment is sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure: SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant. — A party
seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory
relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move
with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his
favor upon all or any part thereof. The defenses of "lack of knowledge for lack of
privity," or "(inability to) recall because it happened a long time ago," or that "the funds
were lawfully acquired" were insufficient to tender genuine issues.

The Court ruled that the prima facie presumption is that a property was unlawfully
acquired, hence, subject to forfeiture, if its amount was manifestly disproportionate to
the lawful income of the public officer who owns it. Here, all the elements therein were
sufficiently established.
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary Alberto Agra,
G.R. No 191644, 19 February 2013

Facts:
The petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent positions as Acting
Secretary of Justice and Acting Solicitor General, claiming it to be prohibited under
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Agra renders a different version of
antecedents but admitted to hold two offices concurrently. The appointments in
challenge were in acting or temporary capacity and respondent argued that an
appointment, to be covered by the constitutional prohibition, must be regular and
permanent, instead of mere designation. Petitioner counters that there was no
prevailing special circumstance that justified the non-application to Agra that the
temporariness of the appointment is not an excuse to disregard the constitutional ban
against holding multiple offices by the Members of the Cabinet.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not Agra’s concurrent positions violate the constitutional prohibition
against dual or multiple offices for the members of the Cabinet and their deputies and
assistants.

(2) Whether petitioner was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with
Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379.

Ruling:
Yes. The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his
position of Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutional and void for being a violation
of the constitutional prohibition under Sec. 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Clearly, the primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor General are not related or
necessary to the primary functions of the Department of Justice. Considering that the
nature and duties of the two offices are such as to render it improper, from
considerations of public policy, for one person to retain both, an incompatibility
between the offices exists, further warranting the declaration of Agra's designation as
the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his designation as the Acting Solicitor
General, to be void for being in violation of the express provisions of the Constitution

The Court holds that all official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting Secretary of
Justice, assuming that was his later designation, were presumed valid, binding and
effective as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office. 54 This
clarification is necessary in order to protect the sanctity of the dealings by the public
with persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State. 55 Agra's official
actions covered by this clarification extend to but are not limited to the promulgation
of resolutions on petitions for review filed in the Department of Justice, and the
issuance of department orders, memoranda and circulars relative to the prosecution
of criminal cases.
Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618,
23 November 2010; GR No. 191618, 7 June 2011 (En Bane)

Facts:
Atty. Macalintal filed an undesignated petition questions challenging the constitution
of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of
Section 4,2 Article VII of the Constitution. Arguments of Macalintal: The constitution of
the PET, with the designation of the Members of the Court as Chairman and Members
thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which prohibits the
designation of Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law
to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

Issue:
Whether or not the PET performs judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

Ruling:
Yes. The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution
of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. x x x x With the explicit
provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction
with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise
thereof.

The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to
courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution
draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court.

The Constitution which, in Section 17, Article VI, explicitly provides that three Supreme
Court Justices shall sit in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals, respectively,
effectively exempts the Justices-Members thereof from the prohibition in Section 12,
Article VIII. In the same vein, it is the Constitution itself, in Section 4, Article VII, which
exempts the Members of the Court, constituting the PET, from the same prohibition.
Atty. Evillo C. Pormento v. Joseph Ejercito "Erap" Estrada and Comelec, G.R.
No. 191988, August 31, 2010

Facts:
Private respondent Joseph “Erap” Ejercito Estrada was elected President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He was
however ousted [“resigned” according to the decision of the Supreme Court in Estrada
vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001] from office and was not able to finish his
term. He sought the presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010.
Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed Erap’s candidacy and filed a petition for
the latter’s disqualification, which was however denied by the COMELEC 2nd Division.
His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc.

Issue:
Whether or not Joseph Estrada is disqualified to run for presidency in the May 2010
elections according to the phrase in the Constitution which states: "the President
shall not be eligible for any reelection"?

Ruling:
There is no actual controversy in the case at bar. The respondent did not win the
second time he ran. The issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any
reelection" will be premised on a person second election as President. Assuming an
actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has
been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today.
Following the results of that elections, private respondent was not elected President
for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his "reelection" will simply be hypothetical
and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. Nos 82585, et. al., 14 November 1988

Facts:
On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining
the City Fiscal’s finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on
April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration
was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments,
petitioners’ contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies
available under the law has lost factual support.

Issue:
Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate
criminal proceedings against the petitioners through filing of a complaint-affidavit.

Ruling:
Petitioner Beltran contends argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if
criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit,
she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under
the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her
privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be
exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that,
aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office
and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
President's behalf.

Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise
the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against
such accused. Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President
from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection
afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether
to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a
decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 14710-15, 2 March 2001

Facts:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking,
illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by
the House of representatives and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were
begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption
against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11
senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence
against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the
entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after
casting his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined
the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that
he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency
was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo
took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President.
Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition
for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman
from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term
as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful
and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office.

Issues:
Whether or not Estrada officially resigned as a president.

Ruling:
Yes. The resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his
leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement: (1) he
acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit
with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the
seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process
of our nation.
He also called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release
was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell.
Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. NO 152259, 29 July 2004

Facts:
People of the Philippines, through PCGG, filed a petition charging the accused with
violation of Section 5, RA. 3019 as amended. Said petitioner, brother-in-law of former
President Marcos and therefore, related by affinity within the third civil degree, did then
and there willfully and unlawfully, and with evident bad faith, for the purpose of
promoting his self-interested sic and/or that of others, intervene directly or indirectly,
in a contract between the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a
government-owned and controlled corporation and the Bataan Shipyard and
Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation, the majority stocks of which
is owned by former President Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and
conveyed to the BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests over all
equipment and facilities including structures, buildings, shops, quarters, houses,
plants and expendable and semi-expendable assets, located at the Engineer Island
known as the Engineer Island Shops including some of its equipment and machineries
from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed by BASECO in its shipbuilding and
ship repair program for the amount of P5,000,000.00.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner enjoys derivative immunity from suit.

Ruling:
In Estrada vs. Desierto, the SC exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in
order to determine the extent of its applicability. Executive immunity applied only
during the incumbency of a President. It could not be used to shield a non-sitting
President from prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in office. The
reasoning of petitioner must therefore fail, since he derives his immunity from one who
is no longer sitting as President. Verily, the felonious acts of public officials and their
close relatives are not acts of the State, and the officer who acts illegally is not acting
as such but stands on the same footing as any other trespasser.
Neri v. Senate Committees, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008

Facts:
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to
conduct an investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was
then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC
Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project,
that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him not to accept the
bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
he refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer
the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN
Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she
directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for contempt.

Issue:
Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive
privilege.

Ruling:
The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications
privilege. It pertains to “communications, documents or other materials that reflect
presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes should
remain confidential.” Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-
making of the President. It is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of
power and the President’s unique constitutional role.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President,
such as the area of military and foreign relations. The information relating to these
powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-
delegable presidential power.” - i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement
with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close
advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor
must be in “operational proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that
may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought
“likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. - there is no adequate showing of
a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
 JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Fabian v. Desierto ,G.R. No. 129742, 16 September 1998

Facts:
Petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation which was engaged in the construction
business. Private respondents Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District
Engineering District when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was
administratively charged in the Office in the office of the Ombudsman.

Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26, 1996, found private
respondent guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of suspension without pay
for one year. Subsequently, the case was transferred to respondent Deputy
Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who, in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18,
1997, set aside the February 26, 1997 Order of respondent Ombudsman and
exonerated private respondents from the administrative charges.

In her appeal, petitioner argued that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) provides that in all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the
written notice of the order. Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined
that the Office of the Ombudsman is empowered by the Constitution and the law to
promulgate its own rules of procedure under Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987
Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not SC has jurisdiction in the case at bar in an appeal from the Office of
the Ombudsman
Ruling:
The court ruled in the negative. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an
appeal to the Supreme Court from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription of Section 30 Article 6 of
the 1987 Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify
such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which was intended to give the
Supreme Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction,
otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Supreme Court.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative
Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other
provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they
provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the
Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further
force and effect. The instant petition is hereby REFERRED and TRANSFERRED to
the Court of Appeals for final disposition.
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila
Bay, G.R. No. 171947, 15 February 2011

Facts:
The Supreme Court rendered a Decision in G.R. Nos. 171947-48 ordering petitioners
to clean up, rehabilitate and preserve Manila Bay in their different capacities. The
Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive and evaluate the quarterly
progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the agencies in accordance with
said decision and to monitor the execution phase. In the absence of specific
completion periods, the Committee recommended that time frames be set for the
agencies to perform their assigned tasks.

Issue:
Whether or not the recommendation by the Committee is an encroachment over the
powers and functions of the Executive Branch headed by the President of the
Philippines.

Ruling:
The petition lacks merit.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Adjudicative function

The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial

power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but
an integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court.

While additional activities are required of the agencies like submission of plans of
action, data or status reports, these directives are but part and parcel of the execution
stage of a final decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Petition is DENIED.
Limketkai Sons Milling v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118509, 5 September 1996

FACTS:
Following the unanimous ruling in favor of the petitioner, the Court's Divisions were
reorganized in the aftermath of one of the Associate Justices' retirement. The private
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which the newly constituted Third
Division, chaired by C.J. Narvasa, considered. A majority vote overturned the prior
ruling. The petitioner now claims that the matter should be submitted to the Court en
banc, claiming that important principles have been amended or overturned, as well as
contesting the Third Division's current makeup. The First Division, it is said, should
have been led by C.J. Narvasa, and the Second by the next senior Justice.

ISSUE:
May the petitioner validly challenge the reorganization of the SC?

RULING:
No. Reorganizations in the Supreme Court’s Divisions are purely an internal matter to
which parties have no business at all. It was also held that no doctrines have been
reversed or modified as alleged by petitioner.
Estrada v. Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, 2 March 2001

Facts:
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in
clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman
were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, for bribery and graft and
corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption,
bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for Government
Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and
corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 for
malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder, etc.; (5)
OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602,
PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 for plunder, graft
and corruption.

On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings of the above-
mentioned cases or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until
after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted." Thru
another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He
prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of
the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office,
and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution."
Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the
respondents to comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12
February 2001.

Issue:
Whether or not the case at bar is a political or justiciable issue

Ruling:

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The Court defines a political
issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure.”

The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo
presidency. The Court said that while the Aquino government was a government
spawned by the direct demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution,
overthrowing the old government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand
was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of
the president was affected. In the former, the question of whether the previous
president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court
held that the issue is legal and not political.
Villavert v. Desierto, G.R. No. 133715, 13 February 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Douglas R. Villavert is a Sales & Promotion Supervisor of PCSO Cebu
Branch responsible for the sale and disposal of PCSO sweepstakes tickets
withdrawn by him, which are already considered sold. As Villavert is not expected to
sell all withdrawn tickets on his own, he is allowed by the PCSO to consign tickets to
ticket outlets and/or to engage the help of sales agents, usually sidewalk peddlers
and hawkers. For two (2) months of weekly draws, petitioner Villavert incurred a total
of P997,373.60 worth of unpaid PCSO tickets. Despite his proposals for settlement,
his past due tickets were noted as exemption by the Commission on Audit which
later recommended filing of an administrative case against the petitioner.

Graft Investigation Officer II Edgemelo C. Rosales, after due consideration of the

evidence submitted by petitioner, rendered a resolution recommending the dismissal
of the Administrative Case. Despite the recommendation, however, the Deputy
Ombudsman issued a Memorandum dated 17 July 1997 finding petitioner "liable for
administrative sanction for Grave Misconduct and/or Dishonesty." On 7 November
1997 respondent Ombudsman approved the Memorandum. On 4 December 1997
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Deputy
Ombudsman-Visayas in an Order dated 30 January 1998 and approved by the
Ombudsman on 3 April 1998.

Issue:
Whether or not decisions by the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court

Ruling:
No. Sec.27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to this Court from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared violative
of the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI, of the Constitution against a law which increases
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent. In addition, the
Court noted that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure precludes appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court.
Consequently, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.

The case was REFERRED to the Court of Appeals as a petition for review under Rule
43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to be disposed of in accordance with law.
De Rama v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131136, 28 February 2001

Facts:
Mayor Conrado L. De Rama of Pagbilao, Quezon passed a letter to request the Civil
Service Commission on July 13, 1995, on seeking for the appointment of the fourteen
employees that has been listed on Civil Service Commission. The Petitioner allegedly
said that the fourteen employees was being appointed during midnight by former
mayor Maria Evelyn S. Abeja and according to the petitioner it was a violation under
Article VII Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. But the Civil Service Commission
denied the request of the petitioner because of the lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the letter that passed by the petitioner requesting the Civil Service
Commission to recall the appointment of the fourteen employees valid.
Ruling:
No, it is the Civil Service Commission that is authorized to recall an appointment
initially approved, but only when such appointment and approval are proven to be in
disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service law and regulations. Rule V,
Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative
Code specifically provides that an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be
withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect
until disapproved by the Commission.
Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the
following grounds. First is Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the
agency’s Merit Promotion Plan, second is Failure to pass through the agency’s
Selection/Promotion Board, third Violation of the existing collective agreement
between management and employees relative to promotion or the fourth one Violation
of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.
Arturo de Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. no. 191002, 17 March 2010
Facts:
Reynato S. Puno retired as chief justice on May 17, 2010 after the presidential
elections on May 10, 2010. Under section 4 in relation to section 9 Article VIII vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof and the list of at least
three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Under
section 15 article VII of the executive department that prohibits the President to make
an appointment in order to fill the vacancies on every position but the Office of the
Solicitor General argues that the president can appoint the next Chief Justice because
section 15 article VII does of the constitution does not apply the appointment of the
president to the supreme court. The Judicial and Bar Council make a list from the five
associate justices to nominate the next Chief Justice and the two associate justices
were declined of the nomination.
Issue:
Whether or not the President can appoint the next chief justice to fill the vacancy.
Ruling:
Yes. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments of the
President to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the
Judiciary.
People v. Salle, G.R. No. 103567, 4 December 1995
Facts:
Francisco Salle and Ricky Mengote are both accused appeallants being guilty of the
crime of murder and arson. Both of them were filed an appeal and being accepted by
Supreme Court. On January 6, 1994, Francisco Salle filed a motion to withdraw his
appeal and to avail the conditional pardon being offered by the president and the
Supreme Court granted his motion to withdraw. But Ricky Mengote did not file a motion
to withdraw his appeal.
Issues:
Whether or not the grant of conditional pardon to Ricky Mengote is applicable.
Ruling:
No, Under Art. VII, Sec. 19 of the 1987 Constitution, no pardon may be extended
before a judgment of conviction becomes final. Where the judgment of conviction is
still pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality, as in the instant case,
executive clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant.
People v. Nacional, G.R. No. 11294, 7 September 1995
Facts:
On March 1, 1994, Walter Nacional, Zacarias Militante and Efren Musa, through
counsel, moved to withdraw their appeal. They claimed that the charges against them
were political in nature "committed while they were members of the New People's
Army (NPA). They informed the Court that as political prisoners, they applied for and
were recommended by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon for conditional
pardon by the President of the Philippines. The Court granted their motion on May 11,
1994. On February 1, 1995, Rudy Luces, through counsel, also moved to withdraw his
appeal for becoming moot and academic. He claimed that he had been granted
conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines and had been released from
prison per instruction. In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General opined that
Rudy Luces abandoned his appeal when he accepted the pardon granted him. We
now therefore dismiss his appeal. With these developments, only accused Javier
Mirabete has remained and pursued his appeal to this Court. The judgment convicting
the five accused is based on the evidence presented by the prosecution. It is derived
mainly from the testimonies of two eyewitnesses Bienvenida Lagason, Quirino's
widow and Joel's mother, and Crisanto Miranda, a neighbor of the Lagasons — and
accused Walter Nacional.

Issue:
Does the trial court have aggravating circumstances against the appellant?

Ruling:
Since there is no mitigating nor generic aggravating circumstance, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed by the trial court against the accused-
appellant.Finally, we rule that the grant of conditional pardon and the consequent
dismissal of the appeals of Walter Nacional, Zacarias Militante, Efren Musa and Rudy
Luces does not exempt them from payment of the civil indemnity. A conditional pardon,
when granted, does not extinguish the civil liability arising from the crime. The43

indemnity of P50,000.00 imposed by the trial court for each of the deaths of Quirino
and Joel Lagason must be shared solidarily by all the accused.
In re: Torres v, Director, Bureau of Corrections, G.R. No 122338, 29 December
1995

Facts:
On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the
President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres
had been charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition by,
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On September 8, 1986, the President
cancelled the conditional pardon of Torres. On October 10, 1986, then Minister of
Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest
and Recommitment against the petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and
confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Torres
impugned the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment in the aforecited case
of Torres v. Gonzales.

Issue:
Whether or not there had been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon.

Ruling:
Concisely put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditional pardoned
and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive
Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code, or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code . Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the
petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an
exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
There is likewise nil a basis for the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a
conditional pardon revoked by the President in the exercise of powers undisputedly
solely and absolutely loaded in his office.
People v. Patriarca, G.R. No. 13547, 29 September 2000

Facts:
Patriarca was charged with the crime of murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo before
RTC Sorsogon docketed as Criminal Case No. 2773. He was also charged with
murder for the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under
Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672, respectively. The RTC
found him guilty in Criminal Case No. 2773 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Patriarca appealed the decision to the SC.
Patriarca applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 entitled "Granting Amnesty
to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed
Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political
Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty
Commission." In 1999, his application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty
Board concluding that his activities were done in pursuit of his political beliefs.

Issue:
What is the effect of the grant of amnesty to the conviction of the accused-appellant?

Ruling:
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high
political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of
another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks
backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty
stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is
totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its
effects. This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-
appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to
put an end to the appeal.

Patriarca was acquitted of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 2773 while
Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672 were ordered dismissed.(People vs. Patriarca,
Jr. G.R. No. 135457, September 29, 2000)
National Electrification Administration v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143481, 15
February 2002

FACTS:
NEA file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, to reverse and
set aside Decision of the Commission on Audit.
Petitioner NEA is a government-owned and controlled corporation. On July 1, 1989,
Republic Act No. 6758 took effect. RA 6758 provided, among others, a salary schedule
for all government positions, appointive or elective, including positions in government-
owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions. Then
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 389 that directed payment of
the fourth and final salary increases authorized under Joint Resolution No. 01 in two
tranches. The Department of Budget and Management issued Implementing
Guidelines under National Budget Circular No. 458, series of 1997, reiterating the
schedule of payments in EO 389.
In January 1997, NEA implemented the salary increases prescribed for the year 1997
pursuant to Joint Resolution No. 01. However, did not implement the salary increases
in accordance with the schedule of payment specified in EO 389 and NBC No. 458.
Instead, implemented in one lump sum beginning January 1, 1997 the salary increases
required to be paid in two tranches. The Commission's resident auditor in NEA issued
a Notice of Suspension requiring the submission of the legal basis for the full
implementation of the new salary schedule. The NEA failed to submit the basis for its
advance implementation of the prescribed salary rates. Thus, the Commission's
resident auditor issued Notices of Disallowance and denied NEA motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not NEA's accelerated implementation of SSL II is in accordance with
law.
RULING:
No. NEA's claim that Republic Act No. 8250, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act of 1997 serves as legal basis for NEA's accelerated implementation
of the last phase of the Salary Standardization Law II, is not self-executory so as to
serve as outright legal authority for NEA to spend what had been appropriated for
NEA's "Personal Services" under the 1997 GAA. Budgetary appropriations under the
GAA do not constitute unbridled authority to government agencies to spend the
appropriated amounts as they may wish. There is no itemization of Personal Services
in the 1997 GAA, and nothing is mentioned therein about the acceleration or full
payment of the Salary Standardization Law II. Thus, Section 34, Chapter 5, Book IV
of the Administrative Code states the execution of the annual GAA is subject to a
program of expenditure to be approved by the President and this approved program
of expenditure is the basis for the fund release. Section 60, Chapter 7, Book VI of the
Administrative Code provides that no portion of the appropriations in the GAA shall be
used for payment of any salary increase or adjustment unless specifically authorized
by law or appropriate budget circular and Section 33 of the 1997 GAA itself expressly
provides that the salary increases authorized by the Senate-House of Representatives
Joint Resolution No. 01 or the Salary Standardization Law II are subject to approval
by the President. Clearly, NEA cannot automatically spend its authorized appropriation
for Personal Services under the 1997 GAA.
Mondano v.Silvosa, G.R. No. L-7708, 30 May 1955

FACTS:
Petitioner then the mayor of the municipality of Mainit, province of Surigao was charge
by Consolacion Vda. De Monsende with the Presidential Complaints and Action
Committee accusing him of rape committed on her daughter Caridad Mosende; and
concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter in a place other than the conjugal
dwelling. The Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed the complaint to the respondent
provincial governor for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. the
petitioner appeared before the provincial governor in obedience to his summons and
was served with a copy of the complaint filed by the provincial governor with the
provincial board. On the same day, the provincial governor issued Administrative
Order No. 8 suspending the petitioner from office. Thereafter, the Provincial Board
proceeded to hear the charges preferred against the petitioner over his objection.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the order of suspension issued by the respondent provincial governor
is illegal and without legal effect.

RULING:
Yes. The charges preferred against the respondent are not malfeasances or any of
those enumerated or specified in section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code,
because rape and concubinage have nothing to do with the performance of his duties
as mayor nor do they constitute or involve "neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or
any other form of maladministration of office." True, they may involve moral turpitude,
but before the provincial governor and board may act and proceed in accordance with
the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code referred to, a conviction by final
judgment must precede the filing by the provincial governor of charges and trial by the
provincial board. Even the provincial fiscal cannot file an information for rape without
a sworn complaint of the offended party who is 28 years of age and the crime of
concubinage cannot be prosecuted but upon a sworn complaint of the offended
spouse. The charges preferred against the petitioner, municipal mayor of Mainit,
province of Surigao, not being those or any of those specified in section 2188 of the
Revised Administrative Code, the investigation of such charges by the provincial board
is unauthorized and illegal. The suspension of the petitioner as mayor of the
municipality of Mainit is, consequently, unlawful and without authority of law.
MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA v. SALONGA, G.R No. 86439, 13 April 1989

FACTS:
On December 17, 1988, President Aquino appointed Bautista as Chairman of the
Commission of Human Rights (CHR) to which she later qualified to pursuant to the
second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, without the confirmation of the Commission
on Appointments (CA) because they are among the officers of government "whom he
(the President) may be authorized by law to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive Order
No. 163, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights. However, on January 10, 1989, Bautista (with the
other appointed members of the CHR) was requested by CA to appear before it for
deliberation on their appointments. She refused to submit averring their appointments
were not subject for CA’s review. On January 14, 1989, the President apparently
submitted an ad interim appointment of Bautista which the CA disapproved in view of
her refusal to submit to its jurisdiction. Pending resolution, the President designated
an Acting Chairman in lieu of her. Meanwhile, Bautista filed this present petition to
declare unconstitutional the actions of, among others, the CA.

ISSUE:
1. WON Bautista’s appointment is subject to CA's confirmation?
2. WON Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment?

HELD:
1. No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that the appointments
which are to be made with the confirmation of CA. Rather, it is within the authority of
President, vested upon her by Constitution (2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she
appoint executive officials without confirmation of CoA. The Commission on
Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to review
presidential appointments, cannot create power to confirm appointments that the
Constitution has reserved to the President alone.

2.No. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to

appointments solely for the President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very
nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of
the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are
to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make,
that is, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad
interim appointments.

The Court holds that petitioner Bautista is the lawful incumbent of the office of
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights by virtue of her appointment, as such,
by the President on 17 December 1988, and her acceptance thereof, is not to say that
she cannot be removed from office before the expiration of her seven (7) year term.
She certainly can be removed but her removal must be for cause and with her right to
due process properly safeguarded.
CALDERON v. CARALE, G.R No. 91636, 23 April 1992

FACTS:
Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code
(PD 442) was approved. Section 13 thereof provides that the Chairman, the Division
Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners of NLRC shall all be appointed
by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
President Aquino appointed respondents as the Chairman and Commissioners of the
NLRC. This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of the
permanent appointments extended by the President to the respondents Chairman and
Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), without submitting the
same to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the
Labor Code as amended by said RA 6715. Calderon insists that the appointments
must be submitted to the CA for confirmation. He also posits that RA 6715 is not an
encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Section 16, Art.
VII, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional
to those mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
WON Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CA of appointments extended
by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution whose appointments require
confirmation by the CA?

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
No. Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments of appointments of the Chairman
and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is hereby declared
unconstitutional and of no legal force and effect because it amends by legislation, the
first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto appointments
requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments and it amends by
legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing
the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are
otherwise entrusted only with the President.
Francisco Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No 202242, 17 July 2012

FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the
JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the
House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having 1/2 of a vote.
Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow
the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote
each. The petitioner questioned this practice as the constitution says one
representative from the congress. Respondent contends that the phrase “a
representative of congress” refers that both houses of congress should have one
representative each, and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory
components of “congress” as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both houses
have their respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the
constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only
one representative from congress.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and
spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:
The petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar
Council is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a
representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8 (1), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary
function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit
in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in
Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary
in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot
simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation
because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence,
the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The
Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines v. Romulo, G.R.
No. 160093, 31 July 2012

FACTS:
President Estrada issued E.O. No. 165 "Directing the Formulation of an Institutional
Strengthening and Streamlining Program for the Executive Branch" creating the
Presidential Committee on Executive Governance (PCEG) composed of the Executive
Secretary as chair and the Secretary of the DBM as co-chair.
The DBM issued the Notice of Organization, Staffing and Compensation Action
(NOSCA). PCEG likewise issued Memorandum Circular No. 62, entitled
"Implementing Executive Order No. 102, Series of 1999 Redirecting the Functions and
Operations of the Department of Health." M.C. No. 62 directed the rationalization and
streamlining of the said Department. Petitioner Malaria Employees and Workers
Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) is a union of affected employees in the
Malaria Control Service of the Department of Health. MEWAP filed a complaint with
the RTC of Manila seeking to nullify Department Memorandum, the NOSCA and the
Placement List of Department of Health Personnel and other issuances implementing
E.O. No. 102.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has authority to effect a reorganization of a department
under the executive branch.

RULING:
Yes. The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the DOH under
the Constitution and statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control
under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged
with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create
includes the power to destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by
statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the
Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into
existence. The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in
the executive department are concerned, the President’s power of control may justify
him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the
broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.
These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority
to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate
bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify
functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The
validity of these two decrees unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides
that "all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and
other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative
until amended, repealed or revoked." So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing
said decrees.
Gloria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903, 15 August 2000

FACTS:
Private respondent Dr. Bienvenido A. Icasiano filed a petition for prohibition to restrain
petitioners from reassigning him from incumbent Schools Division Superintendent of
Quezon City to Vocational Schools Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science
and Technology (MIST). After hearing, the Court of Appeals prohibited the petitioners
from implementing the respondent's reassignment as it is violative of his right to
security of tenure. No period was fixed for private respondent's reassignment, nor was
there any indication that the reassignment was only temporary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the reassigning of the respondent from incumbent Schools Division
Superintendent of Quezon City to Vocational Schools Superintendent of the Marikina
Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) is violative of his right to security of tenure

RULING:
The Court of Appeals prohibited the petitioners from implementing the respondent's
reassignment as it is violative of his right to security of tenure. No period was fixed for
private respondent's reassignment, nor was there any indication that the reassignment
was only temporary. The reassignment of the petitioner to MIST appears to be
indefinite. No period is fixed. No objective or purpose, from which the temporariness
of the assignment may be inferred, is set. In fact, the recommendation of respondent
Secretary Gloria to the President that the position of superintendent of MIST 'will best
fit his (petitioner's) qualifications and experience.' implies that the proposed
reassignment will be indefinite."

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, finding petitioner's
reassignment to MIST to be indefinite. In fact, Secretary Gloria's Memorandum to the
President stated that the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his
qualifications and experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education."
Such feature of the reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of
tenure of the private respondent. Having found the reassignment of private respondent
to the MIST to be violative of his security of tenure, the order for his reassignment to
the MIST cannot be countenanced. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED,
and the Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, 27 October 1983

FACTS:
Petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan appealed from his dismissed petition
against respondents-appellees Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the Director of Forestry on the ground that the timber license that was granted to him
was revoked by the said opposition. Tan submitted all the necessary requirements in
application to public forest lands, areas consisting of thousands of hectares of virgin
forest and won the bidding over other competitors. However, it was then cancelled by
the succeeding Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who issued general
memorandum in the new policy of the timber license. Tan questioned the validity of
the revocation of the permit given to him to operate to the virgin forest.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause

RULING:
The Court of First Instance decided. Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's
timber license is valid, still respondents-appellees can validly revoke his timber
license. As pointed out earlier, paragraph 27 of the rules and regulations included in
the ordinary timber license states: "The terms and conditions of this license are subject
to change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this license may be
made to expire at an earlier date, when public interests so require." A timber license
is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract,
within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can
be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case. "A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful,
and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and
the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right; nor is it taxation." Thus, this Court held that the granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights

The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be
availed of to defeat the proper exercise of police power. The State has inherent power
enabling it to prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety, and welfare of society
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, THE ORDER APPEALED
FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN TOTO. COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER
APPELLANT.
Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125359, 3 December 2002

FACTS:
Petitioners as RTC and MTC judges stationed in Mandaue City received a monthly
allowance of P1,260 each pursuant to the yearly appropriation ordinance. Eventually,
it was increased to P1,500 for each judge. However, the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) issued Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provides
that the additional monthly allowances to be given by a local government unit should
not exceed P1,000 in provinces and cities and P700 in municipalities. Acting on the
said DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to herein
petitioners in excess of the amount authorized by LBC 55. Thus, petitioners filed with
the Office of the City Auditor a protest. However, it was treated as a motion for
reconsideration and was endorsed to the Commission on Audit (COA). Accordingly, it
was denied by the COA. Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not local budget Circular No. 55 issued by the Department of Budget and
Management is valid and enforceable considering that it was not duly published in
accordance with the law.

RULING:
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner judges. Section 458, par. (a)(1) (xi), of RA
7160, the law that supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of
additional allowances to judges "when the finances of the city government allow." The
said provision does not authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the additional
allowances granted to judges. Thus, this Court need not belabor the point that the
finances of a city government may allow the grant of additional allowances higher than
P1,000 if the revenues of the said city government exceed its annual expenditures.
Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an inappropriate way
of enforcing the criterion found in Section 458, par. (a)(l)(xi), of RA 7160. The DBM
over-stepped its power of supervision over local government units by imposing a
prohibition that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement. In other words,
the prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis. Petitioner judges argue that
LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City by dictating a
uniform amount that a local government unit can disburse as additional allowances to
judges stationed therein. They maintain that said circular is not supported by any law
and therefore goes beyond the supervisory powers of the President. They further
allege that said circular is void for lack of publication. On the other hand, the yearly
appropriation ordinance providing for additional allowances to judges is allowed by
Section 458, par. (a)(1)[xi], of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed
decision and resolution, dated September 21, 1995 and May 28, 1996, respectively,
of the Commission on Audit are hereby set aside.
DENR V DENR REGION XII EMPLOYEES, G.R. NO. 149724, 19 AUGUST 2003

FACTS:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued
by the Regional Exec. Director of DENR, directing the immediate transfer of the DENR
12 Regional Offices from Cotabato to Koronadal City. The memorandum was issued
pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued by the DENR Secretary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12
Office.

RULING:
The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations
are adjuncts of the Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts
of the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President as provided
for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have control
of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed."
In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering
the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South
Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is
presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated
the same.
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL V. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD, G.R. NO. 181293, 23
FEBRUARY 2015

FACTS:
The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) was created on 31 March 1977 by Presidential
Decree No. (P.D.) 1112 in order to supervise and regulate, on behalf of the
government, the collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities by the private
sector. On the same date, P.D. 1113 was issued granting to the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines the right, privilege, and authority to
construct, operate, and maintain toll facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll
Expressways for a period of 30 years starting 1 May 1977. On 27 November 1995, the
Republic of the Philippines through the TRB as Grantor, CMMTC as Investor, and
PNCC as Operator executed a Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (STOA)
covering the South Metro Manila Skyway. Under the STOA, the design and
construction of the project roads became the primary and exclusive privilege and
responsibility of CMMTC. On 18 July 2007, the Republic of the Philippines, through
the TRB, CMMTC, and PNCC executed the assailed Amendment to the Supplemental
Toll Operation Agreement (ASTOA). Under the ASTOA, Skyway O & M Corporation
(SOMCO) replaced PSC in performing the operations and maintenance of Stage 1 of
the South Metro Manila Skyway. Petitioners argue that the franchise for toll operations
was exclusively vested by P.D. 1113 in PNCC, which exercised the powers under its
franchise through PSC in accordance with the STOA.

ISSUE:
Whether the TRB has the power to grant authority to operate a toll facility.

RULING:
TRB has the power to grant authority to operate a toll facility. In Francisco v. TRB, the
court held: It is abundantly clear that Sections 3 (a) and (e) of P.D. 1112 in relation to
Section 4 of P.D. 1894 have invested the TRB with sufficient power to grant a qualified
person or entity with authority to construct, maintain, and operate a toll facility and to
issue the corresponding toll operating permit or TOC. First, there is nothing in P.D.
1113 or P.D. 1894 that states that the franchise granted to PNCC is to the exclusion
of all others. Second, if we were to go by the theory of petitioners, it is only the
operation and maintenance of the toll facilities that is vested with PNCC. This
interpretation is contrary to the wording of P.D. 1113 and P.D. 1894 granting PNCC
the right, privilege and authority to construct, operate and maintain the North Luzon,
South Luzon and Metro Manila Expressways and their toll facilities. Third, aside from
having been granted the power to grant administrative franchises for toll facility
projects, TRB is also empowered to modify, amend, and impose additional conditions
on the franchise of PNCC in an appropriate contract, particularly when public interest
calls for it.
Lacson v. Romero, G.R. No. L- 3081, 14 October 1949.

FACTS:
In July 25, 1946, the Petitioner, Antonio Lacson, was appointed by the President as
provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental which was affirmed by Commission on
Appointment. He took the office and, thereafter, performed his duties. In May 17, 1949,
upon recommendation by Secretary of Justice, the President nominated him to the
post of provincial fiscal in Tarlac and, simultaneously, the President nominated the
Respondent, Honorio Romero, to his position as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental.
Both of them were confirmed by the Commission on Appointment. The Petitioner
neither accepted the appointment nor assumed the office of fiscal of Tarlac but
respondent Romero took his oath of office of the post of fiscal of Negros Oriental,
notified the Solicitor General and, thereafter, proceeded to his station. Commotion
started between the parties as both of them appeared in the hearings of Judge
Narvasa and Judge Ocampo where the latter judges favors the Respondent. When
the Petitioner requested payment for his salary as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental,
it was turned down and instead paid Respondent Romero.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the confirmation Commission on Appointment alone, without the
acceptance of the nomination by the Petitioner, can create a vacancy in the post of
provincial fiscal of Negro Oriental.

RULING:
No, the appointment to a government post like that of provincial fiscal to be complete
involves several steps. First, comes the nomination by the President. Then to make
that nomination valid and permanent, the Commission on Appointments of the
Legislature has to confirm said nomination. The last step is the acceptance thereof by
the appointee by his assumption of office. The first two steps, nomination and
confirmation, constitute a mere offer of a post. They are acts of the Executive and
Legislative departments of the Government. But the last necessary step to make the
appointment complete and effective rests solely with the appointee himself. He may
or he may not accept the appointment or nomination.
As held in the case of Borromeo vs. Mariano, “there is no Power in this country which
can compel a man to accept an office.” Consequently, since Lacson has declined to
accept his appointment as provincial fiscal of Tarlac and no one can compel him to do
so, then he continues as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and no vacancy in said
office was created, unless Lacson had been lawfully removed as Such fiscal of Negros
Oriental.
Manalo v. Sistoza, G.R. No. 107369, 11 August 1999

FACTS:
In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 was passed. This law created the Department of
Interior and Local Government. Said law, under Sections 26 and 31 thereof, also
provided on the manner as to how officers of the Philippine National Police are to be
appointed. It was provided that the PNP Chief as well as certain police officers
including Directors and Chief Superintendents, after being appointed by the President,
must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments before said officers can take
their office.
In 1992, then president Corazon Aquino appointed Pedro Sistoza et al as Directors
and Chief Superintendents within the PNP. Said appointments were not confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments hence, Jesulito Manalo questioned the validity of
the appointments made. He insists that without the confirmation by the Commission,
Sistoza et al are acting without jurisdiction, their appointment being contrary to the
provisions of R.A. 6975.
He then went to the Supreme Court asking the court to carry out the provisions of the
said law. Manalo also insists that the law is a valid law, as it enjoys the presumption
of constitutionality, and hence, it must be carried out by the courts.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of R.A. No. 6975 are valid.

DECISION:
No. Said provisions are unconstitutional. It is true that prior to this case, as with all
other laws, R.A. 6975 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. As such, laws
enacted by Congress must be respected by courts and as much as possible, courts
must avoid delving into the constitutionality of a law. However, it is also the duty of the
courts, as guardians of the Constitution, to see to it that every law passed by Congress
is not repugnant to the Constitution. Under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the government to be appointed by
the President:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone.

The first group are the only ones whose appointments are required by the Constitution
to be affirmed by the Commission on Appointments. All others need not be confirmed.
Officers of the PNP are not included therein. There is also no merit to the contention
that PNP officers are akin to officers of the armed forces.
Sections 26 and 31 of R.A. 6975 are void for amending the provisions set forth in the
Constitution.
Courts have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the
legislature transcends the limit alienated by the fundamental law. When it does the
courts will not hesitate to strike down such unconstitutionality.
Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. No. 113956, 21 July 2006

FACTS:
Two groups of appointed members of the Board of Trustees of CCP are contesting
each other’s appointment. The Endriga group, sitting as current members, was
appointed by then-President Ramos and is assailing the appointment of the Rufino
group, replacing all 7 members of the Endriga group, by then-President Estrada.
Endriga group avers that the appointment into the Board of the Rufino group
transgressed PD 15 –creation of Board of Trustees of CCP. As stated in PD 15,
specifically Section 6, appointment into the Board shall only be made by a majority
vote of the trustees; presidential appointments can only be made when the Board is
entirely vacant to uphold the CCP’s charter of independence from pressure or politics.
Meanwhile, Rufino group stands by their appointment since the provision on
appointments stated in Section 6, PD 15 is violative of Section 16, Article 7 of the
Constitution. The Board cannot invoke the charter of autonomy to extend to
appointment of its members.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PD 15, Section 6 allowing appointments made by trustees of their
fellow members is constitutional

RULING:
No, PD 15, Section 6 allowing appointments of members by the trustees themselves
is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. While it is stated that appointing powers may be delegated
by the President, such power is limited in scope to include only ranks lower than the
appointing authority. In the case, an appointment of a member made by a fellow
member transgresses Article 7, Section 16 (1) since both positions are equal in nature.
CCP cannot invoke autonomy prescribed in its charter as an exemption from the
limitation of delegative appointing power because such invocation puts CCP outside
the control of the President.
Binamira v. Garrucho., G.R. No. 92004, 30 July 1990.
FACTS:
In 1986, petitioner Binamira, as evidenced by the memorandum which allowed him to
qualify, was designated General Manager (GM) of the Phil Tourism Authority (PTA) by
the then Minister of Tourism and Chair of the PTA Board. In 1990, President Aquino,
on noting that he was not designated by herself but merely by said Minister contrary
to that required by law, designated the new Sec. of Tourism respondent Garrucho as
the GM until such time she makes an appointment thereto. Binamira now seeks
reinstatement, claiming he has been removed without just cause in violation of his
security of tenure.

ISSUE:
Does Binamira have a claim on security of tenure?

RULING:
No. It is not disputed that Binamira was not appointed by the President but only
designated by the Minister of Tourism. Where the person is merely designated and
not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary
capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the
designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not
confer security of tenure. It is when an appointment is completed, usually with its
confirmation, that security of tenure results for the person chosen, unless he is
replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office.¹ Moreover, even if it is to
be conceded that his designation by the Minister constituted an act of the President—
as Binamira contends—such act shall be considered valid only if not “disapproved or
reprobated by the President” which is what happened in the case at bar.
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
L-65439, 31 July 1986.

FACTS:
Dr. Esteban has the background of a competent person able to handle a high post. He
used to teach in the Philippine College of Commerce when he was invited by Dr.
Blanco to teach in PLM. Blanco was then the president of PLM. He later assigned
Esteban as the VP for Academic Affairs. His appointment is however merely ad
interim. Thereafter, he received notifications of renewal of his term every time his term
would lapse. Until in 1975 when he asked Blanco to appoint him as the permanent VP.
Blanco however refused to appoint him and he assigned Esteban to a lower post
instead. Blanco also said that the Board of Regents was not able to approve his
appointment as VP for it was withdrawn. Esteban file with the CSC and the CSC ruled
in favor of him. PLM appealed to the trial court and the court affirmed the CSC. PLM
again appealed to the IAC and the IAC ruled in favor of Esteban again.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Esteban’s appointment became permanent.

RULING:
Esteban had been extended several “ad-interim” appointments which PLM mistakenly
understands as appointments temporary in nature. An officer ad interim is one
appointed to fill a vacancy, or to discharge the duties of the office during the absence
or temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent.
But such is not the meaning nor the use intended in the context of Philippine law. In
referring to Esteban’s appointments, the term is not descriptive of the nature of the
appointments given to him. Rather, it is used to denote the manner in which said
appointments were made, that is, done by the President of the PLM in the meantime,
while the Board of Regents, which is originally vested by the University Charter with
the power of appointment, is unable to act.

Later, in its Resolution 485, the PLM Board of Regents verified Esteban’s appointment
without condition nor limitation as to tenure. As of that moment, it became a regular
and permanent appointment. Note further that “. . . an ad interim appointment is one
made in pursuance of par (4), sec 10, Article 7, of the [1973] Constitution, which
provides that ‘the President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.’
It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the circumstance that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. An ad interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other than
that its provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course distinguishable
from an ‘acting’ appointment which is merely temporary, good until another permanent
appointment is issued.”
Matibag v. Benipayo G.R. No. 149036, 2 April 2002.
FACTS:
On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the
Comelec’s EID by then Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary
capacity. On March 2001, respondent Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman
together with other commissioners in an ad interim appointment. While on such ad
interim appointment, respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a
Memorandum address transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner
requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her
reassignment to the Law Department. She cited Civil Service Commission
Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government
offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election
period. Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec from
the coverage of the said Memo Circular. Petitioner claims that the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on
the independence of the COMELEC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the instant petition satisfies all the requirements before this Court may
exercise its power of judicial review in constitutional cases?
RULING:
Respondents assert that the petition fails to satisfy all the four requisites before this
Court may exercise its power of judicial review in constitutional cases. Out of respect
for the acts of the Executive department, which is co-equal with this Court,
respondents urge this Court to refrain from reviewing the constitutionality of the ad
interim appointments issued by the President to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason unless
all the four requisites are present. These are: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate controversy; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional issue; (3) the exercise of the judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional issue is the lis mota of the case. Respondents
argue that the second, third and fourth requisites are absent in this case. Respondents
maintain that petitioner does not have a personal and substantial interest in the case
because she has not sustained a direct injury as a result of the ad interim appointments
of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason and their assumption of office. Respondents point out
that petitioner does not claim to be lawfully entitled to any of the positions assumed by
Benipayo, Borra or Tuason. Neither does petitioner claim to be directly injured by the
appointments of these three respondents.
 National Economy and Patrimony
IDEALS, Inc. vs. PSALM Corp. , G.R. No. 192088; October 9, 2012

Facts:
PSALM's Board of Directors approved the Bidding Procedures for the privatization of
the AHEPP. After a post-bid evaluation, PSALM's Board of Directors approved and
confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award to the highest bidder, K-Water.
Petitioners contend that K-Water is a foreign corporation, and that PSALM clearly
violated the constitutional provisions on the appropriation and utilization of water as
a natural resource, as implemented by the Water Code of the Philippines limiting
water rights to Filipino citizens and corporations which are at least 60% Filipino-
owned. Petitioners assert that PSALM should prioritize such domestic and
community use of water over that of power generation. They maintain that the
Philippine Government, along with its agencies and subdivisions, have an obligation
under international law to recognize and protect the legally enforceable human right
to water of petitioners and the public in general.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale of AHEPP to K-Water violates the Constitution provision on
the State’s natural resources?

Ruling:
Yes. Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution provides: All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. Also in
Article 15, the law limits the grant of water rights only to Filipino citizens and juridical
entities duly qualified by law to exploit and develop water resources, including private
corporations with sixty percent of their capital owned by Filipinos. In the case of Angat
River, the NWRB has issued separate water permits to MWSS, NPC and NIA. Under
the EPIRA, the business for generation of electric power was opened to the private
sector and any new generation company is required to secure a certificate of
compliance from the Energy Regulatory Commission, as well as health, safety and
environmental clearances from the concerned government agencies. Power
generation shall not be considered a public utility operation, and no franchise is
necessary. Foreign investors are allowed entry into the electric power industry. No
mention of water rights in the privatization of multi-purpose hydropower facilities.
Section 47 (e) states : “In cases of transfer of possession, control, operation or
privatization of multi-purpose hydro facilities, safeguards shall be prescribed to ensure
that the national government may direct water usage in cases of shortage to protect
potable water, irrigation, and all other requirements imbued with public interest...”
JG Summit Holdings vs. Court of Appeals ,G.R. No. 124293 (Resolution);
September 24, 2003

Facts:
Petitioner JG Summit Holdings, Inc. was declared the highest bidder of the National
Government's share in Philippine Shipyard Engineering Corporation. The Committee
on Privatization approved the sale subject to the right of government's business
partner Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. or its assignee, Philyards Holdings, Inc. (PHI)
to top JGSMI's bid by 5% as specified in the bidding rules. PHI exercised its option to
top the highest bid. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for mandamus by
petitioners on the grounds that the right of first refusal and the right to top are prima
facie legal and that petitioner, by participating in the public bidding, with full knowledge
of the right to top granted to KAWASAKI/ Philyards is estopped from questioning the
validity of the award given to Philyards. Thus, the petitioner raised the issue to this
Court. The Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. It ruled, among others,
that a shipyard like PHILSECO is a public utility whose capitalization must be sixty
percent (60%) Filipino owned. Hence, the motions for reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether or not PHILSECO is a public utility?

Decision:
No. It was held that PHILSECO is not a public utility. A shipyard is not a public utility.
To constitute a public utility, the facility must be necessary for the maintenance of life
and occupation of the residents. The fact that a business offers services or goods that
promote public good and serve the interest of the public does not automatically make
it a public utility. The principal determinative characteristic of a public utility is that of
service to, or readiness to serve, an indefinite public or portion of the public as such
which has a legal right to demand and receive its services or commodities. Stated
otherwise, the owner or person in control of a public utility must have devoted it to
such use that the public which has been served and has accepted the service, has
the right to demand that use or service so long as it is continued, with reasonable
efficiency and under proper charges. Unlike a private enterprise which independently
determines whom it will serve, a "public utility holds out generally and may not refuse
legitimate demand for service." It is clear that a shipyard cannot be considered a public
utility. A "shipyard" is "a place or enclosure where ships are built or repaired." Its
nature dictates that it serves but a limited clientele whom it may choose to serve at its
discretion. While it offers its facilities to whoever may wish to avail of its services, a
shipyard is not legally obliged to render its services indiscriminately to the public. It
has no legal obligation to render the services sought by each and every client. The
fact that it publicly offers its services does not give the public a legal right to demand
that such services be rendered. And also there is no law declaring a shipyard as a
public utility.
Gamboa vs. Teves ,G.R. No. 176579; June 28, 2011

Facts:
Petitioner Gamboa questioned the indirect sale of shares involving almost 12 million
shares of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) owned by PTIC
to First Pacific. Thus, First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT increased from
30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the total common shareholdings of
foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. The petitioner contends that it violates the
Constitutional provision on filipinization of public utility, stated in Section 11, Article XII
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a
public utility to not more than 40%. Then, in 2011, the court ruled the case in favor of
the petitioner, hence this new case, resolving the motion for reconsideration for the
2011 decision filed by the respondents.

Issue:
Whether or not the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers
to the total common shares only?

Decision:
Yes. Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution mandates the Filipinization of
public utilities. The court agreed that the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors,
and only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock comprising
both common and non-voting preferred shares. The Corporation Code of the
Philippines classifies shares as common or preferred, thus: “The shares of stock of
stock corporations may be divided into classes or series of shares, or both, any of
which classes or series of shares may have such rights, privileges or restrictions as
may be stated in the articles of incorporation: Provided that no share may be deprived
of voting rights except those classified and issued as "preferred" or "redeemable"
shares, unless otherwise provided in this Code: Provided that there shall always be a
class or series of shares which have complete voting rights. Any or all of the shares
or series of shares may have a par value or have no par value as may be provided for
in the articles of incorporation: Provided that banks, trust companies, insurance
companies, public utilities, and building and loan associations shall not be permitted
to issue no-par value shares of stock.“ Considering that common shares have voting
rights which translate to control, as opposed to preferred shares which usually have
no voting rights. If the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of
directors, then the term "capital" shall include such preferred shares because the right
to participate in the control or management of the corporation is exercised through the
right to vote in the election of directors.
Spouses Palomo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95608, January 21, 1997

FACTS:
Governor General William Cameron Forbes issued Executive Order No. 40 on June
13, 1913 which reserved some square meters of land in Barrio Naga, Albay for
provincial park purposes. On December 9, 1916, The CFI of Albay ordered the
registration of 15 parcels of land covered by E.O. No. 40 to Diego Palomo. Two
months before his death, Diego Palomo donated these parcels of land to his heir,
Ignacion Palomo and Carmen Palomo which was allegedly covered by an Original
Certificate of Title. President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47
converting the area embraced in E.O No. 40 into “Tiwi Hot Spring National Parks and
Wildlife. The area was never released as an alienable and disposable portion of public
domain and therefore is neither susceptible to disposition nor registrable. The
Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property and paid real estate taxes
and introduced improvements by planting bananas, pandan and coconuts. On May 7,
1974 petitioners filed a civil case against private respondents who were all employees
of the Bureau of Forest Development who entered their land and cut down bamboos.
The Republic of the Philippines also filed a Civil Case for the annulment and
cancellation of the Certificate of Titles involving the 15 parcels of land. RTC and CA
ruled against the Palomos.

ISSUE:
Whether or not forest land which is a public domain may be owned by private persons.

RULING:
No. The lands in the case at bar were not alienable lands of the public domain. There
was no proof that the petitioners’ predecessors in interest derived title from an old
Spanish grant. The “decisions” of the CFI were not signed by the judge but merely
certified true copies of notification to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the clerk
of court. It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot
be owned by private persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof no matter
how lengthy, cannot be converted into private property unless such lands are
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. CA’s decision was affirmed.
LEE v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, G.R No. 128195, 3 October 2001

FACTS:
Petitioners, heirs of Lee Liong, sought reconstitution of title of subject parcel of land in
the name of Lee Liong whose transfer certificate of title was lost or destroyed during
the war. At the trial, they presented documents proving the sale of the land from the
Dinglasans to Lee Liong and the latter's subsequent possession of the property in the
concept of owner. The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in
March 1936, during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution which prohibits aliens to
acquire private agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary succession. Thus, Lee
Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire the land in question. The trial
court ordered the reconstitution of title in the name of Lee Liong. The Dinglasans,
however, claimed that Lee Liong was disqualified to acquire the land in question thus
they filed with the Court of First Instance, Capiz an action against the heirs of Lee
Liong for annulment of sale and recovery of land.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ownership of the land can revert back to the previous owner since
Lee Liong is a Chinese Citizen who is prohibited to acquire private agricultural lands?

HELD:
No. Although the constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public
or private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-
Filipinos in this case, however, there would be no more public policy violated since the
land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. "If land is
invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured
and the title of the transferee is rendered valid." Thus, the subsequent transfer of
the property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of the
invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our
lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. vs. CA G.R. No. 50464, Jan. 29, 1990

FACTS:
On April 29, 1963, the Director of Lands caused the issuance of a Sales Patent in favor
of defendant Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., over the parcels of land both situated
in Mariveles, Bataan. An OCT was thereby issued. The Solicitor-General filed an
action for reversion on the ground that the lots were forest lands and therefore
inalienable. The Court of First Instance of Bataan dismissed the complaint in the Order
of October 7, 1977, adopting mainly the theory that since the titles sought to be
cancelled emanated from the administrative act of the Bureau of Lands Director, the
latter, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the disposition of the land.

ISSUE:
Whether or not land is alienable.

HELD:
The SC affirmed by adhering to the Regalian Doctrine which subjects all agricultural,
timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of the State. Thus, before any land may be
declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural purposes, there must be a positive act from the Government. Even rules
on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified
as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere fact that a title
was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer any validity on such title if the
property covered by the title or patent is part of the public forest
Republic v. Sayo, G.R. No. 60413, 31 October 1990

FACTS:
Spouses Casiano and Luz Sandoval filed an application for a parcel of land originally
part of Santiago. The land had been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic
Act No. 236. The case went on until 20 years and after the Heirs of Sandoval, Heirs of
Bayaua, and the Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development entered a
compromise agreement, which effectively distributed parts of lot 7454 among the
aforesaid parties and the counsel of the Heirs of Sandoval as attorney's fees. The
compromise agreement was approved by the court and confirmed the title and
ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms. The Solicitor General filed a
complaint and contended that the Heirs of Sandoval et. al. did not present any
evidence to support their claims of ownership or registration, nor did the government
agencies involve have an authority to enter into the compromise agreement, and
finally, that he was not notified of the proceedings and so had not opportunity to take
part therein. As for the Heirs of Sandoval et.al.'s contention, they assert that the land
is not a public land as the possessory information title in their name and of their
predecessors-in-interest, the pre-war certification appearing in the Bureau of Archives,
and the fact that the proceeding of the registration was brought under the Torrens act
which presupposes an existing title to be confirmed, are all evidences that the land is
a private land.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land in question (Lot 7454) is a private land.

RULING:
NO. Under the Regalian Doctrine all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Unless the applicant succeeds
in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired
by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of public
lands, the property must be held to be part of the public domain. In the case at bar, it
appears that the principal document relied upon and presented by the applicants for
registration, to prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of their
application, was a photocopy of a certification of the National Library. Spanish
document cannot be considered a title to property, it not being one of the grants made
during the Spanish regime, and obviously not constituting primary evidence of
ownership. It is an inefficacious document on which to base any finding of the private
character of the land in question. The initiation of an application for registration of land
under the Torrens Act is proof that the land is of private ownership, not pertaining to
the public domain, is to beg the question. It is precisely the character of the land as
private which the applicant has the obligation of establishing. For there can be no
doubt of the intendment of the Land Registration Act, Act 496, that every applicant
shows a proper title for registration; indeed, even in the absence of any adverse claim,
the applicant is not assured of a favorable decree by the Land Registration Court if he
fails to establish a proper title for official recognition.
Republic v. Register of Deeds of Quezon, G.R. No. 74974, 21 May 1995

FACTS:
On April 18, 1967, Atienza was awarded FP No. 324198 over a parcel of land located
in Ila, Malicboy, Pagbilao, Quezon, with an area of 172,028 square meters. By virtue
of such award, he was issued on May 5, 1967, OCT No. P-13840.Through an
investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, it was found that the free patent
acquired by Petitioner was fraudulent. A case for falsification of public documents was
filed by Petitioner was acquitted of the crime. Subsequently, the Solicitor-General filed
a complaint against Petitioner, praying for the declaration of nullity of the Free Patent
and the OCT. Petitioner's main contention was that the land in question was no longer
within the unclassified public forest land because by the approval of his application for
Free Patent by the Bureau of Lands, the land was already alienable and disposable
public agricultural land. He also claimed that the land was a small portion of Lot 5139,
an area which had been declared disposable public land by the cadastral court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land is alienable and disposable public land

HELD:
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise clearly appearing to be privately-
owned are presumed to belong to the State. Forest lands, like mineral or timber lands
which are public lands, are not subject to private ownership unless they under the
Constitution become private properties. In the absence of such classification, the land
remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition. The task of administering and disposing lands of the public domain
belongs to the Director of Lands, and ultimately the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. Classification of public lands is, thus, an exclusive prerogative of
the Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no
authority to do so. Thus, in controversies involving the disposition of public agricultural
lands, the burden of overcoming the presumption of state ownership of lands of the
public domain lies upon the private claimant. In the present case, Petitioner failed to
present clear, positive, and absolute evidence to overcome said presumption and to
support his claim. Moreover, the fact the Petitioner acquired a title to the land is of no
moment, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of title issued under the Torrens System.
The indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by one who procured the
same by means of fraud. Fraud here means actual and extrinsic -- an intentional
omission of fact required by law. Petitioner committed fraud by his failure to state that
the land sought to be registered still formed part of the unclassified forest lands.
Philippine Telephone Corporation v. National Telecommunications
Commission, G.R. No. 138295, 28 August 2003

FACTS:
Petitioner, Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed a petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals seeking the nullification of the Order of respondent National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) which granted respondent International
Communications Corporation (ICC) Provisional Authority (PA) to construct, operate
and maintain local exchange services in some of the areas already covered by
petitioner's Provisional Authority. Among other things, petitioner contended that the
Order of the respondent is tantamount to confiscation of property without due process
of law. The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Philippine Telephone Corporation can claim exclusive operation in the
areas covered by its provisional authority.

RULING:
No. — Section 23 of EO 109 does not categorically state that the issuance of a PA is
exclusive to any telecommunications company. Neither Congress nor the NTC can
grant an exclusive "franchise, certificate, of any other form of authorization" to operate
a public utility. In Republic v. Express Telecommunications Co. , the Court held that
"the Constitution is quite emphatic that the operation of a public utility shall not be
exclusive." Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution provides:
Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be granted to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty
per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise,
certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty
years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition
that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the
common good so requires . . .
Thus, in Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. National
Telecommunications Commission , the Court ruled that the "Constitution mandates
that a franchise cannot be exclusive in nature.
Associated Communication & Wireless Services-United Broadcasting
Networks v. National Telecommunications Commission
G.R. No. 144109, 17 February 2003

FACTS:
In November 1911, Congress enacted Act No. 3846. In 1965, Congress granted
Marcos Villaverde, Jr. and Winfred Villaverde a franchise to construct, install, maintain,
and operate radio stations in the country. This franchise was transferred to Associated
Communications & Wireless Services-United Broadcasting Networks (ACWS) in
1969. In 1974, P.D. No. 576-A was issued A few years later or in 1979, E.O. No. 5464
was issued. It integrated the Board of Communications and the Telecommunications
Control Bureau under the Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972 into the NTC. Upon
termination of petitioner’s franchise on December 31, 1981 pursuant to P.D. No. 576-
A, it continued operating its radio stations under permits granted by the NTC.
Petitioner argued that contrary to the decision of respondent NTC, its application for
renewal of temporary permit to operate television Channel 25 does not require a
congressional franchise. The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the said
requirement provided under Act No. 3846 was not expressly repealed by PD No. 576-
A nor EO No. 546. Absent the express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed
as repealing a prior law unless there is an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy
in the language of the new and old laws, which petitioner was not able to show.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the ruling of the NTC that a
congressional franchise is a condition sine qua non in the operation of a radio and
television broadcasting system

RULING:
No. The appellate court was correct in ruling that “a congressional franchise is required
for the operation of radio and television broadcasting stations as this requirement
under Act 3846 was not expressly repealed by PD 576-A nor EO 546.” Even assuming
that Act No. 3846 applies only to radio stations and not to television stations as
petitioner adamantly insists, the subsequent P.D. No. 576-A clearly shows in Section
1 that a franchise is required to operate radio as well as television stations.
There is nothing in P.D. No. 576-A which reveals any intention to do away with the
requirement of a franchise for the operation of radio and television stations. Section 6
of P.D. No. 576-A merely identifies the regulatory agencies from whom authorizations,
in addition to the required congressional franchise, must be secured after December
31, 1981. Thus, while it is correct to say that specified agencies in the Executive
Branch have the power to issue authorization for certain classes of public utilities, this
does not mean that the authorization or CPC issued by the NTC dispenses with the
requirement of a franchise as this is clearly required under P.D. No. 576-A.
Wherefore, the petition is denied and the Court of Appeals' January 13, 2000 decision
and February 21, 2000 Resolution are affirmed. No costs.
SPS. ANTONIO FORTUNA and ERLINDA FORTUNA, petitioners
vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent, G.R. No. 173423, 5 March
2014

FACTS: The couples Fortuna filed an application for registration of a 2,597-square-

meter land known as Lot No. 4457 in Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando, La Union in
December 1994. The RTC received the application and docketed it as LRC No. 2372.
The RTC granted the application for registration in favor of the spouses Fortuna. The
CA reversed and set aside the RTC judgement in a decision. Despite the fact that the
spouses Fortuna were able to establish the land's alienable and disposable nature,
the court found that they failed to show that they had been in possession for the
required period of time, i.e., since June 12, 1945. It concurred with the Republic's claim
that Tax Declaration No. 8366 merely demonstrated that Pastora, Fortuna's
predecessor-in-interest, had only been in possession of the land since 1948.
Through the present petition, the spouses Fortuna seek a review of the CA rulings.
They argue that Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the Public Land Act
(PLA), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942, is the appropriate law. The PLA
was changed by RA No. 1942, which required 30 years of open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious occupation to gain imperfect title to public domain agricultural land. PD
No. 1073, on the other hand, eliminated the 30-year limit and instead required
possession to begin on June 12, 1945. The PRD's Section 14(1) incorporated the
adjustment made by PD No. 1073.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public
Land Act (PLA), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942 is applicable for
registration of a 2,597-square meter land identified as Lot No. 4457 in favor of the
spouses Fortuna.
RULING: THE PETITION HAS BEEN DENIED. The Court of Appeals' decision is
AFFIRMED inasmuch as it dismissed the spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna's
application for title registration.
Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that “[the] Decree shall take effect upon its
promulgation,” the Court has declared in Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al. that
the publication of laws is an indispensable requirement for its effectivity. Accordingly,
Section 6 of PD No. 1073 should be understood to mean that the decree took effect
only upon its publication, or on May 9, 1977. This, therefore, moves the cut-off date
for applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under Section
48(b) of the PLA to May 8, 1947. In other words, applicants must prove that they have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since May 8, 1947.
The spouses Fortuna were unable to prove that they possessed Lot No. 4457 since
May 8, 1947. Even if the Court assumes that Lot No. 4457 is an alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain, the spouses Fortuna’s application
for registration of title would still not prosper for failure to sufficiently prove that they
possessed the land since May 8, 1947.
Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74833, January 21, 1991

FACTS:
Thomas Cheesman, an American citizen and Criselda P. Cheesman, a Filipina, were
once a married couple until their separation in February 15, 1981. While they were still
together, a "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights" was executed conveying
a parcel of unregistered land and the house at Olongapo City in favor of Criselda P.
Cheesman. Thomas Cheesman, although aware of the deed, did not object to the
transfer being made only to his wife. Even during the time when the tax declarations
for the property purchased were issued in the name only of Criselda Cheesman as
well as when she assumed exclusive management and administration of said property
and leasing it to tenants, Thomas Cheesman did not protest.

However, when Criselda P. Cheesman sold the property to Estelita M. Padilla on July
1, 1981, without the knowledge or consent of Thomas Cheesman, the latter filed a
case against his wife for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction
had been executed without his knowledge and consent. After continuous hearing of
the case, the Trial Court rendered a "Summary Judgment" declaring the sale executed
by Criselda Cheesman in favor of Estelita Padilla to be valid, dismissing Thomas
Cheesman's complaint and ordering him "to immediately turn over the possession of
the house and lot Estelita Padilla. Thomas Cheesman appealed to the Intermediate
Appellate Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower courts failed to declare that Thomas Cheesman's citizenship
is not a bar to his action to recover the lot and house for the conjugal partnership.

RULING:
The Court is very clear that the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of
residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in
cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain."
Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him
and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase;
and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely,
he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. The
petitioner had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of
the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising
the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory
would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property
were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not
insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to
its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to
have.
MULLER V. MULLER, G.R. NO. 149615, AUGUST 29, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in
Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. In 1992, the couple decided to move and
reside permanently in the Philippines and by this time, respondent had inherited the
house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the
purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal. The Antipolo property was registered
in the name of petitioner of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila. However,
the couple got separated due to incompatibilities and respondent's alleged
womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment.
Respondent then filed a petition for separation of properties before RTC- Quezon City.
The trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute community
of property between the petitioner and respondent and it decreed the separation of
properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located
within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage.
With regards to the Antipolo property, the court held that that respondent cannot
recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article
XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the
acquisition of the Antipolo property.

RULING:
The respondent is NOT entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition
of the Antipolo property.

Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that, “Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”
The Court held that aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from
acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring
private lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation
of national patrimony.
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception
of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural
lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens.
Thus, respondent's disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute.
Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in
violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can
result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow
circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
Philip Matthews v. Benjamin Taylor and Joselyn Taylor,
G.R. No. 164584, 22 June 2009

FACTS:
Benjamin Taylor, a British subject, was married to Joselyn Taylor on June 30, 1988.
While their marriage was subsisting, the couple bought a parcel of land in Boracay.
The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. All required permits and licenses for the
operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyn’s sister.
When the relationship turned sour, Joselyn ran away with another man. In 1992, she
executed a special power of attorney in favor of Benjamin so he could maintain, sell,
lease, and sublease the property in Boracay.
Later that year, Joselyn entered into an agreement of lease with Philip Matthews. In
the contract of agreement, Benjamin’s signature appeared on the last page under the
phrase “signed in the presence of.” However, Benjamin later instituted an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages because his consent was
not obtained and that the property was conjugal. Matthews claimed he was in good
faith.

ISSUE:
Does Benjamin’s non-consent nullify the Agreement of Lease?

RULING:
No. It is a clear mandate from the Constitution that aliens may not be able to acquire
lands in the Philippines if they do not fall within the exceptions. The pertinent
constitutional provision is Article XII, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution, which states
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain.
Hence, even if the property was purchased by the alien, he cannot claim that trust was
created in his favor because the contract was illegal to begin with. Since in the Deed
of Sale, Joselyn’s name was listed as the vendee, she acquired sole ownership
thereto. Thus, Benjamin’s consent is not even required in the lease agreement.
Frenzel v. Catito, G.R. No. 143958, 11 July 2003

FACTS:
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent who was
married to Teresita Santos, a Filipino citizen. He works as a pilot for New Guinea
Airlines. On the other hand, private respondent Ederlina P. Catito was married to Klaus
Muller, a German national. She worked as a masseuse in the King’s Cross nightclub
in Sydney, Australia. The two met when Alfred went on a vacation in Sydney. They
met again and this time, Alfred was able to convince Ederlina to stop working and to
go back to the Philippines. When she returned to the Philippines, she was given money
by Alfred to put up a beauty salon. Later on, he also gave money to her to be able to
purchase a house and lot in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. Since he was
aware that aliens were prohibited to purchase lands, he agreed to have Ederlina as
the sole vendee. Later also, they opened two bank accounts with the Hong Kong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation in Kowloon, Hong Kong. In addition, there were
subsequent purchases of other real and personal properties. These were made on the
anticipation on the part of Alfred that he and Ederlina will get married soon. However,
this failed to materialize because of the fact that Ederlina was still married to Klaus.
Ederlina failed to secure a divorce from Klaus. Thus, Alfred filed a complaint before
the RTC of Davao City for recovery of real and personal properties. He demanded
from Ederlina that she return all the money that were used to purchase the properties
and also the properties which were bought, especially the house and lot and three
other lots.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Alfred is entitled to recover the said properties.

RULING:
No. The contention of petitioner Frenzel that to bar him from recovering the properties
would be in violation of Article 22 of the Civil Code on unjust enrichment holds no
water. It must be remembered that a contract which violates the Constitution and the
laws is void and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It does not produce any
legal effect. His reliance on Article 22 is misplaced because in this case, the action is
proscribed by the Constitution or the parties are in pari delicto. This is founded on the
general principles of public policy. It must be remembered that Alfred knew all along
that he was disqualified from purchasing lands. His contention that he entered into the
transaction because he was expecting that he and Ederlina will get married in the
future is not a valid one. He also knew that he cannot get married to Ederlina because
he still had a valid existing marriage with Teresita Santos.
Halili vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113539, 12 March 1997

FACTS:
Petitioners appealed from the decision of the MTC and RTC ruling that Helen
Guzman’s (American citizen) waiver of her inheritance in favor of her son was not
contrary to the constitutional prohibition against the sale of land to an alien.
Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real
properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow, defendant-appellee
Helen Meyers Guzman, and his son, defendant-appellee David Rey Guzman, both of
whom are also American citizens. Helen executed a deed of quitclaim assigning,
transferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests in and over
six parcels of land which the two of them inherited from Simeon. Subsequently, David
Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to defendant-appellee Emiliano Cataniag.

Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint questioning the
constitutionality and validity of the two conveyances and claiming ownership thereto
based on their right of legal redemption under Art. 1621[5] of the Civil Code.

ISSUES:
Were the petitioners entitled to a right of redemption?
Was the sale of the lot to defendant-appellee Cataniag valid?

RULING:
NO. The petitioners were not entitled to a right of redemption. The subject land is
urban. Thus, petitioners have no right to invoke Art. 1621 of the Civil Code, which
presupposes that the land sought to be redeemed is rural.

YES. The sale to Cataniag is valid. Non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private
lands or to lands of the public domain. But what is the effect of a subsequent sale by
the disqualified alien vendee to a qualified Filipino citizen? Jurisprudence is consistent
that if the land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen
or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and
the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Since the disputed land is now owned by
Private Respondent Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer
be assailed. The objective of the constitutional provision — to keep our land in Filipino
hands — has been served.