CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II From the lectures of Atty.

Muñez

THE BILL OF RIGHTS

Constitution defined:
- is a written instrument by which the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined,
and by which these powers are distributed among several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the
benefit of the body politic”- Justice Miller, US Supreme

Parts of the Constitution:

● Constitution of Government- defines the power of government and distributes it among various organs
● Constitution of Liberty- Guarantees the fundamental rights and liberties of citizens. This pertains to the
bill of rights. This constitutes the limitations on the power of the state.
● Constitution of Sovereignty- Provides for the methods and procedures for amending or revising the
fundamental law

State Authority Vs Individual Liberty

● State authority is very limited. The state does not interfere with individual rights
● But in period of dictatorship or authoritarian rule, State power becomes larger while individual liberty
sinks or it becomes smaller.
● In the end it is a struggle between state authority and individual liberty. And the supreme court is
supposedly the one to tell us the limits where should state authority ends and where should individual
liberty begin. That is balancing act. And that is the focus of bill of rights (judge De la Banda)

Content/ Arrangement of the 22 Sections:

Secs.1-11-Civil and Political rights

Civil rights are those which we enjoy as members of a political society as members of apolitical society

Political rights allow us to participate in the affairs of government (ie. Voting- but the right to vote is not
found in the bill of rights.

What are the political rights that are covered by the bill of rights? Right to free expression because if we
criticize the government, the government acts. Allows us to indirectly participate in the government)

Sec. 12-22- rights of suspects, those in trial or those convicted of offenses-crime related rights

The bill of Rights do not guarantee Economic, Cultural and Social Rights.

For instance, right to education, right to social insurance, right to reasonable standard of living-its not
guaranteed, by the bill of rights but I notice, that Justice Puno came up with the proposed Constitution and
included in the bill of rights Economic and Cultural rights.
It is a little bit problematic because enforcement of economic and cultural rights is different from the
enforcement of civil and political rights

Function of the Constitution

1. To establish government powers
2. To limit government powers
3. To define government powers
4. To distribute powers
Basic Concept

Bill of rights- it is simply a list of rights

Question: Why did the framers placed them in the Constitution? Why not give it to the congress?

Answer: these rights are important. We want to put it beyond the power of Congress. Beyond the Executive,
and even beyond the power of he courts to limit. In effect, we look at the Bill of rights, at least from a
naturalist perspective, we do not consider the state or the government as the origin or the source of this right.

Bill- declaration which is made in the Constitution

Bill of Rights- it is the list of rights that the State cannot interfere with.

It does not exhaust all rights of the citizens as other rights are embodied in statutes and laws. Affirmative
rights are not included in the bill of Rights. It includes only negative rights.

Significance in the Difference between the Bill of Rights and Rights Embodied In Statutes

Framers seemed to think that there are rights that are so important and fundamental that they wanted to place
it above the reach of Congress. In effect, Congress cannot pass a law which will amend or diminish the rights
Found in the bill of rights, above the reach of Partisan politics

PURPOSE: The bill of rights is a restriction on government power. This is an area where the State cannot
interfere.

STRUCTURE: it is placed in the constitution because rights are more important than the laws. It puts rights
in a higher category and limits the power of the government.

There are 22 section in the bill of rights. The provisions in the section 1 to 11 generally pertain to rights which
everyone can enjoy; section 12 to 22 pertain to rights of the accused or persons who are suspected of the
crimes

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF BILL OF RIGHTS

1. The provisions of the bill of Rights are self-executing. It is immediately effective.

The Framers of the constitution and Justice Leonen in some of his decision would say that provision of the
bill of rights are “ ready for use”. That’s the term. If there is a case against somebody, they can immediately
invoke the bill of rights.

Self-executing means that there is no more need of an implementing legislation before it can be invoked. This
is the distinction between other rights found in the Constitution and rights found in the Bill of Rights

The Provision of the Bill of rights are self-executory because even in the absence of any legislation, the Bill
of rights can be used as a defense or may be invoked as a cause of action in litigation without the need of any
statute from the congress. So meaning, you can automatically go to court and have them enforced

2. The Bill of Rights can be invoked solely against the state (TAKE NOTE OF THIS)

The bill of Rights can only be invoked against the state and not against private individuals

Q: Why?

A: Let’s go back to the function of the Constitution. The provisions of the Constitutions are intended only to
govern a relationship between the individual and the state.

Q: Can you invoke it against your girlfriend/boyfriend for reading your private conversation with your
ex? Or against your parents for entering your room without your consent and in the process found your
pornographic materials hidden under your bed or drawer?

A: of course not! Because you can only invoke it against the state, the government and its agents

Q: what is your remedy?

A: the provisions governs a relationship in another individual is the civil Code, revised Penal code or other
laws made by the Congress but NOT the Constitution

PEOPLE VS BONGCARAWAN
( G.R No. 143944, July 11, 2002)

FACTS: The accused was convicted of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act).

Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger ship, M/V Super Ferry
5, sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock at
the port of Iligan City when its security officer, Diesmo, received a complaint from passenger Canoy about
her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and
four (4) other members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom they
later found at the economy section. The suspect was identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The
accused was informed of the complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was
bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by 2 security agents back to the economy
section to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When
requested by the security, the accused opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs
containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be “shabu,” the security personnel
immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its
contents. They also called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance.

But the accused countered this by saying that the Samsonite suitcase containing the methamphetamine
hydrochloride or “shabu” was forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in violation of his
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful
search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him.

ISSUE: WON the accused can invoke the Bill of Rights against the agency of super ferry right

HELD: NO. The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution. Evidence acquired in the violation of this rights shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional
protection or waiving his right by giving consent is against transgression against unlawful searches and
seizures applies as a restraint directed only against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could
only be invoked against the state to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.

In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security personnel. It
was only after they found “shabu” inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for
assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without
government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure
does not apply.

There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure performed by the
vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police authorities for like the latter,
the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a
private employee and does not discharge any governmental function.

NOTE: In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt, viz:

(1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or a regulated drug;

(2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and

(3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him. To overcome this
presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In this case, the accused
points to a certain Alican “Alex” Macapudi as the owner of the contraband, but presented no evidence to
support his claim. No witnesses were presented to prove that there is such a living, breathing, flesh and blood
person named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted the Samsonite to the accused. Surely, if he does exist, he has
friends, fellow businessmen and acquaintances who could testify and support the claim of the accused. Mere
denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case at bar, it is the keystone of the defense of the
accused-appellant. Stories can easily be fabricated. It will take more than bare-bone allegations to convince
this Court that a courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner and has no knowledge or intent to possess the
same.

3. Basic human rights are superior to property rights.

PBMLO vs PBMCI

FACTS: Union wanted to partcipate in demonstration. The management allowed them on the demonstration.
The management allowed them on the condition that it should not be during their shift so that operation will
not be hampered. But union wanted all of the members to participate at the same time and they did. As a
consequence, the management dismissed the officers of the union.

ISSUE: Whether the rights of the workers ( right to assembly, expression and petition for redress of
grievances) should be given more importance over the rights of the management-property rights

HELD: The court ruled in favor of the workers, Human rights enjoy primacy over property rights. Not all
rights are equal. There is a hierarchy of rights in the Bill

Basis of the court’s decision:

1. Property right prescribe, human rights do not

2. The test for limiting property rights- Reasonable Standard Test (reasonable relation between the means
employed by the law and its object)

Note: The Doctrines of prescription and estoppels applies only to property rights and not to human rights
Preferred Rights: these are the rights so essentials to the validity of a democratic society

1. Freedom od speech
2. Freedom of the press
3. Freedom of assembly
4. Right to petition
5. Right to religion

LIFE- to live; right against physical harm; right to a good life ( reasonable standard of living); right to life
starting from a conception.

Any measure that would, even only endanger his health or subject him to unnecessary pain or to unreasonable
physical execution would be subject to challenge

LIBERTY- the right to do anything which is not injurious to others.

These are the rights not mentioned in the constitution but are implied as protected in the test of the
constitution, e.g right to privacy. It includes others provided by statues or by other laws. It is not unbridled
license, it is regulated bu law. In short, do anything that does not offend the public welfare.

Chief elements
1. The right to labor
2. The right to contract
3. The right choose ones employment
4. The right to locomotion (justice Laurel)

PROPERTY- includes movable and immovable property, tangibles or intangibles (trademarks, stocks, trade
names) vested rights ( court judgement, perfected homestead claims) employment, profession, or trade.

Property may be regarded as anything that can come under the right of ownership and be the subject of a
contract

Not included as right are:

Licenses, permits and certificates of public convenience, because these are privileges revocable
according to the will of the grantor even without due process and public office, because it is a public trust

4.Provisions of the Bill of Rights have NO RETROACTIVE APPLICATION

This refers to custodial investigation This has been strengthened in 1987 Constitution)

The bill of rights gives rights. It does not punish unlike penal laws. If the law is favorable to the accused, the
provision of the Bill of Rights have no retroactive application

FILOTEO, JR VS SANDIGANBAYAN
263 S 222 ( 1966)

HELD: Petitioners contention that Art III, Sec 12 of the 1987 Constitution should be given retroactive effect
for being favorable to him as an accused, cannot be sustained. While Art 22 of the revised Penal Code
provides that “ penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor that the person guilty if a felony
who is not a habitual criminal”, what is being construed here is obviously not a penal statute. A bill of Rights
is a declaration of the individual rights and privileges which the constitution is designed to protect against
violations be government, or by individuals or group of individuals

PEOPLE VS DOMANTAY
307 SCRA 1 (1999)

Held: Yes. The confession is not covered by Sec. 12(1) of BOR. The BOR does not concern itself with the
relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the
individual and the state. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. In this
case, the presence of the police officers 2-3 meters away did not exert undue pressure or influence on accused
or coerced him into giving his confession. Accused could have refused to be interviewed but instead he
agreed.

SERRANO VS NLRC
323 SCRA 445 (2000)

Held: No. The employer’s failure to comply with the notice requirement does not constitute a denial of due
process, but a mere failure to observe a procedure for termination. The reason is that the due process clause
is a limitation on government power, not on private power such as the termination of employment
under the Labor Code. Secondly, the notice and hearing are required under the due process clause before the
powers of organized society are brought to bear upon the individual. Under Article 283, however, the purpose
of the 30-day notice is not to give him an opportunity to be heard on the charge against him, for there is none,
but to prepare him for the eventual loss of his job. Thirdly, the requirement of Art. 282 and Art. 283 of notice
cannot be considered part of the due process clause because the employer cannot be entirely an impartial
judge of his own cause.

5. Provisions of the Bill of Rights are generally applicable to aliens.

There are a couple of rights there which by express command of the Constitution does not seem to be
applicable to aliens.

6. Provisions of the Bill of Rights are generally subject to restrictions or are not absolute.

Q: Since the Bill of Rights are not absolute, how do we know whether the restrictions impose by the
State are valid?

A: Tests Applied by Supreme Court:

a. Strict Scrutiny Test – the test is applied in relation to statutes interfering with:

(1) Fundamental rights such as

● Freedom of Speech
● Freedom of Expression
● Assembly
● Religion
● Privacy
● Right to Travel or

(2) To classifications based on race, alienage or national origin and religion.

In PH, it is not much of an issue because in PH aliens are not allowed to hold public office or own
lands so in a sense, they are a little bit discriminated.
 This can happen that classifications based on religion will be subjected to strict scrutiny.

Q: What is the effect if the Court applies the strict scrutiny test?

A: In this instance, the court starts with the heavy presumption that the law is unconstitutional.

Take Note: Heavy presumption of unconstitutionality

Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the classification

1. Is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest;

2. Is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored
to accomplish the interest.

b. Intermediate Scrutiny Test

Q: When is the intermediate scrutiny test applied?

A: When the challenge restriction does not involve fundamental rights or suspect classes (example:
classification based on gender, legitimacy, financial need and age). Also, if the restriction on speech is
content-neutral.

Q: What is the effect?

A: No heavy presumption of unconstitutionality, substantial government interest – it appears here that

from the wording, that

1. The act of the government is still presumed to be unconstitutional but the presumption is not heavy;
2. The government’s interest is substantial but not compelling

Chavez vs Gonzales
G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008

When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial governmental
interest is required for its validity. Because regulations of this type are not designed to suppress any particular
message, they are not subject to the strictest form of judicial scrutiny but intermediate approach – somewhere
between the mere rationality that is required of any other law and the compelling interest stanadred applied to
content-based restrictions. The test is called intermediate because the Court will not merely rubberstamp the
validity of a law but also require that the governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of
expression. The intermediate approach has been formulated in this manner:

A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government,
if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression and if the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.

On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is
given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact. Only when the challenged act ahs
overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the
burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.
 Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the content-based restraint will be struck down.

With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must also show the type of harm the speech sought
to be restrained would bring about-especially the gravity and the imminence of the threatened harm-
otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid. Prior restraint on speech based on its content cannot be justified
by hypothetical fears, “but only by showing a substantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of a reality
already on ground”. As formulated, “the question in every case is whether the words used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.”

The regulation which restricts the speech content must also serve an important or substantial government
interest, which is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.
SECTION 1. NO PERSON SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF
LIFE, LIBERTY OR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW NOR SHALL ANY PERSON BE
DENIED THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW.

If you look at Section 1, it has 2 major topics – the due process clause and the equal protection clause.

It would appear that even the right to life and liberty are not absolute rights. They can still be subject to
limitation. In fact, before, you can be sentenced to death and therefore, in a sense, the right to life is not
absolute.

However, you have to understand also that what seems to be absolute is the right not to be deprived of
it [life] without due process. (Judge G.A. De la Banda)

Q: What are not covered by the term “property”?

a.) Permits and Licenses – Supreme Court told us that permits and licenses (for instance, permit to operate a

!
i
cockpit or a lotto outlet) are not property rights because they only give privileges. They can be withdrawn
anytime and one cannot invoke the due process clause, generally. They are not considered to fall under the
term “right to property”.

b.) Private Employment – prior to the Serrano decision, you are illegally dismissed (meaning, there is a
cause but not due process observed), you are entitled to reinstatement and back wages. But after the Serano
decision penned by Justice Carpio, it has been held that private employment is not covered by the due process
clause. While you are entitled to due process before you are removed, that is because that is provided in the
Labor Code, a statue. You have due process but it does not spring from Section 1 of the Bill of Rights.

&c.) Public Office – we have to understand the context here. We know that when you are removed from office,
you are also entitled to due process because of the Civil Service Law. But the context of the decision is
always on abolition. When an office is abolished (maybe by the act of Congress or the Executive), you cannot
claim due process for the reason that the public office is a public trust and it is not covered by Section 1.

Outline of Section 1

I. Due Process
a. Procedural Due Process
b. Substantive Due Process
II. Equal Protection
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

- relates to the mode of procedure which government agencies must follow in the enforcement and application
of laws.

Exemption from the Requirement of Procedural Due Process

a. Rule-Making Power or Quasi-Legislative Power. Usually, an administrative body exercises both quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial power. For instance, the Civil Service issues some rules and regulations but if
you commit a violation, they can also investigate you and dismiss you. So, it exercises its rule-making
power (aka quasi-legislative), but when it decides to dismiss you for infractions of some rules, that is
quasi-judicial.

Quezon City PTCA vs DepEd

G.R. No. 188720, February 23, 2016

Ruling: Notice and hearing are not essential when an administrative agency acts pursuant to its rule-making
power.

Previous notice and hearing, as elements of due process, are constitutionally required for the protection of life
or vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a
judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event which has to be established
or ascertained. It is not essential to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future
conduct of a class of persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise.

It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is legislative, notice of
hearing is not required by due process of law. IF the nature of the administrative agency is essentially
legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing are not necessary. The validity of a rule of future action
which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or property are not involved, is not determined according to
the same rules which apply in the case of the direct application of a policy to a specific individual.

Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the
character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of
the great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing
are not essential to the validity of the administrative action where the administrative body acts in the
exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body
acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general
and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice
and hearing. supreme cont
·

I think this is already settled now in Constitutional law. When an entity exercises its rule-making power, it
need not observe due process. When Congress passes a law, does it need to conduct notice and hearing? There
is no such requirement. In fact, what we studied in Consti 1, (Section 21, Article VI, in aid of legislation), that
is only optional. It is stated there that Congress or any of its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. There is no requirement of due process because it is exercising legislative function. The same is
true for all entities which are passing rules and regulations (Judge G.A. De la Banda).

Q: When the LTFRB increases taxi fares, they hold hearings. Why is that a requirement?

A: It is not because of the Constitution but because of the law creating the LTFRB requires it to call hearings.
Again, it is not a requirement of the Constitution.

b. Abatement of Nuisance Per Se

Q: What is Nuisance Per Se?

A: Nuisance per se is when it is a nuisance at all times and under all conditions.

Ex: If you build a house in the middle of Bolton St. in front of UM, the City Engineers Office can demolish it
outright and you cannot say that “I need Notice and Hearing!”

Nuisances are of two kinds: Nuisance Per Se and Nuisance Per Accidens.

Nuisance per se is recognized as a nuisance any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace
to public health or safety, and for that reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined law of necessity.

Nuisance per accidens is that which depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence
being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide
whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

I. Procedural Due Process can take on many forms in different situations. The most common way it can
come up is Administrative Proceedings.

The elements of Due Process in Administrative Proceedings:

1. The right to a hearing which includes the right of a party interested or affected to present his case and
submit evidence to support thereof;
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. The decision must have something to support itself;
4. The evidence must be substantial;
5. The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing or at least contained in the
records and disclosed to the party affected; and
6. The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved and the reason for the decision. (On
Requirement No.6 – try to relate this with Consti 1. In the Judiciary [Article VIII], the provision is
saying that the decision should contain the facts and the law. But we have a decision of the SC saying
that it does not apply to LTFRB, COMELEC or the Military Commission, among others. Simply put,
the requirements of facts and law would not be necessary in their decision. But they are bound by this
requirement)

In essence, there are Two Important Requirements when it comes to Due Process:

1. Notice – to inform the party that proceedings are being taken against him.

2. Hearing – to give him the opportunity to defend himself.

&80fobotni Republic vs Dela Merced

G.R. No. 201501, January 22, 2018

Ruling: Dela Merced & Sons argues that the fine was imposed without due process of law because the
company was “never given an opportunity to present its evidence to dispute the alleged violation of the law.”
It also claims that the DENR-PAB simply entered the former’s premises and unilaterally conducted an
inspection and thereafter assessed excessive fines without first conducting conferences or a trial. We are not
persuaded.
The opportunity to be heard was made completely available to Dela Merced & Sons who participated in all
stages of administrative proceeding before the DENR-PAB after issuing the notice of violation and possible
imposition of fines to the petitioner, gave it time to comply with the requirements of the environmental laws.
The petitioner never requested for an extension of time to comply with the requirements which the respondent
granted. But a subsequent inspection of the facility showed that the petitioner still failed to comply with the
DENR effluent standards despite the extension given by respondent. Thus, the respondent was compelled to
issue a cease and desist order.

Upon full compliance of the petitioner with all the requirements, the respondent issued a TLO in its favor.
EMB-NCR conducted another inspection of the facility and found that the effluents conformed to the DENR
Effluent Standards. Thereafter, the respondent invited the petitioner to a technical conference wherein the
latter was instructed to submit a position paper on the amount of fines to be imposed and gave it a copy of the
respondent’s initial computation of fines. The petitioner in its Position Paper, pleaded that the computation be
discarded. After due deliberation of petitioner’s arguments, the respondent DENR-PAB imposed fines. The
petitioner moved for its reconsideration which was denied.

The above findings overwhelmingly show that Dela Merced & Sons was not denied due process. In a real
sense, it was able to take advantage of the available opportunities to explain its side and to question the acts
and order of the DENR-PAB. In administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
one’s side suffices to mee the requirements of due process.

It is wrong for Dela Merced & Sons to insist that a trial-type of proceeding is necessary. Administrative
due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. In the former, a formal
type or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly
applied.

It is not legally objectionable for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers,
affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as is the case here.

In any event, whatever procedural defect there may have been in the subject proceedings was cured when
Dela Merced & Sons moved for reconsideration.

Q: In an administrative proceeding, such as the imposition of fines by the DENR for entities failing to
comply with environmental standards, is there a requirement of conducting a trial-type procedure, in
order to comply with the Due Process Clause?

A: No, it does not require trial type proceedings. While you are entitled to notice and hearing, it need not be in
the form of direct and cross-examination.

OTHER SITUATIONS

i.) Appeals

RIVERA VS CSC
G.R. NO. 115147, JANUARY 4, 1995

Ruling: In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, the
reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there
could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer
would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he
was mistaken in his first view of the case it should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself
totally from any participation in resolving Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to give full meaning and
consequence to a fundamental aspect of due process. The argument that Commissioner Gaminde did not
participate in MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990 is unacceptable. It is not denied that she did participate,
indeed has concurred, in MSPB's resolution of 03 March 1994, denying the motion for reconsideration of
MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990 is unacceptable.it is not denied that she dis participate, indeed has
concurred, in MSPB’s resolution

ii.) Publication of laws

We cannot do away with publications. As decided in the famous case of Tanada, that is a requirement of
procedural due process

iii.) Vague Laws Question

Q: What is a vague law?

·

A: A statute or act suffers the defect of vagueness when it lacks a comprehensible standard that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to
the Constitution in two (2) respects:

1. It violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and

2. It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle

II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

Pertains to the intrinsic validity of the law interfering with life, liberty and property.

A question one will simply ask to determine substantive due process is “ is the law reasonable or is it an
undue interference in life, liberty or property?

Sometimes, the examiner will ask “ is there a violation of due process? It is sometimes equivalent to asking
the question “ is there a valid exercise of police power? These 2 questions are interchangeable

Police Power- the power of the government to prescribe regulations to promote health, morals, education,
good order or safety and the general welfare of the people

“I emphasize this to my students, to promote health, morals, education, good order or safety and the general
welfare of the people. In the old cases, that used to be the standard. If the exercise of the power of the
government does not fall under any of these, that will no longer be a valid exercise of police power. Over the
years, cases come up where the Supreme Court would say that it is a valid exercise of police power even if
they do not fall under the category” -Judge G, A De la Banda”

Tests for Valid Exercise of Police Power:

Q: Is the law reasonable? We call this the Rational Basis Test.

Judge G.A De la Banda said that this is the third test. The other two being Strict Scrutiny Test and the
Intermediate Scrutiny Test.

Normally, we apply the Rational Basis Test only when it involves violation of property rights. This test is very
easy to satisfy

Components of Rational Basis Test

A. That the interest of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class requires such
interference; and

B. That the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals

OUTLINE OF THE TEST

1. Lawful Subject. you simply ask the question “ is there a lawful subject?” Does it fall under health, morals,
education, good order or safety and the general welfare of the people? That is the meaning of a lawful subject.

2. Lawful Method. It appears to be made up of two parts:

2.A.Rational relation between method and purpose. “Is there a rational relation between the method and
purpose?

When you speak of rational between method and purpose, this is a matter of logic

YNOT vs IAC

Issue: Whether EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause.

Ruling: YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be present: (a) that the interests
of the public, generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference, and; (b)
that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose.

In US v. Toribio, the Court has ruled that EO 626 complies with the above requirements—that is, the carabao,
as a poor man’s tractor so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of
the order, and that the method chosen is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and
not unduly oppressive. The ban of the slaughter of carabaos except those seven years old if male and eleven if
female upon issuance of a permit adequately works for the conservation of those still fit for farm work or
breeding, and prevention of their improvident depletion

Here, while EO 626-A has the same lawful subject, it fails to observe the second requirement. Notably, said
EO imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The object of the
prohibition is unclear. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the disputed measure is missing. It is not clear how the interprovincial transport of the animals
can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, as they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one
province than in another. Obviously, retaining them in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any
more that moving them to another will make it easier to kill them there. Even if assuming there was a
reasonable relation between the means and the end, the penalty is invalid as it amounts to outright
confiscation, denying petitioner a chance to be heard

In the instant case, no such pressure is present. The manner by which the disposition of the confiscated
property also presents a case of invalid delegation of legislative powers since the officers mentioned
(Chairman and Director of the NMIC and AI respectively) are granted unlimited discretion. The usual
standard and reasonable guidelines that said officers must observe in making the distribution are nowhere to
be found; instead, they are to go about it as they may see fit. Obviously, this makes the exercise prone to
partiality and abuse, and even corruption

The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative
authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-
A unconstitutional.

2.B. Means chosen not unduly oppressive of another right. “Is the means chosen not unduly oppressive of
another right?

Always remember, when Congress passes a law or an LGU, passes an ordinance, it always, in almost all
cases, affects another right but that does not mean that the law will be unconstitutional because the
requirement is that, it will only be unconstitutional if the effect on the other right is unduly oppressive

Take note of the word: UNDULY

Ermita-Malate vs City Mayor of Manila

Issue: whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause
Ruling: The statute here questions deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are
asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and
hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence
of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in
the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the
presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside

Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being
repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with the due
process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being
specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on
conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and
narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and
4 5
the least limitable of powers, extending as it does "to all the great public needs." It would be, to paraphrase
another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be
6
deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the genera welfare.
Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all
that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society

But in Laguio and White Light, the supreme Court says [ since] it’s mine, it stated that it is an undue restraint
on a business and the right of patrons [ this is third party standing- the right of patrons who never before the
court, never bothered to file a case because the owners were the ones who filed the case.

Secondly, the Supreme Court also used this test. There is no rational basis. Take note, it’s really very rare
when it applies this-no rational relation between the purpose of law which is to promote morals and the
method chose which is to prohibit short-time because motels can be used for innocent purposes

White Light com. VS City of Manila

Issue: is the ordinance a legitimate exercise of police power?

Ruling: Ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to
enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3)
must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable

The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting
out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred
on local government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare
clause.

More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights
and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

In this case We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair.
There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire
families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their
homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for
abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private
spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately
look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.

We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by
the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained
from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is
in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The
Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the
rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out
a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

Fernando VS St. Scholastica’s College

 693 SCRA 141 (2013)

Issue: Can beautification be a valid purpose for the exercise of the police power?

Ruling: No. beautification purpose of the setback requirement is not valid. it has long been settled that the
State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their
property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community. The Court, thus, finds
Section 5 to be unreasonable and oppressive as it will substantially divest the respondents of the beneficial
use of their property solely for aesthetic purposes. Accordingly, Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 is invalid

But recently the Supreme Court Stated that, apparently, beautification is a valid exercise pf police power but
it will not be permitted if it permanently divests the owner of use of his property

CARLOS SUPERDRUG VS DSWD

G.R. NO. 166494, JUNE 29, 2007
HELD:
The senior citizens act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens to nation
building and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as the state
considers them an integral part of our society.

To implement the above policy the law grants at 20% discount to senior citizens for medical and dental
services and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses,
carnivals and other similar places of culture, leisure, and amusement fares; for domestic land, air, and sea
travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments restaurants and recreation centers;
and purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement,
the law provides that business establishment extending the 20% discount to senior citizens may claim the
discount as a tax deduction.

The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which similar to the power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been purposely
veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room
for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances does assuring the greatest benefits.
Accordingly it has been described as “the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers
extending as it does to all the great public needs.”

It is “the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties or without, not repugnant
to the constitution, as they shall judged to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth and of the
subjects of the same.”

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must
bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield
to general welfare.

Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea
of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital the question provision is invalidated.
Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in
question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every low has
in its favor.

Given this, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior citizen discount is unduly
oppressive to their business because petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and come up with a
financial report, so that they have not been able to show properly whether or not the tax deductions scheme
really works greatly to their disadvantage.

SOUTHERN LUZON DRUG VS DSWD

G.R. NO. 199669, APRIL 25, 2017
HELD:

It is in the exercise of its police power that the Congress enacted RA Nos. 9257 and 9442, the laws mandating
a 20% discount on purchases of medicines made by senior citizens and PWDs. It is also in further exercise of
this power that the legislature opted that the said discount be claimed as tax deduction rather than tax credit,
by covered establishments.

To begin with, the issue of just compensation finds no relevance in the instant case as it had already been
made clear in Carlos Superdrug that the power being exercised by the State in the imposition of senior citizen
discount was its police power. Unlike in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, just compensation is
not required in wielding police power. This is precisely because there is no taking involved but only an
imposition of burden.

In the exercise of police power, “property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.”

Even then, the State’s claim of police power cannot be arbitrary or unreasonable. After all, the overriding
purpose of the exercise of the power is to promote general welfare, public health and safety, among
others. It is a measure, which by sheer necessity, the state exercises, even to the point of interfering with
personal liberty or property rights in order to advance common good. To warrant such interference, two
requisites must concur: (a) the interest of the public generally, as distinguish from those of a particular
class, required the interference of the state; and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the
attainment of the object to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In other words the
proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.

The Court also entertains no doubt on the legality of the method taken by the legislature to implement the
declared policies of the subject laws, that is to impose discounts on the medical services and purchases of
senior citizen and PWDs and to treat the said discounts as tax deduction rather than tax credit. The measure is
fair and reasonable and no credible proof was presented to prove the claim that it was confiscatory. To
be considered confiscatory, there must be taking of property without just compensation.

MANILA MEMORIAL VS SECRETARY

G.R. NO. 175356, DECEMBER 3, 2013

RULING: In sum we sustain a ruling in Carlos Superdrug Corporation that the 20% senior citizen discount
and tax deduction scheme are valid exercises of police power of the state absent a clear showing that it is
arbitrary, oppressive, or confIscatory.

PLANTERS VS FERTIPHIL
G.R. NO. 166006, MARCH 14, 2008

ISSUE: Assuming that LOI No. 1695 was issued in the exercise of police power, would it be valid?

HELD:
No. it would be invalid for failing to comply with the test of lawful subjects and lawful means. LOI No. 1695
is invalid because it did not promote public interest. The law was enacted to give undue advantage to a
private corporation. To be sure, ensuring the continued supply and distribution of fertilizer in the country is an
undertaking imbued with public interest. However, the method by which LOI 1465 sought to achieve this is
by no means a measure that will promote the public welfare. The government's commitment to support the
successful rehabilitation and continued viability of PPI, a private corporation, is an unmistakable attempt to
mask the subject statute’s partiality. There is no way to treat the self-interest of a favored entity like PPI, as
identical with the general interest of the country's farmers or even the Filipino people in general.

Taxes are exacted only for a public purpose. The 10 peso levy is unconstitutional because it was not for a
public purpose. The levy was imposed to give undue benefit to PPI.

MOSQUEDDA VS PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS

 800 SCRA 313 (2016)

HELD:

In the states exercise of police power, the property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. A local government unit is considered to have
properly exercise its police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites: (1) the interest of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the state; (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the objects up to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive.

The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; the second to the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution.

Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have sufficient justification for the government's
action. This means that in exercising police power the local government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically
or despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance realistically
serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose
without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process challenge.

The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume considerable
time and financial resources given the topography and geographical features of the plantations. As such, the
conversion cannot be completed within the short time frame of three months. Requiring the respondents and
other affected individuals to comply with the consequences of the ban within the three month period under
pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of business permits would definitely be
oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.

Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the occurrence of drift causes
inconvenience and harm to the residents and degrades the environment. Given this justification, does the
ordinance satisfy the requirement that the classification must rest on substantial distinction?

It can be noted that the imposition of the ban is too broad because the ordinance applies irrespective of the
substance to the aerially applied and irrespective of the agricultural activity to be conducted. The respondents
admit that they aerially treat their plantations not only with pesticides but also vitamins and other substances.
The imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of substances other than fungicides and regardless of the
agricultural activity being performed becomes unreasonable inasmuch as it patiently bears no relation to the
purported inconvenience, discomfort, health risk and environmental danger which the ordinance, seeks to
address. The burden now will become more onerous to various entities including the respondents and even
others with no connection whatsoever to the intended purpose of the ordinance.

KMU VS AQUINO III

G.R. NO. 2150500, APRIL 2, 2019

HELD:
Yes. To be a valid exercise of police power, there must be a lawful subject and the power is exercised
through lawful means. The second requisite which requires a reasonable relation between the purpose
and the means.

Using the parameters above, we hold that the increases reflected in the issuances of the SSS are reasonably
necessary to observe the constitutional mandate of promoting social justice under the Social Security Act.
The public interest involved here refers to the State’s goal of establishing, developing, promoting, and
perfecting a sound and viable tax-exempt social security system. To achieve this, the Social Security System
and the Social Security Commission are empowered to adjust from time to time the contribution rate and the
monthly salary credits. Given the past increases since the inception of the law, the contribution rate increase
of 0.6% applied to the corresponding monthly salary credit does not scream of unreasonableness or injustice.

Last,125123
EVASCO, JR. VS MONTANEZ
G.R. NO. 199172, FEB. 21, 2018
HELD:
Yes. An ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of police power if:
A. it has a lawful subject such as the interest of the public, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
requires its exercise; and
B. it uses a lawful method such that its implementing measures must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

The court will not be quick at invalidating an ordinance as unreasonable unless the rules imposed are so
excessive as to be prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory.

BAR QUESTIONS:

Bar Question: 5. 1987,V: is an ordinance prohibiting babrbershop operators from rendering massage service
to their customers in a separate room valid?

Q: how would you attack the Problem?

A: By applying the 2 test
1. What is the valid purpose of the ordinace? to protect morals. If you do barbering in a separate room,
you do not know what is happening there. That’s why in requiring them not to render massage in a
separate room will promote morals. The purpose is to protect morals
2. Is the method not unduly oppressive of another right? Is there a logical connection? The first one, I see
no problem. There kiguic there- to ensure morals are protected: you do nor render massage in a
separate room. Is that duky oppressive of the people who are involved in this business? I don’t think
so, Why? because it did not say that, from now onm massage(s) are totally prohibited. that will be
unduly oppressive of the occupation of some people. Thats no longer regulation, that’s prohibiting it.

This ios just a reasonable way to promote morals

2010, XXI. The sagguiniang Panlungsod of Pasay City passed an ordinance requiring all disco pub
owners to have all theri hospitality girls tested for AIDS viru. Both disco pub onwers and the
hospitality girls assailed tht validity of the ordinace for being violative of their constitutional right to
privacy and choose a calling or business. Is the ordinance valid?Explain.

Suggestion Answer: The ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. The right to privacy yields to certain
paramount rights of the public and defers to the exercise of police power. The ordinance is not prohibiting the
disco pub owners and the hospitality girls form pursuing theri calling or business but is merely regulating it
social justice Society u. Dangerous Drug Board, 570 SCRA 410 (2008). The ordinace is a valid exercise of
police power, because its purpose is to safeguard public health. ( Beltranvs Secretary of health, 476 SCRA
168 (2005)

Again, by appying the 2 test.

1. What us the valid purpose of the ordinance? to protect health beacuse hospitality girls can easily
transmit AIDS to thier costumers
2. Is the method not unduly oppressive of another right? They are not really prohibited from
exercising their calling or business. It’s only that they will have to undergo some tests
Q: Is the dully oppressive of the right of who people who are involved in this business? No, it is a valid
exercise of police to promite health and it does not really prohibit you or unduly oppress another right, not
even the right of privacy. The right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights
Bar Question V. 2009: To address the pervasive problem of gambling congress is considering the following
options:
1. prohibit all forms of gamblings
2. allow gambling only on Sundays
3. allow gumbling only on government owned casinos
 4. remove all prohibition against gambling but impose a tax equivalent to all 30% on all winnings

a.If congress choses the first options and passes the correspinduing law absolutely prohibiting all forms of
gambling, can the law be validly attacked on the ground that is is an invalid exercise of police power? explain
your answer.

Again, lets us try tio apply the 2 test>

1. What us the valid purpose of the option 1? prohibit all forms of gambling is a valid purpose, to
promite morals
2. Is the method not unduly oppressive of another right? do you have the right to gamble under the
constitution? I dont think there is such right. You have the right to enjoy yourself but that is only one
method that you are prohibited.
Second option: suppose Congress chooses number 2, allow gambling only on Sundays

Q: how do you challenge it? the main challenge is that there is no logical connection between the method and
the purpose of the law. Do you mean taht it is immoral on MOnday, moral on Tuesday, immoral on
Wednesday and so on. There is no logical connection between the method and the purpose.

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Equal protection pertains to the requirement that laws treat all persons or things similarly situated alike, both
as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Congress cannot pass a law which favors a certain group
and conversely, which will prejudice anither group. the principle is there should be no classification. treat
people equally.

2. When it passes the 4 tests for a valid classification

NOTE: This is the topic that is always asked in the bar

RATIONAL BASIS TEST – Test for Valid Classification:

1. It must rest on a substantial distinction;

2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law;

3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only;

4. It must apply equally to members of the same class.

But STRICT SCRUTINY TEST is applied in relation to statures interfering with:

(a) Fundamental Rights

· Freedom of Speech

· Expression

· Assembly

· Religion

· Privacy
 · Right to Travel or

(b) Classification based on:

· Race, alienage, or national origin and religion. (Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 632
SCRA 5, 2010).

INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY

When the challenge restriction does not involve fundamental rights or suspect classes. Laws which tend to
classify people based on gender, legitimacy, financial need, and age will be subjected to Intermediate Scrutiny.
(Chavez v. Gonzales, 555 SCRA 441, 2008)

No heavy presumption of unconstitutionality/ substantial government interest.

Chavez v. Gonzales, 555 SCRA 441, 2008

Be that as it may, the determination in every case of whether there is an impermissible restraint on the
freedom of speech has always been based on the circumstances of each case, including the nature of the
restraint. And in its application in our jurisdiction, the parameters of this principle have been etched on
a case-to-case basis, always tested by scrutinizing the governmental issuance or act against the
circumstances in which the operate, and then determining the appropriate test with which to evaluate.

Prior Restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in
advance of actual publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from
government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it is
wielded by the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the government. Thus, it precludes governmental
acts that required approval of a proposal to publish; licensing or permits as prerequisites to publication
including the payment of license taxes for the privilege to publish; and even injunctions against
publication. Even the closure of the business and printing offices of certain newspapers, resulting in the
discontinuation of their printing and publication, are deemed as previous restraint or censorship. Any law or
official that requires some form of permission to be had before publication can be made, commits an
infringement of the constitutional right, and remedy can be had at the courts.

Hence, it is not enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some form of restraint on freedom
of speech. A distinction has to be made whether the restraint is (1) a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely
concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under
well-defined standards; or (2) a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the
subject matter of the utterance or speech. The cast of the restriction determines the test by which the
challenged act is assayed with.

When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial governmental
interest is required for its validity. Because regulations of this type are not designed to suppress any particular
message, they are not subject to the strictest form of judicial scrutiny but an intermediate approach –
somewhere between the mere rationality that is required of any other law and the compelling interest standard
applied to content-based restrictions. The test is called intermediate because the Court will not merely
rubberstamp the validity of a law but also require that the restrictions be narrowly-tailored to promote
an important or significant governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of expression.
The intermediate approach has been formulated in this manner:
A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government, if
it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged (freedom of speech &
expression) is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.

On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech r of the press based on content is
given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact. Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having
the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.

Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the content-based restraint will be struck down.

With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must also show the type of harm the speech
sought to be restrained would bring about – especially the gravity and the imminence of the threatened harm –
otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid. Prior restraint on speech based on its content cannot be justified
by hypothetical fears, “but only by showing a substantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of a
reality already on ground.” As formulated, “the question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity
and degree.”

The regulation which restricts the speech content must also serve an important or substantial government
interest, which is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.

Also, the incidental restriction on speech must be no greater than what is essential to the furtherance of
that interest. A restriction that is so broad that it encompasses more than what is required to satisfy the
governmental interest will be invalidated. The regulation, therefore, must be reasonable and narrowly
drawn to fit the regulatory purpose, with the least restrictive means undertaken.

Thus, when the prior restraint partakes of a content-neutral regulation, it is subjected to an intermediate
review. A content-based regulation, however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured
against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a
compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague.

Applying the foregoing, it is clear that the challenged acts in the case at bar need to be subjected to the clear
and present danger rule, as they are content-based restrictions. The acts of respondents focused solely on
but one subject - a specific content - fixed as these were on the alleged taped conversations between the
President and a COMELEC official. Undoubtedly, this did not merely provide regulations as to the time,
place, or manner of the dissemination of speech or expression.

PARRENO VS COA

GR NO. 162224, JUNE 7, 2007

Issue: Whether there is a violation of the Equal protection clause?

Ruling: NO.

The first additional right to equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. To be reasonable,the classification (a) Must be based on substantial distinctions which make
real differences; (b) Must leave germane to the purpose of the law; ( c) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (d) Must apply equally to each member of the class.

There is compliance with all these conditions. There is a substantial difference between retirees who are
citizens of the Philippines and retirees have lost their Filipino citizenship by naturalization in another country,
such as petitioner in the case before us. The constitutional right of the state to require all citizens to render
personal and military service necessarily includes not only private citizens, but also citizens who have retired
from military service. A retiree, who had lost his Filipino citizenship, already renounced his allegiance to the
state.

Thus, he may no longer be compelled by the state to render compulsory military service when the need arises.
Petitioners' loss of Filipino citizenship constitutes a hsubstantial distinction that distinguishes him from other
retirees who retain their Filipino citizenship. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another.

Republic Act No. 7077 (RA 7077) affirmed the constitutional right of the state to a Citizen Armed Forces.
Section 11 of RA 7077 provides that citizen soldiers or reservists include ex-servicemen and retired officers of
the AFP. Hence, even when a retiree is no longer in the active service, he is still a part of the Citizen Armed
Forces. Thus, we do not find the requirement imposed by section 27 of PD1638, as amended, oppressive,
discriminatory, or contrary to public policy. The state has the right to impose in reasonable condition that is
necessary for national defense. To rule otherwise would be detrimental to the interests of the state.

QUINTO VS COMELEC
G.R. NO. 189698, DECEMBER 1, 2009

RULING: There is no valid classification.

In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of
their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law
unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those
who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.

In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act make passed the
constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be
complied with, namely:

1. It must rest on a substantial distinction;

2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law;

3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only;

4. It must apply equally to members of the same class.

The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated
differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and
substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its
classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways.Not all motorized vehicles are created equal a
two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheeled vehicle.

Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirement if it is
not germane to the purpose of the law. Justice Isagani A. Cruz (Ret.) in his treatise on constitutional law,
explains:

The classification, even if based on substantial distinctions, will still be invalid if it is not germane to the
purpose of the law. To illustrate, the accepted difference in physical stamina between men and women will
justify the prohibition of the latter from employment as minors or stevedores or in other heavy and strenuous
work. On the basis of this same classification, however, the law cannot provide for a lower passing average
for women in the bar examinations because physical strength is not the test for admission to the legal
profession. Imported cars may be taxed at a higher rate than locally assembled automobiles for the protection
of the national economy, but their difference in origin is no justification for treating them differently when it
comes to punishing violations of traffic regulations. The source of the vehicle has no relation to the
observance of these rules.

The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the
problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be
regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed.

Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons
holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purpose of the law.

The obvious reason for the challenge provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote
once candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further
aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that
the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the
public.The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena,
while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be
attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.

BELTRAN VS SECRETARY
G.R. No. 133640 November 25, 2005

Ruling: There is a valid classification

Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the law to create a situation in which unjustifiable
discrimination and inequality shall be allowed. To effectuate its policy, a classification was made between nonprofit
blood banks/centers and commercial blood banks.

We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons:

One, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical
service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood donation, the
latter treats blood as a sale of commodity.

Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law,
that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating
blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase
out of commercial blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise, and they source their blood
supply from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as shown by the USAID-
sponsored study on the Philippine blood banking system.

Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the
peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing conditions.
Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.

Having said that, this Court comes to the inquiry as to whether or not Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes a valid exercise
of police power.

The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a primordial
governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the State’s police
power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety.

Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, requires the interference of the State; and, (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the
46
attainment of the objective sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

In the earlier discussion, the Court has mentioned of the avowed policy of the law for the protection of public health by
ensuring an adequate supply of safe blood in the country through voluntary blood donation. Attaining this objective
requires the interference of the State given the disturbing condition of the Philippine blood banking system.

In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of the law, the Legislature deemed it necessary
to phase out commercial blood

banks. This action may seriously affect the owners and operators, as well as the employees, of commercial blood banks
but their interests must give way to serve a higher end for the interest of the public.

MIRASOL VS. DPWH

490 SCRA 318 (2006)

Ruling: there is a valid classifcation

A police power measure may be assailed upon proof that it unduly violates constitutional limitations like due process
and equal protection of the law. Petitioners’ attempt to seek redress from the motorcycle ban under the aegis of equal
protection must fail. Petitioners’ contention that AO 1 unreasonably singles out motorcycles is specious. To begin with,
classification by itself is not prohibited

A classification can only be assailed if it is deemed invidious, that is, it is not based on real or substantial differences. As
explained by Chief Justice Fernando in Bautista v. Juinio

To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to
liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoked the equal protection clause only
if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was
prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that
the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in
the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be
given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical is analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden
or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the
group equally binding the rest.

We find that it is neither warranted nor reasonable for petitioners to say that the only justifiable classification
among modes of transport is the motorized against the non-motorized. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal.
A 16-wheeler truck is substantially different from other light vehicles. The first may be denied access to some roads
where the latter are free to drive. Old vehicles may be reasonably differentiated from newer models. We find that real
and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to justify its classification
among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Amongst all types of motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a child,
that a motorcycle is quite different from a car, a bus or a truck. The most obvious and troubling difference would be that
a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheeled vehicle

A classification based on practical convenience and common knowledge is not unconstitutional simply because it may
lack purely theoretical or scientific uniformity. Moreover, we take note that the Philippines is home to a host of unique
motorized modes of transport ranging from modified hand-carts (kuliglig) to bicycle "sidecars" outfitted with a motor. To
follow petitioners’ argument to its logical conclusion would open up toll ways to all these contraptions. Both safety and
traffic considerations militate against any ruling that would bring about such a nightmare.

DUNCAN VS GLAXO
GR. No. 162992, September 17, 2004

Facts: Involves the rules of the company which prohibits intermarriage amoing its employees. This was
challenged by one employee on the ground of equal protection clause.

Ruling: The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution as petitioners
erroneously suggest. It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to
the state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of U.S. Supreme
Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects no shield against merely private conduct, however,
discriminatory or wrongful.

The Bill of rights can be invoked only against the government and not against private entities

The only exception occurs when the state in any of its manifestations or actions has been found to have
become entwined or involved in the wrongful private conduct. Obviously, however, the exception is not present in
this case. Significantly, the company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply
with the policy. Indeed, the application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard
for the lot of the employee.

REPUBLIC VS MANALO
GR. No. 221029, April 24, 2018

FACTS: Manolo was married to a Japanes national. Later, she filed a petition for divorce against her husband before a
Japanese court. After it was grabted on December 6, 2011, she sought to have the recoird of her marriage in the Officer
of the Civil Registrar of San Jose, Manila, cancelled. Considering that Art 26, paragraph 2, of the Family code, only
provides that: Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorse is thereof
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry, the filipino spouse shall likewise have the
capacity to remarry under Philippine law”

Issue: should the petition be granted?

Held: YES

While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the court of justice, such classification may be subjected to judicial review. The deference
stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the
Constitution.

In this case, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings a
Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and
foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The
circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their
foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely
on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the
treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

DOTR VS,. PHILIPPINE PETROLEUM

Gr. No. 230107, July 24, 2018

Facts: The “ Oil Pollution Management Fund” was created undewr Section 22(a) of Republic Act No. 9483 and
uits implementing Rukles and regulations, by imposing “ ten centavos oer liter fr every delivery or
transhipment of oil made by tanker barges and taker haulers.” The fund is intended for use in cases if
containment, removal and clean up if the environment arising from ol pollution. Considering that only
tankers,as distingguised from other vessels, are made to contribute to the fund

Issue: does this violate the equal protection clause?

Held: NO,

While all vessels plying Philippines waters are susceptible to accidents whuch may cause oil spills, this does not make
them “ similarly situated” within the context of the equal protection clause. ( meaning, three is a substantial distinction
between then and the other ships). Aside from the difference in the purposes behind theri existence and navigation, it is
internationally recognized that oil tankers pose greater risk to the enviromnent and people. As a matter of fact, ths type
of vessels have long treatment by various organizations. For instance, fire safety provisions are much more strignent for
tankers than ordinary cargo ships since the danger of the fire on board ships carrying oil is muich greater. Tankers are
also required to have double hulls, as opposed to shingles hulls, they have designated protective locations of
segregated ballast tanks. These show that a vessel that carries oil in bulk has been recognze and treated as a separate
class of vessels
 BIRAGO VS PHILIPPINES TRUTH COMMISSION
637 SCRA 78 (2010)

FACTS:

The President in July 30, 2010 signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commsion of 2010. The
ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to incestigate reports of graft and corruption
cimmitted by third level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administrations to the President, Congress and Ombusdman.

ISSUE:
Since the EO was tasked mainly to incestigate corruption under the administration of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, does it
violate the equal prrotective clause?

RULING:
In Executive Order no 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous administration was picked out was
deliberate and international as can be gleaned from form the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the
assailed executive order. It must be united that Executive order No 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or
report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the past. “ The equal protection clause is
violated by purposeful and international discrimination

Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth commission as nobly envisioned by the present
administration. Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as to include the earlier past administrations would
allow it to pass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution. Of all the branches of the
government, it is the judiciary which is the most interested in knowing the truth and so it will not allow itself to be a
hindrance or obstacle to its attainment. It must, however, be emphasized that the search for the truth must be within
constitutional bounds for "ours is still a government of laws and not of men

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar
as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Concept of the Equal Protection CLause

The equal protection of the laws is embraces in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. it has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific
guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness un general may be
challenged in the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act weapon to cut it down is the equal protection
clause

“ According to a long line of decsions equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed”

“ The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against international
and arbitrary discrimantion, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through
that state’s duly constituted authorities”

“ in other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinction between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective”

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions
cover all the department of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions
of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

it, however, does nor require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What us
simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness.

4 Requisites of Equal Protection Test:

1. The classification rests on substantial distinctions

 2. it is germane to the purpose of the law
3. it is not limited to existing conditions only
4. it applies equally to all members of the same class. “superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification”

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the
number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those whoi may thereafter be in similar
circumstances ansd conditions. It must not leave out ot “underinclude” those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification.

The guaranty of equal protection of h=the laws is not a guaranty of equality in application of the laws upon all citizens of
the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that evert
man, woman and child should be affected alike by a operation on persons merely as such, buton persons according to
the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The constitution does not require
that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does
not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object
to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate

IT MUST NOT BE LIMITED TO EXISTING CONDITIONS ONLY

ORMOC SUGAR CO., INC., VS. TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY

GR, NO L-23794, FEBRUARY 17, 1968

FACTS:
1
Tthe Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of
centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum
(1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries

petitioner filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint
against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance
is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of
uniformity of taxation

ISSUE: Whether the ordinance is valid

RULING:

Unconstitutional. When the taxing ordinance was enacted, Ormoc Sugar Co., INC was only sugar central in the City. A
reasonable classification should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should
not be singular and exclusive as to exclusde any subsequently established sugar central cannot be subject to tax. A
subsequently established sugar central cannot be subject to tax because the ordinance expressly points to Ormoc
Sugar company INC. as the entity to be levied upon

Article III, Section 2. The right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.

Commentators refer to this as the “warrant clause” of the Constitution. This is also called the “search and seizure
clause”.

Outline of Discussion on Arrest, Search and Seizure

1. Search Warrant
2. Arrest Warrant
3. Warrantless Searches
4. Warrantless Arrests
5. Exclusionary Rule

Search Warrant

Requisites for a Valid Search Warrant:

a. It must be based upon probable cause;

b. The probable cause must be determined personally by the judge;
c. The determination of must be made after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce;

d. It must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

First Requisite:

Probable cause refers to such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.

Second Requisite:

The probable cause must be determined personally by the judge. The examinations must be done personally by
the judge. It cannot be delegated or passed on to the clerk of court or to anyone else.

Third Requisite:

The determination must be made after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.

The affidavit of the complainant cannot be the sole basis for the issuance of a search warrant.

The judge must still conduct, at the very least, searching questions during the examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses that they may produce.

Purpose: By placing the complainant and the witnesses under oath or affirmation is to make them liable for perjury or
falsification, as the case may be, should their statements and testimony be false.

Fourth Requisite:

It must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

A search warrant must specifically describe:

a. The place to be searched;

b. The objects to be seized; and
c. Must describe and must be issued only for one specific offense.
General Warrants, Void

A warrant which fails to comply with any of the abovementioned specifications is considered a general warrant. Such a
warrant is null and void.

Effect: Any item seized pursuant to a general warrant shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Rules on Description of Places:

1. If the place is under the control of one person, a general description may be sufficient.

William C. Yao, Sr., et.al vs People of the Philippines

[G.R. No. 168306, June 19, 2007]

Facts: Petitioners are incorporators and officers of MASAGANA GAS CORPORATION (MASAGANA), an entity
engaged in the refilling, sale and distribution of LPG products. Private respondents Petron Corporation (Petron) and
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell) are two of the largest bulk suppliers and producers of LPG in the
Philippines. Petron is the registered owner in the Philippines of the trademarks GASUL and GASUL cylinders used for
its LPG products. It is the sole entity in the Philippines authorized to allow refillers and distributors to refill, use, sell, and
distribute GASUL LPG containers, products and its trademarks.

Pilipinas Shell, on the other hand, is the authorized user in the Philippines of the tradename, trademarks, symbols, or
designs of its principal, Shell International Petroleum Company Limited (Shell International), including the marks
SHELLANE and SHELL device in connection with the production, sale and distribution of SHELLANE LPGs. It is the
only corporation in the Philippines authorized to allow refillers and distributors to refill, use, sell and distribute
SHELLANE LPG containers and products.

On 3 April 2003, (NBI) agent Ritche N. Oblanca (Oblanca) filed two applications for search warrant with the RTC, Cavite
City, against petitioners and other occupants of the MASAGANA compound for alleged violation of Section 155, in
relation to Section 170 of “The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines.” The two applications for search warrant
uniformly alleged that per information, belief, and personal verification of Oblanca, the petitioners are actually
producing, selling, offering for sale and/or distributing LPG products using steel cylinders owned by, and bearing the
tradenames, trademarks, and devices of Petron and Pilipinas Shell, without authority and in violation of the rights of the
said entities.

MASAGANA, as third party claimant, filed with the RTC a Motion for the Return of Motor Compressor and LPG Refilling
Machine. It claimed that it is the owner of the said motor compressor and LPG refilling machine; that these items were
used in the operation of its legitimate business; and that their seizure will jeopardize its business interests.

RTC resolved that MASAGANA cannot be considered a third party claimant whose rights were violated as a result of
the seizure since the evidence disclosed that petitioners are stockholders of MASAGANA and that they conduct their
business through the same juridical entity.

CA affirmed RTC’s decision

Ruling: The long standing rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant
can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community.

Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all other, and on inquiry
leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement.

Even if there are several structures inside the MASAGANA compound, there was no need to particularize the areas to
be searched because, as correctly stated by Petron and Pilipinas Shell these structures constitute the essential and
necessary components of the petitioners business and cannot be treated separately as they form part of one entire
compound. The compound is owned and used solely by MASAGANA. What the case law merely requires is that the
place to be searched can be distinguished in relation to the other places in the community. Indubitably, this
requisite was complied with in the instant case.

As to the issue that the search warrants did not indicate with particularity the items to be seized since the
search warrants merely described the items to be seized as LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks GASUL and
SHELLANE without specifying their sizes.

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific
as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the
warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; or when the things described are limited to those
which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.

The law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leave no
room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities; otherwise it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to
obtain a search warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for.

Once described, however, the articles subject of the search and seizure need not be so invariant as to require absolute
concordance, in our view, between those seized and those described in the warrant. Substantial similarity of those
articles described as a class or specie would suffice.

What the case law merely requires is that the place to be searched can be distinguished in relation to the other places
in the community.

The case of PICOP is an exemption this rule:

Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) vs Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion

G.R. No. 122092, May 19, 1999

Facts: On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant before the RTC
of Quezon City, stating: 1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP
compound, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the
subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept] and
conceal[ed] in the premises described; 2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to
take possession and bring to the described properties. After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge
Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search warrant. On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search
warrant at the PICOP compound and seized a number of firearms and explosives. Believing that the warrant was invalid
and the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a «Motion to Quash» before the trial court. Subsequently, they also
filed a «Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash» and a «Motion to SuppressEvidence.» On March 23, 1995, the
RTC issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners’ motions. On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its
second contested Order denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue: Whether the search warrant was valid

Ruling:

In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed to described the place with particularly. It simply authorizes a
search of "the aforementioned premises," but it did not specify such premises. The warrant identifies only one place,
and that is the "Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig[,]
Surigao del Sur." The PICOP compound, however, is made up of "200 offices/building, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1
airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous structures,
all of which are spread out over some one hundred fifty-five hectares." Obviously, the warrant gives the police officers
unbridled and thus illegal authority to search all the structures found inside the PICOP compound.

In their Opposition, the police state that they complied with the constitutional requirement, because they submitted
sketches of the premises to be searched when they applied for the warrant. They add that not one of the PICOP
Compound housing units was searched, because they were not among those identified during the hearing.

These arguments are not convincing. The sketches allegedly submitted by the police were not made integral parts of
the search warrant issued by Judge Asucion. Moreover, the fact that the raiding police team knew which of the buildings
or structures in the PICOP Compound housed firearms and ammunitions did not justify the lack of particulars of the
place to be searched. Otherwise, confusion would arise regarding the subject of the warrant — the place indicated in
the warrant or the place identified by the police. Such conflict invites uncalled for mischief or abuse of discretion on the
part of law enforces.

PICOP case is an exception. However, the general rule is that if the place is under the control of one person, a
general description may be sufficient.

2. If the place is a compound occupied by various persons, the warrant must specifically indicate the unit to
be searched.
 People vs Judge Estrada
G.R. No. 124461, September 25,1998

Facts: A petition for review was filed seeking the reversal of respondent Judge Estrada's order that granted private
respondent's motion to quash search warrant 958 as well as the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The
pertinent facts of the present case are as follows:

Atty. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of BFAD filed an application for the
issuance of a search warrant against Aiden Lanuza (private respondent) of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street,
Mabolo, Cebu City for violation of Article 40(k) of RA 7934 (The Consumer Act of the Philippines). However, the
application ended with a statement that the warrant is to search the premises of another person at a different address
(Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu - who happened to be the subject on whom another search was
applied for by the same applicant)

Respondent Judge issued search warrant 958 on June 27, 1995 which was served the next day. The present petition
stated that, during the search, the team discovered that said address (516 xx) was actually a 5,000-meter compound
containing at least 15 structures. The policemen proceeded to search the residence of private respondent Lanuza at Lot
41 of said address. Failure to find any drug products prompted the policemen to proceed to search a nearby warehouse
at Lot 38 which yielded 52 cartons of assorted drug products.

On August 22, 1995, private respondent Lanuza filed a motion to quash the search warrant on the ground that the
search warrant is illegal and null and void.

Respondent judge granted Lanyza’s motion to quash the search warrant and denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

Hence, the present petition.

Ruling:

This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to
be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. In the present case, it must be noted that the application for search
warrant was accompanied by a sketch of the compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. The
sketch indicated the 2-storey residential house of private respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a square. Within the
same compound are residences of other people, workshops, offices, factories and warehouse. With this sketch as the
guide, it could have been very easy to describe the residential house of private respondent with sufficient particularity
so as to segregate it from the other buildings or structures inside the same compound. But the search warrant merely
indicated the address of the compound which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. This description
of the place to be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the specific house of private respondent.
Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the residence of private respondent sought to be searched has
characterized the questioned search warrant as a general warrant, which is violative of the constitutional
requirement.

3. The police can only search the place described in the warrant, not an adjoining one.

People of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 126379, June 26,1998

Facts: S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search warrant before Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr.
Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area
F,Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.

Search Warrant No. 1068 (95) against Mr. Hussain was issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1,
immediately adjacent (to) Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four (4) Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of
their personal belongings, papers and effects such as wallet, wrist watches, pair of shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts,
sunglasses and travelling bags including cash amounting to $3,550.00 and P1,500.00 aside from
US$5,175.00 (receipted) which were never mentioned in the warrant.
Three days after the warrant was served, a return was made without mentioning the personal belongings, papers
and effects including cash belonging to the private respondents. There was no showing that lawful occupants were
made to witness the search.

Private respondents upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged; and submitted their
"Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search Warrant and to Declare Evidence Obtained Inadmissible),"

According to the private respondents in their pleading, an ocular inspection of the premises searched was conducted by
respondent Judge and the following facts had been established as contained in the order, to wit:

1) That the residence of all the accused is at Apartment No. 1 which is adjacent to the Abigail's Variety Store;

2) That there is no such number as "1207" found in the building as it is correspondingly called only as "Apartment No. 1,
2, 3 and 4;"

3) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the Abigail's Variety Store;

4) That there are no connecting doors that can pass from Abigail's Variety Store to Apartment No. 1;

5) That Abigail's Variety Store and Apartment No. 1 have its own respective doors used for ingress and egress.

The respondent Judge issued its order duly granting the motion to quash search warrant

Issue: Whether or not that particular apartment had been specifically described in the warrant.

Ruling:

It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that
the place actually searched — although not that specified in the warrant — is exactly what they had in view when they
applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of
a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the
proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers' theory, in the context of the facts of
this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.

The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' own
personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the
warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly
describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the
power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door
to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution
has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be
done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting
the search.

Ruben del Castillo vs People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 185128, January 30,2012

Facts: Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged in selling shabu, police officers headed by
SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of petitioner, secured a
search warrant from the RTC and around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of September 13, 1997, the same police operatives
went to Gil Tudtud St., Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant to petitioner.

Upon arrival, somebody shouted "raid," which prompted them to immediately disembark from the jeep they were riding
and went directly to petitioner's house and cordoned it. The structure of the petitioner's residence is a two-storey house
and the petitioner was staying in the second floor. When they went upstairs, they met petitioner's wife and informed her
that they will implement the search warrant. But before they can search the area, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw
petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because
he and his men were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place.
In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner named Dolly del Castillo,
searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who
searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the
nipa hut several articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Consequently, the
articles that were confiscated were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The contents of the four (4) heat
sealed transparent plastic packs were subjected to laboratory examination, the result of which proved positive for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the Information. After the
motion for reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the CA, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for
certiorari under Rule 45.

Petitioner asserts that the nipa hut located about 20 meters away from his house is no longer within the "permissible
area" that may be searched by the police officers.

Issue: Was there a violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches - YES

Ruling:

It must be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of
definitenessIn the present case, Search Warrant No. 570-9-1197-24 specifically designates or describes the residence
of the petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20
meters away from the residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found in a place other than the
one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the presentation of
which as an evidence is a violation of petitioner's constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure.

4. Once the place is specifically described, there is a need to name the occupant or owner.

Frank Uy vs BIR
G.R. No. 129651, October 20, 2000

Facts: Rodrigo Abos, a former Operating Chief of Unifish, reported to the BIR that petitioners are committing acts in
violation of the National Internal Revenue Code o Selling by the thousands cartons of canned sardines without issuing
receipts o Selling of imported oil and cans to local customers, when these exempted from tax on the condition that they
are to be used in the manufacturing of tuna for export Nestor Labaria, Asst. Chief of the Special Investigation Branch of
the BIR applied for search warrants, which the RTC Judge Gozo issued for violation of Sec 153 of the NIRCode A
second warrant was issued, almost identical to the first, except for the city address (changed from Cebu City to
Mandaue City), and the addition of “alias Frank Uy” A third warrant was issued for violations of Sec 238 of the NIRCode.
Aside from this, it was identical to the first two warrants issued. Acting on these warrants, BIR agents seized the records
and documents of Unifish.

Ruling:

Where the search warrant is issued for the search of specifically described premises only and not for the search of a
person, the failure to name the owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit and search warrant does not
invalidate the warrant; and where the name of the owner of the premises sought to be searched is incorrectly inserted in
the search warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the legal description of the premises to be searched is otherwise correct so
that no discretion is left to the officer making the search as to the place to be searched.

Since, in the case at bar, the warrant was issued not for search of the persons owning or occupying the premises, but
only a search of the premises occupied by them, the search could not be declared unlawful or in violation of the
constitutional rights of the owner or occupants of the premises, because of inconsistencies in stating their names.

Rules on Description of Objects:

1. Objects need not be described in precise details.

Benjamin Kho vs Hon. Roberto L. Makalintal

G.R. No. 949020-0, April 21, 1999

Facts: May 15, 1990 – NBI Agent Salvador applied for a search warrant against Benjamin Kho in his residence at BF
Homes, Paranaque. On the same day NBI Agent Arugay also applied to the same court for a warrant against the Kho
for in his house at Brgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque.

The warrants were applied for after NBI trams had conducted personal surveillance and investigation in the two houses
based on the confidential information they received that the places were being used as storage centers for unlicensed
firearms and “chop-chop” vehicles.

NBI sought the issuance of the warrants in anticipation of criminal cases to be filed against Kho.

On the same day, the Judge Makalintal conducted the necessary examination of the applicants and their witnesses,
after which he issued the warrant.

May 16, 1990 – Armed with the search warrant, the NBI agents searched the subject premises and recovered various
high-powered firearms and hundreds of rounds of ammunition, explosives, and various radio and telecommunication
equipment. (In both houses)

The items were confiscated. Upon verification with the Firearms and Explosives Unit, the NBI agents found out that no
license has ever been issued to any person/entity for the confiscated items.

May 22, 1990 – NBI submitted separate returns to Judge Makalintal requesting that the items seized be in the
continued custody of the NBI.

May 28, 1990 – Petitioners presented a Motion to Quash the said warrants; Judge Makalintal dismissed their petition.

Ruling:

The law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no
room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. Otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to
obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Since the element of time is
very crucial in criminal cases, the effort and time spent in researching the details to be embodied in the warrant would
render the purpose of the search nugatory.

In the case under consideration, the NBI agents could not have been in a position to know before hand the exact caliber
or make of the firearms to be seized. Although the surveillance they conducted did disclose the presence of unlicensed
firearms within the premises to be searched, they could not have known the particular type of weapons involved before
seeing such weapons at close range, which was of course impossible at the time of the filing of the applications for
subject search warrants.

Verily, the failure to specify detailed descriptions in the warrants did not render the same general. Retired Justice
Ricardo Franciscos book on Criminal Procedure has this useful insight:

A description of the property to be seized need not be technically accurate nor necessarily precise; and its nature will
necessarily vary according to whether the identity of the property, or its character, is the matter of concern. Further, the
description is required to be specific only so far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. x x x

In People v. Rubio (57 Phil 384), the Court held that, ... But where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their
description must be rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given, for this would mean
that no warrant could issue.

2. Minor discrepancies in between the objects described in the warrant from those actually taken do not
nullify the warrant for as long as they are of the same kind and nature
 Yousef Al-Ghoul,et.al vs CA
G.R. no. 126859, September 4, 2001

Facts: Judge Mangay, presideing judge of the RTC, issued search warrants 5 for the search and seizure of certain
items in Apartment No. 2 in Kalookan City. Subsequently, the police searched Apartment No. 8, in the same compound
and found one (1) .45 caliber pistol. Found in Apartment No. 2 were various firearms, ammunitions, explosives and
other incendiary devices. The said items seized were acknowledged in the receipt signed by SPO2 De La Cruz.

Petitioners Yousef Al-Ghoul et al. were charged with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives,
pursuant to PD No. 1866. Thereafter, petitioners were arrested and detained. The petitioners filed a motion for bail.
They also objected to the admissibility of the evidence obtained.

Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights as well as Section
3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure because the place searched and articles seized were not
described with particularity. They argue that the two-witness requirement under Section 10 of Rule 126 was ignored
when only one witness signed the receipt for the properties seized during the search, and said witness was not
presented at the trial. Petitioners also aver that the presumption of regularity of the implementation of the search
warrant was rebutted by the defense during cross-examination of prosecution witnesses.

Ruling:

Moreover, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to
leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the
applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. 24 Once
described, however, the articles subject of the search and seizure need not be so invariant as to require absolute
concordance, in our view, between those seized and those described in the warrant. Substantial similarity of those
articles described as a class or species would suffice.

In People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384, 389 (1932), this Court said, "While it is true that the property to be seized under a
warrant must be particularly described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder, yet the
description is required to be specific only in so far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow." Where by the
nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required that a technical description
be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. As a corollary, however, we could not logically conclude
that where the description of those goods to be seized have been expressed technically, all others of a similar
nature but not bearing the exact technical descriptions could not be lawfully subject to seizure. Otherwise, the
reasonable purpose of the warrant issued would be defeated by mere technicalities.

3. Where a warrant contains a specific description of some objects and a general description of the other, the
entire warrant is not voided

Frank Uy vs BIR
G.R. No. 129651, October 20, 2000

Facts: Rodrigo Abos, a former Operating Chief of Unifish, reported to the BIR that petitioners are committing acts in
violation of the National Internal Revenue Code o Selling by the thousands cartons of canned sardines without issuing
receipts o Selling of imported oil and cans to local customers, when these exempted from tax on the condition that they
are to be used in the manufacturing of tuna for export Nestor Labaria, Asst. Chief of the Special Investigation Branch of
the BIR applied for search warrants, which the RTC Judge Gozo issued for violation of Sec 153 of the NIRCode A
second warrant was issued, almost identical to the first, except for the city address (changed from Cebu City to
Mandaue City), and the addition of “alias Frank Uy” A third warrant was issued for violations of Sec 238 of the NIRCode.
Aside from this, it was identical to the first two warrants issued. Acting on these warrants, BIR agents seized the records
and documents of Unifish.

Ruling:

The use of a generic term or a general description in a warrant is acceptable only when a more specific
description of the things to be seized is unavailable. The failure to employ the specificity available will invalidate a
general description in a warrant. 35 The use by the issuing judge of the terms "multiple sets of books of accounts,
ledgers, journals, columnar books, cash register books, sales books or records, provisional & official receipts,"
"production record books/inventory lists, stock cards," "sales records, job order," "corporate financial records," and
"bank statements/cancelled checks" is therefore unacceptable considering the circumstances of this case.

As regards the terms "unregistered delivery receipts" and "unregistered purchase & sales invoices," however, we hold
otherwise. The Solicitor General correctly argues that the serial markings of these documents need not be specified as
it is not possible to do so precisely because they are unregistered. 36 Where, by the nature of the goods to be
seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this
would mean that no warrant could issue. Taking into consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is clear
that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a
particular description of the contents thereof. 37 Although it appears that photocopies of these unregistered documents
were among those handed by Abos to the issuing judge, it would be impractical to require the latter to specify each and
every receipt and invoice, and the contents thereof, to the minutest detail.

The general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not render the entire warrant
void. Insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure of unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered
purchase and sales invoices, the warrants remain valid. The search warrant is severable, and those items not
particularly described may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant.

4. Objects not specifically described in the warrant but are considered contraband may be seized in PLAIN
VIEW and are admissible in court.
For example, the search warrant is for unlicensed firearm. The place to be searched is particularly described but when
you search the place you saw it in plain view shabu, of course you can seize the shabu because it is in plain view.

Specific Doctrines on the “One Offense Rule”:

Q: What is the status of a Warrant issued for more than one offense?

A: It is a total nullity. Any object taken pursuant to such a warrant shall be inadmissible in evidence.
When related offenses are punished by different provisions of the same law, issuance of a single warrant is justified.

PEOPLE V. REDENTOR DICHOSO

G.R. No. 101216-18, June 4, 1993

It is clear that the search warrant cannot be assailed as a general search warrant because while it is for ‘Violation of RA
6425 known as the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992 as amended,” the body thereof, which is controlling, particularizes
the place to be searched and the things to be seized and specifies the offense involved viz., illegal possession of
marijuana and shabu and paraphernalia in connection therewith. These are evident from the clause, “are illegally in
possession of undetermined quantity/amount of dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (Shabu)
and sets of paraphernalia stored inside the nipa hut within the compound of their residence at Farconville Sub., Phase
II, San Pablo City.”

Appellant’s contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than one (1) offense, hence, in violation
of Section 3 Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in semantic juggling by suggesting that since
illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of paraphernalia are covered by
different articles in sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than one (1)
specific offense. In short, following this theory, there should have been three (3) separate search warrants, one for
illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession of marijuana and the third for illegal possession of
paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with
dangerous drugs which are subsumed into “prohibited” and “regulated” drugs and defines and penalizes categories of
offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant
may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

In Olaes vs. People, which was cited by the Solicitor General, We sustained a search warrant similarly captioned and
rejected the argument of the petitioner therein that it was a general warrant, thus:

The petitioners claim that the search warrant issued by the respondent judge is unconstitutional because it does not
indicate the specific offense they are supposed to have committed. There is, therefore, according to them no valid
finding of probable cause as a justification for the issuance of the said warrant in conformity with the Bill of Rights. In
support of this argument, they cite Stonehill v. Diokno, where Chief Justice Concepcion struck down the search
warrants issued therein for being based on the general allegation that the petitioners had committed violations of
“Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.”.
We have examined the search warrant issued in the instant case and find it does not come under the strictures of the
Stonehill doctrine. In the case cited, there was a bare reference to the laws in general, without any specification of the
particular sections thereof that were alleged to have been violated out of the hundreds of prohibitions contained in such
codifications. There is no similar ambiguity in the instant case.

While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with “Violation of RA 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” it is clearly recited in the text there off that “There is probable cause to
believe that Adolfo Olaes alias “Debie” and alias “Baby” of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in
their possession and control and custody of marijuana dried stalks/ leaves/ seeds/ cigarettes and other regulated/
prohibited, and exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above.

Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific
offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding for probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies
the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the description to be made of the “place to research, and the
persons or things to be seized.”

DR. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE v. THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M. DAYRIT

G.R. No. 82870, December 14, 1989

The application for search warrant was captioned: “For Violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.).
While the said decree punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase “illegal
possession of firearms, etc.” As explained by respondent Judge, the term “etc.” referred to ammunitions and explosives.
In other words, the search warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and explosives.
Hence, the failure of the search warrant to mention the particular provision of PD No. 1866 that was violated is not of
such a gravity as to call for its invalidation on this score. Besides, while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under
Section 1 of PD No. 1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under Section 3 thereof, it cannot be
overlooked that said decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and
explosives; such illegal possession of items destructive of life and property are related offenses or belong to the same
species, as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under PD No. 1866.

NOTE: The doctrines in case of Dichoso and Dayrit will be modified in the subsequent case:

3. Where there are several counts of one specific offense, issuance of one search warrant is sufficient.

COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., et. al. v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 110318, August 28, 1996

On private respondents’ averment that the search warrant was made applicable to more than one specific offense on
the ground that there are as many offenses of infringement as there are rights protected and, therefore, to issue one
search warrant for all the movie titles allegedly pirated violates the rule that a search warrant must be issued only in
connection with one specific offense, the lower court said:

….. As the face of the search warrant itself indicates, it was issued for violation of Section 56, PD 49 as amended only.
The specifications therein (in Annex A) merely refer to the titles of the copyrighted motion pictures/ films belonging to
private complainants which defendants were in control/ possession for sale, lease, distribution or public exhibition in
contravention of Sec. 56, PD 49 as amended.

That there were several counts of the offense of copyright infringement and the search warrant uncovered several
contraband items in the form of pirated video tapes is not to be confused with the number of offenses charged. The
search warrant herein issued does not violate the one-specific-offense rule.

RULES ON TERRITORIAL VALIDITY

I. Any Court within whose territorial jurisdiction where the crime was committed can issue a search warrant.
E.g. A judge in Panabo and Tagum, as a rule, can only issue a search warrant valid in these two places. He/she
cannot issue a search warrant which will be valid or effective in Mati City.

II. As an exception, any judge can issue a search warrant, for compelling reasons stated in the application,
within the judicial region where the crime was committed or where the warrant shall be served.
 So generally, a judge in Davao City can issue a search warrant only effective in Davao City. That’s the rule. In what
instance can he issue a warrant effective somewhere else? This is the exception.

REQUISITES FOR EXCEPTION TO APPLY:

1. He may issue a search warrant to be effective within the judicial region; and
E.g. A judge in Davao City may issue a warrant effective in Samal, Bansalan or even in Mati because that is still
within the judicial region. (Region XI)

2. For compelling reasons.

Q: What are considered compelling reasons?

Examples of Compelling Reasons:

1. The applicant stated that actually if you apply for a warrant in this place, the owner of the house that you
want to search is working in the courtroom and the one encodes the warrant.

2. There may be a warrant to be issued in Mati City. A Judge in Baganga will say “Why don’t you apply in
Kidapawan” and the person replies that “Actually, there are no judges in Mati City. They are all attending a
need
seminar in Manila.” So that is a compelling reason because of urgency. You just to get a certification that
there is no available judge and because of that, the judge in Baganga can issue one.

Note: You have to make sure that it is within the Judicial Region (Region 11). So a Judge in Davao
City (R11) cannot issue a search warrant effective in General Santos City (R12) for it is no longer
within the Judicial Region.

RE: REPORT ON PRELIMINARY RESULTS

A.M. NO. 16-05-142-RTC, Sept. 5, 2017

Issue #1: Whether or not the absence of a statement of compelling reasons in the application warrants the outright
denial of the search warrant.

Ruling: NO.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides for the proper venue where applications for search warrant should
be filed:

Sec. 2. Court where applications for search warrant shall be filed. An application for search warrant shall be filed with
the following:

a. Any court within whose jurisdiction a crime was committed.

b. For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crim was
committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal
action is pending.

It is settled that the inclusion of a statement of compelling reasons in a search warrant application that is filed in a court
which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of commission of the alleged crime is a mandatory
requirement, and the absence of such statement renders the application defective.

The absence of a statement of compelling reasons, however, is not a ground for the outright denial of a search warrant
application, since it is not one of the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant. Section 4 of Rule 126 is clear on
this point:

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

In other words, the statement of compelling reasons is only a mandatory requirement in so far as the proper venue for
the filing of a search warrant application is concerned. It cannot be viewed as an additional requisite for the issuance of
a search warrant.

Issue #2: Whether or not the determination of the existence of compelling reasons can be reviewed in an administrative
proceeding.

Ruling: NO.
The determination of the existence of compelling reasons under Section 2(b) of Rule 126 is a matter squarely
addressed to the sound discretion of the court where such application is filed, subject to review by an appellate court in
case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

Clearly, this administrative proceeding is not the proper forum to review the search warrants issued by Judge Docena in
order to determine whether the compelling reasons cited in their respective applications are indeed meritorious.

Given these circumstances, we cannot agree with the OCA’s findings that Judge Docena violated Section 2 of Rule 126
by simply issuing search warrants involving crimes committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Malabon
City where: a) there is no compelling reason to take cognizance of the applications; and b) the compelling reasons
alleged in the applications appear to be unmeritorious.

It is obvious that Judge Docena simply exercised the trial court’s ancillary jurisdiction over a special criminal process
when they took cognizance of the applications and issued said search warrants. To hold a judge administratively liable
for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and
duties, it must be shown that his acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or
deliberate intent to do an injustice. Absent such proof, the judge is presumed to have acted in good faith in exercising
his judicial functions.

III. Any court subject to the requirement of territorial jurisdiction can issue any warrant for any offense.

KENNETH ROY SAVAGE v. JUDGE TAYPIN

G.R. No. 134217, May 11, 2000

Facts:
They were trying to conduct a search for violation of intellectual property law. Intellectual property cases are filed with
the Commercial Court. But in this instance, they applied before an ordinary judge (RTC of Cebu). So later the person
charged argued that there was improper application of the search warrant.

Issue: Whether the RTC of Cebu may issue the warrant.

Ruling: YES. Any court subject to the requirement of territorial jurisdiction can issue any warrant for any offense. The
reason there is that a warrant is only a process. Its not jurisdictional.

The authority to issue search warrants was not among those mentioned in the administrative orders. But the Court has
consistently ruled that a search warrant is merely a process issued by the court in the exercise of its ancillary
jurisdiction and not a criminal action which it may entertain pursuant to its original jurisdiction. The authority to
issue search warrants is inherent in all courts and may be effected outside their territorial jurisdiction.In the instant case,
the premises searched, located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu, are well within the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent
court.
 SPO4 LAUD v. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 199032, NOV. 19, 2014

Facts:
The Vice Executive Judge of Manila, upon application of the police senior superintendent, who did not state any
compelling reason issued a warrant for the search and seizure of the six human remains inside the Laud Compound in
Magtood, Maa, Davao City.

TAKE NOTE: It is OUTSIDE the region. A judge of Manila is executing a warrant to be effected in Davao City.

Issue: Is the Search Warrant valid?

Ruling: YES. It can be done. This is by way of exception only.

Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC states the re requirements for the issuance of search warrants in special
criminal cases.

WHO CAN ISSUE?:

RTCs of Manila and Quezon City.

What are the Special Criminal Cases:

These special criminal cases pertain to those involving:

1. Heinous crimes;
2. Illegal gambling;
3. Illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions;
4. As well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Acts of 2002;
5. The Intellectual Property Code;
6. The Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001;
7. The Tariff and Customs Code, as amended; and
8. Other relevant laws that may, hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court.
Other Requirements:
As in ordinary search warrant applications, they “shall particularly described therein the places to be searched and/or
the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court.”

“The Executive Judges [of these RTCs] and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not physically
present in the station, the Vice Executive Judges” are authorized to act on such applications and “shall issued the
warrants if justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts.”

So, [RTCs of Manila and Quezon] have broad powers and it can be enforced throughout the Philippines.

PEOPLE v. PASTRANA
G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018

Facts:
The NBI applied for a search warrant before the RTC, Makati City, for the purpose of conducting a search of the office
premises of respondents. It alleged that the NBI received information that respondents were engaged in a scheme to
defraud foreign investors. Those who agreed to buy stocks were instructed to make a transfer for the payment thereof.
No shares of stock, however, were actually purchased. Instead, the money collected was allocated as follows: 42% to
respondents’ personal account; 32% to the sales office;7% to investors-clients, who threatened respondents with
lawsuits; 10% to the cost of sales; and 8% to marketing. The judge issued one Search Warrant for estafa under Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and for violation of RA 8799 or the Securities Regulations Code (SRC).
Issue #1: Considering that RA 8799 and estafa are so intertwined with each other, is the search warrant valid?

Ruling: NO.

A search warrant must issue for only one specific offense. Violation of the SRC is not an offense in itself for there are
several punishable acts under the said law, such as manipulation of security prices, insider trading, acting as dealer or
broker without being registered with the SEC, use of unregistered exchange, use of unregistered clearing agency, and
violation of the restrictions on borrowings by members, brokers, and dealers, among others. Even the charge of “estafa
under Article 315 of the RPC” is vague, for there are three ways of committing the same crime.

Issue #2: The judge issued a search warrant for violation of Republic Act 8799 or the Securities Regulation Code
(SRC). When the warrant was challenged on the ground it was not issued for one specific offense, the government
belatedly argued that it was issued for violation of Section 28.1. of the SRC (lacked the license to operate as brokers or
dealers). Is the search warrant valid?

Ruling: NO.
Even assuming that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC was specified in the application for search warrant, there could
have been no finding of probable cause in connection with the offense. In People v. Hon.Estrada, the Court
pronounced: The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be
obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary, especially in cases where the issue
is the existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged - for instance, the absence of a license required by
law, as in the present case - and such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily
produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at the time of application, the applicant must show a
justifiable reason during the examination by the judge. The necessity of requiring stringent procedural safeguards
before a search warrant can be issued is to give meaning to the constitutional right of person to the privacy of his home,
and person. Here, the applicant for the search warrant did not present proof that respondents lacked the license to
operate as brokers or dealers.

DABON v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 208775, January 22, 2018

Facts:
Armed with a Search Warrant, Police Officers searched the two-storey apartment which served as residence of accused
Dabon and his family. While the members of the family were present during the conduct of the search of the rooms
where the illegal drugs were found, it appears, however, during the cross-examination that they (Dabon and Wife) were
at the sala or in another room. The search was only witnessed by a Barangay Kagawad who was brought by the police
with them.

Issue: Are the drugs taken during the search admissible in evidence?

Ruling: NO.
A search warrant issued in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not give
the authorities limitless discretion in implementing the same as the same Rules provide parameters in the proper
conduct of a search. One of those parameters set by law is Section 8 Rule 126, is that the search “shall be made xxx in
the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.” The law is mandatory to ensure the regularity in the
execution of the search warrant. This requirement is intended to guarantee that the implementing officers will not act
arbitrarily, which may tantamount to desecration of the right enshrined in our Constitution. Here the hierarchy among the
witnesses, as explicitly provided under the law was not complied with. For one, lawful occupants of the premises were
not absent when the police authorities implemented the search warrant. Even so, the two-witness rule was not complied
with as only one witness was present when the search was conducted.

There is a requirement that the search be done in the presence of the lawful occupant. You cannot place him in a room
and then search in another room. Also the need for other witnesses will only come in if the lawful occupant is not
present but take note it should be two (2) witnesses.

ARREST WARRANTS

How is the procedure for obtaining a Search Warrant distinguished from the procedure for obtaining an Arrest Warrant?

1. Must the judge personally examine the complainant and his witnesses?
NO need for arrest warrant.
 (Note: But this is necessary for search warrants.)

Atty: No search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be personally determined by the
judge upon examination under oath of the applicant and the witness he may produce.

What is the procedure when you want to get an arrest warrant?

Atty: So, affidavit complaint di ba. Subpoena, yung kontra. Resolve. Probable cause. Information. Then sa information,
there’s already determination of probable cause as examined by the fiscal handling the case.

PEOPLE v. GREY
G.R. No. 180109 | July 26, 2010

What the constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of
the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall:

(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence
of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or

(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.

Atty: But, it’s more practicable kung makita na yung probable cause sa fiscal, then issue an arrest warrant. Kay mapuno
ang docket sa court if the judge will require the witness to appear. Madugay

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would by unduly laden with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.

What the law requires as personal determination on the part of a judge is that he should not rely solely on the report of
the investigating prosecutor. This means that the judge should consider not only the report of the investigating
prosecutor but also the affidavit and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and
his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to
the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information.

The Court also ruled that the personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses is not mandatory and
indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The necessity arises
only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable cause. Otherwise, the judge
may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor, provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in
support thereof.

Atty: So, naa gyud nay mga attachments. In my opinion, probable cause here is the duty of the executive and not the
judiciary. Di ba!?

Can the judge rely on the certification of the prosecutor that there is probable cause for the offense? NO.

LIM v. ALFANE
G.R. No. 94054-57 | February 19, 1991

FACTS:
The Fiscal determined (that there was) probable cause and decided to file the case in Masbate. However, there was a
change of venue by the Supreme Court and the case was moved to Makati. In Makati, what happened was that the
judge did not receive the entire folder (of the records). The only record before the judge was the information filed by the
prosecutor and (his) finding of probable cause. So, the judge issued the warrant of arrest based on the certification of
the prosecutor that he found probable cause.
Atty: Ang certification na lang gyud ang nabilin. Pwede ba na? – NO.

ISSUE:
May a Judge without ascertaining the facts through his own personal determination and relying solely on the certification
or recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable cause exists issue a warrant of arrest?
RULING:
NO. The Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which requires “. . . probable cause to be
personally determined by the judge . . .”, not by any other officer or person.
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are
in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial
Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

Atty: Alangan certification ra. So, that’s it.

The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the
respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners.
There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the existence of a
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have
known what transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the
petitioner’s motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere certification and recommendation of the
respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.

We reiterate the ruling in Soliven v. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and
his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence.
However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal’s bare certification. All of these
should be before the Judge.

The extent of the Judge’s personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the circumstances of each
case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge’s examination should be. The Judge has
to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be
as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the
Prosecutor’s certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and
witnesses themselves to answer the court’s probing questions when the circumstances of the case so require.

Atty: Basta, in short, certification lang. Wala nay lain.

3. Is the person subject to arrest entitled to notice and hearing before the judge issues (arrest warrant)? - Of
course not.

Atty: No. Diba dili na. Human naman. Na-subpoena naman na sya. Nakabalo naman na sya more or less na pwede sya
madakpan.

WARRANTLESS SEARCHES

The general principle is that all warrantless searches are generally void. However, the Supreme Court has, over the
years, given so many exceptions. But take note of the following principles:

1. Failure to object to evidence during trial results to waiver;

E.g. If you are illegally searched but your lawyer was careless – during the offer of the evidence, he did not object.
Effect: The evidence is admissible and you can get convicted. The failure to object to evidence during trial renders
the evidence admissible.

2. Only the person whose right was invaded can invoke the illegality of the search.
Why? It is a PERSONAL RIGHT. (Father Bernas) and in the old case of the SC ruled:

STONEHILL v. DIOKNO
G.R. No. L-19550 | June 19, 1967

(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and
(b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

ISSUE #1: Can the petitioners invoke the exclusionary rule?

RULING: As to the first group of documents, NO. As to the second group of documents, YES.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may
be.
Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed
of by third parties.
Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers
and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the
admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and
may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residence of petitioners, two (2) important questions
need to be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the
authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said
documents, papers and thing may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.

ISSUE #2: Whether the search warrant is valid.

RULING: NO. They are all void.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely:

(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in
said provision; and

(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the thing to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a “violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” In other words, no specific offense
had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract.
As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter
of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be
the legal heresy of the highest order to convict anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.”
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims and caprices or passion of peace officers. This is precisely, the evil sought to
be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted – to outlaw the so-called general warrants. Thus, we hold that
the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners are null and void and that the searches and
seizures therein made are illegal.

Warrantless Search is Generally void:

● 1. Failure to object to evidence during trial results to waiver

● 2. Only the person whose right was invaded can invoke the illegality.
Evidence taken by virtue of warrantless searches, inadmissible as evidence in court.

Exceptions:

1.) Search incident to a lawful arrest

2.) Consented search
3.) Search in plain view
4.) Stop and Frisk (Terry Search)
5.) Search in moving vehicle
 6.) Search in the enforcement of Custom laws
7.) Search during exigency
8.) Airport/Seaport Security
9.) Prison Search
10.) Private Individual
1. Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest
The arrest has to be lawful for the search to be lawful. Hence, if the arrest is unlawful, the search is also unlawful.

Requisites:

1. Cotemporaneous to arrest – This means that at the same time you conduct the arrest, you also conduct the
search. There shall be no appreciable length of time that should elapse between the two.

2. Place under his immediate control - Over the years, the Supreme Court has made this very strict.
Atty: In contemporaneous arrest, immediately upon arrest, dapat i-search dayon ka.

PEOPLE v. LEANGSIRI
G.R. No. 112659 | January 24, 1996

Issue: Whether or not the piece of paper is admissible in court. -NO.

Held: In the case of Nolasco vs. Pano, the Court discussed that: “The better and established rule is a strict application of
the exception provided . . . that is to absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested to his or
her person at the time of and incident to his or her arrest and to “dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of the offense.” Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the
place of arrest.”

The Supreme Court here stated that the other room (Room413) is no longer under the immediate control of the
accused.

PEOPLE v. CHER CHUN TING

G.R. Nos. 130568-69. March 21, 2000

Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search is valid. -NO.

Held: The accused was admittedly outside unit 22 and in the act of delivering to Mabel Cheung Mei Po a bag of shabu
when he was arrested by the NARCOM operatives. Moreover, it is borne by the records that Unit 122 was not even his
residence but that of his girlfriend Nimfa Ortiz, and that he was merely a sojourner therein. Hence, it can hardly be said
that the inner potion of the house constituted a permissible area within his reach or immediate control to justify a
warrantless search therein.

The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search under the exception, the same
must be limited to and circumscribed by the subject, time, and place of the arrest.

As to SUBJECT, the warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect to the person of the suspect, and things that
may be seized from him are limited to “dangerous weapons or “anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of the offense.”

With respect to the TIME and PLACE of the warrantless search, it must be contemporaneous with the lawful arrest.
Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must have been conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately
thereafter and only at the place where the suspect was arrested, or the premises or surroundings under hi immediate
control.

Purpose of Exception. – It must be stressed that the purposes of the exception are only to protect the arresting
officer against physical harm from the person being arrested who might be armed with a concealed weapon,
and also to prevent the person arrested from destroying the evidence within his reach. The exception therefore
should not be strained beyond what is needed in order to serve its purposes.
We therefore hold that the search in Unit 122 and the seizure therein of some 5,578.68 grams of shabu do not fall within
the exception, hence, were illegal for being violative of one’s basic constitutional right and guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

As a consequence of the illegal search, the things seized on the occasion thereof are inadmissible in evidence
under the exclusionary rule. They are regarded as having been obtained from a polluted source, the “fruit of a
poisonous tree.”

PEOPLE v. TIU WON CHUA

G. R. No. 149878 – July 1, 2003

Issue: whether or not the search of the car was legal. -NO.
The Court affirmed the illegality of the search conducted on the car, on the ground that it was not part of the description
of the place to be searched mentioned in the warrant. It is mandatory that for the search to be valid, it must be directed
at the place particularly described in the warrant. Moreover, the search of the car was not incidental to alawful arrest. To
be valid, such warrantless search must be limited to that point within the reach or control of the person arrested, or that
which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of escaping.

PEOPLE v. MARI MUSA

G. R. No. 96177 | January 27, 1993

Issue: Whether or not the seized plastic bag containing marijuana is admissible as evidence. -NO.

Held:

In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his house but found
nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner.

The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the
one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under hi immediate control. Objects in the “plain view” of an
officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence.

Although the warrantless search done falls under Sec. 12 of Rule 126 and that the search may include premises or
surrounding under the accused’s immediate control, it does not fall under the ”Plain View” doctrine. The agents found
the plastic bag inside the kitchen, and upon asking about the contents of the bag, the accused did not answer, making
the agents open the bag and find marijuana leaves. Even if an object is observed in “plain view,” the “plain view”
doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the
“plain view” of the object.

Atty: So, stripe plastic bag. It could be anything. So, the court said even if an object is observed in “plain view,” the “plain
view” doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from
the “plain view” of the object.

Atty: Di ba!? Weapons ug evidence lang of the crime and there’s immediate control. Unya, naa to didto. Plain view ba
na? – Yes, plain view but the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the “plain view” of the object. In this
case, it must be apparent. So, plastic lang man.

VALEROSO v. CA & PEOPLE

G. R. No. 164815 | September 3, 2009

(Atty: What happened in this case? – Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest allegedly for kidnapping with
ransom. At that time, Valeroso was sleeping inside the boarding house of his children. He was awakened by the
arresting officers who were heavily armed. They tied his hands and placed him near the faucet (outside the room) and
put him under the care of Disuanco. The other police officers remain inside the room and ransacked the locked cabinet
where they found the subject firearm and ammunition. With such discovery, Valeroso was charged with illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition.)

Issue: Whether or not the search of the locked cabinet is valid. – NO.

(Atty: Naa siyay warrant of arrest for kidnapping, then giposasan sya, gi-search. Including the locked cabinet)
Held: From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that the arresting officers served the warrant of
arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. They placed him immediately under their control by pulling him out of the
bed, and bringing him out of the room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was
locked, could no longer be considered as an “area within his immediate control” because there was no way for
him to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used against him.

The arresting officers would have been justified in searching the person of Valeroso, as well as the tables or drawers in
front of him, for any concealed weapon that might be used against the former. But under the circumstances obtaining,
there was no comparable justification to search through all the desk drawers and cabinets or the other closed or
concealed areas in that room itself.

It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception (warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest) is to
protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed
weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. The exception therefore, should not be
strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose. In the case before us, search was made in the locked cabinet
which cannot be said to have been within Valeroso’s immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what
may be considered as an incident to a lawful arrest.

(Atty: Dili ako ang nag-ingon ana. Ang nag-ingon ana is the Supreme Court.)

PEOPLE v. VAPOROSO
G. R. No. 238659 | June 03, 2019

(Atty: What happened in this case? – Six hours after accused allegedly broke the glass of a vehicle and took away bags
belonging to the car owner. They were arrested by the police and subjected to an initial cursory body search and
brought them to the Panabo Police Station. At the station, they were subjected to a more thorough search, which
yielded (5) plastic sachets containing shabu. Thus, they were charged with violation of R.A. 9165.)
Atty: Arrested sila. Pag abot sa istasyon, didto pa sila gi-rekisa. Didto sila gidakop, body search is sa istasyon na pod.
ISSUE: Is the evidence admissible?
HELD: No. The Court holds that the first search made on petitioners, i.e., the cursory body search which, however, did
not yield any drugs but only personal belongings of petitioners, may be considered as a search incidental to a lawful
arrest as it was done contemporaneous to their arrest and at the place of apprehension.
On the other hand, the same cannot be said of the second search which yielded the drugs subject of this case,
considering that a substantial amount of time had already elapsed from the time of the arrest to the time of the second
search, not to mention the fact that the second search was conducted at a venue other than the place of actual arrest,
i.e., the Panabo Police Station. In sum, the subsequent and second search made on petitioners at the Panabo Police
Station is unlawful and unreasonable. Resultantly, the illegal drugs allegedly recovered therefrom constitutes
inadmissible evidence pursuant to the exclusionary clause enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.

POLANGCOS v. PEOPLE
G. R. No. 239866 | September 11, 2019

Atty: What happened here? – Accused was accosted by the police for driving a motorcycle without a plate number.
(Traffic violation)
After issuing a traffic violation ticket for expired ang driver’s license and walang or/cr. The officers searched him
physically and found in the cap he was wearing, a plastic sachet containing shabu. So, kay may traffic violation, gipara
siya, gi-search siya.

Issue: Is the evidence admissible under the exception of search incident to lawful arrest?
Held: No. Accused was arrested for violation of a city ordinance of driving a motorcycle which carries a penalty of the
payment of P500.00 fine. Likewise, violation of LTO Department Order No. 2008-39, for “operating/allowing the
operation of MV with a suspended/revoked Certificate/Official Receipt of registration” is punishable only with a fine of
P1,000.00. In view of the foregoing, the policeman thus conducted an illegal search when he frisked the accused for the
foregoing violations which were punishable only by fine. He had no reason to “arrest” the accused because the latter’s
violation did not entail a penalty of imprisonment. It was thus not, as it could not have been, a search incidental to a
lawful arrest as there was no, as there could not have been any, lawful arrest to speak of. (See also Luz v. People, 667
SCRA 421 (2012) and People v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 234207, June 10, 2019).

The Supreme Court is saying that if you have been accosted by the police for an offense which is only punishable by
fine, then they cannot conduct a valid search incident to a lawful arrest.

What is the reason? The Court seems to be saying that if the penalty for the offense is just a fine, you cannot be the
subject of an arrest.

Atty: Unless magkisi-kisi ka. Di ba!?

 PICARDAL v. PEOPLE
G. R. No. 235749 | June 19, 2019

Atty: What happened in this case? – While conducting a beat patrol, the police saw accused urinating against the wall
and told him that it was forbidden by MMDA regulation. While they trying to handcuff him, he tried to ran away. He was
then apprehended and when they searched him, they found a rusty owned .38 caliber with five (5) live ammunition.

ISSUE: Is the firearm admissible in evidence against accused?

HELD: No. The act supposedly committed by accused – urinating in a public place – is punished only by Section 2(a) of
Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) Regulation No. 96-009 is punished by a fine of P500.00 or community
service of one (1) day. Stated differently, the MMDA Regulation is, as its name implies, a mere regulation, and not a law
or an ordinance. Therefore, even if it were true that the accused did urinate in a public place, the police officers involved
in this case still conducted an illegal search when they frisked him for allegedly violating the regulation. It was not a
search incidental to a lawful arrest as there was no or there could not have been any lawful arrest to speak of.
Thus, as the firearm was discovered through an illegal search, the same cannot be used in any prosecution
against him as mandated by Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. (See also, Miguel v. People, 833

6 SCRA 440 (2017)

Any evidence obtained in violation of this or
shall be inadmissible for
the
proceeding section
any purpose in any proceeding.
REYES v. PEOPLE
G. R. No. 229380, June 06, 2018

Atty: What happened here? – While on patrol at around eight (8) o'clock in the evening, a group of police officers saw
two teenagers who informed them that a woman with long hair and a dragon tattoo on her left arm had just bought
shabu. After a few minutes, accused who fitted the description passed by the police officers during patrol and she
smelled like liquor (hubog). The police asked her if she bought shabu and ordered her to bring it out. She pulled a small
plastic sachet out which contained shabu.

Atty: So, what happened here? – Gi-tsismis siya nga nipalit siya ug shabu. Di ba!?

ISSUE: Is the evidence admissible?

HELD: No. The arrest was not lawful so that the consequent search was illegal. Accused passed by the police and she
was not acting suspiciously or doing anything wrong, except that she smelled liquor. As no overt act could be properly
attributed to Reyes as to rouse the suspicion of the police that she had just committed, was committing or was about to
commit a crime, the arrest was bereft of any legal basis. The act of walking while reeking of liquor per se cannot be
considered a criminal act.

Neither did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of any fact or circumstances indicating that accused had
committed a crime. He only relied on the tip given by the teenagers. Surely, to interpret “personal knowledge” as to
encompass unverified tips from strangers would create a dangerous precedent and stretch the power of the police
officers to effect warrantless arrest.

2. Consented search

The second exception is sometimes called ‘waiver’ because you agreed to be subject of the search.
Principles:

1. Only the person whose right has been invaded can give consent [Asis, Damaso]
2. Consent has to be given expressly
3. The search cannot extend beyond the purpose for which consent was given [Layague]
1. Only the person whose right has been invaded can give consent.

PEOPLE v. DAMASO

Atty: A PC conducted a search on the house rented by the accused who was believed to be a member of the CPP-NPA.
The Constabulary had no search warrant that time. Only the helper was present. She gave them the consent to enter
and search the house and rooms wherein they obtain firearms. The accused challenged the admissibility of the
evidence.
Atty: So, ang nag consent lang sa search is ang househelp.

HELD: The records show that appellant was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged
helper, allowed the authorities to enter. The Court finds no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was
indeed the appellant’s helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that the appellant had given her authority to open
his house in his absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority. Without this
evidence, the authorities’ intrusion into the appellant’s dwelling cannot be given any color of legality. helper va man
-

PEOPLE v. ASIS
G. R. No. 142531. October 15, 2002

Primarily, the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be
waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or who is expressly authorized to do so on his
or her behalf.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses show that at the time the bloodstained pair of the shorts was recovered,
Appellant Formento, together with his wife and mother, was present. Being the very subject of the search, necessarily,
her himself should have given consent. Since he was physically present, the waiver could not have come from any other
person.

2. Consent has to be given expressly.

Generally, in searches involving RESIDENCES, the Supreme Court would always say that “SILENCE MEANS NO.”

The fact that you failed to object does not mean that you gave your consent because consent has to be given
expressly. It cannot be inferred from your silence or failure to object.

Atty: Ingnon gyud nimo na wala ka nag-consent. Di ba!? Kay muingon man pud ng prosecution na nag consent ka.

3. The search cannot extend beyond the purpose for which consent was given.

VEROY v. LAYAGUE
G. R. No. L-95630 | June 18, 1992

Atty: I think this is a Davao Case. – Petitioners questioned the admissibility of the evidence, articles seized in violation of
the Constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Petitioners aver that while they concede that Capt.
Obrero had permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy to break open the door of their residence, it was merely for the purpose of
ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to conduct
a room to room search once inside the house. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of
their constitutional rights As such, they are inadmissible in evidence against them.

HELD: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures [Articles III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution]. However, the rule that
searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions
thereto are:

(1) a search incidental to an arrest;

(2) a search of a moving vehicle; and
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view

None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason for searching the house of herein petitioners is that it
was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldier. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter
the compound, he did not enter the house because he did not have a search warrant and the owners were not present.

This shows that he himself recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house but
rather contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the same. Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy
to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the
police officers had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not.

PEOPLE v. COGAED
731 SCRA 427(2014)
Question: How should a waiver of one’s right against unreasonable search be effected?

Answer: For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the police officer
introduce himself or herself or be known as a police officer. The police officer must also inform the person to be
searched that any inaction on his or her part will amount to a waiver of any of his or her objections that the
circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. The police officer must communicate this clearly and, in a
language, known to the person who is about to waive his or her constitutional rights. There must be an assurance given
to the police officer that the accused fully understands his or her rights.

Atty: In short, the person must be fully appraised or informed of the consequences of his consent. That the evidence will
be admissible in court, etc. It must be intelligently and voluntarily given.

3. Plain View Doctrine

Requisites for Search in Plain View:

1. There must be a prior justification for the intrusion; - Police have a right to be in that place. For instance, they
are armed with a search warrant or an arrest warrant.

2. The police inadvertently came across the evidence; - the important word here is ‘inadvertently,’ meaning
‘accidentally’.

3. The illegality must be immediately apparent.

Atty: Pagtan-aw pa lang nimo, illegal na gyud siya. Di ba!? Dili parehas atong sa plastic bag.

PEOPLE v. MUSA
G. R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993

Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their
“plain view,” what may be said to be the object in their “plain view” was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The
incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the “plain view” of
said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer.
We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the “plain view” doctrine does not apply and the marijuana
contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2)
of the Constitution.
Note: So, the illegality was not readily apparent. Remember that if one element is missing, the doctrine will not apply.

People v Evaristo

Facts:

The police while on patrol heard gunfires. They saw Rosillo in the act of firing his gun in the air. When
they tried to approach him, Rosillo ran away and entered a house. The police followed him. When they came to the
house, they asked Evaristo, the owner, about the suspect’s whereabouts. Evaristo replied that Rosillio was no longer in
the house. Anywaym the police ware able to get Evaristo’s consent to conduct a search of the house. It turned out that
the house was full of firearms.

Issue: Are the pieces of evidence recovered admissible?

Held: They are admissible because the police had prior justification for the intrusion since they were given consent by
Evaristo. They also came across the guns inadvertently, and the illegality of the object were readily apparent.

Evaristo compared to veroy v Layague

In both cases, the police The police were looking

were looking for persons. for persons. They were
They were also able to also able to recover
recover firearms. firearms.
 The pieces of evidence The .45 caliber gun was
were found in the sala found inside a closed
which were in plain view drawer
of the policeman

It is implied that the

policeman were already
looking for the guns and
not just rebels because
the rebels cannot fit inside
those small cabinets. The
policeman had no right to
open the compartments
when their authority was
only to look for rebel

People v Elamparo

Ruling: This case falls squarely under the plain view doctrine. Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to
be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in
evidence. The “plain view” doctrine applies when the following requisites concur :(a) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular
area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence if a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer
must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the
course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object
must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.

Dominguez v People

Facts: No, In the case at hand, while it can be said that the presence of the police officer was legitimate as he was
patrolling the area and that discovery of the plastic sachet was inadvertent, it should be emphasized that, as to the third
requisite, it was not clearly not apparent that such plastic sachet is an evidence of a crime, a contraband, or otherwise
subject to seizure. The Police Officer only saw that accused was holding a very small plastic sachet. To the court’s mind,
a very small plastic is not readily apparent as evidence incriminating accused, such that it can be seized without a
warrant. A very small plastic sachet can contain just about anything. It could even be just that –a very small plastic
sachet and nothing more. Although laboratory result later showed that the plastic sachet indeed contained shabu, this
cannot justify the seizure of the plastic sachet from the accused because at the time of the warrantless seizure, it was
not readily apparent to the policeman that the very small plastic sachet contained anything, much less shabu. Thus, the
circumstances of this case do not justify a seizure based in the plain view doctrine.

People v Acosta

Held: No. The “plain view” doctrine applies when the following requisite concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search
of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b)
the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence if a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.. In this case, it is also clear that
Salucana apprised the police officers of the illegal planting and cultivation of the marijuana plants when he reported the
mauling incident. Thus, when the police officers proceeded to Acosta’s abode, they were already alerted to the facts
that there could possibly be marijuana plants in the area. This belies the argument that the discovery of the plants was
inadvertent. The “plain view” doctrine cannot apply if the officers are actually “searching” for evidence against the
accused.

People v Nunez(munez)hahaha

Held; No, As a rule, only the personal properties described in the search warrant may be seized by the authorities. In
the case at bar, Search Warrant. 42 specifically authorized the taking of methamphetamine hydrocloride (shabu) and
paraphernalia’s only. By the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statue describes things of a particular class or kind
accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic words will usually be limited to things of a similar nature with
those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the statement which would repel such
inference. Thus, we are here constrained to point out an irregularity in the search conducted. Certainly, the lady’s
wallet, cash grinder, camera, component, speaker electric planer, jigsaw, electric Taser, saws hammer, drill, and bolo
were not encompassed by the word paraphernalia as they bear no relation to the use or manufacture of drugs. In
seizing the said items then, the police officers exercised their own discretion and determined for themselves which items
in appellants’ residence they believed were “proceeds of the crime” or “means of committing the offense.”

The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly described in the warrant is to
limit the things to the taken to those, and only those particularly described in the search warrant, to leave the officers of
the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority
empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or article
relating to a crime. Accordingly, the objects taken which were not specified in the search warrant should be restored to
appellant.

IV. Stop and Frisk

This simply means you are walking along the highway and the police become suspicious of you so they stop you and
start frisking you.

Guideline:

a. It must be based in PROBABLE CAUSE, that is the person is acting suspiciously.

b. Must not be based in the subjective perception of the police.

c. His unusual behavior must suggest a crime.

d. Report do no constitute probable cause

The probable cause must be based on the objective observation of the police, that you are acting suspiciously.

POSADAS v CA

Facts: Pat. Ungab and Pat. Umpar, both members of the Integrated National Police of the Davao Metrodiscom, were
conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao city. While they were within the premises of the Rizal
Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a “buri” bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously.

They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his
attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance. They then checked the “buri” bah of the
petitioner where they found one caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver and live ammunition

Issue: is the warrantless search valid?

Held: Yes. At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he
attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession
of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did not know what
its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant. However, there are many instances
where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the
“stop and search” without a search warrant at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has
been upheld by this court.

As between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereat in the
case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former it was
effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and
in was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. It is too much indeed to require the police officers to
search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose.
Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.

The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a “stop and frisk” situation whose object is either to
determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks
to obtain more information. This is illustrated in the case of Terry vs Ohio. The US SC held that “a police officer may in
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for the purpose of investigating possible
criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” In such a situation, it is reasonable for an
officer rather that simply to shrug his shoulder and allow a crime to occur, to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order
to determine his identity or maintain the status quo while obtaining more information;

Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizures has not been violated.

People v Rogelio Mengote

In the recent case of People v Malmstedt, the court sustained the warrantless arrest of the accused because there was
a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon inspection,, turned out to be a pouch
containing hashish. In the People v Claudio, the accused boarded a bus and placed the buri bag she was carrying
behind the seat if the arresting officer while she herself sat in the seat before him. His suspicion aroused, he
surreptitiously examined the bad, which he found to contain marijuana. He the and there made the warrantless arrest
and seizure that we subsequently upheld on the ground the probable cause had been sufficiently established.

The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers’ sus[picion other that
Mengote’s darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no strech of the imagination could it have been inferred from
these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in
their presence.

The Caase is similar to People v Aminnudin, where the court held that the warrantless arrest of the accuse was
unconstitutional. This was effected while he has coming down a vessel, to all appearances no less innocent than the
other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was he actually committing or attempting to commit an
offense in the presence of the arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable
cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant. It
would be sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is holding his
abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person
with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually committing or attempting it./ this
simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police sate where order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal
malice on the part of the arresting officer may be justified in the name of security.

People v Lacerna

In the case at bar, the taxicab occupied by appellant was validly stopped at the police checkpoint by PO3 Valenzuela. It
should be stressed as a caveat that the search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to routine checks
and visual inspection or flashing a light inside the car, without the occupants being subjected to physical or body
searches. A search of the luggage inside the vehicle would require the existence of probable cause.

In the applicable earlier Decisions, this court held that there was probable cause in the following instances: (a) where
the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated frim the plastic bag carried by the accused; (b) where an informer positively
identified the accused who was observed to have been acting suspiciously; (c) where the accused fled when accosted
by policemen; (d) where the policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused would transport a
large quantity of marijuana; and ( E ) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence
information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy, one who participated in the drug smuggling
activities of the syndicate to which the accused belonged, that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the
country

In the case at hand, however, probable cause is not evident. First, the radio communication from the General Nazareno,
which they were implementing at that time, concerned possible cases of robbery and holdups in their area. Second,
Norial Lacerna’s suspicious reactions of hiding his face and slouching in his seat when PO3v Valenzuela’s car passed
alongside the taxicab might have caused him to suspect that something was amiss. But these bare acts do not
constitute probable cause to justify the search and seizure of appellant’s person and baggage. Furthermore, the claudio
ruling cannot be applied to this case because the marijuana was securely packed inside an airtight plastic bag and no
evidence was offered by the prosecution.

Nonetheless, we hold that appellant and his baggage were validly searched, not because he was caught in flagrante
delicto, but because he freely consented to the searched. True, appellant and his companion were stopped by PO3
Valenzuela on mere suspicion, not probable cause, that they were engage in a felonious enterprise. But Valenzuela
expressly sought appellant’s permission for the search. Only after appellant agreed to have his person and baggage
checked did the actual search commence. It was his consent which validated the search, waiver being a generally
recognized exception to the rule against warrantless search.

We are aware that this court in Aniag, Jr. vs COMELEC outlawed a search based on an implied acquiescence, because
such acquiescence was not consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty, but was merely passive conformity
to the search given under intimidating and coercive circumstances. In the case before us, however, appellant himself
who was “urbanized in mannerism and speech” expressly said that he was consenting to the search as he allegedly had
nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong. In his brief, appellant explicitly, even if awkwardly, reiterated this:
“Confident that they have not done anything wrong, they allowed to be search.” This declaration of appellant is a
confirmation of his intelligent and voluntary acquiescence to the search. The marijuana bricks were, therefore, obtained
legally through a valid search and seizure. They were admissible in evidence; there was no poisonous tree to speak of.

People v Villareal

When a person scampers away at sight of a police officer, does it constitute probable cause for the police to arrest and
search him without any warrant?

Held: No, The act of accused of darting away when a police officer approached him should no be construed against
him. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt. It is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances, for even
in high crime area there are many innocent reason for flight, including fear of retribution for speaking to officers,
unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and dear of being wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party. Thus, the attempt of
accused to run away from the policeman is susceptible of various explanations; it could easily have meant guilt just as it
could likewise signify innocence.

Valdez v. people

It is not unreasonable to expect that petitioner, walking the street at night, after being closely observed and then later
tailed by three unknown persons, would attempt to flee at their approach. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and
must not always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt. Of persuasion was the Michigan SC when it ruled in
People v Shabaz that “flight alone is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances because flight alone is
inherently ambiguous.” Alone, and under the circumstances of this case, petitioner’s flight lend itself just as easily to an
innocent explantion as it does to a nefarious one.

Manalili v CA and People

In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that appellant had red
eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan city cemetery, which according to police information was a
popular hangout of addicts. From his experience as a member of the anti-narcotics unit , such suspicious behavior was
characteristics of drug addicts who were HIGH. The police man therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to
investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation, they found marijuana in petitioner’s possession

People v Cristobal

Accused was accosted by the police for failure to present the original receipt and certificate of registration of the
motorcycle he was driving, while being issued a traffic violation ticket he allegedly tried to rum away. He was caught
again and was search for any deadly weapon but they did not find anything. Later, the policeman subjected him to a
thorough search and found from his pocket a plastic bag which contained several sachet of shabu. Can the search be
justified under the TERRY rule?

Held: no. “Stop and frisk” searches should thus be allowed only in the specific and limited instances contemplated in
Terry: (1) it should be allowed only on the basis of the police officer’s reasonable suspicion, in light of his or her
experience, that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he/she is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous; (2) the search must only be a carefully limited search of the outer clothing; and (3) conducted for
the purpose of discovering weapons which might be used to assault him/her or other persons in the area. applying the
foregoing in the present case, the police officers’ act of proceeding to search Cristobal’s body, despite their own
admission that they were unable to find any weapon on him, constitute an invalid and unconstitutional search.

6. SEARCH UNDER CUSTOM ENFORCEMENT

A traditional exception to the search without warrant for the same reason as search in moving vehicles because
smuggled goods can easily be transported and taken out, or brought to another locality and out of the jurisdiction of one
court. It would be difficult to enforce the law if the police must first obtain a search warrant.

Comment:

Reason: Practicability

Requisites for Search under Customs Law

1. It must be conducted by persons exercising police authority under the custom law

Only the customs police. Ordinary police or military do not possess this authority, unless they are deputized
by the customs police.

2. There must be probable cause.

A mere report is sufficient to constitute probable cause. Acting suspiciously is not necessary.

Comment: In case of search under customs law

3. It is limited to persons, vehicles, vessels, aircrafts, land enclosure, warehouse, stores, but not dwelling
houses (residence).

Dwellings are not covered. If you are searching contrabands in residences, you have to apply for a court-
issued warrant. Custom officials cannot issue an order to conduct searches in residences.

4. Only dutiable or prohibited goods can be seized.

These are items subject to tariffs duties and taxes, or goods which are prohibited but are entering the
country.

Case: Papa v Mago

G.R. No. L-27360, February 28, 1968

Facts: Customs Authorities received information that there were undervalued goods which were to be released in the
port of Manila. This prompted to put up surveillance. They saw two trucks presumably full of goods and which they
immediately pursued. Without the benefit of a search warrant, they seized the items loaded in the truck.

Issue: Is the search permissible? - YES.

Held: According to the court, it was a search under Tariffs and Customs Code and it can be done without a search
warrant provided there is probable cause.
Comment:
This is a 1968 case, where one puts Enrile as the Commissioner of Custom during this time.

Case: Salazar v. Achacoso

G.R. No. 81510, March 14, 1990
Under the new Constitution, which states…no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the Judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
It is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search. The exception is in cases of deportation of
illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a
final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

The Secretary of Labor, not being a Judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must
go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code, unconstitutional
and of no force and effect.

General Rule: Under Article III, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution, it is only judges and no other, who may issue
warrants of arrest and search:

Exception: Is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of
Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purposes of deportation.

Q: Why is that possible?

A: Matters of deportation are within the realm of the foreign affairs power of the President. Although it was not granted
by the Constitution, but it was given by the Administrative Code.

Case: Harvey v. Santiago

G.R. No. 82544, June 28, 1988

Facts: The case stems from the apprehension of petitioners on 27 February 1988, from their respective residences by
agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued by respondent
Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of the CID. Petitioners are presently detained at the CID Detention Center.
Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three months of
close surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna. Two (2) days after apprehension, or on 29 February 1988,
seventeen (17) of the twenty-two (22) arrested aliens, opted for self-deportation and have left the country. One was
released for lack of evidence; another was charged not for being a pedophile but for working without a valid working
visa. Thus, of the original twenty-two (22), only the three petitioners have chosen to face deportation.

The arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three months during
which period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the
photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrants. Even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was
not valid at its inception, the records show that the formal deportation charges have been filed against them as
undesirable aliens. That petitioners were not “caught in the act” does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were
found with young boys in their respective rooms. The agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had
committed “pedophilia”. While not a crime under the RPC, it is behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the
declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, and social well-being of our youth.

The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.

7. SEARCH DURING EXIGENCY

Case: People v De Gracia

G.R. No. 102009, July 6, 1994

Facts:
Accused was charged with illegal possession of firearms which was obtained from a warrantless search. The search
was conducted at the height of the coup attempt in 1989. The authorities were conducting searches and surveillance as
counter-measures to stop the activities of the rebel forces. In one of the searches, the officers were able to attain
firearms from the accused.

Ruling:

Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to
the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts
obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently
more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding
team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested
that on December 5,1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the
moment , a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.

Case: People v De Gracia

G.R. No. 102009, July 6, 1994

Facts:
RAM-SFP staged a copu d’etat. A surveillance was conducted by the Intelligence Division, NCR Defense Command
and an intelligence report informed them that Eurocar Sales Office in EDSA was being occupied by the elements of
RAM-SFP as communication command post.

The search team raided the establishment and found De Gracia holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through the
door. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, there was so much disorder
considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous
firing within the vicinity of Eurocar, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed. De Gracia was
convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion.

Issue: WON there was a valid search and seizure- YES.

Ruling:
The instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the
military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime
was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action.
Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search
warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his
court was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment , a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.

8. AIRPORT SEARCH/ SEAPORT SEARCH

Airport search has been justified by the Supreme Court in several cases. The following are the reasons given by the
Supreme Court:

People v Johnson (401 Phil 734, 2000)

1. Reduced expectation of privacy.
Meaning, when you take the plane, you do not expect that all your claims to privacy will be respected
because you are actually taking public transportation and there are safety matters involved.

2. Minimum intrusiveness.
The search is reasonable because what happens simply is that your bags will pass through the metal
scanner/x-ray.

3. Gravity of safety interest involved.

RA 6235 Section 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain
among others the following condition printed thereon: “Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggages are
subject to search for, and seizure of prohibited materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall
not be allowed to board the aircraft,” which shall constitute part of the contract between the passenger and
the air carrier.

Case: Dela Cruz v People 779 SCRA 34, 2016

Facts:
Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel. He frequently traveled, “coming back and forth taking a
vessel.” At around 12:00 noon of May 11, 2007, Dela Cruz was at a pier of the Cebu Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo.
While buying a ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the floor with a porter. It took him around 15 minutes to purchase a
ticket. Retrieving his bag he proceeded to the entrance of the terminal and placed his bag on the x-ray scanning
machine saw firearms inside Dela Cruz’s bag. When the bag was manually inspected three firearms were found.

Issue: Are they admissible in evidence- YES.

Ruling: The search was conducted by port personnel who are not necessarily law enforcers during routine security
checks at ports have the color of a state-related function. Nevertheless, searches pursuant to port security measures
are not unreasonable per se. They are akin to routine security procedures in airports.

The reason behind it is that there is reasonable reduced expectation of piracy when coming into airports or ports of
travel.

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public
in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane and
hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft
routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-
ray scans. Should these procedures suggest he presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to
determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline
travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs and notices in their airline
tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to
seizure. These materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place
passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to
routine airport procedures.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Stephen Don Quijano Muñez
SESSION 13 – MARCH 7, 2022

Case: People v O’cochlain

G.R. No. 229071 Dec 10, 2018

Issue: Is the warrantless search valid?

Held:
Searches and seizures are ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized wrong doing. However, because
administrative searches primarily ensure public safety instead of detecting criminal wrongdoing, they do not require
individual suspicion. In particular, airport searches have receive judicial sanction because of the magnitude of the
danger to the public safety. Thus, airport search is reasonable when limited in scope to the object of the Anti-Hijacking
program, not war on illegal drugs. Unlike a routine search where a prohibited drug was found by chance, a search on
the person of a passenger or on his personal belongings in a deliberate and conscious effort to discover an illegal drug
is not authorized under the exception to the warrant and probable cause requirement. In this case, marijuana was taken
from accused, not weapons for hijacking or terrorism. The Court is not empowered to suspend constitutional guarantee
so that the government may more effectively wage a “war on drugs”. If the war has sough to be fought, those who fight it
must respect the rights of individuals.

(Here, there is consent to be searched)

Comment: Here the doctrine says that airport searches are valid because of the safety interest involved. But object only
is to prevent hijacking, it cannot be used to search for drugs unless the drugs were discovered accidentally. Here in this
case, the search was illegal and the accused was convicted because the accused was asked to be search and he
agreed.

Case: Saluday v People

G.R. No. 215305 April 3, 2018

Facts:
Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force Davao of the Philippine Army at a checkpoint near
the Tefasco Wharf in Ilang, Davao City. All male passengers were asked to disembark from the vehicle while allowing
the female passengers to remain inside. A soldier boarded the bus to check the presence and intercept the entry of any
contraband, illegal firearms or explosives, and suspicious individuals. A small, gray-black pack bag on the seat at the
rear of the bus caught the soldier’s attention. When he lifted it, it was rather heavy. Upon questioning, the bus conductor
pointed to accused. Upon request, accused opened the bag, which contained a gun and 3 grenades, among others.

Issue: Are they admissible as evidence? YES.

Held:
Concededly, a bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a shopping mall are all private property whose owners have every
right to exclude anyone from entering. At the same time, however, because these private premises are accessible to the
public, the State, much like the owner, can impose, non-intrusive security measures and filter those going in. The only
difference in the imposition of security measures by an owner and the State is, the former emanates from the attributes
of ownership under Article 429 of the Civil Code, while the latter stems from the exercise of police power for the
promotion of public safety. Necessarily, a person’s expectation of privacy is diminished whenever he or she enters
private premises that are accessible to the public.

In view of the foregoing, the bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint a reasonable
search. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation where passengers have a reduced
expectation of privacy. Further, SCAA Buco merely lifted petitioner’s bag. This visual and minimally intrusive inspection
was even less than the standard x-ray and physical inspections done at the airport and seaport terminals where
passengers may further be required to open their bags and luggages. Considering the reasonableness of the bus
search, Section, Article III of the Constitution finds no application, thereby precluding the necessity for a warrant.

The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be put at risk. Given the present
circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice that public transport buses and their terminals, just like passenger ships
and seaports, are in that category.

Comment: This decision extends to the exception to airports, seaports and bus. You can be subject to reasonable
search because of the minimum expectation of privacy when you take this public transportation (which include private
vehicles). Also imply the safety interest involved.
Q: What do we apply in search of moving vehicles?
The Supreme Court will consequently follow this in search of moving vehicles the principle that: Probable cause,
Visuals concept, all of those things will probably apply only to private vehicles. But for public transportation, we now
regard them like search of plane and ship because when you used public transportation you have a reduced
expectation of privacy.
One of the exceptions of warrantless search is Jail Security.

9. JAIL SECURITY

When you enter a jail, even if you are not an inmate or when you visit somebody, you can be subject of a thorough
search without any warrant.
The reason is for the safety of the jail; to prevent somebody from escaping and the entry of contrabands; (like drugs,
guns,etc)

10. PRIVATE PERSONS

When you are searched by a private person, you cannot invoke the Bill of Rights. Again, you can only invoke it solely
against the state and not against private individual.

COMELEC Checkpoints
During election time, we have COMELEC checkpoints.
Questions:
1. What can be done in the checkpoints?
2. Can you be the subject to searches?
3. If anything is taken from you, can it be used as evidence?

In COMELEC checkpoints, the COMELEC cannot authorize any type of search because only judges can authorize it.

Sec 8. Searches at COMELEC checkpoint-

Any search at any COMELEC checkpoint must be made only by members of the unit designated to man the same. It
should be done in a manner which will impose minimum inconvenience upon the person or persons so searched, to the
end that civil, political and human rights of the person/s are not violated.

As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an appropriate authority. However, a
warrantless search can be made in the following cases:

(a) Moving vehicles and the seizure of evidence in plain view;

(b) As long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupant/s subjected to a body search, and the inspection
of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search;
 (c) When the occupant(s) of the vehicle appear to be nervous or suspicious or exhibit unnatural reaction;

(d) If the officer conducting the search has reasonable or probable cause to believe that either the occupant(s)
is a law offender or that the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime can be
found in the vehicle to be searched; or

(e) On the basis of prior confidential information which are reasonably corroborated by other attendant matters.

Searches in checkpoints cannot be done indiscriminately. There is no such thing as an exception of search in
COMELEC checkpoints.

The exceptions as stated in the resolution are those already existing in jurisprudence. COMELEC checkpoints not a
separate exception.

RATIONALE OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF MOVING VEHICLES:

They allow searches without warrant is because there is ease in which they can be removed from one locality to
another. If you apply search warrant by the time you go back to the place, the vehicle is already gone.

There can be extensive search of moving vehicle if there is probable cause. In jurisprudence there are 2 definitions of
probable cause:

(1) If the person is described specifically as ruled in the case of Bagista.

If he is not described in the reports specifically or might be no report at all, he is acting suspiciously while on board that
can be considered as probable cause (as enunciated in the case of Escala).

Report plus suspicious behavior= PROBABLE CAUSE

In Bagista, Valdez and Gonzalez case the information received by the officer with specific description of the person has
been abandoned. In all probability, report plus suspicious behavior on the part of the suspect can constitute probable
cause.

Now we need to combine the two in order that there would be Probable Cause or others that will reasonable arousal of
the suspicions of the police officer other than the report they get.

Again, silence to the search is NOT CONSENT. Majority of the judges agree to this.
Jurisprudence enumerated 7 exceptions to the valid warrantless arrest but we discussed already the 3 (search by
private individual, search in airports, seaports and prison search) is also an exception to a valid warrantless searches.

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Transcribed by: ACFA HARC, JAGA