The Holy See vs.
Rosario RULING:
(G.R. No. 101949, Dec. 1, 1994)
FACTS:
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty
over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is
represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio;
Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.,
is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate
business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of
land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the
Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of
petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots
registered in the name of the Philippine Realty
Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through
Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the
sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to
private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the
lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to
who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting
and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the
relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of
Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development
Corporation (Tropicana).
private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for
annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and
specific performance and damages against petitioner,
represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other
defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the
PRC and Tropicana
petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to
dismiss the complaint — petitioner for lack of
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit,
and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An
opposition to the motion was filed by private
respondent. The trial court issued an order denying,
among others, petitioner’s motion to dismiss after
finding that petitioner “shed off [its] sovereign
immunity by entering into the business contract in
question” Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to
us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of
sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on
behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.
ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as
its business relations regarding selling a lot to a
private entity.
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the
Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy
See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has
had diplomatic representations with the Philippine
government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to
be the universal practice in international relations.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign
immunity, each widely held and firmly established.
According to the classical or absolute theory, a
sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the courts of another sovereign.
According to the newer or restrictive theory, the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with
regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but
not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an
incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii,
especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold
lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business,
surely the said transaction can be categorized as an
act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that
the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A
were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said
property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic
Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent
failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from
the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made
not for commercial purpose, but for the use of
petitioner to construct thereon the official place of
residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign
sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a
receiving state, necessary for the creation and
maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized
in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in
by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the
Philippines on November 15, 1965.
The decision to transfer the property and the
subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with
a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot
5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off
the same because the squatters living thereon made
it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the
purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have
occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they
stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been
admitted by private respondent in its complaint.
Private respondent is not left without any legal
remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both
Public International Law and Transnational Law, a
person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign
sovereign can ask his own government to espouse
his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine
government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse
its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to
persuade the Philippine government to take up with
the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the
Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the
impact of its espousal on the relations between the
Philippine government and the Holy See (Young,
Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign
States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of
Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once
the Philippine government decides to espouse the
claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED
and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against
petitioner is DISMISSED.
Republic vs. Villasor
(G.R. No. L-30671, Nov. 28, 1973)
FACTS:
A decision was rendered in favor of respondents P. J.
Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International
Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner
herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount
of P1,712,396.40. Respondent Honorable Guillermo
P. Villasor, issued an order declaring the aforestated
decision final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of
Rizal Province, Quezon City as well as Manila to
execute the said decision. Pursuant to the said order,
the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued.
On the strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of
Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served
notices of garnishment dated June 28, 1969 with
several Banks, especially on the monies due the
Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of
deposits sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in
the said Writ of Execution; the Philippine Veterans
Bank received the same notice of garnishment on
June 30, 1969. The funds of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly,
with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine
National Bank or their branches are public funds duly
appropriated and allocated for the payment of
pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military
and civilian personnel and for maintenance and
operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. It
was alleged that respondent Judge, Honorable
Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of
execution against the properties of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, hence, the Alias Writ of Execution
and notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto
are null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether the garnishment suit against the AFP is a
suit against the State without its consent
RULING:
 Yes. The universal rule that where the State gives its
consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action
‘only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to
the stage of execution’ and that the power of the
Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since
government funds and properties may not be seized
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy
such judgments, is based on obvious considerations
of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must
be covered by the corresponding appropriation as
required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law. Such a principle applies even to
an attempted garnishment of a salary that had
accrued in favor of an employee.
 The State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be
sued in its own courts except by express authorization
by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to
garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is
prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys
sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the
hands of the disbursing officer of the Government,
belong to the latter, although the defendant in
garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion
thereof.
Department of Agriculture v. NLRC (G.R. No. 104269)
FACTS:
On April 1, 1989, the Department of Agriculture (DoA)
office in Cagayan de Oro and Sultan Security Agency
(SSA) entered into a contract where the latter was to
provide security services to the former. On September
13, 1990, several guards from SSA filed a complaint
for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th
month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential
pay, holiday pay, as well as for damages, against
DoA and SSA. Both the DoA and SSA were
subsequently found guilty by the Executive Labor
Arbiter, which also held both of them liable for the
payment of money claims amounting to P266,483.91.
On July 18, 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of
execution. As a response, the DoA filed a petition for
injunction, prohibition, and mandamus, with prayer for
preliminary writ of injunction, before the NLRC. The
DoA's petition was dismissed.
Following the dismissal of its petition before the
NLRC, DoA filed a petition before the SC arguing that:
(a) it was COA, not NLRC, that was supposed to have
jurisdiction over money claims against the
Government pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 327
as amended by PD No. 1445; and (b) that NLRC had
disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of
the State.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not it was COA that has exclusive
jurisdiction over money claims against the
Government.
2. Whether or not DoA, as an agency of the State, is
covered by the principle of the non-suability of the
State.
HELD:
1. Yes, the Court ruled that money claims against the
Government should be filed before the Commission
on Audit pursuant to CA Act No. 327 as amended by
PD No. 1445. In the instant case, underpayment of
wages, holiday pay, overtime pay, and other similar
items arising from the Contract for Service clearly
constitute money claims. As such, the writ of
execution issued by the Labor Arbiter and the
resolution issued by NLRC were reversed by the
Court in favor of DoA.
2. No, DoA cannot use the principle of non-suability of
the State as an excuse not to be sued.
Section 3, Art. XVI of the 1987 Constitution states that
"the State may not be sued without its consent." This
principle reflects a recognition of the sovereign
character of the State and an express affirmation of
the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the
jurisdiction of the courts. As per Justice Holmes, a
sovereign State is exempt from suits "not because of
any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the
logical and practical ground that there can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends."
PNB vs Pabalan
G.R. No. L-33112 – 83 SCRA 595 – Political Law –
Constitutional Law – Immunity of the State from Suit
The Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, a
government owned and controlled corporation lost a
case and was directed to pay damages. The decision
became final and so upon motion, Judge Javier
Pabalan issued a writ of execution against PVTA and
its account with the Philippine National Bank La Union
was garnished. PNB La Union then filed a certiorari
case against Judge Pabalan alleging that the latter
failed to recognize that the questioned funds are of
public character and therefore may not be garnished,
attached, nor may be levied upon. The PNB La Union
Branch invoked the doctrine of non suability, putting a
bar on the notice of garnishment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the argument of PNB is
correct.
HELD: No. Funds of government owned and
controlled corporations which can sue and be sued
are not exempt from garnishment. A GOCC has a
personality of its own, distinct and separate from that
of the Government. Accordingly, it may sue and be
sued and may be subjected to court processes just
like any other corporation.
When the government enters into commercial
business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to
be treated like any other corporation. By engaging in
a particular business thru the instrumentality of a
corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice
of its sovereign character, so as to render the
corporation subject to the rules of law governing
private corporations.
Rayo, et. al vs CFI of Bulacan
(G.R. No. L-55273-83, Dec. 19, 1981)
FACTS:
Petitioners, who were among the many unfortunate
victims of that man-caused flood, filed with the
respondent Court eleven complaints for damages
against the respondent corporation and the plant
superintendent of Angat Dam, Benjamin Chavez
On October 26, 1978, typhoon “Kading” struck
Bulacan. Due to this, the National Power Corporation
(NPC), through its plant superintendent Benjamin
Chavez, simultaneously opened 3 floodgates of Angat
Dam.
The opening of the floodgates caused several towns
to be inundated (the town of Norzagaray was the
most affected one). It resulted to a hundred deaths
and damage to properties that were worth over a
million pesos.
Petitioners (victims) filed a complaint for damages
against NPC, including plant superintendent Benjamin
Chavez.
Respondent filed counterclaims and put up a special
and affirmative defense that “in the operation of the
Angat Dam,” it is “performing a purely governmental
function”, hence it “cannot be sued without the
express consent of the State.”
Petitioners oppose the defense, contending that the
NPC is not performing governmental but
merely proprietary functions and that under its own
organic act, Section 3 (d) of Republic Act No. 6395, it
can sue and be sued in any court.
CFI dropped the NPC from the complaint and left
Chavez as the sole party-defendant.
CFI RULING: Upon a motion for reconsideration, the
CFI ruled that petitioners’ reliance on Sec. 3 of RA
6395 is not tenable since the same refer to such
matters that are only within the scope of the other
corporate powers of said defendant and not matters
of tort as in the instant cases.
Being an agency performing a purely governmental
function in the operation of the Angat Dam, said
defendant was not given any right to commit wrongs
upon individuals. To sue said defendant for tort may
require the express consent of the State. PETITION
DISMISSED.
ISSUE:
1. Whether respondent National Power Corporation
performs a governmental function with respect to the
management and operation of the Angat Dam; and
2. Whether the power of respondent National Power
Corporation to sue and be sued under its organic
charter includes the power to be sued for tort.
RULING:
SC reversed the CFI decision and GRANTED
petitioners to reinstate their complaint against the
NPC. It is sufficient to say that the government has
organized a private corporation, put money in it and
has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under
its charter. (R.A. No. 6395). As a government owned
and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its
own, distinct and separate from that of the
Government. Moreover, the charter provision that the
NPC can “sue and be sued in any court” is without
qualification on the cause of action and accordingly it
can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by
the petitioners.
Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of Printing Employees
Ass.
(G.R. No. L-15751, Jan. 28, 1961)
FACTS:
Respondent Bureau of Printing Employees
Association (NLU), Pacifico Advincula, Roberto
Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran
filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against
herein petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin
Salvador, the Acting Secretary of the Department of
General Services, and Mariano Ledesma, the Director
of the Bureau of Printing. The Court of Industrial
Relations ruled in favor of herein respondents.
PETITIONER’S CLAIM:
That private respondents were suspended pending
result of an administrative investigation against them
for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations; that
the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to
sue and be sued; that said Bureau of Printing is not
an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain
but is an agency of the Republic performing
governmental functions.
RESPONDENT’S CLAIM:
They alleged that Serafin Salvador and Mariano
Ledesma have been engaging in unfair labor practice
by interfering with, or coercing the employees of the
Bureau of Printing, particularly the members of the
complaining association, in the exercise of their right
to self-organization and discriminating in regard to
hire and tenure of their employment in order to
discourage them from pursuing their union activities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner government office is
capable to sue and thus be sued?
RULING:
NO. The Bureau of Printing is an office of the
Government created by the Administrative Code of
1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the
Government, it operates under the direct supervision
of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President,
and is “charged with the execution of all printing and
binding, including work incidental to those processes,
required by the National Government and such other
work of the same character as said Bureau may, by
law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance)
Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake. It
has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are
provided for in the General Appropriations Act.
Designed to meet the printing needs of the
Government, it is primarily a service bureau and is
obviously, not engaged in business or occupation for
pecuniary profit. While the Bureau of Printing is
allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it cannot be
pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business
concern. The additional work it executes for private
parties is merely incidental to its function, and
although such work may be deemed proprietary in
character, there is no showing that the employees
performing said proprietary function are separate and
distinct from those employed in its general
governmental functions. As an office of the
Government, without any corporate or juridical
personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued.
Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to
produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or
proceeding against the Government itself, and the
rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued
without its consent, much less over its objection.
Mobil Phils. Exploration vs. Customs Arrastre
Services
(G.R. No. L-23139, Dec. 17, 1966)
FACTS:
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from
abroad consigned to Mobil Philippines. The Customs
Arrastre later delivered to the broker of the consignee
three cases only of the shipment. Mobil Philippines
Exploration Inc. filed suit in the CFI against the
Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs
to recover the value of the undelivered cases plus
other damages.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that not being a person
under the law, defendants cannot be sued.
After the plaintiff opposed the motion, the court
dismissed the complaint on the ground that neither
the Customs Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of
Customs is suable.
ISSUE:
Can the Customs Arrastre Service or the Bureau of
Customs be sued?
RULING:
NO. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the
machinery of the national government in the
operations of arrastre service, pursuant to express
legislative mandate and a necessary incident of its
prime governmental function, is immune from suit,
there being no statute to the contrary.
The Bureau of Customs has no personality of its own
apart from that of the government. Its primary function
is governmental, that of assessing and collecting
lawful revenues from imported articles and all other
tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines, and
penalties. To this function, arrastre is a necessary
incident. Although said arrastre function is deemed
proprietary, it is necessarily an incident of the primary
and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs,
so that engaging in the same does not necessarily
render said Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it
could not perform its governmental function without
necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity
granted as to the end should not be denied as to the
necessary means to that end.
Civil Aeronautics Administration vs CA (G.R. No. L-
51806, Nov. 8, 1988)
FACTS:
Ernest Simke went to Manila International Airport to
meet his future son-in-law. While walking towards the
viewing deck or the terrace to get a better view of the
incoming passengers, he slipped over an elevation
about four inches high, and he fell on his back and
broke his thigh bone.
He filed an action for damages based on quasi-delict
with the CFI of Rizal against the Civil Aeronautics
Administration or CAA as the entity empowered to
administer, operate, manage, control, maintain, and
develop the MIA. Judgment was rendered in his favor,
and on appeal to the Court of Appeals, judgment was
affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether the CAA, being an agency of the
government, can be made a party defendant?
RULING:
YES. Not all government entities whether corporate or
not are immune from suits. Immunity from suits is
determined by the character of the objects for which
the entity was organized. The CAA is not immune
from suit it being engaged in functions pertaining to a
private entity. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far
from being the exclusive prerogative of the state, may
more than the construction of public roads, be
undertaken by private concerns. The CAA was
created not to maintain a necessity of the
government, but to run what is essentially a business
even if the revenues be not its prime objective but
rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of
the traveling public.
Air Transportation Administration vs. Spouses David
(G.R. No.159402, Feb 23, 2011)
FACTS:
Respondent Spouses discovered that a portion of
their registered land in Baguio City was being used as
part of the runway and running shoulder of the
Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air
Transportation Office (ATO). The respondents agreed
after negotiations to convey the affected portion by
deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the
amount of P778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to
pay despite repeated verbal and written demands.
Thus, the respondents filed an action for collection
against the ATO and some of its officials in the RTC.
In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants
invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of
Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos
had reserved certain parcels of land that included the
respondents affected portion for use of the Loakan
Airport. They asserted that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to entertain the action without the States
consent considering that the deed of sale had been
entered into in the performance of governmental
functions.
The RTC held in favor of the Spouses, ordering the
ATO to pay the plaintiffs Spouses the amount of
P778,150.00 being the value of the parcel of land
appropriated by the defendant ATO as embodied in
the Deed of Sale, plus an annual interest of 12% from
August 11, 1995, the date of the Deed of Sale until
fully paid; (2) The amount of P150,000.00 by way of
moral damages and P150,000.00 as exemplary
damages; (3) the amount of P50,000.00 by way of
attorney’s fees plus P15,000.00 representing the 10,
more or less, court appearances of plaintiff’s counsel;
(4) The costs of this suit.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision with
modification deleting the awarded cost, and reducing
the moral and exemplary damage to P30,000.00
each, and attorney’s fees is lowered to P10,000.00.
ISSUE:
Could ATO be sued without the State's consent?
RULING:
An unincorporated government agency without any
separate juridical personality of its own enjoys
immunity from suit because it is invested with an
inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim
for damages against the agency cannot prosper;
otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is
violated. However, the need to distinguish between an
unincorporated government agency performing
governmental function and one performing proprietary
functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld
in favor of the former because its function is
governmental or incidental to such function; it has not
been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was
not in pursuit of a necessary function of government
but was essentially a business. National Airports
Corporation v. Teodoro, Sr. and Phil. Airlines Inc., 91
Phil. 203 (1952)
Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. Court of Appeals
(167 SCRA 28 [1988]),the Supreme Court, reiterating
the pronouncements laid down in Teodoro, declared
that the CAA (predecessor of ATO) is an agency not
immune from suit, it being engaged in functions
pertaining to a private entity.
The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the
category of a private entity. Although not a body
corporate it was created, like the National Airports
Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of
government, but to run what is essentially a business,
even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather
the promotion of travel and the convenience of the
travelling public. It is engaged in an enterprise which,
far from being the exclusive prerogative of state, may,
more than the construction of public roads, be
undertaken by private concerns. National Airports
Corp. v. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 203 (1952)
The CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical
character of the ATO as an agency of the
Government not performing a purely governmental or
sovereign function, but was instead involved in the
management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport,
an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of
the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO
had no claim to the States immunity from suit. We
uphold the CAs afore-quoted holding.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be
successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for
compensation arising from the taking without just
compensation and without the proper expropriation
proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiff’s
property.
Mun. of San Fernando vs. Firme
(G.R. No. 52179, April 8, 1991)
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
seeking the nullification or modification of the
proceedings and the orders issued by the respondent
Judge Romeo N. Firme, in his capacity as the
presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of La
Union, Second Judicial District, Branch IV, Bauang,
La Union.
The passengers of the jeepney died as a result of the
collision between a jeepney and a dump truck of the
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union. As a result,
the heirs filed a complaint for damages against the
owner and driver of the jeepney, as well as the
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union. The
respondent judge rendered a judgment ruling that the
Municipality of San Fernando is jointly and severally
liable with the driver of the dump truck. Petitioner
maintains that the respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction
in issuing the aforesaid orders and in rendering a
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the Municipality can be held liable for the tort
committed.
RULING:
NO. In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of
the municipality insists that “he was on his way to the
Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the
repair of San Fernando’s municipal streets.”
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the
regularity of the performance of official duty is
presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the
driver of the dump truck was performing duties or
tasks pertaining to his office.
We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. vs.
Province of Ilocos Norte, the District Engineer, and
the Provincial Treasurer that “the construction or
maintenance of roads in which the truck and the
driver worked at the time of the accident are
admittedly governmental activities.” Consequently,
municipality cannot be held liable for the torts
committed by its regular employee, who was then
engaged in the discharge of governmental functions.
Hence, the death of the passenger –– tragic and
deplorable though it may be –– imposed on the
municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.
Mun. of San Miguel vs. Fernandez (HONORABLE
OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ, in his capacity as the
Presiding Judge, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan)
(G.R. No. L-61744, June 25, 1984)
FACTS:
In Civil Case No. 604-B, the then CFI of Bulacan
rendered judgment holding herein petitioner
municipality liable to respondents Imperio, et al. When
the judgment became final, respondent judge issued
a writ of execution to satisfy the same. Petitioner
municipality filed a motion to quash the writ on the
ground that the municipality‘s property or funds are
public exempt from execution. The motion was
denied. The respondent judge issued another order
requiring both the municipal and provincial treasurer
to comply with the money judgment. When the
treasurers failed to do so, respondent judge issued an
order for their arrest and that they will be released
upon compliance, hence the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the funds of the municipality in the hands of
the Provincial and Municipal Treasurers of Bulacan
and San Miguel, respectively are public funds which
are exempt from execution?
RULING:
Municipal funds in possession of municipal and
provincial treasurers are public funds exempt from
execution. The reason for those was explained in the
case of Municipality of Paoay vs. Manaois “ that are
held in trust for the people intended and used for the
accomplices of the purposes for which municipal
corporations are created and that to subject said
properties and public funds to execution would
materially impede, even defeat and in some instance
destroy said purpose. Thus, it is clear that all the
funds of petitioner municipality in the possession of
the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel as well as
those in the possession of the Provincial Treasurer of
Bulacan are also public funds and as such they are
exempt from execution. Besides PD 447, known as
the Decree on Local Fiscal Administration, provides in
section 3 (a) that ―no money shall be paid out of the
treasury except in pursuance of a lawful appropriation
or other specific statutory authority. Otherwise stated,
there must be a corresponding appropriation in the
form of an ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang
Bayan before any money of the municipality may be
paid out. In the case at bar, it has not been shown
that the Sangguniang Bayan has passed any
ordinance to this effect.
Mun. of Makati vs CA
(G.R. No. 89898-99, Oct. 1, 1990)
FACTS:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a
portion of land owned by private respondents, Admiral
Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings,
the RTC of Makati determined the cost of the said
land which the petitioner must pay to the private
respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the
advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued the
corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a
writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which
was deposited in PNB. However, such order was
opposed by petitioner through a motion for
reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB
could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution,
for to do so would result in the disbursement of public
funds without the proper appropriation required under
the law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines
v. Palacio. The RTC dismissed such motion, which
was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter
affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed this
petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are
exempt from garnishment and levy upon execution.
RULING:
It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of
respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of
P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by
respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which
are public fund and thereby are exempted from
execution without the proper appropriation required
under the law. There is merit in this contention. In this
jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds
are not subject to levy and execution, unless
otherwise provided for by statute. Municipal revenues
derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and
which are intended primarily and exclusively for the
purpose of financing the governmental activities and
functions of the municipality, are exempt from
execution. Absent a showing that the municipal
council of Makati has passed an ordinance
appropriating the said amount from its public funds
deposited in their PNB account, no levy under
execution may be validly effected. However, this court
orders petitioner to pay for the said land which has
been in their use already. This Court will not condone
petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation
arising from expropriation of land they are already
enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain
should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and
justice.
City of Caloocan vs Judge Allarde
(G.R. 107271, Sept. 10, 2003)
FACTS:
The City Mayor, through an ordinance, abolished the
position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other
positions from the plantilla of the local government of
Caloocan. Then Assistant City Administrator Delfina
Hernandez Santiago and the 17 affected employees
of the City Government assailed the legality of the
abolition before the then Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Caloocan City, Branch 33, which was ruled in their
favor and has attained finality. Later, all dismissed
employees were paid their back wages except
respondent Santiago who was only partially paid. City
of Caloocan resorted to several attempts to delay the
payment of remaining unpaid back wages with
interest of Santiago by filing another action with the
Court of Appeals and later, inquiry from the Civil
Service Commission. Both were not favorable to the
City.
When the City Council of Caloocan enacted
appropriation Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992
which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by
Santiago, Judge Allarde issued an order for the City
of Caloocan to deliver to the RTC a manager’s check
for the satisfaction of the judgment. When the City
Mayor refused to sign the check intended for
Santiago’s payment, Judge Allarde ordered the
Sheriff to garnish the funds of the City of Caloocan.
The order was questioned by the City contending their
public funds are beyond the reach of garnishment.
ISSUE:
Is Judge Allarde correct in ordering the garnishment
of City funds to satisfy the judgment in favor of
Santiago?
RULING:
The rule is and has always been that all government
funds deposited in the PNB or any other official
depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its
agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or
special deposit, remain government funds and may
not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence
of a corresponding appropriation as required by law.
The rule is based on obvious considerations of public
policy. The functions and public services rendered by
the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their
legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by
law. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a
well-defined exception, that is, when there is a
corresponding appropriation as required by law.
Otherwise stated, the rule on the immunity of public
funds from seizure or garnishment does not apply
where the funds sought to be levied under execution
are already allocated by law specifically for the
satisfaction of the money judgment against the
government. In such a case, the monetary judgment
may be legally enforced by judicial processes.
In the instant case, the City Council of Caloocan
already approved and passed Ordinance No. 0134,
Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14
for respondent Santiago’s back salaries plus interest.
Thus, this case fell squarely within the exception. For
all intents and purposes, Ordinance No. 0134, Series
of 1992, was the “corresponding appropriation as
required by law.” The sum indicated in the ordinance
for Santiago were deemed automatically segregated
from the other budgetary allocations of the City of
Caloocan and earmarked solely for the City’s
monetary obligation to her. The judgment of the trial
court could then be validly enforced against such
funds.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
In re: Rodolfo U. Manzano
Admin Matter No. 88-7-1861-RTC, 05 October 1988
FACTS:
On July 4, 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano,
Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch
19, sent a letter of request to the Supreme Court in
issuance of a resolution, (1) authorizing him to accept
the appointment and to assume and discharge the
powers and duties as a member of the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice; ( 2) considering his
membership in the Committee as neither violative of
the independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of
Sec. 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of
Sec. 7, Article IX (B), both of the Constitution, and will
not in any way amoun t to an abandonment of his
present position as aforementioned, and as a member
of Judiciary; and (3) considering his membership in
the said committee as part of the primary functions of
an executive Judge.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the membership in the
committee is neither violative of the independence of
the Judiciary; Sec. 12, Article VIII, and the second
paragraph of Sec. 7, Art. IX (B).
(2) Whether or not being a member of the said
committee, at the same time being an Executive
Judge is constitutional.
RULING:
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme
Court and other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasijudicial or
administrative functions (Sec. 12, Art. VIII, Const
itution). Considering that membership of Judge
Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice, which discharges administrative functions,
will be in violation of the Constitution, the court is
constrained to deny his request.
Accordingly, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo
U. Manzano is denied.
Angara vs. Electoral Commission
G.R. No. L-45081
FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and
Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position
of member of the National Assembly for the 1st
district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers
proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l
Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He
then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd,
Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with
finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed
before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest
against the election of Angara, that he be declared
elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral
Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the
last day for the filing of the protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed
before the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the
protest that the protest in question was filed out of the
prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied
Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to
restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission taking
further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended
that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction
upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the
merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly
and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction
to hear the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy;
Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
RULING:
In this case, the nature of the present controversy
shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two
agencies created by the Constitution. The court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the character, scope and
extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI
1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the
Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming
to take cognizance of the election protest filed by
Ynsua.
Casibang vs Aquino (HONORABLE NARCISO A.
AQUINO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Branch XIV)
(G.R. No. L-38025, August 20, 1979)
FACTS:
Yu was proclaimed elected Mayor of Rosales,
Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections. His rival,
petitioner Casibang, filed an election protest with the
CFI. Proceedings therein continued with respect to
the election protest of petitioner before the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, presided
by respondent Judge, who initially took cognizance of
the same as it is unquestionably a justiciable
controversy.
Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution was ratified. Yu
moved to dismiss on the ground that the CFI no
longer had jurisdiction over the issue, that, in view of
the ratification of the 1973 Constitution, a political
question outside the range of judicial review has
intervened. He relied on Sec 9 of Art XVII and Sec 2
of Art XI of the new Constitution which granted
incumbent officials of the govt a privilege to continue
in office at the pleasure of the incumbent President,
and which conferred unto the National Assembly (NA)
the power to enact a local govt code. This, he avers,
states clearly the new form of govt that was to be
enforced. CFI ruled in favor of Yu hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Is the issue in the electoral protest a political
question?
RULING:
No. The only issue in the electoral protest case xxx is
who between protestant (Casibang) and protestee
(Yu) was the duly elected mayor xxx and legally
entitled to enjoy the rights, privileges xxx appurtenant
thereto xxx. That is the only consequence of a
resolution of the issue therein involved – a purely
justiciable question as it implies a given right, xxx an
act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy,
granted xxx by law, for said breach of right. Any
judgment to be made on that issue will not in any way
collide or interfere with xxx Sec 9 Art XVII of the new
Constitution xxx. Neither does Sec 2 of Art XI
stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with
a political color. For simply that section allocated unto
the NA the power to enact a local govt code. Petition
granted.
Tañada vs Cuenco
(G.R. No. 10520, Deb 28, 1957)
FACTS:
Pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET)
was an election protest filed by members of the
Citizens Party (CP) who lost to members of the
Nacionalista Party (NP). The Senate was at the time
composed of 23 members of the NP and one of the
CP — petitioner Sen. Tañada. When the SET was
being organized, Sen. Tañada, in behalf of the CP,
nominated himself alone. Sen. Primicias, a member of
the NP, then nominated “not on behalf of the [NP] but
on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate”
Sens. Delgado and respondent Cuenco “to complete
the membership of the Tribunal”. This he claims is the
mandate of the Constitution which reads: “xxx Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court xxx and the remaining six shall be
Members of the [House] who shall be chosen by each
House, three upon nomination of the party having the
largest number of votes and three of the party having
the second largest number of votes therein. xxx.”
Over the objection of Sen. Tañada, Sens. Delgado
and Cuenco were chosen to sit in the SET. Sen.
Tañada now contests them in Court. Respondents
aver, among others, that the SC has no jurisdiction on
the matter as the issue is a political question and not
judicial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issue is a political question.
RULING:
No. The issue at bar is not a political question for the
Senate is not clothed with “full discretionary authority”
in the choice of members of the SET. The exercise of
its power thereon is subject to constitutional
limitations. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of
the judicial department to pass upon the validity the
proceedings in connection therewith. We have not
only jurisdiction, but also the duty to consider and
determine the principal issue² raised by the parties
herein.
The question is said to be political when it is a matter
which is to be exercised by the people in their primary
political capacity. It is judicial when it is a matter that
has been specifically delegated to some other
department or particular officer of the government,
with discretionary power to act. In short, the term
“political question” connotes a question of policy; that
is, it refers to “those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or Executive branch of the Government.”
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
On the issue on whether the election of Sens.
Delgado and Cuenco is valid, the Court ruled in the
negative. It was held that the clear intention of the
framers of the Constitution in prescribing the manner
for organizing the Electoral Tribunals is to prevent the
majority party from ever controlling the Electoral
Tribunals, and that the structure thereof be founded
upon the equilibrium between the majority and the
minority parties with the Justices of the SC to insure
greater political justice in the determination of election
contests. Thus, the party having the largest number of
votes in the Senate may nominate not more than
three members thereof to the SET, and the party
having the second largest number of votes in the
Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other
three Senators. The Senate may not elect, as
members of the SET, those who have not been
nominated by the political parties specified in the
Constitution; hence, the Committee on Rules for the
Senate has no standing to validly make such
nomination. (Ibid.)
SANIDAD VS COMELEC
(G.R. NO. L-44640, OCT. 12, 1976)
FACTS:
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD,
father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition
with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from holding and
conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16;
to declare without force and effect Presidential
Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose
amendments to the Constitution, as well as
Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold,
and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on
October 16, 1976.
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 to call for
a national referendum on October 16, 1976 through
the so-called Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”). Its
primary purpose is to resolve the issues of martial law
(as to its existence and length of effectivity).
On September 22, the president issued another
proclamation (P.D. 1033) to specify the questions that
are to be asked during the referendum on October 16.
The first question is whether or not the citizen wants
martial law to continue, and the second one asks for
the approval on several proposed amendments to the
existing Constitution.
The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive
supervision and control of the national referendum in
October 16.
Father and son, Pablo and Pablito Sanidad filed for
prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the
COMELEC from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16, and to declare
without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991
and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution.
Another petitioner, Vicente Guzman filed for
prohibition with preliminary injunction, asserting that
the power to propose amendments or revisions of the
Constitution during the transition period is expressly
conferred to the interim National Assembly under
Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Another set of petitioners, Raul Gonzales and Alfredo
Salapantan sought to restrain the implementation of
Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming
Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16. They assert
that the incumbent President cannot act as a
constituent assembly to propose amendments to the
Constitution and a referendum-plebiscite is untenable
under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The submission of the proposed amendments in such
a short period of time for deliberation renders the
plebiscite a nullity. To lift Martial Law, the President
need not consult the people via referendum; and
allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an
amendment of the Constitution, which confines the
right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18
years of age and above.
The Solicitor General contends that petitioners have
no standing to sue, and that the issue raised is
political in nature – and thus it cannot be reviewed by
the court. The Solicitor General also asserts that at
this state of the transition period, only the incumbent
President has the authority to exercise constituent
power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards
normalization.
ISSUE:
WON the issue poses a justiciable question
(specifically on the constitutionality of PDs 991 and
1033).
RULING:
YES. 7 Justices of the Court held that the issue is a
justiciable question, while only 3 maintained it was of
political nature and thus not justiciable.
The Court did not agree with the Solicitor General’s
contention that the issue is a political one. This is
because the 1973 Constitution expressly provided
that the power to propose amendments to the
constitution resides in the interim National Assembly
in the period of transition.
After that transition period, and when the regular
National Assembly is in its active session, the power
to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the
prerogative of the regular National Assembly. The
normal course has not been followed.
Rather than calling the National Assembly to
constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the
president undertook the proposal of amendments
through Presidential Decree 1033 and in effect,
through a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
Unavoidably, the irregularity of the amendment
procedure raises a contestable issue.
In the transitory provision of the 1973 provisions, the
National Assembly, although composed mainly by
legislators, amending the Constitution is not
legislating. The prerogative of the President to
approve or disapproved applies only to the ordinary
case of legislation. The President has nothing to do
with the proposition or adoption of amendments to the
Constitution. The petitions are dismissed.
REP. RAUL A. DAZA vs REP. LUIS C. SINGSON
(G.R. No.86344, Dec. 21, 1989)
FACTS:
The HoR proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the
CoA among several political parties represented in
that chamber in accordance with Art. VI Sec 18. The
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized,
resulting in a political realignment in the HoR. 24
members of the Liberal Party joined the LDP,
reducing their former party to only 17 members.
On the basis of this development, the House of
Representatives revised its representation in the CoA
by withdrawing the seat occupied by Daza and giving
this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5th, the
chamber elected a new set of representatives
consisting of the original members except the
petitioner and including therein Luis C. Singson as the
additional member from the LDP.
Daza came to the Supreme Court to challenge his
removal from the CoA and the assumption of his seat
by the Singson. Acting initially on his petition for
prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction,
SC issued a TRO that same day to prevent both Daza
and Singson from serving in the CoA.
Daza contented that he cannot be removed from the
CoA because his election thereto is permanent. He
claimed that the reorganization of the House
representation in the said body is not based on a
permanent political realignment because the LDP is
not a duly registered political party and has not yet
attained political stability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the question raised by the Daza is
political in nature and is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.
RULING:
No. The Court has the competence to act on the
matter at bar. The issue involved is not a discretionary
act of the House of Representatives that may not be
reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What
is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the
act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from
the Commission on Appointments.    
The term political question refers to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Even if we were to assume that the issue presented
before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from resolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question. Article VII,
Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
DELEGATION OF POWERS
CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, (SECOND
DISTRICT OF BATAAN) VS. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
(G.R. NO. 101273, JULY 3, 1992)
FACTS:
On 27 November 1990, the President issued
Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition
to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by
law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an
additional duty of five percent (5%) ad valorem. This
additional duty was imposed across the board on all
imported articles, including crude oil and other oil
products imported into the Philippines. This additional
duty was subsequently increased from five percent
(5%) ad valorem to nine percent (9%) ad valorem by
the promulgation of Executive Order No. 443, dated 3
January 1991.
Subsequent to this, Executive Order No. 475 was
issued by the President, on 15 August 1991 reducing
the rate of additional duty on all imported articles from
nine percent (9%) to five percent (5%) ad valorem,
except in the cases of crude oil and other oil products
which continued to be subject to the additional duty of
nine percent (9%) ad valorem.
Petitioner assails the validity of Executive Orders Nos.
475 and 478. He argues that Executive Orders Nos.
475 and 478 are violative of Section 24[1], Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution. He contends that since the
Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills
in Congress, the President may not assume such
power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478
which are in the nature of revenue-generating
measures.
Petitioner further argues that Executive Orders No.
475 and 478 contravene Section 401 of the Tariff and
Customs Code, which Section authorizes the
President, according to petitioner, to increase, reduce
or remove tariff duties or to impose additional duties
only when necessary to protect local industries or
products but not for the purpose of raising additional
revenue for the government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President can validly increase
tariff rates rendering EO 475 and 478 constitutional.
RULING:
Yes, under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution,
the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff
bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the
province of the Legislative rather than the Executive
Department. It does not follow, however, that
therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478,
assuming they may be characterized as revenue
measures, are prohibited to the President, that they
must be enacted instead by the Congress of the
Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution provides as follows:
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to
fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of
the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission 1 to
Congress to authorize the President “subject to such
limitations and restrictions is [Congress] may impose”
to fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates . . . and other
duties or imposts . . .”
The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines, and Sections 104[2]
and 401[3], the pertinent provisions thereof. These
are the provisions which the President explicitly
invoked in promulgating Executive Orders Nos. 475
and 478. There is nothing in the language of either
Section 104 or of 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code
that suggest a sharp and absolute limitation of
authority. The entire contention of petitioner is
anchored on just two (2) words, one found in Section
401 (a)(1): “existing protective rates of import duty,”
and the second in the proviso found at the end of
Section 401 (a): “protection levels granted in Section
104 of this Code.” We believe that the words
“protective” and” protection” are simply not enough to
support the very broad and encompassing limitation
which petitioner seeks to rest on those two (2) words.
Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code
establishes general standards with which the exercise
of the authority delegated by that provision to the
President must be consistent: that authority must be
exercised in “the interest of national economy,
general welfare and/or national security.”
The power of the President to increase or decrease
rates of import duty within the limits fixed in
subsection “a” shall include the authority to modify the
form of duty. In modifying the form of duty, the
corresponding ad valorem or specific equivalents of
the duty with respect to imports from the principal
competing foreign country for the most recent
representative period shall be used as bases.
Araneta vs. Dinglasan (RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge
of First Instance of Manila)
(G.R. No. L-2044, August 26, 1949)
FACTS:
The petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is under
prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Manila for
violation of the provisions of this Executive Order, and
prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition to the
judge and the city fiscal.
In view of the state of world war in 1941, CA 671
(Emergency Powers Act) was enacted by the National
Assembly (NA) which authorized the President to
promulgate rules and regulations to meet such
emergency. CA 671 did not expressly fix the term of
its effectiveness, although Sec 3 thereof provides “the
President x x x shall as soon as practicable upon the
convening of the Congress x x x report thereto all the
rules and regulations promulgated by him under the
powers herein granted.” Then Pres. Quezon later   
wrote in his autobiography describing the
circumstances obtaining when he called the NA for a
special session and recommended the enactment of
CA 671: “[I issued the call for a special session of the
NA] when it became evident that we were completely
helpless against air attack, and that it was most
unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next
regular session which was to open on January 1,
1942.” True enough, Congress met in regular session
only on May 25, 1946. Subsequently, by authority
vested by CA 671, then Pres. Roxas issued EO 62
which provided for the regulation of the rentals of
residential lots and buildings. By the same authority,
his successor, Pres. Quirino issued EOs 192, 225 and
226 providing for the appropriation of public funds in
the operation of the national govt and the conduct of
the 1949 elections, and the control of exports.
Petitioners, being prosecuted under the foregoing
EOs, question the validity of the same averring that
CA 671, by virtue of which said EOs were issued, has
ceased to have any force and effect.
ISSUE:
Has CA 671 ceased to have force and effect?
RULING:
Yes. CA 671 became inoperative when Congress met
in regular session, thus EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226
were issued without authority of law. Art VI, Sec 26
(now Sec 23) of the Constitution, provides that any
law passed by virtue thereof should be “for a limited
period.” These words are beyond question intended to
mean restrictive in duration. An emergency xxx “must
be temporary or it cannot be said to be an
emergency.”
More anomalous is that fact that there would be two
legislative bodies operating to legislate concurrently
and xxx mutually nullifying each other’s actions.
Furthermore, it is clear from the language of Sec 3 of
CA 671 that the legislature intended to limit the
duration of the Act when it provided that there was to
be only one meeting of Congress at which the
President was to give an account of his trusteeship.
Moreover, giving much weight on the statements of
Pres. Quezon in his autobiography (considering his
part in the passage and in the carrying out of the law),
it was held that CA 671 was enacted with the specific
view of the inability of the NA to meet. Hence, the sole
raison d’être for the enactment of CA 671 was the
inability for the Congress to function; such emergency
period should thus end with the convening of that
body. Emergency powers of the President.
Rodriguez vs Gella
(G.R. L-6266, Feb. 2, 1953)
FACTS:
Petitioners sought to invalidate Executive Orders (EO)
545 and 546 issued on November 10, 1952. EO 545
appropriated the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and
essential public works, while EO 546 set aside the
sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and
cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts,
earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities.
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides
that "in times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may by law authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
 may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to
carry out a declared national policy." Accordingly the
National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No.
671, declaring (in section 1) the national policy that
"the existence of war between the United States and
other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves
the Philippines makes it necessary to invest the
President with extraordinary powers in order to meet
the resulting emergency," and (in section 2)
authorizing the President, "during the existence of the
emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations
as he may deem necessary to carry out the national
policy declared in section 1."
  House Bill No. 727 sought to repeal all Emergency
Powers Acts but was vetoed by the President. HB 727
may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution
of the Congress to formally declare the termination of
the emergency powers.  must decide because emergency in itself cannot and
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Executive Orders are still
operative?
RULING:
EOs 545 and 546 must be declared as having no
legal anchorage. The Congress has since liberation
repeatedly been approving acts appropriating funds
for the operation of the Government, public works,
and many others purposes, with the result that as to
such legislative task the Congress must be deemed to
have long decided to assume the corresponding
power itself and to withdraw the same from the
President.
CA 671 was in pursuance of the constitutional
provision; it has to be assumed that the National
Assembly intended it to be only for a limited period. If
it be contended that the Act has not yet been duly
repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation
of the emergency powers delegated to the President,
the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since
it may never be repealed by the Congress, or if the
latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield
his veto.
If the President had ceased to have powers with
regards to general appropriations, none can remain in
respect of special appropriations; otherwise he may
accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly.
Besides, it is significant that Act No. 671 expressly
limited the power of the President to that continuing
"in force" appropriations which would lapse or
otherwise become inoperative, so that, even
assuming that the Act is still effective, it is doubtful
whether the President can by executive orders make
new appropriations.
The specific power "to continue in force laws and
appropriations which would lapse or otherwise
become inoperative" is a limitation on the general
power "to exercise such other powers as he may
deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfil its
responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its
authority." Indeed, to hold that although the Congress
has, for about seven years since liberation, been
normally functioning and legislating on every
conceivable field, the President still has any residuary
powers under the Act, would necessarily lead to
confusion and overlapping, if not conflict.
The framers of the Constitution, however, had the
vision of and were careful in allowing delegation of
legislative powers to the President for a limited period
"in times of war or other national emergency." They
had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the
Congress the duty of coping with any national
emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone
should not create power. In our democracy the hope
and survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and
unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful
adherence to the Constitution.
People vs. Vera (Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Manila)
(G.R. No. 45685, Nov. 16, 1937)
FACTS:
This is an original action instituted in this court on
August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the writ
of certiorari  and of prohibition to the Court of First
Instance of Manila.
Mariano Cu Unjieng, the defendant of this case,
applied for probation under the provisions of Act No.
4421. An Original action for certiorari and prohibition
was filed to prohibit the Court of Manila from taking
any action in entertaining the application for the
probation on the ground that Act No. 4421 in
unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of
legislative power. The challenged provision of the said
Act was Section 11 which reads "This Act shall apply
only in those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards have provided for the salary of a
probation officer at rates not lower than those now
provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer
shall be appointed by the secretary of Justice and
shall be subject to the direction of the probation office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision in 0uestion constitute an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
RULING:
Yes. the provincial boards may be regarded as
administrative bodies endowed with power to
determine when the Act should take effect in their
respective provinces. An examination of variety of
cases on delegation of power to administrative bodies
will show that the ratio decidendi is at variance but, it
can be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves
around the presence or absence of a standard or rule
of action or the suffiency thereof in the statute, to aid
the delegate in exercising the granted discretion. As a
rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence
invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative officer or board
may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary
powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by
the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon
the provincial Board standard or guide in the exercise
of their discretionary power.
Eastern Shipping Lines vs POEA
(G.R. No.L-76633, Oct. 18, 1988)
FACTS:
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in
Japan. The widow filed a complaint for charges
against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based
on a Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the
POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial for
the family of overseas workers. ESL questioned the
validity of the memorandum circular as violative of the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It
contends that no authority had been given the POEA
to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such
authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of
legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not
subject to delegation. Nevertheless, POEA assumed
jurisdiction and decided the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular
No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers.
RULING:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of
powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly
provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797.
… “The governing Board of the Administration
(POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to govern the
exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the
Administration (POEA).”
It is true that legislative discretion as to the
substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated.
What can be delegated is the discretion to determine
how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall
be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot
be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the
delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of
legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature
has found it more and more necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to
carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is
called the “power of subordinate legislation.” With this
power, administrative bodies may implement the
broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in’ the
details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected
by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing
rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new
Labor Code. These regulations have the force and
effect of law.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or
not there is a valid delegation of legislative power:
1. Completeness test – the law must be complete in
all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the
only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test – there must be adequate
guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference
of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not
allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative.
United States vs. Ang Tang Ho
(43 Phil 1 (1922)
FACTS:
On August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a
proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be
sold.
On August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the
defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale
of rice at an excessive price.
The Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868 “An
Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and
speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under
extraordinary circumstances, regulating the
distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the
Governor-General xxx to issue the necessary rules
and regulations therefor xxx”.
Pursuant thereto, the Governor-General issued
Executive Order No. 53 fixing the price at which rice
should be sold. Defendant Ang Tang Ho who sold rice
at a price greater than that fixed by Executive Order
No. 53 was found guilty of violation thereof. He
contested the validity of said law averring that it
constituted invalid delegation of legislative power.
ISSUE:
Did Act No. 2868 validly delegate legislative power to
the Governor-General?
RULING:
No. A law must be complete in all its terms and
provision. When it leaves the legislative branch of the
government, nothing must be left to the judgment of
the delegate of the legislature. The Legislature does
not undertake to specify or define under what
conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General
shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be
issued “for any cause,” and leaves the question as to
what is “any cause” to the discretion of the Gov-Gen.
The Act also says it may be issued “…whenever…
conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn.” The Legislature does
not specify or define what is “an extraordinary rise.”
The Act also says that the Governor-General, “with
the consent of the Council of State,” is authorized to
issue and promulgate “temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of
this Act.” It does not specify or define what is a
temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how
long such temporary rules or emergency measures
shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall
take effect.
That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any
manner specified or defined any basis for the order,
but has left it to the sole judgment and discretion of
the Governor-Gener to say what is or what is not “a
cause,” and what is or what is not “an extraordinary
rise in the price, and as to what is a “temporary rule”
or an “emergency measure” for the carrying out the
purposes of the Act.
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a
law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of things upon which the
law makes, or intends to make, its own action to
depend.
Ynot vs IAC
(G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987)
FACTS:
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump
boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984,
when they were confiscated by the police station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of
E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the interprovincial
movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of
carabaos not complying with the requirements of said
EO. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the
carabaos. The IAC affirmed the same.
Petitioner contends that the EO is unconstitutional
insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the
carabao or carabeef being transported across
provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is
invalid because it is imposed without according the
owner a right to be heard before a competent and
impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He
complains that the measure should not have been
presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There
is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the
legislative power by the former President under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether E.O. No. 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as
it authorizes the outright confiscation of carabao and
carabeef being transported across provincial
boundaries
RULING:
Yes. E0 626-A is unconstitutional.
While it is true that laws are presumed to be
constitutional, that presumption is not by any means
conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. The
challenged measure is denominated an executive
order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating
a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing
law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the
purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully
executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority
under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder
that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or
whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act
adequately on any matter that in his judgment
required immediate action, he could, in order to meet
the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of
instruction that were to have the force and effect of
law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify
the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the
petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity
of the executive order
Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban
not on the slaughter  of the carabaos but on
their movement, providing that “no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose
and no carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another.” The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is
missing.
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the
police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to
the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the
owner of the property confiscated is denied the right
to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the
guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers
to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken.
Tablarin vs. Gutierrez
(G.R. No.78164, July 31, 1987)
TERESITA TABLARIN, MA. LUZ CIRIACO, MA.
NIMFA B. ROVIRA, EVANGELINA S. LABAO, in their
behalf and in behalf of applicants for admission into
the Medical Colleges during the school year 1987-88
and future years who have not taken or successfully
hurdled the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT),  for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision,
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S.
GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVII of
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region with seat at Manila
FACTS:
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or
schools of medicine for the school year 1987- 1988.
However, the petitioners either did not take or did not
successfully take the National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical
Education, one of the public respondents, and
administered by the private respondent, the Center for
Educational Measurement (CEM). 
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition
with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to
enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports,
the Board of Medical Education and the Center for
Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5
(a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended,
and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23
August 1985 and from requiring the taking and
passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding
with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and
from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26
April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the
petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial
court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The
NMAT was conducted and administered as previously
scheduled. Petitioners accordingly filed this Special
Civil Action for certiorari with this Court to set aside
the Order of the respondent judge denying the petition
for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical
colleges contravenes the Constitutional guarantee for
the accessibility of education to all, and whether such
regulation is invalid and/or unconstitutional.
RULING:
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts
Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of
1959" defines its basic objectives in the following
manner: Section 1. Objectives. — This Act provides
for and shall govern (a) the standardization and
regulation of medical education (b) the examination
control and regulation of the practice of medicine in
the Philippines. The State is not really enjoined to
take appropriate steps to make quality education
“accessible to all who might for any number of
reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but
rather merely to make such education accessible to
all who qualify under “fair, reasonable and equitable
admission and academic requirements.” The
regulation of the practice of medicine in all its
branches has long been recognized as a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the
public. The power to regulate and control the practice
of medicine includes the power to regulate admission
to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine.
Legislation and administrative regulations requiring of the Philippines to create municipalities through the
those who wish to practice medicine first to take and issuance of the questioned Executive Orders.
pass medical board examinations have long ago been
recognized as valid exercises of governmental RULING:
powers. Similarly, the establishment of minimum
medical educational requirements for admission to the No, Section 68 of the RAC does not provide valid
delegation of legislative power which would qualify the
medical profession, has also been sustained as a
President of the Philippines to create municipalities
legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the
through the issuance of the various Executive Orders.
state. Although, Congress may delegate to another branch
of the Government the power to fill in the details in the
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial essential, to prevent a violation of the principle of
court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary separation of powers, that said law: (a) must be
injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.  complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy
SO ORDERED. to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate — and (b) must fix a standard — the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or determinable —
to which the delegate must conform in the
Pelaez vs. Auditor General
performance of his functions. Without the statutory
(G.R. No.L-23825, Dec. 24, 1965)
declaration of policy by the Congress, the delegate
would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which
FACTS:
is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with
to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the
preliminary injunction filed by petitioner Emmanuel
delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as
authority. Hence, he could thereby assume upon
taxpayer, against the respondent Auditor General, to
himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also
restrain him, as well as his representatives and
to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with
agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of
the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress,
public funds in implementation of various executive
thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers
orders and/or any disbursement therefrom. Purporting
and the system of checks and balances, and,
to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
consequently, undermining the very foundation of our
Administrative Code (RAC), the President of the
Republican system. Section 68 of the Revised
Philippines issued various executive orders creating
Administrative Code does not meet these well settled
thirty-three (33) municipalities during the period from
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix
September 4 to October 29, 1964. Petitioner alleges
the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not
that said executive orders are null and void, upon the
enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented
ground that Section 68 of RAC has been impliedly
by the President. Neither does it give a standard
repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 which took effect
sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above
on January 1, 1960, thereby, constitutes an undue
referred to.
delegation of legislative power. Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 2370 states that barrios may "not be created
or their boundaries altered nor their names changed"
except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding
provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the
voters in the areas affected" and the
"recommendation of the council of the municipality or
municipalities in which the proposed barrio is
situated." The main import of the petitioner's
argument, is that the statutory denial of the
presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a
negation of the bigger power to create municipalities,
each of which consists of several barrios. Respondent
alleges that the power of the President to create
municipalities was conferred in section 68 of RAC, as
such it does not amount to an undue delegation of
legislative power.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 68 of the RAC provides a

valid delegation of legislative power to the President