IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

US VS RUIZ

FACTS

The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales provided under
the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.

Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for some
projects.

Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids.

But the United States inform the company that the company did not qualify to
receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory
performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the
U.S.

Naval Station in Subic Bay and that the projects had been awarded to third parties.

The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of
questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint
and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and
omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of
America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any
other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint.

ISSUE

Whether the US naval base can invoke state immunity.

RULING

YES. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the
courts of another State without its consent or waiver.

This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality

of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are
constantly developing and evolving.

And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).

The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The
restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the
United Kingdom and other states in western Europe.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs.

Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an

individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be
sued only when it enters into business contracts.

It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions.

In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to
the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of
the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.

HOLY SEE VS ROSARIO

FACTS
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome,
Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent,
Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real
estate business.

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000
square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of
petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of the
Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).

The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr.,
acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private
respondent.

In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent,
a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and
clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale
by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation
(Tropicana).

Private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61,
Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and
specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal
Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC
and Tropicana.

Petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint — petitioner
for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for
being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private
respondent.

the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to
dismiss after finding that petitioner “shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering
into the business contract in question” Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to
us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its
own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.
ISSUE:

Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations
regarding selling a lot to a private entity

RULING:

The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign
sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had
diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p.
87). This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and
firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot,
without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign.
According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is
recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not
with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.

If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act

jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.

In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course
of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act
jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent
disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property
for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private
respondent failed to dispute said claim.

Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila.
The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to
construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a
foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state,
necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized
in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty
was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines
on November 15, 1965.

The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are
likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A
for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters
living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of
the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot,
and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by
private respondent in its complaint.

Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its
grievances. Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person
who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government
to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.

Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office,
to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the
Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of
course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its
espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See
(Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings
on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the
Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a
private cause.

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA VS VINZON

FACTS

Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, entered into

Maintenance Agreement with respondent. The agreement stated that the
respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy
buildings and the official residence of petitioner. Petitioners claim that sometime
prior to the date of expiration of the said argument, they informed respondent that
the renewal of the agreement shall be of the discretion of the incoming Chief of
Administration, Minister Consellor Azhari Kasim. When the latter assumed the
position, he allegedly found respondent's work and services unsatisfactory and not
in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement, Hence, the
Indonesian embassy terminated the agreement, The respondent claims that the
aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful, hence, filing a complaint before
the RTC.

ISSUE

1. Whether the petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using as its
basis the Maintenance Agreement

2. Whether the actual physic maintenance of the premises of the diplomatic mission
is no longer a sovereign function of the State

3. Whether the petitioners may be sued herein in their private capacities

RULING

1. No. The mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private party
cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii
or jure gestionis. If the foreign State is not engaged regularly in a business or
commercial activity, and in this case it has not been shown to be engaged, the
particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in
pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii.
Hence, the existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action
arising out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines
and by a specified court is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity from
suit. Submission of a foreign state must be clear and equivocal. It must be given
explicitly or by necessary implication, The Court finds no such waiver herein.

2. No. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act

jure imperii. A sovereign State establishes a diplomatic mission which necessarily
include its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with
private entities for the same purpose. It is therefore clear that the petitioner was
acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into contract with
respondent.

3. No. Under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a

diplomat shall enjoy immunity from criminal jurisdiction, except in case of: (a) a
real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the
recovering State; (b) an action relating to succession which the diplomatic agent is
involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person; or (c)
action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions. The act of the
petitioners in terminating the Maintenance Agreement is not covered by the
exceptions.

BAER VS TIZON

FACTS

In 1962, private respondent Edgardo Gener (Gener) was issued by the Bureau of
Forestry a timber license to cut logs in Morong, Bataan. He commenced logging
operation inside the United States Naval Base, Subic Bay, but he was apprehended
and stopped by the Base authorities from logging inside. The renewal of his license
expired and has not been renewed by the Bureau of Forestry. As such, Gener filed a
complaint for injunction with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bataan against
petitioner, Donald Baer (Baer), the Commander of the United States Naval Base in
Olongapo. He prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction restraining Baer from
interfering with his logging operations.
Baer contested the jurisdiction of public respondent, CFI Judge Tito Tizon (Tizon),
on the ground that the suit was one against a foreign sovereign without its consent.
Baer filed a motion to dismiss and pointed out that he is the chief or head of an
agency or instrumentality of the United States of America, with the subject matter
of the action being official acts done by him for and in behalf of the United States of
America. He also claimed that in directing the cessation of logging operations by
Gener, it was entirely within the scope of his authority and official duty as
Commander of the Base to maintain security.

However, Judge Tizon ruled in favor of Gener. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the doctrine of immunity from suit without consent is applicable

RULING

Yes. The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without
its consent is appropriate. It is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to march
through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government
or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place.

In Parreno v. McGranery, "It is a widely accepted principle of international law,

which is made a part of the law of the land (Article II, Section 3 of the
Constitution), that a foreign state may not be brought to suit before the courts of
another state or its own courts without its consent."

The solidity of the stand of petitioner is therefore evident. What was sought by
private respondent and what was granted by respondent Judge amounted to an
interference with the performance of the duties of petitioner in the base
area in accordance with the powers possessed by him under the Philippine-
American Military Bases.

US VS GUINTO

FACTS

In the 4 consolidated suits, the USA moves to dismiss the cases on the ground that
they are in effect suits against it which it has not consented.

On the first suit:

 On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area
Exchange, US Air Force, solicited bids for barber services contracts through
its contracting officer James F. Shaw
 Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T.
Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar
  Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private
respondents who claimed that he had made a bid for 4 facilities, including the
Civil Engineering Area which was not included in the invitation to bid
 The Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX), through its representatives petitioners
Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse, upon the private respondents'
complaint, explained that the Civil Engineering concession had not been
awarded to Dizon
 But Dizon was alreayd operating this concession, then known as the NCO
club concession
 On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court
below to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to
Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow
the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue
operating the concessions pending litigation
 Respondent court directed the individual petitioners to maintain the status
quo
 On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to
the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in
effect a suit against USA which had not waived its non-suability
 On July 22, 1986, trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction
 On Oct. 10, 1988, trial court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss
On the second suit:
  Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony
Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal
as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in
Baguio City
 It had been ascertained that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock
used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers
 His dismissal was effected on March 5, 1986 by Col. David C. Kimball,
Commander of the 3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force Base
 Genove filed a complaint in the RTC of Baguio
 The defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss
the complaint, alleging that Lamachia (the manager) as an officer of the US
Air Force was immune from suit for the acts done by him in his official
capacity; they argued that the suit was in effect against USA, which had not
given its consent to be sued
 Motion was denied by respondent judge: although acting intially in their
official capacities, the defendants went beyond what their functions called
for; this brought them out of the protective mantle of whatever immunities
they may have had in the beginning

On the third suit:

 Luis Bautisa, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O'Donnell, an
extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation
conducted by the individual petitioners Tomi J. King, Darrel D. Dye and
Stephen F. Bostick, officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air
Force of Special Investigators (AFOSI)
  Bautista was dismissed from his employment as a result of the filing of the
charge
 He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners,
claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed
 Defendants alleged that they had only done their duty in the enforcement of
laws of the Philippines inside the American bases, pursuant to the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement
  The counsel for the defense invoked that the defendants were acting in their
official capacity; that the complaint was in effect a suit against the US
without its consent
 Motion was denied by respondent judge: immunity under the Military Bases
Agreement covered only criminal and not civil cases; moreover, the
defendants had come under the jurisdiction of the court when they submitted
their answer

On the fourth suit:

 Complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against the
petitioners (except USA)
 According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed the, and
unleashed dogs on them
 Defendants deny this and claim that the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and
were bitten by dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest
 USA and the defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the
United States which had not given its consent to be sued; that they were also
immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the
performance of their official functions
 Motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court: the acts cannot be
considered Acts of State, if they were ever admitted by the defendants

ISSUE
Whether petitioners are immune from suit.

RULING

 1st suit: No. The barbershops concessions are commercial enterprises

operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the US Armed forces.
Petitioners cannot plead immunity. Case should be remanded to the lower
court.
 2nd suit: No. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity.
The restaurants are commercial enterprises. By entering into the
employment contract with Genove, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign
immunity from suit. (However, the petitioners are only suable, not liable.)
 3rd suit: Yes. It is clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of
their official functions. For discharging their duties as agents of the US, they
cannot be directly impleaded for acts attributable to their principal, which has
not given its consent to be sued.
  4th suit: The contradictory factual allegations deserve a closer study. Inquiry
must first be made by the lower court. Only after can it be known in what
capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident.

US VS REYES

FACTS

Private respondent, hereinafter referred to as Montoya, is an American citizen who,

at the time material to this case, was employed as an identification (I.D.) checker
at the U.S. Navy Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United States Military Assistance
Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. She is married to one Edgardo H.
Montoya, a Filipino-American serviceman employed by the U.S. Navy and stationed
in San Francisco, California. Petitioner Maxine Bradford, hereinafter referred to as
Bradford, is likewise an American citizen who was the activity exchange manager at
the said JUSMAG Headquarters. As a consequence of an incident whereby her body
and belongings were searched after she had bought some items from the retail
store of the NEX JUSMAG, where she had purchasing privileges, and while she was
already at the parking area, Montoya filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court
of her place of residence — Cavite — against Bradford for damages due to the
oppressive and discriminatory acts committed by the latter in excess of her
authority as store manager of the NEX JUSMAG. Bradford countered that a suit
against her is a suit against her foreign state, thus the doctrine of immunity from
suit is applicable.

ISSUE: 
Is the RTC correct in not applying the doctrine of immunity from suit considering
the search conducted by Bradford was done in the parking area outside the NEX-
JUSMAG?

HELD: 
YES. [T]he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked
where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an
ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the
government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This
situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess
of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public
official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage
he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

Since it is apparent from the complaint that Bradford was sued in her private or
personal capacity for acts allegedly done beyond the scope and even beyond her
place of official functions, said complaint is not then vulnerable to a motion to
dismiss based on the grounds relied upon by the petitioners because as a
consequence of the hypothetical admission of the truth of the allegations therein,
the case falls within the exception to the doctrine of state immunity.

IMMUNITY OF HEAD OF STATE

REGINA VS BOW STREET MAGISTRATES

FACTS

Former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet had been accused by Spanish

judge Baltazar Garzon of torture, a crime under international law that can be
prosecuted in any country under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. While on a
visit to London for a medical treatment, Pinochet was arrested by British authorities
following the issuance of an arrest warrant via Interpol by the Spanish judge.
Pinochet's lawyers argued before a High Court panel presided by Lord Bingham that
since Pinochet was head of state at the time of the alleged crimes, he was immune
from the jurisdiction of British courts.

ISSUE

Whether Pinochet is immune from suit by virtue of his being head of state at the
time of the alleged crimes.

RULING

No. The House ruled that Pinochet did not enjoy immunity from prosecution for
torture, but only as it applied after 8 December 1988, when section 134 of
the Criminal Justice Act 1988, giving UK courts universal jurisdiction over crimes of
torture, came into effect, Pinochet could not be tried as it would constitute a
retroactive law. Only acts committed outside of British territories could only be
prosecuted under national law if committed after the passing of section 134 of the
1988 Criminal Justice Act.

A former head of state had immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the United
Kingdom for acts done in his official capacity as head of state pursuant to section
20 of the State Immunity Act 1978 when read with article 39(2) of Schedule 1 to
the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964; but that torture was an international crime
against humanity and jus cogens and after the coming into effect of the
International Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment 1984 there had been a universal jurisdiction in all the
Convention state parties to either extradite or punish a public official who
committed torture; that in the light of that universal jurisdiction the state parties
could not have intended that an immunity for ex-heads of state for official acts of
torture would survive their ratification of the Convention; since Chile, Spain and
the United Kingdom had all ratified the Convention by 8 December 1988
the applicant could have no immunity for crimes of torture or conspiracy to
torture after that date; that the relevant date when the immunity was lost was
29 September 1988 when section 134 of the Act of 1988 came into effect; that
there was nothing to show that states had agreed to remove the immunity for
charges of murder which immunity.

ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE

Underhill vs Hernandez

FACTS

George Underhill (plaintiff), a United States citizen, built a water system for and
supplied water to the City of Bolivar, Venezuela, pursuant to a contract signed with
the government. General Hernandez (defendant) organized a coup and overthrew
the government. The United States soon recognized Hernandez’s faction as the
rightful government of Venezuela. After Hernandez overtook the City of Bolivar,
Underhill applied to Hernandez for a passport to leave the country. Hernandez
initially denied the request. Several days later, Hernandez granted the request, and
Underhill returned to the United States. Underhill sued Hernandez in United States
federal court, alleging an illegal detention. The court of appeals ruled that the court
did not have jurisdiction over the case, because it was an act of a foreign
government on its own soil.

ISSUE
Whether Underhill may sue Hernandez.

RULING

NO. Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts
of the government of another, done within its own territory.

"because the acts of defendant were those of a military commander, representing

a de facto government in the prosecution of a war, he was not civilly responsible
therefor."

"that the acts of the defendant were the acts of the government of Venezuela, and
as such are not properly the subject of adjudication in the courts of another
government."

DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR IMMUNITIES

 - Remedy against diplomats: The receiving state can ask that his
mother country waive his immunity so he can be tried before the local
courts. (rarely happens)
- The sole receiving state can declare it as a persona non grata.
Terminate his functions or
- If he is not recalled within a reasonable time, the receiving state can
refuse to recognize him as a member of the embassy, therefore, he
can be sued.

- Consular officers: Involved with administrative and economic issues.

- Do not enjoy absolute immunity from criminal and civil jurisdictions.

They are only immune with respect to acts performed by them in their
consular functions.

- Their staff do not enjoy any immunity.

- In a car accident, they are not immune from civil jurisdiction. They can
get insurance, but not immune.

- Consulate bag – not immune (can be opened if the receiving state has
suspicions it contains something other than materials for official use,
unlike in diplomat bag) – they will be opened before the official of the
sending state.

- If the sending state refuses to open, the bag will be returned to the
state.

US VS TEHRAN

FACTS

On 4 November 1979 there was an armed attack by Iranian students on the United
States Embassy in Tehran and they overtook it. The students, belonging to the Muslim
Student Followers of the Imam's Line, did this as an act of support to the Iranian
Revolution. More than sixty American diplomats and citizens were held hostage for 444
days (until January 20, 1981). Some of the hostages were released earlier, but 52
hostages were held hostage until the end. Although Iran had promised protection to the
U.S. Embassy, the guards disappeared during the takeover and the government of Iran
did not attempt to stop it or rescue the hostages. The U.S. arranged to meet with
Iranian authorities to discuss the release of the hostages, but Ayatollah Khomeini (the
leader of the Iranian Revolution) forbade officials to meet them. The U.S. ceased
relations with Iran, stopped U.S. exports, oil imports, and Iranian assets were blocked.

The Iranian government did not do anything; supported the hostage-taking. Which is a
violation of the Vienna Convention because the receiving state has the obligation to
protect the dignitaries.
ISSUE

RULING

IMMUNITIES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

- Immunities vary subject to the provisions of the treaty

-

WHO VS AQUINO

FACTS

Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to its regional office in Manila as Acting
Assistant Director of Health Services. His personal effects, contained in twelve (12)
crates, were allowed free entry from duties and taxes. Constabulary Offshore Action
Center (COSAC) suspected that the crates “contain large quantities of highly
dutiable goods” beyond the official needs of Verstuyft. Upon application of the
COSAC officers, Judge Aquino issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of
the personal effects of Verstuyft. 

Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised Judge Aquino that Dr.
Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as
accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and
requested that the search warrant be suspended. The Solicitor General accordingly
joined Verstuyft for the quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge
nevertheless summarily denied the quashal. Verstuyft, thus, filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the SC. WHO joined Verstuyft in asserting diplomatic
immunity.

Issue:

Whether or not personal effect of Verstuyft can be exempted from search and
seizure under the diplomatic immunity.

Held:

Yes. The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is
entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement.
The DFA formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official
position. The Solicitor General, as principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise
expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the
quashal of the search warrant. 

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation

of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts
should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the
government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed
by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty
of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the
principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other
officer acting under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by
seizure and detention of property, as to embarass the executive arm of the
government in conducting foreign relations. 

The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant
issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft.

INTL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSION VS CALLEJA [rank-and-file election

of employees]

- IRRI is not an IGO, it is an NGO, enjoys immunity by virtue of local

law.

FACTS

ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the
refugee processing center in Morong, Bataan. It was incorporated in New York,
USA, at the request of the Holy See, as a non-profit agency involved in
international humanitarian and voluntary work.

IRRI on the other hand was intended to be an autonomous, philanthropic, tax-free,

non-profit, non-stock organization designed to carry out the principal objective of
conducting “basic research on the rice plant, on all phases of rice production,
management, distribution and utilization with a view to attaining nutritive and
economic advantage or benefit for the people of Asia and other major rice-growing
areas through improvement in quality and quantity of rice.”

The labor organizations in each of the above mentioned agencies filed a petition for
certification election, which was opposed by both, invoking diplomatic immunity.

ISSUE: Are the claim of immunity by the ICMC and the IRRI from the application of
Philippine labor laws valid?

HELD: YES
There are basically three propositions underlying the grant of international
immunities to international organizations. These principles, contained in the ILO
Memorandum are stated thus:

1) international institutions should have a status which protects them against

control or interference by any one government in the performance of
functions for the effective discharge of which they are responsible to
democratically constituted international bodies in which all the nations
concerned are represented;
2) no country should derive any national financial advantage by levying fiscal
charges on common international funds; and
3) the international organization should, as a collectivity of States members,
be accorded the facilities for the conduct of its official business customarily
extended to each other by its individual member States.

The theory behind all three propositions is said to be essentially institutional in

character. “It is not concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals,
but with the elements of functional independence necessary to free international
institutions from national control and to enable them to discharge their
responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their members. The raison d’etre for
these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their
functions by the agencies concerned.
**
ICMC’s and IRRI’s immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of its
basic rights, which are guaranteed by our Constitution.

For, ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be
settled. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations provides that “each specialized agency
shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising
out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized
agency is a party.” Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of
Agreement between ICMC the the Philippine Government, whenever there is any
abuse of privilege by ICMC, the Government is free to withdraw the privileges and
immunities accorded.

Neither are the employees of IRRI without remedy in case of dispute with
management as, in fact, there had been organized a forum for better management-
employee relationship as evidenced by the formation of the Council of IRRI
Employees and Management (CIEM) wherein “both management and employees
were and still are represented for purposes of maintaining mutual and beneficial
cooperation between IRRI and its employees.”

NOTES:
The term “international organization” is generally used to describe an organization
set up by agreement between two or more states.  Under contemporary
international law, such organizations are endowed with some degree of
international legal personality such that they are capable of exercising specific
rights, duties and powers. They are organized mainly as a means for conducting
general international business in which the member states have an interest. The
United Nations, for instance, is an international organization dedicated to the
propagation of world peace.

“Specialized agencies” are international organizations having functions in particular

fields.

EBRO VS NLRC [before the MOA between ICMC and the PH in the case of ICMC vs
Calleja]

FACTS
Private respondent International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) is a non-profit
agency engaged in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered
with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative
Status, Category II. It was one of the agencies accredited by the Philippine government
to operate the refugee processing center at Sabang, Morong, Bataan.

On June 24, 1985, private respondent ICMC employed petitioner Jose G. Ebro III to
teach "English as a Second Language and Cultural Orientation Training Program" at the
refugee processing center.

After six months, ICMC notified petitioner that effective December 21, 1985, the latter’s
services were terminated for his failure to meet the requirements.

Petitioner filed a case against ICMC. ICMC invoked its diplomatic immunity on the basis
of the Memorandum of Agreement signed on July 15, 1988 between the Philippine
government and ICMC.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, arguing among other things, that the
Memorandum of Agreement could not be given retroactive effect and that in any case
ICMC had waived its immunity by consenting to be sued.

ISSUE

Whether the Memorandum of Agreement executed on July 15, 1988 gave ICMC
immunity from suit. –YES.

RULING

The grant of immunity to ICMC is in virtue of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, adopted by the UN General
Assembly on November 21, 1947, and concurred in by the Philippine Senate on May 17,
1949. This Convention has the force and effect of law, considering that under the
Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land. The Memorandum of Agreement in question merely
carries out the Philippine government’s obligation under the Convention.

The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC . . . is clearly necessitated by

their international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the
danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings. The
exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the
very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations, in
accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host
country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the
unhampered performance of their functions.

Another question is whether ICMC can invoke its immunity because it only did so in
its memorandum before the Labor Arbiter. It is contended that ICMC waived its
immunity in any event. Art. III, §4 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities
of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations requires, however, that the waiver
of the privilege must be express. There was no such waiver of immunity in this
case. Nor can ICMC be estopped from claiming diplomatic immunity since estoppel does
not operate to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. 

Finally, neither can it be said that recognition of ICMC’s immunity from suit deprives
petitioner of due process. As pointed out in International Catholic Migration Commission
v. Calleja, petitioner is not exactly without remedy for whatever violation of rights it
may have suffered for the following reason: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized

Agencies of the United Nations provides that "each specialized agency shall make
provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts
or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party."
Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC and
the Philippine Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the
Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded.

Thus: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Article IV. Cooperation with Government Authorities. — 1. The Commission shall

cooperate at all times with the appropriate authorities of the Government to
ensure the observance of Philippine laws, rules and regulations, facilitate the
proper administration of justice and prevent the occurrences of any abuse of the
privileges and immunities granted its officials and alien employees in Article III
of this Agreement to the Commission.

2. In the event that the Government determines that there has been an abuse of
the privileges and immunities granted under this Agreement, consultations shall
 be held between the Government and the Commission to determine whether any
such abuse has occurred and, if so, the Government shall withdraw the privileges
and immunities granted the Commission and its officials.

SEAFDEC VS ACOSTA

FACTS

Two labor cases for illegal dismissal was filed against SEAFDEC before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) of Iloilo. SEAFDEC, however, invoked the
doctrine of state immunity from suit and claims that the NLRC cannot acquire
jurisdiction over it as it is a recognized international organization. 

Issue:
Whether SEAFDEC may invoke the doctrine of state immunity from suit

Ruling:
Yes. It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is an international agency
enjoying diplomatic immunity. (created by ASEAN nations and Japan) – also there
is no waiver of immunity; you can still invoke even before the parties rests its case.

In the case Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department

vs. NLRC (1992), the Supreme Court has held that SEAFDEC is an international
agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. And that it was
established by the Governments of Burma, Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of
Indonesia, Japan, Kingdom of Laos, Malaysia, Republic of the Philippines, Republic
of Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand and Republic of Vietnam. xxx

Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments

(AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in
whose territory its office is located.

Further, the said case also discussed the doctrine of state immunity,
One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local
jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the
tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the
subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a
convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their
operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the
organization; besides, such objection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity
of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-
states. 
DFA VS NLRC

- Dismissed because ADB is created by a treaty and in its HQ agreement

with the PH, it is immune from suit.

FACTS
On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal case against
Asian Development Bank. Two summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB
and the other through the Department of Foreign Affairs. ADB and the DFA notified
respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Officers, were
covered by an immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the
sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing
the Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of
the Agreement Between The Bank and The Government Of The Philippines Regarding
The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").

The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had
waived its diplomatic immunity from suit and, in time, rendered a decision in favor
Magnayi. The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on 03 November 1993, the DFA
referred the matter to the NLRC; in its referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of
the void judgment." When DFA failed to obtain a favorable decision from the NLRC, it
filed a petition for certiorari.

Issues:

1. Whether or not ADB is immune from suit

2. Whether or not by entering into service contracts with different private companies,
ADB has descended to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction giving
rise to a waiver of its immunity from suit

3. Whether or not the DFA has the legal standing to file the present petition

4. Whether or not the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is proper in this case

Held:

1. Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB enjoys immunity from
legal process of every form, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee
operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities. The Bank’s
officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their
official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these
immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed
by the Philippine government which must be respected.
  
Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the
ADB is independent of the municipal law. "One of the basic immunities of an
international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune
from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is
found.  The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the
authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host
government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies
and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would
impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of
its member-states."

2. No. The ADB didn't descend to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial
transaction, which should have constituted a waiver of its immunity from suit, by
entering into service contracts with different private companies. “There are two
conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established.
According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent,
be made a respondent in the Courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or
restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard
to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private act or acts
jure gestionis.

 “Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party
cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical
question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of
business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the
particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of
a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially
when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.”

The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the
ADB for profit or gain but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would not
attach.

3. Yes. The DFA's function includes, among its other mandates, the determination of
persons and institutions covered by diplomatic immunities, a determination which,
when challenged, entitles it to seek relief from the court so as not to seriously impair
the conduct of the country's foreign relations.  The DFA must be allowed to plead its
case whenever necessary or advisable to enable it to help keep the credibility of the
Philippine government before the international community. When international
agreements are concluded, the parties thereto are deemed to have likewise accepted
the responsibility of seeing to it that their agreements are duly regarded.  In our
country, this task falls principally on the DFA as being the highest executive department
with the competence and authority to so act in this aspect of the international arena. In
Holy See vs. Hon. Rosario, Jr., this Court has explained the matter in good detail; viz:
"In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead
sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the
state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.

"In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of 'suggestion,' where the
foreign state or the international organization sued in an American court requests the
Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If
the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks
the Attorney General to submit to the court a 'suggestion' that the defendant is entitled
to immunity.  

"In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international
organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or
diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to
the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja, 190 SCRA
130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary
of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not
be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization vs.
Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a
telegram to that effect. In Baer vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of
the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a
'suggestion' to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the 'suggestion' in a
manifestation and memorandum as amicus curiae.

"In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal
Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The
Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's
claim of sovereign immunity.

"In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local
courts by the respondents through their private counsels.  In cases where the foreign
states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make their
own determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions involved."

4. Yes. Relative to the propriety of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the Court
has, under special circumstances, so allowed and entertained such a petition when (a)
the questioned order or decision is issued in excess of or without jurisdiction, or (b)
where the order or decision is a patent nullity, which, verily, are the circumstances that
can be said to obtain in the present case. When an adjudicator is devoid of jurisdiction
on a matter before him, his action that assumes otherwise would be a clear nullity.

JEFFREY LIANG (HUE FENG) VS PEOPLE

- Officer of ADB; case of grave oral defamation against Cabal.

 - He does not enjoy immunity because defamation (commission of a
crime) is not part of his official functions.

FACTS

Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB
worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two
counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by
the MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the
Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an “office of
protocol” from the DFA stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal
process under section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on the
said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge
without notice to the prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a
motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was
denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of
Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce
the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was
denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a petition for review arguing
that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary
investigation was held before the criminal case.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petitioner’s case is covered with immunity from legal process
with regard to Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Gov’t. – no.

RULING

The determination whether the statements made by petitioner were uttered

while in the performance of his official functions is necessary so that the
immunity may be granted to the petitioner. The Agreement Between the
Asian Development Bank and the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Regarding the Headquarters of the Asian Development Bank
under Section 45 (a) provides that officers and staff of the Bank, including
experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank, shall enjoy
immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their
official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.

The immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute; it is
limited to acts performed in an official capacity. Immunity cannot cover the
commission of a crime such as slander or oral defamation in the name of
official duty.  Slander, in general, cannot be considered as falling within the
scope of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel.