1987 CONSTITUTION
VIII – Judiciary merely interprets
: 3n1 Constitution (this Constitution is
primarily divided into three)
1. CONSTITUTION OF SOVEREIGNTY
(supreme power to govern)
- Government of the people, for
the people and by the people.
Article I – The State has the power to
ordain and enforce laws over the
entirety of the Philippines
Article II – Section 1, “Philippines is a
democratic and republican state.
Sovereignty resides in the people and
all government authority emanates
from them.” The people owns the
sovereignty thus we adhere to the
principle of democracy (freedom) and
republicanism (impose certain limits on
freedom).
‘sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas’
The rights of other persons are the
limitations of our own kind.
A right seizes to be one if in the
exercise of it, you are trampling upon
the rights of others.
Section 1 emphasizes that sovereignty
resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.
But the Constitution is also regarded as a
social contract where people who wield or
possess sovereignty under the 1987
Constitution surrender their sovereignty in
favor of the government.
How does the Constitution ensure that the
exercise of this powers by the government
will not be abused by the government
officials?
ARTICLE III – BILL OF RIGHTS
- A set of limitations upon the exercise of
governmental powers.
2. CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT
Art. VI – Legislative Department has
the power to make laws or repeal them.
Art. VII - Executive Department
executive these laws
Art.
the law
Art. IX – Constitutional Commissions
Art. X – Local Government
(recognizing the autonomy and
existence of all LGUs)
Art. XI – Ombudsman, Sandiganbayan
and Tanodbayan
Art. XIII – Commission on Human
Rights
3. CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY
Article III – meant to put limitations
upon the government’s exercise of
inherent powers.
BILL OF RIGHTS
- Declaration and enumeration of a person’s
rights and privileges which the Constitution is
designed to protect against violation by the
government, or by individuals or by groups of
individuals.
Basis:
According to Marcelo H. Del Pilar, perfection of
humanity is not possible without freedom for the
individual. Thus, the existence of social institution
and all political organizations and relationships
are justified insofar as they have for their primary
aim the defense and protection of freedom.
CLASSES OF RIGHTS
1. Natural Rights – those possessed by
every citizen without being granted by the
State for they are given to man by God as
human being created to His image that he
may live a happy life. (inherent and
inalienable)
In PIL, every child has the right to be born.
2. Constitutional Rights – conferred and
protected by the Constitution.
3. Statutory Rights – provided by law,
promulgated by the law-making body and
consequently may be abolished by the
same body.
CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
1. Political Rights – the power to
participate directly or indirectly in the
establishment or administration of the
government.
 Ex. Right to citizenship, right to suffrage,
right to information, right to form political
parties, etc.
2. Civil Rights – a law which secures
private individuals for the purpose of
securing enjoyment of their means of
happiness.
Ex. Rights against involuntary servitude,
right not to be imprison because of
debts, property rights, right to a healthful
and balance ecology, right to education
3. Social and Economic Rights
(ICESCR)– intended to insure the well –
being and economic security of an
individual.
4. Rights of the Accused (Section 14,
Art. XIII) – intended for the protection of
a person accused of any crime.
Under Public International law, human rights
is divided into three different generations
GENERATIONS OF THE STUDY OF HUMAN
RIGHTS
1st generation – Civil and Political Law (ICCPR)
2nd generation – Social and Economic Rights
(ICESCR)
3rd generation – Right to Development
(Collective-developmental)
The relationship between human rights and
civil and political rights:
Human rights are broader in scope as a matter of
fact civil and political rights are just two slices of
the cake known as human rights law.
BILL OF RIGHTS
- purposely placed there to set limitations
on the stage exercise on its inherent
power. It is appended in our prime charter
so that the state through its agents will not
be committing abuses insofar as its
exercise of its Police Power, Power of
Imminent Domain, and Power of
Taxation.
*Bill of rights before Articles 6,7, 8, 9, 10 and so
on to remind the government that before it
exercises its inherent powers as to deserve
Article 3 first, and those are the limitations
thereof.
POLICE POWER
- simply means the power of the
government. To prohibit all that is hurtful
to comfort, safety and welfare of the
society which is vested upon congress by
way of ordaining or even repealing
reasonable laws not contrary to the
constitution for purposes of promoting the
general welfare and common good.
- vested upon any civilized government for
purposes of promoting the general
welfare. This is actually one of the
essences of democracy and of course
republicanism. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all the government authority
emanates from them.
SCOPE OF THE POLICE POWER
Insofar as the present Constitution is concerned,
the exercise of the Police Power will justify the
enactment of legal measures that would cover
three very important areas:
1. Public Health
2. Public Safety
3. Public Morals
SECTION 1, ARTICLE III
(Due Process and Equal Protection)
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
(Due process and Equal Protection Clause)
SCOPE OF BOTH CLAUSES
(Due Process and Equal Protection)
1. Life – is the most important form of human
rights.
A person who is breathing but is not accorded
with all his human rights is good as dead.
2. Liberty – everyone’s liberty cannot be taken
away from him without due process.
3. Property- one of the very important
component of comfortable living.
Labor Rights – also partakes of a
property right. An employee cannot be just
terminated from his employment without due
process.
DUE PROCESS
- implies the right of the person affected
thereby to be present before the tribunal which
pronounces judgment upon the question of life, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCEDURAL DUE
liberty and property in its most comprehensive PROCESS PROCESS
cases to be heard by testimony or otherwise and Intrinsic validity of the Compliance with the
to have to have the right of controverting by proof law that interferes with procedures and steps
any material fact. (Medenilla vs. Civil Service the right of a person to even periods
Commission) his property. prescribed by the
statute in conformity
Due process of law is a proceeding which hears
with the standard of
before it condemns, the punishment of the guilty
fair play and without
only proceeds after inquiry and renders judgment
arbitrariness on the
only after trial. (Webster)
part of those who are
called upon.
TWO ASPECTS OF DUE PROCESS
According to US vs. Ling Su fan, due process
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS - A person
of law is a process according to the law of the
cannot be convicted of a crime based on an
land. Due process of law" is not that the law shall
invalid law.
be according to the wishes of all the inhabitants
of the state, but simply — The law must be valid before it could affect the
concerned person who is sought to be affected by
1. Substantive Due Process that law.
First. That there shall be a law prescribed in
harmony with the general powers of the Once the law is invalid the accused cannot be
legislative department of the Government; convicted thereof. Nullum crimen sine lege. (no
Second. That this law shall be reasonable in its crime without law)
operation;

2. Procedural Due Process PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS- Procedural

Third. That it shall be enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure prescribed; and
Fourth. That it shall be applicable alike to all the
citizens of the state or to all of a class.
The first and second Principle is known as.
The third and fourth is known as
TWO COMPONENTS OF DUE PROCESS
(Secretaty of Justice vs. Lantion)
1. Substantive Due Process
- which requires the intrinsic validity
of the law in interfering with the rights of
the person to his life, liberty, or property
2. Procedural Due Process
- consists of the two basic rights of
notice and hearing, as well as the
guarantee of being heard by an impartial
and competent tribunal.
In order that a particular act may not be impugned
be violative of due process clause there must
compliance with both substantive and procedural
requirements.
Simply put:
(Alliance for The Family Foundation, vs. Janette
Garin, G.R. No. 217872, April 26, 2017)
Fairness. Procedure that government agencies
should follow.
An accused tried and convicted in absentia prior
to his arraignment must be acquitted even he was
guilty as hell because there is a blatant violation
of the rules on criminal procedure.
Arraignment- Reads the criminal charge(s)
against the person.
If already arraigned, the trial can proceed even in
the absence of the accused.
Q: What would happen if the trial court
proceeds to try and hear the case in absentia
notwithstanding that the accused wasn’t
arraigned prior thereto?
A: This will affect the validity of the proceeding.
The conviction of the accused upon the
completion of the trial will never be valid.
The same is all true if the said accused was tried
and convicted by the in absentia even prior to his
arrest, jurisdiction over the person of the accused
may only be obtain by the court upon his arrest.
The court convicts the accused. If we rule
otherwise, it will violate the accused constitutional
right.
Substantive Due Process is not always
judicial due process. This is true when the
doctrines of exhaustion administrative remedies
and primary jurisdiction.
Exhaustion Administrative Remedies
- the mandate of the rules of procedures,
there are certain cases which though maybe
cognizable by the trial court but one cannot
immediately file charges without going through
the administrative process.
Example:
Under the local government code, local tax
ordinances, if a local government unit enacts a
tax ordinance, then it would appear to you that
there is something wrong with the said law and it
urges you to go before the court and question the
same. Local Government Code says, before you
can question the validity of a Local Tax ordinance
before the court, you have to bring it first to the
attention of the Secretary of Justice Then In case
you get judgment not favorable to you, you must
to elevate it first to the office of the President, and
if the result is still unfavorable to you, that’s the
time you may elevate the case up to Court of
Appeals.
Primary Jurisdiction- there are issues that need
not be brought to the attention of the judicial
courts first because those issues might be
dependent upon the expertise of the appropriate
administrative agency.
Example:
Supposed you have a valid monetary claim
against the government, and it would appear
based on the situation prevailing, the government
has the obligation to pay, then time came you
want to claim what is due to you, and the
government has denied the same.
Q: Is appearing before the court to raise your
concern an appropriate action?
A: No, you cannot do that. Because in
Constitutional Law 1, when it comes to the
monetary claims against the government, you
have to first bring it to the attention of the
commission on audit.
The observance of fairness in the conduct of any
investigation or inquiry is at the very heart of the
due process.
Essence of The Due Process
 to be heard and as applied to the
administrative proceedings
This means that the fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain one’s side.
Administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type
hearing is not always necessary, and 6
technical rules of procedure are not strictly
applied. (Peter Vivo vs. PAGCOR)
*RRACS- Revised Rules of Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service.
In American jurisprudence, the due process
requirement entails the opportunity to be
heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner. (Carlos Saunar vs.
Executive Secretary)
In other words, due process as a constitutional
concept does not always and in all situation
require a trial type proceeding.
Criminal Due Process – the bulk of this will be
found in Rules of Criminal Procedure. In an
administrative case that would be entirely
different because administrative due process is
not in all situation require trial type.
Due Process requirement is satisfied if the
parties are given the opportunity to explain
their respective sides through position
papers or pleadings.
Due Process is satisfied when a person is
notified of the charge against him and given
the opportunity to explain or defend himself.
Like in administrative proceedings, the filing of
charges in giving reasonable opportunity for the
person so charged to answer the accusations
against him constitution the minimum
requirement of due process.
ANG TIBAY DOCTRINE
(Ang Tibay vs. CIR)
CARDINAL RIGHTS
There are primary rights which must be respected
even in proceedings of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes
the right of the party interested or affected
to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof.
(2) The tribunal must consider the
evidence presented. (the right to hearing
and the right to present of a party would
be rendered meaningless if the tribunal
will not give any strain of consideration
with regards these pieces of evidence.
 (3) The decision must have something to
support itself.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence
to support a finding or conclusion, but the
evidence must be "substantial."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The tribunal or body or any of these
judges must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decision rendered.
Two-Fold purpose of Administrative Due
Process
1. Contributes to the accuracy and thus
minimizes errors;
2. More intrinsically to the person with subject of
deprivation, it gives him a sense of rational
participation and a decision that can affect his
destiny and thus, enhances his dignity.
Part of the due process clause is publication.
Publication cannot be dispensed with, without
affecting the validity of the law.
The 15-day period can be increase or shorten,
but in no case shall publication be dispensed
with. Therefore, there is no such thing as
immediate effectivity of the law. (Art. 2, NCC)
Due process which is a rule of fairness requires
those who must obey a command must first know
what to obey. Ignorantia legis non excusat. (Fr.
Bernas)
CASE: ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL V CITY
MAYOR OF MANILA, G.R. No. L-24693, July
31, 1967
FACTS:
It was June 13, 1963 when the Municipal Court
of City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760
that sought to regulate operations of hotels and
motels within its territorial boundary. Among
other things, Section 1 of the said ordinance
was being challenged for being arbitrary,
unreasonable and violative of due process
clause so far as it imposed 6,000 pesos fee per
annum for first class motels and 4, 500 pesos
for second class motels. Also, the provision in
the same Section would likewise require the
owner/manager/ duly authorized
representative of a hotel or lodging house to
refrain from entering or accepting any guest or
customer or letting any room or other quarter to
any person/s without filling up the prescribed
forms in the lobby open to public view at all
times and in his presence, wherein the
surname, given name and middle name, the
date of birth, the address, the occupation, the
sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the
number of companions in the room, if any, with
the name, relationship, age and sex would be
specified, with data furnished as to his
residence certificate as well as his passport
number, if any, coupled with a certification that
a person signing such form has personally
filled it up and affixed his signature in the
presence of such owner, manager, keeper or
duly authorized representative, with such
registration forms and records kept and bound
together.
Under this assailed ordinance, said motels and
hotels where likewise subjected into inspection
from time to time by the mayor or by the chief
of police as the case may be, on that they are
prohibited to admit persons below the age of
18.
ISSUE:
Is the subject ordinance violative of the due
process clause of the constitution?
RULING:
The SC answered in the negative.
No, petitioners may not assert with plausibility
that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective
as being repugnant to the due process clause
of the Constitution. The mantle of protection
associated with the due process guarantee
does not cover petitioners. This particular
manifestation of a police power measure being
specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is
immune from such imputation of nullity resting
purely on conjecture and unsupported by
anything of substance. (In other words, the
claim of the petitioners here, anchored on the
constitutional protection of due process would
actually bow down on the so called least
limitable power - police power.)
To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict
and narrow the scope of police power which
has been properly characterized as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers, extending as it does "to all the great
public needs.” It would be, to paraphrase
another leading decision, to destroy the very
purpose of the state if it could be deprived or
allowed itself to be deprived of its competence
to promote public health, public morals, public
safety and the general welfare. Negatively put,
police power is "that inherent and plenary
power in the State which enables it to
prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society.
CASE: Velasco v. Villegas,
G.R. No. L-24153, February 14, 1983
FACTS:
Another Manila City Ordinance is involved in
this case. challenging the constitutionality
based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of
Manila, the contention being that it amounts to
a deprivation of property of petitioners-
appellants of their means of livelihood without
due process of law. The assailed ordinance is
worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any
operator of any barber shop to conduct the
business of massaging customers or other
persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said
barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the
same building where the barber shop is located
as long as the operator of the barber shop and
the rooms where massaging is conducted is
the same person."
ISSUE:
Is the Manila City Ordinance No. 4964
unconstitutional for violating due process of
law?
RULING:
It was not unconstitutional. It was
constitutional. The court explained that it was a
police power measure. The objectives behind
its enactment are:"
(1) To be able to impose payment of the license
fee for engaging in the business of massage
clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended
by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different
measure than the ordinance regulating the
business of barbershops and,
(2) in order to forestall possible immorality
which might grow out of the construction of
separate rooms for massage of customers."
This Court has been most liberal in
sustaining ordinances based on the general
welfare clause.
GENERAL RULE: potestas non potest
delegari
EXCEPTION: when congress delegates police
power to LGUs
Congress enacted RA 7160 in 1991. It is a valid
delegation of police power.
LIMITATION: it cannot go against a
statute/national law
The Supreme court has once again
recognized the significance of local police
power. This clause has been given wide
application by municipal authorities and has in
its relation to the particular circumstances of
the case been liberally construed by the courts.
Such, it is well to recall, is the progressive view
of Philippine jurisprudence." As it was then, so
it has continued to be. 6 There is no showing,
therefore, of the unconstitutionality of such
ordinance.
CASE: TAÑADA V. TUVERA,
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
FACTS:
Here the petitioners were concerned citizens
and an Association of Nationalist Lawyers and
they brought an action for mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish or
cause the publication of various decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders and other
presidential issuances in the Official Gazette.
In defense of the public defendants of this
case, the Solicitor General stood up and first
questioned the locus standi of the petitioners.
Focus: How the Supreme Court applies the
due process clause.
Solicitor General’s contention:
Under Article 2 of the Civil Code,
publication in the official Gazette was not
required where the laws themselves provides
for the dates of their effectivity.
RULING:
Solicitor General’s contention is wrong. The
publication of presidential issuances "of a
public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. Therefore,
presidential issuances which have not been
published has no force or effect.
Also justified by the legal maxim ignorantia
legis non excusat. Corolarily, a person who
has been charged of a law which has not been
published at all, nullum crimen nulla poena sine
lege will apply because that law would be
invalid.
CASE: Ynot v. IAC,
G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987
FACTS:
The petitioner owned six carabaos and
transportedin a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the
Executive Order No. 626-A.
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby
amended such that henceforth, no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or
purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from
one province to another. The carabao or carabeef
transported in violation of this Executive Order as
amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions
as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef,
and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case
of carabaos.
So he brought an action for replevin (for
purposes of reconveyance of personal
property) and challenging the constitutionality
of the E. O. He was just transporting the
carabaos not butchering.
Trial court sustained the confiscation and did
not rule on the constitutionality of the law on the
ground that it lacked authority to do so.
Decision is affirmed by the IAC (Intermediate
Appellate Court). That’s why it is elevated to
the SC.
ISSUE:
Was the confiscation of the 6 carabaos owned
by petitioner violative of due process?
RULING:
There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter
of these animals except where they are at least
seven years old if male and eleven years old if
female upon issuance of the necessary permit,
the executive order will be conserving those
still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing
their improvident depletion.
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-
provincial transport of carabaos can prevent
their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that
they can be killed anywhere, with no less
difficulty in one province than in another.
The measure struck at once and pounced
upon the petitioner without giving him a
chance to be heard, thus denying him the
centuries-old guarantee of elementary fair
play -due process.
CASE: Bautista v. Juinio,
G.R. No. L-50908, January 31, 1984
FACTS:
There was a Letter of Instruction signed by
then President Ferdinand Marcos which
banned the use of vehicles under the "H" and
"EH" classifications of the LTC on weekends
and holidays starting 0001 hours, Saturday
morning, (or the day of the holiday) until 0500
hours, Monday morning (or the day after the
holiday).
Exempted from this prohibition are motor
vehicles of the following classifications: S
(Service), T (Truck). DPL (Diplomatic), CC
(Consular Corps), TC (Tourist Cars)
Memorandum Circular No. 39, issued by the
then respondent Minister of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications, and then
respondent Land Transportation
Commissioner, imposing the penalties "of fine,
confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of
license is likewise unconstitutional"
Claim of petitioners: Letter of Instruction is
discriminatory and a denial of due process
ISSUE:
Was that Letter of Instruction violative of due
process?
RULING:
The LOI cannot be declared void on its face.
Behind it is the presumption of validity. As
underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character,
the presumption of constitutionality must
prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record for overthrowing the
 statute. Admittedly, such measures (the LOI)
are conducive to energy conservation.
The laws operate equally and uniformly on all
persons under similar circumstances or that all
persons must be treated in the same manner,
the conditions not being different, both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
The government is not required by the
Constitution to adhere to the policy of all or
none.
The LOI cannot be declared void on its face as
behind it the presumption of validity. The
necessity for evidence to rebut such
presumption is unavoidable as underlying
questions of facts may condition the
constitutionality of legislation. The
presumption of validity must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of
record for overthrowing the statute.
-The government is not required to adhere to
the policy of all or none.
“Nor shall any person be denied by the equal
protection of the laws.”
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
refers to the constitutional guarantee of
the equality of a person before the law. Every
individual is held as an equal person in the law
which does not treat the person differently as to
who/what he is or what he says. - Fr. Bernas
President’s immunity from suit is not a defense in
the face of a criminal action against the president.
The rule is, to impeach before filing a criminal
case.
Exception: it is only with respect to official and
governmental acts. So if criminal acts are not
related to the functions of his office, not included
to the non-suability of a sitting president.
The equal protection clause confers upon a
person the same rights and obligation under the
law under the same circumstances.
There is more truism in legal equality rather
than total equality.
unattainable
“This guarantee of equal protection clause is
explained by the SC that no person or class of
persons shall be deprived of the same
protection clause which is enjoyed by other
persons in the same place and
circumstances. However, the equal
protection clause does not prohibit
classification.” - Tolentino v. Board of
Accountancy
The government is not required by the
Constitution to adhere to the policy of all or
none.
Basically, the equal protection clause does not
prevent the legislature from establishing classes
of individuals or objects upon which different rules
shall operate, so long as the classification is not
unreasonable.
CASE: CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION V. BANGKO SENTRAL
G.R. No. 148208
December 15, 2004
(EXAMPLE OF CLASSIFICATION)
Cited Victoria v. Elizarde (landmark case-1974)
Background: Unionism is encouraged by no
less than the constitution. The management
and the union must engage in bargaining
(Collective Bargaining Agreement). CBA may
contain a union security clause.
- Close shop agreement- management
undertakes to accept applicants who
are not union member
- Union shop agreement - management
may accept applicants who are not
union members but within a specific
time as written in the CBA must
become a union member. (terminated if
not)
In the Victoria case, one employee is a
member of INC and they are not allowed to join
unions. There came a law which exempted
them from joining unions, likewise protected
them from being terminated because of either
a close shop/union shop agreement. Religious
freedom always prevails over some
contractual obligation.
Is that equal protection?It isWhat
not onlyabout other
impossible but
religions/sectors? also not feasible.
Sometimes, the law may make some
exemptions. According to INC’s ecclesiastical
 doctrine, this is not allowed and we have to
respect that.
“Guarantee of the equal protection clause
is not a guarantee of equality in the
application of the laws upon all the citizens
of the State.”
EQUAL PROTECTION
Concept:
– legal equality.
We have the equal number of rights as well as the
number of obligations under the law under the
same circumstances.
 Does not prohibit classification.
At times, the law may impose classification
insofar as those who are to be benefited by law
because it is required by circumstances.
Ex. Law on Senior Citizen
CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, INC., vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL
The equal protection of the laws clause of the
Constitution allows classification. Classification
in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things
in speculation or practice because they agree
with one another in certain particulars. A law is
not invalid because of simple inequality. The
very idea of classification is that of inequality,
so that it goes without saying that the mere fact
of inequality in no manner determines the
matter of constitutionality. All that is required of
a valid classification is that it be reasonable,
which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make
for real differences, that it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; that it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and that it
must apply equally to each member of the
class.
Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho G.R.
No. L-29646 November 10, 1978
FACTS:
The City of Manila enacted an ordinance which
prohibited the employment of aliens in any
occupation or business unless they first secure
a permit from the mayor off Manila and pay the
fee of 500 pesos. Violation of the ordinance
was punished by imprisonment of not less than
3 months nor more than 3 months for a fine of
not less than 100 nor more than 300 pesos
posed on the discretion of court.
The respondent who is an alien employed in
Manila brought suit in obtained judgment from
the CFI now known as the Regional Trial Court,
layering the ordinance null and void. That is
why the mayor of the City of Manila appealed
the case up to the Supreme Court.
RULING:
The ordinance involve here is a tax measure
and in imposing a flat fee of P500, it fails to
consider substantial differences in situation
among aliens and for that reason violates the
rule on uniformity of taxation. It also lays down
no guide for the granting or denial of permit and
therefore, permits the arbitrary exercise of
discretion by the city Mayor. Finally, the
Supreme Court said that the ordinance denies
aliens’ due process and the equal protection
clause. Requiring a permit before a person can
be employed is tantamount to denying him the
basic right to earn a livelihood, the due process
clause and the equal protection clause over
citizens and aliens.
VERA V. CUEVAS,
G.R. NO. L-33693-94 MAY 31, 1979
FACTS:
The private respondents are engaged in the
manufacture in sale of field milk products. They
brought an action before the CFI of Manila for
a declaration of their rights in respect of
Section 169 of the tax code. This provision
provided an required that all condensed
skimmed milk in whatever form from which the
fatty part has been removed totally or in parts
sold in the Philippines shall be clearly and
eligibly marked on its immediate containers
with the words, "This milk is not suitable for
nourishment for infants less than one year of
age or words of similar import."
Now the CFI restrained the CIR (Commissioner
of Internal Revenue) and its agents from
enforcing this requirement. That is why the
petitioners here elevated the case up to the
Supreme Court for certiorari.
RULING:
It was held that Section 169 of the Tax Code
has been repealed by RA 344. At any rate,
Section 169 applies only to skimmed milk and
not to filled milk. Section 169 is being enforced
only against respondents manufacturers of
filled milk but not against manufacturers of
skimmed milk. Thus, denying them the equal
protection of the law.
DUMLAO V. COMELEC,
G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980
FACTS:
Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 provides in part that
any retired elective provincial city or municipal
official has received payment of the retirement
benefit to which he is entitled under the law,
“Any retired elective provincial city or municipal
official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under
the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years of
age at the commencement of the term of office
to which he seeks to be elected shall not be
qualified to run for the same elective local office
from which he has retired.” Claiming that this
provision was directed at him, the petitioner
who was former governor of Nueva Viscaya
Dumlao and a candidate for that office in
January 30, 1980 elections sued for prohibition
to enjoin enforcement of the law on the ground
that it is contrary to the equal protection and
due process guarantee of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Was Dumlao in his contention correct?
RULING:
Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the
application of that provision. No petition
seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been
filed before the COMELEC. His petitions are
mere request for an advisory opinion from the
court (theory of judicial review). No locus
standi.
Nevertheless, because of the paramount public
interest in the question of the proximity in the
election, the question should be resolved. The
purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of
younger blood in local governments. The
classification in question being pursuant to that
purpose, it cannot be considered invalid. The
tiredness of the retiree for government work is
present, and what is emphatically significant is
that the retired employee has already declared
himself tired and unavailable for the same
government work.
IGOT V. COMELEC,
G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980
FACTS:
Romeo Igot filed the case as a taxpayer, voter
and as a member of the Bar. Prohibition to
enjoin enforcement of BP 52. Section 4 of
which provides for the disqualification as
candidate of any person convicted of
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or others of
similar offences and provides that filing of
charges for such crimes before a civil or
military tribunal after preliminary investigation
shall be a prima facie evidence of such fact.
RULING:
Neither petitioner has been convicted nor
charged with acts of disloyalty nor disqualified
from being candidates for local elective
positions. They have no personal nor
substantial interest at stake. In the absence of
any litigate interest, they can claim no locus
standi in seeking judicial redress. Neither can
they sue as taxpayers as the statute in
question does not directly involved the
disbursement of public funds.
Accordingly, the majority finds no necessity at
this stage to pass upon the validity of Section
4. However, the situation is different with
respect to the presumption arising from the
filing in a court or military tribunal to such
crimes after preliminary investigation. This
provides a contravene the constitutional
presumption of innocence as the candidate
is disqualified for public office on the ground
alone that charges have been filed against him
before civil or military tribunal. Such a person
is virtually placed in the same category as a
person already convicted of a crime with the
penalty of arresto, which carries with it the
accessory penalty of suspension of the right to
hold office during the term of the sentence.
Although the presumption is rebuttable, time
constraints may prevent from offering contrary
proof. Above all, it is best that evidence of
disloyalty be passed upon by courts rather than
by an administrative body.
REQUISITES FOR VALID CLASSIFICATION
1. It must rest on substantial distinction
which make real differences;
2. It must be germane to the purpose of the
law;
3. It must not be limited to existing
conditions only.
4. Apply equally to all members of the same
class
PEOPLE V. CAYAT,
G.R. No. L-45987, May 5, 1939
FACTS:
The accused, Mr. Cayat, was a native of
Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province. He was
sentenced by the Justice of the Peace (MTC)
to pay a fine of 5 pesos or suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Being a
member of a non-Christian tribe who received,
acquired and had in his possession and under
his control or custody one bottle of A-1-1 gin,
an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called
native wines and liquors which the members of
such tribes have been accustomed themselves
to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.
Cayat invoked his so-called constitutional
protection on the equal protection clause. He
claimed that there was an invalid classification
and because of that, the law appeared to be
problematic and therefore must be declared
unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Is Act No. 1639 constitutional
RULING:
Yes. It is an established principle of
constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not equal protection of
the laws is not violated by a legislation based
on reasonable classification. And the
classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) must be
germane to the purposes of the law; (3)
must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The
classification rests on real and substantial, not
merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It
is not based upon "accident of birth or
parentage," as counsel to the appellant
asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and
culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers,
not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the
geographical area, and, more directly, to
natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade
of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship
apart from settled communities." This
distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for
the Act was intended to meet the peculiar
conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.
The exceptional cases of certain members
thereof who at present have reached a position
of cultural equality with their Christian brothers,
cannot affect the reasonableness of the
classification thus established.
That it is germane to the purposes of law
cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy,
receive, have in his possession, or drink any
ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating
liquors of any kind, other than the so-called
native wines and liquors which the members of
such tribes have been accustomed themselves
to make prior to the passage of this Act.," is
unquestionably designed to insure peace and
order in and among the non-Christian tribes.
The law is not limited in its application to
conditions existing at the time of its enactment.
It is intended to apply for all times as long as
those conditions exist. The Act was not
predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts,
upon the assumption that the non-Christians
are "impermeable to any civilizing influence."
On the contrary, the Legislature understood
that the civilization of a people is a slow
process and that hand in hand with it must go
measures of protection and security.
Finally, that the Act applies equally to all
members of the class is evident from a perusal
thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation
against a certain number non-Christians by
reason of their degree of culture, is not an
argument against the equality of its application.
Are aliens entitled to the protection of equal
protection clause?
General Rule: It applies to all persons, both
citizens and aliens. The Constitution places the
civil rights of aliens on equal footing with those
of the citizens.
XPN: Statutes may validly limit exclusively to
citizens the enjoyment of rights or privileges
connected with public domain, the public works,
or the natural resources of the State.
NOTE: The rights and interests of the State in
these things are not simply political but also
proprietary in nature and so citizens may lawfully
be given preference over aliens in their use or
enjoyment
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE V.
QUISUMBING,
G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000
FACTS:
International School, Inc. (the School, for
short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is
a domestic educational institution established
primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic
personnel and other temporary residents. To
enable the School to continue carrying out its
educational program and improve its standard
of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree
authorizes the School to employ its own
teaching and management personnel selected
by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or
other nationalities, such personnel being
exempt from otherwise applicable laws and
regulations attending their employment, except
laws that have been or will be enacted for the
protection of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and
local teachers as members of its faculty,
classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires
and (2) local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain
benefits not accorded local-hires. These
include housing, transportation, shipping costs,
taxes, and home leave travel allowance.
Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate
twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-
hires. The School justifies the difference on two
"significant economic disadvantages" foreign-
hires have to endure, namely: (a) the
"dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure.
When negotiations for a new collective
bargaining agreement were held on June 1995,
International School Alliance of Educators, "a
legitimate labor union and the collective
bargaining representative of all faculty
members" of the School, contested the
difference in salary rates between foreign and
local-hires. This resulted to a bargaining
deadlock and ultimately, an impending strike to
which the Secretary of Labor promptly
assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and who
later on resolved the controversy in favor of the
School.
The Labor Union claims that the point-of-hire
classification employed by the School is
discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of
higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes
racial discrimination.
ISSUE:
Was the subject policy of the school
Constitutional?
RULING:
No. The School cannot invoke the need to
entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to
rationalize the distinction in salary rates without
violating the principle of equal work for equal
pay.
While we recognize the need of the School to
attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be
used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-
hires. The local-hires perform the same
services as foreign-hires and they ought to be
paid the same salaries as the latter. For the
same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the
foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve
as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates.
The dislocation factor and limited tenure
affecting foreign-hires are adequately
compensated by certain benefits accorded to
them which are not enjoyed by local-hires,
such as housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire
classification employed by respondent School
to justify the distinction in the salary rates of
foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid
classification. There is no reasonable
distinction between the services rendered by
foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of
the School of according higher salaries to
foreign-hires contravenes public policy and,
certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of
this Court.
DYCAICO V. SSS,
G.R. No. 161357. November 30, 2005
(Due process and equal protection clause)
FACTS:
Elena Dycaico was the widow of Bonifacio
Dycaico who became the member of SSS on
January 24, 1980. In his self-employed data
record (SSS Form RS-1), he named Elena P.
Dycaico and their eight children as his
beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena
lived together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage.
In June 1989, Bonifacio was considered retired
and began receiving his monthly pension from
the SSS. He continued to receive the monthly
pension until he passed away on June 19,
1997. A few months prior to his death,
however, Bonifacio married the petitioner on
January 6, 1997.
Shortly after Bonifacio's death, the petitioner
filed with the SSS an application for survivor's
pension. Her application, however, was denied
on the ground that under Section 12-B(d) of
Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 8282 or the Social
Security Law she could not be considered a
primary beneficiary of Bonifacio as of the date
of his retirement. The said proviso reads:
 Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits.
' achievement of the policy objective of the law,
(d) Upon the death of the retired
member, his primary beneficiaries as of
the date of his retirement shall be
entitled to receive the monthly pension.
' infringes the equal protection clause.
ISSUE:
Was the denial valid?
RULING:
No. In fact, the court declared this proviso,
Section 12-B(d) of Republic Act (Rep. Act) No.
8282, as violative of the equal protection
clause.
The proviso as of the date of his
retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No.
8282 which qualifies the term 'primary
beneficiaries' results in the classification of
dependent spouses as primary beneficiaries
into two groups:
(1) Those dependent spouses whose
respective marriages to SSS members were
contracted prior to the latter's retirement; and
(2) Those dependent spouses whose
respective marriages to SSS members were
contracted after the latter's retirement.
Underlying these two classifications of
dependent spouses is that their respective
marriages are valid. In other words, both
groups are legitimate or legal spouses. The
distinction between them lies solely on the date
the marriage was contracted. The petitioner
belongs to the second group of dependent
spouses, i.e., her marriage to Bonifacio was
contracted after his retirement. As such, she
and those similarly situated do not qualify as
'primary beneficiaries' under Section 12-B(d) of
Rep. Act No. 8282 and, therefore, are not
entitled to survivor's pension under the same
provision by reason of the subject proviso.
However, it reflects congressional concern with
the possibility of relationships entered after
retirement for the purpose of obtaining
benefits. In particular, the proviso was
apparently intended to prevent sham
marriages or those contracted by persons
solely to enable one spouse to claim benefits
upon the anticipated death of the other spouse.
This concern is concededly valid. However,
classifying dependent spouses and
determining their entitlement to survivor's
pension based on whether the marriage was
contracted before or after the retirement of the
other spouse, regardless of the duration of the
said marriage, bears no relation to the
i.e., provide meaningful protection to members
and their beneficiaries against the hazard of
disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death
and other contingencies resulting in loss of
income or financial burden." The proviso
GSIS V. MONTESCLAROS,
G.R. No. 146494, July 14, 2004
Same situation with Dycaico vs. SSS, only
difference in law involved (GSIS Law). Both
Social Security Laws contain constitutional
infirmities.
HIMAGAN VS PEOPLE
GR No. 113811
FACTS:
Petitioner, a policeman assigned with the
medical company of the Philippine National
Police Regional Headquarters at Camp
Catitigan, Davao City, was implicated in the
killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the
attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After
the information for murder and attempted
murder were filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 11, Davao City, on September
16, 1992, the trial court issued an Order
suspending petitioner until the termination of
the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A.
6975, otherwise known as Department of
Interior and Local Government Act of 1990,
which provides:
Upon the filing of a complaint or
information sufficient in form and substance
against a member of the PNP for grave
felonies where the penalty imposed by law is
six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the
court shall immediately suspend the accused
from office until the case is terminated. Such
case shall be subject to continuous trial and
shall be terminated within ninety (90) days
from arraignment of the accused (Emphasis
ours).
(NB: the length of the preventive suspension
is largely dependent upon the termination of
the case meaning if there is an acquittal or
conviction. Under CSC rules, a government
employee can be prevently suspended either
60 days or 90 days. If the suspension is
already finished, he or she shall resume his
or her function of his office notwithstanding
the status of the case. However, when it
comes to the members of the PNP is different
because of Section 47, R.A. 6975.)
About 11 months through suspension,
Himagan filed a motion to lift the order for his
suspension, relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807
of the Civil Service Decree. According to
Himagan, his suspension should be lifted
because it was supposedly limited to 90 days
pursuant to Section 42 of Civil Service
Decree. The said motion was denied by the
Judge. Therefore, Himagan, in elevating the
case after the SC, claims that an imposition
of preventive suspension of over 90 days is
contrary to the Civil Service Law and would
be a violation of his constitutional right to
equal protection of laws.
ISSUE: Is Section 47 of RA 6975 in violation
of the equal protection clause?
RULING:
No. It was not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In other words, Section 47
of RA 6975 is not unconstitutional. The court
said that The reason why members of the
PNP are treated differently from the other
classes of persons charged criminally or
administratively insofar as the application of
the rule on preventive suspension is
concerned is that policemen carry weapons
and the badge of the law which can be used
to harass or intimidate witnesses against
them, as succinctly brought out in the
legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged
with a serious offense is reinstated to his post
while his case is pending, his victim and the
witnesses against him are obviously exposed
to constant threat and thus easily cowed to
silence by the mere fact that the accused is
in uniform and armed. The imposition of
preventive suspension for over 90 days
under Section 47 of R.A. 6975 does not
violate the suspended policeman's
constitutional right to equal protection of the
laws.
In fine, the SC court explains that the equal
protection clause exists to prevent undue
favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on
inequality. Recognizing the existence of real
differences among men, the equal protection
clause does not demand absolute equality. It
merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to the privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal
protection clause does not absolutely forbid
classifications, such as the one which exists
in the instant case. If the classification is
based on real and substantial differences; s
germane to the purpose of the law; applies to
all members of the same class; and applies
to current as well as future conditions, the
classification may not be impugned as
violating the Constitution's equal protection
guarantee. A distinction based on real and
reasonable considerations related to a proper
legislative purpose such as that which exists
here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor
unfounded.
SECTION 2, ARTICLE III
(Searches and Seizures)
Section 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
GENERAL RULE: A person or his house
including papers can neither be search nor seize
without a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest
as the case may be.
REQUISITES FOR A VALID SEARCH
WARRANT
1. There must be an existence of probable
cause;
2. This probable cause must be personally
determined by the Judge by examination
under oath or by affirmation of the
complainant and his witnesses; and
3. The so-called particularity of description of
the place to be search or the things to be
seized.
Purpose of this provision:
“The inviolability of the home is one of the most
fundamental of all the individual rights declared
and recognized in the political codes of civilized
nations.” –Fr. Bernas
“A man’s home is his castle.” No one can enter
into the home of another without the consent of
its owner.
A privacy of a home, the place of abode, the
place where a man with his family may dwell in
peace and enjoy the companionship of his wife
and children unmolested by anyone even by the
king, has always been regarded by civilized
nation as one of the most sacred personal
right to whom men are entitled.
Q: Can the rights under Section 2 of Article 3
be asserted in checkpoints?
Valmonte vs. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988,
September 29, 1989
(Checkpoints)
FACTS:
Sometime in January 20, 1987, National
Capital Region District Command (NCRDC)
was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction
02/87 of the Philippine General
Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of
conducting security operations within its area
of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the
purpose of establishing an effective territorial
defense, maintaining peace and order, and
providing an atmosphere conducive to the
social, economic and political development of
the National Capital Region. As part of its
duty to maintain peace and order, the
NCRDC installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners alleged that because of the
installation of said checkpoints, the residents
of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed
and of their safety being placed at the
arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the
checkpoints, considering that their cars and
vehicles are being subjected to regular
searches and check-ups, especially at night
or at dawn, without the benefit of a search
warrant and/or court order. The petitioners
likewise further asserted in this case that the
said checkpoints give the respondents the
blanket authority to make searches and/or
seizures without search warrant or court
order in violation of the Constitution; and,
instances have occurred where a citizen,
while not killed, had been harassed.
ISSUE:
Is the conduct of checkpoint violative of
Section 2 of the Bill of Rights?
RULING:
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to
the effect that he had been stopped and
searched without a search warrant by the
military manning the checkpoints, without
more, i.e., without stating the details of the
incidents which amount to a violation of his
right against unlawful search and seizure, is
not sufficient to enable the Court to
determine whether there was a violation
of Valmonte's right against unlawful
search and seizure. Not all searches and
seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable
search is not to be determined by any fixed
formula but is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws
aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds, or simply
looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein,
these do not constitute unreasonable search.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the
military is susceptible of abuse by the men in
uniform, in the same manner that all
governmental power is susceptible of abuse.
But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen,
the checkpoints during these abnormal times,
when conducted within reasonable limits, are
part of the price we pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community.
Q: Does the law requires that the
announcement of the public be made prior to
the installation of the checkpoints?
People V. Escaño, G.R. Nos. 129756-58,
January 28, 2000
(prior announcement of checkpoints)
NO. We see no need for checkpoints to be
announced, as the accused have invoked.
Not only would it be impractical, it would
also forewarn those who intend to violate
the ban. Even so, badges of legitimacy of
checkpoints may still be inferred from
their fixed location and the regularized
manner in which they are operated.
 This Court has ruled that not all
checkpoints are illegal. Those which are
warranted by the exigencies of public
order and are conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists are allowed.
For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do
intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists’
right to "free passage without
interruption," but it cannot be denied that,
as a rule, it involves only a brief detention
of travelers during which the vehicle’s
occupants are required to answer a brief
question or two. For as long as the vehicle
is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the
inspection of the vehicle is limited to a
visual search, said routine checks cannot
be regarded as violative of an individual’s
right against unreasonable search. In fact,
these routine checks, when conducted in
a fixed area, are even less intrusive.
PROBABLE CAUSE
-defined generally as “such reasons, supported
by facts and circumstances, as will warrant a
cautious man in the belief that his action, and the
means taken in prosecuting it, are legally just and
proper. It is “such facts and circumstances
antecedent to the issuance of a warrant, that are
in themselves sufficient to induce a cautious man
to rely upon them and act in pursuance thereof.
FOR PURPOSES OF THE ISSUANCE OF
WARRANT OF ARREST
- Such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed by the person sought
to be arrested.
FOR PURPOSES OF THE ISSUANCE OF
WARRANT OF ARREST
- Such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and the objects
sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched.
HOW PROBABLE CAUSE IS ESTABLISHED
-determined personally by the judge under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses.
“The establishment of the existence of
probable cause presupposes the introduction
of competent proof that the party against
whom they sought as performed particular
acts or committed specific omissions
violating a given provision of our criminal
law.” -STONEHILL V. DIOKNO, G.R. No. L-
19550, June 19, 1967
Bache & Co. Vs. Hon. Judge Vivencio M.
Ruiz, et al.,
G.R. No. L-32409. 27 Feb. 1971
(Personal determination by the judge in
the issuance of search warrants)
“Probable cause for the issuance of
search warrant must be personally
determined by the judge.”
FACTS:
Upon the filing of the application for search
warrant, the Deputy Clerk of Court took the
deposition of the complainant and the
witnesses after which the stenographic notes
of the deposition where read to the judge in
the presence of the complainant and his
witnesses.
The stenographer, upon request of the
Judge, read to him her stenographic notes;
and thereafter, the Judge asked Logronio to
take the oath and warned him that if his
deposition was found to be false and without
legal basis, he could be charged for perjury.
Thereafter, the judge issued the warrant.
ISSUES:
Is the warrant valid?
RULING:
NO. The warrant is not valid. Personal
examination by the judge of the complainant
and his witnesses is necessary to enable him
to determine the existence or non-existence
of a probable cause, pursuant to Art. III, Sec.
1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Court, both of
which prohibit the issuance of warrants
except "upon probable cause." The
determination of whether or not a probable
cause exists calls for the exercise of
judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts
and should not be allowed to be delegated in
the absence of any rule to the contrary.
In the case at bar, no personal examination
at all was conducted by respondent Judge of
the complainant (respondent De Leon) and
his witness (respondent Logronio).
 Following established doctrine and
The participation of respondent Judge in the procedure, he shall:
proceedings which led to the issuance of (1) personally evaluate the report and the
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was thus limited supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
to listening to the stenographer’s readings of regarding the existence of probable cause
her notes, to a few words of warning against and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
the commission of perjury, and to arrest; or
administering the oath to the complainant (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
and his witness. This cannot be consider a cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report
personal examination. If there was an and require the submission of supporting
examination at all of the complainant and his affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at
witness, it was the one conducted by the a conclusion as to the existence of probable
Deputy Clerk of Court. But, as stated, the cause.
Constitution and the rules require a personal
examination by the judge. The judge may rely the finding of the probable
cause by the investigating prosecutor. If on
the basis thereof, the judge finds no probable
Search warrant issued by the judge was cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report
declared null and void and the things and require the submission of supporting
ceased were declared to be the fruit of the affidavits of witnesses.
poisonous tree and were ordered to be
returned to its owner.
SEARCH WARRANT OF
WARRANT ARREST
“Mere affidavits of the complainant and his Personal determination Judge may not
witnesses are thus not sufficient. The by the judge personally determine
examining Judge has to take depositions in and may rely upon the
finding of the probable
writing of the complainant and the witnesses cause by the
he may produce and to attach them to the investigating
record. Such written deposition is necessary prosecutor
in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or non-
PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
existence of the probable cause, to hold liable
for perjury the person giving it if it will be Section 2 of Article III requires that the things, the
found later that his declarations are false.” place or person to be searched or the things to be
seized must be specifically or particularly
Mata vs. Bayona, G.R. No. 50720. March 26,
1984 describe in the warrant.

Intent of the requirement (Uy Kheytin vs.

Q: Is it necessary that the Judge should
personally determine probable cause before
he could validly issue a warrant of arrest?
Soliven vs. Makasiar
G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988
(Personal determination by the judge in
the issuance of warrants of arrest)
What the Constitution underscores is the
exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge
is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses.
Villareal, G.R. No. 16009:
- to limit the things to be seized to those,
and only those, particularly described in
the search warrant
- to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they
shall seize, to the end that "unreasonable
searches and seizures" may not be
made,
- that abuses may not be committed.
Q: May the Court issue a John Doe Warrant
without violating the Constitutional
requirement of particularity of description?
People v. Veloso,
G.R. No. L-23051, October 20, 1925
(Validity of John Doe Warrants)
FACTS:
There was a warrant of arrest issued by the
Judge. The person to be seized was simply
identified as John Doe and the place to be
occupied by him as described in the warrant
was identified as the Building No. 124 Calle
Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippines. The
warrant was executed and Veloso was
arrested. In defense, he questioned the
legality of the warrant. The warrant that was
made basis by arrest was unconstitutional
because it failed to satisfy the constitutional
requirement of particularity of description.
ISSUE:
Was the warrant issued by the Court against
a particular John Doe valid?
RULING:
The warrant is valid. It is invariably
recognized that the warrant for the
apprehension of an unnamed party is void,
"except in those cases where it contains a
description personae such as will enable the
officer to identify the accused." The
description must be sufficient to indicate
clearly the proper person upon whom the
warrant is to be served. As the search
warrant stated that John Doe had gambling
apparatus in his possession in the building
occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo,
City of Manila, and as this John Doe was
Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club,
the police could identify John Doe as Jose
Ma. Veloso without difficulty.
A John Doe warrant can be valid provided
that it contains a description personae.
Pangandaman Vs. Casar,
G.R. No. 71782, April 14, 1988
(Limitation of John Doe Warrants)
The issuance of John Doe Warrants is not
unlimited. Insofar, however, as said warrant
is issued against fifty (50) "John Does" not
one of whom the witnesses to the complaint
could or would Identify, it is of the nature of a
general warrant, one of a class of writs long
proscribed as unconstitutional and once
anathematized as "totally subversive of the
liberty of the subject." Clearly violative of the
constitutional injunction that warrants of
arrest should particularly describe the person
or persons to be seized, the warrant must, as
regards its unidentified subjects, be voided.
Specific description of property to be seized
-The description is required to be specific only
insofar as the circumstances will ordinarily allow
where by the nature of the goods to be seized,
there description must rather be general. It is not
required that technical precision of description be
required, particularly, where by the nature of the
goods to be seized, their description must be
rather general, since the requirement of a
technical description would mean that no warrant
could issue.
Stonehill vs. Diokno,
G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967
(Particularity of description)
FACTS:
There were 42 assailed warrants to seize
and take possession of the following
personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or
papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
Allegedly in violation of Central Bank laws,
tariffs and custom laws, the internal revenue
code and the revised penal code (no section
or article was mentioned).
HELD:
The Court in this case said that two points
must be stressed in connection with this
constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
to be determined by the judge in the manner
set forth in said provision; and (2) that the
warrant shall particularly describe the things
to be seized.
None of these requirements has been
complied with in the contested warrants.
Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and
juridical person therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other
 words, no specific offense had been alleged
in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were
abstract. As a consequence, it was
impossible for the judges who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes
the introduction of competent proof that the
party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed
specific omissions, violating a given provision
of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the
applications involved in this case do not
allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of
the highest order, to convict anybody of a
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the
aforementioned applications — without
reference to any determinate provision of
said laws.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for
and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners herein,
regardless of whether the transactions were
legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the
seizure of all records of the petitioners and
the aforementioned corporations, whatever
their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that
the things to be seized be particularly
described — as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general
warrants.
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
General Rule: No person can be searched nor
be arrested without a valid warrant, either for
search of his person, house, dwelling, papers or
effects or even the seizure of his person or those
objects named in the warrant after the
determination of the probable cause personally
determined by the judge and with the other
constitutional requirement that the warrant must
be specifically described objects and things to be
seized.
Exception:
1. warrantless search incidental to lawful
arrest;
2. search of a moving vehicle;
3. seizure of evidence in “plain view”;
4. custom searches;
5. where there is waiver of rights;
6. exigent and emergency
circumstances.
1. SEARCHES INCIDENTAL TO A VALID
ARREST
(Valid search without warrant)
an official making an arrest may take from
the person arrested any money or property
found upon his possession which was used in
the commission of the crime or could be the fruit
of the crime or which might be furnished by the
prisoners with the means of committing violence
or escaping or which may be used in evidence
in the trial of the accused.
These exceptions are applicable to
instances where there was a warrant for the
arrest of a person sought to be taken into
custody issued by the court— there was a
warrant of arrest. When this warrant is served
upon the person, the arresting officer may
search him even without a search warrant.
Purpose of this principle:
To protect the arresting officer against
physical harm from the person being
arrested who might be armed with a
concealed weapon and also to prevent the
person from destroying evidence within his
reach (two-fold purpose).
Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court
Person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapon or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of a crime
without a search warrant.
Nolasco v. Cruz-Paño, G.R. No. L-69803,
October 8, 1985
(Search incidental to lawful arrest)
FACTS:
There was a certain Mila Aguilar-Roque. She
was one of the accused in a rebellion case
entitled People vs. Jose Maria Sison. She
was, at the time, at large but of course she
had a standing warrant (fugitive of justice).
Now, prior to their arrest especially on the
part of Cynthia Nolasco, in the morning of
August 6, around 9 in the morning, the police
applied for a search warrant from herein
respondent Ernani Cruz Pano to be served at
239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City—
particularly in the leased residence of Ms.
Aguilar-Roque which was of course
described as a suspected underground
house of CPP/NPA. The search warrant was
then issued by the respondent judge under
the pending criminal case People vs. Mila
Aguilar-Roque for rebellion— did not,
however appear in the records that an
application in writing was submitted by the
Chief of CDG— Lt. Col Saldajeno, only the
deposition of Secret Agent Lapuz was
submitted to the court stating that to his
knowledge, there were kept in the premises
sought to be searched, some records,
documents and other papers of the CPP/NPA
and the National Democratic Front including
support money from foreign and local
sources intended for rebellion.
At around 11:30 of that day (Aug 6), Ms.
Aguilar-Roque and Cynthia Nolasco were
arrested by the Constabulary Security Group.
They were arrested in the intersection of
Mayon St. and P. Margall St., Quezon City
and at 12 noon of that day, the CSG searched
the premises at 239-B Mayon Street. The
searching party seized 428 documents and
written materials, and additionally a portable
typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431
items in all.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the search was valid
2. In view of the invalidity of the search
warrant, should the seized
documents and other property be
returned to the petitioner?
3. Do the petitioner in this case, Mila
Aguilar Roque and Cynthia Nolasco,
be released in view of the invalidity of
the search warrant?
RULING:
1. NOT VALID. It is at once evident that
the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the
seizure of personal properties vaguely
described and not particularized. It is an all-
embracing description which includes
everything conceivable regarding the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the
National Democratic Front. It does not
specify what the subversive books and
instructions are; what the manuals not
otherwise available to the public contain to
make them subversive or to enable them to
be used for the crime of rebellion. There is
absent a definite guideline to the searching
team as to what items might be lawfully
seized thus giving the officers of the law
discretion regarding what articles they should
seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable
typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in
the nature of a general warrant and infringes
on the constitutional mandate requiring
particular description of the things to be
seized. In the recent rulings of this Court,
search warrants of similar description were
considered null and void for being too
general.
2. NO. Notwithstanding the irregular
issuance of the Search Warrant and
although, ordinarily, the articles seized under
an invalid search warrant should be returned,
they cannot be ordered returned in the case
at bar to AGUILAR-ROQUE. Some searches
may be made without a warrant. Thus,
Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court,
explicitly provides:
Section 12. Search without warrant of person
arrested. —A person charged with an offense
may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense.
3. NO. Considering that AGUILAR-
ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion,
which is a crime against public order; that the
warrant for her arrest has not been served for
a considerable period of time; that she was
arrested within the general vicinity of her
dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling
was made within a half hour of her arrest, we
are of the opinion that in her respect, the
search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon
City, did not need a search warrant; this, for
possible effective results in the interest of
public order.
Such being the case, the personalities seized
may be retained. by CSG, for possible
introduction as evidence in the Rebellion
Case, leaving it to AGUILAR-ROQUE to
object to their relevance and to ask Special
Military Commission No.1 to return to her any
and all irrelevant documents and articles.
2. SEARCHES FOR MOVING VEHICLES
(Valid search without warrant)
Papa v. Mago, G.R. No. L-27360, February
28, 1968
(Search on moving vehicles)
FACTS:
Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-
intelligence unit of the Manila Police
Department, acting upon a reliable
information received on November 3, 1966 to
the effect that a certain shipment of personal
effects, allegedly misdeclared and
undervalued, would be released the following
day from the customs zone of the port of
Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon
orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of
Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent
of the Bureau of Customs, conducted
surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs
zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about
4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966,
elements of the counter-intelligence unit went
after the trucks and intercepted them at the
Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of
the two trucks consisting of nine bales of
goods, and the two trucks, were seized on
instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon
investigation, a person claimed ownership of
the goods and showed to the policemen a
"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected
in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by
the Bureau of Customs in the name of a
certain Bienvenido Naguit.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the
seizure and detention of the two trucks and
their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B.
Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance
of Manila a petition "for mandamus with
restraining order or preliminary injunction,
docketed as, alleging, among others, that the
goods were seized by members of the Manila
Police Department without search warrant
issued by a competent court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search and seizure
valid?
RULING:
YES. Petitioner Martin Alagao and his
companion policemen had authority to effect
the seizure without any search warrant
issued by a competent court. The Tariff and
Customs Code does not require said warrant
in the instant case. The Code authorizes
persons having police authority under
Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code
to enter, pass through or search any land,
inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not
being a dwelling house; and also to inspect,
search and examine any vessel or aircraft
and any trunk, package, or envelope or any
person on board, or to stop and search and
examine any vehicle, beast or person
suspected of holding or conveying any
dutiable or prohibited article introduced into
the Philippines contrary to law, without
mentioning the need of a search warrant in
said cases. But in the search of a dwelling
house, the Code provides that said "dwelling
house may be entered and searched only
upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of
the peace. . .." It is our considered view,
therefore, that except in the case of the
search of a dwelling house, persons
exercising police authority under the customs
law may effect search and seizure without a
search warrant in the enforcement of
customs laws. In other words, the SC here is
saying that there is an express statutory
provision to this effect. When it comes to
imported goods, the Tariff and Customs
Code provides for an express allowance for
searches of this nature.
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures is construed as
recognizing a necessary difference between
a search of a dwelling house or other
structure in respect of which a search warrant
may readily be obtained and a search of a
ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for
contraband goods, where it is not practicable
to secure a warrant because the vehicle can
be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.
Stated differently, the justification for the
allowance of this kind of searches on moving
vehicles is of course mobility itself of these
cars or automobile. To require the law
enforcer to apply for a search warrant
prior to the conduct of the search would
be impractical—this is the justification
involved.
However, as emphasized by the SC in
Almeida Sanchez v. US (1973), automobile
or not, there must be probable cause for the
search.
Where did the probable cause come from
that validated the search conducted by
the law enforcement even without search
warrant?
If you could remember the factual
background of the case, the law enforcement
had actually received a tip from an informant.
Now, the informant’s tip triggered their
suspicion. However, suspicion here would
 never be enough. Suspicion is different since
the level of probable cause is higher. After
receiving the tip that aroused their suspicion,
they conducted a surveillance. In the conduct
of surveillance, they gathered additional
information that strengthened their belief that
indeed, some crimes were actually
committed by those guys— that is what they
call probable cause.
LIMITS IN THE CONDUCT OF CHECKPOINTS
a. where the officer merely draws aside the
curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the
public fair grounds;
b. simply looks into a vehicle;
c. flashes a light therein without opening the car’s
doors;
d. where the occupants are not subjected to a
physical or body search;
e. where the inspection of the vehicles is limited
to a visual search or visual inspection; and
f. where the routine check is conducted in a fixed
area.
But never could they be legally subjected to
extensive search unless there is probable
cause (requirement). If the conduct of
checkpoints is merely limited to those
requirements/allowable acts pronounced by the
SC— visual search, one or two questions— but
in no case shall an extensive search be
conducted, there is no problem with that since
these searches are less intrusive and cannot as
yet be considered as violative of Section 2, Article
III, 1987 Constitution.
However, if the personnel conducting the
checkpoint has probable cause to believe that the
vehicle subjected to search is being used in the
commission of a crime, the law enforcement
personnel conducting the checkpoint may subject
the vehicle occupants to extensive search.
EXAMPLE
A vehicle is bound for Davao City from Digos
City– that specific vehicle contained bags of
shabu. Because of this information is known to
someone who happen to be a police asset, this
police asset would then tell the Digos Police that
there is a Black Toyota Fortuner with plate
number 12346 is being used to transport illicit
drugs particularly shabu and right now it is on
mobile en route for Davao. The police, alarmed
with the tip given to him, will call Davao City
Police Authorities— that a vehicle is going to
Davao containing shabu and the vehicle is
described to be Black Toyota Fortuner with plate
number 12346. Now, by the time this vehicle
reaches Sirawan checkpoint (Task Force Davao),
if the operatives see the vehicle as described in
the information relayed to them, the operatives
will now be possessed with what we call probable
cause. The search will not only be limited to visual
search. By virtue of the information relayed to
your command, you will now have probable
cause that will validate any extensive search that
you are to conduct to that vehicle. Anything illegal
obtained during the search will be considered
admissible because in that case, there is
probable cause— absence of which, the search
will be limited to a routine check.
“There was no need for the government to
announce the installation of checkpoints,
otherwise it would forewarn those who would
intend to violate the law. In this case the SC
likewise underscored that an extensive search
without warrant could only be resorted to if the
officers conducting the search had reasonable or
probable cause to believe before the search that
either the motorist was a law offender or that they
would find instrumentality or evidence pertaining
to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be
searched. The existence of probable cause
justifying the warrantless search is determined by
the facts of each case. Thus, we upheld the
validity of the warrantless search in situations
where the smell of marijuana emanated from a
plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the
accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted
to flee. There has to be a probable cause in order
that a warrantless search could be validly made
upon the moving vehicle. The mere mobility of
those vehicles does not give the police authorities
unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate
searches without warrant.” -Aniag vs COMELEC
To sum it all, only routine checks is generally
allowed in checkpoints except in the
presence of probable cause, extensive search
maybe allowed.
3. PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
(Valid search without warrant)
(the evidence in plain view doctrine)
- an illicit object maybe seized in plain view.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer, who has
the right to be in the position to have that view,
are subject to seizure and may be introduced in
the case.
In the case of People vs. Tabar (GR 101124),
the SC said where Marijuana Sticks fall before the
eyes of a police officer, the seizure of those sticks
would not of course require a warrant.
Requirements to legally hold firearm:
1. LTOP- License to own and possess
firearm;
2. License of the firearms (when the firearms
are already in someone’s possession);
3. Permit to carry firearms outside
residence.
Plainview Doctrine — “Kumbaga di ka
naghahanap pero kusa mo na lang nakikita”.
To come under this exception, the
discovery must be inadvertent. Meaning, you are
not looking for it purposely. If an officer
encountered prohibited objects only after poking
around, the discovery would not be considered
inadvertent.
Example
Say for example you are a member of PDEA.
Now, because of the nature of your work, you
happen to know that one of your high school
classmates is included in the list of pushing
drugs. You will then go to their house since you
know where it is. While inside, you immediately
look for the hidden drugs.
Q: When you see the drugs there, could you
arrest and seize your friend?
A: Under the plainview doctrine, the answer is no.
Because it was not by mere inadvertence. You
purposely look for it. In that case, you cannot
make a valid search much less a valid arrest.
PEOPLE V. MUSA, (G.R. No. 96177
January 27, 1993
(Evidence in plain view doctrine)
Citing Ker vs. California said that the "plain
view" doctrine may not, however, be used to
launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate
seizures nor to extend a general exploratory
search made solely to find evidence of
defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is
usually applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused,
but nonetheless inadvertently comes across
an incriminating object.45 Furthermore, the
U.S. Supreme Court stated the following
limitations on the application of the doctrine:
What the "plain view" cases have in common
is that the police officer in each of them had
a prior justification for an intrusion in the
course of which he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The doctrine serves to supplement
the prior justification — whether it be a
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search
incident to lawful arrest, or some other
legitimate reason for being present
unconnected with a search directed against
the accused — and permits the warrantless
seizure. Of course, the extension of the
original justification is legitimate only where it
is immediately apparent to the police that
they have evidence before them; the "plain
view" doctrine may not be used to extend a
general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last
emerges.
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw
the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the
kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents.
They had to ask the appellant what the bag
contained. When the appellant refused to
respond, they opened it and found the
marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the
marijuana was visible to the police officer's
eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could
not have discovered the inculpatory nature of
the contents of the bag had they not forcibly
opened it. Even assuming then, that the
NARCOM agents inadvertently came across
the plastic bag because it was within their
"plain view," what may be said to be the
object in their "plain view" was just the plastic
bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating
nature of the contents of the plastic bag was
not immediately apparent from the "plain
view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that
the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents,
whether by its distinctive configuration, its
transparency, or otherwise, that its contents
are obvious to an observer.
We, therefore, hold that under the
circumstances of the case, the "plain view"
doctrine does not apply and the marijuana
contained in the plastic bag was seized
illegally and cannot be presented in evidence
pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the
Constitution.
People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 129296,
September 25, 2000
(Plain view doctrine)
FACTS:
At around 10:15am, Monday, an informer
went to the police and told them the presence
of a marijuana plantation. The following day,
about 5am, the police team accompanied by
the informer left for the site where the
marijuana plants were grown. After a three-
hour, uphill trek from the nearest barangay
road, the police operatives arrived at the
place and found the accused, Mr. Valdez,
inside his nipa hut and when the operatives
try to look around, where appellant had his
kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high,
flowering marijuana plants in two rows,
approximately 25 meters from appellant's
hut. They arrested Valdez and uprooted the
seven marijuana plants and subsequently
filed criminal charges for violation of the Anti-
Drugs Law, Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended, against Valdez. He questioned the
admissibility of the Marijuana Plant offered in
evidence because according to him they
were illegally obtained because there is no
search warrant validly issued by a court
pursuance to the requirement set forth in
Article 3. On the other hand, the prosecution
maintained that the marijuana leaves were all
admissible in evidence because they were
seized through a warrantless search as
allowed by law.
ISSUE:
Are the marijuana plants admissible in
evidence?
RULING:
No. Those marijuana leaves were not
admissible in evidence. The search and
seizure without the warrant violated Section
2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Considering that the informant had revealed
the name of the accused as well as the place
where the marijuana was planted and that the
police had at least one day to obtain a search
warrant, they had no reason not to obtain
one.
Plain view doctrine cannot apply here that the
seizure of evidence in plain view applies
where the police inadvertently come across
the object. Note further that the police team
was dispatched to appellant's kaingin
precisely to search for and uproot the
prohibited flora that is why the marijuana
plants that were seized allegedly from the
possession of Mr. Valdez were declared by
the Supreme Court to be inadmissible in
evidence.
People vs. Amminudin, G.R.No. 74869,
July 6, 1988
FACTS:
Accused was named Idel Amminudin. He
was arrested on June 25, 1984 shortly after
this embarking M/V Wilcon at about 8:30 in
the evening in Iloilo City. The police were in
fact waiting for him, simply accosted him,
inspected his bag and found articles which
look liked marijuana leaves. They took him to
their headquarters for investigation. The two
bundles of suspect articles were confiscated
from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory
for examination. When they were verified as
marijuana leaves, an information for violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against
him. Eventually he was convicted.
Prior to his arrest, the constabulary had
earlier received a tip from one of the
informers that Amminudin was on board a
vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying
marijuana. He was in fact identified by his
name and then acting by this tip, the
operatives waited for him in the evening of
June 25, 1984 and approached him as he
descended from the gangplank of the M/V
Wilcon 9 after the informer had pointed to
him. After that, they detained him and
inspected the bag he was carrying and it was
found contained 3 kilos of what were later
analyzed as marijuana leaves by an nbi
forensic examination, testified during trials
that she conducted microscopic chemical
and chromatographic tests on them and on
the basis of this finding, the corresponding
charge was filed against him.
ISSUE:
Was the search in this case including the
arrest valid?
RULING:
No. In the case at bar, there was no
warrant of arrest/search warrant issued
by the judge after personal determination
by him of the existence of probable cause.
Contrary to the averments of the government,
the accused-appellant was not caught in
flagrante nor was a crime about to be
committed or had just been committed to
justify the warrantless arrest allowed under
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The present
case presented no such urgency. From the
conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses,
it is clear that they had at least two days
within which they could have obtained a
warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who
was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His
name was known. The vehicle was identified.
The date of its arrival was certain. And from
the information they had received, they could
have persuaded a judge that there was
probable cause, indeed, to justify the
issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing.
No effort was made to comply with the law.
Thus, Aminnudin was not, at the moment of
his arrest, committing a crime nor nor was it
shown that he was about to do so or that he
had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon
9 and there was no outward indication that
called for his arrest. To all appearances, he
was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. It
was only when the informer pointed to him as
the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became suspect and so subject to
apprehension. It was the furtive finger that
triggered his arrest. The identification by the
informer was the probable cause as
determined by the officers (and not a judge)
that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
In other words, marijuana leaves just like in
the case of People vs. Valdez was prudent in
evidence. The court said that they were
inadmissible, they cannot be used to pin
down, they cannot convict Amminudin here
because they were considered as fruit of a
poisonous tree. By way of valid warrant of
arrest as laid down in Section 2, Article III.
People vs. Tangliben, G.R. No. L-63630,
April 6, 1990
FACTS:
In the late evening of March 2, 1992, two
police officers with a barangay tanod were
conducting surveillance mission at the
Victory Liner Terminal compound located at
Barangay San Nicolas, San Fernando,
Pampanga; that the surveillance was aimed
not only against persons who may commit
misdemeanors at the said place but also on
persons who may be engaging in the traffic of
dangerous drugs based on information
supplied by informers; that it was around 9:30
in the evening that said Patrolmen noticed a
person caring a traveling bag who was acting
suspiciously and they confronted him; that
the person was requested by Patrolmen
Quevedo and Punzalan to open the red
traveling bag but the person refused, only to
accede later on when the patrolmen identified
themselves; that found inside the bag were
marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic
wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or less;
that the person was asked of his name and
the reason why he was at the said place and
he gave his name as Medel Tangliben and
explained that he was waiting for a ride to
Olongapo City to deliver the marijuana leaves
and the operative filed criminal charges
against Tangliben for violation of Anti-Drugs
Act, in defense, Tangliben offered the
marijuana leaves confiscated from his
possession were not admissible in evidence.
He invoked the case law in People vs.
Aminnudin in trying to secure his
exoneration.
ISSUE:
Was the search and arrest of Tangliben
valid?
RULING:
Yes. The court explained that accused
was caught in flagrante, since he was
carrying marijuana at the time of his
arrest. This case therefore falls squarely
within the exception. The warrantless
search was incident to a lawful arrest and
is consequently valid.
The doctrine of Aminnudin does not apply to
this case. In contrast, the case before us
presented urgency. Although the trial court's
decision did not mention it, the transcript of
stenographic notes reveals that there was an
informer who pointed to the accused-
appellant as carrying marijuana. Faced with
such on-the-spot information, the police
officers had to act quickly. There was not
enough time to secure a search warrant. We
cannot therefore apply the ruling in
Aminnudin to the case at bar. To require
search warrants during on-the-spot
apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal
possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors,
smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc.
would make it extremely difficult, if not
impossible to contain the crimes with which
these persons are associated.
People v. Burgos, G.R. No. L-68955
September 4, 1986
FACTS:
It was by virtue of intelligent information
obtained by PC-INP units that allegedly on
May 12, 1982, a particular person was
recruiting a certain Cesar Masamlok to
become a member of the NPA. Because of
this information, the police went to look for the
accused Ruben who forcibly recruited Cesar.
Immediately, upon receipt of said
information, a joint team of PC-INP units,
composed of fifteen (15) members, headed
by Captain Melchesideck Bargio, (PC), on
the following day, May 13, 1982, was
dispatched at Tiguman; Davao del Sur, to
arrest accused Ruben Burgos. The team left
the headquarter at 1:30 P.M., and arrived at
Tiguman, at more or less 2:00 o’clock P.M.,
where through the help of Pedro Burgos,
brother of accused, the team was able to
locate accused, who was plowing his field.
Ruben was then arrested and his
house was searched where he recovered the
firearm, Caliber .38 revolver and several
subversive documents. He was later on
charged and eventually convicted by the trial
court of a crime of illegal possession of
firearms in the furtherance of subversion until
Burgos questioned the admissibility of the 38
Caliber Revolver and these subversive
documents. Those object were a product of a
so-called poisonous tree hence inadmissible.
There was no search warrant as well as
warrant of arrest issued by the court in
compliance with Section 2, Article III.
ISSUE:
Was the conviction valid?
RULING:
No. It was not valid. The conclusions
reached by the trial court are erroneous.
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer
arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense
must have personal knowledge of that fact.
The offense must also be committed in his
presence or within his view.
There is no such personal knowledge in this
case. Whatever knowledge was possessed
by the arresting officers; it came in its entirety
from the information furnished by Cesar
Masamlok. The location of the firearm was
given by the appellant’s wife.
At the time of the appellant’s arrest, he
was not in actual possession of any firearm
or subversive document. Neither was he
committing any act which could be described
as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his
field at the time of the arrest.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the
sole basis of Masamlok’s verbal report.
Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that
the accused had committed a crime. They
were still fishing for evidence of a crime not
yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of
the subject firearm on the basis of information
from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make
the arrest lawful. If an arrest without warrant
is unlawful at the moment it is made,
generally nothing that happened or is
discovered afterwards can make it lawful.
The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also
tainted.
More important, we find no compelling
reason for the haste with which the arresting
officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail
to see why they failed to first go through the
process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if
indeed they had reasonable ground to
believe that the accused had truly committed
a crime. There is no showing that there was
a real apprehension that the accused was on
the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there
is no showing that the whereabouts of the
accused were unknown.
NB: Even if the accused is guilty, if the rules
of procedure were not followed, particularly
those found in the rules on criminal
procedure pursuant to Article III, Sec. 2, in
effect it will be inadmissible in evidence.
People v. Belen Mariacos, G.R. No.
188611, June 16, 2010
FACTS:
There was a police officer named PO2
Pallayoc who met with the secret agent of the
Barangay Intelligence Network who informed
him that a baggage of marijuana had been
loaded on a passenger jeepney that was
about to leave for the poblacion. The agent
mentioned three (3) bags and one (1) blue
plastic bag. Further, the agent described a
backpack bag with an "O.K." marking. PO2
Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and
positioned himself on top thereof. While the
vehicle was in motion, he found the black
backpack with an "O.K." marking and peeked
inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc found
bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers.
He then asked the other passengers on top
of the jeepney about the owner of the bag,
but no one knew.
When the jeepney reached the
poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together
with the other passengers. Unfortunately, he
did not notice who took the black backpack
from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few
moments later that the said bag and three (3)
other bags, including a blue plastic bag, were
already being carried away by two (2)
women. He caught up with the women and
introduced himself as a policeman. He told
them that they were under arrest, but one of
the women got away.
PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who
was later identified as herein accused-
appellant Belen Mariacos, and the bags to
the police station. At the police station, the
investigators contacted the Mayor of San
Gabriel to witness the opening of the bags.
When the Mayor arrived about fifteen (15)
minutes later, the bags were opened and
three (3) bricks of marijuana wrapped in
newspaper, two (2) round bundles of
marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana
fruiting tops, all wrapped in a newspaper,
were recovered.
Thereafter, the investigators marked,
inventoried and forwarded the confiscated
marijuana to the crime laboratory for
examination. The laboratory examination
showed that the stuff found in the bags all
tested positive for marijuana, a dangerous
drug.
Eventually, Mariacos was criminally
charged for violating the Dangerous Drugs
Act and after trial, she was convicted.
On appeal, Mariacos questioned the
admissibility of the marijuana leaves
confiscated from her from having been a
product of illegal search.
ISSUE:
Were the marijuana leaves lawfully seized
admissible in evidence?
RULING:
Yes, they were admissible. The facts of the
case show the urgency of the situation. Over
the years, the rules governing search and
seizure have been steadily liberalized
whenever a moving vehicle is the object of
the search on the basis of practicality. This is
so considering that before a warrant could be
obtained, the place, things and persons to be
searched must be described to the
satisfaction of the issuing judge – a
requirement which borders on the impossible
in instances where moving vehicle is used to
transport contraband from one place to
another with impunity.
Given the discussion above, it is readily
apparent that the search in this case is valid.
The vehicle that carried the contraband or
prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2
Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and
act fast. It would be unreasonable to require
him to procure a warrant before conducting
the search under the circumstances. Time
was of the essence in this case. The
searching officer had no time to obtain a
warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to
board the vehicle before the same left for its
destination.
It is well to remember that on October
26, 2005, the night before appellant’s arrest,
the police received information that
marijuana was to be transported from
Barangay Balbalayang, and had set up a
checkpoint around the area to intercept the
suspects. At dawn of October 27, 2005, PO2
Pallayoc met the secret agent from the
Barangay Intelligence Network, who
informed him that a baggage of marijuana
was loaded on a passenger jeepney about to
leave for the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc
had probable cause to search the packages
allegedly containing illegal drugs.
People v. Jack Racho, G.R. No. 186529,
03 August 2010
FACTS:
A confidential agent of the police
transacted through cellular phone with Racho
for the purchase of shabu. The agent
reported the transaction to the police
authorities who immediately formed a team
composed of member of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the
Intelligence group of the Philippine Army and
the local police force to apprehend the
appellant. The agent gave the police
appellant’s name, together with his physical
description. He also assured them that
appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the
following day.
The next day, Racho called up the
agent and informed him that he was on board
a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler,
Aurora, anytime of the day wearing a red and
white striped T-shirt. The team members then
posted themselves along the national
highway in Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m.
of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in
Baler. When Racho alighted from the bus, the
confidential agent pointed to him as the
person he transacted with earlier. Having
alighted from the bus, Racho stood near the
highway and waited for a tricycle that would
bring him to his final destination. As appellant
was about to board a tricycle, the team
approached him and invited him to the police
station on suspicion of carrying shabu. Racho
immediately denied the accusation, but as he
pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a
white envelope slipped therefrom which,
when opened, yielded a small sachet
containing the suspected drug.
The team then brought appellant
Racho to the police station for investigation.
The confiscated specimen was turned over to
Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera
who marked it with his initials and with
appellant’s name. The field test and
laboratory examinations on the contents of
the confiscated sachet yielded positive
results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
The trial court convicted him of RA
9165. On appeal, he questioned the
admissibility of evidence that it was obtained
through unlawful search and/or seizure.
ISSUE:
May he be acquitted?
RULING:
Yes. The information given by the informant
to the police a day prior to the arrest. Clearly,
what prompted the police to apprehend
appellant, even without a warrant, was the tip
given by the informant that appellant would
arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This
circumstance gives rise to another question:
whether that information, by itself, is sufficient
probable cause to effect a valid warrantless
arrest.
The long standing rule in this
jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone
is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest.
The rule requires, in addition, that the
accused perform some overt act that would
indicate that he has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.
Appellant herein was not committing a
crime in the presence of the police officers.
Neither did the arresting officers have
personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested had committed,
was committing, or about to commit an
offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant
had just alighted from the Gemini bus and
was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not
acting in any suspicious manner that would
engender a reasonable ground for the police
officers to suspect and conclude that he was
committing or intending to commit a crime.
Were it not for the information given by the
informant, appellant would not have been
apprehended and no search would have
been made, and consequently, the sachet of
shabu would not have been confiscated.
Doctrine of reliable information was
not applied in this case because the police
has had an ample time to secure a search
warrant/warrant of arrest.
4. CUSTOMS SEARCHES/INSPECTION
(Valid search without warrant)
- Upon arrival of the cargo, customs officers are
empowered to inspect these items.
- Boarder officers may likewise subject persons
entering the territory to search even without the
requisite of a search warrant.
5. WAIVER OF RIGHTS
(Valid search without warrant)
- “The right to be secure from unreasonable
search may, like every right, be waived and such
waiver may be made either expressly or
impliedly.
This waiver can be shown by failure to make any
objection or even a little bit of protest.” –People
vs. Malasugui
REQUISITES TO COMPLY FOR A WAIVER
TO BE VALID
for the purposes of conducting a warrant or a
search
(1) the right exists
(2) The person involved had knowledge of the
existence of that right
(3) Actual intention to relinquish the right.
People V. Compacion, G.R. No. 124442.
July 20, 2001
FACTS:
The accused was subjected to a warrantless
search/arrest. The team proceeded at the
residence of accused despite failure to obtain
a warrant. The prosecution contends that it
was valid because there was a waiver on the
part of the accused.
ISSUE:
W/N the search and seizure was valid?
RULING:
No. The act of the accused-appellant in
allowing the members of the military to enter
his premises and his consequent silence
during the unreasonable search and seizure
could not be construed as voluntary
submission or an implied acquiescence to
warrantless search and seizure especially so
when members of the raiding team were
intimidatingly numerous and heavily armed.
His implied acquiescence, if any, could
not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under coercive or
intimidating circumstances and is, thus,
considered no consent at all within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Consequently, herein accused-appellants
lack of objection to the search and seizure is
not tantamount to a waiver of his
constitutional right or a voluntary submission
to the warrantless search and seizure.
6. DOCTRINE OF EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCE
(Valid search without warrant)
People V. De Gracia, G.R. No. 102009-10,
July 6,1994
(Doctrine of Exigent Circumstance)
FACTS:
There were intelligent reports that a building
was being used as headquarters by RAM —
former rebel soldiers during the time of
Colonel Gringo Honasan (1989 coup d’etat)
A surveillance team was coming out of the
building but the occupants refused to open
the door despite repeated requests.
Indications were there that there were large
quantities of explosives and ammunitions
inside the building. At the time, nearby courts
were closed and there was general chaos
and disorder in the area. The raiding team
forcibly entered the building and conducted
the search. In the search, there were
recovered several illegal items (firearms used
by former rebels and subversive documents).
The soldiers were criminally charged before
the court. In defense, the members of the
RAM captured interposed the argument that
the evidence against them (firearms and
ammunitions) can never be used as evidence
because they are inadmissible.
ISSUE:
Was the search conducted by the law
enforces in the case valid?
RULING:
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our
considered opinion that the instant case falls
under one of the exceptions to the prohibition
against a warrantless search. In the first
place, the military operatives, taking into
account the facts obtaining in this case, had
reasonable ground to believe that a crime
was being committed. There was
consequently more than sufficient probable
cause to warrant their action. Furthermore,
under the situation then prevailing, the
raiding team had no opportunity to apply for
and secure a search warrant from the courts.
The trial judge himself manifested that on
December 5, 1989 when the raid was
conducted, his court was closed. Under such
urgency and exigency of the moment, a
search warrant could lawfully be dispensed
with (DOCTRINE OF EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCE).
STOP AND FRISK RULE
(TERRY SEARCH)
POSADAS VS. CA,
G.R. No. 89139, 02 August 1990
FACTS:
In this case, two men repeatedly walked past
a store window and returned to a spot where
they apparently conferred with a third man.
This aroused the suspicion of a police officer.
To the experienced officer, the behavior of
the men indicated that they were sizing up the
store for an armed robbery. When the police
officer approached the men and asked them
for their names, they mumbled a reply.
Whereupon, the officer grabbed one of them,
spun him around and frisked him. Finding a
concealed weapon in one, he did the same to
the other two and found another weapon. The
trio was arrested and eventually criminally
charged before the court. During the trial, the
three accused put up the defense of illegal
search and seizure saying at that time they
 were subjected to search, there was no valid
search warrant issued by the court.
ISSUE:
Was the search and seizure made by the
police officer in this case against the persons
of the accused valid?
RULING:
The US SC held that yes, they were in fact
admissible in evidence. It explained that
where the police officer observes an unusual
conduct which leads him to reasonably
conclude in the light of his experience that a
criminal activity may happen, that the
persons with whom he is dealing with may be
armed and dangerous. Where in the course
of investigation of his behavior, he identifies
himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries and where nothing in the
initial stages of the encounter serve to dispel
his reasonable fear of his or other’s safety, he
is entitled, for protection of himself and others
in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer closing such person, in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be
used to assault them. Such a search is
reasonable.
“The case at bar constitutes an instance where a
search and seizure may be effected without first
making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to
"stop and frisk" accused-appellant when his
companions filed upon seeing the government
agents. Under the circumstances, the
government agents could not possibly have
procured a search warrant first. In this case, SC
was underscoring probable cause to be the basis
of the conduct of warrantless search.” – People
vs Solayao
“Delving into the notable points to the TERRY
RULING discussed the justification for the
allowable scope of a “stop-and-frisk” as a limited
protective search of outer clothing of weapons
while probable cause is not required to conduct a
"stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and
frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer's experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him.” –
Malacat vs CA
Two-Fold Purpose of Stop and Frisk Rule:
1. Effective crime prevention and detection
2. Permit the police officer to take steps to
assure himself that the person with whom
he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against the police officer.
People v. Mengote, G.R. No. 87059, JUNE
22, 1992
(Stop and Frisk rule)
FACTS:
There was a police officer who saw two men
"looking from side to side," one of whom was
holding his abdomen. They approached
these persons and identified themselves as
policemen, whereupon the two tried to run
away but were unable to escape because the
other lawmen had surrounded them. The
suspects were then searched. One of them,
who turned out to be the accused-appellant,
was found with a .38 caliber Smith and
Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the
chamber. His companion, later identified as
Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in
his front right pants pocket. The weapons
were taken from them. Mengote and Morellos
were then turned over to police headquarters
for investigation by the Intelligence Division.
ISSUE:
May the seized weapons be introduced as
evidence for purposed of securing conviction,
hence the two accused here?
RULING:
The Philippine Supreme Court held that
the evidence was inadmissible. The SC
said that the search was illegally conducted.
The searching police officers cannot lean on
probable cause when proceeding on the
search, there was no offense was involved in
looking from side to side and in holding his
abdomen. Take note that the essential
requisites of probable cause must be
satisfied before a warrantless search and
seizure may be legally conducted. In this
case, probable cause must be based on
reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that
a crime is committed or is about to be
committed is however decided not by the
judge in this case required by Sec 2, Article
III but by the searching authority.

CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE AN ARREST
MAYBE VALIDY MADE WITHOUT AN
ARREST WARRANT
— Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Criminal
Procedure
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. —
A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense.
Otherwise known as IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
- the offender is caught in the act, caught red
handedly or caught at the very act of committing
the offense.
3 STAGES OF “CAUGHT IN RED HANDEDLY
 Person sought to be arrested has
committed a crime
 xxx actually committed the crime
 xxx is about to commit it
(b) When an offense has just been committed,
and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
HOT PURSUIT- must be continuous. It is not
required that the arresting person witness the
commission of the crime. It is enough that he has
personal knowledge of the same.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b)
above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. (5a)
(INQUEST PROCEEDING)
POSADAS VS. C.A.,
G.R. No. 89139, 02 August 1990
FACTS:
This is a Davao case. There were two
policemen who were on foot patrol along
Magallanes Street, Davao City. While
walking, they noticed a person was walking
so fast and was carrying a buri bag (bayong).
When the duo tried to accost the said person,
the latter hurriedly speed up – running as fast
as he could but the policemen gave him a
chase and he was subsequently captured by
the law enforcer. When searched, that
person yielded a .38 caliber. As a result,
criminal chargers hurled against him
particularly by the violation of PD 1866 -
possession of unlicensed firearm. Upon trial,
the prosecution offered in evidence the .38
caliber revolver confiscated. In effect, the
accused questioned the admissibility of that
revolver invoking Section 2, Article III,
Constitution.
ISSUE:
May the court admit the .38 caliber as
evidence and use it to hand down conviction?
RULING:
Yes. It is true that the apprehending officer
cannot yet validly invoke probable cause
when they try to accost the accused when
they noticed him to be walking so fast but
nevertheless, when the law enforcers try to
catch the attention of the accused and he
subsequently ran apparently out of fear as he
was aware that he is in possession of
something illicit, is sufficiently enough for
probable cause to rise. Hence, where the
policemen were justified when they searched
without a warrant. The unlicensed firearm
may be introduced as an evidence against
him in court as the accused was in the act of
committing a crime when apprehended.
PEOPLE V. JAYSON,
G.R. No. 120330, Nov. 18, 1997
FACTS:
While patrolling in their car, policemen
received a radio message from their camp
directing them to an “ihaw-ihaw” where there
had been a shooting incident. These police
officers went to the place and there, they saw
the victim. The by-standers pointed to them
the accused in the case who worked as a
bouncer and it likewise happened that, this
 accused was trying to flee from the scene.
So, the police officers went after him. After a
while, he was arrested. In defense, the
accused herein argued that his arrest was not
valid because when he was arrested, he was
not committing any crime. In fact, the
arresting officers did not actually see him
perpetrating the offense as charged.
ISSUE:
Was the arrest without warrant in this case
valid?
RULING:
Yes. In the case at bar there was a shooting.
The policemen summoned to the scene of
the crime found the victim. Accuse-appellant
was pointed to them as the assailant only
moments after the shooting. In fact, accused-
appellant had not gone very far (only ten
meters away from the "Ihaw-Ihaw"), although
he was then fleeing. The arresting officers
thus acted on the basis of personal
knowledge of the death of the victim and of
facts indicating that accused-appellant was
the assailant.
The arresting officer has acted on the basis
of personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it.
A warrantless arrest effected three months
after the commission of the crime is already
invalid. The logic is, it is no longer a warrantless
arrest but a regular filing.
REGULAR INQUEST
FILING PROCEEDING
applicable when applicable when
the person was warrantless arrest can no
arrested where longer be resorted in to. If
there is no an accused however is
warrant. caught in hot pursuit or in
flagrante delicto, inquest
proceeding will follow.
As provided by Rule 112, inquest proceeding is
applicable when the person was arrested where
there is no warrant. The situation falls either
under paragraph a or b of Section 5, Rule 115 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure. In regular filing,
the police will conduct a fact-finding investigation
(affidavit of the
witnesses/complainant/relatives/police officers)
— these affidavits will be submitted to the fiscal
and the latter will conduct the usual preliminary
investigation. Of course, this is on the assumption
that all material details are present. If the suspect
was properly named in the complaint, the
prosecution will send the suspect a subpoena —
requiring him to file his counter affidavit. The
fiscal will then wait within the period fixed in the
subpoena (passing of counter affidavit). Once it
is submitted, the fiscal will study the case and will
try to find probable cause. If he will see one based
on testimonies/contents of the affidavit, the fiscal
will issue a resolution recommending that the
respondent be bound over for trial — fiscal will
invite the respondent and will find the necessary
information in court. Only by then, the judge may
issue the warrant of arrest based on the fiscal’s
resolution and subsequently the arrest of the
respondent.
SITUATION
My motor was parked outside UM. When I went
outside, it was gone and someone told me that it
was taken by someone. Subsequently, I will
report the incident to the police— saying that a
witness saw my motor being taken. The police
then will conduct investigation. In the meantime,
the culprit cannot be located because he was
able to escape/flee using my motor. Say after
three months, I saw it being used by a person.
Q: Can I capture him right then and there
without a warrant?
A: YES, because it is a continuing crime. While
the motor is in his possession which he took from
me without my consent — he continues the same
crime day by day. Hence, you can arrest him
without a warrant. Rule in paragraph a and b can
still be applied in this instance.
Q: What if the one riding the motor is not the
person who stole it? Can I arrest him?
A: YES, despite that he was not the thief but
because he is using a stolen thing, there is no
difference in that in the eyes of justice. They are
both thieves in the eyes of the law.
BUY BUST OPERATION
- A form of entrapment used by law
enforcers especially in a drugs law enforcement.
Instigation is illegal cause in that particular case,
the police officer is trying to instigate a person to
commit a crime and then later on he will arrest
him. In entrapment, the person sought to be
entrapped already has the mindset to commit the
crime.
One of the members of the police force
will act as the poseur buyer— must be an
organic member of PDEA, PNP or NBI. For
purpose of entrapment, the poseur buyers should
not be a civilian.
In certain cases, the SC invalidated buy bust
operations when the person who conducted
the test is not an organic member of law
enforcement.
“Where the criminal intent originates in the
entrapping of person, and the accused is
lured into the commission of the offense— in
order to prosecute him, there is instigation
and conviction may be had. However, the
criminal offense committed and the fact that
the person acting as decoy for the state
furnished the accused an opportunity to
perpetrate for the commission of the offense,
there is an entrapment and the accused must
be convicted. The law tolerates the use of
decoy or other articles to catch criminals.”
SITUATION
There were some law enforcers together with a
civilian asset went to a known drug infested
community. Upon reaching the said place, the
police team leader gave money and directed the
civilian asset to proceed to the house of the
suspected pusher to buy some shabu. Now, the
asset proceeded and after a while went back
bringing a sachet of shabu. To make it sure, the
team leader again commanded the asset to go
back to the house for another purchase then after
few minutes, the asset came back bringing
another sachet. Out of the said information, the
enforcers proceeded to raid the suspect’s house
and arrest him and subsequently a criminal case
for the violation of RA 9165 was filed against him.
Q: Should the court convict him?
A: NO. The accused here was illegally searched
and arrested. In cases like this, the SC usually
acquits the accused who was arrested in that
manner. The court explained that the law
enforcers wrongfully implemented the proper
procedure in drug operations in such a way that
when they raided and apprehended the suspect
without search warrant, he was not committing a
crime. The accused must have been arrested
outright as he handed to the poseur buyer the
illegal drug. For that anti-drug operatives could
abuse the shabu bought by their asset in applying
for search warrant.
Q: Do you think that prior surveillance or
“Test Buy” is necessary for the validity of a
buy bust operation in drugs cases?
A: It was not required. The court categorically
stated in the case of Ermico Vs. People, that the
prior surveillance or Test buy is not required for a
valid buy bust operation, for as long as the
authority is accompanied by their informant.
Thus, the court said in People vs Francisco
Manlangit, (GR. NO. 189806, January 12, 2010),
that simple as the rule that the absent of prior
surveillance of test buy does not affect the legality
of the buy bust operation there is no textbook
method of conducting buy bust operation, the
court has left to the discretion to the police
authorities for the selection of defective means to
apprehend drug dealers. The prior surveillance
was less lengthy one is not necessary especially
where the police operatives are accompanied by
their informant during the entrapment, flexibility is
a trade of good police work that when time is of
the essence the police may dispense with need
for prior surveillance.
Proper Conduct of buy bust operation would
require that the poseur buyer must be an organic
member of the law enforcement organization
Martinez vs. People
GR. 198694, February 13, 2013
FACTS:
According on the facts of this case, at around
9:30 of the evening December 29, 2007, PO2
Roberto Soque, PO2 Sipi and PO2 Zeta were
all assign to station of the anti-illegal drugs
section of Malate police station No. 9, they
conducted a routine foot patrol at Balingkit
street Malate, Metro Manila. In the process,
they heard a man shouting “PUTANG INA
MO!” “LIMANG DAAN NA BA TO”? and for
purportedly violating section 844 of the
revised ordinance of the City of Manila which
punishes breaches of the peace, a man later
identified as Ramon was apprehended and
ask to empty his pocket. In the course
thereof the police officers were able to
recover from him a small transparent plastic
sachet in white crystalline substance
suspected to be shabu. PO2 Soque
confiscated the sachet and brought Ramon to
police station number 9, consequently
Ramon was charge of possession of
dangerous drugs under section 11, par. 3
Article 2 of RA 9165. During trial Ramon
questioned the validity of his arrest.
ISSUE:
WAS THE ARREST OF RAMON VALID IN
THIS CASE?

RULING:
The Supreme court says NO. It cannot be
said that the act of shouting in a thickly
populated place, when people conversing
with each other on the street would constitute
any of the acts punishable under section 844,
of the Manila City ordinance as mentioned
above. Ramon was not making or assisting in
any riot, a fray, disorder, disturbance or
breach of the peace, he was not assaulting
the people or using violence upon another,
and the word he allegedly shouted “Putang
ina mo!” “limang daan naba to”? are not
slanderous, threatening or abusive and thus,
could not have tendered to disturbed the
peace or exile a riot considering that at the
time of the incident in Balingkit street was full
of people and alive of activity. And that no
probable cause existed to justify Ramon’s
warrantless arrest.
The Supreme court continued in explaining
that indeed, while it is true that the legality of
the arrest depends upon the reasonable
discretion of the officer or functionary to
whom the law at the moment lives the
decision to characterized the nature or the
act or deed of the person for the urgent
purpose of suspending his liberty, it should
not exercise in a whimsical manner, or else a
person liberty may be subjected to ubiquitous
abuse. As law enforcers it is largely expected
from them to conduct more circumspect
assessment of situation at hand and
ostensible criminal activity on the other, in
this respect it must be performed wisely and
cautiously like applying the exact standard of
reasonable discreet and prudent man and
surely as constitutional guarantee rights, the
duty to determined probable cause should be
clothed with utmost conscience as well as
compiled by public accountability.
Ramon here was acquitted because both of
the search and the arrest are not bound in
accordance with Section 2, Article 3 of the
Constitution. Under the exclusionary rule that
the sachet of shabu cannot be used against
him in admissible in evidence for being
treated as the fruit of poisonous tree.
Could it be enough that an informant comes to the
police and then the police immediately thereafter
will conduct a buy bust operation by making use
of one its operatives to act as a poseur buyer with
the drugs marked money and will perform the
orchestrated purchase. In that case when the
person is arrested the drug dealer upon handling
over the illicit merchandise, the poseur buyer
along with the other operatives may now effect
the necessary arrest and there would be a no
constitutional violation in that situation.
NB: The discovery of the illicit merchandized,
or anything that have been used in the
commission of the crime must be inadvertent.
The law enforcement officer was lawfully made
an initial intrusion or properly to be in the position
from which he can be particularly view the area,
in the course of such lawful intrusion he came
inadvertently across the piece of evidence
incriminating the accused.
ELENITA C. FAJARDO VS. PEOPPLE,
G.R. NO. 190889
“The object must be open to the eye and
hand its discovery must be
INADVERTENT”
FACTS:
There were members of the provincial
intelligence special operation (PISO), that
were instructed by the provincial director of
the provincial police superintendent to
respond to the complaint of some concern
citizens residing on Ilang-Ilang Sampaguita
Road part homes subdivision in Barangay
Andagao Kalibo Aklan, that there were
accordingly armed men drinking liquor at the
residence of Fajardo (petitioner), and who
were indiscriminately firing. The elements of
the PISO proceeded to the area, upon arrival
they notice that several persons run in
different direction, the responding team saw
one Valerio, he was holding two .45 caliber
pistols, he fired shots to the policeman before
entering the house of Fajardo, then Fajardo
was seen tacking a .45 between her waist
and the waist band of her shorts. After which
she entered the house and lock the main
door. To prevent any violent commotion this
men desisted from entering the petitioners
house, but in order to deter Valerio from
evading apprehension, they cordoned the
perimeter of the house as they waited for
further instructions, this time SP02 Nava who
was posted at back portion of the house of
Fajardo saw Valerio emerged twice on top of
the house and throw something, the
discarded object landed near the wall of
Fajardo’s house and inside the compound of
the neighboring residence, so that SP02
Nava together with SP01 Neron and Vega
who was a radio announcer who acted as a
witness recovered the said object which turn
out to be two (2) receivers of a 45 caliber
pistol ( Serial no. 763025 and Model No.
M1911A1 US). On the basis thereof they
were convicted of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition under the plain view
doctrine.
(Note: They saw only a part of a handgun and
not the whole handgun, only the receiver.
However, under the law a receiver as part of
a gun is considered as a firearm and
possession of which not sanctioned by law
will make you criminally liable.)
On appeal, Fajardo insisted on acquittal she
acclaimed that the discovery of two receivers
does not come in the purview of the plain
view doctrine. She argued that no valid
intrusion was attendant, that no evidence
was adduce that she was with Valerio when
he threw the receivers, likewise absent
according to her was the positive showing
that any of the two receivers recover by the
police men match the 45 caliber pistol
allegedly seen tacked in the waist band of her
short when the police element arrived.
Neither there is no proof that she had
knowledge of the alleged throwing.
ISSUE: Where the receivers seized in plain
view doctrine admissible in evidence?
RULING:
YES. They find that the seizure of the two
receivers of the 45 pistols outside the
petitioner’s house falls within the purview of
the plain view doctrine.
First, the presence of SPO2 Nava at the back
of the house and of the other law enforcers
around the premises was justified by the fact
that petitioner and Valerio were earlier seen
respectively holding .45 caliber pistols before
they ran inside the structure and sought
refuge. The attendant circumstances and the
evasive actions of petitioner and Valerio
when the law enforcers arrived engendered a
reasonable ground for the latter to believe
that a crime was being committed. There was
thus sufficient probable cause for the
policemen to cordon off the house as they
waited for daybreak to apply for a search
warrant.
Secondly, from where he was situated
SP02 Nava clearly saw on two different
instances that Valerio emerged on top of the
subject dwelling and throw suspicious
objects.
Lastly, considering the earlier sighting of
Valerio holding a pistol, SPO2 Nava had
reasonable ground to believe that the things
thrown might be contraband items, or
evidence of the offense they were then
suspected of committing. Indeed, when
subsequently recovered, they turned out to
be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol. The
ensuing recovery of the receivers according
to the Supreme court may have been
deliberate, not the less, the initial discovery
was inadvertent, it is not crucial that the initial
citing that the seized contraband may be
identified and known to be saw and all merely
requires the law enforcer observes that the
seized item may be evidence of a crime a
contraband of otherwise subject of seizure.
ISSUE 2: May Fajardo be validly convicted
of possession of the receivers confiscated in
plain view? (as to the admissibility of those
two(2) receivers, it is admissible because
there was a valid search and eventually a
valid seizure of those hand gun receivers. But
the question on the propriety of Fajardo’s
conviction can those receivers be used as
evidence.)
RULING:
NO. The liability for their possession of the
receivers should fall only for Valerio and not
for Fajardo.
In the present case, a distinction should
be made between criminal intent and intent to
possess. While mere possession, without
criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a
person for illegal possession of a firearm, it
must still be shown that there was animus
possidendi or an intent to possess on the part
of the accused. Such intent to possess is,
however, without regard to any other criminal
or felonious intent which the accused may
have harbored in possessing the firearm.
Criminal intent here refers to the intention of
the accused to commit an offense with the
use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not
important in convicting a person under
Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in
order that one may be found guilty of a
violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the
accused had no authority or license to
possess a firearm, and that he intended to
possess the same, even if such possession
was made in good faith and without criminal
intent.
 [In Criminal Law the difference between Mala
in se Vs. Mala Prohibita. Mala In se those are
criminal acts which are evil per se like killing
a person, robbery, rape etc those acts by
themselves are evil per se the possession of
hand gun is not evil per se but still it is
punishable because the law prohibits it -Mala
Prohibita. PD 1866 is a specie of Malum
Prohibitum ( criminal act) ]
The court in this case said that Fajardo
(petitioner) was neither in physical nor
constructive possession of the subject
receivers. The testimony of SPO2 Nava
clearly bared that he only saw Valerio on top
of the house when the receivers were thrown.
None of the witnesses saw petitioner holding
the receivers, before or during their disposal.
At the very least, petitioner’s possession of
the receivers was merely incidental because
Valerio, the one in actual physical
possession, was seen at the rooftop of
petitioner’s house. Absent any evidence
pointing to petitioner’s participation,
knowledge or consent in Valerio’s actions,
she cannot be held liable for illegal
possession of the receivers.
SESBREÑO V. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. No. 160689, March 26, 2014
In this case the persons involved were not a
policer officers but a private citizen.
FACTS:
There were meter inspectors of an electric
company who after obtaining permission
from the housemaid of a particular residence
were allowed entry to the premises of the
house so that they inspected the electric
meter registered in the account of Sesbreno
who was not around at the time, the
inspectors noticed that the electric meter is
turned upside down handing and its disc
not rotating. Pursuant to the Electric Service
Commission Contract, the meter was
replaced with a new one and subject to a
laboratory test. Then the Electric company
then sent Sesbreno a bill on the unrecorded
consumption. (most likely what Sesbreno did
was use a jumper that will enable him to
consume amounts of electricity without being
recorded in the meter) Sesbreno in retaliation
filed a complaint for damages against the
electric company and the inspectors in
accordance with Art 32 of the new civil code,
among other grounds he claimed that the
inspectors entry into his residence not
justified and was in fact in violation of
Section 2, Article 3 of the 1987 constitution
and because during that time according to
Sesbreno the meter inspectors were not
armed with a search warrant.
ISSUE: Was Sesbreno’s claim correct?
RULING:
NO. The constitutional guaranty against
unlawful searches and seizures is
intended as a restraint against the
Government and its agents tasked with
law enforcement. It is to be invoked only to
ensure freedom from arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of State power. The
Court has made this clear in its
pronouncements, including that made in
People v. Marti.
If the search is made upon the request of law
enforcers, a warrant must generally be first
secured if it is to pass the test of
constitutionality. However, if the search is
made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its
own and private purposes, as in the case at
bar, and without the intervention of police
authorities, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure cannot be invoked for
only the act of private individual, not the law
enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the
ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government
NB: In unreasonable searches and seizures,
the constitutional protection found in Section
2, article 3 of the constitution can only be
invoked against the state NOT as AGAINST
PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS.
People vs Victor Cogaed
GR NO. 200334, July 30, 2014
FACTS:
Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI
Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in
San Gabriel,La Union, "received a text
message from an unidentified civilian
informer" that one Marvin Buya (also known
as Marvin Bugat) wouldbe transporting
marijuana" from Barangay Lunoy, San
Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San
Gabriel, La Union.
After that, PSI Bayan organized checkpoints
in order "to intercept the suspect." He
ordered a certain, SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr.
(SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San
Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint in the
waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel
bound for San Fernando City. Later during
the conduct of the check point, a passenger
jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at
SPO1 Taracatac’s checkpoint. The jeepney
driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1
Taracatac indicating the two male
passengers who were carrying marijuana.
SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male
passengers who were later identified as
Victor Romana Cogaed and Santiago Sacpa
Dayao. Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and
a sack while Dayao was holding a yellow bag.
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao
about the contents of their bags. Cogaed and
Dayao replied that they did not know since
they were transporting the bags as a favor for
their barriomate named Marvin.
After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue
bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like
marijuana. SPO1 Taracatac arrested
[Cogaed] and Dayao and brought them to the
police station." Cogaed and Dayao "were still
carrying their bags" inside the station. While
thereat, the Chief of Police and Investigator
PO3 Stanley Campit (PO3 Campit)
requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their
bags.18 Inside Cogaed’s sack was "four (4)
rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting
tops,"19 and inside Dayao’s yellow bag was
a brick of suspected marijuana.
Both were criminally charge
thereafter. But the case against Dayao was
dismissed for being a 14-year-old minor,
however, Cogaed was convicted.
ISSUE: May those Marijuana bricks and
fruiting tops be admissible as evidence to
secure conviction?
RULING:
NO. The right to privacy is a fundamental
right enshrined by implication in our
Constitution. It has many dimensions. One of
its dimensions is its protection through the
prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution:
One of these jurisprudential exceptions to
search warrants is "stop and frisk" rule. (we
have discussed this base on US
Jurisprudence, Terry vs Ohio). The Court
said "Stop and frisk" searches are often
confused with searches incidental to lawful
arrests under the Rules of Court. Searches
incidental to a lawful arrest require that a
crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and
the search conducted within the vicinity and
within reach by the person arrested is done
to ensure that there are no weapons, as well
as to preserve the evidence.
The search involved in this case was initially
a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply
with all the requirements of reasonability
required by the Constitution.
It is the police officer who should observe
facts that would lead to a reasonable degree
of suspicion of a person. (In this case it was
the driver who had the opportunity to
observed the facts indicating that those two
male passengers were actually committing a
crime) The police officer should not adopt the
suspicion initiated by another person. This is
necessary to justify that the person
suspected be stopped and reasonably
searched.85 Anything less than this would be
an infringement upon one’s basic right to
security of one’s person and effects.
There was not a single suspicious
circumstance in this case, and there was no
approximation for the probable cause
requirement for warrantless arrest. The
person searched was not even the person
mentioned by the informant. (remember in
the facts given the chief of police received a
text message informing a transporting of
marijuana by a certain person named Marvin
Mugat but the person arrested is not Marvin)
The informant gave the name of Marvin
Buya, and the person searched was Victor
Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed
responded by saying that he was transporting
the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained
only as one circumstance. This should not
have been enough reason to search Cogaed
and his belongings without a valid search
warrant.

The court continued by saying, none of the
other exceptions to warrantless searches
exist to allow the evidence to be admissible.
The facts of this case do not qualify as a
search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Likewise the Supreme Court discounted the
allegation of waiver on the part of the
prosecution. (the prosecution insisted that
when Cogaed permitted the search on his
bag, there was waiver on his part). But the
Court said it was wrong. There can be no
valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights
even if we assume that he did not object
when the police asked him to open his bags.
As this court previously stated:
Appellant’s silence should not be lightly
taken as consent to such search. The
implied acquiescence to the search, if there
was any, could not have been more than
mere passive conformity given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances and is
thus considered no consent at all within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Cogaed’s silence or lack of aggressive
objection was a natural reaction to a coercive
environment brought about by the police
officer’s excessive intrusion into his private
space. The prosecution and the police carry
the burden of showing that the waiver of a
constitutional right is one which is knowing,
intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all
cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.
SECTION 3, ARTICLE III
(Privacy of Communication and
Correspondence)
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication
and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when
public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this
or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
 Paragraph 2 of Section III is an
exclusionary rule. The first exclusionary
rule found in article III.
 “violation of this or the preceding section”
also covers Section II of Article III for the
unreasonable searches and seizure.
NB: This constitutional right can only be
invoked against the state, not against a
private individual.
“Invasion of communication and correspondence
is a kind of search.”
–Fr. Bernas
Example:
The use of postal mail
 Under this constitutional rule, nobody can
intrude in the privacy of the letter by
forcibly opening the sealed envelope.
 If the letter is opened: the effect will be the
exclusionary rule
 It will be an inadmissible evidence
 It will be a fruit of the poisonous tree
Even Verbal Communication (Telephone,
Landline)
 Note that the traditional telephone (only
the person holding the hand-held
telephone can hear what is on the other
line)
 Under the law, it is regarded as private
communication
 Under RA 4200, Anti Wiretapping Act, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication done in among
others via telephone is criminally
punishable
In the same manner of Smartphone
Even the text messages- they are intended to one
receiver only
Unless, you are using loudspeaker, you cannot
legally blame anyone around who was able to
overhear the conversation.
1. You have the reasonable expectation that
the communication is private if the call
made was not in a loudspeaker mode.
 This privacy is protected by the prime
charter of the land, the constitution, as
mandated by section 3 of Article III
GENERAL RULE: The constitution protects
our communication, even correspondence, to
be an inviolable right. So the state cannot just
intrude into these matters without the lawful court
order, or an express provision of the law.
EFFECT OF THE NON-OBSERVANCE OF
THIS RULE
 - Any evidence obtained in violation of this
rule shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding (exclusionary rule).
- Will be considered as the fruit of the
poisonous tree.
COMERCIANTE vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 205926, July 22, 2015
Article 3, Section 2 mandates that the Search
and seizure must be carried out through or on
the strength of a judicial warrant predicated
upon the existence of probable cause; in the
absence of such warrant, such search and
seizure becomes, as a general rule,
"unreasonable" within the meaning of said
constitutional provision.
To protect people from unreasonable
searches and seizures, Section 3 (2),
Article III of the Constitution provides an
exclusionary rule which instructs that
evidence obtained and confiscated on the
occasion of such unreasonable searches
and seizures are deemed tainted and
should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
CONCEPT OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The right to privacy in general meaning is the right
to be alone, the right to be let alone.
“The right to privacy is enshrined in our
Constitution and in our laws. It is defined as “the
right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of
one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to
a person’s ordinary sensibilities.” It is the right of
an individual “to be free from unwarranted
publicity, or to live without unwarranted
interference by the public in matters in which the
public is not necessarily concerned.” Simply put,
the right to privacy is “the right to be let alone.”
The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to
privacy and protects them against the State’s
abuse of power. In this regard, the State
recognizes the right of the people to be secure in
their houses. No one, not even the State, except
“in case of overriding social need and then only
under the stringent procedural safeguards,” can
disturb them in the privacy of their homes.” – Hing
vs. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736,
ARTICLE 26, PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE CIVIL
CODE:
Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and
similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action
for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's
residence;
This part of the civil code seeks to protect an
individual’s right to privacy, and provides legal
remedy against abuses that may be committed by
other individuals.
 This does not mean that only the
residence is entitled to privacy, because
the law also covers similar acts.
 In other words, a business establishment
and an office is likewise entitled to the
same privacy when the public is excluded
therefrom, and only such individuals
allowed may come in.
“Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article
26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to
his house or residence as it may extend to places
where he has the right to exclude the public or
deny them access. The phrase “prying into the
privacy of another’s residence,” therefore, covers
places, locations, or even situations which an
individual considers as private. And as long as
his right is recognized by society, other
individuals may not infringe on his right to
privacy.” - Hing vs Choachuy
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
- one of the highest form of human right
The concept of privacy also involves another
relative concept of Zones of Privacy
DISINI V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 203335, etc., 11 February 2014
(Discussion on Zones of Privacy)
Only those persons who have
deliberately broadcasted in public
libelous remarks through the use of
the internet is criminally liable. Zones of
privacy are recognized and protected in our
laws. Within these zones, any form of
intrusion is impermissible unless excused by
law and in accordance with customary legal
 process. The meticulous regard we accord to
these zones arises not only from our
conviction that the right to privacy is a
"constitutional right" and "the right most
valued by civilized men," but also from our
adherence to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights which mandates that, "no one
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference
with his privacy" and "everyone has the right
to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks."
The supreme court also cited the landmark
case of Morfe vs Mutuc which stated:
The concept of liberty would be emasculated
if it does not likewise compel respect for his
personality as a unique individual whose
claim to privacy and interference demands
respect.
In other words, our laws, especially the
constitution, will always seek to protect our
human right to privacy, especially on
communication.
Q: How does the constitution protect the
Zones of Privacy?
A: There are two constitutional guarantees
that create these zones of privacy:
(a) the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let
alone, and
(b) the right to privacy of communication and
correspondence. In assessing the challenge that
the State has impermissibly intruded into these
zones of privacy, a court must determine whether
a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation
of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has
been violated by unreasonable government
intrusion.
“In assessing the challenge that the State has
impermissibly intruded into these zones of
privacy, a court must determine whether a
person has exhibited a reasonable
expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by
unreasonable government intrusion.” - DISINI
V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
The right to be let alone is the beginning of all
freedoms.
Father Bernas in his book added that the right to
privacy is but an aspect of the right to be
secured. Pg. 219
CLASSIFICATIONS OF PRIVACY
(Whalen vs Roe, US Supreme Court in 1997)
1) Decisional Privacy- involves the right to
independence in making certain important
decisions
2) Informational Privacy- refers to avoiding
disclosure of personal matters
Two Aspects (Disini):
(1) the right not to have
private information
disclosed, and
(2) the right to live freely
without surveillance and
intrusion.
DETERMINATION WHETHER OR NOT A
MATTER IS ENTITLED TO THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY
In determining whether or not a matter is entitled
to the right to privacy, this Court has laid down a
two-fold test.
The first is a subjective test, where one
claiming the right must have an actual or
legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain
matter.
The second is an objective test, where his or
her expectation of privacy must be one society is
prepared to accept as objectively reasonable.
RA 4200 (Anti- Wiretapping Law)
- statutory enabling law with regards to Sec 3
Article 3 not only that the constitution says that
search and seizures of any evidence in violation
of section 3 could result In statutory rule and
that could mean a criminal act.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 4200
AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE
TAPPING AND OTHER RELATED
VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY OF
COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not
being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire
or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a Dictaphone
or dictagraph or Dictaphone or walkie-talkie or
tape recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a
participant or not in the act or acts penalized in
the next preceding sentence, to knowingly
possess any tape record, wire record, disc
record, or any other such record, or copies
thereof, of any communication or spoken word
secured either before or after the effective date of
this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to
replay the same for any other person or persons;
or to communicate the contents thereof, either
verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions
thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other
person: Provided, That the use of such record or
any copies thereof as evidence in any civil,
criminal investigation or trial of offenses
mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be
covered by this prohibition.
“If section 3, Article III provides for the
exclusionary rule, legal effect of the illegally
obtained communications or things pursuant to
section II (unreasonable searches and seizures),
RA 4200 criminalizes those acts.
Q: Is RA 4200 redundant with Section 3
Article III?
A: No. Section III (Article III) of the constitution
provides for the general rule and the exclusionary
rule. In RA 4200, it imposes criminal liability.
Gaanan v. IAC, G.R. No. L-69809, 16
October 1986
FACTS:
The law involved here is RA 4200. This
case involves Atty. Tito Pintor and his client
Manuel Montebon. Atty. Tito Pintor and his
client Manuel Montebon were in the living
room of complainant's residence discussing
the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint
for direct assault which they filed with the
Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against
Leonardo Laconico. After they have decided
on the conditions, Atty. Pintor made a call
with Laconico. Laconico requested Gaanan
to go to the extension line to listen to the
conversation with Atty. Pintor
Gaanan personally heard the
conditions wherein they would withdraw the
complaint if they would pay 8,000.00 pesos
Atty. Pintor called again to know if they would
agree with the settlements and instructed
Laconico to wait for the instructions on
address where they could deliver the money
Atty. Pintor instructed Laconico to deliver the
money to her wife. Laconico insisted that
Atty. Pintor must be the one to personally
receive the money. Laconico called Colonel
Zulueta. Atty. Pintor, having no choice,
personally received the money at some
restaurant. When Atty. Pintor received the
money, he was arrested.
The day after, Gaanan executed an
affidavit stating that he heard Pintor demand
8,000 for the withdrawal of the case for direct
assault. Laconico attached the affidavit and
charged them for robbery and extortion.
Since Gaanan listened to the
conversation, Atty. Pintor charged Gaanan of
violation of the Anti-wiretapping law for which
they were convicted. On appeal, they argued
that the telephone extension is not covered
by the term device under RA 4200.
ISSUE:
Was their conviction valid?
RULING:
No. There is no question that the telephone
conversation between complainant Atty.
Pintor and accused Atty. Laconico was
"private" in the sense that the words uttered
were made between one person and another
as distinguished from words between a
speaker and a public. It is also undisputed
that only one of the parties gave the petitioner
the authority to listen to and overhear the
caller's message with the use of an extension
telephone line. Obviously, complainant
Pintor, a member of the Philippine bar, would
not have discussed the alleged demand for
an P8,000.00 consideration in order to have
his client withdraw a direct assault charge
against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu
City Fiscal's Office if he knew that another
lawyer was also listening. We have to
consider, however, that affirmance of the
criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that
a caller by merely using a telephone line can
force the listener to secrecy no matter how
obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may
be. It would be the word of the caller against
the listener's.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or
the use of a "device or arrangement" for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting,
or recording the communication. There must
be either a physical interruption through a
wiretap or the deliberate installation of a
device or arrangement in order to overhear,
intercept, or record the spoken words.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the
same category as a dictaphone, dictograph or
the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of
RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be
considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a
telephone line. The telephone extension in this
case was not installed for that purpose. It just
happened to be there for ordinary office use. It
is a rule in statutory construction that in order to
determine the true intent of the legislature, the
particular clauses and phrases of the statute
should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part
thereof must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts.
An extension telephone is an instrument which
is very common especially now when the
extended unit does not have to be connected
by wire to the main telephone but can be moved
from place ' to place within a radius of a
kilometer or more. A person should safely
presume that the party he is calling at the other
end of the line probably has an extension
telephone and he runs the risk of a third party
listening as in the case of a party line or a
telephone unit which shares its line with
another.
 Telephone extension lines are not one of
those devices enumerated in section 1.
 If wiretapping, you need to deliberately tap
the lines to purposely overhear
 The purpose there was for convenience and
not violate the anti-wiretapping.
Salcedo – Ortañez v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 100662, 04 August 1994
FACTS:
Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City a complaint for
annulment of marriage with damages against
petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on
grounds of lack of marriage license and/or
psychological incapacity on the part of
Teresita.
Among the exhibits offered by Rafael were
three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone
conversations between petitioner and
unidentified persons.
At the trial when Rafael presented these
evidence, Teresita interpose her objection
thereto. However, the trial court despite her
objections admitted those tape recordings.
Motion for Reconsideration was filed by
Teresita.
However, the Trial Court denied the motion
for consideration, that is why Teresita opted
to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals assailing the admissions in evidence
of those mentioned cassette tapes.
The Court of Appeals rendered judgment
dismissing the petition. That is why Teresita
elevated the case up to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Was the tape recorded conversation
admissible in evidence?
RULING:
NO, those are not admissible in evidence.
In fact, Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to
Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and
Other Related Violations of the Privacy of
Communication, and for other purposes"
expressly makes such tape recordings
inadmissible in evidence
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of
Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted
provisions of the law in admitting in evidence
the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear
showing that both parties to the telephone
conversations allowed the recording of the
same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes
is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
93833, 28 September 1995
FACTS:
Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City alleging that the private
respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a
confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly
vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a
"hostile and furious mood" and in a manner
offensive to petitioner's dignity and
personality," contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy."
As a result of petitioner's recording of
the event and alleging that the said act of
secretly taping the confrontation was illegal,
private respondent filed a criminal case
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
for violation of Republic Act 4200 vigorously
argues, as her "main and principal issue" that
the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200
does not apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation. She contends that the
provision merely refers to the unauthorized
taping of a private conversation by a party
other than those involved in the
communication
ISSUE: Is the argument of Ramirez
Correct?
RULING:
NO, in other words the evidence
presented was held to be inadmissible.
Clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for
any person, not authorized by all the parties
to any private communication to secretly
record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction
as to whether the party sought to be
penalized by the statute ought to be a party
other than or different from those involved in
private communication. The statute's intent to
penalize all persons unauthorized to make
such a recording is underscored by the use
of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as
respondent Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, "even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private
conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a
violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200.
Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
107383, 20 February 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private
respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her
husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic
and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours, greetings cards,
cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. The documents
and papers were seized for use in evidence
in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine
which the petitioner had filed against her
husband.
ISSUE:
Were the seized documents inadmissible in
violation of Article III, Section 3 of the bill of
rights?
RULING:
Indeed, the documents and papers in
question are inadmissible in evidence.
The constitutional injunction declaring "the
privacy of communication and
correspondence [to be] inviolable"3 is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who
thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's
infidelity) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The
only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from
a] court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."4
Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do
not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of
marital infidelity. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or
his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to
him or to her.
In short, the documents taken by Cecilia
from the clinic of doc martin were all
declared to be in admissible.
People v. Andre Marti, G.R. No. 81561, 18
January 1991
FACTS:
On August 14, 1987 the appellant and his
common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the
booth of the "Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex,
Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift
wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the
proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes)
attended to them. The appellant informed
Anita Reyes that he was sending the
packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland.
Before delivery of the appellant's box to the
Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts,
Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of
Anita (Reyes), following standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final
inspection. When he opened appellant's box,
a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His
curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the
bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt
dried leaves inside. Opening one of the
bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper
protruding from the opening of one of the
gloves. He made an opening on one of the
cellophane wrappers and took several grams
of the contents thereof.
He brought the letter and a sample of
appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that
date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He was
interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section.
Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of
the shipment was still in his office. Therefore,
Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a
photographer, went to the Reyes' office at
Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).
Job Reyes brought out the box in which
appellant's packages were placed and, in the
presence of the NBI agents, opened the top
flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out
the cellophane wrappers from inside the
gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to
have been contained inside the cellophane
wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987;
Emphasis supplied).
The NBI agents made an inventory and
took charge of the box and of the contents
thereof, after signing a "Receipt"
acknowledging custody of the said effects of
the seized dried leaves. On the same day the
Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the
dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry
Section for laboratory examination. It turned
out that the dried leaves were marijuana
flowering tops as certified by the forensic
chemist.
Thereafter, an Information was filed
against appellant for violation of RA 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act.
Andre Marti claims that the search and
seizure of the prohibited drugs is illegal in
violation of his constitutional rights
against unreasonable search and seizure
and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and
3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore
argues that the same should be held
inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art.
III).
ISSUE: Is his argument correct?
RULING:
NO. However, in this case the
Supreme Court refused to take the side of
Andre Marti in hoping that the marijuana
leaves searched and seized from the boxes
that he was ought to send to his friend in
Zurich be excluded in evidence.
The case at bar assumes a peculiar
character since the evidence sought to be
excluded was primarily discovered and
obtained by a private person, acting in a
private capacity and without the intervention
and participation of State authorities.
We hold in the negative. In the absence of
governmental interference, the liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked against the State.
The contraband in the case at bar having
come into possession of the Government
without the latter transgressing appellant's
rights against unreasonable search and
seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason
why the same should not be admitted against
him in the prosecution of the offense
charged.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the
Constitution is not meant to be invoked
against acts of private individuals finds
support in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.
The constitutional proscription against
unlawful searches and seizures therefore
applies as a restraint directed only against
the government and its agencies tasked with
the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could
only be invoked against the State to whom
the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence
procured by an individual effected through
private seizure equally applies, in pari passu,
to the alleged violation, non-governmental as
it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to
privacy and communication.
Note: the packages were about to be sent
by Ander Marti they being objects cannot be
considered communications. And that
entitles him to the protection under section 3
article 3 of the bill of rights.
Waterous Drugs v. NLRC, G.R. No.
113271, 16 October 1997
FACTS:
In this case Antonia Catolico was
pharmacist employed by Waterous drugs.
Emma is involve with several irregularities in
 so far as the functions of her employment
with the company. At one point she was being
investigated for overpricing – jack up of
prices of medicines being sold by Waterous
drugs. She is being investigated and after
confirmation of one the clients, found to have
accepted a check written in her name in the
amount of P640.00 pesos.
 The check is a refund for her …
 The papers she issues the right
price…then the kick back is given to
her by issuing her a check payment.
Ms Catolico denied everything and she
questioned the act of Ms Saldana in opening
the envelope. Later, Waterous drug
terminated the services of Ms. Catolico in
pursuant to the results of the investigation.
Among others Catolico questions the
admissibility of the check for having been
searched and seized without a search
warrant wherein the NLRC Agreed to.
ISSUE: Is catolico and nlrc argument
correct. That the envelope is not admissible
in evidence since it was opened without her
consent and without search warrant?
RULING:
The arguments of Catolico and NLRC are
both wrong.
As regards the constitutional violation upon
which the NLRC anchored its decision, we
find no reason to revise the doctrine laid
down in People vs. Marti34 that the Bill of
Rights does not protect citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures
perpetrated by private individuals. It is not
true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the
citizens have no recourse against such
assaults. On the contrary, and as said
counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise
to both criminal and civil liabilities.
May the law enforcement (agents of the
government (Police, NBI, PDEA) record
electronically conversation made by a person
through a public telephone booth without
infringing the rule on privacy of
communication?
Assuming that the person who uses the
telephone booth is a person suspected to engage
in criminal acts as part of surveillance conducted
by law enforcement upon him, They will record
secretly the communication by the suspected
person using the telephone booth.
Assuming that the suspected person will be
apprehended based on the electronically
recorded telephone conversation he made with
the other party through a telephone booth. Is it
admissible in evidence or otherwise, will the
recording be violative of the rule in section 3
article 3?
Q: Is the conversation made through a public
telephone booth not considered private?
A: No. The truth is the rule even if the mode of
communication is through a public telephone
booth that communication is still protected under
section 3 of article 3 of the constitution. It has to
be characterized as private.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
FBI is conducting surveillance on one person
who is a member of a criminal group.
One of the surveillance the NBI recorded one
communication made by the suspect and
which had relations to the offense or crime
that they had planned to commit.
This recording was used against that guy in
the criminal case filed against him before the
US District court.
The US Supreme Court held that the act of
FBI agents in electronically recording the
conversation made by petitioner (Katz) in an
enclosed public telephone booth violated
his right to privacy and constituted a search
seizure because the petitioner had a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
Because the petitioner had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in using the enclosed
booth to make a personal telephone call, the
protection of the fourth amendment right
(pertains to right to privacy and
communication) extends to such area. In the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, it
was further noted that the existence of
privacy right under prior decisions involved a
two-fold requirement: first, that a person has
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy; and second, that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable (objective).
The supreme court acknowledged that Mr.
Katz at that time when he made the
communication in a public telephone booth
 had a reasonable expectation of privacy and
it was when after his entry to the booth shuts
the door behind him and pays the toll. (a clear
manifestation that he intended his
conversation with the other line or other party
to be private)
The recordings made by the FBI were held
inadmissible in evidence.
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
This is the catch to easily determine whether or
not a particular situation is covered under section
3 article 3.
Ex: when we use the phone we place it close to
our ears because we intend to have our
conversation to be a private matter.
US CASE
One guy is employed by a labor union he
reports to the headquarters of the union. He
has his own table and drawers.
His belongings and papers that are placed in
the table in the headquarters are still
protected by the provision of Section 3,
Article 3 the right to privacy of
communication.
Issue in one US Case:
Is a union employee entitled to privacy with
regard to an office at the union headquarters
that he shared with other union officials?
RULING:
Yes. The US Supreme Court invoked the
case of MANCUSI vs DeForte, a 1968 case
which addressed the reasonable expectation
of private employees in the workplace. In
other words, the Court is saying that even in
the workplace we have the right to invoke the
privacy of communication and
correspondence especially in the so called
reasonable expectation of privacy.
In fact, in that case of Mancusi vs Deforte, the
US Supreme Court held that a union
employee had the fourth amendment rights
with regard to an office, union headquarters
that he shared with other union officials even
as the latter or other guest could enter the
office the court recognize that employees
may have a reasonable expectation of
privacy against intrusions by the police.
Michael Simmons v. US, No. 16-7473 (4th
Cir. 2017)
FACTS:
Simmons was an employee of a division of
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
- Computer Geek, very knowledgeable
in computers
- Hired by the CIA mostly the scope of
his work is electronics surveillance
Simmons was later on convicted of receiving
and possessing materials containing child
pornography. Simmons was provided with an
office, all alone in that office because he did
not share that office with anyone. He was
issued with a computer with internet access.
The agency had instituted a policy on
computer use, Simmons is fully aware of the
said policy. The usage of office computers,
employees were to use the internet for official
government business only.
And that accessing unlawful material
was specifically prohibited. Simmons knew
of this policy because the policy was stated
when he signed the contract of employment
as one of the conditions.
In addition to that there was also a
stipulation under his employment contract
that computer users shall understand that
the agency will periodically audit, inspect, or
monitor the usage of internet access has
been appropriate.
Then after confirming that Simmons
had indeed downloaded pictures that were
pornographic in nature all the files of the hard
drive of Simmons computer were copied
from a remote workstation. Days later the
contractors representatives finally entered
Simmons office, removed the original hard
drive on his computer, replaced it with the
copy and gave the original to the agency
security officers. Then after the agency
secured warrants and searched Simmons
office in the evening when Simmons was not
around. They still Copied the content in
Simmons' computer and the diskettes found
in Simmons' desk drawer. The computer file
stored on the zip drive or on zip drive
diskettes including video tapes and various
documents including personal
correspondence.
At his trial, Simmons moved to
suppress those evidence arguing that the
searches at his office and computer violated
his fourth amendment rights (similar to
Philippines Sec 3, Article 3) after the hearing,
the district court denied his motion and
eventually Simmons was found guilty as
charged.
ISSUE:
Was there a violation of Simmons' right to
privacy?
RULING:
NO. The US Supreme Court in the case of
Mark L. Simon in 2000 held that the searches
in Simmons computer and office did not
violate his fourth amendment rights and the
first search warrant was valid. Held that the
search remains valid under the O’Conner
exception (O’Conner Ruling) to the warrant
requirement because the evidence of the
crime was discovered in the course of
otherwise a proper administrative inspection.
Simmons' violation of the agency’s internet
policy also happens to be a violation of
criminal law. It just means that said employer
lost the capacity and interest of an employee.
Warrantless entry in Simmons office was
reasonable under the fourth amendment
Standard announced in the O’Conner’ s case
because the exception of the search the
employer had reasonable grounds of
suspecting that the hard drive will yield
evidence of his conduct and the employer
were already aware that Simmons had
misused his internet access to download over
a thousand pornographic images. The
retrieval of the hard drive was reasonably
related to the objective of the search and the
search was not excessively intrusive. While
Simmons had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his office he did not have a
legitimate expectation of privacy with regard
to the files in his computer.
O'CONNOR CASE
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987)
FACTS:
It involves a government physician or a
government doctor, Dr. Magno Ortega
working in a State hospital, with a personal
office with a personal table and drawers with
locks.
A search was conducted by government
operatives in the office of Dr. Magno Ortega.
In the search the law enforcement seized
personal items from his desk and from his
filing cabinets.
ISSUE:
May the State search the office of a
government employee and seize personal
items from his desk and filing cabinets?
RULING:
No. The US Supreme Court held that the
fourth amendment equally applies to a
government workplace and it was made very
clear by the Supreme Court in this case.
DR. Magno Ortega claimed violations of his
fourth amendment rights when hospital
officials and police investigating charges an
alleged mismanagement of the psychiatric
residency program, an alleged sexual
harassment of female hospital employees
and other irregularities involving his private
patients.
Dr. Ortega said the search and seizures was
invalid. That violated the fourth amendment
right. The Supreme Court in this case ruled
that individuals, including Dr. Magno Ortega,
do not lose the fourth amendment rights
merely because they work for the
government instead of a private employer. In
plurality of four justices in this case, the
correct analysis has two (2) steps. First,
because some government offices may be so
open to fellow employees or public that no
expectation of privacy is reasonable, the
court may consider the operational realities of
the workplace in order to determine whether
an employee’s fourth amendment rights are
implicated. Next where an employee has a
legitimate privacy expectation, an employer’s
intrusion on that expectation for non-
investigatory work related purposes as well
as for investigation of work related
misconduct should be judged by the standard
of reasonableness under all circumstances.
On the basis of those established rules, the
US Supreme Court in this case declared that
Dr. Ortega’s fourth amendment rights are
implicated only if the conduct of the hospital
officials infringe an expectation of privacy that
society is prepared to consider.
The court said given the undisputed
evidence, Dr. Ortega did not share his desk
or filing cabinets with any other employees
that he kept personal correspondence and
other private items in his own office while
those work related files for instance on
Physicians residency training were scored
outside his office and that there being no
evidence that the hospital has established
any reasonable regulations or policy
discouraging employees from storing
personal papers and effects then desk files or
filing cabinets.
The court concluded that Dr. Ortega had a
reasonable expectation of privacy at least
in his desk and file cabinets. (the cabinets
are locked and Dr. Ortega has the sole
access to it.)
BRICCIO POLLO VS. KARINA
CONSTANTINO-DAVID
G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel
Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV
and also the Officer-in-Charge of the Public
Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD)
under the "Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya
Na" program of the CSC.
On January 3, 2007 at around 2:30 p.m., an
unsigned letter-complaint addressed to
respondent CSC Chairperson Karina
Constantino-David which was marked
"Confidential" and sent through a courier
service (LBC) received by the Integrated
Records Management Office (IRMO) at the
CSC Central Office. Following office practice
in which documents marked "Confidential"
are left unopened and instead sent to the
addressee, the aforesaid letter was given
directly to Chairperson David.
The letter-complaint reads:
The Chairwoman
Civil Service Commission
Batasan Hills, Quezon City
Dear Madam Chairwoman,
Belated Merry Christmas and Advance Happy
New Year!
As a concerned citizen of my beloved country,
I would like to ask from you personally if it is just
alright for an employee of your agency to be a
lawyer of an accused gov’t employee having a
pending case in the CSC. I honestly think this
is a violation of law and unfair to others and
your office.
Chairperson David immediately formed a
team to conduct an investigation.
The next day, all the computers in the PALD
were sealed and secured for the purpose of
preserving all the files stored therein. Several
diskettes containing the back-up files
sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD
computers were turned over to Chairperson
David. The contents of the diskettes were
examined by the CSC’s Office for Legal
Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the
files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied
from the computer assigned to and being
used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to
42 documents, were draft pleadings or
letters7 in connection with administrative
cases in the CSC and other tribunals.
He appealed his dismissal to the Supreme
Court.
POLLO invoked the O’Conner doctrine.
ISSUE:
Was there a violation of his rights to privacy
and invalidate the search and seizure by the
investigating personnel coming from the
CSC?
RULING:
NO, there was none. Petitioner failed to
prove that he had an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy either in his office or
government-issued computer which
contained his personal files. Petitioner did not
allege that he had a separate enclosed office
which he did not share with anyone, or that
his office was always locked and not open to
other employees or visitors. Neither did he
allege that he used passwords or adopted
any means to prevent other employees from
accessing his computer files. On the
contrary, he submits that being in the public
assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he
normally would have visitors in his office like
friends, associates and even unknown
people, whom he even allowed to use his
computer which to him seemed a trivial
request. He described his office as "full of
people, his friends, unknown people" and that
in the past 22 years he had been discharging
his functions at the PALD, he is "personally
assisting incoming clients, receiving
documents, drafting cases on appeals, in
charge of accomplishment report,
Mamamayan Muna Program.
Petitioner’s claim of violation of his
constitutional right to privacy must
necessarily fail. His other argument invoking
the privacy of communication and
correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III
of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable
considering the recognition accorded to
certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy
of employees in the government workplace
under the aforecited authorities. We likewise
find no merit in his contention that O’Connor
and Simons are not relevant because the
present case does not involve a criminal
offense like child pornography. As already
mentioned, the search of the petitioner's
computer was justified there being
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
files stored therein would yield incriminating
evidence relevant to the investigation being
conducted by CSC as government employer
of such misconduct subject to the
anonymous complaint. This situation clearly
falls under the exception to the warrantless
requirement in administrative searches
defined in O’Connor.