Gonzales vs.

COMELEC
G.R. No. L-28195, November 9, 1967

FACTS:

Ramon A. Gonzales, is a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter. He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a
class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated.

The Congress passed 3 resolutions simultaneously.

The first, proposing amendments to the Constitution so as to increase the membership of the House of
Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180.

he second, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two
(2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be elected in the general elections.

In addition, the third, proposing that the same Constitution be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of
the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting
their respective seats in Congress. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President,
became Republic Act No. 4913 providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned
resolutions be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections.

The petitioner assails the constitutionality of the said law contending that the Congress cannot simultaneously
propose amendments to the Constitution and call for the holding of a constitutional convention.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Congress can simultaneously propose amendments to the Constitution and call for the holding of a
constitutional convention?

RULING:

The constituent power or the power to amend or revise the Constitution, is different from the law-making power of
Congress. Congress can directly propose amendments to the Constitution and at the same time call for a
Constitutional Convention to propose amendments.

Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general grant
of legislative powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people — as the repository of sovereignty in
a republican state, such as ours— to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may
propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when
exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of
Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress
derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function, for their authority
does not emanate from the Constitution — they are the very source of all powers of government, including the
Constitution itself.

Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress
derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on
whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the
same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of
our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme
Court, the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional, despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power.

Tolentino vs. Comelec

G.R. No. L-34150, October 16, 1971

FACTS:

A Constitutional Convention was called upon to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines, in which,
the delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of resolutions and the implementing
legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1, amending section one of
article 5 of the Constitution of the Philippines to lower the voting age to 18. Said resolution also provided in its
Section 3 that the partial amendment, which refers only to the age qualification for the exercise of suffrage shall be
without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on
other portions of the amended Section or on other portions of the entire Constitution.
The main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing resolutions thereof
subsequently approved by the Convention have no force and effect as laws as far as they are in contravention to
Section 1 Article XV of the Constitution. Under the said provision, the proposed amendment in question cannot be
presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all of the other amendments to be drafted and
proposed by the Convention.
ISSUE:
WON the Resolution approved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention constitutional.
RULING:
NO. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of
the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite, as well as the resolution of the respondent
COMELEC complying therewith are null and void.
The Court is of the opinion that in providing for the questioned plebiscite before it has finished, and separately from,
the whole draft of the constitution it has been called to formulate, the Convention’s Organic Resolution No. 1 and all
subsequent acts of the Convention implementing the same violate the condition in Section 1, Article XV that there
should only be one “election” or plebiscite for the ratification of all the amendments the Convention may propose. We
are not denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed amendment; We are only holding that under Section
1, Article XV of the Constitution, the same should be submitted to them not separately from but together with all the
other amendments to be proposed by this present Convention.
Prescinding already from the fact that under Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is evident that no fixed frame of
reference is provided the voter, as to what finally will be concomitant qualifications that will be required by the final
draft of the constitution to be formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of suffrage, there
are other considerations which make it impossible to vote intelligently on the proposed amendment. No one knows
what changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution the Convention will be minded to approve. To be more
specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of any significant value at all.
Who can say whether or not later on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters for each level
of the political units it may divide the country into. The root of the difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention
is precisely on the verge of introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect of the
existing social and political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed plebiscite
intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the different institutions, which the
Convention may establish and of which presently he is not given any idea? Clearly, there is improper submission.

Santiago v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997

FACTS:

December 6, 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative.
Upon the filing of the Petition, the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order directing Delfin to cause the
publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution including the
proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form, and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily
newspapers of general circulation at his own expense and setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at
10:00 a.m.
December 12, 1996, Senator Roco, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory
petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed this special
civil action for prohibition raising that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the
Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III.
This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some
future law.
December 19, 1996, the Court required the respondents to comment on the petition and issued a temporary
restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC
from proceeding with the Petition, and private respondents conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to
amend the Constitution.
January 2, 1997, private respondents filed their Comment on the petition. They argue therein that R.A No. 6735 is the
enabling law implementing the power of people initiative to propose amendments to the constitution.
ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating
Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the
Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

RULING:

No, insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to
satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That
word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on
national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the
Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people
are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution"
through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
Second. It is true that Section 3 of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as
one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage
of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act
does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires,
among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the
Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the
latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress
intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it
could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy
of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the
initiative on national and local laws.

Lambino v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006

FACTS:

On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative
petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the
Initiative and Referendum Act.

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per
centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of
its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures
of the 6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled
“Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the
proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.

The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the
initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

ISSUE:
 1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution

RULING:

1.       The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by
the People

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people’s initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must
be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional amendment” should be “ready
and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that “before they sign there is
already a draft shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself
because the proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.”

The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire
proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people
must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an
initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people
who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments.

There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures.
The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures – that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.

Dale Sanders & A.S. Moreau Jr., v. Hon. Regino T. Veridiano II et al.,
G.R. No. L-46930, June 10, 1988, 162 SCRA88 (1988)

FACTS:
Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station. Petitioner Moreau was the
commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent
residence in the Philippines. Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both employed as game room attendants in
the special services department of the NAVSTA.
On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from
permanent full-time to permanent part-time. They instituted grievance proceedings to the rules and regulations of the
U.S. Department of Defense. The hearing officer recommended for reinstatement of their permanent full-time status.

However, in a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report. The letter
contained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi
and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c)
"even though the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public
places where others not involved in the case could hear."
Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from petitioner Moreau was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel
explaining the change of the private respondent's employment status. So, private respondent filed for damages
alleging that the letters contained libelous imputations and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an
invasion of their personal and proprietary rights.
However, petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official
duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity. However,
the motion was denied on the main ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were
official in nature.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties?

RULING:
Yes. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its
personnel, including the private respondents. Given the official character of the letters, the petitioners were being
sued as officers of the United States government because they have acted on behalf of that government and within
the scope of their authority. Thus, it is that government and not the petitioners personally that is responsible for their
acts.

It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal
capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the
doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him
from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority.
These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also where the person sued
in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case.

Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such
award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government
as their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the
appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that
government without its consent.

The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right against the authority
which makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of
the sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium and that a contrary
attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations."

Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate
from our previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Festejo vs. Fernando (G.R. L-5156, March 11, 1954)

FACTS:

Carmen Festejo filed a suit against Isaias Fernando, Director of the Bureau of Public Works, for taking possession of
three parcels of land she owned and causing an irrigation canal to be constructed thereon without obtaining first a
right of way, without her consent and knowledge, and against her express objection. Festejo demanded the return of
the land and its restoration to its former condition. The defendant, through the Attorney General, filed a motion to
dismiss the lawsuit on the grounds that the Court does not have jurisdiction to render a valid judgment against him,
since judicially the claim is against the Republic of the Philippines, and the Republic of the Philippines has not
submitted its consent to the lawsuit. The lower court upheld the motion and dismissed the claim without prejudice and
without costs.

ISSUE:

Is Fernando immune from suit for being a public officer?

RULING:
No, Fernando is not immune from suit for being a public officer. ART. 32 of the Civil Code provides that any public
officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxx (6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; The defendant committed acts outside
the scope of his authority. When he went outside the boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff's land and damaged
it or destroyed its former condition and usefulness, he must be held to have designedly departed from the duties
imposed on him by law. There can be no claim that he thus invaded plaintiff's land southeasterly of the right of way
innocently. Surveys clearly marked the limits of the land appropriated for the right of way of this trunk highway before
construction began. Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable therefor, and may be
sued as any other citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from his tortious act. If an
officer, even while acting under color of his office, exceeds the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter
himself under the plea that he is a public agent. It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-
judicial, ministerial, or otherwise who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may
thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. If he exceeds the power conferred on him by law,
he cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office, and not personally.
In the eye of the law, his acts then are wholly without authority.

United States vs. Guinto

(G.R. No.76607, Feb. 26, 1990)

FACTS:

These are consolidated cases which involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not
impleaded in the case at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it
has not consented.

In the first case, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in
connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the base.

In the second case, private respondents filed a complaint for damages against private petitioners for his dismissal as
cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station.

In the third case, private respondent, who was employed as a barracks boy in a U.S. Base, was arrested following a
buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners, officers of the U.S. Air Force and special agents of the Air
Force Office of Special Investigators. He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners
claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed.

In the fourth case, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the private petitioners, for
injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendants. According to the plaintiffs, the
defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in several parts of their
bodies and caused extensive injuries to them.

These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of
America was not impleaded in the complaints below but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect
suits against it to which it has not consented. It is now contesting the denial of its motions by the respondent judges.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty.

RULING:

NO. While suable, the petitioners are nevertheless not liable. It is obvious that the claim for damages cannot be
allowed on the strength of the evidence, which have been carefully examined.

The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or
waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the
rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. In addition, because the
activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them – between sovereign and governmental
acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now
extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the
United Kingdom and other states in Western Europe.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be
said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be
sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base, which is devoted to the defense
of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are
not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived
its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity, as in the cases at bar. It is only
when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. A State may
be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to
be sued only when it enters into business contracts.
The private respondents invoke Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which holds the government liable if it acts through a
special agent. The argument, it would seem, is premised on the ground that since the officers are designated “special
agents,” the United States government should be liable for their torts.

There seems to be a failure to distinguish between suability and liability and a misconception that the two terms are
synonymous. Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the
established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other
hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that
the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff
the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.

The said article establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The government may be held liable under this rule only if it
first allows itself to be sued through any of the accepted forms of consent. Moreover, the agent performing his regular
functions is not a special agent even if he is so denominated, as in the case at bar. No less important, the said
provision appears to regulate only the relations of the local state with its inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the
Philippine government and not to foreign governments impleaded in our courts.

The complaints against the petitioners in the court below were aptly dismissed.

The Holy See vs. Rosario

(G.R. No. 101949, Dec. 1, 1994)

FACTS:

Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the
Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation
engaged in the real estate business.

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the
Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots registered
in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).

The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later,
Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.

In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the
parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties
was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).
private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of
the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the
Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana
petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint — petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on
sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by
private respondent. The trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to dismiss after finding
that petitioner “shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question” Petitioner forthwith
elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf
and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.
ISSUE:

Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity.

RULING:

The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through
its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957
(Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the
classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard
to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is
not undertaken for gain or profit.

In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely
the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition
and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its
mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for
commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal
Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the
creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the
Philippines on November 15, 1965.

The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental
character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the
squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that
squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has
been admitted by private respondent in its complaint.

Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public
International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask
his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.

Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the
Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims.
Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between
the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States,
Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine
government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is
DISMISSED.

United States vs. Ruiz

(G.R. No. L-35645, May 22, 1985)

FACTS:

The United States of America used to have a naval base in Subic, Zambale as provided in the Military Bases
Agreement between the Philippines and USA. In May 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for the
following projects:

 Repair fender system, Alava Wharf at the US Naval Station

 Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to shoreline revetment, NAVBASE
Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf approach, NAVBASE Subic Bay
One of those who responded to the invitation to bid was Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. In its complaint, it alleged that
USA had accepted its bid because the latter requested to confirm a price proposal. The company took this as a
confirmation of the proposal. However, in a letter by William Collins, the director of Contracts Division, Naval
Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest Pacific, Department of the Navy of the United States, the company was
informed that it did not qualify to receive the award for the projects because of a previous unsatisfactory performance
on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the US Naval Station at Subic. Eligio de Guzman & Co.
sued the United States as well as some of its officers. The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the company
to work on the projects an in the event that performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay
damages. The company also sought for a preliminary injunction to restrain UA from entering into contracts with third
parties for work on the projects. What the United States wants is to restrain the respondent Judge Ruiz from trying
the civil case.

ISSUE:

May the United States be sued in this case?

RULING:
No. The rule on State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver.
This is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules on international
law are constantly developing and evolving, which made it necessary to distinguish the activities of States. The activities of the
States are categorized into sovereign and governmental acts ( jure imperii) and private,, commercial, and proprietary acts (jure
gestionis). State immunity now extends only to act jure imperii. The correct test for the application of State immunity is not the
conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act. In this case, the contract was clearly for acts  jure impreii,
not jure gestionis. Thus, the courts have no jurisdiction to try the case.

Republic vs. Villasor

(G.R. No. L-30671, Nov. 28, 1973)

FACTS:

A decision was rendered in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International
Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of
P1,712,396.40. Respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an order declaring the aforestated decision final
and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City as well as Manila to execute the said decision.
Pursuant to the said order, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. On the strength of the afore-
mentioned Alias Writ of Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served notices of garnishment dated June 28, 1969
with several Banks, especially on the monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits
sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution; the Philippine Veterans Bank received the
same notice of garnishment on June 30, 1969. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the
Banks, particularly, with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank or their branches are public
funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and
civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. It was alleged that
respondent Judge, Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the properties of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, hence, the Alias Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment issued pursuant
thereto are null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether the garnishment suit against the AFP is a suit against the State without its consent

RULING:

 Yes. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or
special law, it may limit claimant’s action ‘only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution’
and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may
not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations
of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by
law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the
diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. Such a principle applies
even to an attempted garnishment of a salary that had accrued in favor of an employee.

 The State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the
Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another
reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the
Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof.

SANIDAD VS COMELEC
(G.R. NO. L-44640, OCT. 12, 1976)

FACTS:

On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 to call for a national
referendum on October 16, 1976 through the so-called Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”). Its primary purpose is to
resolve the issues of martial law (as to its existence and length of effectivity).

On September 22, the president issued another proclamation (P.D. 1033) to specify the questions that are to be
asked during the referendum on October 16. The first question is whether or not the citizen wants martial law to
continue, and the second one asks for the approval on several proposed amendments to the existing Constitution.
The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the national referendum in October 16.

Father and son, Pablo and Pablito Sanidad filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the COMELEC
from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16, and to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution.

Another petitioner, Vicente Guzman filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction, asserting that the power to
propose amendments or revisions of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred to the interim
National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Another set of petitioners, Raul Gonzales and Alfredo Salapantan sought to restrain the implementation of
Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16. They assert that the
incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution and a
referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.

The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a
nullity. To lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to
vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the
Philippines 18 years of age and above.

The Solicitor General contends that petitioners have no standing to sue, and that the issue raised is political in nature
– and thus it cannot be reviewed by the court. The Solicitor General also asserts that at this state of the transition
period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a
step towards normalization.

ISSUE:

WON the issue poses a justiciable question (specifically on the constitutionality of PDs 991 and 1033).

RULING:

YES. 7 Justices of the Court held that the issue is a justiciable question, while only 3 maintained it was of political
nature and thus not justiciable.

The Court did not agree with the Solicitor General’s contention that the issue is a political one. This is because the
1973 Constitution expressly provided that the power to propose amendments to the constitution resides in the interim
National Assembly in the period of transition.

After that transition period, and when the regular National Assembly is in its active session, the power to propose
amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly. The normal course has not been
followed.

Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the president undertook the
proposal of amendments through Presidential Decree 1033 and in effect, through a Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16. Unavoidably, the irregularity of the amendment procedure raises a contestable issue.

In the transitory provision of the 1973 provisions, the National Assembly, although composed mainly by legislators,
amending the Constitution is not legislating.
The prerogative of the President to approve or disapproved applies only to the ordinary case of legislation. The
President has nothing to do with the proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

The petitions are dismissed.

Tanada vs Cuenco
(G.R. No. 10520, Deb 28, 1957)

FACTS:

Pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) was an election protest filed by members of the Citizens Party
(CP) who lost to members of the Nacionalista Party (NP). The Senate was at the time composed of 23 members of
the NP and one of the CP — petitioner Sen. Tañada. When the SET was being organized, Sen. Tañada, in behalf of
the CP, nominated himself alone. Sen. Primicias, a member of the NP, then nominated “not on behalf of the [NP] but
on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate” Sens. Delgado and respondent Cuenco “to complete the
membership of the Tribunal”. This he claims is the mandate of the Constitution which reads: “xxx Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court xxx and the
remaining six shall be Members of the [House] who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the
party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein.
xxx.” Over the objection of Sen. Tañada, Sens. Delgado and Cuenco were chosen to sit in the SET. Sen. Tañada
now contests them in Court. Respondents aver, among others, that the SC has no jurisdiction on the matter as the
issue is a political question and not judicial.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the issue is a political question.

RULING:

No. The issue at bar is not a political question for the Senate is not clothed with “full discretionary authority” in the
choice of members of the SET. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations. It is clearly
within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection
therewith. We have not only jurisdiction, but also the duty to consider and determine the principal issue² raised by the
parties herein.

The question is said to be political when it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political
capacity. It is judicial when it is a matter that has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular
officer of the government, with discretionary power to act. In short, the term “political question” connotes a question of
policy; that is, it refers to “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
Executive branch of the Government.” It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.

On the issue on whether the election of Sens. Delgado and Cuenco is valid, the Court ruled in the negative. It was
held that the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution in prescribing the manner for organizing the Electoral
Tribunals is to prevent the majority party from ever controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof
be founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties with the Justices of the SC to insure
greater political justice in the determination of election contests. Thus, the party having the largest number of votes in
the Senate may nominate not more than three members thereof to the SET, and the party having the second largest
number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three Senators. The Senate may not
elect, as members of the SET, those who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the
Constitution; hence, the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination. (Ibid.)

Angara vs. Electoral Commission

63 Phil.139 (1936)

FACTS:
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the
position of member of the National Assembly. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the
National Assembly and took his oath on November 15, 1935.  On Dec 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed
Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus
far been filed.  On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the
election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, of which fixed said date as the
last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
should be upheld.  Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the National Assembly proclamation,
Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that Electoral Commission proclamation governs and
that the Electoral Commission can take cognizance of the election protest and that the Electoral Commission cannot
be subject to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy?
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy. In
cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme
Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate
constitutional boundaries. The Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to
the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of
functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one
leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is
the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

Garcia vs. Executive Secretary

(G.R. No. 101273, July 3, 1992)

FACTS:
On 27 November 1990, the President issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties,
taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of five percent (5%)
ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other
oil products imported into the Philippines. This additional duty was subsequently increased from five percent (5%) ad
valorem to nine percent (9%) ad valorem by the promulgation of Executive Order No. 443, dated 3 January 1991.

Subsequent to this, Executive Order No. 475 was issued by the President, on 15 August 1991 reducing the rate of
additional duty on all imported articles from nine percent (9%) to five percent (5%) ad valorem, except in the cases of
crude oil and other oil products which continued to be subject to the additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem.

Petitioner assails the validity of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. He argues that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and
478 are violative of Section 24[1], Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. He contends that since the Constitution vests
the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
Petitioner further argues that Executive Orders No. 475 and 478 contravene Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs
Code, which Section authorizes the President, according to petitioner, to increase, reduce or remove tariff duties or to
impose additional duties only when necessary to protect local industries or products but not for the purpose of raising
additional revenue for the government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President can validly increase tariff rates rendering EO 475 and 478 constitutional.

RULING:
Yes, under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all
other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow,
however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue
measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission 1 to Congress to authorize the President “subject to such limitations
and restrictions is [Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties or
imposts . . .”
The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, and Sections 104[2] and
401[3], the pertinent provisions thereof. These are the provisions which the President explicitly invoked in
promulgating Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. There is nothing in the language of either Section 104 or of 401 of
the Tariff and Customs Code that suggest a sharp and absolute limitation of authority. The entire contention of
petitioner is anchored on just two (2) words, one found in Section 401 (a)(1): “existing protective rates of import duty,”
and the second in the proviso found at the end of Section 401 (a): “protection levels granted in Section 104 of this
Code.” We believe that the words “protective” and” protection” are simply not enough to support the very broad and
encompassing limitation which petitioner seeks to rest on those two (2) words.
Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code establishes general standards with which the exercise of the authority
delegated by that provision to the President must be consistent: that authority must be exercised in “the interest of
national economy, general welfare and/or national security.”
The power of the President to increase or decrease rates of import duty within the limits fixed in subsection “a” shall
include the authority to modify the form of duty. In modifying the form of duty, the corresponding ad valorem or
specific equivalents of the duty with respect to imports from the principal competing foreign country for the most
recent representative period shall be used as bases.

Eastern Shipping Lines vs POEA

(G.R. No.L-76633, Oct. 18, 1988)

FACTS:

A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint for charges against the
Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the POEA which stipulated
death benefits and burial for the family of overseas workers. ESL questioned the validity of the memorandum circular
as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the
POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of
legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. Nevertheless, POEA assumed
jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers.

RULING:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.

The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. … “The
governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).”

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be
delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment
of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the
legislature to the delegate.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the
national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of subordinate legislation.” With this
power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in’ the details which
the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what
are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the
new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power:

1. Completeness test – the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test – there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to
step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

United States vs. Ang Tang Ho

(43 Phil 1 (1922)

FACTS:

The Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868 “An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in,
palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing
the Governor-General xxx to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor xxx”.

Pursuant thereto, the Governoe-General issued Executive Order No. 53 fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
Defendant Ang Tang Ho who sold rice at a price greater than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 was found guilty of
violation thereof. He contested the validity of said law averring that it constituted invalid delegation of legislative
power.¹

ISSUE:

Did Act No. 2868 validly delegate legislative power to the Governor-General?

RULING:

No. A law must be complete in all its terms and provision. When it leaves the legislative branch of the government,
nothing must be left to the judgment of the delegate of the legislature. The Legislature does not undertake to specify
or define under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that
it may be issued “for any cause,” and leaves the question as to what is “any cause” to the discretion of the Gov-Gen.

The Act also says it may be issued “…whenever… conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of
palay, rice or corn.” The Legislature does not specify or define what is “an extraordinary rise.”

The Act also says that the Governor-General, “with the consent of the Council of State,” is authorized to issue and
promulgate “temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act.” It does not specify
or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency
measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect.

That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it
to the sole judgment and discretion of the Governor-Gener to say what is or what is not “a cause,” and what is or
what is not “an extraordinary rise in the price, and as to what is a “temporary rule” or an “emergency measure” for the
carrying out the purposes of the Act.

The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine
some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to depend.

Ynot vs IAC
(G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987)

FACTS:

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they
were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of E.O. No. 626-A which
prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the
requirements of said EO. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos. The IAE affirmed the same.

Petitioner contends that the EO is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or
carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed
without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due
process. He complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There
is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6
of the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether E.O. No. 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the outright confiscation of carabao and carabeef
being transported across provincial boundaries

RULING:

Yes. E0 626-A is unconstitutional.

While it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive and in
fact may be rebutted. The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for
the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under
Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a
threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in
his judgment required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of
instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise
of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order

Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter  of the carabaos but on their movement,
providing that “no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported
from one province to another.” The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to
be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the
carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is
violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the
guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned
therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

Merritt vs Government of the Philippine Islands

(G.R. No.11154, March 21, 1916)

FACTS:

Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was bumped by the ambulance of the General
Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to return to work. The legislature later enacted Act
2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the Government in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between
his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to
which he is entitled. After trial, the lower court held that the collision was due to the negligence of the driver of the
ambulance. It then determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same.

ISSUE:

Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to
the plaintiff? 

RULING:

By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to
plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It
merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its
right to interpose any lawful defense.

Gov. of the Philippine Islands vs. Monte de Piedad

(G.R. No. 9959, Dec. 13, 1916)

FACTS:

On June 3, 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in the Philippines. The Spanish Dominions then provided
$400,000.00 as aid for the victims and it was received by the Philippine Treasury. Out of the aid, $80,000.00 was left
untouched; it was then invested in the Monte de Piedad Bank which in turn invested the amount pieces of jewelry.
But when the Philippine government later tried to withdraw the said amount, the bank cannot provide for the amount.
The bank argued that the Philippine government is not an affected party hence has no right to institute a complaint.
Bank argues that the government was not the intended beneficiary of the said amount.

ISSUE:

Does the Philippine Government have the personality to institute the action?

RULING:

Yes. In this country, the Government as parens patriae has the right to enforce all charities of public nature by virtue
of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it. This
prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of the [State] xxx. It is a most beneficial function, and
often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot
protect themselves. Furthermore, it would be impracticable for the beneficiaries to institute an action or actions either
individually or collectively. The only course that can be satisfactorily pursued is for the Government to again assume
control of the fund and devote it to the object for which it was originally destined. Philosophical Principle: “In the
instant case the Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it, in bringing and prosecuting this
action, is exercising its sovereign functions or powers xxx. These principles being based "upon the foundation of the
great principle of public policy" are, in the very nature of things, applicable to the Philippine Government.”

Republic vs. Sandoval

(G.R. No. 84607, March 19, 1993)

FACTS:

This case is connected to the Mendiola Massacre, which was the culmination of eight days and seven nights of encampment by
members of the Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP) at the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) at the Philippine Tobacco
Administration Building along Elliptical Road in Diliman, Quezon City. The farmers demanded genuine agrarian reform. The
group was led by its national president, Jaime Tadeo.

On January 20, 1987, the minister of agriculture, Heherson Alvarez, told Tadeo that he should wait for the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and just allow the government to implement its comprehensive land reform program. Tadeo, however, said that he
did not believe in the Constitution.

On January 22, Tadeo’s group marched to Malacanang to air their demands. He threatened the government, saying, “. . . inalis
namin ang barikada bilang kahilingan ng ating Presidente, pero kailangan alisin din niya ang barikada sa Mendiola sapahkat
bubutasin naming iyon at dadanak ang dugo . . .”
The group proceeded to march from Quezon Menorial Circle at 10:00 am and were joined by organizations such as Kilusang
Mayo Uno (KMU), Baging Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), League of Filipino Students (LFS), and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng
Maralitang Lungsod (KPML).
I
n anticipation of a civil disturbance, Capital Regional Command (CAPCOM) Commander General Ramon Montano inspected the
preparations and adequacy of the government forces to quell impending attacks. OPLAN YELLOW was put into effect. Task
Force Nazareno, under the command of Col. Cesar Nazareno, was deployed at the vicinity of Malacanang. Intelligence reports
were received that the KMP was heavily infiltrated by CPP/ NPA elements and that insurrection was pending. The marchers
were around 10,000 to 15,000 in number. At 4:30 p.m., they proceeded to the police lines. No dialog took place between the
marchers and the anti-riot squad. Then, there was suddenly an explosion followed by the throwing of pillboxes, stones, and
bottles. After the riot, 12 marchers were confirmed dead, 39 were wounded by gunshots, and 12 sustained minor injuries, all
belonging to the group of marchers. From the police and military personnel, 3 sustained gunshot wounds, and 20 suffered minor
physical injuries.
President Corazon Aquino then issued AI 11 on January 22, 1987, which created the Citizens’ Mendiola Commission. It was
specifically created for investigating the Mendiola Massacre.

Respondent Judge Sandoval dismissed the complaint because it was against the Republic of the Philippines, and the latter has
not given its consent to be sued. He also denied the motion for reconsideration of the Caylao group, which was composed of
the heirs of the victims.

The Caylao group contended that the State has given its consent to be sued when President Aquino created the fact-
finding commission and when she gave a speech, saying that the government will address the grievances of the
rallyists.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the State has given its consent to be sued?

RULING:
No. This is not a suit against the State with its consent. The recommendation made by the Commission regarding the
indemnification of the heirs of the deceased and victims did not automatically mean that the liability attaches to the
State. The Commission was merely a fact-finding commission. Furthermore, the speech made by President Aquino
did not amount to consent by the State. In this case, even if the Republic is sued by name, the ultimate liability does
not pertain to the government. Instead, it pertains to the military and police officials. The Court said that their official
functions ceased when they exceeded their authority. Based on the Commission’s findings, there was not enough
justification of the use of firearms by the military and police personnel. An officer cannot shelter himself by the plea
that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without authority.

Amigable vs. Cuenca

(G.R. No.L-26400, Feb. 29, 1972)

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu dismissing the plaintiff's complaint. FACTS:
Victoria Amigable, is the registered owner of a lot in Cebu City. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the
government used a portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On March 27, 1958
Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had
been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th
Endorsement. Thus, Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, against the Republic of the Philippines and
Nicolas Cuenca (Commissioner of Public Highways) for the recovery of ownership and possession of her lot. The
defendants denied the plaintiff’s allegations stating: (1) that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed
first with the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery had already prescribed; (3) that
the action being a suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid
basis since the Government had not given its consent to be sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it was the province of
Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of
action against the defendants. On July 29, 1959, the court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction
over the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the lot on the ground that the
government cannot be sued without its consent; that it had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear and
decide plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages, being a money claim against the government; and that it had long
prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not given its consent to be sued.
Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of the case.
RULING:
Yes. Immunity of State from suit; Exception-where the government takes away property from a private land owner for
public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may
properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from
suit without its consent. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetuating as an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law
at the time, a compliant would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the
judgment, or after tender of the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it “have the right to enter in
and upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment”. Wherefore, the
decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for the determination of
compensation, including attorney’s fees, to which the appellant is entitled. No pronouncement as to cost.