24. A.C. No.

6484 June 16, 2015

ADELITA B. LLUNAR, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT, Respondent.

Issue:

The main issue in this case is whether Atty. Romulo Ricafort should be held liable for
grave misconduct, neglecting a legal matter, and violating ethical rules.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The present administrative case stemmed from the complaint-affidavit1 that Adelita B.
Llunar (complainant) filed against Atty. Romulo Ricafort (respondent) for gross and
inexcusable negligence and serious misconduct.

Antecedents

In September 2000, the complainant, as attorney-in-fact of Severina Bañez, hired the

respondent to file a case against father and son Ricardo and Ard Cervantes (Ard) for
the recovery of a parcel of land allegedly owned by the Bañez family but was
fraudulently registered under the name of Ricardo and later was transferred to Ard.

The property, which Ard had mortgaged with the Rural Bank of Malilipot, Albay,
was the subject of foreclosure proceedings at the time the respondent was hired. The
respondent received from the complainant the following amounts: (a) ₱70,000.00 as
partial payment of the redemption price of the property; (b) ₱19,000.00 to cover the
filing fees; and (c) ₱6,500.00 as attorney's fees.

Three years later, the complainant learned that no case involving the subject
property was never filed by the respondent with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Legaspi City. Thus, the complainant demanded that the respondent return to her the
amount of ₱95,000.00.

The respondent refused to return the whole amount of ₱95,000.00 to the

complainant. He argued that a complaint for annulment of title against Ard Cervantes
had actually been filed in court, though not by him, but by another lawyer, Atty. Edgar
M. Abitria. Thus, he was willing to return only what was left of the ₱95,000.00 after
deducting therefrom the ₱50,000.00 that he paid to Atty. Abitria as acceptance fee for
handling the case.

The complainant refused to recognize the complaint for annulment of title filed by
Atty. Abitria and claimed that she had no knowledge of Atty. Abitria's engagement as
counsel. Besides, the complaint was filed three (3) years late and the property
could no longer be redeemed from the bank. Also, the complainant discovered that
the respondent had been suspended indefinitely from the practice of law since May 29,
2002, pursuant to this Court's decision in Administrative Case No. 5054,3 which the
complainant suspected was the reason another lawyer, and not the respondent, filed
the complaint for annulment of title in court.

In a resolution4 dated February 2, 2005, the Court referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.

In a report5 dated May 22, 2009, IBP Investigating Commissioner Cecilio C.

Villanueva found the respondent to have been grossly negligent in handling the
complainant's case and to have gravely abused the trust and confidence reposed in him
by the complainant, thereby, violating Canons 156 and 17,7 and Rules
1.01,8 16.03,9 18.03,10 and 18.0411 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

OLD CPR

CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY

IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE

SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due
or upon demand.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

NEW CPRA

Canon II, Section 1. Proper conduct. — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.

Canon II, Section 2. Dignified conduct. — A lawyer shall respect the law, the courts,
tribunals, and other government agencies, their officials, employees, and processes,
and act with courtesy, civility, fairness, and candor towards fellow members of the bar.
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on one’s fitness to practice
law, nor behave in a scandalous manner, whether in public or private life, to the
discredit of the legal profession.

Canon III, Section 3. Lawyer-client relationship. — A lawyer-client relationship is of

the highest fiduciary character. As a trust relation, it is essential that the engagement is
founded on the confidence reposed by the client on the lawyer. Therefore, a lawyer-
client relationship shall arise when the client consciously, voluntarily and in good faith
vests a lawyer with the client’s confidence for the purpose of rendering legal services
such as providing legal advice or representation, and the lawyer, whether expressly or
impliedly, agrees to render such services.

Canon IV, Section 1. Competent, efficient and conscientious service. — A lawyer

shall provide legal service that is competent, efficient, and conscientious. A
lawyer shall be thorough in research, preparation, and application of the legal
knowledge and skills necessary for an engagement.
Also, the Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have erred in not
informing his client that he was under indefinite suspension from the practice of
law. Due to these infractions, Commissioner Villanueva recommended that the
respondent remain suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.

In Resolution No. XIX-2011-224 dated May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
agreed with the Investigating Commissioner's findings on the respondent's liability but
modified the recommended penalty from indefinite suspension to disbarment.12 It
also ordered the respondent to return to the complainant the amount of ₱95,000.00
within thirty (30) days from notice. The respondent moved for reconsideration.

In his motion for reconsideration,13 the respondent argued that his referral of the
complainant's case to Atty. Abitria was actually with the complainant's knowledge
and consent; and that he paid Atty. Abitria ₱50,000.00 for accepting the case. These
facts were confirmed by Atty. Abitria in an affidavit 14 dated November 17, 2004, but
were alleged to have been overlooked by Commissioner Villanueva in his report. The
IBP Board . of Governors, in Resolution No. XX-2013-710 dated June 21, 2013, denied
the respondent's motion for reconsideration.15

Our Ruling

We find the respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct in his dealings with his client and
in engaging in the practice of law while under indefinite suspension, and thus impose
upon him the ultimate penalty of DISBARMENT.

The respondent in this case committed several infractions making him liable for
grave misconduct. First, the respondent did not exert due diligence in handling the
complainant's case. He failed to act promptly in redeeming the complainant's property
within the period of redemption. What is worse is the delay of three years before a
complaint to recover the property was actually filed in court. The respondent clearly
dilly-dallied on the complainant's case and wasted precious time and opportunity that
were then readily available to recover the complainant's property. Under these facts, the
respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which
states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."

Second, the respondent failed to return, upon demand, the amounts given to him by the
complainant for handling the latter's case. On three separate occasions, the respondent
received from the complainant the amounts of ₱19,000.00, ₱70,000.00, and ₱6,500.00
for purposes of redeeming the mortgaged property from the bank and filing the
necessary civil easels against Ard Cervantes. The complainant approached the
respondent several times thereafter to follow up on the easels to be filed supposedly by
the respondent who, in turn, reassured her that actions on her case had been taken.

After the complainant discovered three years later that the respondent had not filed any
case in court, she demanded that the respondent return the amount of ₱95,000.00, but
her demand was left unheeded. The respondent later promised to pay her, but until
now, no payment of any amount has been made. These facts confirm that the
respondent violated Canon 16 of the CPR, which mandates every lawyer to "hold in
trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession"16 and to
"account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client." 17 In
addition, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property he holds for his
client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated these funds or property for
his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by his
client.18

Third, the respondent committed dishonesty by not being forthright with the
complainant that he was under indefinite suspension from the practice of law. The
respondent should have disclosed this fact at the time he was approached by the
complainant for his services. Canon 15 of the CPR states that "a lawyer shall observe
candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients." The
respondent lacked the candor expected of him as a member of the Bar when he
accepted the complainant's case despite knowing that he could not and should not
practice law.

Lastly, the respondent was effectively in the practice of law despite the indefinite
suspension imposed on him. This infraction infinitely aggravates the offenses he
committed. Based on the above facts alone, the penalty of suspension for five (5) years
from the practice of law would have been justified, but the respondent is not an ordinary
violator of the profession's ethical rules; he is a repeat violator of these rules. In Nunez
v. Atty. Ricafort,19 we had adjudged the respondent liable for grave misconduct in failing
to turn over the proceeds of the sale of a property owned by his client and in issuing
bounced checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution issued by the court in the case for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 filed against him by his client. We then suspended
him indefinitely from the practice of law - a penalty short of disbarment. Under his
current liability - which is no different in character from his previous offense - we have
no other way but to proceed to decree his disbarment. He has become completely
unworthy of membership in our honorable profession.

With respect to the amount to be returned to the complainant, we agree with the
IBP that the respondent should return the whole amount of ₱95,000.00, without
deductions, regardless of whether the engagement of Atty. Abitria as counsel was with
the complainant's knowledge and consent.

In the first place, the hiring of Atty. Abitria would not have been necessary had
the respondent been honest and diligent in handling the complainant's case from
the start. The complainant should not be burdened with the expense of hiring another
lawyer to perform the services that the respondent was hired to do, especially in this
case where there was an inexcusable non-delivery of such services.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is hereby DISBARRED from the

practice of law and his name REMOVED from the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately upon his receipt of this Decision. Also, he is ORDERED to RETURN the
amount of ₱95,000.00 to complainant Adelita B. Llunar, within thirty (30) days from
notice of this Decision.
Issue:

The main issue in this case is whether the gross negligence and failure of Legarda's
lawyer to inform her of the adverse judgment and take any action to defend her in the
case warrants the annulment of the judgment and the reconveyance of her property.

25. G.R. No. 94457 June 10, 1992

VICTORIA LEGARDA, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, NEW CATHAY HOUSE, INC. and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 94, respondents.

R E S O L U T I ON

PER CURIAM:

Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the defendant in a complaint for specific

performance with damages filed by private respondent New Cathay House, Inc. before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The complaint was aimed at compelling
Victoria Legarda to sign a lease contract involving her house and lot at 123 West
Avenue, Quezon City which New Cathay House, Inc. intended to use in operating a
restaurant.1

As prayed for in the complaint, the lower court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining Victoria Legarda and her agents from stopping the renovation of the
property which was being done by New Cathay House, Inc. After hearing, the lower
court issued a writ of preliminary injunction.

Thereafter, Antonio P. Coronel of the Coronel Law Office at 146 Katipunan Road,
White Plains, Quezon City, entered his appearance as counsel for Victoria Legarda.
He also filed an urgent motion for an extension of ten (10) days from February 6,
1985 within which to file an answer to the complaint. The motion was granted by the
court which gave Victoria Legarda until February 20, 1985 to answer the complaint.

However, Victoria Legarda failed to file her answer within the extended period
granted by the court. Hence, upon motion of New Cathay House, Inc., she was declared
in default, thereby paving the way for the presentation of evidence ex parte.

On March 25, 1985, the lower court rendered a decision by default. It ordered
Victoria Legarda to execute and sign the lease contract and to pay the following:
(a) exemplary damages of P100,000.00, (b) actual and compensatory damages in the
total amount of P278,764.37 and (c) attorney's fees of P10,000.00.
Atty. Coronel received a copy of the lower court's decision on April 9, 1985 but he
did not interpose an appeal therefrom within the reglementary period.
Consequently, the decision became final and, upon motion of New Cathay House,
Inc., the lower court issued a writ of execution. In compliance with the writ, on June 27,
1985, the sheriff levied upon, and sold at public auction, the property subject of
the litigation to New Cathay House, Inc., the highest bidder. The sheriff's certificate of
sale was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

The one-year redemption period having expired on July 8, 1986, the sheriff issued a
final deed of sale which, on July 11, 1986, was duly registered with the Office of the
Register of Deeds. On November 6, 1986, Victoria Legarda, represented by her
attorney-in-fact Ligaya C. Gomez, filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for
annulment of the judgment against her in Civil Case No. Q-43811. She alleged therein
that the decision was obtained through fraud and that it is not supported by the
allegations in the pleadings nor by the evidence submitted.

Forthwith, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from dispossessing petitioner of the premises in question. Private
respondent New Cathay House, Inc. then filed its consolidated comment on the petition
with a motion for the lifting of the temporary restraining order. Victoria Legarda, through
Atty. Coronel, filed a reply to the consolidated comment. The petition was thereafter
orally argued. Required by the Court of Appeals to manifest if the parties desired to file
their respective memoranda, Dean Coronel informed the appellate court that he was
adopting Victoria Legarda's reply to the consolidated comment as her memorandum.

The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision on November 29, 1989. On the issue of
fraud, for which Victoria Legarda claimed that Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., who
represented New Cathay House, Inc., made her believe through false pretenses that
he was agreeable to the conditions of the lease she had imposed on the lessee and that
the latter would withdraw the complaint against her, thereby prompting her to advise her
lawyer not to file an answer to the complaint anymore, the Court of Appeals 2 said:

On the other hand, petitioner's above allegation of fraud supposedly practiced upon
her by Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. is so improbable as to inspire belief. For the Coronel Law
Office had already entered its appearance as petitioner's counsel by then, so that if it
were true that Cabrera had already agreed to the conditions imposed by petitioner, said
law office would have asked plaintiff to file the proper motion to dismiss or withdraw
complaint with the Court, and if plaintiff had refused to do so, it would have filed
defendant's answer anyway so that she would not be declared in default.

Or said law office would have prepared a compromise agreement embodying the
conditions imposed by their client in the lease contract in question which plaintiffs had
allegedly already accepted, so that the same could have been submitted to the Court
and judgment on a compromise could be entered. All these, any conscientious
lawyer of lesser stature than the Coronel Law Office, headed by no less than a
former law dean, Dean Antonio Coronel, or even a new member of the bar, would
normally have done under the circumstances to protect the interests of their client,
instead of leaving it to the initiative of plaintiff to withdraw its complaint against
defendant, as it had allegedly promised the latter.

Thus, it is our belief that this case is one of pure and simple negligence on the part of
the defendant's counsel, who simply failed to file the answer in behalf of defendant. But
counsel's negligence does not stop here. For after it had been furnished with copy of the
decision by default against defendant, it should then have appealed therefrom or file
(sic) a petition for relief from the order declaring their client in default or from the
judgment by default. Hence, defendant is bound by the acts of her counsel in this case
and cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different if it had
proceeded differently (Pulido v. C.A., 122 SCRA 63; Ayllon v. Sevilla, 156 SCRA 257,
among other cases). And the rationale of this rule is obvious and clear. For "if such
grounds were to be admitted as reasons for opening cases, there would never be an
end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and show
that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or learned"
(Fernandez v. Tan Tiong Tick, 1 SCRA 1138). (Emphasis supplied.)

Finding the second ground for the petition to be likewise unmeritorious, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition. Surprisingly, however, inspite of the Court of Appeals'
tirade on his professional competence, Atty. Coronel did not lift a finger to file a
motion for reconsideration. Neither did he initiate moves towards an appeal to this
Court of the decision which was adverse and prejudicial to his client.

Thus, the Court of Appeals decision became final. On December 8, 1989, counsel
for New Cathay House, Inc. sent petitioner through the Coronel Law Office, a letter
demanding that she vacate the property within three days from receipt thereof.
Atty. Coronel did not inform petitioner of this development until sometime in March,
1990. Due to petitioner's persistent telephone calls, Atty. Coronel's secretary informed
her of the fact that New Cathay House, Inc. had demanded her eviction from the
property. Consequently, petitioner had no recourse but to oblige and vacate the
property. 3

On August 7, 1990, Victoria Legarda, represented by a new counsel, 4 filed before this
Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 contending that the decisions of the courts
below "are null and void as petitioner was deprived of her day in court and divested
of her property without due process of law through the gross, pervasive and
malicious negligence of previous counsel, Atty. Antonio Coronel.5

In its decision of March 18, 1991, this Court declared as null and void the decisions
of March 25, 1985 and November 29, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
and the Court of Appeals, respectively, as well as the sheriff's certificate of sale
dated June 27, 1985 of the property involved and the subsequent final deed of sale
covering the same. The Court further directed private respondent New Cathay House,
Inc. to reconvey the property to the petitioner and the Register of Deeds to cancel
the registration of said property in the name of said private respondent and to issue a
new one in the name of the petitioner.

The same decision required the former counsel of petitioner, Atty. Antonio Coronel,
to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be held
administatively liable for his acts and omissions which resulted in grave injustice
to the petitioner. Said counsel having been inadvertently omitted in the service of
copies of said decision, 6 on February 11, 1992, the Clerk of Court of this Division to
which this case was transferred, sent Atty. Coronel a copy thereof which he received on
February 12, 1992. 7

On the tenth day from his receipt of said copy, Atty. Coronel filed an urgent ex-
parte motion for an extension of thirty (30) days from February 22, 1992 within which to
file his explanation. He alleged as reason for the motion pressure of work
"consisting of daily hearings in several forums and preparations of pleadings in equally
urgent cases, such as the more than 80 civil and criminal cases against the
Marcoses. 8

The Court, in its resolution of March 9, 1992, granted said motion for extension with
warning that no further extension will be given. Atty. Coronel received a copy of said
resolution on March 27, 1992 but it appears that on March 24, 1992, 9 a day after the
expiration of the 30-day extended period prayed for in his first motion for extension,
he had mailed another urgent motion for a second extension of thirty (30) days within
which to submit his explanation on the ground that since March 2, 1992, he had been
"treated and confined at the St. Luke's Hospital." Attached to the motion is a medical
certificate stating that Atty. Coronel had "ischemic cardiamyopathy, diabetes
mellitus, congestive heart failure class IV and brain infarction, thrombotic." 10

While off-hand, the reasons cited in the second motion for reconsideration seem to
warrant another extension, the fact that it was filed on day late, coupled with the
circumstances of this case do not call for a reconsideration of the resolution of March 9,
1992. Hence, the second motion for extension must be denied. Lawyers should not
presume that their motions for extension of time will always be granted by the Court.
The granting or denial of motions for extension of time is addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court with a view to attaining substantial justice. 11

It should be emphasized that the show-cause resolution was addressed to Atty.

Coronel not in his capacity as a lawyer of a litigant in this Court. It was addressed to him
in his personal capacity as a lawyer subject to the disciplinary powers of this Court. That
he failed to immediately heed the directive of the decision of March 18, 1991 to show
cause, notwithstanding the grant of a 30-day extension for him to do so, reflects an
unbecoming disrespect towards this Court's orders. We cannot countenance such
disrespect. As a lawyer, Atty. Coronel is expected to recognize the authority of this
Court and obey its lawful processes and orders. 12
Hence, the Court considers his failure to show cause, not-withstanding reasonable
notice therefor, as a waiver of his rights to be heard and to due process, thereby
warranting an ex parte determination of the matter for which he had been required to
explain. 13

The facts of the case clearly show that Atty. Coronel violated Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client
with competence and diligence." He failed to observe particularly Rule 18.03 of
the same Code which requires that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable."

Indeed, petitioner could not have gone through the travails attending the disposition of
the case against her not to mention the devastating consequence on her property rights
had Dean Coronel exercised even the ordinary diligence of a member of the Bar. By
neglecting to file the answer to the complaint against petitioner, he set off the events
which resulted in the deprivation of petitioner's rights over her house and lot. In this
regard, worth quoting is the observation of Justice Emilio A. Gancayco in
his ponencia of March 18, 1991:

Petitioner's counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and dean of a law school. It is

to be expected that he would extend the highest quality of service as a lawyer to
the petitioner. Unfortunately, counsel appears to have abandoned the cause of
petitioner. After agreeing to defend the petitioner in the civil case filed against her by
private respondent, said counsel did nothing more than enter his appearance and
seek for an extension of time to file the answer. Nevertheless, he failed to file the
answer. Hence, petitioner was declared in default on the motion of private
respondent's counsel. . . .

This is not the only case wherein, in dealing with this Court's orders, Atty. Coronel
appears to exhibit a pattern of negligence, inattention to his obligations as
counsel, sloppiness and superciliousness. In G.R. No. 97418, "Imelda R. Marcos, et
al. v. PCGG, et al., the Court en banc, in its Resolution of May 28, 1992, imposed upon
Atty. Coronel a fine of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) after he was found guilty of
inexcusable negligence in his failure to comply with this Court's resolutions. The Court
said:

We find the explanation for his failure to comply with the Resolutions of 4 June 1991
and 27 August 1991 unsatisfactory, Atty. Coronel had obviously taken this Court for
granted. Although he received a copy of the 4 June 1991 Resolution on 4 July 1991, he
nonchalantly let the 10-day period pass and even deliberately chose to remain silent
about it even after he received a copy of the Resolution of 27 August 1991. It was only
on the last day of the period granted to him under said Resolution that he showed initial
efforts to comply with the Resolution by filing a motion for a 20-day extension from 30
September 1991 to file the Reply. This was a self-imposed period and, therefore, he
was expected to faithfully comply with it not only because of the respect due this Court,
but also because he had put his honor and virtues of candor and good faith on the line.
For reasons only known to him, he did not. Worse despite his receipt on 27 November
1991 of the Resolution of 5 November 1991 which granted his 30 September 1991
motion, Atty. Coronel did not even move for a new period within which to comply with
the Resolutions of 4 June 1991 and 27 August 1991. This Court had to issue the
Resolution of 30 January 1992 to compel compliance. When he finally did, he
committed, allegedly through inadvertence, the blunder of placing his Reply under a
wrong caption.

For deliberately failing, if not stubbornly refusing, to comply with the Resolutions of 4
June 1991 and 27 August 1991 and meet his self-imposed deadline. Atty. Coronel was
both unfair and disrespectful to this Court. Furthermore, he has unduly delayed the
disposition of the pending incidents in this case. (Emphasis supplied.)

Undoubtedly, in the case at hand, Atty. Coronel's failure to exercise due diligence in
protecting and attending to the interest of his client caused the latter material
prejudice. 14 It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a client's cause,
he covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A
lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandons his client's cause makes him
unworthy of the trust reposed on him by the
latter. 15 Moreover, a lawyer owes fealty, not only to his client, but also to the Court of
which he is an officer. Atty. Coronel failed to obey this Court's order even on a
matter that personally affects him, such that one cannot avoid the conclusion that he
must be bent on professional self-destruction. Be that as it may, Atty. Coronel cannot
escape this Court's disciplinary action for gross negligence which resulted in depriving
petitioner of her property rights, for, as this Court enunciated in the aforecited Cantiller
v. Potenciano case:

Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this
jurisdiction. At a time when strong and disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the legal
profession, strict compliance with one's oath of office and the canons of professional
ethics is an imperative.

Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond reproach in
dealing with their clients. The profession is not synonymous with an ordinary business
proposition. It is a matter of public interest.

WHEREFORE, the second motion for an extension of time to file explanation is hereby
DENIED. Atty. Antonio P. Coronel is hereby found GUILTY of gross negligence in the
defense of petitioner Victoria Legarda in Civil Case No. Q-43811 and accordingly
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective from
the date of his receipt of this resolution. A repetition of the acts constituting gross
negligence shall be dealt with more severely.
[A.C. No. 3967. September 3, 2003.]

ARTEMIO ENDAYA, Complainant, v. ATTY. WILFREDO OCA, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The law is no brooding omnipresence in the sky, so spoke justice Holmes. He must have
made the statement because invariably the legal system is encountered in human form,
notably through the lawyers. For practical purposes, the lawyers not only represent the
law; they are the law. With their ubiquitous presence in the social milieu, lawyers have to
be responsible. The problems they create in lawyering become public difficulties. To
keep lawyers responsible underlies the worth of the ethics of lawyering. Indeed, legal
ethics is simply the aesthetic term for professional responsibility.

The case before us demonstrates once again that when a lawyer violates his duties to
his client, the courts, the legal profession and the public, he engages in conduct which is
both unethical and unprofessional.

This case unfolded with a verified Complaint filed on January 12, 1993 by complainant
Artemio Endaya against respondent Atty. Wilfredo Oca for violation of the lawyer’s
oath and what complainant termed as "professional delinquency or infidelity." The
antecedents are:

On November 7, 1991, a complaint for unlawful detainer docketed as Civil Case No.
34-MCTC-T was filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Taysan-Lobo, Batangas
by Apolonia H. Hornilla, Pedro Hernandez, Santiago Hernandez and Dominador
Hernandez against the complainant and his spouse Patrosenia Endaya.

On December 13, 1991, the complainant and his wife as defendants in the case filed
their answer which was prepared by a certain Mr. Isaias Ramirez. A preliminary
conference was conducted on January 17, 1992, which complainant and his wife
attended without counsel. During the conference, complainant categorically admitted
that plaintiffs were the declared owners for taxation purposes of the land involved in the
case. Continuation of the preliminary conference was set on January 31, 1992.
Thereafter, complainant sought the services of the Public Attorney’s Office in
Batangas City and respondent was assigned to handle the case for the complainant
and his wife.

At the continuation of the preliminary conference, respondent appeared as counsel for

complainant and his spouse. He moved for the amendment of the answer previously
filed by complainant and his wife, but his motion was denied. Thereafter, the court,
presided by Acting Trial Court Judge Teodoro M. Baral, ordered the parties to submit
their affidavits and position papers within ten days from receipt of the order. The
court also decreed that thirty days after receipt of the last affidavit and position
paper, or upon expiration of the period for filing the same, judgment shall be rendered
on the case.

Respondent failed to submit the required affidavits and position paper, as may be
gleaned from the Decision dated March 19, 1992 of the MCTC where it was noted that
"only the plaintiffs submitted their affidavits and position papers."

Nonetheless, the court dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer principally on
the ground that the plaintiffs are not the real parties-in-interest. The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, this case is hereby dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs have
no legal capacity to sue as they are not the real party (sic) in interest, in addition to
the fact that there is no privity of contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants as to
the verbal lease agreement.

SO ORDERED.

Plaintiffs appealed the Decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City,
Branch 1, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3378. On April 10, 1992, the
RTC directed the parties to file their respective memoranda. Once again,
respondent failed the complainant and his wife. As observed by the RTC in its
Decision dated September 7, 1992, respondent did not file the memorandum for his
clients, thereby prompting the court to consider the case as submitted for decision. 12

In its Decision, the RTC reversed the decision appealed from as it held that plaintiffs are
the co-owners of the property in dispute and as such are parties-in-interest. It also found
that the verbal lease agreement was on a month-to-month basis and perforce terminable
by the plaintiffs at the end of any given month upon proper notice to the defendants. 14 It
also made a finding that defendants incurred rentals in arrears. 15 The decretal portion
of the Decision reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Taysan-Lobo dated March 19, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and new one
entered, to wit:

Defendants ARTEMIO ENDAYA and PATROSENIA ENDAYA and all persons claiming
under them are hereby ordered to vacate and dismantle their house on the land
subject of the verbal lease agreement at their own expense. The defendants are
likewise ordered to pay the monthly rental of P25.00 from the month of January 1991 to
November 1991 and ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS monthly from December
1991 until the defendants finally vacate and surrender possession of the subject property
to the plaintiffs and to pay attorney’s fee in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00)
PESOS.

No pronouncement as to cost.
Complainant received a copy of the Decision on October 7, 1992. Two days later, or on
October 9, 1992, complainant confronted respondent with the adverse decision but
the latter denied receipt of a copy thereof. Upon inquiry with the Branch Clerk of
Court, however, complainant found out that respondent received his copy back on
September 14, 1992.

Having lost the unlawful detainer case, on January 12, 1993 complainant filed the
present administrative complaint against the respondent for professional
delinquency consisting of his failure to file the required pleadings in behalf of the
complainant and his spouse. Complainant contends that due to respondent’s
inaction he lost the opportunity to present his cause and ultimately the case itself.
18

In his Comment dated March 17, 1993, respondent denies that he committed
professional misconduct in violation of his oath, stressing that he was not the
original counsel of complainant and his spouse. He further avers that when he agreed
to represent complainant at the continuation of the preliminary conference in the main
case, it was for the sole purpose of asking leave of court to file an amended
answer because he was made to believe by the complainant that the answer was
prepared by a non-lawyer. Upon discovering that the answer was in fact the work of a
lawyer, forthwith he asked the court to relieve him as complainant’s counsel, but he was
denied. He adds that he agreed to file the position paper for the complainant upon the
latter’s undertaking to provide him with the documents which support the position that
plaintiffs are not the owners of the property in dispute. As complainant had reneged on
his promise, he claims that he deemed it more prudent not to file any position paper as it
would be a repetition of the answer. He offers the same reason for not filing the
memorandum on appeal with the RTC. Finally, respondent asserts that "he fully
explained his stand as regards Civil Case No. 34-MCTC-T to the complainant."

Pursuant to our Resolution 22 dated May 10, 1993, complainant filed his Reply to
respondent’s Comment wherein he merely reiterated his allegations in the Complaint.

On July 28, 1993, this Court directed respondent to file his rejoinder within ten days from
notice of our Resolution. But he failed to do so despite the lapse of a considerable period
of time. This prompted the Court to require respondent to show cause why he should not
be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt and to file his rejoinder, both within ten
(10) days from notice.

In his Explanation dated February 28, 1997, respondent admits having received a
copy of the resolution requiring him to file a rejoinder. However, he asserts that he
purposely did not file a rejoinder for "he believed in good faith that a rejoinder to
complainant’s reply is no longer necessary." He professes that in electing not to file a
rejoinder he did not intend to cast disrespect upon the Court.
On June 16, 1997, we referred this case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
evaluation, report and recommendation.

In its Report dated February 6, 2001, the Office of the Bar Confidant found respondent
negligent in handling the case of complainant and his wife and recommended that
he be suspended from the practice of law for one month. The pertinent portions of
the Report read, thus:

It is to be noted that after appearing at the preliminary conference before the

Municipal Circuit Trial Court, respondent was never heard from again. Respondent’s
seeming indifference to the cause of his client, specially when the case was on appeal,
caused the defeat of herein complainant. Respondent practically abandoned
complainant in the midst of a storm. This is even more made serious of the fact that
respondent, at that time, was assigned at the Public Attorney’s Office — a government
entity mandated to provide free and competent legal assistance.

"A lawyer’s devotion to his client’s cause not only requires but also entitles him to
deploy every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to
present every defense provided by law to enable the latter’s cause to succeed." (Miraflor
v. Hagad, 244 SCRA 106)

x x x

The facts, however, do not show that respondent employed every legal and honorable
means to advance the cause of his client. Had respondent tried his best, he could have
found some other defenses available to his client; but respondent was either too lazy or
too convinced that his client had a losing case.

x x x

For intentionally failing to submit the pleadings required by the court, respondent
practically closed the door to the possibility of putting up a fair fight for his client.
As the Court once held, "A client is bound by the negligence of his lawyer." (Diaz-Duarte
v. Ong, 298 SCRA 388) 31

However, the Bar Confidant did not find complainant entirely faultless. She observed,
viz:

Respondent’s allegation that complainant failed in his promise to submit the

documents to support his claim was not denied by complainant; hence, it is deemed
admitted. Complainant is not without fault; for misrepresenting that he could prove his
claim through supporting documents, respondent was made to believe that he had a
strong leg to stand on. "A party cannot blame his counsel for negligence when he
himself was guilty of neglect." (Macapagal v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 491) 32

On April 18, 2001, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.

Several hearings were set by the IBP but complainant did not appear even once.
Respondent attended five hearings, but he failed to present evidence in support of his
defense, as required by Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez. This
compelled the latter to make his report on the basis of the pleadings and evidence
forwarded by the Office of the Bar Confidant.

On October 11, 2002, Commissioner Fernandez issued his Report wherein he

concurred with the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant.

In a Resolution dated April 26, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the Report of
Commissioner Fernandez.

The Court is convinced that respondent violated the lawyer’s oath not only once but
a number of times in regard to the handling of his clients’ cause. The repeated
violations also involve defilement of several Canons in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Right off, the Court notes that respondent attributes his failure to file the required
pleadings for the complainant and his wife invariably to his strong personal belief that it
was unnecessary or futile to file the pleadings. This was true with respect to the
affidavits and position paper at the MCTC level, the appeal memorandum at the RTC
level and the rejoinder at this Court’s level. In the last instance, it took respondent as
long as three years, under compulsion of a show cause order at that, only to manifest
his predisposition not to file a rejoinder after all. In other words, at the root of
respondent’s transgressions is his seeming stubborn mindset against the acts required
of him by the courts. This intransigent attitude not only belies lack of diligence and
commitment but evinces absence of respect for the authority of this Court and the other
courts involved.

The lawyer’s oath embodies the fundamental principles that guide every member
of the legal fraternity. From it springs the lawyer’s duties and responsibilities that any
infringement thereof can cause his disbarment, suspension or other disciplinary action.
35

Found in the oath is the duty of a lawyer to protect and safeguard the interest of his
client. Specifically, it requires a lawyer to conduct himself "to the best of his knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients." 36 This duty is
further stressed in Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates
that" (A) lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence."
In this case, evidence abound that respondent failed to demonstrate the required
diligence in handling the case of complainant and his spouse. As found by the
Office of the Bar Confidant, after appearing at the second preliminary conference before
the MCTC, respondent had not been heard of again until he commented on the
complaint in this case. Without disputing this fact, respondent reasons out that his
appearance at the conference was for the sole purpose of obtaining leave of court
to file an amended answer and that when he failed to obtain it because of
complainant’s fault he asked the court that he be relieved as counsel. The
explanation has undertones of dishonesty for complainant had engaged respondent for
the entire case and not for just one incident. The alternative conclusion is that
respondent did not know his procedure for under the Rules on Summary Procedure the
amended answer is a prohibited pleading.

Even assuming respondent did in fact ask to be relieved, this could not mean that less
was expected from him. Once a lawyer takes the cudgels for a client’s case, he owes it
to his client to see the case to the end. This, we pointed out in Legarda v. Court of
Appeals, 40 thus:

It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants
that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails
to exercise due diligence or abandons his client’s cause make him unworthy of the trust
reposed on him by the latter. 41

Also, we held in Santiago v. Fojas, 42 "every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full
attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts if for a fee or for free." In other words, whatever the lawyer’s reason is for
accepting a case, he is duty bound to do his utmost in prosecuting or defending
it.

Moreover, a lawyer continues to be a counsel of record until the lawyer-client

relationship is terminated either by the act of his client or his own act, with permission
of the court. Until such time, the lawyer is expected to do his best for the interest of his
client.

Thus, when respondent was directed to file affidavits and position paper by the MCTC,
and appeal memorandum by the RTC, he had no choice but to comply. However,
respondent did not bother to do so, in total disregard of the court orders. This
constitutes negligence and malpractice proscribed by Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates that" (A) lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable."

Respondent’s failure to file the affidavits and position paper at the MCTC did not
actually prejudice his clients, for the court nevertheless rendered a decision favorable to
them. However, the failure is per se a violation of Rule 18.03.

It was respondent’s failure to file appeal memorandum before the RTC which
made complainant and his wife suffer as it resulted in their loss of the case. As found
by the Office of the Bar Confidant, to which we fully subscribe, in not filing the appeal
memorandum respondent denied complainant and his spouse the chance of putting up
a fair fight in the dispute. Canon 19 prescribes that" (A) lawyer shall represent his
client with zeal within the bounds of the law." He should exert all efforts to avail of the
remedies allowed under the law. Respondent did not do so, thereby even putting to
naught the advantage which his clients apparently gained by prevailing at the MCTC
level. Verily, respondent did not even bother to put up a fight for his clients. Clearly, his
conduct fell short of what Canon 19 requires and breached the trust reposed in him by
his clients.

We cannot sustain respondent’s excuse in not filing the affidavits and position paper
with the MCTC and the appeal memorandum with the RTC. He claims that he did not
file the required pleadings because complainant failed to furnish him with evidence that
would substantiate complainant’s allegations in the answer. He argues that absent the
supporting documents, the pleadings he could have filed would just be a
repetition of the answer. However, respondent admits in his comment that
complainant furnished him with the affidavit of persons purporting to be barangay
officials attesting to an alleged admission by Felomino Hernandez, the brother of the
plaintiffs in the unlawful detainer case, that he had already bought the disputed
property. 44 This did not precipitate respondent into action despite the evidentiary value
of the affidavit, which was executed by disinterested persons. Said affidavit could have
somehow bolstered the claim of complainant and his wife which was upheld by the
MCTC that plaintiffs are not the real parties-in-interest. While respondent could have
thought this affidavit to be without probative value, he should have left it to the sound
judgment of the court to determine whether the affidavit supports the assertions of his
clients. That could have happened had he filed the required position paper and annexed
the affidavit thereto.

Further, notwithstanding his belief that without the supporting documents filing the
required pleadings would be a futile exercise, still respondent should have formally and
promptly manifested in court his intent not to file the pleadings to prevent delay in the
disposition of the case. Specifically, the RTC would not have waited as it did for the
lapse of three months from June 5, 1992, the date when plaintiffs-appellants submitted
their appeal memorandum, before it rendered judgment. Had it known that respondent
would not file the appeal memorandum, the court could have decided the case much
earlier.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw library

For his failure to inform the court, respondent violated Canon 12, to wit:

Canon 12: A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Respondent likewise failed to demonstrate the candor he owed his client. Canon 17
provides that" (A) lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him." When complainant received the RTC
decision, he talked to respondent about it. 46 However, respondent denied knowledge
of the decision despite his receipt thereof as early as September 14, 1992. Obviously,
he tried to evade responsibility for his negligence. In doing so, respondent was
untruthful to complainant and effectively betrayed the trust placed in him by the latter.

On top of all these is respondent’s employment as a lawyer of the Public Attorney’s

Office which is tasked to provide free legal assistance for indigents and low-income
persons so as to promote the rule of law in the protection of the rights of the citizenry
and the efficient and speedy administration of justice. 47 Against this backdrop,
respondent should have been more judicious in the performance of his professional
obligations. As we held in Vitriola v. Dasig 48 "lawyers in the government are public
servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service." Furthermore, a lawyer from
the government is not exempt from observing the degree of diligence required in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 6 of the Code provides that "the canons
shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
tasks." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

At this juncture, it bears stressing that much is demanded from those who engage in
the practice of law because they have a duty not only to their clients, but also to
the court, to the bar, and to the public. The lawyer’s diligence and dedication to his
work and profession not only promote the interest of his client, it likewise help attain the
ends of justice by contributing to the proper and speedy administration of cases, bring
prestige to the bar and maintain respect to the legal profession. 49

The determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant attorney

involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the facts of the cases. 50 In
cases of similar nature, the penalty imposed by this Court consisted of reprimand, 51
fine of five hundred pesos with warning, 52 suspension of three months, six
months, 5and even disbarment in aggravated cases.

The facts and circumstances in this case indubitably show respondent’s failure to live up
to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer’s oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby warranting his suspension from the
practice of law. At various stages of the unlawful detainer case, respondent was remiss
in the performance of his duty as counsel.

To reiterate, respondent did not submit the affidavits and position paper when
required by the MCTC. With his resolution not to file the pleadings already firmed up, he
did not bother to inform the MCTC of his resolution in mockery of the authority of
the court. His stubbornness continued at the RTC, for despite an order to file an appeal
memorandum, respondent did not file any. Neither did he manifest before the court that
he would no longer file the pleading, thus further delaying the proceedings. He had no
misgivings about his deviant behavior, for despite receipt of a copy of the adverse
decision by the RTC he opted not to inform his clients accordingly. Worse, he denied
knowledge of the decision when confronted by the complainant about it.

At this Court’s level, respondent’s stubborn and uncaring demeanor surfaced again
when he did not file a rejoinder to complainant’s reply.

Respondent’s story projects in vivid detail his appalling indifference to his

clients’ cause, deplorable lack of respect for the courts and a brazen disregard of
his duties as a lawyer.

However, we are not unmindful of some facts which extenuate respondent’s

misconduct. First, when complainant sought the assistance of respondent as a
PAO lawyer, he misrepresented that his answer was prepared by someone who is
not a lawyer. Second, when complainant showed respondent a copy of their answer
with the MCTC, he assured him that he had strong evidence to support the defense in
the answer that plaintiffs were no longer the owners of the property in dispute. However,
all that he could provide respondent was the affidavit of the barangay officials. Last but
not least, it is of public knowledge that the Public Attorney’s Office is burdened with a
heavy caseload.

All things considered, we conclude that suspension for two (2) months from the
practice of law is the proper and just penalty.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wilfredo Oca is ordered SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for two (2) months from notice, with the warning that a similar
misconduct will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be attached to
respondent’s personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished
to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and to all the courts in the
land.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

OSELITO F. TEJANO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. BENJAMIN F. BATERINA,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a verified administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Benjamin F. Baterina.
The Facts

On 26 March 2009, Joselito F. Tejano filed an Affidavit-Complaint before the Office of

the Court Administrator (OCA) of the Supreme Court against Judge Dominador LL.
Arquelada, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Vigan City, Ilocos Sur,
Branch 21, and Tejano’s own counsel, Atty. Baterina.

Tejano accused Judge Arquelada of acting in conspiracy with Atty. Baterina for the
former to take possession of his (Tejano) property, which was the subject matter of
litigation in the judge’s court.

The case stems from Civil Case No. 4046-V, a suit for recovery of possession and
damages filed by Tejano, his mother and sisters against the Province of Ilocos Sur. The
property involved in the suit is a strip of land located at the northern portion of Lot
No. 5663 in Tamag, Vigan City. The lot was wholly owned by Tejano’s family, but the
Province of Ilocos Sur constructed an access road stretching from the provincial
highway in the east to the provincial government’s motor pool in the west without
instituting the proper expropriation proceedings.

The case was raffled off to Branch 21 of the Vigan City RTC in October 1988. Four
judges would hear the case before Judge Arquelada became the branch’s presiding
judge in 2001. Prior to his appointment to the bench, however, Judge Arquelada was
one of the trial prosecutors assigned to Branch 21, and in that capacity represented
the Province of Ilocos Sur in Civil Case No. 4046-V.4

In his Affidavit-Complaint, Tejano accused Judge Arquelada of colluding with Atty.

Baterina in the former’s bid to “take possession” of their property and was “collecting
rentals from squatters who had set up their businesses inside the whole of Lot [No.]
5663.” In support of his accusations, Tejano attached a copy of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-430045 covering Lot No. 5663 in the name of Karen Laderas, purportedly
the daughter of Judge Arquelada; receipts of rents paid to Terencio Florendo, sheriff
at Judge Arquelada’s sala at the Vigan City RTC; receipts of rents paid to Aida
Calibuso, who was expressly designated by Laderas as her attorney-in-fact in collecting
said rents; and receipts of rents paid to Edgar Arquelada, Judge Arquelada’s brother.

As to his counsel, Tejano claims that Atty. Baterina “miserably failed to advance [his]
cause.” Specifically, Tejano alleged that Atty. Baterina (1) failed to object when the
trial court pronounced that he and his co-plaintiffs had waived their right to present
evidence after several postponements in the trial because his mother was ill and
confined at the hospital; (2) manifested in open court that he would file a motion for
reconsideration of the order declaring their presentation of evidence terminated but
failed to actually do so; (3) not only failed to file said motion for reconsideration, but also
declared in open court that they would not be presenting any witnesses without
consulting his clients; and (4) failed to comply with the trial court’s order to submit their
formal offer of exhibits.
In a letter dated 27 March 2009, then Court Administrator (now Supreme Court
Associate Justice) Jose P. Perez informed Tejano that the OCA has no jurisdiction
over Atty. Baterina since it only has administrative supervision over officials and
employees of the judiciary. However, Tejano was informed to file the complaint
against his counsel at the Office of the Bar Confidant, and that the complaint against
Judge Arquelada was already “being acted upon” by the OCA.

In a Resolution dated 6 July 2009, the Court required Atty. Baterina to file a Comment
on the complaint within 10 days from notice. Failing to comply with the Court’s order,
Atty. Baterina was ordered to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
with and once again ordered to comply with the Court’s 6 July 2009 Order.

In his Compliance dated 28 March 2010, Atty. Baterina explained that he had been
recuperating from a kidney transplant when he received a copy of the complaint. He
begged the Court’s indulgence and said that his failure to comply was “not at all
intended to show disrespect to the orders of the Honorable Tribunal.”

Atty. Baterina also denied the allegation of bad faith and negligence in handling the
Tejano case. He explained that the reason he could not attend to the case was that in
2002, after the initial presentation of the plaintiffs’ case, he was suspended by the
Court from the practice of law for two years. He alleged that this fact was made
known to Tejano’s mother and sister. However, the trial court did not order
plaintiffs to secure the services of another lawyer. On the contrary, it proceeded to
hear the case, and plaintiffs were not represented by a lawyer until the termination of
the case. Atty. Baterina instead points to the “displayed bias” and “undue and conflict of
interest” of Judge Arquelada as the culprit in Tejano’s predicament.

The Court, in its 19 July 2010 Resolution, found Atty. Baterina’s explanation “not
satisfactory” and admonished him “to be more heedful of the Court’s directives in order
to avoid delay in the disposition of [the] case.” The Court also referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

IBP Investigation, Report and Recommendation

After the proceedings, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline promulgated its Report
and Recommendation, part of which reads:

First, it appears that respondent’s failure to appear in representation of his clients

in the said civil case before the RTC was due to his two-year suspension from the
practice of law in 2001. While this is a justified reason for his non-appearance,
respondent, however, manifestly failed to properly inform the RTC of this fact. That
way, the RTC would have, in the meantime, ordered plaintiffs to seek the services of
another lawyer. Respondent’s contention that the fact of his suspension was
nonetheless circularized to all courts of the Philippines including the RTC is unavailing.
Still, respondent should have exerted prudence in properly informing the RTC of
his suspension in order to protect the interests of his clients.
Moreover, while he relayed such fact of suspension to his clients, there is no showing
that he explained the consequences to them, or that he advised them to seek
another counsel’s assistance in the meantime. Clearly therefore, respondent’s inaction
falls short of the diligence required of him as a lawyer.

Second, it must be recalled that the RTC in the said case required the plaintiffs therein
to submit their formal offer of evidence. However, respondent did not bother to do so, in
total disregard of the RTC’s Order dated 8 November 2004. Respondent’s bare
excuse that he remembers making an oral offer thereof deserves no merit because the
records of this case clearly reveal the contrary. Because of the said inaction of
respondent, his clients’ case was dismissed by the RTC.

xxxx

From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent’s acts constitute sufficient ground for
disciplinary action against him. His gross negligence under the circumstances cannot be
countenanced. It is, therefore, respectfully recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years, and be fined in the amount of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), considering that this is his second disciplinary
action. x x x.22

On 20 March 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the following resolution:

RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-237

Adm. Case No. 8235
Joselito F. Tejano vs.
Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
“A”, and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent is guilty of gross
negligence, Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for two (2) years. However, the Fine of Fifty Thousand Pesos imposed on respondent
is hereby deleted.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court adopts the IBP’s report and recommendation, with modification as to the
penalty.

The Code of Professional Responsibility governing the conduct of lawyers states:

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.
xxxx

RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

RULE 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

Lawyers have a “fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their
clients,” and must act “in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession
as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.”24

When a lawyer agrees to take up a client’s cause, he makes a commitment to exercise

due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Once a lawyer’s services are engaged,
“he is duty bound to serve his client with competence, and to attend to his
client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of whether he accepts
it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed on him.”A lawyer’s acceptance to take up a case
“impliedly stipulates [that he will] carry it to its termination, that is, until the case
becomes final and executory.”

Atty. Baterina’s duty to his clients did not automatically cease with his
suspension. At the very least, such suspension gave him a concomitant responsibility
to inform his clients that he would be unable to attend to their case and advise them to
retain another counsel.

A lawyer – even one suspended from practicing the profession – owes it to his client to
not “sit idly by and leave the rights of his client in a state of uncertainty.”The client
“should never be left groping in the dark” and instead must be “adequately and fully
informed about the developments in his case.”

Atty. Baterina practically abandoned this duty when he allowed the proceedings to
run its course without any effort to safeguard his clients’ welfare in the meantime. His
failure to file the required pleadings on his clients’ behalf constitutes gross negligence
in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and renders him subject to
disciplinary action. The penalties for a lawyer’s failure to file the required brief or
pleading range from warning, reprimand, fine, suspension, or in grave cases,
disbarment.

Further, Atty. Baterina’s reckless disregard for orders and directives of the courts is
unbecoming of a member of the Bar. His conduct has shown that he has little respect
for rules, court processes, and even for the Court’s disciplinary authority. Not only did
he fail to follow the trial court’s orders in his clients’ case, he even disregarded court
orders in his own disciplinary proceedings.
Considering Atty. Baterina’s medical condition at that time, a simple explanation to
the Court would have sufficed. Instead, however, he simply let the orders go
unheeded, neglecting his duty to the Court.

Lawyers, as this Court has previously emphasized, “are particularly called upon to obey
court orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court
directives being themselves officers of the court.” As such, Atty. Baterina should “know
that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be
complied with promptly and completely.”

Proper Penalty

In Spouses Soriano v. Reyes, the Court held that “the appropriate penalty on an errant
lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts.”34

The Court notes that in 2001, Atty. Baterina was also suspended for two years after
being found guilty of gross misconduct. In that case, Araceli Sipin-Nabor filed a
complaint against Atty. Baterina for failing to file her Answer with Counterclaim in a case
for quieting of title and recovery of possession where she and her siblings were
defendants. Because of such failure, Sipin-Nabor was declared by the trial court to be in
default and unable to present her evidence, and which, in turn, resulted in a decision
adverse to her.

Atty. Baterina was also found to have “convert[ed] the money of his client to his own
personal use without her consent” and “deceiv[ed] the complainant into giving him the
amount of P2,000.00 purportedly to be used for filing an answer with counterclaim,”
which he never did.

The Court likewise noted in that case Atty. Baterina’s “repeated failure to comply with
the resolutions of the Court requiring him to comment on the complaint [which] indicates
a high degree of irresponsibility tantamount to willful disobedience to the lawful orders of
the Supreme Court.”36

These two disciplinary cases against Atty. Baterina show a pattern of neglecting his
duty to his clients, as well as a propensity for disrespecting the authority of the courts.
Such incorrigible behavior is unacceptable and will not be tolerated among the
members of the Bar.

For this reason, the Court deems it proper to impose on Atty. Baterina a longer
suspension period of five (5) years.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina is found GUILTY of gross negligence. He

is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) years. He is also STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.
G.R. No. 120654 September 11, 1996

MARIA LOURDES PAREDES-GARCIA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HON. ESCOLASTICO M. CRUZ, JR., respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside
the decision of 19 June 1995 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37081
dismissing the petitioner's special civil action for certiorari to annul the order of
respondent Judge Escolastico M. Cruz, Jr., which cited the petitioner for contempt and
ordered her to pay a fine of P100.00.

The pleadings and the annexes thereto disclose the following uncontroverted facts:

The petitioner, an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal, was deputized at the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Makati City and assigned at the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 58, Makati City. The respondent is the presiding judge of the said branch.

At 8:30 a.m. of 11 April 1995, the respondent Judge commenced the session of his
court. When Criminal Cases Nos. 93-7434 to 39 (People of the Philippines vs. Ofelia
Baja) was called, the petitioner, who was the prosecutor assigned to the said case,
was not yet around. She arrived ten minutes later, just when the second case in the
calendar was on its first call. The respondent Judge forthwith ordered the petitioner
to explain within seventy-two hours her failure to come to court on time.

Before the "finalization of the aforesaid open court order," the petitioner filed her
Explanation. 2 She alleged therein that she actually reported to her office at 8:00 a.m.,
as shown by a copy of a page of the Prosecutor's logbook, and that she went to the
respondent Judge's court. However, she returned to her office to attend to some
matters prior to the hearing. She thereafter proceeded back to the respondent
Judge's court for the hearings, but was late for ten minutes. At the time, the second
case was just on its first call. She asserted further that she had never been late in
any of the hearings of the court nor previously fined or ordered to explain for
tardiness in any hearing, which is the respondent Judge's usual practice for lawyers
and litigants who come late.

On 12 April 1996, the respondent Judge issued the following order, 3 which cited
the petitioner in contempt of court and directed her to pay within seventy-two
hours from receipt of the order a penalty in the amount of P100.00.
In an open court order dated April 11, 1995, the Public Prosecutor and the Public
Attorney were ordered to explain their failure to come to court at 8:30 in the
morning.

On even date and before the finalization of the aforesaid open court order, Public
Prosecutor Maria Lourdes P. Garcia submitted an "Explanation" alleging, among
other things, that on April 11, 1995, she reported for work at around 8:00 a.m. as
shown by the logbook, a photocopy of which she appended to her "Explanation."

In paragraph 5 of her "Explanation," she contends that she had never been late in
any of the court hearings as in fact she had never been ordered to explain nor imposed
a fine, a usual practice as a matter of course.

The time has come for the Court to advice [sic] Asst. Prosecutor Garcia of the need
to disabuse her mind with the thought that the xerox copy of the logbook she attached
to her "Explanation" has evidentiary value insofar as coming to court on time is
concerned. She maybe [sic] in her office at 8:00 a.m. or even earlier, but it does not
follow that she is also in the court room before sessions begin. Under the law on
physics, no creature can occupy two different spaces at the same time. Coming to her
office on time is certainly different from coming to court on time.

On the argument that she had never been ordered to explain nor imposed a fine,
Asst. Prosecutor Garcia is well aware that her allegation of "for the record, undersigned
had never been late in any of the hearings of this Court . . ." is a downright lie. If only
she will examine her conscience, she would know that paragraph 5 of her "Explanation"
is a falsity. The only reason why the court never ordered her to explain her
tardiness is because of PAKIKISAMA ("companionship" as translated into the English
language by Mr. Leo James English).

Asst. Prosecutor Garcia's verbal clash with the branch clerk of court yesterday,
April 11, 1995 is the proverbial "last straw that broke the camel's back." The branch
clerk's refusals to let her enter the undersigned's chambers are all orders of the
undersigned out of propriety. Propriety dictates that no lawyer with a pending case
— government or private — should be allowed to talk with the undersigned. Asst.
Prosecutor Garcia has not only been improper in her several attempts to enter the
undersigned's chambers — she has also been improper in her, to buy food, to deposit
her pay checks, to run errands for her — all reaching the knowledge of the branch clerk
of court and the undersigned. Worse, if the Asst. Prosecutor would perhaps "get down
to brass tacks" and remain in the court room while criminal proceedings are going on,
no case on technicality could have been lost (re: People vs. Cawili).

In defiance of Memorandum # 1-95 dated March 28, 1995 conspicuously posted right
at the court room door, she still attempted several times to talk to the undersigned in
chambers, prompting the branch clerk of court to exercise her "administrative powers"
to rightfully prevent as she did, the Asst. Prosecutor from doing so.
WHEREFORE, with all these and more, finding the "Explanation" a downright lie, Asst.
Prosecutor MARIA LOURDES P. GARCIA is hereby cited in CONTEMPT of Court.
Consequently, she is hereby ordered to pay within seventy-two (72) hours from
receipt of this order, a penalty in the amount of P100.00 to the branch clerk, this court,
who in turn is directed to turn over the fine to the Office of the Clerk of Court after
issuing the corresponding receipt therefor.

The petitioner filed a motion for a reconsideration of the order, which was, however,
denied by the respondent Judge. Pertinent portion of the order of denial reads:

Paragraph 9 of Asst. Prosecutor Maria Lourdes P. Garcia's Motion for

Reconsideration alleging that ". . . . this being the first incident at that, she does not
deserve such cruel and harsh treatment from this Honorable Court;" is false, for the
truth is what is stated in page 2 of the contempt order reproduced hereunder, thus:

On the argument that she had never been ordered to explain nor imposed a fine,
Asst. Prosecutor Garcia is well aware that her allegation of "for the record,
undersigned had never been late in any of the hearings of this court . . . ." is a
downright lie. If only she will examine her conscience, she would know that paragraph 5
of her "Explanation" is a falsity. The only reason why the court never asked her to
explain her tardiness is because of PAKIKISAMA ("companionship" as translated
in the English language by Mr. Leo James English). 4

Aggrieved by the aforementioned orders, the petitioner instituted with the Court of
Appeals a special civil action for certiorari, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
37081, wherein she challenged the orders in this manner:

FIRST: BEING UNINTENTIONALLY LATE FOR TEN (10) MINUTES DUE TO THE
PERFORMANCE OF OTHER OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS BY THE PETITIONER WHO IS
AN ASSISTANT PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ASSIGNED IN MAKATI CITY IS NOT A
CALLOUS DISREGARD TO THE ORDERS OF THE COURT NOR A
CONTUMACIOUS ACT AGAINST THE DIGNITY OF THE COURT AND AGAINST THE
SOLEMNITY OF ITS PROCEEDINGS.

SECOND: THE CONTEMPT ORDER AND THE SUBSEQUENT ORDER OF THE

HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION ARE HARSH AND CRUEL AND THAT THEY WERE DONE AND
ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

THIRD: THE ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT OF ARREST IS A MISAPPLICATION AND

A CLEAR MISAPPRECIATION ON THE PART OF THE HONORABLE PUBLIC
RESPONDENT OF SECTION 1, RULE 70 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

FOURTH: THE ASSAILED ORDERS AND THE PENALTIES IMPOSED BY THE

HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT WILL WORK GREAT INJUSTICE TO THE
PETITIONER.
FIFTH: THERE IS NO OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE
ORDINARY COURSE AND LAW AVAILABLE TO THE HEREIN
PETITIONER. 5

In this comment on the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 37081, the respondent Judge
defended the correctness of his orders and attached thereto, among other things,
(a) his Office Memorandum 1-95 of 28 March 1995 outlining his policy on those who
wish to see him in his chambers; (b) his own affidavit narrating his policies on how to
conduct sessions in relation to tardiness and imposition of fines in particular, the
instances when the petitioner personally apologized to him for her tardiness, and the
reason why he cited the petitioner for contempt; (c) copies of eight of his orders
imposing fines on government and private prosecuting lawyers and litigants who arrived
late in court; (d) separate affidavits of the personnel of his sala (branch clerk of court,
Criminal Cases in-charge, legal researcher, two court stenographers, branch sheriff,
process server, court aide, two casual employees), a prosecution witness, and a private
complainant, attesting to instances of tardiness of the petitioner.

The Court of Appeals limited the issues to whether the petitioner was tardy and
whether she committed falsehood in her explanation. 6

In its decision of 19 June 1995, 7 the Court of Appeals dismissed CA-G.R. SP No.
37081. As to the first issue, it held that the petitioner herself admitted the fact of her
tardiness. As to the second issue, it found that the petitioner was not honest about her
punctual attendance in court, which if considered together with her tardiness, may be
punished with contempt. Thus:

The possibility is, the petitioner was penalized for contempt not only because she was
late or tardy, but also because of falsehood in her April 11, [1995] "explanation".
Precisely, the respondent said, despite her tardiness she offered no apology and worst
she allegedly lied. Her "temerity" in alleging a falsehood is a "callous disregard" of the
dignity of the court and a "manifestation of disregard" of the virtue of honesty.
Besides, petitioner's "blatant allegation of an obvious falsehood" is a wrongful act. 8

The Court of Appeals gave credence to the affidavits of the respondent Judge and
several court employees attesting to the tardiness of the petitioner on certain
occasions. It concluded that although "a late appearance by only about 10 minutes
does not per se amount to a stubborn or perverse disobedience," that "tardiness
coupled with statements less than truthful should certainly be castigated." It went on to
state that:

The respondent Judge should not be faulted for being strict in the matter of time
attendance during trials. He has . . . consistently penalized private as well as
government lawyers, litigants, witnesses and court personnel who are remiss in their
duties to come to court on time, a policy he adopted without exemptions, since 1989
when he was still a Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. 9
The petitioner then came to this Court through the instant petition for review contending
that the decision of the Court of Appeals is based on a mere possibility, thereby
depriving her of her constitutional right to be presumed innocent. She would never have
the nerve or temerity to violate the court's rules, indulge in any falsehood, or commit any
act which would taint her record and jeopardize her burning ambition to join the judiciary
in the future. She argues that if indeed she order issued by the respondent Judge; no
such order exists. The fact that she immediately submitted her explanation indicated her
unfailing respect to the court. She also attacks the value of the affidavits submitted by
the respondent Judge before the Court of Appeals for having been executed through
the respondent Judge's influence, who exercises moral ascendancy over the affiants.
She attached to her petition machine copies of several pages of the Prosecutor's
Logbook showing her daily attendance from 16 August 1994 to 11 April 1995. 10

The petitioner also alleges that the contempt order was a retaliatory act because
she had spurned the respondent Judge's amorous advances to her. Describing herself
as a young woman, who is, by standards of physical beauty, "well-endowed and
physically attractive," she claims that the respondent Judge had been extending
unusual courtesies to her. There were numerous occasions when he would visit her in
her office or invite her for lunch at his chambers or elsewhere; he also allowed her
frequent access to his chambers and provided her an electric fan and a cellular
phone. These were discreet ministrations for her to give in to his offers for cocktails or a
date at Karaoke clubs. But prior to the issuance of the contempt order, she earned the
ire of the respondent Judge, because on a trip to Cagayan de Oro City, she failed
to call him despite his numerous requests to do so. She explained to him that she had
lost the phone. At another time, he sought her for the jurat in his affidavit; but when
she requested him to personally appear before her and take his oath, the respondent
Judge was apparently insulted and had the affidavit retrieved and referred to another
prosecutor instead. She was, in fact, the prime target of Memorandum No. 1-95, to
sever whatever free access she had previously enjoyed.

Finally, the petitioner asserts that the respondent Judge acted with unusual haste in
dismissing her explanation and motion for reconsideration. If she were indeed guilty of
anything, it would only be an indirect contempt.

In his Comment, the respondent Judge questions the viability of this petition for its
failure to raise questions of law and to show that it falls within the exceptions to the rule
on conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals. He underscores the
fact that the petitioner admitted her tardiness. The affidavits he submitted cannot be
taken lightly, for they have been obtained from various affiants whose positive
assertions cannot prevail over the petitioner's self-serving denial. He also observes that
some annexes 11 of the petition readily show that the petitioner had been late seven
time when she logged her time at her office at 8:30 a.m., she could not have been in
court at the same time. He claims that he has consistently fined public and private
lawyers and litigants who arrived late in court.
The respondent Judge further alleges that the electric fan was lent to the petitioner
by the officer-in-charge of the court, not by him, and that the cellular phone was
just borrowed from him by the petitioner. He denies the alleged amorous
advances and claims that the petitioner is suffering from some delusion of
beauty. 12

Finally, the respondent Judge avers that all these years his record as a trial court
judge remains unsullied. He had been the recipient of several awards, such as the (1)
Jose Abad Santos Award for Most Outstanding Metropolitan Trial Court Judge of the
Philippines [1991] given by the Foundation for Judicial Excellence; (2) Presidential
Lingkod Bayan Award [1991] given by the Office of the President; and the (3)
Outstanding Pillar of Justice Award [1994] given by the city government of Manila. On
the other hand, he bemoans the petitioner's competence as a prosecutor and cites an
instance where her neglect in requesting the complainant to identify the signature of the
drawee of bounced checks caused the acquittal of the accused in a case 13 involving a
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law). In another case, 14 she deliberately
attempted to mislead the court by offering exhibits different from the presented and
marked in court.

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays for the dismissal of the petition,
as (a) it raises pure questions of fact; and (b) contrary to the petitioner's assertion, the
challenged decision is supported by the evidence on record notwithstanding the Court
of Appeals' use of the word "possibility." In any event, the error thus raised refers to the
application of evidence. As regards the petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals
disregarded certain relevant facts showing the "oppressive and vindictive attitude" of the
respondent Judge, the Office of the Solicitor General avers that the same cannot be
entertained for having been raised for the first time on appeal.

In her Reply to the Comments, the petitioner brings into focus the Court of Appeals'
alleged error in upholding the nature of the contempt as direct contempt; in sustaining
the legality of the contempt order, although it was issued without due process; and in
failing to consider the ulterior motive of the respondent Judge in issuing the contempt
order and to correct "the patent cruelty, the latent vindictiveness, oppressiveness, and
the retaliatory nature" of the said order. She attached thereto a copy of her performance
rating sheet and the affidavit of Ma. Enrina Talag-Pascual. The former shows that her
performance score for 1995 was 90%, earning for her a "very satisfactory" rating. She
was, as well, evaluated to possess good public relations and an integrity that is beyond
reproach. In the latter, affiant Enrina, a former acting branch clerk of court and
interpreter of Branch 13, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, declared that when the
respondent Judge was the presiding judge of the said branch, he did certain acts
leading toward a special personal relationship with her. When he later noticed her
frequent male visitor and her preference for that visitor, the respondent Judge would no
longer talk to her nor give her anything to do. Eventually, another person got the
appointment to the position she was aspiring for. Feeling cheated and taken advantage
of, she resigned.
We resolved to give due course to this petition, and the submitted the required
memoranda.

We find for the petitioner.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. It is indispensable to

their right of self-preservation, to the execution of their powers, and to the maintenance
of their authority, and consequently to the due administration of justice. 15 It is an
essential element, or is possessed as part, of judicial authority vested by the
Constitution in the courts. 16 Put a little differently, the power is an "implied constitutional
power." 17

The power, however, is not limitless. It must be used sparingly with caution, restraint,
judiciousness, deliberation, and due regard to the provisions of the law and the
constitutional rights of the individual. It should be exercised on the preservative and not
on the vindictive principle. Being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, it should not be
resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice. 18 For, as observed in People
vs. Estenzo: 19

There is a compelling and exigent need therefore for judges to take utmost care lest
prejudice, innate or covert hostility to personality of counsel, or previous incidents lead
them to characterize conduct susceptible of innocent explanation as slights on the
dignity of the court. It is ever timely to remember how easy it is to overstep the dividing
line that should separate the prosecutor from the judge, when both roles are merged in
the same person. The infusion of personal element may go unnoticed. Even if such
were not the case, objectively viewed, such an impression may be difficult to avoid by
laymen. That is a consideration that cannot be overlooked.

Indeed, the contempt power could easily tempt a judge to make its exercise nothing
more than a camouflage for a wounded pride, a burning prejudice, revenge, a
misplaced passion, or selfish motives.

We do not hesitate to rule that the respondent Judge failed to observe the rule of
conduct in the exercise of the power to punish the petitioner for contempt of court. In our
considered opinion, he acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in holding the petitioner guilty of contempt without complying with the
requirements of due process.

It must be underscored that in open court on 11 April 1995, the respondent Judge
merely ordered the petitioner to explain her failure to come to court on time or at
8:30 a.m. of that day. That order did not yet amount to a show-cause order or a
citation directing an explanation why she should not be held in contempt of court
for tardiness. Tardiness could be a valid ground for contempt. Justice Malcolm
remarked:
All too frequently, a Court of First Instance finds it necessary to impose a small fine on
attorneys for failure to be present at the session of the court at the hour and on the day
named and for unseemly behavior in the presence of the court. 20

Failure of counsel to appear in court for trial despite due notice was held to constitute
indirect contempt, 21 for it is a misbehavior committed not in the presence of or so near a
court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. 22

The Explanation of the petitioner which was forthwith submitted was an explanation of
her failure to come on time, as was, in fact, called for in the order.

The respondent Judge issued the challenged order of 12 April 1995 mainly because of
his perception that the explanation was a "downright lie," and for the other grounds
enumerated in the order, viz., the petitioner's (a) verbal clash with the branch clerk of
court on 11 April 1995 when the latter prevented the former from entering the Judge's
chamber; (b) previous improper attempts to enter the said chambers; (c) improper
conduct in asking the staff of the court to carry her travelling bags or paraphernalia, buy
food, deposit her pay checks, or run errands for her; (d) defiance of the respondent
Judge's Memorandum No. 1-95, dated 28 March 1995; and (e) failure to remain in court
while criminal proceedings were going on resulting in the dismissal of a case due to
technicality.

Clearly then, the petitioner was cited and punished for contempt not only because of
her "failure to come to court on time" in the morning of 11 April 1995, but also
because of the foregoing acts or omissions. Her tardiness as a ground for contempt
was, however, relegated to the background, for the respondent Judge had found other
grounds for contempt.

The grounds or reasons enumerated by the respondent Judge could constitute

grounds for indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, probably
under paragraphs (a) and (d) thereof. 23 He cannot, therefore, immediately impose a
penalty, but must faithfully comply with the due process requirements prescribed in the
said Section 3, namely, the filing of a charge in writing and giving the accused an
opportunity to be heard by himself or by counsel. The charge under this section
may be made by the judge himself. 24 And considering that the latter seemed to have
personal knowledge of such alleged grounds, it was even his duty if he were honestly
convinced of the viability of such grounds to institute the proceedings. 25 If the answer to
the charge is satisfactory, the contempt proceedings ends. Otherwise, it shall proceed in
accordance with the Rules. 26 On the day set for the hearing, the court shall proceed to
investigate the charges and consider such answer or testimony as the respondent may
make or offer. 27 Since contempt of court proceedings are commonly treated as criminal
in their nature, the mode of procedure and rules of evidence therein are assimilated to
criminal prosecutions. 28 Accordingly, if reasonable doubt in fact or in law exists as to
the alleged contemner's guilt, the doubt shall be resolved in favor of the alleged
contemner. 29 The penalty, if warranted, can only be imposed after the alleged
contemner shall have been heard. 30
In findings the petitioner guilty of the aforementioned acts and imposing upon her the
penalty of a fine without granting her an opportunity to answer the imputed falsehood
and impriorities and an opportunity to be heard, the respondent Judge disregarded the
requirements of due process in contempt proceedings and, therefore, acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 31

Even assuming arguendo that the respondent Judge's order of 12 April 1995 was
meant to be a resolution on the issue of the petitioner's tardiness in the morning of 11
April 1995, and that it could be summarily dealt with as a direct contempt and forthwith
punished, the penalty of P100.00 is unreasonable. The petitioner admitted that she was
late by ten minutes and that she arrived when the second case in the calendar was on
its first call. This reference to a first call, which is not denied by the respondent Judge,
presupposes the existence of a practice where at the commencement of the sessions at
8:30 a.m. the cases are called to determine which are ready and to call the second time
those which were not ready on the first call. Of course, it cannot be expected that two
cases ready on the first call would be tried at the same time. The delay then of ten
minutes was of de minimis importance, especially considering the fact that there is no
showing at all that another case was ready for trial at 8:30 a.m.

As to the alleged "lie" which the respondent Judge characterized as "downright," no

evidence supports it except his appeal to the petitioner to examine her conscience
because she knew that if the court never ordered her to explain her tardiness it was due
to " pakikisama." This appeal to the petitioner's conscience was itself an admission that
there was no evidence to prove the petitioner's prior tardiness or of any order calling her
attention to it or admonishing her for that. If it was the respondent Judge's practice or
policy to impose a fine on lawyers and litigants — and he was able to attach to his
Comment in CA-G.R. SP No. 37081 copies of eight orders imposing such
fines — then he should have done so against the petitioner if she were tardy in the past.
Yet, he could not produce any order intended for the petitioner; he was then unfair or
discriminatory in the implementation of his policy or practice. If the petitioner had in fact
been tardy to a point of habituality, no " pakikisama" can warrant the respondent
Judge's tolerance, unless we are to believe the petitioner's version that she had been
the object of the respondent Judge's special attention or grant of privileges in the
past.

Moreover, since what was filed was a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, which is an available remedy inappropriate cases of judgments in
contempt proceedings, 32 the only issue which the respondent Court had resolve was
whether the respondent Judge has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the challenged orders. 33 It should not have taken
into account in resolving the merits of the case the affidavits and other documents
submitted by the respondent Judge to prove the alleged falsehood in the petitioner's
Explanation and the correctness of his orders. These pieces of evidence, obtained
when this case was already before the Court of Appeals, were not available to or
considered by the respondent Judge when he issued the orders.
The above pronouncements should not be understood as absolving the petitioner from
any liability for her tardiness or from her solemn duty as an officer of the court. As a
lawyer, she is bound by her oath to conduct herself as a lawyer according to the
best of her knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as
to her client. She should never forget that punctuality is not only a practice mandated
by the Code of Professional Responsibility 34 and Canons of Professional Ethics, 35 it is
a virtue which must be faithfully maintained as part of her contribution in the task
of ensuring a speedy, efficient, and effective administration of justice. If the
petitioner then had committed a breach of her duty to the court she could accordingly be
dealt with but in accordance with established procedure. The right to do so is hereby
reserved to the respondent Judge.

We close with the sad observation that both the petitioner and the respondent Judge
have resorted to personal attacks against each other in this case. They failed to
limit themselves to the issues and even exchanged tirades on their competence and
physical being. They did not observe the proper decorum of civility and refinement
even in times of disagreement. Such is not expected of them as officers of the court.
What happened in this case may not easily be forgotten by them. If the petitioner would
thus remain detailed at the branch of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City presided
over by the respondent Judge the soured relationship may affect the administration of
justice. The petitioner then must be re-assigned somewhere else.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of 19 June

1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37081 and the challenged orders of
respondent Judge Escolastico M. Cruz, Jr., of 12 April 1995 and 20 April 1995 in
Criminal Cases Nos. 93-7434 to 39 are SET ASIDE.

The Department of Justice and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal are
requested to recall the designation of the petitioner to Branch 58 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City and to detail her to other courts if these have not been done
yet.

No pronouncement as to costs.

A.C. No. 10945

(Formerly CBD 09-2507)

ANGELITO RAMISCAL and MERCEDES ORZAME, Complainants,

vs.

ATTY. EDGAR S. ORRO, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The fiduciary duty of every lawyer towards his client requires him to conscientiously act
in advancing and safeguarding the latter's interest. His failure or neglect to do so
constitutes a serious breach of his Lawyer's Oath and the canons of professional ethics,
and renders him liable for gross misconduct that may warrant his suspension from the
practice of law.

Antecedents

Complainants Spouses Angelito Ramiscal and Mercedes Orzame (Ramiscals)

engaged the legal services of respondent Atty. Edgar S. Orro to handle a case in
which they were the defendants seeking the declaration of the nullity of title to a parcel
of land situated in the Province of Isabela.

Upon receiving the P10,000.00 acceptance fee from them, the respondent handled the
trial of the case until the Regional Trial Court (RTC) decided it in their favor. As
expected, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals.

(CA), and they ultimately filed their appellants’ brief. Upon receipt of the appellants’
brief, the respondent requested from the complainants an additional amount of
P30,000.00 for the preparation and submission of their appellees’ brief in the CA. They
obliged and paid him the amount requested.

Later on, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The respondent did not inform
the Ramiscals of the adverse decision of the CA which they only learned about from
their neighbors. They endeavored to communicate with the respondent but their efforts
were initially in vain. When they finally reached him, he asked an additional P7,000.00
from them as his fee in filing a motion for reconsideration in their behalf, albeit telling
them that such motion would already be belated. Even so, they paid to him the amount
sought. To their dismay, they later discovered that he did not file the motion for
reconsideration; hence, the decision attained finality, eventually resulting in the loss of
their property measuring 8.479 hectares with a probable worth of P3,391,600.00.3

Consequently, the Ramiscals brought this administrative complaint against the

respondent. The Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for appropriate evaluation, report and recommendation.
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

Despite due notice, the Ramiscals and the respondent did not appear during the
scheduled mandatory conferences set by the IBP. Neither did they submit their
respective evidence.

IBP Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda rendered his findings to the effect that the
respondent had violated Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and recommended his suspension from the practice
law for one year.

On October 11, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-
829,6 whereby it adopted the report of IBP Commissioner Almeyda but modified his
recommendation of the penalty by increasing the period of suspension to two years,
to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A," and for violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
aggravated by his disregard of the notices from the Commission and considering the
extent of the damage suffered by Complainant, Atty. Edgar S. Orro is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years.

Ruling of the Court

We agree with the IBP’s findings that the respondent did not competently and
diligently discharge his duties as the lawyer of the Ramiscals.

Every lawyer, upon becoming a member of the Philippine Bar, solemnly takes the
Lawyer’s Oath, by which he vows, among others, that: "I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients." If he should
violate the vow, he contravenes the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly its
Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18, viz.:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

xxxx
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

It is beyond debate, therefore, that the relationship of the lawyer and the client
becomes imbued with trust and confidence from the moment that the lawyer-client
relationship commences, with the lawyer being bound to serve his clients with full
competence, and to attend to their cause with utmost diligence, care and devotion. To
accord with this highly fiduciary relationship, the client expects the lawyer to be always
mindful of the former’s cause and to be diligent in handling the former’s legal affairs. As
an essential part of their highly fiduciary relationship, the client is entitled to the
periodic and full updates from the lawyer on the developments of the case. The lawyer
who neglects to perform his obligations violates Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.10

As a member of the Law Profession in the Philippines, the respondent had the foregoing
professional and ethical burdens. But he obviously failed to discharge his burdens
to the best of his knowledge and discretion and with all good fidelity to his
clients. By voluntarily taking up their cause, he gave his unqualified commitment to
advance and defend their interest therein. Even if he could not thereby guarantee to
them the favorable outcome of the litigation, he reneged on his commitment
nonetheless because he did not file the motion for reconsideration in their behalf despite
receiving from them the P7,000.00 he had requested for that purpose. He further
neglected to regularly update them on the status of the case, particularly on the
adverse result, thereby leaving them in the dark on the proceedings that were
gradually turning against their interest. Updating the clients could have prevented their
substantial prejudice by enabling them to engage another competent lawyer to handle
their case. As it happened, his neglect in that respect lost for them whatever legal
remedies were then available. His various omissions manifested his utter lack of
professionalism towards them.

We further underscore that the respondent owed it to himself and to the entire Legal
Profession of the Philippines to exhibit due respect towards the IBP as the national
organization of all the members of the Legal Profession. His unexplained disregard of
the orders issued to him by the IBP to comment and to appear in the
administrative investigation of his misconduct revealed his irresponsibility as
well as his disrespect for the IBP and its proceedings. He thereby exposed a
character flaw that should not tarnish the nobility of the Legal Profession. He should
always bear in mind that his being a lawyer demanded that he conduct himself as a
person of the highest moral and professional integrity and probity in his dealings with
others. He should never forget that his duty to serve his clients with unwavering loyalty
and diligence carried with it the corresponding responsibilities towards the Court, to the
Bar, and to the public in general.
There can be no question that a lawyer is guilty of misconduct sufficient to justify
his suspension or disbarment if he so acts as to be unworthy of the trust and
confidence involved in his official oath and is found to be wanting in that honesty and
integrity that must characterize the members of the Bar in the performance of their
professional duties. Based on all the circumstances in this case, we approve the
recommendation of the IBP for the respondent's suspension from the practice of law
for a period of two years. Although the Court imposed a six-month suspension from
the practice of law on lawyers violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the recommended penalty is condign and proportionate to the offense
charged and established because his display of disrespectful defiance of the orders of
the IBP aggravated his misconduct.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. EDGAR S.

ORRO guilty of violating Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period
for TWO YEARS EFFECTIVE UPON NOTICE, with the STERN WARNING that any
similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.

[ A.C. No. 12661, February 19, 2020 ]

BENJAMIN M. KATIPUNAN, JR., PETITIONER, V. ATTY. REBENE C. CARRERA,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Case

Complainant Benjamin M. Katipunan, Jr. charged respondent Atty. Rebene C. Carrera

with violations of Canon 18, Rules 18.02, 18.03, and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, the Lawyer's
Oath, and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The Complaint Affidavit

Complainant essentially alleged :

From October 12, 1996 until 2003, he worked as a seafarer with the rank of Master
Mariner (shipmaster) for Philippine Transmarine Company, Inc. (PTC). He got
separated from employment due to a heart ailment he contracted while in service.
Although his condition rendered him totally and permanently disabled, his employer
denied his claim for disability benefits, prompting him to file a case before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). By Decision dated January 25, 2005, the
Labor Arbiter ruled in his favor and awarded him total disability benefits
ofUS$60,000.00.
Dissatisfied with the award, he appealed to the NLRC. He wanted an award of
US$90,000.00 instead of just US$60,000.00. He engaged respondent as his counsel
from the NLRC proceedings all the way to the Supreme Court. By Resolution dated
April 6, 2006, the NLRC reversed. His motion for reconsideration was also denied per
Resolution dated August 28, 2006.

Undaunted, he brought the case to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which affirmed
the NLRC dispositions and likewise denied his motion for reconsideration.

On petition for review on certiorari, he sought affirmative relief from the Court. By
Resolution dated August 11, 2008, the Court required him to submit a verified
statement of the exact date when he filed his motion for reconsideration, an
affidavit of service, and a verification and certification of non-forum shopping with
competent proof of identity. On October 3, 2009, respondent filed a "Verified
Compliance and Statement of Material Dates."

By Resolution dated January 27, 2010, the Court denied the petition for failure to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in rendering the
assailed dispositions. Respondent received a copy of the resolution on February 25,
2010 but failed to inform him about it. And even when he paid respondent a visit in
the latter's office and inquired regarding the case status, respondent replied that the
case was still pending resolution.

His first visit happened sometime in March 2010. He only came to know of the decree
of dismissal when he again paid respondent a visit on May 11, 2010. On that occasion,
he inquired anew on the status of the case but respondent gave the same
response, i.e. the case was still pending with the Supreme Court. He then decided
right there and then to borrow the case folder from respondent to refresh himself
on the details. To his surprise, he came across a copy of this Court's Resolution dated
January 27, 2010 denying his petition. He confronted respondent about what
happened but the latter merely shrugged it off saying that there was no more
remedy. As it was, respondent did not even file a motion for reconsideration within
fifteen (15) days from notice, thus, allowing the resolution to lapse into finality.

Had respondent timely informed him of the decree of denial, he could have instructed
him to draft a motion for reconsideration, and if respondent was no longer willing to
represent him, he could have engaged the services of another lawyer.

Petitioner, thereafter, sent respondent a letter dated June 23, 2010, demanding that
the latter answer for the damages he suffered as a result of respondent's negligence
and deceitful conduct. He followed-up with a second demand letter dated July 12, 2010.

On August 8, 2010, he received respondent's reply, accusing him of extortion. Thus,

after some deep and lengthy reflection, he opted to administratively charge
respondent before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Respondent
miserably failed to perform the kind of competence and diligence required of him under
Canon 18 of the CPR insofar as handling his (complainant's) case was concerned. In
fact, the petition which respondent filed on his behalf did not even contain the material
dates, nor bear the requisite proof of identity vis-a-vis the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping.

Respondent's Answer

In his answer, respondent basically countered:

He and complainant had a close and cordial relationship. Complainant was even his
son's godfather. Because of their close association, he agreed to represent complainant
in the case before the NLRC all the way to the Supreme Court. In view of the Court's
denial of the petition, he inquired from complainant if he had new evidence or
argument to persuade the Court regarding the merits of his case, but complainant
was not able to offer anything new. Worse, complainant got the copy of the Resolution
dated January 27, 2010 from the case file and kept it to himself.

In the absence of any new issue, matter, or evidence, a motion for reconsideration
would only be a reiteration of the arguments previously raised and passed upon in full in
the proceedings below. The Court may, therefore, just consider the motion dilatory and
the suit, groundless, thereby exposing him to a possible citation for contempt.

Complainant has yet to pay him a single centavo from the time complainant engaged
his services. He continuously sent complainant billing statements but complainant
refused to settle them. He, nevertheless, handled complainant's case with utmost effort
and within the bounds of law and human decency. He was surprised to have received a
letter from complainant demanding the sum of US$90,000.00, equivalent to the
disability benefits he was claiming. As a lawyer though, he could have never insured the
success of complainant's case.

At any rate, he filed all the necessary pleadings and raised sound arguments at every
stage of the proceedings. His alleged incompetence did not lead to the dismissal of
the petition. It only pertained to deficiencies in form which he was able to rectify though
a "Verified Compliance and Statement of Material Dates." The Court could have just
dismissed the case outright based on the deficiencies but the Court did not. It instead
ordered respondent to file a compliance, which he did.

The truth is complainant's Certification of Fitness to Work dated June 17, 2003 which he
himself executed made it difficult to convince the Court of Appeals and eventually, the
Supreme Court to give due course to complainant's claim for total and permanent
disability benefits. More, PTC was able to establish that at the time complainant was
claiming total and permanent disability benefits, he was employed as training director in
another shipping agency.

Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP - CBD)
In its Report and Recommendation dated July 21, 2011, the IBP-CBD recommended
that respondent be meted the penalty of censure with warning that a repetition of
the same will be dealt with more severely.

It held that respondent had exerted ordinary diligence in handling complainant's

case, but had been remiss in his duty to promptly inform his client of the denial of
his petition. He had the obligation to discuss the results of the case with his client. For
until his retirement from the case is made of record, a lawyer continues to assume
professional responsibility and any perceived difficulty in discharging his duties does not
excuse him from performing it.

Resolutions of the IBP - Board of Governors (BOG)

By Resolution dated March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governor affirmed.
Respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied under Resolution dated April 20,
2017 for lack of any new argument which could have entailed a reversal of its findings.
Complainant's own motion for reconsideration, too, was denied under Resolution dated
February 16, 2019.

Per verification, no motion for reconsideration or petition for review was filed by either
party as of October 22, 2019. Nevertheless, the IBP elevated the entire case records to
the Court since the IBP Resolution is merely recommendatory in nature and does not
attain finality without the Court's imprimatur.

Issue

Did respondent violate the CPR, Canons of Professional Ethics, the Lawyer's
Oath, and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court when he allegedly
failed to inform complainant that the latter's petition for review on certiorari in
G.R. No. 183172 was already denied?

Ruling

The Court adopts the factual findings of the IBP-CBD but modifies the recommended
penalty.

Respondent violated the lawyer's oath when he neglected complainant's case after filing
the petition for review.

The Lawyer's Oath is not a mere formality recited for a few minutes in the glare of
flashing cameras and before the presence of select witnesses. The lawyer must
conduct himself beyond reproach at all times and live strictly according to his or her
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.9

As a member of the Bar, respondent pledged to assist his clients with full competence
and utmost diligence enshrined under the Lawyer's Oath to delay no man for money or
malice, and conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.

By taking the lawyer's oath, respondent became a guardian of the law and an
indispensable instrument for the orderly administration of justice. As such, he can be
disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, which renders him
unfit to continue to be an officer of the court.10

Here, respondent failed to live up to his duties and responsibilities. He served as

counsel for complainant before the NLRC and all the way to this Court. As it was
though, he never did anything more to protect his client's interest after he filed the
petition for review on certiorari before the Court onward.

Respondent violated the CPR when he did not apprise complainant of the case status.

The moment the lawyer-client relationship commences, the relationship of the lawyer
and the client becomes imbued with trust and confidence. Thereupon, the lawyer is
bound to serve his or her clients with full competence, and to attend to their cause with
utmost diligence, care and devotion. In accordance with this highly fiduciary
relationship, the client expects the lawyer to be always mindful of the former's cause
and to be diligent in handling his or her legal affairs.

As an essential part of this highly fiduciary relationship, the client is entitled to a

periodic and full status update from the lawyer pertaining to the case,11 viz.:

CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.02 — A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.

Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to client's request for information.

Here, complainant requested for an update on the case twice, first in March, and
second in May 2010. But instead of being truthful to complainant, respondent lied
through his teeth, claiming that the case was still pending resolution even though he
was already aware that it already got dismissed as early as February 25, 2010. When
complainant eventually uncovered the truth, he confronted respondent who simply
shrugged it off saying there was nothing more he could do.

When a client requests for a follow-up on his case, the update from the lawyer must
not only be prompt, but also full and effective. The lawyer must not merely brush
aside the client's request without even perusing the case records. For the client is
entitled to a full-disclosure on the material developments on his case.12 To be clear, a
lawyer need not wait for their clients to ask for information but must advise them
without delay about matters essential for them to avail of legal remedies.13

When respondent repeatedly failed to apprise complainant of the decree of denial of

the latter's petition, respondent is deemed to have failed to fulfill his duties under Rules
18.03 and 18.04 of the CPR.

In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo, Atty. Margallo erroneously assumed that complainant

Ramirez was no longer interested to pursue the appeal, causing complainant to lose
any chance to have the case reviewed by a higher court. Atty. Margallo failed to
exhaust all possible means to protect Ramirez's interest, contrary to what she
had sworn to do as a member of the legal profession. She was, therefore, held
liable for violating Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the CPR.

Similarly, in Cabauatan v. Venida, respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida was

suspended from the practice of law as he had been remiss in handling his client's
case. Complainant made several follow-ups with respondent but the latter ignored her
and made her believe that he was diligently handling her case. Complainant was
surprised when she received notice from the Court of Appeals informing her that her
appeal had been abandoned and her case, dismissed. For his failure to file an appeal,
the dismissal lapsed into finality. The Court held that Atty. Freddie A. Venida violated
Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR.

Lastly, in Caranza Vda. de Saldivar v. Cabanes, Jr., Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr.
neglected to inform his client about the Comi of Appeals' ruling which he had duly
received, thereby precluding his client from availing of any further remedies. The Court
found him guilty of violating Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the CPR.

So must it be.

Respondent was not justified in deciding on his own whether to pursue a motion for
reconsideration before the Court.

Complainant is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense authorized
by law, and is expected to rely on the lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. We, therefore, emphasize that a lawyer is not in the position to rule on the
merits of his or her complainant's case. Neither can a lawyer unilaterally decide whether
to forego the very last remedy available to his or her client.

As the facts here stand, respondent, on his own, opted to no longer file a motion
for reconsideration in complainant's case since respondent opined there was no
new issue, matter or evidence to offer anyway for the purpose of convincing the
Court to favorably rule for his client. Worse, respondent did not even relay to his
client that he chose not to move for reconsideration of the decree of denial. Neither did
he terminate his services as complainant's counsel pursuant to Sec. 26, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, viz.:

Section 26. Change of attorneys. — An attorney may retire at any time from any action
or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also
retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client,
should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he
ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly
employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and
written notice of the change shall be given to the advance party.

A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the
contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of
the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client
the full compensation stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney may, in the
discretion of the court; intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the payment of his
compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case
wherein his services had been retained by the client.

Without complying with Sec. 26, the attorney of record for one party remains his or her
counsel on whom notices should be served.1avvph!1 For its part, the Court may
recognize no other representation on behalf of the client except such counsel of record
until a formal substitution of attorney is effected.18 Until then, the lawyer of record is
deemed continuously required to exert "utmost learning and ability" to the end that
nothing shall be taken away or be withheld from his or her clients, save by the rules of
law 19 pursuant to Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Ethics:

Canon 15. How far a lawyer may go in supporting a client's cause

Nothing operates more certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice against lawyers
as a class, and to deprive the profession of that full measure of public esteem and
confidence which belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than does the false claim.
often set up by the unscrupulous for the defense of questionable transactions, that it is
the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed in winning his client's
cause.

It is improper for a lawyer to assert in argument his personal belief in his client's
innocence or in the justice of his cause.

The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of
law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity should restrain him
from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit
of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he
may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to
be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not
without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it
demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He
must obey his own conscience and not that of his client. (Emphasis supplied)

Had respondent been so minded to notify complainant of his desire not to file a motion
for reconsideration, or at least of this Court's adverse ruling, complainant could have
engaged the services of another lawyer to protect his interest in the case. We, thus,
underscore respondent's duty to inform his client of the status of the case and the
options the latter had under the circumstances and give him sufficient time to make a
choice.

To dispense with the filing of the motion for reconsideration altogether as he deemed fit,
is not the "utmost diligence" required of a lawyer in rendering services to a client. When
respondent withheld information on the denial of complainant's petition before the Court,
at least two (2) opportunities got lost, (1) complainant's opportunity to persuade the
Court regarding the merits of his claim on reconsideration, and (2) the Court's
opportunity to take a second hard look on the merits of the claim and rectify reversible
error, if any.

In Toquib v. Tomol, Jr., the Court suspended Atty. Valeriano Tomol, Jr. for violating
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics when he failed to inform his client of the
adverse decision he duly received. Copy of the decision dated May 25, 1961 was
served upon Atty. Tomol through his representative on June 7, 1961. He did not as
much as notify his client of the adverse ruling and allowed it to lapse into finality.

Penalty

A lawyer's neglect of a legal matter entrusted him by his client constitutes inexcusable
negligence for which he must be held administratively liable.21

Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. - A

member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis
supplied)

All told, while we affirm the findings of the IBP-CBD as regards respondent's
culpability, we cannot sustain the recommended penalty of censure.
In Figueras v. Jimenez,22 Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez had been remiss in the
performance of his duties as counsel for failure to timely file appellant's brief causing the
dismissal of the appeal. For his negligence, he was found administratively liable for
violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and was
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month.

Similarly, We deem it proper to impose a one (1) month suspension on respondent

for his negligent failure to apprise complainant on the Court's decree of denial
and inform complainant that he opted not to file a motion for reconsideration
allowing it to lapse into finality, in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and Canon 18,
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the CPR, and Canon 15 of the Canon of Professional
Ethics.

Final Note

A lawyer should never leave his or her client groping in the dark, for to do so would
destroy the trust, faith, and confidence reposed not only in the lawyer so retained, but
also in the legal profession as a whole. Aside from delivering efficient and effective legal
services, lawyers must also timely and adequately inform the clients about the status of
the case. The lawyer's duty to keep his clients constantly updated on the developments
of his case is crucial in maintaining the latter's confidence.24

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rebene C. Carrera is GUILTY of violating the Lawyer's Oath,

Canon 18, Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one (1) month with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or any
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.