ALLIANA KEANNIE G.

MEJICA
BPG 4-2
MR. JUSTINIANO RIOS

1.Secretary of Justice vs. Latinon, January 18,2020 (Doctrine of

Incorporation)
G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ respondents. MELO, J.:

FACTS:
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the
United States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for various crimes in violation of US laws. In
compliance with the related municipal law, specifically Presidential Decree No. 1069 “Prescribing the
Procedure for Extradition of Persons Who Have committed Crimes in a Foreign Country” and the
established “Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the
United States of America”, the department proceeded with proceeded with the designation of a panel
of attorneys to conduct a technical evaluation and assessment as provided for in the presidential decree
and the treaty.

The respondent requested for a copy of the official extradition request as well as the documents and
papers submitted therein. The petitioner denied the request as it alleges that such information is
confidential in nature and that it is premature to provide such document as the process is not a
preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation. Therefore, the constitutional rights of the accused are
not yet available.

ISSUE:

1.Whether or not private respondent, Mark B. Jimenez, be granted access to the official extradition
request and documents with an opportunity to file a comment on or opposition thereto
2.Whether or not private respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent be furnished a copy of the extradition request and
its supporting papers and to give him a reasonable period of time within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence. In this case, there exists a clear conflict between the obligation of the Philippine
Government to comply with the provisions of the treaty and its equally significant role of protection of
its citizens of its right of due process.
The processes outlined in the treaty and in the presidential decree already pose an impending threat to
a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as the evaluation stage. It is not an imagined threat to his
liberty, but a very imminent one. On the other hand, granting due process to the extradition case causes
delay in the process.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law,
requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The doctrine of
incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there
appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or
statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the
conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal
law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of
incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to,
national legislative enactments.
In this case, there is no conflict between international law and municipal law. The United States and the
Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective
jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due process protection to their respective
citizens. In fact, neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the rights of due process from a
prospective extradite.

2.Tanada Vs. Tuvera, May 2,1997 (Limitations through treaty

stipulations)

ARTICLE 2
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA Case Digest
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

FACTS:

Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents,
through the Solicitor General would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners
have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the
absence of any showing that the petitioner are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the
alleged non -publication of the presidential issuances in question.Respondent further contend that
publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of the law where
the law themselves provides for their own effectivity dates.

ISSUE:
Whether the presidential decrees in question which contain special provisions as to the date they are to
take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity?

RULING:

Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not
provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the 15th day following its publication, but not when the law itself provides for the
date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The publication of all presidential
issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is mandatedby law. Obviously, presidential
decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose burdens
on the people, such as tax revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders
need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concern. The Court
therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application,
which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.

3.Holy See Vs. Judge Rosario ,Jr. December 1, 1994 (Immunity fgrom suits)

THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and
STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994

FACTS:

Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is
represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales
Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters
located in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was
contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation
(PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent
to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute
arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of
squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to
Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).
private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro
Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and
damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants:
namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana
petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint — petitioner for lack of
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper
party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.
the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to dismiss after
finding that petitioner “shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract
in question” Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes
the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official
representative, the Papal Nuncio.

ISSUE:

Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a
lot to a private entity

RULING:

The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The
Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with
the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in
international relations.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or
restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or
acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii,
especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real
estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis.
However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were
made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the
Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation
was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the
official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire
property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of
its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
(Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in
the Philippines on November 15, 1965.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed
with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely
wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible
for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied
and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been
admitted by private respondent in its complaint
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under
both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts
of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic
channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse
its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up
with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a
determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine
government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States,
Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once
the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183
against petitioner is DISMISSED.

4. Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Development Vs.

National Labor Relations Commision. February 14, 1992 (Immunity From Suits)

G.R. No. 86773 February 14, 1992

SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER-

AQUACULTURE DEPARTMENT (SEAFDEC-AQD), DR. FLOR LACANILAO
(CHIEF), RUFIL CUEVAS (HEAD, ADMINISTRATIVE DIV.), BEN DELOS
REYES (FINANCE OFFICER), petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JUVENAL LAZAGA,
respondents.

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the decision of the NLRC sustaining the
labor arbiter, in holding herein petitioners liable to pay private respondent the amount of
P126,458.89 plus interest thereon computed from May 16, 1986 until full payment thereof is
made, as separation pay and other post-employment benefits.
On April 20, 1975, private respondent Juvenal Lazaga was employed as a Research Associate an
a probationary basis by the SEAFDEC-AQD and was appointed Senior External Affairs Officer on
January 5, 1983 with a monthly basic salary of P8,000.00 and a monthly allowance of P4,000.00.
Thereafter, he was appointed to the position of Professional III and designated as Head of
External Affairs Office with the same pay and benefits.

SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international organization, the Southeast Asian Fisheries

Development Center, organized through an agreement entered into in Bangkok, Thailand on
December 28, 1967 by the governments of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia
and the Philippines with Japan as the sponsoring country

On May 8, 1986, petitioner Lacanilao in his capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice of
termination to private respondent informing him that due to the financial constraints being
experienced by the department, his services shall be terminated at the close of office hours on
May 15, 1986 and that he is entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one (1) month of his
basic salary for every year of service plus other benefits.

Upon petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD’s failure to pay private respondent his separation pay, the latter
filed on March 18, 1987 a complaint against petitioners for non-payment of separation benefits
plus moral damages and attorney’s fees with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC

Petitioners in their answer with counterclaim alleged that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the
case inasmuch as the SEAFDEC-AQD is an international organization and that private
respondent must first secure clearances from the proper departments for property or money
accountability before any claim for separation pay will be paid, and which clearances had not
yet been obtained by the private respondent.

LABOR ARBITER: ordered petitioner to pay the benefits claimed

NLRC: affirmed the LA.

PETITIONER CONTENDS that:

SEAFDEC-AQD is immune from suit owing to its international character and the complaint is in
effect a suit against the State which cannot be maintained without its consent.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner is within the scope of application of Philippine labor laws (WON SEAFDEC is
immuned from suit)

HELD: Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department

(SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC.
Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys
functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is
located.

In so far as they are autonomous and beyond the control of any one State, they have a distinct
juridical personality independent of the municipal law of the State where they are situated. As
such, according to one leading authority “they must be deemed to possess a species of
international personality of their own.” (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, 83 [1956
ed.])

One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction,
i.e.,that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country
where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to
the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host
government may interfere in there operations or even influence or control its policies and
decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the
capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-
states.

WHEREFORE, finding SEAFDEC-AQD to be an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of the

courts or local agency of the Philippine government, the questioned decision and resolution of
the NLRC dated July 26, 1988 and January 9, 1989, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE for having been rendered without jurisdiction.

5. Vinuya Vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010 (Individual can bring claim
to international legal system)

ISABELITA C. VINUYA, VICTORIA C. DELA PEÑA, HERMINIHILDA,

MANIMBO, LEONOR H. SUMAWANG, CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA
L. QUILANTANG, MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES
M. NAVARO, FRANCISCA M. ATENCIO, ERLINDA MANALASTAS,
TARCILA M. SAMPANG, ESTER M. PALACIO MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ,
BELEN A. SAGUM, FELICIDAD TURLA, FLORENCIA M. DELA PEÑA,
FRANCIA A. BUCO, PASTORA C. GUEVARRA, VICTORIA M. DELA CRUZ,
PETRONILA O. DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P. DELA CRUZ, CORAZON M.
SUBA, EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A. SANCHEZ, ROSALINA
M.BUCO, PATRICIA A. ERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA
LIWAG, ESTER C. BALINGIT, JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA C. MANGILIT,
VERGINIA M. BANGIT, GUILLERMA S. BALINGIT, TERECITA
PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA,
SEFERINA S. TURLA, MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA G. GUEVARRA,
ROSALINA M. CULALA, CATALINA Y. MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM,
CARIDAD L. TURLA, et al.
In their capacity and as members of the “Malaya Lolas Organization”,

VS.

THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, THE

HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGNAFFAIRS DELIA DOMINGO-
ALBERT, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N.
GUTIERREZ, and THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR GENERAL ALFREDO L.
BENIPAYO

G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010

FACTS:

This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the
Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization
registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by
Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the
DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and
military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the
Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and
took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had
already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the
Philippines and Japan.

Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to
espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them;
and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of
reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international
tribunals.

Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war
were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations
Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women’s Fund and the Philippine government signed a
Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort
women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development.

ISSUE:

WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing
petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

RULING:

Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the
exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan.

Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”

One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-
established that “the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislative–‘the political’–departments of the government,
and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision.” are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.
They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose
welfare they advance or imperil.

But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly
possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However,
the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against
a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the
Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive
all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The
wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.

The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which
prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential
sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical
to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby
creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive
Department’s determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a
coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally
committed.

From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an
extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treaty’s conclusion and our consideration
– the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of
espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners
and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether
further steps are appropriate or necessary.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a
claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a
government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf. By taking up the case of one of its
subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his
behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect
for the rules of international law.

Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by
whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is
asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their
rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do
is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or
obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not
affect the position internationally.

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis.
Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus
cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute
perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of
jus cogens.

The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a
legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole.
Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the
international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of
diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of
the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes.

The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that command peremptory
authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered
peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be
modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

6. Banco Nacional de Cuba Vs. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 1964 (separation of
powers)

Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino - 376 U.S. 398, 84 S. Ct. 923

(1964)

FACTS:

A contract to purchase Cuban sugar from a wholly owned subsidaiary of Compania Azucarera
Vertientes-Camaquey de Cuba (CAV) a corporation organized under Cuban law was made by
Farr, Whitlock & Co. (Farr) an American commodities broker. The CAV stock was principally
owned by United States residents. The agreement was for Farr to pay for the sugar in New York
upon the presentation of the shipping documents. After this deal, a law was enacted in Cuba
which empowered the government to nationalize forcefully, expropriation of property or
enterprise in which American nationals had an interest.
Hence, the sugar which Farr had contracted was expropriated from Compania Azucarera. Farr
however entered into contracts which was similar to the one made with CAV with the Banco
Para el Comercio de Cuba, which was an instrumentality of the government. This was done by
Farr in order to obtain consent from the Cuban government before a ship carrying sugar could
leave Cuba.A bill of lading which was also an instrumentality of the Cuban government was
assigned by the bank to Banco Para el Comercio de Cuba, who presented the bills and a sight
draft as required under the contract to Farr in New York in return for payment. After CAV
notified Farr of its claim to the proceeds as rightful owner of the sugar, Farr refused the
documents.
This action of Farr resulted in a court order which appointed Sabbatino (D) as receiver of
CAV‘s New York assets and enjoined it from removing the payments from the state. Based
on the allegation of the conversion of the bills of lading seeking to recover the proceeds thereof
from Farr and to enjoin Sabbatino (D), the receiver from exercising dominion over such
proceeds, the Banco Nacional (P) instituted this action. A summary judgment was granted
against Banco Nacional (P) by the district court on the grounds that the Act of State Doctrine
does not apply when the foreign act in question is in violation of international law. The court of
appeals also upheld this judgment.

ISSUE:

Does the judiciary have the authority to examine the validity of a taking of property within its
own territory by a foreign sovereign even if the taking violated international law?
HELD:

(Harlan, J). No. The judiciary, in line with the Act of State Doctrine will not examine the validity
of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government recognized by
this country in the absence of international agreements to the contrary, even if the taking
violates customary international law. Even in a situation whereby international law has been
violated, the clear implication of past cases is that the Act of State Doctrine is applicable
because the Act of State doctrine does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction once acquire over a
case. The damages of adjudicating the propriety of such expropriation acts, regardless of
whether the State Department has it did in this case, asserted that the act violated
international law are too far-reaching for the judicial branch to attempt. Hence the judgment of
the court of appeals is reverse and the case remanded back to the district court.

Dissent. (White, J). American courts are not required by the Act of State Doctrine to decide
cases in disregard of international law and of the rights of litigants to a full determination on
the merits.

Discussion. Even in the diversity of citizenship cases, the Court concluded that the Act of State
Doctrine must be determined according to federal rather than state law. The court also made it
clear that it is constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding
the competence and function of the judiciary and national executive in ordering our
relationships with other members of the international community must be treated exclusively
as an aspect of federal law.

7. MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011

FACTS:

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties
over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in
R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some
basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our
sovereignty and security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those
territories.

ISSUE: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

RULING:

1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm
that regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out
basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the
international community of the scope of our maritime space.

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes
within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence
of such, international law norms operate.

the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place
them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary
international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.

3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it
increased the Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’ continues
claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago’.

Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach the rules: that it
should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.

9. ESTRADA Vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001 (resignation as president)

G.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs. Arroyo

G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto
March 2, 2001
FACTS:

Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the President,
alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank
account known as “Jose Velarde” – a grassroots-based numbers game. Singson’s allegation also
caused controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing
of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar
fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and
an impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer.
Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.
The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at
EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the
group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other
bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also
withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests
and maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to
continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be
held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will
not run in this election.
OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of
the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the
legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up his
office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left
Malacañang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a
peition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him
not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be
the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be
holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution.”
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not
petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.
2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.
HELD:
The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The
Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand
of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely,
the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government exercising under the 1987
constitution, wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the former, it The
question of whether the previous president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to
judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal and not political.
For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the
intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of
events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements
extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On top of all these, the
press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president
despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the
sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality
test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a
material relevance on the issue.
As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that
petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the
intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust,
the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged
criminal acts committed while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent of the
framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his
tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time
during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after
which the several incumbents shall succeed one another).

10. PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. GOVERNMENT OF REPUBLIC PEACE PANEL ON

ANCESTRAL DOMAIN OR SO-CALLED OFFICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER ON PEACE PROCESS, GR
No. 183591, 2008-10-14

Facts:

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF,
through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF
Tripoli

Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

The

The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however,...
this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from... signing the same.

the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights,
negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific... settlement of the conflict, and refrain
from the use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations on the
substantive agenda are on-going.[2]

Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any smooth sailing in the GRP-
MILF peace process. Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked a number of
municipalities in Central Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control of the town hall of

Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.[3] In response, then President Joseph Estrada declared and
carried out an "all-out-war" against the MILF.

When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive against the
MILF was suspended and the government sought a resumption of the peace talks.

Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the
outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001)
containing the basic principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation:

Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard to the
Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same
be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting."

A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which
ended with the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli
Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the

Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the

Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless,
there were many incidence of violence between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to

Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was
replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad's
position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal.[6]

In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually
leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be
signed last August 5, 2008.
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato[8] and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a
petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining

Order.[9] Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to
compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-
AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the

MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public
consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional.[10]

This initial petition was followed by another one, docketed as G.R. No. 183752, also for
Mandamus and Prohibition[11] filed by the City of Zamboanga,[12] Mayor Celso Lobregat, Rep.
Ma. Isabelle Climaco and Rep. Erico Basilio

Fabian who likewise pray for similar injunctive reliefs. Petitioners herein moreover pray that the
City of Zamboanga be excluded from the Bangsamoro Homeland and/or Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity and, in the alternative, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void.

By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order commanding
and directing public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the
MOA-AD.[13] The Court also required the Solicitor General to... submit to the Court and
petitioners the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD,[14] to which she complied.[15]

On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino Pimentel III filed a petition
for Prohibition,[20] docketed as G.R. No. 183962, praying for a judgment prohibiting and
permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and... executing the MOA-AD and or
any other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being
unconstitutional and illegal. Petitioners herein additionally implead as respondent the MILF
Peace Negotiating Panel represented by its Chairman Mohagher

Iqbal.

Issues:

extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace process.

Ruling:

The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded.
In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded
therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted
to any local government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM.

Before assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however,
it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different
provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of... association. Significantly,
the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its
provisions with it in mind.