223. ROCES vs.

HRET
FACTS: Miles Roces & Harry Ang-Ping competitors for 3rd Leg. Dist. of Manila, registered voter
Alejandro Gomez challenged Ang-Ping’s qualification (being not a natural-born citizen), responded by
withdrawing candidacy, substituted by wife Zenaida. COMELEC denied due course, votes in favor not
counted. Case was pending before 1st Div. when COMELEC en banc (motu proprio) issued assailed Res.
striking out Ang-Ping’s name & denying Mrs. Ang-Ping’s substitution before the expiration of the
reglementary period. Filed case before HRET w/c gave due course & permitted substitution. Roces files
Certiorari.
ISSUE: Which body has jurisdiction in the case at bar?
HELD: HRET exercises sole jurisdiction & has power to determine jurisdiction, procedure, etc. COMELEC
Res. was void for violating due process (opportunity to be heard was systematically denied). Did not commit
grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari DISMISSED.

224. Seneres v. Comelec

FACTS: Melquiades Robles was elected president and chairperson of BUHAY, a party-list group duly
registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The constitution of BUHAY provides for a
three-year term for all its party officers, without re-election. BUHAY participated in the 2001 and 2004
elections, with Robles as its president. All the required Manifestations of Desire to participate in the said
electoral exercises, including the Certificates of Nomination of representatives, carried the signature of
Robles as president of BUHAY. On January 26, 2007, in connection with the May 2007 elections, BUHAY
again filed a Manifestation of its Desire to participate in the Party-List System of Representation. As in the
past two elections, the manifestation to participate bore the signature of Robles as BUHAY president.
Dr. Hans Christian Señeres, on the other hand, filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to
Certificates. In it, Señeres alleged that he was the acting president and secretary-general of BUHAY, having
assumed that position since August 17, 2004 when Robles vacated the position. Señeres also claim that the
nominations made by Robles (nominations pertaining as to who should represent BUHAY in Congress)
were, for lack of authority, void owing to the expiration of the latter’s term as party president. Furthermore,
Señeres asserted that Robles was, under the Constitution, disqualified from being an officer of any political
party, the latter being the Acting Administrator of the Light Railway Transport Authority (LRTA), a
government-controlled corporation. Robles, so Señeres would charge, was into a partisan political activity
which civil service members, like the former, were enjoined from engaging in.
ISSUE: Whether Robles should be disqualified as president of BUHAY.
HELD: NO. Robles is not disqualified as the president of BUHAY. His being the chairman of LRTA and
the president of BUHAY, a party-list group, is not compatible. There is no law prohibiting that the LRTA
chair cannot be a president of a party-list group. Further, Robles is not guilty of electioneering. Robles’ act
of nominating BUHAY representatives to Congress is not electioneering. The crime electioneering is clearly
defined under Section 79 (b) of the Omnibus Election Code but Robles did not commit any act defined
thereunder.

MAIN POINT: As a general rule, officers and directors of a corporation hold over after the expiration of
their terms until such time as their successors are elected or appointed. The holdover doctrine has, to be sure,
a purpose which is at once legal as it is practical. It accords validity to what would otherwise be deemed as
dubious corporate acts and gives continuity to a corporate enterprise in its relation to outsiders.

227. Perez v. Comelec

FACTS: Aguinaldo filed his COC for Representative of the Third District of Cagayan (TDC) for the
elections. Petitioner, filed in the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of Aguinaldo on the ground
that he had not been a resident of the district for at least one (1) year immediately before the day of the
elections. The COMELEC, dismissed the petition for disqualification, finding Aguinaldo qualified to run.
Aguinaldo won the election and was proclaimed elected and, he was sworn in office.
Aguinaldo asks that the petition be dismissed contending that after his proclamation and his assumption of
office, the COMELEC lost jurisdiction to pass upon his qualifications for the office of Representative. He
argues further that this case should have been filed with the HRET.
ISSUE: Does the COMELEC have jurisdiction to entertain instant petition and eventually pass upon
Aguinaldo’s eligibility for the office of Representative of the Third District of Cagayan?
HELD: No. Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the continuation of proceedings for disqualification even
after the elections if the respondent has not been proclaimed. The COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to
entertain the motion because the proclamation of private respondent barred further consideration of
petitioner's action. In the same vein, considering that at the time of the filing of this petition on June 16,
1998, private respondent was already a member of the House of Representatives, this Court has no
jurisdiction over the same.
Pursuant to Art. VI, §17 of the Constitution, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the
exclusive original jurisdiction over the petition for the declaration of Respondent's ineligibility.

228. Aggabao v. Comelec

FACTS: During the canvassing of the certificates of canvass of votes (COCV), Respondent Miranda,
moved for the exclusion of the 1st copy of the COCV on grounds that it was tampered with; prepared under
duress; differed from other authentic copies and contained manifest errors.
Aggabao objected arguing that the grounds raised by Miranda are proper only for a pre-proclamation
controversy which is not allowed in elections for Members of the House of Representatives. The
reconstituted Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) excluded from canvass the contested COCVs and used
instead the 4th and 7th copies of the COCVs. Based on the results, Miranda garnered the highest number of
votes and was proclaimed as the duly elected Congressman for the 4th District of Isabela.
ISSUE: Is Aggabao’s petition best addressed to the HRET?
HELD: Yes. The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns,
and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s
own jurisdiction begins. It is undisputed that Miranda has already been proclaimed, taken his oath and
assumed office.
As such, Aggabao’s recourse would have been to file an electoral protest before the HRET. His remedy is
not this petition for certiorari. The allegation that Miranda’s proclamation is null and void ab initio does not
divest the HRET of its jurisdiction
In an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath
of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The
reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction
between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people’s mandate.

229. Barbers v. Comelec

FACTS: The COMELEC sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of Senators
promulgated Resolution based on the COC’s. Biazon was proclaimed as the first duly elected Senator in the
elections. Barbers filed a petition claiming that the proclamation of Biazon was "illegal and premature being
based on an incomplete canvass” and filed an Omnibus Motion for Immediate Service of Summons, for
Suspension of the Effects of Proclamation, and to Set Case for Hearing.
The COMELEC DENIES the petition to annul the proclamation of Biazon for lack of merit. Accordingly,
the Special Division RESTATES the proclamation of the COMELEC Sitting en banc as the NBC declaring
Biazon as the duly elected 12th Senator. Barbers filed a motion for reconsideration which the COMELEC en
banc denied in the second assailed resolution.
ISSUE: Does the COMELEC have the exclusive jurisdiction to decide this case?
HELD: No. It is the Senate Electoral Tribunal that has the exclusive jurisdiction in light of Sec. 17, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution. The word “sole” underscores the exclusivity of the SET’s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to members of the Senate. The authority conferred upon the SET is categorical and
complete. It is therefore clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. Since
Barbers contests Biazon’s proclamation as the 12 th of the winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which
has exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers’ complaint. For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral
protest against Biazon would usurp the constitutional functions of the SET.

230. Rasul v. Comelec

FACTS: Respondent, Oreta, was proclaimed as the 12th winning candidate in the May 1998 senatorial
elections. Petitioner questioned the said proclamation arguing that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion when, acting as a National Board of Canvassers, it declared that the remaining uncanvassed
certificates would no longer affect the results and proceeded to proclaim the twelve (12) winning candidates.
She contends that if the number of registered voters who have yet to cast their votes where special elections
have been suspended is combined with the uncanvassed votes from other areas of the country, there is a
possibility that the 12th ranking senatorial candidate, Teresa Aquino-Oreta could be dislodged by the l3th
placer, Roberto Pagdanganan.
The petitioner submits that the inclusion of Aquino-Oreta among the winning candidates was premature and
based on incomplete canvass. Thus, she filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Does the Senate Electoral Tribunal have jurisdiction over the case?
HELD: YES. Sec. 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as well as Section 250 of the Omnibus Election
Code provide that "the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members..."
The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters
affecting the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that "election"
referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and
the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the
winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of
the election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against
the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of
candidacy.
The word “sole” in the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code underscores the exclusivity of the
Tribunal’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.
Inasmuch as petitioner is contesting the proclamation of Aquino-Oreta as the 12th winning candidate, her
proper recourse is to file a regular election protest which pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal.

232. Villarosa v. HRET

FACTS: The provincial board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the winning candidate. In her COC,
petitioner wrote “JTV” as her “nickname/stagename.” The HRET agreed with the COMELEC in
disallowing petitioner to use JTV as her nickname because it was not her nickname with which she was
popularly known. HRET also invoked rule 14 of section 211 of the Omnibus Election code providing that
votes containing initials only shall be considered stray.
Petitioner assails the HRET decision, reiterates the issue of the validity of the JTV votes, and charges the
HRET with grave abuse of discretion and deprivation of her right to due process. She further asserted that
treating of the “JTV” votes as stray would result tot the disenfranchisement of the voters. She argues that
“JTV” was her designated nickname and the one that she used in her election propaganda materials. The
HRET ruled against the petitioner because in her affidavit she stated that she was known Girlie in ever
barangay, hence an admission that her nickname was not JTV but Girlie. The counting of JTV votes would
be tantamount to injustice because it allows the petitioner to have 2 nicknames.
ISSUE: Did the HRET commit grave abuse of discretion in not counting the votes for JTV or other
derivatives thereof in favor of the petitioner?
HELD: No. The Facts established in the case, reinforced by the admission of the parties during the
preliminary conferences conducted and during the oral arguments, lead the Court to no other conclusion that
the use of JTV as a nickname or stage name was a clever ruse or ploy to make a mockery of the election
process. Based on the facts the court ruled that HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in ruling
the JTV votes shall not be counted in favor of the petitioner because they are stray votes.
HRET correctly applied Rule 14, Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that there are
three different kinds of stray votes:
1. A vote containing initials only;
2. A vote which is illegible; and
3. A vote which does not sufficiently identify the candidate for whom it was intended.
A candidate must use his/her own nickname and not the nickname of any other person. Such
nickname must be indicated in the certificate of candidacy. Any vote bearing the incorrect nickname
will not be counted for such candidate.

234. Garcia v. HRET

FACTS: On May 29, 1998, within the prescribed 10-day period, a quo warranto petition was filed to
question eligibility of Congressman-elect Angping. Petitioner claims that the latter was not a natural-born
Filipino citizen. However, on June 10, 1998, the petition for quo warranto was dismissed by HRET for
failing to pay the cash deposit which was required under Rule 32 of HRET Rules of Procedure. On June 26,
1998, petitioners paid the cash deposit after receiving the copy of the resolution. Petitioners filed a Motion
for Reconsideration but was further denied in view of Rule 32.
ISSUE: Did the HRET committ grave abuse of discretion in applying its Rules and dismissing the petition
for quo warranto?
HELD: No. HRET acted within its jurisdiction by applying its Rule on payment of the required cash deposit
for the petition to prosper. Its Rule states that if a party fails to make cash deposits or additional deposit
within the prescribed limit, the Tribunal may dismiss the protest.
The Court ruled that, due to the delicate nature of the charge, HRET Rules of Procedure must be taken
seriously to attain the objective – hence the technicalities must strictly be followed. Imperative justice
requires proper observance of technicalities precisely designed to ensure proper dispensation.
Certiorari cases are filed to question if lower courts acted within its jurisdiction without abuse amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition will only correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors conclusion
of the lower court. Any alleged errors committed in exercise of its discretion will be nothing more but an
error of judgment which are reviewable by appeal and not by special civil action.
Certiorari will only prosper if grave abuse of discretion or act without or in excess of jurisdiction is
manifested.