“To be gritty is to keep putting one foot in front of the other.

To be gritty is to hold fast to

an interesting and purposeful goal. To be gritty is to invest, day after week after year, in
challenging practice. To be gritty is to fall down seven times, and rise eight.”
Angela Lee Duckworth

Makalintal v. COMELEC

FACTS:

This pertains to the petition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine
Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that
he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it
that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the
instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.

ISSUES:

The petitioner raises three principal questions:

A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are
immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an
affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency
requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?

B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the
winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives including the
President and the Vice-President violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-
President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress?

C. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in

Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections
shall promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1,
Article IX-A of the Constitution?

HELD:
Lonzanida vs COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as
municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections. In the May
1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again
proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His
proclamation was contested and resulted to declaring his opponent winning the election
and ordered Lonzanida to vacate the office. In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida
again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent filed a petition for disqualification
on the grounds that it is a violation of the three-term rule. COMELEC granted the
petition. Petitioner filed a petition challenging the validity of the COMELEC resolution.

Issue: Whether petitioner’s assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1, 1998 is
considered full term of office for the purpose of three-term rule

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that it cannot be considered a full term of office for two
reasons, he cannot be considered elected as the proclamation was void and he also did
not voluntary renounce office, but was involuntary severance from office.
The petition is granted and the resolution of the COMELEC declaring petitioner
Lonzanida disqualified to run for mayor in the 1998 mayoral elections are hereby set
aside.
G.R. No. 163193 June 15, 2004
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent.
Facts:
Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System including the
assailed resolution, Resolution 6712, which provides for the electronic transmission of
advanced result of “unofficial” count. Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow
the preemption and usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes
for President and Vice-President and would likewise encroach upon the authority of
NAMFREL, as the citizens’ accredited arm, to conduct the "unofficial" quick count as
provided under pertinent election laws. Comelec contended that the resolution was
promulgated in the exercise of its executive and administrative power "to ensure free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections” Comelec added that the issue is
beyond judicial determination.
Issue:
Whether or not Comelec's promulgation of Resolution 6712 was justified.
Ruling:
The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing Resolution 6712. The issue squarely fell within the ambit of the
expanded jurisdiction of the court.
Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA 8436, vest upon
Congress the sole and exclusive authority to officially canvass the votes for the
elections of President and Vice-President. Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436,
solely authorize NAMFREL, the duly-accredited citizen’s arm to conduct the “unofficial
counting of votes for the national or local elections. The quick count under the guise of
an “unofficial” tabulation would not only be preemptive of the authority of congress and
NAMFREL, but would also be lacking constitutional and/or statutory basis. Moreover,
the assailed COMELEC resolution likewise contravened the constitutional provision that
"no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law." It being “unofficial”, any disbursement of public fund would be contrary to
the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003 General
Appropriations Act.
The Omnibus Election Code in providing the powers and functions of the Commission
subjects the same to certain conditions with respect to the adoption of the latest
technological and electronic devices, to wit: (1)consideration of the area and available
funds (2) notification to all political parties and candidates. The aforementioned
conditions were found to have not been substantially met.
Resolution 6712 was null and void.

Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15

FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal
gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee.
On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the HOR and, on December 7,
impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious
allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped
on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in
suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada.
As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution
panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against
Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the
crowd at EDSA Shrine.
Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this
election.
On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada “constructively resigned his post”.
At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the
14th President.
Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for
prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from
“conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as
president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge
the duties of his office.
ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.
RULING:
1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It
is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I
EDSA II
exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government.
exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President.
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it
cannot be the subject of judicial review
intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the
succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review.
presented a political question;
involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for
resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution:
Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under
Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential
immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner
against prejudicial publicity.
2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment.
Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing
material relevant issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive
resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as
confirmed by his leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his final
statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of
disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability
disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as
President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the
same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission
before, during and after January 20, 2001.
3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and
subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As
Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as
Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of Congress
recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise
that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected
his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and
addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove
that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave
on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid
to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-
equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes,
especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of
immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing
the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from
liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the
officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any
trespasser.
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible.
Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned
and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The
Court also said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity
given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform.
Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary
investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the
judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with
prosecution.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1, Estrada vs Arroyo Case Digest, Estrada vs Desierto
Case Digest
AKBAYAN VS AQUINO
DELIMA V DUTERTE
FACTS:
May 9, 2016: Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Roa Duterte was elected as the 16th President
of the Philippines with a key agenda of his Administration was the relentless national
crackdown on illegal drugs.
August 2, 2016: Sen. De Lima delivered a privilege speech on the floor of the Senate
calling a stop to the alleged extrajudicial killings committed in the course of the
crackdown.
Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data seeking to enjoin President Rodrigo
Roa Dutete from committing acts allegedly violative of her right to life, liberty and
security through his public statements:
August 11, 2016 public statement of President Duterte: “I know I’m the favorite whipping
boy of the NGOs and the human rights stalwarts. But, I have a special ano kaya no.
She is a government official. One day soon I will – bitiwan ko yan in public and I will
have to destroy her in public.” Incidentally, in the same event, President Duterte
insinuated that with the help of another country, he was keeping surveillance of her.
“Akala nila na hindi rin ako nakikinig sa kanila. So while all the time they were also
listening to what I’ve done, I’ve also been busy, and with the help of another country,
listening to them.
The statement uttered in a briefing at the NAIA Terminal 3, Pasay City in August 17,
2016 wherein President Duterte named Sen. De Lima as the government office he
referred to earlier at the same time accused her of living an immortal life by having a
romantic affair with her driver, a married man, and of being involved in illegal drugs.
“There’s one crusading lady, whose even herself led a very immoral life, taking his
driver as her lover… Paramour niya ang driver nya nagging hooked rin sa drugs
because of the close association. You know, when you are an immoral, dirty woman,
the driver was married. So you live with the driver, its concubinage.
The statements that described her an immoral woman; that publicized her intimate and
personal life, starting from her new boyfriend to her sexual escapades; that told of her
being involved in illegal drugs as well as in activities that included her construction of a
house for her driver/lover with financing from drug-money
Statements that threatened her (“De Lima, you are finished”) and demeaned her
womanhood and humanity. If I were De Lima, ladies and gentlemen, I’ll hang myself.
Your life has been, hindi lang life, the innermost of your core as a female is being
serialized everyday. Dapat kang mag-resign. You resign. And “De Lima better hang
yourself… Hindi ka na naghiya sa sarili mo. Any other woman would have slashed her
throat. You? Baka akala mo artista ka. Mga artistang x-rated paglabas sa, paktapos
ng shooting, nakangiti…”
Sen. De Lima traces his animosity towards her when she 1st encountered President
Durterte while he was still the City Mayor of Davao and she the Chairperson of the
Commission on Human Rights investigating the existence of the so-called “Davao
Death Squad.”

ISSUE: W/N Presidential’s immunity from suit can shield the President from being haled
to court
HELD: Dismissed even without the President invoking the privilege of immunity from
suit.
YES.
G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019
Immunity can be classified either by: a. extent i.e. absolute or qualified or b. duration i.e.
permanent or temporary
Extent:
Absolute immunity is granted to a government official who has proven that his actions
fell within the scope of his duties, and that his actions are discretionary rather than
ministerial – conduct or the action performed must not involve insignificant or routinely
office work but rather the challenged action must involve personal judgment. It attaches
to the function instead of the office.
Qualified immunity was initially given to a government official who was able to prove
that at the time of commission of the act complained of, he possessed a good faith that
his actions were lawful – subjective element determined with the two-tier test:
If the statutory or constitutional right asserted by the plaintiff was clear at the time of the
alleged wrongful action
Whether the official should reasonably have known the action was contrary to law
Duration:
Permanent or the immunity for speech or debate – immunity from liability in law suits
that arise out of the performance of public duties of democratic deliberation
Temporary or congressional immunity from arrest – to legislators from litigating even
private suits while “at Session” of Congress as public officers
Estrada v. Desierto (G.R. No. 146
710-15, March 2, 2001): Being a former President, President Estrada no longer enjoyed
immunity from suit
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006): Improper to implead
President Arroyo in a consolidated petition disputing the factual bases for Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5 declaring a state of national
emergency and called out the Armed Forces of the Philippines in her capacity as
Commander-in-Chief to maintain law and order throughout the country and to suppress
acts of lawless violence, insurrection or rebellion.
Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. No. 183871, February 18, 2010): Court upheld
the exclusion of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, maintaining that presidential
immunity from suit despite not being expressly reserved in the 1987 Constitution and
declared that the President could not be sued during her tenure in a petition for the
issuance of the writ of amparo against military, police personnel and the Office of the
Ombudsman and including President Arroyo.
Balao v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 186050, December 13, 2011): Court ruled that
RTC had erred in holding that Presidential immunity could not be invoked in amparo
proceedings

While the concept of immunity from suit originated elsewhere, the ratification of the
1981 constitutional amendments and the 1987 Constitution made our version of
presidential immunity unique. Section 15, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as
amended, provided for immunity at two distinct points in time: 1. Immunity during the
tenure of the President 2. Thereafter. Framer’s intended during tenure.
Presidential immunity does not hinge on the nature of the suit. It is not intended to
immunize the President from liability or accountability.
Rationale for the grant of immunity stated in Soliven v. Makasiar (G.R. No. 82585,
82827, 83979, November 14, 1988): To assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions fee from any hindrance of distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s
time, also demands undivided attention.
Rationale expanded in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo: It will degrade the dignity of the high
office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations
while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of
his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one
constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the
discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution
necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that
the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains
accountable to the people but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided
by law and that is by impeachment.
Passage in Soliven was made only to point out that it was the President by virtue of the
office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in
the President’s behalf and that it was the President who had gone to court as the
complainant
If the Court were to first require the President to respond to each and every complaint
brought against him, and then avail himself of presidential immunity on a case to case
basis, then the rationale for the privilege – protecting the President from harassment,
hindrance or distraction in the discharge of his duties – would very well be defeated.
Constitution provides remedies for violations committed by the Chief Executive except
an ordinary suit before the courts. The Chief Executive must 1st be allowed to end his
tenure (not his term) either through resignation or removal by impeachment.